Chapter 9 SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Part 1. General Provisions
Sec.
Part 2. Effectiveness of Security Agreement — Attachment of Security Interest — Rights of Parties to Security Agreement
Part 3. Perfection and Priority
28-9-322A. Security interests in crops for provision of agricultural chemicals.
Part 4. Rights of Third Parties
Part 5. Filing
28-9-516A. Filing officer duties.
Part 6. Default
Part 7. Transition
Part 8. Transition Provisions for 2011 Amendments
Part 1 General Provisions
§ 28-9-101. Short title. — This chapter may be cited as “Uniform Commercial Code
Secured Transactions.”
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-101, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-101, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-101, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The official comments in chapters 1 to 12 of this title are copyrighted by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute and are reproduced by permission.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
C.J.S.
ALR.
Validity, in contract for installment sale of consumer goods, or commercial paper given in connection therewith, of provision waiving, as against assignee, defenses good against seller. 39 A.L.R.3d 518.
Consignment transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code. 40 A.L.R.3d 1078.
Priorities as between vendor’s lien and subsequent title or security interest obtained in another state to which vehicle was removed. 42 A.L.R.3d 1168.
Repossession by secured seller as affecting his right on note or other obligation given as a down payment. 49 A.L.R.3d 364.
Burden of proof as to commercially reasonable disposition of collateral. 59 A.L.R.3d 369.
Failure of secured creditor to give required notice of disposition of collateral as bar to deficiency judgment. 59 A.L.R.3d 401.
Priorities as between previously perfected security interest and repairman’s lien on motor vehicle under Uniform Commercial Code. 69 A.L.R.3d 1162. Equipment leases as security interest within Uniform Commercial Code§ 1-201(37). 76 A.L.R.3d 11.
Consignment transactions under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 on Secured Transactions. 58 A.L.R.6th 289.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. This Article supersedes former Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. As did its predecessor, it provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures. For the most part this Article follows the general approach and retains much of the terminology of former Article 9. In addition to describing many aspects of the operation and interpretation of this Article, these Comments explain the material changes that this Article makes to former Article 9. Former Article 9 superseded the wide variety of pre-UCC security devices. Unlike the Comments to former Article 9, however, these Comments dwell very little on the pre-UCC state of the law. For that reason, the Comments to former Article 9 will remain of substantial historical value and interest. They also will remain useful in understanding the background and general conceptual approach of this Article.
Citations to “Bankruptcy Code Section ___” in these Comments are to Title 11 of the United States Code as in effect on July 1, 2010.
Background and History.
Reorganization and Renumbering; Captions; Style.
3. Reorganization and Renumbering; Captions; Style. This Article reflects a substantial reorganization of former Article 9 and renumbering of most sections. New Part 4 deals with several aspects of third-party rights and duties that are unrelated to perfection and priority. Some of these were covered by Part 3 of former Article 9. Part 5 deals with filing (covered by former Part 4) and Part 6 deals with default and enforcement (covered by former Part 5). Appendix I contains conforming revisions to other articles of the UCC, and Appendix II contains model provisions for production-money priority.
This Article also includes headings for the subsections as an aid to readers. Unlike section captions, which are part of the UCC, see Section 1-107, subsection headings are not a part of the official text itself and have not been approved by the sponsors. Each jurisdiction in which this Article is introduced may consider whether to adopt the headings as a part of the statute and whether to adopt a provision clarifying the effect, if any, to be given to the headings. This Article also has been conformed to current style conventions.
Summary of Revisions.
Scope of Article 9.
Deposit accounts. Section 9-109 includes within this Article’s scope deposit accounts as original collateral, except in consumer transactions. Former Article 9 dealt with deposit accounts only as proceeds of other collateral. Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 9-109 also includes within the scope of this Article most sales of “payment intangibles” (defined in Section 9-102 as general intangibles under which an account debtor’s principal obligation is monetary) and “promissory notes” (also defined in Section 9-102). Former Article 9 included sales of accounts and chattel paper, but not sales of payment intangibles or promissory notes. In its inclusion of sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, this Article continues the drafting convention found in former Article 9; it provides that the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes creates a “security interest.” The definition of “account” in Section 9-102 also has been expanded to include various rights to payment that were general intangibles under former Article 9.
Health-care-insurance receivables. Section 9-109 narrows Article 9’s exclusion of transfers of interests in insurance policies by carving out of the exclusion “health-care-insurance receivables” (defined in Section 9-102). A health-care-insurance receivable is included within the definition of “account” in Section 9-102.
Nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens. Section 9-109 also brings nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9.
Consignments. Section 9-109 provides that “true” consignments-bailments for the purpose of sale by the bailee-are security interests covered by Article 9, with certain exceptions. See Section 9-102 (defining “consignment”). Currently, many consignments are subject to Article 9’s filing requirements by operation of former Section 2-326.
Supporting obligations and property securing rights to payment. This Article also addresses explicitly (i) obligations, such as guaranties and letters of credit, that support payment or performance of collateral such as accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles, and (ii) any property (including real property) that secures a right to payment or performance that is subject to an Article 9 security interest. See Sections 9-203, 9-308.
Commercial tort claims. Section 9-109 expands the scope of Article 9 to include the assignment of commercial tort claims by narrowing the exclusion of tort claims generally. However, this Article continues to exclude tort claims for bodily injury and other non-business tort claims of a natural person. See Section 9-102 (defining “commercial tort claim”).
Transfers by States and governmental units of States. Section 9-109 narrows the exclusion of transfers by States and their governmental units. It excludes only transfers covered by another statute (other than a statute generally applicable to security interests) to the extent the statute governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of security interests.
Nonassignable general intangibles, promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables, and letter-of-credit rights. This Article enables a security interest to attach to letter-of-credit rights, health-care-insurance receivables, promissory notes, and general intangibles, including contracts, permits, licenses, and franchises, notwithstanding a contractual or statutory prohibition against or limitation on assignment. This Article explicitly protects third parties against any adverse effect of the creation or attempted enforcement of the security interest. See Sections 9-408, 9-409.
Duties of Secured Party.
Subject to Sections 9-408 and 9-409 and two other exceptions (Sections 9-406, concerning accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles, and 9-407, concerning interests in leased goods), Section 9-401 establishes a baseline rule that the inclusion of transactions and collateral within the scope of Article 9 has no effect on non-Article 9 law dealing with the alienability or inalienability of property. For example, if a commercial tort claim is nonassignable under other applicable law, the fact that a security interest in the claim is within the scope of Article 9 does not override the other applicable law’s effective prohibition of assignment. b. Duties of Secured Party. This Article provides for expanded duties of secured parties.
Release of control. Section 9-208 imposes upon a secured party having control of a deposit account, investment property, or a letter-of-credit right the duty to release control when there is no secured obligation and no commitment to give value. Section 9-209 contains analogous provisions when an account debtor has been notified to pay a secured party.
Information. Section 9-210 expands a secured party’s duties to provide the debtor with information concerning collateral and the obligations that it secures.
Default and enforcement. Part 6 also includes some additional duties of secured parties in connection with default and enforcement. See, e.g., Section 9-616 (duty to explain calculation of deficiency or surplus in a consumer-goods transaction).
Choice of Law.
c. Choice of Law. The choice-of-law rules for the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority are found in Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307). See also Section 9-316.
Where to file: Location of debtor. This Article changes the choice-of-law rule governing perfection (i.e., where to file) for most collateral to the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located. See Section 9-301. Under former Article 9, the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location governed only perfection and priority of a security interest in accounts, general intangibles, mobile goods, and, for purposes of perfection by filing, chattel paper and investment property.
Determining debtor’s location. As a baseline rule, Section 9-307 follows former Section 9-103, under which the location of the debtor is the debtor’s place of business (or chief executive office, if the debtor has more than one place of business). Section 9-307 contains three major exceptions. First, a “registered organization,” such as a corporation or limited liability company, is located in the State under whose law the debtor is organized, e.g., a corporate debtor’s State of incorporation. Second, an individual debtor is located at his or her principal residence. Third, there are special rules for determining the location of the United States and registered organizations organized under the law of the United States.
Location of non-U.S. debtors. If, applying the foregoing rules, a debtor is located in a jurisdiction whose law does not require public notice as a condition of perfection of a nonpossessory security interest, the entity is deemed located in the District of Columbia. See Section 9-307. Thus, to the extent that this Article applies to non-U.S. debtors, perfection could be accomplished in many cases by a domestic filing.
Priority. For tangible collateral such as goods and instruments, Section 9-301 provides that the law applicable to priority and the effect of perfection or nonperfection will remain the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located, as under former Section 9-103 (but without the confusing “last event” test). For intangible collateral, such as accounts, the applicable law for priority will be that of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.
Possessory security interests; agricultural liens. Perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of a possessory security interest or an agricultural lien are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral subject to the security interest or lien is located. See Sections 9-301, 9-302.
Goods covered by certificates of title; deposit accounts; letter-of-credit rights; investment property. This Article includes several refinements to the treatment of choice-of-law matters for goods covered by certificates of title. See Section 9-303. It also provides special choice-of-law rules, similar to those for investment property under current Articles 8 and 9, for deposit accounts (Section 9-304), investment property (Section 9-305), and letter-of-credit rights (Section 9-306). Change in applicable law. Section 9-316 addresses perfection following a change in applicable law.
Perfection.
d. Perfection. The rules governing perfection of security interests and agricultural liens are found in Part 3, Subpart 2 (Sections 9-308 through 9-316).
Deposit accounts; letter-of-credit rights. With certain exceptions, this Article provides that a security interest in a deposit account or a letter-of-credit right may be perfected only by the secured party’s acquiring “control” of the deposit account or letter-of-credit right. See Sections 9-312, 9-314. Under Section 9-104, a secured party has “control” of a deposit account when, with the consent of the debtor, the secured party obtains the depositary bank’s agreement to act on the secured party’s instructions (including when the secured party becomes the account holder) or when the secured party is itself the depositary bank. The control requirements are patterned on Section 8-106, which specifies the requirements for control of investment property. Under Section 9-107, “control” of a letter-of-credit right occurs when the issuer or nominated person consents to an assignment of proceeds under Section 5-114.
Electronic chattel paper. Section 9-102 includes a new defined term: “electronic chattel paper.” Electronic chattel paper is a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium (i.e., it is not written). Perfection of a security interest in electronic chattel paper may be by control or filing. See Sections 9-105 (sui generis definition of control of electronic chattel paper), 9-312 (perfection by filing), 9-314 (perfection by control).
