Revisor’s notes. —

The provisions of this title were redrafted in 1984 to remove personal pronouns pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982, and in 1984, 1990, 1996, 2008, and 2016 to make other minor word changes.

Administrative Code. —

For labor and workforce development, see 8 AAC.

For labor relations, see 8 AAC, part 9.

Notes to Decisions

Application of National Labor Relations Act definitions not mandated. —

No provision in Alaska’s labor statutes mandates that the definitions contained in the National Labor Relations Act be employed as interpretative aids. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 1496 ex rel. Morton v. D & A Supermarkets, 688 P.2d 165 (Alaska 1984).

Employee/employer relationship existed between dancer and club in which she worked for purposes of Alaska’s labor laws where dancer was required to work eight hour shifts (though she was only required to perform three dances lasting less than one hour), where she supplied her own costumes within the strict confines specified by the club management and where dancer was expected to convince customers to buy drinks from establishment when she was not performing one of the three required dances. Jeffcoat v. State, Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987).

Collateral references. —

Shaw and Rosenthal, Employment Law Deskbook (Matthew Bender).

National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives, Social Security Practice Guide (Matthew Bender).

Chapter 05. Department of Labor and Workforce Development.

Article 1. Administration.

Notes to Decisions

Exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. —

Nothing in AS 23.05.190 or in any of the remainder of this chapter expressly provides that an employee claiming failure to be paid wages at a rate commensurate with the work he was doing must exhaust an administrative remedy. Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

Cited in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.05.010. Purpose.

The Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall foster and promote the welfare of the wage earners of the state, improve their working conditions, and advance their opportunities for profitable employment.

History. (§ 43-1-1 ACLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Notes to Decisions

Decision held not final. —

Decision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was not a final decision for purposes of an appeal as a matter of right because the decretal language contemplated further administrative proceedings by remanding so the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board could make further findings; on remand the parties would have the opportunity to alter the decision through administrative means, either through argument or presentation of additional evidence. Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Applied in

United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 1496 ex rel. Morton v. D & A Supermarkets, 688 P.2d 165 (Alaska 1984).

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 19, 27-30, 36-43.

Sec. 23.05.020. Records of department.

The department shall keep a record of all proceedings. All records shall be open during regular hours of business for public inspection.

History. (§ 43-1-3 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.05.030. Funds.

The department shall remit to the Department of Revenue all money it receives and sign and issue vouchers for necessary disbursements.

History. (§ 43-1-3 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.05.040. Bond of commissioner.

The commissioner shall give bond approved by the Department of Administration in the sum of $10,000 running to the state, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the duties of the office. The bond shall be filed with the Department of Administration.

History. (§ 43-1-3 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.05.050. Power to issue subpoenas and take testimony.

The department may issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and take testimony concerning any matter within its jurisdiction.

History. (§ 43-1-4 ACLA 1949)

Administrative Code. —

For occupational safety and health review board, see 8 AAC 61, art. 3.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.05.055. Electronic filing.

Notwithstanding any contrary provision of the law, if the commissioner determines by order that it is in the public interest, the commissioner may authorize electronic filing of certain information with the department in a format prescribed by the department as an additional means of filing under this title. If the commissioner authorizes electronic filing, the department shall consider the electronic filing as equivalent to paper filing for purposes of compliance with other requirements of this title. Electronic filings authorized under this section are equivalent to paper filings for the purposes of civil or criminal penalties for violations of this title or AS 11.

History. (§ 1 ch 50 SLA 2013)

Effective dates. —

Section 14, ch. 50, SLA 2013 makes this section effective July 1, 2013.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 50, SLA 2013 (HB 76), see 2013 House Journal 70 — 71.

Sec. 23.05.060. Powers of the department.

The department may

  1. enforce all state labor laws;
  2. act as mediator and appoint deputy commissioners of conciliation in labor disputes whenever it considers the interest of industrial peace requires it;
  3. make investigations and collect and compile statistical information concerning the conditions of labor generally and upon all matters relating to the enforcement of this chapter;
  4. institute court proceedings against an employer of labor without cost to the employee when it is satisfied that the employer has failed to pay an employee an amount due by contract;
  5. issue cease and desist orders and other orders and regulations necessary for the enforcement of state labor laws;
  6. in accordance with AS 37.07 (the Executive Budget Act), receive and spend money derived from agreements with local governments, nongovernmental organizations, or other persons.

History. (§ 43-1-5 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 2 ch 15 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 107 SLA 1975; am § 43 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 30 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Administrative Code. —

For employment of minors 14 and 15 years of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 1.

For minimum wages and overtime, see 8 AAC 15, art. 2.

For exemptions, see 8 AAC 15, art. 3.

For reduction of wages, see 8 AAC 15, art. 4.

For transportation of employees, see 8 AAC 20.

For payment of wages, see 8 AAC 25.

For wages and hours, see 8 AAC 30, art. 1.

For investigations and hearings, see 8 AAC 30, art. 4.

For debarment, see 8 AAC 30, art. 5.

For holder in possession and application for certificate of fitness, see 8 AAC 90, art. 1.

For plumber certificate of fitness, see 8 AAC 90, art. 2.

For electrician certificate of fitness, see 8 AAC 90, art. 3.

For renewal and cancellation of electrical and plumbing certificate of fitness, see 8 AAC 90, art. 4.

For continuing education, see 8 AAC 90, art. 5.

For right of inspection, see 8 AAC 90, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (3), added “and” following “make investigations”, and made a stylistic change.

Notes to Decisions

State is liable for failure to enforce safety regulations once it has undertaken inspection and has discovered safety violations in the course of that investigation. Wallace v. State, 557 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1976).

The state Department of Labor, by conducting safety inspections of the pipe installation site, voluntarily assumed a duty, owed to decedent, to use due care in attempting to remedy the unsafe condition discovered in the course of inspection. Wallace v. State, 557 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1976).

Authority over wage claims. —

Construing the term “wage claim” in light of AS 23.05 as a whole, the supreme court found that the power to accept an assignment of and to investigate and prosecute a wage claim contemplates an employee seeking agreed-upon or equitably owed compensation for services which is unpaid and, therefore, due and that the legislature intended the Department of Labor’s authority to extend only to claims for wages owing under an express or implied contract and not to include the power to deal with a claim that an employer unconstitutionally, illegally, arbitrarily and capriciously failed to increase an employee’s salary. State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.05.065. Fees for publications, research data, and other services.

The commissioner may establish by regulation and the department may charge reasonable fees for department publications, research data, and other centralized administrative services to cover the cost of reproduction, printing, mailing, distribution, and other centralized administrative services.

History. (§ 15 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 23.05.067. Service fees for administration of workers’ safety and compensation programs.

  1. Each insurer providing workers’ compensation insurance and each employer who is self-insured or uninsured for purposes of  AS 23.30 in this state shall pay an annual service fee to the department for the administrative expenses of the state for workers’ safety programs under  AS 18.60 and the workers’ compensation program under  AS 23.30 as follows:
    1. for each employer,
      1. except as provided in (b) of this section, the service fee shall be paid each year to the department at the time that the annual report is required to be filed under  AS 23.30.155(m) or (n); and
      2. the service fee is 2.9 percent of all payments reported to the division of workers’ compensation in the department under  AS 23.30.155(m) or (n), except second injury fund payments; and
    2. for each insurer, the director of the division of insurance shall, under (e) of this section, deposit from funds received from the insurer under  AS 21.09.210 a service fee of  2.5 percent of the direct premium income for workers’ compensation insurance received by the insurer during the year ending on the preceding December 31, subject to all the deductions specified in  AS 21.09.210(b) .
  2. An employer who is required to pay an annual service fee under (a) of this section may elect to pay in yearly increments over a five-year period the portion of the service fee due under (a) of this section as a result of a settlement of over $50,000 approved under  AS 23.30.012 . An election under this subsection must be made in the first year that a service fee would be due as a result of the settlement. The employer shall notify the department of an election under this subsection. If an election is made, payment of each yearly increment that is due shall be made at the time the annual report is required to be filed under  AS 23.30.155(m) or (n).
  3. Payment of the annual service fee under this section shall be made in the manner and by the method specified by the department.
  4. If an employer who is required to pay an annual service fee under this section does not pay the required amount of the service fee by the time specified in this section, the employer shall pay a civil penalty of $100 for the first day the payment is late and $10 a day for each additional day the payment is late. The civil penalty under this subsection is in addition to any civil penalties imposed for late filings of reports under  AS 23.30.155(m) .
  5. Annual service fees and civil penalties collected under this section  and AS 23.30.155(c) and (m) shall be deposited in the workers’ safety and compensation administration account in the state treasury. Under  AS 37.05.146(c) , the service fees and civil penalties shall be accounted for separately, and appropriations from the account are not made from the unrestricted general fund.  The legislature may appropriate money from the account for expenditures by the department for necessary costs incurred by the department in the administration of the workers’ safety programs contained in  AS 18.60 and of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act contained in  AS 23.30. Nothing in this subsection creates a dedicated fund or dedicates the money in the account for a specific purpose. Money deposited in the account does not lapse at the end of a fiscal year unless otherwise provided by an appropriation.
  6. The department may adopt regulations to implement this section.
  7. Notwithstanding  AS 21.76.020(a) , a joint insurance arrangement established under  AS 21.76 is subject to the provisions of this section and regulations adopted under this section and, if self-insured, is subject to the annual service fee on behalf of its members.
  8. The department shall grant a credit against the service fee imposed under (a)(1) of this section to an employer if (1) the employer applies to the department for the credit on a form prescribed by the department; (2) the employer provides proof that the employer has paid a premium tax imposed under  AS 21.09.210 on an insurance policy; and (3) workers’ compensation claims have been paid under the insurance policy described in (2) of this subsection and the claims are subject to the service fee imposed under (a) of this section. The credit allowed under this subsection is equal to the amount of the premium tax paid by the employer under the insurance policy, may not exceed the service fee imposed under (a) of this section, and only applies to premium taxes paid by the employer on or after January 1, 2000.
  9. In this section, “insurer” has the meaning given in  AS 21.97.900 .

History. (§ 2 ch 89 SLA 2000; am § 31 ch 41 SLA 2009; am §§ 1, 2 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2002, in subsection (e), “ AS 37.05.146(c) ” was substituted for “ AS 37.05.146(b) ” to reflect the 2002 renumbering of AS 37.05.146 . In 2010, in subsection (i), “ AS 21.97.900 ” was substituted for “ AS 21.90.900 ” to reflect the 2010 renumbering of AS 21.90.900 .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (a)(1)(B), substituted “division of workers’ compensation in the department” for “Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board”.

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, in (a)(2), substituted “2.5 percent” for “1.82 percent” following “a service fee of”; in (e), inserted “and AS 23.30.155(c) and (m)” following “under this section” in the first sentence.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 91, SLA 2018 (HB 79), the basis for the 2018 amendments to this section, see 2017 House Journal 97 — 101.

Sec. 23.05.070. Accounting and disposition of receipts. [Repealed, § 28 ch 90 SLA 1991.]

Sec. 23.05.080. Employer’s records.

An employer shall keep an accurate record of the name, address, and occupation of each person employed, of the daily and weekly hours worked by each person, and of the wages paid each pay period to each person. The record shall be kept on file for at least three years.

History. (§ 43-1-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 107 SLA 1975)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Public policy interest and burden of proof. —

If an employee produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of the work for which the employee was improperly compensated, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence sufficient to negate the reasonableness of the inference drawn from the employee’s evidence. Although this burden of proof in an action under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act is not binding on a bankruptcy court in a proceeding to determine the validity of a claim, it is indicative of the public policy interest that proper records be kept by an employer and that an employee be properly compensated for any overtime worked. In re Equipment Services, Ltd., 36 B.R. 241 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983).

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.05.090. Employer shall furnish information.

An employer shall furnish to the department the information it is authorized to require, and shall make true and specific answers to all questions, whether submitted orally or in writing, authorized to be asked of the employer.

History. (§ 43-1-7 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.05.100. Inspections and examination of records.

The department may

  1. enter a place of employment during regular hours of employment and in cooperation with the employer, or someone designated by the employer, collect facts and statistics relating to the employment of workers;
  2. make inspections for the proper enforcement of all state labor laws;
  3. for the purpose of examination, have access to and copy from any book, account, record, payroll, paper, or document relating to the employment of workers.

History. (§ 43-1-8 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

State liability. —

The state is liable for a failure to enforce safety regulations once it has undertaken an inspection and has discovered safety violations in the course of that investigation. Wallace v. State, 557 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1976).

The state Department of Labor, by conducting safety inspections of the pipe installation site, voluntarily assumed a duty, owed to decedent, to use due care in attempting to remedy the unsafe condition discovered in the course of inspection. Wallace v. State, 557 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.05.110. Biennial report.

The department shall submit a report to the governor concerning its activities during the preceding two years. The department shall notify the legislature that the report is available.

History. (§ 43-1-9 ACLA 1949; am § 44 ch 21 SLA 1995)

Sec. 23.05.120. Cooperation with other agencies.

The department may negotiate with the United States Department of Labor and with other federal and state agencies the arrangements that it considers expedient for cooperation in formulating and carrying out policies and projects designed to encourage and assist in the protection and welfare of labor of the state.

History. (§ 43-1-10 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.05.125. Office of citizenship assistance.

  1. The office of citizenship assistance is established in the office of the commissioner. The office shall
    1. provide employment information and referrals to services for legal aliens, including employment services, such as job placement services, and information about how labor unions, administrative agencies, and court actions may be used to deal with claims or charges of job discrimination, illegal termination of employment, sexual harassment, and unsafe working conditions; and
    2. advise the commissioner on
      1. improving employment opportunities for legal aliens;
      2. preventing employment discrimination against legal aliens; and
      3. cooperating with state and federal agencies to accomplish the office’s mission.
  2. In this section, “legal alien” means an individual who resides in Alaska, is not a citizen of the United States, and is in compliance with the individual’s federal visa requirements.

History. (§ 1 ch 167 SLA 2004)

Sec. 23.05.130. Preference for resident workers.

The department shall aid and assist resident workers to obtain, safeguard, and protect their rightful preference to be employed in industries in the state.

History. (§ 43-1-11 ACLA 1949)

Article 2. Wage Claims.

Administrative Code. —

For payment of wages, see 8 AAC 25.

Sec. 23.05.140. Pay periods; penalty.

  1. An employee and employer may agree in an annual initial contract of employment to monthly pay periods when the employer shall pay the employee for all labor performed or services rendered. Otherwise, the employer shall establish monthly or semi-monthly pay periods, at the election of the employee.
  2. If the employment is terminated, all wages, salaries, or other compensation for labor or services become due immediately and shall be paid within the time required by this subsection at the place where the employee is usually paid or at a location agreed upon by the employer and employee. If the employment is terminated by the employer, regardless of the cause for the termination, payment is due within three working days after the termination. If the employment is terminated by the employee, payment is due at the next regular pay day that is at least three days after the employer received notice of the employee’s termination of services.
  3. [Repealed, § 2 ch 19 SLA 1971.]
  4. If an employer violates (b) of this section by failing to pay within the time required by that subsection, the employer may be required to pay the employee a penalty in the amount of the employee’s regular wage, salary, or other compensation from the time of demand to the time of payment, or for 90 working days, whichever is the lesser amount.
  5. In an action brought by the department under this section, an employer found liable for failing to pay wages within the time required by (b) of this section shall be required to pay the penalty set out in (d) of this section. The amount of the penalty shall be calculated based on the employee’s straight time rate of pay for an eight-hour day.
  6. In an action brought for unpaid overtime under AS 23.10.060 that results in an award of liquidated damages under AS 23.10.110 , the provisions of (d) of this section do not apply unless the action was brought by the department under (e) of this section.

History. (§ 43-2-11 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 118 SLA 1959; am §§ 1, 2 ch 19 SLA 1971; am §§ 1, 2 ch 11 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 47 SLA 1983; am §§ 3 — 5 ch 48 SLA 2000; am § 17 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), in the first sentence, substituted “shall pay the employee” for “shall pay all employees” following “when the employer”.

Notes to Decisions

“Termination” defined. —

Striking employees were terminated for the purposes of this section when their employer hired permanent replacements. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 1496 ex rel. Morton v. D & A Supermarkets, 688 P.2d 165 (Alaska 1984).

Wage claim must be based on underlying authority. —

Claims under this section are to be construed as claims under the underlying authority that defines what wages are due. The section does not create “non-waivable” rights because it grants no rights at all unless the wages are owed under Anchorage, Alaska, Municipal Code § 3.30.129(B) or some other authority. Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage, 23 P.3d 641 (Alaska 2001).

Private right of action. —

Employees could assert a claim under this section predicated on the employers' obligations under AS 23.10.060 and AS 23.10.065 . Thornton v. Crazy Horse, Inc., — F. Supp. 2d — (D. Alaska Sept. 26, 2011).

Demand for payment necessary. —

This section afforded employee no relief where employee and other class members could not bring claims unless they had made a demand; employer did not withhold hourly wages beyond three days after employee’s termination, and trial court did not err in determining that employee and class members were at least required to make a demand for premature payment of the seasonal bonus. Hallam v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 18, 2008).

Employees could not recover penalty pay under this section without first demanding payment. Filing a complaint alleging a claim for such pay did not count as the requisite demand. McCoy v. North Slope Borough, — F. Supp. 2d — (D. Alaska Aug. 26, 2013).

Exhaustion of remedies when retaliatory discharge alleged. —

In seeking back overtime pay, former municipal employees were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies where they raised a factual issue by alleging under oath that they were threatened with retaliatory discharge if they pursued such remedies. Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage, 23 P.3d 641 (Alaska 2001).

Protection for terminated striking employees. —

Striking employees who are terminated are entitled to the protection of subsections (b) and (d) of this section; because this section covers all employees who, “regardless of the cause,” are terminated, strike-related terminations are moved out from under the provisions of AS 23.05.170 and into the ambit of this section. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 1496 ex rel. Morton v. D & A Supermarkets, 688 P.2d 165 (Alaska 1984).

Independent statutory right. —

This section confers independent statutory right upon employee that requires no collective bargaining agreement interpretation to adjudicate. Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999).

Employee hired by agent. —

An employer was responsible for the wages owed an employee who was hired by another employee whom the employer had given the power to hire. Lowery v. McMurdie, 944 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1997).

Statute of limitations. —

A cause of action for liability upon a violation of the statutory right defined in subsection (b) must be brought within two years pursuant to AS 09.10.070 (3) (now (a)(5)). Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

A cause of action for unpaid wages due upon termination of an employee, which wages are governed by a collective bargaining agreement, is a contract action which must be brought within six years pursuant to AS 09.10.050 . Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987); Quinn v. State Employees Ass'n/AFSCME, 944 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1997).

Plaintiff’s claim, filed approximately six months after he was terminated, for unpaid overtime and a penalty under subsections (b) and (d) was timely filed pursuant to AS 09.10.070 , however, that filing did not revive Alaska Wage and Hour Act claims that were “forever barred” by AS 23.10.130 . Quinn v. State Employees Ass'n/AFSCME, 944 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1997).

Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987), establishes that the limitations period for this section does not trump the limitations period for the underlying authority that establishes what wages are due. Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage, 23 P.3d 641 (Alaska 2001).

Severance payment which exceeds maximum recovery. —

Release given by employee in exchange for large severance payment, which substantially exceeded the maximum he could have recovered under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, encompassed any subsequent AWHA violation claims by the employee, and the severance payment fully satisfied any potential AWHA award. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Shook, 978 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1999).

Award of penalty discretionary. —

The award of a penalty under this section is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Klondike Indus. Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987).

Findings by the court that it “does not find in the facts or circumstances of this case that any penalty should be applied” were not sufficient to determine whether its decision not to award penalties against the employer was an abuse of discretion. Lowery v. McMurdie, 944 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1997).

Although an employer maintained that its failure to pay an employee's final two days' compensation was not intentional or in bad faith, the court declined to exercise its discretion to waive the penalty and denied summary judgment as to whether the penalty should be imposed and, if so, the amount of such penalty, as the record showed that the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development informed the employer about the wage claim. Scalf v. Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska Aug. 27, 2018).

Treble damages not authorized. —

Subsection (d) does not support treble damages. All subsection (d) provides is that if the employee prevails on the wage claim, then the trial court has the discretion to impose a statutory penalty; however, that penalty is not automatic. Metcalfe Invs. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).

Penalty not covered by wage or mechanic’s lien. —

There is no basis for claiming that the penalty provision of subsection (d) was intended to expand the amount of a wage lien established under AS 34.35.435 or a mechanic’s lien established under AS 34.35.050 . Mitchell v. Smith, 742 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1987).

Quoted in

Wade Oilfield Serv. Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1302 (Alaska 1988); Hallam v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 27 P.3d 751 (Alaska 2001).

Stated in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Cited in

Jeffcoat v. State, Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987); Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989); Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge, 339 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2014).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, §§ 81, 87.

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 1176, 1177

98 C.J.S., Work and Labor, § 8 et seq.

Delegation of legislative power to nongovernmental agencies as regard to wages. 3 ALR2d 188.

Discrimination between union members and nonmembers as to wage increases, vacations and the like. 3 ALR2d 997.

Validity of minimum wage statutes relating to private employment. 39 ALR2d 740.

Employee’s right with respect to compensation where he continues in employer’s service after expiration of contract for definite term. 53 ALR2d 384.

Modern status as to duration of employment where contract specifies no term but fixes daily or longer compensation. 93 ALR3d 659.

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on resignation of employee immediately or within specified period. 11 ALR5th 715.

Sec. 23.05.150. Pay orders. [Repealed, § 2 ch 19 SLA 1971.]

Sec. 23.05.160. Notice of wage payments.

An employer shall notify an employee in writing at the time of hiring of the day and place of payment, and the rate of pay, and of any change with respect to these items on the payday before the time of change. An employer may give this notice by posting a statement of the facts, and keeping it posted conspicuously at or near the place of work where the statement can be seen by each employee as the employee comes or goes to the place of work.

History. (§ 43-2-11(a) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Cited in

Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981).

Sec. 23.05.170. Wages earned before strike, lockout, or layoff.

An employee who goes on strike, or is temporarily laid off or subjected to an employer lockout during a pay period shall receive the portion of compensation earned on or before the next regular payday established as required in this chapter.

History. (§ 43-2-11(b) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Protection for terminated striking employees under AS 23.05.140 . —

Because AS 23.05.140 covers all employees who, “regardless of the cause,” are terminated, strike-related terminations are moved out from under this section and into the ambit of AS 23.05.140 . United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 1496 ex rel. Morton v. D & A Supermarkets, 688 P.2d 165 (Alaska 1984).

Sec. 23.05.180. Wages in dispute.

  1. If the amount of wages is in dispute, the employer shall give written notice to the employee of the wages, or part of the wages, that the employer concedes to be due, and shall pay that amount, without condition, within the time set by this chapter.  The employee retains all remedies that the employee might otherwise be entitled to, including those provided under this chapter or AS 23.10, to any balance claimed.
  2. The acceptance by an employee of a payment under this section does not constitute a release of the balance of the claim, and a release required by an employer as a condition of payment is void.

History. (§ 43-2-11(c) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 2 ch 47 SLA 1983)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

Modern status of rule that acceptance of check purporting to be final settlement of disputed amount constitutes accord and satisfaction. 42 ALR4th 12.

Sec. 23.05.190. Enforcement.

The department shall

  1. enforce this chapter;
  2. investigate possible violations of this chapter;
  3. institute actions for penalties provided in this chapter.

History. (§ 43-2-11 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Exhaustion of administrative remedy not required. —

Nothing in this section or in any of the remainder of this chapter expressly provides that an employee claiming failure to be paid wages at a rate commensurate with the work he was doing must exhaust an administrative remedy. Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

Sec. 23.05.200. Hearings on wage claims.

  1. The department may hold hearings to investigate a claim for wages. It may cooperate with an employee in the enforcement of a claim against the employer when it considers the claim just and valid.
  2. The authorized representative of the department, in conducting a hearing under this chapter, may administer oaths and examine witnesses under oath, issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, records, payrolls, and evidentiary documents, and may take depositions and affidavits in a proceeding before the department at the place most convenient to both employer and employee.
  3. If a person fails to comply with a subpoena or a witness refuses to testify to a matter regarding which the witness may be lawfully interrogated, the judge of a competent court may, on application by the department, compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena issued from the court or a refusal to testify before it.

History. (§ 43-2-11(d)(1)-(3) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949)

Revisor’s notes. —

In subsection (b), in 2008, “and” was inserted before “evidentiary documents”, and, in 2016, a comma following “attendance of witnesses” was deleted, to correct a manifest error in ch 34, SLA 1949.

Administrative Code. —

For payment of wages, see 8 AAC 25.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983); Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

Sec. 23.05.210. Proceedings by attorney general.

The attorney general may prosecute a civil case arising under this chapter that is referred to the attorney general by the department for that purpose.

History. (§ 43-2-11(d)(4) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

Stated in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.05.220. Assignment of liens and claims to department.

  1. The department may take an assignment of (1) a wage claim and an incidental expense account and an advance; (2) a mechanics or other lien of an employee; (3) a claim based on a “stop order” for wages or on a bond for labor; for damages for misrepresentation of a condition of employment; against an employment agency or its bondsman; for unreturned bond money of an employee; for a penalty for nonpayment of wages; for the return of a worker’s tools in the illegal possession of another person; and for vacation pay or severance pay.
  2. The department is not bound by any rule requiring the consent of the spouse of a married claimant, the filing of a lien for record before it is assigned, or prohibiting the assignment of a claim for penalty before the claim has been incurred or by any other technical rule with reference to the validity of an assignment.
  3. The department may not accept an assignment of a claim in excess of the amount set out in AS 22.15.040 as the maximum amount, exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney fees, for the jurisdiction of the district court to hear an action for the payment of wages as a small claim.

History. (§ 43-2-11(e)(1) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 172 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 36 SLA 1965; am § 3 ch 11 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 24 SLA 1998; am § 6 ch 48 SLA 2000)

Notes to Decisions

Limitation on authority over wage claims. —

Construing the term “wage claim” in light of AS 23.05 as a whole, the supreme court found that the power to accept an assignment of and to investigate and prosecute a wage claim contemplates an employee seeking agreed-upon or equitably owed compensation for services which is unpaid and, therefore, due and that the legislature intended the Department of Labor’s authority to extend only to claims for wages owing under an express or implied contract and not to include the power to deal with a claim that an employer unconstitutionally, illegally, arbitrarily and capriciously failed to increase an employee’s salary. State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983).

Applied in

State v. Osborne, 607 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1980).

Stated in

Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

Cited in

Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981).

Sec. 23.05.230. Prosecution of claims.

  1. The department may prosecute an action for the collection of a claim of a person whom it considers entitled to its services, and whom it considers to have a claim that is valid and enforceable.
  2. The department may prosecute an action for the return of a worker’s tools that are in the illegal possession of another person.
  3. The department may join several claimants in one lien to the extent allowed by the lien laws and, in case of suit, join them in one cause of action.  A bond is not required from the department in connection with an action brought as assignee under this section and AS 23.05.220 .

History. (§ 43-2-11(e)(1), (2) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 172 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

State, Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div. v. Univ. of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1983); Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1987).

Cited in

Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 96.

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 1256-1310

56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, §§ 160(1)-160(13).

Sec. 23.05.240. Officers to execute process without security; immunity from damages; custody of property.

  1. An officer, requested by the department to serve a summons, writ, complaint, order, garnishment paper, or other process within the officer’s jurisdiction, shall do it without requiring the department to furnish security or bond.
  2. When the department requests an officer to seize or levy on property in an attachment proceeding to satisfy a wage claim judgment, the officer shall do so without requiring the department to furnish security or bond.
  3. The officer, in carrying out the provisions of this section, is not responsible in damages for a wrongful seizure made in good faith.
  4. If anyone other than the defendant claims the right of possession or ownership to the seized property, the officer may permit the third party claimant to have the custody of property, pending determination of the court as to who has the better right to possession or ownership.

History. (§ 43-2-11(e)(3), (4) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 172 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.05.250. Witness fees of garnishee defendants.

A garnishee defendant, when required to appear in court in an action brought under AS 23.05.230 , shall do so without having witness fees paid in advance. But the witness fees are included as part of the taxable costs of the action and are paid to the garnishee defendant after judgment.

History. (§ 43-2-11(e)(5) ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 34 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 172 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.05.260. Disposition of funds recovered.

  1. Out of a recovery in an action under AS 23.05.220 there shall be paid first, court costs advanced by the department which shall be returned to the department’s appropriation for this purpose and second, the wage claim involved.
  2. When an action is lost by the department, it shall pay costs out of money appropriated for that purpose.

History. (§ 43-2-11(e)(5), (6) ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 172 SLA 1959)

Article 3. Violations and Penalties.

Sec. 23.05.270. Violations by employer.

It is a violation of this chapter for an employer to

  1. hinder or unnecessarily delay the department in the enforcement of this chapter;
  2. refuse to admit an authorized representative of the department to a place of employment;
  3. falsify or fail to keep a record required under provisions of this chapter, or refuse to make the records accessible or to furnish a sworn statement of the records; or
  4. refuse to give information required for the enforcement of this chapter, upon demand, to the department.

History. (§ 43-1-8 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.05.280. Penalties.

A person who violates a provision of this chapter or a regulation adopted or order made under this chapter upon conviction is punishable for each offense by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both. Each day’s continuance of a violation is a separate offense.

History. (§ 43-1-12 ACLA 1949; § 6 ch 148 SLA 1957)

Article 4. Reciprocal Agreements.

Sec. 23.05.320. Reciprocal agreements with other states.

The commissioner may enter into reciprocal agreements with the labor department or corresponding agency of another state, or with the person, board, officer, or commission authorized to act on behalf of that department or agency, for the collection in the other state of claims or judgments for wages based upon claims previously assigned to the commissioner.

History. (§ 1 ch 114 SLA 1966)

Sec. 23.05.330. Actions in courts of other states.

The commissioner may, to the extent permitted by a reciprocal agreement with an agency of another state, maintain actions in the courts of that state for the collection of claims or judgments for wages, and may assign claims or judgments to the labor department or agency of that state for collection.

History. (§ 1 ch 114 SLA 1966)

Sec. 23.05.340. Actions in this state for demands arising in other states.

The commissioner may, upon the written request of the labor department or corresponding agency of another state or of a person, board, officer, or commission authorized to act on behalf of that department or agency, maintain actions in the courts of this state upon assigned claims or judgments for wages arising in another state in the same manner and to the same extent that such actions by the commissioner are authorized for claims arising in this state; provided that these actions may be maintained only in the event that the department or agency in the other state provides, by agreement, reciprocal services to the commissioner.

History. (§ 1 ch 114 SLA 1966)

Article 5. Labor Relations Agency.

Sec. 23.05.360. Alaska labor relations agency.

  1. There is established within the Department of Labor and Workforce Development the Alaska labor relations agency. The agency is comprised of six members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature. The term of office of a member is three years. Members serve staggered terms in accordance with AS 39.05.055 . A vacancy in an unexpired term shall be filled by appointment by the governor for the remainder of the term. The agency must include two members with a background in management, two members with a background in labor, and two members from the general public. All members must have relevant experience in labor relations matters.
  2. Not more than three members of the agency may be members of the same political party.
  3. Members of the agency may be removed by the governor only for cause.
  4. Members of the agency receive no compensation for their services, but are entitled to per diem and travel expenses authorized for boards and commissions.
  5. The governor shall designate a chair from the public members. The chair holds office at the pleasure of the governor.
  6. For purposes of holding hearings, the members of the board sit in panels of three members. The chair designates the panel that will consider a matter. Each panel must include a representative of management, a representative of labor, and a representative from the general public. A member of one panel may serve on the other panel when the chair considers it necessary for the prompt administration of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 (Public Employment Relations Act) or AS 42.40 (Alaska Railroad Corporation Act).

History. (E.O. No. 77 § 2 (1990); am §§ 1 — 3 ch 43 SLA 1993)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (a) of this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For travel and per diem for members of boards and commissions, see AS 39.20.180 .

Administrative Code. —

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

Sec. 23.05.370. Powers, duties, and functions of Alaska labor relations agency.

  1. The agency shall
    1. establish its own rules of procedure;
    2. exercise general supervision and direct the activities of staff assigned to it by the department;
    3. prepare and submit to the governor an annual report on labor relations problems it has encountered during the previous year, including recommendations for legislative action; the agency shall notify the legislature that the report is available;
    4. serve as the labor relations agency under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 (Public Employment Relations Act) and carry out the functions specified in that Act; and
    5. serve as the railroad labor relations agency for the Alaska Railroad under AS 42.40 (Alaska Railroad Corporation Act) and carry out the functions specified in that Act.
  2. Two members of a panel constitute a quorum for hearing cases. Action taken by a quorum of a panel in a case is considered the action of the full board. Four members constitute a quorum for the transaction of business other than hearing cases.

History. (E.O. No. 77 § 2 (1990); am §§ 4, 5 ch 43 SLA 1993; am § 45 ch 21 SLA 1995)

Sec. 23.05.380. Regulations.

The agency shall adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to carry out labor relations functions under AS 23.05.360 23.05.390 , AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , and AS 42.40.730 42.40.890 .

History. (E.O. No. 77 § 2 (1990))

Administrative Code. —

For certification, see 8 AAC 97, art. 1.

For unfair labor practices, see 8 AAC 97, art. 2.

For impasse, see 8 AAC 97, art. 3.

For right of nonassociation, see 8 AAC 97, art. 4.

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

For collective bargaining agreement, see 8 AAC 97, art. 6.

Sec. 23.05.390. Definition.

In AS 23.05.360 23.05.390 , “agency” means the Alaska labor relations agency established in AS 23.05.360 .

History. (E.O. No. 77 § 2 (1990))

Chapter 10. Employment Practices and Working Conditions.

Collateral references. —

Laurie E. Leader, Wages and Hours: Law and Practice (Matthew Bender).

Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Employment Discrimination (Matthew Bender).

Janice Goodman, Employee Rights Litigation: Pleading and Practice (Matthew Bender).

Lex K. Larson, Unjust Dismissal (Matthew Bender).

Lex K. Larson, Employment Screening (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Coercion and Fraud.

Secs. 23.10.005 — 23.10.010. Coercion to use hotel or store prohibited; penalty. [Repealed, § 21 ch 166 SLA 1978. For current law on the crime of coercion see AS 11.41.530.]

Sec. 23.10.015. False representations to procure employees prohibited.

A person doing business in this state may not personally or through an agent induce an individual to change from one place to another in this state, or bring an individual into this state to work as an employee in this state, by means of false or deceptive representations, false advertising, or false pretenses concerning the kind and character of the work to be done, or the amount and character of the compensation to be paid for the work, or the sanitary or other conditions of employment.

History. (§ 43-2-43 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 59 SLA 1971)

Collateral references. —

51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 6-15.

Sec. 23.10.020. Penalty for violation of AS 23.10.015.

A person who, personally or as agent or servant for another, violates AS 23.10.015 is punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.

History. (§ 43-2-44 ALCA1949)

Sec. 23.10.025. Use of armed guards. [Repealed, § 3 ch 59 SLA 1976.]

Sec. 23.10.030. Worker’s right of action.

A worker induced to accept employment with a person mentioned in AS 23.10.015 by conduct violating that section has a right of action for damages caused by the false or deceptive representations used to induce the worker to change the worker’s place of employment, against the person directly or indirectly causing the damages. In addition to the actual damages the worker has sustained, the worker may recover the reasonable attorney fees which the court shall fix, to be taxed as costs.

History. (§ 43-2-46 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.10.035. Limit of application.

AS 23.10.015 23.10.030 may not be construed to interfere with the right of a person to guard or protect the person’s private property, or private interest as provided by law. AS 23.10.015 23.10.030 may be construed only to apply when a worker is brought into the state or induced to go from one place to another in the state by a false pretense, false advertising, or deceptive representation, or is brought into the state under arms, or is moved from one place to another in the state under arms.

History. (§ 43-2-45 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.10.037. Lie-detector tests.

  1. A person either personally or through an agent or representative may not request or suggest to an employee of the person or to an applicant for employment by the person or require as a condition of employment that the employee or applicant submit to an examination in which a polygraph or other lie-detecting device is used.
  2. The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply to the state or a political subdivision of the state when dealing with police officers in its employ or with persons applying to be employed as police officers. In this subsection, “police officers” includes officers and employees of the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities who are stationed at an international airport and have been designated to have the general police powers authorized under AS 02.15.230(a) .
  3. In this section “person” includes the state and a political subdivision of the state.
  4. A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.

History. (§ 1 ch 36 SLA 1964; am § 2 ch 71 SLA 1989)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).

Collateral references. —

Validity and construction of statute prohibiting employers from suggesting or requiring polygraph or similar tests as condition of employment or continued employment. 23 ALR4th 187.

Article 2. Payment of Wages.

Sec. 23.10.040. Payment of wages in state.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by AS 37.25.050 , an employer of labor performing services in this state shall pay the wages or other compensation for the services with lawful money of the United States or with negotiable checks, drafts, or orders payable upon presentation without discount by a bank or depository inside the state.
  2. [Repealed, § 2 ch 28 SLA 1971.]
  3. [Repealed, § 2 ch 28 SLA 1971.]
  4. A person who violates a provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.

History. (§ 43-2-12 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 35 SLA 1967; am §§ 1, 2 ch 28 SLA 1971; am § 10 ch 175 SLA 2004)

Cross references. —

For fines and sentences for misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035 and 12.55.135 .

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 82.

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 1179.

Sec. 23.10.043. Deposit of wages.

An employer may not deposit wages due or to become due or an advance on wages to be earned in an account in a bank, savings and loan association, or credit union unless the employee has voluntarily authorized the deposit. All deposits under this section shall be in a bank, savings and loan association, or credit union of the employee’s choice.

History. (§ 1 ch 120 SLA 1976)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 23.10.040(e). Renumbered in 1976.

Sec. 23.10.045. Payments into benefit fund.

  1. If an employer agrees with an employee to make payments to a fund for the benefit of the employees, including a fund for medical, health, hospital, welfare, and pension benefits or any of them, or has entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing for these payments, the employer may not without just cause fail to make the payments required by the terms of the agreement.
  2. Each violation of this section is a separate offense and a person found guilty of a violation is punishable in accordance with the schedule of punishment set out in AS 23.10.415 .

History. (§ 43-2-13 ACLA 1949; added by § 1 ch 23 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 111 SLA 1959; am § 10 ch 2 SLA 1964; am § 18 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), deleted “but not limited to” following “benefit of the employees, including”.

Sec. 23.10.047. Employee’s lien.

  1. If an employer agrees with an employee or group of employees to make payment to a medical, health, hospital, welfare, or pension fund or such other fund for the benefit of the employees, or has entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing for the payments, but fails to make the payments when due, a lien is created in favor of each affected employee on the earnings of the employer and on all property of the employer used in the operation of the employer’s business to the extent of the money, plus penalties due to be paid on the employee’s behalf to qualify the employee for participation in the fund and for expenses incurred by the employee for which the employee would have been entitled to reimbursement under the fund if the required payments had been made.
  2. The lien claimant, a representative of the claimant, or the trustee of the fund on behalf of the claimant must record a notice of claim within 60 days after the employer’s payment is due with the recorder of the recording district in which the employer’s place of business is located or in which the claimant resides.  The notice contains
    1. the name of employee;
    2. the name of the employer and the name of the person employing the claimant if known;
    3. a statement of the pertinent terms and conditions of the employee benefit plan;
    4. the date when the payments are due and were to have been paid; and
    5. a statement of the demand including the amounts due to the claimant if expenses have been incurred.
  3. The notice of claim of lien is served on the employer in the same manner as a summons and complaint in civil actions or mailed to the employer by registered mail.
  4. The lien created by the recording of the notice of claim of lien is enforced within the same time and in the same manner as a mechanic’s lien is foreclosed if the lien is on real property, or as a chattel lien is enforced if the lien is on personal property.  The court may allow, as part of the costs of the action, the recording fees for the notice of claim, reasonable attorney’s fees, and court costs.
  5. The lien created under (a) of this section is preferred and superior to an encumbrance that attaches after the employer’s payments became due, and is also preferred and superior to an encumbrance that has attached previously, but that was not recorded and of which the lien claimant had no notice.

History. (§ 43-2-14 ACLA 1949; added by § 1 ch 145 SLA 1962)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (b), (d), and (e) of this section in 1988 under § 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Article 3. Alaska Wage and Hour Act.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska wages and hours, see 8 AAC 15.

Notes to Decisions

Based on Fair Labor Standards Act. —

AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 , enacted in 1959, have similar purposes to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and are based upon it. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980); Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).

The federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 were both enacted for the same purposes: to establish minimum wage, maximum workweek, and overtime compensation standards which are adequate to maintain the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Origins of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 . —

See Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).

AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 are not preempted by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Punitive damages may not be awarded for a willful violation of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act. Gore v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 703 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1985).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, §§ 71-96.

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 1141-1145, 1166, 1172-1174.

“Right to work” laws. 92 ALR2d 598.

Vacation pay rights of private employees not covered by collective labor contract. 33 ALR4th 264.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of attorney’s fees in matters involving commercial and general business activities. 23 ALR5th 241.

Sec. 23.10.050. Public policy.

It is the public policy of the state to

  1. establish minimum wage and overtime compensation standards for workers at levels consistent with their health, efficiency, and general well-being, and
  2. safeguard existing minimum wage and overtime compensation standards that are adequate to maintain the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers against the unfair competition of wage and hour standards that do not provide adequate standards of living.

History. (§ 1 ch 171 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Wage and Hour Act not unconstitutional. —

The Alaska Wage and Hour Act does not violate the Commerce Clause as Alaska’s strong interest in protecting the health and efficiency of its work force outweighs the incidental burden on interstate commerce imposed by the required keeping of records for Alaska employees. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 848 P.2d 1367 (Alaska 1993), overruled, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 2021 Alas. LEXIS 47 (Alaska Apr. 23, 2021), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 are directed toward situation distinct from that of Equal Pay for Women Act. Brown v. Wood, 575 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1978), modified, 592 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1979).

Purpose of overtime statutes are to compensate those who labored in excess of the statutory maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of extra work and to spread employment through inducing employers to shorten hours because of the pressure of extra cost. Janes v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 757 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1988).

Class actions. —

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a class certification to a pro se plaintiff for violations of the statute, because a pro se plaintiff could not adequately represent the interests of the other class members. Hallam v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 27 P.3d 751 (Alaska 2001).

Piercing corporate veil. —

When an employee sued a corporation under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act just before the corporation filed for bankruptcy protection, the employee’s veil-piercing claim against the corporation’s president was not part of the corporation’s bankruptcy estate because (1) no corporate injury was alleged, (2) the corporation could not have asserted the claim before filing for bankruptcy, and (3) the bankruptcy trustee could not assert the claim. Brown v. Knowles, 307 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2013).

Payment of arbitral costs. —

Requiring an employee to pay arbitral costs was unenforceable because it was contrary to the policies of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act and was not specific to arbitration; any contract requiring the waiver of substantive rights afforded by the Act may be declared void on that basis, and giving the employer the option on remand to agree that it would be responsible for all of the arbitration costs was preferable to ruling that the case may not be arbitrated. Gibson v. NYE Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2009).

Applied in

Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981).

Cited in

O'Dell v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 856 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. Alaska 1988); Moore v. State, DOT & Pub. Facilities, 875 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994); Hageland Aviation Servs. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2009); Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy, Inc., 251 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2011); Mills v. Hankla, 297 P.3d 158 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 23.10.055. Exemptions; compensation of executives, administrators, and professionals.

  1. The provisions of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 do not apply to
    1. an individual employed in agriculture, which includes farming in all its branches and, among other things, includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities, the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices, including forestry and lumbering operations, performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations, including preparation for market, or delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market;
    2. an individual employed in the catching, trapping, cultivating, farming, netting, or taking of any kind of fish, shellfish, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life;
    3. an individual employed in the handpicking of shrimp;
    4. an individual employed in domestic service, including a babysitter, in or about a private home;
    5. an individual employed by the United States or by the state or a political subdivision of the state, except as provided in AS 23.10.065(b) , including prisoners not on furlough detained or confined in prison facilities;
    6. an individual engaged in the nonprofit activities of a nonprofit religious, charitable, cemetery, or educational organization or other nonprofit organization where the employer-employee relationship does not, in fact, exist, and where services rendered to the organization are on a voluntary basis and are related only to the organization’s nonprofit activities; in this paragraph, “nonprofit activities” means activities for which the nonprofit organization does not incur a liability for unrelated business income tax under 26 U.S.C. 513, as amended;
    7. an employee engaged in the delivery of newspapers to the consumer;
    8. an individual employed solely as a watchman or caretaker of a plant or property that is not in productive use for a period of four months or more;
    9. an individual employed
      1. in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity;
      2. in the capacity of an outside salesman or a salesman who is employed on a straight commission basis; or
      3. as a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker;
    10. an individual employed in the search for placer or hard rock minerals;
    11. an individual under 18 years of age employed on a part-time basis not more than 30 hours in a week;
    12. employment by a nonprofit educational or child care facility to serve as a parent of children while the children are in residence at the facility if the employment requires residence at the facility and is compensated on a cash basis exclusive of room and board at an annual rate of not less than
      1. $10,000 for an unmarried person; or
      2. $15,000 for a married couple;
    13. an individual who drives a taxicab, who is compensated for taxicab services exclusively by customers of the service, and whose written contractual arrangements with owners of taxicab vehicles, taxicab permits, or radio dispatch services are based on flat contractual rates and not based on a percentage share of the individual’s receipts from customers, and whose written contract with owners of taxicab vehicles, taxicab permits, or radio dispatch services specifically provides that the contract places no restrictions on hours worked by the individual or on areas in which the individual may work except to comply with local ordinances;
    14. a person who holds a license under AS 08.54 and who is employed by a registered guide-outfitter or master guide-outfitter licensed under AS 08.54, for the first 60 workdays in which the person is employed by the registered guide-outfitter or master guide-outfitter during a calendar year;
    15. an individual engaged in activities for a nonprofit religious, charitable, civic, cemetery, recreational, or educational organization where the employer-employee relationship does not, in fact, exist, and where services are rendered to the organization under a work activity requirement of AS 47.27 (Alaska temporary assistance program);
    16. an individual who
      1. provides emergency medical services only on a voluntary basis;
      2. serves with a full-time fire department only on a voluntary basis; or
      3. provides ski patrol services on a voluntary basis;
    17. a student participating in a University of Alaska practicum described under AS 14.40.065 ;
    18. an individual who is employed by a motor vehicle dealer and whose primary duty is to
      1. receive, analyze, or reference requests for service, repair, or analysis of motor vehicles;
      2. arrange financing for the sale of motor vehicles and related products and services that are added or included as part of the sale; or
      3. solicit, sell, lease, or exchange motor vehicles.
  2. Notwithstanding (c) of this section, an individual employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity shall be compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than two times the state minimum wage for the first 40 hours of employment each week, exclusive of board or lodging that is furnished by the individual’s employer.
  3. In (a)(9) of this section,
    1. “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” has the meaning and shall be interpreted in accordance with 29 U.S.C. 201 — 219 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), as amended, or the regulations adopted under those sections;
    2. “computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker” has the meaning and shall be interpreted in accordance with 29 U.S.C. 201 — 219 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), as amended, or the regulations adopted under those sections;
    3. “outside salesman” means an employee
      1. who is customarily and regularly away from the employer’s place of business; and
      2. whose primary duty is making sales or contracts for sales, consignments, or shipments, or obtaining orders for services or for use of facilities for which consideration will be paid by the client or customer;
    4. “salesman who is employed on a straight commission basis” means an employee
      1. who is customarily and regularly employed on the business premises of the employer;
      2. who is compensated on a straight commission basis for the purpose of making sales or contracts for sales, consignments, shipments, or obtaining orders for services or the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and
      3. whose primary duty is making sales or contracts for sales, consignments, shipments, or obtaining orders for service or the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer.
  4. In (a)(18) of this section,
    1. “lease” means a contract by which a person owning a motor vehicle grants to another person the right to possess, use, and enjoy the motor vehicle for a specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a stipulated price and in which the use of the vehicle is granted for a period of at least 12 months;
    2. “motor vehicle” has the meaning given in AS 45.25.990 ;
    3. “motor vehicle dealer” has the meaning given in AS 08.66.350 , except that, in this paragraph, notwithstanding the definition of “motor vehicle dealer” given in AS 08.66.350 , “motor vehicle” has the meaning given in this section.

History. (§ 2(1) ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 2 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 50 SLA 1972; am § 2 ch 124 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 2 ch 12 SLA 1990; am § 2 ch 13 SLA 1993; am § 10 ch 33 SLA 1996; am § 9 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 1 ch 23 SLA 1997; am §§ 1, 2 ch 19 SLA 1999; am § 2 ch 102 SLA 2004; am § 39 ch 84 SLA 2005; am §§ 1, 2 ch 90 SLA 2005; am §§ 1, 2 ch 11 SLA 2014; am § 76 ch 13 SLA 2019)

Revisor's notes. —

Paragraph (15) was enacted as (14). Renumbered in 1996.

Administrative Code. —

For exemptions, see 8 AAC 15, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective April 23, 2014, added (a)(18) and (d), and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment, effective October 17, 2019, in (a)(2), deleted “or” following “cultivating”, made stylistic changes in (a)(3), (4), and (13), in (a)(5), substituted “in this paragraph” for “for purposes of this paragraph” following “nonprofit activities;”.

Notes to Decisions

Construction. —

Encino 's interpretive principle that courts must give federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exemptions a fair interpretation applied when the Alaska Wage and Hour Act text explicitly required alignment with FLSA interpretations, and therefore the white collar exemptions had to be interpreted consistent with Encino . Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 23, 2021), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2021), sub. op., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Employees covered by and exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act. —

AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 apply to both employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and those who are, because of insufficient connections to interstate commerce, exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Burden of proof. —

Employer must prove that an Alaska Wage and Hour Act exemption applied by a preponderance of the evidence, and it reversed its precedent to the contrary. Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 23, 2021), op. withdrawn, — P.3d — (Alaska 2021), sub. op., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Helicopter pilot not classified as professional. —

A commercial helicopter pilot is not a professional for purposes of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 848 P.2d 1367 (Alaska 1993), overruled, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 2021 Alas. LEXIS 47 (Alaska Apr. 23, 2021), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Class action. —

Alleged differences between state and federal law did not cause individual issues to predominate and thus did not preclude class certification in an action alleging misclassification of salespeople as exempt employees because this section provides that the exemption for executive, administrative, or professional employees is interpreted the same as under the Fair Labor Standards Act; moreover, because the employees' duties were much the same, common issues would predominate regardless. Peterson v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Grp., Inc., — F. Supp. 3d —, 328 F.R.D. 255 (D. Alaska 2018), modified, — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska 2019).

Summary judgment inappropriate. —

Summary judgment was improper on employee’s claim that the employer failed to pay overtime compensation, in violation of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act; there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee was an administrative or executive worker and the employee asserted that she did not exercise discretion or independent judgment. Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy, Inc., 251 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2011).

Employer raised genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat an employee's motion for summary judgment as to the applicability of the administrative exemption where it provided evidence that she had authority to hire and fire employees, that she had input into discounts offered to corporate customers, that she went on independent sales calls and signed contracts with customers, that she made bids on behalf of her employer, and that she supervised at least one full-time employee at all times, and frequently supervised two full-time employees. However, the employer's motion was denied, as the employee's evidence suggested that the majority of her decisions regarding matters of significance required approval from more senior managers. Scalf v. Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska Aug. 27, 2018).

Prisoners excluded from operation of chapter. —

See McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975).

Restaurant managers. —

Partial summary judgment for plaintiffs was improper where superior court was obliged to consider district manager’s testimony that restaurant managers such as plaintiffs spent less than 10 percent of their time performing tasks otherwise performed by hourly employees; a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiffs spent more than 20 percent of their time on duties not directly and closely related to management of the restaurant. American Restaurant Group v. Clark, 889 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1995).

Retail manager not exempt. —

Although the retail store manager supervised employees and made more than $600 per week, he was not exempt from the Alaska Wage and Hour Act since he spent more than 20% of his time in retail sales, an activity normally performed by nonmanagerial employees. Grimes v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Alaska 1995).

Employee held exempt. —

Applying a four part test, summary judgment was granted in favor of an employer with respect to whether an employee was an exempt executive employee under the FLSA and the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) where it was undisputed that she received a salary of at least $455 per week; examining the character of her position as a whole, including her relative salary, the authority she exerted over other employees, and her relative freedom from supervision, the court found that her primary duty was management; she customarily and regularly directed the work of two or more other employees; and she had the authority to hire and fire employees. Scalf v. Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska Aug. 27, 2018).

Employee held not exempt. Employee was not an exempt administrative employee and was entitled to overtime pay where the undisputed record evidence established that employer failed to pay employee on a salary basis and required him to work under direct supervision. Whitesides v. U-Haul Co., 16 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2001).

Employee was not exempt from overtime pay where he spent almost 60 percent of his work time performing non-management tasks. Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Burden of proof. —

In the absence of an opinion by the Alaska Supreme Court that overruled Dayhoff , the court applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the employees' overtime claims under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA), and the preponderance of the evidence standard to their FLSA claims. However, in light of the denial of the cross motions for summary judgment and the potential uncertainty regarding the applicable evidentiary standard under the AWHA, the court certified the question of what burden of proof applied to the determination of whether an employee was exempt from the overtime requirements of the AWHA as an executive or administrative employee. Scalf v. Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska Aug. 27, 2018).

Applied in

Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979); ERA Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40 (Alaska 2000).

Quoted in

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Shook, 978 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1999); Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage, 23 P.3d 641 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981); Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder, 338 P.3d 305 (Alaska 2014); Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018).

Collateral references. —

Who is employed in “executive or administrative capacity” within exemptions from minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act. 40 ALR2d 332; 124 ALR Fed. 1; 131 ALR Fed. 1.

Who is employed in “professional capacity,” within exemption, under 29 USCS § 213(a)(1), from minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act. 77 ALR Fed. 681.

Employee training time as exempt from minimum wage and overtime requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act. 80 ALR Fed. 246.

Who is “employee employed in agriculture” and therefore exempt from overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act by § 13(b)(12) of Act ( 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b)(12)). 162 ALR Fed. 575.

Validity and construction of domestic service provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.). 165 ALR Fed. 163.

Sec. 23.10.060. Payment for overtime.

  1. An employer who employs employees engaged in commerce or other business, or in the production of goods or materials in the state, may not employ an employee for a workweek longer than 40 hours or for more than eight hours a day.
  2. If an employer finds it necessary to employ an employee for hours in excess of the limits set in this subsection, overtime compensation for the overtime at the rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay shall be paid. An employee is entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of eight hours a day. An employee is also entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week; in determining whether an employee has worked more than 40 hours a week, the number of hours worked shall be determined without including hours that are worked in excess of eight hours in a day because the employee has or will be separately awarded overtime compensation based on those hours.
  3. This section is considered included in all contracts of employment.
  4. This section does not apply to
    1. an employee employed by an employer employing fewer than four employees in the regular course of business, as “regular course of business” is defined by regulations of the commissioner;
    2. an employee employed in handling, packing, storing, pasteurizing, drying, preparing in their raw or natural state, or canning agricultural or horticultural commodities for market, or in making cheese or butter or other dairy products;
    3. an employee of an employer engaged in small mining operations where not more than 12 employees are employed if the employee is employed not in excess of 12 hours a day or 56 hours a week during a period or periods of not more than 14 workweeks in the aggregate in a calendar year during the mining season, as the season is defined by the commissioner;
    4. an employee engaged in agriculture;
    5. an employee employed in connection with the publication of a weekly, semiweekly, or daily newspaper with a circulation of less than 1,000;
    6. a switchboard operator employed in a public telephone exchange that has fewer than 750 stations;
    7. an employee in an otherwise exempted employment or proprietor in a retail or service establishment engaged in handling telephone or radio messages for the public under an agency or contract arrangement with a communications company where the communications revenue of the agency does not exceed $500 a month;
    8. an employee employed as a seaman;
    9. an employee employed in planting or tending trees, cruising, or surveying, or bucking, or felling timber, or in preparing or transporting logs or other forestry products to the mill, processing plant, railroad, or other transportation terminal if the number of employees employed by the employer in the forestry or lumbering operations does not exceed 12;
    10. an individual employed as an outside buyer of poultry, eggs, cream, or milk in their raw or natural state;
    11. casual employees as may be liberally defined by regulations of the commissioner;
    12. an employee of a hospital whose employment includes the provision of medical services;
    13. work performed by an employee under a flexible work hour plan if the plan is included as part of a collective bargaining agreement;
    14. work performed by an employee under a voluntary flexible work hour plan if
      1. the employee and the employer have signed a written agreement and the written agreement has been filed with the department; and
      2. the department has issued a certificate approving the plan that states the work is for 40 hours a week and not more than 10 hours a day; for work over 40 hours a week or 10 hours a day under a flexible work hour plan not included as part of a collective bargaining agreement, compensation at the rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay shall be paid for the overtime;
    15. an individual employed as a line haul truck driver for a trip that exceeds 100 road miles one way if the compensation system under which the truck driver is paid includes overtime pay for work in excess of 40 hours a week or for more than eight hours a day and the compensation system requires a rate of pay comparable to the rate of pay required by this section;
    16. an individual employed as a community health aide by a local or regional health organization as those terms are defined in AS 18.28.100 ;
    17. work performed by a mechanic primarily engaged in the servicing of automobiles, light trucks, and motor homes if the mechanic
      1. is employed as a flat-rate mechanic by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling or servicing motor vehicles;
      2. has signed a written agreement with the employer that specifies the mechanic’s flat hourly rate of pay and the automotive manual or manuals on which the flat rate is to be based;
      3. is compensated for all hours worked in any capacity for that employer up to and including eight hours a day and 40 hours a week at an hourly rate that is not less than the greater of
        1. 75 percent of the flat hourly rate of pay agreed on by the employer and employee under (B) of this paragraph; or
        2. twice the state minimum wage; and
      4. is compensated for all hours worked in any capacity for that employer in excess of eight hours a day or 40 hours a week at one and one-half times the rate described in (C) of this paragraph;
    18. work performed by an employee under a voluntary written agreement addressing the trading of work shifts among employees if
      1. the employee is employed by an air carrier subject to subchapter II of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 181-188), including employment as a customer service representative;
      2. the trading agreement is not a flexible work hour plan entered into under (13) or (14) of this subsection;
      3. the trading agreement is filed with the employee’s employer; and
      4. the trading agreement states that the employee is not entitled to receive overtime for any hours worked by the employee when the employee voluntarily works those hours under a shift trading practice under which the employee has the opportunity, in the same or other work weeks, to reduce hours worked by voluntarily offering a shift for trade or reassignment;
    19. work performed by a flight crew member employed by an air carrier subject to 45 U.S.C. 181 — 188 (subchapter II of the Railway Labor Act); in this paragraph, “flight crew” means the pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer, and flight attendants.
  5. The minimum amount due an employee under (d)(17)(C) and (D) of this section shall be figured on a weekly basis.

History. (§ 3 ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 3 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 243 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 45 SLA 1972; am § 33 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 1 ch 31 SLA 1980; am § 3 ch 47 SLA 1983; am § 1 ch 160 SLA 1990; am § 1 ch 103 SLA 1992; am § 5 ch 13 SLA 1993; am §§ 1, 2 ch 123 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 39 SLA 1999; am § 2 ch 43 SLA 1999; am § 1 ch 11 SLA 2003; am § 3 ch 90 SLA 2005; am § 77 ch 13 SLA 2019)

Revisor's notes. —

The paragraphs of (d) of this section were renumbered in 1990 and 1996 to reflect the deletion of repealed paragraphs.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings concerning the amendment of subsection (b) by § 2, ch. 43, SLA 1999, see § 1, ch. 43, SLA 1999 in the 1999 Temporary & Special Acts.

For provisions directing that the amendment of (b) of this section made by sec. 2, ch. 43, SLA 1999, applies to all claims for overtime based on employment on and after July 1, 1990, and before June 2, 1999, and declaring that this application “applies retrospectively to all pending administrative and judicial actions under [that subsection] that are based on the calculation of overtime for employment [between those dates] and that are not resolved by final court judgment or administrative decision on July 3, 2003,” see §§ 1 and 2, ch. 133, SLA 2003, in the 2003 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provisions directing that the enactment of (d)(19) of this section by sec. 1, ch. 11, SLA 2003, applies to employment performed on and after January 1, 2000, and declaring that this application “applies retrospectively to actions and proceedings under [(b) of this section] that are based on a claim for overtime compensation for employment as a flight crew member on or after January 1, 2000, and that are not determined by final court judgment or administrative decision on or before May 18, 2005,” see secs. 1 and 2, ch. 19, SLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts. For Superior Court case holding that ch. 19, SLA 2005 was unconstitutional, see Pearson v. Cape Smythe Air Service, Inc., 3AN-04-06493CI (Nov. 7, 2005; Superior Ct., 3rd Jud. Dist. at Anchorage.)

Administrative Code. —

For minimum wages and overtime, see 8 AAC 15, art. 2.

For exemptions, see 8 AAC 15, art. 3.

For reduction of wages, see 8 AAC 15, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2019 amendment, effective October 17, 2019, in (d)(7), deleted “telegraphic,” following “handling” and “telegraphic message or” following “where the”, and made stylistic changes in (d)(1) and (17).

Opinions of attorney general. —

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 does not expressly preempt AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 on the question of whether airline employees are excluded from the mandatory overtime directive of this section. April 15, 1980, Op. Att’y Gen.

In the case of pilots, flight crews, and other interstate air carrier employees whose activities are directly and substantially related to the transportation activities of the carrier, and who are covered by a valid existing collective bargaining agreement or agreements with the carrier, the state is precluded from applying its overtime laws due to the preemptive nature of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188. April 15, 1980, Op. Att’y Gen.

In instances where no collective bargaining agreements apply, crews of interstate air carriers are nonetheless beyond the jurisdiction of state overtime law because of certain commerce clause implications. April 15, 1980, Op. Att’y Gen.

Nonflight personnel of interstate carriers who are not covered by valid existing collective bargaining agreements are not exempt from state law, and as to those individuals the provisions of state overtime law apply. April 15, 1980, Op. Att’y Gen.

Air carriers operating solely intrastate would not seem to fall under the exclusionary scope of either the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188, or of the commerce clause absent unusual fact situations. Accordingly, the protections of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 dealing with overtime extend to those individuals. April 15, 1980, Op. Att’y Gen.

An administrative regulation which would require an employer to include underground travel time as part of the “workweek” for calculating wages and overtime under this section might raise the issue of federal preemption but would survive such a challenge, since Congress did not intend to preclude state regulation and there is no actual conflict between such a regulation and federal law. February 22, 1989 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Article not void. —

The Alaska Wage and Hour Act merely requires higher minimum and overtime pay than the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. Although compliance with both is more expensive than compliance with the federal act, it is not, in any sense, impossible so as to make the Alaska law void. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Retroactive amendment held unconstitutional. —

Amendment of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act to retroactively exempt pilots from the act’s overtime compensation provision, was an unconstitutional taking of the pilot’s overtime wages under Alaska Const. art. I, § 18, and an unconstitutional impairment of the parties’ employment agreement under Alaska Const. art. I, § 15; because the pilots had already worked the overtime hours, and by law were entitled to receive the compensation for those hours of work at the end of each pay period, the pilots had a vested property right protected by the takings clause. Further, the retroactive removal of existing contract rights from one party in favor of another who clearly violated existing law was manifestly unfair and violated the contracts clause. Hageland Aviation Servs. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2009).

Or preempted. —

Since, under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, the number of hours required for the overtime rate is less than that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Alaska act provides for a lower maximum workweek within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) and consequently, comes within the express saving clause so as not to be preempted by the federal law. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Article compatible with Federal Aviation Act. —

This article provides for mandatory overtime compensation, not the regulation of maximum hours, and it is therefore neither preempted by, nor in direct conflict with, the former Federal Aviation Act. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 848 P.2d 1367 (Alaska 1993), overruled, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 2021 Alas. LEXIS 47 (Alaska Apr. 23, 2021), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Purpose of overtime statutes are to compensate those who labored in excess of the statutory maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of extra work and to spread employment through inducing employers to shorten hours because of the pressure of extra cost. Janes v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 757 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1988).

State not bound to federal regulatory definitions. —

See Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019, 102 S. Ct. 1716, 72 L. Ed. 2d 137 (U.S. 1982).

Employer liable for on-call time. —

Employer that miscalculated overtime pay rate for hours during which its field mechanic employees were on call was liable for damages for all overtime hours paid because, taking into consideration limits on the employees’ freedom to engage in personal activities and the terms of the employment agreement, all the on-call time counted as work time. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084 (Alaska 2008).

Salaried workers. —

The Alaska Wage and Hour Act does not define what “regular rate of pay” in subsection (b) of this section means for a worker who receives an annual salary instead of an hourly wage. Piquniq Mgt. Corp. v. Reeves, 965 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1998).

8 AAC 15.100(a)(2) requires a salaried worker's award for unpaid overtime compensation to be computed by: (1) “Figuring” the worker's salary on a weekly basis; (2) assuming that the week of salary represents pay for a week of straight-time work; (3) using the “regular rate” of hourly pay derived from this assumption as the basis for determining the worker's total compensation for all hours actually worked; and (4) deducting from this amount all amounts of salary actually paid. Piquniq Mgt. Corp. v. Reeves, 965 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1998).

A court converting annual salary to a regular rate of hourly pay under 8 AAC 15.100(a)(2) must use the regular rate as a basis for computing total earnings for all hours actually worked; all salary actually paid must be deducted from these total earnings, and the difference will reflect the award necessary to ensure that straight-time, overtime, and total compensation are all based on the applicable rate of regular pay. Piquniq Mgt. Corp. v. Reeves, 965 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1998).

“Supervisory”, as that term is used in this section, means a person who directs the activities of other employees and who does not perform duties which are regularly performed by the employees supervised, except for brief periods of time not to exceed more than eight hours in the supervisor’s workweek, is reasonable and not arbitrary. Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979).

Bookkeeper in separate company held to be employee. —

An employee of a real estate company who handled the bookkeeping for a storage company was considered to be an employee of the storage company since the relationship was of a permanent nature, the bookkeeper received a flat management fee regardless of profits, and bookkeeping is an integral part of a business. Bobich v. Stewart, 843 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1992).

Partner considered as employee. —

Where a partnership agreement provides regular compensation, untied to profits, for a partner’s services, such a compensated partner shall be considered to be both an owner and an employee. To do otherwise would permit employers to defeat the Alaska Wage and Hour Act’s remedial purposes by simply calling paid employees “partners.” Bobich v. Stewart, 843 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1992).

Exemptions. —

An employees’ work schedule, established under collective bargaining agreement that the employees were to work 14 consecutive 12-hour days, followed by 14 days off, was exempt from the overtime requirements of this section. Ganz v. Alaska Airlines, 963 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1998).

Employee was exempt from overtime pay under this section; she was responsible for supervising nurses and maintaining payroll records, although she also provided direct patient care for part of the work week. Hutka v. Sisters of Providence, 102 P.3d 947 (Alaska 2004).

In the absence of an opinion by the Alaska Supreme Court that overruled Dayhoff , the court applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the employees' overtime claims under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA), and the preponderance of the evidence standard to their FLSA claims. However, in light of the denial of the cross motions for summary judgment and the potential uncertainty regarding the applicable evidentiary standard under the AWHA, the court certified the question of what burden of proof applied to the determination of whether an employee was exempt from the overtime requirements of the AWHA as an executive or administrative employee. Scalf v. Classic Alaska Trading/Big Ray's Alaska, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska Aug. 27, 2018).

Pilot not entitled to overtime compensation. —

In a pilot's claim for unpaid overtime compensation, on remand, the superior court judge did not err in finding that the pilot's time spent waiting was not his employer's but his own, and he was not entitled to be compensated for it under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act because, although he was required to reside on the premises as the job itself was being a pilot for a remote wilderness fly fishing lodge, he was generally not expected to stay in a particular location, ready to fly; and he was free to engage in personal activities during the time he was allegedly on call, and he did so. Moody v. Lodge, 433 P.3d 1173 (Alaska 2018).

Employee held not exempt. —

Employee was not an exempt administrative employee and was entitled to overtime pay where the undisputed record evidence established that employer failed to pay employee on a salary basis and required him to work under direct supervision. Whitesides v. U-Haul Co., 16 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2001).

Employee was not exempt from overtime pay where he spent nearly 60 percent of his work time performing non-management tasks. Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Accrual of claims. —

Employee’s overtime and derivative claims were not time-barred because the claims did not accrue until the accounting procedures used to calculate the employee’s unpaid bonus were completed Brown v. Knowles, 307 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2013).

Procedural issues. —

In an action by long haul truck drivers claiming overtime compensation, where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether driving times relied upon by the employer in calculating compensation were inaccurate, and whether the employer knew this to be the case despite driver logs to the contrary, grant of summary judgment against the drivers was error. Schorr v. Frontier Transp. Co., 942 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1997).

Severance payment which exceeds maximum recovery. —

Release given by employee in exchange for large severance payment, which substantially exceeded the maximum he could have recovered under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, encompassed any subsequent AWHA violation claims by the employee, and the severance payment fully satisfied any potential AWHA award. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Shook, 978 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1999).

Contract-based claims. —

Law of the case doctrine did not prevent trial court’s ruling against employee on his claim for additional overtime pay under subsection (b); employee’s contract-based claim for overtime pay failed as employment contract did not support employee’s pyramiding claim. Hallam v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 18, 2008).

Constructive discharge evidence standard. —

Summary judgment was improperly granted to employer in constructive discharge dispute about overtime pay and pension plan payments, where the employee offered evidence that might lead a reasonable person to find the working conditions created at the employer’s business so intolerable as to cause a reasonable person to resign. Finch v. Greatland Foods, Inc., 21 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2001).

Overtime hours properly calculated. —

In calculating the number of overtime hours worked, trial court did not err in finding that employee made 15 professional visits per week where employer’s nursing note and progress note evidence was inconsistent, employee’s supervisor admitted that her supervision was very loose, and employee’s mileage logs and her testimony supported finding that employee saw 15 patients per week. Geneva Woods Pharm., Inc. v. Thygeson, 181 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2008).

Cited in

Gibson v. NYE Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2009); State v. Rothe, 2010-Ohio-2498 (Ohio Ct. App., Fairfield County 2010); Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Who is “employee employed in agriculture” and therefore exempt from overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act by § 13(b)(12) of Act ( 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b)(12)). 162 ALR Fed. 575.

Sec. 23.10.065. Minimum wages.

  1. Except as otherwise provided for in law, an employer shall pay to each employee a minimum wage, as established herein, for hours worked in a pay period, whether the work is measured by time, piece, commission or otherwise. An employer may not apply tips or gratuities bestowed upon employees as a credit toward payment of the minimum hourly wage required by this section. Tip credit as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended does not apply to the minimum wage established by this section. Beginning February 24, 2015, the minimum wage shall be $8.75 per hour effective January 1, 2015, $9.75 per hour effective January 1, 2016, and thereafter adjusted annually for inflation. The adjustment shall be calculated each September 30, for the proceeding January-December calendar year, by the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development, using 100 percent of the rate of inflation based on the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers for the Anchorage metropolitan area, compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor; the department shall round the adjusted minimum hourly wage up to the nearest one cent; the adjusted minimum hourly wage shall apply to work performed beginning on January 1 through December 31 of the year for which it is effective.
  2. Subject to the limitation under (c) of this section, an employer shall pay to each person employed as a public school bus driver wages at a rate of not less than two times the minimum wage established under (a) of this section, for hours worked in a pay period, whether work is measured by time, commission, or otherwise. An employer may not apply fringe benefits as a credit toward payment of the minimum wage established under this subsection.
  3. Notwithstanding (b) of this section, an employer who contracts with the Department of Education and Early Development, a school district, or a regional educational attendance area to provide school bus transportation services is not required to adjust school bus driver wages under (b) of this section, except when entering into or renewing the contract.
  4. If the minimum wage determined under (a) of this section is less than one dollar over the federal minimum wage, the Alaska minimum wage shall be set at one dollar over the federal minimum wage. This amount shall be adjusted in subsequent years by the method established in (a) of this section.

History. (§ 4 ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 2 ch 2 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 41 SLA 1974; am §§ 3, 4 ch 12 SLA 1990; am § 3 ch 110 SLA 2002; am § 1 ch 148 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 56 SLA 2009; am §§ 3, 4, 2014 General Election Ballot Measure No. 3)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, “Department of Education” was changed to “Department of Education and Early Development” in (c) of this section in accordance with § 89, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Subsection (a) was repealed and reenacted by 2014 General Election Ballot Measure No. 3, and in 2015 a comma was added to conform the initiative to the style of the Alaska Statutes, and “Beginning February 24, 2015,” was substituted for “Beginning with the passage of this Act”. Subsection (d) was enacted as section 4 of 2014 General Election Ballot Measure No. 3 and was codified in 2014 at which time “(a) of this section” was substituted for “Section 3” in two places.

Although, Ballot Measure No. 2 (Initiative 13-MINW), which was enacted at the 2014 general election and repealed and reenacted subsection (a) and enacted subsection (d), provides that an increase in the minimum wage is to take effect January 1, 2015, the Ballot Measure itself did not take effect until February 24, 2015.

Cross references. —

For the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, see 29 U.S.C. 201-219.

Administrative Code. —

For minimum wages and overtime, see 8 AAC 15, art. 2.

For reduction of wages, see 8 AAC 15, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 24, 2009, repealed and reenacted subsection (a), which read, “Except as provided under (b) of this section and as otherwise provided for in law, for work performed on or after January 1, 2003, an employer shall pay to each employee wages at a rate of not less than $7.15 an hour for hours worked in a pay period, whether the work is measured by time, piece, commission, or otherwise. An employer may not apply tips or gratuities bestowed upon employees as a credit toward payment of the minimum hourly wage required by this section. Tip credit as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended does not apply to the minimum wage established by this section.”

The 2014 amendment, effective February 24, 2015, rewrote (a), which read, “Except as provided in (b) of this section and as otherwise provided by law, for hours worked in a pay period, whether the work is measured by time, piece, commission, or otherwise, an employer shall pay to each employee wages at a rate that is not less than $7.25 an hour until December 31, 2009, and thereafter not less than 50 cents an hour more than the federal minimum wage. An employer may not apply tips or gratuities bestowed on employees as a credit toward payment of the minimum hourly wage required by this section. Tip credit as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, does not apply to the minimum wage established by this section.”

Editor’s notes. —

2014 General Election Ballot Measure No. 3, was enacted by the voters at the general election of November 4, 2014. The results of the general election were certified by the Lieutenant Governor November 26, 2014. Under art. XI, sec. 6, Constitution of the State of Alaska, the initiative’s provisions take effect February 24, 2015.

For findings and declaration and purpose for subsections (a) and (d), see secs. 1 and 2 of 2014 General Election Ballot Measure No. 3.

Notes to Decisions

This section is based on federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the terms used in the Alaska Statute are defined in the same way as in the federal act. McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975) (decided prior to the 1978 amendment to AS 23.10.055 (5)).

Article not void. —

The Alaska Wage and Hour Act merely requires higher minimum and overtime pay than the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. Although compliance with both is more expensive than compliance with the federal act, it is not, in any sense, impossible so as to make the Alaska law void. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Concurrent coverage of minimum wage claims is not preempted by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. It appears that 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) was intended to allow the recovery of additional amounts under more protective state laws. It is logical that Congress contemplated that the state would allow for an action as to the whole claim, not just the increment, and, further, that Congress intended that the claims would be brought together, where possible, so that enforcement would not be costly. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Prisoners as employees of the state. —

See McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975) (decided prior to the 1978 amendment to AS 23.10.055 (5)).

Applied in

Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979).

Cited in

Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981); Jeffcoat v. State, Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987); Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Validity of minimum wage statutes relating to private employment. 39 ALR2d 740.

Sec. 23.10.070. Exemptions from minimum wage.

To the extent necessary to prevent curtailment of opportunities of employment, the commissioner may by regulations or orders provide for the employment at wages lower than the minimum wage prescribed in AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 of

  1. an individual whose earning capacity is impaired by physical or mental deficiency, age, or injury, at the wages and subject to the restrictions and for the period of time that are fixed by the commissioner; and
  2. an apprentice at the wages that are approved by the commissioner; or
  3. a learner at the wages and subject to the restrictions and for the periods of time that are fixed by the commissioner.

History. (§ 5 ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 3 ch 2 SLA 1962)

Administrative Code. —

For exemptions, see 8 AAC 15, art. 3.

Sec. 23.10.071. Wages for work therapy.

  1. For work therapy, as defined in AS 47.37.270 , a participant in a residential drug abuse or alcoholism treatment program designed to extend more than 120 days may be paid less than the minimum wage prescribed in AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 if the rate has been approved by the commissioner under this section and is in compliance with federal law.
  2. The commissioner shall adopt regulations regarding the payment of wages for work therapy.  In adopting the regulations, the commissioner shall consider whether the work performed by the patient
    1. is solely for the benefit of the patient and is that which is ordinarily carried on by patients in a residential treatment program;
    2. would ordinarily be performed by full-time employees of the program;
    3. is work that may produce income to the patient, other than wages;
    4. produces goods or services the proceeds of which will economically or otherwise benefit the owners, operators, or businesses of the rehabilitation program; and
    5. creates an unfair competition with private enterprise because of lower wage standards.

History. (§ 1 ch 58 SLA 1983)

Sec. 23.10.075. Labor standards and safety division.

There is established in the department the division of labor standards and safety. The director of the division is responsible to the commissioner. The director shall administer AS 18.60.010 18.60.105 and AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 .

History. (§ 6(1) ch 171 SLA 1959; am E.O. No. 52, § 4 (1982))

Sec. 23.10.080. Powers and duties of division.

The director, or an authorized representative of the director, shall

  1. investigate and ascertain the wages and related conditions and standards of employment of any employee in the state;
  2. enter the place of business or employment of an employer at reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting payroll records that relate to the question of wages paid or hours worked;
  3. require and subpoena from an employer a statement in writing, when the director or the representative considers it necessary, of hours worked by and the wages paid to a person in the employ of the employer, and the commissioner may require the employer to make the statement under oath;
  4. question an employee in a place of employment during work hours with respect to the wages paid and the hours worked by the employees;
  5. compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents by subpoena when necessary for the purpose of a hearing or investigation provided for in AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 .

History. (§ 6(2) ch 171 SLA 1959)

Administrative Code. —

For procedures relating to violations, investigations, or hearings, see 8 AAC 15, art. 5.

Sec. 23.10.085. Scope of administrative regulations; room and board deductions.

  1. The director may adopt, amend, or rescind administrative regulations not inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 that are necessary for the administration of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 .
  2. The regulations may, without limiting the generality of (a) of this section, define terms used in AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 , and restrict or prohibit industrial homework or other acts or practices that the director finds appropriate to carry out the purpose of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 , or to prevent the circumvention or evasion of AS 23.10.050 — 23.10.150.
  3. The regulations may permit deductions by an employer from the minimum wage applicable under AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 to employees for the reasonable cost, as determined by the director on an occupation basis, of furnishing board or lodging if board or lodging is customarily furnished by the employer and used by the employee.

History. (§ 6(3) ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 2004; am § 4 ch 90 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For minimum wages and overtime, see 8 AAC 15, art. 2.

For exemptions, see 8 AAC 15, art. 3.

For reduction of wages, see 8 AAC 15, art. 4.

For procedures relating to violations, investigations, or hearings, see 8 AAC 15, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

This section and AS 23.10.095 constitute delegation of authority from the legislature to the agency to formulate policies, leaving to the agency’s discretion the issue whether federal definitions of “regular rate of pay” and other terms can be applied consistently with AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 . Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019, 102 S. Ct. 1716, 72 L. Ed. 2d 137 (U.S. 1982).

Regulations as to deductions. —

Former 8 AAC 15.160(d) does not bar deductions that are permitted under former 8 AAC 15.160(a), rather, former 8 AAC 15.160(d) permits, under the limits it expresses, deductions that would otherwise be barred by former 8 AAC 15.160(a); former 8 AAC 15.160(d) does not apply to deductions that do not reduce an employee’s wage rate to below the minimum wage. Diaz v. Silver Bay Logging, Inc., 55 P.3d 732 (Alaska 2002).

Applied in

Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 23.10.090. Administrative procedures.

Regulations adopted or hearings conducted under AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 shall be adopted or conducted and be subject to judicial review in accordance with AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act).

History. (§ 6(4) ch 171 SLA 1959)

Administrative Code. —

For procedures relating to violations, investigations, or hearings, see 8 AAC 15, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 23.10.095. Adoption of federal regulations.

The commissioner may adopt regulations and interpretations that are made by the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the federal Department of Labor and that are not inconsistent with AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 .

History. (§ 6(5) ch 171 SLA 1959)

Administrative Code. —

For minimum wages and overtime, see 8 AAC 15, art. 2.

For reduction of wages, see 8 AAC 15, art. 4.

Notes to Decisions

This section and AS 23.10.085 constitute delegation of authority from the legislature to the agency to formulate policies, leaving to the agency’s discretion the issue whether federal definitions of “regular rate of pay” and other terms can be applied consistently with Alaska’s Wage and Hour Act. Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019, 102 S. Ct. 1716, 72 L. Ed. 2d 137 (U.S. 1982).

Sec. 23.10.100. Employer to keep records.

  1. An employer shall keep for a period of at least three years at the place where an employee is employed a record of the name, address, and occupation of each employee, the rate of pay and the amount paid each pay period to each employee, the hours worked each day and each workweek by each employee, and other payroll information that the commissioner may require.
  2. The commissioner or an authorized representative of the commissioner may copy the employer’s records at any reasonable time.  An employer shall furnish to the commissioner or the representative on demand a sworn statement of the employer’s records, and the commissioner may require that the sworn statement be made upon forms the commissioner has prescribed or approved.

History. (§ 7 ch 171 SLA 1959)

Administrative Code. —

For minimum wages and overtime, see 8 AAC 15, art. 2.

Notes to Decisions

Public policy interest and burden of proof. —

If an employee produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of the work for which the employee was improperly compensated, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence sufficient to negate the reasonableness of the inference drawn from the employee’s evidence. Although this burden of proof in an action under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act is not binding on a bankruptcy court in a proceeding to determine the validity of a claim, it is indicative of the public policy interest that proper records be kept by an employer and that an employee be properly compensated for any overtime worked. In re Equipment Services, Ltd., 36 B.R. 241 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983).

Overtime hours properly calculated. —

In calculating the number of overtime hours worked, trial court did not err in finding that employee made 15 professional visits per week where employer’s nursing note and progress note evidence was inconsistent, employee’s supervisor admitted that her supervision was very loose, and employee’s mileage logs and her testimony supported finding that employee saw 15 patients per week. Geneva Woods Pharm., Inc. v. Thygeson, 181 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2008).

Applied in

Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979).

Stated in

Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).

Sec. 23.10.105. Posting summary required.

An employer subject to AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 shall keep a summary or abstract of these sections, approved by the commissioner, posted in a conspicuous location at the place where a person subject to them is employed. An employer shall be furnished copies of a summary by the state on request without charge.

History. (§ 8 ch 171 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.10.110. Remedies of employee; attorney fees; offers of judgment; settlement; waiver.

  1. An employer who violates a provision of AS 23.10.060 or 23.10.065 is liable to an employee affected in the amount of unpaid minimum wages, or unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and, except as provided in (d) of this section, in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
  2. An action to recover from the employer the wages and damages for which the employer is liable may be maintained in a competent court by an employee personally and for other employees similarly situated, or an employee may individually designate in writing an agent or representative to maintain an action for the employee.  The consent shall be filed in the court in which the action is brought.  At the request of a person paid less than the amount to which the person is entitled under AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 , the commissioner may take an assignment in trust for the employee of the full amount to which the employee is entitled under this section and may bring any legal action necessary to collect the claim.
  3. The court in an action brought under this section shall, in addition to a judgment awarded to the plaintiff, allow costs of the action and, except as provided in (e) — (h) of this section, reasonable attorney fees to be paid by the defendant. The attorney fees in the case of actions brought under this section by the commissioner shall be remitted by the commissioner to the Department of Revenue. The commissioner may not be required to pay the filing fee or other costs. The commissioner in case of suit has power to join various claimants against the same employer in one cause of action.
  4. In an action under (a) of this section to recover unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated damages for unpaid overtime, if the defendant shows by clear and convincing evidence that the act or omission giving rise to the action was made in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not in violation of AS 23.10.060 , the court may decline to award liquidated damages or may award an amount of liquidated damages less than the amount set out in (a) of this section.
  5. If the plaintiff prevails in an action for unpaid overtime compensation under (a) of this section, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff unless the defendant shows by clear and convincing evidence that the act or omission giving rise to the action was made in good faith and that the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not in violation of AS 23.10.060 , in which case
    1. the court may award attorney fees to the plaintiff in accordance with court rules; or
    2. if the defendant would be entitled to attorney fees if the action were subject to the standards under court rule offers of judgment, the court may not award attorney fees to either the plaintiff or the defendant.
  6. If the defendant prevails in an action for unpaid overtime compensation under (a) of this section and had previously made an offer of judgment to the plaintiff, the court shall award attorney fees to the defendant unless the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court that the action was both brought and prosecuted in good faith and that the plaintiff had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was in violation of AS 23.10.060 . If the court awards attorney fees to the defendant, the award shall be made in accordance with court rule.
  7. Failure to inquire into Alaska law is not consistent with a claim of good faith under this section.
  8. Subsections (d) — (g) of this section do not apply to an action brought under this section by the commissioner.
  9. The commissioner may supervise the payment of the unpaid overtime compensation owing to an employee under AS 23.10.060 . Payment in full in accordance with an agreement by an employee to settle a claim for unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated damages for unpaid overtime compensation constitutes a waiver of any right as to this claim the employee may have under (a) of this section to unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated damages for unpaid overtime compensation.
  10. In a settlement for unpaid overtime compensation that is not supervised by the department or the court, an employee is entitled to liquidated damages under (a) of this section unless the employee and the employer enter into a written settlement agreement in which the employee expressly waives the right to receive liquidated damages. A private written settlement agreement under this subsection is not valid unless submitted to the department for review. The department shall review the agreement and approve it if it is fair to the parties. The department shall approve or deny an agreement within 30 days of receipt. A waiver of liquidated damages may not be a condition of employment.

History. (§ 9(3) ch 171 SLA 1959; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 37 SLA 1995; am § 22 ch 22 SLA 2015)

Administrative Code. —

For procedures relating to violations, investigations, or hearings, see 8 AAC 15, art. 5.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2015 amendment, effective May 15, 2015, substituted “this section” for “this subsection” at the end of (g).

Notes to Decisions

Effect of 1995 amendment. —

Even where the legislature applied prospectively an amendment to this statute allowing a good faith defense to the award of liquidated damages, the distinction created between employers who failed to pay overtime before and after the effective date was not discriminatory, was based on a rational decision by the legislature, and was not a violation of equal protection rights. Henash v. Ipalook, 985 P.2d 442 (Alaska), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964, 120 S. Ct. 399, 145 L. Ed. 2d 311 (U.S. 1999).

Liquidated damages as mandatory and punitive. —

See Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979); McKeown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 820 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1991) (decided prior to the 1995 amendment, which added subsections (d) through (j)).

Denial of liquidated damages held proper. —

Trial court that granted summary judgment to employee on an overtime claim did not err in failing to award liquidated damages because employer acted reasonably and in good faith in that employer initiated interactions with a supervisory level state department of labor (DOL) employee, provided her with a detailed pay plan, received her approval of the plan, consulted with its attorney regarding the issue, was open with its employees about how they were being paid, and lacked intent to conceal or mislead the DOL or its employees. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084 (Alaska 2008).

No conflict with 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 260. —

This section, which grants mandatory liquidated damages, does not conflict with 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 260, which make such awards discretionary if the employer shows he acted in good faith. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980) (decided prior to the 1995 amendment, which among other things, added subsection (d)).

Concurrent coverage of minimum wage claims is not preempted by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. It appears that 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) was intended to allow the recovery of additional amounts under more protective state laws. It is logical that Congress contemplated that the state would allow for an action as to the whole claim, not just the increment, and, further, that Congress intended that the claims would be brought together, where possible, so that enforcement would not be costly. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Revival of agent or representative action. —

The legislature plainly determined to revive the agent or representative action, where the employee individually designates in writing an agent or representative to maintain an action for him. Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, 627 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1981).

Class action procedures. —

See Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Private settlement of claim. —

An employer and employee can privately settle an Alaska Wage and Hour Act claim, and public policy is not offended when the employee unquestionably receives the full amount the AWHA requires. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Shook, 978 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1999).

Severance payment which exceeds maximum recovery. —

Release given by employee in exchange for large severance payment, which substantially exceeded the maximum he could have recovered under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, encompassed any subsequent AWHA violation claims by the employee, and the severance payment fully satisfied any potential AWHA award. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Shook, 978 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1999).

Retaliatory discharge. —

Denial of plaintiffs’ summary judgment or directed verdicts on retaliatory discharge claims was not error. Bliss v. Bobich, 971 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1998).

Prevailing party status in mixed causes of action. —

In cases involving mixed causes of action, some governed by the attorney’s fees provisions of Alaska R. Civ. P. 82 and some by that of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, the determination of prevailing party status remains a matter for sound trial court discretion, and it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to split prevailing party status for the divergent claims. Bliss v. Bobich, 971 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1998).

Offsetting of award. —

If suits are filed under both the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 , the Alaska award must be offset by any recovery under the federal act. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1980).

Prejudgment interest for liquidated damages. —

Because a plaintiff has no right to use liquidated damages before they are actually awarded, an award of prejudgment interest would compensate her for a nonexistent loss. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, an employee may not recover prejudgment interest for liquidated damages. Bobich v. Stewart, 843 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1992).

Computation of salaried worker’s compensation. —

Trial court’s decision to treat all of complainant’s earned overtime pay as unpaid overtime wages, which would pay him at twice his regular rate for his actual straight-time hours, required reversal of judgment and remand for recalculation of damages. Piquniq Mgt. Corp. v. Reeves, 965 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1998).

Abuse of discretion not found. —

Excluding evidence of employer’s prior overtime violations and of his dealings with his attorneys from suit for unpaid overtime wages was not an abuse of discretion. Bliss v. Bobich, 971 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1998).

Trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff employee attorney fees and liquidated damages; employer failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of good faith in failing to pay overtime. Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Payment of arbitral costs. —

Requirement that an employee would pay arbitral costs was unenforceable because it was contrary to the policies of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act; any contract requiring the waiver of substantive rights afforded by the Act may be declared void on that basis, and giving the employer the option on remand to agree that it would be responsible for all of the arbitration costs was preferable to ruling that the case may not be arbitrated. Gibson v. NYE Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2009).

Attorney fees. —

In a case in which the superior court judge found that the pilot's time spent waiting was not his employer's but his own, and he was not entitled to be compensated for it under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, the superior court judge did not err in declining to award attorney's fees to the employer as the pilot's claim that he was engaged to wait, while ultimately a losing one, involved a complex interpretation of law and fact that merited a full trial on the merits. Moody v. Lodge, 433 P.3d 1173 (Alaska 2018).

Judgment reversed. —

Trial court’s decision to treat all of complainant’s earned overtime pay as unpaid overtime wages, which would pay him at twice his regular rate for straight-time hours, required reversal of the judgment and remand for recalculation of damages. Piquniq Mgt. Corp. v. Reeves, 965 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1998).

Attorney fees. —

Trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was not an abuse of discretion. Bobich v. Stewart, 843 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1992).

The Alaska Wage and Hour Act, prior to its amendment in August 1995, did not permit an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing employer. Grimes v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 938 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1997).

Where final judgment includes liquidated damages, those damages must be included in calculations under Alaska R. Civ. P. 68(b)(1), comparing final judgment against prior settlement offer in determining award of attorney’s fees. Bobich v. Hughes, 965 P.2d 1196 (Alaska 1998).

Court erred in denying prevailing plaintiff fees for the time their attorney spent preparing their fee application. Bliss v. Bobich, 971 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1998).

If the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA), AS 23.10.050 et seq. applied to the employees’ claims, then the superior court should have determined liquidated damages and awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, and if AWHA did not apply to the employees’ claims, then the superior court should have determined whether the employees were entitled to attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory. DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 525 (Alaska 2002).

Claims for overtime wages earned before August 22, 1995 (the effective date for amended AS 23.10.110 ) are exempt from having attorney’s fees collected against them under former AS 23.10.110 (c) or Alaska Civ. R. 82; claims for wages earned after that date are subject to amended AS 23.10.110(f) , which allows a defendant to collect attorney’s fees in an action for unpaid overtime compensation only in the event of a frivolous or bad faith claim. Diaz v. Silver Bay Logging, Inc., 55 P.3d 732 (Alaska 2002).

It was not an abuse of discretion to award an employee attorney fees because it was reasonable to conclude that the employee was a prevailing party as to the employee’s main claim for an unpaid bonus. Brown v. Knowles, 307 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2013).

Applied in

Hallam v. Holland Am. Line, Inc., 27 P.3d 751 (Alaska 2001).

Quoted in

Gore v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 703 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1985); Jeffcoat v. State, Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987).

Cited in

Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989); Geneva Woods Pharm., Inc. v. Thygeson, 181 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2008); Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge, 339 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 23.10.115. Enforcement by injunction.

If it appears to the commissioner that an employer is engaged in an act or practice that violates or will violate a provision of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 or of a regulation adopted under these sections, the commissioner may bring an action in a competent court to enjoin the act or practice, and to enforce compliance with AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 or with the regulation. Upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.

History. (§ 9(4) ch 171 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Gore v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 703 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1985).

Cited in

Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 23.10.120. Enforcement of subpoenas.

If a person fails to comply with a subpoena issued under AS 23.10.080 , or if a witness refuses to produce evidence or to testify to a matter regarding which the witness may be lawfully interrogated, a competent court shall, upon application of the commissioner or an authorized representative, compel obedience by proceedings for contempt, as in the case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena issued by the court or a refusal to testify before it.

History. (§ 9(5) ch 171 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.10.125. Collective bargaining.

AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 do not limit the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing to establish wages or conditions of work in excess of the applicable minimum under AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 or to establish hours of work shorter than the applicable maximum under AS 23.10.050 — 23.10.150.

History. (§ 10 ch 171 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.10.130. Statute of limitations.

An action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 is forever barred unless it is started within two years after the cause of action accrues. For the purposes of this section an action is considered to be started on the date when the complaint is filed.

History. (§§ 11, 12 ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 57 ch 59 SLA 1982)

Notes to Decisions

No preemption by Federal statute. —

The statute of limitations for willful violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), does not preempt the limitation period in this section. Quinn v. State Employees Ass'n/AFSCME, 944 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1997).

Separate filing did not revive claims barred by this section. —

Plaintiff’s claim, filed approximately six months after he was terminated, for unpaid overtime and a penalty under AS 23.05.140(b) and (d) was timely filed pursuant to AS 09.10.070(a)(3); however, that filing did not revive Alaska Wage and Hour Act claims that were “forever barred” by this section. Quinn v. State Employees Ass'n/AFSCME, 944 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1997).

Contract claim held time-barred. —

Because employee who was entitled to damages for miscalculation of overtime pay had no viable breach of contract overtime claim, his recovery was governed by the two-year statute of limitations for AWHA violations rather than the three-year statute of limitations for contract claims. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084 (Alaska 2008).

Time claim accrues. —

Employee’s overtime and derivative claims were not time-barred because the claims did not accrue until the accounting procedures used to calculate the employee’s unpaid bonus were completed. Brown v. Knowles, 307 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2013).

Wage claim tolls statute. —

Department of labor proceedings are a form of quasi-judicial relief; therefore, filing a statutory wage claim with the department equitably tolls the statute of limitations if the other requirements of that doctrine are established. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989).

Class action complaint tolls statute. —

Where, after denying an initial motion to certify classes in a class action suit alleging violations of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, the trial court reserved the plaintiffs’ right to move for certification again after further discovery, the statute of limitations was tolled from the date of the original class complaint. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Adams, 963 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1998).

Although it denied an employee the right to participate in a class action suit alleging violations of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act, trial court reserved the plaintiff’s right to sue directly, and, under equitable tolling principles, employee had the full statutory period to file his claim to recover for all of his overtime hours. Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 23.10.135. Violations.

An employer violates AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 if the employer (1) hinders or delays the commissioner or an authorized representative of the commissioner in the performance of their duties in the enforcement of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 ; (2) refuses to admit the commissioner or an authorized representative to any place of employment; (3) fails to keep or falsifies a record required under the provisions of AS 23.10.050 — 23.10.150; (4) refuses to make a record accessible, or to furnish a sworn statement of the record, or to give information required for the enforcement of AS 23.10.050 — 23.10.150, upon demand, to the commissioner or an authorized representative; (5) fails to post an abstract of AS 23.10.050 — 23.10.150 as required by AS 23.10.105 ; (6) discharges or in any other manner discriminates against an employee because the employee has filed a complaint, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to AS 23.10.050 — 23.10.150, or has testified or is about to testify in such a proceeding.

History. (§ 9(1) ch 171 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.10.140. Penalty.

An employer who violates a provision of AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 , or of any regulation or order of the commissioner issued under it, upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $2,000, or by imprisonment for not less than 10 nor more than 90 days, or by both. Each day a violation occurs constitutes a separate offense.

History. (§ 9(2) ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Gore v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 703 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1985).

Sec. 23.10.145. Definitions.

If not defined in this title or in regulations adopted under this title, terms used in AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 shall be defined as they are defined in 29 U.S.C. 201 — 219 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), as amended, or the regulations adopted under those sections.

History. (§ 2(2) ch 171 SLA 1959; am § 4 ch 47 SLA 1983; am § 5 ch 90 SLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Applicability of federal regulatory definitions. —

This section directs the courts to apply federal regulatory definitions “where applicable,” and such definitions are “applicable” only when the state director of the wage and hour division and the commissioner of labor have refrained from defining terms in the state regulations, pursuant to their discretionary authority under AS 23.10.085 and 23.10.095 . Dresser Indus. v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 633 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019, 102 S. Ct. 1716, 72 L. Ed. 2d 137 (U.S. 1982).

Employee was not exempt from overtime pay where he spent almost 60 percent of his work time performing non-management tasks. Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Prisoner is not “employee” of state under the federal act and, therefore, is not so by virtue of AS 23.10.065 . McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975).

Stated in

Whitesides v. U-Haul Co., 16 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2001).

Sec. 23.10.150. Short title.

AS 23.10.050 23.10.150 may be cited as the Alaska Wage and Hour Act.

History. (§ 1 ch 171 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Hageland Aviation Servs. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444 (Alaska 2009); Hoendermis v. Advanced Physical Therapy, Inc., 251 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2011).

Secs. 23.10.155 — 23.10.320. Equal pay for women, discrimination in employment, and age discrimination. [Repealed, § 8 ch 117 SLA 1965, § 5 ch 125 SLA 1980. For present provisions, see AS 18.80.220.]

Article 4. Employment of Children.

Administrative Code. —

For child labor, see 8 AAC 05.

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 154.

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 1021.

Sec. 23.10.325. Purpose.

It is the purpose of AS 23.10.325 23.10.370 to establish protective standards for child labor to the end that their health, morals, education, and future welfare will be protected during the formative years and to the further end that any abuses or unjust exploitation of this labor will be effectively prohibited.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1949)

Administrative Code. —

For entertainment industry, see 8 AAC 5, art. 5.

Sec. 23.10.330. Exempted employment.

  1. AS 23.10.325 23.10.370 do not prohibit employment of a child under the direct supervision of a parent in a business owned and operated by the parent or the work of a child on a boat owned and operated by the parent of the child.
  2. Notwithstanding AS 23.10.335 23.10.350 , a minor of any age may be employed as a performer in the entertainment industry. The provisions of AS 23.10.335 23.10.350 and AS 23.10.360(a) and 23.10.360(c) concerning times, hours, or days of work do not apply to the employment of a minor as a performer in the entertainment industry. The department may adopt regulations to implement this subsection. In this subsection, a “performer in the entertainment industry” means a performer in advertisements and television, film, radio, and theater productions but does not include employment on the premises of a business offering any form of adult entertainment under AS 23.10.350(f) regardless of the nature of the work performed by the minor.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 86 SLA 1992; am § 2 ch 18 SLA 1995)

Administrative Code. —

For entertainment industry, see 8 AAC 5, art. 5.

Collateral references. —

Lawn mowing by minors as violation of child labor statutes. 56 ALR3d 1166.

Sec. 23.10.332. Authorization for children under 17 to work.

  1. Except for employment exempted under AS 23.10.330 and other employment specifically exempted by regulations adopted by the department, a minor under 17 years of age may not be employed or allowed to work without the written authorization of the commissioner unless authorized under AS 23.10.360 or under (c) of this section.
  2. The department shall adopt regulations necessary to implement this section.
  3. An employer may employ a minor who is at least 14 years of age to perform a specific job consisting of listed duties without the written authorization of the commissioner under (a) of this section if the employer has, in advance, secured the approval of the commissioner for a minor to perform that job and the employer files the written consent from the minor’s parent or guardian described in (d) of this section. The employer may not change any of the listed duties of a job to be performed by a minor without prior approval of the commissioner.
  4. A written consent from a parent or guardian filed under (c) of this section
    1. is valid only for the job and listed duties specified on the consent;
    2. must be filed with the commissioner within seven calendar days after the minor begins working the job specified in the consent;
    3. is valid for the calendar year in which it is executed or, in the case of a written consent executed in December, for that calendar year, the next calendar year, or both, depending on the terms of the written consent;
    4. shall be on a form provided by the department; the department may use the same form that it uses to issue work permits under (a) of this section to secure parental signatures under this subsection; and
    5. must be signed by a parent or legal guardian of the minor before the date the minor begins working the job specified in the consent.

History. (§ 3 ch 112 SLA 1976; am §§ 1, 2 ch 76 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For employment of minors under 18 years of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 2.

Sec. 23.10.335. Employment of children under 14.

A minor under 14 years of age may not be employed or allowed to work in an occupation outside school hours except in domestic employment, baby-sitting, and handiwork in and about private homes; newspaper delivery or sales; or canneries in warehouse work casing cans under competent supervision.

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1949)

Sec. 23.10.340. Employment of children under 16.

  1. A minor under 16 years of age may not be employed for more than a combined total of nine hours school attendance and employment in one day.  If employed, the minor’s work may be performed only between 5 a.m. and 9 p.m.  Employment outside school hours may not exceed 23 hours in one week, domestic work and baby-sitting excepted.
  2. [Repealed, § 7 ch 112 SLA 1976.]

History. (§ 1 ch 73 SLA 1949; § 3 ch 73 SLA 1949; am § 2 ch 28 SLA 1951; am § 7 ch 112 SLA 1976; am § 1 ch 55 SLA 1981)

Sec. 23.10.345. Exemptions for minors over 16 or who have graduated from high school. [Repealed, § 7 ch 112 SLA 1976.]

Sec. 23.10.350. Employment of person under 18.

  1. A minor under 18 years of age may not be employed or allowed to work
    1. more than six days a week;
    2. in hazardous excavation, or underground in mines, or as hoisting engineer in mines; or
    3. in an occupation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to the health of the minor.
  2. If the commissioner determines that the duties to be performed by the minor would not unduly endanger the life, limb, or health of the minor and if the employment meets the conditions of wages and hours prevailing for the majority of the employees in the industry at the time of employment, the commissioner may grant an exemption in writing from (a) of this section for a minor 16 — 18 years of age to work at those duties
    1. outside school hours, or while on school vacation, if the minor is attending school; or
    2. if the minor is no longer attending school.
  3. Except as provided in (e) of this section, a person under 18 years of age who is scheduled to work for six consecutive hours or more is entitled to a break of at least 30 minutes during the course of the work shift. The break required by this subsection may be scheduled at the convenience of the employer but must occur after the first hour and a half of work and before the beginning of the last hour of work. A person under 18 years of age who works for five consecutive hours without a break is entitled to a break of at least 30 minutes before continuing to work. This subsection may be modified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement that covers the employment of the person under 18. This subsection may be modified on occasion by mutual agreement between the employer and the employee.
  4. Notwithstanding AS 23.10.055(a)(11) , failure to provide the unpaid break periods required by (c) of this section creates a minimum wage liability under AS 23.10.065 for the break that the employee did not receive or received late. A claim for minimum wage in lieu of the unpaid break is enforceable under AS 23.10.110 .
  5. The provisions of (c) of this section do not apply to
    1. an individual employed in the catching, trapping, cultivating or farming, netting, or taking of any kind of fish, shellfish, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life;
    2. an individual employed by a member of the individual’s family; in this paragraph, “member of the individual’s family” means the individual’s spouse, parent, stepparent, grandparent, step-grandparent, great grandparent, step-great grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, great-uncle, or great-aunt, whether of the whole or half blood or by adoption or by marriage.
  6. A minor under the age of 18 may not be employed or allowed to work in any capacity on the premises of a business that offers adult entertainment. In this subsection, “business that offers adult entertainment” means a business in which one or more individuals are employed or contracted to, wholly or in part, or permitted to entertain others by
    1. removing clothes or other items that clothe or hide the person’s body;
    2. dancing or in any other manner exhibiting the individual’s body in a completely or almost completely unclothed state;
    3. participating in an actual or simulated illegal, indecent, or lewd exhibition, act, or practice including
      1. sexual penetration;
      2. the lewd exhibition or touching of a person’s genitals, anus, or breast; or
      3. bestiality.

History. (§§ 2, 3 ch 73 SLA 1949; § 4 ch 73 SLA 1949; am §§ 1, 2 ch 28 SLA 1951; am § 84 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 4 ch 112 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 86 SLA 1992; am § 3 ch 18 SLA 1995)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2005, in subsection (d), “AS 23.10.055 (a)(11)” was substituted for “AS 23.10.055 (11)” to reflect the addition of AS 23.10.055(b) and (c) by § 2, ch. 90, SLA 2005.

Administrative Code. —

For employment of minors 14 and 15 years of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 1.

For employment of minors under 18 years of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 2.

For certificates of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 3.

Notes to Decisions

Premise behind present paragraph (3) of subsection (a). —

The child labor laws, and present paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section in particular, are premised in part on the notion that a child is not competent to assess the risks of personal injury and exploitation attendant in the performance of hazardous activities. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Illegally-employed child may assert common-law rights against employer. —

Where an employer has knowingly entered into an illegal contract of employment with a child, in express violation of a statute, the employer will not be permitted to insist that a child is an “employee” within the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, so that the child can no longer assert its common-law rights against the employer. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Absent any evidence of a conscious intent on her part to choose compensation benefits, an illegally employed minor cannot be held to have waived her right to a common-law remedy. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

And AS 23.30.055 does not bar common-law damage action by such child. —

AS 23.30.055 , the exclusive liability provision of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, does not bar a common-law damage action when such an action is brought against an employer by a person who was employed in violation of child labor laws at the time of injury. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Sec. 23.10.355. Employment of persons under 21.

A person under 21 may not be employed or allowed to sell or serve alcoholic beverages or to work on a licensed premises, except as provided in AS 04.16.049 .

History. (§ 3 ch 73 SLA 1949; am § 2 ch 28 SLA 1951; am § 24 ch 245 SLA 1970; am § 5 ch 112 SLA 1976; am § 58 ch 59 SLA 1982; am § 17 ch 109 SLA 1983)

Legislative history reports. —

Chapter 245, SLA 1970 (HCSSB 399 am H), was identical to CSHB 406 (Jud.). For report on CSHB 406 (Jud.), see 1970 House Journal Supplement No. 6.

Sec. 23.10.360. Regulations for minimum standards and work opportunities.

  1. The department may, from time to time after public notice and hearing, adopt regulations and issue orders establishing minimum standards for safety, working conditions, kind and extent of work in various phases of the respective fields of employment, maximum hours for the day and week, and minimum rates of pay, and other reasonable safeguards compatible with the welfare of all minors covered by AS 23.10.325 23.10.370 .
  2. The department shall make cooperative arrangements with other state and federal agencies and shall adopt the regulations that are necessary to provide opportunities for work experience in safe and healthful occupations for minors.
  3. The department shall, after notice and hearing, adopt regulations authorizing the employment of minors under 18 years of age and exempting appropriate employers from the requirement to secure the commissioner’s written authorization under AS 23.10.332(a) .

History. (§ 5 ch 73 SLA 1949; am § 6 ch 112 SLA 1976; am § 3 ch 76 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For employment of minors 14 and 15 years of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 1.

For employment of minors under 18 years of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 2.

For certificates of age, see 8 AAC 5, art. 3.

For entertainment industry, see 8 AAC 5, art. 5.

Sec. 23.10.365. Enforcement.

The department shall enforce AS 23.10.325 23.10.370 .

History. (§ 6 ch 73 SLA 1949)

Sec. 23.10.370. Penalty.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person who violates a provision of AS 23.10.325 23.10.370 is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or by both.
  2. A person who employs a minor in violation of AS 23.10.350(f) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor for the first offense and a class C felony for the second and each subsequent offense.

History. (§ 7 ch 73 SLA 1949; am §§ 4, 5 ch 18 SLA 1995)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Article 5. Transportation of Employees.

Administrative Code. —

For transportation of employees, see 8 AAC 20.

Collateral references. —

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 1158.

Sec. 23.10.375. Policy.

The welfare of the state demands that adequate provision be made for financing the return transportation of certain persons to their place of recruitment inside and outside the state upon termination of employment.

History. (ch 67 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Vail v. Coffman Eng'rs, 778 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 23.10.380. Right to return transportation.

  1. An employer who furnishes, finances, agrees to furnish or finance, or in any way provides transportation for a person from the place of hire to a point inside or outside the state to employ the person shall provide the person with return transportation to the place of hire from which transportation was furnished or financed, or to a destination agreed upon by the parties, with transportation to be furnished or financed
    1. on or after the termination of employment for a cause considered good and sufficient by the department, beyond the control of the person, or on or after the termination of the contract of employment or a renewal of the contract; and
    2. upon the request of the person or the department made within 45 days after the termination of employment.
  2. Upon the termination of employment the subsistence of the employee may not continue longer than 10 days after the termination or until transportation is available, whichever occurs first.

History. (§ 1 ch 67 SLA 1949; am § 1 ch 136 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 164 SLA 1960)

Administrative Code. —

For transportation of employees, see 8 AAC 20.

Notes to Decisions

No obligation regarding employee’s family or belongings. —

This section imposes on the employer a minimal obligation to provide return transportation to any employee it paid to relocate at the time of hire. The statute would, therefore, entitle the employee to recover return transportation expenses for himself, but not for his family or belongings. Vail v. Coffman Eng'rs, 778 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1989).

Cited in

Jeffcoat v. State, Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987).

Sec. 23.10.385. Enforcement by civil action.

  1. The department may take a written assignment of a right of action provided by AS 23.10.380 , and may prosecute the action.  The department may join various employees in one claim and in case of suit may join them in one action.
  2. The general provisions of law respecting wage collection suits brought by the department in behalf of employees apply in an action brought under this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 67 SLA 1949)

Administrative Code. —

For transportation of employees, see 8 AAC 20.

Sec. 23.10.390. Construction of contracts.

AS 23.10.375 23.10.400 are considered a part of every contract of hire involving transportation of an employee to and from this state or from one part of the state to another.

History. (§ 2(a) ch 67 SLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Vail v. Coffman Eng'rs, 778 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 23.10.395. Orders and regulations.

The department may issue orders and adopt regulations necessary to carry out AS 23.10.375 23.10.400 .

History. (§ 4 ch 67 SLA 1949)

Administrative Code. —

For transportation of employees, see 8 AAC 20.

Sec. 23.10.400. Penalty.

An employer who violates AS 23.10.375 23.10.400 is, in addition to any civil liability, guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000.

History. (§ 3 ch 67 SLA 1949)

Article 6. Employment in Underground Mines.

Cross references. —

For industrial safety generally, see AS 18.60.

Collateral references. —

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 1200.

Sec. 23.10.405. Legislative declaration of hazard.

Employment in underground coal mines, underground lode mines, underground placer mines, in underground coal, lode, or placer workings, or in all other underground mines or workings is injurious to health and dangerous to life and limb.

History. (§ 43-2-1 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.10.410. Limitation on period of employment in underground mines and requirement for pay for certain work.

  1. Except as provided in (d) — (f) of this section, a miner may not be employed in an underground mine or workings for more than 10 hours in 24 hours, except on a day when a change of shift is made. The 10-hour limitation applies only to work actually performed at the mine face or other place where the work is actually carried on and excludes time for meals, travel to or from the mine site, and travel between the mine portal and the mine face, whether in going on or off shift, or in going to or returning from meals. However, an employer shall pay wages for the time worked from the time the miner enters the mine at the mine portal, whether or not work is performed at the mine face or other place where the work is actually carried on, until the miner leaves the mine.
  2. If life or property is in imminent danger, the 10-hour period may be extended for the continuance of the emergency.
  3. The department may not, by regulation, impose more restrictions on the hours of work of miners than are imposed by this section. The department may issue orders and adopt regulations as necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
  4. On application from an employer, the commissioner may grant a variance that permits employment in an underground mine or workings for more than 10 but not more than 12 hours in a 24-hour period if the commissioner finds that
    1. the additional working time is permitted under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by a bargaining organization that represents workers performing the work covered by the variance; or
    2. the extension is in the best interest of resident workers of the state.
  5. If an employer intends to employ a miner for more than eight hours in 24 hours under (a) of this section, the employer shall notify the department.
  6. The department may revoke a variance granted under (d) of this section or reduce the 10-hour limitation on hours of work set in (a) of this section to eight hours if the department finds that
    1. a significant violation of state or federal law has occurred at the mine relating to health and safety;
    2. the employer has not abated the hazard causing the violation after receiving notice from the commissioner and an opportunity to cure the problem;
    3. the reduction of hours of work is necessary to protect the health and safety of the miners; and
    4. the reduction of hours of work is in the best interest of the resident workers of the state.
  7. An employer that has abated a hazard that was the cause of a violation described in (f)(1) of this section may notify the department of the abatement. The department shall reinstate the variance or remove the reduction of hours, as appropriate, within 30 days after receiving the notice from the employer if the department finds that the hazard has been abated.
  8. In this section, “miner”
    1. means a person who works in an underground mine or workings and is engaged in actual mining operations;
    2. does not include mechanics, warehousemen, electricians, and other support personnel at an underground mine or workings.

History. (§ 43-2-2 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 25 SLA 1996)

Cross references. —

For findings and intent concerning the 1996 amendment of this section, see § 1, ch. 25, SLA 1996 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 3, ch. 25, SLA 1996 provides that the provisions of that Act, which amended this section, “are severable under AS 01.10.030 .”

Sec. 23.10.415. Penalties.

  1. A person who, whether as principal or agent, employs a person in violation of the provisions of AS 23.10.410 is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon a first conviction is punishable by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500, or by imprisonment in a jail for not less than 60 days, nor more than six months, or by both.
  2. Upon a second conviction under AS 23.10.410 , the punishment is imprisonment in a jail for not less than 60 days, nor more than one year.  A second conviction under AS 23.10.410 means a conviction for a violation of AS 23.10.410 committed within a period of two years after a previous conviction for a violation of AS 23.10.410.  Other convictions are first convictions.  Each day’s violation of the provisions of AS 23.10.410 is a separate offense.

History. (§ 43-2-3 ACLA 1949)

Sec. 23.10.420. Train crews. [Repealed, § 1 ch 40 SLA 1983.]

Article 7. Employee Rights.

Sec. 23.10.430. Access to personnel files.

  1. An employer shall permit an employee or former employee to inspect and make copies of the employee’s personnel file and other personnel information maintained by the employer concerning the employee under reasonable rules during regular business hours. The employer may require an employee or former employee who requests copies of material under this subsection to pay the reasonable cost of duplication.
  2. This section does not supersede the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
  3. In this section,
    1. “employee” means a person employed by an employer;
    2. “employer” means a person who employs one or more other persons and includes the state, the University of Alaska, the Alaska Railroad, and political subdivisions of the state.

History. (§ 1 ch 24 SLA 1989)

Collateral references. —

Validity and construction of statute giving employee the right to review and comment upon personnel record maintained by employer. 64 ALR4th 619.

Sec. 23.10.440. Posting of information on sexual harassment. [Repealed, § 2 ch 65 SLA 1992.]

Article 8. Drug and Alcohol Testing by Employers.

Cross references. —

For provisions relating to controlled substances, see AS 11.71.

Sec. 23.10.500. — 23.10.550. [Renumbered as AS 39.20.500 — 39.20.550.]

Sec. 23.10.600. Employer protection from litigation.

  1. If an employer has established a drug and alcohol testing policy and initiated a testing program under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 , a person may not bring an action for damages against the employer for
    1. actions in good faith based on the results of a positive drug test or alcohol impairment test;
    2. failure to test for drugs or alcohol impairment or failure to test for a specific drug or another controlled substance;
    3. failure to test or, if tested, failure to detect a specific drug or other substance, a medical condition, or a mental, emotional, or psychological disorder or condition; or
    4. termination or suspension of a drug or alcohol prevention or testing program or policy.
  2. A person may not bring an action for damages based on test results against an employer who has established and implemented a drug and alcohol testing program under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 unless the employer’s action was based on a false positive test result and the employer knew or clearly should have known that the result was in error and ignored the true test result because of reckless or malicious disregard for the truth or the wilful intent to deceive or be deceived.
  3. In a claim, including a claim under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 , if it is alleged that an employer’s action was based on a false positive test result,
    1. there is a rebuttable presumption that the test result was valid if the employer complied with the provisions of AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 ; and
    2. the employer is not liable for monetary damages if the employer’s reliance on a false positive test result was reasonable and in good faith.
  4. A person may not bring an action for damages against an employer for an action taken related to a false negative drug test or alcohol impairment test.
  5. A person may not bring an action against an employer based on failure of the employer to establish a program or policy on substance abuse prevention or to implement drug testing or alcohol impairment testing.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.610. Limits on causes of action for disclosures.

A person may not bring an action for defamation of character, libel, slander, or damage to reputation against an employer who has established a program of drug testing or alcohol impairment testing under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 if the action is based on drug or alcohol testing unless

  1. the results of the test were disclosed to a person other than the employer, an authorized employee, agent or representative of the employer, the tested employee, the tested prospective employee, or another person authorized or privileged by law to receive the information;
  2. the information disclosed was a false positive test result;
  3. the false positive test result was disclosed negligently; and
  4. all elements of an action for defamation of character, libel, slander, or damage to reputation as established by law are satisfied.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.615. Employer’s compliance voluntary.

Compliance with AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 by employers is voluntary.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.620. Employer policy.

  1. Under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 , an employer may only carry out the testing or retesting for the presence or evidence of use of drugs or alcohol after adopting a written policy for the testing and retesting and informing employees of the policy. The employer may inform employees by distributing a copy of the policy to each employee subject to testing or making the policy available to employees in the same manner as the employer informs its employees of other personnel practices, including inclusion in a personnel handbook or manual or posting in a place accessible to employees. The employer shall inform prospective employees that they must undergo drug testing.
  2. The written policy on drug and alcohol testing must include, at a minimum,
    1. a statement of the employer’s policy respecting drug and alcohol use by employees;
    2. a description of those employees or prospective employees who are subject to testing;
    3. the circumstances under which testing may be required;
    4. the substances as to which testing may be required;
    5. a description of the testing methods and collection procedures to be used, including an employee’s right to a confirmatory drug test to be reviewed by a licensed physician or doctor of osteopathy after an initial positive drug test result in accordance with AS 23.10.640(d) ;
    6. the consequences of a refusal to participate in the testing;
    7. any adverse personnel action that may be taken based on the testing procedure or results;
    8. the right of an employee, on the employee’s request, to obtain the written test results and the obligation of the employer to provide written test results to the employee within five working days after a written request to do so, so long as the written request is made within six months after the date of the test;
    9. the right of an employee, on the employee’s request, to explain in a confidential setting, a positive test result; if the employee requests in writing an opportunity to explain the positive test result within 10 working days after the employee is notified of the test result, the employer must provide an opportunity, in a confidential setting, within 72 hours after receiving the employee’s written notice, or before taking adverse employment action;
    10. a statement of the employer’s policy regarding the confidentiality of the test results.
  3. An employer may require the collection and testing of a sample of an employee’s or prospective employee’s urine or breath for any job-related purpose consistent with business necessity and the terms of the employer’s policy, including
    1. investigation of possible individual employee impairment;
    2. investigation of accidents in the workplace; an employee may be required to undergo drug testing or alcohol impairment testing for an accident if the test is taken as soon as practicable after an accident and the test is administered to employees who the employer reasonably believes may have contributed to the accident;
    3. maintenance of safety for employees, customers, clients, or the public at large;
    4. maintenance of productivity, the quality of products or services, or security of property or information;
    5. reasonable suspicion that an employee may be affected by the use of drugs or alcohol and that the use may adversely affect the job performance or the work environment.
  4. In addition to tests required under (c) of this section, an employer may require employees or groups of employees to undergo drug testing on a random or chance basis.
  5. If an employer institutes a policy of drug testing or alcohol impairment testing under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 , the policy must identify which employees or positions are subject to testing. An employer must test all or part of the work force based on consideration of safety for employees, customers, clients, or the public at large. An employer may not initiate a testing program under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 until at least 30 days after the employer notifies employees of the employer’s intent to implement the program and makes written copies of the policy available as required by (a) of this section.
  6. The provisions of AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 may not be construed to discourage, restrict, limit, prohibit, or require on-site drug testing or alcohol impairment testing.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.630. Collection of samples.

  1. An employer may test an employee for the presence of drugs or for alcohol impairment. An employer may test a prospective employee for the presence of drugs.
  2. In order to test reliably, an employer may require an employee or prospective employee to provide a sample of the individual’s urine or breath and to present reliable individual identification to the person collecting the sample. Collection of the sample must conform to the requirements of AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 . The employer may designate the type of sample to be used for testing.
  3. An employer shall normally schedule a drug test or an alcohol impairment test of employees during, or immediately before or after, a regular work period. Alcohol impairment or drug testing required by an employer is considered to be work time for the purposes of compensation and benefits for current employees. Sample collection shall be performed in a manner that guarantees the individual’s privacy to the maximum extent consistent with ensuring that the sample is not contaminated, adulterated, or misidentified.
  4. An employer shall pay the entire actual costs for drug testing and alcohol impairment testing required of employees and prospective employees. An employer shall also pay reasonable transportation costs to an employee if the required test is conducted at a location other than the employee’s normal work site.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.640. Testing procedures.

  1. Sample collection and testing for alcohol impairment and drugs under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 shall be performed under reasonable and sanitary conditions. The person collecting samples shall document the sample, including labeling the sample to preclude to the extent reasonable the possibility of misidentification of the person tested in relation to the test result provided, and shall provide the person to be tested with an opportunity to provide medical information that may be relevant to the test, including identifying current or recently used prescription and nonprescription drugs.
  2. Sample collection, storage, and transportation to the place of testing shall be performed in a manner reasonably designed to preclude the possibility of sample contamination, adulteration, or misidentification.
  3. Sample testing must comply with scientifically accepted analytical methods and procedures. Except for on-site testing under AS 23.10.645 , drug testing shall be conducted at a laboratory approved or certified by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration or the College of American Pathologists, American Association of Clinical Chemists.
  4. Drug testing, including on-site drug testing, must include confirmation of a positive drug test result. The confirmation must be by use of a different analytical process than was used in the initial drug screen. The second or confirmatory drug test shall be a gas chromatography mass spectrometry. An employer may not rely on a positive drug test unless the confirmatory drug test results have been reviewed by a licensed physician or doctor of osteopathy. The physician or osteopath shall
    1. contact the employee within 48 hours and offer an opportunity to discuss the confirming test result;
    2. interpret and evaluate the positive drug test results for legal use; and
    3. report test results that have been caused by prescription medication as negative.
  5. A drug test conducted under this section or in an on-site test under AS 23.10.645 for a drug for which the United States Department of Health and Human Services has established a cutoff level shall be considered to have yielded a positive result if the test establishes the presence of the drug at levels equal to or greater than that cutoff level. For a drug for which the United States Department of Health and Human Services has not established a cutoff level, the employer shall, in the written policy under AS 23.10.620 , inform employees of the cutoff level that the employer will use to establish the presence of the drug.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.645. On-site testing.

  1. An employer may include on-site drug and alcohol tests of employees and prospective employees as part of the employer’s drug and alcohol testing policy under AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 . In on-site testing under this section, an employer may only use products approved by the Food and Drug Administration for employee testing and shall use the products in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. On-site testing under this section may only be conducted by a test administrator who is certified under AS 23.10.650(b) .
  2. In on-site testing under this section, the specimen to be tested must be kept in sight of the employee or applicant who is the subject of the test. The test administrator shall
    1. conduct the test in a manner that allows the subject of the test to observe the testing procedure and the results; in the case of a sight-impaired employee, the employee may request the presence of an observer; however, the test administrator is not required to delay collection of the sample or administration of the test because of the sight-impaired employee’s request;
    2. complete the sample documentation required under AS 23.10.640(a) ;
    3. prepare a written record of the results of the on-site test.
  3. An employer may not take permanent employment action against an employee based on an unconfirmed, screen positive on-site test result. If an employer takes temporary adverse employment action based on an on-site test result, the employer shall restore the employee’s wages and benefits if the confirmatory test result is negative or if the employee demonstrates that the positive test result was caused by drugs taken in accordance with a valid prescription of the employee or by lawful nonprescription drugs.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.650. Training of test administrators.

  1. Each employer shall ensure that at least one designated employee receives at least 60 minutes of training on alcohol misuse and at least an additional 60 minutes of training on the use of controlled substances. The training will be used by the designee to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists to require an employee to undergo testing under AS 23.10.630 .
  2. If an employer administers on-site drug or alcohol tests to test employees or prospective employees under AS 23.10.645 , the employer shall ensure that each person who will be administering the on-site test receives training and meets the qualifications of this subsection. An on-site test administrator must
    1. have been trained by the manufacturer of the test or the manufacturer’s representative on the proper procedure for administering the test and accurate evaluation of on-site test results; training must be conducted in person by a trainer from the manufacturer or the manufacturer’s representative;
    2. be certified in writing by the manufacturer or the manufacturer’s representative as competent to administer and evaluate the on-site test;
    3. have been trained to recognize adulteration of a sample to be used in on-site testing; and
    4. sign a statement that clearly states that the on-site test administrator will hold all information related to any phase of a drug test confidential.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.655. Disciplinary procedures.

  1. An employer may take adverse employment action based on
    1. a positive drug test or alcohol impairment test result that indicates a violation of the employer’s written policy;
    2. the refusal of an employee or prospective employee to provide a drug testing sample; or
    3. the refusal of an employee to provide an alcohol impairment testing sample.
  2. Adverse employment action under (a) of this section may include
    1. a requirement that the employee enroll in an employer provided or employer approved rehabilitation, treatment, or counseling program; the program may include additional drug testing and alcohol impairment testing; the employer may require participation in the program as a condition of employment; costs of participating in the program may or may not be covered by the employer’s health plan or policies;
    2. suspension of the employee, with or without pay, for a designated period of time;
    3. termination of employment;
    4. in case of drug testing, refusal to hire a prospective employee; and
    5. other adverse employment action.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.660. Confidentiality of results; access to records.

A communication received by an employer relevant to drug test or alcohol impairment test results and received through the employer’s testing program is a confidential and privileged communication and may not be disclosed except

  1. to the tested employee or prospective employee or another person designated in writing by the employee or prospective employee;
  2. to individuals designated by an employer to receive and evaluate test results or hear the explanation of the employee or prospective employee; or
  3. as ordered by a court or governmental agency.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.670. Effect of mandatory testing obligations.

An employer who is obligated by state or federal requirements to have a drug testing or alcohol impairment testing policy or program shall receive the full benefits of AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 even if the required policy or program is not consistent with AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 , so long as the employer complies with the state or federal requirements applicable to the employer’s operations.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Sec. 23.10.699. Definitions.

In AS 23.10.600 23.10.699 ,

  1. “alcohol” means ethanol, isopropanol, or methanol;
  2. “drug testing” means testing for evidence of the use of a drug;
  3. “drugs” means a substance considered unlawful under AS 11.71 or the metabolite of the substance;
  4. “employee” means a person in the service of an employer;
  5. “employer” means a person who employs one or more full-time employees under a contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written;
  6. “good faith” means reasonable reliance on fact, or that which is held out to be factual, without the intent to deceive or be deceived and without reckless or malicious disregard for the truth;
  7. “prospective employee” means a person who has made application to an employer, whether written or oral, to become an employee;
  8. “random” means a scientifically valid method that ensures that all covered employees have an equal chance of being selected;
  9. “sample” means urine or breath from the person being tested.

History. (§ 1 ch 106 SLA 1997)

Chapter 15. Employment Services.

Article 1. Vocational Rehabilitation.

Administrative Code. —

For vocational rehabilitation, see 8 AAC 98.

Collateral references. —

79 Am. Jur. 2d, Welfare Laws, §§ 32-37.

51B C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 1044

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 102-106.

Sec. 23.15.010. Administration of vocational rehabilitation.

The commissioner shall administer the vocational rehabilitation program.

History. (§ 37-9-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 169 SLA 1955; am § 2 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 79 SLA 1960; am § 16 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Administrative Code. —

For plans of service, see 8 AAC 98, art. 1.

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.020. Powers and duties of commissioner.

  1. The commissioner may cooperate with a federal agency, as provided and required by federal law for vocational rehabilitation.
  2. The commissioner shall comply with the federal laws and the conditions necessary to secure the full benefit of the federal vocational rehabilitation laws, and shall do all things necessary to entitle the state to receive the benefits of the federal laws.
  3. The commissioner may do all the things and adopt the regulations that are necessary to carry out the federal laws and the purposes of AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 .

History. (§ 37-9-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 169 SLA 1955; am § 2 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 79 SLA 1960; am § 17 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Administrative Code. —

For plans of service, see 8 AAC 98, art. 1.

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

For confidentiality of personal information, see 8 AAC 98, art. 3.

For hearings and appeals, see 8 AAC 98, art. 4.

Sec. 23.15.030. Appointment of administrative officers.

The commissioner may appoint administrative officers and delegate to them the authority necessary to carry out AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 .

History. (§ 37-9-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 169 SLA 1955; am § 2 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 79 SLA 1960; am § 18 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 23.15.040. Division of vocational rehabilitation established.

The division of vocational rehabilitation is established under the commissioner to carry out AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 .

History. (§ 37-9-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 169 SLA 1955; am § 2 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 18 ch 208 SLA 1975; am § 19 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 23.15.050. Director of vocational rehabilitation.

The commissioner shall appoint a director of the division of vocational rehabilitation. The director has the administrative authority delegated by the commissioner and necessary to carry out AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 and the regulations and policies adopted by the commissioner.

History. (§ 37-9-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 144 SLA 1957; am §§ 2, 3 ch 79 SLA 1960; am § 9 ch 96 SLA 1967; am § 19 ch 208 SLA 1975; am § 20 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 23.15.060. Agreements under Social Security Act.

  1. The commissioner may enter into necessary agreements on behalf of the state with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to carry out the provisions of the federal Social Security Act, as amended, and as it is subsequently amended, relating to the making of determinations of disability under Title II and Title XVI of that Act.
  2. The Department of Revenue shall act as the custodian of funds paid by the federal government to the state, shall comply with agreements entered into under the Social Security Act, and shall disburse the funds in accordance with instructions from the director of the division of vocational rehabilitation.

History. (§ 37-9-6 ACLA 1949; am § 2 ch 169 SLA 1955; am § 2 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 20 ch 208 SLA 1975; am § 1 ch 5 SLA 1978; am § 21 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Cross references. —

For federal law relating to eligibility under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. 422 and 1382.

Sec. 23.15.070. Personnel policies [Repealed, § 84 ch 58 SLA 1999.]

Sec. 23.15.080. Eligibility for vocational rehabilitation service.

  1. Vocational rehabilitation service shall be provided directly or through a public or private instrumentality to an individual with a disability who
    1. is a resident of the state at the time of application for the service and whose vocational rehabilitation the agency determines after full investigation can be satisfactorily achieved; or
    2. is eligible for the service under an agreement with another state or with the federal government.
  2. In determining the types and extent of vocational rehabilitation services to be provided to an individual with a disability, the agency shall take into consideration any similar benefits that may be available to the individual under other programs. However, the agency may not take other benefits into consideration when doing so would significantly delay the provision of needed services to the individual with a disability. The agency need not take other benefits into consideration when they are for
    1. diagnostic and related services, including transportation and subsistence in connection with those services;
    2. counseling, guidance, and referral;
    3. training, including personal and vocational adjustment training, and necessary training materials;
    4. services to members of families of individuals with disabilities;
    5. job placement; and
    6. services necessary to assist individuals with disabilities to maintain suitable employment.

History. (§ 37-9-7(1) ACLA 1949; am § 3 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 2 ch 5 SLA 1978; am § 4 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For hearings and appeals, see 8 AAC 98, art. 4.

Sec. 23.15.090. Priority as to eligibility.

If vocational rehabilitation service cannot be provided for all eligible individuals with disabilities who apply, the agency shall provide by regulation for determining the order to be followed in selecting those to whom the services will be provided.

History. (§ 37-9-7(2) ACLA 1949; am § 3 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 5 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For order of selection for vocational rehabilitation services, see 8 AAC 98, art. 5.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2006 amendment, effective May 10, 2006, substituted “individuals with disabilities” for “handicapped individuals.”

Sec. 23.15.095. Gainful employment of individuals with disabilities.

  1. When providing vocational training, vocational rehabilitation, or employment placement of an individual with a disability, the agency’s primary objective and preferred outcome is to help the individual become gainfully employed in an integrated workplace where individuals with disabilities work with and alongside of individuals without disabilities.
  2. By December 31 of each year, the commissioner shall provide to the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority established by AS 47.30.011 a report on the agency’s progress toward the objective under (a) of this section.
  3. In this section, “gainfully employed” means employed full time or part time for compensation that is
    1. at or above the minimum wage; and
    2. not less than the compensation paid by the employer for the same or similar work performed by an individual who is not disabled.

History. (§ 3 ch 19 SLA 2014)

Effective dates. —

Section 3, ch. 19, SLA 2014, which enacted this section, took effect on August 27, 2014.

Sec. 23.15.100. Powers and duties; vending facilities.

  1. In carrying out AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 , the agency shall
    1. take the action it considers necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 and adopt regulations in conformity with these purposes;
    2. determine the eligibility of applicants for vocational rehabilitation service;
    3. submit to the governor annual reports of activities and expenditures and, before each regular session of the legislature, estimates of sums required for carrying out AS 23.15.010 — 23.15.210 and estimates of the amounts to be made available for this purpose from all sources;
    4. cooperate with public and private departments, agencies, and institutions in providing for the vocational rehabilitation of individuals with disabilities, studying the problems involved in providing this rehabilitation, and establishing, developing, and providing, in conformity with the purposes of AS 23.15.010 — 23.15.210, the programs, facilities, and services that may be necessary or desirable;
    5. survey the potential for providing vending facilities on public property and, when feasible, establish vending facilities operated by blind persons and persons with severe disabilities on public property;
    6. license blind persons and persons with severe disabilities in accordance with AS 23.15.133 for the operation of vending facilities on public property, with blind persons having first priority for operation of the vending facilities;
    7. provide the training and supervision necessary to enable blind persons and persons with severe disabilities to operate vending facilities;
    8. provide the equipment and initial stock necessary to enable blind persons and persons with severe disabilities to operate vending facilities.
  2. In carrying out AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 , the agency may
    1. enter into agreements with other states to provide for the vocational rehabilitation of residents of the states concerned;
    2. establish and operate rehabilitation facilities and workshops and make grants to public and other nonprofit organizations for these purposes;
    3. supervise the operation of vending stands and other small businesses established under AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 to be conducted by individuals with severe disabilities;
    4. make studies, investigations, demonstrations, and reports, and provide training and instruction, including the establishment and maintenance of the research fellowships and traineeships with the stipends and allowances that are considered necessary, in matters relating to vocational rehabilitation; and
    5. adopt regulations necessary for carrying out the provisions of AS 23.15.010 — 23.15.210.

History. (§ 37-9-8(1) (2) ACLA 1949; am § 4 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 75 SLA 1976; am §§ 1, 10 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 6 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Cross references. —

For present law covering the subject matter of former (b)(5) of this section, see AS 23.15.133 .

Administrative Code. —

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

For confidentiality of personal information, see 8 AAC 98, art. 3.

For hearings and appeals, see 8 AAC 98, art. 4.

For order of selection for vocational rehabilitation services, see 8 AAC 98, art. 5.

Sec. 23.15.110. Extension of services outside state.

Vocational rehabilitation service may be extended to the continental United States to all individuals eligible under AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 . The director may place professional or clerical personnel or both inside the continental United States to carry out the purposes of AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 .

History. (§ 37-9-8(3) ACLA 1949; am § 4 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 22 ch 208 SLA 1975)

Sec. 23.15.120. Cooperation with federal government.

  1. The agency shall cooperate with the federal government in carrying out the purposes of federal laws pertaining to vocational rehabilitation, including the licensing of blind persons to operate vending stands on federal property, and may adopt the methods of administration that are found by the federal government to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of agreements or plans for vocational rehabilitation. The agency may comply with the conditions that are necessary to obtain the full benefits of the federal laws for the state and its residents.
  2. Upon designation by the governor, the agency may perform functions and services for the federal government relating to individuals under a physical or mental disability, in addition to those provided in (a) of this section.

History. (§ 37-9-9 ACLA 1949; am § 5 ch 144 SLA 1957)

Administrative Code. —

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

For confidentiality of personal information, see 8 AAC 98, art. 3.

Sec. 23.15.125. Assistive technology loan guarantee and interest subsidy program.

  1. An assistive technology loan guarantee fund is established in the agency. The fund consists of money appropriated to it. The agency may solicit and accept available public and private money for distribution from the fund.
  2. Subject to (c) and (d) of this section, the agency may use money in the fund established under this section to guarantee 90 percent of the principal amount of a loan or to subsidize the interest rate of a loan guaranteed by the agency for appropriate assistive technology that is best suited for enabling a person with a disability to
    1. obtain or maintain employment; or
    2. live more independently.
  3. The agency may guarantee a loan or subsidize the interest rate of a loan guaranteed under this section if
    1. the loan is made to a person with a disability or a member of the person’s family to obtain assistive technology for the person with a disability within the limitations of (b) of this section;
    2. the loan is originated and serviced by a state or federally chartered financial institution located in the state;
    3. before a loan guarantee or subsidy is requested from a lending institution, the agency determines that the person requesting the loan guarantee or subsidy is not able to obtain the needed assistive technology from a less costly source;
    4. the lending institution determines that the person or the family of a child reasonably can be expected to repay the loan given their expected income or other resources; and
    5. for a loan to modify a vehicle to provide transportation for a person with a disability, the applicant has been steadily employed for the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the loan application.
  4. The director shall establish an assistive technology loan committee within the agency. The committee shall consist of the director, or the director’s designee, a representative of a financial institution who is experienced with consumer loans, and at least one but not more than three persons with disabilities. The committee shall
    1. establish guidelines for providing loans under this section, including guidelines relating to the maximum amounts and duration of loans and guidelines to ensure that persons with disabilities who live in rural or remote areas of the state have adequate access to loans under this section;
    2. annually establish the percentage of money in the fund that may be used for subsidizing the interest rates on loans guaranteed under this section; and
    3. make reports and recommendations to the legislature on the operation of the loan program.
  5. In this section,
    1. “assistive technology” means durable equipment, adaptive aids, and assistive devices;
    2. “person with a disability” means an individual having a physical or mental disability.

History. (§ 1 ch 65 SLA 1995; am § 7 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Sec. 23.15.130. Vocational rehabilitation small business enterprise revolving fund.

  1. There is created in the state treasury a revolving fund designated as the vocational rehabilitation small business enterprise revolving fund.  The fund shall be administered by the director.
  2. Receipts from the net proceeds of vending facilities on public property, other than vending facilities operated by a licensee, shall be paid into the fund.
  3. The commissioner of administration shall separately account for receipts under (b) of this section that are paid into the vocational rehabilitation small business enterprise revolving fund.  The annual estimated receipts of the fund may be used by the legislature to make appropriations to the department to aid licensees in operating vending machine facilities.
  4. In this section “net proceeds” means the gross receipts from operating a vending facility less the costs of operation and a fair return to the operator, to be determined by the agency.

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-10, as enacted by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 3 ch 75 SLA 1976; am § 2 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 45 ch 138 SLA 1986)

Sec. 23.15.132. Vending facilities.

  1. A vending facility may not be established on public property that is under the jurisdiction of the state except as authorized by the commissioner.
  2. A vending facility authorized by the commissioner shall be selected and located after consulting with the persons responsible for the maintenance and operation of the property to be served by the vending facility. A contract for the operation of the vending facility by a licensee shall be executed by the agency and must contain provisions ensuring that the licensee shall charge reasonable prices and that the vending facility shall provide high quality merchandise.

History. (§ 3 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 32 ch 40 SLA 2008)

Opinions of attorney general. —

A coffee/pop fund operated by state employees to purchase coffee and soda pop for themselves is not a “vending facility” within the meaning of this section. April 12, 1988 Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.15.133. Vendors’ licenses.

  1. The agency shall issue a license for the operation of a vending facility on public property to a blind person or a person with a severe disability who is a resident of the state at the time of application and who qualifies for a license under
    1. 20 U.S.C. 107 — 107f (Randolph-Sheppard Act); or
    2. regulations adopted by the agency providing for licensing of blind persons or persons with severe disabilities.
  2. A license issued under this section does not expire. However, a license may be revoked if the agency finds that the licensee is not operating the facility in accordance with regulations adopted by the agency.

History. (§ 3 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 8 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.134. Active participation by licensees with severe disabilities.

The agency shall adopt regulations that ensure the opportunity for active participation by a licensee with severe disabilities in the administration of vending facilities operated by licensees with severe disabilities. The opportunity for active participation provided under this section must be at least as extensive as the opportunity for active participation provided for a blind licensee under AS 23.15.135 .

History. (§ 3 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 9 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.135. Committee of blind vendors.

  1. The Committee of Blind Vendors consisting of all blind licensees is established.  The agency shall conduct a biennial election of a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer of the committee and may conduct elections to fill vacancies in office at any time.
  2. The commissioner shall assure active participation by the Committee of Blind Vendors in administrative, policy, and program development decisions concerning vending facilities operated by blind licensees. The agency shall, with active participation by the Committee of Blind Vendors,
    1. adopt regulations providing for the licensing of blind persons for the operation of vending facilities on public property;
    2. consider and respond to grievances of blind licensees;
    3. develop and administer a statewide system for the transfer and promotion of blind licensees;
    4. develop training and retraining programs for blind licensees and for blind persons interested in obtaining a license to operate a vending facility;
    5. organize meetings and conferences for blind licensees;
    6. adopt regulations necessary to assure that vending facilities operated by blind licensees are administered by the agency in a substantially equivalent manner whether a vending facility is located on state or federal property;
    7. designate public property as appropriate for the location of a vending facility operated by a blind licensee.
  3. To ensure the opportunity for active participation in decisions that affect the administration of vending facilities operated by blind licensees the agency shall, before each meeting of the Committee of Blind Vendors, provide the committee with written information on matters to be considered.  The agency shall provide the committee with reasons in writing for decisions and actions of the agency that do not conform to recommendations submitted by the committee.

History. (§ 3 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 33 ch 40 SLA 2008)

Administrative Code. —

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.136. Group insurance for certain licensees.

The agency shall purchase group insurance coverage under AS 39.30.090 for licensees holding current operating agreements. The employer share of the insurance premium shall be paid from the vocational rehabilitation small business enterprise revolving fund.

History. (§ 1 ch 38 SLA 1990)

Sec. 23.15.140. Vocational Rehabilitation Fund. [Repealed, § 2 ch 23 SLA 1968.]

Sec. 23.15.150. Custodian of funds.

The Department of Revenue is designated custodian of all vocational rehabilitation funds in the state.

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-12, as enacted by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957)

Sec. 23.15.160. Gifts.

The commissioner may accept a gift or donation from a public or a private source that is offered unconditionally for carrying out AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 . The commissioner may accept a conditional gift if, in the judgment of the agency, the conditions are proper and consistent with AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 .

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-13, as enacted by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 3 ch 23 SLA 1968; am § 22 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 23.15.170. Maintenance not assignable.

The right of an individual with a disability to maintenance under AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 is not transferable or assignable at law or in equity.

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-14, as amended by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 10 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Sec. 23.15.180. Hearings.

  1. An individual applying for or receiving vocational rehabilitation who is aggrieved by the action or inaction of the agency is entitled to a fair hearing by the agency, in accordance with regulations.
  2. A blind person or a person with a severe disability aggrieved by a decision or action of the agency under AS 23.15.133 23.15.135 shall receive a hearing on request in accordance with AS 44.62.330 44.62.630 (Administrative Procedure Act). A blind person may also file a complaint in accordance with 20 U.S.C. 107d-1 for arbitration of a grievance.

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-15, as amended by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 4 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 11 ch 25 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For business enterprise program, see 8 AAC 98, art. 2.

For hearings and appeals, see 8 AAC 98, art. 4.

Sec. 23.15.190. Misuse of lists and records.

Except for purposes directly connected with the administration of the vocational rehabilitation program and in accordance with regulations, a person may not solicit, disclose, receive, or make use of, or authorize, knowingly permit, participate in, or acquiesce in the use of a list of, names of, or information concerning, persons applying for or receiving vocational rehabilitation, directly or indirectly, derived from the records, papers, files, or communications of the state or an agency of the state, or acquired in the course of the performance of official duties. An officer or employee violating this provision is subject to discharge or suspension.

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-16, as amended by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957)

Administrative Code. —

For confidentiality of personal information, see 8 AAC 98, art. 3.

Sec. 23.15.200. Limitation on political activity.

An officer or employee engaged in the administration of the vocational rehabilitation program may not use official authority to influence or permit the use of the vocational rehabilitation program for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the results of an election or for a partisan political purpose. An officer or employee may not solicit or receive, and an officer or employee may not be obliged to contribute or render, a service, assistance, subscription, assessment, or contribution for a political purpose. An officer or employee violating this section is subject to discharge or suspension.

History. (ACLA 1949, § 37-9-17, as amended by § 6 ch 144 SLA 1957)

Sec. 23.15.210. Definitions.

In AS 23.15.010 23.15.210 ,

  1. “active participation” means a process through which the Committee of Blind Vendors or a licensee is provided the opportunity to exert a major influence in program policies, standards, and procedures affecting the operation of vending facilities, with the commissioner having final responsibility;
  2. “agency” means the division of vocational rehabilitation;
  3. “blind person” means a person whose central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or whose visual acuity, if better than 20/200, is accompanied by a limit to the field of vision in the better eye to such a degree that its widest diameter subtends an angle of not greater than 20 degrees; an examination by an ophthalmologist or by an optometrist is necessary before a person is found to be blind;
  4. “director” means the director of the division of vocational rehabilitation;
  5. “individual having a physical or mental disability” means an individual who has a physical or mental condition that materially limits, contributes to limiting, or, if not corrected, will probably result in limiting the individual’s activities or functioning;
  6. “individual with a disability” means an individual having a physical or mental disability that for that individual constitutes or results in a substantial barrier to employment and who can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from the provision of vocational rehabilitation services;
  7. “licensee” means a blind person or a person with a severe disability licensed by the division of vocational rehabilitation under 20 U.S.C. 107 — 107b and 107d — 107f (Randolph-Sheppard Act), AS 23.15.133 , and regulations adopted under federal or state law;
  8. “person with a severe disability” means a person who has one or more physical or mental disabilities that seriously limit the person’s functional capacities in terms of regular employment and whose vocational rehabilitation requires multiple vocational rehabilitation services over an extended period of time;
  9. “public property” means real or personal property owned or leased by the state or federal government or an agency of the state or federal government;
  10. “vending facility” means a vending machine, cafeteria, snack bar, shelter, cart, or counter where food, tobacco, newspapers, periodicals, and other articles are offered for sale to the general public and dispensed automatically or manually whether prepared on or off the premises; and excludes a facility in a hospital, school, or other institution where food or other articles are offered for sale only to patients, inmates, and persons enrolled in or employed by the institution;
  11. “vocational rehabilitation service” means goods and services, including diagnostic and related services, necessary to enable an individual with a disability to engage in gainful employment;
  12. “workshop” means a rehabilitation facility engaged in a production or service operation that is operated for the primary purpose of providing gainful employment or professional services to persons with disabilities as an interim step in the rehabilitation process for those who cannot readily be absorbed in the competitive labor market or during times when employment opportunities for them in the competitive labor market do not exist.

History. (§ 37-9-5 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 169 SLA 1955; am § 1 ch 144 SLA 1957; am § 23 ch 208 SLA 1975; am § 2 ch 75 SLA 1976; am §§ 3-6 ch 5 SLA 1978; am §§ 5-8 ch 69 SLA 1982; am § 84 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 12 ch 25 SLA 2006; am § 34 ch 40 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was reorganized in 1984 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order.

Opinions of attorney general. —

A coffee/pop fund operated by state employees to purchase coffee and soda pop for themselves is not a “vending facility” within the meaning of AS 23.15.132 . April 12, 1988 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Article 2. State Vocational Rehabilitation Committee.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 57, SLA 2010 (SB 83), establishing the State Vocational Rehabilitation Committee in place of the former Governor’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, see 2009 Senate Journal 77 — 78.

Sec. 23.15.220. Purpose.

The purpose of AS 23.15.220 23.15.320 is to create a State Vocational Rehabilitation Committee for Alaska to carry on a continuing program to promote the employment of people of the state with disabilities by creating statewide interest in the rehabilitation and employment of people with disabilities, and by obtaining and maintaining cooperation with public and private groups and individuals in this field.

History. (§ 1 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 7 SLA 1989; am § 1 ch 57 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 10, 2010, substituted “State Vocational Rehabilitation Committee” for “Governor’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities”.

Collateral references. —

Accommodation requirement under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap. 76 ALR4th 310.

Handicap as job disqualification under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap. 78 ALR4th 265.

Damages and other relief under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap. 78 ALR4th 435.

What constitutes handicap under state legislation forbidding job discrimination on account of handicap. 82 ALR4th 26, 77 ALR5th 595.

When must specialized testing, training, or other work procedures be provided for benefit of qualified disabled employee or applicant to fulfill employer’s reasonable accommodation requirement. 127 ALR Fed. 559.

Action under Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq.), to remedy alleged harassment or hostile work environment. 162 ALR Fed. 603.

Sec. 23.15.230. Appointment of committee.

The governor shall appoint the members of the State Vocational Rehabilitation Committee for staggered terms not exceeding three years. The composition of the committee must be consistent with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. 725 and 3003, as amended. A member may be reappointed, and a vacancy shall be filled by the governor.

History. (§ 2 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 5 ch 168 SLA 1990; am § 2 ch 57 SLA 2010)

Cross references. —

For transitional provision relating to the continued service of members of the former Governor’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities as members of the State Vocational Rehabilitation Committee, as the committee is recomposed under this section, see § 5, ch. 57, SLA 2010, in the 2010 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 10, 2010, rewrote the section.

Sec. 23.15.240. Selection and term of chair.

The members of the committee shall select a chair from among the voting members of the committee, subject to disapproval by the governor. The chair serves for one year or until a successor is selected.

History. (§ 2 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 7 SLA 1989; am § 3 ch 57 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 10, 2010, in the section heading substituted “Selection” for “Appointment”, and rewrote the section.

Sec. 23.15.250. Compensation and expenses.

Members of the committee may receive no compensation for services on the committee but are entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses in accordance with existing law.

History. (§ 2 ch 23 SLA 1960)

Sec. 23.15.260. Meetings.

The committee shall meet four times a year, but, at the request of the governor, special meetings may be called. Meetings may be conducted telephonically.

History. (§ 2 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 4 ch 57 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 10, 2010, substituted “four times a year” for “annually”, and added the second sentence.

Sec. 23.15.270. Cooperation with other committees and agencies.

The committee shall work in close cooperation with local committees and with the President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities to carry out the purpose of AS 23.15.220 23.15.320 more effectively, and with state and federal agencies having responsibilities for employment and rehabilitation of people with disabilities.

History. (§ 1 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 7 ch 5 SLA 1978; am § 3 ch 7 SLA 1989)

Sec. 23.15.280. Appointment of advisors.

The division of vocational rehabilitation, the State Employment Service, the Department of Health and Social Services, and other state agencies that the committee names shall each designate a staff member who shall meet with the committee and act in an advisory capacity. The federal Veterans Employment Service and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs shall each be invited to designate a member of their respective staffs to serve in this capacity with the committee. Agencies of the state shall provide the assistance to the committee that the committee requests to aid it in carrying out the purposes of AS 23.15.220 23.15.320 .

History. (§ 3 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 79 ch 21 SLA 2000)

Sec. 23.15.290. Employ people with disabilities week.

Each year the governor shall issue a proclamation designating the first full week in October as Alaska Employ People with Disabilities Week. During this week, appropriate ceremonies shall be held throughout the state for the purpose of enlisting public support for, and interest in the employment of, people with disabilities. The mayors of cities, and heads of government instrumentalities, and leaders of industry and business, educational, and religious groups, labor, veterans, women, farm, scientific and professional, and all other interested organizations and individuals shall be invited to participate.

History. (§ 4 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 8 ch 5 SLA 1978; am § 4 ch 7 SLA 1989)

Sec. 23.15.300. Manner of handling funds.

Funds to carry out AS 23.15.220 23.15.320 shall be appropriated, expended, and accounted for through the same procedures as funds for operation of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development.

History. (§ 5 ch 23 SLA 1960; am § 90 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.15.310. Gifts.

The committee may accept property by gift, devise, bequest, or otherwise to carry out the purposes of AS 23.15.220 23.15.320 .

History. (§ 6 ch 23 SLA 1960)

Sec. 23.15.315. Fees.

  1. The committee may charge a fee for attendance at a conference, workshop, or similar event conducted by the committee, based on the estimated cost to the committee of organizing and holding the event.
  2. The receipt and expenditure by the committee of fees authorized by this section is subject to AS 23.15.300 .

History. (§ 1 ch 18 SLA 1992)

Legislative history reports. —

For Governor’s transmittal letter in connection with the enactment of this section by § 1, ch. 18, SLA 1992 (SB 347), see 1992 Senate Journal 1787.

Sec. 23.15.320. Annual report to governor.

The committee shall annually report its activities during the preceding year to the governor.

History. (§ 7 ch 23 SLA 1960)

Article 3. Employment Agencies.

Administrative Code. —

For private employment agencies, see 8 AAC 10.

Collateral references. —

27 Am. Jur. 2d, Employment Agencies, §§ 1-7.

51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 19.

Regulation of private employment agencies. 20 ALR3d 599.

Liability of employment agency for personal injury or property damage suffered by employer from acts of referred employee or by employee from acts of referred employer. 41 ALR4th 531.

Sec. 23.15.330. Exemptions.

AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 do not apply to an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or benevolent organization that does not charge for services, or to a bona fide labor organization or a government agency.

History. (§ 2 ch 94 SLA 1953)

Sec. 23.15.340. Permit.

In order to operate an employment agency, a person shall obtain a permit from the department. The permit shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the employment agency.

History. (§ 3(1) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.350. Application.

To obtain a permit to operate an employment agency a person shall apply to the department on forms prescribed by the department. The application must include

  1. the name and address of the applicant and the street and number of the building or place where the business of the employment agency is to be conducted;
  2. the businesses or occupations engaged in by the applicant for at least two years immediately preceding the date of application; and
  3. the names and addresses of all persons financially interested in the operation of the agency.

History. (§ 3(2) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.360. Bond.

The department may not issue a permit until the applicant furnishes a bond to the department in the amount and with surety that the department considers necessary. The amount of the bond may not be less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000. The bond shall be conditioned on the applicant’s full compliance with the provisions and requirements imposed by AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 and the payment of all judgments recovered against the applicant for violation of AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 and any judgment and costs recovered against the applicant by a laborer, worker, or applicant for a position due to wilful misrepresentation or wilful deceit of a laborer or applicant for a position.

History. (§ 3(3) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.370. Investigation of applicant.

Upon application for a permit, the department may make an investigation as to the character and responsibility of the applicant and the premises where the applicant proposes to conduct the business.

History. (§ 3(4) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.380. Refusal of permit.

The department may, after notice and hearing, refuse to grant a permit where there is reasonable ground to believe that the applicant is of unfit moral character or is irresponsible. The department shall grant or refuse an application within 30 days of the date of filing.

History. (§ 3(5) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.390. Term of permit; fees.

The fee for filing an application for a permit is $10. A permit is valid for a term of two years. The biennial fee for the issuance of a permit, including a renewal permit, is $100. All fees shall be deposited in the general fund. In addition to paying this fee, all persons conducting employment agencies shall comply with the provisions of AS 43.70 (Alaska Business License Act).

History. (§ 3(6) ch 94 SLA 1953; am § 51 ch 63 SLA 1993)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.400. Renewal of permit.

Thirty days before the expiration of a permit the holder must apply for renewal of the permit in order to renew the permit. The application for renewal must contain all the information requested in the original application, brought up to date.

History. (§ 3(7) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

Sec. 23.15.410. Revocation or suspension of permit.

  1. The department may revoke or suspend a permit if
    1. the permittee or an agent of the permittee has violated or failed to comply with a provision of AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 ;
    2. the permittee has stopped being of good moral character.
  2. Before revoking or suspending a permit, the department shall notify the holder in writing of the charges and provide the permittee an opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel.

History. (§ 3(8) (9) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Sec. 23.15.420. Limitations on conduct of employment agencies.

The department may not issue a permit to conduct an employment agency

  1. in rooms used for living purposes;
  2. in connection with a pool hall, bar, or intoxicating liquor dispensary, or recreation center operated for profit;
  3. to a person whose permit has been revoked within three years from the date of application;
  4. to a person who is financially interested in a travel agency or who in any way benefits financially from the sale of air, steamship, or bus transportation.

History. (§ 4 ch 94 SLA 1953)

Sec. 23.15.430. Agency to maintain register.

An employment agency shall keep a register containing the name and address of each applicant, the date registered, and the amount of fee received.

History. (§ 5(1) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.440. Records open to inspection.

All registers, books, records, and other papers kept under AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 shall be open to the inspection of the department at all reasonable times. The agency shall furnish a copy of a record or report to the department within 30 days of the request.

History. (§ 5(2) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.450. Applicant’s receipt.

An agency shall give to an applicant for employment from whom a fee is to be received a receipt. The receipt must contain

  1. the name, address, and telephone number of the employment agency;
  2. the name of the applicant;
  3. the name and address of the person to whom the applicant is sent for employment, and the address to which the applicant is to report for work;
  4. the amount of the fee charged and collected from the applicant;
  5. the kind of work to be performed, the wages or salary, and other conditions of employment.

History. (§ 5(3) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.460. Schedule of fees.

A person conducting an employment agency shall file a schedule of its fees with the department. The agency may change the fee schedule, but a change is not effective until seven days after it is filed with the department and until it is posted for not less than seven days in a conspicuous place in the agency. The agency shall post a copy of the fee schedule in the agency in a conspicuous place frequented by applicants for help or employment.

History. (§ 5(4) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

For fee schedule, see 8 AAC 10, art. 3.

Collateral references. —

Construction and operation of fee payment provisions of employment agency contract. 61 ALR3d 375.

Sec. 23.15.470. Maximum fees.

After notice and hearing the department shall set a maximum schedule of fees. The department may review the schedule every two years after giving notice and hearing.

History. (§ 5(5) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

For fee schedule, see 8 AAC 10, art. 3.

Sec. 23.15.480. Return of fees.

If the applicant paying a cash fee fails to obtain employment, the agency shall, upon demand, return the amount of the fee to the applicant within 48 hours.

History. (§ 5(6) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

Sec. 23.15.490. Prohibited acts.

An employment agency may not

  1. send out an applicant for employment without having a bona fide request from an employer;
  2. send a person to an employer for the purpose of assisting or conducting an illegitimate business or practice;
  3. place a child in employment in violation of the child labor laws;
  4. divide or offer to divide a fee with an employer;
  5. make a charge that does not conform with the schedule of fees;
  6. falsify a record of the agency;
  7. write, publish, or have published false, fraudulent, or misleading information, representation, notice, or advertisement concerning a job opportunity;
  8. send an applicant for employment to a place where a strike or lockout exists without informing the applicant of the existence of the strike or lockout.

History. (§ 5(7) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

For fee schedule, see 8 AAC 10, art. 3.

Sec. 23.15.500. Department may adopt regulations.

The department may adopt regulations consistent with AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 .

History. (§ 5(8) ch 94 SLA 1953)

Administrative Code. —

For application, bond and permit, see 8 AAC 10, art. 1.

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

For fee schedule, see 8 AAC 10, art. 3.

For prohibited acts, see 8 AAC 10, art. 4.

Sec. 23.15.510. Violations.

A person who wilfully violates any provision of AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both. However, this section does not apply to the violation of the requirement under AS 23.15.390 to comply with AS 43.70.

History. (§ 6 ch 94 SLA 1953; added by § 1 ch 65 SLA 1955; am § 4 ch 104 SLA 2008)

Sec. 23.15.520. Definitions.

In AS 23.15.330 23.15.520 ,

  1. “employment agency” or “agency” means a person engaged in the business of furnishing employment or help, or giving information as to where employment or help may be obtained, or furnishing information regarding employment, or displaying an employment sign or bulletin, or, through the medium of a card, circular, or pamphlet, or otherwise offering to obtain employment or help, or a person who offers employment information through communications media, including, but not limited to, radio, television, and newspapers;
  2. “fee” means money or other valuable consideration received by a person, paid or promised to be paid for services given to or be given by a person conducting an employment agency.

History. (§ 1 ch 94 SLA 1953; am § 1 ch 197 SLA 1970; am § 38 ch 168 SLA 1990)

Administrative Code. —

For agency procedures and requirements, see 8 AAC 10, art. 2.

Article 4. Alaska Workforce Investment Board.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 86, SLA 2002 (HCS CSSB 252(FIN)), see 2002 Senate Journal 2003 - 2004.

Sec. 23.15.550. Alaska Workforce Investment Board.

  1. The Alaska Workforce Investment Board is established in the department. The board consists of the following voting members, not to exceed 26:
    1. the lieutenant governor or the lieutenant governor’s designee;
    2. the commissioners of commerce, community, and economic development, education and early development, health and social services, and labor and workforce development, or each respective commissioner’s designee;
    3. one representative from the University of Alaska;
    4. four additional representatives of education, with one from local public education, one from secondary vocational education, one from a postsecondary vocational education institution, and one from adult basic education;
    5. four representatives of business and industry;
    6. four representatives of organized labor whom the governor shall appoint from lists of nominees submitted by recognized state labor organizations; the governor may reject a list submitted under this paragraph and request that another list be submitted;
    7. at least one representative from an organization representing employment and training needs of Alaska Natives;
    8. at least one representative of a community-based service organization;
    9. at least one representative who has personal or professional experience with developmental disabilities;
    10. at least one veteran; in this paragraph, “veteran” has the meaning given in AS 43.20.048(f) ;
    11. at least one and up to four additional members of the private sector to ensure a private sector majority and regional and local representation on the board.
  2. Additional nonvoting members may be appointed to the board from government or nongovernment entities.
  3. A member of the board under (a) of this section may appoint a designee to serve in place of the member. The member shall appoint the designee in writing.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 3 ch 86 SLA 2002; am § 2 ch 49 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 33 SLA 2015)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, in (a)(2) of this section, “community and economic development” was changed to “commerce, community, and economic development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Cross references. —

For transitional provisions relating to members of the former Alaska Human Resources Investment Council serving as the members of the Alaska Workforce Investment Board and to the executive director of the former council serving as the executive director of the board under the 2002 amendment of this section, see § 50, ch. 86, SLA 2002, in the 2002 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2015 amendment, effective August 31, 2015, in (a), added (a)(10), redesignated existing (a)(10) as (a)(11) and in (a)(11) substituted “four” for “five”; made related changes.

Sec. 23.15.555. Appointment and term of members.

  1. Members of the Alaska Workforce Investment Board other than those listed in AS 23.15.550(a) (1) and (2) are appointed by the governor and serve at the pleasure of the governor. The governor may appoint one person to fill two or more of the places listed in AS 23.15.550(a) if the person is qualified in all of the areas the person represents. A member appointed to fill more than one place under this subsection is entitled to only one vote and may appoint only one designee to replace the member in the event the member is unable to attend a meeting.
  2. The voting members of the board other than those listed in AS 23.15.550(a)(1) and (2) serve for staggered four-year terms and may serve until a successor is appointed. An appointment to fill a vacancy shall be made in the same manner as the original appointment and for the balance of the unexpired term.
  3. The governor shall ensure that individuals appointed to the board have sufficient expertise to effectively carry out the duties of the board. Expertise of the board includes, where appropriate, knowledge of the long-term needs of individuals preparing to enter the work force; the needs of local, state, and regional labor markets; and the methods for evaluating the effectiveness of vocational training programs in serving varying populations.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 4 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.15.560. Compensation.

Members of the Alaska Workforce Investment Board listed in or appointed under AS 23.15.550(a) , including a designee of a member attending in place of the member, serve without compensation but are entitled to per diem and travel expenses authorized by law for boards and commissions under AS 39.20.180 . Nonvoting members of the board appointed under AS 23.15.550(b) serve without compensation and are not entitled to per diem and travel expenses. A commissioner appointed under AS 23.15.550(a) (2) or the commissioner’s designee is entitled to per diem and travel expenses as a state employee.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 5 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.15.565. Officers.

The Alaska Workforce Investment Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair from among the members listed in or appointed under AS 23.15.550(a)(5) . The chair and vice-chair serve in their positions at the pleasure of the board.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 6 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.15.570. Meetings, quorum, and committees.

  1. The Alaska Workforce Investment Board shall meet not more than three times in a calendar year at the call of the chair to conduct its business. A majority of the members listed in or appointed to the board under AS 23.15.550(a) constitutes a quorum.
  2. The board shall establish an executive committee and four permanent standing committees as described in (c) — (g) of this section. The chair of a permanent standing committee must be from the private sector. The board may establish additional standing committees and special committees or subcommittees, not necessarily consisting of board members, to advise and assist the board in carrying out its functions assigned by federal or state statute. The permanent standing committees are
    1. the assessment and evaluation committee;
    2. the policy and planning committee;
    3. the employment and placement committee; and
    4. the workforce readiness committee.
  3. The executive committee consists of the chair and vice-chair of the board, the immediate past chair of the board, and the chairs of the four standing committees described in (d) — (g) of this section. The executive committee has the duties and may exercise the powers of the council between meetings of the board. The executive committee shall
    1. report to the board in a timely fashion on actions taken on behalf of the board; and
    2. supervise the affairs of the board between regular meetings of the board.
  4. The assessment and evaluation committee shall
    1. assess and evaluate programs, initiatives, and the delivery of services to help to ensure equitable distribution of quality education, training, and employment services statewide, especially to rural areas and to programs serving economically disadvantaged citizens;
    2. call for and monitor the workforce development system for increased accountability in performance and continuous quality improvement along the goals and strategies of the board’s overall statewide strategic plan for workforce development;
    3. use evaluation and performance measures to gauge customer satisfaction within the workforce development system; and
    4. perform other duties assigned by the board.
  5. The policy and planning committee shall
    1. build policies regarding day-to-day operations and long-term responsibilities of the board;
    2. work to increase awareness of the board and its mission throughout the state;
    3. work with all other committees on a statewide strategic plan for workforce development; and
    4. perform other duties assigned by the board.
  6. The employment and placement committee shall
    1. ensure the statewide strategic plan for workforce development addresses
      1. customer needs at the local level;
      2. moving welfare recipients into the workforce;
      3. promoting the hiring of state residents in jobs that have traditionally been filled by out-of-state workers;
      4. tailoring employment and training programs to suit state business, industry, and economic development needs;
    2. monitor the coordination of service delivery to promote efficiency and to prevent overlap of services among programs; and
    3. perform other duties assigned by the board.
  7. The workforce readiness committee shall
    1. provide oversight for training, education, and employment programs to ensure the programs are delivering education and training that is relevant to local market needs and the career goals of state residents;
    2. build partnerships between employers and quality workforce training programs;
    3. work to connect the state public and private education systems with business, government, and labor to ensure that state residents are receiving workforce readiness skills throughout the education process; and
    4. perform other duties assigned by the board.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 7 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter on ch. 86, SLA 2002 (HCS CSSB 252(FIN)), see 2002 Senate Journal 2003 — 2004.

Sec. 23.15.575. Board as state planning entity.

The Alaska Workforce Investment Board shall act as the lead state planning and coordinating entity for state human resource programs administered under

  1. 29 U.S.C. 2801 — 2945 (Workforce Investment Act of 1998);
  2. 20 U.S.C. 2301 — 2471 (Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied Technology Education Act);
  3. 29 U.S.C. 49 — 49l-1 (Wagner — Peyser Act);
  4. federal law for work programs for needy families with children under the Social Security Act;
  5. the employment program established under 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(4) (Food Stamp Act of 1977);
  6. all federal programs designated as successors to the programs listed in (1) — (5) of this section; and
  7. all state laws involving employment training, vocational education, and workforce development.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 8 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.15.580. Functions of the board.

  1. As the lead state planning and coordinating entity, the Alaska Workforce Investment Board has responsibility, to the extent authorized by federal and state law, for planning and coordinating federal, state, and local efforts in human resource programs in this state related to employment training, including the work activities of the Alaska temporary assistance program under AS 47.27.
  2. The board shall
    1. facilitate the development of statewide policy for a coordinated and effective employment training and education system in this state;
    2. identify the human resource investment needs in the state and develop a plan to meet those needs;
    3. review the provision of services and the use of money and resources by the human resource programs listed in AS 23.15.575 ;
    4. assume the duties and functions of the state boards described under the laws relating to the federal human resource programs listed in AS 23.15.575 ;
    5. advise the governor, state and local agencies, the University of Alaska, and other training entities on the development of state and local standards and measures relating to applicable human resource programs;
    6. submit, to the governor and the legislature, a biennial strategic plan to accomplish the goals developed to meet human resource investment needs;
    7. monitor for the implementation and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategic plan developed by the board;
    8. adopt regulations that set standards for the percentage of program expenses that may be used for administrative costs; the regulations must clearly identify and distinguish between program expenses that may be included in administrative costs and those that may not be included in administrative costs; the percentage allowed for administrative costs may not exceed the lesser of 20 percent of program expenses in the prior fiscal year or the amount permitted under the requirements of a federal program, if applicable;
    9. report annually to the legislature, by the 30th day of the regular legislative session, on the performance and evaluation of training programs in the state subject to review under (f) of this section;
    10. identify ways for agencies operating programs subject to oversight by the board to share resources, instructors, and curricula through collaboration with other public and private entities to increase training opportunities and reduce costs;
    11. adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to carry out the purposes of AS 23.15.550 23.15.585 ; and
    12. perform duties assigned in AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 for the state training and employment program.
  3. The board may receive money designated for human resource programs and may disburse money, including grants, to human resource projects in accordance with AS 37.07 (Executive Budget Act). The board may enter into partnership agreements through appropriate administrative agencies with private industry training entities within the state in order to facilitate the coordination of training opportunities.
  4. The board shall provide oversight for the planning and coordination of employment-related education training programs operated by the state or operated under contract with the state that are described in (f) of this section. The board shall require a training program listed in (f) of this section to meet the requirements of this subsection. The board shall, by regulation, establish appropriate penalties for programs that fail to meet the requirements of this subsection. The board may recommend to the legislature changes to enhance the effectiveness of the training programs it oversees under this section. A training program described in (f) of this section funded with money appropriated by the legislature must
    1. meet the standards adopted by the board concerning the percentage of a grant that may be spent on administrative costs;
    2. be operated by an institution that holds a valid authorization to operate issued under AS 14.48 by the Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education if the program is a postsecondary educational program operated by a postsecondary educational institution subject to regulation under AS 14.48;
    3. provide to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development the information required by the department for the preparation of the statistical information necessary for the board to evaluate programs by the standards set out in (e) of this section.
  5. The board shall develop standards that encourage agencies to contract for training programs that meet local demands and maximize the use of resources. The board shall adopt standards for the evaluation of training programs listed in (f) of this section with regard to the following:
    1. the percentage of former participants who have a job one year after leaving the training program;
    2. the median wage of former participants seven to 12 months after leaving the program;
    3. the percentage of former participants who were employed after leaving the training program who received training under the program that was related to their jobs or somewhat related to their jobs seven to 12 months after leaving the training program;
    4. the percentage of former participants of a training program who indicate that they were satisfied with or somewhat satisfied with the overall quality of the training program;
    5. the percentage of employers who indicate that they were satisfied with the services received through the workforce development system.
  6. The following training programs are subject to the provisions of (d) and (e) of this section:
    1. in the Department of Labor and Workforce Development or operated by the department:
      1. programs under 29 U.S.C. 2801 — 2945 (Workforce Investment Act of 1998), assisting communities in moving toward a self-sustainable economy and providing training;
      2. the state training and employment program under AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 ;
      3. employment-related adult basic education;
      4. employment training services operated as part of the Alaska temporary assistance program (ATAP);
      5. unemployment insurance grants provided under the federal training relocation assistance program;
      6. Alaska works programs, assisting with the welfare-to-work program;
      7. Kotzebue Technical Center;
      8. Alaska Vocational Technical Center;
    2. in the Department of Education and Early Development or operated by the department, the non-public-school portions of the
      1. vocational education and technical preparation program; and
      2. Alaska Career Information System.
  7. The board shall assess the programs listed in this subsection and make recommendations to the legislature in its report required under (b)(9) of this section about whether to include one or more of these programs under the requirements of (f) of this section:
    1. in the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development or operated by the department:
      1. local government assistance training and development, including the rural utility business advisory program;
      2. energy operations, providing training in management and administration of electric utilities and bulk fuel storage systems;
    2. in the Department of Corrections:
      1. Correctional Academy, training individuals applying for a correctional officer position;
      2. inmate programs, providing vocational technical training and education courses for inmates preparing to be released from a correctional facility;
      3. employment of prison inmates, providing inmates with jobs while they are incarcerated;
    3. in the Department of Environmental Conservation:
      1. remote maintenance worker program, providing training and technical assistance to communities to keep drinking water and sewage disposal systems running, and providing on-the-job training to local operators;
      2. water and wastewater operator training and assistance;
      3. federal drinking water operator training and certification;
    4. in the Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs: educational benefits for members of the Alaska National Guard and the Alaska Naval Militia;
    5. in the Department of Public Safety:
      1. fire service training to maintain emergency training skills for existing firefighter staff and volunteers and individuals interested in becoming firefighters;
      2. Public Safety Training Academy, training trooper recruits;
    6. in the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities:
      1. engineer-in-training program, providing on-the-job training for apprentice engineers to enable them to gain the experience necessary to be certified;
      2. statewide transportation improvement program, offered by the United States National Highway Institute;
      3. local technical assistance program, transferring technical expertise to local governments;
      4. Native technical assistance program, transferring technical expertise to Native governments;
      5. border technology exchange program, to coordinate highway issues with the Yukon Territory;
    7. in the Department of Labor and Workforce Development: vocational rehabilitation client services and special work projects, employment services, including job development, assisting individuals in finding employment, and assisting employed individuals in finding other employment.
  8. The University of Alaska shall evaluate the performance of its training programs using the standards set out in (e) of this section and shall provide a report on the results to the board for inclusion in the board’s annual report to the legislature.
  9. The board shall review each program listed in (f) of this section to determine whether it is in compliance with the standards set out in (d) and (e) of this section. If the board finds that a program has failed to comply with the standards set out in (d) and (e) of this section, it shall notify the program director of the failure. If the program director fails to improve the performance of the program within a reasonable time, the board shall notify the governor and the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee that the program is out of compliance. A contract entered into by a state agency relating to a training program set out in (f) of this section must contain terms consistent with this section.
  10. A department that operates or contracts for a training program listed in (f) of this section shall pay to the board a management assessment fee not to exceed .75 percent of the program’s annual operating budget. The total amount received as management assessment fees may not exceed the board’s authorized budget for the fiscal year. The board shall, by regulation, establish a method to determine annually the amount of the management assessment fee. If the amount the board expects to collect under this subsection exceeds the authorized budget of the board, the board shall reduce the percentages set out in this subsection so that the total amount of the fees collected approximately equals the authorized budget of the board for the fiscal year. The board shall adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) necessary to administer this subsection.
  11. Upon the enactment of a new federal or state program relating to work force development, the board shall
    1. advise the governor and the legislature on whether the board should provide oversight for the new program under this section; and
    2. make recommendations necessary to streamline and coordinate state efforts to meet the guidelines of the new program.
  12. For purposes of this section, “program”
    1. does not refer to the overall activities of an individual institution or individual fields of study or courses that are not associated with programs for which the board has oversight responsibility;
    2. may include a certificate or associate degree course or a course that is not for credit, whether it is offered by a public or private institute or contracted for by the private sector, so long as it is related to employment.

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 9 ch 86 SLA 2002; am § 3 ch 49 SLA 2003; am § 1 ch 58 SLA 2006; am §§ 1, 2 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, in (g) of this section, “Department of Community and Economic Development” was changed to “Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development”, in accordance with § 3, ch. 47, SLA 2004.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska workforce investment board, see 8 AAC 84.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, added (b)(12) and made related stylistic changes; and rewrote (f)(1)(B), which read, “state training and employment program (AS 23.15.620 ), providing training and employment services for people who are unemployed or likely to become unemployed, fostering new jobs, and increasing training opportunities for workers severely affected by fluctuations in the state economy or adversely affected by technology advances in the workplace”.

Sec. 23.15.585. Administration.

  1. The governor shall appoint the executive director for the Alaska Workforce Investment Board. The department shall provide professional, technical, and administrative staff for the Alaska Workforce Investment Board.
  2. Subject to legislative appropriations, and in accordance with AS 37.07 (Executive Budget Act), the board’s budget is funded from programs for which the board is the lead state planning and coordinating entity under AS 23.15.575 .

History. (§ 23 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 10 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.15.610. Participation in Manpower Development and Training Act. [Repealed, § 1 ch 103 SLA 1968.]

Sec. 23.15.611. Department participation in manpower training programs. [Repealed, § 84 ch 58 SLA 1999.] .

Sec. 23.15.614. Manpower training division. [Repealed, § 84 ch 58 SLA 1999.]

Sec. 23.15.617. Manpower Training Advisory Council. [Repealed, § 2 ch 174 SLA 1975.]

Article 5. State Training and Employment Program.

Cross references. —

For findings in connection with the enactment of AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 by § 2, ch. 116, SLA 1996, see § 1, ch. 116, SLA 1996 in the Temporary and Special Acts. For predecessor program, see ch. 95, SLA 1989, as amended by ch. 17, SLA 1991 and ch. 17, SLA 1993. For transitional provision extending the validity of certain regulations in effect on June 30, 2002, that implement AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 , despite the amendments to those sections under ch. 86, SLA 2002, see § 52(b), ch. 86, SLA 2002, in the 2002 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For state training and employment program, see 8 AAC 87.

Legislative history reports. —

For Governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 16, SLA 1996 (CSSB 229(L&C)), see 1996 Senate Journal 2181.

Sec. 23.15.620. State training and employment program.

  1. A program is created in the department to provide grants to eligible persons who provide training and employment assistance services. The purpose of the program is to enhance the quality of in-state job training and employment assistance and to make in-state job training and employment assistance more easily available to employers, employees, and future employees. To foster the success of the program, the department shall, to the greatest extent feasible, combine the resources of the program with resources available outside of the program.
  2. A person who provides training and employment services may apply for a grant from the program and may use the grant to augment or improve public access to the training and employment services provided, including a registered apprenticeship program under 29 U.S.C. 50.

History. (§ 2 ch 116 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Administrative Code. —

For state training and employment program, see 8 AAC 87.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, repealed and reenacted the section, which read, “There is created in the department a program to finance and award grants to employment assistance and training entities. Employment assistance and training entities shall give appropriate state agencies full access to accounting records concerning grants received to assure compliance with program standards.”

Sec. 23.15.625. Employment assistance and training program account.

The employment assistance and training program account is established in the general fund. The commissioner of administration shall separately account for money collected under AS 23.15.630 that the department deposits in the general fund. The annual estimated balance in the account may be appropriated by the legislature to the department to implement AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 . The legislature may appropriate the lapsing balance of the account to the unemployment compensation fund established in AS 23.20.130 .

History. (§ 2 ch 116 SLA 1996)

Sec. 23.15.630. Special employee unemployment credit and contributions for program.

  1. In the manner provided in AS 23.20, the department shall collect from each employee an amount equal to one-tenth of one percent of the wages, as set out in AS 23.20.175 , on which the employee is required to make contributions under AS 23.20.290(d) . The department shall remit to the Department of Revenue, in accordance with AS 37.10.050 , money collected under this subsection.
  2. Notwithstanding AS 23.20.290(d) , the department shall credit each employee with an amount equal to the amount collected from the employee under (a) of this section against unemployment contributions owed by the employee under AS 23.20.
  3. The department shall assess and collect, under AS 23.20.185 23.20.275 , interest and penalties for delinquent reports and payments due under this section. Interest and penalties collected shall be handled in accordance with AS 23.20.130(d) .

History. (§ 2 ch 116 SLA 1996)

Sec. 23.15.635. People to be served.

Within the limits of its grant, an employment assistance and training entity receiving a grant under AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 shall provide services set out in AS 23.15.641 to state residents who, immediately before beginning training or receiving benefits under a grant financed by this program,

  1. are unemployed and
    1. are receiving unemployment insurance benefits; or
    2. have exhausted the right to unemployment insurance benefits within the past three years; or
  2. are employed, but liable to be displaced because of
    1. reductions in overall employment within a business;
    2. elimination of the worker’s current job; or
    3. a change in conditions of employment requiring that, to remain employed, the employee must learn substantially different skills that the employee does not now possess.

History. (§ 2 ch 116 SLA 1996; am § 4 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 23.15.640 (a)” was substituted for “AS 23.15.640 ” to reflect the 2000 enactment of AS 23.15.640(b)-(d).

Administrative Code. —

For state training and employment program, see 8 AAC 87.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in the introductory language substituted “AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 ” for “AS 23.15.651 ” and “AS 23.15.641 ” for “AS 23.15.640(a)”; in (2) deleted “within the next six months” following “liable to be displaced”; deleted (3), which related to people who worked in a position covered by AS 23.20 during the past three years and not currently eligible for unemployment benefits for various reasons; made a related stylistic change.

Sec. 23.15.636. Implementation of program.

The department and the board shall jointly implement the program as follows:

  1. after review and approval by the board, the department shall adopt regulations under AS 44.62 to implement AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 and to regulate the distribution and accounting of grants awarded under the program;
  2. the department may use financial resources of the program to cover some or all of the department’s cost of administering the program and may also distribute financial resources of the program through grants, the purchase of services or other contracts, or other mechanisms authorized by state law;
  3. the department may enter into interagency agreements with the University of Alaska and other state agencies for the provision of training and employment assistance under the program;
  4. after annual review and approval by the board, the department shall annually establish priorities for the provision of training and employment assistance services under AS 23.15.641 to eligible participants under AS 23.15.643 ; in setting priorities, the department shall consider unemployment statistics, unemployment insurance claims, projections of occupational and industrial workforce demand, availability of other training and employment assistance programs, available funding, and other relevant information; when awarding or financing grants under the program, the department may give preference to financing projects and services that train or assist individuals in vocations, businesses, or industries identified in the resident hire report required under AS 36.10.130 as employing a disproportionate percentage of nonresident individuals;
  5. the board shall assist in the evaluation of proposals for grants and make recommendations to the department regarding which grants should be awarded by the program; the department may distribute financial resources of the program to the board to pay for some or all of the board’s costs, existing or anticipated, that are related to evaluating or awarding proposed grants or grants that have been awarded.

History. (§ 5 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 10, ch. 36, SLA 2009 makes this section effective June 21, 2009, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 23.15.640. Services for eligible people; repayment. [Repealed, § 8 ch 36 SLA 2009.]

Sec. 23.15.641. Eligibility of grantees; use of assistance received.

  1. To be eligible for a grant to help cover the cost of providing training and employment assistance, a person shall
    1. meet or exceed the requirements of AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 and regulations adopted under AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 ;
    2. offer training or employment assistance services that meet the requirements of regulations adopted under AS 23.15.620 — 23.15.660;
    3. be a governmental agency, a private business, an employer, or an organization exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (Internal Revenue Code); and
    4. demonstrate to the satisfaction of the department and the board that
      1. the person’s accounting system is organized and maintained in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, promotes efficiency, ensures compliance with program requirements, and can be audited at the department’s direction with not more than a reasonable amount of effort and expense; and
      2. grants awarded under the program will be used only as allowed under AS 23.15.620 — 23.15.660.
  2. A recipient of a grant awarded under the program may use the grant to provide any of the following training and employment assistance services to eligible participants:
    1. industry-specific training;
    2. on-the-job training, including apprentice training in a registered apprenticeship program under 29 U.S.C. 50;
    3. institutional or classroom job-linked training;
    4. support services, including financial allowances and relocation expenses that the department determines are reasonably necessary to enable an eligible participant to receive training and employment assistance;
    5. assistance considered necessary to help an eligible participant obtain or retain a job for which training and employment assistance provided under the program has prepared the eligible participant;
    6. purchases of basic tools, work clothing, safety gear, or other items the eligible participant needs to obtain or retain a job for which training and employment assistance provided under the program has prepared the eligible participant;
    7. other costs the department determines are necessary to pay in order that an eligible participant can receive training or employment assistance or obtain or retain a job for which the training and employment assistance provided under the program has prepared the eligible participant.
  3. The department may allow payment for items described in (b) of this section if the department determines that alternative sources of financing have been exhausted or are unavailable to the eligible participant or that a grant from the program is otherwise required so that, when combined with other available financing, the grant will enable an eligible participant to receive training or employment assistance approved by the department.

History. (§ 6 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 10, ch. 36, SLA 2009 makes this section effective June 21, 2009, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 23.15.643. Eligibility of program participants.

The department and a person awarded a grant under the program may use the grant only to provide training and employment assistance services to eligible participants. To be an eligible participant, the person may be employed or employable and shall, at the time of application for training or employment assistance under the program,

  1. be a resident of the state;
  2. have worked in a position covered by AS 23.20, or similar provisions in another state, at any time during the five years immediately preceding the application; and
  3. need training to improve the person’s prospects for obtaining or retaining employment.

History. (§ 6 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 10, ch. 36, SLA 2009 makes this section effective June 21, 2009, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 23.15.645. Duties and powers of the department. [Repealed, § 8 ch 36 SLA 2009.]

Sec. 23.15.650. Work Incentive Program for Welfare Recipients. [Repealed, § 7 ch 128 SLA 1990.]

Sec. 23.15.651. Duties of Alaska Workforce Investment Board; grants; eligible entities. [Repealed, § 8 ch 36 SLA 2009.]

Sec. 23.15.652. Program accountability.

  1. The department and a person who is awarded a grant to provide training and employment assistance services under the program shall comply with state and federal laws and maintain records, including accounting records, as required by those laws.
  2. The department may allocate or authorize the expenditure of not more than 20 percent of the amount appropriated to the program for a fiscal year to pay for administration of the program by the department and the board.
  3. The department shall annually prepare and present to the board a report concerning the program and notify the legislature that the report is available.

History. (§ 7 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 10, ch. 36, SLA 2009 makes this section effective June 21, 2009, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 23.15.654. Appeals.

The department shall adopt regulations that provide for an appeal of a denial of a grant application under AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 .

History. (§ 7 ch 36 SLA 2009)

Effective dates. —

Section 10, ch. 36, SLA 2009 makes this section effective June 21, 2009, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Sec. 23.15.660. Definitions.

In AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 ,

  1. “board” means the Alaska Workforce Investment Board established in AS 23.15.550 ;
  2. “program” means the state training and employment program established in AS 23.15.620 23.15.660 .

History. (§ 2 ch 116 SLA 1996; am § 25 ch 58 SLA 1999; am §§ 17, 18, 46 ch 86 SLA 2002; am § 6 ch 49 SLA 2003)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was reorganized in 2002 and 2008 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order.

Administrative Code. —

For state training and employment program, see 8 AAC 87.

Secs. 23.15.700 — 23.15.810. Business incentive training program. [Repealed, § 6 ch 49 SLA 2003.]

Article 6. Alaska Technical and Vocational Education.

Sec. 23.15.820. Powers and duties of the Alaska Workforce Investment Board.

  1. The Alaska Workforce Investment Board shall
    1. administer the Alaska technical and vocational education program established in AS 23.15.820 23.15.850 ;
    2. facilitate the development of a statewide policy for a coordinated and effective technical and vocational education training system in this state and, to the extent authorized by federal and state law, plan and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts in technical and vocational education programs;
    3. adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to carry out the purposes of AS 23.15.820 23.15.850 , including regulations that set standards for the percentage of a grant that may be used for administrative costs; the regulations must clearly identify and distinguish between expenses that may be included in administrative costs and those that may not be included in administrative costs; the percentage allowed for administrative costs may not exceed the lesser of five percent or the amount permitted under the requirements of a federal program, if applicable;
    4. administer the grant program under AS 23.15.840 and establish grant administration requirements including accounting procedures that apply to qualified entities and their grantees;
    5. facilitate the development and implementation of a statewide policy and procedure that provides for the acceptance of credit or hours toward a degree or technical program offered by a vocational or technical training center in the state for an applicant who provides satisfactory evidence of successful completion of relevant military education, training, or service as a member of the armed forces of the United States, the United States Reserves, the National Guard of any state, the Military Reserves of any state, or the Naval Militia of any state.
  2. The board may
    1. receive money designated for technical and vocational education programs and may disburse money, including grants, to technical and vocational education projects in accordance with AS 37.07 (Executive Budget Act);
    2. enter into partnership agreements through appropriate administrative agencies with private industry training entities within the state in order to facilitate the coordination of training opportunities; and
    3. recommend to the legislature changes to enhance the effectiveness of the training programs it oversees under this section.

History. (§ 3 ch 132 SLA 2000; am § 33 ch 86 SLA 2002; am § 4 ch 28 SLA 2013)

Cross references. —

For Alaska Workforce Investment Board, see AS 23.15.550 .

Administrative Code. —

For state technical and vocational education program, see 8 AAC 86.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective December 31, 2013, added (a)(5), and made a related change.

Sec. 23.15.830. Alaska technical and vocational education program account.

The Alaska technical and vocational education program account is established in the general fund. The commissioner of administration shall separately account for money collected under AS 23.15.835 that the department deposits in the general fund. The legislature may appropriate the annual estimated balance in the account to the board to implement AS 23.15.820 23.15.850 . The legislature may appropriate the lapsing balance of the account to the unemployment compensation fund established in AS 23.20.130 .

History. (§ 3 ch 132 SLA 2000; am § 34 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.15.835. Special employee unemployment contributions for program.

  1. In the manner provided in AS 23.20 and for the benefit of the program, the department shall collect from each employee an amount equal to .16 percent of the wages, as set out in AS 23.20.175 , on which the employee is required to make contributions under AS 23.20.290(d) . The department shall remit to the Department of Revenue, in accordance with AS 37.10.050 , money collected under this subsection.
  2. Notwithstanding AS 23.20.290(d) , the department shall credit each employee with an amount equal to the amount collected from the employee under (a) of this section against unemployment contributions owed by the employee under AS 23.20.
  3. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall assess and collect, under AS 23.20.185 23.20.275 , interest and penalties for delinquent reports and payments due under this section. Interest and penalties collected shall be handled in accordance with AS 23.20.130(d) .
  4. Notwithstanding AS 23.15.840(a) , for the fiscal years ending June 30, 2015, through June 30, 2024, the money collected under this section or otherwise appropriated to the Alaska Workforce Investment Board shall be allocated directly in the following percentages to the following institutions for programs consistent with AS 23.15.820 23.15.850 and capital improvements:
  5. The institutions receiving funding under (d) of this section shall provide an expenditure and performance report to the department by November 1 of each year that includes
    1. the percentage of former participants in the program who have jobs one year after leaving the program;
    2. the median wage of former participants seven to 12 months after leaving the program;
    3. the percentage of former participants who were employed after leaving the program who received training under the program that was related or somewhat related to the former participants’ jobs seven to 12 months after leaving the program;
    4. a description of each vocational education course funded through the allocation set out in (d) of this section that permits high school students to earn dual credit upon course completion, and the number of high school students who earned dual credit in the past year;
    5. a copy of any articulation agreement established under (g) of this section that either was in effect for the preceding year or is in process for the next year of funding, and the number of high school students who earned dual credit under each articulation agreement; and
    6. the performance and financial information needed to verify the performance of the program as specified by the department by regulation.
  6. The department shall prepare and present an expenditure and performance report based on the information provided under (e) of this section to the legislature not later than the 15th day of each regular legislative session.
  7. The institutions receiving funding under (d) of this section shall establish and maintain at least one articulation agreement under which dual credit may be earned by high school students upon completion of a vocational education course.
  8. An institution’s failure to comply with (e) or (g) of this section shall result in a withholding penalty of 20 percent of the funding allocated under (d) of this section in the following year.

University of Alaska 45 percent Galena Interior Learning Academy 4 percent Alaska Technical Center 9 percent Alaska Vocational Technical Center 17 percent Northwestern Alaska Career and Technical Center 3 percent Southwest Alaska Vocational and Education Center 3 percent Yuut Elitnaurviat, Inc. People’s Learning Center 9 percent Partners for Progress in Delta, Inc. 3 percent Amundsen Educational Center 2 percent Ilisagvik College 5 percent.

Click to view

History. (§ 3 ch 132 SLA 2000; am §§ 1, 2 ch 47 SLA 2008; am §§ 30 — 33 ch 15 SLA 2014; am § 1 ch 24 SLA 2017; am § 1 ch 16 SLA 2020; am § 1 ch 4 SLA 2021)

Cross references. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 15, SLA 2014, see 2014 House Journal 1434 — 1437.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, in (a), substituted “.16 percent” for “.15 percent” following “in an amount equal to”, effective May 14, 2014, in the introductory language in (d), substituted “June 30, 2015” for “June 30, 2009” and “June 30, 2017” for “June 30, 2014”; in the list of institutions, deleted “University of Alaska Southeast 5 percent”, substituted “Galena Interior Learning Academy” for “Galena Project Education Vocational Training Center”, substituted “Alaska Technical Center” for “Kotzebue Technical Center”, substituted “Partners for Progress in Delta, Inc.” for “Delta Career Advancement Center”, substituted “Amundsen Educational Center” for “New Frontier Vocational Technical Center” and added “Ilisagvik College 5 percent”; effective July 1, 2015, in (e), added (e)(4) — (e)(6) and deleted former (e)(4) and (e)(5) related to satisfaction of participants and employers with the program; added (g) and (h), and made related and stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment, effective June 30, 2017, in (d), substituted “June 30, 2020” for “June 30, 2017” and deleted “, formerly known as the Alaska Human Resource Investment Council,” following “Alaska Workforce Investment Board”.

The 2020 amendment, effective April 21, 2020, in (d), substituted “June 30, 2021” for “June 30, 2020”.

The 2021 amendment, effective June 10, 2021, in (d), in the introductory language, substituted “June 30, 2024” for “June 30, 2021”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 2, ch. 24, SLA 2017 provides that the 2017 amendment to subsection (d) “is retroactive to June 30, 2017.”

Sec. 23.15.840. Grants for technical and vocational education.

  1. The board shall award grants, in accordance with the priority list adopted under (f) of this section, to technical and vocational education entities. A technical and vocational education entity is eligible for a grant under this section if the entity meets program requirements, the grant program is physically located in Alaska, and the entity can demonstrate that
    1. the entity’s accounting systems include controls adequate to check the accuracy and reliability of accounting data, promote operating efficiency, and assure compliance with program requirements and generally accepted accounting principles;
    2. the entity’s activities do not replace or compete in any way with a federally approved apprenticeship program or any other existing training programs; and
    3. the entity has secured matching funds for the program for which the grant is requested.
  2. The board may not award a grant if the grant would displace money available through existing public or private technical and vocational education programs.
  3. Subject to the limits of its grant, an entity receiving a grant under this section shall provide one or more program elements. The program elements include
    1. industry-specific training;
    2. on-the-job training; and
    3. institutional or classroom job-linked training.
  4. A technical or vocational educational institution that receives a grant from the board shall give appropriate state agencies full access to accounting records concerning the grant to assure compliance with program standards.
  5. In making a grant under this section, the board shall require that the qualified entity and grantees of the qualified entity limit the amount of the grant proceeds spent on administration so that the total spent on administration from the proceeds of the technical and vocational education program account, including amounts spent by the board itself, does not exceed five percent. A training program funded by the board must
    1. meet the standards adopted by the board concerning the percentage of a grant that may be spent on administrative costs;
    2. be operated by an institution that holds a valid authorization to operate issued under AS 14.48 if the program is a postsecondary educational program operated by a postsecondary educational institution subject to regulation under AS 14.48.
  6. To the extent that funding is available, grants shall be awarded to entities that apply for funding by the deadline established by the board by regulation. The board shall give priority to grant applications from qualified entities whose purpose is listed first on the list of priorities adopted under this subsection. If money remains after grants for the first priority have been awarded, the board may make grants to entities whose purpose is listed next on the list of priorities. The board shall proceed in this fashion until it has exhausted the money available for granting for the year. The board shall adopt a priority list each year based on economic, employment, and other relevant data in order to maximize employment opportunities for participants.

History. (§ 3 ch 132 SLA 2000; am §§ 35 — 39 ch 86 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For state technical and vocational education program, see 8 AAC 86.

Sec. 23.15.850. Definitions.

In AS 23.15.820 23.15.850 ,

  1. “articulation agreement” means a dual-credit partnership between a school district and an institution receiving funding under AS 23.15.835(d) that describes vocational education courses, student eligibility, course location, academic policies, student support services, credit on a student’s transcript, funding, and other items required by the partnering institutions;
  2. “board” means the Alaska Workforce Investment Board;
  3. “dual credit” means simultaneous high school credit and credit toward a career or vocational certification.
  4. “program” means the Alaska technical and vocational education program established in AS 23.15.820 23.15.850 .

History. (§ 3 ch 132 SLA 2000; am § 40 ch 86 SLA 2002; am § 34 ch 15 SLA 2014)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraphs (1) and (3) were enacted as (3) and (4), and renumbered in 2014.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added paragraph (3) and (4) [now (1) and (3), respectively].

Chapter 20. Alaska Employment Security Act.

Cross references. —

For provisions temporarily suspending or amending certain provisions of this chapter beginning March 1, 2020 during the state or national emergency resulting from the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, see secs. 1 and 2, ch. 4, SLA 2020, in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Comprehensive program established. —

This chapter establishes a comprehensive program which provides unemployed workers with job placement services and cash benefits during the period of their unemployment. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Primary purpose of this chapter is to ameliorate the negative effects that involuntary unemployment has on both the unemployed individual and society as a whole. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Corporate officers’ personal liability. —

Corporate officers who exercise significant control over a corporation’s finances may be held personally liable for the entire contribution owed by the corporation under this chapter. Breck v. State, Dep't of Labor, 862 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1993).

Article 1. Administration.

Collateral references. —

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 265-270.

Sec. 23.20.005. Purpose.

  1. This chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes to promote employment security by increasing opportunities for placement through the maintenance of a system of public employment offices and to provide through the accumulation of reserves for the payment of compensation to individuals with respect to their unemployment.
  2. The legislature declares its intention to provide for carrying out the purposes of this chapter in cooperation with the appropriate agencies of other states and the federal government, as part of a nationwide employment security program, and particularly to provide for meeting the requirements of Title III of the Federal Social Security Act, the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 3303 and 3304 (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Internal Revenue Code), and the Act of Congress approved June 6, 1933, entitled “An Act to provide for the establishment of a national employment system and for cooperation with the states in the promotion of such system, and for other purposes” (cited in this chapter as the Wagner-Peyser Act), and Title IV of the Act of Congress approved June 22, 1944, each as amended, in order to obtain for this state and its citizens the grants and privileges available under the federal Act.  Doubt as to the proper construction of a provision of this chapter shall be resolved in favor of conformity with the requirements of the federal Act.

History. (§ 101 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Cross references. —

For Title III of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504; for the Wagner-Peyser Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 49 — 49c, 49d, 49g, 49h, 49j, 49k and 557; for Title IV of the Act of June 22, 1944, see P.L. 78-346 (Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944).

Notes to Decisions

Remedial statute. —

This chapter, the Alaska Employment Security Act, is a remedial statute with the primary purpose of ameliorating the negative effects that involuntary unemployment has on both the unemployed individual and society as a whole. Estes v. Department of Labor, 625 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1981).

Liberal construction. —

The unemployment laws are remedial in nature, and as such are to be liberally construed. Aragon v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 10 Alaska 236 (D. Alaska 1942), rev'd, 149 F.2d 447, 10 Alaska 524 (9th Cir. Alaska 1945) (decided under prior law).

Construction consistent with federal enactment. —

This chapter must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the federal enactment from which it arises. Allen v. State, Dep't of Labor, 658 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1983).

Quoted in

State v. Almen, 480 P.2d 695 (Alaska 1971).

Stated in

Worthington Constr. Co. v. Employment Sec. Div., 413 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1966).

Cited in

Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.20.010. Policy.

As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public policy of the state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the state. Involuntary unemployment is, therefore, a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden and to maintain purchasing power as a factor in stabilizing the economy of the state. This can be accomplished by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment, from which benefits may be paid for periods of involuntary unemployment. The legislature, therefore, declares that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the state require the enactment of this measure, under the police power of the state, for the operation of public employment service offices and for the establishment of an employment security program to be used for the benefit of eligible unemployed persons.

History. (§ 102 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Extraordinary and unusual stress. —

Because the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and Commission failed to consider the character of the sudden, traumatic threat to the employee, the Commission erred in concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the employee’s stress was not “extraordinary and unusual” in comparison to the stresses encountered by other prison guards. Even accepting that prison guards might have been subject to threats, the traumatic death threat that the employee described in detail constituted “extraordinary and unusual” stress. Kelly v. Dep't of Corr., 218 P.3d 291 (Alaska 2009).

Primary purpose of this chapter, the Alaska Employment Security Act, is to ameliorate the negative effects that involuntary unemployment has on both the unemployed individual and society as a whole. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978); Estes v. Department of Labor, 625 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1981).

Claimant must be available for full-time work in order to qualify for unemployment benefits. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

The purpose of this chapter, the Alaska Employment Security Act, is furthered, in part, by the availability requirement since it ensures that unemployment benefits go to those whose unemployment is truly involuntary; i.e., those who are ready and willing to work if a job becomes available to them. Given this policy, the legislature did not intend to benefit those who have voluntarily limited their ability to obtain work by being unavailable for full-time work. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Voluntary or involuntary status of unemployment is not the only criterion for denial or allowance of benefits. Twenty-Eight (28) Members of Oil Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Empl. Sec. Div., 659 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1983).

Labor dispute disqualification not overridden. —

The general policy section of this section regarding involuntary unemployment did not override the specific enunciation of the labor dispute disqualification in former AS 23.20.380 (9). Twenty-Eight (28) Members of Oil Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Empl. Sec. Div., 659 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1983).

Quoted in

In re Active Steel Erectors, Inc., 53 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).

Secs. 23.20.012 , 23.20.015. Policy on temporary unemployment compensation; annual report. [Repealed, § 25 ch 122 SLA 1977.]

Sec. 23.20.020. Maintenance and protection of fund.

If possible, there shall be provided in the fund a reserve against the liability in future years to pay benefits. Whenever the department believes that a change in contribution or benefit rates is necessary to protect the solvency of the fund, it shall promptly inform the governor and the legislature, and make recommendations with respect to a change.

History. (§ 306 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 4 ch 60 SLA 1960)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

In re Active Steel Erectors, Inc., 53 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).

Sec. 23.20.021. Certain appropriations to the fund.

In accordance with AS 37.07 (Executive Budget Act), the legislature may appropriate money to the fund.

History. (§ 2 ch 50 SLA 2013)

Effective dates. —

Section 14, ch. 50, SLA 2013 makes this section effective July 1, 2013.

Sec. 23.20.022. Actuarial studies.

On December 1, 1975, the commissioner shall submit to the governor an actuarial study of the unemployment tax and benefit structures established under this chapter. Thereafter, an actuarial study of the structures shall be submitted to the governor on December 1 of every second year.

History. (§ 1 ch 43 SLA 1973)

Sec. 23.20.025. Establishment of Employment Security Advisory Council. [Repealed, § 16 ch 61 SLA 1995. For Alaska Human Resource Investment Council, see AS 23.15.550 et seq.]

For Alaska Human Resource Investment Council, see AS 23.15.550 et seq.

For Alaska Human Resource Investment Council, see AS 23.15.550 et seq.

Sec. 23.20.030. Director.

  1. Subject to AS 23.20.035 , the department shall appoint a director.  The director shall administer this chapter under the authority which the department delegates.  The department may not delegate the power to adopt, amend, or rescind regulations.
  2. The department shall prescribe the divisions, subdivisions, and units of the organization to be directed by the director to carry out the purposes of this chapter.  The director may require a person handling money or signing checks to give bond.  The director shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
  3. [Repealed, § 59 ch 59 SLA 1982.]

History. (§ 306 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 310 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 4 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 59 ch 59 SLA 1982)

Sec. 23.20.035. Duties and powers of director.

  1. The director, in accordance with AS 23.20.020 and 23.20.030 , shall employ persons, including a deputy director, make expenditures, require reports, make investigations, and take other action that the director considers necessary to carry out the authority of the office.
  2. The director may delegate powers and duties to a deputy director or to a responsible employee of the agency when the director is absent from the office. The deputy director shall assume the duties and powers of the director when that office is vacant.

History. (§ 311 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 75 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Sec. 23.20.040. Qualifications of director.

A person may not be appointed director unless the person is a citizen of the United States and qualified by training and experience to perform the duties of the office.

History. (§ 310 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Busby, 721 P.2d 1151 (Alaska 1986).

Sec. 23.20.045. Regulations.

The department may adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) necessary to administer this chapter.

History. (§ 312 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 2 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 26 ch 21 SLA 1985)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.050. Publications.

The department shall have printed for distribution to the public the text of this chapter, the department’s regulations, the annual reports of the commissioner to the governor, and any other material the department considers relevant and suitable. The department shall furnish copies of these to any person upon application.

History. (§ 313 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.055. Department records; admissibility.

  1. The department may make summaries, compilations, photographs, duplications, or reproductions of records, reports, or transcripts of them which it considers advisable for the effective and economical preservation of the information contained in them.
  2. The summaries, compilations, photographs, duplications, or reproductions, duly authenticated, are admissible in a proceeding under this chapter, including a court action, if the original records would be admissible.
  3. The department may provide by regulation for the destruction, after a reasonable period, of records, reports, transcripts, other papers in its custody, or reproductions of them, when their preservation is no longer necessary for a purpose necessary to the administration of this chapter.

History. (§ 316 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.060. Oaths and witnesses.

In administering this chapter, the department may administer oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records considered necessary as evidence in connection with a disputed claim or the administration of this chapter.

History. (§ 318 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.065. Subpoenas.

In case of contumacy, or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the superior court may, upon application by the department, issue an order requiring the person to appear before the department to produce evidence if ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question. Failure to obey the order of the court is punishable as contempt.

History. (§ 320 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.070. Self-incrimination.

A person may not be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before the department, or in obedience to a subpoena of the department in a cause or proceeding before the department, or an appeal tribunal, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of the person may tend to incriminate the person or subject the person to a penalty or forfeiture. An individual may not be prosecuted or subjected to a penalty or forfeiture for or on account of a transaction, matter, or thing concerning which the individual is compelled, after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence. However, the individual testifying is not exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in testifying.

History. (§ 321 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Erroneous suppression of incriminating statements. —

In defendant’s trial for theft of unemployment benefits, in violation of AS 11.46.130(a) and AS 11.46.130(a) and 11.46.180 , and making false statements to obtain unemployment benefits in violation of AS 23.20.485 , a trial court erroneously suppressed incriminating statements defendant made to an Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor investigator regarding defendant’s unemployment benefits where defendant failed to assert his right against self-incrimination under this section and defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes or coerced when he made the statements: Defendant had forfeited the privilege and was not entitled to suppression of his statements. State v. Rivers, 146 P.3d 999 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Sec. 23.20.075. Acquisition of land and buildings.

  1. The department may acquire in the name of the state by term purchase agreements based on competitive bids in accordance with AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code) land and buildings upon terms and conditions that are approved by the Bureau of Employment Security of the United States, or its successor, for the purpose of providing office space for the department at a place which the department finds necessary and suitable.
  2. An agreement made for the purchase of premises is subject to the approval of the attorney general and does not subject the state to liability for the payment of the purchase price, except from money which is allocated to the state by the United States Bureau of Employment Security or its successor for the administration of this chapter.
  3. All money received from the United States for the payments authorized in this section for land and buildings shall be deposited in the employment security administration fund in the state treasury and is appropriated from that fund for purposes of this chapter.
  4. It is the policy of this state that if premises are purchased under this chapter, the department shall be housed in the premises without further payment by the United States, except for general maintenance, utilities, and janitorial services, or if, in the future, it is desirable to move the offices, other suitable similar space will be furnished by the state without further payment for the space by the United States, except for general maintenance, utilities, and janitorial services.

History. (§ 324 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 21 ch 106 SLA 1986)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981).

Sec. 23.20.077. Application for demonstration programs.

  1. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall pursue application with appropriate agencies to qualify this state as a pilot state for demonstration programs related to helping unemployed Alaskans regain employment, if administrative money is available to operate the project.
  2. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development may waive provisions of this chapter for individuals who participate in a demonstration project, to the extent required for the state to participate in the project.

History. (§ 28 ch 100 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 23.20.533. Renumbered in 1989.

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.20.080. Federal-state cooperation.

  1. In the administration of this chapter, the department shall cooperate, to the extent consistent with this chapter, with the Secretary of Labor, and shall take action through the adoption of regulations, administration methods, and standards that is necessary to obtain for this state and its citizens all advantages available under 26 U.S.C. 3303 and 3304 (Internal Revenue Code) and the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended.  The department shall comply with the regulations of the Secretary of Labor relating to the receipt or expenditure by this state of money granted under these federal laws and shall make reports in the form and containing the information which the Secretary of Labor requires.  The department shall comply with the provisions which the Secretary of Labor may from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of the reports.  The department may cooperate with every agency of the United States charged with the administration of an unemployment insurance law.
  2. Notwithstanding AS 23.20.330 23.20.409 , after notifying the legislature and other interested parties of its intent, the department may implement an unemployment compensation program not otherwise provided for in this chapter in accordance with this subsection. A program implemented under this subsection is repealed on the date two years after the date on which it took effect unless its implementation is approved by law. The program may be implemented only if
    1. the program is authorized by the United States Secretary of Labor;
    2. the governor approves the implementation in writing;
    3. the commissioner of labor and workforce development determines that the program will result in the receipt of additional federal money to carry out the purposes of this chapter and will produce a net monetary gain to the state and its people; and
    4. the implementation will not require spending money from the general fund other than money received from the federal government for the program.

History. (§ 322 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 2 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (b) of this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For Wagner-Peyser Act, see the cross references at AS 23.20.005 .

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Legislative history reports. —

For Governor’s transmittal letter in connection with the enactment of subsection (b) by § 1, ch. 2, SLA 1992 (CCS SB 349), see 1992 Senate Journal 1788.

Sec. 23.20.081. Emergency unemployment compensation program. [Repealed, §§ 9, 15 ch 28 SLA 1993.]

Sec. 23.20.085. Interstate benefit payments.

  1. The department shall enter into reciprocal arrangements with appropriate and duly authorized agencies of other states or of the federal government, or both, so that potential rights to benefits under this chapter may constitute the basis for payment of claims by another state or by the federal government and potential rights to benefits accumulated under the law of another state or of the federal government may constitute the basis for the payment of claims by this state. These claims shall be paid under the provisions of this chapter or under the provisions of the law of the other state or of the federal government or under that combination of the provisions of both laws as is agreed upon as being fair and reasonable to all affected interests.  An arrangement under this section may not be entered into unless it contains provision for reimbursement to the fund for those claims paid on the basis of wages and service subject to the law of another state or of the federal government, and provision for reimbursement from the fund for those claims paid by another state or by the federal government on the basis of wages and service subject to this chapter.  Reimbursements paid from the fund under this section are considered to be benefits for the purposes of this chapter.
  2. The department shall participate in any arrangements for the payment of benefits on the basis of combining an individual’s wages and employment covered under this chapter with the individual’s wages and employment covered under the unemployment insurance laws of other states which are approved by the United States Secretary of Labor in consultation with the state employment security agencies as reasonably calculated to assure the prompt and full payment of benefits in such situations and which arrangements shall include provisions for
    1. applying the base period of a single state law to a claim involving the combining of an individual’s wages and employment covered under two or more state unemployment insurance laws, and
    2. avoiding the duplicate use of wages and employment by reason of the combining.
  3. In this section, the terms “other state” and “another state” include any state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Canada, and where applicable include the federal government.

History. (§ 325 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 5 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 122 SLA 1977)

Revisor’s notes. —

Under the terms of § 30, ch. 122, SLA 1977, the 1977 amendment was effective January 1, 1978, the day after the date the Secretary of Labor approved the Virgin Islands Employment Security Law.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.090. Reciprocal coverage and cooperation.

  1. The commissioner may enter into reciprocal arrangements with appropriate and authorized agencies of other states or of the federal government, or both, whereby, notwithstanding AS 23.20.395 ,
    1. service performed by an individual for a single employing unit for which service is customarily performed by the individual in more than one state is considered service performed entirely within any one of the states in which (A) a part of the individual’s service is performed, (B) the individual resides, or (C) the employing unit maintains a place of business; provided, that there is in effect, as to the service, an approved election by an employing unit with the acquiescence of the individual, under which service performed by the individual for the employing unit is considered performed entirely within that state; and
    2. service performed by not more than three individuals, on a portion of a day but not necessarily simultaneously, for a single employing unit which customarily operates in more than one state is considered service performed entirely within the state in which the employing unit maintains the headquarters of its business; provided, that there is in effect, as to the service, an approved election by an employing unit with the affirmative consent of each individual, under which service performed by the individual for the employing unit is considered performed entirely within that state.
  2. To the extent permissible under the laws and constitution of the United States, the department may enter into an arrangement of the character provided in this section with the agency of a foreign government administering an employment security law.

History. (§ 325.1 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 6 ch 60 SLA 1960)

Sec. 23.20.095. Exchange of services, facilities, and information.

  1. The administration of this chapter and of other state and federal unemployment compensation and public employment service laws will be promoted by cooperation between this state and those states and the appropriate federal agencies exchanging services and making facilities and information available.
  2. The department may make investigations, secure and transmit information, make available services and facilities, and exercise other powers provided in this chapter with respect to the administration of this chapter which the department considers necessary or appropriate to facilitate the administration of the unemployment compensation or public employment service law of another state or the federal government.

History. (§ 326 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.100. Public employment offices.

The department shall establish and maintain free public employment offices in the number and in the places which may be necessary for the administration of this chapter and for the purposes of performing functions which are within the scope of the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended. The provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended, are accepted by this state, and the department is designated the agency of this state for the purposes of that Act. All money received by this state under that Act shall be paid into the employment security administration fund and shall be expended solely for the maintenance of the state system of public employment offices.

History. (§ 331 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Cross references. —

For the Wagner-Peyser Act, see the cross references at AS 23.20.005 .

Sec. 23.20.105. Employing units to keep records and reports.

An employing unit shall keep work records containing information which the department prescribes. The records shall be open to inspection and may be copied by the department at any reasonable time and as often as may be necessary. The department may require an employing unit to submit sworn or unsworn reports, with respect to persons employed by it, which are considered necessary for the administration of this chapter.

History. (§ 315 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.20.110. Information obtained by department.

  1. Except for disclosures required by 42 U.S.C. 503, as amended, and 20 C.F.R. 603, as amended, and disclosures authorized under this section, the department shall hold information obtained from an employing unit or individual in the course of administering this chapter and determinations as to the benefit rights of an individual confidential and may not disclose them or open them to public inspection in a manner that reveals the identity of the individual or employing unit. A claimant or an employing unit is entitled to information from the records of the department only to the extent necessary to properly present or protest a claim or determination under this chapter. The department may not provide information that is confidential under this section to a person for use in any civil or administrative matter not directly involving the presentation or protest of a claim or determination under this chapter; however, subject to restrictions that the department prescribes by regulation, the information must be made available to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, for the purpose of verifying a claimant’s immigration status, to the United States Railroad Retirement Board, to an agency of this state or another state or federal agency charged with the administration of an unemployment compensation law or the maintenance of a system of public employment offices, to the United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, for the purposes of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, or to the Department of Revenue for tax purposes. Information obtained in the course of administering this chapter or in connection with the administration of the employment service may be made available to persons or agencies for purposes appropriate to the operation of a public employment service or the administration of employment and training programs planned or coordinated by the Alaska Workforce Investment Board under AS 23.15.550 23.15.585 .
  2. Upon request the department shall furnish to an agency of the United States charged with the administration of public works or assistance through public employment, and may furnish to a state agency similarly charged, the name, address, ordinary occupation, and employment status of each recipient of benefits and the recipient’s rights to benefits under this chapter.
  3. Upon request of an agency of this or another state or of the federal government which administers or operates one or more programs of public assistance under either federal law or the law of this state, or which is charged with any duty or responsibility under any such program, and if that agency is required by law to impose safeguards for the confidentiality of information at least as effective as required under this section, the department shall provide, with respect to any named individual specified by the requesting agency, the following information:
    1. whether the individual is receiving, has received, or has made application for unemployment compensation under this chapter;
    2. the period, if any, for which unemployment compensation was payable and the weekly rate of compensation paid;
    3. the individual’s most recent address; and
    4. whether the individual has refused an offer of employment, and, if so, the date of the refusal and a description of the employment refused, including duties, conditions of employment, and rate of pay.
  4. The department may require that an agency or authorized person to which it provides information under this section reimburse the department for its costs of furnishing that information.
  5. The department shall provide wage and unemployment compensation information
    1. requested by a state or federal agency under an income and eligibility verification system that meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. 1320b-7 (Social Security Act);
    2. as required by federal law for child support purposes;
    3. to the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services for the National Directory of New Hires as required by 42 U.S.C. 503 and 42 U.S.C. 653; or
    4. to a state or a political subdivision of a state that administers a program funded under 42 U.S.C. 601 — 619 that provides temporary assistance for needy families.
  6. [Repealed, § 2 ch 60 SLA 1985.]
  7. A recipient of records disclosed under this section may not use the disclosed records for a purpose other than the purpose for which the disclosure was made. The requirements concerning the confidentiality of information obtained in the course of administering this chapter apply to officers and employees of a state, federal, municipal, or other agency to whom the department provides information as authorized by this section.
  8. [Repealed, § 13 ch 45 SLA 2008.]
  9. [Repealed, § 13 ch 45 SLA 2008.]
  10. [Repealed, § 13 ch 45 SLA 2008.]
  11. If an individual who is applying for or participating in a housing assistance program administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development gives authorization, the department shall disclose, to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development or to representatives of the housing assistance program operating the program, wage information and unemployment compensation information. The authorization shall be made by the individual on a consent form approved by the department. The form must state the information authorized to be released and require the signature of the individual. In this subsection,
    1. “unemployment compensation information” means whether the individual is receiving, has received, or has applied for unemployment compensation, and the amount of unemployment compensation that the individual is receiving, has received, or is eligible to receive, and the individual’s current address and other contact information;
    2. “wage information” means the social security number, or numbers if there are more than one, and quarterly wages of an employee, and the name, address, state, and, if known, federal employer identification number of an employer reporting wages under this chapter.
  12. The department may provide information obtained under this chapter to an agency of this state or to a person under contract with the state to
    1. verify the eligibility of an applicant for a public benefit or a publicly financed payment;
    2. assist the state in the collection of fines, penalties, judgments of restitution on behalf of victims of crimes or delinquent acts, or other payments ordered by a court or an administrative agency; or
    3. collect money owed to the fund under this chapter.
  13. The department may not release information under this section to a state agency or to a person under contract with the state until the department and the agency or person have entered into a written agreement that governs the release of information. The written agreement must specify
    1. the purpose for the information;
    2. a description of the information to be provided;
    3. a description of the procedure for transmitting, securing, using, and disposing of the information;
    4. the method of reimbursement, if any, for the cost of providing the information; and
    5. that the department may perform on-site inspections to ensure that the confidentiality requirements of this section are met.
  14. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the department may produce statistical and other public reports based on information obtained in the course of administering this chapter, so long as the department complies with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 603, as amended, regarding the use or release of confidential records.
  15. Upon request and for child support purposes authorized under law, the department shall provide to the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 , or the child support enforcement agency of another state, the following:
    1. the name, address, social security number, ordinary occupation, and employment status of each applicant for or recipient of benefits under this chapter;
    2. information about the applicant’s or recipient’s right to benefits under this chapter;
    3. the name, address, and employer identification number of the applicant’s or recipient’s current or former employer;
    4. information, if available, on the applicant or recipient concerning
      1. earnings or other income of the applicant or recipient;
      2. benefits from employment, including rights to or enrollment in group health care coverage; and
      3. the type, status, location, and amount of assets of or debts owed by or to the applicant or recipient.
  16. Upon the written request by a state district attorney, a municipal attorney, a United States attorney, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the department may release to the requester information under this section for the investigation or prosecution of a crime or to enforce an order of a court in a criminal matter, including enforcing probation or parole conditions.
  17. The confidentiality requirements of this section do not apply to disclosure of decisions and records on appeal in any matter before the department as long as the federal social security number of the claimant and the employer’s federal employer identification number and federal social security number are redacted or removed before disclosure is made.
  18. The department may provide information obtained under this chapter to another state agency if
    1. the disclosure is authorized under 20 C.F.R. 603, as amended;
    2. the disclosure is for the statewide workforce and education-related statistics program described under AS 14.42.035 ;
    3. the department has entered into a written agreement with the agency receiving the information in which the agency agrees not to disclose the information unless
      1. the subsequent disclosure is for the statewide workforce and education-related statistics program described under AS 14.42.035 ; and
      2. the agency is authorized to make the subsequent disclosure under a written agreement between the agency and the Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education.
  19. In this section, “judgment of restitution” has the meaning given in AS 09.38.500 .

History. (§ 323 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 79 SLA 1969; am § 2 ch 122 SLA 1977; am § 3 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 2 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 1, 2 ch 60 SLA 1985; am §§ 2, 3 ch 40 SLA 1988; am § 2 ch 100 SLA 1989; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 43 SLA 1996; am §§ 33, 34 ch 87 SLA 1997; am § 27 ch 58 SLA 1999; am § 1 ch 51 SLA 2000; am §§ 15, 16 ch 92 SLA 2001; am § 41 ch 86 SLA 2002; am §§ 1, 2 ch 130 SLA 2004; am §§ 1 — 7, 13 ch 45 SLA 2008; am § 3 ch 32 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

The subsections of this section were relettered in 2004, 2008, and 2018.

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” was changed to “child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” in (o) of this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Cross references. —

Under sec. 4, ch. 32, SLA 2018, subsection (r) “applies to information obtained by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development under AS 23.30 before, on, or after” June 19, 2018.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 30, 2004, substituted “federal, or municipal agency” for “or federal agency” in subsection (g), and added subsection (q) [now (p)].

The 2008 amendment, effective May 29, 2008, rewrote subsections (a) and (n), inserted “wage and unemployment compensation” in the introductory language of subsection (e), added paragraphs (e)(3) and (4), inserted the first sentence of subsection (g), substituted “municipal, or other” for “or municipal” in the second sentence of subsection (g), repealed subsections (h) — (j), substituted “has received, or is eligible to receive, and the individual’s current address and other contact information” for “or will receive” in paragraph (k)(1), added paragraph (m)(5), added subsection (q), and made related changes.

The 2018 amendment, effective June 19, 2018, added (s) [now (r)].

Editor's notes. —

The delayed amendments to this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which were to take effect July 1, 2001, were repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.

Section 45, ch. 92, SLA 2001, provides that the amendments to subsection ( l ) and the addition of subsection (p) [now (s)], made by ch. 92, SLA 2001, apply “to judgments or orders of restitution entered in adjudications of delinquency of minors or in criminal cases before, on, or after January 1, 2002.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 130, SLA 2004 (HB 490), which relates to the release of employment security records for law enforcement purposes and amends subsection (g) and adds subsection (p) of this section, see 2004 House Journal 2613 — 2614.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Although subsection (a) of this section and former AS 43.20.190(a) (replaced by AS 43.05.230(a) ) guarantee confidentiality of records in the Department of Labor and Revenue, AS 24.20.271 (6) (now AS 24.20.271 (7)) enables the Division of Audit to have access to the records of every state agency whether confidential or not. 1972 Op. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 21, 1972).

A proposed agreement between the Internal Revenue Service and the Employment Security Division allowing the IRS direct computer access to employment security information is not permissible under this section. April 24, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

Disclosure of the results of a survey conducted by the Department of Labor regarding employment of residents and nonresidents on the Eilson AFB Housing Project as part of an effort to promote local hire on the project must be limited to purely statistical information, without identification of individual contractors. October 14, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

The Department of Labor may not compile and release a list of the names and addresses of people who commute to Anchorage to work if it must obtain this information from the data provided by employers in compliance with the state’s employment security program. October 2, 1989 Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.20.115. Unauthorized disclosure of information.

A member of the department, an employee of the department, an agent of the department, or an officer or employee of a state, federal, municipal, or other agency that has been provided with information by the department who, in violation of AS 23.20.110 , makes a disclosure of information obtained from an employing unit or from an individual in the administration of this chapter, or a person who has obtained a list of applicants for work or of claimants or recipients of benefits under this chapter and who uses or permits the use of the list for a purpose not authorized by AS 23.20.110 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

History. (§ 905 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 4 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 3 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 3 ch 130 SLA 2004; am § 8 ch 45 SLA 2008)

Cross references. —

For fines and sentences for class B misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035 and 12.55.135 .

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 30, 2004, substituted “federal or municipal agency” for “or federal agency” near the beginning of the section.

The 2008 amendment, effective May 29, 2008, substituted “municipal, or other” for “or municipal” in the first sentence.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 130, SLA 2004 (HB 490), which relates to the release of employment security records for law enforcement purposes and adds this section, see 2004 House Journal 2613 — 2614.

Sec. 23.20.120. Examination of bank.

The department may request the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States to make or have made an examination of the correctness of a return or report of a national banking association rendered under this chapter. The department may, in connection with the request, transmit the report or return to the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States as provided in 26 U.S.C. 3305(c) (Internal Revenue Code).

History. (§ 323 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.125. Data to be collected. [Repealed, § 1 ch 74 SLA 1965.]

Article 2. Funds.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

Collateral references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 1-10.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 192-210.

Sec. 23.20.130. Unemployment compensation fund; training and building fund; establishment and control.

  1. There shall be maintained, as special funds separate and apart from all public funds of this state, an unemployment compensation fund, which shall be administered by the department exclusively for the purposes of this chapter, and a training and building fund.
  2. The unemployment compensation fund consists of
    1. all contributions collected under this chapter;
    2. interest earned on money in the unemployment trust fund account;
    3. property or securities acquired through the use of money belonging to the fund;
    4. earnings of the property or securities;
    5. sums made available to the state as advances under 42 U.S.C. 1321 — 1324 (Title XII, Social Security Act), as amended, for the purposes of paying benefits as provided in this chapter;
    6. advances from the general fund of the state for the purposes of paying benefits provided in this chapter;
    7. all money credited to this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund under 42 U.S.C. 1103 (§ 903, Social Security Act), as amended;
    8. all money received for the fund from any other source;
    9. reimbursement of benefits paid under AS 23.20.277 and 23.20.278 ; and
    10. recovery of benefits paid from the unemployment compensation fund to individuals not entitled to them as provided by AS 23.20.390 .
  3. All money in the unemployment compensation fund is mingled and undivided.
  4. The training and building fund consists of all interest and penalties collected under AS 23.20.185 , 23.20.190 , and 23.20.195 and all sums recovered on official bond for losses sustained by the fund. Training and building fund money shall be deposited in the clearing account of the unemployment compensation fund for clearance only and does not become a part of the fund.  The unobligated amount in the training and building fund in excess of $100,000 on the close of business of the 30th day following the last day of each fiscal year shall be transferred within 20 days to this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund.  The fund shall be included in the budget submitted to the legislature under AS 37.07 (Executive Budget Act).  Funds available in the training and building fund shall be expended upon the direction of the department, with the approval of the governor, when it appears to the governor that the expenditure is necessary for but not limited to
    1. the proper administration of this chapter if no federal funds are available for the specific purpose for which the expenditure is to be made, and if the funds are not substituted for appropriations from federal funds that would be made available in the absence of those funds;
    2. the proper administration of this chapter, if appropriations from federal funds have been requested but not yet received, and the training and building fund will be reimbursed upon receipt of the requested federal appropriation;
    3. [Repealed, § 84 ch 58 SLA 1999.]
    4. the purposes specified in AS 23.20.075 .

History. (§ 401 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 13 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 123 SLA 1968; am § 1 ch 106 SLA 1969; am § 2 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1976; am §§ 5, 6 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 1 ch 106 SLA 1984; am § 84 ch 58 SLA 1999)

Sec. 23.20.135. Accounts and deposit.

  1. The commissioner of revenue is ex officio the treasurer and custodian of the fund and shall administer it as directed by the department. Disbursements shall be issued from the fund in accordance with AS 37.25.050 and the regulations that the department adopts. The fund has three separate accounts:
    1. a clearing account;
    2. an unemployment trust fund account; and
    3. a benefit account.
  2. The department, or a designee of the department, shall immediately deposit, upon receipt, all money payable to the fund in the clearing account. Refunds of contributions erroneously collected and payable under AS 23.20.225 and 23.20.526(a)(11) may be paid from the clearing account in the same manner, or from the training and building fund.  Interest and penalty payments may not be refunded from the unemployment compensation fund.  After clearance, all money in the clearing account, except for that portion of employee contributions under AS 23.20.290(d) used to pay interest on advances received under AS 23.20.140 , shall be immediately deposited with the United States Secretary of the Treasury to the credit of the account of this state in the unemployment trust fund established and maintained under 42 U.S.C. 1104 (§ 904, Social Security Act), as amended.
  3. The benefit account consists of money requisitioned from this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund for the purpose of paying benefits.  Money in the clearing and benefit accounts may be deposited by the designee of the department, under the direction of the department, in a bank or public depository in which general funds of the state may be deposited, but no public deposit insurance charge or premium may be paid out of the fund.  Money in these accounts may not be commingled with other state funds, but shall be maintained in separate accounts on the books of the depository bank.  The money is secured by the depository law of this state. Collateral pledged for this purpose shall be kept separate and distinct from collateral pledged to secure other funds of the state.  The commissioner of revenue is liable on the official bond of the commissioner for the faithful performance of the commissioner’s duties in connection with the fund. Sums recovered for losses sustained by the fund shall be deposited in the fund.

History. (§ 402 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 14 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 5 ch 106 SLA 1969; am § 7 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 1 ch 82 SLA 1987; am § 11 ch 175 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2006, in subsection (a), substituted “Disbursements shall be issued from” for “Checks or warrants shall be issued on,” inserted “AS 37.25.050 and,” and made stylistic changes.

Sec. 23.20.140. Advances.

When, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1321 — 1324 (Title XII, Social Security Act), as amended, the balance in the unemployment trust fund reaches a point where the governor must apply for an advance in order to obtain for the state and its citizens the advantages available under 42 U.S.C. 1321 — 1324, the department shall notify the governor and take other action which is appropriate to obtain an advance to the unemployment trust fund and arrange for its repayment in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1321 — 1324.

History. (§ 403 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 8 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 2 ch 82 SLA 1987)

Sec. 23.20.145. Withdrawals.

  1. In accordance with regulations adopted by the department, money shall be requisitioned from the state’s account in the unemployment trust fund solely for the payment of benefits and refunds, except that money credited to the state’s account under 42 U.S.C. 1103 (§ 903, Social Security Act), as amended, shall be used exclusively as provided in (f) — (h) of this section.
  2. The department shall from time to time requisition from the unemployment trust fund amounts not exceeding the amounts standing to the state’s account in the fund that it considers necessary for the payment of benefits for a reasonable future period. Upon receipt of an amount the department shall deposit the money to the benefit account. A payment may be made solely from the benefit account.
  3. If money in the clearing account is not sufficient to provide for refunds of contributions erroneously collected and payable under AS 23.20.225 and 23.20.526(a)(11) , the department shall withdraw from the unemployment trust fund the amounts not exceeding the amount standing to this state’s account in the fund that are necessary for the payment of the refunds, but no amounts may be withdrawn from the unemployment trust fund for the refund of interest and penalty payments. Upon receipt, the department, or the designee of the department, shall deposit this money to the clearing account. A payment of a refund shall be made from the clearing account.
  4. Expenditures of the money in the benefit account and refunds from the clearing account are not subject to provisions of law requiring specific appropriations or other formal release by state officers of money in their custody.
  5. A balance of money requisitioned from the unemployment trust fund which remains unclaimed or unpaid in the benefit account after the expiration of the period for which the sums were requisitioned shall be deducted from estimates for and may be used for the payment of benefits during succeeding periods, or, in the discretion of the department, shall be redeposited with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States to the credit of this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund, as provided in AS 23.20.135 .
  6. Money credited to the account of this state in the unemployment trust fund by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States under 42 U.S.C. 1103 (§ 903, Social Security Act) may not be requisitioned from this state’s account or used except for the payment of benefits and for the payment of expenses incurred for the administration of this chapter. This money may be requisitioned under (b) of this section for the payment of benefits. This money may also be requisitioned and used for the payment of expenses incurred for the administration of this chapter but only under a specific appropriation by the legislature and only if the expenses are incurred and the money is requisitioned after the enactment of an appropriation law that
    1. specifies the purpose for which the money is appropriated and the amount appropriated;
    2. limits the period within which the money may be obligated to a period ending not more than two years after the date of the enactment of the appropriation law; and
    3. limits the amount that may be obligated during a fiscal year to an amount that does not exceed the amount by which the aggregate of the amounts credited to the account of this state under 42 U.S.C. 1103 (Sec. 903, Social Security Act) during that fiscal year and the 34 preceding fiscal years exceeds the aggregate of the amounts obligated for administration and paid out for benefits and charged against the amounts credited to the account of this state during those 35 fiscal years.
  7. Amounts credited to this state’s account in the unemployment trust fund under 42 U.S.C. 1103 (Sec. 903, Social Security Act) that are obligated for administration or paid out for benefits shall be charged against equivalent amounts that were first credited and that are not already so charged. However, an amount obligated for administration during a fiscal year specified in this section may not be charged against any amount credited during a fiscal year earlier than the 34th preceding fiscal year.
  8. Money appropriated under this section for the payment of expenses of administration shall be requisitioned as needed for the payment of obligations incurred under that appropriation and, upon requisition, shall be deposited in the employment security administration fund from which the payments shall be made.  Money so deposited shall, until expended, remain a part of the unemployment fund and, if it will not be expended, shall be returned promptly to the account of this state in the unemployment trust fund.

History. (§ 404 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 15 ch 169 SLA 1957; am §§ 2, 3 ch 123 SLA 1968; am § 6 ch 106 SLA 1969; am §§ 9 — 12 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 3, 4 ch 100 SLA 1989; am §§ 12 — 14 ch 175 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Opinions of attorney general. —

A pay order drawn on the unemployment benefit account for the payment of unemployment benefits must bear the signature of the commissioner of administration since it would be a warrant within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section. July 13, 1966, Op. Att’y Gen. (decided prior to 2004 amendment).

The commissioner does not have to sign with his own hand each check or warrant issued against the benefit account; his signature may be printed on the appropriate check or warrant as it is now in the case of benefit checks. July 13, 1966, Op. Att’y Gen. (decided prior to 2004 amendment).

It is permissible to affix the signature of the commissioner of administration to the pay order card by means of a rubber validation stamp that would be used by the claims examiner at the time he countersigns for the commissioner of labor and issues the pay order card. July 13, 1966, Op. Att’y Gen. (decided prior to 2004 amendment).

For procedure for authorizing use of commissioner’s signature on pay order cards, see July 13, 1966, Op. Att’y Gen. (decided prior to 2004 amendment).

Sec. 23.20.150. Discontinuance of unemployment trust fund.

  1. To the extent that AS 23.20.130 23.20.140 relate to the unemployment trust fund, they are operative only so long as the unemployment trust fund exists and so long as the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America maintains for the state a separate book account of all funds deposited in it by this state for benefit purposes, together with the state’s proportionate share of the earnings of the unemployment trust fund, from which no other state may make withdrawals.
  2. If the unemployment trust fund ceases to exist, or a separate book account is no longer maintained, all money, property, or security in the fund which belongs to the unemployment compensation fund of the state shall be transferred to the treasurer of the unemployment compensation fund, who shall hold, invest, transfer, sell, deposit, and release the money, property, or security in a manner approved by the department in accordance with this chapter.  However, the money shall be invested in bonds or other interest-bearing obligations of the United States and the investments shall be made so that all the assets of the fund are readily convertible into cash when needed for the payment of benefits.  The treasurer may dispose of securities or other property belonging to the unemployment compensation fund only under the direction of the department.

History. (§ 405 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.155. Employment security administration fund.

  1. There is created a special fund in the state treasury known as the employment security administration fund.
  2. All money deposited into this fund shall be continuously available to the department for expenditure in accordance with this chapter, and may not lapse at any time or be transferred to any other fund.  All money in this fund, except money received under AS 23.20.145(h) , which is received from the federal government or which is appropriated by the state for the purpose described in AS 23.20.100 shall be expended solely for the purpose and in the amount found necessary by the Secretary of Labor for administration of this chapter.
  3. The fund consists of all money appropriated by this state; all money received from the federal government; all money received from another source for that purpose; money received from an agency of the United States or another state as compensation for services or facilities supplied to such agency; amounts received under a surety bond or insurance policy or from other sources for losses sustained by the employment security administration fund or by reason of damage to equipment or supplies purchased from money in the fund; and proceeds realized from the sale or disposition of equipment or supplies which are no longer necessary for the administration of this chapter. Notwithstanding any provision of this section, all money requisitioned and deposited in this fund under AS 23.20.145(h) shall remain part of the unemployment fund and shall be used only in accordance with the conditions specified in AS 23.20.145(f) — (h).
  4. All money in this fund shall be deposited, administered, and disbursed, in the same manner and under the same conditions and requirements provided by law for other special funds in the state treasury.
  5. The commissioner of revenue is liable on the official bond of the commissioner for the faithful performance of the commissioner’s duties in connection with the employment security administration fund.  This liability on the official bond exists in addition to liabilities on a separate bond. Money recovered on a surety bond for losses sustained by the employment security administration fund shall be deposited in that fund.

History. (§ 411 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am §§ 4, 5 ch 123 SLA 1968)

Sec. 23.20.160. Reimbursement of fund.

If money received from the Department of Labor under 42 U.S.C. 501 — 504 (Title III, Social Security Act), or money granted to this state under the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended, or money made available by this state and matched by money granted to this state under the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended, is found by the Secretary of Labor, because of any action or contingency, to have been lost or expended for a purpose other than or in an amount in excess of that found necessary by the Secretary of Labor for the proper administration of this chapter, it is the policy of the state that the money shall be replaced by money appropriated for the purpose from the general fund of the state to the employment security administration fund for expenditures as provided for in AS 23.20.155 . Upon receipt of notice of the finding by the Secretary of Labor, the department shall promptly report the amount required for replacement to the governor and the governor shall at the earliest opportunity submit to the legislature a request for the appropriation of the amount.

History. (§ 412 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 6 ch 123 SLA 1968)

Cross references. —

For Wagner-Peyser Act, see the cross references at AS 23.20.005 .

Article 3. Contributions.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 130, SLA 2004 (HB 490), which relates to administrative hearing decisions on unemployment benefits, recommends changes to ensure that this chapter complies with federal law requirements, and makes a series of amendments in this article, see 2004 House Journal 2613 — 2614.

Collateral references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 19-42.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 192-210.

Liability of political party or its subdivision for contributions under unemployment compensation acts. 43 ALR3d 1351.

Sec. 23.20.165. Payment of contributions.

  1. Contributions with respect to wages for employment accrue and are payable by an employer for each calendar year in which the employer is subject to this chapter.  Contributions become due and shall be paid by an employer to the department for the fund in accordance with regulations adopted by the department. An employer may not deduct contributions payable by the employer from the wages of an employee.
  2. Contributions with respect to wages paid on or after January 1, 1955, for employment accrue and are payable by an individual who performs service in employment for each calendar year in which the services are subject to this chapter.
  3. The contributions required from each individual, in accordance with regulations adopted by the commissioner, are payable, shall be deducted from the individual’s wages by the employer, and shall be held in trust by the employer for the commissioner until the employee contributions are required by regulation to be deposited with the commissioner. These funds are not subject to garnishment or attachment, and in the event of lien, judgment, or bankruptcy proceedings are not considered assets of the employer.  An employer who fails to make the deductions from the wages of employees is liable to the commissioner for the payment of the required contributions.  The contributions shall be collected from the employer in the manner provided for the collection of employer contributions.
  4. If an employer converts to personal use or misappropriates funds so held in trust, the employer shall pay to the commissioner for deposit in the clearing account the amount converted or misappropriated, together with a penalty equal to five times that amount but not less than $25.  In addition, if the conversion or misappropriation is wilful, the employer is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $200, or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or by both.
  5. An employer shall maintain a record of the amount deducted from the wages of each employee and shall furnish a statement of the deductions to each employee at the times and in the manner the department prescribes by regulation.  A deduction may not be made from those wages paid to an employee during a calendar year which are in excess of the wages subject to contributions under AS 23.20.175 .  If an employee in the employ of two or more employers earns wages in one calendar year totaling more than the wages subject to contributions or if an employer through error makes a deduction and erroneously pays contributions on wages of an employee in excess of the wages subject to contributions during a calendar year, the amount of deductions in excess of those required by this chapter shall be refunded to the employee by the department upon application for them in accordance with regulations adopted by the department. Application must be made during the calendar year after the calendar year in which the deductions are made.

History. (§ 501 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 16 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 7 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 156 SLA 1962; am § 2 ch 43 SLA 1973; am § 13 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 1 ch 114 SLA 1981; am § 4 ch 115 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Company not exempt from contribution liability. —

Because the company’s lease-drivers provided “services,” and did not satisfy the “ABC test” in AS 23.20.525(a)(10) , the company was not exempt from contribution liability and was therefore a liable employer required to make contributions under the Alaska Employment Security Act. Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Quoted in

Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

Cited in

Worthington Constr. Co. v. Employment Sec. Div., 413 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1966); Breck v. State, Dep't of Labor, 862 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1993); Metcalfe Invs. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996); Hartung v. DOL, 22 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).

Sec. 23.20.170. Rate of contributions.

  1. [Repealed, § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980.]
  2. An employer who is not entitled to a rate determination under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 because the employer is ineligible under AS 23.20.281 shall pay contributions at a rate equal to the average industry tax rate as determined by the commissioner. Assignment by the commissioner of employers to industrial classification, for the purposes of this subsection, shall be to the industry group code specified in the most current version of the North American Industry Classification System, United States, in accordance with established classification practices found in the most current version of the North American Industry Classification System manual prepared by the United States Office of Management and Budget.
  3. The standard rate of contributions with respect to employment is 5.4 percent of wages paid. Reductions from the standard rate may only be made under this section and AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 .

History. (§ 502 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 17 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 8 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 3 ch 43 SLA 1973; am §§ 14, 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 2 ch 106 SLA 1984; am § 2 ch 51 SLA 2000)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Worthington Constr. Co. v. Employment Sec. Div., 413 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1966).

Sec. 23.20.175. Base of contributions.

  1. [Repealed, § 30 ch 100 SLA 1989.]
  2. [Repealed, § 30 ch 100 SLA 1989.]
  3. For the purposes of AS 23.20.165 and 23.20.170 , wages do not include that part of remuneration paid during any calendar year to an individual by an employer or by a predecessor of the employer that exceeds 75 percent of the average annual wage, as defined in AS 23.20.520 , in Alaska for the preceding 12-month period ending June 30 computed to the nearest multiple of $100.

History. (§ 503 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 18 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 9 ch 60 SLA 1960; am §§ 4, 5 ch 43 SLA 1973; am §§ 15, 16 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 30 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 32 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (c), deleted “after December 31, 1982” following “AS 23.20.165 and 23.20.170 ”.

Sec. 23.20.180. Records and analysis of experience with unemployment risk.

For each calendar year the department shall maintain separate accounts for each employer and claimant to obtain facts and studies upon which the legislature may determine whether an experience rating system should be adopted to require contributions from employers based upon their experience with unemployment risk, and, if so, the most equitable system for accomplishing this purpose consistent with the solvency of the unemployment compensation fund.

History. (§ 504 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 19 ch 169 SLA 1957)

Sec. 23.20.185. Interest on past due contributions.

  1. If contributions are not paid on the date on which they are due, the amount remaining unpaid bears interest at the rate of 12 percent per year from the due date until payment plus accrued interest is received by the department.  Interest collected under this section shall be deposited in the clearing account of the unemployment compensation fund.
  2. Interest does not accrue on contributions from an estate in the hands of a receiver, executor, administrator, trustee in bankruptcy, common law assignee, or other liquidating officer after the date when the officer qualifies.  However, contributions accruing with respect to employment of a person by the officer are due and draw interest in the same manner as contributions due from other employers.
  3. Payments of contributions erroneously paid to an unemployment compensation fund of another state which should have been paid to this state and which are refunded by the other state and paid by the employer to this state shall be considered paid to this state at the date of payment of the other state.
  4. Interest collected under this section shall periodically be transferred from the clearing account to the training and building fund.

History. (§ 511 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 2 ch 106 SLA 1969; am §§ 17, 18 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Sec. 23.20.190. Penalty for failure to file reports.

  1. An employer required to pay contributions under the provisions of AS 23.20.165 who fails to file a contribution report and wage schedule on the date it is due is subject to a penalty, to be assessed and collected in the same manner as contributions.  If the report is filed within 30 days of the date it is due, the penalty is five percent of the contributions due. For each additional 30-day period or its fraction, the penalty is an additional five percent of the contributions due.  However, the penalty may not exceed 25 percent of the contributions due in the aggregate and may not be less than $10 for each reporting period.
  2. If a report is filed after it is due and it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that the failure to file was due to a reasonable cause, a penalty may not be assessed or collected.
  3. Penalties collected under this section shall periodically be transferred from the clearing account to the training and building fund.
  4. An employer who has elected to make reimbursement payments under AS 23.20.277 who fails to file a contribution report and wage schedule on the date it is due is subject to a penalty, to be assessed and collected in the same manner provided under this section for failure to file a contribution report and wage schedule.  If the report is filed not later than 30 days after the date it is due, the penalty is one-tenth of one percent of the total wages paid for the quarter.  For each additional 30-day period or its fraction, the penalty is an additional one-tenth of one percent of the total wages paid for the quarter. However, the penalty may not exceed one-half of one percent of the total wages paid for the quarter in the aggregate and may not be less than $10 for each reporting period.
  5. The department may require an employer who fails to file a contribution report and wage schedule on the date it is due to file a monthly contribution report and wage schedule, with payment, not later than 30 days after the close of each month.  A decision under this subsection shall be reviewed annually under regulations adopted by the department.  The monthly contribution report and wage schedule is subject to the same interest and penalty provisions as provided in this section and in AS 23.20.185 .

History. (§ 512 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 3 ch 106 SLA 1969; am §§ 19 — 21 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.195. Penalty for nonpayment of contribution.

  1. If the contributions are unpaid after 30 days from the date of mailing or personal delivery of a written demand for payment, the department may assess and collect in the same manner as contributions a penalty equal to the greater of 10 percent of the contributions due or $10.
  2. This penalty does not attach if within 30 days after mailing or personal delivery of the demand, arrangements for payments are made with the department, and payment is made in accordance with the arrangements.
  3. Penalties collected under this section shall periodically be transferred from the clearing account to the training and building fund.

History. (§ 513 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 4 ch 106 SLA 1969; am § 22 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 60, 61 ch 59 SLA 1982; am § 5 ch 100 SLA 1989)

Collateral references. —

Construction, application and effect, with respect to withholding, social security and unemployment compensation taxes, of statutes imposing penalties for tax evasion or default. 22 ALR3d 8.

Sec. 23.20.200. Lien.

  1. A claim for contributions, including interest and penalties, not paid when due is a lien in favor of the state against all the real and personal property of the employer.
  2. The claim becomes a lien when the department records a notice of the lien with the recording officer of the recording district in which the property is located. The claim becomes a lien on a motor vehicle when the department files a notice of the lien in the office of the commissioner of administration. Filing or recording of the notice of lien is constructive notice of the lien against the property described in the notice to creditors of the owner, and to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.
  3. [Repealed, § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980.]
  4. The department may release a notice of lien by filing or recording a certificate of release in the manner prescribed for the filing or recording of a notice of lien.  The department may not file or record a certificate of release until the amount of contributions, including interest, and penalties and costs, is paid, or until it receives assurance of payment which it considers adequate.

History. (§ 514 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 37 SLA 1963; am § 1 ch 67 SLA 1967; am § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 27 ch 21 SLA 1985; am E.O. No. 99 § 19 (1997))

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsections (b) and (d) of this section in 1988 under § 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Standard of relationship. —

A reasonable standard of relationship between the property owner and the employer’s business is established by this section, and this is sufficient to overcome objections to it on constitutional grounds. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

A man who permits his property to be used in the conduct of a business of another presumably derives some privilege or benefit from this circumstance. The liability here, then, so far as the specific property is concerned, may rest upon the enjoyment of such privilege or benefit as to make it reasonable and just to deal with this property as though it were owned by the taxpayer or as if he had an interest in it. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

There is no deprivation of property without due process. —

The Employment Security Act, AS 23.20.005 23.20.535 , giving the state a lien against property of third person used with his permission in prosecuting the business of an employer, does not deprive such third person of his property without due process of law. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Purpose of lien on property of third person used in employer’s business. —

When in 1955 the lien provisions were broadened, it is logical to presume that it was to avoid evasion in payment of taxes; for an employer engaged in business could conceivably nullify the act creating a lien to enforce payment of contributions by using in the operation of his business property belonging to a third person. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Lien does not attach to property leased before 1955. —

When the state’s lien was extended in 1955 to cover “property used with the permission of the owner,” the legislature did not expressly provide that this was meant to include property in circumstances where the “use” and “permission” antedated the statute and where the owner of the property, after the enactment of the law, had no practical means of protecting himself against the state’s claim of lien for unpaid taxes. In the absence of such express provisions, the statute reasonably may be construed as having a more limited application, so that the state’s lien does not attach to property leased before the 1955 amendment. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Mere use of property of third person alone will not bring this section into play. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

There must be use “in prosecuting the business of the employer.” Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

And this use must be “with the permission of the owner.” Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Only when all of these factors are present does property become subject to lien. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Person who leases property to another is chargeable with knowing the lien provisions of AS 23.20.005 23.20.150 . Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

And cannot complain if property rights are subordinated to state’s lien. —

If, in advance of making the lease, the lessor knows that his property may be subjected to the lien of the state’s tax but enables his lessee to exercise dominion over the property and use it in the conduct of a business subject to the incidence of the tax, then he cannot be heard to complain if his property rights are subordinated to the state’s claim of lien. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Lessor should stipulate for prospective or permissible use of property. —

Practically, this section suggests that the lessor should ascertain for what purposes the property is to be used, and then make appropriate provisions in the lease as to prospective or permissible use. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

And that employment security taxes will be paid. —

This section also suggests that the lessor secure assurance from his lessee that employment security taxes — if the lessee is likely to be subject to them — will be paid when due. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Recorded mortgage lien not subordinate to unrecorded lien for unpaid employment security contributions. —

The provision of this section that filing of notice shall constitute constructive notice means that a recorded mortgage lien would not be subordinate to the unrecorded lien of the state for unpaid employment security contributions. Territory v. Craig Enters., 355 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1960).

Federal tax liens are entitled to priority over liens of Employment Security Commission. Bentley v. Kirbo, 169 F. Supp. 38 (D. Alaska 1958).

Applied in

S. Birch & Sons Constr. Co. v. Capehart, 192 F. Supp. 330 (D. Alaska 1961).

Stated in

In re Active Steel Erectors, Inc., 53 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).

Sec. 23.20.205. Notice of assessment, distraint, seizure, and sale.

  1. If the department finds that a contribution including interest or penalty on the contribution is delinquent, the department may issue a notice of assessment specifying the amount due and may serve it on the delinquent employer. The notice must inform the employer of the department’s rights under (c) of this section. A peace officer or an authorized representative of the department may serve the notice personally or the department may mail the notice by certified or registered mail with return receipt requested.
  2. If the notice is served by mail the notice must be deposited in the post office, addressed to the delinquent employer at the employer’s last address of record and the postage paid. The date of service is considered to be the day of delivery shown on the delivery receipt.  However, if it appears the addressee is deliberately avoiding service, then the date of service is the day of mailing.
  3. Unless an appeal is filed under AS 23.20.220 , if the amount assessed is not paid within 30 days after personal service or mailing of the notice as required by (a) of this section, the department may collect the amount stated in the assessment by the distraint, seizure, and sale of the property, goods, chattels, and effects of the delinquent employer. Goods and property exempt from execution under the laws of this state are exempt from distraint and sale under this section.

History. (§ 515 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 20 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 23 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 6, 7 ch 100 SLA 1989)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.20.210. Inventory and sale.

  1. Upon making a distraint, the department shall seize the property and make an inventory of it.  The department shall mail or personally deliver a copy of the inventory to the owner of the property, and shall specify the time and place when the property is to be sold. Notice specifying the property to be sold and the time and place of sale shall be posted in at least two public places in the recording district of the judicial district where the seizure is made.  The time of sale may not be less than 20 nor more than 30 days from the date of posting the notice.  The department may adjourn the sale from time to time but adjournment may not exceed 90 days in all.  The department or its authorized representative shall conduct the sale.  The property may be sold by parcel or lot at a public auction.  The department may set a minimum price to include the expenses of making the levy and advertising the sale, and if the amount bid for the property at the sale is not equal to the minimum price fixed by the department, the department or its representative may declare the property purchased by the department for the minimum price.  The department shall credit the delinquent account with the amount received at the sale for the property after defraying the costs of distraint, seizure, and sale.  The department may sell the property acquired by it at public or private sale, and shall deposit the amount received in the unemployment compensation fund.
  2. Upon sale of the property, the department shall issue a bill of sale or a deed to the purchaser. The bill of sale or the deed is prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings of the department in making the sale.  The bill of sale or the deed transfers to the purchaser all right, title, and interest of the delinquent employer in the property. The department shall first apply the proceeds of the sale toward reimbursement of the administration fund for the costs of distraint, seizure, and sale and the balance toward satisfaction of the delinquent account. The department shall refund the excess to the delinquent employer.

History. (§ 516 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.215. Notice and order to withhold and deliver.

  1. The department may issue a notice and order to withhold and deliver property of any kind to a person or a political subdivision or department of the state when (1) the department has reason to believe that the person, political subdivision, or department possesses property which is due, owing, or the property of another person; and (2) notice and order of assessment has been served, at least 30 days before the issuance of the notice and order to withhold and deliver.
  2. A peace officer or an authorized representative of the department may serve the notice to withhold and deliver.  The person, political subdivision, or department upon whom service is made shall answer the notice within 10 days.
  3. If the person, political subdivision, or department possesses property, credits, or money subject to the claim of the department, it shall deliver the property to the department immediately upon demand.  The department shall hold the property in trust for application on the indebtedness involved or for return, without interest, in accordance with final determination of liability or nonliability, or, in the alternative, there shall be furnished a sufficient bond satisfactory to the department conditioned upon final determination of liability.
  4. If a person fails to answer the order to withhold and deliver within the time prescribed, the superior court in the judicial district in which the order is served may enter a judgment by default against the person for the full amount claimed by the department in the notice to withhold and deliver, together with costs.

History. (§ 516.1 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 21 ch 169 SLA 1957)

Sec. 23.20.220. Appeals.

  1. When a notice of assessment is delivered or mailed to a delinquent employer, the employer may within 30 days file an appeal in writing with the department, stating that the assessment is unjust or incorrect and requesting a hearing on it. The period for filing an appeal may be extended for a reasonable period for good cause. The appeal must set out the reasons the assessment is objected to and the amount of contributions that the employer admits is due, and must be accompanied by a bond or deposit of other security in the amount of the assessment to ensure collection. The department may waive the security requirement if the employer submits proof of solvency or reasonable assurance, as prescribed by regulations, that the contributions, interest, and penalties due are not in jeopardy. If the employer fails to provide the required security, the collection under AS 23.20.205(c) is not stayed. The department shall adopt regulations for procedures for an appeal under this subsection.
  2. If the appeal is accompanied by the required security or the department has waived the security requirement, filing an appeal on a disputed assessment with the department stays the sale provided for in AS 23.20.210 until a final decision on the assessment is made. However, the filing of an appeal does not affect the right of the department to perfect a lien as provided in AS 23.20.200 .
  3. After granting the appellant reasonable opportunity for fair hearing, the department shall make a decision on the appeal. The department’s decision is final unless the appellant initiates a proceeding for judicial review in the manner provided by AS 23.20.445 .
  4. When an order and notice of assessment becomes final, the superior court shall upon application of the department enter a judgment on the amount provided for in the order and notice of assessment.  The judgment has the same effect as a judgment entered in a civil action.