Investment property. The perfection requirements for “investment property” (defined in Section 9-102), including perfection by control under Section 9-106, remain substantially unchanged. However, a new provision in Section 9-314 is designed to ensure that a secured party retains control in “repledge” transactions that are typical in the securities markets.
Instruments, agricultural liens, and commercial tort claims. This Article expands the types of collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing to include instruments. See Section 9-312. Agricultural liens and security interests in commercial tort claims also are perfected by filing, under this Article. See Sections 9-308, 9-310.
Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Although former Article 9 covered the outright sale of accounts and chattel paper, sales of most other types of receivables also are financing transactions to which Article 9 should apply. Accordingly, Section 9-102 expands the definition of “account” to include many types of receivables (including “health-care-insurance receivables,” defined in Section 9-102) that former Article 9 classified as “general intangibles.” It thereby subjects to Article 9’s filing system sales of more types of receivables than did former Article 9. Certain sales of payment intangibles—primarily bank loan participation transactions—should not be subject to the Article 9 filing rules. These transactions fall in a residual category of collateral, “payment intangibles” (general intangibles under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is monetary), the sale of which is exempt from the filing requirements of Article 9. See Sections 9-102, 9-109, 9-309 (perfection upon attachment). The perfection rules for sales of promissory notes are the same as those for sales of payment intangibles.
Possessory security interests. Several provisions of this Article address aspects of security interests involving a secured party or a third party who is in possession of the collateral. In particular, Section 9-313 resolves a number of uncertainties under former Section 9-305. It provides that a security interest in collateral in the possession of a third party is perfected when the third party acknowledges in an authenticated record that it holds for the secured party’s benefit. Section 9-313 also provides that a third party need not so acknowledge and that its acknowledgment does not impose any duties on it, unless it otherwise agrees. A special rule in Section 9-313 provides that if a secured party already is in possession of collateral, its security interest remains perfected by possession if it delivers the collateral to a third party and the collateral is accompanied by instructions to hold it for the secured party or to redeliver it to the secured party. Section 9-313 also clarifies the limited circumstances under which a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title may be perfected by the secured party’s taking possession. Automatic perfection. Section 9-309 lists various types of security interests as to which no public-notice step is required for perfection (e.g., purchase-money security interests in consumer goods other than automobiles). This automatic perfection also extends to a transfer of a health-care-insurance receivable to a health-care provider. Those transfers normally will be made by natural persons who receive health-care services; there is little value in requiring filing for perfection in that context. Automatic perfection also applies to security interests created by sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 9-308 provides that a perfected security interest in collateral supported by a “supporting obligation” (such as an account supported by a guaranty) also is a perfected security interest in the supporting obligation, and that a perfected security interest in an obligation secured by a security interest or lien on property (e.g., a real-property mortgage) also is a perfected security interest in the security interest or lien.
Priority; Special Rules for Banks and Deposit Accounts.
e. Priority; Special Rules for Banks and Deposit Accounts. The rules governing priority of security interests and agricultural liens are found in Part 3, Subpart 3 (Sections 9-317 through 9-342). This Article includes several new priority rules and some special rules relating to banks and deposit accounts (Sections 9-340 through 9-342).
Purchase-money security interests: General; consumer-goods transactions; inventory. Section 9-103 substantially rewrites the definition of purchase-money security interest (PMSI) (although the term is not formally “defined”). The substantive changes, however, apply only to non-consumer-goods transactions. (Consumer transactions and consumer-goods transactions are discussed below in Comment 4.j.) For non-consumer-goods transactions, Section 9-103 makes clear that a security interest in collateral may be (to some extent) both a PMSI as well as a non-PMSI, in accord with the “dual status” rule applied by some courts under former Article 9 (thereby rejecting the “transformation” rule). The definition provides an even broader conception of a PMSI in inventory, yielding a result that accords with private agreements entered into in response to the uncertainty under former Article 9. It also treats consignments as purchase-money security interests in inventory. Section 9-324 revises the PMSI priority rules, but for the most part without material change in substance. Section 9-324 also clarifies the priority rules for competing PMSIs in the same collateral.
Purchase-money security interests in livestock; agricultural liens. Section 9-324 provides a special PMSI priority, similar to the inventory PMSI priority rule, for livestock. Section 9-322 (which contains the baseline first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule) also recognizes special non-Article 9 priority rules for agricultural liens, which can override the baseline first-in-time rule.
Purchase-money security interests in software. Section 9-324 contains a new priority rule for a software purchase-money security interest. (Section 9-102 includes a definition of “software.”) Under Section 9-103, a software PMSI includes a PMSI in software that is used in goods that are also subject to a PMSI. (Note also that the definition of “chattel paper” has been expanded to include records that evidence a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods.) Investment property. The priority rules for investment property are substantially similar to the priority rules found in former Section 9-115, which was added in conjunction with the 1994 revisions to UCC Article 8. Under Section 9-328, if a secured party has control of investment property (Sections 8-106, 9-106), its security interest is senior to a security interest perfected in another manner (e.g., by filing). Also under Section 9-328, security interests perfected by control generally rank according to the time that control is obtained or, in the case of a security entitlement or a commodity contract carried in a commodity account, the time when the control arrangement is entered into. This is a change from former Section 9-115, under which the security interests ranked equally. However, as between a securities intermediary’s security interest in a security entitlement that it maintains for the debtor and a security interest held by another secured party, the securities intermediary’s security interest is senior.
Deposit accounts. This Article’s priority rules applicable to deposit accounts are found in Section 9-327. They are patterned on and are similar to those for investment property in former Section 9-115 and Section 9-328 of this Article. Under Section 9-327, if a secured party has control of a deposit account, its security interest is senior to a security interest perfected in another manner (i.e., as cash proceeds). Also under Section 9-327, security interests perfected by control rank according to the time that control is obtained, but as between a depositary bank’s security interest and one held by another secured party, the depositary bank’s security interest is senior. A corresponding rule in Section 9-340 makes a depositary bank’s right of set-off generally senior to a security interest held by another secured party. However, if the other secured party becomes the depositary bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account, then its security interest is senior to the depositary bank’s security interest and right of set-off. Sections 9-327, 9-340.
Letter-of-credit rights. The priority rules for security interests in letter-of-credit rights are found in Section 9-329. They are somewhat analogous to those for deposit accounts. A security interest perfected by control has priority over one perfected in another manner (i.e., as a supporting obligation for the collateral in which a security interest is perfected). Security interests in a letter-of-credit right perfected by control rank according to the time that control is obtained. However, the rights of a transferee beneficiary or a nominated person are independent and superior to the extent provided in Section 5-114. See Section 9-109(c)(4).
Chattel paper and instruments. Section 9-330 is the successor to former Section 9-308. As under former Section 9-308, differing priority rules apply to purchasers of chattel paper who give new value and take possession (or, in the case of electronic chattel paper, obtain control) of the collateral depending on whether a conflicting security interest in the collateral is claimed merely as proceeds. The principal change relates to the role of knowledge and the effect of an indication of a previous assignment of the collateral. Section 9-330 also affords priority to purchasers of instruments who take possession in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the competing secured party. In addition, to qualify for priority, purchasers of chattel paper, but not of instruments, must purchase in the ordinary course of business.
Proceeds. Section 9-322 contains new priority rules that clarify when a special priority of a security interest in collateral continues or does not continue with respect to proceeds of the collateral. Other refinements to the priority rules for proceeds are included in Sections 9-324 (purchase-money security interest priority) and 9-330 (priority of certain purchasers of chattel paper and instruments). Miscellaneous priority provisions. This Article also includes (i) clarifications of selected good-faith-purchase and similar issues (Sections 9-317, 9-331); (ii) new priority rules to deal with the “double debtor” problem arising when a debtor creates a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor subject to a security interest created by another person (Section 9-325); (iii) new priority rules to deal with the problems created when a change in corporate structure or the like results in a new entity that has become bound by the original debtor’s after-acquired property agreement (Section 9-326); (iv) a provision enabling most transferees of funds from a deposit account or money to take free of a security interest (Section 9-332); (v) substantially rewritten and refined priority rules dealing with accessions and commingled goods (Sections 9-335, 9-336); (vi) revised priority rules for security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title (Section 9-337); and (vii) provisions designed to ensure that security interests in deposit accounts will not extend to most transferees of funds on deposit or payees from deposit accounts and will not otherwise “clog” the payments system (Sections 9-341, 9-342).
Model provisions relating to production-money security interests. Appendix II to this Article contains model definitions and priority rules relating to “production-money security interests” held by secured parties who give new value used in the production of crops. Because no consensus emerged on the wisdom of these provisions during the drafting process, the sponsors make no recommendation on whether these model provisions should be enacted.
Proceeds.
Part 4: Additional Provisions Relating to Third-Party Rights.
g. Part 4: Additional Provisions Relating to Third-Party Rights. New Part 4 contains several provisions relating to the relationships between certain third parties and the parties to secured transactions. It contains new Sections 9-401 (replacing former Section 9-311) (alienability of debtor’s rights), 9-402 (replacing former Section 9-317) (secured party not obligated on debtor’s contracts), 9-403 (replacing former Section 9-206) (agreement not to assert defenses against assignee), 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406 (replacing former Section 9-318) (rights acquired by assignee, modification of assigned contract, discharge of account debtor, restrictions on assignment of account, chattel paper, promissory note, or payment intangible ineffective), 9-407 (replacing some provisions of former Section 2A-303) (restrictions on creation or enforcement of security interest in leasehold interest or lessor’s residual interest ineffective). It also contains new Sections 9-408 (restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables ineffective, and certain general intangibles ineffective) and 9-409 (restrictions on assignment of letter-of-credit rights ineffective), which are discussed above.
Filing.
h. Filing. Part 5 (formerly Part 4) of Article 9 has been substantially rewritten to simplify the statutory text and to deal with numerous problems of interpretation and implementation that have arisen over the years.
Medium-neutrality. This Article is “medium-neutral”; that is, it makes clear that parties may file and otherwise communicate with a filing office by means of records communicated and stored in media other than on paper. Identity of person who files a record; authorization. Part 5 is largely indifferent as to the person who effects a filing. Instead, it addresses whose authorization is necessary for a person to file a record with a filing office. The filing scheme does not contemplate that the identity of a “filer” will be a part of the searchable records. This approach is consistent with, and a necessary aspect of, eliminating signatures or other evidence of authorization from the system (except to the extent that filing offices may choose to employ authentication procedures in connection with electronic communications). As long as the appropriate person authorizes the filing, or, in the case of a termination statement, the debtor is entitled to the termination, it is largely insignificant whether the secured party or another person files any given record.