History. (§ 517 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 22 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 24 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 8 — 10 ch 100 SLA 1989)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hartung v. DOL, 22 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).

Sec. 23.20.225. Adjustments and refunds.

  1. Within two years after contributions or interest are erroneously paid, an employer who has paid such contributions or interest may file a written petition with the department for an adjustment of the payment as an offset against subsequent contribution payments, or for a refund of the payment when the adjustment as an offset cannot be made.  If the department upon ex parte consideration determines that the contributions or interest were erroneously collected, it shall allow the employer to make an adjustment without interest. For like cause and within the same period, adjustment or refund may be made on the department’s own motion.
  2. If the department finds upon ex parte consideration that it cannot determine that an adjustment or refund should be allowed, it shall deny the application and notify the employer in writing. Within 30 days after notification is mailed or delivered to the employer, whichever happens first, the employer may file a petition in writing with the department for a hearing.  However, the right to a hearing does not apply when an assessment has been appealed from and has become final as provided in AS 23.20.220 . The petition shall set forth the reasons for granting a hearing and the amount which the petitioner believes should be adjusted or refunded.  If a petition is not filed within the time prescribed, the determination of the department as stated in the notice is final.
  3. After granting the petitioner reasonable opportunity for fair hearing, the department shall make a decision on the petition.  The decision is final unless the petitioner initiates a proceeding for judicial review in the manner provided by AS 23.20.445 .
  4. If not later than two years after the date of payment of interest or penalty an employer who has made such a payment determines that it was made erroneously, the employer may file a written petition with the department to have any subsequent amount of interest or penalties which has been, or might be, assessed against the employer, adjusted by the amount of the erroneous payment, or, if it appears that this adjustment would not be feasible within a reasonable time, the employer may request a refund of the erroneous payment.  If the department upon ex parte consideration determines that the payment of interest or penalties, or any portion of it, was erroneous, it shall allow such an employer to make an adjustment in an amount equal to that erroneously paid, without interest, in connection with any subsequent interest or penalty payment which may be due, or, if this adjustment cannot be made, the department shall refund the amount, without interest, from the fund into which the payment was deposited or transferred.  Refunds of interest and penalties erroneously collected may be made from the clearing account of the unemployment compensation fund or from the training and building fund if they were transferred to and deposited in that fund.  Interest and penalty payments may not be refunded from the unemployment compensation fund. If an employer to whom a refund is due does not file a petition for the refund, the department may make an adjustment or refund of interest or penalties on its own initiative for like cause and subject to the same conditions.
  5. The department shall adopt regulations providing for the disposition of excess contributions paid to the unemployment compensation fund under AS 23.20.130 after notice and opportunity for hearing.

History. (§ 518 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am §§ 7, 8 ch 106 SLA 1969; am §§ 25, 26 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 11 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 4 ch 130 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.230. Arbitrary reports.

If an employing unit fails or neglects to make or file a report or return required by this chapter, the department, upon the basis of knowledge available to it, may arbitrarily make a report on behalf of the employing unit. The report is considered prima facie correct.

History. (§ 519 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

Cited in

Yong Kang v. Mullins, 420 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 23.20.235. Jeopardy assessment.

If the department has reason to believe that an employer is insolvent or if the collection of contributions accrued will be jeopardized by delaying collection, the department may make an immediate assessment and may proceed to enforce collection immediately. However, interest does not begin to accrue upon the contribution until the date when the contribution normally becomes delinquent.

History. (§ 520 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.240. Collection of delinquent contributions.

  1. If after notice an employer defaults in the payment of contribution or interest, the amount due may be collected by a person authorized by law and authorized by the department, by civil action in the name of the state, or by both methods. The department shall include in the amount due the fees or costs charged the department by the person for the collection of the delinquent amount. An employer who is liable shall pay the cost of the collection, including collection fees charged, and the costs of legal action.
  2. A lien created by this chapter may be foreclosed by decree of the court in the action.
  3. The court shall hear a civil action brought under this section to collect contributions or interest at the earliest possible date and the action is entitled to preference on the calendar of the court over all other civil actions except petitions for judicial review under this chapter and cases arising under the workers’ compensation laws of the state.
  4. The courts in this state shall, in the manner provided in this section, entertain actions to collect contributions or interest for which liability has accrued under the employment security law of another state if the other state has a similar provision for actions to collect contributions due this state in its employment security law.
  5. The attorney general may commence action in this state as agent for and on behalf of any other state to enforce judgments and liabilities for unemployment insurance contributions, penalties, interest, and benefit overpayments due such state which extends a like comity to this state if the requesting state agrees to pay the costs which may be assessed by the court against the plaintiff.
  6. In this section, “employer” as defined in AS 23.20.520 also includes an officer or employee of a corporation, a member, manager, or employee of a limited liability company, or a member or employee of a partnership, including a limited partnership and a limited liability partnership, who, as an officer, employee, manager, or member, is under a duty to pay the contributions as required by (a) of this section.

History. (§ 521 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 23 SLA 1969; am § 27 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 12 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 5 ch 130 SLA 2004)

Notes to Decisions

Scope of personal liability. —

Personal liability will attach under this section only to those corporate officers or employees who have significant control over a corporation’s finances and who are in a position to see that the corporation pays the taxes owed. Breck v. State, Dep't of Labor, 862 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1993).

A corporate officer is not liable for payments that become due during the post-petition period and which bankruptcy prevents the officer from effectuating, but the corporate officer is still liable for all payments that become due during a period in which the officer is in a position to behave strategically; therefore, if the corporate officer fails to compel payments prior to the bankruptcy petition even though he is in a position to do so, he cannot escape personal liability for those pre-petition obligations. Hartung v. DOL, 22 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).

Sec. 23.20.242. Appeals by officer, manager, member, or employee.

The department shall permit each officer or employee of a corporation, member, manager, or employee of a limited liability company, or member or employee of a partnership, including a limited partnership and a limited liability partnership, who is required to pay the contributions and interest owed by the corporation, limited liability company, or partnership, including the limited partnership and the limited liability partnership, under AS 23.20.165 23.20.278 to appeal individually their duty to pay under those sections.

History. (§ 13 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 6 ch 130 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.245. Remedies cumulative.

Remedies given to the state under this chapter for the collection of contributions and interest are cumulative. An action taken by the department may not be construed to be an election on the part of the state to pursue one remedy to the exclusion of another.

History. (§ 522 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Collateral references. —

Repayment of unemployment compensation benefits erroneously paid. 90 ALR3d 987.

Sec. 23.20.247. Employer’s security for delinquent contributions.

  1. If the department determines that an employer has been delinquent in paying contributions owed to the fund for two or more calendar quarters, the department may require an employer to deposit and keep on deposit with the department a sum equal to the contributions payable to the fund for the four completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the delinquency. If the employer does not have four completed payroll quarters immediately before the delinquency, the department shall estimate the employer’s annual contributions, based on contributions payable for the completed payroll quarters. In lieu of the deposit, the department may accept a bond or other security equal in value to the required deposit. The deposit, bond, or other security accepted by the department does not relieve the employer from making contributions to the fund or paying delinquent contributions, interest, and penalties as provided in this chapter. After notice and opportunity for hearing related to the application of the security, the department may immediately apply all or part of the deposit, bond, or other approved security to the employer’s delinquent contributions, interest, or penalties arising under this chapter.
  2. Unless precluded by other law, the deposit, bond, or other security accepted by the department shall take priority over all other liens, claims, or encumbrances and shall be exempt from any process, attachment, garnishment, or execution.
  3. If an employer ceases to be an employer subject to this chapter, the department shall, upon receipt of all payments due the fund, refund to the employer the deposits remaining to the employer’s credit and shall cancel any bond or other security accepted by the department under this section. The department may return, in whole or part, the deposit, bond, or other security accepted by the department under this section to the employer if the employer is current in paying contributions under this section for eight consecutive quarters.

History. (§ 4 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Sec. 23.20.248. Injunctive relief.

  1. If an employer does not deposit and keep on deposit the security required by the department under AS 23.20.247 , the department, through the attorney general, may bring an action in superior court to enjoin the employer from operating any business as an employer within the state until
    1. the employer is current on all final assessments, including interest and penalties made under this chapter; and
    2. if requested, the employer deposits and keeps on deposit the security described in AS 23.20.247 to protect against future failures and to comply with this chapter.
  2. The department may not seek injunctive relief under (a) of this section until the department has given the employer at least 30 days to comply with an order relating to security under AS 23.20.247 .
  3. The department may not be required to post a bond for injunctive relief under this section.

History. (§ 4 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Sec. 23.20.250. Lien upon distribution or assignment of assets.

  1. If the assets of an employer are distributed under a court order, including a receivership, probate, legal dissolution, or a similar proceeding, or in the case of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, a composition, or a similar proceeding, contributions which are or which become due are a lien upon all the assets of the employer. The lien is prior to all other liens or claims except a prior tax lien, a lien filed or recorded under AS 23.20.200 , or a claim for remuneration of service of not more than $250 to each claimant, earned within six months before the starting of the proceeding.
  2. The existence of a condition of insolvency or the institution of a judicial proceeding for legal dissolution or of a proceeding for distribution of assets causes the lien to attach without action on behalf of the department or the state.
  3. In the event of an employer’s adjudication in bankruptcy, judicially-confirmed extension proposal, or composition, under 11 U.S.C. (Federal Bankruptcy Act), contributions that are or become due are entitled to the priority provided under that Act, as amended.

History. (§ 523 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 28 ch 21 SLA 1985)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (a) of this section in 1988 under § 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

In re Active Steel Erectors, Inc., 53 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).

Sec. 23.20.255. Compromise of contributions.

  1. The department may compromise a claim for contributions, interest, or penalties existing or arising under this chapter in any case where collection of the full claim would result in the insolvency of the employing unit or individual from whom the contributions, interest, or penalties are claimed.
  2. If the department compromises a claim, there shall be filed with the department a statement of the amount of contributions, interest, and penalties imposed by law and claimed due, a complete record of the compromise agreement, and the amount actually paid in accordance with the terms of the compromise agreement.
  3. A person who, in connection with a compromise or offer of compromise, wilfully conceals from an officer or employee of the state property belonging to an employing unit or individual liable for contributions, interest, or penalties, or receives, destroys, mutilates, or falsifies a book, document, or record, or makes a false statement under oath relating to the financial condition of the employing unit or individual liable for contributions, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
  4. If the department accepts a compromise, the compromise is final and conclusive at the time stated in it or at the time agreed to, and, except upon showing of fraud, malfeasance, misrepresentation of a material fact, or failure to meet the terms of the compromise, the case may not be reopened as to the matters agreed upon.

History. (§ 524 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.260. Liability of successor employer.

  1. The contributions required by this chapter are a lien upon the property of an employer subject to the provisions of the chapter who sells out the business or stock of goods, who quits business, or whose property used or acquired in the business is sold under voluntary conveyance or under foreclosure, execution or attachment, distraint, or other judicial proceeding.
  2. The employer shall file the reports which the department prescribes and pay the contributions required by this chapter with respect to wages payable for employment up to the date of the occurrence of each contingency.
  3. The purchaser or successor in business shall withhold enough purchase money to cover the amount of contributions due and unpaid until the employer produces a receipt from the department showing that the contributions have been paid, or a certificate that no contributions are due.  If the purchaser or successor fails to withhold purchase money as provided, and the contributions are not paid within 10 days, the purchaser or successor is personally liable for the payment of the contributions accrued and unpaid on account of the operation of the business by the former owner.

History. (§ 525 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Effect of subsection (c). —

Essentially, subsection (c) puts successor in business in position of tax collecting agent of the state; but, when there is no fund available from which a successor can withhold the amount of the tax debt, the obligation to withhold does not arise. Northern Lights Inn, Co. v. Empl. Sec. Div., 695 P.2d 723 (Alaska 1985).

When no fund is available for withholding. —

Where the successor in business foreclosed on the predecessor’s property and purchased it with an offset bid for the amount of the predecessor’s debt, the successor was unable to withhold purchase consideration and should not have been assessed for the predecessor’s unpaid taxes. Northern Lights Inn, Co. v. Empl. Sec. Div., 695 P.2d 723 (Alaska 1985).

Collateral references. —

Provision of act subjecting to its provisions an employer purchasing or succeeding to the business of another employer. 4 ALR2d 721.

Sec. 23.20.265. Liability of contractor and principal for contributions.

  1. An employing unit which contracts with or has under it a contractor or subcontractor who is an employer under the provisions of this chapter may not make a payment to the contractor or subcontractor for a debt due until the contractor or subcontractor has paid or furnished a sufficient bond acceptable to the department for payment of contributions, including penalty and interest, due or to become due for personal services which have been performed by individuals for the contractor or subcontractor arising during the course of the employment of the contractor or subcontractor by the employing unit.
  2. Failure to comply with this section makes the employing unit directly liable for the contributions and interest and the department has the remedies of collection against the employing unit under this chapter as though the services in question were performed directly for the employing unit.
  3. Upon request, the department may notify an employing unit of its contractor’s or subcontractor’s liability for contributions, interest, and penalties under this chapter to allow the employing unit to comply with this section.

History. (§ 526 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 97 SLA 1959; am § 5 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Opinions of attorney general. —

The Employment Security Division may assess the prime contractor for contributions and interest owing by a bankrupt subcontractor, if the prime contractor has not complied with the requirements of this section. October 11, 1984 Op. Att’y Gen.

The Department of Labor may hold an employee-leasing company and the actual business liable for Employment Security Division taxes. July 16, 1987 Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.20.270. Limitation of actions and uncollectible accounts.

  1. The department shall begin action for the collection of contributions, including interest and penalties, imposed by this chapter by assessment or suit within five years after a return is filed.  A proceeding for the collection of these amounts may not be begun after the expiration of this period. In case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade contributions, or in the event of a failure to file a return, the contributions may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of the contributions may be begun, at any time.
  2. The department may charge off as uncollectible and no longer an asset of the unemployment compensation fund a delinquent contribution after five years from the date of delinquency, if the department is satisfied that there are no available means by which the contribution may be collected.

History. (§ 527 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 23 ch 169 SLA 1957)

Opinions of attorney general. —

A notice of assessment filed within the five-year period stops the running of the statute. November 22, 1966 Op. Att’y Gen., aff’d February 29, 1984 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Tachick Freight Lines v. State, Dep't of Labor, 773 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 23.20.275. Service of process.

Process for assessment and collection of contributions may be served inside and outside the state. In addition to any other method of service provided for in this chapter, service may be made by certified or registered mail.

History. (§ 528 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 10 ch 60 SLA 1960)

Sec. 23.20.276. Financing benefits paid to employees of nonprofit organizations; election.

  1. Benefits paid to employees of nonprofit organizations shall be financed in accordance with the provisions of this section and AS 23.20.277 . For the purposes of this section and AS 23.20.277 , a nonprofit organization is an organization, or group of organizations, described in 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (Internal Revenue Code) and exempt from income tax under 26 U.S.C. 501(a).
  2. A nonprofit organization described in this section that, under AS 23.20.525(a)(4) , is, or becomes, subject to this chapter shall pay contributions under the provisions of AS 23.20.165 , unless it elects, in accordance with this section, to pay to the department for the unemployment compensation fund an amount equal to the amount of regular benefits and of one-half of the extended benefits paid, that is attributable to service in the employ of the nonprofit organization, to individuals for weeks of unemployment that begin during the effective period of the election.
  3. A nonprofit organization which is, or becomes, subject to this chapter on January 1, 1972, may elect to become liable for payments in place of contributions for a period of not less than one taxable year beginning with January 1, 1972, if it files with the department a written notice of its election within the 30-day period immediately following January 1, 1972, or within a like period immediately following the date of enactment of this subsection, whichever occurs later.
  4. A nonprofit organization which becomes subject to this chapter after January 1, 1972, may elect to become liable for payments in place of contributions for a period of not less than 12 months beginning with the date on which this subjection begins by filing a written notice of its election with the department not later than 30 days immediately following the date of the determination of the subjection.
  5. A nonprofit organization which makes an election in accordance with (c) or (d) of this section will continue to be liable for payments in place of contributions until it files with the department a written notice terminating its election.  The notice must be filed not later than 30 days before the beginning of the taxable year for which the termination will first be effective.
  6. A nonprofit organization which has been paying contributions under this chapter for a period after January 1, 1972, may change to a reimbursable basis by filing with the department not later than 30 days before the beginning of any taxable year a written notice of election to become liable for payments in place of contributions.  This election is not terminable by the organization for that and the next taxable year.
  7. The department may for good cause extend the period within which a notice of election or a notice of termination must be filed and may permit an election to be retroactive in effect but not any earlier than with respect to benefits paid after December 31, 1971.
  8. The department, in accordance with regulations it adopts, shall notify each nonprofit organization of any determination which it may make of its status as an employer and of the effective date of any election which it makes and of any termination of election. These determinations are subject to reconsideration, appeal, and review in accordance with the provisions of AS 23.20.410 23.20.470 .

History. (§ 3 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 33 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (b) substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(4) ” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(6) ”, deleted “on or after January 1, 1972,” following “subject to this chapter”, and made stylistic changes.

Sec. 23.20.277. Reimbursement payments by nonprofit organizations, governmental entities, and federally recognized tribes.

  1. Payments in place of contributions by nonprofit organizations shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section including either (b) or (c) of this section.
  2. At the end of each calendar quarter, or at the end of any other period as determined by the department, the department shall bill each government entity, federally recognized tribe, nonprofit organization, or group of nonprofit organizations that has elected to make payments in place of contributions, for benefits paid during the quarter or other prescribed period that are attributable to service in the employ of the government entity, federally recognized tribe, nonprofit organization, or group. In the case of nonprofit organizations and groups of nonprofit organizations, the amount billed is an amount equal to the full amount of regular benefits plus extended benefits that are not reimbursable by the federal government. In the case of a government entity or federally recognized tribe, the amount billed is an amount equal to the full amount of the regular benefits plus the full amount of the extended benefits paid.
  3. Each nonprofit organization that has elected payments in place of contributions may request permission to make payments as provided in this subsection.  This method of payment becomes effective upon approval by the department.  At the end of each calendar quarter or at the end of any other period as determined by the department, the department shall bill each nonprofit organization for an amount representing one of the following:
    1. that percentage of its total payroll for the immediately preceding calendar year as the department determines; the determination shall be based each year on the average benefit costs attributable to service in the employ of nonprofit organizations during the preceding calendar year;
    2. for any organization that did not pay wages throughout the four calendar quarters of the preceding calendar year, that percentage of its payroll during the year as the department determines.
  4. At the end of each taxable year, the department may modify the quarterly percentage of payroll thereafter payable by the nonprofit organization in order to minimize excess or insufficient payments.
  5. At the end of each taxable year, the department shall determine whether the total of payments for the year made by a nonprofit organization or group of nonprofit organizations is less than, or in excess of, the total amount of regular benefits plus extended benefits not reimbursable by the federal government paid to individuals during the taxable year based on wages attributable to service in the employ of the nonprofit organization or group. In the case of a government entity or federally recognized tribe that has elected to make payments under this section, the department shall determine whether the total of payments for the year is less than, or in excess of, the total amount of regular benefits plus the total amount of extended benefits as determined in this subsection. If total payments for the taxable year are less than the amount so determined, the employer is liable for payment of the unpaid balance to the fund in accordance with (f) of this section. If the total payments exceed the amount so determined for the taxable year, all or part of the excess may, at the discretion of the department, be refunded from the fund or retained in the fund as part of the payments that may be required for the next taxable year.
  6. Payment of any bill rendered under (b) or (c) of this section shall be made not later than 30 days after the bill was mailed to the last known address of the nonprofit organization, group of nonprofit organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe or was otherwise delivered to it, unless there has been an application for review and redetermination in accordance with (h) of this section.
  7. Payments made by any nonprofit organization, group of nonprofit organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe under the provisions of this section may not be deducted or deductible, in whole or in part, from the remuneration of an individual in the employ of the organization, group of organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe; nor may contributions be required of an employee on the basis of wages paid to that employee for services performed by the employee in employment for a nonprofit organization, group of nonprofit organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe that makes an election to become liable for payments in place of contributions under AS 23.20.276 23.20.278 , and the wages are paid during the period of election.
  8. The amount due, specified in a bill from the department, is conclusive on the employer unless, not later than 30 days after the bill was mailed to its last address of record or otherwise delivered to it, the employer files an application for redetermination by the department, setting out the grounds for the application. The department shall promptly review and reconsider the bill and shall issue a redetermination in any case in which an application for redetermination has been filed. Any redetermination is conclusive on the employer unless, not later than 30 days after the redetermination was mailed to its last address of record or otherwise delivered to it, the employer files an appeal to the commissioner, setting out the grounds for the appeal. Proceedings on appeal to the commissioner from the amount of a bill rendered under this subsection or a redetermination of the amount shall be in accordance with AS 23.20.410 23.20.470 .
  9. Past due payments of amounts in place of contributions are subject to the same interest and penalties that, under AS 23.20.185 23.20.195 , apply to past due contributions.
  10. At the discretion of the department, a nonprofit organization, group of nonprofit organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe that elects to become liable for payments in place of contributions under AS 23.20.276 23.20.278 is required, within 30 days after the effective date of its election, to execute and file with the department a surety bond approved by the department or it may elect instead to deposit with the department money or securities. The amount of the bond or deposit shall be determined by the department in accordance with regulations adopted by the department.
  11. If a nonprofit organization, group of nonprofit organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe is delinquent in making payments in place of contributions as required under this section and after having been given notice, the department, after giving notice to the employer who is delinquent, shall terminate that employer’s election to make payments in place of contributions until a time provided by regulations adopted by the department.
  12. Each employer that is liable for payments in place of contributions shall pay to the department for the fund the amount of regular benefits plus the extended benefits not reimbursable by the federal government paid to individuals that are attributable to service in the employ of that employer. However, a government entity or federally recognized tribe that has elected to make payments under this section is liable for the amount of regular benefits plus the full amount of extended benefits that are attributable to service in the employ of that entity or tribe. If benefits paid to an individual are based on wages paid by more than one employer and one or more of these employers is liable for payments in place of contributions, the amount payable to the fund by each employer that is liable for payments shall be determined by the department in accordance with regulations adopted by the department.
  13. The department may not approve an election to make payments in place of contributions if, at the time of the election, a nonprofit organization, group of nonprofit organizations, government entity, or federally recognized tribe is delinquent in making contributions under AS 23.20.165 .

History. (§ 4 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 3 ch 122 SLA 1977; am §§ 28, 29 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 14 — 16 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 6 ch 43 SLA 1996; am §§ 2 — 10 ch 27 SLA 2009; am § 34 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent in connection with the amendments to this section made by §§ 2 — 10, ch. 27, SLA 2009, see § 1, ch. 27, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, effective May 26, 2009, added “federally recognized tribe” or similar, “group of nonprofit organizations”, and “government entity” throughout the section; in subsections (g) and (j), substituted “AS 23.20.276 23.20.278 ” for “AS 23.20.276 ” following “in place of contributions under”; in subsection (h), substituted “employer” for “organization” four times; in subsection (k), substituted “and after having been given notice, the department, after giving notice to the employer who is delinquent, shall terminate that employer’s election to make payments in place of contributions until a time provided by regulations adopted by the department” for “the department may terminate that organization’s election to make payments in place of contributions as of the beginning of the next taxable year, and the termination is effective for that and the next taxable year”; added subsection (m); and made related stylistic changes.

The second 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (c), deleted (c)(1), which read, “for 1972, .25 percent of its total payroll for 1971;”, redesignated (c)(2) as (c)(1) and (c)(3) as (c)(2), and, in (c)(1), deleted the introductory language, “for years after 1972,”; made a stylistic change.

Sec. 23.20.278. Financing benefits paid to employees of the state, political subdivisions of the state, or a federally recognized tribe.

A federally recognized tribe, a political subdivision, or a department, division, or other agency of the state subject to this chapter, under AS 23.20.525(a)(12) , shall pay contributions under the provisions of AS 23.20.165 , unless it elects to reimburse the department for the unemployment compensation fund according to the provisions applicable to nonprofit organizations, government entities, or federally recognized tribes under AS 23.20.276 and 23.20.277 .

History. (§ 5 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 4 ch 122 SLA 1977; am § 11 ch 27 SLA 2009; am § 35 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

The contingent amendment to this section made under sec. 33, ch. 122, SLA 1977 never took effect and was repealed by sec. 82, ch. 41, SLA 2009.

In 2009, to reconcile the amendments made by § 11, ch. 27, SLA 2009 and §§ 35 and 38, ch. 41, SLA 2009, a reference to “ AS 23.20.525(a)(12) ” was used instead of “ AS 23.20.525(a)(14) ”.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent in connection with the 2009 amendment of this section, see § 1, ch. 27, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, effective May 26, 2009, substituted “political subdivisions of the state, or a federally recognized tribe” for “and its political subdivisions” in the catchline; added “federally recognized tribe, a” at the beginning; substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(14) ” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(4) and (14)” following “subject to this chapter, under”; and added “, government entities, or federally recognized tribes” following “applicable to nonprofit organizations”.

The second 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(12) ” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(4) and (14)” preceding “shall pay contributions”.

Sec. 23.20.279. Prohibition on relief of certain charges to an employer’s account.

  1. An employer’s account may not be relieved of charges relating to a payment that was made erroneously from the unemployment trust fund account (AS 23.20.135(a) ) if the department determines that
    1. the erroneous payment was made because the employer or an agent of the employer was at fault for failing to respond timely or adequately to a documented request from the department for information relating to the claim for unemployment compensation; and
    2. the employer or an agent of the employer has established a pattern of failing to respond timely or adequately to requests under (1) of this subsection.
  2. In this section,
    1. “erroneous payment” means a payment that, but for the failure by the employer or an agent of the employer with respect to the claim for unemployment compensation, would not have been made;
    2. “pattern of failing” means repeated documented failure by the employer or the agent of the employer to respond, taking into consideration the number of instances of failure in relation to the total volume of requests; however, an employer or an agent of the employer that fails to respond as described in (a)(2) of this section may not be determined to have engaged in a pattern of failure if the number of failures during the year before the request is made is fewer than two or the percentage of failures is less than two percent.

History. (§ 3 ch 50 SLA 2013)

Effective dates. —

Section 14, ch. 50, SLA 2013 makes this section effective July 1, 2013.

Editor’s notes. —

Under sec. 11, ch. 50, SLA 2013, this section applies to overpaid benefits established after October 21, 2013.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 50, SLA 2013 (HB 76), see 2013 House Journal 70 — 71.

Article 4. Experience Rating.

Collateral references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 43-75, 196, 197, 209.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 211-234.

Unemployment compensation benefits where, during the base year, employee worked in different states for same employer. 9 ALR2d 646.

Repayment of unemployment compensation benefits erroneously paid. 90 ALR3d 987.

Sec. 23.20.280. Eligible employer.

  1. An employer is eligible for a rate determination in accordance with the provisions of AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 and the department regulations if the employer has been subject to this chapter throughout not less than the four consecutive calendar quarters ending with the computation date and remains subject to this chapter into the calendar quarter which immediately precedes the effective date of the rate.  An employer is not eligible for a rate determination under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 if, with respect to a calendar quarter in or preceding the employer’s qualifying period, the employer has failed to file contribution or payroll reports or to pay contributions, interest, and penalties required by this chapter within 60 days after the computation date or within 10 days after the department has mailed the employer written notice of the delinquency or of failure to file reports, or of both, by registered or certified mail to the employer’s last address of record, whichever is the later date.
  2. A report made arbitrarily for an employer by the department under AS 23.20.230 does not entitle an employer to a rate determination under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 , but the report may be used to establish a rate determination in the discretion of the commissioner.
  3. An employer who, because of failure to pay contributions or file reports timely, does not qualify for a rate determination under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 shall pay contributions at the highest rate provided in AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 .

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 13 SLA 1962; am § 6 ch 43 SLA 1973; am §§ 30, 31 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Bankruptcy debtor’s unemployment tax rate. —

The state was precluded by the provisions of a confirmed Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan, which provided that “any and all penalties for non-payment, late payment and/or late filing” were to be waived, and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution from raising the bankruptcy debtor’s unemployment tax rate to the highest rate permitted by state law because of its failure to make certain tax payments prior to the filing of its bankruptcy petition. To the extent that the penalty rate exceeded the rate that would have otherwise been imposed had the debtor paid its pre-petition taxes, it was discharged. In re Active Steel Erectors, Inc., 53 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).

Sec. 23.20.281. Ineligible employer.

An employer who has been subject to this chapter less than four calendar quarters immediately preceding the computation date is not entitled to a rate determination under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 and the employer shall pay contributions at the standard rates specified in AS 23.20.170(b) .

History. (§ 37 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Sec. 23.20.285. Quarterly decline quotients.

  1. The department shall determine each eligible employer’s contribution rate by the procedures set out in AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 .  The department shall put the employer’s quarterly payrolls in chronological order beginning with the first calendar quarter in the qualifying period and ending with the last calendar quarter in the period.  If an employer’s payroll in a calendar quarter is less than the payroll in the preceding quarter in the qualifying period, the quarterly decline quotient shall be computed to at least nine decimal places by dividing the amount of the decline by the amount of the payroll in the preceding calendar quarter.
  2. For the purpose of computing quarterly decline quotients, the department may, by regulation, prescribe (1) the manner in which wages paid in the form of annual bonuses or other lump-sum payments for service performed over a period of more than three months are apportioned among the calendar quarters of the calendar year in which the service was performed; and (2) the method for making adjustments in quarterly payrolls to eliminate the effect upon quarterly decline quotients resulting from unemployment which would not be compensable by reason of the labor dispute provision of AS 23.20.383 .
  3. The department shall determine the sum of each eligible employer’s decline quotients and shall weight the sum by adding to it 1.000000000 for each quarter in the employer’s qualifying period in which the employer has no payroll, which quarter immediately follows a quarter in which the employer has no payroll.  Each eligible employer’s average quarterly decline quotient shall be computed to the ninth decimal place by dividing the sum of the quarterly decline quotients for the employer, weighted when required by this section, by the number of quarters in the employer’s qualifying period less one.

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 32 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.290. Rate determination.

  1. The department shall determine each eligible employer’s ratable payroll.  The department shall then put all eligible employers in the order of their average quarterly decline quotients beginning with the smallest average decline quotient and shall determine, with respect to each employer, the cumulative ratable payroll during the four consecutive quarters ending with the computation date of the employer together with all employers who precede the employer on the list.
  2. The department shall segregate the employers into groups in accordance with cumulative ratable payroll.  The limits of the groups are those set out in column B of the table in (c) of this section.  Each of these groups shall be identified by the rate class number in column A which is opposite the figures in column B which represent the percentage limits of each group. An employer shall be assigned the experience factor in column C which is opposite the rate class in which the greater part of the employer’s ratable payroll falls.  If one-half of the employer’s ratable payrolls falls in one class, and one-half in another, the employer shall be assigned to the lower numbered rate class.  An employer may not be assigned to a higher numbered rate class than is assigned to another employer with the same average quarterly decline quotient.
  3. The rate of contributions for each employer is a percentage of the average benefit cost rate multiplied by the employer’s experience factor set out in column C of the table in this subsection opposite the employer’s applicable rate class set out in column A plus the fund solvency adjustment surcharge required under (f) of this section. That percentage is 76 percent beginning January 1, 2009, and 73 percent beginning January 1, 2010. However, the rate of contributions for an employer may not be less than one percent or more than six and one-half percent. The rate of contributions for an employer in rate class 21 may not be less than 5.4 percent. The rate of contributions for an employer must be rounded to the nearest 1/100th of one percent.
  4. The rate of contributions payable by each employee of an employer who is subject to AS 23.20.165 is a percentage of the average benefit cost rate as determined in (e) of this section rounded to the nearest 1/100th of one percent. That percentage is 24 percent beginning January 1, 2009, and 27 percent beginning January 1, 2010. However, the rate of contributions for an employee may not be less than one-half percent or more than one percent.
  5. The department shall determine the average benefit cost rate as follows:
    1. the department shall determine the amount of benefits paid to insured workers during the last three computation years;
    2. the department shall subtract from the amount determined in (1) of this subsection the amount of any benefits reimbursed to the fund and the amount of interest earned on the trust fund balance during those computation years;
    3. the department shall divide the amount determined in (2) of this subsection by the total wages paid by all employers required to pay contributions under this chapter during the first three of the last four computation years;
    4. the department shall determine the amount of total wages subject to contributions under this chapter paid during the preceding computation years;
    5. the department shall determine the amount of all wages paid to insured workers during the preceding computation year;
    6. the department shall subtract from the amount determined in (5) of this subsection the amount of wages paid during the preceding computation year by employers who elect to reimburse the department under AS 23.20.276 and 23.20.277 ;
    7. the department shall divide the amount determined in (4) of this subsection by the amount determined in (6) of this subsection; and
    8. the department shall divide the amount determined in (3) of this subsection by the amount determined in (7) of this subsection.
  6. An employer shall pay a fund solvency adjustment surcharge if the reserve rate is less than three percent. The surcharge is a percentage equal to the difference between three percent and the reserve rate, rounded to the nearest 1/100 of one percent. An employer shall receive a fund solvency adjustment credit if the reserve rate is greater than 3.3 percent. The credit is a percentage equal to the difference between 3.3 percent and the reserve rate rounded to the nearest 1/100 of one percent. The solvency surcharge may not be greater than 1.1 percent, and the solvency credit may not be greater than 0.4 percent. However, an employer’s fund solvency adjustment surcharge may not increase more than 0.3 percent from one year to the next year.

COLUMN ARate Class COLUMN BCumulativeRatable Payroll COLUMN CExperienceFactor at least(percent) but less than(percent) 1 5 .40 2 5 10 .45 3 10 15 .50 4 15 20 .55 5 20 25 .60 6 25 30 .65 7 30 35 .70 8 35 40 .80 9 40 45 .90 10 45 50 1.00 11 50 55 1.00 12 55 60 1.10 13 60 65 1.20 14 65 70 1.30 15 70 75 1.35 16 75 80 1.40 17 80 85 1.45 18 85 90 1.50 19 90 95 1.55 20 95 99.99 1.60 21 99.99 1.65.

Click to view

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am §§ 7, 8 ch 43 SLA 1973; am §§ 33 — 36 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 5 ch 115 SLA 1982; am §§ 3 — 5 ch 106 SLA 1984; am §§ 3, 4 ch 116 SLA 1996; am §§ 9, 10 ch 45 SLA 2008; am §§ 4, 5 ch 50 SLA 2013)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in the first sentence of (c), inserted “surcharge” following “fund solvency adjustment”; rewrote (f).

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 50, SLA 2013 (HB 76), see 2013 House Journal 70 — 71.

Sec. 23.20.293. Requirement to notify the department of a business change and acquisitions.

  1. An employing unit that has a change in ownership, management, or control, or that succeeds to or acquires all or part of another employing unit’s trade or business, shall notify the department in writing in accordance with regulations adopted by the department.
  2. For the purposes of this section, “a change in ownership, management, or control” means a change of person, entity, or responsible party required by law to pay unemployment insurance contributions.

History. (§ 1 ch 27 SLA 2006)

Sec. 23.20.295. Rates for successors in business.

  1. When an employing unit, whether or not an employer within the meaning of AS 23.20.520 , succeeds to or acquires substantially all of the operating assets of an organization, trade, or business of another employing unit which at the time of acquisition was an employer subject to this chapter, the payroll records of the predecessor employer shall be transferred as of the date of acquisition to the successor employer for the purpose of determining an employer’s qualifying period and for all other purposes of rate determination.
  2. If the successor employer was an employer subject to this chapter before the date of acquisition, the rate of contributions for the remainder of the calendar year of acquisition is the successor employer’s rate for the period immediately preceding the date of acquisition; the rate for the succeeding years is based on the total of the successor employer’s payrolls consolidated with those of the predecessor.
  3. If the successor was not an employer before the date of acquisition, the rate is the rate applicable to the predecessor employer for the period immediately preceding the date of acquisition provided there was only one predecessor or there were only predecessors with identical rates.  If the predecessor rates were not identical, the successor’s rate is the highest rate applicable to any of the predecessor employers with respect to the period immediately preceding the date of acquisition.
  4. This section does not apply to an acquisition, transfer of a trade or business, or transfer of an employers’ workforce conducting the trade or business if the acquisition or transfer is determined by the commissioner
    1. to have been primarily for the purpose of obtaining a more favorable rate of contributions under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 ;
    2. to be inequitable to the parties;
    3. to be contrary to the public interest; or
    4. to be a violation of 42 U.S.C. 503(k) (SUTA Dumping Prevention Act of 2004).

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 27 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Collateral references. —

Right of successor in business to experience or rating of predecessor for purpose of fixing rate of contributions. 22 ALR2d 673.

Sec. 23.20.297. Special standards addressing transfers of experience and assignment of rates.

  1. The following standards apply regarding assignment of rates and transfers of experience. For the purposes of AS 23.20.295(d)(1) and (4),
    1. if an employer transfers its trade or business, its workforce conducting the trade or business, or a portion of that trade, business, or workforce, to another employer and, at the time of the transfer, there is substantially common ownership, management, or control of the two employers, then the unemployment experience attributable to the transferred trade, business, or workforce is transferred to the employer to whom that trade, business, or workforce is transferred; the rates of both employers are recalculated and made effective immediately upon the date of the transfer;
    2. if a person is not an employer at the time the person acquires the trade, business, or workforce of an employer, the unemployment experience of the acquired trade, business, or workforce may not be transferred to that person if the commissioner finds that the person acquired the trade, business, or workforce in order to obtain a lower rate of contributions; instead, the person is assigned the applicable new employer rate under AS 23.20.170(b) .
  2. An employer who knowingly or recklessly violates or attempts to violate, or who advises another employer to violate, (a) of this section or any other provision of this chapter related to determining the assignment of a contribution rate, or fails to notify the department of a trade, business, or workforce change or acquisition in order to obtain a more favorable rate of contributions, is not eligible for a rate determination under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 . The employer shall pay one of the following as assigned by the department:
    1. contributions at the highest rate provided for the rate year of the violation and for the three succeeding rate years; or
    2. if the employer’s trade, business, or workforce is already at the highest rate for the rate year of the violation, contributions at the highest rate for the three succeeding rate years and a cash penalty of two percent of taxable wages for the rate year of the violation and three succeeding rate years.
  3. A person who knowingly or recklessly advises another person or employer to transfer or acquire a trade, business, or workforce under the provisions of this section in order to obtain a more favorable rate of contributions in violation of (a) of this section is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000.
  4. The department may interpret and apply this section in such a manner as to meet the minimum requirements by the United States Department of Labor.

History. (§ 3 ch 27 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.299. Obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception.

  1. A person who violates AS 23.20.297(b) or (c) commits the crime of obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception.
  2. A person commits the crime of obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the first degree if the value of the difference between the rate that had been assigned to the trade, business, or workforce and the rate assigned as a result of the violation is $25,000 or more. Obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the first degree is a class B felony.
  3. A person commits the crime of obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the second degree if the value of the difference between the rate that had been assigned to the trade, business, or workforce and the rate assigned as a result of the violation is $500 or more but less than $25,000. Obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the second degree is a class C felony.
  4. A person commits the crime of obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the third degree if the value of the difference between the rate that had been assigned to the trade, business, or workforce and the rate assigned as a result of the violation is $50 or more but less than $500. Obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
  5. A person commits the crime of obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the fourth degree if the value of the difference between the rate that had been assigned to the trade, business, or workforce and the rate assigned as a result of the violation is less than $50. Obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception in the fourth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
  6. A person who attempts to commit the crime of obtaining an unemployment contribution rate by deception commits the crime of attempt under AS 11.31.100 .

History. (§ 4 ch 27 SLA 2006)

Sec. 23.20.300. Corrections and adjustments.

Corrections or modifications of an employer’s payroll may be taken into account within two years after the computation date for the purpose of a reduction or increase in the employer’s rate. When an adjustment is made in an employer’s payroll or in an employer’s average quarterly decline quotient after rates have been assigned, the adjustment may not alter the position of another employer on the schedule or the contribution rate of another employer. The employer for whom the adjustment in decline quotients is made shall be placed in the class in which another employer with the nearest similar average quarterly decline quotient is placed.

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 38 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Sec. 23.20.305. Application for review.

  1. The department shall promptly notify each employer of the rate of contributions for the employer as determined for a calendar year under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 . The determination becomes conclusive upon the employer unless, within 30 days after the notice is mailed to the employer’s last address of record or delivered to the employer, the employer files an application for review and redetermination, setting out the reasons for the application.
  2. If the commissioner grants review, the employer shall be promptly notified and shall be granted a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing. The commissioner shall make a redetermination and shall notify the employer of the redetermination and the reason for it.
  3. If the commissioner denies a review, the commissioner shall notify the employer of the denial and the reasons for the denial.  A redetermination or a denial of review becomes final, unless within 30 days after the notice is mailed to the last address of record of the employer, or delivered to the employer, the employer initiates judicial review in accordance with AS 23.20.445 .

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 3 ch 13 SLA 1962; am §§ 39, 40 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 7 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.310. Definitions for AS 23.20.280 — 23.20.310.

In AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 ,

  1. “business” means a trade or business or a part of the trade or business;
  2. “computation date” means June 30 of the year immediately preceding the calendar year for which the contribution rates are effective;
  3. “computation year” means the 12 months beginning July 1 and ending June 30;
  4. “knowingly” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  5. “payroll” means all wages paid by an employer to individuals in the employ of the employer for service in employment as defined in this chapter;
  6. “qualifying period” means the three-year period of 12 consecutive calendar quarters ending on the computation date; for an employer who has not been subject to this chapter during each of the 12 calendar quarters ending with the computation date, “qualifying period” means the period ending with the computation date and beginning with the first calendar quarter in the 12 quarter period in which the employer was subject to this chapter, but in no event shall an employer’s qualifying period be less than the four consecutive calendar quarters ending with the computation date; an employing unit is subject to this chapter beginning with the start of the first quarter in which the employing unit pays wages under this chapter, and ending with the end of the calendar quarter in which either the employing unit files closing contribution and wage reports under regulations adopted by the department, or the account is closed by the independent action of the commissioner;
  7. “quarterly payroll” means all wages paid by the employer during a calendar quarter;
  8. “ratable payroll” means that part of an employer’s payroll for the four consecutive calendar quarters ending on the computation date as is subject to payment of contributions; for the purpose of determining the rate for a newly subject employer under AS 23.20.280 23.20.310 the definition of employment in force at the time that the employer becomes subject to this chapter applies to service performed for the employer before the date on which the employer becomes subject;
  9. “recklessly” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
  10. “reserve rate” means the ratio of the total amount available for benefits in the unemployment trust fund on September 30, immediately following the computation date, to the payroll of employers required to pay contributions under the provisions of AS 23.20.165 for the 12 consecutive calendar months ending on the computation date, expressed as a percentage.

History. (§ 11 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 13 SLA 1962; am § 9 ch 43 SLA 1973; am §§ 41 — 44, 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 5 ch 27 SLA 2006)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was reorganized in 1984 and 2006 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order.

Cross references. —

For definition of employment, see AS 23.20.525 .

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

In re Active Steel Erectors, Inc., 53 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985).

Article 5. Coverage.

Collateral references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 43-76.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 211-264.

Sec. 23.20.315. Coverage determination.

  1. On its own motion or on the application of an employing unit, the department shall, on the basis of facts found by it, determine whether the employing unit is an employer and whether service performed for it constitutes employment.
  2. Within one year or a longer time which the department for good cause allows, after a determination has been made under (a) of this section, the department may reconsider its determination in the light of additional evidence and make a redetermination.
  3. The department shall mail or deliver a notice of its determination made under (a) or (b) of this section to the last address of record of the employing unit affected.  The notice must include a statement of the supporting facts found by the department.
  4. Within 30 days after a notice of a determination has been mailed or delivered to the last address of record of an employing unit, the employing unit may apply to the department to reconsider its determination in the light of additional evidence and to issue a redetermination. The department shall, if the request is granted, mail or deliver to the last address of record of the employing unit affected a notice of the redetermination. The notice must include a statement of the supporting facts found by the department. If the department denies the request for redetermination, it shall furnish a notice of the denial of the application.
  5. Within 30 days after a notice of a determination made under (a), (b), or (d) of this section or a denial of the application under (d) of this section has been mailed or delivered to the last address of record of an employing unit, the employing unit may appeal from the determination to the department. The department shall give the parties a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing as provided in the case of hearings before appeal tribunals in AS 23.20.410 23.20.470 . The decision of the department is final unless, within 30 days after the decision is mailed or delivered to the last address of record of a party, the party initiates judicial review in accordance with AS 23.20.445 .

History. (§ 601 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am §§ 45 — 47 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 8, 9 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

New determinations under subsection (a). —

Subsection (a) permitted the department to prospectively determine the company’s contribution liability for new coverage periods, and subsection (a) did not require new or additional evidence for the new determination. Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Subsection (a) permits the department to determine coverage for a new period, even if its new coverage determination differs from a previous coverage determination. Contributions accrue and are payable by an employer for each calendar year in which the employer is subject to the act, and here, as in other areas of tax law, each period subject to contribution liability stands alone, to be determined and assessed separately. Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Company not exempt from contribution liability. —

Because the company’s lease-drivers provided “services,” and did not satisfy the “ABC test” in AS 23.20.525(a)(10) , the company was not exempt from contribution liability and was, therefore, a liable employer required to make contributions under the Alaska Employment Security Act. Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.20.320. Conclusiveness of determination.

A determination of the status of an employing unit by the department under AS 23.20.315 in the absence of appeal, and a final determination of the department upon an appeal, together with the record of the proceeding are admissible in a subsequent proceeding under this chapter. If the determination is supported by substantial evidence and there is no fraud, the determination is conclusive, except as to an error of law, upon an employing unit which is a party to the proceeding.

History. (§ 602 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.325. Elective coverage of excluded service.

  1. A service performed for an employing unit which is excluded under the definition of employment, and with respect to which no payments are required under the employment security law of another state or of the federal government, is considered employment for all purposes of this chapter if the department approves a written election to that effect filed by the employing unit for which the service is performed, as of the date stated in the approval.  The department may not approve an election unless it (1) includes all the service of the type specified in each establishment or place of business for which the election is made, and (2) is made for not less than two calendar years.
  2. A service which because of an election by an employing unit under (a) of this section is employment subject to this chapter ceases to be employment subject to the chapter as of January 1 of a calendar year after the two calendar years of the election only if not later than March 15 of the year (1) the employing unit has filed with the department a written notice to that effect, or (2) the department on its own motion has given notice of termination of coverage.

History. (§ 604 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 5 ch 122 SLA 1977)

Revisor’s notes. —

The contingent amendment to this section made under sec. 33, ch. 122, SLA 1977 never took effect and was repealed by sec. 82, ch. 41, SLA 2009.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.326. Elective coverage by political subdivisions. [Repealed, § 25 ch 122 SLA 1977.]

Article 6. Benefits.

Cross references. —

For effect of receipt of unemployment benefits on permanent and temporary total disability compensation payments, see AS 23.30.187 .

Collateral references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 43-201.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 291-297.

Vested right of applicant for unemployment compensation in mode and manner of computing benefits in effect at time of his discharge or loss of employment. 20 ALR2d 963.

Termination of employment as a result of union action or pursuant to a union contract as “voluntary” for purposes of unemployment compensation. 90 ALR2d 835.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by claimant’s receipt of holiday pay. 3 ALR4th 557.

Unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or payment in lieu thereof. 14 ALR4th 1175.

Discharge from employment on ground of political views or conduct as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 29 ALR4th 287.

Sec. 23.20.330. Claims.

Claims for benefits and notices of unemployment shall be made in accordance with the regulations that the department adopts.

History. (§ 701 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Employee cannot claim benefits for same period from two jobs. Alin v. Alaska Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 17 Alaska 607 (1958) Decided under former AS 23.20.380 )

Collateral references. —

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 ALR3d 1280.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public welfare payments. 22 ALR4th 534.

Sec. 23.20.335. Notice to employees.

An employer shall post and maintain in places readily accessible to individuals in the service of the employer printed statements concerning the regulations or other matters which the department prescribes by regulation. An employer shall supply individuals in the service of the employer with copies of the printed statements or materials relating to claims for benefits which the department prescribes by regulation. The department shall supply the printed statements to an employer without cost.

History. (§ 701 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.340. Determination of claims.

  1. An examiner designated by the department shall take the claim.  The examiner shall take all evidence pertaining to the eligibility of the claimant and shall promptly transmit all evidence to the department.  The department, or a representative designated by it for the purpose, shall, on the basis of the evidence submitted and any additional evidence it requires, make an initial determination of the claim as to whether the claimant is eligible for benefits under AS 23.20.350 and an initial determination of the weekly benefit amount and the maximum potential benefit amount.
  2. Within one year from the date of the initial determination of the weekly benefit amount and the maximum potential benefit amount established under AS 23.20.350 , the department shall reconsider the determination or any subsequent determination under this chapter and shall issue a redetermination amending the determination if the department finds that
    1. an error in computation or identity has been made;
    2. additional wages or other facts pertinent to the claimant’s insured status or eligibility for benefits have become available;
    3. the determination resulted from a nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact; or
    4. the determination resulted from a misapplication of law by the department.
  3. The claimant shall be promptly notified of the initial determination or a subsequent redetermination and the reasons for it.
  4. Unless the claimant is determined to be disqualified for benefits under AS 23.20.360 , 23.20.362 , 23.20.375 , 23.20.378 23.20.387 , or 23.20.505 , benefits shall be promptly paid in accordance with the initial determination or subsequent redetermination.
  5. The claimant may file an appeal from an initial determination or a redetermination under (b) of this section not later than 30 days after the claimant is notified in person of the determination or redetermination or not later than 30 days after the date the determination or redetermination is mailed to the claimant’s last address of record. The period for filing an appeal may be extended for a reasonable period if the claimant shows that the application was delayed as a result of circumstances beyond the claimant’s control.
  6. If a determination of disqualification under AS 23.20.360 , 23.20.362 , 23.20.375 , 23.20.378 23.20.387 , or 23.20.505 is made, the claimant shall be promptly notified of the determination and the reasons for it.  The claimant and other interested parties as defined by regulations of the department may appeal the determination in the same manner prescribed in this chapter for appeals of initial determinations and redeterminations.  Benefits may not be paid while a determination is being appealed for any week for which the determination of disqualification was made. However, if a decision on the appeal allows benefits to the claimant, those benefits must be paid promptly.
  7. [Repealed, § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980.]

History. (§ 702 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am §§ 48 — 53, 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 6, 7 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 17 ch 100 SLA 1989; am §§ 10, 11 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal period. —

Subsection (e) of this section as rewritten in 1980, while not entirely free from ambiguity, supports the interpretation that the appeal period runs from the date of personal notification, or, if notice is mailed, from the date of mailing. Estes v. Department of Labor, 625 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1981).

The time period for filing an appeal should not be strictly applied to a claimant who inadvertently files late, particularly when the claimant had very little time to file a timely appeal. Estes v. Department of Labor, 625 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1981).

Since the Alaska Employment Security Act, AS 23.20, exists in part to provide unemployment benefits to eligible unemployed persons, the purpose and policies of the act are not served by strict application of the time period for filing an appeal in circumstances where a claimant had as little as two days to file a timely appeal; particularly when no apparent prejudice is caused to the department by allowing the appeal. Estes v. Department of Labor, 625 P.2d 293 (Alaska 1981).

Cited in

Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989); Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007).

Collateral references. —

Termination of employment because of pregnancy as affecting right to employment compensation. 51 ALR3d 254.

Alien’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. 87 ALR3d 694.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to comply with requirements as to dress, grooming, or hygiene. 88 ALR3d 150.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s insistence upon conditions not common or customary to particular employment. 88 ALR3d 1353.

Eligibility as affected by mental, nervous or psychological disorder. 1 ALR4th 802.

Sec. 23.20.345. Payment of benefits.

Benefits are payable from the fund. All benefits shall be paid through employment offices in accordance with regulations adopted by the department.

History. (§ 711 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.350. Amount of benefits.

  1. An individual who is paid at least $2,500 in wages during the individual’s base period for employment covered by this chapter is eligible to receive benefits under this chapter if those wages were paid in at least two of the calendar quarters of the individual’s base period.
  2. [Repealed, § 33 ch 115 SLA 1982.]
  3. For the purpose of computing the benefits payable under this chapter, the base period wages of an insured worker shall be determined as follows:
    1. if the insured worker is paid 90 percent or more of the worker’s wages in the calendar quarter of the worker’s base period in which the worker was paid the greatest amount of wages, the base period wages are the wages paid in the quarters of the base period other than the one in which the greatest amount of wages were paid, multiplied by 10; and
    2. if the insured worker is paid less than 90 percent of the worker’s wages in the calendar quarter of the worker’s base period in which the worker was paid the greatest amount of wages, the base period wages are the wages paid to the worker during the base period.
      1. (B) Base Period Wages Weekly Benefit Amount At least But less than 0  2,500 $ 0 2,500 2,750 56 2,750 3,000 58 3,000 3,250 60 3,250 3,500 62 3,500 3,750 64 3,750 4,000 66 4,000 4,250 68 4,250 4,500 70 4,500 4,750 72 4,750 5,000 74 5,000 5,250 76 5,250 5,500 78 5,500 5,750 80 5,750 6,000 82 6,000 6,250 84 6,250 6,500 86 6,500 6,750 88 6,750 7,000 90 7,000 7,250 92 7,250 7,500 94 7,500 7,750 96 7,750 8,000 98 8,000 8,250 100 8,250 8,500 102 8,500 8,750 104 8,750 9,000 106 9,000 9,250 108 9,250 9,500 110 9,500 9,750 112 9,750 10,000 114 10,000 10,250 116 10,250 10,500 118 10,500 10,750 120 10,750 11,000 122 11,000 11,250 124 11,250 11,500 126 11,500 11,750 128 11,750 12,000 130 12,000 12,250 132 12,250 12,500 134 12,500 12,750 136 12,750 13,000 138 13,000 13,250 140 13,250 13,500 142 13,500 13,750 144 13,750 14,000 146 14,000 14,250 148 14,250 14,500 150 14,500 14,750 152 14,750 15,000 154 15,000 15,250 156 15,250 15,500 158 15,500 15,750 160 15,750 16,000 162 16,000 16,250 164 16,250 16,500 166 16,500 16,750 168 16,750 17,000 170 17,000 17,250 172 17,250 17,500 174 17,500 17,750 176 17,750 18,000 178 18,000 18,250 180 18,250 18,500 182 18,500 18,750 184 18,750 19,000 186 19,000 19,250 188 19,250 19,500 190 19,500 19,750 192 19,750 20,000 194 20,000 20,250 196 20,250 20,500 198 20,500 20,750 200 20,750 21,000 202 21,000 21,250 204 21,250 21,500 206 21,500 21,750 208 21,750 22,000 210 22,000 22,250 212 22,250 22,500 214 22,500 22,750 216 22,750 23,000 218 23,000 23,250 220 23,250 23,500 222 23,500 23,750 224 23,750 24,000 226 24,000 24,250 228 24,250 24,500 230 24,500 24,750 232 24,750 25,000 234 25,000 25,250 236 25,250 25,500 238 25,500 25,750 240 25,750 26,000 242 26,000 26,250 244 26,250 26,500 246 26,500 26,750 248 26,750 27,000 250 27,000 27,250 252 27,250 27,500 254 27,500 27,750 256 27,750 28,000 258 28,000 28,250 260 28,250 28,500 262 28,500 28,750 264 28,750 29,000 266 29,000 29,250 268 29,250 29,500 270 29,500 29,750 272 29,750 30,000 274 30,000 30,250 276 30,250 30,500 278 30,500 30,750 280 30,750 31,000 282 31,000 31,250 284 31,250 31,500 286 31,500 31,750 288 31,750 32,000 290 32,000 32,250 292 32,250 32,500 294 32,500 32,750 296 32,750 33,000 298 33,000 33,250 300 33,250 33,500 302 33,500 33,750 304 33,750 34,000 306 34,000 34,250 308 34,250 34,500 310 34,500 34,750 312 34,750 35,000 314 35,000 35,250 316 35,250 35,500 318 35,500 35,750 320 35,750 36,000 322 36,000 36,250 324 36,250 36,500 326 36,500 36,750 328 36,750 37,000 330 37,000 37,250 332 37,250 37,500 334 37,500 37,750 336 37,750 38,000 338 38,000 38,250 340 38,250 38,500 342 38,500 38,750 344 38,750 39,000 346 39,000 39,250 348 39,250 39,500 350 39,500 39,750 352 39,750 40,000 354 40,000 40,250 356 40,250 40,500 358 40,500 40,750 360 40,750 41,000 362 41,000 41,250 364 41,250 41,500 366 41,500 41,750 368 41,750 42,000 370 42,000 370.
  4. An individual who is eligible under (a) of this section is entitled to receive the weekly benefit amount set out in column (B) of the table in this subsection that is opposite the amount set out in column (A) of the individual’s base period wages determined under (c) of this section:
  5. An individual who is eligible under (d) of this section is entitled to receive a weekly benefit under this chapter for the number of weeks set out in column (B) of the table in this subsection opposite the applicable earnings ratio of the individual set out in column (A):
  6. An individual who establishes a benefit year is eligible for an allowance for dependents in addition to the individual’s weekly benefit amount. The department may require an individual claiming or receiving an allowance for dependents to produce income tax returns, birth certificates, notices of adoption or custody, social security account number of spouse, verification of support documents, or other information necessary to verify that the allowance is payable to the individual.  The allowance for dependents
    1. is $24 per week for each dependent, except that the total allowance for dependents paid to an individual may not exceed $72 for each week of unemployment;
    2. is payable beginning with the week during the benefit year in which the individual claims an allowance for the dependent and is payable for the remainder of the individual’s eligibility for regular, extended, or supplemental payments during the benefit year;
    3. may not be claimed for a new dependent after the end of the benefit year or after the exhaustion of regular benefits in the benefit year;
    4. [Repealed, § 30 ch 100 SLA 1989.]
    5. [Repealed, § 30 ch 100 SLA 1989.]
  7. In this section,
    1. “dependent” means an individual’s
      1. unmarried child, stepchild, legally adopted child, or legal ward under 18 years of age who is
        1. lawfully in the individual’s physical custody at the time the individual claims the allowance for dependents; or
        2. dependent on the individual for more than 50 percent of support;
      2. unmarried child, stepchild, legally adopted child, or legal ward of any age who is dependent on the individual for more than 50 percent of support and who is prevented by infirmity from engaging in a gainful occupation;
    2. “earnings ratio” means the ratio obtained by dividing the total base period wages of the insured worker by the wages paid in the quarter of the base period in which the worker was paid the greatest amount of wages.

Click to view

(A) (B) Earnings Ratio Number of Weeks less than 1.50 16 1.50-1.99 18 2.00-2.49 20 2.50-2.99 22 3.00-3.49 24 3.50 or more 26

Click to view

History. (§ 712(a) — (d) ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 25 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 112 SLA 1966; am §§ 9, 10 ch 106 SLA 1969; am § 7 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 10 ch 43 SLA 1973; am § 54 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 8, 33 ch 115 SLA 1982; am §§ 6 — 8 ch 106 SLA 1984; am § 26 ch 85 SLA 1988; am § 30 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 1 ch 167 SLA 1990; am § 5 ch 116 SLA 1996; am §§ 11, 12 ch 45 SLA 2008)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 23.20.352. Additional benefits. [Repealed, § 32 ch 32 SLA 1971.]

Sec. 23.20.353. Supplemental state benefits.

  1. An individual is eligible to receive supplemental state benefits for a week in which
    1. the individual is an “exhaustee” as defined in AS 23.20.409 ;
    2. the individual has otherwise satisfied the requirements of this chapter for the receipt of regular benefits; and
    3. the individual is ineligible for extended benefits solely because of the provisions of AS 23.20.406(k) .
  2. Supplemental state benefits are paid in the same amounts, for the same periods, and under the same conditions as extended benefits under AS 23.20.406(a) — (j) and (l) and AS 23.20.407 23.20.409 .
  3. [Repealed, § 9 ch 28 SLA 1993.]

History. (§ 9 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 2 ch 28 SLA 1993)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in (a)(3) of this section, “AS 23.20.406 (k)” was substituted for “AS 23.20.406 ( l )” and in (b), “AS 23.20.406(a) — (j) and ( l )” was substituted for “AS 23.20.406(a) — (k)” to reflect the 1996 relettering of AS 23.20.406(k) and ( l ).

Sec. 23.20.354. State interim benefits.

  1. There is established a state interim benefits program.  State interim benefits are payable only to the extent that money is appropriated from the general fund for that purpose.
  2. An individual who has otherwise satisfied the requirements of this chapter for the receipt of regular benefits is eligible for state interim benefits if
    1. the individual’s weekly benefit amount payable under this chapter is reduced or denied under AS 23.20.381(h) ; or
    2. the individual is a noncertificated individual who provides compensated service to a school district for teaching indigenous languages and the individual’s weekly benefit amount payable under this chapter is reduced or denied under AS 23.20.381(e) .
  3. The amount of state interim benefits payable to an individual for a week is equal to the difference between the individual’s weekly benefit amount, including the dependents allowance, established under AS 23.20.350 and the individual’s weekly benefit amount, including the dependents allowance, payable for that week under AS 23.20.381(e) or 23.20.381(h) . The total amount of state interim benefits paid may not exceed the total amount of regular benefits denied solely under AS 23.20.381(e) or 23.20.381(h) .
  4. State interim benefits are subject to reduction, disqualification, recoupment, and offset in the same manner as regular benefits under this chapter.
  5. Extended, additional, or supplemental benefits of any kind are not payable on the basis of a claim for, or the payment of, state interim benefits.  State interim benefits may not be used to supplement a reduction or denial of extended, additional, or supplemental benefits.

History. (§ 9 ch. 106 SLA 1984)

Sec. 23.20.355. Interstate payment restrictions. [Repealed, § 8 ch 106 SLA 1971.]

Sec. 23.20.360. Earnings deducted from weekly benefit amount.

The amount of benefits, excluding the allowance for dependents, payable to an insured worker for a week of unemployment shall be reduced by 75 percent of the wages payable to the insured worker for that week that are in excess of $50. However, the amount of benefits may not be reduced below zero. If the benefit is not a multiple of $1, it is computed to the next higher multiple of $1. If the benefit is zero, no allowance for dependents is payable.

History. (§ 713 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 26 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 55 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 10 ch 115 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Construction.

AS 23.20.360 provides that a claimant's weekly benefits are reduced by 75 percent of the claimant's weekly wages that exceed $ 50, and the statute is thus clear that the $ 50 figure is based on a claimant's total weekly, not daily, earnings; the statute controls over the Department of Labor and Workforce Development handbook, nothing in the handbook conflicts with the Department's interpretation of the wage reporting provision as having a weekly time frame, and the citizen's interpretation of the handbook provision was unreasonable. Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Quoted in

Blas v. State, 331 P.3d 363 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 23.20.362. Disqualifying or deductible income.

  1. The amount of benefits payable to an insured worker for a week of unemployment which begins in a period for which the insured worker receives a pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar periodic payment that is based on the previous work of the insured worker shall be reduced by the amount of the payment that is attributable to that week.  The requirements of this subsection apply only if
    1. the pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar periodic payment is provided under a plan maintained or contributed to by an employer of the insured worker during the base period of the insured worker; and
    2. for a periodic payment other than a payment made under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, or earlier versions of those federal laws, the service performed for an employer by an insured worker after the beginning of the base period or remuneration for those services affects eligibility for, or increases the amount of the pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar periodic payment.
  2. The reduction of benefits provided in (a) of this section does not apply to that part, if any, of a pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar periodic payment that is attributable to contributions of the insured worker.
  3. The amount of benefits payable to an insured worker for a week of unemployment shall be reduced by the amount of any severance or termination payment, wages in lieu of dismissal notice, or payment for vacation, sick leave, or holidays that is attributable to that week.
  4. An individual is not entitled to benefits for a week of unemployment for which the individual has received or is seeking unemployment benefits under another employment security law in a manner other than in accordance with the reciprocal arrangements with other states or the federal government.  This subsection does not apply if the appropriate agency finally determines that the individual is not entitled to benefits under the other law.
  5. If, after a reduction of the benefit amount under (a) or (c) of this section, the weekly benefit amount is not a multiple of $1, the benefit amount shall be increased to the next higher multiple of $1.

History. (§ 56 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 1 ch 145 SLA 1980; am § 2 ch 114 SLA 1981; § 10 ch 106 SLA 1984)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Disqualifying pension income. —

Where claimant was granted a civil service pension made up of equal contributions by claimant and his employer, 50% of the pension income was properly considered disqualifying income even though claimant’s and his employer’s contributions to the pension fund were commingled. Wentland v. Employment Sec. Div., 671 P.2d 1285 (Alaska 1983).

Pension benefit attributable to employer. —

This section does not make a distinction for amounts contributed as pension plan payments pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement; rather, it simply states that the requirements of subsection (a) apply if “(1) the pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or similar periodic payment is provided under a plan maintained or contributed to by an employer of the insured worker. . . .” Belmont v. State, Dep't of Labor, 745 P.2d 75 (Alaska 1987).

Collateral references. —

Benefits where, during the base year, employee worked in different states for same employer. 9 ALR2d 646.

Effect of receipt of subsistence allowance under Federal Servicemen’s Readjustment Act. 21 ALR2d 1072.

Effect on right to state unemployment compensation benefits of receipt of payments under private supplemental plans. 91 ALR2d 1211.

Severance payments as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 93 ALR2d 1319.

Workmen’s compensation, application for, or receipt of, unemployment compensation benefits as affecting claim for. 96 ALR2d 941.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of pension. 56 ALR3d 520.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by receipt of Social Security benefits. 56 ALR3d 552.

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by claimant’s receipt of holiday pay. 3 ALR4th 557.

Unemployment compensation as affected by vacation or payment in lieu thereof. 14 ALR4th 1175.

Sec. 23.20.365. Limited liability of state.

Benefits are considered due and payable under this chapter only to the extent provided in this chapter and to the extent that money is available for them to the credit of the unemployment fund, and the liability of the state is limited accordingly.

History. (§ 1001 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.370. Benefits of decedent or incompetent.

Benefits due and payable to a deceased or judicially declared incompetent person shall be paid, in accordance with regulations adopted by the department, to persons in the following order: spouse, child, parent, sister or brother, aunt or uncle, payment to whom the department finds will best carry out the purposes of this chapter. The regulations need not conform to the statutes applicable to the descent and distribution of decedents’ estates. A receipt from the person to whom the department makes payment fully discharges the fund and the department from liability for the benefits.

History. (§ 721 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 57 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Sec. 23.20.375. Filing requirements.

  1. An insured worker is entitled to receive waiting-week credit or benefits for a week of unemployment for which the insured worker has not been disqualified under AS 23.20.360 , 23.20.362 , 23.20.378 23.20.387 , or 23.20.505 if, in accordance with regulations adopted by the department, the insured worker has
    1. made an initial claim for benefits; and
    2. for that week, certified for waiting-week credit or made a claim for benefits.
  2. Benefits are not payable for a waiting week and benefits are not payable for a week of unemployment occurring within the benefit year before the completion of the waiting week.
  3. [Repealed, § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980.]

History. (§ 731 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 9 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 6 ch 122 SLA 1977; am §§ 58, 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 3 ch 114 SLA 1981; am § 11 ch 115 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

State v. Almen, 480 P.2d 695 (Alaska 1971); Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Collateral references. —

Failure or delay with respect to filing or reporting requirements as ground for denial of unemployment compensation benefits. 97 ALR2d 752.

Right to unemployment compensation or social security benefits of teacher or other school employee. 33 ALR5th 643.

Sec. 23.20.376. Base period extension and limitation.

  1. If the department finds that during the individual’s base period an individual has been incapable of work during the greater part of the individual’s working time in a calendar quarter, the base period shall be extended a calendar quarter subject to the limitation set out in (b) of this section.  The extension of an individual’s base period may not exceed four calendar quarters.
  2. The maximum benefits payable as a result of the use of wages earned in a calendar quarter before the individual’s current base period as defined in AS 23.20.520 shall be reduced by the amount of benefits paid previously as a result of the use of wages in computing a previous benefit determination.

History. (§ 1 ch 111 SLA 1966)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.378. Able to work and available for suitable work.

  1. An insured worker is entitled to receive waiting-week credit or benefits for a week of unemployment if for that week the insured worker is able to work and available for suitable work. An insured worker is not considered available for work unless registered for work in accordance with regulations adopted by the department. An insured worker may not be disqualified for failure to comply with this subsection if
    1. the insured worker is not available for work because the insured worker
      1. is ill or disabled;
      2. is traveling to obtain medical services that are not available in the area in which the insured worker resides, or, if a physician determines it is necessary, the insured worker is accompanying a spouse or dependent who is traveling to obtain medical services;
      3. resides in the state and is noncommercially hunting or fishing for personal survival or the survival of dependents;
      4. is serving as a prospective or impaneled juror in a court; or
      5. is attending the funeral of an immediate family member for a period of no longer than seven days; and
    2. a condition described in (1) of this subsection occurs during an uninterrupted period of unemployment immediately following a week for which the insured worker has filed a compensable claim, and work has not been offered that would have been suitable for the insured worker before the illness, disability, hunting, fishing, medical travel, jury service, or funeral attendance.
  2. A waiver of disqualification for an illness or disability under (a)(1) of this section may not exceed six consecutive weeks.
  3. An insured worker is disqualified for waiting-week credit or benefits for a week of unemployment while the insured worker is pursuing an academic education. A disqualification under this subsection begins with the first week of academic instruction and ends with the week immediately before the first full week in which the insured worker is no longer pursuing an academic education. However, an insured worker who has been pursuing an academic education for at least one school term and who was working at least 30 hours a week during a significant portion of the time that the worker was pursuing an academic education is not disqualified for waiting-week credit or benefits under this subsection if the worker’s academic schedule does not preclude full-time work in the worker’s occupation and if the insured worker became unemployed because the worker was laid off or the worker’s job was eliminated. In this subsection,
    1. “pursuing an academic education” means attending an established school in a course of study providing academic instruction of 10 or more credit hours per week, or the equivalent;
    2. “school” includes primary schools, secondary schools, and institutions of higher education.

History. (§ 59 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 12 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 18 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 12 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Most of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under former AS 23.20.380 .

Constitutionality. —

The distinctions drawn in the unemployment compensation law between vocational training and academic training are reasonable, not arbitrary, and are fairly and substantially related to their purposes. Thus, the distinctions do not violate the state’s equal protection or substantive due process guarantees. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

Applicability. —

Substantial evidence did not support the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) credibility determination where the ALJ erred in relying on claimant’s receipt of unemployment benefits in making an adverse credibility determination. The record contained no certification by claimant that he was physically and mentally able to work, and the ALJ erred in relying on claimant’s activities of daily living in making an adverse credibility determination. Lamb v. Colvin, — F. Supp. 3d — (D. Alaska Jan. 29, 2014).

Applicant must be genuinely attached to labor force. —

Eligibility for unemployment benefits is conditioned upon the applicant being genuinely attached to the labor force. Lind v. Employment Sec. Div., Dep't of Labor, 608 P.2d 6 (Alaska 1980).

In order to be genuinely attached to labor force one must be, among other things, available for suitable work, a standard which is met when the individual is willing to work and is available to a substantial field of employment. Lind v. Employment Sec. Div., Dep't of Labor, 608 P.2d 6 (Alaska 1980).

Two-fold test for determining availability for work requires (1) that an individual claimant be willing to accept suitable work which he has no good cause for refusing, and (2) that the claimant thereby make himself available to a substantial field of employment. Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Claimant must be available for full-time work in order to qualify for unemployment benefits. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Where the testimony as a whole of a claimant for unemployment benefits led the Department of Labor to conclude that the claimant was neither willing nor prepared to find and maintain a full-time job during the period in which she was going to school, because her primary interest was to obtain her beauty operator license in a reasonable amount of time and, at most, she was open to the idea of working a few hours a day, this evidence was sufficient to support the Department of Labor’s conclusion that the claimant was not available for full-time work. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

The purpose of the Alaska Employment Security Act is furthered, in part, by the availability requirement since it ensures that unemployment benefits go to those whose unemployment is truly involuntary; i.e., those who are ready and willing to work if a job becomes available to them. Given this policy, the legislature did not intend to benefit those who have voluntarily limited their ability to obtain work by being unavailable for full-time work. Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Availability for part-time work does not suffice to qualify for unemployment. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

Where claimant stated that he would not accept full-time work while in law school but that he would be available for work during hours he was not in school, and he stated that he did not know if he could manage both full-time employment and law school, such evidence sufficed to support a determination that he was not available for full-time work. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

It is proper to consider parental duties as allowable restriction on availability. Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Move from area where one’s services were in demand to a place where work is nearly nonexistent in one’s profession is relevant to a determination of whether an applicant is genuinely attached to the labor market. Lind v. Employment Sec. Div., Dep't of Labor, 608 P.2d 6 (Alaska 1980).

Burden of proving extent of availability for suitable work. —

Where a claimant has shown she is available for suitable work which she has no good cause for refusing, the department shall have the burden of proving that this availability does not extend to a sufficiently “substantial field of employment.” Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Worker found not available. —

Division of Employment Security did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the claimant was not available for suitable work for two days when he traveled outside of Alaska, as he did not travel for purposes related to obtaining employment and did not seek work where he traveled. Blas v. State, 331 P.3d 363 (Alaska 2014).

“Reasonable basis” standard of review of department’s decisions. —

See Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Collateral references. —

Leaving employment, or unavailability for particular job or duties, because of sickness or disability. 14 ALR2d 1308.

“Availability for work,” under unemployment compensation statute, of claimant who undertakes to restrict willingness to work certain hours, types of work, or conditions, not usual and customary in the occupations, trade or industry. 25 ALR2d 1077, 35 ALR3d 1129, 88 ALR3d 1353; 12 ALR4th 611; 2 ALR5th 475.

Right to unemployment compensation of claimant who refuses nonunion employment. 56 ALR2d 1015.

Refusal of type of work other than that in which employee was formerly engaged as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 97 ALR2d 1125; 94 ALR3d 63.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts. 35 ALR3d 1129; 12 ALR4th 611; 2 ALR5th 475.

Eligibility of employee laid off according to employer’s mandatory retirement plan. 50 ALR3d 880.

Termination of employment because of pregnancy as affecting right to employment compensation. 51 ALR3d 254.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to comply with requirements as to dress, grooming, or hygiene. 88 ALR3d 150.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to accept employment at compensation less than that of previous job. 94 ALR3d 63.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at reduced compensation. 95 ALR3d 449.

Eligibility as affected by mental, nervous, or psychological disorder. 1 ALR4th 802.

Leaving or refusing employment for religious reasons as barring unemployment compensation. 12 ALR4th 611.

Sec. 23.20.379. Voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, and refusal of work.

  1. An insured worker is disqualified for waiting-week credit or benefits for the first week in which the insured worker is unemployed and for the next five weeks of unemployment following that week if the insured worker
    1. left the insured worker’s last suitable work voluntarily without good cause; or
    2. was discharged for misconduct connected with the insured worker’s last work.
  2. An insured worker is disqualified for waiting-week credit or benefits for a week and the next five weeks of unemployment following that week if, for that week, the insured worker fails without good cause
    1. to apply for available suitable work to which the insured worker was referred by the employment office; or
    2. to accept suitable work when offered to the insured worker.
  3. The department shall reduce the maximum potential benefits to which an insured worker disqualified under this section would have been entitled by three times the insured worker’s weekly benefit amount, excluding the allowance for dependents, or by the amount of unpaid benefits to which the insured worker is entitled, whichever is less.
  4. The disqualification required in (a) and (b) of this section is terminated if the insured worker returns to employment and earns at least eight times the insured worker’s weekly benefit amount.
  5. An insured worker is disqualified for waiting-week credit or benefits for the first week in which the insured worker is unemployed and for the next 51 weeks of unemployment following that week or until the individual has worked subsequent to the discharge from work and earned 20 times the insured worker’s weekly benefit amount in employment covered under this chapter if the insured worker was discharged for commission of a felony or theft in connection with the work. In addition, the insured worker is not eligible for extended benefits under this chapter until the worker has requalified for benefits by meeting the earnings requirement in this subsection.
  6. In this section,
    1. “alcohol” has the meaning given in AS 23.10.699 ;
    2. “drugs” has the meaning given in AS 23.10.699 ;
    3. “misconduct” includes conduct in violation of an employer’s policy concerning the use of drugs or alcohol, but only if the policy is consistent with AS 23.10.620 .

History. (§ 59 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 19 — 21 ch 100 SLA 1989; am §§ 3, 4 ch 51 SLA 2000)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Good cause. —

The statutory scheme applies an objective standard to the determination of whether a worker left “suitable work” for “good cause,” encompassing any factor that would influence a “reasonably prudent person” in the particular circumstances at issue. Wescott v. DOL, 996 P.2d 723 (Alaska 2000).

Good cause for quitting was not shown where claimant did not establish that the work was unsuitable under AS 23.20.385 by reason of workplace hostility and safety concerns, which did not constitute significant health and safety risks. Moreover, she did not exhaust all reasonable alternatives with regard to her transportation problems and the workplace hostility because she did not raise the issues with management. Calvert v. DOL & Workforce Dev., Emples. Sec. Div., 251 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2011).

Misconduct connected with work. —

Store cashier’s willful violation of a store policy requiring management approval for credit card transactions in excess of fifty dollars constituted misconduct within the meaning of paragraph (a)(2). Smith v. Sampson, 816 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1991).

“Misconduct”. —

The generally accepted definition of “misconduct” is: (1) A deliberate, willful, or wanton disregard of an employer’s interest or of the standards of behavior which he has a right to expect of his employee, or (2) carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design. Smith v. Sampson, 816 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1991).

Because the question of whether employee committed misconduct under paragraph (a)(2) and 8 AAC 85.095 is different from the question of whether employer railroad had “just cause” to terminate him, the Commissioner of Labor’s determination that employee did not engage in willful misconduct should not have had a preclusive effect in employee’s wrongful discharge case. Manning v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 853 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1993).

Misconduct sufficient to disqualify from unemployment benefits. Risch v. State, 879 P.2d 358 (Alaska 1994).

Former law construed. —

See Alin v. Alaska Employment Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1958).

Quoted in

Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

Collateral references. —

Right to compensation as affected by discharge from private employment on ground of political views or conduct. 51 ALR2d 742; 29 ALR4th 287.

Harassment or garnishment by employee’s creditor as constituting misconduct connected with employment so as to disqualify employee. 86 ALR2d 1013.

Termination of employment as a result of union action or pursuant to union contract as “voluntary.” 90 ALR2d 835.

Employee’s insubordination as barring unemployment compensation. 26 ALR3d 1333; 20 ALR4th 637.

Work-connected inefficiency or negligence as “misconduct” barring unemployment compensation. 26 A.L.R.3d 1356.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts. 35 ALR3d 1129; 12 ALR4th 611; 2 ALR5th 475.

Eligibility of employee laid off according to employer’s mandatory retirement plan. 50 ALR3d 880.

Discharge for absenteeism or tardiness as affecting right to unemployment compensation. 58 ALR3d 674.

Harassment or other mistreatment by employer or supervisor as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment. 76 ALR3d 1089.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation of employee who retires voluntarily. 88 ALR3d 274.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s insistence upon conditions not common or customary to particular employment. 88 ALR3d 1353.

Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to accept employment at compensation less than that of previous job. 94 ALR3d 63.

Leaving or refusing employment for religious reasons as barring unemployment compensation. 12 ALR4th 611.

Employee’s act or threat of physical violence as bar to unemployment compensation. 20 ALR4th 637.

Termination of employment known to be for a specific, limited duration, upon expiration of period, as voluntary. 30 ALR4th 1201.

Conduct or activities of employees during off-duty hours as misconduct barring unemployment compensation benefits. 35 ALR4th 691.

Eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits of employee who attempts to withdraw resignation before leaving employment. 36 ALR4th 395.

Harassment or other mistreatment by co-worker as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment. 40 ALR4th 304.

Alcoholism or intoxication as ground for discharge justifying denial of unemployment compensation. 64 ALR4th 1151.

Voluntary separation, unemployment compensation: burden of proof as to voluntariness of separation. 73 ALR4th 1093.

Work-related inefficiency, incompetence, or negligence as “misconduct” barring unemployment compensation. 95 ALR5th 329.

Use of employer’s e-mail or internet system as misconduct precluding unemployment compensation. 106 ALR5th 297.

Unemployment compensation: Harassment or other mistreatment by coworker as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment. 121 ALR5th 467.

Sec. 23.20.380. Disqualification for benefits. [Repealed, § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980.]

Sec. 23.20.381. Other disqualifications.

  1. Benefits are not payable to any individual on the basis of any services, substantially all of which consist of participation in sports or athletic events or training or preparing to so participate, for any week which commences during the period between two successive seasons or similar periods of that sport or athletic event if that individual performed the services in the first of those seasons or similar periods and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform the same or similar services in the second of those seasons or similar periods.
  2. Benefits are not payable on the basis of services performed by an alien unless that alien is an individual who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise is permanently residing in the United States under color of law, including an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of the provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1153 or 1182 (§§ 203(a)(7) or 212(d)(5), Immigration and Nationality Act).
  3. Benefits may not be refused under (b) of this section unless any data or information required of an individual to determine whether benefits are not payable to the individual because of the individual’s alien status is uniformly required of all applicants for benefits and, in the case of an individual whose applications for benefits would otherwise be approved, determination that benefits to that individual are not payable because of the individual’s alien status are made only upon a preponderance of the evidence in the record.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of (b) or (c) of this section, any other conditions which may be required under any amendments to 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(14) for allowing or denying benefits to aliens as a condition of approval of the unemployment insurance laws of this state under 26 U.S.C. 3304 shall be applied in determining eligibility for benefits under this chapter, commencing on the date on which those conditions are required by federal law to be in effect.
  5. Benefits based on service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution may not be paid to an individual for a week of unemployment which begins during the period between two successive academic years, or during a similar period between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual’s contract, if the individual performs services in the first of those academic years or terms and if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in the same or similar capacity for an educational institution in the second of those academic years or terms.
  6. [Repealed, § 2 ch 145 SLA 1980.]
  7. An individual may not receive benefits under this chapter in two successive benefit years unless
    1. the individual has performed services, whether or not in “employment” as defined in AS 23.20.525 , after the beginning of the first benefit year; and
    2. the individual has earned wages for those services equal to at least eight times the individual’s weekly benefit amount, excluding an allowance for dependents.
  8. Benefits based on services for an educational institution in other than an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity may not be paid to an individual for a week of unemployment that begins during the period between two successive academic years or terms if the individual performed those services in the first of those academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform those services in the second of those academic years or terms.  If an individual is denied benefits for any week under this subsection and the individual is not later offered an opportunity to perform services for the educational institution in the second academic year or term, the individual is entitled to a retroactive payment of benefits for each week for which the individual filed a timely claim for benefits and for which benefits were denied solely under this subsection.
  9. Benefits based on services described in (e) and (h) of this section may not be paid to an individual for a week that begins during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if the individual performs those services in the period immediately before the vacation period recess and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform those services in the period immediately following the vacation period or holiday recess.
  10. Benefits based on services described in (e) and (h) of this section shall be denied under (e), (h), and (i) of this section to an individual who performed those services in an educational institution while in the employ of an educational service agency. In this subsection, “educational service agency” means a governmental agency, governmental entity, or federally recognized tribe that is established and operated exclusively for the purpose of providing services to one or more educational institutions.

History. (§ 7 ch 122 SLA 1977; am § 60 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 2 ch 145 SLA 1980; am § 13 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 11 ch 106 SLA 1984; am § 12 ch 27 SLA 2009)

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent in connection with the 2009 amendment of (j) of this section, see § 1, ch. 27, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective May 26, 2009, added “, or federally recognized tribe” in the second sentence; made related stylistic changes.

Notes to Decisions

Subsection (e) of this section is almost identical to 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A). Allen v. State, Dep't of Labor, 658 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1983).

“Reasonable assurance” under subsection (e) of this section does not require express notification concerning future job status. Allen v. State, Dep't of Labor, 658 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1983).

A pattern of past employment with a school district and the absence of any indication that the teacher would not be rehired have been considered to be important factors in finding that a teacher has a “reasonable assurance” of reemployment. Allen v. State, Dep't of Labor, 658 P.2d 1342 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

Alien’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. 87 ALR3d 694.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act. 95 ALR3d 891.

Sec. 23.20.382. Benefits while attending approved vocational training course.

  1. Benefits or waiting-week credit for any week may not be denied an otherwise eligible individual because the individual is attending a vocational training or retraining course with the approval of the director of the employment security division or because, while attending the course, the individual is not available for work or refuses an offer of work.
  2. An otherwise eligible individual may not be denied benefits or waiting-week credit for any week because the individual is in training approved under 19 U.S.C. 2296(a)(1) (sec. 236(a)(1), Trade Act of 1974), if
    1. while attending the training, the individual is not available for work, fails to seek work, or refuses work; or
    2. the individual left work that was not suitable employment to enter training.
  3. In (b)(2) of this section, “suitable employment” means work that
    1. pays at least 80 percent of the individual’s average weekly wage, as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 1974; and
    2. is at least equal in skill level to the individual’s past adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act of 1974.
  4. An otherwise eligible individual may not be denied benefits or waiting-week credit for any week because the individual is in any training approved under P.L. 105-220 (Workforce Investment Act of 1998) and, while attending the training, is not available for work, fails to seek work, or refuses work.

History. (§ 741.5 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 1 ch 64 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 74 SLA 1976; am § 14 ch 115 SLA 1982; am §§ 22, 23 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 5 ch 51 SLA 2000; am E.O. No. 118, § 2 (2016))

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2016, ‘‘division responsible for employment and training services’’ was substituted for ‘‘employment security division’’ in (a) to implement E.O. No. 118, Sec. 2.

Cross references. —

For definition of “average weekly wage” in the Trade Act, see 19 U.S.C. § 2319(4); for definition of “adversely affected employment” in the Trade Act, see 19 U.S.C. § 2319(1).

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, by E.O. 118, in (a), substituted ‘‘division responsible for employment and training services’’ for ‘‘employment security division’’. E.O. No. 118, § 4, provides that the 2016 amendment to subsection (a) takes ‘‘effect July 1, 2016.’’ However, E.O. No. 118 was signed by the governor July 28, 2016.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Legislative history reports. —

For report on ch. 74, SLA 1976 (HB 874 am), see 1976 House Journal, p. 805.

Opinions of attorney general. —

If the entire monthly amount received under Public Law 89-358, §§ 1681, 1682 was expended for subsistence, there was no objection to excluding it for the purpose of computing a claimant’s unemployment insurance benefits. 1966 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

The distinctions drawn in the unemployment compensation law between vocational training and academic training are reasonable, not arbitrary, and are fairly and substantially related to their purposes. Thus, the distinctions do not violate the state’s equal protection or substantive due process guarantees. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

Quoted in

Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Twenty-Eight (28) Members of Oil Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Empl. Sec. Div., 659 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1983).

Sec. 23.20.382. Benefits while attending approved vocational training course.

  1. Benefits or waiting-week credit for any week may not be denied an otherwise eligible individual because the individual is attending a vocational training or retraining course with the approval of the director of the division responsible for employment and training services or because, while attending the course, the individual is not available for work or refuses an offer of work.
  2. An otherwise eligible individual may not be denied benefits or waiting-week credit for any week because the individual is in training approved under 19 U.S.C. 2296(a)(1) (sec. 236(a)(1), Trade Act of 1974), if
    1. while attending the training, the individual is not available for work, fails to seek work, or refuses work; or
    2. the individual left work that was not suitable employment to enter training.
  3. In (b)(2) of this section, “suitable employment” means work that
    1. pays at least 80 percent of the individual’s average weekly wage, as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 1974; and
    2. is at least equal in skill level to the individual’s past adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act of 1974.
  4. An otherwise eligible individual may not be denied benefits or waiting-week credit for any week because the individual is in any training approved under P.L. 105-220 (Workforce Investment Act of 1998) and, while attending the training, is not available for work, fails to seek work, or refuses work.

History. (§ 741.5 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 1 ch 64 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 74 SLA 1976; am § 14 ch 115 SLA 1982; am §§ 22, 23 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 5 ch 51 SLA 2000; am E.O. No. 118, § 2 (2016))

Sec. 23.20.383. Labor dispute disqualification.

  1. An insured worker is disqualified for waiting-week credit or benefits for a week of the insured worker’s unemployment if, for that week, the department finds the insured worker’s unemployment is due to a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute at the immediate establishment or other premises at which the insured worker is or was last employed.  For the purposes of this section, each separate department of the same premises which is commonly conducted as a separate business in separate premises is considered a separate establishment or other premises.
  2. This section does not apply if the department finds that
    1. the insured worker was not participating in or directly interested in the labor dispute that caused the insured worker’s unemployment, and the insured worker did not belong to a grade or class of workers that, immediately before the commencement of the dispute, had members employed at the premises at which the labor dispute occurred who were participating in or directly interested in the labor dispute; or
    2. the labor dispute is caused by the failure or refusal of the employer to comply with an agreement or contract between the employer and the insured worker, or a state or federal law pertaining to hours, wages, or other conditions of work.

History. (§ 61 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 15 ch 115 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Many of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes.

“Labor dispute” is not defined in statute. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 (U.S. 1946).

But definition in federal statute may be accepted. —

Until a better definition of “labor dispute” is found, or there is some substantial reason for a finding that the legislature had in mind a different meaning to be attached thereto, there would seem to be no impropriety in accepting existing definitions [in Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts] in the determination of what was then meant. Aragon v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 10 Alaska 236 (D. Alaska 1942), rev'd, 149 F.2d 447, 10 Alaska 524 (9th Cir. Alaska 1945).

And is persuasive of what should be definition of such dispute. —

The courts of Alaska are not bound by the definition of a labor dispute contained in the federal statutes, but these definitions are at least persuasive of what should be the definition of such a dispute and are not out of line with the general and common acceptation of the meaning of the term. Aragon v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 10 Alaska 236 (D. Alaska 1942), rev'd, 149 F.2d 447, 10 Alaska 524 (9th Cir. Alaska 1945).

Construction of labor dispute disqualification in light of AS 23.20.010 . —

See Twenty-Eight (28) Members of Oil Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Empl. Sec. Div., 659 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1983).

Stoppage of work. —

The phrase “stoppage of work” refers to substantial curtailment of employer operations, not to cessation of work by individual employee. Twenty-Eight (28) Members of Oil Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Empl. Sec. Div., 659 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1983).

Evidence of increased costs or changes in production methodology is not conclusive evidence of substantial work stoppage and is relevant to issue of “substantiality” only for purpose of establishing curtailment of employer’s main business purpose. Twenty-Eight (28) Members of Oil Workers Union, Local 1-1978 v. Empl. Sec. Div., 659 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1983).

Proper construction of “last employed”. —

Where the act itself does not define the meaning of the term “last employed”, it would seem that the commission could properly construe it to mean in effect “last regularly employed.” To do otherwise would open the door to unlimited abuse. It would permit a striker to obtain any sort of temporary work and when it was terminated to apply for benefits for the loss of the temporary job even though the work stoppage still continued. Alin v. Alaska Employment Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1958).

Where claimant was unemployed because of a labor dispute and accepted casual temporary stop-gap employment, such temporary employment did not make new employer the place where “last employed.” Alin v. Alaska Employment Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1958).

Burden of proof. —

The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish that he is eligible for benefits and that a labor dispute was not the cause of his continued unemployment. Alin v. Alaska Employment Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1958).

Collateral references. —

Construction and application of provisions of unemployment compensation or social security acts regarding disqualification for benefits because of labor disputes or strikes. 28 ALR2d 287, 60 ALR3d 11, 61 ALR3d 693, 61 ALR3d 746, 62 ALR3d 314, 62 ALR3d 380, 62 ALR3d 437, 63 ALR3d 88.

Termination of employment as a result of union action or pursuant to union contract as “voluntary.” 90 ALR2d 835.

Construction of phrase “establishment” or “factory, establishment or other premises” within unemployment compensation statute rendering employee ineligible during labor dispute or strike at such location. 60 ALR3d 11.

Construction of phrase “stoppage of work” in statutory provision denying unemployment compensation benefits during stoppage resulting from labor dispute. 61 ALR3d 693.

Eligibility of participants in sympathy strike or slow down. 61 ALR3d 746.

Labor dispute disqualification as applicable to striking employee who is laid off subsequent employment during strike period. 61 ALR3d 766.

What constitutes participation or direct interest in, or financing of, labor dispute or strike within disqualification provisions of unemployment compensation acts. 62 ALR3d 314.

Refusal of nonstriking employee to cross picket line as justifying denial of unemployment compensation benefits. 62 ALR3d 380.

Application of labor dispute disqualification for benefits to locked out employee. 62 ALR3d 437.

General principles pertaining to statutory disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits because of strike or labor dispute. 63 ALR3d 88.

Sec. 23.20.385. Suitable work.

  1. Work may not be considered suitable and benefits may not be denied under a provision of this chapter to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:
    1. if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;
    2. if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
    3. if, as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining a bona fide labor organization.
  2. In determining whether work is suitable for a claimant and in determining the existence of good cause for leaving or refusing work, the department shall, in addition to determining the existence of any of the conditions specified in (a) of this section, consider the degree of risk to the claimant’s health, safety, and morals, the claimant’s physical fitness for the work, the claimant’s prior training, experience, and earnings, the length of the claimant’s unemployment, the prospects for obtaining work at the claimant’s highest skill, the distance of the available work from the claimant’s residence, the prospects for obtaining local work, and other factors that influence a reasonably prudent person in the claimant’s circumstances.
  3. This section shall be given the same meaning as the Secretary of Labor gives to 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(5) (Internal Revenue Code of 1954).

History. (§ 742 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Two-fold test for determining availability for work requires (1) that an individual claimant be willing to accept suitable work which he has no good cause for refusing, and (2) that the claimant thereby make himself available to a substantial field of employment. Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Objective test. —

The statutory scheme applies an objective standard to the determination of whether a worker left “suitable work” for “good cause,” encompassing any factor that would influence a “reasonably prudent person” in the particular circumstances at issue. Wescott v. DOL, 996 P.2d 723 (Alaska 2000).

Health and safety risks. —

Good cause for quitting was not shown, AS 23.20.379(a) , because the claimant did not establish that the work was unsuitable by reason of workplace hostility and safety concerns, which did not constitute significant health and safety risks. Moreover, she did not exhaust all reasonable alternatives with regard to her transportation problems and the workplace hostility because she did not raise the issues with management. Calvert v. DOL & Workforce Dev., Emples. Sec. Div., 251 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2011).

Allowable restrictions. —

It is proper to consider parental duties as an allowable restriction on availability for suitable work. Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Assessment of suitability for work. —

The hearing officer erred in affirming the denial of work-week benefits where he focused on the claimant’s physical fitness for a job, but failed to consider any detriment that the work might cause to the claimant’s undisputed physical impairment of club feet. Wescott v. DOL, 996 P.2d 723 (Alaska 2000).

Burden of proving extent of availability. —

Where a claimant has shown she is available for suitable work which she has no good cause for refusing, the department shall have the burden of proving, if it so believes, that this availability does not extend to a sufficiently “substantial field of employment.” Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

“Reasonable basis” standard of review of department’s decisions. —

See Arndt v. State, Dep't of Labor, 583 P.2d 799 (Alaska 1978).

Collateral references. —

Unemployment compensation: Eligibility as affected by claimant’s refusal to work at particular times or on particular shifts for domestic or family reasons. 2 ALR5th 475.

Sec. 23.20.387. Disqualification for misrepresentation.

  1. An insured worker is disqualified for benefits for the week with respect to which the false statement or misrepresentation was made and for an additional period of not less than six weeks or more than 52 weeks if the department determines that the insured worker has knowingly made a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact or knowingly failed to report a material fact with intent to obtain or increase benefits under this chapter. The length of the additional disqualification and the beginning date of that disqualification shall be determined by the department according to the circumstances in each case.
  2. A person may not be disqualified from receiving benefits under this section unless there is documented evidence that the person has made a false statement or a misrepresentation as to a material fact or has failed to disclose a material fact. Before a determination of fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure may be made, there must be a preponderance of evidence of an intention to defraud, and the false statement or misrepresentation must be shown to be knowing and to involve a material fact.
  3. The insured worker shall be notified of the department’s determination under this section as provided in AS 23.20.340(f) and may appeal the determination as provided in AS 23.20.415 .

History. (§ 61 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 24 ch 100 SLA 1989)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Circumstantial evidence. —

Circumstantial evidence proved that the claimant had an intent to defraud the Division of Employment Security, as the claimant received the information handbook, the questions about whether he traveled were unambiguous, and the claimant participated in a prior appeal at which his obligation to accurately report was explained. Blas v. State, 331 P.3d 363 (Alaska 2014).

Fraudulent intent. —

Division of Employment Security had to prove that the claimant had a subjective intent to defraud before it could disqualify him from receiving benefits for up to a year. Blas v. State, 331 P.3d 363 (Alaska 2014).

Stated in

Shehata v. Salvation Army, 225 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2010).

Collateral references. —

Right to unemployment compensation as affected by misrepresentation in original employment application. 23 ALR4th 1272.

Sec. 23.20.390. Recovery of improper payments; penalty.

  1. An individual who receives a sum as benefits from the unemployment compensation fund when not entitled to it under this chapter is liable to the fund for the sum improperly paid to the individual.
  2. The department shall promptly prepare and deliver or mail to the individual at the individual’s last address of record a notice of determination of liability declaring that the individual has been determined liable to refund the amount of benefits to which the individual is not entitled. The amount, if not previously collected, shall be deducted from future benefits payable to the individual. However, the department may absolve liability to the fund for repayment of all or a portion of those benefits if the department determines that an individual has died or has acted in good faith in claiming and receiving benefits to which the individual was not entitled and recovery of those benefits would be against equity and good conscience.
  3. For similar cause and in the same manner, a claim by another state for the recovery of sums paid as benefits under an employment security law of the other state is recoverable under this chapter if the sums were obtained by an individual who is not entitled and the other state has a comparable provision in its employment security law for recovery of the sums on behalf of this state.
  4. If paid-out benefit sums have neither been repaid by the recipient nor deducted from benefits payable to the recipient within two years following the last day of the year in which payment was made, the commissioner may declare the sums uncollectible and cancel both the resulting shortage and related records.
  5. An appeal from the determination of liability under this section may be made in the same manner and to the same extent as provided by AS 23.20.340 and 23.20.410 23.20.470 for an appeal relating to a determination in respect to a claim for benefits. If no appeal is taken to the appeal tribunal by the individual within 30 days of the delivery of the notice of determination of liability, or within 30 days of the mailing of the notice of determination, whichever is earlier, the determination of liability is final and the court shall, upon application of the department, enter a judgment in the amount provided by the notice of determination. The judgment has the same effect as a judgment entered in a civil action.
  6. In addition to the liability under (a) of this section for the amount of benefits improperly paid, an individual who is disqualified from receipt of benefits under AS 23.20.387 is liable to the department for a penalty in an amount equal to 50 percent of the benefits that were obtained by knowingly making a false statement or misrepresenting a material fact, or knowingly failing to report a material fact, with the intent to obtain or increase benefits under this chapter. The department shall deposit into the unemployment trust fund account (AS 23.20.135(a) ) a minimum of 30 percent of the penalties collected because of benefits that were obtained by knowingly making a false statement or misrepresenting a material fact, or knowingly failing to report a material fact, with the intent to obtain or increase benefits under this chapter.

History. (§ 751 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 43 SLA 1965; am § 62 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 4 ch 114 SLA 1981; am § 16 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 25 ch 100 SLA 1989; am §§ 13 — 15 ch 43 SLA 1996; am § 7 ch 130 SLA 2004; am § 7 ch 50 SLA 2013)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (d) was enacted as (e) and relettered in 1965, at which time former subsection (d) was relettered as (e).

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2004 amendment, effective June 30, 2004, substituted “obtained by an individual who is not entitled” for “fraudulently obtained” in subsection (c).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, deleted the second sentence, which read “The department may, under regulations adopted under this chapter, waive the collection of a penalty under this section.”; at the end of the present second sentence substituted “the unemployment trust fund account” to the end for “the general fund the penalty that it collects”.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 130, SLA 2004 (HB 490), which recommends changes to ensure that this chapter complies with federal law requirements and amends (c) of this section, see 2004 House Journal 2613 — 2614.

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 50, SLA 2013 (HB 76), see 2013 House Journal 70 — 71.

Notes to Decisions

Construction.

AS 23.20.390(b) does not apply to the investigatory stage of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development's overpayment determination process, but rather to the notification stage; the provision does not limit the length of a Department investigation into whether a claimant has been overpaid, and rather, it requires that once a determination of overpayment has been made, the Department must promptly notify the claimant of the determination. Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Prompt notification requirement.

Department investigator began reviewing the case no earlier than November 2016, first notified the citizen of the possibility of overpayment on December 6, and mailed the notice of determination on December 21; this satisfied the prompt notification requirement. Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Criminal prosecution for unsworn falsification was not barred in the case of a person who had lied in her benefits application and subsequently agreed to repay the unlawfully obtained benefits plus the fifty-percent penalty specified in subsection (f). Mitchell v. State, 818 P.2d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Quoted in

Blas v. State, 331 P.3d 363 (Alaska 2014).

Collateral references. —

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 ALR3d 1280.

Repayment of unemployment benefits erroneously paid. 90 ALR3d 987.

Sec. 23.20.392. Deductions from back pay awards.

An employer who makes a deduction from a back pay award to an insured worker because of the insured worker’s receipt of benefits under this chapter for which the insured worker is ineligible by reason of the back pay award, shall pay into the unemployment trust fund an amount equal to the amount of the deduction. If an employer making a payment under this section has already reimbursed the department for the benefits under AS 23.20.276 and 23.20.277 , the account of the employer shall be properly credited. The insured worker’s liability under AS 23.20.390 shall be reduced by the amount paid by the employer under this section.

History. (§ 17 ch 115 SLA 1982)

Sec. 23.20.395. Waiver of rights void.

  1. An agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute the individual’s right to benefits or any other rights under this chapter is void.
  2. An agreement by an individual in the employ of a person or concern to pay all or a portion of an employer’s contributions required under this chapter from the employer is void.
  3. An employer may not make or require or accept a deduction from wages to finance the employer’s contributions required from the employer, or require or accept a waiver of any right under this chapter by an employee.  An employer or officer or agent of an employer who violates a provision of this section upon conviction is punishable, for each offense, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.

History. (§ 761 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.400. Limitation of fees.

  1. An individual claiming benefits may not be charged a fee of any kind in a proceeding under this chapter by the department or its representatives, or by a court or an officer of a court.  An individual claiming benefits in a proceeding before the department or its representatives or a court may be represented by counsel or other authorized agent; but the counsel or agent may not charge or receive for services more than an amount approved by the department or the court.
  2. A person who violates a provision of this section upon conviction is punishable, for each offense, by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.

History. (§ 762 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney fees. —

The provisions of this section are applicable on the question of attorney fees, notwithstanding the fact that the substantive rights of the parties were governed by the law as it existed when the controversy arose. Fidalgo Island Packing Co. v. Phillips, 149 F. Supp. 260, 16 Alaska 689 (D. Alaska), dismissed, 253 F.2d 621, 17 Alaska 377 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).

Sec. 23.20.401. Child support interception.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, an individual filing a new claim for unemployment compensation must disclose whether child support obligations as defined in (h) of this section are owed by that individual.  If the individual discloses that child support obligations are owed and the individual is determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation, the department shall notify the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue that the individual has been determined to be eligible for unemployment compensation.
  2. The department shall, unless the obligor and obligee agree otherwise, deduct and withhold from unemployment compensation payable to an individual who owes child support obligations as defined in (h) of this section
    1. the amount specified by the individual to the department to be deducted and withheld under this subsection, if neither (2) nor (3) of this subsection is applicable;
    2. the amount specified in an agreement submitted to the department under 42 U.S.C. 654(19)(B)(i) (sec. 454(19)(B)(i), Social Security Act), by the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue, unless (3) of this subsection is applicable; or
    3. any amount required to be deducted and withheld through legal process, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 662(e) (Sec. 462(e), Social Security Act), properly served upon the department.
  3. The child support services agency may order the department to deduct and withhold the allowance paid for a dependent minor child under AS 23.20.350(f) , if the child support services agency finds that the individual claiming the allowance has a support obligation to the child and the child is not in the physical custody of the individual and is dependent on the individual for more than 50 percent of support.
  4. The department shall pay an amount deducted and withheld under (b) and (c) of this section to the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue.
  5. An amount deducted and withheld under (b) and (c) of this section shall for all purposes be treated as if it were paid to the individual as unemployment compensation and paid by that individual to the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue in satisfaction of the individual’s child support obligations.
  6. In (a) — (e) of this section, “unemployment compensation” means compensation payable under this chapter, including amounts payable under an agreement under a federal law providing for compensation, assistance, or allowances with respect to unemployment.
  7. This section applies only if appropriate arrangements have been made for reimbursement by the child support services agency of the Department of Revenue for the administrative costs incurred by the department under this section.
  8. In this section, “child support obligations” includes only obligations that are being enforced under a plan described in 42 U.S.C. 654 (§ 454, Social Security Act), which has been approved by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services under 42 U.S.C. 651-665 (Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act).

History. (§ 18 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 68 SLA 1988; am § 36 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency” was changed to “child support services agency” in this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (b)(2), substituted “42 U.S.C. 654(19)(B)(i) (sec. 454(19)(B)(i), Social Security Act)” for “section 42 U.S.C. 654(20)(B)(i) (sec. 454 (20)(B)(i), Social Security Act)”.

Sec. 23.20.403. Voluntary income tax withholding.

  1. When an individual files a new claim for unemployment compensation, the department shall advise the individual that
    1. unemployment compensation benefits are subject to federal income tax;
    2. federal requirements exist pertaining to estimated federal tax payments;
    3. the individual may elect to have federal income tax deducted and withheld from the individual’s payment of unemployment compensation benefits at the amount specified in 26 U.S.C. (Internal Revenue Code); and
    4. the individual is permitted to change a previously elected status for the withholding of federal income tax.
  2. Amounts deducted for federal income taxes and withheld from unemployment compensation benefits shall remain in the unemployment fund until transferred to the federal Internal Revenue Service as payment of federal income tax.
  3. The department shall comply with legal requirements of the federal Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service regarding the deduction and withholding of federal income tax.

History. (§ 16 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Sec. 23.20.405. Assignment void; exemption of benefits.

  1. An assignment, pledge, or encumbrance of a right to benefits which are or may become due or payable under this chapter is void.
  2. [Repealed, § 14 ch 62 SLA 1982.]
  3. [Repealed, § 14 ch 62 SLA 1982.]
  4. A waiver of an exemption provided in this section is void.
  5. Benefits paid or payable under this chapter are exempt from levy to enforce the collection of a debt as provided in AS 09.38 (exemptions).

History. (§ 763 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 4 ch 62 SLA 1982)

Notes to Decisions

Funds cannot be “mingled” until they have been actually paid over to each claimant. Fidalgo Island Packing Co. v. Phillips, 149 F. Supp. 260, 16 Alaska 689 (D. Alaska), dismissed, 253 F.2d 621, 17 Alaska 377 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957) (decided prior to 1982 amendments).

And until funds become “mingled,” exemptions listed in this section preclude impressing of benefits due claimants with any lien whatsoever. Fidalgo Island Packing Co. v. Phillips, 149 F. Supp. 260, 16 Alaska 689 (D. Alaska), dismissed, 253 F.2d 621, 17 Alaska 377 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957) (decided prior to 1982 amendments).

Attorney fee does not constitute lien on benefits. —

Although the court may decide what is a just attorney fee, the social purpose of the Employment Security Act would be impaired if the attorney fee were to constitute a lien upon the benefits. Fidalgo Island Packing Co. v. Phillips, 149 F. Supp. 260, 16 Alaska 689 (D. Alaska), dismissed, 253 F.2d 621, 17 Alaska 377 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957) (decided prior to 1982 amendments).

Application of “salvage” theory to unemployment compensation benefits. —

See Fidalgo Island Packing Co. v. Phillips, 149 F. Supp. 260, 16 Alaska 689 (D. Alaska), dismissed, 253 F.2d 621, 17 Alaska 377 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957) (decided prior to 1982 amendments).

Cited in

Gutterman v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1979).

Article 7. Extended Unemployment Compensation.

Sec. 23.20.406. Extended benefits.

  1. Except when the result would be inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter which apply to claims for or the payment of regular benefits apply to claims for and the payment of extended benefits.
  2. An individual is eligible to receive extended benefits with respect to any week of unemployment in the individual’s eligibility period if the department finds that with respect to that week the individual
    1. is an “exhaustee” as defined in AS 23.20.409 ; and
    2. has otherwise satisfied the requirements of this chapter for the receipt of regular benefits.
  3. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, an individual is ineligible for payment of extended benefits for any week of unemployment in the individual’s eligibility period if the department finds that during that period the individual failed to
    1. accept an offer of suitable work as defined under (k) of this section or failed to apply for suitable work to which the individual was referred by the department; or
    2. actively seek work as prescribed under (f) of this section, except that the eligibility of the individual will be determined under AS 23.20.378 without regard to the disqualification provisions otherwise applicable under (d) of this section if the individual is not actively engaged in seeking work because the individual is
      1. summoned for jury duty before a court of the United States or any state;
      2. hospitalized for treatment of an emergency or life-threatening condition; or
      3. attending an approved vocational training course under AS 23.20.382 .
  4. An individual who has been found ineligible for extended benefits under (c) of this section shall be denied benefits beginning with the first day of the week following the week in which the failure occurred and until the individual has been employed in each of four subsequent weeks and has earned remuneration equal to not less than four times the extended weekly benefit amount, excluding the allowance for dependents.
  5. An individual may not be denied extended benefits for failure to accept an offer of or referral to a job that is suitable work as defined in (l) of this section if
    1. the job was not offered to that individual in writing and was not listed with the employment service;
    2. the failure would not result in a denial of benefits under the definition of suitable work for regular benefit claimants in AS 23.20.385 to the extent that the criteria of suitability in that section are consistent with (l) of this section; or
    3. the individual furnishes satisfactory evidence to the department that the prospects for obtaining work in the customary occupation of the individual within a reasonably short period are good; if the evidence is satisfactory for this purpose, the department shall determine whether any work is suitable for that individual in accordance with the definition of suitable work in AS 23.20.385 .
  6. For the purposes of (c)(2) of this section, an individual is considered to be actively seeking work during a week if the individual furnishes evidence in writing to the department that the individual has engaged in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain work during that week.
  7. The employment service shall refer an individual who is entitled to extended benefits under this chapter to any suitable work that meets the criteria prescribed in (l) of this section.
  8. An individual is not eligible to receive extended benefits for any week of unemployment in the individual’s eligibility period if the individual has been disqualified for benefits because the individual voluntarily left work, was discharged for misconduct, or refused an offer of suitable work, unless the disqualification imposed for those reasons has been terminated in accordance with AS 23.20.379(d) .
  9. Except as provided in (j) of this section, an individual is not eligible for extended benefits for a week of unemployment if
    1. the individual files a claim for extended benefits which are payable under this chapter for that week;
    2. the claim is an interstate claim filed in any state in accordance with the interstate benefit payment arrangement under AS 23.20.085 ; and
    3. an extended benefit period is not in effect for the week in the state in which the interstate claim is filed.
  10. Subsection (i) of this section does not apply to the first two weeks for which extended benefits are payable to an individual, determined without regard to (i) of this section, under an interstate claim filed in accordance with AS 23.20.085 .
  11. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, an individual is not eligible for extended benefits unless, in the base period determined with respect to the individual’s applicable benefit year, the individual has been paid, for employment covered by this chapter, total wages that equal or exceed
    1. 40 times the weekly benefit amount, including any allowance for dependents, which is payable to the individual during the individual’s applicable benefit year; or
    2. 1.5 times the individual’s wages during the calendar quarter of the base period in which the individual’s wages were the highest.
  12. In this section, “suitable work” means any work that is within the individual’s capabilities, if
    1. the gross average weekly remuneration for the work
      1. exceeds the sum of
        1. the individual’s average weekly benefit amount as determined under AS 23.20.407 , plus
        2. the amount, if any, of supplemental unemployment benefits as defined in 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(17)(D) (Internal Revenue Code of 1954) that are payable to the individual for that week; and
      2. equals or exceeds the greater of
        1. the minimum wages provided by 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1) (§ 6(a)(1), Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938), without regard to any exemption; or
        2. the state minimum wage; and
    2. the work is in accordance with 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(5) (Internal Revenue Code of 1954), and AS 23.20.385(a) .

History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1971; am §§ 5, 6 ch 114 SLA 1981; am § 19 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 12 ch 106 SLA 1984; am § 3 ch 28 SLA 1993; am § 17 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsections (i) and (j) were enacted as AS 23.20.408(i) and (j) and renumbered in 1981. Subsection ( l ) was enacted as (i) and relettered as (k) in 1981 and relettered again as ( l ) in 1996. Subsection (k) was formerly ( l ); relettered in 1996.

Sec. 23.20.407. Weekly extended benefit amount; total payable.

  1. The weekly extended benefit amount payable to an individual for a week of total unemployment in the individual’s eligibility period is an amount equal to the weekly benefit amount, including the allowance for dependents, payable to the individual during the applicable benefit year.
  2. The total extended benefit amount payable to any eligible individual with respect to the individual’s applicable benefit year is the least of the following amounts:
    1. 50 percent of the total amount of regular benefits, including dependents’ allowances, which were payable to the individual under this chapter in the individual’s applicable benefit year;
    2. 13 times the weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, which was payable to the individual under this chapter for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year; or
    3. 39 times the weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, which was payable to the individual under this chapter for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year, reduced by the total amount of regular benefits which were paid or considered paid to the individual under this chapter with respect to the benefit year.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, if the benefit year of an individual ends within an extended benefit period, the remaining balance of extended benefits that the individual would, but for this section, be entitled to receive in the extended benefit period, with respect to weeks of unemployment beginning after the end of the benefit year, shall be reduced by the number of weeks for which the individual received an amount as a trade readjustment allowance within the benefit year multiplied by the individual’s weekly benefit amount for extended benefits. However, the extended benefits may not be reduced below zero.
  4. During a high unemployment period, as described in AS 23.20.408(i) , the total extended benefit amount payable to an eligible individual with respect to the individual’s applicable benefit year equals the lowest amount calculated under the following:
    1. 80 percent of the total amount of regular benefits, including dependents’ allowances, that were payable to the individual under this chapter in the individual’s applicable benefit year;
    2. 20 times the weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, that was payable to the individual under this chapter for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year; or
    3. 46 times the weekly benefit amount, including dependents’ allowances, that was payable to the individual under this chapter for a week of total unemployment in the applicable benefit year, reduced by the total amount of regular benefits that were paid or considered by the department to be paid to the individual under this chapter with respect to the benefit year.

History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1971; am § 63 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 20 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 4 ch 28 SLA 1993)

Sec. 23.20.408. Extended benefit periods.

  1. When an extended benefit period is to become effective in this state as a result of a state “on” indicator, or an extended benefit period is to be terminated in this state as a result of a state “off” indicator, the department shall make an appropriate public announcement.
  2. An extended benefit period may not begin by reason of a state “on” indicator before the 14th week following the end of a prior extended benefit period which was in effect with respect to this state.
  3. [Repealed, § 25 ch 122 SLA 1977.]
  4. [Repealed, § 33 ch 115 SLA 1982.]
  5. [Repealed, § 33 ch 115 SLA 1982.]
  6. Except as provided in (g)(2) of this section, there is a state “on” indicator for a week if the
    1. rate of insured unemployment under this chapter for the period consisting of that week and the immediately preceding 12 weeks either equaled or exceeded
      1. 120 percent of the average rate of insured unemployment for the corresponding 13-week period in each of the preceding two calendar years and equaled or exceeded five percent; or
      2. six percent, without regard to the rate of insured unemployment in the two previous years; or
    2. average rate of seasonally adjusted total unemployment, as determined by the United States Secretary of Labor, for the period consisting of the most recent three months for which data for all states are published before the end of that week equals or exceeds
      1. 6.5 percent; and
      2. 110 percent of that average for either or both of the corresponding three-month periods ending in the two preceding calendar years.
  7. There is a state “off” indicator for a week if,
    1. for the period consisting of that week and the immediately preceding 12 weeks, there was not an “on” indicator under (f) of this section; or
    2. notwithstanding (f) of this section, in that week the state is otherwise eligible to participate in the emergency unemployment compensation program in 26 U.S.C. 3304; however, the department must trigger “off” to enable the state to participate in that program.
  8. In (f) of this section, “rate of insured unemployment” means the percentage derived by dividing (1) the average weekly number of individuals filing claims for regular compensation in this state for weeks of unemployment with respect to the most recent 13 consecutive week period, as determined by the department on the basis of its reports to the United States Secretary of Labor, by (2) the average monthly employment covered under this chapter for the first four of the most recent six completed calendar quarters ending before the close of that 13-week period. Computations required by this subsection shall be made by the department in accordance with regulations prescribed by the United States Secretary of Labor.
  9. The state is in a high unemployment period if the circumstances set out in (f)(2) of this section are present, but the average rate of seasonally adjusted total unemployment equals or exceeds eight percent.

History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1971; am §§ 1, 2 ch 5 SLA 1975; am §§ 8 — 11, 25 ch 122 SLA 1977; am § 64 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 21 — 24, 33 ch 115 SLA 1982; am §§ 5 — 7 ch 28 SLA 1993; am § 37 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1993, “; however” was substituted for “, but” in (g)(2) of this section to conform to the style of the Alaska Statutes.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (h), substituted “In (f) of this section” for “In (f) and (g) of this section”.

Sec. 23.20.409. Definitions for AS 23.20.406 — 23.20.409.

In AS 23.20.406 23.20.409 ,

  1. “applicable benefit year” means, with respect to an individual, the current benefit year if, at the time an initial claim for extended benefits is filed, the individual has an unexpired benefit year only in the state against which the claim is filed, or, in any other case, the individual’s most recent benefit year; the most recent benefit year, for an individual who has unexpired benefit years in more than one state when the initial claim for extended benefits is filed, is the benefit year with the latest ending date or, if the benefit years have the same ending date, the benefit year in which the latest continued claim for regular compensation was filed; extended benefits are not payable under this section unless the “applicable benefit year” was a benefit year established under this chapter;
  2. “eligibility period” of an individual means the period consisting of the weeks in the individual’s benefit year which begin in an extended benefit period and, if the individual’s benefit year ends within the extended benefit period, any weeks thereafter which begin in that period;
  3. “exhaustee” means an individual who, with respect to any week of unemployment in the individual’s eligibility period, has no right to unemployment benefits or allowances, as the case may be, under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act or under other federal laws which are specified in regulations issued by the United States Secretary of Labor and has not received and is not seeking unemployment benefits under the unemployment compensation law of Canada, but if the individual is seeking these benefits and the appropriate agency finally determines that the individual is not entitled to benefits under that law the individual is considered an exhaustee; and either
    1. has received, before that week of unemployment, all of the regular benefits that were available to the individual under this chapter or any other law, including dependents’ allowances and benefits payable to federal civilian employees and ex-servicemen under 5 U.S.C. 8501-8525, in the individual’s current benefit year that includes that week; however, for the purposes of this paragraph, an individual is considered to have received all of the regular benefits that were available to the individual even though the individual may subsequently be determined to be entitled to added regular benefits as a result of a pending appeal with respect to wages in covered employment that were not considered in the original monetary determination to be in the individual’s benefit year; or
    2. the individual’s benefit year having expired before that week, has no or insufficient wages in covered employment on the basis of which the individual could establish a new benefit year that would include that week;
  4. “extended benefit period” means a period which
    1. begins with the third week after a week for which there is a state “on” indicator; and
    2. ends with either of the following weeks, whichever occurs later:
      1. the third week after the first week for which there is a state “off” indicator; or
      2. the 13th consecutive week of that period;
  5. “extended benefits” means benefits, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-servicemen under 5 U.S.C. 8501-8525, payable to an individual under the provisions of AS 23.20.406 23.20.409 for weeks of unemployment in the individual’s eligibility period;
  6. “regular benefits” means benefits payable to an individual under this chapter or under any other law, including benefits payable to federal civilian employees and to ex-servicemen under 5 U.S.C. 8501-8525, other than extended benefits.

History. (§ 1 ch 1 SLA 1971; am § 24 ch 71 SLA 1972; am § 12 ch 122 SLA 1977; am §§ 25, 26 ch 115 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

For effective date of 1977 amendments, see the Revisor’s notes at AS 23.20.085 . This section was reorganized in 1984 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order.

Article 8. Appeals.

Collateral references. —

76 Am. Jur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, §§ 202-222.

81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, §§ 271-290.

Declaratory relief. 14 ALR2d 826.

Sec. 23.20.410. Appeal tribunals.

The department shall appoint one or more referees, each of whom constitutes an appeal tribunal to hear and decide appeals from determinations and redeterminations.

History. (§ 801 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.415. Review by appeal tribunal.

  1. A party entitled to notice of determination provided in AS 23.20.340 may file an appeal from the determination to an appeal tribunal within the time specified in that section. However, an appeal from a determination which involves AS 23.20.383 shall be made to the department.  The parties to an appeal from a determination shall include all those entitled to notice of the determination and a properly designated representative of the department.
  2. If an appeal involves a question whether service constitutes employment, the tribunal shall give notice of the appeal and the issues involved to a properly designated representative of the department and to the employing unit for which the service was performed.  The employing unit, if not already a party, shall then become a party to the appeal.
  3. If an appeal from a determination is pending on the date a redetermination is issued, the appeal unless withdrawn shall be treated as an appeal from the redetermination.  Appeals may be withdrawn at the request of the appellant and with the permission of the appeal tribunal if the record preceding the appeal and the request for the withdrawal support the correctness of the determination, and indicate that no coercion or fraud is involved in the withdrawal.
  4. In addition to the issues raised by the determination which is appealed, the tribunal may hear and decide additional issues affecting the claimant’s rights to benefits if, by the date of hearing, the department has issued no final determination concerning the additional issues and the parties involved have been notified of the hearing and of the pendency of the additional issues.

History. (§ 802 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 65 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.420. Hearing procedure and record.

  1. Each party shall be promptly given a reasonable opportunity for fair hearing.  An appeal tribunal shall inquire into and develop all facts bearing on the issues and shall receive and consider evidence without regard to statutory and common law rules.  The appeal tribunal shall include in the record and consider as evidence all records of the department that are material to the issues.
  2. The department shall adopt regulations governing the manner of filing appeals and the conduct of hearings and appeals consistent with the provisions of this chapter.  A record shall be kept of all testimony and proceedings in an appeal, but testimony need not be transcribed unless further review is initiated.
  3. Witnesses subpoenaed shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the department.  The fees of witnesses subpoenaed on behalf of the department or a claimant are considered part of the expense of administering this chapter.
  4. A member of the department, or of an appeal tribunal, or a person acting on behalf of the department may not participate in an appeal in which the person has an interest.

History. (§ 803 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Hearsay evidence. —

In the absence of a hearsay objection, hearsay evidence is competent evidence which may be considered. Smith v. Sampson, 816 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1991).

Quoted in

Tachick Freight Lines v. State, Dep't of Labor, 773 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1989).

Sec. 23.20.425. Consolidated appeals.

  1. When the same or substantially similar evidence is material to the matter in issue with respect to more than one individual, as long as no party is prejudiced, (1) the same time and place for considering all cases may be fixed; (2) hearings on the cases may be jointly conducted; (3) a single record of the proceedings may be made; and (4) evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding may be considered as introduced in the others.
  2. However, a party who would be prejudiced by a proceeding under (a) of this section may have a separate hearing upon demand.

History. (§ 804 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.430. Notice of decision and time for appeal.

After a hearing an appeal tribunal shall promptly make findings and conclusions and on the basis of them shall affirm, modify, or reverse the determination. Each party shall be promptly given a copy of the decision, the supporting findings, and the conclusions. This decision is final unless further review is initiated under AS 23.20.435 within 30 days after the decision is mailed to each party at the party’s last address of record or delivered to the party. The period within which further review may be initiated may be extended for a reasonable period of time upon a showing that the application was delayed as a result of circumstances beyond the party’s control.

History. (§ 805 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 66 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 18 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.435. Review by department.

  1. An appeal to the department by a party is a matter of right if the decision of the appeal tribunal reverses or modifies the determination of the department, or if a question arising under AS 23.20.383 is presented.  In all other cases further appeal to the department is permitted only at the discretion of the department.
  2. The department on its own motion may initiate a review of a decision or determination of an appeal tribunal within 30 days after the date of the decision. The department may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings or conclusions of the appeal tribunal solely on the basis of evidence previously submitted, or upon the basis of additional evidence that it may take or direct to be taken.

History. (§ 806 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 67 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 19 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.20.440. Removal of appeal to department.

The department may remove to itself or transfer to another appeal tribunal an appeal pending before an appeal tribunal. In an appeal removed to the department, before a fair hearing has been completed, the parties shall be given a fair hearing by the department as required by AS 23.20.410 23.20.470 with respect to proceedings before an appeal tribunal.

History. (§ 808 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.445. Notice of decision of department and judicial review.

Each party, including the properly designated representative of the department, shall be promptly given a copy of the decision and the supporting findings and conclusions of the department. The decision is final unless a party initiates judicial review by filing an appeal in the superior court as provided in the Rules of Appellate Procedure of the State of Alaska. For the purpose of judicial review, an appeal tribunal’s decision from which an application for appeal has been denied by the department is considered the decision of the department, except that the time for initiating judicial review runs from the date of the mailing or delivery of the notice of the denial of the application for appeal by the department.

History. (§ 809(a) ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 68 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior law.

Reviewing court’s function is limited. —

All that is needed to support the commission’s interpretation is that it has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 (U.S. 1946).

Conclusiveness of findings. —

Where the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence it is conclusive and binding upon the court and should not be set aside. Alin v. Alaska Employment Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1958).

Review must be in light most favorable to administrative tribunal. —

Even where the facts are in dispute or where reasonable minds may differ as to the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, review must be made in the light most favorable to the administrative tribunal. Alin v. Alaska Employment Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alaska 607 (D. Alaska 1958).

Court must not usurp agency’s function. —

A reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the commission of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 (U.S. 1946).

To sustain commission’s application of statutory term, the court need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one or even that it is the result the court would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 (U.S. 1946).

No right to jury trial.

Appeal from the Department of Labor and Workforce Development's determination is authorized by AS 23.20.445 , which permits superior court review of the decision of the Department's appeal tribunal; there was no right to a jury trial in such an appeal because administrative appeals arose under statute, plus the legislature set forth procedures for such appeals in AS 22.10.020(d) , and they do not provide for a jury trial. Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 23.20.450. Conclusiveness of final determinations and decisions.

  1. Except to the extent there is a redetermination under AS 23.20.330 23.20.405 , all final determinations and decisions are conclusive upon employing units with notice, the department, and the claimant.  A final determination or decision as to benefit rights is not subject to collateral attack by an employing unit regardless of notice.
  2. The department, or appeal tribunal, shall reopen a determination or decision or revoke permission for withdrawal of an appeal if (1) it finds that a worker or employer has been defrauded or coerced in connection with the determination, decision, or withdrawal of the appeal, and (2) the defrauded or coerced person informs the appropriate officer or body of the fraud or coercion within 60 days after the person has become aware of the fraud or within 60 days after the coercion has been removed.

History. (§ 810 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.20.455. Rule of decision and certification to department.

  1. Final decisions of the department and the principles of law declared in their support are binding in all subsequent proceedings under this chapter involving similar questions unless expressly or impliedly overruled by a later decision of the department or of a court. Final decisions of appeal tribunals and the principles of law declared in their support are binding on the employees and representatives of the department and are persuasive authority in subsequent appeal tribunal proceedings.
  2. If in a subsequent proceeding the department or an appeal tribunal has serious doubt as to the correctness of a principle previously declared by an appeal tribunal or by the department, or if there is an apparent inconsistency or conflict in final decisions of comparable authority, then the findings of fact in the case may be certified, together with the question of law involved, to the department.  After giving notice and reasonable opportunity for hearing upon the law to all parties to the proceedings, the department shall certify to the appropriate employees or representatives of the department or appeal tribunal and the parties its answer to the question submitted; or the department in its discretion may remove to itself the entire proceeding as provided in AS 23.20.440 and give its decision upon the entire case.

History. (§ 811 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 20 ch 43 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.20.460. Limitation of fees.

A claimant may not be charged fees or costs of any kind by the department, its representative, an appeal tribunal, a court, or a court officer. However, a court may assess costs against the claimant if it determines that the proceedings for judicial review have been instituted without reasonable grounds.

History. (§ 812 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.465. Representation of claimant.

A claimant in a proceeding before the department or an appeal tribunal may be represented by counsel or other authorized agent. The counsel or agent may not charge or receive for services more than an amount approved by the department.

History. (§ 813 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Sec. 23.20.470. Attorney fees.

  1. An attorney at law representing a claimant on appeal to the courts is entitled to reasonable counsel fees as fixed by the court and necessary court costs and printing disbursements as fixed by the court.
  2. The department shall pay the counsel fees, costs, and disbursements out of employment security administration funds in a court appeal (1) from an administrative or judicial decision favorable in whole or in part to the claimant, (2) by a claimant from a department decision which reverses a tribunal decision in the claimant’s favor, (3) as a result of which the claimant is awarded benefits, or (4) by a claimant from a decision by a tribunal, the department, or court which was not unanimous.

History. (§ 814 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 69 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Collateral references. —

Workers’ compensation: availability, rate, or method of calculation of interest on attorney’s fees or penalties. 79 ALR5th 201.

Article 9. General Provisions.

Sec. 23.20.475. Amendment or repeal.

There may be no vested right of any kind against the state as the result of enactment, amendment, or repeal of this chapter.

History. (§ 1002 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.480. Termination.

  1. If the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is amended or repealed by Congress, or is held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, with the result that no portion of the contributions required under this chapter may be credited against the tax imposed by the federal Act, the Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall send immediate notice of the fact to the governor of the state.  Because of the danger to the welfare of the people of the state the governor may then call a special session of the legislature, if necessary, so that it may take measures to effectuate the purpose of this chapter or to end its operations.
  2. Pending the determination by the legislature, the department shall requisition from the unemployment trust fund all money in the fund to its credit.  This money, together with any other money in the unemployment fund, as long as the money is available, shall be used for the payment of benefits in accordance with this chapter.

History. (§ 1004 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (a) of this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.20.485. False statement to secure benefits.

A person who makes a false statement or misrepresentation knowing it is false or who knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, with intent to obtain or increase a benefit or other payment under this chapter or under an employment security law of another state, of the federal government, or of a foreign government, either for that person or another, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each false statement or misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact is a separate offense.

History. (§ 901 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 70 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Cross references. —

For fines and sentences for class B misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035 and 12.55.135 .

Notes to Decisions

Theft conviction upheld. —

Legislature did not intend for this section of the Alaska Employment Security Act to provide the sole remedies available to prosecute the unlawful obtaining of unemployment benefits; the legislature intended for the state to be able to prosecute the unlawful obtaining of unemployment benefits as theft. Ornelas v. State, 129 P.3d 934 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Erroneous suppression of incriminating statements. —

In defendant’s trial for theft of unemployment benefits, in violation of AS 11.46.130(a) and 11.46.180 , and making false statements to obtain unemployment benefits in violation of this section, a trial court erroneously suppressed incriminating statements defendant made to an Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor investigator regarding defendant’s unemployment benefits where defendant failed to assert his right against self-incrimination under AS 23.20.070 and defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes or coerced when he made the statements: Defendant had forfeited the privilege and was not entitled to suppression of his statements. State v. Rivers, 146 P.3d 999 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Collateral references. —

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 ALR3d 1280.

Sec. 23.20.486. Participation in the federal offset program.

In addition to any remedies authorized by this chapter, the department may offset any covered unemployment compensation debt against a claimant’s federal income tax refund in accordance with 26 U.S.C. 6402.

History. (§ 8 ch 50 SLA 2013)

Effective dates. —

Section 14, ch. 50, SLA 2013 makes this section effective July 1, 2013.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 50, SLA 2013 (HB 76), see 2013 House Journal 70 — 71.

Sec. 23.20.490. Acts of employer prohibited.

  1. An employing unit or an officer or agent of an employing unit may not
    1. make a false statement or representation knowing it is false;
    2. knowingly fail to disclose a material fact to prevent or reduce the payment of benefits to an individual entitled to them, or to avoid or reduce a contribution or other payment required from an employing unit under this chapter; or
    3. knowingly fail or refuse to make a contribution or other payment, or to furnish a report required by this chapter or by authority granted under this chapter, or to produce or permit the inspection or copying of records as required by this chapter.
  2. An employing unit or officer or agent of an employing unit who violates (a) of this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

History. (§ 902 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 71 ch 9 SLA 1980)

Cross references. —

For fines and sentences for class A misdemeanors, see AS 12.55.035 and 12.55.135 .

Sec. 23.20.495. Noncompliance with subpoena of agency.

A person who, without just cause, fails or refuses to attend and testify or to answer a lawful inquiry or to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records, if it is in the person’s power to do so, in obedience to a subpoena of the department, an appeal tribunal, or an authorized representative of any of them, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $200, or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or by both. Each day the failure or refusal continues is a separate offense.

History. (§ 903 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.497. Binding effect of department decisions.

  1. A finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made with respect to a claim for unemployment compensation under this chapter is not conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding in another forum concerning proceedings not under this chapter, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.
  2. In this section, “action” means a court or administrative proceeding not brought under this chapter or an arbitration proceeding.

History. (§ 21 ch 43 SLA 1996; am § 8 ch 130 SLA 2004)

Sec. 23.20.500. Violation of statute or regulations.

A person who wilfully violates a provision of this chapter or an order or regulation under it, the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under this chapter, and for which a penalty is not prescribed in this chapter or provided by another applicable statute, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $200, or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or by both.

History. (§ 904 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.505. Unemployed defined.

  1. An individual is considered “unemployed” in a week during which the individual performs no services and for which no wages are payable to the individual, or in a week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to the individual for the week are less than one and one-third times the individual’s weekly benefit amount, excluding the allowance for dependents, plus $50.
  2. [Repealed, § 33 ch 115 SLA 1982.]
  3. [Repealed, § 33 ch 115 SLA 1982.]
  4. An individual is not considered “unemployed” in a week if
    1. the individual is not performing services during that week because the individual is on leave from the regular employer of the individual for a period of four weeks or less; and
    2. the leave is part of a work schedule consisting of alternating periods of work and leave in which the hours of work for one complete period of work and leave average at least 40 hours per week.

History. (§ 254 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 5 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 72 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 27, 33 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 13 ch 106 SLA 1984)

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Department of Labor v. Boucher, 581 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1978); Levi v. State, 433 P.3d 1137 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 23.20.510. Pay period.

  1. If the service performed during one-half or more of a pay period by an individual for an employing unit constitutes employment, all the service of the individual for the period is considered employment.
  2. If the service performed during more than one-half of a pay period by an individual for an employing unit does not constitute employment, then none of the service of the individual for the period is considered employment.
  3. In this section, “pay period” means a period of not more than 31 consecutive days for which a payment for service is ordinarily made to the individual by the employing unit.  This section does not apply to service performed in a pay period by an individual for an employing unit when any of the service is excluded because it is subject to an unemployment insurance program established by an Act of Congress.

History. (§ 235 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Sec. 23.20.515. Earnings of fishermen not subject to contributions. [Repealed, § 26 ch 122 SLA 1977.]

Sec. 23.20.520. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “American vessel” means a vessel documented or numbered under the laws of the United States, or a vessel not documented or numbered under the laws of the United States nor documented under the laws of a foreign country, if its crew performs service solely for one or more citizens or residents of the United States or corporations organized under the laws of the United States or of a state;
  2. “average annual wage” means the amount determined by dividing the total wages paid by covered employers during a 12-month period by the average monthly employment reported by covered employers for the same period;
  3. “base period” means the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual’s benefit year, except that, if an individual would not otherwise be eligible for unemployment compensation because of the use of a base period that does not include the most recently completed calendar quarter immediately preceding the first day of an individual’s benefit year, “base period” means, and eligibility shall be determined using, the four most recently completed calendar quarters before the start of the benefit year;
  4. “benefit year” means a period of 52 consecutive weeks beginning at 12:00 a.m. of the Sunday preceding the day that an insured worker first files a request for determination of the worker’s insured status, and, thereafter, the period of 52 consecutive weeks beginning at 12:00 a.m. of the Sunday preceding the day that the insured worker next files the request after the end of the worker’s last preceding benefit year; however, for a worker covered by this paragraph, “benefit year” also means a period of 53 weeks if the filing of a request for determination would result in overlapping any quarter of the base year of a previously filed request for determination; the filing of a notice of unemployment is considered a request for determination of insured status if a current benefit year has not previously been established;
  5. “benefits” means the money payments payable to an individual, as provided in this chapter with respect to the individual’s unemployment;
  6. “calendar quarter” means the period of three consecutive calendar months ending March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31;
  7. “claimant” means an individual who has filed a request for a determination of insured status, a notice of unemployment, a certification for waiting-week credit, or a claim for benefits;
  8. “contribution” and “payment in place of contribution” mean the money payment to be made to the fund, which payments are taxes due to the state;
  9. “covered unemployment compensation debt” means
    1. a past due debt for erroneous payment of unemployment compensation under this chapter because of fraud or the person’s failure to report earnings that has become final under this chapter and that remains uncollected;
    2. contributions due to the unemployment trust fund account (AS 23.20.135(a) ) for which a person is liable and that remain uncollected; and
    3. any penalties and interest assessed on the debt;
  10. “employer” means (A) an employing unit which for some portion of a day within the calendar year has or had in employment one or more individuals; and (B) for the effective period of its election under AS 23.20.325 , an employing unit which has elected to become subject to this chapter;
  11. “employing unit” means one or more departments or other agencies of the state, a political subdivision of the state, a federally recognized tribe, an individual, or a type of organization, partnership, association, trust, estate, joint trust company, insurance company, or domestic or foreign corporation, or the receiver, referee in bankruptcy, trustee, or successor of one of these, or the legal representative of a deceased person, that has or had one or more individuals performing service for it in the state; an individual performing services in the state for an employing unit that maintains two or more separate establishments in the state is considered as employed by a single employing unit for the purposes of this chapter; notwithstanding any provision in this chapter, any employing unit that employs individuals whose services must be covered by the unemployment insurance laws of this state as a condition of approval of the unemployment insurance laws of this state under 26 U.S.C. 3304(a) (Internal Revenue Code of 1954), as amended, will be considered an employer as to those individuals and is subject to contributions on all wages paid or reimbursement payments to cover benefits paid based on services performed, depending on the applicable law;
  12. “employment office” means a free public employment office or branch of one operated by this state or another state or territory as a part of a state-controlled system of public employment offices or by a federal agency or an agency of a foreign government charged with the administration of an unemployment insurance program or of free public employment offices;
  13. “federally recognized tribe”
    1. means a tribe that is recognized by the United States Secretary of the Interior to exist as an Indian tribe under 25 U.S.C. 479a (Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994);
    2. includes any subdivision, subsidiary, or business enterprise wholly owned by a federally recognized tribe;
  14. “fund” means the unemployment compensation fund established by this chapter;
  15. “hospital” means any institution primarily engaged in the treatment of emotional or physical disability which provides, on a regular basis, 24-hour-a-day bed care under the supervision of licensed medical personnel and those components, of other institutions, which are primarily engaged in the treatment of emotional or physical disability and which provide, on a regular basis, 24-hour-a-day bed care under the supervision of licensed medical personnel;
  16. “institution of higher education” means an educational institution that
    1. admits as regular students only individuals having a certificate of graduation from a high school, or the recognized equivalent of a high school graduation certificate;
    2. is legally authorized in the state in which it is located to provide a program of education beyond high school;
    3. provides an educational program for which it awards a bachelor’s or higher degree, or provides a program that is acceptable for full credit toward either degree, a program of postgraduate or postdoctoral studies, or a program of training to prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation; and
    4. is operated by a federally recognized tribe or is a public or other nonprofit institution;
  17. “insured work” means employment for employers;
  18. “insured worker” means an individual who, with respect to a base period, meets the wage and employment requirements of AS 23.20.350 ;
  19. “municipal agency” means an agency of a municipality of the state; in this paragraph, “municipality” has the meaning given in AS 29.71.800 ;
  20. “state” includes the states of the United States of America, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands;
  21. “vocational training or retraining course” means a course of vocational or technical training or retraining in schools or classes, including field or laboratory work and related remedial or academic instruction, which is conducted as a program designed to prepare individuals for employment in trades, skills, or crafts; the term “vocational training or retraining course” does not include a program of instruction for an individual, including a transfer credit program of instruction given at a community college, which is intended as credit for a degree from an institution of higher education;
  22. “waiting week” means the first week of unemployment for which an individual files a claim during the individual’s benefit year and for which no disqualification is imposed under AS 23.20.360 , 23.20.362 , 23.20.375 , and 23.20.378 23.20.387 ;
  23. “week” means the period of seven consecutive days which the department may by regulations prescribe.

History. (§§ 202 — 204 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 205 ch 5 ESLA 1955; §§ 206, 208, 210, 212, 213, 236 — 238, 240, 241, 252, 253 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 169 SLA 1957; § 13 ch 64 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 1960; am §§ 10 — 13 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 24 ch 208 SLA 1975; am § 2 ch 74 SLA 1976; am §§ 13, 14 ch 122 SLA 1977; am §§ 73, 74, 77, 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 28, 29 ch 115 SLA 1982; am §§ 29 — 31 ch 21 SLA 1985; am § 16 ch 61 SLA 1995; am § 22 ch 43 SLA 1996; am § 6 ch 51 SLA 2000; am § 9 ch 130 SLA 2004; am §§ 13 — 16 ch 27 SLA 2009; am § 9 ch 50 SLA 2013; am § 19 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

The contingent amendment to this section made under sec. 33, ch. 122, SLA 1977 never took effect and was repealed by sec. 82, ch. 41, SLA 2009.

This section was reorganized in 1984 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order, in 1990 and 1996 to reflect the deletion of repealed paragraphs, and in 2004, 2009, and 2013 to retain the defined terms in alphabetical order.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent in connection with the 2009 amendments of this section, see § 1, ch. 27, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, effective May 26, 2009, in paragraph (10), added “a federally recognized tribe” following “a political subdivision of the state,”; deleted “after January 1, 1937,” preceding “had one or more individuals”; deleted “after December 31, 1971” in three places; in paragraph (14)(D) [now (15)(D)] added “is operated by a federally recognized tribe or”; added paragraph (22) [now (12)]; renumbered former paragraphs (12) through (21) as (13) through (22) respectively; made stylistic changes.

The second 2009 amendment, effective January 1, 2010, in paragraph (3), added the language beginning “except that, if an individual would not otherwise be eligible...”

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, added (23) (now (9)).

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (21), in the first sentence, deleted “, but not limited to,” following “retraining in schools or classes, including”.

Editor’s notes. —

Concerning the amendment to paragraph (5) made by sec. 6, ch. 51, SLA 2000, sec. 7, ch. 51, SLA 2000 provides as follows: “TRANSITION PROVISION. Notwithstanding the change to the definition of ‘benefit year’ enacted by sec. 6 of this Act, for an insured worker who, on October 6, 2001, has an established current benefit year, the definition of ‘benefit year’ as it existed in AS 23.20.520 (5) on October 6, 2001, applies to that worker’s claim under AS 23.20 until that worker’s current benefit year is completed. If an insured worker’s current benefit year under this section ends on a day other than Sunday, the current benefit year is extended until 11:59 p.m. of the Saturday following that ending week.”

Notes to Decisions

Intent of paragraph (20). —

The history underlying paragraph (20) shows an intent to limit compensation to the involuntarily unemployed. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

Law schools are not vocational training schools within the meaning of paragraph (20). Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).

Stated in

Hartung v. DOL, 22 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).

Collateral references. —

Liability of political party or its subdivision for contributions under unemployment compensation acts. 43 ALR3d 1351.

Sec. 23.20.525. “Employment” defined.

  1. In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “employment” means
    1. service performed by an individual for wages or by an officer of a corporation, including service in interstate commerce;
    2. service performed by an individual who, under (8) of this subsection, has the status of an employee;
    3. service performed by an individual other than an individual who is an employee under (1) or (2) of this subsection who performs services for remuneration for any person
      1. as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages, or laundry or dry-cleaning services, for the individual’s principal; or
      2. as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver, engaged upon a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission to, the individual’s principal of orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations; however, for all purposes of this paragraph, the term “employment” includes services described in this subparagraph and (A) of this paragraph only if
        1. the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of the services are to be performed personally by the individual;
        2. the individual does not have a substantial investment in facilities used in connection with the performance of the services, other than in facilities for transportation; and
        3. the services are not in the nature of a single transaction that is not part of a continuing relationship with the person for whom the services are performed;
    4. service performed by an individual in a calendar quarter in the employ of an organization exempt from income tax under 26 U.S.C. 501(a) (Internal Revenue Code), other than an organization described in 26 U.S.C. 401(a), or under 26 U.S.C. 521, if the remuneration for the service is $250 or more; notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, services performed by an individual in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other organization described in 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (Internal Revenue Code) that is exempt from income tax under 26 U.S.C. 501(a), constitutes employment for the purposes of this chapter even though remuneration for the services is less than $250 in a calendar quarter, but only if the organization had four or more individuals in employment for some portion of a day in each of 20 different weeks, whether or not the weeks were consecutive, within either the current or preceding calendar year, regardless of whether the individuals were employed at the same moment of time;
    5. service of an individual who is a citizen of the United States, performed outside the United States, except in Canada, in the employ of an American employer, or of this state or of any of its instrumentalities or any of its political subdivisions, other than service that is considered “employment” under the provisions of (9) or (10) of this subsection or the parallel provisions of the law of another state, if
      1. the employer’s principal place of business in the United States is located in this state; or
      2. the employer has no place of business in the United States, but
        1. the employer is an individual who is a resident of this state; or
        2. the employer is a corporation that is organized under the laws of this state; or
        3. the employer is a partnership or a trust and the number of the partners or trustees who are residents of this state is greater than the number who are residents of any one other state; or
      3. none of the criteria in (A) and (B) of this paragraph is met but the employer has elected coverage in this state or, the employer having failed to elect coverage in any state, the individual has filed a claim for benefits, based on service described in this paragraph, under the law of this state;
    6. notwithstanding the provisions of (9) of this subsection, all service performed by an officer or member of the crew of an American vessel or in connection with the vessel, if the operating office, from which the operations of vessels operating on navigable waters inside, or inside and outside the United States are ordinarily and regularly supervised, managed, directed, and controlled, is inside this state;
    7. notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, service with respect to which tax is required to be paid under any federal law imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be paid into a state unemployment fund or which as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is required to be covered under this chapter;
    8. service performed by an individual whether or not the common-law relationship of master and servant exists, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that
      1. the individual has been and will continue to be free from control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both under the individual’s contract for the performance of service and in fact;
      2. the service is performed either outside the usual course of the business for which the service is performed or is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed; and
      3. the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed;
    9. an individual’s entire service performed inside or both inside and outside this state if the service is localized in this state; service is considered to be localized inside a state or territory if
      1. the service is performed entirely inside the state or territory; or
      2. the service is performed both inside and outside the state or territory but the service performed outside the state or territory is incidental to the individual’s service inside the state or territory; for example, where it is temporary or transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions;
    10. an individual’s entire service performed inside or both inside and outside this state if the service is not localized in a state or territory but some of the service is performed in this state and
      1. the individual’s base of operations is in this state;
      2. if there is no base of operations, then the place from which the service is directed or controlled is in this state; or
      3. the individual’s base of operations or place from which the service is directed or controlled is not in a state or territory in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual’s residence is in this state;
    11. service covered by an election under AS 23.20.325 , and service covered by an election approved by the commissioner in accordance with an arrangement under AS 23.20.090(a) during the effective period of the election;
    12. service in the employ of this state or any of its instrumentalities or any political subdivision of this state or any of its instrumentalities or any instrumentality of any of the foregoing and one or more other states or political subdivisions, or in the employ of a federally recognized tribe, if that service is excluded from “employment” under 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(7) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Internal Revenue Code) and is not excluded from “employment” under AS 23.20.526(d) ;
    13. domestic services for an employer who paid wages of $1,000 or more in any calendar quarter in the current or preceding calendar year for those services;
    14. service by an individual in agricultural labor when that service is performed for a person who
      1. during any calendar quarter in either the current or the preceding year, paid remuneration in cash of $20,000 or more to individuals employed in agricultural labor; or
      2. employed in agricultural labor 10 or more individuals for some portion of the day in each of at least 20 different calendar weeks in either the current or the preceding calendar year, whether or not the weeks were consecutive, and regardless of whether the individuals were employed at the same moment of time;
      3. for the purposes of this paragraph, any individual who is a member of a crew furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person shall be treated as an employee of that crew leader
        1. if that crew leader holds a valid certificate of registration under the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, or substantially all the members of that crew operate or maintain tractors, mechanized harvesting or cropdusting equipment, or any other mechanized equipment, which is provided by that crew leader; and
        2. if that individual is not an employee of that other person within the meaning of (8) of this subsection;
      4. for the purposes of this paragraph, in the case of an individual who is furnished by a crew leader to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person and who is not treated as an employee of that crew leader under (C) of this paragraph,
        1. that other person and not the crew leader shall be treated as the employer of that individual; and
        2. that other person shall be treated as having paid cash remuneration to that individual in an amount equal to the amount of cash remuneration paid to that individual by the crew leader, either on behalf of the crew leader or on behalf of that other person, for the service in agricultural labor performed for that other person;
      5. for the purposes of this paragraph, the term “crew leader” means an individual who
        1. furnishes individuals to perform service in agricultural labor for any other person;
        2. pays, either on behalf of the crew leader or on behalf of that other person, the individuals furnished by the crew leader for the service in agricultural labor performed by the individuals; and
        3. has not entered into a written agreement with that farm operator under which the agricultural worker is designated as an employee of that farm operator.
  2. In (a)(5) of this section, “American employer” means a person who is
    1. an individual who is a resident of the United States;
    2. a partnership if two-thirds or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
    3. a trust, if all of the trustees are residents of the United States; or
    4. a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state.

History. (§§ 214-216 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 217 ch 5 ESLA 1955; §§ 218-220 ch 5 ESLA 1955; §§ 220.1, 220.2 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by §§ 2, 3 ch 169 SLA 1957; § 220.3 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 1 ch 108 SLA 1961; § 221 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 222 ch 5 ESLA 1955; §§ 223, 224 ch 5 ESLA 1955; §§ 226, 227 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 228 ch 5 ESLA 1955; §§ 229 — 234 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 234.1 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 1 ch 46 SLA 1959; § 234.2 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 2 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 4 ch 169 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 60 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 87 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 22 SLA 1967; am § 14 ch 106 SLA 1971; am §§ 15 — 18 ch 122 SLA 1977; am §§ 75, 76 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 17 ch 27 SLA 2009; am § 38 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor’s notes. —

The contingent amendment to this section made under sec. 33, ch. 122, SLA 1977 never took effect and was repealed by sec. 82, ch. 41, SLA 2009.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent in connection with the amendment of (a)(12) of this section by § 17, ch. 27, SLA 2009, see § 1, ch. 27, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (a)(2), substituted “(8)” for “(10)” preceding “of this section”; in (a)(3)(B), deleted “, performed after December 31, 1979,” preceding “only if”; deleted (a)(4), relating to service performed after December 31, 1971 through December 31, 1977 by someone employed by the state in a hospital or institution of higher education; deleted (a)(5), relating to service performed before January 1, 1978 by an employee of a political subdivision of the state or similar; redesignated former (a)(6) through (a)(16) as (a)(4) through (a)(14) respectively; in (a)(4), deleted “after June 30, 1962” following “in a calendar quarter”, and “after December 31, 1971,” following “services performed”; in (a)(5), deleted “after December 31, 1971” following “except in Canada,” and substituted “(9) or (10)” for “(11) or (12)” following “under the provisions of”; in (a)(6), substituted “(9)” for “(11)” following “notwithstanding the provisions of”; in (a)(12), deleted “performed after December 31, 1977,” following “service”; in (a)(13), deleted “performed after December 31, 1977” following “domestic services”; in the introductory language of (a)(14), deleted “performed after December 31, 1977” following “service”; in (a)(14)(C)(ii), substituted “(8)” for “(10)” following “within the meaning of”; in (b), in the lead-in language, substituted “In (a)(5)” for “In (a)(7)”; made stylistic changes throughout the section.

The second 2009 amendment, effective May 26, 2009, in paragraph (a)(14) [now (a)(12)], deleted “after December 31, 1977” following “service performed”; added “or in the employ of a federally recognized tribe,” following “other states or political subdivisions,”; substituted “AS 23.20.526(d) ” for “AS 23.20.526(d)(8) ”.

Notes to Decisions

Place of business. —

Premises leased by a lumber mill operator for the purpose of hiring workers to harvest the timber thereon to be delivered to the mill for processing were considered a place of business for the purpose of unemployment tax liability. Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

Discretion of department of labor under paragraph (a)(10). —

It is evident from the statutory requirement of a showing “to the satisfaction of the department” under paragraph (a)(10) that the Department of Labor is vested with broad discretion in deciding whether an “employment” relationship exists. Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

Proof required under paragraph (a)(10). —

Under paragraph (a)(10) of this section, a business proprietor must prove the factors listed in (A), (B) and (C) to win an exemption from the tax. Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

The statutory definition is controlling, and the employer must show that all three prongs of the “ABC test” in paragraph (a)(10) are met. Tachick Freight Lines v. State, Dep't of Labor, 773 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1989).

Where an employer could not demonstrate that workers hired for a particular job were customarily entrepreneurs engaged in an independently established business, but that the unavailability of work created unemployment for them, he failed to carry the burden of proof to establish the requirements of subparagraph (a)(10)(C) of this section. Clayton v. State, 598 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1979).

Because the company’s lease-drivers provided “services,” and did not satisfy the “ABC test” in paragraph (a)(10), the company was not exempt from contribution liability and was, therefore, a liable employer required to make contributions under the Alaska Employment Security Act. Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

Collateral references. —

Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, within social security and unemployment insurance statutes. 10 ALR2d 369.

Insurance agents or salesmen as within coverage of social security or unemployment compensation acts. 39 ALR3d 872.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act. 95 ALR3d 891.

Trucker as employee or independent contractor. 2 ALR4th 1219.

Sec. 23.20.526. Exclusions from definition of “employment”.

  1. In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “employment” does not include
    1. domestic service in a private home, except as provided in AS 23.20.525(a)(13) ;
    2. newsboys’ services in selling or distributing newspapers on the street or from house to house;
    3. service not in the course of the employing unit’s trade or business performed in a calendar quarter by an individual, unless the cash remuneration paid for the service is $50 or more and the service is performed by an individual who is regularly employed by the employing unit to perform the service; an individual is here considered to be regularly employed to perform service not in the course of an employing unit’s trade or business during a calendar quarter only if the individual performs the service for some portion of the day on each of 24 days during the quarter or during the preceding calendar quarter;
    4. service performed by an individual in the employ of the individual’s
      1. son, daughter, or spouse;
      2. parent or legal guardian if the individual was under the age of 21 years and a full-time student during eight of the last 12 months and intends to resume full-time student status within the next four months; and
      3. mother or father if the service is performed by a child under the age of 18;
    5. service with respect to which unemployment insurance is payable under an unemployment insurance program established by an Act of Congress;
    6. service performed in the employ of a foreign government including service as a consular or other officer or employee or a nondiplomatic representative;
    7. service performed in the employ of an instrumentality wholly owned by a foreign government if
      1. the service is of a character similar to that performed in foreign countries by employees of the United States government or its instrumentalities; and
      2. the department finds that the United States Secretary of State has certified to the United States Secretary of the Treasury that the foreign government, with respect to whose instrumentality exemption is claimed, grants an equivalent exemption with respect to similar service performed in the foreign country by employees of the United States government and its instrumentalities;
    8. service performed by an insurance agent, insurance solicitor, real estate broker, real estate salesperson, or securities salesperson to the extent the person is compensated by commission, unless the service is required to be covered under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended;
    9. notwithstanding AS 23.20.525(a)(9) , service performed by an officer or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection with the vessel, if the operating office, from which the operations of the vessel operating on navigable waters inside or inside and outside the United States are ordinarily and regularly supervised, managed, directed, and controlled, is outside this state;
    10. service performed on or in connection with a vessel not an American vessel by an individual if the individual performed service on and in connection with the vessel when outside the United States;
    11. service performed in the employ of the United States government or an instrumentality of the United States exempt under the Constitution of the United States from the contributions imposed by this chapter, except that to the extent that the Congress of the United States permits states to require an instrumentality of the United States to make payments into an unemployment fund under a state employment security law, all of the provisions of this chapter apply to the instrumentalities, and to service performed for the instrumentalities in the same manner, to the same extent, and on the same terms as to all other employers, employing units, individuals, and service; however, if this state is not certified for any year by the United States Secretary of Labor under 26 U.S.C. 3304(c) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Internal Revenue Code), the payments required of the instrumentalities with respect to the year shall be refunded by the department from the fund in the same manner and within the same period as is provided in AS 23.20.225 with respect to contributions erroneously collected;
    12. service performed in the employ of another state, or political subdivision of another state, or an instrumentality of another state or political subdivision that is wholly owned by another state or its political subdivision, or a service performed in the employ of an instrumentality of another state or its political subdivisions to the extent that the instrumentality is, with respect to the service, exempt under the Constitution of the United States from the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. 3301 (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Internal Revenue Code);
    13. service performed in the employ of an international organization;
    14. service covered by an election approved by the agency charged with the administration of any other state or federal employment security law, in accordance with an arrangement under AS 23.20.090(a) during the effective period of the election;
    15. service performed by an individual in agricultural labor, except as provided in AS 23.20.525(a)(14) ; the term “agricultural labor” means remunerated service
      1. on a farm, in the employ of any person in connection with cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticultural commodity, including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training, and management of livestock, bees, poultry, and fur-bearing animals and wildlife;
      2. in the employ of the owner or tenant or other operator of a farm, in connection with the operation, management, conservation, improvement, or maintenance of the farm and its tools and equipment, or in salvaging timber or clearing land of brush and other debris left by a hurricane, if the major part of the service is performed on a farm;
      3. in connection with the production or harvesting of any commodity defined as an agricultural commodity in 12 U.S.C. 1141j (Sec. 15(g), Agricultural Marketing Act), as amended, or in connection with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs, or waterways, not owned or operated for profit, used exclusively for supplying and storing water for farming purposes;
      4. in the employ of the operator of a farm in handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, grading, storing, or delivering to storage or to market or to a carrier for transportation to market, in its unmanufactured state, any agricultural or horticultural commodity; but only if the operator produced more than one-half of the commodity with respect to which the service is performed except as stated in (b) of this section;
      5. in the employ of a group of operators of farms, or a cooperative organization of which the operators are members, in the performance of service described in (D) of this paragraph, but only if the operators produced more than one-half of the commodity with respect to which the service is performed;
      6. on a farm operated for profit if the service is not in the course of the employer’s trade or business;
    16. service performed as a student nurse in the employ of a hospital or a nurses’ training school by an individual who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes in a nurses’ training school chartered or approved in accordance with the laws of this state, and service performed as an intern in the employ of a hospital by an individual who has completed a four-year course in a medical school chartered or approved in accordance with the laws of this state, unless the service is required to be covered under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act;
    17. service performed by an individual on a boat engaged in catching fish or other forms of aquatic animal life under an arrangement with the owner or operator of that boat under which
      1. that individual does not receive any cash remuneration except as provided in (B) of this paragraph;
      2. that individual receives a share of the boat’s, or the boats’ in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one boat, catch of fish or other forms of aquatic animal life or a share of the proceeds from the sale of that catch; and
      3. the amount of that individual’s share depends on the amount of the boat’s, or the boats’ in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one boat, catch of fish or other forms of aquatic animal life; but only if the operating crew of that boat, or each boat from which the individual receives a share in the case of a fishing operation involving more than one boat, is normally made up of fewer than 10 individuals;
    18. service performed as a prospective or impaneled juror in a court;
    19. service performed for a corporation by an employee of the corporation if
      1. the corporation is incorporated under AS 10.06;
      2. the corporation is not a government corporation; and
      3. the employee is an executive officer of the corporation;
    20. service performed by an individual who drives a taxicab whose compensation and written contractual arrangements are as described in AS 23.10.055(a)(13) ;
    21. service of an individual who
      1. directly sells or solicits the sale of consumer products, for resale or otherwise, personally to a prospective consumer in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment; a sale or solicitation by telephone, mail, other telecommunications method, or other nonpersonal method does not satisfy the requirement of this subparagraph;
      2. is compensated solely by
        1. commissions on sales or other remuneration directly related to sales or sales performance; or
        2. a profit represented by the difference between the wholesale cost of the product to the seller and the final sale price to the consumer; and
      3. performs under a written contract with the person for whom the service is performed that provides, notwithstanding AS 23.20.395(a) , that the individual is not an employee for purposes of this chapter or for federal or state tax purposes;
    22. temporary services related to emergency oil spill training and response activities by an individual described in (17) of this subsection; in this paragraph, “temporary” means a period of less than seven continuous days; and
    23. volunteer work performed by a person engaged on a contract basis as a sports official at a sports event for which the competitors are not paid a wage or salary; however, the exemption provided under this paragraph does not apply to a claim for benefits under this chapter that is related to a sports event or competition sponsored by an employer for whom the person making the claim normally performs work, including work as a teacher, coach, or administrator, that is not sports official work; in this paragraph,
      1. “sports official” is a participant in a sports event or competition whose participation is neutral with respect to who wins or loses, including an umpire, referee, judge, scorekeeper, timekeeper, or organizer;
      2. “volunteer work” means work for which compensation does not exceed $1,500 a year and is paid only to defray or reimburse the reasonable food, travel, and incidental expenses the person incurs in order to perform the work or as a result of performing the work.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the provisions of (a)(15)(D) and (E) of this section are not applicable to service performed in connection with commercial canning or commercial freezing or in connection with any agricultural or horticultural commodity after its delivery to a terminal market for distribution for consumption.
  3. In (a)(15) of this section, “farm” includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, fur-bearing animal, and truck farms, plantations, ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used primarily for the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities, and orchards.
  4. For the purposes of AS 23.20.525(a)(4) and (12), the term “employment” does not apply to service performed
    1. by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of the person’s ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by the order;
    2. in a facility conducted for the purpose of carrying out a program of rehabilitation for individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury or providing remunerative work for individuals who, because of their impaired physical or mental capacity, cannot be readily absorbed in the competitive labor market by an individual receiving the rehabilitation or remunerative work;
    3. as part of an unemployment work-relief or work-training program assisted or financed in whole or in part by a federally recognized tribe or any federal agency or any agency of a state or political subdivision of the state, by an individual receiving work relief or work training;
    4. for a state hospital by an inmate of a prison or correctional institution;
    5. in the employ of a school, college, or university if the service is performed by a student who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes at the school, college, or university;
    6. by an individual under the age of 22 who is enrolled at a nonprofit or public educational institution that normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are carried on as a student in a full-time program, taken for credit at the institution, that combines academic instruction with work experience if the service is an integral part of the program and the institution has so certified to the employer, except that this paragraph does not apply to service performed in a program established for or on behalf of an employer or group of employers;
    7. in the employ of a hospital if the service is performed by a patient of the hospital, as defined in AS 23.20.520 ;
    8. in the employ of the state or a political subdivision of the state if the service is performed by an individual in the exercise of duties
      1. as a judicial officer, the governor, the lieutenant governor, a person hired or appointed as the head or deputy head of a department in the executive branch, a person hired or appointed as the director of a division of a department in the executive branch, an assistant to the governor, a chair or member of a state commission or board, state investment officers and the state comptroller in the Department of Revenue, an appointed or elected municipal officer, any other elected official, the fiscal analyst of the legislative finance division, the legislative auditor of the legislative audit division, the executive director of the Legislative Affairs Agency, and the directors of the divisions within the Legislative Affairs Agency;
      2. as a member of the Alaska Army National Guard or Alaska Air National Guard or Alaska Naval Militia;
      3. as an employee serving on only a temporary basis in case of fire, storm, snow, earthquake, flood, or similar emergency; or
      4. as an election official or election worker if the amount of remuneration received by the individual during the calendar year for services as an election official or election worker is less than $1,000;
    9. in the employ of
      1. a church or a convention or association of churches; or
      2. an organization that is operated primarily for religious purposes and that is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or a convention or association of churches;
    10. in the employ of a federally recognized tribe in this state if the service is performed by an individual in the exercise of duties as an officer of the federally recognized tribe and meets the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 3309(b)(3)(E) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Internal Revenue Code).

History. (§ 15 ch 106 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 55 SLA 1976; am §§ 19 — 23, 25 ch 122 SLA 1977; am § 80 ch 9 SLA 1980; am § 3 ch 145 SLA 1980; am § 1 ch 91 SLA 1982; am § 30 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 14 ch 106 SLA 1984; am § 26 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 1 ch 165 SLA 1990; am § 36 ch 127 SLA 1992; am § 3 ch 13 SLA 1993; am § 1 ch 97 SLA 1995; am § 1 ch 4 SLA 1996; am § 13 ch 63 SLA 1998; am § 11 ch 74 SLA 1998; am § 2 ch 29 SLA 1999; am § 10 ch 130 SLA 2004; am § 1 ch 32 SLA 2008; am § 18 ch 27 SLA 2009; am §§ 39, 40 ch 41 SLA 2009; am § 1 ch 8 SLA 2010; am § 15 ch 58 SLA 2010)

Revisor’s notes. —

The addition of (a)(22) of this section as set out in § 1, ch. 53, SLA 1998 did not occur because the condition set out in § 3, ch. 53, SLA 1998, relating to amendment of federal law, did not occur.

The contingent amendment to this section made under sec. 33, ch. 122, SLA 1977 never took effect and was repealed by sec. 82, ch. 41, SLA 2009.

The paragraphs of subsection (a) were renumbered in 1990 to reflect the deletion of repealed paragraphs.

Paragraph (a)(20) enacted as (a)(21). Renumbered in 1993.

In 2005, in paragraph (a)(20), “AS 23.10.055 (a)(13)” was substituted for “AS 23.10.055 (13)” to reflect the addition of AS 23.10.055(b) and (c) by § 2, ch. 90, SLA 2005.

In 2009, to reconcile the amendments made by § 18, ch. 27, SLA 2009 and §§ 38 and 40, ch. 41, SLA 2009, in (d) of this section a reference to “ AS 23.20.525(a)(4) and (12)” was used instead of “ AS 23.20.525(a)(6) and (14)”.

Cross references. —

For legislative findings and intent in connection with the amendment of (d) of this section by sec. 18, ch. 27, SLA 2009 see § 1, ch. 27, SLA 2009, in the 2009 Temporary and Special Acts.

For explanation of the amendment made to (a)(2) of this section by § 15, ch. 58, SLA 2010, see 2010 Senate Journal Supplement No. 6, July 9, 2010.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2009 amendment, effective May 26, 2009, in the introductory language of (d), substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(6) and (14)” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(4) — (6) and (14)”; in (d)(3), added “a federally recognized tribe or”; added (d)(10).

The second 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (a)(1), substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(13) ” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(15)”; in (a)(2), substituted “service performed by an individual under 18 years of age” for “newsboys’ services”; in (a)(3), deleted “some” preceding “24 days during the quarter”; in (a)(8), substituted “securities salesperson” for “securities salesman”; in (a)(9), substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(9) ” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(11) ”; in (a)(11), added “United States” preceding “Secretary of Labor”; in (a)(15), substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(14) ” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(16)”; in the introductory language in (d), substituted “AS 23.20.525(a)(4) and (12)” for “AS 23.20.525(a)(4) — (6) and (14)”; made stylistic changes throughout the section.

The first 2010 amendment, effective July 29, 2010, added (a)(23).

The second 2010 amendment, effective retroactively to June 21, 2009, in (a)(2), substituted “newsboys’ services” for “service performed by an individual under 18 years of age”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 30, ch. 58, SLA 2010, makes the 2010 amendment of (a)(2) of this section retroactive to June 21, 2009.

Collateral references. —

Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, within social security and unemployment insurance statutes. 10 ALR2d 369.

Salesman on commission as within act. 29 ALR2d 751.

What constitutes “agricultural” or “farm” labor within social security or unemployment acts. 56 ALR2d 406.

Own projects or activities, right to unemployment compensation of one working on. 65 ALR2d 1182.

Insurance agents or salesmen as within coverage of social security or unemployment compensation acts. 39 ALR3d 872.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or eligible for benefits under state unemployment compensation act. 95 ALR3d 891.

Sec. 23.20.530. Wages defined.

  1. In this chapter, “wages” means all remuneration for service from whatever source, including insured work, noninsured work, or self-employment; commissions, bonuses, back pay, and the cash value of all remuneration in a medium other than cash shall be treated as wages; gratuities customarily received by an individual in the course of service from persons other than the individual’s employing unit may be treated as wages received from the employing unit only to the extent the individual reports the gratuities to the employing unit. The reasonable cash value of remuneration in a medium other than cash, and the reasonable amount of gratuities, shall be estimated and determined in accordance with regulations adopted by the department; notwithstanding AS 23.20.350(a) , back pay awards shall be allocated to the weeks or quarters with respect to which the pay was earned. If the remuneration of an individual is not based on a fixed period of time or if the individual’s wages are paid in irregular intervals or in a manner that does not extend regularly over the period of employment, the wages shall be allocated to weeks or quarters in accordance with regulations adopted by the department. The regulations must, so far as possible, produce results reasonably similar to those that would prevail if the individual’s wages were paid at regular intervals. When an employer has filed for bankruptcy, unpaid wages earned for services performed for the employer are considered wages for the quarter in which they were earned.
  2. In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “wages” does not include
    1. the amount of any payment, including an amount paid by an employing unit for insurance or annuities or into a fund to provide for the payment, to or on behalf of an individual or the individual’s dependent under a plan or system established by an employing unit that makes provisions generally for individuals performing service for it, or for such individuals generally and their dependents, or for a class or classes of the individuals and their dependents, on account of
      1. retirement;
      2. sickness or accident disability;
      3. medical or hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability; or
      4. death;
    2. the amount of a payment made by an employing unit to an individual performing service for it, including an amount paid by an employing unit for insurance or annuities or into a fund to provide for the payment, on account of retirement;
    3. the amount of a payment on account of sickness or accident disability, or medical or hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability, by an employing unit to or on behalf of an individual performing service for it after the expiration of six calendar months following the last calendar month in which the individual performed services for the employing unit;
    4. the amount of a payment made by an employing unit to or on behalf of an individual performing services for it or the individual’s beneficiary
      1. from or to a trust described in 26 U.S.C. 401(a) (Internal Revenue Code) that is exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(a) at the time of the payment, unless the payment is made to an individual performing services for the trust as remuneration for those services and not as a beneficiary of the trust; or
      2. under or to an annuity plan that, at the time of the payment, meets the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 401(a)(3) — (6);
    5. the amount of a payment made by an employing unit (without deduction from the remuneration of the individual in its employ) of the tax imposed upon an individual in its employ under 26 U.S.C. 3101 (Internal Revenue Code) with respect to service performed;
    6. remuneration paid in a medium other than cash to an individual for service not in the course of the employing unit’s trade or business;
    7. the amount of a payment, other than vacation or sick pay, to an individual after the month in which the individual attains the age of 65, if the individual did not perform services for the employing unit in the period for which the payment is made;
    8. dismissal payments that the employing unit is not legally required to make;
    9. the amount of any payment, including any amount paid by an employer into a fund to provide for any such payment, made to or on behalf of an employee under a plan or system established by an employer that makes provision for the employer’s employees generally, or for a class or group of the employer’s employees, for the purpose of supplementing unemployment benefits;
    10. the amount of a payment made to or on behalf of an employee for subsistence while the employee is employed away from home, but this exemption applies only to that portion of a subsistence payment that does not exceed the actual expenses of the employee while so employed;
    11. compensation received for inactive service performed by a member of the Alaska National Guard or Naval Militia;
    12. the amount of a payment made to or on behalf of an employee or the employee’s beneficiary under a cafeteria plan as defined in 26 U.S.C. 125, if the payment would not be treated as wages under this section without regard to the cafeteria plan;
    13. the amount of payment made, or benefit furnished, by the employer under a plan to provide educational assistance to or for the benefit of an employee if, at the time of the payment or the furnishing, it is reasonable to believe that the employee will be able to exclude the payment or benefit from income under 26 U.S.C. 127(b).

History. (§§ 242 — 249 ch 5 ESLA 1955; § 249.1 ch 5 ESLA 1955, added by § 3 ch 60 SLA 1960; § 250 ch 5 ESLA 1955; am § 1 ch 88 SLA 1965; am § 24 ch 122 SLA 1977; am § 78 ch 9 SLA 1980; am §§ 31 — 33 ch 115 SLA 1982; am § 27 ch 100 SLA 1989; am § 23 ch 43 SLA 1996; am § 11 ch 130 SLA 2004; am § 41 ch 41 SLA 2009; am § 20 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

The paragraphs in subsection (b) were renumbered in 1990 to reflect the deletion of repealed paragraphs.

Administrative Code. —

For employment security, see 8 AAC 85.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (b)(3), deleted “made after December 31, 1954” following “sickness or accident disability”; in (b)(5), deleted “after January 1, 1941” following “respect to service performed”; in (b)(7), deleted “made after December 31, 1954,” following “vacation or sick pay,”; in (b)(8), substituted “that” for “after January 1, 1941, which”; made stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), in the first sentence, deleted “, but not limited to,” following “from whatever source, including”; made a stylistic change.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 130, SLA 2004 (HB 490), which recommends changes to ensure that this chapter complies with federal law requirements and adds paragraph (13) to (b) of this section, see 2004 House Journal 2613 — 2614.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Metcalfe Invs. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).

Collateral references. —

Service charges, made by hotels or restaurants and later distributed to waiters or similar employees, as “wages” upon which federal or state unemployment taxes or contributions are required to be paid. 83 ALR2d 1024.

Sec. 23.20.535. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Alaska Employment Security Act.

History. (§ 101 ch 5 ESLA 1955)

Chapter 25. Employer’s Liability for Negligence.

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 139 et seq.

61 Am. Jur. 2d, Plant and Job Safety — OSHA and State Laws, §§ 26-30, 131.

30 C.J.S., Employers’ Liability for Injuries to Employees, § 1 et seq.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee’s recovery from employer in tort. 23 ALR4th 1151.

Liability of employer with regard to inherently dangerous work for injuries to employees of independent contractor. 34 ALR4th 914.

Liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments. 34 ALR4th 958.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of damages awarded for personal injuries resulting in death of persons engaged in trades and manual occupations. 47 ALR4th 134.

Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of workers’ compensation law. 57 ALR4th 888.

Sec. 23.25.010. Liability to employees for defects or insufficiency of machinery.

A person engaged in manufacturing, mining, constructing, building, or other business or occupation carried on by means of machinery or mechanical appliances is liable to an employee or, in the event of the employee’s death, to the employee’s personal representative for the benefit of the employee’s surviving spouse and children, if any, or if none, then for the employee’s parents, or, if neither surviving spouse, nor children nor parents, then for the employee’s next of kin dependent upon the employee, for all damages that may result from the negligence of any of the employer’s officers, agents, or employees, or by reason of defect or insufficiency due to the employer’s negligence in the machinery, appliances, and works.

History. (§ 43-2-51 ACLA 1949; am § 85 ch 127 SLA 1974)

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

This chapter is form of employers’ liability act. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

So-called employers’ liability statutes did not aspire to create any new principle of liability applicable to the employment relation as such. The most they ever set out to accomplish was the restoration of the employee to a position no worse than that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the employer or his servants. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

And it has been referred to as “Defective Machinery Act.” Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

However, such terminology is inaccurate. —

See Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Chapter abrogates certain defenses. —

This chapter was primarily intended to abrogate certain defenses traditionally available to an employer in a common-law action brought by his employee for injuries suffered in the course of employment. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Similarity to federal law. —

The language of 45 U.S.C. § 51 (first enacted in 1908) is quite similar to that of this section. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

This section is not concerned primarily with requiring employers to maintain safe equipment. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Rather, it covers much wider range of causes of industrial injuries. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

This section describes two distinct causes of injury to the employee which give rise to the employer’s liability: (1) The negligence of the employer in providing defective or insufficient machinery, appliances and works; and (2), the negligence of an officer, agent, or employee of the employer whether or not such negligence is related to defects or insufficiencies in the machinery, appliances and works. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

II.Construction with Workers’ Compensation Act

Harmonious construction. —

The Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ), and this chapter can and should be construed to be harmonious rather than in conflict. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Legislative intent. —

The Alaska legislature, by continuing the Defective Machinery Act in existence after enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ), did not evidence its intent to exclude defective, dangerous machinery from the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in order to coerce employers to furnish safe machinery. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967); Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

The legislature intended that the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ), should bar a claim for relief under this chapter. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Coverage of Defective Machinery Act. —

The scope of employer coverage originally provided by the Defective Machinery Act has not been retained separate from and undiminished by the coverage provided by the later enacted Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ). Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

As each subsequent amendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ), extended its coverage, the coverage of the Defective Machinery Act was correspondingly reduced by reason of the provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act that the remedies provided therein were exclusive. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967). See also Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

But although the coverage provided by the Defective Machinery Act has been drastically reduced, it still cannot be said that their application to all classes of employers has been eliminated. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

No separate cause of action provided. —

The Defective Machinery Act does not provide a cause of action where defective machinery has been employed which is separate and apart from the coverage provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ). Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Exemption for employers covered by Workers’ Compensation Act. —

Employers covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ), are exempt from any other liability. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

This chapter has no application where the employee’s injuries are covered by workers’ compensation. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Motion to dismiss properly granted. —

Although plaintiff alleged that her exposure to crude oil from an oil spill caused irreparable harm to her and her unborn child, the pipeline company’s motion to dismiss was granted because the company was never plaintiff’s employer, and it did not own or have custody of the oil when it spilled. Carey v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 12, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Sec. 23.25.020. Contributory negligence not a defense.

In an action against a master or employer under AS 23.25.010 the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence does not bar a recovery where the employee’s contributory negligence was slight and the negligence of the employer was gross in comparison, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee. All questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury.

History. (§ 43-2-52 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

This section and 45 U.S.C. § 53 adopt comparative negligence rule in markedly similar language, although the federal statute adopts a broader rule. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Quoted in

Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Collateral references. —

Calculation of net recovery by applying percentage of plaintiff’s fault before or after subtracting amount of settlement by less than all joint tortfeasors. 71 ALR4th 1108.

Sec. 23.25.030. Contract, insurance, or indemnity is not a defense.

  1. No contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity for injury or death entered into by or on behalf of an employee, nor the acceptance of insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity by the person entitled to it constitutes a bar or defense to an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or death of the employee.
  2. Upon trial of the action the defendant may set off the sum contributed by the employer toward the insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity paid to the employee, or in case of the employee’s death to the employee’s personal representative.
  3. Contributions for insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity exacted from or paid by the employee may not be allowed as set off.

History. (§ 43-2-53 ACLA 1949)

Notes to Decisions

Subsection (a) is similar in substance to 45 U.S.C. § 55, though different in form. Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

Sec. 23.25.040. Prerequisites to maintenance of action.

An action may not be maintained under this chapter unless

  1. it is shown that there exist beneficiaries as provided in AS 23.25.010 ;
  2. the action is brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued.

History. (§ 43-2-54 ACLA 1949)

Chapter 30. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.

Revisor's notes. —

In 1980, pursuant to § 60, ch. 94, SLA 1980, the term “workers”’ was substituted for “workmen’s” wherever appearing in this chapter.

Cross references. —

For provision establishing a legislative workers’ compensation working group and requiring a report to the legislature by December 1, 2019, see sec. 23, ch. 91, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For workers’ compensation, see 8 AAC, part 3.

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 10, FSSLA 2005 (SB 130), the basis of a number of the 2005 amendments to this chapter, see 2005 Senate Journal 465 — 468.

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 91, SLA 2018 (HB 79), the basis of a number of the 2018 amendments to this chapter, see 2017 House Journal 97 — 101.

Collateral references. —

Daniel J. Stone, Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (Matthew Bender).

Larson and Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (Matthew Bender).

Larson and Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation, Desk Edition (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Administration.

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 139 et seq.

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 1 et seq.

99 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 1 et seq.

Ownership interest in employer business as affecting status as employee for workers’ compensation purposes. 28 ALR4th 973.

Sec. 23.30.001. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of the legislature that

  1. this chapter be interpreted so as to ensure the quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject to the provisions of this chapter;
  2. workers’ compensation cases shall be decided on their merits except where otherwise provided by statute;
  3. this chapter may not be construed by the courts in favor of a party;
  4. hearings in workers’ compensation cases shall be impartial and fair to all parties and that all parties shall be afforded due process and an opportunity to be heard and for their arguments and evidence to be fairly considered.

History. (§ 3 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Penalty for nonpayment of claim. —

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission erred in deciding that no penalty could be imposed upon an employer for the bad faith controversion of a prescription for a bed because its construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act was contrary to the Act’s purpose of providing quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of medical benefits to a claimant; the Act permits imposition of a penalty where a medical benefit that has been prescribed but not yet paid. Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Applied in

Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013).

Quoted in

Shehata v. Salvation Army, 225 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2010); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Stated in

Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

Schiel v. Union Oil Co., 219 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 23.30.002. Division of workers’ compensation; director.

The division of workers’ compensation is established in the department. The commissioner shall appoint the director of the division of workers’ compensation.

History. (§ 17 ch 12 SLA 2006)

Sec. 23.30.005. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board.

  1. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board consists of a southern panel of three members sitting for the first judicial district, two northern panels of three members sitting for the second and fourth judicial districts, five southcentral panels of three members each sitting for the third judicial district, and one panel of three members that may sit in any judicial district. Each panel must include the commissioner of labor and workforce development or a hearing officer designated to represent the commissioner, a representative of industry, and a representative of labor. The latter two members of each panel shall be appointed by the governor and are subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session. The board shall by regulation provide procedures to avoid conflicts and the appearance of impropriety in hearings.
  2. The commissioner shall act as chair and executive officer of the board and chair of each panel. The commissioner may designate a representative to act for the commissioner as chair and executive officer of the board. The commissioner may designate hearing officers to serve as chairs of panels for hearing claims.
  3. The governor shall appoint the members of the panels. Each member, except the commissioner of labor and workforce development, serves a term of three years.  The term of a management member and the term of a labor member of each panel may not expire in the same year. The management and labor members are entitled to compensation in the amount of $50 a day for each day or portion of a day spent in actual meeting or on authorized official business incidental to their duties and to all other transportation and per diem as provided by law.
  4. [Repealed, § 9 ch 77 SLA 1979.]
  5. A member of one panel may serve on another panel when the commissioner considers it necessary for the prompt administration of this chapter.  Transfers shall be allowed only if a labor or management representative replaces a counterpart on the other panel.
  6. Two members of a panel constitute a quorum for hearing claims and the action taken by a quorum of a panel is considered the action of the full board.
  7. A claim may be heard by only one panel.
  8. The department shall adopt rules for all panels, and procedures for the periodic selection, retention, and removal of both rehabilitation specialists and physicians under AS 23.30.041 and 23.30.095 , and shall adopt regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter. The department may by regulation provide for procedural, discovery, or stipulated matters to be heard and decided by the commissioner or a hearing officer designated to represent the commissioner rather than a panel. If a procedural, discovery, or stipulated matter is heard and decided by the commissioner or a hearing officer designated to represent the commissioner, the action taken is considered the action of the full board on that aspect of the claim. Process and procedure under this chapter shall be as summary and simple as possible. The department, the board or a member of it may for the purposes of this chapter subpoena witnesses, administer or cause to be administered oaths, and may examine or cause to have examined the parts of the books and records of the parties to a proceeding that relate to questions in dispute. The superior court, on application of the department, the board or any members of it, shall enforce the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production and examination of books, papers, and records.
  9. The department may adopt regulations concerning the medical care provided for in this chapter.  In addition to the reports required of physicians under AS 23.30.095(a) — (d), the board may direct a physician or hospital rendering medical treatment or service under this chapter to furnish to the board periodic reports of treatment or services on forms procured from the board.
  10. The board may also arrange to have hearings held by the commission, officer, or tribunal having authority to hear cases arising under the workers’ compensation law of any other state, of the District of Columbia, or of any territory of the United States.  The testimony and proceedings at the hearing shall be reported to the board and are a part of the record in the case.  Evidence taken at the hearing is subject to rebuttal upon final hearing before the board.
  11. The board shall notify the contracting agency of the state or of a political subdivision of the state when it revokes the self-insurance certificate of an employer holding a contract with the state or a political subdivision of the state.
  12. Regulations adopted by the department under (h) and (i) of this section become effective only after approval by a majority of the full board.
  13. The board may by regulation delegate authority to the director to assist the board in administering and enforcing this chapter.

History. (§ 25 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 76 SLA 1965; am § 1 ch 100 SLA 1966; am § 2 ch 107 SLA 1969; am § 1 ch 198 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 166 SLA 1972; am §§ 1, 2 ch 207 SLA 1976; am §§ 4 — 9 ch 77 SLA 1979; am § 1 ch 59 SLA 1981; am § 1 ch 2 SLA 1985; am § 4 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 7 ch 43 SLA 1994; am § 1 ch 48 SLA 2002; am §§ 4 — 7 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am § 21 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For regulations governing workers’ compensation matters, see 8 AAC 45.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in ( l ), substituted “only after approval” for “only after approved” following “become effective”.

Notes to Decisions

Duty to fully advise applicant. —

A workers’ compensation board or commission owes to every applicant for compensation the duty of fully advising him as to all the real facts which bear upon his condition and his right to compensation so far as it may know them, and of instructing him on how to pursue that right under the law. Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963).

Judicial review of action by board. —

While the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board is a quasi-judicial agency, the same criteria for judicial review of any administrative action should apply. Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

In an occupational disability benefits case, although the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (AWCB) found that the employee’s disability was a work related injury, the Anchorage Police and Fire Retirement Board (PFRB) was not in privity with the AWCB; thus, the AWCB’s determination that the employee’s disability claim was work related did not preclude the PFRB’s reconsideration of that issue. Palmer v. Municipality of Anchorage, Police & Fire Ret. Bd., 65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003).

Court must accept any reasonable statutory construction of board only where undefined or ambiguous terms exist in the statutory language. London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

Board empowered to use equitable principles. —

The board possesses the authority to invoke equitable principles to prevent an employer from asserting statutory rights to offset an employee’s social security benefits and to receive compensation for overpayments as predicated by AS 23.30.225(a) and AS 23.30.155(j) respectively. Under this authority, the board may construct an implied waiver upon a party’s negligence to insist upon a right. However, the record must demonstrate substantial evidence to justify the exercise of these equitable principles, and they may not be applied where the compensee was informed by the compensator of future reductions for any received social security benefits. Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van Biene, 847 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1993).

Process for deciding disputed claims. —

Process the State advocated, involving piecemeal litigation and multiple hearings for a limited controversion claim, was not as simple as possible as statutorily required; like any adjudicator, the Workers' Compensation Board had an interest in deciding disputed claims promptly and thoroughly, without the need for numerous hearings, and the Board acted reasonably and not arbitrarily in interpreting and applying its regulations. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Marriage as determining factor for spousal death benefits upheld. —

Legislature’s reliance on marriage as the determining factor for spousal death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 et seq., bears a fair and substantial relationship to the goal of ensuring the quick, efficient, fair and predictable delivery of benefits at a reasonable cost; the act’s balance between perfect fairness on the one hand, and cost, efficiency, speed, and predictability on the other, does not violate the equal protection clause. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Reimbursement of certain financial expenses not allowed. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly denied an injured employee’s reimbursement claims for a court-imposed fine, court-ordered alcohol treatment and testing, theft, unpaid rent, an interest in a boat, and an interest in his employer’s business; those claims were not compensable under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004).

Stated in

Smith v. Univ. of Alaska, 172 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2007).

Cited in

Lieb v. Interior Enters., 395 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1964); State v. Wien Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980); Anderson v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981); Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing & Heating, 869 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1994); Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994); Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003); Hagen Ins., Inc. v. Roller, 139 P.3d 1216 (Alaska 2006); AT&T Alascom v. Orchitt, 161 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2007); Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007); Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 23.30.007. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission.

  1. There is established in the Department of Labor and Workforce Development the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission. The commission has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions and orders of the board under this chapter. Jurisdiction of the commission is limited to administrative appeals arising under this chapter.
  2. The commission consists of five members appointed by the governor and confirmed by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session. The members shall be appointed as follows:
    1. a member appointed as chair who meets the requirements of (c)(2) of this section;
    2. two members who meet the qualifications in (c)(1) of this section and, because of their employment or affiliations, may be classified as a representative of employees covered by this chapter;
    3. two members who meet the qualifications in (c)(1) of this section and, because of their employment or affiliations, may be classified as a representative of employers covered by this chapter.
  3. To be eligible for appointment under this section,
    1. a member must
      1. be a citizen of the United States;
      2. be a resident of the state for the five years preceding the appointment;
      3. have not been convicted of either a
        1. felony; or
        2. misdemeanor related to workers’ compensation; and
      4. have served for a total of not less than 18 months as a member of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board;
    2. the chair must
      1. meet the criteria specified in (1) of this subsection, except for the requirement in (1)(D) of this subsection;
      2. be licensed to practice law in this state and be a member in good standing with the Alaska Bar Association; and
      3. have engaged in the active practice of law for at least five years with experience in workers’ compensation in this state.
  4. An individual seeking appointment as a member or as chair shall submit an application to the chief administrative law judge appointed under AS 44.64.010 . The application must show that the applicant meets requirements in (c) of this section that are applicable to the position for which the application is submitted. For each vacant position, other than the chair, the chief administrative law judge shall select not less than two eligible individuals and submit the names of those individuals to the governor. For the chair, the chief administrative law judge shall select not less than three for submission to the governor.
  5. The term of service on the commission is five years. A member may be reappointed so long as the reappointment complies with the provisions of this section, including the application and appointment process described in (d) of this section.
  6. A vacancy arising in the commission shall be filled by appointment by the governor and confirmed by a majority of the members of the legislature in joint session. Except as provided in AS 39.05.080 (4), an appointee selected to fill a vacancy shall hold office for the unexpired term of the member whose vacancy is filled. A vacancy in the commission does not impair the authority of a quorum of members to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the commission.
  7. A member may act and receive compensation under this section from the date of appointment until confirmation or rejection by the legislature.
  8. The chair of the commission is in the exempt service under AS 39.25.110 and shall receive a monthly salary that is not less than Step A nor more than Step F of Range 27 of the salary schedule in AS 39.27.011(a) for Anchorage, Alaska.
  9. An appeal to the commission shall be heard and decided by a three-member panel of the commission. An appeal panel shall consist of the chair of the commission and two members of the commission assigned by the chair, one member classified as representing employees, and one member classified as representing employers. At other meetings to conduct commission business, the number of commission members classified as representing employees must equal the number of commission members classified as representing employers. The chair of the commission and two representative members of the commission, one classified as representing employees and one classified as representing employers, constitute a quorum.
  10. A member of the commission may be removed from office by the governor for good cause. To be removed for cause, a member of the commission shall be given a copy of the charges and afforded an opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel in the member’s own defense upon not less than 10 days’ notice. If the member is removed for cause, the governor shall file with the lieutenant governor a complete statement of all charges made against the member, the governor’s findings on the charges, and the record of any proceedings. In this subsection, “good cause” includes
    1. misconduct in office or violation of AS 39.52;
    2. conviction of a felony;
    3. conviction of a misdemeanor related to workers’ compensation;
    4. inability to serve, neglect of duty, incompetence, unjustified failure to handle the caseload assigned, or similar nonfeasance of office; and
    5. failure to continue to meet the requirements of this section relating to qualification for office.
  11. Representative members are entitled to compensation in the amount of $400 a day for each day spent in actual hearing of appeals or on authorized official business incidental to their duties, and to transportation and per diem as provided by law. Compensation shall be paid pro rata for each portion of a day spent in actual hearing of appeals or on authorized official business.
  12. A member of the commission may not hear an appeal under this chapter if
    1. a party is an employee or was, in the past seven years, an employee of the commission member or of a business that employs the commission member; this paragraph does not apply to the chair of the commission when the State of Alaska is or was the employer of a party;
    2. a party is a member or was, in the past seven years, a member of the same union or employee association as the commission member;
    3. a party has a contractual relationship with the commission member, a business that employs the commission member, or a union or employee association of which the commission member is a member;
    4. the commission member is unable to be fair, impartial, and unbiased toward the appeal participants; or
    5. participation in the appeal is a violation of AS 39.52.
  13. If the chair of the commission is unable to hear an appeal for reasons of absence or illness in excess of 10 days, or for reasons set out in (l) of this section, the chief administrative law judge appointed under AS 44.64.010 shall appoint a person who meets the qualifications of this section to serve as chair to hear the appeal as chair pro tempore. The person shall receive the compensation provided in (k) of this section. Appointment of a chair pro tempore does not require legislative confirmation.
  14. Each member of the commission, before entering upon the duties of office, shall take and subscribe to the oath prescribed for principal officers of the state. A member of the commission, during tenure, may not
    1. hold or campaign for elective office;
    2. be an officer of a political party, political committee, or group;
    3. permit the member’s name to be used, or make any contributions whatsoever, in support of or in opposition to a candidate or proposition or question that appears on any ballot in the state including that of a municipality; however, contributions may be made to a candidate for the office of President of the United States;
    4. participate in any way in an election campaign or participate in or contribute to any political party; or
    5. lobby, employ, or assist a lobbyist.
  15. The offices of the commission shall be physically separate from the offices of the division.
  16. Notwithstanding (e) of this section, the terms of the individuals initially appointed to the commission shall be as follows:
    1. the chair, five years;
    2. one member, four years;
    3. one member, three years;
    4. one member, two years;
    5. one member, one year.

History. (§ 8 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am § 22 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Administrative Code. —

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (n)(3), deleted “but not limited to” following “any ballot in the state including”.

Notes to Decisions

Commission held constitutional. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission is quasi-judicial, and it was properly established; the legislature acted within its constitutional authority in creating the commission and, with limiting construction of this section, the authority of the commission did not encroach on the judicial branch. Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007).

Jurisdiction. —

Although AS 23.30.007(a) , AS 23.30.008(a) , AS 23.30.125(b) , and AS 23.30.128(b) , when construed together, do not explicitly give the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission jurisdiction over discretionary review of non-final Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decisions, the Commission has implied jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals. Thus, the Commission did not err in reviewing a venue decision in a medical care dispute. Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341 (Alaska 2011).

Sec. 23.30.008. Powers and duties of the commission.

  1. The commission shall be the exclusive and final authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under this chapter in those matters that have been appealed to the commission, except for an appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court. The commission does not have jurisdiction in any case that does not arise under this chapter or in any criminal case. On any matter taken to the commission, the decision of the commission is final and conclusive, unless appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, and shall stand in lieu of the order of the board from which the appeal was taken. Unless reversed by the Alaska Supreme Court, decisions of the commission have the force of legal precedent.
  2. The commission, in its administrative capacity, shall maintain, index, and make available for public inspection the final administrative decisions and orders of the commission and of the board. The chair of the commission may review and circulate among the other members of the relevant commission appeal panel the drafts of the panel’s formal decisions and decisions upon reconsideration. The drafts are confidential documents and are not subject to disclosure.
  3. The chair of the commission shall draft and propose, and the commission in its administrative capacity may adopt, regulations implementing the commission’s authority and duties under this chapter, including rules of procedure and evidence for proceedings before the commission under this chapter. The provisions of AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) apply to the adoption of regulations by the commission.
  4. In an appeal, the commission shall award a successful party reasonable costs and, if the party is represented by an attorney, attorney fees that the commission determines to be fully compensatory and reasonable. However, the commission may not make an award of attorney fees against an injured worker unless the commission finds that the worker’s position on appeal was frivolous or unreasonable or the appeal was taken in bad faith.
  5. The commission, in its administrative capacity, may adopt and alter an official seal and do all things necessary, convenient, or desirable to carry out the powers expressly granted or necessarily implied in this chapter.

History. (§ 8 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Notes to Decisions

Creation of quasi-judicial agency. —

Creation of Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was quasi-judicial, and it was properly established; the authority of the commission did not encroach on the judicial branch. This section could be read to encroach on judicial functions if it meant that decisions of the commission could serve as precedent for courts or other administrative agencies, but the judiciary retained judical review over the agency’s actions. Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007).

Jurisdiction. —

Although AS 23.30.007(a) , AS 23.30.008(a) , AS 23.30.125(b) , and AS 23.30.128(b) , when construed together, do not explicitly give the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission jurisdiction over discretionary review of non-final Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decisions, the Commission has implied jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals. Thus, the Commission did not err in reviewing a venue decision in a medical care dispute. Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341 (Alaska 2011).

Appeal not frivolous. —

In a case in which a mother sought workers' compensation death benefits or other damages related to her daughter's death, the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in awarding attorney fees to the daughter's employer because the mother's appeal to the Workers' Compensation Commission was not unreasonable or frivolous. Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 135, 205 L. Ed. 2d 48 (U.S. 2019).

Attorney fees not awarded absent showing of bad faith. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission erred in affirming the decision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board ordering an employee to reimburse his employer for workers’ compensation benefits he received while he was working and directing him to pay his employer’s attorney fees. The employee was not required to pay the employer’s appellate attorney fees for a frivolous appeal where he prevailed on most issues and there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the employee. Shehata v. Salvation Army, 225 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2010).

Attorney fees awarded. —

Analogizing to Alaska R. App. P. 508(g)(2), a workers’ compensation claimant was a “successful party” under this section for purposes of an attorney’s fee award on appeal to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission where she obtained the remedy requested. Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage, 249 P.3d 1063 (Alaska 2011).

In light of the statutory mandate that the successful party in an appeal was entitled to fully compensable and reasonable attorney's fees, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission's decision to award a claimant only half of the claimant's attorney's fees was legal error as the claimant was successful on appeal in that what the claimant obtained through litigation was more than the employer's proposed settlement. Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019).

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission abused its discretion when it lowered the hourly rate for a claimant's attorney and disallowed one of the attorney's time entries as the Commission did not have an evidentiary basis for doing so. However, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by excluding entries for paralegal supervision because the relevant time entries were vague and did not clearly indicate that the attorney was adding value to the work as opposed to training the attorney's staff. Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019).

Award of attorney fees to non-claimants. —

For purposes of subsection (d), even though one non-claimant can get an attorney’s fee award in an appeal when it litigates against another non-claimant, there is no reason to disregard the success of the other non-claimant in the event that both non-claimants are successful on a significant issue. State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014).

Award of attorney fees and costs to non-claimant. —

Litigants other than claimants may be entitled to attorney fees and costs under AS 23.30.008(d) in an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission appeal. State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014).

Who is entitled to fees. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission’s decision awarding the employer full attorney’s fees under AS 23.30.008(d) was reversed where the commission failed to consider the Division of Workers’ Compensation’s partial success in the appeal. State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014).

Applied in

Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009).

Stated in

Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Cited in

Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 23.30.009. Powers and duties of the chair of the commission.

  1. The chair of the commission shall exercise general supervision over the office of the commission and over appeals and shall direct the administrative functions of the commission. The chair of the commission shall serve as the executive officer of the commission and shall have authority in all administrative matters relating to the members. The chair may
    1. employ and supervise commission staff and appoint a commission clerk;
    2. establish and implement a time management system for the commission members and staff and manage the calendar of appeals;
    3. assign the work of the commission members and staff so that appeals are resolved as expeditiously and competently as possible;
    4. advise and cooperate with the board to develop appropriate procedures for maintenance and transfer of hearing files and the preservation and transfer of records on appeal; and
    5. prepare an annual budget of the commission.
  2. The chair of the commission shall preside over hearings and arguments on appeals. The chair of the commission shall ensure that all functions of the commission are performed with due regard for the rights of all parties and consistent with the orderly and prompt resolution of appeals. The chair of the commission shall rule on questions of procedure and advise the representative members of the commission on matters of law.
  3. The chair of the commission shall, not later than March 15 of each year, make available to the public and file with the lieutenant governor a report regarding the commission for the prior calendar year, including data regarding time periods between initial receipt and final decisions on appeals.
  4. The chair of the commission shall devote full time to the duties of the chair of the commission and may not engage in any other employment or business. The chair of the commission may not hold any other office or position under the United States, this state, any municipality or political subdivision of this state, or any tribal government or corporation. The chair of the commission may not hold office or position in a partisan political organization or party.

History. (§ 8 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Sec. 23.30.010. Coverage.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, compensation or benefits are payable under this chapter for disability or death or the need for medical treatment of an employee if the disability or death of the employee or the employee’s need for medical treatment arose out of and in the course of the employment. To establish a presumption under AS 23.30.120(a)(1) that the disability or death or the need for medical treatment arose out of and in the course of the employment, the employee must establish a causal link between the employment and the disability or death or the need for medical treatment. A presumption may be rebutted by a demonstration of substantial evidence that the death or disability or the need for medical treatment did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. When determining whether or not the death or disability or need for medical treatment arose out of and in the course of the employment, the board must evaluate the relative contribution of different causes of the disability or death or the need for medical treatment. Compensation or benefits under this chapter are payable for the disability or death or the need for medical treatment if, in relation to other causes, the employment is the substantial cause of the disability or death or need for medical treatment.
  2. Compensation and benefits under this chapter are not payable for mental injury caused by mental stress, unless it is established that (1) the work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to pressures and tensions experienced by individuals in a comparable work environment; and (2) the work stress was the predominant cause of the mental injury. The amount of work stress shall be measured by actual events. A mental injury is not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment if it results from a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or similar action taken in good faith by the employer.

History. (§ 33(1) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 9 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For employees subject to this chapter, see AS 23.30.230 23.30.244 .

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Opinions of attorney general. —

An employee who is a resident of Alaska and is employed by an Alaska resident employer, but who is injured in the scope of his employment while on a temporary, emergency job in Canada, is entitled to compensation under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board has jurisdiction over the case. 1960 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 35.

A business firm of foreign nationals who are acting as consultants for an Alaska fish products company is covered by the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1966 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 9.

As to employment status of state board and commission members with regard to coverage under the state’s Workmen’s Compensation Act, see 1969 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior law.

Constitutionality. —

As it relates to the freedom of agreement respecting employment, the Workmen’s Compensation Act is fairly supportable on the ground that it is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 248 F. 407, 4 Alaska Fed. 666 (9th Cir. Alaska 1918).

Workers’ compensation acts, to be constitutional, must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or fundamentally unjust or oppressive. Territory v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 9 Alaska 360 (D. Alaska 1938), aff'd, Alaska v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 105 F.2d 841, 9 Alaska 557 (9th Cir. Alaska 1939).

Applicability. —

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for an employer in a wrongful death suit brought by the decedent’s estate because genuine issues of material facts remained as to whether the decedent was “on-shift” or “off-shift” when his injury occurred, and there was an issue as to whether the employer authorized the decedent’s use of an ATV. Estate of Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc., 145 P.3d 533 (Alaska 2006).

Ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-related injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967); Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Theory of compensation legislation is that the costs of all industrial accidents should be borne by the consumer as a part of the cost of the product. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

The principle that inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise should be included in the costs of operation and, therefore, the burden distributed among those benefited by the enterprise has been recognized by every state in the enactment of workmen’s compensation laws whereby employees may recover compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment without reference to negligence on the part of employers. The costs to the employers are distributed to the public in the price of the product. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).

Purposes of Workers’ Compensation Law. —

The chief purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Law is to do away with the old disputed questions of negligence, assumption of risk, etc., as well as to remove the uncertainty of juries’ findings as to the amount of damages recoverable, and provides that employees injured shall have a specific recovery for specific injuries, and the heirs dependent upon the deceased shall also have a specific compensation. Johnson v. Ellamar Mining Co., 5 Alaska 740 (D. Alaska 1917).

One of the objectives of the workers’ compensation system is to provide support for those made destitute by the death of their provider. Juneau Lumber Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 122 F. Supp. 663, 15 Alaska 101 (D. Alaska 1954).

In substituting certainty of compensation for the hazards of litigation of work-related injuries, it is too clear to require discussion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was intended to comprehend and govern all the interacting relations of employee, fellow employee and employer. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

The purpose of workers’ compensation is to compensate the victims of work-related injury for a part of their economic loss, measured by the wage loss to the worker or the surviving family. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Another important purpose of workers’ compensation laws is to provide a simple and inexpensive remedy for claimant’s benefit. Johnson v. Ellamar Mining Co., 5 Alaska 740 (D. Alaska 1917).

One major purpose of workmen’s compensation acts is to furnish a simple, speedy remedy for injured workers whereby they may be compensated for injuries arising out of their employment. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Presumption of compensability. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission erred in deciding that an employer rebutted the presumption of compensability because the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board carefully considered each doctor’s opinion, and it correctly determined that none of the doctors provided substantial evidence of another cause for the employee’s injury; the doctors’ opinions did not show that the employee’s work-related scratch could not have been the entry point for the bacteria that caused the infection. Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Claimant through the medical records and the claimant's own testimony attached the presumption of compensability because the claimant showed that the claimant's work-related psychological condition of post-traumatic stress disorder was disabling shortly after the claimant was shot in the face with a pellet gun while working as an asset-protection worker at a retail store. Vue v. Walmart Assocs., 475 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2020).

Liberal construction. —

The Workmen’s Compensation Act should receive a fair and liberal construction in consonance with its purposes. Killisnoo Packing Co. v. Scott, 14 F.2d 86, 5 Alaska Fed. 310 (9th Cir. Alaska 1926); Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

The act should be construed so as to effectuate its purpose to provide prompt and adequate recovery for injuries. Dierks v. Alaska Air Transp., 109 F. Supp. 695, 14 Alaska 159 (D. Alaska 1953).

The Workmen’s Compensation Act should be given a practical construction and application. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

Trend has been toward liberalization rather than restriction. —

In the evolution of the workers’ compensation system the trend has been toward enlargement and liberalization of its provisions rather than contraction and restriction. Juneau Lumber Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 122 F. Supp. 663, 15 Alaska 101 (D. Alaska 1954).

No retroactive effect unless clear legislative intent shown. —

Workmen’s compensation acts should be liberally construed in favor of the employee, but statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and will not be given a retroactive effect, unless by express terms or necessary implication it clearly appears that that was the legislative intent. Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

There are four basic types of disability compensation payable under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act: (1) temporary total disability, (2) temporary partial disability, (3) permanent total disability and (4) permanent partial disability. Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

Terms may not be rejected. —

The compensation act does not authorize rejection of its terms under any circumstances. Grant v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 355 (D. Alaska 1947).

Benefits relate to loss of earning capacity. —

The basic principle of all workers’ compensation laws is that benefits relate to loss of earning capacity and not to physical injury as such. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

But there is no indication that statutory scheme envisions multiple payments by employer. Admiralty Alaska Gold Mining Co. v. Benson, 17 Alaska 727 (D. Alaska 1958).

Injuries from purely maritime cause not compensable. —

Injuries sustained by a sailor deckhand on a motor towboat on navigable waters near the Territory of Alaska were from a purely maritime cause, and not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 186 F.2d 1015, 13 Alaska 178 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

But act may apply if situation involves merely local matter. —

Even though there is admiralty jurisdiction over torts committed on navigable waters, the local Workmen’s Compensation Act may nevertheless apply if the situation involves merely a local matter. Sunny Point Packing Co. v. Faigh, 63 F.2d 921, 5 Alaska Fed. 691 (9th Cir. Alaska 1933).

And injury in nonmaritime employment on navigable waters is within act. —

Where the injury resulting in the death of the decedent occurred on navigable waters, and he was engaged in a nonmaritime employment, the case comes within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Bishop, 24 F.2d 63, 5 Alaska Fed. 405 (9th Cir. Alaska 1928).

Medical benefits included in “compensation”. —

AS 23.30.045(a) and this section use the word “compensation” so that the only reasonable reading of the word would include medical benefits. Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

“Wife” defined. —

“Wife” has not been defined statutorily and has no technical meaning in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 et seq., so the Supreme Court of Alaska looks to common usage, where the word ordinarily refers to a married woman. “Spouse” is commonly known to mean husband or wife, by the same token, “wife” is commonly known to mean “spouse,” or a “married woman,” and “marriage” has been defined by AS 25.05.011 of the Alaska Marriage Code. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Rights of employee are defined by statute in force during employer-employee relationship. Cropley v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 131 F. Supp. 34, 15 Alaska 531 (D. Alaska 1955).

Whether the employee has a claim cognizable at common law or a silicosis claim under the compensation act depends on the provisions of the compensation act in effect during the period of employment, but the quantitative extent of the remedy is not determinable until disability ensues; thus, no right to compensation accrues if there is no occupational disease coverage during employment. Cropley v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 131 F. Supp. 34, 15 Alaska 531 (D. Alaska 1955).

Median between disallowing compensation and compensating all injuries. —

It is both possible and desirable to locate a median between disallowing compensation and compensating all injuries which, by any thread of causation, may be connected with an earlier compensable injury. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Substantial cause of injury. —

Employee’s work- related injuries were not the substantial cause of her current disability and need for medical treatment where the medical evidence pointed to her preexisting orthopedic problems as the substantial cause of her disability and need for medical treatment of her knees, back, and neck. Buchinsky v. Arc of Anchorage, — P.3d — (Alaska May 25, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Alaska Workers' Compensation Board correctly concluded that the claimant's two injuries, which occurred 10 years apart, were the causes it needed to consider in determining the "substantial cause" of the claimant's need for medical attention, and it correctly determined that the second injury was the substantial cause of the need for medical treatment because that injury occurred almost 10 years after the first injury and, in that time, the claimant had not sought medical treatment for the previously injured knee. Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr., 440 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2019).

Compensation is not to be barred because risk is not generally recognized or because only those unusually susceptible or predisposed to a given disease will contract it. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Disability flowing from traumatic neurosis is compensable. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

A worker should be compensated if the accident was “a precipitating factor” in any disability resulting from traumatic neurosis causally related to the employment. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Aggravation of preexisting condition would in fact be compensable. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

A preexisting disease or infirmity does not disqualify a claim under the work-connection requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability from which compensation is sought. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

A claimant is entitled to compensation if any of the incidents of his employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with his disease or infirmity to produce disability. Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970).

Earlier compensable injury contributing to later nonindustrial injury. —

If the earlier compensable injury is a substantial factor contributing to the later nonindustrial injury, then the later injury is compensable. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Turner, 611 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980).

A neck injury sustained by the employee in the earlier work-related accident played a substantial role in causing the automobile accident which took his life. Therefore, the later injury was compensable. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

A carrier must compensate for death sustained as a result of a nonindustrial accident substantially caused by a physical defect or impairment which is work-related and compensable. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Pulp mill employee who was receiving temporary total disability benefits when he subsequently suffered a heart attack during a strike against the mill was not an employee of the union which represented the striking employees, and the union was therefore not responsible for workers’ compensation benefits under the last injurious exposure rule. Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 791 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1990).

Whether employment contributed to result. —

The question in a particular case of whether the employment did contribute to the final result is one of fact which is usually determined from medical testimony. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Compensation for emotional distress. —

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act does not provide compensation for emotional distress which does not result in permanent or partial disability. Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).

No irrebuttable presumption. —

Employee’s case did not involve an irrebuttable presumption, even though the employer’s task in rebutting the presumption became more difficult after the Alaska Workers’ Compensation made its finding about an injury’s existence, because the uncertainty in the case was resolved through the use of the presumption of compensability; difficulty in finding and presenting additional evidence is not equivalent to creating an irrebuttable presumption. Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

When denial of jurisdiction is error. —

When a party’s only effective remedy is before the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board, to deny jurisdiction because of a civil action which is pending only in a technical sense is error. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd. v. Marsh, 550 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1976).

Claim not rendered action for declaratory relief. —

The pursuit of any compensation claim for an employee’s injuries involves an initial determination of the employee status of the applicant. That the board might find that the injuries occurred outside the scope of employment, and that it might, therefore, determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, does not render a claim an action for declaratory relief. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd. v. Marsh, 550 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

Seward v. Wisdom, 413 P.2d 931 (Alaska 1966); Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966); Butts v. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 467 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2020); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

Simon v. Alaska Wood Prods., 633 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1981); Gaede v. Saunders, 53 P.3d 1126 (Alaska 2002); Buckley v. Am. Fast Freight, Inc., 444 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2019); Leigh v. Alaska Children's Servs., 467 P.3d 222 (Alaska 2020); Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 674 et seq.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 826-835.

Injury sustained while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment. 47 ALR3d 566.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action. 83 ALR5th 103.

Sec. 23.30.011. Extraterritorial coverage.

  1. If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of which the employee, or in the event of the employee’s death, the employee’s dependents, would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this chapter had the injury occurred in this state, the employee or, in the event of the employee’s death resulting from the injury, the employee’s dependents shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this chapter, if at the time of the injury
    1. the employee’s employment is principally localized in this state;
    2. the employee is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment not principally localized in any state;
    3. the employee is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment principally localized in another state whose workers’ compensation law is not applicable to the employee’s employer; or
    4. the employee is working under a contract of hire made in this state for employment outside the United States and Canada.
  2. The payment or award of benefits under the workers’ compensation law of another state, territory, province, or foreign nation to an employee or the employee’s dependents otherwise entitled on account of the injury or death to the benefits under this chapter is not a bar to a claim for benefits under this chapter; however, a claim under this chapter must be filed within the time limits set out in this chapter. If compensation is paid or awarded under this section
    1. the medical and related benefits furnished or paid for by the employer under another workers’ compensation law on account of the injury or death shall be credited against the medical and related benefits to which the employee would have been entitled under this chapter had claim been made solely under this chapter;
    2. the amount of all income benefits paid or awarded the employee under another workers’ compensation law shall be credited against the total amount of income benefits which would have been due the employee under this chapter had claim been made solely under this chapter;
    3. the total amount of death benefits paid or awarded under another workers’ compensation law shall be credited against the total amount of death benefits due under this chapter.
  3. If an employee is entitled to the benefits of this chapter by reason of an injury sustained in this state in employment by an employer who is domiciled in another state and who has not secured the payment of compensation as required by this chapter, the employer or the employer’s carrier may file with the board a certificate, issued by the commission or agency of the other state having jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims, certifying that the employer has secured the payment of compensation under the workers’ compensation law of the other state and that with respect to that injury the employee is entitled to the benefits provided under that law.  In that event
    1. the filing of the certificate shall constitute an appointment by the employer or the employer’s carrier of the board as the employer’s agent for acceptance of the service of process in a proceeding brought by the employee or the employee’s dependents to enforce the employee’s or their rights under this chapter on account of the injury;
    2. the board shall send to the employer or carrier, by registered or certified mail to the address shown on the certificate, a true copy of any notice of claim or other process served on the director by the employee or the employee’s dependents in any proceeding brought to enforce the employee’s or their rights under this chapter;
    3. if the employer is a qualified self-insurer under the workers’ compensation law of the other state, the employer, upon submission of evidence satisfactory to the board of the employer’s ability to meet the employer’s liability to the employee under this chapter, shall be considered to be a qualified self-insurer under this chapter;
    4. if the employer’s liability under the workers’ compensation law of another state is insured, the employer’s carrier, as to the employee or the employee’s dependents only, shall be considered to be an insurer authorized to write insurance under and be subject to this chapter; however, unless its contract with the employer requires it to pay an amount equivalent to the compensation benefits provided by this chapter, its liability for income benefits or medical and related benefits may not exceed the amounts of the benefits for which the insurer would have been liable under the workers’ compensation law of the other state;
    5. if the amount for which the employer’s insurance is liable under (3) and (4) of this subsection is less than the total of the compensation benefits to which the employee is entitled under this chapter, the board may, if it considers it necessary, require the employer to file security satisfactory to the board to secure the payment of benefits due the employee or the employee’s dependents under this chapter; and
    6. upon compliance with the preceding requirements of this subsection, the employer, as to the employee only, shall be considered to have secured the payment of compensation under this chapter.
  4. In this section
    1. “carrier” includes an insurance company licensed to write workers’ compensation insurance in a state of the United States or a state or provincial fund that insures employers against their liabilities under a workers’ compensation law;
    2. a person’s employment is “principally localized” in this or another state when (A) the person’s employer has a place of business in this or the other state and the person regularly works at or from that place of business, or (B), if (A) of this paragraph is not applicable, the person is domiciled and spends a substantial part of the person’s working time in the service of an employer in this or the other state; an employee whose duties require the employee to travel regularly in the service of an employer in this and one or more other states may, by written agreement with the employer, provide that the employment is principally localized in this or another state, and unless the other state refuses jurisdiction, the agreement shall be given effect under this chapter;
    3. “state” includes a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or a province of Canada;
    4. “United States” includes only the states of the United States and the District of Columbia;
    5. “workers’ compensation law” includes “occupational disease law.”

History. (§ 1 ch 180 SLA 1975)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 23.30.106 . Renumbered in 1981. Subsection (d) was reorganized in 1984 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order.

Sec. 23.30.012. Agreements in regard to claims.

  1. At any time after death, or after 30 days subsequent to the date of the injury, the employer and the employee or the beneficiary or beneficiaries, as the case may be, have the right to reach an agreement in regard to a claim for injury or death under this chapter, but a memorandum of the agreement in a form prescribed by the director shall be filed with the division. Otherwise, the agreement is void for any purpose. Except as provided in (b) of this section, an agreement filed with the division discharges the liability of the employer for the compensation, notwithstanding the provisions of AS 23.30.130 , 23.30.160 , and 23.30.245 , and is enforceable as a compensation order.
  2. The agreement shall be reviewed by a panel of the board if the claimant or beneficiary is not represented by an attorney licensed to practice in this state, the beneficiary is a minor or incompetent, or the claimant is waiving future medical benefits. If approved by the board, the agreement is enforceable the same as an order or award of the board and discharges the liability of the employer for the compensation notwithstanding the provisions of AS 23.30.130 , 23.30.160 , and 23.30.245 . The agreement shall be approved by the board only when the terms conform to the provisions of this chapter, and, if it involves or is likely to involve permanent disability, the board may require an impartial medical examination and a hearing in order to determine whether or not to approve the agreement. A lump-sum settlement may be approved when it appears to be to the best interest of the employee or beneficiary or beneficiaries.

History. (§ 7(8) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 5 ch 42 SLA 1962; am § 2 ch 99 SLA 1966; am § 10 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 23.30.210(b). Renumbered in 1981.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Board’s authority. —

This section does not limit the authority of the board to set aside a compromise and release obtained fraudulently. Blanas v. Brower Co., 938 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1997).

Board approval of settlement agreement. —

Statute does not always require Alaska Workers' Compensation Board approval for a settlement agreement to be enforceable as a compensation order. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Jurisdiction. —

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board had jurisdiction to approve an employee’s settlement despite the fact that the employee also brought a maritime claim against his employer because the Board did not act to enforce or approve a settlement of the maritime claim, but only asked to see that settlement to determine if the employee’s settlement of the employee’s workers’ compensation claim was in the employee’s best interests. Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 316 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1004, 134 S. Ct. 1516, 188 L. Ed. 2d 452 (U.S. 2014).

Form parties used for a global settlement agreement could not expand an agency's jurisdiction, and the statute did not transmute funds paid for a civil settlement into workers' compensation benefits. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Because the settlement agreement contained provisions related to the wrongful death claim, the board did not have jurisdiction over all of its aspects; the board only had jurisdiction to dismiss the workers' compensation claim. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Waiver of board’s filing requirements. —

The Worker’s Compensation Board is empowered by the Administrative Code to determine whether its filing requirements may be waived. The Board was required to determine whether the death of an employee before signing a negotiated compromise and release, which had been signed by the employer, waived its signature requirements. Cole v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 850 P.2d 642 (Alaska 1993).

Municipal employer’s fraud claim settlement did not have to be “in a form prescribed by the director,” under AS 23.30.012(a) , because the statute did not apply to a fraud petition. The petition was not a claim for “injury” under AS 23.30.395 , so the existence of a settlement could be determined from the parties’ correspondence. Municipality of Anchorage v. Stenseth, 361 P.3d 898 (Alaska 2015).

Best interest of employee. —

Significant discrepancies within the terms and language of a compromise and release, including waiver of employee’s entitlement to a pain management clinic when nearly all doctors recommended that he receive such treatment or further evaluation for pain management, were sufficient call into question whether the settlement was in the employee’s best interest. Kaiser v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 89 P.3d 740 (Alaska 2004).

Section does not require an impartial medical examination nor a hearing. —

In a workers’ compensation case, neither a hearing nor an impartial medical examination is required by this section; the Workers’ Compensation Board has discretion to order a medical examination or to hold a hearing, but it is not required to do so. However, AS 23.30.110(c) required the parties to appear at the scheduled hearing because they entered into the settlement only one week before the originally scheduled hearing date. Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009).

Relief from fraudulently obtained compromise and release. —

A permissible way to seek relief from a board-approved compromise and release on the ground it was obtained fraudulently was to petition the board to set aside or modify the compromise and release in the same workers’ compensation case it was intended to resolve. Blanas v. Brower Co., 938 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1997).

The one-year limitation in Rule 60(b), R. Civ. P., did not apply to a petition asking the board to set aside a compromise and release which was allegedly obtained fraudulently; thus, a distinction between “regular” fraud and fraud upon the court had no bearing on the timeliness of the petition. Blanas v. Brower Co., 938 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1997).

The one-year limitation in AS 23.30.130 did not apply to a petition asking the Workers’ Compensation Board to set aside a compromise and release which was allegedly obtained fraudulently. Blanas v. Brower Co., 938 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1997).

Employer can use “last injurious exposure” rule as a defense to liability where the employee has settled with the last employer who was potentially liable and was properly before the Board. Peek v. SKW/Clinton, 855 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1993).

Oral agreement for dismissal with prejudice of a claim for medical costs was “an agreement in regard to a claim” within the meaning of this section and was void. Lindekugel v. Fluor Alaska, 934 P.2d 1307 (Alaska 1997).

Lump-sum settlements. —

Worker maintained the Alaska Worker’s Compenstion Board abused its discretion when it approved a lump-sum settlement; however, the money the worker received was the result of a compromise of his claim and not commutation of his award into a lump sum. Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079 (Alaska 2008).

Putative agreement held void. —

Claimant's attempts to set aside the partial settlement or to enforce the putative medical benefits agreement was rejected because the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act foreclosed the possibility of modifying or amending the partial compromise and release agreement based on a mistake of fact; the claimant accepted the money the employer sent him to fulfill its obligation under the agreement; no agreement about the claimant's medical benefits met the administrative requirements that the agreement be in writing and signed by both parties; and any putative agreement about those benefits was void under this statute. McKee v. Alaska Functional Fitness, LLC, — P.3d — (Alaska Feb. 13, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Employee’s claim precluded by settlement. —

By settling with the last employer, widow of employee accepted the risk that the Workers’ Compensation Board might find that employer to be the last employer to substantially contribute to employee’s death. Peek v. SKW/Clinton, 855 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1993).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board did not err by refusing to set aside a settlement agreement between an injured worker and his former employer; substantial evidence in the record supported the Board’s decision that the worker was competent when he signed the compromise and release agreement, because he was represented by counsel and his doctor testified that he was competent. Milton v. UIC Constr., — P.3d — (Alaska Aug. 21, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Res judicata prevented a claimant from setting aside a settlement and reopening his workers' compensation claim where he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate regulatory compliance when the settlement agreement was approved, and the issues of medical stability, the claimant's best interest, and other issues were considered or could have been raised at that time. Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Form of settlement agreement. —

Appellant elected a civil remedy and the tort settlement and workers' compensation claim dismissal were merged into one global settlement agreement; the board's approval of the workers' compensation claim dismissal did not change the nature of the underlying settlement. Using two documents rather than one might have avoided some of this litigation, but nothing in the statute prohibited the settlement agreement form the parties used. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Agreements not modifiable due to fact mistake. —

AS 23.30.012 provides that approved settlement agreements discharge the liability of the employer for compensation notwithstanding AS 23.30.130 (modification of awards). This is an expression of legislative intent that approved agreements may not be modified because of unilateral or mutual mistakes of fact. Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 856 P.2d 1155 (Alaska 1993).

Applied in

Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008).

Stated in

Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

McShea v. State, Dep't of Labor, 685 P.2d 1242 (Alaska 1984); Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997).

Collateral references. —

What constitutes duress by employer or former employer vitiating release by employee of claims arising out of employment. 30 ALR4th 294.

Workers’ compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment. 26 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sec. 23.30.015. Compensation where third persons are liable.

  1. If on account of disability or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter the person entitled to the compensation believes that a third person other than the employer or a fellow employee is liable for damages, the person need not elect whether to receive compensation or to recover damages from the third person.
  2. Acceptance of compensation under an award in a compensation order filed by the board operates as an assignment to the employer of all rights of the person entitled to compensation and the personal representative of a deceased employee to recover damages from the third person unless the person or representative entitled to compensation commences an action against the third person within one year after an award.
  3. Payment of compensation into the second-injury fund as a result of death operates as an assignment to the employer of all rights of the representative of the deceased to recover damages from the third person.
  4. An employer under an assignment may either institute proceedings for the recovery of damages or may compromise with a third person, either without or after instituting an action.
  5. An amount recovered by the employer under an assignment, whether by action or compromise, shall be distributed as follows:
    1. the employer shall retain an amount equal to
      1. the expenses incurred by the employer with respect to the action or compromise, including a reasonable attorney fee determined by the board;
      2. the cost of all benefits actually furnished by the employer under this chapter;
      3. all amounts paid as compensation and second-injury fund payments, and if the employer is self-insured or uninsured, all service fees paid under AS 23.05.067 ;
      4. the present value of all amounts payable later as compensation, computed from a schedule prepared by the board, and the present value of the cost of all benefits to be furnished later under AS 23.30.095 as estimated by the board; the amounts so computed and estimated shall be retained by the employer as a trust fund to pay compensation and the cost of benefits as they become due and to pay any finally remaining excess sum to the person entitled to compensation or to the representative; and
    2. the employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation or to the representative of that person.
  6. Even if an employee, the employee’s representative, or the employer brings an action or settles a claim against the third person, the employer shall pay the benefits and compensation required by this chapter.
  7. If the employee or the employee’s representative recovers damages from the third person, the employee or representative shall promptly pay to the employer the total amounts paid by the employer under (e)(1)(A) — (C) of this section insofar as the recovery is sufficient after deducting all litigation costs and expenses. Any excess recovery by the employee or representative shall be credited against any amount payable by the employer thereafter. If the employer is allocated a percentage of fault under AS 09.17.080 , the amount due the employer under this subsection shall be reduced by an amount equal to the employer’s equitable share of damages assessed under AS 09.17.080(c) .
  8. If compromise with a third person is made by the person entitled to compensation or the representative of that person of an amount less than the compensation to which the person or representative would be entitled, the employer is liable for compensation stated in (f) of this section only if the compromise is made with the employer’s written approval.
  9. If the employer is insured and the carrier has assumed the payment of compensation, the carrier shall be subrogated to all the rights of the employer.
  10. Notice of the commencement of an action against a third party shall be given to the division and to all interested parties within 30 days.

History. (§ 30 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 7 ch 42 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 73 SLA 1965; am § 2 ch 75 SLA 1977; am § 36 ch 26 SLA 1997; am § 3 ch 89 SLA 2000; am §§ 11, 12 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For severability of the provisions of ch. 26, SLA 1997, see § 56, ch. 26, SLA 1997 in the 1997 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Opinions of attorney general. —

When a carrier voluntarily pays all compensation due in a compensable claim under an award in a compensation order filed by the workmen’s compensation board, the carrier is not subrogated to the right of the employee to sue a third party tort-feasor within one year following the effective date of the award. 1966 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1.

A carrier can legally enter into an agreement with the workers in a compensable claim to sue a third party and to provide that the proceeds of the suit would be assigned as provided in this section. 1966 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Clear purpose of this section is to allow employees to seek damages from third-party tortfeasors without jeopardizing their compensation while, at the same time, allowing employers to share in damage awards up to the limit of their exposure under the workers’ compensation law. Forest v. Safeway Stores, 830 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1992).

AS 23.30.015(a) indicates that the legislature was concerned with an employee’s election of remedies in cases involving multiple cause disabilities. Forest v. Safeway Stores, 830 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1992).

Failure to get written approval of settlement with third-party.—

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission did not err in deciding that the employee did not substantially comply with this section, as nothing indicated that the employee's counsel ever told the employer about the workers' compensation claim but only told the employer's underinsured motorist carrier about the settlement, which did not necessarily impart knowledge to the employer. Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018).

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission (Commission) properly dismissed an employee's appeal of a decision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board because the employee (1) offered no argument as to why the Commission erred when dismissing the employee's claim for failure to obtain an employer's required consent to settle a related personal injury case, and (2) did not explain why the employee's appeal was filed late. Lunbeck v. First Grp. Am., Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 28, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Suit against third party for aggravation of existing injury. —

It does not follow from the language of this section, taken in its entirety, that an employee who sues a third party for aggravation of a existing work-related injury forfeits his or her right to all compensation, both for the initial injury and for the aggravation, simply because the employer was excluded from settlement negotiations; such an interpretation would result in a windfall for the employer, and it would also constitute a particularly harsh penalty for an injured worker who would end up paying for what is undoubtedly an attorney’s blunder. Forest v. Safeway Stores, 830 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1992).

Right of insurer to intervene. —

An insurer who pays compensation under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act can intervene in a negligence action by the injured employee against a third party for the injuries and is entitled to be subrogated to the extent of compensation paid without an award having been made by the board. Johnson v. Standard Oil Co., 30 F.R.D. 329 (D. Alaska 1962).

Insurer’s assignment of right to reimbursement. —

The assignment by a workers’ compensation insurer to another insurer of its right to reimbursement of workers’ compensation benefits under subsection (g) did not violate the general rule prohibiting assignment of tort actions for personal injuries, and the assignee could enforce its assigned right for the full amount of benefits paid the employee. Wichman v. Benner, 948 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1997).

Reassignment of cause of action. —

Where a cause of action for wrongful death had been assigned to the employer by operation of subsection (c) when it deposited $10,000 into the second-injury fund, the employer’s subsequent reassignment of the cause of action back to the deceased employee’s personal representative was valid, in the absence of any public policy against such reassignments. Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1988).

Reimbursement from third-party settlement. —

This section entitled an employer’s insurer to claim reimbursement from the proceeds generated in a third-party settlement and to enforce the claim as an equitable lien or under the constructive trust doctrine. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1999).

Legislative intent regarding subsection (f). —

Subsection (f) ensures prompt payment, because resolution of litigation can be protracted, and because the third-party litigation may be unsuccessful, and the risks for the employee would be much greater if employer payments of compensation and benefits would be forfeited by the institution of a third-party suit by the employee. McCarter v. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1994).

Subsection (g) held not unconstitutional. —

Worker could not establish that subsection (g) was unconstitutional, because there is no constitutional right to retain the proceeds of a third party settlement where the amount of the settlement plus the compensation benefits do not grant full legal redress to the injured worker. McCarter v. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1994).

Subsection (g) does not conflict with subsection (a), which provides that employees need not choose between remedies. McCarter v. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1994).

Legislative intent regarding subsection (g). —

See Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976); McCarter v. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1994).

Employer’s credit for future benefits. —

If an employee recovers an amount in excess of the compensation paid, the employee can keep it, subject to the employer’s credit for future benefits that would otherwise be paid. Stone v. Fluid Air Components of Alaska, 990 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1999).

Employer’s right to intervene to protect lien. —

Where an injured employee and third party tortfeasors settled the employee’s claim and then asked the superior court find the employer 25 percent at fault, the court erred when it denied the employer’s motion to intervene on the basis that the motion was untimely; the timing of the motion was reasonable and, if the finding against the employer was binding, then it had lost a chance to save its AS 23.30.015(g) lien. Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138 (Alaska 2005).

Determination of future benefits. —

The Workers’ Compensation Board has the authority to determine the present value of future benefits in the context of an employer’s claim against a third party, and a decision of the board which is supported by evidence that a reasonable person would accept will not be disturbed by the reviewing court. Stone v. Fluid Air Components of Alaska, 990 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1999).

Action for negligent inspection of workplace. —

There is nothing in the statutory language of the Alaska scheme which prevents an employee from bringing a negligence action against a carrier for negligent inspection of the employer’s workplace. Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989).

Proration of costs and fees. —

In order to insure that the employer’s compensation carrier is not unjustly enriched at the expense of the employee, the supreme court reads subsection (g) to require the proration between the carrier and the employee of litigation costs and attorney’s fees incurred by the employee in recovering from a third-party tort-feasor. Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

This section is construed to require a deduction from the amount reimbursed to the employer for the litigation expenses attributable to his share of the recovery. Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Where the carrier hired an attorney who was already obligated to represent decedent’s estate, to determine the applicability of the rule in Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976), that a compensation carrier is required to pay its pro rate share of litigation expenses (including attorney’s fees) incurred by an employee in recovering from a third-party tort-feasor, a distinction between “active” and “passive” representation had to be made: If the attorney’s independent efforts on the carrier’s behalf substantially contributed to the settlement, he should be able to recover the fees he sought, but if his efforts did not substantially contribute to the recovery, the Cooper rule applied, the carrier was obligated to make a pro rata contribution to the estate attorneys’ fees, and the attorney should only recover as one of those attorneys. D.N. Corp. v. Hammond, 685 P.2d 1225 (Alaska 1984) (remanding for this determination).

An employer’s pro rata share of fees and costs should be based on both past and future benefits to the employer. Stone v. Fluid Air Components of Alaska, 990 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1999).

Proration must be according to ratio of total compensation payments to total recovery. Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Inclusion in medical costs calculation of projected inflation. —

There was no error in calculating future medical costs by taking into account projected inflation, since the use of that method did no more than recognize the same realities as the statute which provides that “future anticipated inflation” should be taken into account before applying a market discount rate. Stone v. Fluid Air Components of Alaska, 990 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1999).

When employer or fellow employee commits intentional tort, he can be considered to be outside the purview of subsection (a) of this section and can be treated as a third person. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

The exclusivity provision of AS 23.30.055 does not protect a fellow employee committing an intentional tort, despite the statute’s use of the terms “employer and any fellow employee.” Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Award of attorney’s fees to prevailing party. —

A third party alleged tortfeasor’s Rule 82 award (recovery of attorney’s fees as a prevailing party) is a “cost of litigation” which must be deducted from the settlement funds held in trust by an employee’s attorneys before the employer who has paid worker’s compensation benefits to the employee may obtain reimbursement under subsection (g). Williams v. Utility Equip., 837 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1992).

Employee’s options regarding disbursement. —

This section contemplates a net gain from third party actions and allows employers to be reimbursed from that gain. Plaintiffs, who are employees, control funds recovered from third parties while there are still pending claims against other defendants. A plaintiff may agree to an earlier disbursement to the employer and assume the risk that the cost of future litigation may exceed recovery, but he has the right to retain any funds recovered until all third-party claims are resolved. Williams v. Utility Equip., 837 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1992).

Reimbursement where employer is concurrently negligent. —

In light of the specific reimbursement provision in subsection (g) of this section, the appropriate forum for resolution of the issue of whether, in light of the policies behind adoption of comparative negligence in this state, this section should be construed to deny reimbursement from third-party defendants where the employer is shown to be concurrently negligent is with the legislature. Arctic Structures v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).

Reimbursement where physician is negligent. —

The employer is entitled to be reimbursed for compensation paid for injuries caused by the negligence of a physician. Ribar v. H & S Earthmovers, 618 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1980).

Reduction of credit. —

Because the language of this provision requires a credit reduction by any “amount payable” by the employer and does not preclude such an offset when collateral sources pay for medical benefits, where an employer would be otherwise responsible under the workers’ compensation statute for an employee’s medical expenses the employer’s credit decreases. Berger v. Wien Air Alaska, 995 P.2d 240 (Alaska 2000).

Set-off. —

If a general contractor who by operation of the contractor-under clause contained in AS 23.30.045(a) has been required to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the employee of an uninsured subcontractor is also found liable for damages at common law, he may set-off from that award the amount of compensation benefits he has previously paid to the subcontractor’s employee. Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1981).

Apportionment of damages. —

When the legislature enacted AS 09.17.080 , governing apportionment of damages, it left intact the exclusive liability and employer reimbursement provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).

Evidence of an employer’s negligence may be relevant and admissible in an employee’s action against third-party tortfeasors to prove that the employer was entirely at fault, or that the employer’s fault was a superseding cause of the injury. Under AS 09.17.080 , the finder of fact may allocate all or none of the total fault to the employer. It may not allocate only a portion of the total fault to the employer. Jury instructions must be carefully prepared to prevent a panel from attributing to the employee any negligence of the employer. Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).

Jury instructions. —

Trial court by giving its own workers' compensation instruction, rather that an airline passenger's preferred instruction on workers' compensation recovery, did not commit reversible error because the court's instruction properly told the jury not to consider any possible workers' compensation benefits that the passenger may have received. The passenger also failed to show prejudice as the jury never reached the issue of damages, and the potential of a double recovery by the passenger was unrelated to the negligence issue the jury addressed. Maurer v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska July 28, 2021) (memorandum decision).

Remand for apportionment of settlement proceeds. —

Case was remanded to the superior court with instructions to remand it to the workers’ compensation board to apportion the settlement proceeds received in a third-party action between the employee’s claim and his wife’s consortium claim, where the employer was entitled to a credit against future compensation payments for any “excess recovery by the employee” and no apportionment of proceeds had been made between the claims. Gossett v. Era Meyeres Real Estate, 787 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1990).

Rights and limitations under former statute. —

See Andersen v. Pacific S. S. Co., 8 Alaska 291 (D. Alaska 1931); Dierks v. Alaska Air Transp., 109 F. Supp. 695, 14 Alaska 159 (D. Alaska 1953); Ransom v. Haner, 174 F. Supp. 82 (D. Alaska 1959); Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1961).

Limitation of actions. —

See Dierks v. Alaska Air Transp., 109 F. Supp. 695, 14 Alaska 159 (D. Alaska 1953).

Applied in

Wilson v. Interior Airways, 384 P.2d 956 (Alaska 1963); Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1984); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. De Havilland Aircraft Co., 699 P.2d 355 (Alaska 1985).

Quoted in

Industrial Indem. Co. v. State, 669 P.2d 561 (Alaska 1983); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 199 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2008); Mat-Su Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC v. Burkhead, 225 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2010); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1983); Tolan v. ERA Helicopters, 699 P.2d 1265 (Alaska 1985); Huf v. Arctic Alaska Drilling Co., 890 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1995); Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc., 9 P.3d 1013 (Alaska 2000); O'Donnell v. Johnson, 209 P.3d 128 (Alaska 2009).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 88-115, 374, 449-463.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 983-1045.

Statute of limitations applicable to action, by way of subrogation or the like, by employer or insurance carrier against third person for injury to employee. 41 ALR2d 1044.

Right to maintain action against fellow employee for injury or death covered by workmen’s compensation. 21 ALR3d 845; 57 ALR4th 888.

Modern status of effect of state workmen’s compensation act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman. 100 ALR3d 350.

Liability of employer with regard to inherently dangerous work for injuries to employees of independent contractor. 34 ALR4th 914.

Third-party tortfeasor’s right to have damages recovered by employee reduced by amount of employee’s workers’ compensation benefits. 43 ALR4th 849.

Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of Workers’ Compensation Law. 57 ALR4th 888.

Prejudicial effect of bringing to jury’s attention fact that plaintiff in personal injury or death action is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. 69 ALR4th 131.

“Dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee’s recovery for medical malpractice from company medical personnel. 73 ALR4th 115.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground for liability to third party. 13 ALR5th 289.

Exclusive remedy provision of federal employees’ compensation act (5 USCS § 8116(c)) as precluding recovery of contribution or indemnity from the United States by third-party tortfeasor for sums expended in satisfying or settling suit by injured government employee. 12 ALR Fed. 616.

Sec. 23.30.017. Immunity for third-party design professional.

  1. A person entitled to compensation under this chapter as a result of injury occurring at the job site of a construction project may not bring a civil action to recover damages for that injury against a design professional or an employee of a design professional who provides professional services for the construction project.
  2. This section does not apply to a person receiving compensation under this chapter who is injured at a job site at which the design professional or employee of the design professional
    1. specifically assumed responsibility for job site safety practices under a contract;
    2. actually exercises control over the premises where the injury occurred; or
    3. prepared design plans or specifications, the plans or specifications contributed to the injury, and the plans or specifications were prepared negligently, recklessly, or with intentional misconduct.
  3. In this section,
    1. “design professional” means a person registered under AS 08.48 as an architect, engineer, or land surveyor;
    2. “professional services” means services provided by a design professional that are within the scope of services for which the design professional is registered.

History. (§ 3 ch 75 SLA 1995; am § 7 ch 20 SLA 2002)

Sec. 23.30.020. Chapter part of contract of hire.

This chapter constitutes part of every contract of hire, express or implied, and every contract of hire shall be construed as an agreement on the part of the employer to pay and on the part of the employee to accept compensation in the manner provided in this chapter for all personal injuries sustained.

History. (§ 35 ch 193 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Relationship of employer-employee can only be created by contract, which may be express or implied. Selid Constr. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1960).

To establish the relationship of employer-employee for purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a contract of hire must have been entered into. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Former law construed. —

The rights of the employee are defined by the statute in force during the employer-employee relationship. Cropley v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 131 F. Supp. 34, 15 Alaska 531 (D. Alaska 1955).

On the contract theory based upon statutory provisions like those of this section, the courts have invariably denied recovery in cases in which it was shown that employment terminated before the extension of coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Cropley v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 131 F. Supp. 34, 15 Alaska 531 (D. Alaska 1955).

Quoted in

Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972); Eldridge v. Felec Servs, Inc., 920 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. Alaska 1990).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 14.

99 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 14.

Sec. 23.30.022. False statements by employee.

An employee who knowingly makes a false statement in writing as to the employee’s physical condition in response to a medical inquiry, or in a medical examination, after a conditional offer of employment may not receive benefits under this chapter if

  1. the employer relied upon the false representation and this reliance was a substantial factor in the hiring; and
  2. there was a causal connection between the false representation and the injury to the employee.

History. (§ 5 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 1 ch 45 SLA 1997)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 23.30.020(b). Renumbered in 1988.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Codification of “Larson test”. —

This section codifies the so-called “Larson test” for analyzing employee responses to employer questionnaires. Robinett v. Enserch Alaska Constr., 804 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1990).

Cited in

Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care, 297 P.3d 891 (Alaska 2013).

Collateral references. —

Eligibility for workers’ compensation as affected by claimant’s misrepresentation of health or physical condition at time of hiring. 12 ALR5th 658.

Sec. 23.30.025. Approval and coverage of insurance policies.

  1. An insurer may not enter into or issue a policy of insurance under this chapter until its policy form has been submitted to and approved by the director of the division of insurance. The director of the division of insurance may not approve the policy form of an insurance company until the company files with it the certificate of the director of the division of insurance showing that the company is authorized to transact the business of workers’ compensation insurance in the state. The filing of a policy form by an insurance company with the division of workers’ compensation for approval constitutes, on the part of the company, a conclusive and unqualified acceptance of the provisions of this chapter, and an agreement by it to be bound by them.
  2. All policies of insurance companies insuring the payment of compensation under this chapter are conclusively presumed to cover all the employees and the entire compensation liability of the insured employer employed at or in connection with the business of the employer carried on, maintained, or operated at the location or locations set forth in such policy or agreement.  A provision in a policy attempting to limit or modify the liability of the company issuing it is wholly void except as provided in this section.
  3. An insurer extending coverage required under this chapter by specifying Alaska in the other states section or similar provision of the insurance policy shall provide notice to the department under AS 23.30.085 .

History. (§ 40 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 6 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 34 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 13 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of subsection (b). —

The provisions of subsection (b) were enacted for the purpose of protecting employees in their right to hold the employer for the payment of compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. They do not, however, limit the right of an insurer and insured to contract as they might choose with reference to the liability of the former as an indemnifier of the latter, or of limiting their right to make their own agreement as to the basis for computing the premium to be paid for the obligations assumed. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Munz, 224 F. Supp. 954 (D. Alaska 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. Alaska 1964) (construing similar provisions of former ACLA 43-3-21).

Liability for payment. —

Insurer is obligated to make payment to the injured employee under this section irrespective of any policy exclusion. Munz v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 336 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. Alaska 1964).

But the employer impliedly agrees to reimburse the insurer if the latter is held liable under AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ) due to a loss which is excluded by the terms of the policy and for which the employer has paid no premiums. Munz v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 336 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. Alaska 1964).

Airplane trips not within coverage of policy. —

Airplane trips to remote fishing lodges for free recreation were not necessary, incidental, or appurtenant to, or connected with, the business of the employer under an insurance policy covering all operations of every nature incidental to employer’s hotel and bar. D. K. MacDonald & Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 555, 14 Alaska 483 (D. Alaska 1953). See also Underwriters at Lloyds v. Munz, 224 F. Supp. 954 (D. Alaska 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. Alaska 1964).

Apportionment of liability between insurance carriers rejected. —

See Underwriters at Lloyds v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 160 F. Supp. 248, 17 Alaska 527 (D. Alaska 1958).

Applied in

Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co., 654 P.2d 269 (Alaska 1982).

Quoted in

Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985).

Sec. 23.30.030. Required policy provisions.

A policy of a company insuring the payment of compensation under this chapter is considered to contain the provisions set out in this section.

  1. The insurer assumes in full all the obligations to pay physician’s fees, nurse’s charges, hospital services, hospital supplies, medicines, prosthetic devices, transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available, burial expenses, and compensation or death benefits imposed upon the insured under the provisions of this chapter.
  2. The policy is made subject to the provisions of this chapter and its provisions relative to the liability of the insured employer to pay physician’s fees, nurse’s charges, hospital services, hospital supplies, medicines, prosthetic devices, transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available, burial expenses, compensation or death benefits to and for said employees or beneficiaries, the acceptance of the liability by the insured employer, the adjustment, trial, and adjudication of claims for the physician’s fees, nurse’s charges, hospital services, hospital supplies, medicines, prosthetic devices, transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available, burial expenses, compensation or death benefits, and the liability of the insurer to pay the same are considered a part of this policy contract.
  3. As between the insurer and the employee or the employee’s beneficiaries, notice to or knowledge of the occurrence of the injury on the part of the insured employer is notice or knowledge on the part of the insurer; jurisdiction of the insured employer for the purpose of this chapter is jurisdiction of the insurer; and the insurer, in all things, is bound by and subject to the orders, awards, judgments, and decrees made against the insured employer under this chapter.
  4. The insurer will promptly pay to the person entitled to them the benefits conferred by this chapter, including physician’s fees, nurse’s charges, hospital services, hospital supplies, medicines, prosthetic devices, transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available, burial expenses, and all installments of compensation or death benefits awarded or agreed upon under this chapter.  The obligation of the insurer is not affected by a default of the insured employer after the injury, or by default in giving a notice required by this policy.  The policy is a direct promise by the insurer to the person entitled to physician’s fees, nurse’s charges, fees for hospital services, charges for medicines, prosthetic devices, transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available, and hospital supplies, charges for burial, compensation or death benefits, and is enforceable in the name of that person.  The insurer shall provide claims facilities through its own staffed adjusting facilities located within the state, or by independent, licensed, resident adjusters with power to effect settlement within the state.
  5. A termination of the policy by cancellation is not effective as to the employees of the insured employer covered by it until 20 days after written notice of the termination has been received by the division. If the employer has a contract with the state or a home rule or other political subdivision of the state, and the employer’s policy is cancelled due to nonpayment of a premium, the termination of the policy is not effective as to the employees of the insured employer covered by it until 20 days after written notice of the termination has been received by the contracting agency, and the agency has the option of continuing the payments on behalf of the employer in order to keep the policy in force. If, however, the employer has secured insurance with another insurance carrier, cancellation is effective as of the date of the new coverage.
  6. All claims for compensation, death benefits, physician’s fees, nurse’s charges, hospital services, hospital supplies, medicines, prosthetic devices, transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available, and burial expenses may be made directly against either the employer or the insurer, or both, and the order or award of the board may be made against either the employer or the insurer or both.
  7. If the insurer fails or refuses to pay a final award or judgment (except during the pendency of an appeal) made against it, or its insured, or if it fails or refuses to comply with a provision of this chapter, the director of the division of insurance shall revoke the approval of the policy form, and may not accept further proofs of insurance from it until it has paid the award or judgment or has complied with the violated provision of this chapter, and has resubmitted its policy form and received the approval of the form by the director of the division of insurance.
  8. An annual insurance premium that exceeds $2,000 may be paid on an installment basis of not fewer than two payments, if requested by the insured. Premiums paid by installment must be structured to reflect seasonal peaks in the basis of the premium. The insurer shall include this provision in the insurance policy in a manner that clearly informs the insured of the provision.

History. (§ 40 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 2 ch 1 SLA 1962; am § 2 ch 166 SLA 1972; am § 7 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 35 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 14 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For an exception to paragraph (5) for coverage of sole proprietors and partners, see AS 23.30.239(d) .

Administrative Code. —

For premium installment payments, see 3 AAC 30, art. 2.

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Joinder of physician. —

Subsection (4) and 8 AAC 45.040 required joinder of the physician to the employee’s workers’ compensation claim where physician had a colorable right to relief, employee could not adequately advocate for him, and physician’s absence affected his ability to protect his interest. Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2009).

Applied in

Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co., 654 P.2d 269 (Alaska 1982); Sherrod v. Municipality of Anchorage, 803 P.2d 874 (Alaska 1990).

Stated in

Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963).

Sec. 23.30.035. Adjustment of insurance rates.

If the provisions of this chapter require insurance rates adjustments, they must be made in strict compliance with the rate regulation provisions of state law.

History. (§ 41 ch 193 SLA 1959)

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 467.

100 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 353(1).

Sec. 23.30.040. Second injury fund.

  1. There is created a second injury fund, administered by the commissioner.  Money in the second injury fund may only be paid for the benefit of those persons entitled to payment of benefits from the second injury fund under this chapter. Payments from the second injury fund must be made by the commissioner in accordance with the orders and awards of the board.
  2. If an employee suffers a compensable injury that results in temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability, or permanent total disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall contribute to the second injury fund. The contribution shall be made annually at the time of the report filing required by  AS 23.30.155(m) . The amount of the contribution is the product of the compensation to which the employee is entitled for temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability, or permanent total disability and the applicable contribution rate set out in column A of this subsection. Payment need not be made to the second injury fund if the total contribution under this subsection is less than $20.  By December 15 of each year the commissioner shall determine and make available to the public the applicable contribution rate for the following calendar year according to the reserve rate of the second injury fund in column B of this subsection:
  3. If an employee suffers a compensable injury that results in death and the employee is not survived by a widow, widower, child, or dependent relative eligible to receive death benefits under  AS 23.30.215 , the employer or insurance carrier shall pay $10,000 to the second injury fund.
  4. The board may refund a payment made into the second injury fund if the employer or insurance carrier shows that it made the payment by mistake or inadvertence, or if it shows there existed at the time of the death of the employee a beneficiary entitled to benefits under  AS 23.30.215 .
  5. [Repealed, § 27 ch 93 SLA 1982.]
  6. [Repealed, § 22 ch 91 SLA 2018.]
  7. The attorney general may investigate claims and hire expert witnesses necessary to prevent fraudulent or excessive claims for money in the second injury fund.
  8. Administration expenses of the state under this section and  AS 23.30.205 must be paid from the second injury fund.
  9. The amount of a payment to the second injury fund and the conditions under which a payment is required of an employer or insurance carrier must be in accordance with the version of (b) of this section in effect on the date that the injury to the employee occurred.

Column B Reserve Rate Column A Second Injury Fund Contribution Rate(Percent) At Least(Percent) But Less Than(Percent) 6 0 50 5 50 75 4 75 100 3 100 125 2 125 150 1 150 175 0 175

Click to view

History. (§ 32 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 117 SLA 1960; am § 8 ch 42 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 99 SLA 1966; am § 1 ch 199 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 6 SLA 1976; am §§ 2, 5 ch 59 SLA 1981; am §§ 2, 27 ch 93 SLA 1982; am §§ 8, 9 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 22 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For provision providing that “[s]ubject to appropriation, the balance of the second injury fund” lapses into the general fund when all claims upon the fund have been satisfied, see sec. 25, ch. 91, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, repealed (f).

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Quoted in

Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Houston Contracting v. Phillips, 812 P.2d 598 (Alaska 1991); Williams v. Mammoth of Alaska, 890 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1995).

Cited in

Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1988); Second Injury Fund v. Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996); Wells v. Swalling Constr. Co., 944 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1997).

Sec. 23.30.041. Rehabilitation and reemployment of injured workers.