Section 9-509 collects in one place most of the rules that determine when a record may be filed. In general, the debtor’s authorization is required for the filing of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds collateral. With one further exception, a secured party of record’s authorization is required for the filing of other amendments. The exception arises if a secured party has failed to provide a termination statement that is required because there is no outstanding secured obligation or commitment to give value. In that situation, a debtor is authorized to file a termination statement indicating that it has been filed by the debtor.
Financing statement formal requisites. The formal requisites for a financing statement are set out in Section 9-502. A financing statement must provide the name of the debtor and the secured party and an indication of the collateral that it covers. Sections 9-503 and 9-506 address the sufficiency of a name provided on a financing statement and clarify when a debtor’s name is correct and when an incorrect name is insufficient. Section 9-504 addresses the indication of collateral covered. Under Section 9-504, a super-generic description (e.g.,“all assets” or “all personal property”) in a financing statement is a sufficient indication of the collateral. (Note, however, that a super-generic description is inadequate for purposes of a security agreement. See Sections 9-108, 9-203.) To facilitate electronic filing, this Article does not require that the debtor’s signature or other authorization appear on a financing statement. Instead, it prohibits the filing of unauthorized financing statements and imposes liability upon those who violate the prohibition. See Sections 9-509, 9-626.
Filing-office operations. Part 5 contains several provisions governing filing operations. First, it prohibits the filing office from rejecting an initial financing statement or other record for a reason other than one of the few that are specified. See Sections 9-520, 9-516. Second, the filing office is obliged to link all subsequent records (e.g., assignments, continuation statements, etc.) to the initial financing statement to which they relate. See Section 9-519. Third, the filing office may delete a financing statement and related records from the files no earlier than one year after lapse (lapse normally is five years after the filing date), and then only if a continuation statement has not been filed. See Sections 9-515, 9-519, 9-522. Thus, a financing statement and related records would be discovered by a search of the files even after the filing of a termination statement. This approach helps eliminate filing-office discretion and also eases problems associated with multiple secured parties and multiple partial assignments. Fourth, Part 5 mandates performance standards for filing offices. See Sections 9-519, 9-520, 9-523. Fifth, it provides for the promulgation of filing-office rules to deal with details best left out of the statute and requires the filing office to submit periodic reports. See Sections 9-526, 9-527.
Defaulting or missing secured parties and fraudulent filings. In some areas of the country, serious problems have arisen from fraudulent financing statements that are filed against public officials and other persons. This Article addresses the fraud problem by providing the opportunity for a debtor to file a termination statement when a secured party wrongfully refuses or fails to provide a termination statement. See Section 9-509. This opportunity also addresses the problem of secured parties that simply disappear through mergers or liquidations. In addition, Section 9-518 affords a statutory method by which a debtor who believes that a filed record is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed may indicate that fact in the files, albeit without affecting the efficacy, if any, of the challenged record. Extended period of effectiveness for certain financing statements. Section 9-515 contains an exception to the usual rule that financing statements are effective for five years unless a continuation statement is filed to continue the effectiveness for another five years. Under that section, an initial financing statement filed in connection with a “public-finance transaction” or a “manufactured-home transaction” (terms defined in Section 9-102) is effective for 30 years.
National form of financing statement and related forms. Section 9-521 provides for uniform, national written forms of financing statements and related written records that must be accepted by a filing office that accepts written records.
Default and Enforcement.
Debtor, secondary obligor; waiver. Section 9-602 clarifies the identity of persons who have rights and persons to whom a secured party owes specified duties under Part 6. Under that section, the rights and duties are enjoyed by and run to the “debtor,” defined in Section 9-102 to mean any person with a non-lien property interest in collateral, and to any “obligor.” However, with one exception (Section 9-616, as it relates to a consumer obligor), the rights and duties concerned affect non-debtor obligors only if they are “secondary obligors.” “Secondary obligor” is defined in Section 9-102 to include one who is secondarily obligated on the secured obligation, e.g., a guarantor, or one who has a right of recourse against the debtor or another obligor with respect to an obligation secured by collateral. However, under Section 9-628, the secured party is relieved from any duty or liability to any person unless the secured party knows that the person is a debtor or obligor. Resolving an issue on which courts disagreed under former Article 9, this Article generally prohibits waiver by a secondary obligor of its rights and a secured party’s duties under Part 6. See Section 9-602. However, Section 9-624 permits a secondary obligor or debtor to waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral and, in a non-consumer transaction, the right to redeem collateral, if the secondary obligor or debtor agrees to do so after default.
Rights of collection and enforcement of collateral. Section 9-607 explains in greater detail than former 9-502 the rights of a secured party who seeks to collect or enforce collateral, including accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. It also sets forth the enforcement rights of a depositary bank holding a security interest in a deposit account maintained with the depositary bank. Section 9-607 relates solely to the rights of a secured party vis-a-vis a debtor with respect to collections and enforcement. It does not affect the rights or duties of third parties, such as account debtors on collateral, which are addressed elsewhere (e.g., Section 9-406). Section 9-608 clarifies the manner in which proceeds of collection or enforcement are to be applied.
Disposition of collateral: Warranties of title. Section 9-610 imposes on a secured party who disposes of collateral the warranties of title, quiet possession, and the like that are otherwise applicable under other law. It also provides rules for the exclusion or modification of those warranties.
Disposition of collateral: Notification, application of proceeds, surplus and deficiency, other effects. Section 9-611 requires a secured party to give notification of a disposition of collateral to other secured parties and lienholders who have filed financing statements against the debtor covering the collateral. (That duty was eliminated by the 1972 revisions to Article 9.) However, that section relieves the secured party from that duty when the secured party undertakes a search of the records and a report of the results is unreasonably delayed. Section 9-613, which applies only to non-consumer transactions, specifies the contents of a sufficient notification of disposition and provides that a notification sent 10 days or more before the earliest time for disposition is sent within a reasonable time. Section 9-615 addresses the application of proceeds of disposition, the entitlement of a debtor to any surplus, and the liability of an obligor for any deficiency. Section 9-619 clarifies the effects of a disposition by a secured party, including the rights of transferees of the collateral.
Rights and duties of secondary obligor. Section 9-618 provides that a secondary obligor obtains the rights and assumes the duties of a secured party if the secondary obligor receives an assignment of a secured obligation, agrees to assume the secured party’s rights and duties upon a transfer to it of collateral, or becomes subrogated to the rights of the secured party with respect to the collateral. The assumption, transfer, or subrogation is not a disposition of collateral under Section 9-610, but it does relieve the former secured party of further duties. Former Section 9-504(5) did not address whether a secured party was relieved of its duties in this situation.
Transfer of record or legal title. Section 9-619 contains a new provision making clear that a transfer of record or legal title to a secured party is not of itself a disposition under Part 6. This rule applies regardless of the circumstances under which the transfer of title occurs.
Strict foreclosure. Section 9-620, unlike former Section 9-505, permits a secured party to accept collateral in partial satisfaction, as well as full satisfaction, of the obligations secured. This right of strict foreclosure extends to intangible as well as tangible property. Section 9-622 clarifies the effects of an acceptance of collateral on the rights of junior claimants. It rejects the approach taken by some courts-deeming a secured party to have constructively retained collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligations-in the case of a secured party’s unreasonable delay in the disposition of collateral. Instead, unreasonable delay is relevant when determining whether a disposition under Section 9-610 is commercially reasonable.
Effect of noncompliance: “Rebuttable presumption” test. Section 9-626 adopts the “rebuttable presumption” test for the failure of a secured party to proceed in accordance with certain provisions of Part 6. (As discussed in Comment 4.j., the test does not necessarily apply to consumer transactions.) Under this approach, the deficiency claim of a noncomplying secured party is calculated by crediting the obligor with the greater of the actual net proceeds of a disposition and the amount of net proceeds that would have been realized if the disposition had been conducted in accordance with Part 6 (e.g., in a commercially reasonable manner). For non-consumer transactions, Section 9-626 rejects the “absolute bar” test that some courts have imposed; that approach bars a noncomplying secured party from recovering any deficiency, regardless of the loss (if any) the debtor suffered as a consequence of the noncompliance.
Consumer Goods, Consumer-Goods Transactions, and Consumer Transactions.
“Low-price” dispositions: Calculation of deficiency and surplus. Section 9-615(f) addresses the problem of procedurally regular dispositions that fetch a low price. Subsection (f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency if the proceeds of a disposition of collateral to a secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor are “significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.” (“Person related to” is defined in Section 9-102.) In these situations there is reason to suspect that there may be inadequate incentives to obtain a better price. Consequently, instead of calculating a deficiency (or surplus) based on the actual net proceeds, the deficiency (or surplus) would be calculated based on the proceeds that would have been received in a disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. j. Consumer Goods, Consumer-Goods Transactions, and Consumer Transactions. This Article (including the accompanying conforming revisions (see Appendix I)) includes several special rules for “consumer goods,” “consumer transactions,” and “consumer-goods transactions.” Each term is defined in Section 9-102.
Good Faith.
k. Good Faith. Section 9-102 contains a new definition of “good faith” that includes not only “honesty in fact” but also “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The definition is similar to the ones adopted in connection with other, recently completed revisions of the UCC. l. Transition Provisions. Part 7 (Sections 9-701 through 9-707) contains transition provisions. Transition from former Article 9 to this Article will be particularly challenging in view of its expanded scope, its modification of choice-of-law rules for perfection and priority, and its expansion of the methods of perfection.
Conforming and Related Amendments to Other UCC Articles.
Article 1. Revised Section 1-201 contains revisions to the definitions of “buyer in ordinary course of business,” “purchaser,” and “security interest.”
Articles 2 and 2A. Sections 2-210, 2-326, 2-502, 2-716, 2A-303, and 2A-307 have been revised to address the intersection between Articles 2 and 2A and Article 9.
Article 5. New Section 5-118 is patterned on Section 4-210. It provides for a security interest in documents presented under a letter of credit in favor of the issuer and a nominated person on the letter of credit.
Article 8. Revisions to Section 8-106, which deals with “control” of securities and security entitlements, conform it to Section 8-302, which deals with “delivery.” Revisions to Section 8-110, which deals with a “securities intermediary’s jurisdiction,” conform it to the revised treatment of a “commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction” in Section 9-305. Sections 8-301 and 8-302 have been revised for clarification. Section 8-510 has been revised to conform it to the revised priority rules of Section 9-328. Several Comments in Article 8 also have been revised.
§ 28-9-102. Definitions and index of definitions.
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In this chapter:
- “Accession” means goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that the identity of the original goods is not lost.