  1. The director shall select and employ a reemployment benefits administrator. The director may authorize the administrator to select and employ additional staff. The administrator is in the partially exempt service under  AS 39.25.120 .
  2. The administrator shall
    1. enforce regulations adopted by the board to implement this section;
    2. recommend regulations for adoption by the board that establish performance and reporting criteria for rehabilitation specialists;
    3. enforce the quality and effectiveness of reemployment benefits provided for under this section;
    4. review on an annual basis the performance of rehabilitation specialists to determine continued eligibility for delivery of rehabilitation services;
    5. submit to the department, on or before May 1 of each year, a report of reemployment benefits provided under this section for the previous calendar year; the report must include a general section, sections related to each rehabilitation specialist employed under this section, and a statistical summary of all rehabilitation cases, including
      1. the estimated and actual cost of each active rehabilitation plan;
      2. the estimated and actual time of each rehabilitation plan;
      3. a status report on all individuals requesting, waiving, beginning, completing, or terminating a reemployment benefits program including
        1. reasons for denial, waiver, suspension, or termination;
        2. dates of completion and return to work; and
        3. other information required by the director;
      4. the cost of reemployment benefits;
      5. status reports of all individuals who successfully completed a reemployment plan that includes
        1. the plan’s occupational goal and whether the individual obtained work after completion in the planned or another occupation; and
        2. the individual’s employment status six months, one year, and two years after reemployment plan completion;
    6. maintain a list of rehabilitation specialists who meet the qualifications established under this section;
    7. promote awareness among physicians, adjusters, injured workers, employers, employees, attorneys, training providers, and rehabilitation specialists of the reemployment program established in this subsection.
  3. An employee and an employer may stipulate to the employee’s eligibility for reemployment benefits at any time. If an employee suffers a compensable injury and, as a result of the injury, the employee is totally unable, for 45 consecutive days, to return to the employee’s employment at the time of injury, the administrator shall notify the employee of the employee’s rights under this section within 14 days after the 45th day. If the employee is totally unable to return to the employee’s employment for 60 consecutive days as a result of the injury, the employee or employer may request an eligibility evaluation. The administrator may approve the request if the employee’s injury may permanently preclude the employee’s return to the employee’s occupation at the time of the injury. If the employee is totally unable to return to the employee’s employment at the time of the injury for 90 consecutive days as a result of the injury, the administrator shall, without a request, order an eligibility evaluation unless a stipulation of eligibility was submitted. If the administrator approves a request or orders an evaluation, the administrator shall, on a rotating and geographic basis, select a rehabilitation specialist from the list maintained under (b)(6) of this section to perform the eligibility evaluation. If the person that employs a rehabilitation specialist selected by the administrator to perform an eligibility evaluation under this subsection is performing any other work on the same workers’ compensation claim involving the injured employee, the administrator shall select a different rehabilitation specialist.
  4. Within 30 days after the referral by the administrator, the rehabilitation specialist shall perform the eligibility evaluation and issue a report of findings. The administrator may grant up to an additional 30 days for performance of the eligibility evaluation upon notification of unusual and extenuating circumstances and the rehabilitation specialist’s request. Within 14 days after receipt of the report from the rehabilitation specialist, the administrator shall notify the parties of the employee’s eligibility for reemployment preparation benefits. Within 10 days after the decision, either party may seek review of the decision by requesting a hearing under  AS 23.30.110 . The hearing shall be held within 30 days after it is requested. The board shall uphold the decision of the administrator except for abuse of discretion on the administrator’s part.
  5. An employee shall be eligible for benefits under this section upon the employee’s written request and by having a physician predict that the employee will have permanent physical capacities that are less than the physical demands of the employee’s job as described in the 1993 edition of the United States Department of Labor’s “Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles” for
    1. the employee’s job at the time of injury; or
    2. other jobs that exist in the labor market that the employee has held or received training for within 10 years before the injury or that the employee has held following the injury for a period long enough to obtain the skills to compete in the labor market, according to specific vocational preparation codes as described in the 1993 edition of the United States Department of Labor’s “Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles.”
  6. An employee is not eligible for reemployment benefits if
    1. the employer offers employment within the employee’s predicted post-injury physical capacities at a wage equivalent to at least the state minimum wage under  AS 23.10.065 or 75 percent of the worker’s gross hourly wages at the time of injury, whichever is greater, and the employment prepares the employee to be employable in other jobs that exist in the labor market;
    2. the employee previously declined the development of a reemployment benefits plan under (g) of this section, received a job dislocation benefit under (g)(2) of this section, and returned to work in the same or similar occupation in terms of physical demands required of the employee at the time of the previous injury;
    3. the employee has been previously rehabilitated in a former worker’s compensation claim and returned to work in the same or similar occupation in terms of physical demands required of the employee at the time of the previous injury; or
    4. at the time of medical stability, no permanent impairment is identified or expected.
  7. Within 30 days after the employee receives the administrator’s notification of eligibility for benefits, an employee shall file a statement under oath with the board, on a form prescribed or approved by the board, to notify the administrator and the employer of the employee’s election to either use the reemployment benefits or to accept a job dislocation benefit under (2) of this subsection. The notice of the election is effective upon service to the administrator and the employer. The following apply to an election under this subsection:
    1. an employee who elects to use the reemployment benefits also shall notify the employer of the employee’s selection of a rehabilitation specialist who shall provide a complete reemployment benefits plan; failure to give notice of selection of a rehabilitation specialist required by this paragraph constitutes noncooperation under (n) of this section; if the employer disagrees with the employee’s choice of rehabilitation specialist to develop the plan and the disagreement cannot be resolved, then the administrator shall assign a rehabilitation specialist; the employer and employee each have one right of refusal of a rehabilitation specialist;
    2. an employee who elects to accept a job dislocation benefit in place of reemployment benefits and who has been given a permanent partial impairment rating by a physician shall be paid
      1. $5,000 if the employee’s permanent partial impairment rating is greater than zero and less than 15 percent;
      2. $8,000 if the employee’s permanent partial impairment rating is 15 percent or greater but less than 30 percent; or
      3. $13,500 if the employee’s permanent partial impairment rating is 30 percent or greater;
    3. the form provided by the division for election must specify that the employee understands the scope of the benefits and rights being waived by the election; the board shall serve a copy of the executed election form on the administrator and the employer within 10 days after receiving the form from the employee; a waiver and election effective under this subsection discharges the employer’s liability for the benefits or rights under this section that were not elected; a waiver may not be modified under  AS 23.30.130 ; the administrator may not accept an election to accept a job dislocation benefit by an employee who has not signed a form that conspicuously notes the benefit being waived.
  8. Within 90 days after the rehabilitation specialist’s selection under (g) of this section, the reemployment plan must be formulated and approved. The reemployment plan must require continuous participation by the employee and must maximize the usage of the employee’s transferrable skills. The reemployment plan must include at least the following:
    1. a determination of the occupational goal in the labor market;
    2. an inventory of the employee’s technical skills, transferrable skills, physical and intellectual capacities, academic achievement, emotional condition, and family support;
    3. a plan to acquire the occupational skills to be employable;
    4. the cost estimate of the reemployment plan, including provider fees; and the cost of tuition, books, tools, and supplies, transportation, temporary lodging, or job modification devices;
    5. the estimated length of time that the plan will take;
    6. the date that the plan will commence;
    7. the estimated time of medical stability as predicted by a treating physician or by a physician who has examined the employee at the request of the employer or the board, or by referral of the treating physician;
    8. a detailed description and plan schedule;
    9. a finding by the rehabilitation specialist that the inventory under (2) of this subsection indicates that the employee can be reasonably expected to satisfactorily complete the plan and perform in a new occupation within the time and cost limitations of the plan; and
    10. a provision requiring that, after a person has been assigned to perform medical management services for an injured employee, the person shall send written notice to the employee, the employer, and the employee’s physician explaining in what capacity the person is employed, whom the person represents, and the scope of the services to be provided.
  9. Reemployment benefits shall be selected from the following in a manner that ensures remunerative employability in the shortest possible time:
    1. on the job training;
    2. vocational training;
    3. academic training;
    4. self-employment; or
    5. a combination of (1) — (4) of this subsection.
  10. The employee, rehabilitation specialist, and the employer shall sign the reemployment benefits plan. If the employer and employee fail to agree on a reemployment plan, either party may submit a reemployment plan for approval to the administrator; the administrator shall approve or deny a plan within 14 days after the plan is submitted; within 10 days of the decision, either party may seek review of the decision by requesting a hearing under  AS 23.30.110 ; the board shall uphold the decision of the administrator unless evidence is submitted supporting an allegation of abuse of discretion on the part of the administrator; the board shall render a decision within 30 days after completion of the hearing.
  11. Benefits related to the reemployment plan may not extend past two years from date of plan approval or acceptance, whichever date occurs first, at which time the benefits expire. If an employee reaches medical stability before completion of the plan, temporary total disability benefits shall cease, and permanent impairment benefits shall then be paid at the employee’s temporary total disability rate. If the employee’s permanent impairment benefits are exhausted before the completion or termination of the reemployment process, the employer shall provide compensation equal to 70 percent of the employee’s spendable weekly wages, but not to exceed 105 percent of the average weekly wage, until the completion or termination of the process, except that any compensation paid under this subsection is reduced by wages earned by the employee while participating in the process to the extent that the wages earned, when combined with the compensation paid under this subsection, exceed the employee’s temporary total disability rate. If permanent partial disability or permanent partial impairment benefits have been paid in a lump sum before the employee requested or was found eligible for reemployment benefits, payment of benefits under this subsection is suspended until permanent partial disability or permanent partial impairment benefits would have ceased, had those benefits been paid at the employee’s temporary total disability rate, notwithstanding the provisions of  AS 23.30.155(j) . A permanent impairment benefit remaining unpaid upon the completion or termination of the plan shall be paid to the employee in a single lump sum. An employee may not be considered permanently totally disabled so long as the employee is involved in the rehabilitation process under this chapter. The fees of the rehabilitation specialist or rehabilitation professional shall be paid by the employer and may not be included in determining the cost of the reemployment plan.
  12. The cost of the reemployment plan incurred under this section shall be the responsibility of the employer, shall be paid on an expense incurred basis, and may not exceed $13,300.
  13. Only a rehabilitation specialist may accept case assignments as a case manager and sign eligibility determinations and reemployment plans. A person who is not a rehabilitation specialist may perform rehabilitation casework if the work is performed under the direct supervision of a rehabilitation specialist employed in the same firm and location.
  14. After the employee has elected to participate in reemployment benefits, if the employer believes the employee has not cooperated, the employer may terminate reemployment benefits on the date of noncooperation. Noncooperation means
    1. unreasonable failure to
      1. keep appointments;
      2. maintain passing grades;
      3. attend designated programs;
      4. maintain contact with the rehabilitation specialist;
      5. cooperate with the rehabilitation specialist in developing a reemployment plan and participating in activities relating to reemployability on a full-time basis;
      6. comply with the employee’s responsibilities outlined in the reemployment plan; or
      7. participate in any planned reemployment activity as determined by the administrator; or
    2. failure to give written notice to the employer of the employee’s choice of rehabilitation specialists within 30 days after receiving notice of eligibility for benefits from the administrator as required by (g) of this section.
  15. Upon the request of either party, the administrator shall decide whether the employee has not cooperated as provided under (n) of this section. A hearing before the administrator shall be held within 30 days after it is requested. The administrator shall issue a decision within 14 days after the hearing. Within 10 days after the administrator files the decision, either party may seek review of the decision by requesting a hearing under  AS 23.30.110 ; the board shall uphold the decision of the administrator unless evidence is submitted supporting an allegation of abuse of discretion on the part of the administrator; the board shall render a decision within 30 days after completion of the hearing.
  16. When the United States Department of Labor publishes a new edition, revision, or replacement for the “Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles” referred to in (e) of this section, the director shall, not later than 90 days after the last day of the month in which the new edition, revision, or replacement standard is published, hold an open meeting under  AS 44.62.310 to select the proposed date on which the new edition, revision, or replacement standard will be implemented to make all eligibility determinations required under (e) of this section. The date selected by the department for implementing the new edition, revision, or replacement standard may not be later than 90 days after the last day of the month in which the new edition, revision, or replacement standard is published. After the meeting, the director shall issue a public notice announcing the date selected by the department. The requirements of  AS 44.62.010 44.62.300 do not apply to the selection or announcement of the date under this subsection.
  17. Notwithstanding  AS 23.30.012 , after medical stability has been determined and a physician has predicted that the employee may have a permanent impairment that may cause the employee to have permanent physical capacities that are less than the physical demands of the employee’s job at the time of injury, an employee may waive any benefits or rights under this section, including an eligibility evaluation and benefits related to a reemployment plan. To waive any benefits or rights under this section, an employee must file a statement under oath with the division to notify the parties of the waiver and to specify the scope of benefits or rights that the employee seeks to waive. The statement must be on a form prescribed or approved by the director. The division shall serve the notice of waiver on all parties to the claim within 10 days after filing. The waiver is effective upon service to the party. A waiver effective under this subsection discharges the liability of the employer for the benefits or rights contained in this section. The waiver may not be modified under  AS 23.30.130 .
  18. In this section,
    1. “administrator” means the reemployment benefits administrator under (a) of this section;
    2. “employability” means possessing the ability but not necessarily the opportunity to engage in employment that is consistent with the employee’s physical status imposed by the compensable injury;
    3. “labor market” means a geographical area that offers employment opportunities in the following priority:
      1. area of residence;
      2. area of last employment;
      3. the state;
      4. other states;
    4. “physical capacities” means objective and measurable physical traits such as ability to lift and carry, walk, stand or sit, push, pull, climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach, handle, finger, feel, talk, hear, or see;
    5. “physical demands” means the physical requirements of the job such as strength, including positions such as standing, walking, sitting, and movement of objects such as lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, handling, fingering, feeling, talking, hearing, or seeing;
    6. “rehabilitation specialist” means a person who is a certified insurance rehabilitation specialist, a certified rehabilitation counselor, or a person who has equivalent or better qualifications as determined under regulations adopted by the department;
    7. “remunerative employability” means having the skills that allow a worker to be compensated with wages or other earnings equivalent to at least 60 percent of the worker’s gross hourly wages at the time of injury; if the employment is outside the state, the stated 60 percent shall be adjusted to account for the difference between the applicable state average weekly wage and the Alaska average weekly wage.

History. (§ 3 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 10 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 11 ch 126 SLA 1994; am §§ 1, 2 ch 59 SLA 1998; am §§ 2 — 7 ch 105 SLA 2000; am §§ 15 — 23 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (p) was enacted as (q). Relettered in 1998, at which time former subsection (p) was relettered as (q).

Subsection (q) was enacted as (r). Relettered in 2000, at which time former subsection (q) [enacted as (p)] was relettered as (r).

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Prior law. —

The last injurious exposure rule adopted as to permanent total disability benefits, i.e., that when employment with successive employers contributes to a worker’s disability, the employer at the time of the most recent injury is liable for disability payments, was also applicable as to vocational retraining benefits under former AS 23.30.191 . Parker Drilling Co. v. Wester, 651 P.2d 842 (Alaska 1982).

Under former AS 23.30.191 the board could award temporary total disability benefits to an employee with an unscheduled disability whose condition has stabilized medically, but who was pursuing an approved vocational rehabilitation program. Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

AS 23.30.045(a) clearly contemplated that the employer would bear the cost of payments under former AS 23.30.191 and that the policy of limited employer liability was not inconsistent with periodic increases in liability. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Julian, 513 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1973).

Former AS 23.30.040 (e) and former AS 23.30.191 both provided for maintenance compensation. But former AS 23.30.191 specifically stated that payments made pursuant to it were “in addition to the amount allowed under AS 23.30.040 for maintenance.” Only payments made pursuant to AS 23.30.040 are the responsibility of the second injury fund. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Julian, 513 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1973).

Use of Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles. —

Subsection (e) requires strict compliance with the physical capacity description set forth in the United States Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles, even where claimant’s job and like jobs in the labor market require greater physical capacity than that described in that publication. Konecky v. Camco Wireline, 920 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).

In determining eligibility for reemployment benefits, the board did not err in following the United States Department of Labor’s “Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,” rather than the actual physical demands of employee’s specific job. Morgan v. Lucky Strike Bingo, 938 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1997).

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission erred in deciding that substantial evidence supported the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's decision that a health care facilities inspector job description sufficiently described the reemployment benefits applicant's job as a surveyor where neither AS 23.30.041(e) nor its implementing regulations prohibited a rehabilitation specialist from considering education or vocational requirements or physical-strength classifications when selecting the most appropriate job title or titles from the Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and the surveyor position contained both a professional background and strength requirement. Vandenberg v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 371 P.3d 602 (Alaska 2016).

Reemployment benefits are not simply income-replacement vehicle to tide injured workers over until they can resume employment; these benefits are paid contingent on the employee’s participation in the development and execution of a reemployment plan. This section makes it clear that the legislature intended these plans to include employee contact with the rehabilitation specialist, and an opportunity for the employer to monitor the employee’s compliance with the plan. Raris v. Greek Corner, 911 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1996).

Job dislocation benefit. —

Equitable principles did not allow an employee to rescind the employee's election of a job dislocation benefit because the employee did not bargain for the benefit with the employee's employer. Unisea, Inc. v. de Lopez, 435 P.3d 961 (Alaska 2019).

Employer had to pay a job dislocation benefit for an orthopedic rating when the employer received the rating, when an employee was evaluated for both orthopedic and psychiatric impairments, because (1) no final, combined, rating was statutorily required, and (2) the employee elected the benefit and received the rating, which the employer did not controvert. Unisea, Inc. v. de Lopez, 435 P.3d 961 (Alaska 2019).

Totally disabled may participate in reemployment plan. —

An employee may receive permanent total disability (PTD) benefits while participating in a reemployment plan. Meek v. Unocal Corp., 914 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1996).

“Reemployment benefits” available under this section include on-the-job training, vocational training, academic training, and self-employment. Through the rehabilitation process established by this section, a person suffering from a “total” disability can gain the skills and education necessary to allow him or her to reenter the job market and attain “remunerative employability.” Therefore, a claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits is not incompatible with a request for reemployment benefits. Meek v. Unocal Corp., 914 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1996).

Beginning of benefit period. —

Although claimant was entitled to two years of reemployment benefits under AS 23.30.041(k) , claimant was only eligible for benefits when he began participating in the reemployment process and when his permanent partial impairment payment was exhausted; superior court erred in determining that his benefit period began when he was assigned a rehabilitation specialist for an eligibility evaluation. Carter v. B & B Constr., Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska June 27, 2008), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 199 P.3d 1150 (Alaska 2008).

Claimant was properly awarded two years of benefits under subsection (k), which was the statutory maximum period that a reemployment plan could last, during the period when claimant began his active pursuit of reemployment benefits. Carter v. B & B Constr., Inc., 199 P.3d 1150 (Alaska 2008).

Physician designated by applicant. —

This section allows the benefits applicant to designate a treating physician who must be consulted by the rehabilitation benefits administrator, and whose views must be considered in the evaluation process. Irvine v. Glacier Gen. Constr., 984 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1999).

Scope of discretion. —

Because this section required the evaluator to consult the applicant’s chosen physician in preparing the eligibility evaluation, she had no discretion to ignore the doctor completely and, in relying on her flawed report, the rehabilitation benefits administrator abused its discretion and the workers’ compensation board committed legal error in upholding the administrator’s decision as a sound exercise of discretion. Irvine v. Glacier Gen. Constr., 984 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1999).

Discovery rule imposed was invalid because the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) did not adopt it as a regulation under AS 44.62.010 44.62.950 ; therefore, the Board erred in reversing the Reemployment Benefit Administrator’s determination finding the employee eligible for a reemployment eligibility evaluation. Burke v. Houston Nana, L.L.C., 222 P.3d 851 (Alaska 2010).

Harmless error. —

The failure of the rehabilitation benefits administrator to consult with or consider the opinion of the applicant’s chosen physician amounted to harmless error where that doctor not only did not couch her opinion in terms of the applicable Department of Labor standards, but where she categorically stated that she did not do evaluations utilizing those standards. Irvine v. Glacier Gen. Constr., 984 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1999).

Liability of subsequent employer of disabled worker. —

Although an employee will not be classified as permanently and totally disabled unless his injury appears permanent, this classification is not immutable, and a second employer may therefore be held liable for an injury suffered by an employee so classified. Lindekugel v. George Easley Co., 986 P.2d 877 (Alaska 1999).

Prohibiting successive settlements in the case of employees classified as permanently and totally disabled would undermine the state’s policy of promoting reemployment of disabled workers. Lindekugel v. George Easley Co., 986 P.2d 877 (Alaska 1999).

Real estate sales is a “job” within the meaning of subsection (e) so that an employee who had received training for, kept a current license for, and practiced real estate sales within ten years of his injury was ineligible for reemployment benefits. Arnesen v. Anchorage Refuse, 925 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1996).

Standard for substantial evidence. —

A doctor’s opinion that an employee was capable of only light to medium duty work constituted substantial evidence despite contradiction by a physical therapist who had reviewed computerized tests of employee’s progress and concluded that employee was able to work a “heavy work level.” The doctor’s report was a prediction which compared the physical demands of the employee’s job, as the U.S. Department of Labor described them, with the employee’s physical capacities, complying with subsection (e). Yahara v. Construction & Rigging, 851 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1993).

Reviewing doctor’s testimony that employee could perform her job as it was described in the United States Department of Labor’s “Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles” was sufficient evidence to support the board’s affirmance of the decision of the Reemployment Benefits Administrator that employee was ineligible for reemployment benefits. Morgan v. Lucky Strike Bingo, 938 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1997).

Availability of job outside Alaska. —

A claimant may be refused rehabilitation benefits if a job for which the claimant is qualified and capable of performing despite his or her injury is available in a place other than Alaska. Thus, a claimant may be forced to choose between (1) moving to another place to take a job, and (2) foregoing reemployment benefits. The legislature intended paragraph (f)(1) of this section to operate in similar fashion. Raris v. Greek Corner, 911 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1996).

Permanent impairment under paragraph (f)(3). —

Because AS 23.30.190 (b)’s rule for evaluating permanent impairments, which requires use of the American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,” controls the determination of a permanent impairment under paragraph (f)(3), and because worker received a rating of zero permanent impairment under the AMA Guides, the superior court correctly found her ineligible for reemployment benefits. Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).

Definition of “physical capacities” as “objective and measurable physical traits,” paragraph (p)(4) (now (r)(4)), simply demands that they be capable of measurement. Yahara v. Construction & Rigging, 851 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1993).

Consideration of remunerative employability. —

The board may not consider “remunerative employability” or comparable wage earning potentials in determining whether an injured worker is eligible for reemployment benefits under subsection (e); the fact that worker was capable of returning to work in his former role as a rate clerk at less than 60% of his wage at the time of his injury did not render him eligible for benefits. Moesh v. Anchorage Sand & Gravel, 877 P.2d 763 (Alaska 1994).

Swimming instructor who was injured by exposure to chlorine fumes was entitled to a rehabilitation plan, where she was capable of performing clerical work and met the definition set forth in former paragraph (i)(3) because a clerical position is an occupation in which she could utilize her current academic achievement level. Kirby v. Alaska Treatment Ctr., 821 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1991).

Reemployment plan benefits cumulative. —

Any time and money spent on employee’s first reemployment plan must be counted toward the statutory maximums for which employer may be liable. The employer’s total exposure for any number of reemployment plans an employee pursues must be capped at $10,000 and two years in time. Binder v. Fairbanks Historical Preservation Found., 880 P.2d 117 (Alaska 1994).

Reemployment plan improperly affirmed. —

Substantial evidence did not support a finding that the claimant’s reemployment plan would have met his remunerative wage of $21.58 per hour at the entry level because his education and experience would not have moved him out of the entry-level salary ranges; due to necessary changes to the claimant’s course work, substantial evidence also did not support a finding that he could have completed his plan within the required two-year time frame. Rockney v. Boslough Constr. Co., 115 P.3d 1240 (Alaska), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2005).

Board erred in denying vocational rehabilitation to employee on the ground that he was no longer impaired where the board’s conclusion that employee was not impaired was not supported by substantial evidence. See Baker v. Reed-Dowd Co., 836 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1992) (decided under prior law).

Employee entitled to reasonable attorney fees. —

Employee was entitled to reasonable attorney fees under AS 23.30.145(b) where the employer was still engaged in the reemployment process after it reclassified benefits; and the benefits were not reclassified voluntarily but rather were reclassified in the face of an impending claim for those benefits by the employer’s attorney. Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore, 160 P.3d 146 (Alaska 2007).

Applied in

Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009).

Quoted in

Summerville v. Denali Ctr., 811 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1991).

Stated in

Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996); Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079 (Alaska 2008).

Cited in

Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998); Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004); Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Vocational rehabilitation statutes. 67 ALR4th 612.

Article 2. Duties of Employer.

Sec. 23.30.045. Employer’s liability for compensation.

  1. An employer is liable for and shall secure the payment to employees of the compensation payable under AS 23.30.041 , 23.30.050 , 23.30.095 , 23.30.145 , and 23.30.180 23.30.215 . If the employer is a subcontractor and fails to secure the payment of compensation to its employees, the contractor is liable for and shall secure the payment of the compensation to employees of the subcontractor. If the employer is a contractor and fails to secure the payment of compensation to its employees or the employees of a subcontractor, the project owner is liable for and shall secure the payment of the compensation to employees of the contractor and employees of a subcontractor, as applicable.
  2. Compensation is payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury.
  3. For a person eligible for vocational rehabilitation service under this chapter or AS 23.15.080 who is placed with an employer for service at the request of the rehabilitation administrator or division of vocational rehabilitation to provide on the job training, work readiness, work therapy experience, or work sampling, the liability set out in (a) of this section applies to the state rather than to the employer.  However, an employer may elect to assume the liabilities in (a) of this section.
  4. A contract may not be awarded by the state or a home rule or other political subdivision of the state unless the person to whom the contract is to be awarded has submitted to the contracting agency proof, furnished by the insurance carrier, of current coverage by workers’ compensation insurance from an insurance company or association authorized to transact the business of workers’ compensation insurance in this state or proof, furnished by the board, of a current certificate of self-insurance from the board.  The person to whom the contract is awarded shall keep the workers’ compensation insurance policy in effect during the life of the contract with the state or political subdivision.  If the state or the political subdivision of the state fails to obtain proof of coverage or self-insurance or to protect itself under (e) of this section, and an employee of the contractor is injured during the term of the contract, the state or the political subdivision is liable for workers’ compensation to the employee if the employee is unable to recover from the employer because of the employer’s lack of financial assets. The state or the political subdivision is not liable, however, to the employee for workers’ compensation if the employee can recover from the employer under (a) and (b) of this section.
  5. When a contracting agency of the state or a political subdivision receives notice that the workers’ compensation insurance policy of an employer to whom the agency has awarded a contract has been cancelled due to nonpayment of a premium, without being replaced by a comparable policy, the agency may either terminate the contract with the employer or continue the premium payments on behalf of the employer in order to keep the policy in force during the life of the agency’s contract.  If the agency chooses to keep the policy in force, it may deduct its payments from the contract price or bring an action against the employer to recover the amount of the payments.  When the contracting agency receives notice that the board has revoked a certificate of self-insurance held by a person to whom a contract has been awarded, the agency may terminate the contract. This subsection does not limit the causes of action or remedies that the state or political subdivision may have against the employer.
  6. In this section,
    1. “contractor” means a person who undertakes by contract performance of certain work for another but does not include a vendor whose primary business is the sale or leasing of tools, equipment, other goods, or property;
    2. “project owner” means a person who, in the course of the person’s business, engages the services of a contractor and who enjoys the beneficial use of the work;
    3. “subcontractor” means a person to whom a contractor sublets all or part of the initial undertaking.

History. (§ 3 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 46 SLA 1967; am § 3 ch 166 SLA 1972; am §§ 4, 5 ch 93 SLA 1982; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 80 SLA 2004)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (f) of this section was reorganized in 2004 to maintain alphabetical order.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Opinions of attorney general. —

An employee who is a resident of Alaska and is employed by an Alaska resident employer, but who is injured in the scope of his employment while on a temporary, emergency job in Canada, is entitled to compensation under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board has jurisdiction over the case. 1960 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 35.

Generally, services voluntarily performed for another are not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8.

Volunteer civil defense workers are not covered by the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act because they are not “employees” under that Act. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

In a case in which a mother sought workers' compensation death benefits or other damages related to her daughter's death, the Supreme Court held that the Workers' Compensation Act did not violate the mother's rights to equal protection or due process. The legislature has limited the substantive rights available to non-dependent family members of workers who die in work-related accidents, and the claims processing mechanism in the Act provided the mother an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Act with respect to her own rights. Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 135, 205 L. Ed. 2d 48 (U.S. 2019).

This section sets out scope of employer’s liability and his responsibility to be insured, or a self-insurer. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Liability under subsection (a). —

Under the clear language of subsection (a), employer is liable for all payments made pursuant to AS 23.30.180 through AS 23.30.215 . Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Julian, 513 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1973).

Subsection (a) is referred to as the “contractor-under” provision. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

Origin. —

The Alaska “contractor-under” statute was taken from the text of the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

Purpose of subsection (a) is to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

Subsection (a) aims to forestall evasion of the act by those who might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations with the workers and relegating them for compensation protection to small contractors who fail to carry compensation insurance. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

“Contractor”. —

The most appropriate definition of the term “contractor,” as it is used in subsection (a), is: a person who undertakes, by contract, the performance of certain work for another, including the furnishing of goods and services. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

A person who has not incurred a contractual duty cannot properly be deemed a contractor under our statute. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

In a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case in which an injured worker was employed by a private carrier that delivered mail for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), his employer qualified as a contractor under AS 23.30.045(f)(1) , and his suit against the USPS could not proceed under the FTCA because a private party in like circumstances would be protected from tort liability under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. Marinese v. United States, 584 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. Alaska 2014) (memorandum decision).

“Project owner.” —

Pipeline operator met the statutory definition of “project owner” where, in the course of its business, it engaged the services of a contractor, which undertook performance of work for the operator; because of its contract with the contractor, the operator did not need to hire its own employees to perform the work done by the contractor. The operator was covered by the exclusivity provisions of this section, and the superior court correctly dismissed the employee’s lawsuit. Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 234 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2010).

Municipality would not be a “project owner” if it entered into a contract with a vendor whose primary business was leasing equipment. However, subsection (d) would still require it to ensure that the vendor had workers’ compensation coverage; subsections (d) and (f) do not conflict, and the municipality could be a “project owner” under (f)(2). Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011).

Corporations involved in a construction project were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing workers’ negligence suit because the corporations did not show the corporations were “project owners,” as (1) only one who actually contracted with a person to perform specific work and enjoyed the beneficial use of that work and who, in the course of the person’s business, engaged the services of a contractor, was a project owner, (2) the only contract was between the workers’ employer and one corporation, (3) the contract’s indemnity provisions were irrelevant to being a project owner, (4) the corporations did not show all were potentially liable for workers’ compensation, and (5) fact disputes existed as to the validity of an assignment and whether a “preliminary agreement” showed a relevant contractual relationship. Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc. (Alaska Mar. 20, 2020).

Corporations involved in a construction project were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing workers’ negligence suit because the corporations did not show the corporations were “project owners,” as (1) only one who actually contracted with a person to perform specific work and enjoyed the beneficial use of that work and who, in the course of the person’s business, engaged the services of a contractor, was a project owner, (2) the only contract was between the workers’ employer and one corporation, (3) the contract’s indemnity provisions were irrelevant to being a project owner, (4) the corporations did not show all were potentially liable for workers’ compensation, and (5) fact disputes existed as to the validity of an assignment and whether a “preliminary agreement” showed a relevant contractual relationship. Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc. (Alaska Mar. 20, 2020).

Settlement agreement. —

Superior court erred by failing to first interpret the settlement agreement to determine the parties' reasonable expectations in light of the requirement that appellant elect between a civil remedy and a workers' compensation remedy; as required to elect the civil remedy, appellant dismissed the workers' compensation claim, because the owner's potential liability for compensation benefits was dependent on appellee's potential liability as the worker's employer, and appellant received no compensation for that claim. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

“Subcontractor”. —

The proper definition of “subcontractor” under subsection (a) is: a person to whom a contractor sublets all or part of his initial contractual undertaking. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970)(decided prior to 2004 amendment defining “subcontractor”).

If a person enters into a contract to perform work, he cannot be construed to be a subcontractor unless the duty which he undertakes is at the same time part of a contractual duty of the party with whom he contracted. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970)(decided prior to 2004 amendment defining “subcontractor”).

In a case in which the worker was injured on the job and later filed personal injury lawsuits against two companies, numerous issues of material fact made it impossible to determine whether the companies were entitled to judgment as a matter of law that they were immune from liability because no party asserted or presented evidence that the first company and the direct employer were joint venturers; no party argued or presented evidence establishing that the worker was a general or special employee of the first company; and it was error to speculate that a contractor-subcontractor relationship existed between the two companies, then rely on that to further speculate about the relationship between the first company and the direct employer. James v. Alaska Frontier Constructors Inc., 468 P.3d 711 (Alaska 2020).

Department of Fish and Game cannot be considered as contractor for the purposes of the “contractor-under” provision. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

Department of Administration not liable as principal contractor. —

Any argument that the Department of Administration, in acting to secure a contract for the Department of Fish and Game, and other departments of the state, becomes liable as a principal contractor pursuant to subsection (a) is rejected. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970).

Present rule only requires that employer exercise reasonable care to select competent contractor. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963).

He has no affirmative duty to determine compliance with act by such contractor. —

An employer need not himself take affirmative steps to determine that an independent contractor is financially responsible and has complied with the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963).

Due process rights held not infringed by amendments to section. —

Oil rig worker, who was employed by a contractor, brought a third-party suit against an oil company for work-related injuries; the worker’s due process rights were not infringed by the 2004 amendments to this section and AS 23.30.055 because the worker still had access to the courts, and the worker still had a worker’s compensation claim. The worker’s equal protection rights were also not violated by the amendments because the worker’s interests were economic; therefore, a minimum scrutiny level of review was applied. Schiel v. Union Oil Co., 219 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2009), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

And may assume contractor will provide compensation where employee used. —

The employer of an independent contractor has a legal right to assume that his contractor will abide by the law and provide for compensation where an employee is used. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963).

The employer does not have the affirmative duty of requiring that a contractor produce for inspection an effective policy of workers’ compensation insurance which would be applicable in the event he employed others. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963).

Medical benefits included in “compensation”. —

Subsection (a) of this section and AS 23.30.010 use the word “compensation” so that the only reasonable reading of the word would include medical benefits. Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

Employee not entitled to recover future expenses relating to injury. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act attempts to replace an employee’s lost wage-based income; it does not provide an employee with benefits covering any future expenses that might conceivably have some relation to his or her injuries. Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004).

Employee’s remedies. —

When an employer fails to comply with the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act’s requirement to secure payment of compensation to its injured employees, either through procurement of a workers’ compensation insurance policy or through self-insurance, the statute offers an injured employee two options for seeking recovery: (1) claiming compensation through the procedures of the workers’ compensation statute, or (2) maintaining a tort action against the employer at law for damages on account of the injury or death under AS 23.30.055 ; failure to provide workers’ compensation insurance does not create a separate contract cause of action. Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).

Reimbursement of certain financial expenses not allowed. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly denied an injured employee’s reimbursement claims for a court-imposed fine, court-ordered alcohol treatment and testing, theft, unpaid rent, an interest in a boat, and an interest in his employer’s business, where claims were not compensable under the workers’ compensation act, because they did not involve medical treatment, rehabilitation, or disability benefits. Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004).

Set-off. —

If a general contractor who by operation of the contractor-under clause contained in subsection (a) has been required to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the employee of an uninsured subcontractor is also found liable for damages at common law, he may set-off from that award the amount of compensation benefits he has previously paid to the subcontractor’s employee. Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1981).

Instruction. —

Absent any evidence that the employer failed to secure payment of compensation to the injured employee, there was no error in the trial court’s instruction in a tort action that the employee’s only remedy was under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Applied in

Everette v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 614 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1980); Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1984).

Quoted in

Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764 (Alaska 2000); Temple v. Denali Princess Lodge, 21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).

Stated in

Seward v. Wisdom, 413 P.2d 931 (Alaska 1966); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Fenner v. Municipality of Anchorage, 53 P.3d 573 (Alaska 2002); Trudell v. Hibbert, 299 P.3d 1279 (Alaska 2013).

Cited in

Wien Consol. Airlines, Inc. v. Comm'r, 528 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1976); Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985); Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990); Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999); Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Northwest Cedar Structures, Inc., 153 P.3d 336 (Alaska 2007); Yong Kang v. Mullins, 420 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2018); Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018); Buckley v. Am. Fast Freight, Inc., 444 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2019); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 228-241.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 918-935.

Insurance carrier’s liability for part of employer’s liability attributable to violation of law or other misconduct on his part. 1 ALR2d 407.

Workers’ compensation: liability of successive employers for disease or condition allegedly attributable to successive employments. 34 ALR4th 958.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action — Compensability under particular circumstances. 84 ALR5th 249.

Sec. 23.30.050. Employer’s liability despite negligence of a third party.

The liability of an employer for medical treatment is not affected by the fact that the employee was injured through the fault or negligence of a third party not in the same employ, until notice of election to sue has been given as required by AS 23.30.015(a) or suit has been brought against the third party without giving notice. The employer has, however, a cause of action against the third party to recover any amounts paid by the employer for the medical treatment in like manner as provided in AS 23.30.015(b) .

History. (§ 6(4) ch 193 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

“Recover” means payment. —

The employer is subrogated to the right to “recover,” and the word “recover” means to get damages or compensation; not a judgment but the benefits of a judgment. It means payment. Andersen v. Pacific S. S. Co., 8 Alaska 291 (D. Alaska 1931) (decided under former law).

Employer is necessary party in action against third party. —

By reason of the fact that the act gives to the employer the right to recover of a negligent third party the amount he has paid the employee, the employer is a necessary party to the action, which involves and should bind all parties upon the questions of defendant’s negligence and the damages sustained by the plaintiff. Andersen v. Pacific S. S. Co., 8 Alaska 291 (D. Alaska 1931) (decided under former law).

Relationship qualifying for death benefits. —

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 et seq., the legislature could have adopted a system that required that each relationship be scrutinized on an individual basis to determine whether death benefits should be granted, but it did not. Instead, it engaged in the traditional legislative practice of line drawing and by adopting marriage as the primary criterion for determining when an intimate partner qualifies for benefits, the legislature has determined that legal marriage is an adequate proxy for the more particularized inquiry concerning whether a relationship is serious enough or the partner is sufficiently dependent to justify awarding benefits. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Cited in

Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963); Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990); Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 88-115, 374, 449-463.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 992-1011.

Sec. 23.30.055. Exclusiveness of liability.

The liability of an employer prescribed in AS 23.30.045 is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer and any fellow employee to the employee, the employee’s legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer or fellow employee at law or in admiralty on account of the injury or death. The liability of the employer is exclusive even if the employee’s claim is barred under AS 23.30.022 . However, if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee or the employee’s legal representative in case death results from the injury may elect to claim compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an action against the employer at law or in admiralty for damages on account of the injury or death. In that action, the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee assumed the risk of the employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee. In this section, “employer” includes, in addition to the meaning given in AS 23.30.395 , a person who, under AS 23.30.045 (a), is liable for or potentially liable for securing payment of compensation.

History. (§ 4 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 42 SLA 1962; am § 11 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 4 ch 80 SLA 2004)

Opinions of attorney general. —

While it is true that under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, employers, including the state, are excluded from admiralty liability, this exclusive liability provision cannot act as a limitation on suits against the state under the federal maritime law once the state has unqualifiedly waived its immunity for negligent torts. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 28.

So much of this section as limits the liability of employers in admiralty must be considered an invalid infringement on the federal jurisdiction. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 28.

All employees on the Alaska ferry system who meet the classification of seamen or members of the crew within the scope of the Jones Act, former 46 U.S.C. § 688, have an exclusive federal remedy within the terms of the Jones Act to the exclusion of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, except as to those injuries that occur in a situation of only local concern or fall within the “twilight zone” between local and federal jurisdiction. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 28.

The “twilight zone” between local and federal jurisdiction encompasses all those employments for which a reasonable argument can be made both for and against the application of a state workmen’s compensation law. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 28.

Seamen who come within the federal maritime jurisdiction for tort claims under the Jones Act, former 46 U.S.C. § 688, can waive the federal remedy and elect to proceed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 28.

State ferry employees, who would be classified by their shore duties as longshoremen or harbor workers, are not subject to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. 1963Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 28.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

There is sufficient justification for the workmen’s compensation scheme, including the “exclusive liability” provision, for it to pass muster as having a rational basis — even under the “less speculative, less deferential, more intensified means-to-end” application of that test. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

The only classification in this section is that separating work-related and nonwork-related injuries. There is nothing inherently “suspect” about this classification, nor is appellant’s right to sue for loss of consortium so “fundamental” as to require a “compelling state interest” to uphold statutory interference. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

This section does not discriminate against women. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

The exclusive liability provision of this chapter does not violate substantive due process since it has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Arctic Structures v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).

With regard to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, there is a fair and substantial relationship between the legislative objective of providing guaranteed, expeditious compensation to the injured employee and the limitation in this section on the employer’s total liability regardless of its percentage of fault, even though that limitation has the effect of denying the third-party tort-feasors the right to pro rata contribution from the employer. Arctic Structures v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).

Applicability. —

When an employee claimed various parties conspired to present the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board a video falsely depicting the employee's physical abilities, in an attempt to terminate the employee's workers' compensation benefits, it was error to dismiss the employee's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because, inter alia, the exclusive remedy provision did not apply to the employer's counsel. Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255 (Alaska 2016).

Statute applies only if an injury arises out of and in the course of employment. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Because the exclusive remedy provision is related to claims made on account of the injury or death, whether appellant filed the workers' compensation claim as a potential beneficiary or as personal representative of the worker's estate was immaterial; had appellant or the estate received workers' compensation benefits, the estate's wrongful death suit would be barred by the exclusive remedy provision. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Purpose of workers’ compensation scheme. —

See Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

Derivation of “exclusive liability” clause. —

Alaska’s “exclusive liability” clause is taken almost verbatim from a similar provision of the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

Extension of coverage. —

The coverage of employers and occupations by the Workmen’s Compensation Act has been gradually extended through the years. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Remedies exclusive. —

Since its enactment, it has always provided that the remedies provided therein were exclusive. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

The remedies provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act are intended to be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to a particular injury whether at common law or otherwise. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967); Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972); Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975); State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979).

An action for wrongful death, filed pursuant to AS 09.55.580 , is barred by this section; the fact that the estates of deceased workers leaving dependents are entitled to favored treatment over the estates of workers leaving no dependents reflects a legislative determination that the former require greater compensation, is entirely reasonable and does not deprive the estate of a worker leaving no dependents of equal protection of the law. Taylor v. Southeast-Harrison W. Corp., 694 P.2d 1160 (Alaska 1985).

Employees cannot obtain compensation outside of the system provided by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004).

Superior court did not err in determining that an employee could not recover damages for his back injury in tort; recovery of such damages was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of this section. Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427 (Alaska 2004).

In a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case in which an injured worker was employed by a private carrier that delivered mail for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), his employer qualified as a contractor under AS 23.30.045(f)(1) , and his suit against the USPS could not proceed under the FTCA because a private party in like circumstances would be protected from tort liability under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. Marinese v. United States, 584 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. Alaska 2014) (memorandum decision).

When an employee claimed various parties conspired to present the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board a video falsely depicting the employee's physical abilities, in an attempt to terminate the employee's workers' compensation benefits, the employee's professional negligence claim against an insurer was properly dismissed because AS 23.30.055 barred the claim. Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255 (Alaska 2016).

Tort remedy against non-complying employer. —

A worker’s lawsuit under this section, as to an employer who did not carry workers’ compensation, must be a tort action for the underlying injury. Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).

Settlement agreement. —

Superior court erred by failing to first interpret the settlement agreement to determine the parties' reasonable expectations in light of the requirement that appellant elect between a civil remedy and a workers' compensation remedy; as required to elect the civil remedy, appellant dismissed the workers' compensation claim, because the owner's potential liability for compensation benefits was dependent on appellee's potential liability as the worker's employer, and appellant received no compensation for that claim. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

When employer fails to secure payment of compensation, thereby entitling an employee to pursue a civil action, courts treat the civil action as any other common law claim, even though the Workers’ Compensation Act affects the allocation of the burden of proof and abrogates certain defenses. Ehredt v. Dehavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1985).

Waiver of exclusive remedy. —

No waiver by the city of its exclusive remedy defense was effected by an addendum placed on the compromise and release by the workers’ compensation insurance carrier’s representative which merely reserved whatever rights the employee had at the time he signed the compromise and release. Gorman v. City of Haines, 675 P.2d 646 (Alaska 1984).

Partnership’s negligence for employee injuries. —

The exclusive remedy provision of this section bars an employee’s common law tort claim against a partner in a partnership where the partner’s negligence arises out of and is within the course of partnership business. Williams v. Mammoth of Alaska, 890 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1995).

Acts before formation of partnership. —

Where a drilling company built a drill rig for use in its business, where later the drilling company and another company formed a partnership, and where, after the partnership was formed, a partnership employee was injured when a component of the drill rig collapsed, drilling company was not employee’s employer when the drill rig was built; thus drilling company is not immune from third party liability by virtue of this section. Huf v. Arctic Alaska Drilling Co., 890 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1995).

Common-law action against fellow employee barred. —

Under this section, workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy and bars a common-law action against a fellow employee. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Unless employee commits intentional tort. —

The exclusivity provision of this section does not protect a fellow employee committing an intentional tort, despite the statute’s use of the terms “employer and any fellow employee.” Logically the supreme court adopts the same construction as to the identical phrase as in AS 23.30.015 . Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

The socially beneficial purpose of the worker’s compensation law would not be furthered by allowing a person who commits intentional tort to use the compensation law as a shield against liability. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

The compensation remedy should not be exclusive when an employee commits an intentional tort on a fellow worker. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Worker’s compensation benefits are paid from employees’ premiums, as a means of spreading the cost of hazards of the workplace. It would not be wise public policy to allow an intentional tort-feasor to shift his liability for his acts to such a fund. Assaults by fellow workers differ not in degree, but in kind, from the type of harm the statute was enacted to deal with. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Co-employees may be liable for responsibilities that are not “incident to” or “inextricably intertwined” with their employment duties. Sauve v. Winfree, 907 P.2d 7 (Alaska 1995).

Where a corporate employee was injured in a fall at work, co-employees who were shareholders and officers of the corporation and who owned the building occupied by the business through a partnership were not immune from an action by the employee alleging that they had breached their duty as landlords. Sauve v. Winfree, 907 P.2d 7 (Alaska 1995).

Negligent employee not decedent’s co-employee. —

Exclusive remedy provision was inapplicable, where a parent aviation firm’s negligent employee was not decedent’s co-employee, despite the firm’s contention that the two were employed by one of its corporate subsidiaries. Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 817 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1991).

Workers’ compensation as exclusive remedy in workplace fight cases. —

The beneficial effect of the rule that workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy in workplace fight cases would be largely destroyed if every case required an inquiry into the relative rank of the assailant and victim, an inquiry which is not relevant to the question whether the quarrel was work-related. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Where the manager of the corporate premises was guilty of assault and battery, directed against two employees, the corporate veil may not be pierced and the corporation’s assets made liable for his intentional torts merely because the manager controlled the activities of the corporation, owned 50 percent of its shares and was its president. Workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

And against employer for acts of managerial employee. —

An employer is not vicariously liable to its employees in an assault and battery action for the acts of its managerial employee. This section makes workmen’s compensation the exclusive remedy against the employer for compensable injuries. AS 23.30.265 (17) (now AS 23.30.395 (24)) defines compensable injuries to include “an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment.” A supervisor is such a third person within this definition, and so workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Boss accompanying employee on errand. —

Decision of the plaintiff, executive of corporate employer, to accompany an employee on his job-related errand was both reasonably foreseeable and contemplated by his employment. As the employee’s boss, the plaintiff’s presence on his employee’s business errand necessarily related to the plaintiff’s job and invoked workers’ compensation coverage, even if the plaintiff considered his break from the franchise business to be wholly unrelated to the employer’s business; therefore, workers’ compensation provided the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. Witmer v. Kellen, 884 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1994).

Intangible injury from sexual harassment. —

The exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ compensation law does not bar intangible injury claims resulting from sexual harassment. Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).

Contribution subversive of section’s policy. —

To expose an employer to an action for contribution would subvert the policy behind this section, exclusivity of liability. Fellows v. Tlingit-Haida Regional Elec. Auth., 740 P.2d 428 (Alaska 1987).

Noncomplying employer not relieved from duty to contribute. —

An employer should not receive the protection of the exclusivity provision of this section when it has failed to secure payment of compensation as required by AS 23.30; a noncomplying employer is not relieved from its duty to contribute under AS 09.16.010 (now see AS 09.17.080 ) by the exclusivity provision of this section. Ehredt v. Dehavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1985).

Recovery of workers’ compensation not bar to suit against employee-assailant. —

An employee-victim in an assault and battery case is not barred from suit against the employee-assailant because of a recovery of workmen’s compensation benefits. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Section applies to employee’s relatives. —

This section applies equally to both the husband or wife of any employee. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

The Alaska statute specifically provides for exclusion of not only the employee’s rights, but also those of the employee’s spouse, as well as various other relations, in-laws and representatives. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

Emotional distress damages in retaliatory discharge case were not precluded by the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy provision, AS 23.30.055 ; employer pointed to no statute text or legislative history suggesting that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act was intended to provide a remedy for a discharge motivated by a violation of public policy. Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contrs., Inc., 127 P.3d 807 (Alaska 2005).

Spouse may not bring loss of consortium action against the injured employee’s employer after the employee has recovered workmen’s compensation benefits. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

While a spouse’s right to recover for loss of consortium is predicated on an injury to her, rather than her husband, it nevertheless requires proof of culpable negligence on the part of the employer. It arises out of, and cannot exist without, the very core of activity with which our workmen’s compensation scheme is concerned. For these reasons, the spouse’s action is brought “on account of the injury” to her husband, as expressed in this section, and is, thus, barred. Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975).

Federal maritime suit not barred. —

This section cannot deprive a state employed maritime worker who has already accepted workers’ compensation benefits from suing the state under the Jones Act, former 46 U.S.C. § 688, because AS 09.50.250 waives the sovereign immunity of the state as to claims brought in superior court under federal law for torts sounding in admiralty. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Brown, 794 P.2d 108 (Alaska 1990).

Factual issues preclude summary judgment. —

In a personal injury suit filed by a worker whose truck collided with a co-worker’s while the trucks were under lease, genuine issues of fact as to whether the men were employees or independent contractors precluded summary judgment on the question of whether workers’ compensation provided the sole remedy. Odsather v. Richardson, 96 P.3d 521 (Alaska 2004).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for an employer in a wrongful death suit brought by the decedent’s estate because genuine issues of material facts remained as to whether the decedent was “on-shift” or “off-shift” when his injury occurred, and there was an issue as to whether the employer authorized the decedent’s use of an ATV. Estate of Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc., 145 P.3d 533 (Alaska 2006).

Summary judgment as to a special employment relationship between a day laborer and a temporary employer was improper as the record evidence did not establish as a matter of law that an implied employment contract existed. Buckley v. Am. Fast Freight, Inc., 444 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2019).

In a case in which the worker was injured on the job and later filed personal injury lawsuits against two companies, numerous issues of material fact made it impossible to determine whether the companies were entitled to judgment as a matter of law that they were immune from liability because no party asserted or presented evidence that the first company and the direct employer were joint venturers; no party argued or presented evidence establishing that the worker was a general or special employee of the first company; and it was error to speculate that a contractor-subcontractor relationship existed between the two companies, then rely on that to further speculate about the relationship between the first company and the direct employer. James v. Alaska Frontier Constructors Inc., 468 P.3d 711 (Alaska 2020).

Section bars claim under Defective Machinery Act. —

The legislature intended that the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act should bar a claim for relief under the Defective Machinery Act (AS 23.25.010 23.25.040 ). Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972).

As each subsequent amendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act extended its coverage, the coverage of the Defective Machinery Act, AS 23.25.010 23.25.040 , was correspondingly reduced by reason of the provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act that the remedies provided therein were exclusive. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Upon the enactment of the first Workmen’s Compensation Act two years later, the coverage provided by the Defective Machinery Act, AS 23.25.010 23.25.040 , was reduced to the extent that it no longer applied to employers in the mining industry employing five or more persons who had not rejected the provisions of the act. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

The Alaska legislature, by continuing the Defective Machinery Act, AS 23.25.010 23.25.040 , in existence after enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, has not evidenced an intent to exclude defective, dangerous machinery from the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in order to coerce employers to furnish safe machinery. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

In a case in which a mother sought workers' compensation death benefits or other damages related to her daughter's death, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred suit against the daughter's employer under the Defective Machinery Act. Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 135, 205 L. Ed. 2d 48 (U.S. 2019).

Harmonious construction with Defective Machinery Act. —

The Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Defective Machinery Act, AS 23.25.010 23.25.040 , can and should be construed to be harmonious rather than in conflict. Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Due process rights held not infringed by amendments to section. —

Oil rig worker, who was employed by a contractor, brought a third-party suit against an oil company for work-related injuries; the worker’s due process rights were not infringed by the 2004 amendments to AS 23.30.045 and this section because the worker still had access to the courts, and the worker still had a worker’s compensation claim. The worker’s equal protection rights were also not violated by the amendments because the worker’s interests were economic; therefore, a minimum scrutiny level of review was applied. Schiel v. Union Oil Co., 219 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2009), overruled in part, Buntin v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 487 P.3d 595 (Alaska 2021).

Relative nature of the work test. —

Alaska adopts the “relative nature of the work test” for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors for the purposes of workers’ compensation. Odsather v. Richardson, 96 P.3d 521 (Alaska 2004).

Effect of section on recovery under wrongful death statute. —

Adult daughter of deceased employee, who was not a beneficiary within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, was not entitled to maintain an action for the wrongful death of the employee. McKenna v. Evans-Jones Coal Co., 12 Alaska 692 (D. Alaska 1950).

Crossclaims by tortfeasors against employer barred. —

This exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act bars third-party crossclaims for indemnity and contribution against an employer. State v. Wien Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980).

A tortfeasor is not entitled to reduce an award against him by the amount of workers’ compensation benefits which have been received by the plaintiff-employee. State v. Wien Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980).

The liability of a third-party defendant cannot be reduced proportionately by the negligence attributable to the plaintiff’s employer. State v. Wien Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980).

Procedural due process is not offended by depriving the third-party defendant of a right to pro-rata contribution from the employer under this section. State v. Wien Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980).

Employee not barred from suing compensation carrier for intentional torts. —

Under the exclusive remedy provisions of Alaska’s Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee is not barred from suing his employer’s compensation carrier for intentional torts. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Intentional tort not found. —

Company violations of state and federal safety regulations regarding the operation of a forklift did not constitute the commission of an intentional tort; therefore, an exception to the exclusivity provisions of this section did not apply. Williams v. Mammoth of Alaska, 890 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1995).

Because an employee did not show that a municipality had the specific intent to injure the employee, the employee’s claim of an intentional tort on the municipality’s part did not operate to take the employee’s claim for damages outside of the confines of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, and the employee’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision, AS 23.30.055 . Fenner v. Municipality of Anchorage, 53 P.3d 573 (Alaska 2002).

Under this chapter carrier is considered separate entity from the employer. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Contractual indemnity not precluded. —

The exclusivity provisions of this section do not preclude express or implied contractual indemnity. Bell Helicopter v. United States, 833 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987).

Since a private employer enjoys the immunity from claims of contribution and indemnity afforded to it under the exclusive remedy provision, so does the federal government. Bell Helicopter v. United States, 833 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987).

Indemnity covenant will not be implied. —

The policies underlying this section and the application of ordinary rules of the law of contracts cannot justify the implication of an indemnity covenant. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

Since a third party may be held liable only upon establishment of its negligence, there is no need for a judicially implied contract of indemnity. There is, thus, no reason for the supreme court to become lost in the labyrinth created by contorting contract law to imply an indemnity agreement when the parties are perfectly free to express their own intentions. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

Courts will imply a contract term in order to conform an agreement to the evident intent of the parties, but since a third party and the employer contracting with it are chargeable with knowledge of the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is illogical to conclude that indemnification of the third party by the employer against the tort claims of the employer’s servants has been in the contemplation of the parties all along. Furthermore, such an interpretation of contracts between employers and third parties effectively nullifies one intended effect of the statute — the establishment of an acceptable, ascertainable and reliable limit to liability. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

Implied contractual indemnity is precluded by this section. Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976).

But should be expressly set forth. —

Where parties chargeable with knowledge of the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act have entered into a service contract, they should be required to set forth expressly any agreement by which they intend to increase an employer’s liability beyond the limits dictated by the workmen’s compensation statute. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

If a third party owning extensive property interests, employing numerous employees and engaging in frequent and substantial contracts wishes to alter this section so as to require an employer contracting with it to indemnify the third party against the tort claims of the employer’s servants, it is not onerous to require that the third party expressly so provide in the contract. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

Express indemnity clause will be enforceable, despite workmen’s compensation exclusive liability as contained in this section. Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976).

Where an employee of a welding and contracting company was injured due to the alleged negligence of an oil production company while he was aboard an off-shore drilling platform owned by the oil production company, and the welding and contracting company had entered into an agreement with the oil production company to indemnify the oil production company for injuries to the welding and contracting company’s employees, the oil production company was entitled to indemnification. Amoco Prod. Co. v. W. C. Church Welding & Contracting, 580 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1978).

As a result of the exclusive liability provisions, an employer may be joined as a third-party defendant only when another party asserts an express indemnity claim against it. However, the fact that the employer is a third-party indemnity defendant in any particular case is a fortuity which does not alter the rule applicable to employer fault generally, even though it might affect the ultimate liability of the parties to the agreement. Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).

Express contractual indemnity claim cannot create common law indemnity claim because such a claim is barred by this section; only an express indemnity claim is not barred by this provision. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. United States, 967 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. Alaska 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048, 113 S. Ct. 964, 122 L. Ed. 2d 121 (U.S. 1993).

Employer may be third party defendant only by express indemnity claim. —

Because an employer may be joined as a third-party defendant only when another party asserts an express indemnity claim against it, a similar action in which the employer was sued separately under an implied contractual indemnity and noncontractual indemnity claims also failed. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. United States, 967 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. Alaska 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048, 113 S. Ct. 964, 122 L. Ed. 2d 121 (U.S. 1993).

Indemnity agreement precluded reliance on section for claim of nonliability. —

In an action by plaintiff airline for indemnification for settlement claims with it brought by defendant airline’s employees as the result of a crash of defendant’s plane on an airfield controlled by plaintiff, the existence and validity of an indemnity agreement between plaintiff and defendant precluded reliance on this section by defendant for its contention of nonliability to the claims. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 826 (D. Alaska 1972).

Presumption of knowledge of exclusive liability provision. —

Each Alaskan employer may, as a matter of law, be presumed to have sufficient knowledge of the provisions of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act to be aware that the Act contains a provision whereby the employer’s liability prescribed by the Act “is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer and any fellow employee to the employee . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer . . . on account of the employee’s injury or death.” Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

There does not appear to be any valid reason for the supreme court to author contractual terms for the parties when, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, they may be presumed to have relied on the statutory exclusive remedy provision. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974).

Common-law damage action by illegally-employed child not barred. —

This section does not bar a common-law damage action when such an action is brought against an employer by a person who was employed in violation of child labor laws at the time of injury. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Where an employer has knowingly entered into an illegal contract of employment with a child, in express violation of a statute, the employer will not be permitted to insist that a child is an “employee” within the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, so that the child can no longer assert its common-law rights against the employer. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Absent any evidence of a conscious intent on her part to choose compensation benefits, an illegally employed minor cannot be held to have waived her right to a common-law remedy. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

As to application of compensation benefits received by ill minor against any damages recovered against employer, see Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976).

Issue of whether plaintiff was employee or independent contractor, involving the exclusive remedy defense of the Workers’ Compensation Act, could be tried by the court and was not subject to the constitutional right to a jury trial. Benson v. City of Nenana, 725 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1986).

When distinguishing between employees and independent contractors for the purposes of workers’ compensation, the inquiry into the character of the claimant’s business can further be broken into the degree of skill involved, whether the claimant holds himself out to the public as a separate business, and whether the claimant bears the accident burden. Odsather v. Richardson, 96 P.3d 521 (Alaska 2004).

Relative nature of the work test for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors requires that the relevant facts be first determined and then analyzed. Odsather v. Richardson, 96 P.3d 521 (Alaska 2004).

Temporary and special employment. —

When a general employer lends an employee to a special employer, the special employer becomes liable for workers’ compensation (and is immune from tort liability) only if: (a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer; (b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and (c) the special employer has the right to control the details of the work. When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for workers’ compensation. Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc., 9 P.3d 1013 (Alaska 2000).

“Project owner.” —

Pipeline operator met the statutory definition of “project owner” under AS 23.30.045(f)(2) where, in the course of its business, it engaged the services of a contractor, which undertook performance of work for the operator; because of its contract with the contractor, the operator did not need to hire its own employees to perform the work done by the contractor. The operator was covered by the exclusivity provisions of this section, and the superior court correctly dismissed the employee’s lawsuit. Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 234 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2010).

Corporations involved in a construction project were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing workers' negligence suit because the corporations did not show the corporations were "project owners," as (1) only one who actually contracted with a person to perform specific work and enjoyed the beneficial use of that work and who, in the course of the person's business, engaged the services of a contractor, was a project owner, (2) the only contract was between the workers' employer and one corporation, (3) the contract's indemnity provisions were irrelevant to being a project owner, (4) the corporations did not show all were potentially liable for workers' compensation, and (5) fact disputes existed as to the validity of an assignment and whether a "preliminary agreement" showed a relevant contractual relationship. Lovely v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 459 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2020).

Mutual employment for benefit of two employers. —

Where the employee is performing services for the mutual benefit of two employers at the time of the accident, such simultaneous employment carries with it the statutory immunity afforded coemployees under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Before an employee may avail himself of such immunity, however, he must, at minimum, offer evidence sufficient to establish that such mutual employment in fact existed at the time of the accident for which the immunity is sought, and such evidence must be sufficient to establish the existence of an express or implied employment agreement between the parties. Cuffe v. Sanders Constr. Co., 748 P.2d 328 (Alaska 1988).

Liability of general contractor for injury to subcontractor’s employee. —

When a general contractor injures a subcontractor’s employee by his own affirmative act of negligence, the general contractor remains liable without regard to the extent of his control over the subcontractor’s work. Cuffe v. Sanders Constr. Co., 748 P.2d 328 (Alaska 1988).

General contractor paying benefits to employee of uninsured subcontractor. —

A general contractor who, by operation of the contractor-under clause contained in AS 23.30.045(a) , has been required to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the employee of an uninsured subcontractor is not an employer for purposes of immunity from common-law liability under this section. Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1981).

If a general contractor who by operation of the contractor-under clause contained in AS 23.30.045(a) has been required to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the employee of an uninsured subcontractor is also found liable for damages at common law, he may set-off from that award the amount of compensation benefits he has previously paid to the subcontractor’s employee. Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1981).

Defendant was not employee. —

This section did not bar a tort action against a defendant who, under the relative nature of the work test, was a subcontractor, not an employee, of plaintiff’s employer. Benner v. Wichman, 874 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1994).

Suit against employer in his personal capacity. —

Dismissal of the insured’s malpractice lawsuit against the insurance broker was proper because this section did not bar the original tort claims brought against the insured where an employee was not suing the insured in his capacity as the employer. Therefore, the insured remained under a continuing duty to inquire. Christianson v. Conrad-Houston Ins., 318 P.3d 390 (Alaska 2014).

“Employer." —

Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission erred in affirming the Workers' Compensation Board's decision that a woman was her neighbor's employer after she hired him help with major home repairs because her connection with the neighbor's work could only be consumptive and not productive where, while she had once owned the building and had received help from the neighbor on earlier repair projects, she rented the building from her son and used it for her massage business and her home, and nothing in the record suggested that she or her business had any obligation to maintain the premises to the extent of making the major repairs that underlay the case or that the neighbor was injured performing work that was part of the woman's business. Yong Kang v. Mullins, 420 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2018).

Pipeline company was agent of oil companies. —

This section did not shield a pipeline service company from common-law tort liability for the injuries of the employees of the execution contractors since the company was not a “contractor” within the meaning of AS 23.30.045 but an agent for the oil companies which owned the permit authorizing construction of the pipeline. Everette v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 614 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1980).

Longshoreman-stevedore’s collection of workmen’s compensation benefits did not preclude further recovery against his employer on a subsequent unseaworthiness claim. Barber v. New Eng. Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973).

Where a longshoreman-stevedore has elected to avail himself of the state compensation benefits, he should have the same right of suing his employer-shipowner as if he elected to proceed under the federal Longshoremen’s Act. Any other result would work material prejudice to general maritime law contrary to the dictates of the constitution’s supremacy clause as interpreted by the United States supreme court. Barber v. New Eng. Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973).

It is not contrary to the Submerged Land Acts, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a), to hold the state did not have the power to exclude a federal maritime remedy. Barber v. New Eng. Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973).

Jurisdiction of superior court. —

Superior court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant a stay where there was prior filing of a workers’ compensation claim, when the major issue before the court was construction of an insurance contract, a question of law uniquely suited to judicial resolution; the employer waited until six weeks before the trial date, after much discovery had taken place, to request a stay; and no action had been taken in the administrative proceeding. Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985).

Dual capacity doctrine not adopted. —

The supreme court refused to adopt as the law of the state the dual capacity doctrine, under which an employer apparently protected by the exclusive liability principle may become liable to the employee in tort if, in respect to that tort, he occupies a position which places upon him obligations independent and distinct from his role as an employer. State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979).

Action for negligent inspection of workplace. —

There is nothing in the statutory language of the Alaska scheme which prevents an employee from bringing a negligence action against a carrier for negligent inspection of the employer’s workplace. Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989).

Aviation firm using pilots without adequate rest. —

Complaint alleging that aviation firm dispatched pilots for a night flight without adequate rest or sleep alleged, at best, gross negligence or willful and knowing violation of FAA regulations, and such allegations failed to constitute the type of intentional tort actionable outside the workers’ compensation system. Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989).

Refusal to allow employer’s negligence as partial defense to liability. —

In an action by an employee who sustained on-the-job injuries to which both his employer and third-party defendants negligently contributed, the third-party defendants were not deprived of any available defenses by the refusal of the superior court to allow them to present the employer’s negligence as a partial defense to liability. Arctic Structures v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).

Defense of comparative negligence was inapplicable in action against employer who failed to secure worker’s compensation insurance. Grothe v. Olafson, 659 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1983).

Apportionment of damages. —

When the legislature enacted AS 09.17.080 , governing apportionment of damages, it left intact the exclusive liability and employer reimbursement provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).

Evidence of an employer’s negligence may be relevant and admissible in an employee’s action against third-party tortfeasors to prove that the employer was entirely at fault, or that the employer’s fault was a superseding cause of the injury. Under AS 09.17.080 , the finder of fact may allocate all or none of the total fault to the employer. It may not allocate only a portion of the total fault to the employer. Jury instructions must be carefully prepared to prevent a panel from attributing to the employee any negligence of the employer. Lake v. Construction Mach., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).

Reimbursement of certain financial expenses not allowed. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly denied an injured employee’s reimbursement claims for a court-imposed fine, court-ordered alcohol treatment and testing, theft, unpaid rent, an interest in a boat, and an interest in his employer’s business, where employee was seeking reimbursement outside of the structure provided by the workers’ compensation act. Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004).

Instruction. —

Absent any evidence that the employer failed to secure payment of compensation to the injured employee, there was no error in the trial court’s instruction in a tort action that the employee’s only remedy was under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Applied in

Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Co. v. Estes, 370 P.2d 180 (Alaska 1962); Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd. v. Marsh, 550 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1976); Ruble v. Arctic Gen., 598 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1979).

Quoted in

Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963); Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 791 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1990); Christensen v. NCH Corp., 956 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1998); Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Stated in

Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999).

Cited in

Taylor v. Interior Enters., 471 P.2d 405 (Alaska 1970); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. H.C. Price Co., 694 P.2d 782 (Alaska 1985); Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1988); Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138 (Alaska 2005); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 199 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2008); Coppe v. Bleicher, 318 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2014).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 9, 62.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 918-935.

Workmen’s Compensation Act as furnishing exclusive remedy for master’s failure to inform servant of disease or physical condition disclosed by medical examination. 69 ALR2d 1218.

Right of employee to maintain common-law action for negligence against workmen’s compensation insurance carrier. 93 ALR2d 598.

Right to maintain action against fellow employee for injury or death covered by workmen’s compensation. 21 ALR3d 845; 57 ALR4th 888.

Right to maintain malpractice suit against injured employee’s attending physician notwithstanding receipt of workmen’s compensation award. 28 ALR3d 1066.

Workmen’s compensation provision as precluding employee’s action against employer for fraud, false imprisonment, defamation, or the like. 46 ALR3d 1279.

Modern status of effect of state Workmen’s Compensation Act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman. 100 ALR3d 350.

Modern status: “dual capacity doctrine” as basis for employee’s recovery from employer in tort. 23 ALR4th 1151.

Workers’ compensation immunity as extending to one owning controlling interest in employer corporation. 30 ALR4th 948.

Workers’ Compensation Law as precluding employee’s suit against employer for third person’s criminal attack. 49 ALR4th 926.

Worker’s compensation as precluding tort action for injury to or death of employee’s unborn child. 55 ALR4th 792.

Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of Workers’ Compensation Law. 57 ALR4th 888.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground for liability to third party. 13 ALR5th 289.

Postaccident conduct by employer, employer’s insurer, or employer’s employees in relation to workers’ compensation claim as waiving, or estopping employer from asserting, exclusivity otherwise afforded by workers’ compensation statute. 120 ALR5th 513.

Sec. 23.30.060. Election of direct payment presumed.

  1. An employer is conclusively presumed to have elected to pay compensation directly to employees for injuries sustained arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this chapter, until notice in writing of insurance, stating the name and address of the insurance company and the period of insurance, is given to the employee.
  2. The notice shall be posted and kept on the premises of the employer or on the premises where the employer’s operations are being carried on in three conspicuous places, at the office of the employer, at the mess house or boarding house if there is one, and in some conspicuous place on the premises or works. The notice must be substantially in the following form, and the signature shall be witnessed by two witnesses:

Employer’s Notice of Insurance To the employees of the undersigned: You and each of you are herby notified that the undersigned is insured in the Insurance Company, whose address is and that the period covered by the insurance is in accordance with the terms, conditions and provisions to pay compensation to employees of the undersigned for injuries received as provided in the Act of the State of Alaska, known as the “Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.” Signed Witness:

Click to view

History. (§ 34 ch 193 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Vienna v. Scott Wetzel Servs., 740 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1987).

Cited in

Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Sec. 23.30.065. Employer’s record of injuries.

An employer shall keep a record with respect to an injury to an employee. The record must contain the information of disease, other disability, or death with respect to an injury that the division requires, and must be available to inspection by the division or by a state authority at the times and under the conditions that the department prescribes by regulation.

History. (§ 27 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 24 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Sec. 23.30.070. Report of injury to division.

  1. Within 10 days from the date the employer has knowledge of an injury or death or from the date the employer has knowledge of a disease or infection, alleged by the employee or on behalf of the employee to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, the employer shall file with the division a report setting out
    1. the name, address, and business of the employer;
    2. the name, address, and occupation of the employee;
    3. the cause and nature of the alleged injury or death;
    4. the year, month, day, and hour when and the particular locality where the alleged injury or death occurred; and
    5. the other information that the division may require.
  2. Additional reports with respect to the injury and to the condition of the employee shall be filed by the employer with the division at the times and in the manner that the director prescribes.
  3. A report made under (a) or (b) of this section is not evidence of a fact stated in the report in a proceeding in respect to the injury or death on account of which the report is made.
  4. Filing of the report with the division in a format prescribed by the director, within the time prescribed in (a) or (b) of this section, is compliance with this section.
  5. If the employer or the carrier has been given notice, or the employer, or an agent of the employer in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred, or the carrier has knowledge of an injury or death of an employee and fails, neglects, or refuses to file a report of it as required by (a) of this section, the limitations in AS 23.30.105(a) of this chapter do not begin to run against the claim of the injured employee or the employee’s dependents entitled to compensation, or in favor of either the employer or the carrier, until the report has been furnished as required (a) of this section.
  6. An employer who fails or refuses to file a report required of the employer by this section or who fails or refuses to file the report required by (a) of this section within the time required shall, if so required by the board, pay the employee or the legal representative of the employee or other person entitled to compensation by reason of the employee’s injury or death an additional award equal to 20 percent of the amounts that were unpaid when due. The award shall be against either the employer or the insurance carrier, or both.

History. (§ 28 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 46 SLA 1964; am § 1 ch 43 SLA 1970; am §§ 25 — 27 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am §§ 3 — 6 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, in the introductory language in (a), substituted “shall file with” for “shall send to” following “the employer”; in (b), substituted “shall be filed by the employer with the division” for shall be sent by the employer to the division” following “condition of the employee”; rewrote (d), which read, “Mailing of the report and a copy to the division in a standard envelope, within the time prescribed in (a) or (b) of this section, is compliance with this section”; in (f) twice substituted “to file a report” for “to send a report” following “or refuses”.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Coppe v. Bleicher, 318 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2014).

Cited in

Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963); Ruble v. Arctic Gen., 598 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1979); Tinker v. Veco, Inc., 913 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1996).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 488-503.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 915.

Sec. 23.30.075. Employer’s liability to pay.

  1. An employer under this chapter, unless exempted, shall either insure and keep insured for the employer’s liability under this chapter in an insurance company or association duly authorized to transact the business of workers’ compensation insurance in this state, or shall furnish the division satisfactory proof of the employer’s financial ability to pay directly the compensation provided for. If an employer elects to pay directly, the board may, in its discretion, require the deposit of an acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they are incurred.
  2. If an employer fails to insure and keep insured employees subject to this chapter or fails to obtain a certificate of self-insurance from the division, upon conviction, the court shall impose a fine of $10,000 and may impose a sentence of imprisonment for not more than one year. If an employer is a corporation, all persons who, at the time of the injury or death, had authority to insure the corporation or apply for a certificate of self-insurance, and the person actively in charge of the business of the corporation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in this subsection and shall be personally, jointly, and severally liable together with the corporation for the payment of all compensation or other benefits for which the corporation is liable under this chapter if the corporation at that time is not insured or qualified as a self-insurer.

History. (§ 36 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 2 ch 46 SLA 1964; am § 12 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 28 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Opinions of attorney general. —

The Violent Crimes Compensation Board has no right to obtain reimbursement for funds paid to a victim injured on the job from the victim’s employer, where the employer has failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance and is now bankrupt. AS 18.67.140 limits any subrogation claims to situations in which subrogation is sought against the person who committed the crime. September 11, 1984 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

No exemption for lack of income.

A business is not exempt from providing workers' compensation coverage simply because it has little income. Adams v. State, 467 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

Smith v. Marchant Enters., 791 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1990).

Stated in

Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963); Clary Ins. Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980).

Cited in

Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985); Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985); Eldridge v. Felec Servs, Inc., 920 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. Alaska 1990); Schiel v. Union Oil Co., 219 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2009); State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014); Yong Kang v. Mullins, 420 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2018); Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 66.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 913, 933.

Who is an “executive officer” of insured within meaning of liability insurance policy. 1 ALR5th 132.

Sec. 23.30.080. Employer’s failure to insure.

  1. If an employer fails to comply with AS 23.30.075 the employer may not escape liability for personal injury or death sustained by an employee when the injury sustained arises out of and in the usual course of the employment because
    1. the employee assumed the risks inherent to or incidental to or arising out of the employment, or the risks arising from the failure of the employer to provide and maintain a reasonably safe place to work, or the risks arising from the failure of an employer to furnish reasonably safe tools or appliances; or because the employer exercises reasonable care in selecting reasonably competent employees in the business;
    2. the injury was caused by the negligence of a co-employee;
    3. the employee was negligent, unless it appears that the negligence was wilful and with intent to cause the injury or was the result of wilful intoxication on the part of the injured party.
  2. In an action by an employee against an employer for personal injury sustained arising out of and in the course of the employment where the employer has failed to insure or to provide security as required by AS 23.30.075 , it is presumed that the injury to the employee was the first result growing out of the negligence of the employer and that the employer’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury; the burden of proof rests upon the employer to rebut this presumption of negligence.
  3. The limits of liability do not apply when an action is brought under this section.
  4. If an employer fails to insure or provide security as required by AS 23.30.075 , the board may issue a stop order at the request of the division prohibiting the use of employee labor by the employer until the employer insures or provides security as required by AS 23.30.075 . The failure of an employer to file evidence of compliance as required by AS 23.30.085 creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer has failed to insure or provide security as required by AS 23.30.075. If an employer fails to comply with a stop order issued under this section, the board shall assess a civil penalty of $1,000 a day. The employer may not obtain a public contract with the state or a political subdivision of the state for three years following the violation of the stop order.
  5. If a representative of the department investigates an employer’s failure to file the evidence of compliance required by AS 23.30.085 and, after investigation, there is substantial evidence that the employer failed to insure or provide security as required by AS 23.30.075 , the representative shall inform the employer. The representative may request the director to issue a stop order prohibiting the use of employee labor by the employer until the employer insures or provides security as required by AS 23.30.075 . The director may issue a stop order, without a hearing, based on the representative’s investigation. The director shall dissolve a stop order issued under this subsection upon receipt of substantial evidence that the employer is insured or has provided security as required by AS 23.30.075(a) . If an employer fails to comply with a stop order issued under this subsection, the division may petition the board to assess a civil penalty. The board may assess a civil penalty of $1,000 a day. An employer who is assessed a penalty under this subsection may not obtain a public contract with the state or a political subdivision of the state for the three years following violation of the stop order.
  6. If an employer fails to insure or provide security as required by AS 23.30.075 , the division may petition the board to assess a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each employee for each day an employee is employed while the employer failed to insure or provide the security required by AS 23.30.075 . The failure of an employer to file evidence of compliance as required by AS 23.30.085 creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer failed to insure or provide security as required by AS 23.30.075.
  7. If an employer fails to pay a civil penalty order issued under (d), (e), or (f) of this section within seven days after the date of service of the order upon the employer, the director may declare the employer in default. The director shall file a certified copy of the penalty order and declaration of default with the clerk of the superior court. The court shall, upon the filing of the copy of the order and declaration, enter judgment for the amount declared in default if it is in accordance with law. Anytime after a declaration of default, the attorney general shall, when requested to do so by the director, take appropriate action to ensure collection of the defaulted payment. Review of the judgment may be had as provided under the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure. Final proceedings to execute the judgment may be had by writ of execution.

History. (§ 38 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 6 ch 93 SLA 1982; am §§ 29, 30 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Defense of comparative negligence was inapplicable in action against employer who failed to secure worker’s compensation insurance. Grothe v. Olafson, 659 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1983).

Quoted in

Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

Schiel v. Union Oil Co., 219 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2009); State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 23.30.082. Workers’ compensation benefits guaranty fund.

  1. The workers’ compensation benefits guaranty fund is established in the general fund to carry out the purposes of this section. The fund is composed of civil penalty payments made by employers under AS 23.30.080 , income earned on investment of the money in the fund, money deposited in the fund by the department, and appropriations to the fund, if any. However, money appropriated to the fund does not lapse. Amounts in the fund may be appropriated for claims against the fund, for expenses directly related to fund operations and claims, and for legal expenses.
  2. Every three months, the Department of Revenue shall provide the division with a statement of the activities of, balances in, interest earned on, and interest returned to the fund.
  3. Subject to the provisions of this section, an employee employed by an employer who fails to meet the requirements of AS 23.30.075 and who fails to pay compensation and benefits due to the employee under this chapter may file a claim for payment by the fund. In order to be eligible for payment, the claim form must be filed within the same time, and in the same manner, as a workers’ compensation claim. The fund may assert the same defenses as an insured employer under this chapter.
  4. If the fund pays benefits to an employee under this section, the fund shall be subrogated to all of the rights of the employee to the amount paid, and the employee shall assign all right, title, and interest in that portion of the employee’s workers’ compensation claim and any recovery under AS 23.30.015 to the fund. Money collected by the division on the claim or recovery shall be deposited in the fund.
  5. If the money deposited in the fund is insufficient at a given time to satisfy a duly authorized claim against the fund, the fund shall, when sufficient money has been deposited in the fund and appropriated, satisfy unpaid claims in the order in which the claims were originally filed, without interest.
  6. The division may contract under AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code) with a person for the person to adjust claims against the fund. The contract may cover one or more claims.
  7. In this section, “fund” means the workers’ compensation benefits guaranty fund.

History. (§ 31 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Construction. —

Nothing in the statute suggests the guaranty fund may act as some type of conduit for private settlement funds. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Liability of fund. —

It was immaterial whether appellant's workers' compensation claim was against the guaranty fund or the employer, as the fund had no independent liability to a compensation claimant; because the fund's liability derived solely from an employer's liability, any claim against the fund necessarily required a claim against the employer. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Settlement agreement. —

Superior court erred by failing to first interpret the settlement agreement to determine the parties' reasonable expectations in light of the requirement that appellant elect between a civil remedy and a workers' compensation remedy; as required to elect the civil remedy, appellant dismissed the workers' compensation claim, because the owner's potential liability for compensation benefits was dependent on appellee's potential liability as the worker's employer, and appellant received no compensation for that claim. Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014); Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 23.30.085. Duty of employer to file evidence of compliance.

  1. An employer subject to this chapter, unless exempted, shall initially file evidence of compliance with the insurance provisions of this chapter with the division, in the form prescribed by the director. The employer shall also give evidence of compliance within 10 days after the termination of the employer’s insurance by expiration or cancellation. These requirements do not apply to an employer who has certification from the board of the employer’s financial ability to pay compensation directly without insurance.
  2. If an employer fails, refuses, or neglects to comply with the provision of this section, the employer shall be subject to the penalties provided in AS 23.30.070 for failure to report accidents; but nothing in this section may be construed to affect the rights conferred upon an injured employee or the employee’s beneficiaries under this chapter.

History. (§ 37 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 32 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Civil as well as criminal penalties. —

The failure on the part of the employer to carry workmen’s compensation insurance or provide self insurance as provided for in the act shall carry civil as well as criminal penalties. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963).

Applied in

Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985).

Cited in

Eldridge v. Felec Servs, Inc., 920 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. Alaska 1990).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 66.

Sec. 23.30.090. Self-insurance certificates.

If an employer has complied with the provisions of this chapter relating to self-insurance and has paid annual service fees assessed under AS 23.05.067 , the board shall issue the employer a certificate that shall remain in force for a period fixed by the board. The board may, upon at least 10 days’ notice and a hearing, revoke a self-insurance certificate upon satisfactory proof that an employer is no longer entitled to it. After revocation, the board may grant a new certificate to an employer, upon the employer’s petition and satisfactory proof of the employer’s financial ability as provided in this chapter. An employer authorized as a self-insurer shall provide claims facilities through its own staffed adjusting facilities located within the state, or independent, licensed, resident adjusters with power to effect settlement within the state.

History. (§ 39 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 1 SLA 1962; am § 4 ch 89 SLA 2000)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 465.

100 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 354-356.

Homeowners’ or personal liability insurance as providing coverage for liability under workmen’s compensation laws. 41 ALR3d 1306.

Sec. 23.30.092. Volunteer ambulance attendants’, police officers’, firefighters’, and search and rescue personnel’s insurance.

A political subdivision may elect to provide benefits and compensation to its volunteer ambulance attendants, police officers, firefighters, or search and rescue personnel by obtaining insurance that would provide its volunteer ambulance attendants, police officers, firefighters, or search and rescue personnel with benefits and compensation at least equivalent to those conferred upon volunteer ambulance attendants, police officers, firefighters, or search and rescue personnel by this chapter, and the election shall be considered compliance with the coverage and insurance provisions of this chapter. The election shall be made by filing copies of the insurance policy or policies with the commissioner.

History. (§ 3 ch 41 SLA 1968; am § 1 ch 77 SLA 1979; am § 5 ch 98 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1989, the terms “police officers” and “fire fighters” were substituted for “policemen,” and “firemen” in this section under §§ 59 and 60, ch. 50, SLA 1989.

Sec. 23.30.095. Medical treatments, services, and examinations.

  1. The employer shall furnish medical, surgical, and other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches, and apparatus for the period which the nature of the injury or the process of recovery requires, not exceeding two years from and after the date of injury to the employee. However, if the condition requiring the treatment, apparatus, or medicine is a latent one, the two-year period runs from the time the employee has knowledge of the nature of the employee’s disability and its relationship to the employment and after disablement.  It shall be additionally provided that, if continued treatment or care or both beyond the two-year period is indicated, the injured employee has the right of review by the board.  The board may authorize continued treatment or care or both as the process of recovery may require. When medical care is required, the injured employee may designate a licensed physician to provide all medical and related benefits. The employee may not make more than one change in the employee’s choice of attending physician without the written consent of the employer. Referral to a specialist by the employee’s attending physician is not considered a change in physicians. Upon procuring the services of a physician, the injured employee shall give proper notification of the selection to the employer within a reasonable time after first being treated. Notice of a change in the attending physician shall be given before the change.
  2. If the employee is unable to designate a physician and the emergency nature of the injury requires immediate medical care, or if the employee does not desire to designate a physician and so advises the employer, the employer shall designate the physician.  Designation under this subsection, however, does not prevent the employee from subsequently designating a physician for continuance of required medical care.
  3. A claim for medical or surgical treatment, or treatment requiring continuing and multiple treatments of a similar nature, is not valid and enforceable against the employer unless, within 14 days following treatment, the physician or health care provider giving the treatment or the employee receiving it furnishes to the employer and the board notice of the injury and treatment, preferably on a form prescribed by the board.  The board shall, however, excuse the failure to furnish notice within 14 days when it finds it to be in the interest of justice to do so, and it may, upon application by a party in interest, make an award for the reasonable value of the medical or surgical treatment so obtained by the employee. When a claim is made for a course of treatment requiring continuing and multiple treatments of a similar nature, in addition to the notice, the physician or health care provider shall furnish a written treatment plan if the course of treatment will require more frequent outpatient visits than the standard treatment frequency for the nature and degree of the injury and the type of treatments. The treatment plan shall be furnished to the employee and the employer within 14 days after treatment begins. The treatment plan must include objectives, modalities, frequency of treatments, and reasons for the frequency of treatments. If the treatment plan is not furnished as required under this subsection, neither the employer nor the employee may be required to pay for treatments that exceed the frequency standard. The board shall adopt regulations establishing standards for frequency of treatment.
  4. If at any time during the period the employee unreasonably refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment, the board may by order suspend the payment of further compensation while the refusal continues, and no compensation may be paid at any time during the period of suspension, unless the circumstances justified the refusal.
  5. The employee shall, after an injury, at reasonable times during the continuance of the disability, if requested by the employer or when ordered by the board, submit to an examination by a physician or surgeon of the employer’s choice authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the examination occurs, furnished and paid for by the employer. The employer may not make more than one change in the employer’s choice of a physician or surgeon without the written consent of the employee. Referral to a specialist by the employer’s physician is not considered a change in physicians. An examination requested by the employer not less than 14 days after injury, and every 60 days thereafter, shall be presumed to be reasonable, and the employee shall submit to the examination without further request or order by the board. Unless medically appropriate, the physician shall use existing diagnostic data to complete the examination. Facts relative to the injury or claim communicated to or otherwise learned by a physician or surgeon who may have attended or examined the employee, or who may have been present at an examination are not privileged, either in the hearings provided for in this chapter or an action to recover damages against an employer who is subject to the compensation provisions of this chapter. If an employee refuses to submit to an examination provided for in this section, the employee’s rights to compensation shall be suspended until the obstruction or refusal ceases, and the employee’s compensation during the period of suspension may, in the discretion of the board or the court determining an action brought for the recovery of damages under this chapter, be forfeited. The board in any case of death may require an autopsy at the expense of the party requesting the autopsy. An autopsy may not be held without notice first being given to the widow or widower or next of kin if they reside in the state or their whereabouts can be reasonably ascertained, of the time and place of the autopsy and reasonable time and opportunity given the widow or widower or next of kin to have a representative present to witness the autopsy. If adequate notice is not given, the findings from the autopsy may be suppressed on motion made to the board or to the superior court, as the case may be.
  6. [Repealed, § 74 ch 10 FSSLA 2005.]
  7. [Repealed, § 27 ch 93 SLA 1982.]
  8. Upon the filing with the division by a party in interest of a claim or other pleading, all parties to the proceeding must immediately, or in any event within five days after service of the pleading, send to the division the original signed reports of all physicians relating to the proceedings that they may have in their possession or under their control, and copies of the reports shall be served by the party immediately on any adverse party. There is a continuing duty on all parties to file and serve all the reports during the pendency of the proceeding.
  9. Interference by a person with the selection by an injured employee of an authorized physician to treat the employee, or the improper influencing or attempt by a person to influence a medical opinion of a physician who has treated or examined an injured employee, is a misdemeanor.
  10. The commissioner shall appoint a medical services review committee to assist and advise the department and the board in matters involving the appropriateness, necessity, and cost of medical and related services provided under this chapter. The medical services review committee shall consist of nine members to be appointed by the commissioner as follows:
    1. one member who is a member of the Alaska State Medical Association;
    2. one member who is a member of the Alaska Chiropractic Society;
    3. one member who is a member of the Alaska State Hospital and Nursing Home Association;
    4. one member who is a health care provider, as defined in AS 09.55.560 ;
    5. four public members who are not within the definition of “health care provider” in AS 09.55.560 ; and
    6. one member who is the designee of the commissioner and who shall serve as chair.
  11. In the event of a medical dispute regarding determinations of causation, medical stability, ability to enter a reemployment plan, degree of impairment, functional capacity, the amount and efficacy of the continuance of or necessity of treatment, or compensability between the employee’s attending physician and the employer’s independent medical evaluation, the board may require that a second independent medical evaluation be conducted by a physician or physicians selected by the board from a list established and maintained by the board. The cost of an examination and medical report shall be paid by the employer. The report of an independent medical examiner shall be furnished to the board and to the parties within 14 days after the examination is concluded. A person may not seek damages from an independent medical examiner caused by the rendering of an opinion or providing testimony under this subsection, except in the event of fraud or gross incompetence.
  12. [Repealed, § 74 ch 10 FSSLA 2005.]
  13. [Repealed, § 74 ch 10 FSSLA 2005.]
  14. A generic drug product must be used when dispensing a drug product to an employee under this chapter unless the prescribing physician provides justification in writing explaining the medical necessity for the name-brand drug product. The department, by regulation, shall establish a preferred drug list and a procedure for establishing medical necessity to depart from the list and to use a name-brand drug product. In this subsection, “generic drug product” has the meaning given the term “equivalent drug product” in AS 08.80.480 .
  15. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, an employer is not liable for palliative care after the date of medical stability unless the palliative care is reasonable and necessary (1) to enable the employee to continue in the employee’s employment at the time of treatment, (2) to enable the employee to continue to participate in an approved reemployment plan, or (3) to relieve chronic debilitating pain. A claim for palliative care is not valid and enforceable unless it is accompanied by a certification of the attending physician that the palliative care meets the requirements of this subsection. A claim for palliative care is subject to the requirements of (c) — (n) of this section. If a claim for palliative care is controverted by the employer, the board may require an evaluation under (k) of this section regarding the disputed palliative care. A claim for palliative care may be heard by the board under AS 23.30.110 .

History. (§ 6(1) (2) ch 193 SLA 1959; § 6(3), (5) ch 193 SLA 1959; § 6(6) ch 193 SLA 1959; am §§ 2, 3 ch 42 SLA 1962; added by § 4 ch 42 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 74 SLA 1963; am § 86 ch 127 SLA 1974; am §§ 7 — 9, 27 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 112 SLA 1984; am §§ 13 — 18 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 4 ch 75 SLA 1995; am §§ 8, 9 ch 105 SLA 2000; am § 1 ch 84 SLA 2002; am §§ 33 — 35, 74 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Cross references. —

For additional duties of the medical services review committee, the membership of which is altered by the 2005 amendment of (j) of this section, see § 82, ch. 10, FSSLA 2005, in the 2005 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Frequency of treatment limits constitutional. —

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act frequency-of-treatment provision in subsection (c) and the corresponding regulation do not violate federal and state guarantees of due process, equal protection and privacy. Chiropractors for Justice v. State, 895 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1995).

Liability of employer is to pay for medical services, not to arrange for them. Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963).

It is board’s prerogative and duty to enforce employer’s obligation to furnish medical treatment if the employer refuses or neglects to do so of his own volition. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

Obligation to furnish medical care. —

Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission erred in reversing the Workers' Compensation Board's award of attorney's fees under because the employer delayed an employee's surgery through its actions both before and after his attorney filed a written claim by refusing to preauthorize the surgery and scheduling an employer's independent medical examination (EIME), the employer's obligation to furnish medical care could include an obligation to pay medical bills promptly, the employer had adequate information about the reasonable necessity of the third surgery well before it was authorized, and the information the employer sought from the EIME was not reasonably related to the question of the compensability of and need for the requested surgery. Bockus v. First Student Servs., 384 P.3d 801 (Alaska 2016).

Although a worker sought an order requiring payment of medical care for the worker's serious injury for the rest of the worker's life, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board did not abuse its discretion in ordering the employer to provide future medical care in accordance with the requirements of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act, AS § 23.05.010 et seq. Further, the employer was required to provide periodic surveillance examinations until another cause displaced the work injury as the substantial cause of the need for continuing treatment. Cavitt v. D&D Servs., 466 P.3d 345 (Alaska 2020).

Reasonable and necessary treatments. —

By providing that employers are responsible only for providing that medical care and those services “which the nature of the injury or the process of recovery requires,” the Workers’ Compensation Act indicates that the compensation board’s proper function includes determining whether the care paid for by employers under the statute is reasonable and necessary. Bockness v. Brown Jug, Inc., 980 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1999).

Selection by employee of out-of-state physician. —

Under subsection (a) of this section, an injured employee has no right to select an out-of-state physician without the approval of the board. Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963).

The selection by the employee of a physician outside the state would require a ruling by the board that, in its judgment, care or treatment could best be administered by such out-of-state physician. Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963).

Substitution of new attending physician. —

Where the record indicated that employee’s attending physician refused to treat the employee, the board erred in denying the employee’s request to substitute a new physician. Bloom v. Tekton, Inc., 5 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2000).

Confusion over rights. —

Although the Workers’ Compensation Act allows an injured worker to change attending physicians only once without the consent of the employer, a new regulation found in 8 AAC 45.082 provides that if the attending physician dies, moves the physician’s practice 50 miles or more from the employee, or refuses to treat the employee, the employee may substitute a physician and it will not be considered a change of attending physicians. Bloom v. Tekton, Inc., 5 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2000).

Combination of the employer’s delay in providing an evaluation for employee’s surgery and the final outcome of the surgery produced clear and convincing evidence of no medical stability under AS 23.30.395 ; and, while the employer argued that the delay in the employee’s referral to a second physician was based on the first physician’s misreading of subsection (a) of this section, the employer had notice of the confusion and there was no basis upon which to find that the employee waived procedural rights to seek compensation based on the confusion. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Although worker’s compromise and release entered into with his employer’s insurer stipulated that the worker could only change physicians once, the worker had moved to another state and a letter from the insurer was unclear that the worker had a right to change physician’s because of his move or because of another physician’s refusal to treat him; on remand, the Worker’s Compensation Board would be able to consider the statements of the insurer’s representative to determine whether the statements were misleading in this respect, and with respect to the worker’s waiver of benefits. Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079 (Alaska 2008).

Subsection (a) implicitly recognizes board’s continuing jurisdiction over a compensation case for a two-year period. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

Board may order further examination while appeal of case is pending. —

The exercise of administrative jurisdiction by the board in ordering further medical examination and treatment while a case appealing the board’s finding of no permanent partial disability is pending in the superior court is not inconsistent with the proper exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

But it should notify parties and their counsel of its intentions to reconsider medical aspect of such case. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

And it should disclose reasons for its decision. —

Following reconsideration of the medical aspects of a case, the board should disclose the reasons for its decision, in order that one might know that this exercise of the board’s jurisdiction did not and was not intended to conflict with the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter raised on a pending appeal. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

Independent medical examiner. —

The board is not required to adopt the report of the independent medical examiner. Brown v. State, Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 931 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1997).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board abused its discretion when it determined that the claimant should forfeit her temporary total disability benefits when she refused to travel 2500 miles from her home to attend an employer’s independent medical examination; requiring the claimant to travel that distance was manifestly unreasonable, and the board acknowledged that a physician could have been found in the state where the claimant lived. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Worker maintained that he never waived his right to request a second independent medical examination, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred in not ordering a second independent medical examination; however, the board did not need its own expert to resolve a dispute because the dispute was resolved when the employer’s insurer paid for surgery. Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079 (Alaska 2008).

When an employee claimed various parties conspired to present the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board a video falsely depicting the employee's physical abilities, in an attempt to terminate the employee's workers' compensation benefits, it was error to dismiss the employee's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because, inter alia, the employer's physician was not immune pursuant to AS 23.30.095(k) , as the physician did not render an opinion as an independent medical examiner, since the physician performed a medical evaluation of the employee under AS 23.30.095(e) . Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255 (Alaska 2016).

Notice of right to second evaluation required. —

In every case, the board is required to give the parties notice of their right to request and obtain a second independent medical evaluation (SIME) under subsection (k) in the event of a medical dispute, at which time each party can either request the SIME or enter into the record a clear waiver of the right to a SIME. Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994).

Failure to give notice of right reversible error. —

Although employer rebutted by substantial evidence the presumption of compensability created by AS 23.30.120(a) , the board committed reversible error in not ordering a second independent medical examination or informing employee of her right to such an examination pursuant to subsection (k). Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994).

Effect of controversion of claim. —

Where an employee sought and was ready to undergo treatment well within two years of the date of injury, and only failed to go forward because her employer and insurance carrier controverted her claim, it would have been unjust to allow the employer to rely on the delay in receipt of treatment to avoid the more stringent benefit requirements owed to injured employees in the first two years following injury, and the claim was reviewed according to the date the treatment was sought and the claim was filed with the compensation board. Phillip Weidner & Assocs. v. Hibdon, 989 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999).

“Process of recovery”. —

The “process of recovery” language of subsection (a) does not preclude an award for purely palliative care where the evidence establishes that such care promotes the employee’s recovery from individual attacks caused by a chronic condition. Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991).

Submission of treatment plan. —

Under subsection (c), the obligation to file a treatment plan is entirely dependent on the frequency, not the duration, of treatments; thus, where the standard treatment frequency for the first month of any treatment was three treatments per week and the employee began receiving daily physical therapy, the therapist was obliged to submit a conforming treatment plan within 14 days of the first day of such treatment. Hale v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 922 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1996).

Physician’s reports on billing forms provided by the Department of Labor, and progress reports provided by physical therapists to the physician, were not the equivalent of a treatment plan. Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1997).

Pursuant to AS 23.30.095(c) , only past treatments in excess of frequency treatments would be barred because it would have been unduly harsh to ban all post-plan treatments in excess of standards no matter how much the treatments were needed merely because a treatment plan was provided late. Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow, 73 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board did not err in deciding that the employee had shown that further chiropractic care was reasonable and necessary, but limiting the frequency of care to the number of visits authorized by regulation because the doctor had not filed a treatment plan that conformed to the requirements of this section. Burke v. Houston Nana, L.L.C., 222 P.3d 851 (Alaska 2010).

New treatment revives disability claims. —

In the same way that medical claims are revived whenever there is new treatment, disability claims related to the new treatment are revived. Egemo v. Egemo Constr. Co., 998 P.2d 434 (Alaska 2000).

Restarting statute of limitations. —

New medical treatment entitles a worker to restart the statute of limitations for medical benefits. Egemo v. Egemo Constr. Co., 998 P.2d 434 (Alaska 2000).

Findings as to subsection (a) relevant in interpreting findings as to AS 23.30.105(a) . —

Because the limitation of subsection (a) contains a latency exception parallel to AS 23.30.105(a) , findings with respect to the former statute are relevant in interpreting findings respecting the latter. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Single standard for number of treatments allowed. —

A board regulation which sets forth a single standard for the maximum number of therapy treatments for an injury allowed without board approval, regardless of the nature and degree of the employee’s injury, did not conflict with the mandate of subsection (c) of this section. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. Hale, 857 P.2d 1186 (Alaska 1993).

Reasonableness question raised by subsection (d) of this section is a complex fact judgment involving a multitude of variables and, because the question is a complex one, a reviewing court will have to closely examine the evidence on which the Workers’ Compensation Board relies; thus, the board’s decision will be affirmed only if it is supported by substantial evidence. Fluor Alaska v. Mendoza, 616 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1980).

Refusal of surgery by employee. —

This section, construed in accordance with the “liberal humanitarian purposes” of the Workers’ Compensation Act, requires that a refusal of surgery by an employee be held reasonable if a conscious weighing of the results of having surgery or not having surgery could have led to the refusal, regardless of whether such weighing actually occurred. Fluor Alaska v. Mendoza, 616 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1980).

The Workers’ Compensation Board in a hearing to determine whether an employee should be required to have surgery did not err in considering the terrible experiences that several of the employee’s close relatives had had with surgery. Fluor Alaska v. Mendoza, 616 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1980).

Refusal of treatment after head injury. —

Substantial evidence supported the board’s determination that employee unreasonably refused treatment after suffering a head injury resulting in recurring headaches, where no major, life-threatening surgery was proposed and employee refused to take any recommended prescription medicine and also refused several diagnostic procedures, including CAT scans with and without dye and a digital subtraction angiogram (DSA). Metcalf v. Felec Servs., 784 P.2d 1386 (Alaska 1990).

Equally beneficial treatment not available in employee’s home state. —

An employee is entitled to opt out of state medical treatment when equally beneficial treatment is not available in the employee’s home state. Alcan Elec. v. Bringmann, 829 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1992).

Waiver of frequency standards. —

Nothing in this section or the regulations supports the contention that frequency standards may be waived when the employer initially disputes benefits. Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1997).

Cost-of-living expenses may not be granted. —

The board may not grant cost-of-living expenses to a claimant who is undergoing medical treatment for a prolonged period of time at a place other than his residence. Colby Lumber Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 17 Alaska 650 (D. Alaska 1958).

And when paid voluntarily may not be credited against compensation. —

Sums of money for the claimant’s living expenses paid voluntarily by employer to the employee in addition to total disability compensation could not be credited against the amount due the claimant for his partial disability. Colby Lumber Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 17 Alaska 650 (D. Alaska 1958).

Retroactive ratification of suspension of benefits. —

The board has no authority to issue an order retroactively ratifying a suspension of benefits by the claimant’s carrier on the ground of unreasonable refusal to submit to medical treatment. Metcalf v. Felec Servs., 784 P.2d 1386 (Alaska 1990).

Bearing costs of cross-examination of authors of medical report. —

An injured worker who intends to introduce into evidence before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board a written medical report prepared at the request and expense of his employer does not have to bear the costs of the employer in cross-examining the authors of the report; cross-examination is not necessary as such a report is admissible under a hearsay exception of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2)(C). Frazier v. H.C. Price/CIRI Constr. JV, 794 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).

Presumption as to continuing treatment or care. —

An injured employee may raise the presumption that a claim for continuing treatment or care comes within the provisions of subsection (a), and, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, this presumption will satisfy the employee’s burden of proof as to whether continued treatment or care is medically indicated. Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991).

Standard of review. —

Where an employee filed her claim within two years of the date of the injury, her claim could be reviewed only to determine whether the treatment she sought was reasonable and necessary. Phillip Weidner & Assocs. v. Hibdon, 989 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999).

Remand held erroneous. —

The superior court’s action in remanding a pending case, appealing the board’s finding of no permanent partial disability, to the Workmen’s Compensation Board on the basis of an ex parte order requiring the employer to provide for a medical examination of the employee, was a mistake. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

Applied in

Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982); Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008).

Quoted in

Houston Contracting v. Phillips, 812 P.2d 598 (Alaska 1991); Steffey v. Municipality of Anchorage, 1 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2000); AT&T Alascom v. Orchitt, 161 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2007); Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019); Butts v. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 467 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2020); Leigh v. Alaska Children's Servs., 467 P.3d 222 (Alaska 2020).

Stated in

Mathis v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966); Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 111 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2005); Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019); Vue v. Walmart Assocs., 475 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989); Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991); Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992); Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004); Booth v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2003); Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 504-506.

100 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 484.

Physician’s tort liability for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information about patient. 48 A.L.R.4th 668.

Workers’ compensation: value of home services provided by victim’s relative. 65 ALR4th 142.

Workers’ compensation: recovery for home services provided by spouse. 67 ALR4th 765.

Reasonableness of employee’s refusal of medical services tendered by employer. 72 ALR4th 905.

What amounts to failure or refusal to submit to medical treatment sufficient to bar recovery of workers’ compensation. 3 ALR5th 907.

Sec. 23.30.097. Fees for medical treatment and services.

  1. All fees and other charges for medical treatment or service are subject to regulation by the board consistent with this section. A fee or other charge for medical treatment or service
    1. rendered in the state may not exceed the lowest of
      1. the usual, customary, and reasonable fees for the treatment or service in the community in which it is rendered, for treatment or service provided on or after December 31, 2010, not to exceed the fees or other charges as specified in the fee schedules established by the medical services review committee and adopted by the board in regulation; the fee schedules must include
        1. a physician fee schedule based on the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ resource-based relative value scale;
        2. an outpatient and ambulatory surgical center fee schedule based on the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ ambulatory payment classification; and
        3. an inpatient hospital fee schedule based on the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Medicare severity diagnosis related group;
      2. the fee or charge for the treatment or service when provided to the general public; or
      3. the fee or charge for the treatment or service negotiated by the provider and the employer under (c) of this section;
    2. rendered in another state may not exceed the fee or charge for a treatment or service set by the workers’ compensation statutes of the state where the services are rendered.
  2. An employer or group of employers may establish a list of preferred physicians and treatment service providers to provide medical, surgical, and other attendance or treatment services to the employer’s employees under this chapter; however,
    1. the employee’s right to chose the employee’s attending physician under AS 23.30.095(a) is not impaired;
    2. when given to the employee, the employer’s preferred physician list must clearly state that the list is voluntary, that the employee’s choice is not restricted to the list, that the employee’s rights under this chapter are not impaired by choosing an attending physician from the list, and that, if the employee chooses an attending physician from the list, the employee may, in the manner provided in AS 23.30.095 , make one change of attending physician, from the list or otherwise; and
    3. establishment of a list of preferred physicians does not affect the employer’s choice of physician for an employer medical examination under AS 23.30.095 .
  3. An employer or group of employers may negotiate with physicians and other treatment service providers under this chapter to obtain reduced fees and service charges and may take the fees and charges into account when forming a list of preferred physicians and providers. In no event may an employer or group of employers attempt to influence the treatment, medical decisions, or ratings by the physicians in the course of the negotiations of such a preferred physician and provider fee plans.
  4. An employer shall pay an employee’s bills for medical treatment under this chapter, excluding prescription charges or transportation for medical treatment, within 30 days after the date that the employer receives the provider’s bill or a completed report as required by AS 23.30.095(c) , whichever is later.
  5. A physician or other provider of treatment services under this chapter, including hospital services, that submits a bill for medical treatment to the insurer or self-insured employer shall also submit a copy of the bill to the employee to whom the treatment was provided. An employee who notifies the insurer or self-insured employer’s adjuster in writing of an overcharge in the bill that was not previously identified by the insurer or self-insured employer’s adjuster shall be entitled to a reward equal to 25 percent of the billing reduction or reimbursement achieved due to the employee’s report. This reward does not apply to overcharges of an amount under $100 if the insurer or self-insured employer’s adjuster elects not to pursue correction of the bill.
  6. An employee may not be required to pay a fee or charge for medical treatment or service provided under this chapter.
  7. Unless the employer controverts a charge, the employer shall reimburse an employee’s prescription charges under this chapter within 30 days after the employer receives the health care provider’s completed report and an itemization of the prescription charges for the employee. Unless the employer controverts a charge, an employer shall reimburse any transportation expenses for medical treatment under this chapter within 30 days after the employer receives the health care provider’s completed report and an itemization of the dates, destination, and transportation expenses for each date of travel for medical treatment. If the employer does not plan to make or does not make payment or reimbursement in full as required by this subsection, the employer shall notify the employee and the employee’s health care provider in writing that payment will not be made timely and the reason for the nonpayment. The notification must be provided not later than the date that the payment is due under this subsection.
  8. A provider of medical treatment or services may receive payment for medical treatment and services under this chapter only if the bill for services is received by the employer within 180 days after the later of
    1. the date of service; or
    2. the date that the provider knew of the claim and knew that the claim related to employment.
  9. A provider whose bill has been denied or reduced by the employer may file an appeal with the board within 60 days after receiving notice of the denial or reduction. A provider who fails to file an appeal of a denial or reduction of a bill within the 60-day period waives the right to contest the denial or reduction.
  10. The board shall annually renew and adjust fees on the fee schedules established by the medical services review committee under (a)(1)(A) of this section by a conversion factor established by the medical services review committee and adopted by the board in regulation.
  11. A fee or other charge for medical treatment or service rendered in another state may not exceed the lowest of
    1. the fee or charge for a treatment or service set by the workers’ compensation statutes of the state where the service is rendered; or
    2. the fees specified in a fee schedule under (a)(1)(A) of this section.
  12. A fee or other charge for air ambulance services rendered under this chapter shall be reimbursed at a rate established by the board and adopted in regulation.
  13. A fee or other charge for durable medical equipment not otherwise included in a covered medical procedure under this section may not exceed the amount of the manufacturer’s invoice, plus a markup specified by the board and adopted in regulation.
  14. Reimbursement for prescription drugs under this chapter may not exceed the amount of the original manufacturer’s invoice, plus a dispensing fee and markup specified by the board and adopted in regulation.
  15. A prescription drug dispensed by a physician under this chapter shall include in a bill or invoice the original manufacturer’s code for the drug from the national drug code directory published by the United States Food and Drug Administration.
  16. A fee or other charge for medical treatment or service provided by a hospital licensed by the Department of Health and Social Services to operate as a critical access hospital is exempt from the fee schedules established under (a)(1)(A) of this section.
  17. The board may adjust the fee schedules established under (a)(1)(A) of this section to reflect the cost in the geographical area where the services are provided.
  18. The medical services review committee shall formulate a conversion factor and submit the conversion factor to the commissioner of labor and workforce development. If the commissioner does not approve the conversion factor, the medical services review committee shall revise the conversion factor and submit the revised conversion factor to the commissioner for approval.

History. (§ 36 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am § 1 ch 39 SLA 2007; am § 1 ch 4 SLA 2009; am § 1 ch 32 SLA 2011; am §§ 1, 2 ch 55 SLA 2014; am § 2 ch 63 SLA 2014)

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 75, ch. 10, FSSLA 2005, would have repealed paragraph (a)(1) of this section, effective August 1, 2007. Section 75 was subsequently repealed by § 2, ch. 39, SLA 2007, effective July 31, 2007.

Subsections (j) — (r) were enacted as (h) — (p), and relettered in 2014.

In subsections (j), (k), (p), and (q), added by sec. 2, ch. 63, 2014, references to “(a)(1) of this section” were replaced with “(a)(1)(A)” of this section to conform to the changes made in sec. 2, ch. 55, SLA 2014.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective March 31, 2009, in (a)(1)(A), deleted a reference to the board’s published bulletin and made a stylistic change; added (a)(1)(C).

The 2011 amendment, effective September 29, 2011, rewrote (a)(1).

The first 2014 amendment, effective June 24, 2014, in (a), added “rendered in the state” at the beginning of the introductory language in (a)(1), added (a)(2), and made related changes; added (h) and (i).

The second 2014 amendment, effective July 9, 2014, added (h) and (i) [now (j) and (k), respectively], and effective July 1, 2015, added (j) through (p) [now ( l ) through (r), respectively].

Editor’s notes. —

Under sec. 3, ch. 55, SLA 2014, the changes made to this section by sec. 1, ch. 55, SLA 2014 “apply to fees and charges for medical treatment and services rendered before, on, or after June 24, 2014.”

Section 5, ch. 55, SLA 2014 provides that subsections (h) and (i) and the 2014 changes to subsection (a) “are retroactive.”

Under sec. 1, ch. 31, SLA 2015, the effective date for the amendments to subsection (a) and for the addition of subsections ( l ) - (r) found in sec. 5, ch. 63, SLA 2014, was changed to December 1, 2015 from July 1, 2015.

Notes to Decisions

Physician’s ability to sue. —

Absent an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board determination that employee’s injuries were not work related, subsection (f) could well foreclose the physician’s ability to sue employee for payment; by not giving the physician notice of the proposed settlement and opportunity to present his claim, the board denied him the opportunity to show that the medical care he provided was reasonable and necessary and that other medical care was not. Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2009).

Obligation to pay medical bills promptly. —

Employer’s insistence on an independent medical examination of the employee prior to preauthorizing surgery was not in good faith; the employer knew the surgery was needed and the examination was not for the condition related to the surgery. Accordingly, the employee was entitled to attorney fees. Bockus v. First Student Servs., 384 P.3d 801 (Alaska 2016).

Cited in

Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 23.30.098. Regulations.

Under AS 44.62.245(a)(2) , in adopting or amending regulations under this chapter, the department may incorporate future amended versions of a document or reference material incorporated by reference if the document or reference material is one of the following:

  1. Current Procedural Terminology Codes, produced by the American Medical Association;
  2. Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;
  3. International Classification of Diseases, published by the World Health Organization;
  4. Relative Value Guide, produced by the American Society of Anesthesiologists;
  5. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, produced by the American Psychiatric Association;
  6. Current Dental Terminology, published by the American Dental Association;
  7. Resource-Based Relative Value Scale, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;
  8. Ambulatory Payment Classifications, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;
  9. Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;
  10. International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification, developed by the National Center for Health Statistics;
  11. Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Services, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;
  12. Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;
  13. Payment Allowance Limits for Medicare Part B Drugs, Average Sale Price, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; or
  14. Ambulance Fee Schedule, produced by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

History. (§ 3 ch 63 SLA 2014; am § 7 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, in (2), substituted “federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services” for “American Medical Association”; in (3), substituted “World Health Organization” for “American Medical Association”; added (10) – (14), and made related changes.

Effective dates. —

Section 6, ch. 63, SLA 2014 makes this section effective July 1, 2014.

Article 3. Compensation Proceedings.

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 488-726.

100 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 415-781

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 782-825, 849-875, 915, 916.

Application for, or receipt of, unemployment compensation benefits as affecting claim for workers’ compensation. 96 ALR2d 941.

Right of health or accident insurer to intervene in workers’ compensation proceeding to recover benefits previously paid to claimant or beneficiary. 38 ALR4th 355.

Sec. 23.30.100. Notice of injury or death.

  1. Notice of an injury or death in respect to which compensation is payable under this chapter shall be given within 30 days after the date of such injury or death to the employer.
  2. The notice must be in a format prescribed by the director and contain the name and address of the employee, a statement of the time, place, nature, and cause of the injury or death, and authority to release records of medical treatment for the injury or death, and be signed by the employee or by a person on behalf of the employee, or, in case of death, by a person claiming to be entitled to compensation for the death or by a person on behalf of that person.
  3. Notice shall be given to the employer by delivering it to the employer or by sending it by mail addressed to the employer at the employer’s last known place of business. If the employer is a partnership, the notice may be given to a partner, if a limited liability company, the notice may be given to a member, or if a corporation, the notice may be given to an agent or officer on whom legal process may be served or who is in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred.
  4. Failure to give notice does not bar a claim under this chapter
    1. if the employer, an agent of the employer in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred, or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death and the board determines that the employer or carrier has not been prejudiced by failure to give notice;
    2. if the board excuses the failure on the ground that for some satisfactory reason notice could not be given;
    3. unless objection to the failure is raised before the board at the first hearing of a claim for compensation in respect to the injury or death.

History. (§ 11 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 37 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am §§ 8 — 10 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For presumptions that apply when the board excuses a failure under paragraph (d)(2), see AS 23.30.120(b) .

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, in (a), deleted “to the board and” following “such injury or death”; in (b), substituted “in a format prescribed by the director and” for “in writing,” following “The notice must be”; in (c), deleted “to the board by delivering it or sending it by mail, addressed to the board’s office, and” following “Notice shall be given”, and inserted “if a limited liability company, the notice may be given to a member,” following “given to a partner”, and made a stylistic change.

Notes to Decisions

Dual purpose of limiting period for giving notice. —

Limitation periods pertaining to notice of injury possess the dual purpose of enabling the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimizing the seriousness of the injury; and second, to facilitate the earliest possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966); Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

Timely written notice of an injury is required both because it lets the employer provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment to minimize the seriousness of the injury, and because it facilitates the earliest possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury. A failure to provide timely notice that impedes either of these two objectives prejudices the employer. Tinker v. Veco, Inc., 913 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1996).

Immediate visit to doctor for short-lived symptoms. —

To the extent that an immediate visit to a doctor in connection with short-lived symptoms is called for, the relevant provision is this section, not AS 23.30.105 . Hoth v. Valley Constr., 671 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1983).

Subsection (d) provides three enumerated circumstances in which failure to give notice of injury will not bar claim under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act. Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

And the courts imply another. —

The great majority of the courts have been sufficiently impressed with the acute unfairness of a literal application of this language to read in an implied condition suspending the running of the statute until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained. Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

Support for the application of a “reasonableness” standard by means of language in subsection (d)(2) is found in a related statutory provision, AS 23.30.105(a) . That provision provides in pertinent part that the time for filing claims, as distinguished from giving notice of injury, is “within two years after the employee has knowledge of the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment and after disablement.” Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

No prejudice to employer. —

Where employer, through its in-charge agents, received all of the information a written notice of injury would have conveyed, nothing prevented these in-charge agents from informing the appropriate company personnel of an injury that had occurred at a worksite under their control. Any prejudice that may have resulted is attributable to a failure of communication within the company and not to the manner in which the employee informed it of his injury. Tinker v. Veco, Inc., 913 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1996).

Presumption. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s error in applying the presumption analysis under this section was harmless because its alternative analysis in which it hypothetically, but correctly, applied the presumption analysis, was correct as a matter of law. Coppe v. Bleicher, 318 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2014).

Effect of failure to notify on claim for subsequent aggravation of injury. —

While denial of original claim because of delay in notifying employer that injury was job-related barred claimant from any potential recovery based on existing carpal tunnel syndrome, it did not bar her from claiming benefits for subsequent work-related incidents that aggravated her condition or caused new injuries to the affected hand. Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).

Knowledge of injury. —

Failure of an employee to give timely formal notice was excused where the employer had actual knowledge of the employee’s injury and the failure was not prejudicial. Kolkman v. Greens Creek Mining Co., 936 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1997); Cogger v. Anchor House, 936 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1997).

Even though an employee did not give actual notice of her physical and mental injury until approximately three years after she had knowledge thereof, her claims were not time barred, since the employer had knowledge of the injury and was not prejudiced by her failure to give notice. Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1997).

Res judicata. —

Finding that claimant’s tendonitis, the basis for a subsequent claim, was as longstanding as the underlying carpal tunnel syndrome for which a prior claim had been denied, did not preclude award on grounds of res judicata. Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).

Failure to give notice not bar to claim. —

See State v. Moore, 706 P.2d 311 (Alaska 1985), overruled, Kolkman v. Greens Creek Mining Co., 936 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1997), overruled, Dafermo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 941 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1997).

Untimely notice as bar to claim. —

Where a worker waited more than a year before filing a claim alleging he injured his hip, lower back, and ear during a fight with his co-workers, the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that the worker’s claim was barred because he did not give his employer timely notice of the injury. McGahuey v. Whitestone Logging, Inc., 262 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2011).

Applied in

Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987); Fox v. Alascom, 783 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1989); Dafermo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 941 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1997).

Cited in

Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Turner, 611 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980); Hammer v. City of Fairbanks, 953 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1998); Steffey v. Municipality of Anchorage, 1 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2000).

Sec. 23.30.105. Time for filing of claims.

  1. The right to compensation for disability under this chapter is barred unless a claim for it is filed within two years after the employee has knowledge of the nature of the employee’s disability and its relation to the employment and after disablement. However, the maximum time for filing the claim in any event other than arising out of an occupational disease shall be four years from the date of injury, and the right to compensation for death is barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the death, except that, if payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of the injury or death, a claim may be filed within two years after the date of the last payment of benefits under AS 23.30.041 , 23.30.180 , 23.30.185 , 23.30.190 , 23.30.200 , or 23.30.215 . It is additionally provided that, in the case of latent defects pertinent to and causing compensable disability, the injured employee has full right to claim as shall be determined by the board, time limitations notwithstanding.
  2. Failure to file a claim within the period prescribed in (a) of this section is not a bar to compensation unless objection to the failure is made at the first hearing of the claim in which all parties in interest are given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
  3. If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the provisions of (a) of this section are not applicable so long as the person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but are applicable in the case of a person who is mentally incompetent or a minor from the date of appointment of a guardian or other representative, or, in the case of a minor, if no guardian is appointed before the person becomes of age, from the date the person becomes of age.
  4. If recovery is denied to a person, in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages in respect to injury or death, on the ground that the person was an employee and that the defendant is an employer within the meaning of this chapter and that the employer has secured compensation to the employee under this chapter, the limitation of time prescribed in (a) of this section begins to run only from the date of termination of the suit.

History. (§ 12 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 6 ch 42 SLA 1962; am § 19 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 10 ch 105 SLA 2000)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Construction with AS 23.30.110 . —

Subsection (a) of this section limits the time in which an employee must file a claim, while AS 23.30.110(c) requires an employee, once a claim has been filed and controverted by the employer, to prosecute the employee’s claim in a timely manner. Jonathan v. Doyon Drilling, 890 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1995).

Purpose of subsection (a)’s limitation as to the filing of a compensation claim is to protect the employer against claims too old to be successfully investigated and defended. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966).

Provisions of 1962 amendment. —

Section 6, ch. 42, SLA 1962, added the latent defect provision not contained in subsection (a). Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966).

The 1962 amendment provided that full right to claim should exist, “time limitations notwithstanding,” where the disability is caused by “latent defects.” W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Prior to 1962 amendment the statutory structure was simple: Claims became time-barred upon the first to occur of the passage of four years from “injury” or two years from the date that the employee had knowledge of the disability and its relationship to employment. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

1962 amendment did not repeal first sentence of subsection (a). Thus, a claim for any disability must be filed within two years of actual or chargeable knowledge of the nature of the disability and its relation to employment. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

But did repeal four-year statute of limitations contained in second sentence of subsection (a). —

See W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Only where the claimant acquires knowledge of the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment more than two years but less than four years from the date of “injury” could the four-year period apply, but a result allowing a two-year filing period to an applicant who acquired knowledge four or more years after the mishap and a shorter period to an applicant who acquired knowledge in more than two but less than four years would be incongruent with the liberal purposes motivating the latency amendment. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

A disability which becomes apparent immediately upon the occurrence of some mishap will be more quickly barred by the two-year limitation; a disability which does not fall within the actual or chargeable knowledge of the claimant until four years have passed must be treated as a latent defect for which the four-year period is waived by the 1962 amendment. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

The supreme court has found no time frame in which the four-year statute may operate subsequent to the 1962 amendment. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Key to interpretation of 1962 provision is construction of term “latent defects.” W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Test for latency. —

An injury is latent so long as the claimant does not know, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence (taking into account his education, intelligence, and experience) would not have come to know, the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment. This test is identical to the one set forth in the first sentence of subsection (a) which determines the commencement date of the two-year statute. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

By “defect” legislature intended “injury.” W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Term “latent injury” has generally accepted meaning. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Mere presence of pain does not make injury nonlatent. —

A contention that the mere presence of pain or annoyance associated with the area of the body which suffered the original impact makes an injury nonlatent as a matter of law cannot be supported in the law of this or any other jurisdiction. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Unpaid medical expenses not prerequisite for claim. —

The only requirement for a claim is knowledge of a disability and its work-relatedness. There is no requirement that the injured worker have incurred unpaid medical expenses. Summers v. Korobkin Constr., 814 P.2d 1369 (Alaska 1991).

Knowledge of disability controlling. —

Finding by Workers’ Compensation Board, supported by substantial evidence, that worker did not have knowledge of the nature of his disability until, at most, a matter of months before the claim was filed, was upheld. Wolfer v. Veco, Inc., 852 P.2d 1171 (Alaska 1993).

In order for the statute of limitations under former subsection (a) to begin running, the claimant must know of the disability and its relationship to employment and must actually be disabled by that disability. Egemo v. Egemo Constr. Co., 998 P.2d 434 (Alaska 2000).

“Knowledge” imports also chargeable knowledge. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Layman not expected to diagnose condition physicians failed to diagnose. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Claim cannot be dismissed merely because claimant did not go immediately to a doctor. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

As there are many medical problems where the extent and duration of the symptoms are not known at the outset, a denial of compensation merely because the claimant does not visit a doctor for several hours following injury would only thwart the beneficent purposes of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Immediate visit to doctor for short-lived symptoms. —

To the extent that an immediate visit to a doctor in connection with short-lived symptoms is called for, the relevant provision is AS 23.30.100 , not this section. Hoth v. Valley Constr., 671 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1983).

Awareness of work-related breakdown. —

Where claimant, who applied on November 30, 1982, for disability benefits as a result of a February, 1982, breakdown, had experienced work-related stress prior to the breakdown, the relevant limitations periods for filing her breakdown-related claim did not begin to run when she began to suffer from work-related stress. Rather, the limitations periods started to run as of the date that she became aware of her work-related breakdown. Fox v. Alascom, 783 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1989).

Discovery that injury not treatable with medication. —

A disabled worker does not know the “nature” of the disability and the relationship of the disability to the worker’s employment when the worker reasonably but erroneously believes the injury is controlled by medication. Thus, the two year statute of limitations period did not begin to run until the worker discovered that his condition was no longer safely treatable with medication. Leslie Cutting, Inc. v. Bateman, 833 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1992).

Notice and claim periods. —

Subsection (a) permits claims within two years after the date of the last payment of workers’ compensation benefits paid without an award. But subsection (b) provides that failure to file a claim within the period prescribed in (a) of this section is not a bar to compensation unless objection to the failure is made at the first hearing of the claim in which all parties in interest are given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. Justice v. RMH Aero Logging, Inc., 42 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2002).

Two year period applied to claim for impairment benefits. —

In an action under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act, the two-year limitations period in this section applied to claims for impairment benefits and thus, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission did not err by deciding that the statute of limitations barred appellant's claim for increased impairment, which was brought more than two years after the date of the last impairment benefit payment. Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Reasonable diligence. —

Evidence was insufficient to support board’s finding that claimant, seeking additional benefits 20 years after work-related injury, based on worsening symptoms, failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the nature of the injury. Aleck v. Delvo Plastics, Inc., 972 P.2d 988 (Alaska 1999).

Presumptive death certificate. —

Equitable tolling principles were applied to the one-year statute of limitations where beneficiaries of an employee, who was presumed dead under AS 13.06.035 (5) acted reasonably in not filing their claim for workers compensation benefits until after obtaining a presumptive death certificate. Irby v. Fairbanks Gold Mining, Inc., 203 P.3d 1138 (Alaska 2009).

Reviewable issue. —

Because the issue of when the claimant became aware of his alleged snow shoveling injury and prolonged standing injuries was not resolved by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, the court did not consider the issue on appeal. Groom v. State, 169 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2007).

Claimant’s application for compensation held to have been timely filed. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966).

Findings as to AS 23.30.095(a) relevant in interpreting findings as to subsection (a). —

Because the limitation of AS 23.30.095(a) contains a latency exception parallel to subsection (a), findings with respect to the former statute are relevant in interpreting findings respecting the latter. W. R. Grasle Co. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 517 P.2d 999 (Alaska 1974).

Support for application of “reasonableness” standard by means of language in AS 23.30.100(d)(2) found in subsection (a). —

See Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

Prospective determination of compensability. —

An injured worker who has been receiving medical treatment should have the right to a prospective determination of compensability. Summers v. Korobkin Constr., 814 P.2d 1369 (Alaska 1991).

Applied in

Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Bradshaw, 417 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1966); Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987); Dafermo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 941 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1997).

Quoted in

Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974); Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Rogers & Babler, 747 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1987); Justice v. RMH Aero Logging, Inc., 42 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2002).

Cited in

Simon v. Alaska Wood Prods., 633 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1981); Sang Suh v. Pingo Corp., 736 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1987); Tinker v. Veco, Inc., 913 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1996); Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 111 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2005); Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

100 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 458 to 483.

When limitation period begins to run against claim under Workmen’s Compensation Act or Occupational Disease Acts, for contraction of disease. 11 ALR2d 297.

Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing actions to enforce workmen’s compensation benefits. 15 ALR2d 519.

Exclusion or inclusion of terminal Sunday or holiday in computing time for taking or perfecting appeal from decision of Workmen’s Compensation Board. 61 ALR2d 484.

When limitations period begins to run as to claim for disability benefits for contracting of disease under Workers’ Compensation or Occupational Diseases Act. 86 ALR5th 295.

When time period commences as to claim under workers’ compensation or occupational diseases act for death of worker due to contraction of disease. 100 ALR5th 567.

Sec. 23.30.106. [Renumbered as AS 23.30.011.]

Sec. 23.30.107. Release of information.

  1. Upon written request, an employee shall provide written authority to the employer, carrier, rehabilitation specialist, or reemployment benefits administrator to obtain medical and rehabilitation information relative to the employee’s injury. The request must include notice of the employee’s right to file a petition for a protective order with the division and must be served by certified mail to the employee’s address on the notice of injury or by hand delivery to the employee. This subsection may not be construed to authorize an employer, carrier, rehabilitation specialist, or reemployment benefits administrator to request medical or other information that is not applicable to the employee’s injury.
  2. Medical or rehabilitation records, and the employee’s name, address, social security number, electronic mail address, and telephone number contained on any record, in an employee’s file maintained by the division or held by the board or the commission are not public records subject to public inspection and copying under AS 40.25.100 40.25.295 . This subsection does not prohibit
    1. the reemployment benefits administrator, the division, the board, the commission, or the department from releasing medical or rehabilitation records in an employee’s file, without the employee’s consent, to a physician providing medical services under AS 23.30.095(k) or 23.30.110(g) , a party to a claim filed by the employee, or a governmental agency; or
    2. the quoting or discussing of medical or rehabilitation records contained in an employee’s file during a hearing on a claim for compensation or in a decision or order of the board or commission.
  3. The division may not assemble, or provide information respecting, individual records for commercial purposes that are outside the scope of this chapter.
  4. An employee may elect to authorize the disclosure of the employee’s name, address, social security number, electronic mail address, and telephone number contained in a record described in (b) of this section by signing a declaration on a form provided by the division.

History. (§ 10 ch 93 SLA 1982; am §§ 5, 6 ch 75 SLA 1995; am § 11 ch 105 SLA 2000; am §§ 38, 39 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am §§ 1, 2 ch 61 SLA 2008; am § 23 ch 22 SLA 2015)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 23.30.097 . Renumbered in 1982.

In 2000, “AS 40.25” was substituted for “AS 09.25” to reflect the renumbering of AS 09.25.100 09.25.220 .

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2015 amendment, effective May 15, 2015, substituted “AS 40.25.100 40.25.295 ” for “AS 40.25” in the introductory language of (b).

Notes to Decisions

Release permitted when relevant. —

Where a worker broke her ankle after falling in her employer's icy parking lot and, three years later, the employer requested that she sign a release allowing it to access all of her mental health records for the preceding 19 years because of her pain complaints, the employer was permitted to access the mental health records of employee relevant to the claim, even though the employee did not make a mental health claim, as the record contained multiple references to the impact her mental health conditions might have on her treatment as well as her pain complaints, which were part of her medical treatment and disability claims. Leigh v. Alaska Children's Servs., 467 P.3d 222 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 23.30.108. Prehearings on discovery matters; objections to requests for release of information; sanctions for noncompliance.

  1. If an employee objects to a request for written authority under AS 23.30.107 , the employee must file a petition with the board seeking a protective order within 14 days after service of the request. If the employee fails to file a petition and fails to deliver the written authority as required by AS 23.30.107 within 14 days after service of the request, the employee’s rights to benefits under this chapter are suspended until the written authority is delivered.
  2. If a petition seeking a protective order is filed, the board shall set a prehearing within 21 days after the filing date of the petition. At a prehearing conducted by the board’s designee, the board’s designee has the authority to resolve disputes concerning the written authority. If the board or the board’s designee orders delivery of the written authority and if the employee refuses to deliver it within 10 days after being ordered to do so, the employee’s rights to benefits under this chapter are suspended until the written authority is delivered. During any period of suspension under this subsection, the employee’s benefits under this chapter are forfeited unless the board, or the court determining an action brought for the recovery of damages under this chapter, determines that good cause existed for the refusal to provide the written authority.
  3. At a prehearing on discovery matters conducted by the board’s designee, the board’s designee shall direct parties to sign releases or produce documents, or both, if the parties present releases or documents that are likely to lead to admissible evidence relative to an employee’s injury. If a party refuses to comply with an order by the board’s designee or the board concerning discovery matters, the board may impose appropriate sanctions in addition to any forfeiture of benefits, including dismissing the party’s claim, petition, or defense. If a discovery dispute comes before the board for review of a determination by the board’s designee, the board may not consider any evidence or argument that was not presented to the board’s designee, but shall determine the issue solely on the basis of the written record. The decision by the board on a discovery dispute shall be made within 30 days. The board shall uphold the designee’s decision except when the board’s designee’s determination is an abuse of discretion.
  4. If the employee files a petition seeking a protective order to recover medical and rehabilitation information that has been provided but is not related to the employee’s injury, and the board or the board’s designee grants the protective order, the board or the board’s designee granting the protective order shall direct the division, the board, the commission, and the parties to return to the employee, as soon as practicable following the issuance of the protective order, all medical and rehabilitation information, including copies, in their possession that is unrelated to the employee’s injury under the protective order.
  5. If the board or the board’s designee limits the medical or rehabilitation information that may be used by the parties to a claim, either by an order on the record or by issuing a written order, the division, the board, the commission, and a party to the claim may request and an employee shall provide or authorize the production of medical or rehabilitation information only to the extent of the limitations of the order. If information has been produced that is outside of the limits designated in the order, the board or the board’s designee shall direct the party in possession of the information to return the information to the employee as soon as practicable following the issuance of the order.

History. (§ 12 ch 105 SLA 2000; am § 1 ch 77 SLA 2010)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 16, 2010, added (d) and (e).

Notes to Decisions

Attorney's fees. — Because reemployment eligibility was tied to an employee's inability to return to employment at the time of injury, a claimant's termination and the reasons for it were not wholly unrelated to her reemployment claim; thus, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board erred in its attorney's fees award. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Quoted in

Leigh v. Alaska Children's Servs., 467 P.3d 222 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 23.30.110. Procedure on claims.

  1. Subject to the provisions of AS 23.30.105 , a claim for compensation may be filed with the board in accordance with its regulations at any time after the first seven days of disability following an injury, or at any time after death, and the board may hear and determine all questions in respect to the claim.
  2. Within 10 days after a claim is filed the board, in accordance with its regulations, shall notify the employer and any other person, other than the claimant, whom the board considers an interested party that a claim has been filed.  The notice may be served personally upon the employer or other person, or sent by registered mail.
  3. Before a hearing is scheduled, the party seeking a hearing shall file a request for a hearing together with an affidavit stating that the party has completed necessary discovery, obtained necessary evidence, and is prepared for the hearing. An opposing party shall have 10 days after the hearing request is filed to file a response. If a party opposes the hearing request, the board or a board designee shall within 30 days of the filing of the opposition conduct a pre-hearing conference and set a hearing date. If opposition is not filed, a hearing shall be scheduled no later than 60 days after the receipt of the hearing request. The board shall give each party at least 10 days’ notice of the hearing, either personally or by certified mail. After a hearing has been scheduled, the parties may not stipulate to change the hearing date or to cancel, postpone, or continue the hearing, except for good cause as determined by the board. After completion of the hearing the board shall close the hearing record. If a settlement agreement is reached by the parties less than 14 days before the hearing, the parties shall appear at the time of the scheduled hearing to state the terms of the settlement agreement. Within 30 days after the hearing record closes, the board shall file its decision. If the employer controverts a claim on a board-prescribed controversion notice and the employee does not request a hearing within two years following the filing of the controversion notice, the claim is denied.
  4. At the hearing the claimant and the employer may each present evidence in respect to the claim and may be represented by any person authorized in writing for that purpose.
  5. The order rejecting the claim or making the award, referred to in this chapter as a compensation order, shall be filed in the office of the board, and a copy of it shall be sent by registered mail to the claimant and to the employer at the last known address of each.
  6. An award of compensation for disability may be made after the death of an injured employee.
  7. An injured employee claiming or entitled to compensation shall submit to the physical examination by a duly qualified physician which the board may require.  The place or places shall be reasonably convenient for the employee.  The physician or physicians as the employee, employer, or carrier may select and pay for may participate in an examination if the employee, employer, or carrier so requests. Proceedings shall be suspended and no compensation may be payable for a period during which the employee refuses to submit to examination.
  8. The filing of a hearing request under (c) of this section suspends the running of the two-year time period specified in (c) of this section. However, if the employee subsequently requests a continuance of the hearing and the request is approved by the board, the granting of the continuance renders the request for hearing inoperative, and the two-year time period specified in (c) of this section continues to run again from the date of the board’s notice to the employee of the board’s granting of the continuance and of its effect. If the employee fails to again request a hearing before the conclusion of the two-year time period in (c) of this section, the claim is denied.

History. (§ 18 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 12 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 20 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 13 ch 105 SLA 2000)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Construction with AS 23.30.105(a) . —

AS 23.30.105(a) limits the time in which the employee must file a claim, while subsection (c) of this section requires the employee, once a claim has been filed and controverted by the employer, to prosecute the employee’s claim in a timely manner. Jonathan v. Doyon Drilling, 890 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1995).

Due process and equal protection held not violated. —

This section does not violate employee’s right to substantive due process and equal protection; in the context of the workers’ compensation system as a whole, it is hardly unreasonable to place the burden of proceeding on the claimant after the employer files a formal controversion to the claim. Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 111 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2005).

Procedural due process right held not violated. —

Subsection (c) did not violate claimant’s right to procedural due process because he had received advice from a hearing officer that adequately informed him of his obligation to request a hearing on his claims within two years. Because he filed his request for a hearing more than two years later, any deficiencies in previous written notices had no effect on his claims. Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 111 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2005).

Deadline for hearing request. —

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission properly affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s dismissal of an employee’s claim because the employee failed to meet the statutory deadline for filing a request for hearing. The Board found that the employee’s assertion she was unaware her attorney withdrew and was relying upon him to file the necessary paperwork lacked credibility, and the Board’s credibility determination negated any argument that the employee’s failure to file a timely hearing request should be excused because of lack of understanding. Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care, 297 P.3d 891 (Alaska 2013).

Affidavit of readiness not mandatory. —

Employee did not waive his right to a hearing because the affidavit of readiness requirement in subsection (c) is directory rather than mandatory. Kim v. Alyeska Seafoods, Inc., 197 P.3d 193 (Alaska 2008).

Language “all questions” is limited to the questions raised by the parties or by the agency upon notice duly given to the parties. Simon v. Alaska Wood Prods., 633 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1981).

Question of fact. —

The question in a particular case of whether the employment did contribute to the final result is one of fact which is usually determined from medical testimony. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Nature of subsection (c) right to hearing. —

Under subsection (c), the holding of a hearing on a claim, after a request for a hearing, is mandatory, not discretionary. Summers v. Korobkin Constr., 814 P.2d 1369 (Alaska 1991).

The text of subsection (c) reflects that the legislature intended to award injured workers the right to a hearing on their claims. Pursuant to the provisions of AS 23.30.105 , the only prerequisite for filing a claim is a work-related injury. Summers v. Korobkin Constr., 814 P.2d 1369 (Alaska 1991).

“Interested party” entitled to hearing. —

Injured city employee whose insurer had not waived its claim for reimbursement against him for any recovery he received from a third party was an “interested party” and, therefore, entitled to a hearing, since he remained potentially liable to the insurer if the health care for which the insurer paid was made necessary by work-related injuries. Sherrod v. Municipality of Anchorage, 803 P.2d 874 (Alaska 1990).

Appearance required. —

In a workers’ compensation case, neither a hearing nor an impartial medical examination is required by AS 23.30.012 ; the Workers’ Compensation Board has the discretion to order a medical examination or to hold a hearing, but it is not required to do so. However, under this section the parties were required to appear at the scheduled hearing because they entered into the settlement only one week before the originally scheduled hearing date. Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009).

Subsection (c) applied retroactively. —

Subsection (c), as amended in 1982, applied to worker’s claim for an injury sustained in 1981, because the amendment merely effected a change in procedure and did not alter the legal consequences of events giving rise to the cause of action. Pan Alaska Trucking v. Crouch, 773 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1989).

“Claim”. —

The use of the word claim in the last sentence of subsection (c) of this section means a written application for benefits filed with the board. Jonathan v. Doyon Drilling, 890 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1995).

Prospective determination of compensability. —

An injured worker who has been receiving medical treatment should have the right to a prospective determination of compensability. Summers v. Korobkin Constr., 814 P.2d 1369 (Alaska 1991).

Subsequent claim allowed despite untimely earlier claims. —

Employee, who had an ongoing claim for medication costs for a work-related back injury, did not lose all future right to claim against the employer for certain types of medication once employee had failed to pursue earlier claims for such drugs in a timely manner; the later claim was not a renewal of the earlier requests, but sought compensation for different expenses. Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 111 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2005).

Duty to pro se claimants. —

Workers’ Compensation Board designee should have corrected an erroneous assertion made by an employer at a prehearing conference that the deadline in subsection (c) had already run. Alternatively, the designee or the board should have told the pro se employee how to determine the deadline. Bohlmann v. Alaska Constr. & Eng'g., Inc., 205 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2009).

Controversion by employer. —

A controversion of the right to receive compensation, in the absence of a written claim for compensation, is not sufficient to start the two-year limitations period for requesting a hearing because this section specifically requires that the employee has two years from the date a claim is controverted by the employer to request a hearing. Jonathan v. Doyon Drilling, 890 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1995).

Cancellation of hearing. —

Where an employee’s hearing request, filed within two years of the employer’s controversion, was cancelled because the parties were close to settling, and the proposed settlement was never ratified by the employee, his claim and hearing request were still before the board and he was not required to request another hearing to avoid dismissal. Tipton v. ARCO Alaska, 922 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1996).

Applied in

Huston v. Coho Elec., 923 P.2d 818 (Alaska 1996); Lindekugel v. Fluor Alaska, 934 P.2d 1307 (Alaska 1997).

Quoted in

Summerville v. Denali Ctr., 811 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1991); Lajiness v. H.C. Price Constr. Co., 811 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1991).

Cited in

Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974); Sang Suh v. Pingo Corp., 736 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1987); Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 740 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1987); Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996); Irvine v. Glacier Gen. Constr., 984 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1999); Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore, 160 P.3d 146 (Alaska 2007); Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007); Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341 (Alaska 2011); Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013).

Stated in

Cavitt v. D&D Servs., 466 P.3d 345 (Alaska 2020).

II.Findings

Decision of board is required to contain findings of fact under the Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62.010 44.62.650 ). Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966); Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966).

The board should make findings which disclose the basis for its determination. Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966).

Disclosing basis for determination of motion to dismiss. —

The board should either file a separate order or in its decision make findings which disclose the basis for its determination of motion to dismiss. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966).

Procedure where decision contrary to record evidence. —

The board is entitled to disbelieve evidence and testimony, but, where a decision is contrary to record evidence, the board should describe the observation providing the basis of its disbelief. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

Failure to make specific finding. —

Although a specific finding as to the average weekly wage or the specific impairment of earning capacity by the board would be desirable, the failure to make one can only be deemed at most harmless error in cases where the figures used are easily determined from the decision itself. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Notice to employer. —

It is within the authority of the Workers’ Compensation Board to modify an earlier factual determination; however, where it does so without providing the worker’s former employer the notice required by this section, the board’s second order is improper. Dresser Indus./Atlas Div. v. Hiestand, 702 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1985).

III.Award

It is permissible for board to award more or less than relief requested. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Compensation is not to be barred because risk is not generally recognized or because only those unusually susceptible or predisposed to a given disease will contract it. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Preexisting disease or infirmity does not disqualify claim under the work-connection requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability from which compensation is sought. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Employer or insurer does not have unilateral authority to modify or terminate an employee’s benefits or to change an injured worker’s status. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

The board erred in refusing to make an express award of permanent total disability benefits to a worker who requested such a determination, because the award would have made it more difficult for the employer to change his status at a later time. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

IV.Mailing of Order to Claimant and Employer

Subsection (e) is mandatory. —

This section makes it mandatory upon the board, once it has filed its compensation order, to promptly mail a copy of its order to claimant, as well as to claimant’s employer. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

The board has no discretion to delay mailing copies of the order after it has been filed. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Commencement of 30-day period under AS 23.30.125(a) . —

All that is necessary under subsection (e) of this section and AS 23.30.125(a) to start the 30-day period running is for the board to promptly send, after filing, a registered copy of its order (a copy being one that reflects the date on which the original thereof was filed in the office of the board) to claimant and claimant’s employer at their respective last known addresses. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Collateral references. —

Recovery for discharge in retaliation for filing workmen’s compensation claim. 32 ALR4th 1221.

Sec. 23.30.115. Attendance and fees of witnesses.

  1. A person is not required to attend as a witness in a proceeding before the board at a place more than 100 miles from the person’s place of residence, unless the person’s lawful mileage and fee for one day’s attendance is first paid or tendered to the person; but the testimony of a witness may be taken by deposition or interrogatories according to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. A witness summoned in a proceeding before the board or whose deposition is taken shall receive the same fees and mileage as a witness in the superior court.

History. (§§ 23, 24 ch 193 SLA 1959)

Cross references. —

For court rules on depositions and interrogatories, see Rules 26 — 37, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure; for the court rule on witness fees, see Rule 7, Alaska Rules of Administration.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Commercial Union Cos. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976).

Collateral references. —

Competency of witness in proceeding for death under Workmen’s Compensation Act as affected by Deadman’s Statute. 77 ALR2d 676.

Sec. 23.30.120. Presumptions.

  1. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it is presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that
    1. the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter;
    2. sufficient notice of the claim has been given;
    3. the injury was not proximately caused by the intoxication of the injured employee or proximately caused by the employee being under the influence of drugs unless the drugs were taken as prescribed by the employee’s physician;
    4. the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill self or another.
  2. If delay in giving notice is excused by the board under AS 23.30.100(d)(2) , the burden of proof of the validity of the claim shifts to the employee notwithstanding the provisions of (a) of this section.
  3. The presumption of compensability established in (a) of this section does not apply to a mental injury resulting from work-related stress.

History. (§ 9 ch 193 SLA 1959; am §§ 11, 13 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 21 ch 79 SLA 1988)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (b) was enacted as a part of AS 23.30.100(d)(2) . Renumbered in 1982.

Cross references. —

For the burden of proof in claims by sole proprietors or partners, see AS 23.30.239(c) .

Notes to Decisions

Psychiatric finding not dispositive of all claims. —

Where the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found that claimant was not psychiatrically precluded from work, the conclusion did not dispose of his claim that pain and pain medication prevented him from being employed, and Board’s denial of claim for permanent total disability benefits was improper. Leigh v. Seekins Ford, 136 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2006).

This section provides statutory guidance for supreme court in evaluating the basis for a board decision. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Subsection (c) not unconstitutional. —

The legislature made a rational policy decision when it enacted the 1988 amendments to subsection (c) adopting an objective standard to determine whether mental injuries are compensable. While both physical and mental injuries are real phenomena and very important to those who suffer from them, the two maladies are inherently different in ways that justify different treatment. In an attempt to ensure the quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of medical benefits to injured workers, and to prevent fraud and abuse, thereby reducing costs to employers, the legislature, by enacting the 1988 amendment, removed the presumption of compensability for mental injuries and enacted the extraordinary and unusual test. Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1995).

Preexisting disease or infirmity does not disqualify claim if the work aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

There is presumption in favor of compensability under the workmen’s compensation laws. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

And that injury is work-connected. —

Since the Workmen’s Compensation Act creates a presumption that a claim for compensation comes within the provisions of the statute, it must be presumed that an injury is work-connected in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970). See also Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

Test of coverage should not be limited to specific or required duties of the employment, but should include duties reasonably incidental to the employment. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Hence, where the duties of decedent’s position were broadly defined and included “anything that would inure to the benefit of the country,” it would be difficult to find a rational basis upon which it could be asserted that he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the crash. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Compensable activity. —

While labeling an employee’s activity as “personal” may not render the ensuing injury per se noncompensable, the activity must still be “reasonably foreseeable and incidental” to the employment, and not just “but for” the employment, to entitle the employee to claim compensation. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

Heart attack is within statutory presumption of compensability of accidental injuries under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act. Employers Commerical Union Ins. Cos. v. Schoen, 554 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1976).

Application of presumption. —

Presumption of compensability in paragraph (a)(1) of this section applies in determining whether an employee’s current problems are related to an on-the-job injury or arise from an independent cause. Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

The presumption of compensability is not so limited that it does not apply in cases where the injury is not shown to have occurred on the job and is not sudden or unexplained, but rather the result of a preexisting condition which may have been aggravated by the employment. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Where claimant’s theory was that his employment conditions, particularly his work on a haul road, aggravated his preexisting renal dysfunction by preventing him from getting proper medical attention and maintaining a low salt diet necessary to control hypertension, which accelerated his ultimate renal failure, such aggravation or acceleration must be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Paragraph (a)(1) creates the presumption of a compensable disability once the employee has established a preliminary link between employment and injury. Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471 (Alaska 1991).

The presumption of compensability in this section applies when an employer controverts temporary total disability (TTD) compensation already awarded under AS 23.30.185 . Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1991).

The presumption applies to claims for vocational rehabilitation. Kirby v. Alaska Treatment Ctr., 821 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1991).

Application of the presumption was appropriate since appellant was attempting to use the presumption to prevent appellee and employer from thrusting upon her an employee status to which she did not consent contractually. Cluff v. Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1995).

The “pro-worker” presumption in paragraph (a)(1) of this section applies to permanent total disability (PTD) claims. Meek v. Unocal Corp., 914 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1996).

The presumption of compensability in AS 23.30.120(a) applies when an employer controverts continuing entitlement to temporary benefits; to overcome this presumption, the employer must introduce substantial evidence to the contrary. Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).

Presumption of compensability did not apply to claimant’s case because the employer and the insurer did not dispute claimant’s entitlement to reemployment benefits or their liability for those benefits. Claimant was not seeking coverage, but disputed the plan under which his benefits would be provided. Rockney v. Boslough Constr. Co., 115 P.3d 1240 (Alaska), modified, — P.3d — (Alaska 2005).

The presumption in paragraph (a)(1) of this section applies to claims of aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition. Walsh v. State, 134 P.3d 366 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly applied the presumption of subsection (a) of this section where the employee’s claim involved mental injury resulting from work-related physical injury rather than mental injury resulting from work-related stress. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Presumption applies where lent employee makes claim against general employer. Cluff v. Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1995).

Before statutory presumption of compensability attaches, some preliminary link must be established between the disability and the employment, and in claims based on highly technical medical considerations medical evidence is often necessary in order to make that connection. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

The presumption of compensability found in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is expressly made applicable to any “proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter” of the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ). The broad inclusiveness of this language does not mean that the mere filing of a claim gives rise to the presumption of coverage, for there must be some evidence that the claim arose out of, or in the course of, employment before the presumption arises. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

It is not necessary that a claimant present substantial evidence that his employment was a substantial cause of his disability in order to establish the preliminary link necessary for the presumption of compensability. Cheeks v. Wismer & Becker/G.S. Atkinson, J.V., 742 P.2d 239 (Alaska 1987).

Merely filing a claim for compensation does not give rise to the presumption of coverage. However, the claimant need only present some evidence that the claim arose out of, or in the course of, employment before the presumption arises. Resler v. Universal Servs., 778 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1989).

The presumption of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) does not apply to inter-employer disputes on the question of whether an employment relationship existed between the worker and the subsequent party. Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 791 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1990).

The fact that claimant suffered a work-related injury for which he received compensation from his employer was sufficient to establish a preliminary link between his employment and continuing disability, thus implicating subsection (a). Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471 (Alaska 1991).

Where the claimant suffered a work-related injury and produced evidence that she was unemployable, she implicated the presumption by establishing the preliminary link between her disability and her employment. Carlson v. Doyon Universal-Ogden Servs., 995 P.2d 224 (Alaska 2000).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision, which denied an employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, was inadequate to permit appellate review because a court was unable to determine whether the Board applied incorrect legal rules and whether it considered all of the relevant evidence. Smith v. Univ. of Alaska, 172 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2007).

Claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits as a matter of law because employer did not rebut the presumption of compensability set forth in this section where work-related factors were a substantial cause of claimant’s disability, although claimant’s non-work-related health conditions were also substantial factors. Carter v. B & B Constr., Inc., 199 P.3d 1150 (Alaska 2008).

Presumption not applicable against injured worker. —

The statutory presumption of compensability in paragraph (1)(a) may not be used against an injured worker; the presumption did not apply in a negligence action by a state employee against the state for injuries arising from an automobile accident and, thus, the state had the burden of proving work relatedness. Himschoot v. Shanley, 908 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1996).

Superior court did not apply presumption that the decedent’s accident, which resulted in death, fell under the purview of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; the superior court mentioned AS 23.30.120 in explaining why the estate’s argument was oversimplified. There was no indication that the superior court required the estate to produce “substantial evidence” that the decedent’s injury was not within the scope of workers’ compensation. Estate of Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc., 145 P.3d 533 (Alaska 2006).

The presumption of compensability did not apply in this case due to the worker’s preexisting back condition, the normal imaging studies of his back and hip, and the lack of contemporaneous complaints of back pain or evidence of a home-treatment regimen supported the conclusion that back pain the worker reported a year later was not caused by a fight at work. McGahuey v. Whitestone Logging, Inc., 262 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2011).

Presumption may not be ignored. —

The question in a particular case of whether the employment did so contribute to aggravate or accelerate the final result is one of fact which is usually determined from medical testimony, but once a prima facie case of work-relatedness is made, the board may not ignore the presumption and allocate the burden of proof to the claimant. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Board failed to apply proper legal standard where nowhere in its findings and conclusions was there any mention of the statutory presumption of coverage, or of aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition, and the language employed by the board in its decision suggested that it improperly placed the burden of establishing work-relatedness on claimant. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Because the Board never inquired whether the employer had overcome its burden of rebutting the presumption of compensability with regard to the existence of a work-related injury, it incorrectly treated the claimant as having the burden to prove both the existence of a permanent disability and the work-relatedness of his injuries. Groom v. State, 169 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2007).

Board’s duty to explicitly state proper legal analysis. —

The Workers’ Compensation Board’s failure to explicitly state that claimant was entitled to the presumption of compensability was a harmless error where the board articulated the correct legal standard and then concluded that claimant should be compensated because her work aggravated her preexisting injury and was a substantial factor in bringing about her current disability, so that no doubt could exist that the board applied the proper legal analysis. Harp v. ARCO Alaska, 831 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1992).

In future cases involving the presumption of compensability, the Workers’ Compensation Board should explicitly state whether the employee established a preliminary link between her employment and her physical impairment, whether the employer rebutted the presumption of compensability, and if so, whether the employee proved her case by a preponderance of the evidence. Harp v. ARCO Alaska, 831 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1992).

Overcoming presumption of compensability. —

Two possible ways of overcoming the presumption of compensability are (1) by affirmative evidence showing that the death was not work-connected, or (2) by eliminating all reasonable possibilities that the death was work-connected. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

The employer can overcome the presumption of compensability by introducing affirmative evidence that the assault was not work-related. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

Where the statutory presumption of workers’ compensation coverage governs, it is necessary for the employer to show by substantial evidence that the employee’s continuing back problems did not result from the work-related accident. Rogers Elec. Co. v. Kouba, 603 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1979).

Once the presumption of compensability has been raised, it is the employer’s burden to come forward with substantial evidence that the injury was not work related in order to overcome the presumption. The employer may overcome the presumption in two ways: (1) present affirmative evidence that the injury was not work related, or (2) eliminate all reasonable possibilities that the injury was work-connected. Resler v. Universal Servs., 778 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1989).

There are two ways by which the presumption of compensability can be overcome in relation to work-relatedness: affirmative evidence that the injury was not work-related, or elimination of all reasonable possibilities that the injury was work-connected. Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991).

To rebut the presumption of compensability set out in subsection (a), it is not required that medical experts not only rule out a link between employment and disability but also present an alternative diagnosis. An employer has always been able to rebut the presumption of compensability with an expert opinion that the claimant’s work was probably not a substantial cause of the disability. Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993).

The evidence of three doctors that the claimant was not permanently and totally disabled, together with evidence identifying continuous and suitable work for the claimant, sufficed to overcome the presumption of compensability. Carlson v. Doyon Universal-Ogden Servs., 995 P.2d 224 (Alaska 2000).

Rebutting presumption of compensability. —

In order to rebut the presumption of compensability, an employer does not provide a sufficient “alternative explanation” simply by pointing to other factors that likely aggravated a preexisting condition. DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000).

Rebuttal of presumption by employer. —

The employer presented substantial evidence that work was not a substantial factor in aggravating the employee’s disability and rebutted the presumption of compensability. Steffey v. Municipality of Anchorage, 1 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2000).

Substantial evidence supported the Anchorage Police and Fire Retirement Board’s conclusion that the presumption of compensability was successfully rebutted and that the employee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s heart disease was work-related because (1) the first doctor testified that the employee’s disability was the result of a number of well-recognized, but non-industrial, risk factors and that job-related stress did not contribute to the employee’s disability; and (2) the second doctor testified that the employee’s angina pectoris and angioplasty were in no way related to the employee’s employment. Palmer v. Municipality of Anchorage, Police & Fire Ret. Bd., 65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003).

Presumption of compensability not inconsistent with holding burden of proof on claimant. —

There is no inconsistency between the presumption of compensability found in this section and a holding that the burden of proving that an injury arose out of and in the course of the employment rests upon the claimant for compensation, for the presumption of this section places a burden on the employer to go forward with evidence on the issue of whether the injury arises outside or within the scope of employment. Once competent evidence is introduced, the presumption drops out, and the final burden of proof as to all essential elements is on the claimant. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

Presumption of compensability triggered. —

Where claimant offered “some evidence” that her injury was work related, she triggered the presumption of compensability. DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000).

Aggravation claims. —

For an employee to establish an aggravation claim, the employment need only have been “a substantial factor in bringing about the disability,” that is, when a job worsens an employee’s symptoms such that she can no longer perform her job functions, that constitutes an “aggravation,” even when the job does not actually worsen the underlying condition. DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000).

Burden of proof. —

The presumption of this section applies until such time as there is evidence that the claimant was outside the scope of his employment. At such time the claimant then has the burden of going forward with evidence of the job-related nature of the injury. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

The employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue of whether the injury arose outside the scope of employment, but once substantial evidence is introduced, the presumption drops out, and the burden of proving all elements of the claim falls on the plaintiff. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1976).

The Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act contains a presumption that an injury is work-connected in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. Once substantial evidence is introduced, the presumption drops out and the burden of proving all elements of the claim falls on the claimant. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

If a company meets its burden of producing substantial evidence that the injury was not work-related, the presumption would then drop out, shifting the burden of proving all elements of the claim back to the claimant. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

In workers’ compensation cases, compensability is presumed once the worker establishes a “preliminary link” between his employment and his disability. The employer can rebut this presumption by producing substantial evidence that the injury is not compensable. Thereupon, the presumption drops out, and the employee must bear the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, as to each element of the claim. Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987).

The presumption of compensability shifts the burden of production to the employer once the employee has established a preliminary link between his employment and the injury. Since the presumption shifts only the burden of production and not the burden of persuasion, the evidence tending to rebut the presumption should be examined by itself and not weighed by the court with the evidence tending to establish causation in deciding whether the employer has produced substantial evidence to rebut the presumption. Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985).

The presumption of compensability places the burden of producing evidence on the employer. Once substantial evidence contrary to the presumption is introduced, the presumption drops out and the burden of proving all elements of the claim falls on the claimant. Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989).

If the presumption of compensability has been successfully rebutted by the employer, the board must then determine whether the employee has proved all elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Resler v. Universal Servs., 778 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1989).

Employee’s claim was compensable, where the employer failed to produce substantial “affirmative evidence” that the employee’s heart condition was caused by factors other than work related stress and did not sufficiently eliminate all reasonable possibility that work-related stress was a substantial factor in the development of his heart condition. Grainger v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 805 P.2d 976 (Alaska 1991).

Where claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise the presumption of compensability and there was no evidence that his disability was not caused in substantial part by his employment, the board erred in requiring him to establish that his asthma was work-related, rather than requiring his employer to overcome the presumption by showing that the asthma was not caused by his employment. Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Koons, 816 P.2d 1379 (Alaska 1991).

This section establishes a presumption of compensability which places the burden of producing evidence on the employer. Meek v. Unocal Corp., 914 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1996).

Where an employee claimed that her employment had caused her breast implant to deflate, the workers’ compensation board did not err in finding that the employee had failed to prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, or in giving less weight to the opinion of the employee’s doctor, who was a family practitioner with less experience with breast implants, while giving more weight to the opinions of two surgeons experienced with breast implants. Cowen v. Wal-Mart, 93 P.3d 420 (Alaska 2004).

Substantial evidence required to overcome presumption. —

When a claimant shows that he has been injured at work, substantial evidence is needed to overcome the presumption of compensability. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978). See also Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

For a reviewing court to uphold a decision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board determining that an employer has rebutted the statutory presumption of coverage, it must find that the decision is supported by “substantial evidence.” Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

Workers’ Compensation Board properly applied presumption of compensability established by paragraph (a)(1) but erred in finding there was substantial evidence to overcome the presumption where questions remained about how an employee died while waiting for a flight out of employer’s remote site. Excursion Inlet Packing Co. v. Ugale, 92 P.3d 413 (Alaska 2004).

Presumption as to continuing treatment. —

An injured employee may raise the presumption that a claim for continuing treatment or care comes within the provisions of AS 23.30.095(a) , and, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, this presumption will satisfy the employee’s burden of proof as to whether continued treatment or care is medically indicated. Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991).

“Substantial evidence”. —

The supreme court has consistently defined “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Evidence which is competent or admissible may nevertheless be insufficient to overcome the presumption of compensability; the question whether the quantum of evidence is substantial is a legal question. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

“Substantial evidence” is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Rogers Elec. Co. v. Kouba, 603 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1979); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981); Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

The mere inability to state that the disability was work-related does not constitute substantial evidence. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

The mere possibility of another injury is not “substantial” evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of compensability. Hoth v. Valley Constr., 671 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1983).

Affirmative evidence in the form of expert testimony that decedent’s death was not work-related was sufficient to constitute substantial evidence for purposes of rebutting the statutory presumption of compensability. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

Employer presented substantial evidence in support of its position on the issue of compensability, i.e., evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that employee’s illnesses were not work-related. Accordingly, the board properly concluded that employer had rebutted the presumption of compensability. Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994).

For purposes of overcoming the presumption of compensability, medical testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence if it simply points to other possible causes of an employee’s injury or disability, without ruling out work-related causes. Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).

Subsequent non-work-related injury did not rebut presumption. —

A disability arising after a non-work-related injury is still compensable if an earlier work-related injury substantially contributed to the employee’s disability; thus, the fact that an employee has suffered a non-work-related injury does not, standing alone, rebut the presumption of compensability. Osborne Constr. Co. v. Jordan, 904 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1995).

Presumption of compensability not overcome. —

See Land & Marine Rental Co. v. Rawls, 686 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1984).

Insufficient evidence to overcome presumption of compensability. —

Employer was not relieved of its obligation to pay for an employee’s additional surgery, where the record contained insufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption that the employee did not wilfully intend to injure himself when he reinjured his back by resisting arrest for public intoxication and fighting with the arresting officer. Walt's Sheet Metal v. Debler, 826 P.2d 333 (Alaska 1992).

Evidence was insufficient to rebut presumption of compensability in AS 23.30.120(a)(1) ; claimant was entitled to PTD benefits as a matter of law because physician’s testimony that claimant’s work-related injures were a substantial factor in his PTD was uncontroverted, and because claimant’s employer failed to establish that the work injury was not a substantial factor in bringing about the PTD. Carter v. B & B Constr., Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska June 27, 2008), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 199 P.3d 1150 (Alaska 2008).

Sufficient evidence to overcome presumption of compensability. —

See Raab v. Parker Drilling, 710 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1985); W.R. Grasle Co. v. Mumby, 833 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1992); Gillispie v. B & B Foodland, 881 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1994).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that the claimant had failed to prove the need for further treatment of her costochondritis was supported by substantial evidence, including two doctors’ reports and the claimant’s own testimony; one doctor’s report stated that the condition was not related to the claimant’s knee injury, the second doctor’s report stated that the condition was not a factor in her current pain complex, and the claimant testified that the condition had resolved by February 2001. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Presumption of compensability overcome. —

Employer advanced sufficient medical testimony to permit a reasonable person to accept as adequate the conclusion that employee’s sudden cardiac arrest occurring in employer’s workers’ living quarters was not work-related due to long hours and resulting exhaustion. Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994).

There was substantial evidence rebutting the presumption of compensability including: (1) evidence that employee’s illness was the result of an allergic reaction to another substance; (2) doctor’s opinion that employee may have mistaken her one allergy for another allergy; (3) employee’s delays in seeking medical attention for “life-threatening” reactions; (4) the opinion of an allergy specialist who was “not convinced” that employee’s illnesses were caused by the contested substance; (5) a determination that employer’s doctor was more qualified than employee’s doctor; (6) a determination that employer’s doctor’s procedure was more accurate and accepted; (7) medical opinion that if employee were allergic to often-used contested substance, it was unlikely that she would have suffered only four reactions in 10 years of employment; and (8) the fact that the board was presented with significantly more medical testimony on employer’s behalf. Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994).

Employer held to have overcome the presumption of compensability. Stephens v. ITT/Felec Servs., 915 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1996).

Doctor’s testimony that trauma and the development of fibromyalgia had not been reliably related, and that work was probably not a substantial factor in the development of claimant’s fibromyalgia, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of compensability of the condition as work-related. Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

Where two hepatologists who had seen and treated patients with hydatid cysts testified that the decedent’s rupture of the cyst on liver was not work related and did not rupture because of trauma to the decedent’s abdomen based on symptoms that the decedent experienced in the weeks prior to her death, a reasonable mind could accept the doctors’ testimony as adequate to support the conclusion that the decedent’s cyst ruptured spontaneously and not from work-related trauma to her abdomen. Therefore, the death was not work related and the decedent’s husband did not qualify for workers’ compensation death benefits. Bradbury v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 71 P.3d 901 (Alaska 2003).

Evidence sufficient to establish preliminary link between injury and job. —

See Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).

Standard for determining liability for formerly disabled employee’s subsequent disability. —

Applying the presumption of compensability in this section and the last injurious exposure rule in AS 23.30.205 to a dispute between a carrier and its former insured, which became a self-insured employer, establishes a clear standard for determining liability for a formerly disabled employee’s subsequent disability and avoids treating employees of a self-insured employer differently from similarly situated employees of an employer with outside insurance. Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985).

In order to produce substantial evidence necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of compensability, it is imperative that the carrier be given an opportunity to cross-examine the claimant’s medical experts and produce its own medical evidence of lack of aggravation or causation. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Expert medical evidence. —

Two factors determine whether expert medical evidence is necessary in a given case: the probative value of the available lay evidence and the complexity of the medical facts involved. If lay evidence is sufficiently probative to establish causation in some cases, there is no reason why it should not also be sufficient to establish a lack of causation in appropriate circumstances. Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985).

The presumption of compensability can be rebutted by presenting a qualified expert who testifies that, in his or her opinion, the claimant’s work was probably not a substantial cause of the disability. Big K Grocery v. Gibson, 836 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1992).

Uncontradicted lay testimony, coupled with inconclusive medical testimony, can be enough to support a finding by the board that a physical condition is causally connected to an accidental injury sustained in the course of the employment. Employers Commercial Union Co. v. Libor, 536 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1975).

Resolution of doubt as to substance of medical testimony. —

If there is any doubt as to the substance of medical testimony, it must be resolved in favor of the claimant. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978); Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Turner, 611 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980); Kessick v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980).

The rule on resolving doubt as to the substance of medical testimony is properly applicable only when the substance of a particular witness’ testimony is in doubt. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

Notice of right to second evaluation required. —

Although employer rebutted by substantial evidence the presumption of compensability created by subsection (a), the board committed reversible error in not ordering a second independent medical examination or informing employee of her right to such an examination pursuant to AS 23.30.095(k) . Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994).

Psychiatrist’s report. —

Where a psychiatrist concluded that an injured employee’s problems were mental rather than physical, this report could be given more weight than other doctors’ (who were not psychiatrists) conclusions to the contrary and where the psychiatrist’s report was neither doubtful nor ambiguous, it overcame the statutory presumption of compensability. Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

Where a psychiatrist who had no opportunity to examine the injured employee in any depth concluded contrary to numerous physicians who treated her that the employee’s problems were mental rather than physical, this was insufficient evidence to sustain the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination that the employee’s injury was not compensable. Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

No preliminary showing of on-the-job stress. —

The supreme court of Alaska held that a worker who suffered a mental disability allegedly due to nontraumatic gradual work-related stress did not have to make a preliminary showing that the on-the-job stress the worker experienced was greater than the stress which all employees experience. Fox v. Alascom, 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986).

Burden of proving medical expenses. —

Claimant who testified that she owed certain medical professionals money, but failed to link these debts to treatment of job-related injury despite a three-year interval during which she could have obtained documentation, failed to meet the burden of proving medical expenses by preponderance of the evidence. Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).

Superior court’s findings of occupational disease were supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Paragraph (a)(1) presumption held to operate. —

Where deceased was shot and killed, after closing time while cleaning up, at the restaurant at which he was employed as a bartender, by an unknown assailant, and no words were spoken during the attack and no money was taken, the presumption of paragraph (a)(1) operated, since no motive was found, no one knew why the assault was committed, and no plausible explanation showing the lack of employment connection was suggested. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1976).

Effect of elimination of presumption of compensability. —

In the circumstance where the presumption of compensability has been successfully rebutted, the presumption is eliminated and the employee must prove all the elements of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 698 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1985).

Employee had not proved his claim by a preponderance of the evidence and was not eligible for workers’ compensation, because once the employer has rebutted the presumption that the injuries are work related, the employee can prevail only if he proves his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Temple v. Denali Princess Lodge, 21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).

Employee’s claim not compensable. —

Where the presumption in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) has been successfully rebutted, and the employee has failed to prove all elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the employee’s claim is not compensable. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 698 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1985).

Medical evidence concerning claimant’s foot problems from 1986 to 1991 eliminated any reasonable possibility that his employment during May and June, 1991, was a factor in causing his amputation. Tinker v. Veco, Inc., 913 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1996).

Finding held unnecessary. —

Where the Workers’ Compensation Board rested its final ruling not upon the presumption of compensability, but upon its conclusion that claimant had satisfied his burden of persuasion after the presumption had dropped out, any finding regarding the presumption was unnecessary to the board’s ultimate ruling, and even assuming that the board’s ruling on the presumption issue was error, it was harmless error. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Rogers & Babler, 747 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1987).

Benefits claim because of Crohn’s disease denied. —

See Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859 (Alaska 1985), overruled by Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987), to the extent that it suggested that “eggshell” claimants would be precluded from recovery solely because they succumb to stressful job conditions to which others in the profession do not succumb .

Special hazard exception to going-and-coming rule. —

There is a special hazard exception to the going-and-coming rule in workers’ compensation cases, and the presumption of compensability applies to the factual determinations necessary to decide whether a claim falls within that exception. Sokolowski v. Best Western Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P.2d 286 (Alaska 1991).

Applied in

Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966); Ruble v. Arctic Gen., 598 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1979); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 680 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1984); Robinett v. Enserch Alaska Constr., 804 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1990); Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996); Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1997).

Quoted in

Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992); Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994); Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, 42 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2002); Coppe v. Bleicher, 318 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2014); Humphrey v. Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc., 337 P.3d 1174 (Alaska 2014); Butts v. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 467 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2020).

Stated in

State, Pub. Emples. Ret. Bd. v. Cacioppo, 813 P.2d 679 (Alaska 1991); Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764 (Alaska 2000); Parris-Eastlake v. Dep't of Law, 26 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 1368 (Alaska 1991); Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997); Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1997); Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003); Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr., 440 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

Matters concluded, in action at law to recover for the same injury, by decision or finding made in workmen’s compensation proceeding. 84 ALR2d 1036.

Award of workers’ compensation benefits to professional athletes. 112 ALR5th 365.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular physical injuries or illnesses. 112 ALR5th 509.

Compensability under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli. 113 ALR5th 115.

Sec. 23.30.121. Presumption of coverage for disability from diseases for certain firefighters.

  1. There is a presumption that a claim for compensation for disability as a result of the diseases described in (b) of this section for the occupations listed under (b) of this section is within the provisions of this chapter. This presumption of coverage may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence may include the use of tobacco products, physical fitness and weight, lifestyle, hereditary factors, and exposure from other employment or nonemployment activities.
  2. For a firefighter covered under AS 23.30.243 ,
    1. there is a presumption that a claim for compensation for disability as a result of the following diseases is within the provisions of this chapter:
      1. respiratory disease;
      2. cardiovascular events that are experienced within 72 hours after exposure to smoke, fumes, or toxic substances; and
      3. the following cancers:
        1. primary brain cancer;
        2. malignant melanoma;
        3. leukemia;
        4. non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma;
        5. bladder cancer;
        6. ureter cancer;
        7. kidney cancer; and
        8. prostate cancer;
    2. notwithstanding AS 23.30.100(a) , following termination of service, the presumption established in (1) of this subsection extends to the firefighter for a period of three calendar months for each year of requisite service but may not extend more than 60 calendar months following the last date of employment;
    3. the presumption established in (1) of this subsection applies only to an active or former firefighter who has a disease described in (1) of this subsection that develops or manifests itself after the firefighter has served in the state for at least seven years and who
      1. was given a qualifying medical examination upon becoming a firefighter that did not show evidence of the disease;
      2. was given an annual medical exam during each of the first seven years of employment that did not show evidence of the disease; and
      3. with regard to diseases described in (1)(C) of this subsection, demonstrates that, while in the course of employment as a firefighter, the firefighter was exposed to a known carcinogen, as defined by the International Agency for Research on Cancer or the National Toxicology Program, and the carcinogen is associated with a disabling cancer.
  3. The presumption set out in this section applies only to a firefighter who, at a minimum, holds a certificate as a Firefighter I by the Department of Public Safety under firefighter testing and certification standards established by the department under authority of AS 18.70.350 (1) or other applicable statutory authority.
  4. The provisions of (b)(1)(A) and (B) of this section do not apply to a firefighter who develops a cardiovascular or lung condition and who has a history of tobacco product use as established under (e)(2) of this section.
  5. The department shall, by regulation, define
    1. for purposes of (b)(1) — (3) of this section, the type and extent of the medical examination that is needed to eliminate evidence of the disease in an active or former firefighter; and
    2. for purposes of (d) of this section, the nature and quantity of a person’s tobacco product use; the standards adopted under this paragraph shall use or be based on existing medical research.
  6. In this section, “firefighter” has the meaning given in AS 09.65.295 .

History. (§ 1 ch 26 SLA 2008)

Cross references. —

For an additional presumption of compensability for certain firefighters contracting the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) during the COVID-19 public health disaster emergency declared March 11, 2020, see § 15, ch. 10, SLA 2020 in the 2020 Temporary and Special Acts.

For an additional presumption of compensability for certain firefighters, emergency medical technicians, paramedics, peace officers, or health care providers contracting COVID-19 during the COVID-19 public health disaster emergency declared January 15, 2021, see sec. 11, ch. 2, SLA 2021, in the 2021 Temporary and Special Acts.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 2, ch. 26, SLA 2008 provides that “[t]he presumption of coverage established by this [section] applies to claims made on or after August 19, 2008, even if the exposure leading to the occupational disease occurred before August 19, 2008.”

Notes to Decisions

Presumption of compensibility. —

Presumption of compensability attached to a firefighter’s prostate cancer because the firefighter (1) had to, and did, substantially comply with medical examination requirements adopted after exposure, as the examinations screened for prostate cancer, (2) showed this job exposed him to known carcinogens, and (3) did not have to show the exposure caused a specific cancer. Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2014).

Required showing. —

Section 23.30.121 does not require a firefighter to show exposure to a carcinogen shown to cause a specific cancer but, instead, requires (1) a showing of exposure to a known carcinogen as defined by the National Toxicology Program (NTP) or International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and (2) some evidence linking the carcinogen to the cancer, without showing the IARC or the NTP have determined the carcinogen is a “known carcinogen” for the cancer. Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2014).

Expert testimony. —

Firefighter asserting the presumption in AS 23.30.121 did not have to present expert testimony because the statute’s references to the work of the International Agency for Research on Cancer and the National Toxicology Program provided a way to attach the statutory presumption without a retained expert. Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5 (Alaska 2014).

Cited in

Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 23.30.122. Credibility of witnesses.

The board has the sole power to determine the credibility of a witness. A finding by the board concerning the weight to be accorded a witness’s testimony, including medical testimony and reports, is conclusive even if the evidence is conflicting or susceptible to contrary conclusions. The findings of the board are subject to the same standard of review as a jury’s finding in a civil action.

History. (§ 14 ch 93 SLA 1982)

Notes to Decisions

Absent specific findings by the board that it chose to disbelieve a witness’s testimony, a court will not assume that lack of credibility was a relevant factor in the board’s decision. Hoth v. Valley Constr., 671 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1983).

Board determines witness credibility. —

Deference should be given to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination of witness credibility. However, the weight to be accorded the doctors’ testimony must take place after a determination of whether the presumption of compensability has been overcome. Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994).

Injured employee improperly tried to apply the rule that doubtful medical evidence should be resolved in her favor beyond its original scope; the record included testimony and reports of multiple medical experts who unequivocally expressed the opinion that the employee’s condition likely was not caused by her injury. Brown v. Patriot Maint., Inc., 99 P.3d 544 (Alaska 2004).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board was free to give less weight to the treating physician’s testimony as he was not an expert in toxicology, and substantial evidence supported the board’s finding that the employee did not establish a compensable claim. Apone v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 226 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2010).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision rejecting the employee’s claim because two orthopedic doctors testified that the employee’s lower back pain was probably not caused by the initial accident or by subsequent surgery, rebutting the presumption of compensability; the board did not err by giving little weight to a doctor who thought that the employee’s back pain was related to his work accident because the doctor largely deferred to one of the orthopedic doctors. Davis v. Kiewit Constr. Co., — P.3d — (Alaska Oct. 6, 2010) (memorandum decision).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission properly upheld the denial of an employee’s claim for benefits by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. Because the board was authorized to weigh the medical evidence, it was entitled to give less weight to the testimony of the employee’s family physician. Rivera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 247 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2011).

The Workers’ Compensation Board was empowered to weigh the evidence from medical records showing employee had symptoms in her wrist for many years, and to determine that a doctor’s testimony indicating the employee had a permanent condition was credible evidence. Rockstad v. Chugach Eareckson Support Servs., — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 18, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Award of workers’ compensation benefits to an employee who injured her back should not have been overturned by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission is required to accept the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s credibility determinations, including its decision regarding witness credibility. De Rosario v. Lodging, 297 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2013).

Employee could not avoid a settlement of his workers’ compensation claim on grounds of duress, when the employer demanded the return of funds paid pursuant to the settlement if the employee were not going to perform the settlement. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found the employee’s claim of coercion was not credible, and those findings were binding, so the employee could not show that he involuntarily accepted the settlement. Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 316 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1004, 134 S. Ct. 1516, 188 L. Ed. 2d 452 (U.S. 2014).

Worker's injury was properly found not compensable, under a pre-2005 presumption analysis, because the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board permissibly found substantial credible evidence showed an employer rebutted a presumption of compensability, as medical reports excluded work-related factors as a substantial cause of a disability and need for treatment, as physicians found no pathology supporting claims of pain, and two psychiatrists did not think the worker was disabled or needed treatment due to a work-related incident. McCullough v. Job Ready, Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 21, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Substantial evidence supported the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board that a worker was entitled to compensation because medical testimony that the worker would not have become disabled but for the work exacerbating a prior injury showed the work was the most important cause of the disability. Traugott v. Arctec Alaska, 465 P.3d 499 (Alaska 2020).

Assuming that a worker did need further medical care for the worker's lower back, substantial evidence supported the the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's decision that the worker's employment was not the substantial cause of that need because doctors diagnosed degenerative disc disease unrelated to the worker's lower back injury at work. Espindola v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 486 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2021).

Because the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's crucial findings supporting its decision with regard to a worker's shoulder injury were not supported by the record as the testimony and reports from the worker's treating doctors did not diagnose the worker's shoulder condition with certainty, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Commission erred in concluding that the findings were supported by substantial evidence. Espindola v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 486 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2021).

Written record requirement. —

Because health questionnaires were the only written records that employer alleged that it had before employee’s injury, question whether employer’s knowledge of a permanent impairment satisfied the written record requirement turned on what conclusions could have been drawn from those health questionnaires; because the board was charged with evaluating evidence in compensation proceedings, the case needed to be remanded to the board. Veco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 189 P.3d 983 (Alaska 2008).

Timing of testimony evaluation. —

Although deference should be given to the board’s determination of a witness’ credibility, any weighing of medical testimony may not take place at the rebuttal stage. Rather, determining the weight to be accorded the doctors’ testimony must take place after a determination of whether the presumption has been overcome. Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994).

When a worker alleged he injured his hip, lower back and ear during a fight with his co-workers, the Workers’ Compensation Board erred by applying the presumption of compensability in considering the worker’s credibility at the first stage of the analysis under this section; however, the error was harmless because the Board correctly determined the employer rebutted the presumption with evidence showing the pain the worker reported more than a year later was not caused by the fight. McGahuey v. Whitestone Logging, Inc., 262 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2011).

Applied in

Resler v. Universal Servs., 778 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1989); Steffey v. Municipality of Anchorage, 1 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2000); Smith v. Univ. of Alaska, 172 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2007); Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009); Adams v. State, 467 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2020).

Quoted in

Holmberg v. Division of Risk Mgmt., 796 P.2d 823 (Alaska 1990); Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon, 124 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2005); AT&T Alascom v. Orchitt, 161 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2007); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Stated in

Gillispie v. B & B Foodland, 881 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1994); Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).

Cited in

Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991); DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000); Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore, 160 P.3d 146 (Alaska 2007); Humphrey v. Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc., 337 P.3d 1174 (Alaska 2014); Butts v. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 467 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 23.30.125. Administrative review of compensation order.

  1. A compensation order becomes effective when filed with the office of the board as provided in AS 23.30.110 , and, unless proceedings to reconsider, suspend, or set aside the order are instituted as provided in this chapter, the order becomes final on the 31st day after it is filed.
  2. Notwithstanding other provisions of law, a decision or order of the board is subject to review by the commission as provided in this chapter.
  3. If a compensation order is not in accordance with law or fact, the order may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through proceedings in the commission brought by a party in interest against all other parties to the proceedings before the board. The payment of the amounts required by an award may not be stayed pending a final decision in the proceeding unless, upon application for a stay, the commission, on hearing, after not less than three days’ notice to the parties in interest, allows the stay of payment, in whole or in part, where the party filing the application would otherwise suffer irreparable damage. Continuing future periodic compensation payments may not be stayed without a showing by the appellant of irreparable damage and the existence of the probability of the merits of the appeal being decided adversely to the recipient of the compensation payments. The order of the commission allowing a stay must contain a specific finding, based upon evidence submitted to the commission and identified by reference to the evidence, that irreparable damage would result to the party applying for a stay and specifying the nature of the damage.
  4. Proceedings for reconsidering, suspending, setting aside, or enforcing a compensation order, whether rejecting a claim or making an award, may not be instituted, except as provided in this chapter.

History. (§ 20 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 32 SLA 1965; am § 27 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 22 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 40 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Not all of ch. 2 of ch. 143, SLA 1959, as it relates to workmen’s compensation proceedings, has been repealed by implication. For example, the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act is silent as to judicial review and the scope of judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act, AS 44.62.010 44.62.650 , therefore applies, since there is nothing in the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act which covers the same ground or which is inconsistent with provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act relating to judicial review and the scope of such review. 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24. But see Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes but have been retained for aid in construing present law.

Limitation on power of administrative body to rehear or modify decisions. —

An administrative body has no power to grant a rehearing or set aside or modify its decisions except by virtue of express statutory provision or by necessary implication. Suryan v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 571 (D. Alaska 1950).

Jurisdiction. —

Although AS 23.30.007(a) , AS 23.30.008(a) , AS 23.30.125(b) , and AS 23.30.128(b) , when construed together, do not explicitly give the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission jurisdiction over discretionary review of non-final Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decisions, the Commission has implied jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals. Thus, the Commission did not err in reviewing a venue decision in a medical care dispute. Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341 (Alaska 2011).

Payment of corporate tax prerequisite to judicial review. —

The right to seek judicial review of an award is conditioned so far as a corporation is concerned upon the fact that the corporate tax has been paid in accordance with law. Alaska Mines & Minerals v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 354 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1960), limited, King v. Petroleum Servs. Corp., 536 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1975).

Counterclaim may not be interposed on review. —

Although the statute speaks of injunctive proceedings, the statutory proceeding for review of the orders of the board is in the nature of an appeal rather than an independent action and therefore a counterclaim may not be interposed in such a proceeding. Scott v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 123 F. Supp. 361, 15 Alaska 146 (D. Alaska 1954).

Quoted in

Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965); Rose v. Alaskan Village, 412 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1966).

Cited in

Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H & M Logging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971); Summerville v. Denali Ctr., 811 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1991); Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994); Lindekugel v. Fluor Alaska, 934 P.2d 1307 (Alaska 1997); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

II.Time Limitation

Commencement of 30-day period. —

All that is necessary under AS 23.30.110(e) and subsection (a) of this section to start the 30-day period running is for the board to promptly send, after filing, a registered copy of its order (a copy being one that reflects the date on which the original thereof was filed in the office of the board) to claimant and claimant’s employer at their respective last known addresses. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

The 30-day period within which review proceedings must be instituted begins to run from the day the order is filed in the office of the board and not from the time a copy of the order is received by the claimant. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Time limitation on injunction proceedings. —

If injunction proceedings are not brought within 30 days of the date of the award, the right to have judicial review is lost. Alaska Mines & Minerals v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 354 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1960), limited, King v. Petroleum Servs. Corp., 536 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1975).

Such limitation not suspended between filing of complaint and date corporate tax is paid. —

The running of the time within which injunction proceedings might have been instituted under this section was not suspended between the date plaintiff filed its complaint and the date it paid its corporate tax. Alaska Mines & Minerals v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 354 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1960), limited, King v. Petroleum Servs. Corp., 536 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1975).

Noncompliance with notice provisions. —

If the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act with regard to notice are not complied with, the restriction imposed by the act, limiting the time within which to seek injunctive relief, cannot be applied, and the court may, under its general equity powers, grant the relief prayed for. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Broad interpretation of modification-of-awards statute does not conflict with the 31-day finality provision, since the review authorized under that provision is limited to the legal validity of an award and does not extend to a redetermination of fact. It is apparent, then, that the board may go back through evidence adduced at the prior hearing. The reviewing court, too, may then review that evidence using the applicable standard. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Appeal held timely. —

Where the board was made a party defendant, as provided by this section, the appeal to the supreme court was timely because taken within 60 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from. Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966).

III.Standard of Review

The cases cited in the notes below were decided prior to the 2005 amendment, which rewrote the section.

AS 23.30.120 provides statutory guidance for supreme court in evaluating the basis for a board decision. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Supreme court will accept board’s reasonable construction of ambiguous statutory terms. —

The supreme court will accept the reasonable construction of the board where undefined or ambiguous terms appear in the statutory language. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

If there is ambiguity in the statutory provisions, and the board’s construction appears eminently reasonable, the courts will accept that construction. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

Only questions that supreme court may reconsider are, first, whether the award is contrary to law; and second, whether the administrative findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Court is limited to record. —

Where testimony produced before the board is not before the court, the court is limited in its consideration of the questions presented to the record and documentary evidence. Grant v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 355 (D. Alaska 1947).

And to reviewing questions of law. Hohn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 150 F. Supp. 519, 17 Alaska 94 (D. Alaska 1957).

The court is restricted in its review of the findings of the board to questions of law and not questions of fact. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

Question of whether quantum of evidence is substantial is legal question. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1976).

Question of whether employment aggravated or accelerated preexisting disease or injury is one of fact to be determined by the board. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Review where board’s decision rests on erroneous legal foundations. —

While the supreme court will not vacate findings of the Workmen’s Compensation Board if supported by substantial evidence, its scope of review is not so limited where the board’s decision rests on erroneous legal foundations. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973); Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974); M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1979).

The reviewing court is not to weigh the evidence or choose between competing inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence. But when the decision rests on erroneous legal foundations, it cannot be supported on appeal to the supreme court. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

A reviewing court is limited to a determination of whether the board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, but this standard of review has applicability only where the board has applied the proper legal test in reaching its findings. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Where the board’s findings are based on an erroneous standard of law, and it is impossible to ascertain whether the findings and conclusions would have been the same irrespective of the misconception of the law, the supreme court remanded to the board for reconsideration upon the record already made in accordance with the standards enunciated in this opinion. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Court is not permitted to weigh evidence. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966); Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Hawkins v. Green Associated, 559 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1977); Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

It is not the function of the supreme court to reweigh the evidence other than to determine whether or not such evidence exists. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

The board’s decision need not be compelled under the facts as the only possible solution to the problem, as it is not the function of this court to reweigh the evidence but only to determine whether such evidence exists. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Or usurp fact-finding prerogative of board. —

The court may not, because the evidence is susceptible of contrary or other inferences, usurp the fact-finding prerogative of the board. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Or choose between competing inferences. —

It is not the province of the supreme court to choose between competing inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966); Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Hawkins v. Green Associated, 559 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1977); Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

It is not important whether the particular situation is subject to more than one inference, as it is not the court’s province to choose between competing inferences. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Finding under provisions of this section is conclusive even though the evidence is conflicting or susceptible of contrary conclusions. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 465 (D. Alaska 1949).

And findings of board supported by substantial evidence are binding upon court. Kennedy v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 209, 16 Alaska 117 (D. Alaska 1956); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 160 F. Supp. 248, 17 Alaska 527 (D. Alaska 1958).

The supreme court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966); Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Vetter v. Wagner, 576 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1978); Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

Supreme court review of determinations of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board is limited by the substantial evidence test. A decision of the board may not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. It is not important that the particular situation before the board is subject to more than one inference. What matters is whether the determination of the board is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. Anderson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972); Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

The supreme court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the deputy commissioner. Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

The supreme court may not set aside the inferences drawn by the administrator from the evidence that he chose to believe, if such inferences are reasonably possible and have a rational basis. Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

The findings of fact are conclusive, and may not be disturbed unless plaintiff is able to show that they are unsupported by any substantial evidence. Grant v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 355 (D. Alaska 1947).

And the board’s findings of fact may not be disturbed unless they are wholly unsupported by the evidence, in which case they constitute error as a matter of law. Hohn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 150 F. Supp. 519, 17 Alaska 94 (D. Alaska 1957).

Only when the finding of the board is totally unsupported by the evidence so as to be erroneous as a matter of law may the court then substitute its judgment. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

The task of the supreme court in reviewing the board’s finding is limited to a determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding. Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

Challenge to the board’s decision and the superior court’s affirmance thereof focuses on the board’s findings rather than on the legal basis for its findings; thus, supreme court review is governed by the substantial evidence test. Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974).

The supreme court must independently review the evidence to determine whether the board erred in concluding that there was no substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1976).

The courts must uphold an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board if it is supported by substantial evidence. Hawkins v. Green Associated, 559 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1977); Parker Drilling Co. v. Wester, 651 P.2d 842 (Alaska 1982).

If, in light of the record as a whole, there is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, then the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board must be upheld. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

In reviewing a determination of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board, the applicable standard of review is the substantial evidence test. Miller v. ITT Arctic Servs., 577 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1978).

In reviewing the board’s findings of fact, the issue is whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

For a reviewing court to uphold a decision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board determining that an employer has rebutted the statutory presumption of coverage, it must find that the decision is supported by “substantial evidence”. Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

While the judiciary may not reweigh the evidence before the board, neither may it abdicate its reviewing function and affirm a board decision that has only extremely slight supporting evidence. Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

“Substantial evidence”. —

“Substantial evidence” is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966); Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966); Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966); Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1974); Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1976); Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978); Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Kessick v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980); Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

Countervailing evidence of more probative value. —

That countervailing evidence may have more probative value would not warrant the court in overruling the findings. Beauchamp v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970); Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Court must examine entire record. —

In reviewing the decisions of the board the court must examine the entire record to ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the board. Board of Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625, 14 Alaska 453 (D. Alaska 1953).

And doubt must be resolved in favor of employee. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 465 (D. Alaska 1949).

Any doubt as to the evidence supporting an award must be resolved in the claimant’s favor. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Where there is a conflict in testimony, it is undeniably the province of the Workers’ Compensation Board and not the supreme court to decide who to believe and who to distrust, and where the only medical testimony presented to the board, that of a single doctor, was that the claimant was still temporarily disabled and although the credibility of the doctor’s diagnosis was questioned by the board, where no contradictory medical evidence was presented, given the lack of other competent medical evidence, the state of the doctor’s testimony was, at worst, inconclusive, and any doubts regarding the doctor’s testimony must be resolved in the claimant’s favor. Kessick v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980).

Supreme court is not limited to face value of medical testimony but in fact can rely on the inferences therefrom and the peculiar facts of the case. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Findings of fact supporting compensation awards must be made pursuant to AS 44.62.510(a) and 44.62.570(b) . Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Finding not supported by substantial evidence. —

Upon reviewing the entire record the supreme court found no substantial evidence supporting the board’s finding that claimant was unwilling to find suitable employment, either because her husband was opposed to her working or because she did not desire to work. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Where a psychiatrist who had no opportunity to examine the injured employee in any depth concluded contrary to numerous physicians who treated her that the employee’s problems were mental rather than physical, this was insufficient evidence to sustain the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination that the employee’s injury was not compensable. Black v. Universal Servs., 627 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981), limited, Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey, 965 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1998).

Board has no authority to reconsider court’s ruling of insufficient evidence. —

Where the supreme court expressly rules that there was insufficient evidence to support the board’s finding that claimant had voluntarily removed herself from the labor market, the board has no authority to reconsider it on remand for further proceedings in conformity with the supreme court’s opinion. Vetter v. Wagner, 576 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1978).

IV.Injunction Proceedings

Similarity to Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. —

Subsection (c) of this section is substantially similar to 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967). See also Scott v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 123 F. Supp. 361, 15 Alaska 146 (D. Alaska 1954).

Subsection (c) superseded by appellate rules. —

To the extent that subsection (c) of this section is procedural in nature, it has been superseded by the Alaska Appellate Rules. Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell, 626 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1981).

Showing of irreparable damage required for stay. —

The supreme court has construed the Alaska Appellate Rules to require, in addition to a supersedeas bond, a showing of irreparable damage in order to obtain a stay in workers’ compensation cases. Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell, 626 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1981).

“Irreparable damage”. —

Proper construction of the term “irreparable damage” found in subsection (c) of this section is a highly debatable issue. Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

The term “irreparable damage” requires a showing both of the financial irresponsibility of the claimant and the existence of the probability that the merits of the appeal will be decided adversely to him. Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell, 626 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1981).

Grounds for finding of irreparable damage. —

A claimant’s insolvency, or financial irresponsibility, in and of itself was not sufficient grounds upon which to base a finding of irreparable injury under subsection (c) of this section. Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Standard for staying future medical benefits. —

To stay future medical benefits, an employer must demonstrate a probability that an appeal will be decided adversely to the workers’ compensation recipient. Therefore, it was improper to grant a stay of future benefits based on the serious and substantial question test. Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013).

For other cases construing provisions of subsection (c), see Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966); Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973); Department of Highways v. Burgess Constr. Co., 575 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.30.127. Appeals to commission.

  1. A party in interest may appeal a compensation order issued by the board to the commission within 30 days after the compensation order is filed with the office of the board under AS 23.30.110 . The director may intervene in an appeal. If a party in interest is not represented by counsel and the compensation order concerns an unsettled question of law, the director may file an appeal to obtain a ruling on the question by the commission.
  2. An appeal is initiated by filing with the office of the commission
    1. a signed notice of appeal specifying the compensation order appealed from;
    2. a statement of the grounds upon which the appeal is taken; and
    3. other material the commission may by regulation require.
  3. A cross-appeal may be initiated by filing with the office of the commission a signed notice of cross-appeal within 30 days after the decision is filed or within 15 days after service of notice of an appeal, whichever is later. The notice of cross-appeal shall specify the compensation order appealed from and the grounds upon which the cross-appeal is taken.
  4. The office of the commission may charge a fee, not to exceed $100, for filing appeals and cross-appeals, except that the office of the commission may not charge a fee if the appellant is the state or a political subdivision of the state. The commission may require an appellant to pay the costs of the transcript of hearing and the preparation of the record on appeal. The commission may require cross-appellants or intervenors to share in the costs.
  5. If a request for reconsideration of a board decision was timely filed with the office of the board, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the reconsideration decision is mailed to the parties or the date the request for reconsideration is considered denied in the absence of any action on the request, whichever is earlier.
  6. The commission may require written briefs and make other rules and orders to facilitate the business of the commission and advance the prompt, fair, and just disposition of appeals.

History. (§ 41 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Notes to Decisions

Creation of quasi-judicial agency. —

Creation of Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was quasi-judicial, and it was properly established; the authority of the commission did not encroach on the judicial branch. AS 23.30.008 could be read to encroach on judicial functions if it meant that decisions of the commission could serve as precedent for courts or other administrative agencies, but the judiciary retained judical review over the agency’s actions, although the commission’s decisions would be binding on the Workers’ Compensation Board. Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007).

Timeliness. —

Dismissal of appeal was improper because the Second Injury Fund had 30 days to appeal from the date it received notice that reconsideration was denied, and it filed a timely appeal after the Workers’ Compensation Board gave it written notice that reconsideration was denied. State v. Tongass Bus. Ctr., Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2012).

Quoted in

Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008).

Stated in

Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Cited in

Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341 (Alaska 2011).

Sec. 23.30.128. Commission proceedings.

  1. An appeal from a decision of the board under this chapter, and other proceedings under this section, shall be heard and decided by a three-member panel of the commission. An appeal panel of the commission must include the chair of the commission. The chair of the commission shall assign two members to each appeal, including one commission member classified as representing employees and one commission member classified as representing employers. Acts, decisions, and orders of the commission panel in the appeal or related proceeding shall be considered the acts, decisions, and orders of the full commission. The matter on appeal shall be decided on the record made before the board, a transcript or recording of the proceedings before the board, and oral argument and written briefs allowed by the commission. Except as provided in (c) of this section, new or additional evidence may not be received with respect to the appeal.
  2. The commission may review discretionary actions, findings of fact, and conclusions of law by the board in hearing, determining, or otherwise acting on a compensation claim or petition. The board’s findings regarding the credibility of testimony of a witness before the board are binding on the commission. The board’s findings of fact shall be upheld by the commission if supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. In reviewing questions of law and procedure, the commission shall exercise its independent judgment.
  3. The commission may hold hearings and receive evidence on applications for (1) stays under AS 23.30.125 ; (2) attorney fees and costs of appeal; (3) waiver of fees by indigent appellants; or (4) dismissal of appeals for failure to prosecute or upon settlement. The commission may rely on new or additional evidence presented during the hearing in making its decision on the application.
  4. The commission may affirm, reverse, or modify a decision or order upon review and issue other orders as appropriate. The commission may remand matters it determines were improperly, incompletely, or otherwise insufficiently developed. The commission may remand for further proceedings and appropriate action with or without relinquishing the commission’s jurisdiction of the appeal. The administrative adjudication procedures of AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) do not apply to the proceedings of the commission.
  5. Within 90 days after written briefing on the appeal is completed or oral argument is held, whichever is later, the commission shall issue a decision in writing. The decision must contain a concise statement of reasons for the decision, including findings of fact, if required, and conclusions of law. The commission shall serve each party and the director with a copy of the decision. Appeals may be expedited for good cause by the commission. Unless reconsideration is ordered under (f) of this section, a decision under this subsection is the final commission decision.
  6. A party or the director may request reconsideration of a decision issued under (e) of this section within 30 days after the date of service shown in the certificate of service of the decision. The request must state specific grounds for reconsideration. Reconsideration may be granted if, in reaching the decision, the commission (1) overlooked, misapplied, or failed to consider a statute, regulation, court or administrative decision, or legal principle directly controlling; (2) overlooked or misconceived a material fact; (3) misconceived a material question in the case; or (4) applied law in the ruling that has subsequently changed. The panel of the commission hearing the request for reconsideration shall consist of the same members of the panel that issued the decision. The commission may issue an order for reconsideration of all or part of the decision upon request of a party or the director. Reconsideration is based on the record, unless the commission allows additional argument. The power to order reconsideration expires 60 days after the date of service, as shown on the certificate of service, of a decision issued under (e) of this section. If the commission does not issue an order for reconsideration within the time allowed for ordering reconsideration, a request for reconsideration is considered denied. If reconsideration is ordered, the commission shall issue a decision within 30 days after the close of the record on reconsideration. The commission shall serve each party in the case with a copy of the decision upon reconsideration. The decision upon reconsideration is the final commission decision.
  7. A decision of the commission becomes final on the
    1. 31st day after the date of service of a decision if reconsideration is not requested;
    2. 61st day after the date of service of a decision if reconsideration is requested but an order for reconsideration is not issued; or
    3. date of service of the commission decision upon reconsideration under (f) of this section if reconsideration is requested and an order for reconsideration is issued.

History. (§ 41 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Notes to Decisions

Jurisdiction. —

Although AS 23.30.007(a) , AS 23.30.008(a) , AS 23.30.125(b) , and AS 23.30.128(b) , when construed together, do not explicitly give the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission jurisdiction over discretionary review of non-final Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decisions, the Commission has implied jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals. Thus, the Commission did not err in reviewing a venue decision in a medical care dispute. Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341 (Alaska 2011).

Substantial evidence. —

Substantial evidence supported the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board that a worker was entitled to compensation because medical testimony that the worker would not have become disabled but for the work exacerbating a prior injury showed the work was the most important cause of the disability. Traugott v. Arctec Alaska, 465 P.3d 499 (Alaska 2020).

Findings by the board. —

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission properly upheld a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board denying an employer’s petition alleging an employee fraudulently obtained workers’ compensation benefits. The board’s finding that the employee did not subjectively believe she misrepresented her employment status was a credibility determination that, under AS 23.30.128(b) , was binding on the commission and determinative of whether the employee intended to defraud the employer. Arctec Servs. v. Cummings, 295 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2013).

Decision held not final. —

Decision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was not a final decision for purposes of an appeal as a matter of right because the decretal language contemplated further administrative proceedings by remanding so the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board could make further findings; on remand the parties would have the opportunity to alter the decision through administrative means, either through argument or presentation of additional evidence. Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Credibility determinations. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission erred in overturning an award of workers’ compensation benefits to an employee who injured her back; the Commission was required to accept the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s credibility determinations, including its decision that the employer’s doctor was not credible, while the employee was credible. De Rosario v. Lodging, 297 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2013).

Employee could not avoid a settlement of his workers’ compensation claim on grounds of duress, when the employer demanded the return of funds paid pursuant to the settlement if the employee was not going to perform the settlement; the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found the employee’s claim of coercion was not credible, and the Board’s credibility findings were binding, so the employee could not show that he involuntarily accepted the settlement. Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 316 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1004, 134 S. Ct. 1516, 188 L. Ed. 2d 452 (U.S. 2014).

Authority to reconsider. —

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission was not prohibited from reconsidering orders other than the final decisions described by statute because the authority to reconsider was necessarily incident to the Commission's express authority to issue other orders as appropriate. Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019).

Applied in

Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009); Rivera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 247 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2011).

Quoted in

Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008).

Cited in

Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007); Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage, 249 P.3d 1063 (Alaska 2011); Coppe v. Bleicher, 318 P.3d 369 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 23.30.129. Judicial review of commission orders.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of AS 44.62.560 , orders of the commission may not be appealed to the superior court. Consistent with AS 22.05.010(b) , final decisions of the commission may be appealed to the supreme court, and other orders may be reviewed by the supreme court as provided by the Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure.
  2. A finding by the commission concerning the weight to be accorded a witness’s testimony, including medical testimony and reports, is conclusive even if the evidence is conflicting or susceptible to contrary conclusions. The commission’s findings of fact may be reversed on appeal if not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

History. (§ 41 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Attorney fees. —

Substantial evidence did not support a finding that workers’ compensation claimant was not a “successful party” under AS 23.30.008(d) for purposes of an attorney’s fee award on appeal to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission where she obtained the remedy requested: remand was ordered to clarify a decision to reduce attorney’s fees awarded under AS 23.30.145 on her claim. Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage, 249 P.3d 1063 (Alaska 2011).

Final decision. —

Because the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission is a quasi-judicial agency, the supreme court assumes the legislature was aware of cases defining an agency decision’s finality for purposes of judicial review when it enacted the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act and intended a ‘‘final’’ decision in that section to have the same meaning. Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Decision held not final. —

Decision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was not a final decision for purposes of an appeal as a matter of right because the decretal language contemplated further administrative proceedings by remanding so the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board could make further findings; on remand the parties would have the opportunity to alter the decision through administrative means, either through argument or presentation of additional evidence. Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016).

Applied in

Alaska Pub. Interest Research Group v. State, 167 P.3d 27 (Alaska 2007); Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019).

Quoted in

Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008).

Cited in

Humphrey v. Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc., 337 P.3d 1174 (Alaska 2014); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2017).

Sec. 23.30.130. Modification of awards.

  1. Upon its own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest on the ground of a change in conditions, including, for the purposes of AS 23.30.175 , a change in residence, or because of a mistake in its determination of a fact, the board may, before one year after the date of the last payment of compensation benefits under AS 23.30.180 , 23.30.185 , 23.30.190 , 23.30.200 , or 23.30.215 , whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or before one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case under the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in AS 23.30.110 . Under AS 23.30.110 the board may issue a new compensation order which terminates, continues, reinstates, increases, or decreases the compensation, or award compensation.
  2. A new order does not affect compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and if part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and payment made earlier in excess of the decreased rate shall be deducted from the unpaid compensation, in the manner the board determines.

History. (§ 21 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 2 ch 252 SLA 1976; am § 23 ch 79 SLA 1988)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes but have been retained for aid in construing present law.

Similarity to Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. —

Subsection (a) of this section is substantially the same as 33 U.S.C. § 922 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 430 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967).

The modification-of-awards provision found in subsection (a) of this section is in all respects substantially similar to its federal counterpart found in 33 U.S.C. § 922 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

This section provides method whereby board may reconsider previous decision, for the purpose of awarding increased compensation to cover adverse changes in physical condition subsequent to a prior award. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

Power and duty of board with respect to modification of compensation awards are governed by this section. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

But exercise of power must be warranted. —

The power vested in the board under this section to modify its awards may be invoked only upon a showing of a subsequent development warranting the exercise of that power. Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 122 F. Supp. 210, 15 Alaska 97 (D. Alaska 1954), modified, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957).

Application for adjustment. —

An application for adjustment was the functional equivalent of a petition for modification. Hodges v. Alaska Constructors, 957 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1998).

Petition to reopen treated as petition for modification. —

Worker’s petition to “reopen” her claim was correctly treated as a petition for modification under this section. Hulsey v. Johnson & Holen, 814 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1991).

Petition to set aside fraudulent compromise and release. —

The one-year limitation in this section did not apply to a petition asking the Workers’ Compensation Board to set aside a compromise and release which was allegedly obtained fraudulently. Blanas v. Brower Co., 938 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1997).

Timeliness. —

Injured worker's petition to vacate the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's decision to grant the employer's request to modify a reemployment eligibility decision, when the employer's doctor gave the worker a zero percent impairment rating, was untimely because the employee thus missed the one-year deadline for the modification provision to reopen the decision that terminated the reemployment benefits as both the worker's written claim and petition were filed more than a year after the Board's decision. McAlpine v. Denali Ctr., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 4, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Employer denied modification of benefits absent employee’s intentional misrepresentation. —

Employee suffered an injury to his arm and shoulder while operating a grader, and a physician observed weakness and loss of mobility, noting that operating a grader would cause the employee pain; employer was not entitled to modification of benefits based on a private investigator’s film showing the employee engaging in various activities inconsistent with his claims of debilitating shoulder pain where the employer failed to show that the employee made any intentional misrepresentations. Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon, 124 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2005).

Limitation on power of administrative body to rehear or modify decisions. —

An administrative body has no power to grant a rehearing or set aside or modify its decisions except by virtue of express statutory provision or by necessary implication. Suryan v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 571 (D. Alaska 1950).

Decision as to limitations period. —

This section imposes evidentiary standards for board review of petitions and a limitations period in which board review may occur. The board thus acts within its jurisdiction with respect to modification of the original claim when it decides whether the limitations period has run. Hulsey v. Johnson & Holen, 814 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1991).

Modification proceeding originates in initial claim for compensation. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Continuing jurisdiction conferred on board. —

Continuing jurisdiction over a compensation matter is conferred by law upon the board. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 407 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1965), overruled, Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979).

Whether jurisdiction is impliedly reserved is inherently a case-by-case determination. Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

Board reserved jurisdiction to decide degree of permanent disability. —

In its evidentiary context the language of the board’s order awarding claimant compensation for past and continuing total temporary disability reserved jurisdiction to decide the degree, including totality, of claimant’s permanent disability so that the limitation period of subsection (a) never applied to claimant. Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

The board by implication reserved in its order awarding claimant compensation for past and continuing total temporary disability the right to decide the degree of claimant’s permanent disability when that disability became ascertainable. Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

Affirmance on appeal not bar to reconsideration. —

Even though the Supreme Court, in 1991, affirmed the Board’s 1988 decision that the claimant was permanently totally disabled, the Board still retained the statutory authority to reconsider the 1988 decision, especially since the reconsideration was based on new evidence that did not exist when the original decision was affirmed; the order is not rendered immune from modification simply because it was previously affirmed on appeal. Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996).

Progressive injuries and disabilities are expressly provided for by this section. Hilty v. Fairbanks Exploration Co., 82 F.2d 77, 5 Alaska Fed. 818 (9th Cir. Alaska 1936); Keehn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 230 F.2d 712, 16 Alaska 101 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).

Language of this section is broad; the board may review because of change in condition or mistake in determination of fact. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

As to difficulties in determining whether “compensation” in subsection (a) includes medical payments, see Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

Action of board deemed reopening on its own motion in Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

No application for rehearing need be filed, since the board is expressly authorized to review a prior decision upon its own motion. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

Party is under no obligation to produce newly discovered evidence to invoke the board’s review jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

Board is entrusted with discretionary authority. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

And has valid interest in finality of decision, as do the parties. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Application of res judicata. —

If the power to rehear exists, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable and likewise, if the power does not exist, no occasion arises for invoking it. Suryan v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 571 (D. Alaska 1950); Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

Notice to employer under AS 23.30.110 . —

It is within the authority of the Workers’ Compensation Board to modify an earlier factual determination; however, where it does so without providing the worker’s former employer the notice required by AS 23.30.110 , the board’s second order is improper. Dresser Indus./Atlas Div. v. Hiestand, 702 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1985).

Applied in

McShea v. State, Dep't of Labor, 685 P.2d 1242 (Alaska 1984); Usibelli Coal Mine v. Marx, 708 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1985).

Quoted in

Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984); Green v. Kake Tribal Corp., 816 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1991); Dwight v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, 876 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1994); Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

Stated in

Gilstrap v. International Contractors, 857 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1993).

Cited in

Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992); Aleck v. Delvo Plastics, Inc., 972 P.2d 988 (Alaska 1999); Alaska Contr. & Consulting, Inc. v. Alaska DOL, 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).

II.Procedure on Review

Broad interpretation of this section does not conflict with 31-day finality provision of AS 23.30.125(a) , since the review authorized under that provision is limited to the legal validity of an award and does not extend to a redetermination of fact. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Due diligence affidavit not required. —

Denial of a request for modification of a decision relating to reemployment benefits was vacated because it was error to require a benefits claimant to produce an affidavit showing due diligence under 8 AAC 45.150(d) where the claimant could have reasonably expected that such an affidavit was not required based on a prior decision rendered by a workers’ compensation board. Griffiths v. Andy's Body & Frame, Inc., 165 P.3d 619 (Alaska 2007).

Notice of issues to be addressed. —

Where the Workers’ Compensation Board did not give the claimant adequate notice that it would revisit its earlier factual finding that claimant had sustained a compensable injury, and where the evidence in the record suggested that the parties and the Board considered the question to be settled by the law of the case, claimant made an adequate showing of actual prejudice. Groom v. State, 169 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2007).

Thus, board may go back through evidence adduced at prior hearing. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

And reviewing court may then review that evidence using the applicable standard. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Board need not review all prior evidence. —

Although the board “may” review a compensation case and this review can consist merely of further reflection on the evidence initially submitted, it is an altogether different matter to hold that the board must go over all prior evidence every time an action is instituted under this section. Such a requirement would rob the board of discretion. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

An examination of all previous evidence is not mandatory whenever there is an allegation of mistake in determination of fact under this section. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

It is clear that an allegation of mistake should not be allowed to become a back-door route to retrying a case because one party thinks he can make a better showing on the second attempt. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Board must only give due consideration to any argument and evidence presented with a petition for modification. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Substantial evidence standard is applied in the review of board proceedings under this section. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Review limited to record before agency. —

The general rule regarding review of administrative agency decisions is that such review should be limited to the record before the agency. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

Where superior court goes beyond evidence which board considered and bases its decision on other parts of the record, the extensive review by the court was in error. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974).

III.Change in Conditions

“Change in conditions”. —

Change in condition necessarily implies a change from something previously existing. In this context, it must refer to a change from the condition at the time of the award which is being modified. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

Subsequent allergy test not newly-discovered evidence. —

Where an employee was not tested before a workers’ compensation hearing to determine if she was allergic to dust mites, but the technology existed to do so, the fact that she was later determined to be allergic to dust mites did not constitute newly-discovered evidence under 8 AAC 45.150(d), and as it was applied to AS 23.30.130(a) , and denial of her petition for modification and rehearing was proper. Lindhag v. Dep't of Natural Res., 123 P.3d 948 (Alaska 2005).

Refusal of amended witness list improper. —

The mere possibility of modification under subsection (a) was not a satisfactory rationale for the board’s failure to allow worker’s amended witness list, and worker should have been permitted to present witnesses to rebut carrier’s physician’s testimony and to testify on the outcome and significance of recent surgery. Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing & Heating, 869 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1994).

Future controversion. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board correctly prohibited an employer from unilaterally controverting the compensability of an employee’s diabetes in the future because the compensability of the diabetes was part of a Board order, and thus, the employer was required to petition the Board for modification of the order in order to contest the continuing compensability of the condition. Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Denial held proper. —

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission correctly decided that substantial evidence supported the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denial of a custodian's petition to reopen her claim as nothing in the new medical records from an orthopedics practice either supported her claim that her current condition was related to her work injury or rebutted the evidence of employer medical evaluation physicians and the custodian's own doctors that formed the basis of the earlier decision. Parsons v. Craig City Sch. Dist., — P.3d — (Alaska Nov. 20, 2019) (memorandum decision).

IV.Mistake in Determination of Fact

Modification of previous order on theory of mistake. —

In order to modify a previous order on the theory of mistake, a new order should make it clear that it is doing so, should review the evidence of the first hearing and should indicate in what respect the first order was mistaken, whether in the inaccuracy of the evidence, in the impropriety of the inferences drawn from it, or because of the impossibility of detecting the existence of the particular condition at the time of the earlier order. Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 430 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967); Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

In order to justify the modification of a compensation order on the basis of a mistake, the subsequent showing must consist of something more than additional evidence of facts already known, an accumulation of testimony on facts previously established, a mere change of mind by a witness, or a reanalysis of the prior record by the deputy and a change of his conclusions as a result of a retrospective exploration of the original record. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

Burden of proof. —

Because an injured worker did not present evidence or testimony contradicting the zero percent rating which the employer's doctor gave the worker, the worker's modification petition to vacate the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's decision to grant the employer's request to modify the reemployment eligibility decision did not meet the substantive standards for modification. McAlpine v. Denali Ctr., — P.3d — (Alaska Apr. 4, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Scope of “mistake in its determination of a fact”. —

Under Alaska’s workmen’s compensation provisions there is no limitation as to the type of fact coming within the ambit of the statutory “mistake in its determination of a fact” review criterion. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

There is nothing in the language of the text of subsection (a) which would limit the “mistake in its determination of a fact” basis for review to issues relating solely to disability. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

Under subsection (a), the board has the authority to review an order in which a claim has been rejected because of a mistake in its determination of a fact, even if the fact relates to the question of liability or causation. Fischback & Moore v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969).

Agreements not modifiable due to fact mistake. —

AS 23.30.012 provides that approved settlement agreements discharge the liability of the employer for compensation notwithstanding AS 23.30.130 (modification of awards). This is an expression of legislative intent that approved agreements may not be modified because of unilateral or mutual mistakes of fact. Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 856 P.2d 1155 (Alaska 1993).

Collateral references. —

Crediting employer or insurance carrier with earnings of employee reemployed, or continued in employment, after injury. 84 ALR2d 1108.

Workers’ compensation: incarceration as terminating benefits. 54 ALR4th 241.

Workers’ compensation: reopening lump-sum compensation payment. 26 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sec. 23.30.135. Procedure before the board.

  1. In making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing the board is not bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure, except as provided by this chapter.  The board may make its investigation or inquiry or conduct its hearing in the manner by which it may best ascertain the rights of the parties. Declarations of a deceased employee concerning the injury in respect to which the investigation or inquiry is being made or the hearing conducted shall be received in evidence and are, if corroborated by other evidence, sufficient to establish the injury.
  2. All testimony given during a hearing before the board shall be recorded, but need not be transcribed unless further review is initiated. Hearings before the board shall be open to the public.

History. (§ 22 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 17 SLA 1965)

Cross references. —

For regulations establishing rules of evidence for hearings before the board, see 8 AAC 45.120.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Opinions of attorney general. —

This section and AS 23.30.115 cover much the same ground as AS 44.62.430 , 44.62.440 and 44.62.460 of the earlier Administrative Procedure Act. This would have been unnecessary if the intent had been that the Administrative Procedure Act should govern the procedure for hearings in workers’ compensation hearings. 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24.

The legislature intended the board to follow the separate and later set of statutory provisions in AS 23.30.005 23.30.270 (now AS 23.30.005 23.30.400 ) in conducting its hearings and the earlier provisions regarding the applicability of § 4, ch. 143, SLA 1959, to Alaska Industrial Board proceedings have been repealed by implication. 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24.

The Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act makes no mention of a hearing officer. Therefore, none is required in proceedings under that act. 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 24.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Several of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes but have been retained for aid in construing present law.

This section has plainly changed rule of evidence in all cases affected by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. It gives the Workmen’s Compensation Commission free rein in making its investigations and in conducting its hearings and authorizes it to receive and consider, not only hearsay testimony, but any kind of evidence that may throw light on a claim pending before it. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Right to cross-examination not abrogated. —

AS 44.62.460(d) and subsection (a) of this section, the statutes permitting informal administrative proceedings, were never intended to, and could not, abrogate the right to cross-examination in an adjudicatory proceeding. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819 (Alaska 1974); Commercial Union Cos. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976).

The Workmen’s Compensation Act contains no contradictory provision respecting rights of cross-examination. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819 (Alaska 1974).

The statutory right to cross-examination is absolute and applicable to the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board. Commercial Union Cos. v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976).

Admission of statements of deceased employees. —

The Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act specifically allows the admission of statements of deceased employees, and this language is mandatory. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Board is not limited in its consideration of evidence by rules of common law. Oceanic Fisheries Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 109 F. Supp. 103, 14 Alaska 154 (D. Alaska 1953).

Board is not bound by statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure. Nevertheless, if appellate review is to be meaningful, a party asserting error in proceedings before the board must, by making an offer of proof or other appropriate procedural means, afford the appellate tribunal a means of evaluating the claims of error. Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that the claimant had failed to prove the need for further treatment of her costochondritis was supported by substantial evidence, including two doctors’ reports and the claimant’s own testimony; one doctor’s report stated that the condition was not related to the claimant’s knee injury, the second doctor’s report stated that the condition was not a factor in her current pain complex, and the claimant testified that the condition had resolved by February 2001; claimant’s argument that the doctors’ reports were inadmissible was rejected as the board could use relaxed evidentiary standards, and the reports would likely be admissible under Alaska R. Evid. 803(a)(4), 803(a)(6). Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Hearsay evidence is admissible at board hearings and such evidence need not be brought within any of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

AS 44.62.460(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act applies to compensation proceedings and specifically allows for the consideration of hearsay evidence. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

But award based solely on hearsay cannot stand. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Testimony of employee competent. —

Testimony of the employee as to his condition before, immediately after, and since the injuries were sustained is competent. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Physicians’ letters merely supplement and explain testimony of employee under a rule of the board that any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common-law or statutory rule which might make improper the admission of such evidence. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 191 F.2d 260, 13 Alaska 396 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913, 72 S. Ct. 359, 96 L. Ed. 683, 13 Alaska 581 (U.S. 1952). See also Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913, 72 S. Ct. 359, 96 L. Ed. 683 (U.S. 1952).

Sufficient corroboration of the deceased employee’s declarations was found in the testimony of physicians. Cook v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 476 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1970).

Quoted in

Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966); Frazier v. H.C. Price/CIRI Constr. JV, 794 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000); Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003); Maalah v. Trident Seafoods, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 16, 2020).

Sec. 23.30.140. Appointment of guardian by court.

The director may require the appointment of a guardian or other representative by a competent court for any person who is mentally incompetent or a minor to receive compensation payable to the person under this chapter and to exercise the powers granted to or to perform the duties required of the person under this chapter. If the director does not require the appointment of a guardian to receive the compensation of a minor, appointment for this purpose is not necessary.

History. (§ 10 ch 193 SLA 1959; § 7(4)(c) ch 193 SLA 1959; § 8(2) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 42 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Sec. 23.30.145. Attorney fees.

  1. Fees for legal services rendered in respect to a claim are not valid unless approved by the board, and the fees may not be less than 25 percent on the first $1,000 of compensation or part of the first $1,000 of compensation, and 10 percent of all sums in excess of $1,000 of compensation.  When the board advises that a claim has been controverted, in whole or in part, the board may direct that the fees for legal services be paid by the employer or carrier in addition to compensation awarded; the fees may be allowed only on the amount of compensation controverted and awarded.  When the board advises that a claim has not been controverted, but further advises that bona fide legal services have been rendered in respect to the claim, then the board shall direct the payment of the fees out of the compensation awarded. In determining the amount of fees the board shall take into consideration the nature, length, and complexity of the services performed, transportation charges, and the benefits resulting from the services to the compensation beneficiaries.
  2. If an employer fails to file timely notice of controversy or fails to pay compensation or medical and related benefits within 15 days after it becomes due or otherwise resists the payment of compensation or medical and related benefits and if the claimant has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of the claim, the board shall make an award to reimburse the claimant for the costs in the proceedings, including reasonable attorney fees. The award is in addition to the compensation or medical and related benefits ordered.
  3. If proceedings are had for review of a compensation or medical and related benefits order before a court, the court may allow or increase an attorney’s fees.  The fees are in addition to compensation or medical and related benefits ordered and shall be paid as the court may direct.

History. (§ 26(1), (3), (4) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 26 SLA 1969; am § 43 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Opinions of attorney general. —

An unsupervised paralegal may not collect a fee for legal services rendered before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board under this section, because he would be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law if he collected such a fee. April 2, 1998, Op. Att’y Gen.

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board does not have, nor could it have, the authority to award legal fees to unsupervised paralegals. Accordingly, unsupervised paralegals, or anyone other than a licensed attorney, cannot collect legal fees under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. April 2, 1998, Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Reasonable fee. —

Nothing in the regulation of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board or the statute ties an attorney's hourly rate solely to his or her experience in Alaska workers' compensation law; the Board must consider all of the factors set out in Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) when determining a reasonable attorney's fee, and those factors must guide the Board's analysis of the reasonableness of requested fees. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Because reemployment eligibility was tied to an employee's inability to return to employment at the time of injury, a claimant's termination and the reasons for it were not wholly unrelated to her reemployment claim; thus, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board erred in its attorney's fees award. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Because of the uncertainty in both the duration and amount of an employee's continuing permanent total disability benefits, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's award of fees accomplished the statutory objectives; in light of the uncertain amount of continuing benefits and uncertain length of the human lifespan, the Board could reasonably fashion a fee award as it did, awarding fees both as a lump sum based on the past work of the employee's attorney and as statutory minimum fees. Dep't of Corr. v. Wozniak, 491 P.3d 1081 (Alaska 2021).

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission correctly determined that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees above statutory minimum fees because the award was not manifestly unreasonable, and the order was consistent with the statute; based on the affidavit of the employee's attorney documenting the time he spent on the permanent total disability claim, Board regulations allowed the Board to award fees in excess of the statute's minimum fees. Dep't of Corr. v. Wozniak, 491 P.3d 1081 (Alaska 2021).

Employer must demonstrate worthlessness of claim. —

Workers' compensation attorney's fees awards are in some ways analogous to other fee-shifting statutory schemes; thus, in a workers' compensation settlement where the parties dispute the issues on which a claimant prevailed for purposes of attorney's fees, the employer who contends its conduct was a wholly gratuitous response to a claim that lacked colorable merit, must demonstrate the worthlessness of the claim and explain why it nonetheless voluntarily gave the claimant the requested relief. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Failure to provide rationale. —

Alaska Workers' Compensation erred in affirming the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's analysis about the issues on which the claimants prevailed because the Board did not offer a rationale for its decisions about success, nor did it explore how the non-monetary issues could have impacted one of the claimant's success on her monetary claims; the Board should consider the discovery issues that it did not have to resolve because of the settlement. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Attorney’s fees held not sufficient. —

Fees awarded were unreasonably low because due to the procedure the Alaska Board of Workers' Compensation used, the claimants were not able to document and get payment for their attorney's time spent responding to the employer's extensive objections to the fee affidavits or its objection to the timeliness of their responses. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Reduction abuse of discretion. —

Reduction in hours solely based on the use of quarter-hour increments was an abuse of discretion because the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's regulations did not require use of a specific time increment, and the Board did not tell an attorney at the hearing that he needed to use tenths of an hour so that he could modify his affidavit. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Reductions solely based on block billing were an abuse of discretion because the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's regulation did not prohibit block billing, and prior Board decisions did not have a clear rule about reductions solely for block billing; in evaluating entries with block billing, the Board at times awarded less time than the employer agreed was reasonable without explaining why. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

No distinction between subsections (a) and (b) regarding factors to consider. —

Given the supreme court's recognition that reasonable fees can be awarded in addition to statutory minimum fees under subsection (a), there is no reason to distinguish between subsections (a) and (b) in setting out the factors the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board needs to consider in awarding reasonable attorney's fees. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Presumption of compensability. —

Presumption of compensability did not apply to the amount of fees and their reasonableness; a determination of reasonableness requires consideration and application of various factors that may involve factual determinations, but the reasonableness of the final award is not in itself a factual finding. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Due process. —

Alaska Board of Workers' Compensation violated due process because it reduced claimants' attorney's fees without providing adequate notice about the information they needed to present to preserve their claims or allowing them to present evidence to address the reasons for lowering their fees; the Board used information from its database without providing an opportunity to rebut that information and reduced hours without adequate prior notice that affidavits did not meet an unwritten standard. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Alaska Board of Workers' Compensation's use of extra-record information without providing the claimants an opportunity to see and respond to it before the Board made its decision violated due process because the Board has no regulation tying a certain number of clients or years of practice to a specific hourly fee; the Board had no regulation explaining how experience in workers' compensation was measured and how that experience was used to arrive at a reasonable hourly fee. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Determination of amount. —

Alaska Workers' Compensation Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that encourages, not discourages, attorney representation of injured workers; awarding only a paralegal rate for work done by an attorney will result in fewer attorneys who will represent claimants; reducing an attorney's hourly fee to a paralegal rate for work the attorney performed discourages rather than encourages representation of injured workers. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Alaska Workers' Compensation Board and Commission should not penalize an attorney who does not employ a paralegal and performs legal tasks that either an attorney or a paralegal can perform; even when attorneys employ paralegals, attorneys must have discretion to manage their law practices and select which tasks to delegate to paralegals. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Attorney's voluntary decision to charge only a paralegal rate in one claim does not create a legal rule that permits the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board to reduce arbitrarily the fees awarded when an attorney performs tasks that are necessary to the claim but might be within a paralegal's duties in a larger firm. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

It was improper to award a paralegal's hourly rate for legal tasks performed by an attorney because the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's regulations allowed awards of attorney's fees only to licensed attorneys and permitted paralegal work to be billed as a cost only when the paralegal was employed by an attorney licensed in this state or another state. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

Experience in the field. —

Alaska workers' compensation law is a specialized field, and experience in that field can be taken into account; but an attorney's experience in related legal fields, such as administrative law, occupational disability law, or personal injury law, should be relevant as well. Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Reg'l Health Consortium, 453 P.3d 784 (Alaska 2019).

This section reflects legislature’s intent that attorneys in compensation proceedings should be reasonably compensated for services rendered to a compensation claimant. Rose v. Alaskan Village, 412 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1966); Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

This section seeks to insure that attorney’s fee awards in compensation cases are sufficient to compensate counsel for work performed. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Right to tax attorney’s fees in compensation cases is purely statutory and an employee, in order to be entitled to such fees and to have them taxed against the employer or the carrier, must bring himself under this section. M-B Contracting Co. v. Davis, 399 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1965).

Provisions of subsections (a) and (b) impart meaning to subsection (c). Rose v. Alaskan Village, 412 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1966).

Subsection (a) provides for award of minimum attorney’s fee. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

Any absurdity that might be said to exist in amount of minimum fees set out in subsection (a) is inherent in the statute and not dependent on any interpretation which might be given it. Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

Relief from inadequate fee. —

Subsection (a) provides for a minimum fee. If application of the minimum fee formula yields a fee inadequate to compensate the attorneys, there is the right to appeal to the superior court. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Fees awarded only for claims prevailed upon. —

Although a claimant prevailed before the superior court on the question of assessing a penalty on certain belated disability payments, he was not entitled to full attorney’s fees for his main claim for disability and medical benefits. Alaska Appellate Rule 508(g)(2) calls for an award of “full reasonable attorney’s fees . . . to a successful claimant” in an administrative appeal. Also, in order to recover fees under 23.30.145(b), which, like Rule 508(g), directs a fee award to a “successful” claimant, the employee must succeed on the claim itself and not a collateral issue. Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993); Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996).

Subsection (a) award applies only in cases where claim has been controverted. —

The award of the minimum statutory fees applies only in cases where a claim has been controverted. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

The subsection (a) formula only applies to “controverted” claims. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Subsection (a) requires only that board “advises that a claim has been controverted,” not that a formal notice of controversy be filed under AS 23.30.155(d) . Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

“Legal services rendered in respect to a claim”. —

Law firm performed “legal services rendered in respect to a claim”, within the meaning of this section, when it undertook to “reopen” a claim. Hulsey v. Johnson & Holen, 814 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1991).

“Advises” in subsection (a) can be read as “finds.” Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Formal notice of controversion is not required to be filed under AS 23.30.155(d) as a prerequisite to an award of the minimum attorney fees of subsection (a). Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

A notice of controversion by the employer is not required for an award of attorney’s fees under subsection (a). Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

AS 23.30.155 (d) serves the independent concern of AS 23.30.155 and does not purport to define when a claim is in fact controverted. Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

“Award”. —

The transitive verb “award” means “to grant as merited or due.” Department of Highways v. Brown, 600 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1979).

Where an insurance carrier believed that if a claim were controverted further, the ultimate result would be a decision by the Workmen’s Compensation Board awarding the employee the compensation to which he was entitled, the carrier’s payment of the compensation without waiting for action by the board can fairly be construed as the equivalent of “awarding” such compensation to the employee in the general sense of granting that which is merited or due. Department of Highways v. Brown, 600 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1979).

Subsection (b) makes no reference to award of minimum fee, but refers only to the allowance of a “reasonable attorney fee.” Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

Applicability of subsection (b) grant. —

The subsection (b) grant of reasonable attorney fees applies to an employer who otherwise fails to make payment of compensation. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Subsection (b) construed as separate from minimum fee provision of subsection (a). —

Had the legislature intended the minimum fee provision to apply to subsection (b), it would have been a simple matter to have so specified. The failure to do so, coupled with the illogic of awarding a fee which may be out of all proportion to the services performed, dictates a construction of subsection (b) as being separate and distinct from the minimum fee provision of subsection (a). Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

“Proceedings” in subsection (b) indicates that the board should look at who ultimately is successful on the claim, as opposed to who prevails at each proceeding. Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991).

Subsection (b) states that “if the claimant has employed an attorney in the successful prosecution of the claim, the board shall make an award to reimburse the claimant for the costs in the proceedings. . . .” This language makes it clear that the employee must be successful on the claim itself, not on a collateral issue. Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991).

Alaska’s provision allowing attorney’s fees is unique in its generosity to the claimants and their counsel. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

But it does not provide that a delay in payment, by itself, constitutes a controversion of the claim justifying the award of the minimum fees. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

An employer’s delay in making payment, which was due to conditions over which it had no control, cannot be equated to a controversion of the claim. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

When claim is controverted. —

Although a delay in payments did not constitute a controversion, where an employer has consistently denied and litigated its obligation to pay the increase of compensation sought, and eventually received by, the claimants, the employer controverted the claimant’s claim. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

When worker’s physician indicated that the worker was medically stable and would not be able to pursue gainful employment, the worker was entitled to have his status changed at that time from temporary total disability to permanent total disability. Accordingly, the employer’s refusal to change his status constituted a controversion of his claim “in whole or in part” under subsection (a), entitling the worker to the award of attorney’s fees. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission erred in reversing the Workers' Compensation Board's award of attorney's fees under because the employer delayed an employee's surgery through its actions both before and after his attorney filed a written claim by refusing to preauthorize the surgery and scheduling an employer's independent medical examination (EIME), the employer's obligation to furnish medical care could include an obligation to pay medical bills promptly, the employer had adequate information about the reasonable necessity of the third surgery well before it was authorized, and the information the employer sought from the EIME was not reasonably related to the question of the compensability of and need for the requested surgery. Bockus v. First Student Servs., 384 P.3d 801 (Alaska 2016).

Fact that employer agreed to pay compensation and only disputed amount does not preclude a finding of controversion and an award of attorney’s fees under subsection (a). Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

The contention that subsection (a) attorney fees may be awarded only in cases where the right to compensation, as distinct from the amount, is at issue is contrary to the express language of subsection (a) which contemplates controversion “in part.” Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

Attorney’s fees where claim not controverted. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred by awarding the employee statutory minimum attorney’s fees under subsection (a) of this section, where the employer never controverted the employee’s claim for benefits, as the employer’s answer to the workers’ compensation claim admitted liability for permanent total disability benefits (PTD), and all of the actions that the board identified as showing the employer’s resistance to paying the employee PTD benefits occurred before the employee filed a workers’ compensation claim. Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore, 160 P.3d 146 (Alaska 2007).

Payments tendered not controverted. —

Where the board awarded employee’s attorney’s fees on all compensation in excess of $6,000, the amount tendered by the employer as a permanent partial disability award, the $6,000 voluntarily tendered by the employer was not “in controversy” despite the fact that the employer disputed the disability classification, since this section unambiguously restricts the award of attorney’s fees to amounts which are controverted. Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Attorney’s fees could not attach to payments “tendered” by an employer prior to the board’s award, since this amount was not controverted. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

Second injury fund was liable for attorney’s fees upon having its refusal to pay an employer overturned. Second Injury Fund v. Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).

Discretion of court. —

This section authorizes the court, before which a compensation order of the board is up for review, to exercise its discretion as to whether attorney’s fees should be allowed to counsel for the claimant appellee and be taxed against the employer, even though the employee is not successful on the appeal. M-B Contracting Co. v. Davis, 399 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1965).

An award of attorney’s fees is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

An abuse of discretion is established where it appears that the trial court’s determination as to attorney’s fees was manifestly unreasonable. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly awarded attorney’s fees to the employee where, in view of the board’s detailed findings as to the extent and quality of the employee’s attorney’s services, and in the absence of any timely claim by the employer that the lack of an affidavit impeded its challenge of the board’s award, the board did not abuse its discretion in deciding to waive the affidavit requirement. Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006).

Fees for obtaining benefits belatedly and voluntarily paid. —

A claimant should have been awarded attorney’s fees for his efforts in obtaining the disability benefits that his employer voluntarily but belatedly paid. This payment, though voluntary, was the equivalent of a board award, because the efforts of the claimant’s counsel were instrumental to inducing it. Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993).

Superior court’s fee award for appeal should provide for realistic compensation, taking into account the same factors that the Workmen’s Compensation Board considers when it grants attorney’s fees for noncontroverted claims: “the nature, length and complexity of the services performed, transportation charges, and the benefits resulting from the services to the compensation beneficiaries.” Additionally, though, the superior court should consider the board’s fee award. This is relevant where application of the formula in subsection (a) has produced a disproportionately large award for the board proceeding. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Trial court should explain its reasons for making an award of attorney fees for workers’ compensation appeals. Pioneer Constr. v. Conlon, 780 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1989).

Standard of review. —

The award of attorney’s fees will be upheld unless it is manifestly unreasonable. Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 780 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1989).

Counsel for claimants should be afforded hearing on the issue of the amount of attorney’s fees that would be reasonable in the case considering the time expended and the results obtained. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

When carrier contests amount of compensation owed to injured workman, it “resists the payment of compensation” within the meaning of subsection (b). In such cases, if the claimant has hired an attorney in the successful prosecution of his claim, subsection (b) entitles him to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to any added compensation that is awarded to him. Bradley v. Mercer, 563 P.2d 880 (Alaska 1977).

Determination of amount. —

The attorney’s fee award is not necessarily limited to the hourly rate times the number of hours expended; instead, the board may consider the contingent nature of the fee and the likelihood of success on the merits. Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 780 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1989).

Employee entitled to fees based on total amount of compensation. —

Where a claim for temporary total disability compensation had been controverted by the insurance carrier, the employee disputed this action, secured representation by counsel, and filed an application for adjustment of the claim, and subsequently, as a result of medical evidence, the carrier paid the employee the accumulation of past-due payments covering the preceding year and thereafter continued disability payments until the employee had received the statutory maximum for temporary total disability, the employee was entitled to attorney’s fees based on the total amount of compensation, not just the amount of the past-due payments. Department of Highways v. Brown, 600 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1979).

Award to employer-defendant. —

Appellate court grant of attorneys’ fees to an employer-defendant must be based on finding that claimant’s appeal was frivolous, unreasonable, or brought in bad faith. Whaley v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 648 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1982).

Attorney’s fees when claim controverted more than once. —

An employee could not recover multiple attorney’s fees when his employer controverted his workers’ compensation claim more than once. Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 720 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1986).

Attorney fees on appeal from fee award. —

A workers’ compensation claimant was a “successful party” under AS 23.30.008(d) for purposes of an attorney’s fee award on appeal to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission where she obtained the remedy requested. Lewis-Walunga v. Municipality of Anchorage, 249 P.3d 1063 (Alaska 2011).

Application of res judicata to workers’ compensation judgment. —

See Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 720 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1986).

Contingent-fee agreement not enforced. McShea v. State, Dep't of Labor, 685 P.2d 1242 (Alaska 1984).

Reversing attorney fee award. —

When decisions of both the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board and the superior court must be reversed, the attorney’s fees awards must also be reversed. Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994).

No lump sum payment if amount uncertain. —

This section does not directly state whether attorney’s fees should be paid periodically or in a lump sum. However, fees based on a percentage of an award cannot be presently calculated for lump sum payment where substantial uncertainties exist as to the value of the award, since the claimant will receive permanent total disability benefits only as long as he lives and continues to be unable to work because of his disability, or since the claimant’s future benefits may also be reduced or eliminated if the claimant recovers damages or a settlement from a third-party tortfeasor. Gibeau v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 896 P.2d 822 (Alaska 1995).

Attorney’s fees held reasonable. Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

The amount of the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the claimant’s counsel was not an abuse of discretion in light of the time spent by counsel, the complexity and novelty of the case, the benefit which resulted to the claimant, and the contingent nature of counsel’s right to compensation. Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell, 718 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1986).

Employee entitled to reasonable attorney fees. —

Employee was entitled to reasonable attorney fees under subsection (b) of this section where the employer was still engaged in the reemployment process after it reclassified benefits; and the benefits were not reclassified voluntarily but rather were reclassified in the face of an impending claim for those benefits by the employer’s attorney. Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore, 160 P.3d 146 (Alaska 2007).

Attorney’s fees held not sufficient. Rose v. Alaskan Village, 412 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1966).

Award of attorneys’ fees under prior law. —

See Hunter v. Wagner, 7 Alaska 382 (D. Alaska 1926); Bacciglieri v. Ghezzi, 11 Alaska 93 (D. Alaska 1946); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 465 (D. Alaska 1949).

Appeal. —

An attorney in a workers’ compensation proceeding has the right to appeal from an award of attorney’s fees by either the board or the superior court. Rose v. Alaskan Village, 412 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1966).

Commission erred in denying attorney fees to the claimant on appeal, as he raised enough questions about the Board’s award of fees to have that award vacated. Humphrey v. Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc., 337 P.3d 1174 (Alaska 2014).

Because the State did not ask the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board or the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission to construe the statute to require an analysis of future statutory minimum fees to compare them to reasonable fees, because its appellate argument depended on new facts, and because the argument was neither closely related to its arguments made before the administrative agencies nor inferable from those arguments, the State waived consideration of the argument. Dep't of Corr. v. Wozniak, 491 P.3d 1081 (Alaska 2021).

Applied in

J. B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1966); Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 693 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1985); Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Kinter, 755 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1988); Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging, 787 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990); Norcon, Inc. v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Bd., 880 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1994); Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997); DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000); Temple v. Denali Princess Lodge, 21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).

Quoted in

Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986); Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1991).

Cited in

Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305 (Alaska 1973); Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 740 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1987); Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002); Bustamante v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 59 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2002); Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004); State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014); Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019); Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Workers’ compensation: availability, rate, or method of calculation of interest on attorney’s fees or penalties. 79 ALR5th 201.

Article 4. Payment of Compensation.

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 674-684.

101 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, §§ 826-848.

Sec. 23.30.150. Commencement of compensation.

Compensation may not be allowed for the first three days of the disability, except the benefits provided for in AS 23.30.095 ; if, however, the injury results in disability of more than 28 days, compensation shall be allowed from the date of the disability.

History. (§ 5(1) ch 193 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Purpose of waiting period. —

The purpose underlying the waiting period was to prevent workers who are so inclined, from taking advantage of a slight or imaginary strain, as an excuse for obtaining a few days vacation on half or two-thirds pay. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

Return to work is not absolute bar to compensation. —

Where an injury is sufficiently serious to incapacitate an employee for the statutory period, the claimant’s return to work before the running of the statutory period is not an absolute bar to compensation since, by the use of expert medical testimony which will expose the malingerer and vindicate those claiming severe injury, the purpose of the waiting period is fulfilled. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

Sec. 23.30.155. Payment of compensation.

  1. Compensation under this chapter shall be paid periodically, promptly, and directly to the person entitled to it, without an award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employer. To controvert a claim, the employer must file a notice, in a format prescribed by the director, stating
    1. that the right of the employee to compensation is controverted;
    2. the name of the employee;
    3. the name of the employer;
    4. the date of the alleged injury or death; and
    5. the type of compensation and all grounds on which the right to compensation is controverted.
  2. The first installment of compensation becomes due on the 14th day after the employer has knowledge of the injury or death. On this date all compensation then due shall be paid. Subsequent compensation shall be paid in installments, every 14 days, except where the board determines that payment in installments should be made monthly or at some other period.
  3. The insurer or adjuster shall notify the division in a format prescribed by the director that the payment of compensation has begun or has been increased, decreased, suspended, terminated, resumed, or changed in type. An initial report shall be filed not later than 28 days after the date of issuing the first payment of compensation. If, at any time, 21 days or more pass and no compensation payment is issued, a report notifying the division of the termination or suspension of compensation shall be filed not later than 28 days after the date the last compensation payment was issued. A report shall also be filed not later than 28 days after the date of issuing a payment increasing, decreasing, resuming, or changing the type of compensation paid. When the insurer or adjuster files a report, the division shall notify the employee of the payment or change in payment of compensation. If the division is not notified within the 28 days prescribed by this subsection for reporting, the insurer or adjuster shall pay a civil penalty of $100 for the first day plus $10 for each day after the first day that the notice was not given. Total penalties under this subsection may not exceed $1,000 for a failure to file a required report. Penalties assessed under this subsection are eligible for reduction under (m) of this section. A penalty assessed under this subsection after penalties have been reduced under (m) of this section shall be increased by 25 percent and shall bear interest at the rate established under AS 45.45.010 .
  4. If the employer controverts the right to compensation, the employer shall file with the division, in a format prescribed by the director, a notice of controversion on or before the 21st day after the employer has knowledge of the alleged injury or death. If the employer controverts the right to compensation after payments have begun, the employer shall file with the division, in a format prescribed by the director, a notice of controversion not later than the date an installment of compensation payable without an award is due. When payment of temporary disability benefits is controverted solely on the grounds that another employer or another insurer of the same employer may be responsible for all or a portion of the benefits, the most recent employer or insurer who is party to the claim and who may be liable shall make the payments during the pendency of the dispute. When a final determination of liability is made, any reimbursement required, including interest at the statutory rate, and all costs and attorney fees incurred by the prevailing employer, shall be made not later than 14 days after the determination.
  5. If any installment of compensation payable without an award is not paid within seven days after it becomes due, as provided in (b) of this section, there shall be added to the unpaid installment an amount equal to 25 percent of the installment. This additional amount shall be paid at the same time as, and in addition to, the installment, unless notice is filed under (d) of this section or unless the nonpayment is excused by the board after a showing by the employer that owing to conditions over which the employer had no control the installment could not be paid within the period prescribed for the payment. The additional amount shall be paid directly to the recipient to whom the unpaid installment was to be paid.
  6. If compensation payable under the terms of an award is not paid within 14 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to that unpaid compensation an amount equal to 25 percent of the unpaid installment. The additional amount shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, the compensation, unless review of the compensation order making the award as provided under AS 23.30.008 and an interlocutory injunction staying payments is allowed by the court. The additional amount shall be paid directly to the recipient to whom the unpaid compensation was to be paid.
  7. [Repealed, § 3 ch 59 SLA 1981.]
  8. The board may upon its own initiative at any time in a case in which payments are being made with or without an award, where right to compensation is controverted, or where payments of compensation have been increased, reduced, terminated, changed, or suspended, upon receipt of notice from a person entitled to compensation, or from the employer, that the right to compensation is controverted, or that payments of compensation have been increased, reduced, terminated, changed, or suspended, make the investigations, cause the medical examinations to be made, or hold the hearings, and take the further action which it considers will properly protect the rights of all parties.
  9. When the director considers it advisable, the director may require an employer to make a deposit with the Department of Revenue to secure the prompt and convenient payment of the compensation, and payments from the deposit upon an award shall be made upon order of the director.
  10. If an employer has made advance payments or overpayments of compensation, the employer is entitled to be reimbursed by withholding up to 20 percent out of each unpaid installment or installments of compensation due.  More than 20 percent of unpaid installments of compensation due may be withheld from an employee only on approval of the board.
  11. An injured employee or, in case of death, the employee’s dependents or personal representative shall give receipts for payment of compensation to the employer paying the compensation, and the employer shall produce the receipts for inspection by the director, whenever required.
  12. [Repealed, § 1 ch 83 SLA 1975.]
  13. On or before March 1 of each year, the insurer or adjuster shall file a verified annual report in a format prescribed by the director stating the total amount of all compensation by type, the number of claims received and the percentage controverted, medical and related benefits, vocational rehabilitation expenses, legal fees, including a separate total of fees paid to attorneys and fees paid for the other costs of litigation, and penalties paid on all claims during the preceding calendar year. If the annual report is timely and complete when received by the division and provides accurate information about each category of payments, the director shall review the timeliness of the insurer’s or adjuster’s reports filed during the preceding year under (c) of this section. If, during the preceding year, the insurer or adjuster filed at least 99 percent of the reports on time, the penalties assessed under (c) of this section shall be waived. If, during the preceding year, the insurer or adjuster filed at least 97 percent of the reports on time, 75 percent of the penalties assessed under (c) of this section shall be waived. If, during the preceding year, the insurer or adjuster filed 95 percent of the reports on time, 50 percent of the penalties assessed under (c) of this section shall be waived. If, during the preceding year, the insurer’s or adjuster’s reports have not been filed on time at least 95 percent of the time, none of the penalties assessed under (c) of this section shall be waived. The penalties that are not waived are due and payable when the insurer or adjuster receives notification from the director regarding the timeliness of the reports. If the annual report is not filed by March 1 of each year, the insurer or adjuster shall pay a civil penalty of $100 for the first day the annual report is late and $10 for each additional day the report is late. If the annual report is incomplete when filed, the insurer or adjuster shall pay a civil penalty of $1,000.
  14. If the employer is self-insured or uninsured, the requirements of (c) and (m) of this section apply to the employer.
  15. The director shall promptly notify the division of insurance if the board determines that the employer’s insurer has frivolously or unfairly controverted compensation due under this chapter. After receiving notice from the director, the division of insurance shall determine if the insurer has committed an unfair claim settlement practice under AS 21.36.125 .
  16. An employer shall pay interest on compensation that is not paid when due. Interest required under this subsection accrues at the rate specified in AS 09.30.070(a) that is in effect on the date the compensation is due.
  17. [Repealed, § 22 ch 91 SLA 2018.]

History. (§ 13 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 3 ch 46 SLA 1964; am § 2 ch 10 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 83 SLA 1975; am § 3 ch 59 SLA 1981; am § 15 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 1 ch 70 SLA 1983; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 112 SLA 1984; am §§ 24 — 29 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 14 ch 105 SLA 2000; am §§ 44 — 52 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am §§ 11 — 14, 22 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Cross references. —

For present provisions covering the subject matter of former subsection ( l ), which limited total compensation payable under this chapter for injuries and certain disabilities, see AS 23.30.190(b) .

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, in the introductory language in (a), substituted “in a format” for “on a form” following “must file a notice,”, and made a stylistic change in (a)(5); in (c), substituted “in a format” for “and the employee on a form” following “notify the division” in the first sentence, substituted “not later than” for “with the division and sent to the employee within” following “shall be filed” in the second sentence, deleted “and the employee” following “notifying the division” in the third sentence, and made stylistic changes, in the third and fourth sentences, substituted “not later than” for “with the division and sent to the employee within” following “be filed”, added the fifth sentence, in the sixth sentence, substituted “division is” for “division and the employee are” near the beginning; in (d), in the first sentence, substituted “, in a format prescribed by the director,” for “and send to the employee” following “with the division”, in the second sentence, substituted “, in a format prescribed by the director a notice of controversion not later than the date” for “and send to the employee a notice of controversion within seven days after” following “with the division”, in the last sentence, substituted “not later than 14 days” for “within 14 days” following “shall be made”; in (m), substituted “in a format” for “on a form” following “verified annual report” in the first sentence; repealed (q).

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Similarity of subsection (a) to Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. —

See Johnson v. Standard Oil Co., 30 F.R.D. 329 (D. Alaska 1962) (decided under subsection (a) as it existed prior to 1981 amendment).

Timely payment by “payable through” draft. —

Claimant’s receipt of a “payable through” draft before the fourteen-day deadline prescribed by subsection (f) suspended defendants’ obligation to him, contingent on final clearance; and where the draft was honored, the obligation was discharged and defendants were not subject to a penalty, notwithstanding violation of an Insurance Code provision requiring insurers to pay with a bank check. Harper v. K & W Trucking Co., 725 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1986).

Allowances for temporary and permanent disability may be cumulated. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Intervention and subrogation of insurer. —

An insurer who pays compensation under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act can intervene in a negligence action by the injured employee against a third party for the injuries and is entitled to be subrogated to the extent of compensation paid without an award having been made by the board. Johnson v. Standard Oil Co., 30 F.R.D. 329 (D. Alaska 1962).

Employer or insurer does not have unilateral authority to modify or terminate an employee’s benefits, or to change an injured worker’s status. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

The board erred in refusing to make an express award of permanent total disability benefits to a worker who requested such a determination, because the award would have made it more difficult for the employer to change his status at a later time. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994).

Interest. —

A workers’ compensation award, or any part thereof, shall accrue lawful interest, as allowed under AS 45.45.010 , which provides a rate of interest of 10.5 percent a year and no more on money after it is due, from the date it should have been paid. Land & Marine Rental Co. v. Rawls, 686 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1984).

Medical benefits are deemed to be compensation for purposes of interest. Moretz v. O'Neill Investigations, 783 P.2d 764 (Alaska 1989).

Medical benefits are part of a board award of compensation for the purpose of awarding prejudgment interest. Therefore, an employer owed interest both on the medical benefits that it offered to pay but did not. Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993).

Overcompensation. —

Subsection (j) provides the exclusive remedy for an employer to recover overcompensation. Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, 820 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1991).

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act does not permit an employer to recoup payments made to claimants or their attorneys except by withholding future payments under subsection (j). Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, 820 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1991).

Compensation includes attorney’s fees for purposes of subsection (j). Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, 820 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1991).

Payments mistakenly paid by a more recent insurer after the date of medical stability could not be recovered from an innocent earlier insurer. Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997).

Applicable to permanent partial injury payments. —

The time periods in subsections (b) and (e), providing for installment payments within 14 days and penalties if the payment is over 7 days late, are applicable to a case involving permanent partial injury payments under AS 23.30.190 . Sumner v. Eagle Nest Hotel, 894 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1995).

Construction of subsection (d). —

The phrase “final determination” in subsection (d) does not refer to determinations other than those by the board, and, therefore, this section does not control the award of attorney fees incurred in proceedings before the superior court or the Supreme Court. Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997).

Even though the last two sentences of subsection (d) deal with the last injurious exposure rule, they address different issues; the first guarantees benefits to injured employees, while the second provides reimbursement, including attorney’s fees, to the insurer who prevails. Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997).

Necessity of unequivocal conduct for waiver. —

Payment of temporary disability benefits pursuant to subsection (d) does not satisfy Milne’s standard of direct, unequivocal conduct for waiver, as the purpose of this statute is not to circumscribe the defenses that a controverting carrier may raise. Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing & Heating, 869 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1994).

Construction of subsection (f). —

The original check was mailed to employee within the statutory 14 days, but when the check was never received, stopping payment on the initial check reinstated the payment obligation, and imposed a new 14-day deadline. But because employer did not mail the substitute payment to the employee until 19 days after it stopped payment, the court found that it failed to comply with the statute’s 14-day mandate under subsection (f) of this section, and the court had no discretion to excuse the mandatory 25 percent penalty for late payment. American Int'l Group v. Carriere, 2 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2000).

Discretion of board to act sua sponte under subsection (h). —

To the extent that claimant’s procedural due process claims were based on the assertion that the board should have scheduled a hearing sua sponte under this section, the argument was meritless. Subsection (h), at most, gives the board discretion to act sua sponte in setting a claim for hearing without a request, and claimant did not show any circumstances demonstrating that the board’s failure to schedule a hearing was an abuse of discretion. Bailey v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 111 P.3d 321 (Alaska 2005).

Applied in

J. B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1966); Department of Highways v. Brown, 600 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1979); Green v. Kake Tribal Corp., 816 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1991).

Quoted in

Morrison v. Afognak Logging, 768 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1989); Houston Contracting v. Phillips, 812 P.2d 598 (Alaska 1991); Jonathan v. Doyon Drilling, 890 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1995).

Stated in

Shehata v. Salvation Army, 225 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2010); Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr., 440 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974); Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974); Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975); Kessick v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980); Sang Suh v. Pingo Corp., 736 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1987); Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013); Butts v. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 467 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2020).

II.Penalty for Failure to Notify Board

Hearing is not required before penalty for failure to notify board can be assessed. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Record did not support board’s imposition of penalty. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1966).

III.Controversion of Claim

Subsection (d) serves independent concern of this section and does not purport to define when a claim is in fact controverted. Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

Evaluation of medical evaluation report required. —

Because the State's controversion, based on the employer's medical evaluation (EME) report, contended that the care was not related to the work injury, the Workers' Compensation Board was required to evaluate the EME report in order to determine whether the care was compensable and the State was liable for the controverted services. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Requirement for controversion. —

An employer’s letter to a doctor requesting clarification of the doctor’s letter regarding the claimant’s permanent partial impairment rating did not comply with the statutory requirements for a controversion. Hammer v. City of Fairbanks, 953 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1998).

When an employee was evaluated for both orthopedic and psychiatric injuries, an employer had to pay permanent partial impairment (PPI) compensation after each rating because (1) PPI and temporary total disability (TTD) compensated for different losses, (2) PPI was not tied to medical stability, and (3) the employer did not controvert an orthopedic rating, despite the employee's continued receipt of psychiatric TTD benefits. Unisea, Inc. v. de Lopez, 435 P.3d 961 (Alaska 2019).

Process for deciding disputed claims. —

Process the State advocated, involving piecemeal litigation and multiple hearings for a limited controversion claim, was not as simple as possible as statutorily required; like any adjudicator, the Workers' Compensation Board had an interest in deciding disputed claims promptly and thoroughly, without the need for numerous hearings, and the Board acted reasonably and not arbitrarily in interpreting and applying its regulations. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Ripeness. —

Mere controversion of benefits did not establish that the worker was not entitled to workers’ compensation remedies. Accordingly, his constitutional and statutory claims were not ripe. Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011).

Notice of controversion by employer is not required for award of attorney’s fees under AS 23.30.145(a) . Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

A formal notice of controversion is not required to be filed under subsection (d) as a prerequisite to an award of the minimum attorney fees of AS 23.30.145(a) . Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1978).

Controversion not justified; penalty. —

Because it was unclear from the record whether an employer provided a bed to an employee, the issue was remanded to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board; the employee was free to pursue a penalty on the controversion of the bed or other treatment items that were unpaid, and the Board could determine what penalty was due on the improperly controverted prescriptions or treatments. Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Frivolous. —

Employer's controversions, one related to the claimant's medical treatment and the other one related to the claimant's temporary total disability and medical benefits, were frivolous under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission's precedent because the employer did not have sufficient evidence to support its factual assertions in the controversions. Vue v. Walmart Assocs., 475 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2020).

Good faith filing of controversion notice. —

For a controversion notice to be filed in good faith, the employer must possess sufficient evidence in support of the controversion that, if the claimant does not introduce evidence in opposition to the controversion, the board would find that the claimant is not entitled to benefits. Harp v. ARCO Alaska, 831 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1992).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s conclusions that the employer’s controversions were not frivolous or unfair were supported by the evidence where employer filed the controversions on the bases that: (1) The injury in question was not work-related, (2) the claimant refused to attend a required medical examination, (3) the claimant had been released to return to work, or (4) the claimant refused to sign releases as ordered to by the board. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly denied claimants’ request for a penalty against an employer, which failed to pay death benefits even after a second jury found that an employee died, because there was no finding that the employer acted in bad faith in filing its controversion. Irby v. Fairbanks Gold Mining, Inc., 203 P.3d 1138 (Alaska 2009).

Penalty for nonpayment of medical benefit. —

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission erred in deciding that no penalty could be imposed upon an employer for the bad faith controversion of a prescription for a bed because its construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act was contrary to the Act’s purpose of providing quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of medical benefits to a claimant; the Act permits imposition of a penalty where a medical benefit has been prescribed but not yet paid. Harris v. M-K Rivers, 325 P.3d 510 (Alaska 2014).

Standard for stay of award. —

A showing of “financial irresponsibility” alone is insufficient to obtain a stay of a workers’ compensation award. The movant must also show that these are serious and substantial questions going to the merits of the case (rather than the former standard of probable success on the merits of the appeal). Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 832 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1992).

Twenty-one day period absent controversion. —

Construing subsections (b) and (e) together, unless the employer files a controversion, the employer has 21 days after receiving a permanent partial injury rating from a doctor to pay compensation or be subject to the statutory penalty. Hammer v. City of Fairbanks, 953 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1998).

When an employer neither timely pays nor controverts a claim for compensation, AS 23.30.155(e) imposes a 25% penalty to be paid at the same time as, and in addition to the unpaid compensation; thus, the failure to controvert compensation within 21 days does not bar the employer from later filing a controversion nor does it mean that the level of impairment is established. Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).