- “Account,” except as used in “account for,” means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance: (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of; (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered; (iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued; (iv) for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred; (v) for energy provided or to be provided; (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract; (vii) arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card; or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a state, governmental unit of a state, or a person licensed or authorized to operate the game by a state or governmental unit of a state. The term includes health care insurance receivables. The term does not include: (i) rights to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument; (ii) commercial tort claims; (iii) deposit accounts; (iv) investment property; (v) letter of credit rights or letters of credit; or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.
- “Account debtor” means a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper.
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“Accounting,” except as used in “accounting for,” means a record:
- authenticated by a secured party;
- indicating the aggregate unpaid secured obligations as of a date not more than thirty-five (35) days earlier or thirty-five (35) days later than the date of the record; and
- identifying the components of the obligations in reasonable detail.
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“Agricultural lien” means an interest, other than a security interest, in farm products:
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which secures payment or performance of an obligation for:
- goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor’s farming operation; or
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rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming operation;
- in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or services to a debtor in connection with a debtor’s farming operation; or
- leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor’s farming operation; and
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which secures payment or performance of an obligation for:
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“As-extracted collateral” means:
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oil, gas, or other minerals that are subject to a security interest that:
- is created by a debtor having an interest in the minerals before extraction; and
- attaches to the minerals as extracted; or
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oil, gas, or other minerals that are subject to a security interest that:
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“Authenticate” means:
- to sign; or (B) with the intent to adopt or accept a record, to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol or process.
- “Bank” means an organization that is engaged in the business of banking. The term includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and trust companies.
- “Cash proceeds” means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like.
- “Certificate of title” means a certificate of title with respect to which a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. The term includes another record maintained as an alternative to a certificate of title by the governmental unit that issues certificates of title if a statute permits the security interest in question to be indicated on the record as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral.
- “Chattel paper” means a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, a security interest in specific goods and license of software used in the goods, a lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods and license of software used in the goods. In this paragraph, “monetary obligation” means a monetary obligation secured by the goods or owed under a lease of the goods and includes a monetary obligation with respect to software used in the goods. The term does not include: (i) charters or other contracts involving the use or hire of a vessel; or (ii) records that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card. If a transaction is evidenced by records that include an instrument or series of instruments, the group of records taken together constitutes chattel paper.
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“Collateral” means the property subject to a security interest or agricultural lien. The term includes:
- proceeds to which a security interest attaches;
- accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold; and
- goods that are the subject of a consignment.
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“Commercial tort claim” means a claim arising in tort with respect to which:
- the claimant is an organization; or
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the claimant is an individual and the claim:
- arose in the course of the claimant’s business or profession; and
- does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the death of an individual.
- “Commodity account” means an account maintained by a commodity intermediary in which a commodity contract is carried for a commodity customer.
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“Commodity contract” means a commodity futures contract, an option on a commodity futures contract, a commodity option, or another contract if the contract or option is:
- traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market for such a contract pursuant to federal commodities laws; or
- traded on a foreign commodity board of trade, exchange, or market, and is carried on the books of a commodity intermediary for a commodity customer.
- “Commodity customer” means a person for which a commodity intermediary carries a commodity contract on its books. (17) “Commodity intermediary” means a person that:
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“Commodity intermediary” means a person that:
- is registered as a futures commission merchant under federal commodities law; or
- in the ordinary course of its business provides clearance or settlement services for a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market pursuant to federal commodities law.
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“Communicate” means:
- to send a written or other tangible record;
- to transmit a record by any means agreed upon by the persons sending and receiving the record; or
- in the case of transmission of a record to or by a filing office, to transmit a record by any means prescribed by filing office rule.
- “Consignee” means a merchant to which goods are delivered in a consignment.
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“Consignment” means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
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the merchant:
- deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name of the person making delivery;
- is not an auctioneer; and
- is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others;
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the merchant:
- “Consignor” means a person that delivers goods to a consignee in a consignment.
- “Consumer debtor” means a debtor in a consumer transaction.
- “Consumer goods” means goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
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“Consumer goods transaction” means a consumer transaction in which:
- an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family or household purposes; and
- a security interest in consumer goods secures the obligation.
- “Consumer obligor” means an obligor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation as part of a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
- “Consumer transaction” means a transaction in which: (i) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family or household purposes; (ii) a security interest secures the obligation; and (iii) the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The term includes consumer goods transactions.
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“Continuation statement” means an amendment of a financing statement which:
- identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates; and
- indicates that it is a continuation statement for, or that it is filed to continue the effectiveness of, the identified financing statement.
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“Debtor” means:
- a person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor;
- a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes; or (C) a consignee.
- “Deposit account” means a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank. The term does not include investment property or accounts evidenced by an instrument.
- “Document” means a document of title or a receipt of the type described in section 28-7-201(b), Idaho Code.
- “Electronic chattel paper” means chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium.
- “Encumbrance” means a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property. The term includes mortgages and other liens on real property.
- “Equipment” means goods other than inventory, farm products or consumer goods.
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“Farm products” means goods, other than standing timber, with respect to which the debtor is engaged in a farming operation and which are:
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crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including:
- crops produced on trees, vines and bushes; and
- Required disclosures to payee. Not less than three (3) days prior to the date on which a payee signs a transfer agreement, the transferee shall provide to the payee a separate disclosure statement, in bold type no smaller than fourteen (14) points, setting forth:
- Approval of transfers of structured settlement payment rights.
- Effects of transfer of structured settlement payment rights. Following a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under this subsection:
- Procedure for approval of transfers.
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General provisions — construction.
- “annuity issuer” means an insurer that has issued a contract to fund periodic payments under a structured settlement;
- “dependents” include a payee’s spouse and minor children and all other persons for whom the payee is legally obligated to provide support, including alimony;
- “discounted present value” means the present value of future payments determined by discounting such payments to the present using the most recently published applicable federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, as issued by the United States internal revenue service;
- “gross advance amount” means the sum payable to the payee or for the payee’s account as consideration for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights before any reductions for transfer expenses or other deductions to be made from such consideration;
- “independent professional advice” means advice of an attorney, certified public accountant, actuary or other licensed professional adviser;
- “interested parties” means, with respect to any structured settlement, the payee, any beneficiary irrevocably designated under the annuity contract to receive payments following the payee’s death, the annuity issuer, the structured settlement obligor, and any other party that has continuing rights or obligations under such structured settlement;
- “net advance amount” means the gross advance amount less the aggregate amount of the actual and estimated transfer expenses required to be disclosed under paragraph (B)(ii)5. of this subsection;
- “payee” means an individual who is receiving tax free payments under a structured settlement and proposes to make a transfer of payment rights thereunder; 9. “periodic payments” includes both recurring payments and scheduled future lump sum payments;
- Effective date. This subsection shall apply to any transfer of structured settlement payment rights under a transfer agreement entered into on or after the thirtieth day after the date of enactment of this subsection; provided however, that nothing contained herein shall imply that any transfer under a transfer agreement reached prior to such date is either effective or ineffective; or (14) A claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs trust as described in 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(d)(4), as amended from time to time.
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crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including:
- “Farming operation” means raising, cultivating, propagating, fattening, grazing, or any other farming, livestock, or aquacultural operation.
- “File number” means the number assigned to an initial financing statement pursuant to section 28-9-519(a), Idaho Code.
- “Filing office” means an office designated in section 28-9-501, Idaho Code, as the place to file a financing statement.
- “Filing office rule” means a rule adopted pursuant to section 28-9-526, Idaho Code.
- “Financing statement” means a record or records composed of an initial financing statement and any filed record relating to the initial financing statement.
- “Fixture filing” means the filing of a financing statement covering goods that are or are to become fixtures and satisfying section 28-9-502(a) and (b), Idaho Code. The term includes the filing of a financing statement covering goods of a transmitting utility which are or are to become fixtures.
- “Fixtures” means goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.
- “General intangible” means any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.
- “Good faith” means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
- “Goods” means all things that are movable when a security interest attaches. The term includes: (i) fixtures; (ii) standing timber that is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or contract for sale; (iii) the unborn young of animals; (iv) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, even if the crops are produced on trees, vines or bushes; and (v) manufactured homes. The term also includes a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program if: (i) the program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods; or (ii) by becoming the owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection with the goods. The term does not include a computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the program is embedded. The term also does not include accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, general intangibles, instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights, letters of credit, money, or oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. (45) “Governmental unit” means a subdivision, agency, department, county, parish, municipality, or other unit of the government of the United States, a state, or a foreign country. The term includes an organization having a separate corporate existence if the organization is eligible to issue debt on which interest is exempt from income taxation under the laws of the United States.
- “Governmental unit” means a subdivision, agency, department, county, parish, municipality, or other unit of the government of the United States, a state, or a foreign country. The term includes an organization having a separate corporate existence if the organization is eligible to issue debt on which interest is exempt from income taxation under the laws of the United States.
- “Health care insurance receivable” means an interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health care goods or services provided or to be provided.
- “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in the ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include: (i) investment property; (ii) letters of credit; or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.
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“Inventory” means goods, other than farm products, which:
- are leased by a person as lessor;
- are held by a person for sale or lease or to be furnished under a contract of service;
- are furnished by a person under a contract of service; or
- consist of raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business.
- “Investment property” means a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract or commodity account.
- “Jurisdiction of organization,” with respect to a registered organization, means the jurisdiction under whose law the organization is formed or organized.
- “Letter of credit right” means a right to payment or performance under a letter of credit, whether or not the beneficiary has demanded or is at the time entitled to demand payment or performance. The term does not include the right of a beneficiary to demand payment or performance under a letter of credit.
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“Lien creditor” means:
- a creditor that has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like;
- an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment;
- a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; or
- a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.
- “Manufactured home” means a structure, transportable in one (1) or more sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight (8) body feet or more in width or forty (40) body feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty (320) or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein. The term includes any structure that meets all of the requirements of this paragraph except the size requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the United States secretary of housing and urban development and complies with the standards established under title 42 of the United States Code.
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“Manufactured home transaction” means a secured transaction:
- that creates a purchase-money security interest in a manufactured home, other than a manufactured home held as inventory; or
- in which a manufactured home, other than a manufactured home held as inventory, is the primary collateral.
- “Mortgage” means a consensual interest in real property, including fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
- “New debtor” means a person that becomes bound as debtor under section 28-9-203(d), Idaho Code, by a security agreement previously entered into by another person.
- “New value” means: (i) money; (ii) money’s worth in property, services or new credit; or (iii) release by a transferee of an interest in property previously transferred to the transferee. The term does not include an obligation substituted for another obligation.
- “Noncash proceeds” means proceeds other than cash proceeds.
- “Obligor” means a person that, with respect to an obligation secured by a security interest in or an agricultural lien on the collateral: (i) owes payment or other performance of the obligation; (ii) has provided property other than the collateral to secure payment or other performance of the obligation; or (iii) is otherwise accountable in whole or in part for payment or other performance of the obligation. The term does not include issuers or nominated persons under a letter of credit.
- “Original debtor,” except as used in section 28-9-310(c), Idaho Code, means a person that, as debtor, entered into a security agreement to which a new debtor has become bound under section 28-9-203(d), Idaho Code.
- “Payment intangible” means a general intangible under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.
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“Person related to,” with respect to an individual, means:
- the spouse of the individual;
- a brother, brother-in-law, sister, or sister-in-law of the individual;
- an ancestor or lineal descendant of the individual or the individual’s spouse; or
- any other relative, by blood or marriage, of the individual or the individual’s spouse who shares the same home with the individual.
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“Person related to,” with respect to an organization, means:
- a person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the organization;
- an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, the organization;
- an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, a person described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph;
- the spouse of an individual described in subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of this paragraph; or
- an individual who is related by blood or marriage to an individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C) or (D) of this paragraph and shares the same home with the individual.
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“Proceeds” means the following property:
- whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange or other disposition of collateral;
- whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral;
- rights arising out of collateral;
- to the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral; or
- to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor or the secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.
- “Promissory note” means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds.
- “Proposal” means a record authenticated by a secured party which includes the terms on which the secured party is willing to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures pursuant to sections 28-9-620, 28-9-621 and 28-9-622, Idaho Code.
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“Public-finance transaction” means a secured transaction in connection with which:
- debt securities are issued;
- all or a portion of the securities issued have an initial stated maturity of at least twenty (20) years; and
- the debtor, obligor, secured party, account debtor or other person obligated on collateral, assignor or assignee of a secured obligation, or assignor or assignee of a security interest is a state or a governmental unit of a state.
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“Public organic record” means a record that is available to the public for inspection and that is:
- a record consisting of the record initially filed with or issued by a state or the United States to form or organize an organization and any record filed with or issued by the state or the United States which amends or restates the initial record;
- an organic record of a business trust consisting of the record initially filed with a state and any record filed with the state which amends or restates the initial record, if a statute of the state governing business trusts requires that the record be filed with the state; or
- a record consisting of legislation enacted by the legislature of a state or the congress of the United States which forms or organizes an organization, any record amending the legislation, and any record filed with or issued by the state or United States which amends or restates the name of the organization.
- “Pursuant to commitment,” with respect to an advance made or other value given by a secured party, means pursuant to the secured party’s obligation, whether or not a subsequent event of default or other event not within the secured party’s control has relieved or may relieve the secured party from its obligation.
- “Record,” except as used in “for record,” “of record,” “record or legal title,” and “record owner,” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
- “Registered organization” means an organization formed or organized solely under the law of a single state or the United States by the filing of a public organic record with, the issuance of a public organic record by, or the enactment of legislation by the state or United States. The term includes a business trust that is formed or organized under the law of a single state if a statute of the state governing business trusts requires that the business trust’s organic record be filed with the state.
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“Secondary obligor” means an obligor to the extent that:
- the obligor’s obligation is secondary; or
- the obligor has a right of recourse with respect to an obligation secured by collateral against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.
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“Secured party” means:
- a person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is outstanding;
- a person that holds an agricultural lien;
- a consignor;
- a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes have been sold;
- a trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other representative in whose favor a security interest or agricultural lien is created or provided for; or
- a person that holds a security interest arising under section 28-2-401, 28-2-505, 28-2-711(3), 28-4-210, 28-5-120 or 28-12-508(5), Idaho Code.
- “Security agreement” means an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.
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“Send,” in connection with a record or notification, means:
- to deposit in the mail, deliver for transmission, or transmit by any other usual means of communication, with postage or cost of transmission provided for, addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or
- to cause the record or notification to be received within the time that it would have been received if properly sent under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
- “Software” means a computer program and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program. The term does not include a computer program that is included in the definition of goods.
- “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
- “Supporting obligation” means a letter of credit right or secondary obligation that supports the payment or performance of an account, chattel paper, a document, a general intangible, an instrument or investment property.
- “Tangible chattel paper” means chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium.
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“Termination statement” means an amendment of a financing statement which:
- identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates; and
- indicates either that it is a termination statement or that the identified financing statement is no longer effective.
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“Transmitting utility” means a person primarily engaged in the business of:
- operating a railroad, subway, street railway, or trolley bus;
- transmitting communications electrically, electromagnetically or by light; (C) transmitting goods by pipeline or sewer; or
- “Control” as provided in section 28-7-106, Idaho Code, and the following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter:
- Chapter 1, title 28[, Idaho Code], contains general definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter.
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person’s possession of the personal property.
(B) accounts arising out of the sale at the wellhead or minehead of oil, gas, or other minerals in which the debtor had an interest before extraction.
(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery; and
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obligation.
(B) livestock, born or unborn, including aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations;
(C) supplies used or produced in a farming operation; or
(D) products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states.
(D) transmitting or producing and transmitting electricity, steam, gas or water.
“Applicant” section 28-5-102, Idaho Code.
“Beneficiary” section 28-5-102, Idaho Code.
“Broker” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Certificated security” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Check” section 28-3-104, Idaho Code.
“Clearing corporation” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Contract for sale” section 28-2-106, Idaho Code.
“Customer” section 28-4-104, Idaho Code.
“Entitlement holder” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Financial asset” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Holder in due course” section 28-3-302, Idaho Code.
“Issuer” (with respect to a letter of credit
or letter of credit right) section 28-5-102, Idaho Code.
“Issuer” (with respect to a security) section 28-8-201, Idaho Code.
“Issuer” (with respect to documents
of title) section 28-7-102, Idaho Code.
“Lease” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Lease agreement” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Lease contract” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Leasehold interest” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Lessee” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Lessee in ordinary course of business” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Lessor” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Lessor’s residual interest” section 28-12-103, Idaho Code.
“Letter of credit” section 28-5-102, Idaho Code.
“Merchant” section 28-2-104, Idaho Code.
“Negotiable instrument” section 28-3-104, Idaho Code.
“Nominated person” section 28-5-102, Idaho Code.
“Note” section 28-3-104, Idaho Code.
“Proceeds of a letter of credit” section 28-5-114, Idaho Code.
“Prove” section 28-3-103, Idaho Code.
“Sale” section 28-2-106, Idaho Code.
“Securities account” section 28-8-501, Idaho Code.
“Securities intermediary” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Security” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Security certificate” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Security entitlement” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
“Uncertificated security” section 28-8-102, Idaho Code.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-102, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2002, ch. 107, § 1, p. 290; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 21, p. 77; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 1, p. 381. STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former section 28-9-102 which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-102, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 4, p. 781. was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, rewrote paragraph (a)(7)(B) which formerly read: “to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present intent of the authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or accept a record”; added the second sentence in paragraph (a)(10); added paragraph (a)(68), redesignating the subsequent paragraphs accordingly; and, in paragraph (a)(71), inserted “formed or” near the beginning, substituted “by the filing of a public organic record with, the issuance of a public organic record by, or the enactment of legislation by the state or United States” for “and as to which the state or the United States must maintain a public record showing the organization to have been organized”, and added the last sentence.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in subsection (c) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.
Effective Dates.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
CASE NOTES
Commercial Torts.
Where the debtors’ complaint against an electrical company that alleged breach of contract and warranty, negligence, fraud, and consumer protection violations made apportionment among the claims impossible, and since the suit was primarily premised on a contract for services, despite the lack of a written contract, the action was not a commercial tort claim; the action was a general intangible, or a “thing in action” and was subject to the first creditor’s security agreement. In re Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002), aff’d in part, 324 Bankr. 92 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
Proceeds.
Attorney’s security interest in a promissory note automatically attached to any proceeds of the note, including any rights arising out of the note. The security agreement did not limit the types of proceeds to which the attorney’s security interest would attach because the attorney identified specific proceeds in the security agreement, and a party who seeks to limit the type of statutory proceeds to which its security interest attaches must state an intent to limit proceeds in the security agreement. Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 118 P.3d 136 (2005).
Writing Required.
In Chapter 7 proceedings, since there was no written loan agreement between the debor and her creditor father, there was no perfected security interest which could be avoided by the bankruptcy trustee, and, thus, debtor was entitled to a $3800 exemption from proceeds of the sale of her vehicle. In re Seibold, 351 B.R. 741 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006).
Cited
Wood v. Pillsbury Co., 38 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); J.K. Merrill & Son v. Carter, 108 Idaho 749, 702 P.2d 787 (1985); Hopkins v. Gutknecht (In re Lewis), 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2727 (Bankr. D. Idaho Sept. 2, 2004); Fin. Fed. Credit Inc. v. Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc. (In re Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc.), 436 B.R. 582 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010); Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 311 P.3d 299 (2013).
Decisions Under Prior Law
Account Debtor.
An obligor’s legal status as an “account debtor” comes into being only when the assigned “contract rights” are collateral, subject to a security interest. The code extends no protection to an assignee if a security interest has not attached to the assigned contract rights. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
Object of Trust Receipts Act.
The object of the former Uniform Trust Receipts Act was to standardize and protect the trust receipts method of financing the acquisition and resale of goods in their journey from producer to retailer. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955).
Property Subject to Mortgage.
Valid chattel mortgage could not be given on property other than that described in statute, and attempted chattel mortgage on building affixed to land created no lien thereon. Beeler v. C.C. Mercantile Co., 8 Idaho 644, 70 P. 943 (1902).
State liquor license, being a qualified defeasible property right, was subject to encumbrance as a chattel mortgage. Schieche v. Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 395 P.2d 671 (1964). When chattel mortgage embraced the business, fixtures, good will, inventory and lease on a bar, as between mortgagor and mortgagee, it included the retail liquor license. Schieche v. Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 395 P.2d 671 (1964).
Security Agreement.
Neither the UCC-1F financing statement nor the UCC-3F amendment is a form which “creates or provides for a security interest,” and, therefore, neither meets the definition of a “security agreement.” Kelley Bean Co. v. Victor, 122 Idaho 395, 834 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1992).
Security Interest.
Where the evidence was clear that although a lease agreement did contain some attributes of an installment sales contract, there was no oral or written option to purchase the equipment, and title did not pass to the lessee at the end of the term, and since no other relevant evidence was presented demonstrating that the parties intended the transaction to be anything other than a lease, the trial court properly held that the lease agreement was not a security interest subject to Article 9 of the UCC. W.L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 103 Idaho 736, 653 P.2d 791 (1982).