Penalty was due on an employee's job dislocation benefit and permanent partial impairment compensation because (1) an employer paid nothing within 21 days of the employer's physicians' orthopedic evaluation and did not controvert the evaluation, and (2) the employer could not await the outcome of the employers' physicians' evaluation of the employee's psychiatric impairment. Unisea, Inc. v. de Lopez, 435 P.3d 961 (Alaska 2019).

Reviewability of finding. —

When the Workers’ Compensation Board found that an insurer unfairly controverted a workers’ compensation claim, that finding was appealable, before the Division of Insurance decided, under subsection (o) of this section, if the unfair controversion was also an unfair claims settlement practice, under AS 21.36.125 , because the Board had completed its decision-making process and the Board’s finding adversely affected the insurer because it required an investigation by the Division and could support the Division’s finding that the insurer committed an unfair claims settlement practice. Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow, 81 P.3d 982 (Alaska 2003).

Attorney’s fees where claim not controverted. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred by awarding the employee statutory minimum attorney’s fees under AS 23.30.145(a) where the employer never controverted the employee’s claim for benefits, as the employer’s answer to the workers’ compensation claim admitted liability for permanent total disability benefits (PTD), and all of the actions that the board identified as showing the employer’s resistance to paying the employee PTD benefits occurred before the employee filed a workers’ compensation claim. Harnish Group, Inc. v. Moore, 160 P.3d 146 (Alaska 2007).

Stay pending outcome of appeal. —

When the Workers’ Compensation Board found that an insurer unfairly controverted a workers’ compensation claim, and the insurer appealed that finding, there was no requirement that, when the matter was referred to the Division of Insurance, pursuant to subsection (o) of this section, for a determination of whether the insurer had also committed an unfair claims settlement practice, under AS 21.36.125 , the determination of the Division had to be stayed pending the outcome of the insurer’s appeal. Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow, 81 P.3d 982 (Alaska 2003).

IV.Effect of Subsection (e)

“Compensation” under subsection (e) includes medical benefits. Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993).

Subsection (e) provides for penalties for late payment. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

It does not state that, additionally, defendant shall be penalized by award of outlandish attorney’s fee. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

Express coverage by subsection (e). —

Subsection (e) expressly covers situations where employers fail to make payment of compensation without an award within 14 days after such compensation is due. Haile v. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 P.2d 838 (Alaska 1973).

No penalty on award predating board calculation. —

Since compensation calculated under AS 23.30.220(a)(2) is not “payable” for the purpose of the penalty until awarded by the Workers’ Compensation Board, no penalty can be imposed under subsection (e) of this section on an employer who pays compensation, before an award by the board, calculated at a lower rate under AS 23.30.220(a)(1) . Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 740 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1987).

This section does not draw distinction between willful and negligent failure to make compensation payments, and, thus, either type of failure should come within its ambit. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Section not intended as exclusive remedy for all intentional wrongdoing. —

This section was envisioned by Alaska’s legislature to cover situations where the employer or carrier negligently, or willfully, failed to make timely compensation payments, but this section was not intended to operate as the exclusive remedy for all intentional wrongdoings. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

In circumstances where there is tortious conduct that goes beyond the bounds of untimely payments, the immunity from suit provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act is lost. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Where claimant alleged that insurer did more than delay in making benefit payments, he asserted that it intentionally and maliciously misled him about his right to compensation and discouraged him from exercising his rights, resulting in emotional injury, claimant was not precluded, by virtue of this section, from a trial on the merits of his claims. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

Collateral references. —

Workers’ compensation: compensability of injury during tryout, employment test, or similar activity designed to determine employability. 8 ALR5th 798.

Right to workers’ compensation for injuries suffered after termination of employment. 10 ALR5th 245.

Sec. 23.30.160. Assignment and exemption of claims.

  1. An assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or payable under this chapter, except as provided by this chapter, is not valid.
  2. Benefits payable under this chapter are exempt from levy to enforce the collection of a debt as provided in AS 09.38 (exemptions).  This exemption may not be waived.

History. (§ 15 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 5 ch 62 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

The last sentence of (b) of this section was formerly the last sentence of (a). It was placed in (b) in 1984 to correct a manifest error in the 1982 amendatory Act.

Notes to Decisions

Assignment of claims under prior law. —

See Bacciglieri v. Ghezzi, 11 Alaska 93 (D. Alaska 1946).

Garnishment of non-resident’s benefits to pay child support. —

Superior court’s order allowing garnishment of 50 percent of a California resident’s workers’ compensation and social security benefits, in order to satisfy unpaid child support, was proper, since the Alaska Exemptions Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act both clearly favor the compelling public policy of enforcing child support obligations. Cameron v. Hughes, 825 P.2d 882 (Alaska 1992), limited, Torrey v. Hamilton, 872 P.2d 186 (Alaska 1994).

Cited in

Gutterman v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1979); Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079 (Alaska 2008).

Collateral references. —

Construction and effect of statutory exemptions of proceeds of workmen’s compensation awards. 31 ALR3d 532.

Sec. 23.30.165. Lien.

  1. Each employee and beneficiary entitled to compensation under the provisions of this chapter has a lien for the full amount of the compensation the person is entitled to, including costs and disbursements of suit and attorney fees allowed, upon all of the property in connection with the construction, preservation, maintenance, or operation of which the work of the employee was being performed at the time of the injury or death.  For example: in the case of an employee injured or killed while engaged in mining or in work connected with mining, the lien extends to the entire mine and all property used in connection with it; and in the case of an employee injured or killed while engaged in fishing or in the packing, canning, or salting of fish, or other branch of the fish industry, the lien extends to the entire packing, fishing, salting, or canning plant or establishment and all property used in connection with it; and this is the case with other businesses, industries, works, occupations, and employments.
  2. The lien is prior and paramount to any other lien on the property, except a lien for wages or materials as provided by law, and is of equal rank with a lien for wages or materials.
  3. The lien extends to all right, title, interest, and claim of the employer in the property affected by the lien.
  4. A person claiming a lien under this chapter shall, within one year after the date of the injury from which the claim of compensation arises, record in the office of the recorder of the recording district in which the property affected by the lien is located a notice of lien signed and verified by the claimant or someone on behalf of the claimant, and stating, in substance, the name of the person injured or killed out of which injury or death the claim of compensation arises, the name of the employer of the injured or deceased person at the time of the injury or death, a description of the property affected or covered by the lien, and the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property.
  5. The lien for compensation provided for in this section may be enforced by equitable proceedings as in the enforcement of other liens upon real or personal property, within 10 months after the cause of action arises.  Nothing in this section prevents an attachment of property as security for the payment of compensation.

History. (§ 16 ch 163 SLA 1959)

Revisor’s notes. —

Minor word changes related to the recording of documents were made in subsection (d) of this section in 1988 under § 42, ch. 161, SLA 1988.

Notes to Decisions

Former law construed. —

See Hansen v. American Legion Post No. 11, 12 Alaska 332 (D. Alaska 1949); Rivers v. Wiggins, 15 Alaska 292 (D. Alaska 1954); Varnell v. Swires, 261 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. Alaska 1958).

Cited in

Schiel v. Union Oil Co., 219 P.3d 1025 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 23.30.170. Collection of defaulted payments.

  1. In case of default by the employer in the payment of compensation due under an award of compensation for a period of 30 days after the compensation is due, the person to whom the compensation is payable may, within one year after the default, apply to the board making the compensation order for a supplementary order declaring the amount of the default. After investigation, notice, and hearing, as provided in AS 23.30.110 , the board shall make a supplementary order declaring the amount of the default. The order shall be filed in the same manner as the compensation order.
  2. If the payment in default is an installment of the award, the board may, in its discretion, declare the whole of the award as the amount in default.  The applicant may file a certified copy of the supplementary order with the clerk of the superior court.  The supplementary order is final.  The court shall, upon the filing of the copy, enter judgment for the amount declared in default by the supplementary order if it is in accordance with law.  Any time after a supplementary order by the board, the attorney general, when requested to do so by the commissioner, shall take appropriate action to assure collection of the defaulted payments.
  3. Review of the judgment may be had as in a civil action for damages.  Final proceedings to execute the judgment may be had by writ of execution.  The court shall modify the judgment to conform to a later compensation order upon presentation of a certified copy of it to the court.

History. (§ 17 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 2 SLA 1966)

Notes to Decisions

Exclusive method of enforcing compensation orders is provided for in this section and in AS 23.30.125(c) . Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Stated in

Arctic Structures v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).

Cited in

Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Article 5. Computation of Compensation.

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 379-445.

99 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, §§ 289-352.

Voluntary payment of compensation under statute of one state as bar to claim or ground for reduction of claim of compensation under statute of another state. 8 ALR2d 628.

Insured’s receipt of or right to workmen’s compensation benefits as affecting recovery under accident, hospital, or medical expense policy. 40 ALR3d 1012.

Sec. 23.30.172. Benefit adjustments. [Repealed, § 11 ch 75 SLA 1977.]

Sec. 23.30.175. Rates of compensation.

  1. The weekly rate of compensation for disability or death may not exceed the maximum compensation rate, may not be less than 22 percent of the maximum compensation rate, and initially may not be less than $110. However, if the board determines that the employee’s spendable weekly wages are less than $110 a week as computed under AS 23.30.220 , or less than 22 percent of the maximum compensation rate a week in the case of an employee who has furnished documentary proof of the employee’s wages, it shall issue an order adjusting the weekly rate of compensation to a rate equal to the employee’s spendable weekly wages. If the employer can verify that the employee’s spendable weekly wages are less than 22 percent of the maximum compensation rate, the employer may adjust the weekly rate of compensation to a rate equal to the employee’s spendable weekly wages without an order of the board. If the employee’s spendable weekly wages are greater than 22 percent of the maximum compensation rate, but 80 percent of the employee’s spendable weekly wages is less than 22 percent of the maximum compensation rate, the employee’s weekly rate of compensation shall be 22 percent of the maximum compensation rate. Prior payments made in excess of the adjusted rate shall be deducted from the unpaid compensation in the manner the board determines. In any case, the employer shall pay timely compensation. In this subsection, “maximum compensation rate” means 120 percent of the average weekly wage, calculated under (d) of this section, applicable on the date of injury of the employee.
  2. The following rules apply to benefits payable to recipients not residing in the state at the time compensation benefits are payable:
    1. the weekly rate of compensation shall be calculated by multiplying the recipient’s weekly compensation rate calculated under AS 23.30.180 , 23.30.185 , 23.30.190 , 23.30.200 , or 23.30.215 by the ratio of the cost of living of the area in which the recipient resides to the cost of living in this state;
    2. the calculation required by (1) of this subsection does not apply if the recipient is absent from the state for medical or rehabilitation services not reasonably available in the state;
    3. if the gross weekly earnings of the recipient and the resulting compensation rate are determined under AS 23.30.220(a)(6) , (7), or (10), the calculation required by this subsection applies only to the portion of the recipient’s weekly compensation rate attributable to wages earned in the state;
    4. application of this subsection may not reduce the weekly compensation rate to less than $154 a week, except as provided in (a) of this section;
    5. application of (1) — (4) of this subsection may not result in raising a recipient’s weekly compensation rate to an amount that exceeds the weekly compensation rate that the recipient would have received if the recipient had been residing in the state.
  3. The department shall provide by regulation for the determination and comparison of living costs for this state and the other areas in which recipients reside and for the redetermination and comparison of these costs every three years.
  4. By December 1 of each year, the commissioner shall determine the average weekly wage in this state by dividing the average annual wage in this state for the preceding calendar year by 52. The resulting figure is the average weekly wage in this state applicable for the period beginning January 1 and ending December 31 of the following calendar year. The average annual wage calculation required under this subsection shall include the wages of all employees in the state, both public and private, who are covered by this chapter.
  5. If the commissioner fails to determine the average weekly wage in the state as required in (d) of this section until after January 1, but before April 1, of the year following the date the determination was to be made, an employer is not required to make a retroactive adjustment of compensation.

History. (§ 5(2), (3) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 4 ch 46 SLA 1964; am § 1 ch 113 SLA 1966; am § 1 ch 206 SLA 1968; am § 1 ch 228 SLA 1970; am § 3 ch 10 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 52 SLA 1974; am § 2 ch 83 SLA 1975; am §§ 4, 5 ch 252 SLA 1976; am § 3 ch 75 SLA 1977; am §§ 16 — 18, 27 ch 93 SLA 1982; am §§ 2 — 4 ch 70 SLA 1983; am § 30 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 7 ch 75 SLA 1995; am §§ 15, 16 ch 105 SLA 2000; am §§ 53 — 55 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 78, ch. 10, FSSLA 2005, provides that (b)(5) of this section applies to an injury “occurring on or after September 1, 2005.”

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Several of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes.

Constitutionality. —

Former subsections (c) and (d) of this section, relating to adjustment of benefits to persons who moved out of Alaska, were unconstitutional as deterring disabled workers from exercising their constitutional right to travel and take up residence in another state. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).

Statutory interpretation. —

This section is not to be applied mechanically where to do so would negate the legislative intent underlying AS 23.30.220(a)(3) (now (a)(10)). Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, 744 P.2d 663 (Alaska 1987).

Retroactivity of Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown. —

The holding in Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984), that former subsection (d) unconstitutionally reduced compensation benefits of injured workers who choose to reside outside of Alaska under the equal protection clause and that those workers who were parties to the litigation could be awarded damages prospectively from the date of the superior court’s decision in the case, December 12, 1981, retroactively applied to those nonparty workers whose claims remain open to adjudication, those who have preserved the issue for appeal, and insurers. Vienna v. Scott Wetzel Servs., 740 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1987).

Alaska legislature had specifically utilized federal Longshoremen’s Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Computation of average weekly wage. —

The board improperly utilized former subsection (b) (which was effective at the time the decision was rendered) rather than AS 23.30.220 in computing claimant’s average weekly wage for the purpose of establishing his permanent total disability benefits where claimant was injured in 1964 but his disability occurred in 1982, when his earnings were substantially higher. Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, 744 P.2d 663 (Alaska 1987).

Board’s determination of claimant’s permanent total disability benefits was reversed and remanded for recalculation, where, because the disparity between his 1964 and 1982 weekly wages was so great, it would have been grossly unfair to apply the 1964 version of subsection (b)’s limitation of $81 in order to compensate him for his lost earning capacity. Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, Inc., 756 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1988).

AS 23.30.220 and 23.30.175 do not conflict because they concern two distinct steps in benefit calculation. Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc., 327 P.3d 204 (Alaska 2014).

Authority of court. —

The court must accept any reasonable statutory construction of the board only where undefined or ambiguous terms exist in the statutory language. London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

The court has no right to say whether the compensation is intrinsically inadequate, for the legislature has determined definitely the compensatory damages to be allowed. Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Walker, 15 F.2d 772, 5 Alaska Fed. 321 (9th Cir. Alaska 1926).

Board may not impose additional restrictions. —

Where the statutory mandate is clear and would allow compensation, it is improper for the board to inject its own views on the policies underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act by imposing additional restrictions on the statutory language. London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

This section contains maximum limitation on death benefits because of two things: its own language (“the weekly rate of compensation for disability or death”) and by the cross-reference from AS 23.30.215(b) . Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Determination of maximum limitation. —

This section determines the maximum limitation on death and disability payments by reference to increasing percentages of the state’s average weekly wage. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Applicable version. —

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission correctly affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision that a worker was receiving the maximum amount to which he was entitled because the version of the statute in effect at the time of the worker’s permanent total disability governed his rate of compensation. Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc., 327 P.3d 204 (Alaska 2014).

Maximum rate table formerly in this section prospectively phased in increase. It had no retroactive effect because it did not grant increases to claimants injured before the new maximum rates were passed. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Maximum rate table did not impair obligations. —

The maximum rates formerly specified in a table in subsection (a) did not impair obligations under an employer’s insurance contract. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

The increasing maximums in this section do not impair contract although they tie compensation payments to an unknown variable, Alaska’s future average weekly wage. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Basis for 1975 amendment. —

The 1975 amendment of this section was enacted in response to the critique of the National Commission on State Workmen Compensation Laws, created by Congress as part of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and embodied its recommendations, which were based on its finding that state workmen’s compensation laws in general were inadequate and inequitable. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Maximum limitation prior to 1975. —

This section has specified a method of calculation based on increasing percentages of the state’s average weekly wage since 1975. Before 1975, the maximum limitation was a flat dollar amount. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

All claims arising after May 22, 1975, were governed by increasing rates in subsection (a). Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Increases for claims arising after 1975 amendment and until 1977 amendment. —

For all claims arising after the 1975 amendment and until the 1977 amendment, not only the percentage of the average weekly wage increases, but the average weekly wage also changes, periodically until 1981, with fluctuations in the state’s average weekly wage. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Effect of 1977 amendment. —

The 1977 amendment still gives recipients an increasing percentage, but an increasing percentage relative to the same amount, i.e., the weekly wage in effect at the date of injury. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Whether 1977 amendment was intended to clarify or change prior law is unclear. If it was intended as a clarification, it governs the maximum limitation on all awards. If it was a change in policy, it governs the limitation only for injuries occurring after August 31, 1977, the effective date of the amendment. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Compensation under prior law. —

See London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

Recovery of money for permanent total disability would not preclude subsequent compensation for temporary total disability. London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

It was improper for the board to presume that the amount of compensation afforded to a totally disabled worker should limit in scope the recovery available to one who is partially disabled. London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

Deductibility of money paid under employment contract from temporary disability award. —

Money paid to defendant under provision of a contract of employment requiring payment of wages or earnings for remainder of fishing season, regardless of any disability incurred in the meantime, could not be deducted from the award for temporary disability where the contract was not introduced in evidence by plaintiff. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Applied in

J. B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1966); Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

Quoted in

Bradley v. Mercer, 563 P.2d 880 (Alaska 1977).

Cited in

Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); C.J. v. Dep't of Corr., 151 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2006).

Sec. 23.30.180. Permanent total disability.

  1. In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent 80 percent of the injured employee’s spendable weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of the total disability.  If a permanent partial disability award has been made before a permanent total disability determination, permanent total disability benefits must be reduced by the amount of the permanent partial disability award, adjusted for inflation, in a manner determined by the board. Loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two of them, in the absence of conclusive proof to the contrary, constitutes permanent total disability.  In all other cases permanent total disability is determined in accordance with the facts. In making this determination the market for the employee’s services shall be
    1. area of residence;
    2. area of last employment;
    3. the state of residence; and
    4. the State of Alaska.
  2. Failure to achieve remunerative employability as defined in AS 23.30.041(r) does not, by itself, constitute permanent total disability.

History. (§ 7(1) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 3 ch 83 SLA 1975; am § 5 ch 70 SLA 1983; am §§ 31, 32 ch 79 SLA 1988)

Revisor’s notes. —

In subsection (b), “AS 23.30.041(q) ” was substituted for “AS 23.30.041(p) ” in 1998, and “AS 23.30.041(r) ” was substituted for “AS 23.30.041(q) ” in 2000, to reflect the 1998 and 2000 reletterings of AS 23.30.041(r) .

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes.

Due process. —

An insurance company was not denied a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issue of availability of employment for an employee where it had both notice as to the relevancy of the issue and an opportunity to litigate the issue before the Workers’ Compensation Board. Robles v. Providence Hosp., 988 P.2d 592 (Alaska 1999).

“Total disability”. —

For workers’ compensation purposes total disability does not necessarily mean a state of abject helplessness. It means the inability because of injuries to perform services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist. J. B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1966).

Enumeration of disabilities not exclusive. —

The statute contemplated other disabilities, total in character and permanent in quality, besides those expressly enumerated. Fern Gold Mining Co. v. Murphy, 7 F.2d 613, 5 Alaska Fed. 275 (9th Cir. Alaska 1925).

Determination of disability rating. —

Disability ratings, as distinct from ratings based on the concept of permanent impairment, are based on the worker’s loss of earning capacity and are not measured by any particular degree of medical impairment. Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).

Loss of earning capacity is primary compensation consideration. —

The concept of disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Award for compensation must be supported by a finding that claimant suffered a compensable disability or, more precisely, a decrease in earning capacity due to a work-connected injury or illness. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

What constitutes compensable disability. —

See Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Permanent total disability excludes further ability to work. —

If, by reason of certain injuries, a worker is, under this section, totally and permanently disabled from doing any work, it follows that there is no remaining ability to work which can be affected, either permanently or temporarily, by other injuries received in the same accident. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

Applicability of suitable regular employment standard. —

In making a permanent total disability determination, evidence that suitable regular employment is continuously available elsewhere in the United States generally does not prove regular and continuously available employment in the labor markets specified by subsection (a) of this section, absent evidence that the pertinent labor markets are similar to the national market. Leigh v. Seekins Ford, 136 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2006).

Sufficiency of labor market evidence. —

Where a rehabilitation counselor did not expressly testify that regular and continuously available employment existed in the specific labor markets listed in subsection (a) of this section, labor market evidence ws inadequate, and, on remand, the employer had to present specific evidence of regular and continuously available employment in the relevant labor markets listed in the statute. Leigh v. Seekins Ford, 136 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2006).

In making a permanent total disability determination, the fortuity of a specific position’s availability at any given time does not determine that a regular market for the job exists. Instead, the proper focus must remain on whether an employer has presented substantial evidence that there are jobs reasonably available in the relevant labor market that an employee could realistically obtain and hold. Leigh v. Seekins Ford, 136 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2006).

In making a permanent total disability determination that a regular market for a job existed, rehabilitation counsel’s testimony that openings occurred for the jobs that she identified as suitable for the claimant was insufficient, where she did not testify that the claimant had a realistic chance of obtaining and holding one of those jobs. Leigh v. Seekins Ford, 136 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2006).

Invalid regulation. —

Because Alaska Admin. Code tit. 8, § 45.134(c) effectively rewrites AS 23.30.180(a) , substituting impairment for disability, the regulation is not valid. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2017).

Disability produced by injury plus disease or infirmity. —

Claimant is entitled to compensation if the work-connected accident or injury aggravated, accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability. Providence Wash., Inc. v. Fish, 581 P.2d 680 (Alaska 1978).

The board could rely on evidence of claimant’s psychological or emotional disorders or infirmities to find that, when combined with other factors such as her work-connected back injury, she was permanently and totally disabled. Providence Wash., Inc. v. Fish, 581 P.2d 680 (Alaska 1978).

Difference between permanent total disability and injury affecting use of a member only. —

The difference between a disability that is total and permanent and an injury which, as applied to the usefulness of the member only, is “permanent,” should be noted. The first relates to the working capacity of the individual; the second, to the character of the impairment of the member only. Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Walker, 15 F.2d 772, 5 Alaska Fed. 321 (9th Cir. Alaska 1926).

Loss of eye following previous loss of other eye. —

An employee who lost an eye in the course of his employment, having previously lost the sight of his other eye, was entitled to recover as for total and permanent disability. Killisnoo Packing Co. v. Scott, 14 F.2d 86, 5 Alaska Fed. 310 (9th Cir. Alaska 1926).

Presumptions. —

In the case of the loss of certain members, total and permanent loss of earning power is conclusively presumed for the purpose of awarding compensation under the act. Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 245 F.2d 855, 17 Alaska 183 (9th Cir. Alaska 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 735, 2 L. Ed. 2d 795 (U.S. 1958).

“Permanent” means lasting rest of claimant’s life. Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Kinter, 755 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1988).

Fact that economic impairment from injury exceeds benefits provided for in schedule does not enable employee to have his injury classified as “unscheduled,” so that he can obtain benefits reflecting this greater economic impairment. Ratliff v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 721 P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1986).

Liability of employer for payments. —

Under the clear language of AS 23.30.045(a) , the employer is liable for all payments made pursuant to this section through AS 23.30.215 . Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Julian, 513 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1973).

Offset for permanent partial impairment. —

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission erred in allowing an offset for permanent partial impairment. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2017).

Under law in effect between 1984 and 1988, an employee could not receive concurrent permanent partial disability and permanent total disability benefits. Wagner v. Stuckagain Heights, 926 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1996).

Applied in

Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

Quoted in

Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1994); Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996).

Stated in

Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Gilmore v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 882 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1994).

Cited in

Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982); Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, 744 P.2d 663 (Alaska 1987); Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992); Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates, 87 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2004); Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006); Adams v. State, 467 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2020); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 23.30.185. Compensation for temporary total disability.

In case of disability total in character but temporary in quality, 80 percent of the injured employee’s spendable weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of the disability. Temporary total disability benefits may not be paid for any period of disability occurring after the date of medical stability.

History. (§ 7(2) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 4 ch 83 SLA 1975; am § 6 ch 70 SLA 1983; am § 33 ch 79 SLA 1988)

Notes to Decisions

Standing. —

Because defendant’s benefits were not terminated due to medical stability under this section or AS 23.30.265 (now AS 23.30.395 ), he did not have standing to sue. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. Murdock, 873 P.2d 1291 (Alaska 1994).

Controversion. —

Employer's controversion related to a claimant's temporary total disability and medical benefits was frivolous under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission's precedent because the employer did not have sufficient evidence to support its factual assertions in the controversion related to the claimant reaching medical stability with respect to all of the claimant's work-related conditions. Vue v. Walmart Assocs., 475 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2020).

Relation to unemployment benefits. —

Neither AS 23.30.187 nor its legislative history erects a permanent bar to the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits if unemployment benefits have been repaid; a workers’ compensation board’s interpretation of the statute, that a week for which the employee has repaid benefits is not a week in which the employee receives unemployment benefits, is consistent with the language of the statute, and employee is permitted to recover total temporary disability benefits under this section as long as the employee repaid unemployment benefits received during that time. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Back-injury payments not affected by cancer treatment. —

Claimant was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) payments for the period in which his back condition would have prevented him from working, regardless of the fact he was also undergoing cancer treatment, where medical evidence indicated that he may have suffered from a TTD as a result of his job-related back injury, regardless of whether he contracted cancer. Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Constr., 773 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1989).

Unavailability for other reasons. —

Temporary total disability benefits cannot be denied to a disabled employee because he or she also may be unavailable for work for other reasons. Although the holding to this effect in Estate of Ensley, 773 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1989), concerned unavailability for medical reasons, the rationale for not denying such benefits applies to any reason that might render the employee unavailable for work. Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging, 787 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).

Where employee was disabled from employment because of a work-related injury, he remained disabled while assisting in his wife’s recovery from her own injury. Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging, 787 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).

Premise for concept of disability compensation. —

The concept of disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Award for compensation must be supported by finding that claimant suffered compensable disability or, more precisely, a decrease in earning capacity due to a work-connected injury or illness. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

What constitutes compensable disability. —

See Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Temporary total disability benefits with rehabilitation. —

The board may award temporary total disability benefits to an employee with an unscheduled disability whose condition has stabilized medically, but who is pursuing an approved vocational rehabilitation program. Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Effect of allowing benefits during period of rehabilitation. —

See Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Determination of medical stability. —

Where the board determined that claimant was no longer suffering any effects attributable to his accident, the decision was consistent with the statutory definition of medical stability. Brown v. State, Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 931 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support a workers’ compensation board’s finding that an employee was not medically stable pursuant to AS 23.30.395 of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act during the time in dispute, and thus the employee was entitled to benefits under this section, because the employee incorrectly believed that the employer’s permission was needed to obtain a second opinion, which caused a delay in the employee undergoing surgery, and the surgery was successful. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Physician’s report that employee able to work. —

A physician’s reports and testimony that an employee was able to return to work were sufficient to justify the board’s suspension of temporary total disability benefits for a certain period in the absence of the employee’s proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not able to work. Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1997).

Physician’s report that employee unable to work. —

Employee suffered an injury to his arm and shoulder while operating a grader, and a physician observed weakness and loss of mobility in the employee’s right arm and shoulder, and noted that operating a grader would cause him pain, justifying an award of temporary total disability benefits. Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon, 124 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2005).

Board’s conclusion supported by substantial evidence. —

Because a worker presented no evidence that an ear infection was disabling other than his own testimony that it caused him pain, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission correctly determined that substantial evidence supported the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board's finding that the worker was not entitled to ongoing TTD. Moreover, nothing in the record indicated that he did not or could not perform his job when he had a documented hearing loss, and no healthcare provider had suggested that his hearing loss was disabling. Maalah v. Trident Seafoods, — P.3d — (Alaska Dec. 16, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Board’s conclusion not supported by substantial evidence. —

Board’s conclusion that employee’s back pain did not render him unable to work was not supported by substantial evidence, where the two doctors whose reports were in the record agreed that employee was unable to work on account of his back injuries. Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging, 787 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).

Board’s conclusion that employee’s disability had ended was not supported by substantial evidence where the board relied upon the testimony of one doctor who testified that he did not believe that employee had physically recovered from the effects of his injury and another who could not estimate employee’s physical capacities upon recovery. Baker v. Reed-Dowd Co., 836 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1992) (decided under law prior to 1988 amendment).

Substantial evidence did not support the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that the claimant’s knee was medically stable between November 2000 and January 2001 because two doctors’ predictions, that exercise would result in improvement and that the knee would not deteriorate, proved incorrect. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Weekly maximum under prior law. —

See London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

Applied in

Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986); Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 740 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1987); Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992); Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997); DeYonge v. Nana/Marriott, 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000); Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006).

Quoted in

Johnson v. RCA-OMS, Inc., 681 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1984).

Stated in

Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 680 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1984); Johnson v. RCA-OMS, Inc., 681 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1984); Gilmore v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 882 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1994); Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002); Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009).

Cited in

Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1974); Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984); Deuser v. State, 697 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1985); Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Kinter, 755 P.2d 1103 (Alaska 1988); Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993); Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 23.30.187. Effect of unemployment benefits.

Compensation is not payable to an employee under AS 23.30.180 or 23.30.185 for a week in which the employee receives unemployment benefits.

History. (§ 19 ch 93 SLA 1982)

Notes to Decisions

Construction. —

Neither this section nor its legislative history erects a permanent bar to the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits if unemployment benefits have been repaid; a workers’ compensation board’s interpretation of the statute, that a week for which the employee has repaid benefits is not a week in which the employee receives unemployment benefits, is consistent with the language of the statute, and employee is permitted to recover total temporary disability benefits under AS 23.30.185 as long as the employee repaid unemployment benefits received during that time. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Quoted in

Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471 (Alaska 1991).

Sec. 23.30.190. Compensation for permanent partial impairment; rating guides.

  1. In case of impairment partial in character but permanent in quality, and not resulting in permanent total disability, the compensation is $177,000 multiplied by the employee’s percentage of permanent impairment of the whole person. The percentage of permanent impairment of the whole person is the percentage of impairment to the particular body part, system, or function converted to the percentage of impairment to the whole person as provided under (b) of this section. The compensation is payable in a single lump sum, except as otherwise provided in AS 23.30.041 , but the compensation may not be discounted for any present value considerations.
  2. All determinations of the existence and degree of permanent impairment shall be made strictly and solely under the whole person determination as set out in the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, except that an impairment rating may not be rounded to the next five percent. The board shall adopt a supplementary recognized schedule for injuries that cannot be rated by use of the American Medical Association Guides.
  3. The impairment rating determined under (a) of this section shall be reduced by a permanent impairment that existed before the compensable injury. If the combination of a prior impairment rating and a rating under (a) of this section would result in the employee being considered permanently totally disabled, the prior rating does not negate a finding of permanent total disability.
  4. When a new edition of the American Medical Association Guides described in (b) of this section is published, the board shall, not later than 90 days after the last day of the month in which the new edition is published, hold an open meeting under AS 44.62.310 to select the date on which the new edition will be used to make all determinations required under (b) of this section. The date selected by the board for using the new edition may not be later than 90 days after the last day of the month in which the new edition is published. After the meeting, the board shall issue a public notice announcing the date selected. The requirements of AS 44.62.010 44.62.300 do not apply to the selection or announcement of the date under this subsection.

History. (§ 7(3) ch 193 SLA 1959; am §§ 5 — 10 ch 46 SLA 1964; am § 1 ch 24 SLA 1965; am § 1 ch 102 SLA 1965; am § 1 ch 174 SLA 1968; am § 1 ch 119 SLA 1970; am § 1 ch 10 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 54 SLA 1974; am § 5 ch 83 SLA 1975; am § 4 ch 75 SLA 1977; am § 7 ch 70 SLA 1983; am § 34 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 1 ch 4 SLA 1997; am § 17 ch 105 SLA 2000)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Some of the cases cited below were decided under prior statutes but have been retained for aid in construing present law.

This section governs compensation for permanent partial disability. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Section controls permanent impairment under AS 23.30.041 . —

Because subsection (b)’s rule for evaluating permanent impairments, which requires use of the American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,” controls the determination of a permanent impairment worker AS 23.30.041(f)(3) , and because under received a rating of zero permanent impairment under the AMA Guides, the superior court correctly found her ineligible for reemployment benefits. Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).

Premise for concept of disability compensation. —

The concept of disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

No retroactive effect unless clear legislative intent shown. —

Workmen’s compensation acts should be liberally construed in favor of the employee, but statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and will not be given a retroactive effect, unless by express terms or necessary implication, it clearly appears that that was the legislative intent. Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

There were four basic types of disability compensation payable under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act: (1) temporary total disability, (2) temporary partial disability, (3) permanent total disability and (4) permanent partial disability. Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

Information on injury. —

A doctor’s letter, although based on an edition of the guidelines different from that required by regulation, provided specific information on the claimant’s injury and was sufficient to trigger the employer’s obligation to pay or controvert the claim. Hammer v. City of Fairbanks, 953 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1998).

Distinction between temporary total disability and permanent partial disability. —

The period of temporary total disability is defined as: the healing period or the time during which the worker is wholly disabled and unable by reason of his injury to work. It is, therefore, a separate and unitary period of compensation, and as such is distinguished from a permanent partial disability. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 17 Alaska 658 (D. Alaska 1958).

Permanent partial disability includes temporary disability. —

The very fixing of a rate for a permanent partial disability indicates that the applicant will permanently thereafter suffer disability. Certainly this would include within its terms temporary disability from time to time. Keehn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 230 F.2d 712, 16 Alaska 101 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).

And no further award should be granted for temporary disability. —

Where the permanent award is made, no further awards should be granted for temporary disability, whether total or partial. Keehn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 230 F.2d 712, 16 Alaska 101 (9th Cir. Alaska 1956).

Award for compensation must be supported by finding that claimant suffered compensable disability or, more precisely, a decrease in earning capacity due to a work-connected injury or illness. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Consideration of retirement in determining award. —

In calculating a lump sum award for a permanent partial disability, the employee’s total future loss equals the total payments the employee would receive for his normal life expectancy, without considering actual or possible retirement. Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 780 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1989).

Post-injury earning capacity. —

The determination of lost earning capacity is not limited to an examination of those losses that appear immediately after claimant’s injury stabilizes, but it requires the board to use all “available clues” to forecast the losses that the disabled claimant will incur over the course of her work life. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Crider, 736 P.2d 770 (Alaska 1987).

To fairly measure the difference between pre- and post-injury earning capacity, the board must first eliminate substantial differences caused by inflation. Where there is a substantial difference in wage levels, the post-injury earnings should be corrected to correspond with the general wage level in force at the time that pre-injury earnings were calculated, or the pre-injury earnings should be recomputed at the scale in effect at the time of the post-injury earnings. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Crider, 736 P.2d 770 (Alaska 1987).

Basis for finding of decrease in earning capacity. —

In permanent partial disability situations, the ultimate finding of decrease in earning capacity must be based upon basic fact findings which relate to inability to earn wages, as evidenced by proof of a disparity between wages earned before and after the injury was sustained, and to the claimant’s physical condition. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

What is necessary is to compare earnings made prior to injury with earnings likely to be made in future. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Award not to be delayed. —

Although it is impossible to predict an employee’s earnings in the future, an award must nevertheless be made without waiting until the end of the employee’s worklife. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Where there is a substantial difference in wage levels, the post-injury earnings should be corrected to correspond with the general wage level in force at the time that pre-injury earnings were calculated, or the pre-injury earnings should be recomputed at the scale in effect at the time of the post-injury earnings. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Availability of work is determinant of earning capacity. —

The availability of work in the employee’s community which he can perform in his injured condition is an important determinant of earning capacity. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Serious conceptual differences exist between “whole man” and “earning capacity” theories of disability. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Under the whole man theory, the primary criteria governing disability awards are physiological and psychiatric. This theory challenges the concept, basic to Alaska’s workmen’s compensation law, that unscheduled partial disability awards should be made for economic loss, not for physical injury as such. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Where loss of leg is total in statutory sense and the question of the pyramiding of claims is not involved, the employee is entitled to the compensation fixed for the loss of a leg. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 465 (D. Alaska 1949).

Condition of leg before loss. —

In providing payment for the loss of a leg the statute does not require that it be shown that the leg was whole before the injury. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 465 (D. Alaska 1949).

“Unscheduled” loss. —

Fact that economic impairment from injury exceeded the benefits provided for in the schedule did not enable the employee to have his injury classified as “unscheduled,” so that he can obtain benefits reflecting this greater economic impairment. Ratliff v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 721 P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1986).

In a case where the loss was unscheduled there was no fixed number of weeks during which compensation shall be paid. Absher v. State Dep't of Highways, 500 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1972), overruled, Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986).

It may be inferred that computation was left to discretion of board. —

While the legislature did not adopt a formula for computing lump-sum payments, it could reasonably be inferred that this was left to the discretion of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Absher v. State Dep't of Highways, 500 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1972), overruled, Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986).

Law prior to enactment of former subsection (b). —

See Sherman v. Holiday Constr. Co., 435 P.2d 16 (Alaska 1967).

Amendment of benefit schedule between time of injury and time condition rated. —

For a discussion of the application of repealed provision AS 23.30.172 to a case where the former benefit schedule of this section was increased by amendment between the time of injury and the time the condition was rated, and a resolution of which schedule applied, see Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

Where the law (AS 23.30.172 , repealed) pertaining to compensation at the time of the employee’s injury provided that compensation would be paid at the rates effective at the time the injury was rated, that statutory scheme was incorporated into the workers’ compensation insurance contract. In view of this, an increase in compensation rates made after the injury but prior to its rating cannot have impaired the contract. State Workmen's Comp. Bd. v. Delaney, 615 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1980).

Time period for payment. —

The time periods in AS 23.30.155(b) and (e), providing for installment payments within 14 days and penalties if the payment is over 7 days late, are applicable to a case involving permanent partial injury payments under this section. Sumner v. Eagle Nest Hotel, 894 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1995).

Calculation of earnings for volunteer policeman. —

Gross weekly earnings for calculation of benefits for an employee injured while serving as a volunteer policeman were set at the minimum gross weekly wage paid a full-time city policeman. Twiggs v. Municipality of Anchorage, 938 P.2d 1046 (Alaska 1997).

Criteria for judicial review. —

While the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board is a quasi-judicial agency, the same criteria for judicial review of any administrative action should apply. Hood v. State, Workmen's Comp. Bd., 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).

Award upheld. —

Since provisions limiting recovery for permanent partial and temporary total disability to $30,000 were repealed at the time of rating of appellee’s injury, his employer’s liability was not limited by those provisions and the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board’s decision awarding appellee an increase of benefits over and above $30,000 payable by the employer was upheld. Arctic Structures v. Hardcastle, 660 P.2d 449 (Alaska 1983).

Evidence sufficient to support refusal of award. Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc., 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).

Lump sum payment not merited. —

A lump sum award is not merited because claimant is receiving benefits at a weekly rate substantially smaller than her rate of loss nor because inflation creates a financial need for a lump sum. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Crider, 736 P.2d 770 (Alaska 1987).

Under law in effect between 1984 and 1988, an employee could not receive concurrent permanent partial disability and permanent total disability benefits. Wagner v. Stuckagain Heights, 926 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1996).

Applied in

J. B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1966); Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., 495 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972); Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982); Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986); Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).

Quoted in

Foster v. Wright-Schuchart-Harbor, 644 P.2d 221 (Alaska 1982); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Stated in

Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Cited in

Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984); Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992); Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996); Hagen Ins., Inc. v. Roller, 139 P.3d 1216 (Alaska 2006); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2017); Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. United Physical Therapy, 484 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2021).

Sec. 23.30.191. Expenses for rehabilitating injured employees. [Repealed, § 27 ch 93 SLA 1982. For current law concerning rehabilitation of injured workers, see AS 23.30.041.]

Sec. 23.30.195. Survival of the right to compensation.

  1. Compensation to which any claimant would be entitled under AS 23.30.190 shall, notwithstanding death arising from causes other than the injury, be payable to and for the benefit of the persons following:
    1. if there be a widow or widower and no child of the deceased, to the widow or widower;
    2. if there be a widow or widower and a surviving child of the deceased, one-half to the widow or widower, the other half to the surviving child;
    3. if there be a surviving child of the deceased, but no widow or widower, then to the child.
  2. An award for disability may be made after the death of the injured employee.

History. (§ 7 (4) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 33 ch 32 SLA 1971; am § 87 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 27 ch 32 SLA 1997)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

Wife’s right of action for loss of consortium. 36 ALR3d 900.

Sec. 23.30.200. Temporary partial disability.

  1. In case of temporary partial disability resulting in decrease of earning capacity the compensation shall be 80 percent of the difference between the injured employee’s spendable weekly wages before the injury and the wage-earning capacity of the employee after the injury in the same or another employment, to be paid during the continuance of the disability, but not to be paid for more than five years. Temporary partial disability benefits may not be paid for a period of disability occurring after the date of medical stability.
  2. The wage-earning capacity of an injured employee is determined by the actual spendable weekly wage of the employee if the actual spendable weekly wage fairly and reasonably represents the wage-earning capacity of the employee. The board may, in the interest of justice, fix the wage-earning capacity that is reasonable, having due regard to the nature of the injury, the degree of physical impairment, the usual employment, and other factors or circumstances in the case that may affect the capacity of the employee to earn wages in a disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.

History. (§ 7(5) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 6 ch 83 SLA 1975; am § 8 ch 70 SLA 1983; am §§ 35, 36 ch 79 SLA 1988)

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Premise for concept of disability compensation. —

The concept of disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Award for compensation must be supported by finding that claimant suffered compensable disability or, more precisely, a decrease in earning capacity due to a work-connected injury or illness. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

What constitutes compensable disability. —

See Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Weekly maximum under prior law. —

See London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

Applied in

Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986).

Quoted in

Cesar v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 383 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1963).

Stated in

Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970); Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Cited in

Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

II.Wage-Earning Capacity

Board has wide discretion, to be soundly and justly exercised, in fixing the average daily wage earning capacity of the injured employee. Vanney v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 12 Alaska 284 (D. Alaska 1949).

And discretion is not limited to wages currently being earned daily by employee at time he sustained injuries. Vanney v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 12 Alaska 284 (D. Alaska 1949).

Board may set aside compromise found to be based upon fraud or mistake. Hohn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 150 F. Supp. 519, 17 Alaska 94 (D. Alaska 1957).

Serious conceptual differences exist between “whole man” and “earning capacity” theories of disability. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Under the whole man theory, the primary criteria governing disability awards are physiological and psychiatric. This theory challenges the concept, basic to Alaska’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, that unscheduled partial disability awards should be made for economic loss, not for physical injury as such. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Basis of award. —

It appears to be the duty of the board to determine the amount of wages or compensation the injured employee is capable of earning and which he is or may be precluded from earning and receiving by reason of his injuries, and base the award on that result. Vanney v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 12 Alaska 284 (D. Alaska 1949). See Hohn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 150 F. Supp. 519, 17 Alaska 94 (D. Alaska 1957).

An award must be supported by an ultimate finding that the claimant has suffered a compensable disability, or more precisely, a decrease in his earning capacity. Manthey v. Collier, 367 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1962); Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

The ultimate finding that the claimant has suffered a compensable disability must be based upon basic fact findings which relate to inability to earn wages as evidenced by proof of a disparity between wages earned before and after the injury was sustained, and to the claimant’s physical condition. Manthey v. Collier, 367 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1962); Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

What is necessary is to compare the earnings made prior to the injury with the earnings likely to be made in the future. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Aim is to make best possible estimate of future impairment of earnings considering any available clues. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974).

Where there is substantial difference in wage levels, the post-injury earnings should be corrected to correspond with the general wage level in force at the time that pre-injury earnings were calculated, or the pre-injury earnings should be recomputed at the scale in effect at the time of the post-injury earnings. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Award not to be delayed. —

Although it is impossible to predict an employee’s earnings in the future, an award must nevertheless be made without waiting until the end of the employee’s worklife. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Actual wages will serve as basis for determining wage earning capacity unless it is shown that the wages are in some respect inadequate as a gauge of earning capacity. London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639 (Alaska 1970).

Factors to be considered in making a finding of decrease in earning capacity include not only the extent of the injury, but also age, education, employment available in the area for persons with the capabilities in question, and intentions as to employment in the future. Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1974); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Availability of work is important determinant of earning capacity. —

The availability of work in the employee’s community which he can perform in his injured condition is an important determinant of earning capacity. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973).

Lack of motivation. —

The fact that one who is physically disabled from manual labor and is unqualified in other types of work is not motivated to seek work, is not the equivalent of a physically competent person being unemployed due to lack of motivation. For lack of motivation to be significant, there must be a showing that work is available within the employee’s capabilities. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Workers’ Compensation Board erred in not considering factors including the fact that the post-injury income was from sales of junk and barbeque rather than from employment, the lack of breakdown between gross and net income, the difference in wage levels between the two time periods, and the state employment counselor’s testimony as to lack of any suitable employment for claimant because of his work-related disabilities. Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1978).

Reduction in earning capacity. —

The superior court erred by failing to remand the case to the board for findings on the existence or extent of the reduction in his wage earning capacity. Karkanen v. Perini Arctic Assocs., 651 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1982).

Failure to make specific finding as to average weekly wage or specific impairment of earning capacity. —

Although a specific finding as to the average weekly wage or the specific impairment of earning capacity by the board would have been desirable, the failure to make one can only be deemed at most harmless error in cases where the figures used are easily determined from the decision itself. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Effect of seasonally high wages. —

Just as no one should be denied a fair award because, by reason of his injury, he may be unable to prove that he would inevitably have had remunerative employment during the period of his actual disability, so also, one temporarily or seasonally employed at wages above the scale which he was earning or is capable of earning during the remainder of the year may not justly claim disability compensation based on those seasonal or temporary wages for a disability arising during such employment which does not really disable the employee until after the temporary or seasonal employment has been carried through to completion without any loss of wages therefor. Vanney v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 12 Alaska 284 (D. Alaska 1949).

Inclusion of amount earned in self-employment. —

In determining defendant’s earning capacity, the board erroneously added $1,500, representing the amount that the defendant testified he had earned in self-employment during the first four months in 1948 and which he could have earned in the employ of another had he not chosen to work on his own fishing boat, to the amount of his earnings in 1947, especially since his earnings for that year appeared to be typical. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Evidence sufficient to support board’s calculation. —

Even though the employee’s actual earnings after his injuries were approximately $500 per month working alone selling real estate, a finding that those earnings did not fairly represent his wage-earning capacity was supported by evidence that he could have earned $33,000 per year if he had pursued employment at an established real estate company. Arnesen v. Anchorage Refuse, 925 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1996).

Sec. 23.30.205. Injury combined with preexisting impairment.

  1. If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin incurs a subsequent disability by injury arising out of and in the course of the employment resulting in compensation liability for disability that is substantially greater by reason of the combined effects of the preexisting impairment and subsequent injury or by reason of the aggravation of the preexisting impairment than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, the employer or the insurance carrier shall in the first instance pay all awards of compensation provided by this chapter, but the employer or the insurance carrier shall be reimbursed from the second injury fund for all compensation payments subsequent to those payable for the first 104 weeks of disability.
  2. If the subsequent injury of the employee results in the death of the employee and it is determined that the death would not have occurred except for the preexisting permanent physical impairment, the employer or the insurance carrier shall in the first instance pay the compensation prescribed by this chapter, but the employer or the insurance carrier shall be reimbursed from the second injury fund for all compensation payable in excess of 104 weeks.
  3. In order to qualify under this section for reimbursement from the second injury fund, the employer must establish by written records that the employer had knowledge of the permanent physical impairment before the subsequent injury and that the employee was retained in employment after the employer acquired that knowledge.
  4. The second injury fund may not be bound as to any question of law or fact by reason of an award or an adjudication to which it was not a party or in relation to which the director was not notified at least three weeks before the award or adjudication that the fund might be subject to liability for the injury or death.
  5. An employer or the employer’s carrier shall notify the commissioner of labor and workforce development of any possible claim against the second injury fund as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 100 weeks after the employer or the employer’s carrier has knowledge of the injury or death or after the deadline for submitting a claim for reimbursement under (f) of this section.
  6. An employer or the employer’s insurance carrier shall satisfy all requirements for reimbursement under this section, including notice of any possible claim and payment of compensation in excess of 104 weeks, before submitting a claim for reimbursement to the second injury fund. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, a claim for reimbursement may not be submitted for an injury or death that occurs after August 31, 2018, and must be submitted before October 1, 2020. An employer that qualifies for reimbursement under this section shall continue to receive reimbursement payments on claims accepted by the fund, or ordered by the board, until the fund’s liabilities for the claim are extinguished.
  7. In this section, “permanent physical impairment” means any permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed.  A condition may not be considered a “permanent physical impairment” unless
    1. it is one of the following conditions:
      1. epilepsy,
      2. diabetes,
      3. cardiac disease,
      4. arthritis,
      5. amputated foot, leg, arm, or hand,
      6. loss of sight of one or both eyes or a partial loss of uncorrected vision of more than 75 percent bilaterally,
      7. residual disability from poliomyelitis,
      8. cerebral palsy,
      9. multiple sclerosis,
      10. Parkinson’s disease,
      11. cerebral vascular accident,
      12. tuberculosis,
      13. silicosis,
      14. hemophilia,
      15. chronic osteomyelitis,
      16. osteoporosis,
      17. ankylosis of joints,
      18. hyperinsulinism,
      19. muscular dystrophies,
      20. arteriosclerosis,
      21. thrombophlebitis,
      22. varicose veins,
      23. heavy metal poisoning,
      24. ionizing radiation injury,
      25. compressed air sequelae,
      26. ruptured intervertebral disk,
      27. spondylolisthesis; or
    2. it would support a rating of disability of 200 weeks or more if evaluated according to standards applied in compensation claims.

History. (§ 7(6) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 178 SLA 1968; am § 53 ch 69 SLA 1970; am § 2 ch 45 SLA 1997; am § 56 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am §§ 15, 16 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

In 1999, in (e) of this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

In 2008, in (e) of this section, “has knowledge” was substituted for “have knowledge”.

In 2008 and 2018, subsection (g) was relettered to conform to the style of the Alaska Statutes; in 2008, (d) and (e) were also relettered; and in 2018, subsection (f) was relettered after it was enacted as (g).

Cross references. —

For provision providing that the 2018 changes to this section “apply to notice of any possible claims or claims for reimbursement submitted on or after August 25, 2018”, see sec. 24(a), ch. 91, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective August 25, 2018, in (e), added “on or after the deadline for submitting a claim for reimbursement under (g) [now (f)] of this section” at the end; added (g) [now (f)].

Notes to Decisions

Legislative intent. —

The term “compensation liability for disability” is indicative of a legislative intent to establish the Second Injury Fund as a limited reimbursement scheme for disability payments only. Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Busby, 721 P.2d 1151 (Alaska 1986).

Applicability. —

Employer’s notice to the Second Injury Fund did not merit reversal of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission’s decision as it was irrelevant to whether substantial evidence supported a decision to deny the employee additional benefits. Buchinsky v. Arc of Anchorage, — P.3d — (Alaska May 25, 2016) (memorandum decision).

1968 amendment of this section was not made retroactive by the legislature. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H & M Logging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971).

Purpose of second injury legislation, such as this section, is to equate the workers’ compensation insurance premiums for handicapped employees with those of able-bodied workers. In 1967, as now, that purpose is carried out by limiting the liability of an employer to the amount of compensation which would be due an able-bodied employee, whether or not the worker was already suffering from a disability caused by an earlier injury. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H & M Logging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971).

In interpreting this section policy underlying second injury fund systems must be kept in mind. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Standard for determining liability for formerly disabled employee's subsequent disability. —

Applying the presumption of compensability in AS 23.30.120 and the last injurious exposure rule in this section to a dispute between a carrier and its former insured, which became a self-insured employer, establishes a clear standard for determining liability for a formerly disabled employee’s subsequent disability and avoids treating employees of a self-insured employer differently from similarly situated employees of an employer with outside insurance. Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985).

Fund decreases barrier to employment. —

By making a logical and equitable adjustment of the liability assumed by the employer in hiring a handicapped person, the second injury fund removes or at least decreases one barrier to employment. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Limitation on payments. —

Second injury fund payments are limited to persons who are permanently and totally disabled. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H & M Logging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971).

Legislative intent. —

In the enactment of this section the legislature had said, in effect, that an employer should not be liable for, or pay premiums for, certain pre-existing disabilities. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Determination of liable employer. —

Subsequent employer not liable for aggravation of prior injury unless there is evidence that there was actual aggravation of the preexisting condition and that that aggravation actually was a cause of the disability. United Asphalt Paving v. Smith, 660 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1983).

Effect of subsection (a). —

Subsection (a) of this section does not affect the issue of the employer’s initial liability to the worker. It affects the extent of that liability after a compensable claim is proven. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

Under subsection (a) extent of employer’s liability is spelled out with clarity. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Employment with successive employers. —

The second employer must bear the responsibility for the worker’s compensation benefits when employment with successive employers contributes to the worker’s disability. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Fluor Alaska v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 614 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1980).

The legislature rejected apportionment formulations in second injury fund proceedings in favor of a straightforward scheme which reflects the legislature’s goals of reducing litigation and its accompanying costs. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

Liability may be imposed on a subsequent employer only after the claimant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with a preexisting condition and that this aggravation, acceleration or combination was a substantial factor contributing to the ultimate disability. The substantial factor test may normally be satisfied only by a showing of both cause-in-fact and proximate cause: that the injury would not have happened “but for” an act, omission or force and that reasonable persons would regard this act, omission or force as a cause and attach responsibility to it. Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Rogers & Babler, 747 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1987).

The statutory schedule lists some 27 conditions, plus a general category, which would normally be a detriment to the employability of the average workman. This is a legislative attempt to set up a relatively precise, objective measure of second injury fund participation. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Section to be applied according to its plain meaning. —

The legislative purpose will be best served by applying this section according to its plain meaning. This course has the advantage of avoiding subtle inquiries into the degree by which a particular pre-existing impairment affected the employability of a given workman. Such questions might otherwise become a fruitful source of litigation before the board, calling for findings as to employer attitudes and beliefs, as well as for evaluations of the employee’s job performance. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Nothing in this section implies that there must be case-by-case determination of the amount of hindrance to employment which flows from any scheduled pre-existing condition. If such an implication were to be drawn, it could seriously impede the functioning of the statutory scheme. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Physical impairments covered by section. —

The language of this section covers not only those physical impairments likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment, but also those which might be a hindrance in obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Impairment and later injury must together produce substantially greater disability. —

Under subsection (a) it is necessary that the combined effects of the earlier impairment and the later injury produce a disability substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Permanent physical impairment as matter of law. —

When the objective terms of this section are met, there is a permanent physical impairment as a matter of law. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Notice of possible claim. —

The mere knowledge that an injury has occurred does not suffice to trigger the 100-week notice period within which a second injury fund (SIF) claim must be made; only after knowledge of the possibly SIF-compensable harm to the employee can the employer be expected to notify SIF. Second Injury Fund v. Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).

Absence of arm is such a pre-existing physical impairment as to entitle the employer, as a matter of law, to reimbursement from the second injury fund. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Group v. Christ, 513 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1973).

Change in insurance carriers. —

The last injurious exposure rule adopted in Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979), that when employment with successive employers contributes to a worker’s disability, the employer at the time of the most recent injury is liable for disability payments, is equally applicable where the case involves successive insurance carriers rather than successive employers. Parker Drilling Co. v. Wester, 651 P.2d 842 (Alaska 1982).

Employer is entitled to reimbursement from fund if it produces written record from which its prior knowledge of the employee’s qualifying disability can fairly and reasonably be inferred. Sea-Land Servs. v. Second Injury Fund, 737 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1987).

The written record need not contain the exact medical terminology employed in subsection (d)(1). Sea-Land Servs. v. Second Injury Fund, 737 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1987).

Payments made under compromise and release (C&R) agreement included over 104 payments for a qualifying second injury even though the parties did not know of the existence of the second injury at the time they entered the C&R. Second Injury Fund v. Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).

Employer was not entitled to reimbursement from fund because it had not complied with the written record requirement of subsection (c), where any possible inference of the employee’s injury which a report form “yes” answer to “head or spinal injuries” might have created was negated by other answers on the form. Sea-Land Servs. v. Second Injury Fund, 737 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1987).

Resume insufficient to establish employer's knowledge. —

Employee’s resume was insufficient to establish a reasonable inference that his employer knew of his preexisting arthritis, where not only did the resume state that he had been released with “no restrictions” and that his “injury has been corrected,” it also prominently stated “disabilities: none.” Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Second Injury Fund, 755 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1988).

As are written records of union. —

Written records of a union, which had acted as a hiring agent for the employer under a collective bargaining agreement, could not be imputed to the employer for purposes of determining whether the employer had met the statutory requirement of subsection (c). Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Second Injury Fund, 755 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1988).

Written record requirement standard. —

Workers’ compensation board’s finding that employer had not produced written records from which it could have been inferred that employer had prior knowledge of employee’s qualifying impairment was inappropriate because the board applied a too-restrictive standard in evaluating whether the written-record requirement was satisfied. Veco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 189 P.3d 983 (Alaska 2008).

Former law construed. —

See Scott v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 91 F. Supp. 201, 12 Alaska 655 (D. Alaska 1950); Kennedy v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 209, 16 Alaska 117 (D. Alaska 1956).

Under former provisions, the board could not be required to order the second injury fund to compensate the claimant for an increase in permanent partial disability which resulted from the combination of two injuries. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H & M Logging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971).

This section, as it was worded in 1967, did not provide for payment from the second jury fund to a claimant suffering from permanent partial disability. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H & M Logging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971).

Applied in

State v. Tongass Bus. Ctr., Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2012).

Cited in

Moretz v. O'Neill Investigations, 783 P.2d 764 (Alaska 1989); Wells v. Swalling Constr. Co., 944 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1997); Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr., 440 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2019).

Collateral references. —

Pleading aggravation of a pre-existing physical condition in workmen’s compensation cases. 32 ALR2d 1459.

Sec. 23.30.210. Determination of wage-earning capacity. [Repealed, § 44 ch 79 SLA 1988.]

Sec. 23.30.215. Compensation for death.

  1. If the injury causes death, the compensation is known as a death benefit and is payable in the following amounts to or for the benefit of the following persons:
    1. reasonable and necessary funeral expenses not exceeding $10,000;
    2. if there is a widow or widower or a child or children of the deceased, the following percentages of the spendable weekly wages of the deceased:
      1. 80 percent for the widow or widower with no children;
      2. 50 percent for the widow or widower with one child and 40 percent for the child;
      3. 30 percent for the widow or widower with two or more children and 70 percent divided equally among the children;
      4. 100 percent for an only child when there is no widow or widower;
      5. 100 percent, divided equally, if there are two or more children and no widow or widower;
    3. if the widow or widower remarries, the widow or widower is entitled to be paid in one sum an amount equal to the compensation to which the widow or widower would otherwise be entitled in the two years commencing on the date of remarriage as full and final settlement of all sums due the widow or widower;
    4. if there is no widow or widower or child or children, then for the support of father, mother, grandchildren, brothers, and sisters, if dependent upon the deceased at the time of injury, 42 percent of the spendable weekly wage of the deceased to such beneficiaries, share and share alike, not to exceed $20,000 in the aggregate;
    5. $5,000 to a surviving widow or widower, or equally divided among surviving children of the deceased if there is no widow or widower.
  2. In computing death benefits, the spendable weekly wage of the deceased shall be computed under AS 23.30.220 and shall be paid in accordance with AS 23.30.155 and subject to the weekly maximum limitation in the aggregate as provided in AS 23.30.175 , but the total weekly compensation may not be less than $75 for a widow or widower nor less than $25 weekly to a child or $50 for children.
  3. All questions of dependency shall be determined as of the time of the injury, or death.
  4. Compensation under this chapter to aliens not residents, or about to become nonresidents, of the United States or Canada is the same in amount as provided for residents, except that dependents in a foreign country are limited to widow or widower and child or children, or if there is no widow or widower and child or children, to surviving father or mother whom the employee has supported, either wholly or in part, for a period of one year before the date of injury.  The board, at its option, or upon the application of the insurance carrier, may commute all future installments of compensation to be paid to an alien dependent who is not a resident of the United States or Canada by paying or causing to be paid to the alien dependent one-half of the commuted amount of the future installments of compensation as determined by the board.
  5. Death benefits payable to a widow or widower in accordance with (a) of this section shall abate as that person ceases to be entitled and does not inure to persons subject to continued entitlement.  In the event a child ceases to be entitled, that child’s share shall inure to the benefit of the surviving spouse subject to adjustment as provided in (f) of this section.
  6. Except as provided in (g) of this section, the death benefit payable to a widow or widower shall terminate 12 years following death of the deceased employee.
  7. The provisions of (f) of this section do not apply to a widow or widower who at the time of death of the deceased worker is permanently and totally disabled.  The death benefits payable to a widow or widower are not subject to reduction under (f) of this section after the widow or widower has attained the age of 52 years.
  8. In the event a deceased worker is survived by children of a former marriage not living with the surviving widow or widower, then those children shall receive the amount being paid under a decree of child support; the difference between this amount and the maximum benefit payable under this section shall be distributed pro rata to the remainder of those entitled.
  9. In the event the total amount of all benefits computed under (a)(2) of this section exceeds the maximum benefit provided in AS 23.30.175 , the maximum benefit under AS 23.30.175 shall be prorated among entitled survivors.

History. (§ 8 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 9 SLA 1962; am § 3 ch 99 SLA 1966; am § 1 ch 12 SLA 1968; am § 34 ch 32 SLA 1971; am § 1 ch 56 SLA 1974; am §§ 88, 89 ch 127 SLA 1974; am §§ 7 — 12 ch 83 SLA 1975; am §§ 5 — 8 ch 75 SLA 1977; am §§ 10, 11 ch 70 SLA 1983; am § 8 ch 75 SLA 1995; am §§ 18, 19 ch 105 SLA 2000; am § 2 ch 77 SLA 2010)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 16, 2010, in (a)(1), substituted “$10,000” for “$5,000”.

Editor’s notes. —

Under § 3, ch. 77, SLA 2010, the 2010 amendment of (a)(1) of this section applies “to an injury occurring on or after June 16, 2010.”

Notes to Decisions

Liberal construction. —

Normally the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act is read liberally to effectuate its beneficent purposes. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Broad coverage. —

There is a general policy of applying the coverage provisions of workers’ compensation acts broadly. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

This section lays out basic structure for death benefits. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Subsection (a) indicates percentage of deceased employee’s wages which specified claimants receive. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Subsection (b) tells how to calculate maximum limitation on death benefits. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

AS 23.30.175 contains maximum limitation on death benefits because of two things: its own language (“the weekly rate of compensation for disability or death”) and by the cross-reference from subsection (b) of this section. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Determination of maximum limitation. —

AS 23.30.175 determines the maximum limitation on death and disability payments by reference to increasing percentages of the state’s average weekly wage. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).

Explanation for explicit language of section. —

The explicit language of this section may be explained in part by the general policy of avoiding speculation in damage awards where causation is uncertain. In re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329 (Alaska 1977).

Eligibility for benefits generally. —

Compensating dependents is not the singular purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 et seq., and dependency alone is not enough under the Act to render someone eligible for benefits. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Dependency is determined according to facts and circumstances existing at time of death. In re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329 (Alaska 1977).

Sole dependency not condition of award. —

The fact that support is also furnished a child by her natural father is immaterial. A child can be dependent upon more than one person. AS 23.30.265 (6) (now AS 23.30.395 (7)) speaks only of a child who is “dependent” upon the deceased; it does not specify sole dependency as a condition of an award of compensation. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Dull, 416 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1966).

Child en ventre sa mere is legally dependent on both its parents for nourishment and support. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

A child en ventre sa mere will be considered a child in esse if it is for his benefit, and he may thereby rank as a dependent. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Means of legitimation. —

It is quite likely that acknowledgment was mentioned in AS 23.30.265 (6) (now AS 23.30.395 (7)) because it is a typical method of legitimation. But legitimation can occur under Alaska statutes by other means: subsequent intermarriage of the parents, or through a judgment of the superior court (AS 25.20.050 ). S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Child legitimated other than by acknowledgment would not be an “acknowledged illegitimate child” under AS 23.30.265 (6) (now AS 23.30.395 (7)). Compartmentally speaking, such a child might have to claim as a “posthumous child” or in some other way. If “posthumous child” were applied only to children born in wedlock, a substantial class might be excluded by a rigid interpretation of the term “acknowledged illegitimate child.” S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Illegitimate considered child of both parents. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Obligation of support. —

An illegitimate child has an inherent right, apart from any statute, to enforce against its parent an obligation of support. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Posthumous illegitimate child is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits as a dependent of the deceased. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

The term “posthumous child” in AS 23.30.265 (6) (now AS 23.30.395 (7)) includes an illegitimate posthumous child. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Terms “married” and “widow” are defined by AS 23.30.265 (19) and (32) (now AS 23.30.395 (25) and (40)). Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972).

Benefits granted to divorced wife. —

It is clear under the statutory definition of “married” that a decedent, though divorced, is “married” for the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, where the divorce decree required him to contribute to the support of his former wife. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972).

Benefits granted to survivor of same-sex couple. —

For purpose of equal protection analysis, committed same-sex surviving partners were similarly situated to widows or widowers, and death-benefits provision of Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, along with Marriage Amendment, treat those similarly situated groups differently without bearing relationship to purpose of Act. Harris v. Millennium Hotel, 330 P.3d 330 (Alaska 2014).

Benefits denied to unmarried cohabitant. —

Denial of death benefits to an unmarried cohabitant after the work-related death of her long-term partner did not deprive her of her constitutional rights, since the denial did not substantially burden her freedom to have an unmarried intimate relationship with her partner and was fairly and substantially related to the act’s goal of providing quick, efficient, fair, and predictable benefits to families of deceased workers at a reasonable cost to employers. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Unmarried cohabitant was not eligible for death benefits after the work-related death of her long-term partner, as this section provides for death benefits to “widow” of deceased, and they had never been married. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Detailed benefits scheme set out in the Workers’ Compensation Act, AS 23.30.005 et seq., suggests that the legislature did not intend to include unmarried cohabitants as beneficiaries. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Ruling that unmarried cohabitant was not eligible for death benefits after the work-related death of her long-term partner and that did not deprive her of her constitutional rights, and because the statutory spousal death benefit provision bears a close and substantial relationship to furthering a legitimate state interest, it did not violate her constitutional right to equal protection. Ranney v. Whitewater Eng'g, 122 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2005).

Applied in

Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van Biene, 847 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1993).

Quoted in

Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020).

Cited in

R. C. A. Serv. Co. v. Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964); Wien Consol. Airlines, Inc. v. Comm'r, 528 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1976); Seward Marine Servs. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493 (Alaska 1982); Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1988); Williams v. Mammoth of Alaska, 890 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1995); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. Alaska 1999); C.J. v. Dep't of Corr., 151 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2006); Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 182 P.3d 1079 (Alaska 2008); Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc., 420 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2018); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Collateral references. —

Suicide as compensable under Workmen’s Compensation Act. 15 ALR3d 616.

Construction and application of provision of liability policy, other than automobile liability, excluding from coverage injury or death of employee of insured. 34 ALR3d 1397.

Modern status of effect of state workmen’s compensation act on right of third party tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman. 100 ALR3d 350.

Sec. 23.30.220. Determination of spendable weekly wage.

  1. Computation of compensation under this chapter shall be on the basis of an employee’s spendable weekly wage at the time of injury. An employee’s spendable weekly wage is the employee’s gross weekly earnings minus payroll tax deductions. An employee’s gross weekly earnings shall be calculated as follows:
    1. if at the time of injury the employee’s earnings are calculated by the week, the weekly amount is the employee’s gross weekly earnings;
    2. if at the time of injury the employee’s earnings are calculated by the month, the employee’s gross weekly earnings are the monthly earnings multiplied by 12 and divided by 52;
    3. if at the time of injury the employee’s earnings are calculated by the year, the employee’s gross weekly earnings are the yearly earnings divided by 52;
    4. if at the time of injury the employee’s earnings are calculated by the day, by the hour, or by the output of the employee, then the employee’s gross weekly earnings are 1/50 of the total wages that the employee earned from all occupations during either of the two calendar years immediately preceding the injury, whichever is most favorable to the employee;
    5. if at the time of injury the employee’s earnings have not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the employee’s earnings for the purpose of calculating compensation are the usual wage for similar services when the services are rendered by paid employees;
    6. if at the time of injury the employee’s earnings are calculated by the week under (1) of this subsection or by the month under (2) of this subsection and the employment is exclusively seasonal or temporary, then the gross weekly earnings are 1/50 of the total wages that the employee has earned from all occupations during the 12 calendar months immediately preceding the injury;
    7. when the employee is working under concurrent contracts with two or more employers, the employee’s earnings from all employers is considered as if earned from the employer liable for compensation;
    8. if an employee when injured is a minor, an apprentice, or a trainee in a formalized training program, as determined by the board, whose wages under normal conditions would increase during the period of disability, the projected increase may be considered by the board in computing the gross weekly earnings of the employee; if the minor, apprentice, or trainee would have likely continued that training program, then the compensation shall be the average weekly wage at the time of injury rather than that based on the individual’s prior earnings;
    9. if the employee is injured while performing duties as a volunteer ambulance attendant, volunteer police officer, or volunteer firefighter, then, notwithstanding (1) — (6) of this subsection, the gross weekly earnings for calculating compensation shall be the minimum gross weekly earnings paid a full-time ambulance attendant, police officer, or firefighter employed in the political subdivision where the injury occurred, or, if the political subdivision has no full-time ambulance attendants, police officers, or firefighters, at a reasonable figure previously set by the political subdivision to make this determination, but in no case may the gross weekly earnings for calculating compensation be less than the minimum wage computed on the basis of 40 hours work per week;
    10. if an employee is entitled to compensation under AS 23.30.180 and the board determines that calculation of the employee’s gross weekly earnings under (1) — (7) of this subsection does not fairly reflect the employee’s earnings during the period of disability, the board shall determine gross weekly earnings by considering the nature of the employee’s work, work history, and resulting disability, but compensation calculated under this paragraph may not exceed the employee’s gross weekly earnings at the time of injury.
  2. The commissioner shall annually prepare formulas that shall be used to calculate an employee’s spendable weekly wage on the basis of gross weekly earnings, number of dependents, marital status, and payroll tax deductions.
  3. In this section,
    1. “seasonal work” means employment that is not intended to continue through an entire calendar year, but recurs on an annual basis;
    2. “temporary work” means employment that is not permanent, ends upon completion of the task, job, or contract, and ends within six months from the date of injury.

History. (§ 9 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 13 ch 70 SLA 1964; am § 1 ch 75 SLA 1965; am § 1 ch 41 SLA 1968; am §§ 10, 11 ch 75 SLA 1977; am § 2 ch 77 SLA 1979; am § 12 ch 70 SLA 1983; am § 37 ch 79 SLA 1988; am §§ 9, 10 ch 75 SLA 1995; am § 20 ch 105 SLA 2000; am § 57 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1989, the terms “police officer” and “fire fighter” were substituted for “policeman” and “fireman” in this section under §§ 59 and 60, ch. 50, SLA 1989.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

Several of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes.

Constitutionality. —

The gross weekly wage determination method of this section as it existed prior to the 1995 amendment created large differences in compensation between similarly situated injured workers, bore no relationship to the goal of accurately calculating an injured employee’s lost wages for purposes of determining his or her compensation, was unfair to workers whose past history did not accurately reflect their future earning capacity, and was unnecessary to achieve quickness, efficiency, or predictability. The formula expressed was not substantially related to the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act and could not survive scrutiny on even the lowest end of the sliding scale; therefore, the formula was an unconstitutional infringement on the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. Gilmore v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 882 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1994), amended, 882 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1994), limited, Dougan v. Aurora Elec., Inc., 50 P.3d 789 (Alaska 2002).

In order to determine whether subsection (a), prior to the 1995 amendment, could be constitutionally applied to a particular employee, the first question was whether a worker’s past employment history was an accurate predictor of losses due to injury. As a general matter, if past wage levels had no rational tendency to show earning capacity, application of the paragraph (a)(1) formula might be unfair to either employer or employee, but, where past wage levels were accurate predictors, the Board was required to apply the statutory formula. Thompson v. UPS, 975 P.2d 684 (Alaska 1999).

Retroactivity of amendment. —

As the 1995 amendments to this section evidence no intent that the provision be applied retrospectively, the 1988 version of subsection (a), defining spendable weekly wages, is applicable to cases where the injury occurred prior to September 4, 1995. Thompson v. UPS, 975 P.2d 684 (Alaska 1999).

Construction with other law. —

AS 23.30.220 and 23.30.175 do not conflict because they concern two distinct steps in benefit calculation. Louie v. BP Exploration Alaska, Inc., 327 P.3d 204 (Alaska 2014).

Section must be read to permit some unemployment during the 27-week period. Therefore, an injured worker who had worked for an average of 40 hours per week, even though he had periodically changed jobs during the 27 weeks preceding his injury, was entitled to some unemployment compensation commensurate with his reliably forecasted future earnings as determined by the trial court considering the employee’s irregular work schedule. Phillips v. Houston Contracting, 732 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1987).

Elements considered in making award. —

Evidence of the current and past wage earnings, including bonuses, percentages of product, and payments for overtime, as well as the commonly established or accepted standards of wages in the industry or occupation in which the injured employee has been engaged or which he may follow for a livelihood, are all factors that may be properly considered by the board in making an award. Vanney v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 12 Alaska 284 (D. Alaska 1949).

Ultimate test is, what has the employee lost in wages or compensation by reason of his injuries? That seems to be the standard which the law prescribes. Vanney v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 12 Alaska 284 (D. Alaska 1949).

Objective of this section is to formulate a fair approximation of a claimant’s probable future earning capacity during the period in which compensation benefits are to be paid. Deuser v. State, 697 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1985).

Discretion of Workers’ Compensation Board. —

See Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 740 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1987).

Basis for calculation when multiple injuries. —

In the case of a series of injuries, the injury used as the basis for the benefit rate calculation must, at a minimum, be a legal cause of the disability. Wells v. Swalling Constr. Co., 944 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1997).

Basis for temporary total disability calculation. —

Figures used in making board’s permanent total disability calculation and the nine-plus week employment period having already been upheld, the use of these figures for the employee’s temporary total disability calculation, based on the employee’s work history and future earning potential, was supported by substantial evidence. Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006).

“Average weekly wages” in AS 23.30.225(b) refers to the measure of historical earning capacity used to calculate compensation. Accordingly, it is the same as “gross weekly earnings” in this section. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1994).

Employment history as predictor of future losses. —

Where past wage levels are an accurate predictor of losses due to the injury, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board must apply the statutory formula of this section. The decision to depart from the statute must be based on substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that past wage levels will lead to an irrational workers’ compensation award. Justice v. RMH Aero Logging, Inc., 42 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2002).

Consideration of military pension in determining average weekly wage. —

See Johnson v. RCA-OMS, Inc., 681 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1984).

Increase of claimant’s earnings between injury and disability. —

The board improperly utilized AS 23.30.175(b) rather than former paragraph (a)(3) of this section in computing claimant’s average weekly wage for the purpose of establishing his permanent total disability benefits where claimant was injured in 1964 but his disability occurred in 1982, when his earnings were substantially higher. Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, 744 P.2d 663 (Alaska 1987).

AS 23.30.175 is not to be applied mechanically where to do so would negate the legislative intent underlying former paragraph (a)(3) of this section. Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, 744 P.2d 663 (Alaska 1987); Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, Inc., 756 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1988).

Board’s determination of claimant’s permanent total disability benefits was reversed and remanded for recalculation, where, because the disparity between his 1964 and 1982 weekly wages was so great, it would have been grossly unfair to apply the 1964 version of AS 23.30.175(b) ’s limitation of $81 in order to compensate him for his lost earning capacity. Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, Inc., 756 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1988).

Board must consider pay scale of similar employment at residence of claimant in determining compensation awards. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 17 Alaska 658 (D. Alaska 1958).

Calculation of earnings for volunteer policeman. —

Gross weekly earnings for calculation of benefits for an employee injured while serving as a volunteer policeman were set at the minimum gross weekly wage paid a full-time city policeman. Twiggs v. Municipality of Anchorage, 938 P.2d 1046 (Alaska 1997).

Wage rate of foreign state determines award when employee leaves Alaska. —

Where one sustains an injury in Alaska, and then removes to another state, the amount of the award of compensation is determined by the wage rate of the state to which the claimant has removed. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

It is common knowledge that many employees come to Alaska, either being recruited by contractors to work on a certain job or on their own volition to find employment at the high wages of the construction industry in Alaska, and, upon the termination of their particular job or the completion of the project, return to their home states. When those circumstances exist and the claimant, after his return, is found to be entitled to workers’ compensation based upon injury received, the rate should be based upon the amount of pay he would have received at the same type of employment in the state of his residence. Hohn v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 150 F. Supp. 519, 17 Alaska 94 (D. Alaska 1957).

Law does not contemplate payment of compensation in addition to payment of wages. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

An employer is not liable for compensation in addition to wages paid during the period of time an injured employee returns to work and receives the same rate of pay for the same number of hours of work as before the accident. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

Interest on late payment of TTD and PPI benefits. —

Employer conceded that it remained able to estimate an employee’s compensation rate under former version of this section, and to distribute benefits accordingly; the risk of erroneous estimation on the part of the employer did not demand a departure from the ordinary interest rule, and award of interest on late-paid temporary total disability and permanent partial injury benefits was proper. Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006).

Calculation of compensation under former law. —

See Johnson v. RCA-OMS, Inc., 681 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1984); Deuser v. State, 697 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1985); State Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. Gronroos, 697 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1985).

Employee’s permanent total disability compensation rate was not excessive under former version of this section; his earnings were calculated based on the average wage for the number of weeks in which he actually worked, not from the date of hiring, as he did not begin work for almost a month after that date. Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006).

Failure to make specific finding as to average weekly wage or specific impairment of earning capacity. —

Although a specific finding as to the average weekly wage or the specific impairment of earning capacity by the board would have been desirable, the failure to make one can only be deemed at most harmless error in cases where the figures used are easily determined from the decision itself. Wilson v. Erickson, 477 P.2d 998 (Alaska 1970).

Employee was properly classified as single with no dependents where his ex-wife had custody of their two children and claimed them as dependents under provisions of their divorce decree. Arnesen v. Anchorage Refuse, 925 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1996).

Calculation of compensation rate held proper. —

Workers’ compensation board’s finding that the employee was not an exclusively temporary employee under subsection (a)(6) was proper considering the number of hours he worked, his continuing relationship with the union, and his work history. The board’s application of former subsection (a)(4) to the employee’s situation was supported by evidence that he had been employed by the employer for more than 13 calendar weeks, with interruptions consistent with the nature of the work he performed. Flowline of Alaska v. Brennan, 129 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2006).

Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision to use the tree faller wage rate was supported by substantial evidence; the employee’s earning patterns were stabilizing and improving at the time of the injury, and the board correctly used the average wage rate for 1998 because that was near the time at which the employee was declared permanently and totally disabled. Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey, 130 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2006).

Social security disability offset. —

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission correctly construed and applied AS 23.30.220(a) and AS 23.30.225(b) when it calculated the Social Security Disability Offset. The Commission's construction of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act was consistent with both the purpose of keeping an employee's benefits below wages and providing adequate compensation. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2017).

Applied in

Absher v. State Dep't of Highways, 500 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 1972); Pioneer Constr. v. Conlon, 780 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1989); McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1989); Wrangell Forest Prods. v. Alderson, 786 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1990); Alcan Elec. v. Bringmann, 829 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1992).

Quoted in

Bradley v. Mercer, 563 P.2d 880 (Alaska 1977); Houston Contracting v. Phillips, 812 P.2d 598 (Alaska 1991); Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).

Stated in

Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1985).

Cited in

Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972); Seward Marine Servs. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493 (Alaska 1982); Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984); Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 856 P.2d 1155 (Alaska 1993); Bohlmann v. Alaska Constr. & Eng'g., Inc., 205 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2009).

Sec. 23.30.224. Coordination of benefits.

  1. Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, an employer’s liability for payment of weekly compensation under AS 23.30.180 or 23.30.185 to an employee eligible for a disability benefit under AS 14.25.130 , AS 39.35.400 , or 39.35.410 may not exceed the lesser of
    1. the difference between the disability benefit payable to the employee under AS 14.25.130 , AS 39.35.400 , or 39.35.410 , converted to a weekly basis, and 100 percent of the employee’s spendable weekly wage as calculated under AS 23.30.220 ; or
    2. the maximum compensation rate calculated under AS 23.30.175 .
  2. An employer’s liability for payment of compensation under AS 23.30.041(k) to an employee eligible for a disability benefit payable under AS 14.25.130 , AS 39.35.400 , or 39.35.410 may not exceed the lesser of
    1. the difference between the disability benefit payable to the employee under AS 14.25.130 , AS 39.35.400 , or 39.35.410 , converted to a weekly basis, and 80 percent of the employee’s spendable weekly wage as calculated under AS 23.30.220 ; or
    2. 105 percent of the average weekly wage calculated under AS 23.30.175(d) .
  3. Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, the liability of an employer for payment of compensation for an injury or illness under AS 23.30.180 or 23.30.185 to an employee who is covered by a union or group retirement system to which the employer makes contributions under a collective bargaining agreement or by membership in a welfare or pension plan or trust may not exceed the lesser of
    1. the difference between 100 percent of the employee’s spendable weekly wage and an amount equal to the disability benefit, disability pension, or medical retirement benefit that the employee is eligible to receive as a result of the injury or illness, as calculated on a weekly basis, under the retirement system or welfare or pension plan or trust; or
    2. the maximum compensation rate calculated under AS 23.30.175 .
  4. If the union or group retirement system, pension plan, or trust referred to in (c) of this section provides by its terms that its benefits are precluded or reduced if benefits are awarded under this chapter, the limitation provided in (c)(1) of this section is not applicable to the extent of the amount precluded or reduced.
  5. Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, the liability of an employer for payment of compensation for an injury or illness under AS 23.30.041(k) to an employee who is covered by a union or group retirement system to which the employer makes contributions under a collective bargaining agreement or by membership in a welfare or pension plan or trust may not exceed the lesser of
    1. the difference between 100 percent of the employee’s spendable weekly wage and an amount equal to the disability benefit, disability pension, or medical retirement benefit that the employee is eligible to receive as a result of the injury or illness, calculated on a weekly basis, under the retirement system or welfare or pension plan or trust; or
    2. 105 percent of the average weekly wage calculated under AS 23.30.175(d) .
  6. If the union or group retirement system, pension plan, or trust referred to in (e) of this section provides by its terms that its benefits are precluded or reduced if benefits are awarded under this chapter, the limitation provided in (e)(1) of this section is not applicable to the extent of the amount precluded or reduced.
  7. If the employee receives a lump sum distribution of disability benefits, disability pension, or medical retirement benefits, the combined workers’ compensation and weekly disability or medical retirement benefit specified in this section shall be calculated by assuming that the employee received weekly disability or medical retirement payments under the applicable plan from the date of eligibility for the disability benefit or medical retirement until the total of the weekly payments equals the amount of the lump sum, exclusive of that portion of the lump sum specifically set aside under the applicable plan for retraining expenses, medical and transportation expenses, and attorney fees or other legal costs.

History. (§ 58 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Sec. 23.30.225. Social security and pension or profit sharing plan offsets.

  1. When periodic retirement or survivors’ benefits are payable under 42 U.S.C. 401 — 433 (Title II, Social Security Act), the weekly compensation provided for in this chapter shall be reduced by an amount equal as nearly as practicable to one-half of the federal periodic benefits for a given week.
  2. When it is determined that, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 401 — 433, periodic disability benefits are payable to an employee or the employee’s dependents for an injury for which a claim has been filed under this chapter, weekly disability benefits payable under this chapter shall be offset by an amount by which the sum of (1) weekly benefits to which the employee is entitled under 42 U.S.C. 401 — 433, and (2) weekly disability benefits to which the employee would otherwise be entitled under this chapter, exceeds 80 percent of the employee’s average weekly wages at the time of injury.
  3. If employer contributions to a qualified pension or profit sharing plan have been included in the determination of gross earnings and the employee is receiving pension or profit sharing payments, weekly compensation benefits payable under this chapter shall be reduced by the amount paid or payable to the injured worker under the plan for any week or weeks during which compensation benefits are also payable. The amount of the reduction may not in any week exceed the increase in weekly compensation benefits brought about by the inclusion of employer contributions to a qualified pension or profit sharing plan in the determination of gross earnings.

History. (§ 9 ch 75 SLA 1977; am § 38 ch 79 SLA 1988)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Section not applied retroactively. —

The social security offset provided for by this section, which became effective in 1977, does not apply to a worker injured prior to the effective date of the section. Neither the express terms of the statute, nor necessary implication, require that it be given a retrospective effect. Caspersen v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 786 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1990).

“Average weekly wages” construed. —

“Average weekly wages” in subsection (b) refers to the measure of historical earning capacity used to calculate compensation. Accordingly, it is the same as “gross weekly earnings” in AS 23.30.220(a)(1) . Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1994).

“Average weekly wages” does not refer to the higher of a state historical earning capacity or average current earnings under 42 U.S.C. § 424a. Underwater Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1994).

Social security disability offset.—

Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission correctly construed and applied AS 23.30.220(a) and AS 23.30.225(b) when it calculated the Social Security Disability Offset. The Commission's construction of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act was consistent with both the purpose of keeping an employee's benefits below wages and providing adequate compensation. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Darrow, 403 P.3d 1116 (Alaska 2017).

Applied in

Green v. Kake Tribal Corp., 816 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1991).

Stated in

Dep't of Corr. v. Wozniak, 491 P.3d 1081 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Van Biene, 847 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1993).

Article 6. General Provisions.

Sec. 23.30.230. Persons not covered.

  1. The following persons are not covered by this chapter:
    1. a part-time babysitter;
    2. a cleaning person;
    3. harvest help and similar part-time or transient help;
    4. a person employed as a sports official on a contractual basis and who officiates only at sports events in which the players are not compensated; in this paragraph, “sports official” includes an umpire, referee, judge, scorekeeper, timekeeper, organizer, or other person who is a neutral participant in a sports event;
    5. a person employed as an entertainer on a contractual basis;
    6. a commercial fisherman, as defined in AS 16.05.940 ;
    7. an individual who drives a taxicab and whose compensation and written contractual arrangement is as described in AS 23.10.055(a)(13) , unless the hours worked by the individual or the areas in which the individual may work are restricted except to comply with local ordinances;
    8. a participant in the Alaska temporary assistance program (AS 47.27) who is engaged in work activities required under AS 47.27.035 other than subsidized or unsubsidized work or on-the-job training;
    9. a person employed as a player or coach by a professional hockey team if the person is covered under a health care insurance plan provided by the professional hockey team, the coverage is applicable to both work-related and nonwork-related injuries, and the coverage provides medical and related benefits as required under this chapter, except that coverage may not be limited to two years from the date of injury as described under AS 23.30.095(a) ; in this paragraph, “health care insurance” has the meaning given in AS 21.12.050 ;
    10. a person working as a qualified real estate licensee who performs services under a written contract that provides that the person will not be treated as an employee for federal income tax or workers’ compensation purposes; in this paragraph, “qualified real estate licensee” means a person who is required to be licensed under AS 08.88.161 and whose payment for services is directly related to sales or other output rather than the number of hours worked;
    11. a transportation network company driver who provides a prearranged ride or is otherwise logged onto the digital network of a transportation network company as a driver; and
    12. a person employed as an independent contractor; a person is an independent contractor for the purposes of this section only if the person
      1. has an express contract to perform the services;
      2. is free from direction and control over the means and manner of providing services, subject only to the right of the individual for whom, or entity for which, the services are provided to specify the desired results, completion schedule, or range of work hours, or to monitor the work for compliance with contract plans and specifications, or federal, state, or municipal law;
      3. incurs most of the expenses for tools, labor, and other operational costs necessary to perform the services, except that materials and equipment may be supplied;
      4. has an opportunity for profit and loss as a result of the services performed for the other individual or entity;
      5. is free to hire and fire employees to help perform the services for the contracted work;
      6. has all business, trade, or professional licenses required by federal, state, or municipal authorities for a business or individual engaging in the same type of services as the person;
      7. follows federal Internal Revenue Service requirements by
        1. obtaining an employer identification number, if required;
        2. filing business or self-employment tax returns for the previous tax year to report profit or income earned for the same type of services provided under the contract; or
        3. intending to file business or self-employment tax returns for the current tax year to report profit or income earned for the same type of services provided under the contract if the person’s business was not operating in the previous tax year; and
      8. meets at least two of the following criteria:
        1. the person is responsible for the satisfactory completion of services that the person has contracted to perform and is subject to liability for a failure to complete the contracted work, or maintains liability insurance or other insurance policies necessary to protect the employees, financial interests, and customers of the person’s business;
        2. the person maintains a business location or a business mailing address separate from the location of the individual for whom, or the entity for which, the services are performed;
        3. the person provides contracted services for two or more different customers within a 12-month period or engages in any kind of business advertising, solicitation, or other marketing efforts reasonably calculated to obtain new contracts to provide similar services.
  2. The exclusion of certain persons under (a) of this section may not be construed to require inclusion of other persons as employees for purposes of compensation under this chapter.
  3. In this section,
    1. “digital network” has the meaning given in AS 28.23.180 ;
    2. “on-the-job training” means training provided by an employer under a formal agreement with a department of the state, or an agent of a department, for which wages are paid by the employer to a participant in the Alaska temporary assistance program (AS 47.27) while the participant receives job training;
    3. “prearranged ride” has the meaning given in AS 28.23.180 ;
    4. “subsidized work” means employment, by an employer, of an Alaska temporary assistance program participant in a work placement for which the participant receives wages from the employer, subsidized by, and subject to an agreement between the employer and, a department of the state or an agent of a department; “subsidized work” does not include community work service, job sampling placements, or preplacement activities such as job readiness assessments, job searches, education, or vocational training;
    5. “transportation network company” has the meaning given in AS 28.23.180;
    6. “transportation network company driver” or “driver” has the meaning given in AS 28.23.180.
    7. “unsubsidized work” means employment, by an employer, secured by an Alaska temporary assistance program participant, with or without the assistance of a department of the state or an agent of a department, for which the participant receives wages from the employer; “unsubsidized work” does not include self-employment.

History. (§ 33(3) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 47 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 77 SLA 1986; am § 4 ch 13 SLA 1993; am § 1 ch 72 SLA 1994; am §§ 3, 4 ch 45 SLA 1997; am § 1 ch 69 SLA 1998; am § 1 ch 85 SLA 2006; am §§ 4, 5 ch 10 SLA 2017; am § 17 ch 91 SLA 2018; am § 78 ch 13 SLA 2019)

Revisor's notes. —

Paragraph (a)(6) was enacted as (b). Renumbered as (a)(5) and minor word changes made in 1986. Renumbered again as (a)(6) in the 1994 amendment.

In 2005, in paragraph (a)(7), “AS 23.10.055 (a)(13)” was substituted for “AS 23.10.055 (13)” to reflect the addition of AS 23.10.055(b) and (c) by § 2, ch. 90, SLA 2005.

Paragraphs (c)(1), (3), (5), and (6) were enacted as (c)(4) — (7); renumbered in 2017, at which time former paragraphs (c)(1) — (3) were renumbered as (c)(2), (4), and (7).

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective June 16, 2017, added (a)(11), and made a related change; added (c)(4) — (7) [now (c)(1), (3), (5), and (6)].

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, added (a)(12), and made related changes.

The 2019 amendment, effective October 17, 2019, made a stylistic change in (a)(1), in (a)(7) inserted “and” following “taxicab”.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Where a floating processor works exclusively outside of Alaska territorial waters, Jones Act remedies are available to injured employees, but where an employee vessel has significant contacts with a state, it probably will be necessary for the employer to provide for workers’ compensation coverage. January 26, 1989 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Stated in

Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967); Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001); Lum v. Koles, 426 P.3d 1103 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967); Eldridge v. Felec Servs, Inc., 920 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. Alaska 1990); Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Northwest Cedar Structures, Inc., 153 P.3d 336 (Alaska 2007).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 154, 156, 157.

99 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 69.

Award of workers’ compensation benefits to professional athletes. 112 ALR5th 365.

Application of workers’ compensation laws to illegal aliens. 121 ALR5th 523.

Sec. 23.30.235. Cases in which no compensation is payable.

Compensation under this chapter may not be allowed for an injury

  1. proximately caused by the employee’s wilful intent to injure or kill any person;
  2. proximately caused by intoxication of the injured employee or proximately caused by the employee being under the influence of drugs unless the drugs were taken as prescribed by the employee’s physician.

History. (§ 33(2) ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 20 ch 93 SLA 1982)

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Notes to Decisions

Addiction as injury. —

An employee was denied workers’ compensation benefits for drug addiction due to prescription painkillers prescribed for work-related headaches; but, where addiction to drugs or alcohol is itself the injury claimed by a worker, the statute does not act to bar a claim. Parris-Eastlake v. Dep't of Law, 26 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2001).

Stated in

Adams v. State, 467 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 65, 254-257.

Effect of allegation that injury was caused by, or occurred during course of, worker’s illegal conduct. 73 ALR4th 270.

Sec. 23.30.236. Members of the organized militia as employees.

  1. A member of the organized militia who has been ordered into active state service by the governor under AS 26.05.070 or ordered into training under AS 26.05.100 , and who suffers an injury, disability, or death in the line of duty, is an employee of the state for purposes of this chapter.
  2. The gross weekly earnings for members of the organized militia are calculated using the methods prescribed under AS 26.05.260(h) .

History. (§ 1 ch 83 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 1, ch. 83, SLA 2018, which enacted this section, took effect on November 11, 2018.

Sec. 23.30.237. High school students in work-study programs as employees of the state.

An individual who is enrolled for credit at a public high school in a course that combines academic instruction with work experience outside the school for a public or private nonprofit employer is an employee of the state for the purposes of this chapter while the individual is performing the work experience. Weekly compensation for disability or death under this section may not be less than the initial payment of compensation under AS 23.30.175 .

History. (§ 1 ch 65 SLA 1980)

Sec. 23.30.238. Volunteer emergency medical technicians as employees.

  1. A person who is injured during the course and within the scope of providing service as a volunteer emergency medical technician is an employee of the state for purposes of this chapter if the person
    1. is certified by the state under AS 18.08 as an emergency medical technician or is an active roster volunteer member of a state certified emergency medical service and is registered with the Department of Health and Social Services;
    2. provides emergency medical service outside an incorporated city or borough; and
    3. is not otherwise covered for that injury by an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy or self-insurance certificate.
  2. The gross weekly earnings for a person receiving benefits under this section shall be the minimum gross weekly earnings paid a full-time emergency medical technician employed in the city or borough nearest to the place where the injury occurred, or, if the nearest city or borough has no full-time emergency medical technician, at a reasonable figure previously set by the nearest city or borough to make this determination, but in no case may the gross weekly earnings for calculating compensation be less than the minimum wage computed on the basis of 40 hours of work a week.

History. (§ 1 ch 25 SLA 1992)

Sec. 23.30.239. Sole proprietors and partners as employees.

  1. A person who is a sole proprietor, or a member of a partnership, may elect coverage as an employee under this chapter by making written application to an insurer.  The insurer may accept the application and fix an assumed monthly wage at which the person shall be carried on the payroll for purposes of this chapter.
  2. When the application is accepted, the person is subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this chapter.  The person shall promptly notify the insurer whenever there is a change in the status of the person as a sole proprietor or partner.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of AS 23.30.120(a) , a person covered under (a) of this section bears the burden of proof of the validity of the claim.
  4. A person who has elected coverage under (a) of this section may cancel the election by giving written notice to the insurer.  Notwithstanding AS 23.30.030 (5), the cancellation becomes effective the day following the filing of notice with the insurer.

History. (§ 2 ch 47 SLA 1986)

Sec. 23.30.240. Officers of corporations, municipal corporations, and nonprofit corporations, and members of limited liability companies as employees.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, an executive officer elected or appointed and empowered in accordance with the charter and bylaws of a corporation or a member of a limited liability company organized under AS 10.50 is not an employee of the business entity under this chapter if the executive officer or member owns at least 10 percent of the business entity. Except as provided in (b) of this section, an executive officer of a municipal corporation or charitable, religious, educational, or other nonprofit corporation is not an employee of the corporation under this chapter.
  2. Any type of corporation or limited liability company may bring an executive officer or a member exempted under (a) of this section within the coverage of the business entity’s insurance contract by specifically including the executive officer or member in the contract of insurance. The election to bring the executive officer or member within the business entity’s coverage continues in force for the period during which the contract of insurance is in effect. During that period, an executive officer or a member brought within the coverage of the insurance contract is an employee of the business entity under this chapter.

History. (§ 2(8) ch 193 SLA 1959; am ch 148 SLA 1962; am §§ 59, 60 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am § 18 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Revisor's notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the changes to this section by sec. 18, ch. 91, SLA 2018, effective August 1, 2019, to an insurance policy or contract, see sec. 24(b), ch. 91, SLA 2018, in the 2018 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For compensation, medical benefits, and proceedings before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, see 8 AAC 45.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective August 1, 2019, rewrote the section.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Witmer v. Kellen, 884 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1994).

Stated in

Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).

Collateral references. —

81 Am. Jur. 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, § 177.

Sec. 23.30.241. Special officers as employees.

  1. A special officer appointed under AS 18.65.010(a) is considered an employee under this chapter only when the person is actually traveling or working as a special officer.  The weekly wage earned in the special officer’s regular employment shall be used in computing the amount of compensation to be awarded.  If a special officer has no regular employment, the minimum wage paid a full-time state trooper shall be used in computing the amount of compensation to be awarded.
  2. Annual appropriations to fund the coverage provided for in (a) of this section shall be provided for in the budget of the Department of Public Safety.

History. (§ 1 ch 6 SLA 1978)

Sec. 23.30.242. Members of state boards and commissions as employees.

  1. A member of a state board or commission is considered an employee under this chapter only while the member is actually traveling or working as a member of the board or commission. The maximum weekly wage shall be used in computing the amount of compensation to be awarded.
  2. Annual appropriations to fund the coverage provided for in (a) of this section shall be provided for in the budget of the Office of the Governor.

History. (§ 1 ch 105 SLA 1969; am § 54 ch 69 SLA 1970)

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Collateral references. —

Public officers as within statute. 5 ALR2d 415.

Sec. 23.30.243. Extending coverage to certain firefighters.

  1. For the purposes of workers’ compensation any injury, disability or death incurred by a firefighter by reason of the firefighter’s participation in authorized training, proceeding to or engaging in a fire suppression or rescue operation, or the protection or preservation of life or property, anywhere in the state is considered to have arisen out of and been sustained in the course of employment, and the fire department or regularly organized volunteer fire department of the firefighter’s primary employment or registration is considered to be the employer, except when the injured, at the time of injury or death, is acting for compensation from another.
  2. Nothing in this section requires the extension of benefits to a firefighter employed by a municipality which by law or regulation expressly prohibits the activity giving rise to the injury, disability, or death.

History. (§ 1 ch 29 SLA 1973; am § 1 ch 94 SLA 1994)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1989, the term “fire fighter” was substituted for “fireman” in this section under § 60, ch. 50, SLA 1989.

Sec. 23.30.244. Emergency and disaster relief forces as state employees.

  1. A resident of this state temporarily engaged as a civilian volunteer in an emergency or a disaster relief function in another state or country who suffers injury or death during the course and within the scope of providing emergency or disaster relief aid is considered an employee of this state for purposes of this chapter if, at the time of the injury or death, the volunteer
    1. is an active roster civilian volunteer member of a state-certified emergency force and is registered with the state division of homeland security and emergency management in the Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs;
    2. is providing services under AS 26.23.136 during an emergency or disaster; and
    3. is not otherwise covered for that injury or death by an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy or self-insurance certificate.
  2. A resident of this state temporarily engaged as a civilian volunteer in a disaster emergency relief function in this state who suffers injury or death during the course and within the scope of providing disaster emergency relief aid is considered an employee of the state for purposes of this chapter if, at the time of the injury or death, the volunteer
    1. is an active roster civilian volunteer member of an emergency service organization whose services were requested by the division of homeland security and emergency management in the Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs;
    2. is providing services requested by the Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs during a disaster emergency declared under AS 26.20.040 or AS 26.23.020 ;
    3. is not an employee of an agency of the United States, this state, or a political subdivision of this state; and
    4. is not otherwise covered for that injury or death by an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy or self-insurance certificate.
  3. The gross weekly earnings for a resident of this state temporarily engaged as a civilian volunteer under this section are the minimum gross weekly earnings paid to an employee employed by this state to perform equivalent work, or, if an employee is not employed by this state to perform equivalent work, the state average weekly wage, but the gross weekly earnings for calculating compensation may not be less than the minimum wage computed on the basis of 40 hours of work a week.

History. (§ 1 ch 104 SLA 1977; am § 39 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 1 ch 55 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, in (a)(1) and (b)(1) of this section, “division of emergency services” was changed to “division of homeland security and emergency management” in accordance with § 26(b), ch. 179, SLA 2004.

Sec. 23.30.245. Invalid agreements.

  1. An agreement by an employee to pay a portion of the premium paid by the employer to a carrier or to contribute to a benefit fund or department maintained by the employer for the purpose of providing compensation or medical services and supplies as required by this chapter is not valid.  An employer who makes a deduction for this purpose from the pay of an employee entitled to the benefits of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000.
  2. An agreement by an employee to waive the right to compensation under this chapter is not valid.

History. (§ 14 ch 193 SLA 1959)

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Eldridge v. Felec Servs, Inc., 920 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. Alaska 1990); Metcalfe Invs. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).

Sec. 23.30.246. Search and rescue personnel as state employees.

  1. A resident of the state who temporarily volunteers to participate in a search and rescue training exercise or a search and rescue activity and who suffers injury or death during the course and within the scope of training for or providing search and rescue services is considered an employee of the state for purposes of this chapter if, at the time of the injury or death, the volunteer
    1. is an authorized participant in a search and rescue training exercise under AS 18.60.115 or a search and rescue activity under AS 18.60.120 ; and
    2. is not otherwise covered for that injury or death by an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy or self-insurance certificate.
  2. Notwithstanding the methods for calculating an employee’s gross weekly earnings under AS 23.30.220 , the gross weekly earnings for a resident of the state temporarily engaged as a volunteer under (a) of this section are equal to the state average weekly wage.

History. (§ 6 ch 98 SLA 2008)

Effective dates. —

Section 6, ch. 98, SLA 2008, which enacted this section, became effective September 14, 2008.

Sec. 23.30.247. Discrimination prohibited.

  1. An employer may not discriminate in hiring, promotion, or retention policies or practices against an employee who has in good faith filed a claim for or received benefits under this chapter. An employer who violates this section is liable to the employee for damages to be assessed by the court in a private civil action.
  2. This section may not be construed to prevent an employer from basing hiring, promotion, or retention policies or practices on considerations of the employee’s safety practices or the employee’s physical and mental abilities; nor may this section be construed so as to create employment rights not otherwise in existence.
  3. This section may not be construed to prohibit an employer from requiring a prospective employee to fill out a preemployment questionnaire or application regarding the person’s prior health or disability history as long as it is meant to determine whether the employee has the physical or mental capacity to meet the documented physical or mental demands of the work.

History. (§ 40 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 19 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective September 1, 2018, in (c), deleted “either document written notice for second injury fund reimbursement under AS 23.30.205(c) or” following “as it is meant to”.

Collateral references. —

Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claim. 32 ALR4th 1221.

Sec. 23.30.250. Penalties for fraudulent or misleading acts; damages in civil actions.

  1. A person who (1) knowingly makes a false or misleading statement, representation, or submission related to a benefit under this chapter; (2) knowingly assists, abets, solicits, or conspires in making a false or misleading submission affecting the payment, coverage, or other benefit under this chapter; (3) knowingly misclassifies employees or engages in deceptive leasing practices for the purpose of evading full payment of workers’ compensation insurance premiums; or (4) employs or contracts with a person or firm to coerce or encourage an individual to file a fraudulent compensation claim is civilly liable to a person adversely affected by the conduct, is guilty of theft by deception as defined in AS 11.46.180 , and may be punished as provided by AS 11.46.120 11.46.150 .
  2. If the board, after a hearing, finds that a person has obtained compensation, medical treatment, or another benefit provided under this chapter, or that a provider has received a payment, by knowingly making a false or misleading statement or representation for the purpose of obtaining that benefit, the board shall order that person to make full reimbursement of the cost of all benefits obtained. Upon entry of an order authorized under this subsection, the board shall also order that person to pay all reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the employer and the employer’s carrier in obtaining an order under this section and in defending any claim made for benefits under this chapter. If a person fails to comply with an order of the board requiring reimbursement of compensation and payment of costs and attorney fees, the employer may declare the person in default and proceed to collect any sum due as provided under AS 23.30.170(b) and (c).
  3. To the extent allowed by law, in a civil action under (a) of this section, an award of damages by a court or jury may include compensatory damages and an award of three times the amount of damages sustained by the person, subject to AS 09.17. Attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing party as allowed by law.

History. (§ 29 ch 193 SLA 1959; am § 21 ch 93 SLA 1982; am § 11 ch 75 SLA 1995; am §§ 61, 62 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Standard of proof. —

Considering the three Mathews factors for determining whether a standard of proof is appropriate, the presumption of statutory validity, the standards of proof used in civil fraud cases, and the nature of the civil cases in which a heightened standard of proof has been found to be constitutionally required, employing a preponderance standard in AS 23.30.250(b) cases does not violate due process. Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003).

In employer’s claim for reimbursement of workers’ compensation benefits based on employee’s fraud, the parties’ had no heightened liberty interest, therefore, preponderance of the evidence was the appropriate standard of proof. Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003).

Intent to defraud. —

The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission properly upheld a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board denying an employer’s petition alleging an employee fraudulently obtained workers’ compensation benefits. The board’s finding that the employee did not subjectively believe she misrepresented her employment status was a credibility determination that, under AS 23.30.128(b) , was binding on the commission and determinative of whether the employee intended to defraud the employer. Arctec Servs. v. Cummings, 295 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2013).

Employer denied reimbursement of benefits absent employee’s intentional misrepresentation. —

Employee suffered an injury to his arm and shoulder while operating a grader, and a physician observed weakness and loss of mobility, noting that operating a grader would cause the employee pain; employer was not entitled to reimbursement of benefits based on a private investigator’s film showing the employee engaging in various activities inconsistent with his claims of debilitating shoulder pain where the employer failed to show that the employee made any intentional misrepresentations. Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon, 124 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2005).

Effect of employee’s nondisclosure of part-time work. —

Where an employee worked part-time while receiving workers’ compensation benefits for a shoulder injury, the nondisclosure of his work was not a “false statement or representation”; the Workers’ Compensation Board erred by ordering the employee to reimburse his employer for workers’ compensation benefits he received for the entire time he was working and by ordering him to pay the employer’s attorney fees. Common law fraud elements were not applicable, an affirmative false statement or representation must be a causal factor in the employer’s payment of workers’ compensation benefits to constitute fraud, and the appeal was not frivolous. Shehata v. Salvation Army, 225 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2010).

Cited in

Blas v. State, 331 P.3d 363 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 23.30.255. Penalty for failure to pay compensation.

  1. An employer required to secure the payment of compensation under this chapter who fails to do so is guilty of a class B felony if the amount involved exceeds $25,000 or a class C felony if the amount involved is $25,000 or less.  If the employer is a corporation, its president, secretary, and treasurer are also severally liable to the fine or imprisonment imposed for the failure of the corporation to secure the payment of compensation.  The president, secretary, and treasurer are severally personally liable, jointly with the corporation, for the compensation or other benefit which accrues under this chapter in respect to an injury which happens to an employee of the corporation while it has failed to secure the payment of compensation as required by AS 23.30.075 .
  2. An employer who knowingly transfers, sells, encumbers, assigns, or in any manner disposes of, conceals, secretes, or destroys any property after one of the employer’s employees has been injured within the scope of this chapter, with intent to avoid the payment of compensation under this chapter to the employee or the employee’s dependents, is guilty of a class B felony if the amount involved exceeds $25,000 or a class C felony if the amount involved is $25,000 or less.  If the employer is a corporation, its president, secretary, and treasurer are also severally liable to the penalty of imprisonment as well as jointly liable with the corporation for the fine.
  3. This section does not affect any other liability of the employer under this chapter.

History. (§ 31 ch 193 SLA 1959; am §§ 22, 23 ch 93 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1996, in subsection (b), “employee’s dependents” was substituted for “employer’s dependents” to correct an error that occurred in 1984 when personal pronouns were deleted pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982.

Cross references. —

For fines and sentences for class B and C felonies, see AS 12.55.035 and 12.55.125 .

Notes to Decisions

Stated in

Richard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1963).

Cited in

Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963); Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 740 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1987).

Collateral references. —

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 66.

101 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 913.

Sec. 23.30.260. Penalty for receiving unapproved fees and soliciting.

  1. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is punishable for each offense by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both, if the person
    1. receives a fee, other consideration, or a gratuity on account of any services rendered for representation or advice with respect to a claim, unless the consideration or gratuity is approved by the board or the court; or
    2. makes it a business to solicit employment for a lawyer or for the person making the solicitation with respect to a claim or award for compensation.
  2. Notwithstanding AS 23.30.145 and (a) of this section, approval of a fee is not required if
    1. the fee does not exceed $300 and is a one-time-only charge to an employee by an attorney licensed in this state who performed legal services with respect to the employee’s claim but did not enter an appearance; or
    2. the parties who reach an agreement in regard to a claim for injury or death under this chapter agree to the payment of attorney fees, and the agreement in regard to a claim for injury or death does not require board approval under AS 23.30.012 .

History. (§ 26(2) ch 193 SLA 1959; am §§ 63, 64 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am § 20 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2018, subsection (b) was reorganized to add paragraphs; paragraph (b)(2) was enacted as subsection (c) and renumbered at that time.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, added (c) [now (b)(2)].

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Rose v. Alaskan Village, 412 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1966); Dep't of Corr. v. Wozniak, 491 P.3d 1081 (Alaska 2021).

Cited in

McShea v. State, Dep't of Labor, 685 P.2d 1242 (Alaska 1984); Hulsey v. Johnson & Holen, 814 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1991); State, Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enters., LLC, 338 P.3d 316 (Alaska 2014).

Sec. 23.30.263. Immunity from civil liability for workplace safety inspections.

An employer’s safety inspector is not liable for civil damages for an injury to an employee of that employer resulting from an act or omission in performing or failing to perform a loss control service, a workplace safety inspection, or a safety advisory service provided in connection with an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage, unless the act or failure to act constitutes intentional misconduct. In this section, “safety inspector” means

  1. a carrier and an employee or agent of the carrier;
  2. a trade association of which the employer is a member; or
  3. a person providing adjusting or inspection services to an employer who is a member of an association established under AS 21.76.010 or to an employer who is self-insured under AS 23.30.090 .

History. (§ 12 ch 75 SLA 1995)

Sec. 23.30.265. [Renumbered as AS 23.30.395.]

Sec. 23.30.270. [Renumbered as AS 23.30.400.]

Sec. 23.30.280. Investigation of fraud; staffing.

  1. The director shall establish a section within the division for the investigation of fraudulent or misleading acts under AS 23.30.250 and other fraudulent acts relating to workers’ compensation.
  2. The director may investigate facts reported under this section and may refer facts indicating a possible violation of law to the appropriate prosecutor or agency. If the director determines that there is credible evidence that a person obtained a payment, compensation, medical treatment, or other benefit provided under this chapter by a fraudulent act or false or misleading statement or representation as provided in AS 23.30.250(a) , the director shall notify the affected employer, insurer, and adjuster upon conclusion of the investigation. If the fraudulent act or false or misleading statement or representation was perpetrated against the division, the director may file a petition as provided in AS 23.30.110 for an order of forfeiture against the person, precluding, in whole or in part, the person from future payment, compensation, medical treatment, or other benefit provided under this chapter.
  3. The director shall establish a toll-free fraud hotline to receive calls relating to fraudulent or misleading acts under this chapter. The director shall publicize the availability of the toll-free fraud hotline and encourage the public to provide information to the division relating to fraudulent or misleading acts relating to workers’ compensation.
  4. The section established by the director under (a) of this section shall include not less than two full-time investigators with the primary responsibility of investigating fraudulent or misleading acts relating to workers’ compensation. The director shall also ensure that there are sufficient personnel to staff the toll-free fraud hotline established under (c) of this section.
  5. Except as provided in (f) of this section, a person is not liable for civil damages for filing a report concerning a suspected, anticipated, or completed fraudulent act or a false or misleading statement or representation with, or for furnishing other information, whether written or oral, concerning a suspected, anticipated, or completed fraudulent act or false or misleading statements or representation to
    1. law enforcement officials or their agents and employees;
    2. the division of workers’ compensation, the division of insurance in the Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, or an agency in another state that regulates insurance or workers’ compensation;
    3. an insurer or adjuster or its agents, employees, or designees, or the risk manager of a self-insured employer under this chapter.
  6. The provisions of (e) of this section do not preclude liability for civil damages as described in (e) of this section if the liability arose as a result of gross negligence or reckless or intentional misconduct.
  7. The papers, reports, documents, and evidence received under this section or in an investigation arising from information received under this section are not subject to public inspection for so long as the director considers confidentiality to be in the public interest or reasonably necessary to complete an investigation or protect the person investigated from unwarranted injury. Papers, reports, documents, and other evidence related to an investigation under this section are confidential.
  8. If the material that the director seeks to obtain is located outside the state, the material may be made available to the director to examine at the place where the material is located. The director may designate representatives, including officials of the state in which the material is located, to inspect the material on behalf of the director. The director may respond to a request from an official of another state for similar material.
  9. Papers, reports, documents, and other evidence related to an investigation under this section are not subject to subpoena unless, after notice to the director and a hearing, a court determines that the director would not be unduly hindered by public inspection.

History. (§ 65 ch 10 FSSLA 2005)

Notes to Decisions

Immunity. —

When an employee claimed various parties conspired to present the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board a video falsely depicting the employee's physical abilities, in an attempt to terminate the employee's workers' compensation benefits, it was error to dismiss the employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because, inter alia, an employer's investigator was not immune under AS 23.30.280(e) , as the employee (1) provided enough evidence to show that a material factual dispute existed about the accuracy of the edited video and the manner in which the employer's investigator created it, and (2) presented more than generalized claims of emotional distress. Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255 (Alaska 2016).

Sec. 23.30.395. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “adoption” or “adopted” means legal adoption before the time of the injury;
  2. “arising out of and in the course of employment” includes employer-required or supplied travel to and from a remote job site; activities performed at the direction or under the control of the employer; and employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities; but excludes recreational league activities sponsored by the employer, unless participation is required as a condition of employment, and activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities;
  3. “attending physician” means one of the following designated by the employee under AS 23.30.095(a) or (b):
    1. a licensed medical doctor;
    2. a licensed doctor of osteopathy;
    3. a licensed dentist or dental surgeon;
    4. a licensed physician assistant acting under supervision of a licensed medical doctor or doctor of osteopathy;
    5. a licensed advanced practice registered nurse ; or
    6. a licensed chiropractor;
  4. “board” means the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board;
  5. “brother” and “sister” include stepbrothers and stepsisters, half brothers and half sisters, and brothers and sisters by adoption, but do not include married brothers and married sisters unless wholly dependent on the employee;
  6. “carrier” means a person authorized to insure under this chapter and includes self-insurers;
  7. “child” includes a posthumous child, a child legally adopted before the injury of the employee, a child in relation to whom the deceased employee stood in loco parentis for at least one year before the time of injury, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent on the employee;
  8. “child,” “grandchild,” “brother,” and “sister,” include only persons who are under 19 years of age, persons who, though 19 years of age or over, are wholly dependent upon the deceased employee and incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability, and persons of any age while they are attending the first four years of vocational school, trade school, or college, and persons of any age while they are attending high school;
  9. “chronic debilitating pain” means pain that is of more than six months duration and that is of sufficient severity that it significantly restricts the employee’s ability to perform the activities of daily living;
  10. “commission” means the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission;
  11. “commissioner” means the commissioner of labor and workforce development;
  12. “compensation” means the money allowance payable to an employee or the dependents of the employee as provided for in this chapter, and includes the funeral benefits provided for in this chapter;
  13. “death” as a basis for a right to compensation means only death resulting from an injury;
  14. “department” means the Department of Labor and Workforce Development;
  15. “director” means the director of the division of workers’ compensation in the department;
  16. “disability” means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment;
  17. “division” means the division of workers’ compensation in the department;
  18. “drugs” means a controlled substance as defined by law;
  19. “employee” means a person who is not an independent contractor as described in AS 23.30.230 and who, under a contract of hire, express or implied, is employed by an employer;
  20. “employer” means the state or its political subdivision or a person employing one or more persons in connection with a business or industry coming within the scope of this chapter and carried on in this state;
  21. “grandchild” means a child as defined in (7) of this section;
  22. “gross earnings” means periodic payments, by an employer to an employee for employment before any authorized or lawfully required deduction or withholding of money by the employer, including compensation that is deferred at the option of the employee, and excluding irregular bonuses, reimbursement of expenses, expense allowances, and any benefit or payment to the employee that is not fully taxable to the employee during the pay period, except that the total amount of contributions made by an employer to a qualified pension or profit sharing plan during the two plan years preceding the injury, multiplied by the percentage of the employee’s vested interest in the plan at the time of injury, shall be included in the determination of gross earnings; the value of room and board if taxable to the employee may be considered in determining gross earnings; however, the value of room and board that would raise an employee’s gross weekly earning above the state average weekly wage at the time of injury may not be considered;
  23. “gross weekly earnings” means gross weekly earnings as calculated under AS 23.30.220(a) ;
  24. “injury” means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and an occupational disease or infection that arises naturally out of the employment or that naturally or unavoidably results from an accidental injury; “injury” includes breakage or damage to eyeglasses, hearing aids, dentures, or any prosthetic devices that function as part of the body and further includes an injury caused by the wilful act of a third person directed against an employee because of the employment;
  25. “married” includes a person who is divorced but is required by the decree of divorce to contribute to the support of the former spouse;
  26. “medical and related benefits” includes but is not limited to physicians’ fees, nurses’ charges, hospital services, hospital supplies, medicine and prosthetic devices, physical rehabilitation, and treatment for the fitting and training for use of such devices as may reasonably be required which arises out of or is necessitated by an injury, and transportation charges to the nearest point where adequate medical facilities are available;
  27. “medical services review committee” means the committee established under AS 23.30.095(j) ;
  28. “medical stability” means the date after which further objectively measurable improvement from the effects of the compensable injury is not reasonably expected to result from additional medical care or treatment, notwithstanding the possible need for additional medical care or the possibility of improvement or deterioration resulting from the passage of time; medical stability shall be presumed in the absence of objectively measurable improvement for a period of 45 days; this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence;
  29. “palliative care” means medical care or treatment rendered to reduce or moderate temporarily the intensity of pain caused by an otherwise stable medical condition, but does not include those medical services rendered to diagnose, heal, or permanently alleviate or eliminate a medical condition;
  30. “parent” includes stepparents and parents by adoption, parents-in-law, and a person who for more than three years before the death of the deceased employee stood in the place of a parent to the employee, if dependent on the injured employee;
  31. “payroll taxes” means
    1. the amount that would be withheld under withholding tables in effect on the January 1 preceding the injury under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and regulations issued under the code, as though the employee had claimed the maximum number of dependents for actual dependency, blindness, and old age to which the employee is entitled on the date on which the employee is injured; and
    2. the amount that is or would be deducted or withheld as of the January 1 preceding the injury under the Social Security Act of 1935 as amended from the amount of earnings of the employee at the time of the injury as if the earnings were earned at the beginning of the calendar year in which the employee was injured and regardless of whether the amount was actually withheld or the earnings were subject to withholding;
  32. “physician” includes doctors of medicine, surgeons, chiropractors, osteopaths, dentists, and optometrists;
  33. “prosthetic devices” includes but is not limited to eye glasses, hearing aids, dentures, and such other devices and appliances, and the repair or replacement of the devices necessitated by ordinary wear and arising out of an injury;
  34. “regularly organized volunteer fire department” means a volunteer fire department registered with the state fire marshal which has official recognition and financial support from the political subdivision where it is situated;
  35. “reserve rate” means the unencumbered second injury fund balance on October 31 of each year as a percentage of disbursements from the second injury fund during the 12-month period ending on June 30 of the same calendar year;
  36. “self-insurer” means an employer who, instead of insuring liability under this chapter as it provides, elects to pay directly the compensation provided for, and who has furnished to the board satisfactory proof of the employer’s financial ability to make the direct payments;
  37. “volunteer ambulance attendant” means an individual who serves as an ambulance attendant on a temporary, voluntary basis with a volunteer or full-time fire department or municipal ambulance service of a general law or home rule municipality;
  38. “volunteer emergency medical technician” means a person who (A) is certified by the state as an emergency medical technician under AS 18.08 or (B) is an active roster volunteer member of a state certified emergency medical service and is registered with the Department of Health and Social Services, and who provides emergency medical services on a voluntary basis;
  39. “volunteer firefighter” means an individual whose name is registered with the state fire marshal as a member of a regularly organized volunteer fire department or who serves with a full-time fire department on a temporary, voluntary basis;
  40. “volunteer police officer” means an individual who serves as a peace officer with a full-time police department of a general law or home rule municipality on a temporary, voluntary basis;
  41. “widow” includes only the decedent’s wife living with or dependent for support upon the decedent at the time of death, or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of the decedent’s desertion at such a time;
  42. “widower” includes only the decedent’s husband living with or dependent for support upon the decedent at the time of death, or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of the decedent’s desertion at such a time.

History. (§ 2 ch 193 SLA 1959; am ch 148 SLA 1962; am §§ 3 — 5 ch 74 SLA 1963; am § 11 ch 46 SLA 1964; am § 4 ch 99 SLA 1966; am § 2 ch 41 SLA 1968; am § 1 ch 54 SLA 1969; am §§ 90, 91 ch 127 SLA 1974; am § 3 ch 77 SLA 1979; am § 4 ch 59 SLA 1981; am § 24 ch 93 SLA 1982; am §§ 13 — 15 ch 70 SLA 1983; am §§ 41 — 44 ch 79 SLA 1988; am § 2 ch 25 SLA 1992; am § 2 ch 72 SLA 1994; am § 53 ch 30 SLA 1996; am §§ 66, 67 ch 10 FSSLA 2005; am § 4 ch 63 SLA 2014; am § 41 ch 33 SLA 2016; am § 21 ch 91 SLA 2018)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 23.30.265 . Renumbered in 1996. Reorganized in 1983, 1988, 2005, and 2014 to alphabetize the defined terms.

In 1989, the terms “police officer” and “fire fighter” were substituted for “policeman” and “fireman” in this section under §§ 59 and 60, ch. 50, SLA 1989.

In 2006, in paragraph (19), “(20)” was substituted for “(13)” to reflect the 2005 renumbering of the paragraphs in this section.

In 2008, in paragraph (21), “(7)” was substituted for “(6)” to reflect the 2005 renumbering of the paragraphs in this section.

Cross references. —

For additional definitions applicable to this chapter, see AS 23.90.900 ; for definition of controlled substance, referred to in (18) of this section, see AS 11.71.900 .

Administrative Code. —

For appeals, see 8 AAC 57.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective July 9, 2014, added (42) [now (27)].

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (3)(E), substituted “practice registered nurse” for “nurse practitioner”.

The 2018 amendment, effective November 22, 2018, rewrote (19).

Opinions of attorney general. —

Services voluntarily performed for another are not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8.

Volunteer civil defense workers are not covered by the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act because they are not “employees” under that Act. 1963 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8.

The state is liable for workmen’s compensation when state prisoners voluntarily work for pay and sustain an injury arising out of the course of their employment. 1965 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8.

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Annotator’s notes. —

Several of the cases cited in the notes below were decided under prior statutes.

Constitutionality. —

This section’s definition of “medical stability,” its burden of proof, and its presumption of medical stability are constitutional and do not violate substantive due process. Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1992).

Underlying premise of workmen’s compensation system is that liability is based upon the existence of an employment relationship, not upon a determination of culpability. M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1979).

Liberal construction. —

Normally the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act is read liberally to effectuate its beneficent purposes. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Broad coverage. —

There is a general policy of applying the coverage provisions of workers’ compensation acts broadly. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Where the duties of decedent’s position were broadly defined and included “anything that would inure to the benefit of the country,” it would be difficult to find a rational basis upon which it could be asserted that he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the crash. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Controversion. —

Employer's controversions, one related to the claimant's medical treatment and the other one related to the claimant's temporary total disability and medical benefits, were frivolous under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission's precedent because the employer did not have sufficient evidence to support its factual assertions in the controversions. Vue v. Walmart Assocs., 475 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2020).

Paragraph (24) not vague. —

While the statute must necessarily address the subject broadly because every employee’s condition is different, it provides specific information on how to determine whether a stress related mental injury is in fact compensable under the Act. It thus has meaning in itself and through the process of adjudication this meaning will be enhanced. Paragraph (17) (now (24)) is not void for vagueness as amended in 1988 and the claimant was not deprived of procedural due process. Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1995).

“Physician” includes psychologist. —

Term “physician” as used in this section should be read to include psychologists. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Standing. —

Because defendant’s benefits were not terminated due to medical stability under AS 23.30.185 or this section, he did not have standing to sue. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. Murdock, 873 P.2d 1291 (Alaska 1994).

Common-law action against fellow employee barred. —

Under AS 23.30.055 , workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy and bars a common-law action against a fellow employee. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Unless intentional tort committed. —

The compensation remedy should not be exclusive when an employee commits an intentional tort on a fellow worker. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Workmen’s compensation benefits are paid from employees’ premiums, as a means of spreading the cost of hazards of the workplace. It would not be wise public policy to allow an intentional tort-feasor to shift his liability for his acts to such a fund. Assaults by fellow workers differ not in degree, but in kind, from the type of harm the statute was enacted to deal with. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

The socially beneficial purpose of the workmen’s compensation law would not be furthered by allowing a person who commits intentional tort to use the compensation law as a shield against liability. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Workers’ compensation as exclusive remedy in workplace fight cases. —

The beneficial effect of the rule that workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy in workplace fight cases would be largely destroyed if every case required an inquiry into the relative rank of the assailant and victim, an inquiry which is not relevant to the question whether the quarrel was work-related. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Where the manager of the corporate premises was guilty of assault and battery, directed against two employees, the corporate veil may not be pierced and the corporation’s assets made liable for his intentional torts merely because the manager controlled the activities of the corporation, owned 50 percent of its shares and was its president. Workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

See also note under catchline “Supervisor is ‘third person’ under paragraph (17),” under analysis line VII A, below.

Fraud claim settlement. —

Municipal employer’s fraud claim settlement did not have to be “in a form prescribed by the director,” under AS 23.30.012(a) , because the statute did not apply to a fraud petition. The petition was not a claim for “injury” under AS 23.30.395 , so the existence of a settlement could be determined from the parties’ correspondence. Municipality of Anchorage v. Stenseth, 361 P.3d 898 (Alaska 2015).

Burden of going forward with evidence of increased risk. —

If an employer and his insurance company wished to rely on the defense of increased risk because of a changed method of flight by the claimant, they had the burden of going forward with appropriate evidence indicating such an increase in risk. By failing to do so, they simply did not establish the defense claimed. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

Determination of medical stability. —

Where the board determined that claimant was no longer suffering any effects attributable to his accident, the decision was consistent with the statutory definition of medical stability. Brown v. State, Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 931 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1997).

Applied in

Johnson v. Fairbanks Clinic, 647 P.2d 592 (Alaska 1982); Pioneer Constr. v. Conlon, 780 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1989); Leslie Cutting, Inc. v. Bateman, 833 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1992); Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Ass'n, 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993); Baker v. Reed-Dowd Co., 836 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1992).

Quoted in

Hewing v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 512 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1973); Dresser Indus./Atlas Div. v. Hiestand, 702 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1985); Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249 (Alaska 1986); Fox v. Alascom, 783 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1989); Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1991); Huf v. Arctic Alaska Drilling Co., 890 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1995); Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996); Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 52 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002); Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon, 124 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2005); De Rosario v. Lodging, 297 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2013); ; Seal v. Welty, 477 P.3d 613 (Alaska 2020); Murphy v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 494 P.3d 556 (Alaska 2021).

Stated in

Simon v. Alaska Wood Prods., 633 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1981); Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001 (Alaska 2009); Warnke-Green v. Pro-West Contrs., LLC, 440 P.3d 283 (Alaska 2019).