Agreements between the owner of a truck and a trailer and a lessee constituted true leases rather than security agreements in a sales transaction where the agreements expressly stated that the lessee was given no option to purchase and that lessee had no claim of ownership or any right or interest in the property other than as a lessee. Although other language in the agreement gave lessee an opportunity to purchase the property, this opportunity was restricted, and there was no evidence that lessee would have acquired any equity or interest in the property during the term of the lease as a result of that language. Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 769 P.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1989).
A security interest was created by two promissory notes, each containing the words “SECURITY: 1956 GMC bus,” and by a certificate of title endorsed and delivered to defendant; the promissory notes and the certificate of title served to satisfy the requirement of displaying both a loan and the taking of security for the payment thereof. Simplot v. Owens, 119 Idaho 243, 805 P.2d 449 (1990).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
ALR. — What constitutes inventory under UCC§ 9-109 (4). 77 A.L.R.3d 1266.
Consignment transactions under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 on Secured Transactions. 58 A.L.R.6th 289.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. All terms that are defined in Article 9 and used in more than one section are consolidated in this section. Note that the definition of “security interest” is found in Section 1-201, not in this Article, and has been revised. See Appendix I. Many of the definitions in this section are new; many others derive from those in former Section 9-105. The following Comments also indicate other sections of former Article 9 that defined (or explained) terms. 2. Parties to Secured Transactions.
“Debtor”; “Obligor”; “Secondary Obligor.”
a. “Debtor”; “Obligor”; “Secondary Obligor.” Determining whether a person was a “debtor” under former Section 9-105(1)(d) required a close examination of the context in which the term was used. To reduce the need for this examination, this Article redefines “debtor” and adds new defined terms, “secondary obligor” and “obligor.” In the context of Part 6 (default and enforcement), these definitions distinguish among three classes of persons: (i) those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of a security interest by virtue of their non-lien property interest (typically, an ownership interest) in the collateral, (ii) those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of the security interest because of their obligation to pay the secured debt, and (iii) those persons who have an obligation to pay the secured debt but have no stake in the proper enforcement of the security interest. Persons in the first class are debtors. Persons in the second class are secondary obligors if any portion of the obligation is secondary or if the obligor has a right of recourse against the debtor or another obligor with respect to an obligation secured by collateral. One must consult the law of suretyship to determine whether an obligation is secondary. The Restatement (3d), Suretyship and Guaranty § 1 (1996), contains a useful explanation of the concept. Obligors in the third class are neither debtors nor secondary obligors. With one exception (Section 9-616, as it relates to a consumer obligor), the rights and duties provided by Part 6 affect non-debtor obligors only if they are “secondary obligors.”
By including in the definition of “debtor” all persons with a property interest (other than a security interest in or other lien on collateral), the definition includes transferees of collateral, whether or not the secured party knows of the transfer or the transferee’s identity. Exculpatory provisions in Part 6 protect the secured party in that circumstance. See Sections 9-605 and 9-628. The definition renders unnecessary former Section 9-112, which governed situations in which collateral was not owned by the debtor. The definition also includes a “consignee,” as defined in this section, as well as a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.
Secured parties and other lienholders are excluded from the definition of “debtor” because the interests of those parties normally derive from and encumber a debtor’s interest. However, if in a separate secured transaction a secured party grants, as debtor , a security interest in its own interest (i.e., its security interest and any obligation that it secures), the secured party is a debtor in that transaction . This typically occurs when a secured party with a security interest in specific goods assigns chattel paper.
Consider the following examples:
Example 1:
Example 2:
Example 2: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Bruno co-signs a negotiable note as maker. As before, Behnfeldt is the debtor and an obligor. As an accommodation party (see Section 3-419), Bruno is a secondary obligor. Bruno has this status even if the note states that her obligation is a primary obligation and that she waives all suretyship defenses.
Example 3:
Example 3: Behnfeldt borrows money on an unsecured basis. Bruno co-signs the note and grants a security interest in her Honda to secure her obligation. Inasmuch as Behnfeldt does not have a property interest in the Honda, Behnfeldt is not a debtor. Having granted the security interest, Bruno is the debtor. Because Behnfeldt is a principal obligor, she is not a secondary obligor. Whatever the outcome of enforcement of the security interest against the Honda or Bruno’s secondary obligation, Bruno will look to Behnfeldt for her losses. The enforcement will not affect Behnfeldt’s aggregate obligations. When the principal obligor (borrower) and the secondary obligor (surety) each has granted a security interest in different collateral, the status of each is determined by the collateral involved.
Example 4:
“Secured Party.”
The definition of “secured party” clarifies the status of various types of representatives. Consider, for example, a multi-bank facility under which Bank A, Bank B, and Bank C are lenders and Bank A serves as the collateral agent. If the security interest is granted to the banks, then they are the secured parties. If the security interest is granted to Bank A as collateral agent, then Bank A is the secured party.
Other Parties.
Definitions Relating to Creation of a Security Interest.
“Collateral.”
“Security Agreement.”
Whether an agreement creates a security interest depends not on whether the parties intend that the law characterize the transaction as a security interest but rather on whether the transaction falls within the definition of “security interest” in Section 1-201. Thus, an agreement that the parties characterize as a “lease” of goods may be a “security agreement,” notwithstanding the parties’ stated intention that the law treat the transaction as a lease and not as a secured transaction. See Section 1-203.
Goods-Related Definitions.
“Goods”; “Consumer Goods”; “Equipment”; “Farm Products”; “Farming Operation”; “Inventory.”
The definition of “consumer goods” follows former Section 9-109. The classification turns on whether the debtor uses or bought the goods for use “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”
Goods are inventory if they are leased by a lessor or held by a person for sale or lease. The revised definition of “inventory” makes clear that the term includes goods leased by the debtor to others as well as goods held for lease. (The same result should have obtained under the former definition.) Goods to be furnished or furnished under a service contract, raw materials, and work in process also are inventory. Implicit in the definition is the criterion that the sales or leases are or will be in the ordinary course of business. For example, machinery used in manufacturing is equipment, not inventory, even though it is the policy of the debtor to sell machinery when it becomes obsolete or worn. Inventory also includes goods that are consumed in a business (e.g., fuel used in operations). In general, goods used in a business are equipment if they are fixed assets or have, as identifiable units, a relatively long period of use, but are inventory, even though not held for sale or lease, if they are used up or consumed in a short period of time in producing a product or providing a service.
Goods are “farm products” if the debtor is engaged in farming operations with respect to the goods. Animals in a herd of livestock are covered whether the debtor acquires them by purchase or as a result of natural increase. Products of crops or livestock remain farm products as long as they have not been subjected to a manufacturing process. The terms “crops” and “livestock” are not defined. The new definition of “farming operations” is for clarification only.
Crops, livestock, and their products cease to be “farm products” when the debtor ceases to be engaged in farming operations with respect to them. If, for example, they come into the possession of a marketing agency for sale or distribution or of a manufacturer or processor as raw materials, they become inventory. Products of crops or livestock, even though they remain in the possession of a person engaged in farming operations, lose their status as farm products if they are subjected to a manufacturing process. What is and what is not a manufacturing operation is not specified in this Article. At one end of the spectrum, some processes are so closely connected with farming — such as pasteurizing milk or boiling sap to produce maple syrup or sugar — that they would not constitute manufacturing. On the other hand an extensive canning operation would be manufacturing. Once farm products have been subjected to a manufacturing operation, they normally become inventory.
The revised definition of “farm products” clarifies the distinction between crops and standing timber and makes clear that aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations may be either crops or livestock. Although aquatic goods that are vegetable in nature often would be crops and those that are animal would be livestock, this Article leaves the courts free to classify the goods on a case-by-case basis. See Section 9-324, Comment 11.
“Accession”; “Manufactured Home”; “Manufactured-Home Transaction.”
The definitions of “goods” and “software” are also mutually exclusive. Computer programs usually constitute “software,” and, as such, are not “goods” as this Article uses the terms. However, under the circumstances specified in the definition of “goods,” computer programs embedded in goods are part of the “goods” and are not “software.” b. “Accession”; “Manufactured Home”; “Manufactured-Home Transaction.” Other specialized definitions of goods include “accession” (see the special priority and enforcement rules in Section 9-335), and “manufactured home” (see Section 9-515, permitting a financing statement in a “manufactured-home transaction” to be effective for 30 years). The definition of “manufactured home” borrows from the federal Manufactured Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5401 et seq., and is intended to have the same meaning.
“As-Extracted Collateral.”
c. “As-Extracted Collateral.” Under this Article, oil, gas, and other minerals that have not been extracted from the ground are treated as real property, to which this Article does not apply. Upon extraction, minerals become personal property (goods) and eligible to be collateral under this Article. See the definition of “goods,” which excludes “oil, gas, and other minerals before extraction.” To take account of financing practices reflecting the shift from real to personal property, this Article contains special rules for perfecting security interests in minerals which attach upon extraction and in accounts resulting from the sale of minerals at the wellhead or minehead. See, e.g., Sections 9-301(4) (law governing perfection and priority); 9-501 (place of filing), 9-502 (contents of financing statement), 9-519 (indexing of records). The new term, “as-extracted collateral,” refers to the minerals and related accounts to which the special rules apply. The term “at the wellhead” encompasses arrangements based on a sale of the produce at the moment that it issues from the ground and is measured, without technical distinctions as to whether title passes at the “Christmas tree” of a well, the far side of a gathering tank, or at some other point. The term “at . . . the minehead” is comparable.
The following examples explain the operation of these provisions.
Example 5:
Example 6:
Example 6: Debtor owns an interest in oil that is to be extracted and contracts to sell the oil to Buyer at the wellhead. In an authenticated agreement, Debtor agrees to sell to Lender the right to payment from Buyer. This right to payment is an account that constitutes “as-extracted collateral.” If Lender then resells the account to Financer, Financer acquires a security interest. However, inasmuch as the debtor-seller in that transaction, Lender, had no interest in the oil before extraction, Financer’s collateral (the account it owns) is not “as-extracted collateral.”
Example 7:
Receivables-related Definitions.
“Account”; “Health-Care-Insurance Receivable”; “As-Extracted Collateral.”
a. “Account”; “Health-Care-Insurance Receivable”; “As-Extracted Collateral.” The definition of “account” has been expanded and reformulated. It is no longer limited to rights to payment relating to goods or services. Many categories of rights to payment that were classified as general intangibles under former Article 9 are accounts under this Article. Thus, if they are sold, a financing statement must be filed to perfect the buyer’s interest in them. As used in the definition of “account,” a right to payment “arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card” is the right of a card issuer to payment from its cardholder. A credit-card or charge-card transaction may give rise to other rights to payments; however, those other rights do not “arise out of the use” of the card or information contained on or for use with the card. Among the types of property that are expressly excluded from the definition of account is “a right to payment for money or funds advanced or sold.” As defined in Section 1-201, “money” is limited essentially to currency. As used in the exclusion from the definition of “account,” however, “funds” is a broader concept (although the term is not defined). For example, when a bank-lender credits a borrower’s deposit account for the amount of a loan, the bank’s advance of funds is not a transaction giving rise to an account. The definition of “health-care-insurance receivable” is new. It is a subset of the definition of “account.” However, the rules generally applicable to account debtors on accounts do not apply to insurers obligated on health-care-insurance receivables. See Sections 9-404(e), 9-405(d), 9-406(i).
Note that certain accounts also are “as-extracted collateral.” See Comment 4.c., Examples 6 and 7.
“Chattel Paper”; “Electronic Chattel Paper”; “Tangible Chattel Paper.”
Charters of vessels are expressly excluded from the definition of chattel paper; they are accounts. The term “charter” as used in this section includes bareboat charters, time charters, successive voyage charters, contracts of affreightment, contracts of carriage, and all other arrangements for the use of vessels.
Under former Section 9-105, only if the evidence of an obligation consisted of “a writing or writings” could an obligation qualify as chattel paper. In this Article, traditional, written chattel paper is included in the definition of “tangible chattel paper.” “Electronic chattel paper” is chattel paper that is stored in an electronic medium instead of in tangible form. The concept of an electronic medium should be construed liberally to include electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or any other current or similar emerging technologies.
“Instrument”; “Promissory Note.”
c. “Instrument”; “Promissory Note.” The definition of “instrument” includes a negotiable instrument. As under former Section 9-105, it also includes any other right to payment of a monetary obligation that is evidenced by a writing of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery (and, if necessary, an indorsement or assignment). Except in the case of chattel paper, the fact that an instrument is secured by a security interest or encumbrance on property does not change the character of the instrument as such or convert the combination of the instrument and collateral into a separate classification of personal property. The definition makes clear that rights to payment arising out of credit-card transactions are not instruments. The definition of “promissory note” is new, necessitated by the inclusion of sales of promissory notes within the scope of Article 9. It explicitly excludes obligations arising out of “orders” to pay (e.g., checks) as opposed to “promises” to pay. See Section 3-104. d. “General Intangible”; “Payment Intangible.” “General intangible” is the residual category of personal property, including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various categories of intellectual property and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. As used in the definition of “general intangible,” “things in action” includes rights that arise under a license of intellectual property, including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for infringement. The definition has been revised to exclude commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, and letter-of-credit rights. Each of the three is a separate type of collateral. One important consequence of this exclusion is that tortfeasors (commercial tort claims), banks (deposit accounts), and persons obligated on letters of credit (letter-of-credit rights) are not “account debtors” having the rights and obligations set forth in Sections 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406. In particular, tortfeasors, banks, and persons obligated on letters of credit are not obligated to pay an assignee (secured party) upon receipt of the notification described in Section 9-404(a). See Comment 5.h. Another important consequence relates to the adequacy of the description in the security agreement. See Section 9-108.
“Payment intangible” is a subset of the definition of “general intangible.” The sale of a payment intangible is subject to this Article. See Section 9-109(a)(3). Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its obligation. The term “payment intangible,” however, embraces only those general intangibles “under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.” (Emphasis added.) A debtor’s right to payment from another person of amounts received by the other person on the debtor’s behalf, including the right of a merchant in a credit-card, debit-card, prepaid-card, or other payment-card transaction to payment of amounts received by its bank from the card system in settlement of the transaction, is a “payment intangible.” (In contrast, the right of a credit-card issuer to payment arising out of the use of a credit card is an “account.”)
In classifying intangible collateral, a court should begin by identifying the particular rights that have been assigned. The account debtor (promisor) under a particular contract may owe several types of monetary obligations as well as other, nonmonetary obligations. If the promisee’s right to payment of money is assigned separately, the right is an account or payment intangible, depending on how the account debtor’s obligation arose. When all the promisee’s rights are assigned together, an account, a payment intangible, and a general intangible all may be involved, depending on the nature of the rights.
A right to the payment of money is frequently buttressed by ancillary rights, such as rights arising from covenants in a purchase agreement, note, or mortgage requiring insurance on the collateral or forbidding removal of the collateral, rights arising from covenants to preserve the creditworthiness of the promisor, and the lessor’s rights with respect to leased goods that arise upon the lessee’s default (see Section 2A-523). This Article does not treat these ancillary rights separately from the rights to payment to which they relate. For example, attachment and perfection of an assignment of a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether it be an account or payment intangible, also carries these ancillary rights. Thus, an assignment of the lessor’s right to payment under a lease also transfers the lessor’s rights with respect to the leased goods under Section 2A-523. If, taken together, the lessor’s rights to payment and with respect to the leased goods are evidenced by chattel paper, then, contrary to In re Commercial Money Center, Inc. , 350 B.R. 465 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 2006), an assignment of the lessor’s right to payment constitutes an assignment of the chattel paper. Although an agreement excluding the lessor’s rights with respect to the leased goods from an assignment of the lessor’s right to payment may be effective between the parties, the agreement does not affect the characterization of the collateral to the prejudice of creditors of, and purchasers from, the assignor.
Every “payment intangible” is also a “general intangible.” Likewise, “software” is a “general intangible” for purposes of this Article. See Comment 25. Accordingly, except as otherwise provided, statutory provisions applicable to general intangibles apply to payment intangibles and software.
“Letter-of-Credit Right.”
e. “Letter-of-Credit Right.” The term “letter-of-credit right” embraces the rights to payment and performance under a letter of credit (defined in Section 5-102). However, it does not include a beneficiary’s right to demand payment or performance. Transfer of those rights to a transferee beneficiary is governed by Article 5. See Sections 9-107, Comment 4, and 9-329, Comments 3 and 4.
“Supporting Obligation.”
f. “Supporting Obligation.” This new term covers the most common types of credit enhancements-suretyship obligations (including guarantees) and letter-of-credit rights that support one of the types of collateral specified in the definition. As explained in Comment 2.a., suretyship law determines whether an obligation is “secondary” for purposes of this definition. Section 9-109 generally excludes from this Article transfers of interests in insurance policies. However, the regulation of a secondary obligation as an insurance product does not necessarily mean that it is a “policy of insurance” for purposes of the exclusion in Section 9-109. Thus, this Article may cover a secondary obligation (as a supporting obligation), even if the obligation is issued by a regulated insurance company and the obligation is subject to regulation as an “insurance” product.
This Article contains rules explicitly governing attachment, perfection, and priority of security interests in supporting obligations. See Sections 9-203, 9-308, 9-310, and 9-322. These provisions reflect the principle that a supporting obligation is an incident of the collateral it supports.
Collections of or other distributions under a supporting obligation are “proceeds” of the supported collateral as well as “proceeds” of the supporting obligation itself. See Section 9-102 (defining “proceeds”) and Comment 13.b. As such, the collections and distributions are subject to the priority rules applicable to proceeds generally. See Section 9-322. However, under the special rule governing security interests in a letter-of-credit right, a secured party’s failure to obtain control (Section 9-107) of a letter-of-credit right supporting collateral may leave its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take control. See Section 9-329 (security interest in a letter-of-credit right perfected by control has priority over a conflicting security interest).
“Commercial Tort Claim.”
g. “Commercial Tort Claim.” This term is new. A tort claim may serve as original collateral under this Article only if it is a “commercial tort claim.” See Section 9-109(d). Although security interests in commercial tort claims are within its scope, this Article does not override other applicable law restricting the assignability of a tort claim. See Section 9-401. A security interest in a tort claim also may exist under this Article if the claim is proceeds of other collateral. h. “Account Debtor.” An “account debtor” is a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The account debtor’s obligation often is a monetary obligation; however, this is not always the case. For example, if a franchisee uses its rights under a franchise agreement (a general intangible) as collateral, then the franchisor is an “account debtor.” As a general matter, Article 3, and not Article 9, governs obligations on negotiable instruments. Accordingly, the definition of “account debtor” excludes obligors on negotiable instruments constituting part of chattel paper. The principal effect of this change from the definition in former Article 9 is that the rules in Sections 9-403, 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406, dealing with the rights of an assignee and duties of an account debtor, do not apply to an assignment of chattel paper in which the obligation to pay is evidenced by a negotiable instrument. (Section 9-406(d), however, does apply to promissory notes, including negotiable promissory notes.) Rather, the assignee’s rights are governed by Article 3. Similarly, the duties of an obligor on a nonnegotiable instrument are governed by non-Article 9 law unless the nonnegotiable instrument is a part of chattel paper, in which case the obligor is an account debtor.
Receivables Under Government Entitlement Programs.
i. Receivables Under Government Entitlement Programs. This Article does not contain a defined term that encompasses specifically rights to payment or performance under the many and varied government entitlement programs. Depending on the nature of a right under a program, it could be an account, a payment intangible, a general intangible other than a payment intangible, or another type of collateral. The right also might be proceeds of collateral (e.g., crops).
Investment-Property-Related Definitions: “Commodity Account”; “Commodity Contract”; “Commodity Customer”; “Commodity Intermediary”; “Investment Property.”
6. Investment-Property-Related Definitions: “Commodity Account”; “Commodity Contract”; “Commodity Customer”; “Commodity Intermediary”; “Investment Property.” These definitions are substantially the same as the corresponding definitions in former Section 9-115. “Investment property” includes securities, both certificated and uncertificated, securities accounts, security entitlements, commodity accounts, and commodity contracts. The term investment property includes a “securities account” in order to facilitate transactions in which a debtor wishes to create a security interest in all of the investment positions held through a particular account rather than in particular positions carried in the account. Former Section 9-115 was added in conjunction with Revised Article 8 and contained a variety of rules applicable to security interests in investment property. These rules have been relocated to the appropriate sections of Article 9. See, e.g., Sections 9-203 (attachment), 9-314 (perfection by control), 9-328 (priority).
The terms “security,” “security entitlement,” and related terms are defined in Section 8-102, and the term “securities account” is defined in Section 8-501. The terms “commodity account,” “commodity contract,” “commodity customer,” and “commodity intermediary” are defined in this section. Commodity contracts are not “securities” or “financial assets” under Article 8. See Section 8-103(f). Thus, the relationship between commodity intermediaries and commodity customers is not governed by the indirect-holding-system rules of Part 5 of Article 8. For securities, Article 9 contains rules on security interests, and Article 8 contains rules on the rights of transferees, including secured parties, on such matters as the rights of a transferee if the transfer was itself wrongful and gives rise to an adverse claim. For commodity contracts, Article 9 establishes rules on security interests, but questions of the sort dealt with in Article 8 for securities are left to other law.