Cited in

Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1963); Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993); Grove v. Alaska Constr. & Erectors, 948 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1997); Hammer v. City of Fairbanks, 953 P.2d 500 (Alaska 1998); Parris-Eastlake v. Dep't of Law, 26 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2001); Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001); Excursion Inlet Packing Co. v. Ugale, 92 P.3d 413 (Alaska 2004); Barrington v. Alaska Communs. Sys. Group, Inc., 198 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2008); Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 267 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2011); Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson, 301 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2013); Harris v. Millennium Hotel, 330 P.3d 330 (Alaska 2014); Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2016); Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., — P.3d — (Alaska July 19, 2017); Atkins v. Inlet Transp. & Taxi Serv., 426 P.3d 1124 (Alaska 2018); Morrison v. Alaska Interstate Constr., 440 P.3d 224 (Alaska 2019).

II.Carrier

Under this chapter carrier is considered separate entity from the employer. Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).

III.Child

Paragraph (6) (now (7)) enlarges common-law definition of “child.” S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Child en ventre sa mere is legally dependent on both its parents for nourishment and support. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

A child en ventre sa mere will be considered a child in esse if it is for his benefit, and he may thereby rank as a dependent. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Means of legitimation. —

It is quite likely that acknowledgment was mentioned in paragraph (4) (now (7)) of this section because it is a typical method of legitimation. But legitimation can occur under Alaska statutes by other means: subsequent intermarriage of the parents, or through a judgment of the superior court (AS 25.20.050 ). S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Child legitimated other than by acknowledgment would not be an “acknowledged illegitimate child.” Compartmentally speaking, such a child might have to claim as a “posthumous child” or in some other way. If “posthumous child” were applied only to children born in wedlock, a substantial class might be excluded by a rigid interpretation of the term “acknowledged illegitimate child.” S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Illegitimate considered child of both parents. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Obligation of support. —

An illegitimate child has an inherent right, apart from any statute, to enforce against its parent an obligation of support. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Posthumous illegitimate child is entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits as a dependent of the deceased. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

The term “posthumous child” in paragraph (6) (now (7)) of this section includes an illegitimate posthumous child. S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971).

Sole dependency as condition of award not specified by paragraph (6) (now (7)). —

The fact that support is also furnished a child by her natural father is immaterial. A child can be dependent upon more than one person. Paragraph (6) (now (7)) of this section speaks only of a child who is “dependent” upon the deceased; it does not specify sole dependency as a condition of an award of compensation. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Dull, 416 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1966).

Presumption of dependency. —

Children of a deceased workman are conclusively presumed to be dependent upon him for support. Juneau Lumber Co. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 122 F. Supp. 663, 15 Alaska 101 (D. Alaska 1954).

Test of dependency. —

The true test of dependency is actual support, rather than inability on the part of the alleged dependent to earn a livelihood. Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Bishop, 24 F.2d 63, 5 Alaska Fed. 405 (9th Cir. Alaska 1928).

IV.Compensation

Paragraphs (12) and (26) mutually exclusive. —

Paragraph (8) (now (12)) defines “compensation” for the purposes of this chapter without mention of medical benefits, and paragraph (20) (now (26)) defines “medical and related benefits” in mutually exclusive language. Williams v. Safeway Stores, 525 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1974).

“Payable to an employee” in paragraph (8) (now (12)) does not limit “compensation” to payments made directly to the employee, but includes attorney’s fees paid on behalf of the employee. Croft v. Pan Alaska Trucking, 820 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1991).

V.Disability

“Disability” ordinarily means loss or impairment of earning power. Scott v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 91 F. Supp. 201, 12 Alaska 655 (D. Alaska 1950).

By definition, “disability” is a function of an injured employee’s capacity to earn wages. Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Disability has also been defined as “actual physicial incapacity to work at all, or . . . to work more than a part of the time.” Scott v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 91 F. Supp. 201, 12 Alaska 655 (D. Alaska 1950).

The terms “disability” and “incapacity” as used in workmen’s compensation statutes, appear to be regarded as synonymous. Scott v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 91 F. Supp. 201, 12 Alaska 655 (D. Alaska 1950).

Disability depends on earning capacity: The concept of disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging, 787 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).

Categories of disabilities not defined. —

The four categories of disability — permanent total disability, temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, and temporary partial disability are not separately defined; rather they merely reflect the character (total or partial) and quality (permanent or temporary) of the disability. Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982).

Primary consideration in determining disability is not the degree of the worker’s physical impairment, but rather the loss of earning capacity related to that impairment. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

In determining the extent of an employee’s preexisting disability, his demonstrated earning capacity cannot be ignored. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

Prior injury. —

The board erred when it concluded that the 1984 injury of a logger necessarily was not a substantial cause of his disability because he was already “totally disabled” by reason of a 1969 accident. Although the logger had a residual brain injury after the 1969 injury, he had a sound body and was able to work as a logger. After the 1984 injury, his body may no longer have been sound and he may have no longer been able to work as a logger. Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 856 P.2d 1155 (Alaska 1993).

Angina can by itself produce disability. Jones v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 600 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1979).

Back injury deemed “disability” despite cancer treatment. —

Board erred by failing to consider whether claimant’s back condition constituted a disability regardless of his treatment for cancer, where medical records indicated that he suffered from two independent conditions — one work-related and one not — either of which would have prevented him from working. Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Constr., 773 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1989).

Basis for calculation when multiple injuries. —

In the case of a series of injuries, the injury used as the basis for the benefit rate calculation must, at a minimum, be a legal cause of the disability. Wells v. Swalling Constr. Co., 944 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1997).

VI.Employee

“Employee”. —

For purposes of defining “employee” in a workmen’s compensation case, decisions construing the term in social security and unemployment compensation acts are relevant. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Former § 43-3-9, ACLA 1949, defining “independent contractor,” meant that one was to be regarded as an employee if the principal had the right to control the details of the work; and the four principal factors showing right of control were: (1) direct evidence of right or exercise of control; (2) method of payment; (3) furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fire. Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Co. v. Estes, 370 P.2d 180 (Alaska 1962).

Mere formalization of a contract for hire is not the controlling factor in determining whether an employment contract exists. Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1989).

Injury during tryout period. —

When an employer exposes potential employees to risks inherent in a tryout period and the applicant is under his direction or control, any injury resulting during such a period is compensable as a matter of law. Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1989).

Master-servant test of control employs too narrow a criterion for determination of employee status in light of the rationale of compensation acts. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

The trial court’s instruction embodying the master-servant control test for determination of “employee” status was harmless error because this test is narrower than the “nature of the work” criterion and therefore more favorable to a plaintiff suing for personal injury than an instruction using the relative nature of the work test. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Test for applicability of workmen’s compensation. —

The nature of the claimant’s work in relation to the regular business of the employer should be the test for applicability of workmen’s compensation, rather than the master-servant test of control which has been developed to delimit the scope of a master’s vicarious liability to third persons for torts committed by his servants. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970); Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

The trier of fact determines “employee” status through consideration of the character of the claimant’s work or business, and the relationship of the claimant’s work or business to the purported employer’s business. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970); Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

Dual employment. —

The dual employment situation arises when an employee of two employers, who is under the separate control of each, performs services which are more closely related to the business of one than of the other. When dual employment is found, the employers will be liable for compensation either jointly or separately, depending upon whether it is possible to ascribe the service of the employee at the time of his injury or death to a particular employer or to several employers. The more difficult it is to determine whose interests the employee was furthering at the time of his injury, the greater is the likelihood of joint liability. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

An employee can be said to be a joint employee when he simultaneously engages in work for more than one employer and the work performed for each employer is identical or nearly identical to that performed for the other employer. Both employers are clearly liable when there is joint employment. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Where liability of both employers is primary, as joint obligors they should share the obligation equally. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

While some cases have used a hairsplitting approach to uphold the liability of one employer when a dual employment relationship exists, the better view is more flexible and provides for joint liability when there are only incidental services being performed for one of the employers while the employee is primarily on the business of the other employer. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

The supreme court held that widow’s husband was a dual employee of both the state and Local #341 at the time of his death, and that both employers were responsible for compensation. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Employment with successive employers. —

The second employer must bear the responsibility for the worker’s compensation benefits when employment with successive employers contributes to the worker’s disability. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Fluor Alaska v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 614 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1980).

For application of rule in case involving successive insurance carrier, see Parker Drilling Co. v. Wester, 651 P.2d 842 (Alaska 1982).

Relationship of employer-employee can only be created by contract, which may be express or implied. City of Seward v. Wisdom, 413 P.2d 931 (Alaska 1966).

Illegally employed minor can avoid exclusive remedy provisions. —

A minor, injured while working at her employer’s plant and who was illegally employed, has the ability to void the employment contract for the purpose of avoiding the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Whitney Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 393 (D. Alaska 1978).

Based upon the general tenets of insurance law in Alaska the court holds that persons employed in violation of state law who elect to void their employment contract are not employees within the meaning of the general exclusionary clause. Whitney Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 393 (D. Alaska 1978).

Workers building addition to home. —

Claimant, who was injured while working on an addition to the homeowners’ home, was not an employee covered by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act; the project on which the claimant was working was not in connection with a business or industry. Gaede v. Saunders, 53 P.3d 1126 (Alaska 2002).

Volunteer during earthquake emergency not employees. —

To conclude that all persons who voluntarily rendered help and assistance to the community during the earthquake emergency were employees of the city of Seward would amount to an unwarranted construction and extension of the scope of Alaska’s Workmen’s Compensation Act. City of Seward v. Wisdom, 413 P.2d 931 (Alaska 1966).

Nor are part-time baby sitters, cleaning persons, and harvest help. —

Part-time baby sitters, cleaning persons, and harvest help are not treated as employees, though they may be servants in the common-law sense. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Alaska’s present compensation act treats some persons as “employees” who are not servants. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

And it excludes some servants from category of employee. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

AS 23.30.242 provides that members of state boards and commissions are to be considered employees for the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Presumptive area of intended protection. —

Any worker whose services form a regular and continuing part of the cost of that product, and whose method of operation is not such an independent business that it forms in itself a separate route through which his own costs of industrial accident can be channelled, is within the presumptive area of intended protection. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Test of coverage should not be limited to specific or required duties of the employment but should include duties reasonably incidental to the employment. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Control rationale for determining employment relationship was developed by the courts as an aid to determining questions of tort liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. While the social policy of Alaska’s Workmen’s Compensation Act has dictated the supreme court’s use of a different test in that context, the supreme court still applies the control test along with other factors found in Restatement 2d, Agency, to determine the nature of the employment relationship in common-law tort actions. Laborers & Hod Carriers Union v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808 (Alaska 1972).

Evaluating character of claimant’s work. —

In evaluating the character of the claimant’s work, the trier of fact is to consider the degree of skill involved, the degree to which it is a separate calling or business, and the extent to which it can be expected to carry its own accident burden. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970); Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

And determining relationship of claimant’s work to purported employer’s business. —

Concerning the relationship of the claimant’s work to the purported employer’s business, the trier of fact is to consider how much it is a regular part of the employer’s regular work, whether it is continuous or intermittent, and whether the duration is sufficient to amount to the hiring of continuing services as distinguished from contracting for the completion of a particular job. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970); Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

In action seeking workers’ compensation benefits for injury sustained while performing construction work for appellant, only if appellant acted as an employer in the course of his construction activities could appellee reasonably be said to have been engaged in work which was “a regular part of the employer’s regular work.” Kroll v. Reeser, 655 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1982).

Uninsured subcontractor’s employees are considered employees of contractor, though they are not servants of the contractor. Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970).

Liability of special employer. —

A special employer to whom another’s employee is loaned will become liable for injuries compensable under workmen’s compensation where there is a contract of hire, express or implied, between the employee and the special employer, where the work being done at the time of the injury is essentially that of the special employer, and the right to control the details of that work is in the special employer. Selid Constr. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1960)(construing § 43-3-9 ACLA 1949).

“Loaned servant”. —

To be loaned servant one first must be a servant of a master who loans his employee’s services to another. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

When loaned servant doctrine is inapplicable. —

Where claimant was found to be an independent contractor as to a company rather than an employee, the loaned servant doctrine is inapplicable. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

Emergency employee. —

It is entirely consistent with the theory of workmen’s compensation legislation that a business which utilizes the services of a third person in an emergency should bear the risk of his injury, the costs incurred being ultimately borne by the consumer as a part of the cost of the product. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

An independent contractor or self-employed person may as readily become an emergency employee as may one who is already an employee of a different employer. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

Not every service at request of another creates an emergency employee situation. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

Test in determining whether independent contractor is emergency employee should be whether or not he had the right to compensation, not whether he demanded payment. Ostrem v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 511 P.2d 1061 (Alaska 1973).

Substitution of another employer requires employee’s consent. —

Once created, the employer-employee relationship cannot be changed to substitute another employer without the employee’s consent. Selid Constr. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1960) (construing § 43-3-9 ACLA 1949).

Where the employee commences to serve another at the direction of his employer, no new relationship is necessarily created. He may simply be performing his duty to the employer who gave the order. Even though his actions may be controlled by the new master, no new relationship is created in the absence of an express or implied contract between the employee and the new master. Selid Constr. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1960) (construing § 43-3-9 ACLA 1949).

Conclusiveness of finding of employer-employee relationship. —

A determination by the Alaska Industrial Board (now Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board) that an employer-employee relationship existed would not be reversed unless there was an abuse of discretion. Cordova Fish & Cold Storage Co. v. Estes, 370 P.2d 180 (Alaska 1962).

Regular and casual employees. —

The act does not distinguish between regular and casual employees and the use of such terms is merely descriptive and without legal significance, except in connection with ascertaining the number of persons usually employed or which it was necessary to employ in the ordinary course of defendant’s business in order to determine whether he was within the act. Grant v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 355 (D. Alaska 1947).

Last injurious exposure rule. —

Pulp mill employee who was receiving temporary total disability benefits when he subsequently suffered a heart attack during a strike against the mill was not an employee of the union which represented the striking employees, and the union was therefore not responsible for workers’ compensation benefits under the last injurious exposure rule. Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 791 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1990).

Inapplicable to out-of-state employers. —

The last injurious exposure rule does not apply to employment outside the state of Alaska. Extending the rule to out-of-state employers would add complexity and make the worker’s remedy more difficult to obtain. Wolfer v. Veco, Inc., 852 P.2d 1171 (Alaska 1993).

Burden of proof. —

Decedent’s widow had the burden of proving that her husband was an employee of city at the time he met his death. City of Seward v. Wisdom, 413 P.2d 931 (Alaska 1966).

Evidence sufficient to show employment. —

Evidence was sufficient to show that lodge employed pilot, even though no express contract was found, where, by utilizing his services and by controlling the time, manner and location of his work, the lodge knowingly allowed the pilot to act on its behalf, performing many of the job-related skills for which he was being considered. Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1989).

Property owner was an employer when a carpenter was injured in a fall from a roof on the owner's property because there was substantial evidence–the owner's testimony that the owner's occupation was buying, selling, and renting real estate and the owner's income tax return showing income from real estate rentals–that the owner was an employer engaged in the business or industry of buying, managing, and selling real estate and that the work which the carpenter did in repairing the leaky roof of a rental unit was part of that business. Adams v. State, 467 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2020).

VII.Injury
A.In General

Description of “injury” in this section is intended to make clear that the word, when used in the chapter, refers only to those particular injuries which are work-related, and this “definition” did not apply to an understanding of the term “injury,” as used in AS 23.30.205(f) , for purposes of the second injury fund. Second Injury Fund v. Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).

Medical stability. —

The definition of medical stability in this section requires some measurable improvement for a claimant to continue to receive TTD benefits and makes no provision for benefits when the condition deteriorates; thus, where it was established by a physician’s reports and records that a claimant was medically stable because his knees showed no objectively measurable improvement, he was no longer entitled to TTD benefits. Bouse v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support a workers’ compensation board’s finding that an employee was not medically stable pursuant to paragraph (21) (now (27)) of this section during the time in dispute, and thus the employee was entitled to benefits under AS 23.30.185 , because the employee incorrectly believed that the employer’s permission was needed to obtain a second opinion, which caused a delay in the employee undergoing surgery, and the surgery was successful. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Combination of the employer’s delay in providing an evaluation for employee’s surgery and the final outcome of the surgery produced clear and convincing evidence of no medical stability under paragraph (21) (now (27)) of this section, and, while the employer argued that the delay in the employee’s referral to a second physician was based on the first physician’s misreading of AS 23.30.095(a) , the employer had notice of the confusion and there was no basis upon which to find that the employee waived procedural rights to seek compensation based on the confusion. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).

Substantial evidence did not support the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that the claimant’s knee was medically stable between November 2000 and January 2001 where two doctors’ expectations, that exercise would result in improvement and that the knee would not deteriorate, proved incorrect. Thoeni v. Consumer Elec. Servs., 151 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2007).

Heart attack is within statutory presumption of compensability of accidental injuries under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act. Employers Commerical Union Ins. Cos. v. Schoen, 554 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1976).

Rupture of blood vessel while coughing not “accidental injury”. —

Disability following a hermorrhage as a result of rupturing a blood vessel of the lungs during a fit of coughing which had its inception in a chill suffered by the employee while in a refrigerator taking an inventory of the contents in the course of his employment as cook was not an accidental injury within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 327 (D. Alaska 1947).

Requirements for disease to be injury by accident. —

A disease to be an injury by accident must be traceable to a definite time and place of origin and must moreover not be the ordinary result of an employee’s work reasonably to be anticipated as a result of pursuing the same but contracted as a direct result of unusual circumstances connected therewith. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 327 (D. Alaska 1947).

The difficulty of determining the place of infection or the cause of a nonindustrial disease, including a cold, is undoubtedly the reason that a causal connection must be shown under the workmen’s compensation acts between such disease and some unusual event or condition of employment as a prerequisite to recovery of compensation. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 327 (D. Alaska 1947).

Board held authorized to infer from the evidence that there was a causal relation between the injuries and a cancerous condition of the esophagus regardless of whether the condition was congenital and, therefore, merely aggravated, or the esophagus was directly injured. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 584 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 262, 13 Alaska 401 (9th Cir. Alaska 1951).

Mental injuries. —

Adoption of the “greater than all employees must experience” requirement with regard to mental injuries is contrary to the fundamental principle in workers’ compensation law that the Workers’ Compensation Act should be read liberally and that the employer must take the employee “as he finds him.” Fox v. Alascom, 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986).

A “greater than all employees must experience” test as a preliminary means of demonstrating mental injuries is neither essential nor even germane to the legislative requirement that the injury “arise out of” the employment; furthermore, the argument that threshold requirements are necessary for mental injuries because such injuries are easier to feign than physical injuries is unsubstantiated. Fox v. Alascom, 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986).

The supreme court of Alaska held that a worker who suffered a mental disability allegedly due to nontraumatic gradual work-related stress did not have to make a preliminary showing that the on-the-job stress that the worker experienced was greater than the stress which all employees experience. Fox v. Alascom, 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986).

Conditions caused by age-related changes and obesity. —

Workers' Compensation Board was not required to award compensation for knee replacement surgeries performed five years after the employee's work-related accident after rejecting the employee's claim that her right knee condition was an "injury" based on expert opinion that the condition was caused by age-related degenerative changes and obesity. Butts v. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 467 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2020).

“Individuals in comparable work environment” applied to other supervisors/unit leaders in claimant’s office and, where evidence supported a finding that claimant, a unit leader, was not under extraordinary or unusual levels of stress compared with other unit leaders, denial of her claim of mental injury caused by work-related stress was warranted. Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1997).

When disease is not of occupational type there are two concurrent limitations on right to award, namely, (1) the inception of the disease must be assignable to a determinate or single act identified in space or time; and (2) it must be assignable to something catastrophic or extraordinary. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 327 (D. Alaska 1947).

Supervisor is “third person” under paragraph (24). —

An employer is not vicariously liable to its employees in an assault and battery action for the acts of its managerial employee. AS 23.30.055 makes workmen’s compensation the exclusive remedy against the employer for compensable injuries. Paragraph (17) (now (24)) defines compensable injuries to include “an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment.” A supervisor is such a third person within this definition, and so workmen’s compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).

Failure to overcome presumption of compensability. —

The board erred in finding that the presumption of compensability was overcome where the employer did not present substantial evidence that sufficiently excluded, either affirmatively or negatively, work-related factors as a substantial cause of claimant’s disability, and did not offer evidence that other factors were the exclusive cause of her aggravated condition, nor evidence that her work was not another causal factor. Williams v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 938 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1997).

B.Arising Out of and in the Course of
1.Generally

Workers’ compensation law and respondeat superior doctrine differ in scope. —

While workmen’s compensation law and respondeat superior doctrine both involve allocations of costs regarding industrial accidents, they differ in scope. Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973).

Although the supreme court has noted the similarity between Alaska workmen’s compensation policy and the enterprise theory of vicarious tort liability, it has not equated the tort concept “in the scope of employment” with the workmen’s compensation concept “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973).

Workmen’s compensation benefits turn solely upon whether the employee was injured while performing an activity related to his job — and “relatedness” is usually a function of benefit to the employer. Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973).

In contrast, respondeat superior subjects employers to liability for injuries suffered by an indefinite number of third persons. To limit this burden of liability, the narrower concept, “scope of employment,” has long been tied to the employer’s right to control the employee’s activity at the time of his tortious conduct. While the right to control is not a prerequisite to a holding of liability, it is a factor that may be considered in determining whether the employee’s activity is sufficiently related to his employer’s enterprise, and while the employer’s benefit from the employee’s activity is relevant to the existence of vicarious liability, benefit is not its sole determinant. Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973).

Presumption. —

It is presumed that the employee’s death was work-connected in the absence of substantial evidence that it was not. Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966).

Tests. —

If the accidental injury or death is connected with any of the incidents of one’s employment, then the injury or death would both arise out of and be in the course of such employment. Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966); Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966); Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966); Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967); Taylor v. Interior Enters., 471 P.2d 405 (Alaska 1970); Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973); M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1979).

“Arising out of” and “in the course of,” being used conjunctively, state two separate tests that must coexist before an accidental injury or death will be compensable. Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966).

As a practical matter the two tests (“arising out of” and “in the course of”) should not be kept in separate compartments, but should be merged into a single concept of work connection. Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966).

Under Alaska’s workmen’s compensation law, compensation is payable for accidental injury or death “arising out of and in the course of employment.” In Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966), the supreme court said that the two tests enunciated above should be merged into a single concept of work connection because, if the accidental injury or death is connected with any of the incidents of one’s employment, then the injury or death would both arise out of and be in the course of such employment. Anderson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972).

Proof of either “arising out of” or “in the course of,” without proof of the other, will not sustain an award. Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966).

The injury must not only arise out of but also in the course of employment. Aho v. Chichagoff Mining Co., 6 Alaska 528 (D. Alaska 1922).

Lack of objective signs of injury does not, in and of itself, preclude the existence of such an injury, since there are many types of injuries which are not readily disclosed by objective tests. Kessick v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980).

An injury arises out of the employment if there is a causal connection between the working conditions and the injury, and it must be possible to trace the injury to the nature of the employer’s work, or to the risks to which the employer’s business exposes the employee. Ellamar Mining Co. v. Possus, 247 F. 420, 4 Alaska Fed. 660 (9th Cir. Alaska 1918).

Where a mining employer required his employees to lodge and sleep in a building provided by the employer for that purpose, and the employee, while so occupying the house, and not engaged in actual labor, is injured because of the defective construction of such building, such injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Aho v. Chichagoff Mining Co., 6 Alaska 528 (D. Alaska 1922).

Activity must be reasonably foreseeable and incidental to employment. —

Today it is generally held, utilizing the rubric of various doctrines, that an employee is entitled to compensation so long as the activity is reasonably foreseeable and incidental to his employment. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

While labeling an employee’s activity as “personal” may not render the ensuing injury per se noncompensable, the activity must still be “reasonably foreseeable and incidental” to the employment, and not just “but for” the employment, to entitle the employee to claim compensation. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

Summary judgment precluded. —

Material factual disputes precluded summary judgment on the issues of whether the laborer's injury happened in the course and scope of employment where the laborer being on an unpaid lunch break did not determine whether the injury arose in the course and scope of employment, his clock status was largely irrelevant because the accident happened on a location to which he accompanied an employee, and there were issues of fact as to whether the laborer's participation in laying tire chains was reasonably foreseeable given a prohibition in the contract and the temporary employer's apparent rule that only drivers were allowed to use chains. Buckley v. Am. Fast Freight, Inc., 444 P.3d 139 (Alaska 2019).

Causal factor as legal cause. —

A causal factor is a legal cause if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm or disability at issue. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Board applied incorrect test of causation where it found that the doctors could not say to a reasonable degree of medical probability that applicant’s kidney failure was caused by his employment; for liability is to be imposed whenever employment is established as a causal factor in the disability. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

Board not to reject unrebutted expert testimony. —

The Workers’ Compensation Board cannot reject unrebutted expert testimony that a claimant’s mental injury is related to job stress. Wade v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987).

Injury while on break. —

Although an employee is normally covered by workmen’s compensation if he is injured while on a break, when the employee’s injury arises out of a wholly personal quarrel, the employee is not entitled to compensation. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

Where, even though an employee’s injury was sustained while he was at work, there was compelling evidence presented to indicate that the employee had taken himself outside the scope and duties of his employment in his encounter with a woman patron and that it was that conduct which motivated the assault on him by the woman’s husband, there was substantial evidence to support the board’s determination that the assault on the employee was not work-connected and did not entitle the employee to compensation. Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 584 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1978).

Personally motivated assaults in workplace. —

Although courts have, in rare cases, awarded compensation for injuries arising from personally motivated assaults in the workplace, where the employer’s action or inaction did not facilitate the assault upon the employee, his injuries did not “arise out of his employment.” Temple v. Denali Princess Lodge, 21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).

Death of police inspector arising from customary and accepted practice of fake drawing of weapons with fellow police officer was connected with an incident of deceased’s employment and was compensable. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Dull, 416 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1966).

Burden of proof. —

The burden of proving that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment rests upon the claimant for compensation. R. C. A. Serv. Co. v. Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964).

Claimant attached the presumption of compensability because the claimant showed that the claimant's work-related psychological condition of post-traumatic stress disorder was disabling after the claimant was shot in the face with a pellet gun while working at a retail store. Furthermore, the employer through its medical experts did not offer substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that the claimant was disabled by the psychological condition or that the claimant had reached medical stability as to the claimant's work-related conditions. Vue v. Walmart Assocs., 475 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2020).

2.Off-Premises Injuries

Combined personal and business activities. —

An activity that has both personal and business elements is not per se compensable. Malone v. Lake & Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 977 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1999).

Employment begins when employee reaches entrance to employer’s premises. —

As a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s premises where the work is to be done. Uganik Fisheries v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1949).

But in some cases rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer. Uganik Fisheries v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1949).

Defendant’s legal obligation to keep the sidewalk outside its offices free of ice and snow, and the fact that it installed an advertising awning that overhung a portion of the sidewalk and potentially contributed to its icy condition, were relevant for purposes of determining whether the particular circumstances surrounding the plaintiff employee’s injury placed it within an exception to the premises rule. Seville v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 977 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1999).

Defendants advertising awning, which projected over the sidewalk outside its premises, and its legal duty to keep to keep the sidewalk clear of ice, did not establish that it exercised general control over the adjacent sidewalk for business purposes, and did not support the broader conclusion that the sidewalk was actually part of its premises. Seville v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 977 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1999).

It is not proximity, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying of surrounding areas with the premises, that gives rise to a finding of conditions existing within the course of employment, but rather it is a finding that there is a distinct “arising out of” or causal connection between the conditions under which the claimant must approach and leave the building and the occurrence of the injury. Seville v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 977 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1999).

Premises sought to be brought within adjacent premises rule must actually be adjacent, and where the plant where claimant was employed and the plant where the injury occurred were separated by a distance of one mile by water and two miles by land, the doctrine could not be invoked. Uganik Fisheries v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1949).

Liability of employer for off-premises injuries. —

The liability of an employer does not extend to any other plant than the one in which the employee is employed unless he is at the other plant on his employer’s business or as an incident of his employment, and in such circumstances it is quite immaterial who owns or operates the plant at which the injury was received. Uganik Fisheries v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1949).

Visiting future site of employment. —

Where injuries to the plaintiff and the death of her husband resulted from an accident occurring on the way to a visit to their future place of employment in a remote location, this subsection was inapplicable, in that the decision to make the visit was that of the injured parties, they were not engaging in activities at employer-provided facilities when they were injured, their employer had neither required them to travel nor supplied the transportation, and the employer had no control over their decision to make the journey. Malone v. Lake & Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 977 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1999).

Identifiable deviation from business trip for personal reasons takes employee out of course of employment until he returns to the route of the business trip, unless deviation is so small as to be disregarded as insubstantial. Otherwise, personal deviation from direct route is compensable where authorized, expressly or by implication, and of some incidental benefit to the employer, at least where the deviation does not introduce substantial additional hazards. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

Authorization in small family-owned corporation is impossible to disprove. —

For all practical purposes, it is impossible to disprove a claim in any small family-owned corporation that an otherwise personal deviation from the direct route is compensable because it is a privilege of employment in accordance with company practice. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

Deviation cases are legion but are of only limited help in deciding case, both because of the infinite variety of factual patterns, which vary in the degree of deviation from a minor detour to a complete temporary abandonment of an employer’s business, and because the results often appear to have been dictated by judicial attitudes towards workmen’s compensation acts. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

Test of liability for injuries on trips. —

The test to be applied in determining whether a trip is the employer’s or employee’s is this: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. If, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk. Uganik Fisheries v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1949); Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

In measuring the legal effect of a departure from a normal business route, the guideposts are the materiality of the deviation and its purpose. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

If the employer were required to supply work clothes and tools and had dispatched an employee to a distant store to buy them, any injury received in the store or enroute would clearly by one received in the course of his employment. Uganik Fisheries v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 12 Alaska 242 (D. Alaska 1949).

Encompassing “substantiality” test has not emerged. Rather, there is the need, in close cases, to balance a variety of factors such as the geographic and durational magnitude of the deviation in relation to the overall trip, past authorization or toleration of similar deviations, the general latitude afforded the employee in carrying out his job, and any risks created by the deviation which are causally related to the accident. Anchorage Roofing Co. v. Gonzales, 507 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1973).

Going and coming rule. —

Injuries occurring off the employer’s premises while the employee is going to or coming from work do not arise in the course of his employment. R. C. A. Serv. Co. v. Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964); Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966); Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

The provisions of this statute embody the “going and coming rule,” under which accidents occurring off the work premises during travel to and from work are generally not compensable. Seville v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 977 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1999).

Special errand exception thereto. —

There is an exception to the general rule as to injuries incurred going to and from work not arising in the course of employment, called the special errand doctrine, that is based on the principle that the particular journey is an inherent part of the employment. R. C. A. Serv. Co. v. Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964); Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

The special errand rule may be stated as follows: When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

The general rule pertaining to injuries sustained by employees when going to or returning from their regular place of work is subject to exceptions which depend upon the nature and circumstances of the particular employment. No exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every case. While service on regular hours at a stated place generally begins at that place, there is always room for agreement by which the service may be taken to begin earlier or elsewhere. Service in extra hours or on special errands has an element of distinction which the employer may recognize by agreeing that such service shall commence when the employee leaves his home on the duty assigned to him and shall continue until his return. An agreement to that effect may be either express or be shown by the course of business. In such case the hazards of the journey may properly be regarded as hazards of the service and hence within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Service in extra hours or on special errands has an element of distinction which the employer may recognize by agreeing, either expressly or by course of business, that such service shall commence when the employee leaves his home on the duty assigned to him and shall continue until his return. R. C. A. Serv. Co. v. Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964).

The decedent’s trip to join his family for Christmas dinner was purely one of his own choice and for his own private purpose and convenience, and his employer took no part in arranging or paying for the transportation and exercised no control over the private carrier chartered by the decedent, and there was no express or implied agreement that his service would cover the time he was away from the job; therefore, the special errand exception to the going and coming rule was not applicable. R. C. A. Serv. Co. v. Liggett, 394 P.2d 675 (Alaska 1964).

Where the facts established that employee’s travel to and from the situs of his temporary duty assignment was a hazard of his temporary employment, employee’s case fell within the special errand exception to the judicially established going-and-coming rule. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Special hazard exception to going-and-coming rule. —

There is a special hazard exception to the going-and-coming rule in workers’ compensation cases, and the presumption of compensability applies to the factual determinations necessary to decide whether a claim falls within that exception. Sokolowski v. Best Western Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P.2d 286 (Alaska 1991).

When an employer, in connection with the operation of its business, is charged with a legal duty to control or abate a specific hazard in the area adjacent to its premises, even a common hazard to which the general public is exposed, the legal duty itself supplies the necessary element of work-relatedness for a workers’ compensation action. Seville v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 977 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1999).

Even where the plaintiff was traveling to her future place of employment for a work-related purpose, her claim for compensation failed where the decision to visit that site, although acquiesced in by the future employer, was that of the plaintiff, and where flying to that remote location was not a special hazard causally related to employment, in that the normal route to work, once employment commenced and the plaintiff was living at the location, would not involve flying. Malone v. Lake & Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 977 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1999).

Another exception to the going-and-coming rule is that if the employee is compensated for the time he has spent in going to or coming from his place of employment, then such travel is considered to be within the scope of his employment. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

An employer, by paying his employees for travel time, impliedly agrees that the employment relationship is to continue during travel. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Although a demonstration that travel time was specifically paid for is one of the most reliable ways of making a case for the compensability of a going or coming trip, and is ordinarily sufficient in itself to support such a finding, the fact that the employee is not paid for his travel time does not mean that the trip was not in the course of employment. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Where the use of an employee’s vehicle is an integral part of the employment, injuries incurred while taking it to and from work are compensable. Department of Highways v. Johns, 422 P.2d 855 (Alaska), aff'd, Johns v. State Dep't of Highways, 431 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1967).

Returning home from medical treatment. —

Employee’s injury sustained in an automobile accident returning home from medical treatment of an employment-related injury was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Kodiak Oilfield Haulers v. Adams, 777 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1989).

“Remote site” doctrine. —

The “remote site” doctrine is that everyday activities that are normally considered non-work-related are deemed a part of a remote site employee’s job for workers’ compensation purposes because the requirement of living at the remote site limits the employee’s activity choices. Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764 (Alaska 2000).

Injury received while engaged in recreational activity at remote work site. —

When an on-call employee at a remote work site is injured while engaged in reasonable recreational activities, his injuries may properly be considered work connected under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act. Anderson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972).

When an employee is working in a remote area far from family and friends and the normal recreational outlets available to the working man, his recreational activities become an incident of his employment. Anderson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972).

When an employee is required by the conditions of his employment to reside on the employer’s premises where he is constantly on call, his activities which occur on the premises are normally considered to be “work connected.” Compensation may be awarded even though the accident occurs during the hours when the employee is off duty. Most activities necessary to the personal comfort of the employee, and most recreational activities, which occur upon the premises are found to be within the coverage of the workmen’s compensation statutes. Anderson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 498 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1972).

Injury sustained by an employee while playing softball at a ballpark for her employer’s team against an “insurance league” opponent arose out of and in the course of her employment. LeSuer-Johnson v. Rollins-Burdick Hunter, 808 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1991) (decided prior to 1994 amendment excluding recreational league activities sponsored by the employer).

That portion of paragraph (2) which pertains to employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities is not limited to remote job sites as the statute is written. LeSuer-Johnson v. Rollins-Burdick Hunter, 808 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1991) (decided prior to 1994 amendment excluding recreational league activities sponsored by the employer).

Remote site injury doctrine is not limited to situations involving injuries sustained in recreational pursuits. M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1979).

Injuries compensable under remote site doctrine. —

Where an employee was injured in a motorcycle accident while traveling from a pipeline camp, admittedly a remote site, to the bank in a city about 30 miles away, to cash his payroll check, the injuries he sustained enroute are compensable under this chapter. M-K Rivers v. Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1979).

Injury received going from employer’s camp to its recreational facilities held incident of employment. Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966).

“Direction or control” applied to death on employer’s all-terrain vehicle. —

Under the “direction or control” requirement of this section, it is not the personnel or instrumentalities of the activity that have to be directed or controlled, but the activity itself; where decedent was electrocuted and killed while riding his employer’s ATV, the employer could not successfully argue that worker’s compensation applied to the estate’s wrongful death suit, where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer authorized the decedent’s use of the ATV. Estate of Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc., 145 P.3d 533 (Alaska 2006).

Boss accompanying employee on errand. —

Decision of the plaintiff, executive of corporate employer, to accompany an employee on his job-related errand was both reasonably foreseeable and contemplated by his employment. As the employee’s boss, the plaintiff’s presence on his employee’s business errand necessarily related to the plaintiff’s job and invoked workers’ compensation coverage, even if the plaintiff considered his break from the franchise business to be wholly unrelated to the employer’s business; therefore, workers’ compensation provided the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. Witmer v. Kellen, 884 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1994).

Brussels sprouts caused disability. —

The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board that employee’s small bowel obstruction was work-related and that the brussels sprouts he ingested at the employer’s facility were a “substantial factor” in causing his disability was supported by substantial evidence. Doyon Universal Servs. v. Allen, 999 P.2d 764 (Alaska 2000).

3.Preexisting Disease

Preexisting disease or infirmity does not disqualify claim under the work-connection requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability. Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966); Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979); Fluor Alaska v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 614 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1980); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981).

The presence of a preexisting disease does not preclude recovery if employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which compensation is sought. Alaska Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 417 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1966).

The question of whether the employment did contribute to the death or disability of one with a preexisting disease or infirmity is one of fact which is usually determined from medical testimony. Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966); Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1979).

If there were any doubt as to what the substance of the medical testimony is, such doubt will be resolved in favor of employee’s widow. Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966).

Disability produced by injury plus disease or infirmity. —

Claimant is entitled to compensation if the work-connected accident or injury aggravated, accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability. Providence Wash., Inc. v. Fish, 581 P.2d 680 (Alaska 1978).

Whether claimant’s accident was sole cause of his injury or merely aggravated preexisting condition is not of crucial importance, where in either event, the resulting injury is clearly compensable. Kessick v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 617 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1980).

C.Occupational Disease

Liability of employer and insurer for occupational disease. —

In occupational disease cases there is generally a long period of exposure without any disability and the date of contraction of the disease is not ascertainable. Therefore, there has been difficulty in determining the moment when an employer and insurer become liable. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 160 F. Supp. 248, 17 Alaska 527 (D. Alaska 1958).

Rather than defeat the claim of the employee where the employment at the time of disability was not of a kind contributing to the disease, the employer at the time of the most recent exposure which bears a causal relation to the disability is generally liable for the entire compensation. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 160 F. Supp. 248, 17 Alaska 527 (D. Alaska 1958).

Most frequently liability is assigned to the carrier who was on the risk when the disease resulted in disability, if the employment at the time of disability was of a kind contributing to the disease. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 160 F. Supp. 248, 17 Alaska 527 (D. Alaska 1958).

“Occupational disease”. —

If a disease is caused by the conditions of employment and these conditions carry with them a risk of incurring the disease greater than that which prevails in employment and living conditions in general, then such disease is an occupational disease within the scope of the act. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

Tuberculosis may be compensable if it is either an injury by accident and causally related to the employment or an occupational disease. Board of Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625, 14 Alaska 453 (D. Alaska 1953).

Claimant’s disability from tuberculosis was held to be occupational because of the increased risk of infection brought about by his employment as a missionary. Board of Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625, 14 Alaska 453 (D. Alaska 1953).

Tuberculosis of janitor was proximately caused by his employment in a tuberculosis hospital in the sense that it was due to causes and conditions characteristic and peculiar thereto and was therefore compensable. 13 Alaska 166.

Disease contracted prior to coverage of Act. —

Compensation was denied to plaintiff for disability resulting from silicosis contracted while in the employ of the defendant for several years antedating 1932, as the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act was not extended to occupational disease until after 1946 and the disease did not manifest itself until 1954. Cropley v. Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., 131 F. Supp. 34, 15 Alaska 531 (D. Alaska 1955).

Unnecessary to determine whether disease is injury by accident or occupational disease. —

Where both injury by accident and occupational disease are compensable, as they are in Alaska, it is unnecessary to determine whether the disease complained of is one or the other. A finding either way supports an award. Board of Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 116 F. Supp. 625, 14 Alaska 453 (D. Alaska 1953).

Compensation is not to be barred because risk is not generally recognized or because only those unusually susceptible or predisposed to a given disease will contract it. Aleutian Homes v. Fischer, 418 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1966).

VIII.Medical and Related Benefits

Reasonableness. —

While the Workers’ Compensation Act may require employers to authorize some medical care during periods of medical instability, it does not require them to pay for any and all treatments chosen by the injured employee. Bockness v. Brown Jug, Inc., 980 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1999).

Where an employer repeatedly notified an employee that it would refuse to pay for benefits it considered unreasonable or unnecessary, filed a series of controversion notices, and presented ample medical evidence to meet its burden of proof, the compensation board’s denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Bockness v. Brown Jug, Inc., 980 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1999).

IX.Parent

Dependency of parents. —

That a servant gave his wages to his parents, and such wages were devoted to the support of the family, is sufficient to afford a legal basis for the finding of actual dependency, within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Ketchikan Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Bishop, 24 F.2d 63, 5 Alaska Fed. 405 (9th Cir. Alaska 1928).

X.Married

Divorced wife can be “married” for purpose of this chapter. —

It is clear under the statutory definition of “married” that a decedent, though divorced, is “married” for the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, where the divorce decree required him to contribute to the support of his former wife. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972).

XI.Wages

“Wages”. —

Where one sustains an injury in Alaska, and then removes to another state, the amount of the award of compensation is determined by the wage rate of the state to which the claimant has removed. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

The law does not contemplate the payment of compensation in addition to the payment of wages. Hanson v. Benson, 179 F. Supp. 130 (D. Alaska 1959).

Calculation of spendable weekly wage. —

Employee was properly classified as single with no dependents where his ex-wife had custody of their two children and claimed them as dependents under provisions of their divorce decree. Arnesen v. Anchorage Refuse, 925 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1996).

Including readily identifiable and calculable value of fringe benefits. —

The readily identifiable and calculable value of fringe benefits paid by the employer on the employee’s behalf should be considered “wages” for the purpose of computing the employee’s average weekly wage. Ragland v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 724 P.2d 519 (Alaska 1986).

XII.Widow, Widower

Divorced wife qualifies as “widow” where she was living with decedent husband, who was required by the divorce decree to support her, at the time of his death and was dependent upon him for support. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972).

Construction of term “widower”. —

See Admiralty Alaska Gold Mining Co. v. Benson, 17 Alaska 727 (D. Alaska 1958).

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, § 139 et seq.

82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 1 et seq.

99 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 1 et seq.

Status, under workmen’s compensation act, of gasoline and oil distributor or dealer as agent, employee, independent dealer. 83 ALR2d 1290.

Posthumous children and children born after accident as dependents. 18 ALR3d 900.

Injury sustained while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment. 47 ALR3d 566.

Sexual assaults as compensable under workers’ compensation. 52 ALR4th 731.

Workers’ compensation: student athlete as “employee” of college or university providing scholarship or similar financial assistance. 58 ALR4th 1259.

Workers’ compensation: injuries incurred during labor activity. 61 ALR4th 196.

Injuries incurred while traveling to or from work with employer’s receipts. 63 ALR4th 253.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground for liability to third party. 13 ALR5th 289.

Employee’s reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in obtaining treatment of work-related injury. 36 ALR5th 225.

Employee’s injuries sustained in use of employer’s restroom as covered by workers’ compensation. 80 ALR5th 417.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 97 ALR5th 1.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 106 ALR5th 111.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances. 107 ALR5th 441.

Right to workers’ compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Compensability under particular circumstances. 108 ALR5th 1.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions and requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 109 ALR5th 161.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Compensability of particular physical injuries or illnesses. 112 ALR5th 509.

Compensation under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli. 113 ALR5th 115.

Right to workers’ compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 122 ALR5th 653.

Sec. 23.30.400. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.

History. (§ 1 ch 193 SLA 1959)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 23.30.270 . Renumbered in 1996.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

State v. Wien Air Alaska, 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980).

Chapter 35. Commercial Fishermen’s Fund.

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Collateral references. —

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, §§ 123, 124

82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation, §§ 1, 317-327.

99 C.J.S., Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 153-169.

Sec. 23.35.010. Creation of Fishermen’s Fund Advisory and Appeals Council.

There is within the Department of Labor and Workforce Development a Fishermen’s Fund Advisory and Appeals Council.

History. (§ 13 ch 64 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 1960)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.35.020. Appointment and composition of council.

The council is composed of the commissioner of labor and workforce development or a person designated by the commissioner and five members appointed by the governor for overlapping five year terms. The governor shall appoint one member from each of the following districts:

District 1: Wrangell and areas south;

District 2: Areas north of Wrangell to include Yakutat;

District 3: Areas west of Yakutat to East Coast of Alaska Peninsula, including Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, and Kodiak;

District 4: Areas west of Alaska Peninsula to Cape Newenham, including Bristol Bay;

District 5: Areas north of Cape Newenham, including Kuskokwim, Yukon, Kotzebue, and the Arctic.

History. (§ 13 ch 64 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 175 SLA 1976)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.35.030. Commissioner or designee as chair.

The commissioner of labor and workforce development or the person designated by the commissioner serves as the chair of the council.

History. (§ 13 ch 64 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 1960)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.35.040. Duties of commissioner and council.

  1. The council shall
    1. review all denials of benefits made by the person responsible for the administration of the fund; and
    2. make all initial determinations regarding claims for additional benefits under AS 23.35.140 .
  2. Under regulations adopted by the department, the commissioner shall hear all appeals from the council’s denial of benefits and denials of claims for additional benefits under AS 23.35.140 . The commissioner’s decision is final and may be appealed as provided under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act).

History. (§ 13 ch 64 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 103 SLA 2010)

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 26, 2010, repealed and reenacted the section.

Editor’s notes. —

Section. 4, ch. 103, SLA 2010 provides that the 2010 amendments to this section apply “to applications for benefits from the fishermen’s fund (AS 23.35.060 ) or applications for additional benefits under AS 23.35.140 that are first submitted on or after June 26, 2010,” and that “[a]pplications for benefits and appeals pending on June 25, 2010, shall be resolved under [this section] as it read on that date before its amendment.”

Sec. 23.35.050. Regulations.

The department may adopt regulations to carry out the purposes of this chapter, including those that are necessary or advisable to protect the fund by limiting or suspending payments from the fund. The regulations must be uniform in application.

History. (§ 2 ch 100 SLA 1951)

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Opinions of attorney general. —

The Department of Labor may not adopt a regulation requiring that a reasonable deductible amount be satisfied on each claim before the Fund pays benefits. March 4, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

The Department of Labor could adopt regulations limiting the availability of benefits under AS 23.35 to persons who have no insurance, as this would accord with the department’s interpretation of the purpose of the Fund. March 4, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.35.060. Creation and administration of fishermen’s fund.

  1. There is created a fund, designated as the “fishermen’s fund.” The Department of Revenue is the custodian of the fund, and the Department of Labor and Workforce Development shall administer it. The fund shall be composed of
    1. 39 percent of the money derived by the state from all commercial fishermen’s licenses, not to exceed a maximum of $50 for each license holder for each year; and
    2. money appropriated to carry out the purpose of this chapter.
  2. The legislature may appropriate up to 50 percent of the interest income earned by the state on the balance of the fishermen’s fund for a grant for statewide marine safety training and education programs.

History. (§ 4 ch 100 SLA 1951; am § 1 ch 99 SLA 1955; am § 16 ch 105 SLA 1977; am § 11 ch 123 SLA 1978; am § 2 ch 40 SLA 1997; am § 5 ch 44 SLA 1999; am § 6 ch 27 SLA 2001)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in (a) of this section, “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999.

Sec. 23.35.070. Benefits.

A fisherman, upon becoming disabled, is entitled to receive benefits as follows: immediately after the fisherman sustains an injury or disability arising out of an accident directly connected with operations as a fisherman, either ashore in the state or in Alaska water, or suffers an occupational disease, the fisherman is entitled to emergency treatment, transportation to the nearest place where approved medical facilities are available, medical care, and hospitalization. In this section, “Alaska water” means the inland and territorial water of the state and the fishery conservation zone adjacent to the state established by 16 U.S.C. 1811 (§ 101, Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976).

History. (§ 5 ch 100 SLA 1951; am § 2 ch 99 SLA 1955; am § 1 ch 59 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 15 SLA 1979)

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Chiropractors render medical services and are entitled to recover payment under the Fishermen’s Fund. August 23, 1971, Op. Att’y Gen.

The Department of Labor may not adopt a regulation requiring that a reasonable deductible amount be satisfied on each claim before the Fund pays benefits. March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

It is not required that an injury or accident be “directly caused” by the fishing endeavor; if the legislature had intended that interpretation, it seems likely that it would have said “directly caused by” rather than “directly connected with.” March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

The cost of treatment by acupuncture is an expense that is covered by the Fishermen’s Fund. June 18, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

The council is limited by the plain meaning of this section, which incorporates the federal definition by reference, to define Alaska waters as including to the 200 mile limit. March 30, 1988, Op. Att’y Gen.

The council can validly refuse to pay claims from Metlakatla fishermen who do not pay into the fund through the purchase of commercial license or gear holder permits even though he or she may be validly fishing in Metlakatla waters by tribal permit at the time of the injury. March 30, 1988, Op. Att’y Gen.

The fund is required to cover injuries that occur in the waters off Metlakatla, where fisheries are regulated by the tribal government of the Metlakatla Indian Community and not by the State of Alaska. March 30, 1988, Op. Att’y Gen.

Fishermen who are injured while they are performing “test fishing” are not entitled to benefits from the Fishermen’s Fund because they were not commercial fishing when they were injured. February 17, 1999 Op. Att’y Gen.

If the Indian Health Service, an Indian tribe, or a tribal organization treats an Alaska Native for injuries occurring as a result of commercial fishing, the Fishermen’s Fund is not responsible for paying the cost for medical treatment. Section 25 U.S.C.A. 1621e(b) does not give the Indian Health Service, an Indian tribe, or a tribal organization a right of recovery for health care against the Fishermen’s Fund because the Commercial Fishermen’s Fund Act is neither a state workers’ compensation law nor a state self-insured program. August 16, 2001 Op. Att’y Gen.

If a private or public health provider under contract with the Indian Health Service treats the same fisherman, the Indian Health Service is the payor of last resort and consequently the Fishermen’s Fund is responsible for the first $2,500 that the private or public health provider charges for medical treatment. August 16, 2001 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Hutcherson v. State, Dep't of Labor, 612 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1980).

Sec. 23.35.080. Emergency treatment for cardio-vascular diseases.

The department may pay the costs, within the maximum limitations, of emergency treatment, transportation, medical care, and hospitalization, necessitated by a cardio-vascular disease, if the department determines that the disease is attributable, directly or indirectly, to the fishing endeavor.

History. (§ 5 ch 100 SLA 1951; am § 2 ch 99 SLA 1955; am § 1 ch 59 SLA 1957)

Sec. 23.35.090. Assistance after discharge.

A fisherman is also entitled to such assistance after discharge from the hospital during period of convalescence as the department allows in consideration of the condition of the fund.

History. (§ 5 ch 100 SLA 1951; am § 2 ch 99 SLA 1955; am § 1 ch 59 SLA 1957)

Sec. 23.35.100. Transportation, hospital, nursing, medical, and surgical expenses.

The department may pay out of the fund all reasonable transportation charges incurred under AS 23.35.080 and 23.35.090 , including cost of returning the fisherman to the boat or home of the fisherman or to another place that reasonably meets with the fisherman’s convenience, and the reasonable hospital, nursing, medical, and surgical expense incurred in the examination, treatment, and care of the fisherman.

History. (§ 6 ch 100 SLA 1951)

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Money cannot be expended from the sick and disabled fishermen’s fund for the payment of charges for medicine prescribed by chiropractors. 1961 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23.

It is illegal and criminal for a chiropractor, without additional qualifications, to prescribe drugs or medicine to sick or injured persons. 1961 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23.

Chiropractors render medical services and are entitled to recover payment under the Fishermen’s Fund. August 23, 1971 Op. Att’y Gen.

For discussion of the Fund’s power to seek reimbursement from claimants’ insurance carriers or medical providers where insurance has paid part or all of a claim, see March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

Absent an assignment of the claim from the injured person, the Fishermen’s Fund may not sue third parties for negligence which caused or contributed to the injury, and even with an assignment, it would not be advised. March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

The Fishermen’s Fund may recover overpayments made by mistake. March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

The Department of Labor could adopt regulations limiting the availability of benefits under AS 23.35 to persons who have no insurance, as this would accord with the department’s interpretation of the purpose of the Fund. March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

The cost of treatment by acupuncture is an expense that is covered by the Fishermen’s Fund. June 18, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.35.110. Contracts for care.

In carrying out this chapter, the department may enter into contracts or other arrangements with hospitals and doctors in the state for furnishing care on an annual basis to persons entitled to benefits. Contracting under this section is governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).

History. (§ 6 ch 100 SLA 1951; am § 22 ch 106 SLA 1986)

Sec. 23.35.120. Cooperation with other agencies.

In providing care the department shall provide the type and quality of treatment that will restore the fisherman to health and productivity, if possible. The department may enter into cooperative arrangements with agencies of the federal government, other states and territories, and private clinics and rehabilitation centers for the care and treatment of fishermen.

History. (§ 7 ch 100 SLA 1951)

Sec. 23.35.130. Duration of care.

Except for compelling reasons, compensation may not be paid for the care of any one person involving a single injury or disability beyond a period of one year from the date of initial allowance.

History. (§ 7 ch 100 SLA 1951)

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Opinions of attorney general. —

The legislature intended a relatively liberal interpretation of the act. 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5.

For scope of term “compelling reasons”, see 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5.

With respect to a pre-existing injury, that is, one for which benefits have been paid under the Act, if subsequent aggravation is attributable strictly to that injury, and does not amount to a new injury, then, as with a recurring disability, the Act does not appear to confer benefits, for it remains a “single injury.” March 4, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.35.140. Limitation on benefits.

  1. Except for compelling reasons,
    1. compensation may not be paid for medical care or hospitalization furnished before the ascertainable time of injury, or before authorization in the case of disability caused by an occupational disease;
    2. the total allowance for any one injury or disablement is $10,000.
  2. The total allowance for any one heart attack is $10,000.

History. (§ 7 ch 100 SLA 1951; am § 1 ch 103 SLA 1965; am § 1 ch 166 SLA 1968; am § 2 ch 103 SLA 2010)

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2010 amendment, effective June 16, 2010, substituted “$10,000” for “$2,500” in (a)(2) and in (b).

Opinions of attorney general. —

There might be many very “compelling reasons” to raise the benefits above $2,500 under some circumstances. 1959 Alas. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5.

With respect to a pre-existing injury, that is, one for which benefits have been paid under the Act, if subsequent aggravation is attributable strictly to that injury, and does not amount to a new injury, then, as with a recurring disability, the Act does not appear to confer benefits, for it remains a “single injury.” March 4, 1985, Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 23.35.145. Claim of vessel owner.

If a fisherman files a claim for benefits under this chapter and also files a claim against the protection and indemnity insurance policy of the vessel owner, the vessel owner is entitled to receive a benefit, not to exceed the amount of the actual loss, that is the lesser of

  1. the full amount of the protection and indemnity insurance policy deductible; or
  2. $5,000.

History. (§ 3 ch 103 SLA 2010; am § 1 ch 25 SLA 2019)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2019 amendment, effective December 9, 2019, in (a)(1), substituted “the full amount” for “50 percent of the amount.”

Effective dates. —

Section 6, ch. 103, SLA 2010 makes this section effective June 26, 2010, in accordance with AS 01.10.070(c) .

Editor’s notes. —

Sec. 5, ch. 103, SLA 2010 provides that this section “applies to a claim filed by a fisherman under AS 23.35 on or after June 26, 2010.”

Sec. 23.35.150. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “approved medical facilities” and “medical care” include the facilities of, or the care and treatment prescribed or performed by, a practitioner of chiropractic licensed by the state under AS 08.20;
  2. “council” means the Fishermen’s Fund Advisory and Appeals Council;
  3. “fisherman” means a person who is licensed by the state to engage in commercial fishing under AS 16.05.480 or who is the holder of a permit issued under AS 16.43 and who, at the time injury is sustained or illness is contracted, is actually so engaged or is occupied in Alaska in preparing or dismantling boats or gear used in commercial fishing;
  4. “fund” means the Fishermen’s Fund;
  5. “occupational disease” means hernia; varicose veins of the leg; the respiratory diseases, bronchitis, pleurisy, and pneumonia caused by or aggravated by the fishing endeavor, but excluding the common cold and influenza; rheumatism, arthritis, and those musculoskeletal diseases (such as bursitis, traumatic sciatica, and tenosynovitis) directly caused by or aggravated by the fishing endeavor; and does not include a disease not common to both sexes, venereal disease, or a condition arising out of an attempt of a fisherman to injure self or another.

History. (§§ 4, 5, 8 ch 100 SLA 1951; am §§ 1, 2, ch 99 SLA 1955; am § 1 ch 59 SLA 1957; am § 13 ch 64 SLA 1959; am § 1 ch 93 SLA 1960; am § 1 ch 77 SLA 1962; am § 1 ch 51 SLA 1972; am § 17 ch 105 SLA 1977; am § 38 ch 168 SLA 1990)

Revisor’s notes. —

This section was reorganized in 1984 to place the defined terms in alphabetical order and in 1996 to delete repealed paragraphs.

Administrative Code. —

For fishermen’s fund, see 8 AAC 55.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Persons who are primary fish buyers and packers are “commercial fishing” under AS 16.05.940 (5) so as to qualify them as “fishermen” under paragraph (5) (now (3)) of this section to receive benefits from the Fishermen’s Fund. March 8, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

This section does not preclude the payment to a fisherman who holds a valid Alaska commercial fishing license or gear license, but chooses to commercial fish in Metlakatla waters where a special permit only is required to authorize such fishing. March 30, 1988 Op. Att’y Gen.

Chapter 40. Labor Organizations.

Administrative Code. —

For collective bargaining among public employees, see 8 AAC 97.

Collateral references. —

Bornstein, Gosline, and Greenbaum, Labor and Employment Arbitration (Matthew Bender).

Article 1. Local Organizations and Ferry System Employees.

Sec. 23.40.010. Union contracts with state and political subdivisions. [Repealed, § 5 ch 113 SLA 1972.]

Sec. 23.40.020. Enforcement of certain contracts only if union registers.

A labor contract executed in this state by a labor organization that has no local in this state or which contract is not to be executed by one or more of its locals in this state may not be enforced in the courts of this state unless the labor organization has registered with the department and complied with all regulations adopted by it.

History. (§ 4 ch 108 SLA 1959)

Sec. 23.40.030. Definition of labor organization.

For the purpose of AS 23.40.020 23.40.040 “labor organization” includes an organization constituted wholly or partly to bargain collectively or deal with employers, including the state and its political subdivisions, concerning grievances, terms, or conditions of employment or other mutual aid or protection in connection with employees.

History. (§ 1 ch 108 SLA 1959; am § 32 ch 53 SLA 1973)

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Alaska Int'l Constructors v. Second Injury Fund, 755 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1988).

Collateral references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, § 19.

51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 43-45.

Rights and remedies of workmen blacklisted by labor union. 46 ALR2d 1124.

Combination of separate plants or units of the same employer as single bargaining unit. 12 ALR3d 787.

Right of labor union to exclude applicants for membership and remedies of applicant so excluded. 33 ALR3d 1305.

Sec. 23.40.040. Collective bargaining agreement.

The commissioner of transportation and public facilities or an authorized representative, in accordance with AS 23.40.020 23.40.030 , may negotiate and enter into collective bargaining agreements concerning wages, hours, working conditions, and other employment benefits with the employees of the division of marine transportation engaged in operating the state ferry system as masters or members of the crews of vessels or their bargaining agent. A collective bargaining agreement is not final without the concurrence of the commissioner of transportation and public facilities. The commissioner of transportation and public facilities may make provision in the collective bargaining agreement for the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration.

History. (§ 1 ch 93 SLA 1962; am E.O. No. 39, § 11 (1977))

Notes to Decisions

This section was not repealed by implication by enactment of Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 , et seq., nor is it an implied exception to that act. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978). The Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 et seq., was intended to incorporate existing collective bargaining agreements rather than exempt them. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Construed in pari materia. —

Since this section cannot be treated as an implied exception to the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 et seq., and since the Public Employment Relations Act did not repeal this section by implication, the statutes are construed in pari materia. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

This section and Public Employment Relations Act can be harmonized. —

The Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 , et seq., and this section can be effectively harmonized to further the legislative purpose of establishing uniform procedures for public employee collective bargaining and to protect the policies the legislature thought important in enacting the Public Employment Relations Act. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Any possible conflict between this section and the Public Employment Relations Act is neither severe nor irreconcilable, particularly in light of AS 23.40.240 which incorporates existing agreements. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

The most reasonable construction, consistent with the implied exception rule, is that the legislature was aware of this section and saw no inconsistency in enacting the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 et seq., to provide guidelines and procedures for public employee collective bargaining. The Public Employment Relations Act does nothing to undercut the authorization of collective bargaining under this section. Rather, it gives it additional content. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

This section was comprehensive when it was enacted. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

But it was further defined by the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 , et seq. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

The Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 , et seq., contains far more detailed provisions than this section. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 et seq., applies to employees of state division of marine transportation. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

If there is no implied exemption for ferry personnel under the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 , et seq., it cannot be said that the two acts do not cover the same people. This section is a subset of the broader Public Employment Relations Act coverage and was likely left intact deliberately to designate the commissioner of public works as the state’s representative in bargaining with the ferry unions. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Collateral references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 324-602

48A Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 2963-3630.

51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 148-216.

Validity of union procedures for fixing and reviewing agency fees of nonunion employees under public employees representation contract — post-Hudson cases. 92 ALR Fed. 893.

Secs. 23.40.045 — 23.40.060. Records; local labor organizations; interference in chartering prohibited; civil enforcement; exemptions; penalties. [Repealed, § 55 ch 69 SLA 1970.]

Article 2. Public Employment Relations Act.

Administrative Code. —

For collective bargaining among public employees, see 8 AAC 97.

Notes to Decisions

AS 23.40.040 , relating to collective bargaining agreements, was not repealed by implication by the enactment of this article. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Nor is it an implied exception to article. —

AS 23.40.040 cannot be read as an implied exception to this article. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

This article was intended to incorporate existing collective bargaining agreements rather than exempt them. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Construed in pari materia. —

Since AS 23.40.040 cannot be treated as an implied exception to this article, and since this article did not repeal AS 23.40.040 by implication, the statutes are construed in pari materia. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

This article and AS 23.40.040 can be effectively harmonized to further the legislative purpose of establishing uniform procedures for public employee collective bargaining and to protect the policies the legislature thought important in enacting this article. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Any possible conflict between AS 23.40.040 and this article is neither severe nor irreconcilable, particularly in light of AS 23.40.240 which incorporates existing agreements. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

The most reasonable construction, consistent with the implied exception rule, is that the legislature was aware of AS 23.40.040 and saw no inconsistency in enacting this article to provide guidelines and procedures for public employee collective bargaining. The Public Employment Relations Act does nothing to undercut the AS 23.40.040 authorization of collective bargaining. Rather, it gives it additional content. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

This article contains far more detailed provisions than AS 23.40.040 . Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

And further defines AS 23.40.040 . —

AS 23.40.040 was comprehensive when it was enacted, but it was further defined by this article. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

This article applies to employees of state division of marine transportation. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

If there is no implied exemption for ferry personnel under this article, it cannot be said that the two acts do not cover the same people. AS 23.40.040 is a subset of the broader coverage under this article and was likely left intact deliberately to designate the commissioner of public works as the state’s representative in bargaining with the ferry unions. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Warwick v. State, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976); Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983); Carter v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 663 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1983).

Collateral references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 324-602.

51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 52, 148

51A C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 306.

Validity of union procedures for fixing and reviewing agency fees of nonunion employees under public employees representation contract — post-Hudson cases. 92 ALR Fed. 893.

Sec. 23.40.070. Declaration of policy.

The legislature finds that joint decision-making is the modern way of administering government. If public employees have been granted the right to share in the decision-making process affecting wages and working conditions, they have become more responsive and better able to exchange ideas and information on operations with their administrators. Accordingly, government is made more effective. The legislature further finds that the enactment of positive legislation establishing guidelines for public employment relations is the best way to harness and direct the energies of public employees eager to have a voice in determining their conditions of work, to provide a rational method for dealing with disputes and work stoppages, to strengthen the merit principle where civil service is in effect, and to maintain a favorable political and social environment. The legislature declares that it is the public policy of the state to promote harmonious and cooperative relations between government and its employees and to protect the public by assuring effective and orderly operations of government. These policies are to be effectuated by

  1. recognizing the right of public employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining;
  2. requiring public employers to negotiate with and enter into written agreements with employee organizations on matters of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment;
  3. maintaining merit-system principles among public employees.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Opinions of attorney general. —

Paragraph (2) of this section and AS 23.40.250 (9), standing alone, clearly would make both group life and health insurance benefits and retirement benefits subject to collective bargaining since they both are “fringe benefits.” January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Because health insurance deals with the economic interests of employees and does not deal with fundamental policy; because AS 39.30.090 , the group insurance statute, authorizes the Department of Administration to obtain “a policy or policies”; and because AS 39.30.090 does not specify what levels of coverage or benefits must be included in the policy (or policies) obtained, the issue of group life and health insurance benefits is negotiable under the Public Employment Relations Act (AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 ). January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Given AS 39.35.120(b) and AS 39.35.170 , which make inclusion in the public employees retirement system (AS 39.35.010 39.35.690 ) [now AS 39.35.001 39.35.995 ] a condition of employment for state employees and contributions to it mandatory, the conclusion is that the legislature intended the statutory provisions of the public employees retirement system to apply to all state employees, and benefits under the public employees retirement system may not be negotiated under the Public Employment Relations Act (AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 ). January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Statutory right to organize. —

Employees who had already relied upon their rights under Public Employment Relations Act were not stopped by a borough’s later attempt to stop the employees from organizing; the borough’s attempt was to deny employees their statutory right to organize. Kodiak Island Borough v. State, Dep't of Labor, 853 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1993).

Subdivision to reject before employees organize. —

Political subdivision’s rejection of the Public Employment Relations Act after it became aware of substantial organizational activity was invalid. Kodiak Island Borough v. State, Dep't of Labor, 853 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1993).

Job classification plan. —

A job classification plan is an integral part of the very foundation of the merit principle in state employment. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 831 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1992).

Assignment of salary ranges to job classes. —

The assignment of salary ranges to job classes is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining between the state and its employees’ collective bargaining representatives. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 831 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1992).

Negotiability. —

For discussion of negotiable and nonnegotiable items under former AS 14.20.550 — 14.20.610 in negotiations between school boards and teachers, see Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977).

Applied in

State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975); Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978); Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980); Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982); State v. Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, 93 P.3d 409 (Alaska 2004).

Quoted in

Fairbanks v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 763 P.2d 976 (Alaska 1988).

Stated in

Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. State, Dep't of Admin., 776 P.2d 1030 (Alaska 1989).

Cited in

Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983); Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988); Barnica v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 46 P.3d 974 (Alaska 2002); State v. Alaska State Emples. Ass'n, 190 P.3d 720 (Alaska 2008); Classified Emples. Ass'n v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist., 204 P.3d 347 (Alaska 2009); Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 v. Municipality of Anchorage, 298 P.3d 195 (Alaska 2013).

Collateral references. —

48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 324-602.

51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, §§ 20-22, 33.

Bargainable or negotiable issues in state public employment labor relations. 84 ALR3d 242.

Sec. 23.40.075. Items not subject to bargaining.

The parties may not negotiate terms contrary to the

  1. reemployment rights for injured state employees under AS 39.25.158 ;
  2. reemployment rights of the organized militia under AS 26.05.075 ;
  3. authority of the Department of Health and Social Services under AS 47.27.035 to assign Alaska temporary assistance program participants to a work activity considered appropriate by the Department of Health and Social Services;
  4. authority for agencies to create temporary positions under AS 47.27.055(c) ; or
  5. provisions contained in a contract under AS 14.40.210(a)(4) .

History. (§ 1 ch 86 SLA 1988; am § 2 ch 77 SLA 1990; am § 10 ch 107 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 22 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For self-insurance, see 8 AAC 46.

Sec. 23.40.080. Rights of public employees.

Public employees may self-organize and form, join, or assist an organization to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Opinions of attorney general. —

The Public Employment Relations Act confirms the right of public employees to join and assist labor organizations, choose their own union representatives, and to engage in collective bargaining. The Act also provides various mechanisms for resolution of employer and union or employee disputes. Thus, union representation and activity is not outside service and does not have to be reported. July 26, 2011 Op Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Dismissal of complaint held proper. —

Change in teachers’ salaries brought about by contract renegotiation did not abuse any “vested” rights entitled to judicial protection, and dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted was proper. Rouse v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 613 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).

Applied in

Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979).

Quoted in

Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

Cited in

Kollodge v. State, 757 P.2d 1028 (Alaska 1988); City of Fairbanks v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 763 P.2d 976 (Alaska 1988).

Collateral references. —

Right of public employees to strike or engage in work stoppage. 37 ALR3d 1147.

Right of public employees to form or join a labor organization affiliated with a federation of trade unions or which includes private employees. 40 ALR3d 728.

Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances providing for arbitration of labor disputes involving public employees. 68 ALR3d 885.

Union security arrangements in state public employment. 95 ALR3d 1102.

Who are employees forbidden to strike under state enactments or state common-law rules prohibiting strikes by public employees or stated classes of public employees. 22 ALR4th 1103.

Right of public defenders to join collective bargaining unit. 108 ALR5th 241.

Sec. 23.40.090. Collective bargaining unit.

The labor relations agency shall decide in each case, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, based on such factors as community of interest, wages, hours, and other working conditions of the employees involved, the history of collective bargaining, and the desires of the employees. Bargaining units shall be as large as is reasonable, and unnecessary fragmenting shall be avoided.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For certification, see 8 AAC 97, art. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Construction. —

AS 23.40.170 and this section, when read together, give the Alaska Labor Relations Agency an explicit grant of authority to make regulations that establish collective bargaining units for state employees. Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. State, 990 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1999).

Nothing in this section prohibits the Labor Relations Agency from clarifying through regulation what constitutes a community of interest for grouping certain employees together. Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. State, 990 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1999).

There is nothing in this statute that requires the Labor Relations Agency to go through a weighing process with each employee to determine whether that employee shares a sufficient community of interest with other supervisors to be in the supervisory bargaining unit. Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. State, 990 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1999).

In connection with consolidation of state housing programs, the labor relations board lacked rational basis for holding that the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation was a successor employer to the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs and that the general governing bargaining unit remained an appropriate bargaining unit for transferred employees without considering employee preference, unit size, and avoidance of unnecessary fragmentation. State v. Alaska State Emples. Association /AFSCME Local 52, 923 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1996).

Regulation upheld. —

Since supervisory and non-supervisory employees must be in separate bargaining units, and since it is incumbent on the Alaska Labor Relations Agency (ALRA) to establish guidelines for distinguishing those categories, a regulation which gave union officials and state executives clear guidance on determining which bargaining unit an employee should belong to was reasonably necessary to carry out the ALRA’s grant of authority. Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. State, 990 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1999).

Cited in

McGrath v. University of Alaska, 813 P.2d 1370 (Alaska 1991).

Sec. 23.40.100. Representatives and elections.

  1. The labor relations agency shall investigate a petition if it is submitted in a manner prescribed by the labor relations agency and is
    1. by an employee or group of employees or an organization acting in their behalf alleging that 30 percent of the employees of a proposed bargaining unit
      1. want to be represented for collective bargaining by a labor or employee organization as exclusive representative, or
      2. assert that the organization which has been certified or is currently being recognized by the public employer as bargaining representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the bargaining unit; or
    2. by the public employer alleging that one or more organizations have presented to it a claim to be recognized as a representative of a majority of employees in an appropriate unit.
  2. If the labor relations agency has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, it shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice.  If the labor relations agency finds that there is a question of representation, it shall direct an election by secret ballot to determine whether or by which organization the employees desire to be represented and shall certify the results of the election. Nothing in this section prohibits the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election in conformity with the regulations of the labor relations agency or an election in a bargaining unit agreed upon by the parties.  The labor relations agency shall determine who is eligible to vote in an election and shall establish rules governing the election.  In an election in which none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority of the votes cast, a runoff election shall be conducted, the ballot providing for selection between the two choices receiving the largest and the second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.  If an organization receives the majority of the votes cast in the election it shall be certified by the labor relations agency as exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
  3. An election may not be held in a bargaining unit or in a subdivision of a bargaining unit if a valid election has been held within the preceding 12 months.
  4. Nothing in this chapter prohibits recognition of an organization as the exclusive representative by a public agency by mutual consent.
  5. An election may not be directed by the labor relations agency in a bargaining unit in which there is in force a valid collective bargaining agreement, except during a 90-day period preceding the expiration date.  However, a collective bargaining agreement may not bar an election upon petition of persons in the bargaining unit but not parties to the agreement if more than three years have elapsed since the execution of the agreement or the last timely renewal, whichever was later.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For certification, see 8 AAC 97, art. 1.

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

Opinions of attorney general. —

The Department of Administration may comply with an order received from the labor relations agency directing the state, in its capacity as a public employer, to provide lists of all employees eligible to vote in a representation election held pursuant to AS 23.40.100 . July 1, 1988, Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.110. Unfair labor practices.

  1. A public employer or an agent of a public employer may not
    1. interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the exercise of the employee’s rights guaranteed in AS 23.40.080 ;
    2. dominate or interfere with the formation, existence, or administration of an organization;
    3. discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or a term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in an organization;
    4. discharge or discriminate against an employee because the employee has signed or filed an affidavit, petition, or complaint or given testimony under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 ;
    5. refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with an organization which is the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative.
  2. Nothing in this chapter prohibits a public employer from making an agreement with an organization to require as a condition of employment
    1. membership in the organization which represents the unit on or after the 30th day following the beginning of employment or on the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later; or
    2. payment by the employee to the exclusive bargaining agent of a service fee to reimburse the exclusive bargaining agent for the expense of representing the members of the bargaining unit.
  3. A labor or employee organization or its agents may not
    1. restrain or coerce
      1. an employee in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in AS 23.40.080 , or
      2. a public employer in the selection of the employer’s representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
    2. refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with a public employer, if it has been designated in accordance with the provisions of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 as the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1990 the word “with” was inserted after “interfere” in (a)(1) of this section to correct a manifest error of omission in ch. 113, SLA 1972.

Administrative Code. —

For certification, see 8 AAC 97, art. 1.

For unfair labor practices, see 8 AAC 97, art. 2.

For impasse, see 8 AAC 97, art. 3.

For right of nonassociation, see 8 AAC 97, art. 4.

Notes to Decisions

Similarity to federal act. —

Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3) are substantially similar to § 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (a)(3). Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

For establishment of violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), see Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

Derivative violation of (a)(1) from violation of (a)(3). —

A violation of paragraph (a)(3) derivatively results in a violation of (a)(1) as well since employer discrimination in hiring, firing or working conditions also coerces or restrains employees in their rights to organize, bargain collectively and engage in other concerted activities. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

Refusal to ratify tentative agreement. —

It is permissible for an employer to refuse to ratify a tentative collective bargaining agreement in accordance with an agreed upon ground rule, so long as the employer’s failure to ratify does not appear to have resulted from the employer’s intent to string out negotiations and avoid reaching agreement. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

Negotiable items. —

The salary of teachers is a proper subject of collective bargaining under Alaska’s statutes. Rouse v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 613 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1980), overruled in part, Rosen v. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984).

Work rule changes. —

Since employers are free to make unilateral changes on matters which fall outside mandatory subjects of bargaining, the labor relations agency erred insofar as it rescinded work rules pertaining to permissive bargaining subjects and ordered the extension of terms in the previously expired collective bargaining agreement pertaining to permissive bargaining subjects. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

Duty of employer. —

A school board is required to negotiate with a union, but a board is not required to accept any particular proposal a union might offer. A board is not required, and probably not permitted to delegate to a union the sole power to make any decision. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977).

Superior court erred in affirming a ruling by the Alaska Labor Relations Agency (ALRA) that a city violated the Public Employer Relations Act in reconsidering and rejecting an agreement because the city council was not a public employer and because the ALRA panel's bad faith finding was not supported by substantial evidence where it was only after public comment and additional information from staff that the city council realized the city might not be able to afford the agreement, postponing the ratification vote gave the city council time to reassess the contract, and the city council's reevaluation and subsequent rejection of the agreement was a reflection of the political process. Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, AFSCME Local 803 v. City of Fairbanks, 420 P.3d 1243 (Alaska 2018).

Burden on union. —

A union is required to demonstrate that an applicant was denied employment because of some antiunion motive on the part of the employer. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

The union did not establish the presence of an antiunion motive on the part of the university where there was testimony that the applicant was not hired because more qualified applicants were available and ultimately because a lack of student interest caused the class to be cancelled and where although the union presented correspondence which demonstrated that the university considered the applicant’s unavailability (because of his position as a negotiator) in determining his qualification, there was unequivocal testimony that it was the mere fact of the applicant’s unavailability, not the reason therefor, which was considered in this regard. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

“Zipper” clause. —

A union waived its right to bargain a smoking policy adopted by the university where the collective bargaining agreement contained a promise to follow policies not specifically superseded by the agreement, a management-rights section, and a “zipper” clause stating that the agreement was the complete agreement. Univ. of Alaska v. Univ. of Alaska Classified Employees Ass'n, 952 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1998).

Notice not required when job loss not shown. —

Claim of a probationary state employee, that the unfair labor practices clause of the Alaska Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.110(a)(5) , required the State to inform the employee and the union that the employee’s job would be lost to contracting, was dismissed on summary judgment since the collective bargaining agreement required no such thing unless the contracting resulted in the loss of a probationary or permanent union job, and the employee failed to raise genuine issues of fact about whether the employee’s job was replaced. Witt v. State, 75 P.3d 1030 (Alaska 2003).

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Quoted in

State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975).

Cited in

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977); IBEW, Local Union 1547 v. City of Ketchikan, 805 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1991); Laborers Local # 942 v. Lampkin, 956 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998); Univ. of Alaska v. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2404, 64 P.3d 823 (Alaska 2003); State v. Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, 93 P.3d 409 (Alaska 2004).

Collateral references. —

What constitutes unfair labor practice under state public employee relations acts. 9 ALR4th 20.

Employers subject to state statutes requiring payment of prevailing wages on public works projects. 7 ALR5th 444.

Sec. 23.40.120. Investigation and conciliation of complaints.

If a verified written complaint by or for a person claiming to be aggrieved by a practice prohibited by AS 23.40.110 , or a written accusation that a person subject to AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 has engaged in a prohibited practice, is filed with the labor relations agency, it shall investigate the complaint or accusation. If it determines after the preliminary investigation that probable cause exists in support of the complaint or accusation, it shall try to eliminate the prohibited practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during this endeavor may be used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For unfair labor practices, see 8 AAC 97, art. 2.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.130. Complaint and accusation.

If the labor relations agency fails to eliminate the prohibited practice by conciliation and to obtain voluntary compliance with AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , or, before it attempts conciliation, it may serve a copy of the complaint or accusation upon the respondent. The complaint or accusation and the subsequent procedures shall be handled in accordance with the administrative adjudication portion of AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act).

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For unfair labor practices, see 8 AAC 97, art. 2.

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Collateral references. —

Procedural rights of union members in union disciplinary proceedings — modern state cases. 79 ALR4th 941.

Sec. 23.40.140. Orders and decisions.

If the labor relations agency finds that a person named in the written complaint or accusation has engaged in a prohibited practice, the labor relations agency shall issue and serve on the person an order or decision requiring the person to cease and desist from the prohibited practice and to take affirmative action which will carry out the provisions of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 . If the labor relations agency finds that a person named in the complaint or accusation has not engaged or is not engaging in a prohibited practice, the labor relations agency shall state its findings of fact and issue an order dismissing the complaint or accusation.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects. —

This section requires the labor relations agency to distinguish between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects in its remedial orders. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

While this section authorizes the agency to issue cease and desist orders barring prohibited practices, and to order affirmative action which will carry out the provisions of the Public Employment Relations Act, it does not require employers to bring to the bargaining table subjects other than wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

The labor relations agency erred insofar as it rescinded work rules pertaining to permissive bargaining subjects and ordered the extension of terms in the previously expired collective bargaining agreement pertaining to permissive bargaining subjects. Alaska Cmty. Colleges' Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2404 v. Univ. of Alaska, 669 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1983).

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.150. Enforcement by injunction.

The labor relations agency may apply to the superior court in the judicial district in which the prohibited practice occurred for an order enjoining the prohibited acts specified in the order or decision of the labor relations agency. Upon a showing by the labor relations agency that the person has engaged or is about to engage in the practice, an injunction, restraining order, or other order which is appropriate may be granted by the court and shall be without bond.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.160. Power to investigate and compel testimony.

  1. For the purpose of the investigations, proceedings, or hearings which the labor relations agency considers necessary to carry out the provisions of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , the labor relations agency may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of relevant evidence.
  2. The labor relations agency may administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence.
  3. The attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required from any place in the state at any designated place of hearing.
  4. If a person refuses to obey a subpoena issued under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , the superior court in the district in which the person resides or is found may, upon application by the labor relations agency, issue an order requiring the person to comply with the subpoena.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.170. Regulations.

The labor relations agency may adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to carry out the provisions of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 .

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For right of nonassociation, see 2 AAC 10, art. 4.

For certification, see 8 AAC 97, art. 1.

For unfair labor practices, see 8 AAC 97, art. 2.

For impasse, see 8 AAC 97, art. 3.

For right of nonassociation, see 8 AAC 97, art. 4.

For procedure for hearings, see 8 AAC 97, art. 5.

For collective bargaining agreement, see 8 AAC 97, art. 6.

Notes to Decisions

Construction with other laws. —

This section and AS 23.40.090 , when read together, give the Alaska Labor Relations Agency an explicit grant of authority to make regulations that establish collective bargaining units for state employees. Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. State, 990 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1999).

Stated in

Carter v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 663 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1983).

Cited in

McGrath v. University of Alaska, 813 P.2d 1370 (Alaska 1991).

Sec. 23.40.180. Penalty for violation of order or decision.

A person who violates a provision of an order or decision of the labor relations agency is guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not more than $500.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.190. Mediation.

If, after a reasonable period of negotiation over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, a deadlock exists between a public employer and an organization, the labor relations agency may appoint a competent, impartial, disinterested person to act as mediator in any dispute either on its own initiative or on the request of one of the parties to the dispute. The parties may also select a mediator by agreement or mutual consent. It is the function of the mediator to bring the parties together voluntarily under such favorable auspices as will tend to effectuate settlement of the dispute, but neither the mediator nor the labor relations agency has any power of compulsion in mediation proceedings.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Administrative Code. —

For impasse, see 8 AAC 97, art. 3.

Sec. 23.40.200. Classes of public employees; arbitration.

  1. For purposes of this section, public employees are employed to perform services in one of the three following classes:
    1. those services which may not be given up for even the shortest period of time;
    2. those services which may be interrupted for a limited period but not for an indefinite period of time; and
    3. those services in which work stoppages may be sustained for extended periods without serious effects on the public.
  2. The class in (a)(1) of this section is composed of police and fire protection employees, jail, prison, and other correctional institution employees, and hospital employees. Employees in this class may not engage in strikes. Upon a showing by a public employer or the labor relations agency that employees in this class are engaging or about to engage in a strike, an injunction, restraining order, or other order that may be appropriate shall be granted by the superior court in the judicial district in which the strike is occurring or is about to occur. If an impasse or deadlock is reached in collective bargaining between the public employer and employees in this class, and mediation has been utilized without resolving the deadlock, the parties shall submit to arbitration to be carried out under AS 09.43.030 or 09.43.480 to the extent permitted by AS 09.43.010 and 09.43.300 .
  3. The class in (a)(2) of this section is composed of public utility, snow removal, sanitation, and educational institution employees other than employees of a school district, a regional educational attendance area, or a state boarding school. Employees in this class may engage in a strike after mediation, subject to the voting requirement of (d) of this section, for a limited time. The limit is determined by the interests of the health, safety, or welfare of the public. The public employer or the labor relations agency may apply to the superior court in the judicial district in which the strike is occurring for an order enjoining the strike. A strike may not be enjoined unless it can be shown that it has begun to threaten the health, safety, or welfare of the public. A court, in deciding whether or not to enjoin the strike, shall consider the total equities in the particular class. “Total equities” includes not only the effect of a strike on the public but also the extent to which employee organizations and public employers have met their statutory obligations. If an impasse or deadlock still exists after the issuance of an injunction, the parties shall submit to arbitration to be carried out under AS 09.43.030 or 09.43.480 to the extent permitted by AS 09.43.010 and 09.43.300 .
  4. The class in (a)(3) of this section includes all other public employees who are not included in the classes in (a)(1) or (2) of this section. Subject to (g) of this section, employees in this class may engage in a strike if a majority of the employees in a collective bargaining unit vote by secret ballot to do so.
  5. Notwithstanding the provisions of (b), (c) and (d) of this section, the employees with the concurrence of the employer may agree in writing to submit a dispute arising from interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement to arbitration.
  6. The parties to a collective bargaining agreement may provide in the agreement a contract for arbitration to be conducted solely according to AS 09.43.010 09.43.180 (Uniform Arbitration Act) or AS 09.43.300 09.43.595 (Revised Uniform Arbitration Act) to the extent permitted by AS 09.43.010 and 09.43.300 if either Act is incorporated into the agreement or contract by reference.
  7. Under the provisions of (d) of this section, if an impasse or deadlock is reached in collective bargaining negotiations between a municipal school district, a regional educational attendance area, or a state boarding school and its employees,
    1. the parties shall submit to advisory arbitration before the employees may vote to engage in a strike; the arbitrator shall
      1. be a member of the American Arbitration Association, Panel of Labor Arbitrators, or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service;
      2. have knowledge of and recent experience in the local conditions in the school district, regional educational attendance area, or state boarding school; and
      3. be determined from a list containing at least five nominees who meet the qualifications of this subsection; this list shall be considered a complete list for the purpose of striking names and selecting the arbitrator;
    2. if, under (1) of this subsection, advisory arbitration fails, a strike may not begin until at least 72 hours after notice of the strike is given to the other party; in any event, a strike may not begin on or after the first day of the school term, as that term is described in AS 14.03.030 , unless at least one day in session with students in attendance has passed after notice of the strike is given by the employees to the other party.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972; am §§ 3, 4 ch 1 SLA 1992; am §§ 17, 18 ch 113 SLA 1997; am §§ 1, 2 ch 130 SLA 2003; am §§ 5 — 7 ch 170 SLA 2004)

Administrative Code. —

For impasse, see 8 AAC 97, art. 3.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Fish hatchery employees and area management biologists have a right to strike under paragraph (a)(3) and subsection (d). May 18, 1987 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Analysis

I.General Consideration

Certain teachers not covered by section. —

Teachers, who are not “public employees” for purposes of this article, are not covered by this section. Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982) (decided under former law).

Strikes by teachers. —

Issuance of injunction to end teachers’ strike, without separate finding of irreparable harm was not error, since by making these strikes illegal, the legislature has decided that a teachers’ strike would cause irreparable harm. Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982) (decided under former law).

“Impasse” in negotiations. —

The state may implement unilateral contract changes when negotiations reach an impasse. For Class II employees, an impasse is reached when the parties have reached a good faith impasse and the mediation process has been exhausted. For Class III employees, an impasse is reached when negotiations are deadlocked. Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. State, Dep't of Admin., 776 P.2d 1030 (Alaska 1989).

State’s unilateral contract changes upheld. —

Unilateral contract changes imposed by the state during an impasse in negotiations with public employees, which changes included an extension of work hours, did not deprive the employees of a property interest protected by Alaska Const., art. I, § 18. Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. State, Dep't of Admin., 776 P.2d 1030 (Alaska 1989).

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 v. Municipality of Anchorage, 298 P.3d 195 (Alaska 2013).

II.Arbitration

Not exclusive remedy. —

The fact that an arbitrator cannot grant the relief afforded by a statute is an indication that holding arbitration to provide an exclusive remedy would conflict with the statutory purpose. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Applicability of Uniform Arbitration Act. —

Even though this section does provide that interest arbitration shall be conducted under AS 09.43.030 , the section of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) providing for appointment of arbitrators by agreement of the parties, or, in the absence of an agreement, by the superior court, the entire UAA is not applicable to this section. State v. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).

Applicability of legislative approval. —

The legislative appropriation requirement of AS 23.40.215(a) applies to arbitration awards under subsection (b). Fairbanks Police Dep't Chapter, Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 920 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1996).

Matter for courts. —

Arbitrability is a question for the courts unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise. State v. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).

Only nonstriking employees entitled to compulsory arbitration. —

This section unambiguously extends the right to compulsory arbitration only to those employees who are forbidden from striking, i.e., class (a)(1) employees. Class (a)(2) and (a)(3) employees are not entitled to binding arbitration simply because they happen to be in a bargaining unit with class (a)(1) employees. Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 753 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1988).

Issues arbitrable. —

The duty to maintain fit premises under a collective bargaining agreement providing for bush housing is one for which a contract remedy is available and is thus arbitrable. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Issues not arbitrable. —

The legality of a clearly expressed and plainly applicable contract formula was held not arbitrable under the terms of a contract clause providing for arbitration in disputes involving the meaning or application of the express terms of the contract. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Because of the explicit nonwaiver provisions of AS 34.03.040 , the right to sue under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, AS 34.03, cannot be prospectively bargained away in a collective bargaining agreement which provides for arbitration. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1983).

Interest arbitration for employees classified under subsection (a)(3) is not provided by Alaska’s Public Employment Relations Act; this supports the determination that a dispute between a school district and its employees’ union over the outsourcing of custodial work is not arbitrable. Classified Emples. Ass'n v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist., 204 P.3d 347 (Alaska 2009).

Standard of review. —

Appellate courts should apply the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing awards in compulsory interest arbitrations; in voluntary interest arbitrations, the standard of review is gross error. State v. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).

Sec. 23.40.205. Family leave.

Notwithstanding any provision of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 to the contrary, an agreement between the employer subject to AS 39.20.500 39.20.550 and an employee bargaining organization that does not contain benefit provisions at least as beneficial to the employee as those provided by AS 39.20.500 39.20.550 shall be considered to contain the benefit provisions of those statutes.

History. (§ 7 ch 96 SLA 1992)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 23.40.200(g) . Renumbered in 1992. In 2002, “AS 39.20.500 39.20.550 ” was substituted for “AS 23.10.500 — 23.10.550” to reflect the 2002 renumbering of AS 23.10.500 — 23.10.550.

Collateral references. —

Who is eligible employee under § 101(2) of Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)). 166 ALR Fed. 569.

Adequacy of notice to employer of need for leave under Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. 184 ALR Fed. 171.

Sec. 23.40.210. Agreement; cost-of-living differential.

  1. Upon the completion of negotiations between an organization and a public employer, if a settlement is reached, the employer shall reduce it to writing in the form of an agreement.  The agreement may include a term for which it will remain in effect, not to exceed three years.  The agreement shall include a pay plan designed to provide for a cost-of-living differential between the salaries paid employees residing in the state and employees residing outside the state. The plan shall provide that the salaries paid, as of August 26, 1977, to employees residing outside the state shall remain unchanged until the difference between those salaries and the salaries paid employees residing in the state reflects the difference between the cost of living in Alaska and living in Seattle, Washington.  The agreement shall include a grievance procedure which shall have binding arbitration as its final step. Either party to the agreement has a right of action to enforce the agreement by petition to the labor relations agency.
  2. An employee is eligible for the cost-of-living differential under (a) of this section only if the individual is a state resident. The required presence of an employee at a work station where room and board are provided or reimbursed by the employer may not be considered to be physical presence in the state or physical absence from the state for purposes of determining eligibility for the cost-of-living differential.
  3. The commissioner of administration may adopt regulations under AS 44.62 (Administrative Procedure Act) to clarify and implement the criteria for establishing and maintaining eligibility for the cost-of-living differential.
  4. An agreement entered into under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 must require compliance with the eligibility criteria for receiving the cost-of-living differential contained in this section and the regulations adopted by the commissioner under (c) of this section.
  5. In this section, “state resident” means an individual who is physically present in the state with the intent to remain permanently in the state under the requirements of AS 01.10.055 or, if the individual is not physically present in the state, intends to return to the state and remain permanently in the state under the requirements of AS 01.10.055 and is absent only temporarily for reasons allowed under AS 43.23.008 or a successor statute.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 62 SLA 1977; am § 7 ch 4 FSSLA 1996; am § 1 ch 44 SLA 1998)

Cross references. —

For legislative intent and purpose related to the enactment of subsections (b)-(e), see § 1, ch. 4, FSSLA 1996 in the Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For unfair labor practices, see 8 AAC 97, art. 2.

For collective bargaining agreement, see 8 AAC 97, art. 6.

For receiving and processing complaints, see 21 AAC 20, art. 1.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 44, ch. 4 FSSLA 1996 provides that nothing in that Act, which added subsections (b)-(e), “modifies or terminates the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in effect on July 1, 1996.” Under § 45, ch. 4, FSSLA 1996, the provisions of that act, which added subsections (b)-(e), are not severable, notwithstanding AS 01.10.030 .

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

This section’s cost-of-living wage differentials do not violate the federal constitution’s commerce clause since Alaska acted as a “market participant” rather than as a “market regulator.” Int'l Org. of Masters v. Andrews, 626 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Alaska 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987).

Because the existence and amount of the wage differentials imposed under this section reasonably further a legitimate state purpose, the wage differentials do not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Int'l Org. of Masters v. Andrews, 626 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Alaska 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987).

Imposing wage differentials according to Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) employee’s states of residence did not infringe on their “right to travel” guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment since the wage adjustments do not penalize AMHS employees for migrating to or emigrating from Alaska. Int'l Org. of Masters v. Andrews, 626 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Alaska 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987).

This section’s wage differentials do not violate the privileges and immunities clause because the interest “burdened” by this section’s wage differentials is not “fundamental” in nature, and even if this interest were fundamental for purposes of privileges and immunities analysis, Alaska has a substantial interest in eliminating disincentives that discourage Alaska Marine Highway System employees from residing in the state, and its wage differentials bear a “substantial relationship” to its objective of eliminating, or at least minimizing, these disincentives. Int'l Org. of Masters v. Andrews, 626 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Alaska 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987).

This section, granting cost of living wage adjustments to resident, but not nonresident employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System, does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the right to travel as embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Int'l Org. of Masters v. Andrews, 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962, 108 S. Ct. 1228, 99 L. Ed. 2d 428 (U.S. 1988).

Arbitration waived by union. —

Probationary state employee’s union had unambiguously waived the right of probationary employees to arbitrate in the collective bargaining agreement. Blackburn v. State, 103 P.3d 900 (Alaska 2004).

Agency assumption of jurisdiction over pending grievance procedures. —

The agency may exercise jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims which are the subject of pending grievance procedures not yet exhausted where it appears that pursuing the grievance procedures would be futile. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 799 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1990).

Availability of statutory remedies. —

The availability of arbitration does not preclude statutory remedies. Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 799 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1990).

Statutory violations. —

Exclusion of grievances involving involuntary transfers from binding arbitration in a provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the state and a union, the Public Safety Employees Association, violates this section. Hemmen v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 710 P.2d 1001 (Alaska 1985).

Binding arbitration. —

Arbitrator committed gross error in finding that there was not just cause to terminate an administrative clerk from the Child Support Enforcement Division (now the Child Support Services Agency) where the clerk was convicted for theft of public funds, had access to confidential information, and was in a position of public trust. Alaska State Emples. Association/AFSCME Local 52 v. State, 74 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2003).

Requirement of grievance procedure to include binding arbitration. —

The objective of this section is to ensure that all contracts subject to it contain a grievance procedure, and that binding arbitration be included as the final step of all grievance procedures; consequently, an agreement’s exclusion of grievances involving involuntary transfers from binding arbitration violated this section. State v. Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, 93 P.3d 409 (Alaska 2004).

Requirement that agreement be in writing. —

Court refused to address a union’s claim that a school district had orally agreed not to outsource custodial services because any collective bargaining agreement must be in writing. To the extent the parties had a side oral agreement, it was void. Classified Emples. Ass'n v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist., 204 P.3d 347 (Alaska 2009).

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Barnica v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 46 P.3d 974 (Alaska 2002); State v. Alaska State Emples. Ass'n, 190 P.3d 720 (Alaska 2008).

Sec. 23.40.212. Agreement with the Board of Regents.

  1. The Board of Regents of the University of Alaska may delegate to the Department of Administration its authority under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 to negotiate with an organization for an agreement.
  2. The Department of Administration shall participate in the negotiations between the Board of Regents and an organization.  An agreement between the board and an organization requires the approval of the department.

History. (§ 1 ch 148 SLA 1978)

Sec. 23.40.215. Monetary terms subject to legislative funding.

  1. The monetary terms of any agreement entered into under AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 are subject to funding through legislative appropriation.
  2. The Department of Administration shall submit the monetary terms of an agreement to the legislature within 10 legislative days after the agreement of the parties, if the legislature is in session, or within 10 legislative days after the convening of the next regular session. The complete monetary and nonmonetary terms of a tentative agreement shall be submitted to the legislature no later than the 60th day of the legislative session to receive legislative consideration during that calendar year. However, if the department has submitted a tentative agreement in a timely manner and the parties to the agreement decide to renegotiate the terms, the renegotiated agreement shall be considered to have been submitted in a timely manner. In this subsection, “tentative agreement” means an agreement that has been reached by the negotiators for the employer and the bargaining unit but that may not yet have been ratified by the members of the bargaining unit.
  3. Notwithstanding (b) of this section, the monetary terms of an agreement entered into between a school district or regional educational attendance area and its employees are not required to be submitted to the legislature.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972; am § 1 ch 10 SLA 1984; am § 5 ch 1 SLA 1992; am § 1 ch 15 SLA 2000; am § 8 ch 22 SLA 2001)

Opinions of attorney general. —

To the extent the cost of negotiated group life and health insurance coverage exceeds what the State would have paid under its employer-sponsored plan, the negotiated coverage is subject to legislative approval under this section. January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Applicability to municipalities. —

Subsection (a) applies to political subdivisions of the state; although the terms of subsection (b) refer only to the state, subsection (a) predates subsection (b) and nothing indicates an intent to make subsection (a) inapplicable to municipalities. Fairbanks Police Dep't Chapter, Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 920 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1996).

Applicability to arbitration awards. —

The legislative appropriation requirement of subsection (a) applies to arbitration awards under AS 23.40.200(b) . Fairbanks Police Dep't Chapter, Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 920 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1996).

Accrual of penalties for nonpayment. —

The language of the Public Employment Relations Act mandates that “monetary terms of any agreement” entered into under its provisions “are subject to funding through legislative appropriation.” Since the union does not contend that the geographic differential increases fall outside the definition of a “monetary term of an agreement,” the statute appears to compel legislative approval. Hence, penalties for nonpayment would not accrue until the date when legislative approval is obtained. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, Local 92 v. State, 895 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1995).

Effective date of monetary terms of collective bargaining agreements. —

The plain language of this provision suggests that the monetary terms of a collective bargaining agreement do not become effective unless and until the legislature specifically funds them, which the legislature is not required to do. University of Alaska Classified Emples. Ass'n v. University of Alaska, 988 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1999).

Payment of interest on late-funded increases. —

A university was not required to pay fiscal year increases under a collective bargaining agreement until the legislature funded them, and neither was the university required to pay interest on those late-funded increases. University of Alaska Classified Emples. Ass'n v. University of Alaska, 988 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1999).

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Cited in

Warwick v. State, 548 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1976).

Sec. 23.40.220. Labor or employee organization dues and employee benefits, deduction and authorization.

Upon written authorization of a public employee within a bargaining unit, the public employer shall deduct from the payroll of the public employee the monthly amount of dues, fees, and other employee benefits as certified by the secretary of the exclusive bargaining representative and shall deliver it to the chief fiscal officer of the exclusive bargaining representative.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Sec. 23.40.225. Exemption based on religious convictions.

Notwithstanding the provisions of AS 23.40.220 , a collective bargaining settlement reached, or agreement entered into, under AS 23.40.210 that incorporates union security provisions, including a union shop or agency shop provision or agreement, shall safeguard the rights of nonassociation of employees having bona fide religious convictions based on tenets or teachings of a church or religious body of which an employee is a member. Upon submission of proper proof of religious conviction to the labor relations agency, the agency shall declare the employee exempt from becoming a member of a labor organization or employee association. The employee shall pay an amount of money equivalent to regular union or association dues, initiation fees, and assessments to the union or association. Nonpayment of this money subjects the employee to the same penalty as if it were nonpayment of dues. The receiving union or association shall contribute an equivalent amount of money to a charity of its choice not affiliated with a religious, labor, or employee organization. The union or association shall submit proof of contribution to the labor relations agency.

History. (§ 1 ch 85 SLA 1976; am § 23 ch 3 SLA 2017)

Administrative Code. —

For right of nonassociation, see 2 AAC 10, art. 4.

For right of nonassociation, see 8 AAC 97, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in the first sentence, deleted “but not limited to” following “union security provisions, including”.

Editor’s notes. —

Section 2, ch. 85, SLA 1976 provides: “If any portion of AS 23.40.225 is declared unconstitutional or void by a court of competent jurisdiction, then that entire section is void.”

Opinions of attorney general. —

This section does not supplant AS 18.80.220(a) , a general provision against religious discrimination, nor does it violate the “establishment clause” of the Alaska Constitution where the non-associational rights of all public employees are secured by AS 18.80.220(a) . January 13, 1984, Op. Att’y Gen.

A state employee in a collective bargaining unit who does not belong to an organized religion is entitled to an accommodation of his religious opposition to the payment of union dues. January 13, 1984, Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Sec. 23.40.230. Assistance by Department of Labor. [Repealed, E.O. No. 77 § 8 SLA 1990.]

Sec. 23.40.235. Public involvement in school district negotiations.

Before beginning bargaining, the school board of a city or borough school district or a regional educational attendance area shall provide opportunities for public comment on the issues to be addressed in the collective bargaining process. Initial proposals, last-best-offer proposals, tentative agreements before ratification, and final agreements reached by the parties are public documents and are subject to inspection and copying under AS 40.25.110 40.25.140 .

History. (§ 13 ch 31 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2000, “AS 40.25.110 40.25.140 ” was substituted for “AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.140 ” to reflect the 2000 renumbering of AS 09.25.110 — 09.25.140 .

Editor’s notes. —

Section 16, ch. 31, SLA 1996 provides that this section, added by ch. 31, SLA 1996, does not affect a collective bargaining agreement in effect on August 16, 1996.

Sec. 23.40.240. Effect on certain units, representatives, and agreements.

Nothing in this chapter terminates or modifies a collective bargaining unit, recognition of exclusive bargaining representative, or collective bargaining agreement if the unit, recognition, or agreement is in effect on September 5, 1972.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978); Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 23.40.245. Postsecondary student involvement in collective bargaining.

  1. When a bargaining unit includes members of the faculty or other employees of a public institution of postsecondary education, the public employer and the representative of the bargaining unit shall permit student representatives of that institution to
    1. attend and observe all meetings between the public employer and the representative of the bargaining unit which are involved with collective bargaining;
    2. have access to all documents pertaining to collective bargaining exchanged by the employer and the representative of the bargaining unit, including copies of transcripts of the meetings.
  2. Student representatives may not disclose information concerning the substance of collective bargaining obtained in the course of their activities under (a) of this section, unless that information is released by the employer or the representative of the bargaining unit.
  3. For the purpose of this section, the students of the institution involved in negotiations shall select their representatives from the institution directly involved in negotiations.
  4. When the institutions are negotiating with bargaining units representing more than one major geographic area of the state, the student representatives shall be from those areas.  No more than three student representatives may attend meetings at any time.

History. (§ 1 ch 148 SLA 1978)

Sec. 23.40.250. Definitions.

In AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “collective bargaining” means the performance of the mutual obligation of the public employer or the employer’s designated representatives and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the budget making process, and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or negotiation of a question arising under an agreement and the execution of a written contract incorporating an agreement reached if requested by either party, but these obligations do not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession;
  2. “election” means a proceeding conducted by the labor relations agency in which the employees in a collective bargaining unit cast a secret ballot for collective bargaining representatives, or for any other purpose specified in AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 ;
  3. “labor relations agency” means the Alaska labor relations agency established in AS 23.05.360 ;
  4. “monetary terms of an agreement” means the changes in the terms and conditions of employment resulting from an agreement that
    1. will require an appropriation for their implementation;
    2. will result in a change in state revenues or productive work hours for state employees; or
    3. address employee compensation, leave benefits, or health insurance benefits, whether or not an appropriation is required for implementation;
  5. “organization” means a labor or employee organization of any kind in which employees participate and which exists for the primary purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and conditions of employment;
  6. “public employee” means any employee of a public employer, whether or not in the classified service of the public employer, except elected or appointed officials or superintendents of schools;
  7. “public employer” means the state or a political subdivision of the state, including without limitation, a municipality, district, school district, regional educational attendance area, board of regents, public and quasi-public corporation, housing authority, or other authority established by law, and a person designated by the public employer to act in its interest in dealing with public employees;
  8. “regional educational attendance area” means an educational service area in the unorganized borough that may or may not include a military reservation, and that contains one or more public schools of grade levels K — 12 or any portion of those grade levels that are to be operated under the management and control of a single regional school board;
  9. “terms and conditions of employment” means the hours of employment, the compensation and fringe benefits, and the employer’s personnel policies affecting the working conditions of the employees; but does not mean the general policies describing the function and purposes of a public employer.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972; am § 2 ch 10 SLA 1984; am E.O. No. 77 § 3 (1990); am §§ 6 — 8 ch 1 SLA 1992; am § 2 ch 15 SLA 2000)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraph (4) was enacted as (8) and renumbered in 1984, at which time former paragraphs (4) — (7) were renumbered as (5) — (8). Paragraph (8) was enacted as (9) and renumbered in 1992, at which time former paragraph (8) was renumbered as (9).

Effect of amendments. —

The 2000 amendment, effective April 19, 2000, added subparagraph (4)(C) and made related stylistic changes.

Opinions of attorney general. —

AS 23.40.070 (2) and paragraph (9) of this section, standing alone, clearly would make both group life and health insurance benefits and retirement benefits subject to collective bargaining since they both are “fringe benefits.” January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Because health insurance deals with the economic interests of employees and does not deal with fundamental policy; because AS 39.30.090 , the group insurance statute, authorizes the Department of Administration to obtain “a policy or policies”; and because AS 39.30.090 does not specify what levels of coverage or benefits must be included in the policy (or policies) obtained, the issue of group life and health insurance benefits is negotiable under the Public Employment Relations Act (AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 ). January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Given AS 39.35.120(b) and AS 39.35.170 , which make inclusion in the public employees retirement system (AS 39.35.010 39.35.690 ) [now AS 39.35.001 39.35.995 ] a condition of employment for state employees and contributions to it mandatory, the conclusion is that the legislature intended the statutory provisions of the public employees retirement system to apply to all state employees, and benefits under the public employees retirement system may not be negotiated under the Public Employment Retirement Act (AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 ). January 23, 1978, Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Penalties are monetary terms of agreement. —

The penalty provisions ordered by the arbitrator for nonpayment are “monetary terms of an agreement” as defined in paragraph (4). Public Safety Employees Ass'n, Local 92 v. State, 895 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1995).

Labor organization representing two bargaining units within same employer. —

There is nothing in the language of the definition of “organization” which suggests that an otherwise qualified labor organization could not represent two different bargaining units within the same public employer. Indeed, the use of the phrase “labor organization of any kind” suggests the contrary. City of Fairbanks v. Alaska Dep't of Labor, 763 P.2d 976 (Alaska 1988).

Ferry personnel are public employees of public employer and are not included within any of the itemized exceptions of paragraph (6). Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Since paragraph (3) of this section defines “labor relations agency,” which supervises and enforces this article, as the state personnel board for state employees and the Department of Labor with regard to all other public employees, the state personnel board would be the applicable regulatory agency with regard to ferry personnel. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in the ferry crew exemption from the state personnel system and its inclusion with this article. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978).

Teachers, who are not “public employees” for purposes of this article, are not covered by this section. Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982).

The legislature defined “public employees” as excluding teachers from the Public Employment Relations Act because the cooperative relations purpose of that act was already fulfilled with regard to teachers under the provisions of Title 14. Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982).

Noncertificated school employees are not among those within ambit of this article. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. Classified Ass'n, 590 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1979).

Nor are noncertificated employees of regional educational attendance areas. —

This article does not apply to the noncertificated employees of the regional educational attendance areas. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

Since such attendance areas appear to be school districts. —

Regional educational attendance areas appear to be school districts within the meaning of paragraph (6), defining “public employees” for the purposes of this article. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

Thus, such attendance areas have no statutory duty to bargain with noncertificated employees. —

This article exempts noncertificated employees of the regional educational attendance areas from its coverage. The regional educational attendance areas therefore have no statutory duty to bargain with a bargaining representative of the noncertificated employees. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

Legislature did not intend to bind regional educational attendance areas to employment contracts of their predecessor, the Alaska State Operated School System. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

Although the Alaska State Operated School System, the predecessor to the regional educational attendance areas, was a state agency subject to this article and not a “school district” whose noncertificated employees are exempt under paragraph (6), and therefore did not have a “right” to refuse to bargain which it could waive. Even if the Alaska State Operated School System had waived its right to claim exemption under this article, it does not follow that the regional educational attendance areas also have waived their right to assert the statutory exemption, since the regional educational attendance areas are not simply successors to the Alaska State Operated School System but are independent entities which have been given broad powers to run their individual school districts as they see fit. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

Jurisdiction to determine applicability of collective bargaining agreement. —

Because the noncertificated employees of school districts are not employees of the state directly or public employees under this article neither the state personnel board nor the Department of Labor has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of a collective bargaining agreement to the regional educational attendance areas. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

Assignment of salary ranges to job classes is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining between the state and its employees’ collective bargaining representatives. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 831 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1992).

Quoted in

Carter v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 663 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1983); Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, AFSCME Local 803 v. City of Fairbanks, 420 P.3d 1243 (Alaska 2018).

Cited in

State v. Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, 93 P.3d 409 (Alaska 2004).

Collateral references. —

What entities or projects are “public” for purposes of state statutes requiring payment of prevailing wages on public works projects. 5 ALR5th 470.

Sec. 23.40.255. Applicability to political subdivisions, including school districts.

  1. AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 is applicable to organized boroughs and political subdivisions of the state, home rule or otherwise, unless the legislative body of the political subdivision, by ordinance or resolution, rejects having the provisions of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 apply.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, a municipal school district or regional educational attendance area may not reject application of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 to employment relations with public school employees.

History. (§ 4 ch 113 SLA 1972; am § 11 ch 1 SLA 1992)

Revisor's notes. —

This section was codified in 2008. Subsection (a) is derived from § 4, ch. 113, SLA 1972, and subsection (b) is derived from § 11, ch. 1, SLA 1992. There was also a temporary exception to subsection (a), similar to the exception in current subsection (b), created by § 1(c), ch. 180, SLA 1990.

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 to employees of an authority established under AS 29.35.600 29.35.730 , see AS 29.35.685 .

For provision relating to the applicability of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 to employees of an authority established under AS 29.35.800 29.35.925 , see AS 29.35.880 .

For provision relating to the applicability of AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 to employees of an authority established under AS 29.35.600 29.35.730 , see AS 29.35.685 .

Notes to Decisions

Right of public employees in Alaska to bargain collectively was created by this article. Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 555 P.2d 552 (Alaska 1976).

This article confers upon public employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers and requires public employers to recognize collective bargaining units designated pursuant to this article. Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979), overruled, Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agric. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986).

This article allows political subdivisions of state to reject its provisions for conduct of labor relations and to substitute their own provisions. Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 555 P.2d 552 (Alaska 1976).

Applicability of article is rule. —

Under the present statute, applicability of this article is the rule, exemption the exception. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

This article is expressly made applicable to home-rule municipalities, and thus municipalities are impliedly prohibited from refusing to negotiate with organizations selected by employees unless the exemption was timely enacted. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

This section, Anchorage, Alaska, Municipal Charter arts. V, § 5.06 and II(9), and a city’s home-rule status, did not preempt sponsors’ referendum on the city’s labor relations ordinance because these did not allow the city to exclusively legislate in the area of labor relations to the exclusion of citizens’ rights of initiative and referendum. Municipality of Anchorage v. Holleman, 321 P.3d 378 (Alaska 2014).

Applying liberal construction to powers of local government cannot override express declaration of policy made a part of this article when coupled with considerations of the impact of the repeal of AS 23.40.010 and the different language used in the 1972 exemption provision, § 4, ch. 113, SLA 1972 [now AS 23.40.255 ]. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

Article applicable unless state political subdivisions reject it. —

The legislature provided for this article to be applicable to all political subdivisions of the state unless they rejected it rather than making the article inapplicable unless affirmative steps are taken by these same subdivisions to adopt the act (see § 4, ch. 113, SLA 1972 [now AS 23.40.255 ]). State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

This section not temporary. —

Had the legislature wanted § 4, ch. 113, SLA 1972 [now AS 23.40.255 ], to be of temporary duration, it would have so indicated. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980).

Privatization permitted. —

Nothing in this article restricts the state from reducing its workforce and laying off personnel for reasons of economy. More specifically, nothing in this article prohibits state agencies from resorting to privatization as a cost-cutting measure. Moore v. State, DOT & Pub. Facilities, 875 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994).

When article may be rejected. —

This article may be rejected when all evidence indicates that municipal governments exempted themselves solely for the purpose of retaining local control over their labor relations, and with the clear intent of continuing collective bargaining rather than to interfere with established employee rights. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980); City of Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

Rejection of this article in order to gain an undue advantage in a labor dispute or the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement constitutes a deliberate interference with the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively in derogation of the act’s express declaration of policy. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980).

Rejection must be prior to substantial organizational activity by public employees. —

It is evident from the wording of the exemption provision that the legislature intended to limit the freedom of the political subdivision to consider whether it wishes this article to apply to it by adopting the position that the article must be rejected prior to substantial organizational activity by public employees. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

Prior to becoming aware of substantial organizational activity, the city could have exempted itself from the applicability of this article without interfering with the right of the employees to organize. Rejection of this article after becoming aware of such activity constitutes a gross and impermissible interference with the employees’ freedom to choose which collective bargaining association should represent them. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

This article was intended to recognize the right of employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining and to require public employers to negotiate and enter into labor contracts with employee organizations. It is apparent that this purpose would be substantially frustrated if a city would wait until the employees elected to be represented by a specific union, and then could exempt itself from the requirements of this article if that union was not favored by the city. In effect, this would give the city the right to control the organization to be selected by the employees. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

A city council cannot validly reject application of this article more than six months after it becomes effective, and after the members of the council have learned of the organizational activity of the city’s power plant employees. State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

The right and power of a city to reject this article becomes subordinated to the rights of the employees granted by the same legislation once the public employer becomes aware of substantial organizational activity on the part of its employees. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980).

Freedom to develop varying scheme of collective bargaining. —

Local governments which have validly rejected this article are free to develop a local scheme of collective bargaining which varies from the state scheme as provided in this article. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980).

The legislature has expressly declared that the state policy of promoting harmonious and cooperative relations in public employment relations can best be effectuated by requiring public employers to bargain collectively with their employees. It is, therefore, most difficult to construe this article to prohibit local governments, which effectively rejected the article, from engaging in collective bargaining under their own local ordinances. It is far more likely that § 4, ch. 113, SLA 1972 [now AS 23.40.255 ], was added to give political subdivisions of the state the freedom to fashion their own labor ordinances and systems of collective bargaining. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980).

Determining timely rejection. —

Whether a local government has exercised its option to reject this article in a sufficiently timely fashion is best determined by looking at the circumstances of the individual case rather than setting an inflexible deadline. Anchorage Mun. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1980).

Forfeiture of exemption from article. —

A city did not forfeit its exemption from coverage by this article, by continuing to recognize and negotiate with unions subsequent to its exemption. City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks AFL-CIO Crafts Council, 623 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1981).

There is nothing in the language of the Public Employment Relations Act, AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 , or its legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended to preclude local governments which have validly exempted themselves from coverage under the act from thereafter voluntarily engaging in collective bargaining with employee organizations. City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks AFL-CIO Crafts Council, 623 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1981).

The city did not waive its exemption under § 4, ch. 113, SLA 1972 [now AS 23.40.255 ], by negotiating with the union, and thus did not forfeit the authority to enact its own personnel guidelines. City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Firefighters Union, 623 P.2d 339 (Alaska 1981).

Effect of elimination of state from exemption authorization. —

See State v. City of Petersburg, 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975), limited, Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

Action not in reliance on rights under article. —

Where municipality’s electrical department employees had pursued unionization since the early 1960’s, long before the enactment of this article, although all the electrical department, employees signed union authorization cards sometime in 1972, there was no evidence of any organizational activities occurring between the effective date of this article, September 5, 1972, and the passage of the exemption ordinance in question, July 10, 1973; thus the employees were not acting in reliance on rights granted them by this article. City of Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 P.2d 332 (Alaska 1982).

“Public employees” excludes teachers. —

The legislature chose to define “public employees” as excluding teachers from the Public Employment Relations Act because the cooperative relations purpose of that act was already fulfilled with regard to teachers under the provisions of Title 14. Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982).

Employees covered by this article are free to join national as well as local union. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist. Classified Ass'n, 590 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1979).

As to procedural safeguards which local labor ordinances must afford concerning representation elections, see Alaska Pub. Emples. Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 555 P.2d 552 (Alaska 1976).

Quoted in

Public Safety Emples. Ass'n, AFSCME Local 803 v. City of Fairbanks, 420 P.3d 1243 (Alaska 2018).

Sec. 23.40.260. Short title.

AS 23.40.070 23.40.260 may be cited as the Public Employment Relations Act.

History. (§ 2 ch 113 SLA 1972)

Chapter 45. General Provisions.

[Renumbered as Chapter 90.]

Sec. 23.45.010. [Renumbered as AS 23.90.900.]

Chapter 50. Collective Negotiation by Physicians.

Sec. 23.50.010. Legislative findings.

  1. The legislature finds that permitting competing physicians to engage in collective negotiation of certain terms and conditions of contracts with a health benefit plan will benefit competition, so long as the physicians do not engage in an express or implied threat of retaliatory collective action, including boycotts or strikes.
  2. The legislature finds that permitting physicians to engage in collective negotiations over fee-related terms may, in some circumstances, yield anticompetitive effects. There are, however, instances in which a health benefit plan dominates the market to the degree that fair negotiations between physicians and the health benefit plan are not possible in the absence of joint action on behalf of the physicians. In those circumstances, the health benefit plan can virtually dictate the terms of the contracts that it offers to physicians.
  3. The legislature finds that it is appropriate and necessary to authorize collective negotiations between competing physicians and health benefit plans when the imbalances in bargaining capacity described in this section exist.

History. (§ 1 ch 68 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For physician negotiations, see 9 AAC 23.

Sec. 23.50.020. Collective action by competing physicians.

  1. Competing physicians may meet and communicate in order to collectively negotiate with a health benefit plan concerning any of the contract terms and conditions described in this subsection, but may not negotiate the exclusion of providers who are non-physicians from direct reimbursement by a health benefit plan, and may not negotiate the setting in which providers who are non-physicians deliver services. Competing physicians may not engage in a boycott related to these terms and conditions. Competing physicians may meet and communicate concerning
    1. physician clinical practice guidelines and coverage criteria;
    2. the respective liability of physicians and the health benefit plan for the treatment or lack of treatment of insured or enrolled persons;
    3. administrative procedures, including methods and timing of the payment of services to physicians;
    4. procedures for the resolution of disputes between the health benefit plan and physicians;
    5. patient referral procedures;
    6. the formulation and application of reimbursement methodology;
    7. quality assurance programs;
    8. health service utilization review procedures; and
    9. criteria to be used by health benefit plans for the selection and termination of physicians, including whether to engage in selective contracting.
  2. An authorized third party that intends to negotiate with a health benefit plan the items identified under (a) of this section shall provide the attorney general with written notice of the intended negotiations before the negotiations begin.
  3. In exercising the collective rights granted by (a) of this section,
    1. physicians may communicate with each other with respect to the contractual terms and conditions to be negotiated with a health benefit plan;
    2. physicians may communicate with an authorized third party regarding the terms and conditions of contracts allowed under this section;
    3. the authorized third party is the sole party authorized to negotiate with a health benefit plan on behalf of a defined group of physicians;
    4. physicians can be bound by the terms and conditions negotiated by the authorized third party that represents their interests;
    5. a health benefit plan communicating or negotiating with the authorized third party may contract with, or offer different contract terms and conditions to, individual competing physicians;
    6. an authorized third party may not represent more than 30 percent of the market of practicing physicians for the provision of services in the geographic service area or proposed geographic service area, if the health benefit plan has less than a five percent market share as determined by the number of covered lives as reported by the director of insurance for the most recently completed calendar year or by the actual number of consumers of prepaid comprehensive health services; in this paragraph, “covered lives” means the total number of individuals who are entitled to benefits under the health benefit plan;
    7. the attorney general may limit the percentage of practicing physicians represented by an authorized third party; however, the limitation may not be less than 30 percent of the market of practicing physicians in the geographic service area or proposed geographic service area; when determining whether to impose a limitation described under this paragraph, the attorney general shall consider the provisions described under (f) — (h) of this section; this paragraph does not apply if the market of practicing physicians in the geographic service area or proposed geographic service area consists of 40 or fewer individuals; and
    8. the authorized third party shall comply with the provisions of (d) of this section.
  4. A person acting or proposing to act as an authorized third party under this section shall,
    1. before engaging in collective negotiations with a health benefit plan,
      1. file with the attorney general the information that identifies the authorized third party, the physicians represented by the third party, the authorized third party’s plan of operation, and the authorized third party’s procedures to ensure compliance with this section;
      2. furnish to the attorney general, for the attorney general’s approval, a brief report that identifies the proposed subject matter of the negotiations or discussions with a health benefit plan and that contains an explanation of the efficiencies or benefits that are expected to be achieved through the collective negotiations; the attorney general shall review whether the group of physicians represented by the authorized third party is appropriate to represent the interests involved in the negotiations; the attorney general may not approve the report if the group of physicians is not appropriate to represent the interests involved in the negotiations or if the proposed negotiations exceed the authority granted in this chapter and, if the group is not appropriate or the negotiations exceed the granted authority, shall enter an order prohibiting the collective negotiations from proceeding; the authorized third party shall provide supplemental information to the attorney general as new information becomes available that indicates that the subject matter of negotiations with the health benefit plan has changed or will change;
    2. within 14 days after receiving a health benefit plan’s decision to decline to negotiate or to terminate negotiations, or within 14 days after requesting negotiations with a health benefit plan that fails to respond within that time, report to the attorney general that negotiations have ended or have been declined;
    3. during the negotiation process, provide the attorney general upon the attorney general’s request with a copy of all written communications that are between physicians and the health benefit plan, that are relevant to the negotiations, and that are in the possession of the authorized third party;
    4. before reporting the results of negotiations with a health benefit plan and before giving physicians an evaluation of any offer made by a health benefit plan, provide to the attorney general, for the attorney general’s approval, a copy of all communications to be made to physicians related to the negotiations, discussions, and health benefit plan offers.
  5. The attorney general shall either approve or disapprove the contract that was the subject of the collective negotiation within 60 days after receiving the reports required under (d) of this section. If the contract is disapproved, the attorney general shall furnish a written explanation of any deficiencies along with a statement of specific remedial measures that would correct any identified deficiencies. An authorized third party who fails to obtain the attorney general’s approval is considered to be acting outside the authority of this section.
  6. The attorney general shall approve a collective negotiation contract if
    1. the competitive and other benefits of the contract terms outweigh any anticompetitive effects; and
    2. the contract terms are consistent with other applicable laws and regulations.
  7. The competitive and other benefits of joint negotiations or negotiated provider contract terms must include
    1. restoration of the competitive balance in the market for health care services;
    2. protections for access to quality patient care;
    3. promotion of health care infrastructure and medical advancement; or
    4. improved communications between health care providers and health care insurers.
  8. When weighing the anticompetitive effects of contract terms, the attorney general shall consider whether the terms
    1. provide for excessive payments; or
    2. contribute to the escalation of the cost of providing health care services.
  9. This section does not authorize competing physicians to act in concert in response to a report issued by an authorized third party related to the authorized third party’s discussion or negotiations with a health benefit plan. The authorized third party shall advise the physicians of the provisions of this subsection and shall warn them of the potential for legal action against those who violate state or federal antitrust laws by exceeding the authority granted under this section.
  10. A contract allowed under this section may not exceed a term of five years.
  11. The documents relating to a collective negotiation described under this section that are in the possession of the Department of Law are confidential and not open to public inspection.
  12. Nothing in this section shall be construed as exempting from the application of the antitrust laws the conduct of providers or negotiations or agreements between providers and a health benefit plan if the purpose or effect of the conduct, negotiations, or agreements would be, directly or indirectly, to exclude, limit the participation or reimbursement of, or otherwise limit the scope of services to be provided by separate or competing classes of providers who practice or seek to practice within the scope of the occupational licenses held by the providers.
  13. A contract entered into under this section must be consistent with AS 21.36.090(d) .
  14. Nothing in this section shall be construed to make any conduct by providers unlawful if the conduct was lawful before September 18, 2002.
  15. In this section,
    1. “geographic service area” means the geographic area of the physicians seeking to jointly negotiate;
    2. “provider” has the meaning given in AS 21.36.090(d) .

History. (§ 1 ch 68 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For physician negotiations, see 9 AAC 23.

Sec. 23.50.030. Fee for registration of authorized third parties.

  1. The attorney general shall adopt regulations that establish the amount and manner of payment of a registration fee for authorized third parties. The attorney general shall establish the fee level so that the total amount of fees collected from authorized third parties approximately equals the actual regulatory costs for the oversight of joint negotiations between physicians and health benefit plans. The attorney general shall annually review the fee level to determine whether the regulatory costs are approximately equal to fee collections. If the review indicates that the fee collections and regulatory costs are not approximately equal, the attorney general shall calculate fee adjustments and adopt regulations under this subsection to implement the adjustments. In January of each year, the attorney general shall report on the fee level and revisions for the previous year under this subsection to the office of management and budget.
  2. In this section, “regulatory costs” means costs of the Department of Law that are attributable to oversight of joint negotiations between physicians and health benefit plans.

History. (§ 1 ch 68 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For physician negotiations, see 9 AAC 23.

Sec. 23.50.040. Regulations.

The attorney general may adopt regulations necessary to implement this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 68 SLA 2002)

Administrative Code. —

For physician negotiations, see 9 AAC 23.

Sec. 23.50.099. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “authorized third party” means a person authorized by the physicians to negotiate on their behalf with a health benefit plan under this chapter;
  2. “health benefit plan” means a health care insurer as defined in AS 21.54.500 , but does not include a self-insured health benefit plan.

History. (§ 1 ch 68 SLA 2002)

Chapter 88. Employment of Members of the National Guard and Veterans.

History. (§ 2 ch 71 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 2, ch. 71, SLA 2018, which enacted this section, took effect on October 27, 2018.

Sec. 23.88.010. National guard member and veteran hiring preference allowed.

A private employer may grant an employment preference to a member of the national guard or a veteran when hiring an employee. In this section,

  1. “member of the national guard” means a person presently serving as a member in good standing in the national guard;
  2. “veteran” means a person who was discharged under honorable conditions from service in
    1. the armed forces of the United States;
    2. a reserve unit of the armed forces of the United States;
    3. the Alaska Territorial Guard;
    4. the Alaska Army National Guard;
    5. the Alaska Air National Guard; or
    6. the Alaska Naval Militia.

History. (§ 2 ch 71 SLA 2018)

Effective dates. —

Section 2, ch. 71, SLA 2018, which enacted this section, took effect on October 27, 2018.

Chapter 90. General Provisions.

Sec. 23.90.900. Definitions.

In this title,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of labor and workforce development;
  2. “department” means the Department of Labor and Workforce Development;
  3. “wages” means, except for the purposes of construing AS 23.20 and AS 23.30
    1. the basic hourly rate of pay; and
    2. all other compensation to an employee for services performed, including revocable and irrevocable contributions made by an employer to a trustee or third party for the benefit of the employee and contributions which may be reasonably anticipated in providing benefits to employees under an enforceable agreement to provide medical care, compensation for death or injury, or other fringe benefits.

History. (am § 1 ch 115 SLA 1966)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 1999, in this section, “commissioner of labor” was changed to “commissioner of labor and workforce development” and “Department of Labor” was changed to “Department of Labor and Workforce Development” in accordance with § 90, ch. 58, SLA 1999. Former AS 23.45.010 ; renumbered in 2008.