The indirect-holding-system rules of Article 8 are sufficiently flexible to be applied to new developments in the securities and financial markets, where that is appropriate. Accordingly, the definition of “commodity contract” is narrowly drafted to ensure that it does not operate as an obstacle to the application of the Article 8 indirect-holding-system rules to new products. The term “commodity contract” covers those contracts that are traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market and foreign commodity contracts that are carried on the books of American commodity intermediaries. The effect of this definition is that the category of commodity contracts that are excluded from Article 8 but governed by Article 9 is essentially the same as the category of contracts that fall within the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the federal Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Commodity contracts are different from securities or other financial assets. A person who enters into a commodity futures contract is not buying an asset having a certain value and holding it in anticipation of increase in value. Rather the person is entering into a contract to buy or sell a commodity at set price for delivery at a future time. That contract may become advantageous or disadvantageous as the price of the commodity fluctuates during the term of the contract. The rules of the commodity exchanges require that the contracts be marked to market on a daily basis; that is, the customer pays or receives any increment attributable to that day’s price change. Because commodity customers may incur obligations on their contracts, they are required to provide collateral at the outset, known as “original margin,” and may be required to provide additional amounts, known as “variation margin,” during the term of the contract.
The most likely setting in which a person would want to take a security interest in a commodity contract is where a lender who is advancing funds to finance an inventory of a physical commodity requires the borrower to enter into a commodity contract as a hedge against the risk of decline in the value of the commodity. The lender will want to take a security interest in both the commodity itself and the hedging commodity contract. Typically, such arrangements are structured as security interests in the entire commodity account in which the borrower carries the hedging contracts, rather than in individual contracts.
One important effect of including commodity contracts and commodity accounts in Article 9 is to provide a clearer legal structure for the analysis of the rights of commodity clearing organizations against their participants and futures commission merchants against their customers. The rules and agreements of commodity clearing organizations generally provide that the clearing organization has the right to liquidate any participant’s positions in order to satisfy obligations of the participant to the clearing corporation. Similarly, agreements between futures commission merchants and their customers generally provide that the futures commission merchant has the right to liquidate a customer’s positions in order to satisfy obligations of the customer to the futures commission merchant.
The main property that a commodity intermediary holds as collateral for the obligations that the commodity customer may incur under its commodity contracts is not other commodity contracts carried by the customer but the other property that the customer has posted as margin. Typically, this property will be securities. The commodity intermediary’s security interest in such securities is governed by the rules of this Article on security interests in securities, not the rules on security interests in commodity contracts or commodity accounts.
Consumer-Related Definitions: “Consumer Debtor”; “Consumer Goods”; “Consumer-goods transaction”; “Consumer Obligor”; “Consumer Transaction.”
Although there are significant analytic and regulatory differences between commodities and securities, the development of commodity contracts on financial products in the past few decades has resulted in a system in which the commodity markets and securities markets are closely linked. The rules on security interests in commodity contracts and commodity accounts provide a structure that may be essential in times of stress in the financial markets. Suppose, for example that a firm has a position in a securities market that is hedged by a position in a commodity market, so that payments that the firm is obligated to make with respect to the securities position will be covered by the receipt of funds from the commodity position. Depending upon the settlement cycles of the different markets, it is possible that the firm could find itself in a position where it is obligated to make the payment with respect to the securities position before it receives the matching funds from the commodity position. If cross-margining arrangements have not been developed between the two markets, the firm may need to borrow funds temporarily to make the earlier payment. The rules on security interests in investment property would facilitate the use of positions in one market as collateral for loans needed to cover obligations in the other market. 7. Consumer-Related Definitions: “Consumer Debtor”; “Consumer Goods”; “Consumer-goods transaction”; “Consumer Obligor”; “Consumer Transaction.” The definition of “consumer goods” (discussed above) is substantially the same as the definition in former Section 9-109. The definitions of “consumer debtor,” “consumer obligor,” “consumer-goods transaction,” and “consumer transaction” have been added in connection with various new (and old) consumer-related provisions and to designate certain provisions that are inapplicable in consumer transactions.
“Consumer-goods transaction” is a subset of “consumer transaction.” Under each definition, both the obligation secured and the collateral must have a personal, family, or household purpose. However, “mixed” business and personal transactions also may be characterized as a consumer-goods transaction or consumer transaction. Subparagraph (A) of the definition of consumer-goods transactions and clause (i) of the definition of consumer transaction are primary purposes tests. Under these tests, it is necessary to determine the primary purpose of the obligation or obligations secured. Subparagraph (B) and clause (iii) of these definitions are satisfied if any of the collateral is consumer goods, in the case of a consumer-goods transaction, or “is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” in the case of a consumer transaction. The fact that some of the obligations secured or some of the collateral for the obligation does not satisfy the tests (e.g., some of the collateral is acquired for a business purpose) does not prevent a transaction from being a “consumer transaction” or “consumer-goods transaction.”
Filing-Related Definitions: “Continuation Statement”; “File Number”; “Filing Office”; “Filing-office Rule”; “Financing Statement”; “Fixture Filing”; “Manufactured-Home Transaction”; “New Debtor”; “Original Debtor”; “Public-Finance Transaction”; “Termination Statement”; “Transmitting Utility.”
8. Filing-Related Definitions: “Continuation Statement”; “File Number”; “Filing Office”; “Filing-office Rule”; “Financing Statement”; “Fixture Filing”; “Manufactured-Home Transaction”; “New Debtor”; “Original Debtor”; “Public-Finance Transaction”; “Termination Statement”; “Transmitting Utility.” These definitions are used exclusively or primarily in the filing-related provisions in Part 5. Most are self-explanatory and are discussed in the Comments to Part 5. A financing statement filed in a manufactured-home transaction or a public-finance transaction may remain effective for 30 years instead of the 5 years applicable to other financing statements. See Section 9-515(b). The definitions relating to medium neutrality also are significant for the filing provisions. See Comment 9.
Definitions Relating to Medium Neutrality.
“Record.”
- a. “Record.” In many, but not all, instances, the term “record” replaces the term “writing” and “written.” A “record” includes information that is in intangible form (e.g., electronically stored) as well as tangible form (e.g., written on paper). Given the rapid development and commercial adoption of modern communication and storage technologies, requirements that documents or communications be “written,” “in writing,” or otherwise in tangible form do not necessarily reflect or aid commercial practices.
A “record” need not be permanent or indestructible, but the term does not include any oral or other communication that is not stored or preserved by any means. The information must be stored on paper or in some other medium. Information that has not been retained other than through human memory does not qualify as a record. Examples of current technologies commercially used to communicate or store information include, but are not limited to, magnetic media, optical discs, digital voice messaging systems, electronic mail, audio tapes, and photographic media, as well as paper. “Record” is an inclusive term that includes all of these methods of storing or communicating information. Any “writing” is a record. A record may be authenticated. See Comment 9.b. A record may be created without the knowledge or intent of a particular person.
Like the terms “written” or “in writing,” the term “record” does not establish the purposes, permitted uses, or legal effect that a record may have under any particular provision of law. Whatever is filed in the Article 9 filing system, including financing statements, continuation statements, and termination statements, whether transmitted in tangible or intangible form, would fall within the definition. However, in some instances, statutes or filing-office rules may require that a paper record be filed. In such cases, even if this Article permits the filing of an electronic record, compliance with those statutes or rules is necessary. Similarly, a filer must comply with a statute or rule that requires a particular type of encoding or formatting for an electronic record.
This Article sometimes uses the terms “for record,” “of record,” “record or legal title,” and “record owner.” Some of these are terms traditionally used in real-property law. The definition of “record” in this Article now explicitly excepts these usages from the defined term. Also, this Article refers to a record that is filed or recorded in real-property recording systems to record a mortgage as a “record of a mortgage.” This usage recognizes that the defined term “mortgage” means an interest in real property; it does not mean the record that evidences, or is filed or recorded with respect to, the mortgage.
“Authenticate”; “Communicate”; “Send.”
b. “Authenticate”; “Communicate”; “Send.” The terms “authenticate” and “authenticated” generally replace “sign” and “signed.” “Authenticated” replaces and broadens the definition of “signed,” in Section 1-201, to encompass authentication of all records, not just writings. (References to authentication of, e.g., an agreement, demand, or notification mean, of course, authentication of a record containing an agreement, demand, or notification.) The terms “communicate” and “send” also contemplate the possibility of communication by nonwritten media. These definitions include the act of transmitting both tangible and intangible records. The definition of “send” replaces, for purposes of this Article, the corresponding term in Section 1-201. The reference to “usual means of communication” in that definition contemplates an inquiry into the appropriateness of the method of transmission used in the particular circumstances involved.
Scope-Related Definitions.
Expanded Scope of Article: “Agricultural Lien”; “Consignment”; “Payment Intangible”; “Promissory Note.”
a. Expanded Scope of Article: “Agricultural Lien”; “Consignment”; “Payment Intangible”; “Promissory Note.” These new definitions reflect the expanded scope of Article 9, as provided in Section 9-109(a).
Reduced Scope of Exclusions: “Governmental Unit”; “Health-Care-Insurance Receivable”; “Commercial Tort Claims.”
b. Reduced Scope of Exclusions: “Governmental Unit”; “Health-Care-Insurance Receivable”; “Commercial Tort Claims.” These new definitions reflect the reduced scope of the exclusions, provided in Section 9-109(c) and (d), of transfers by governmental debtors and assignments of interests in insurance policies and commercial tort claims.
Choice-of-Law-Related Definitions: “Certificate of Title”; “Governmental Unit”; “Jurisdiction of Organization”; “Public Organic Record”; “Registered Organization”; “State.”
Statutes often require applicants for a certificate of title to identify all security interests on the application and require the issuing agency to indicate the identified security interests on the certificate. Some of these statutes provide that priority over the rights of a lien creditor (i.e., perfection of a security interest) in goods covered by the certificate occurs upon indication of the security interest on the certificate; that is, they provide for the indication of the security interest on the certificate as a “condition” of perfection. Other statutes contemplate that perfection is achieved upon the occurrence of another act, e.g., delivery of the application to the issuing agency, that “results” in the indication of the security interest on the certificate. A certificate governed by either type of statute can qualify as a “certificate of title” under this Article. The statute providing for the indication of a security interest need not expressly state the connection between the indication and perfection. For example, a certificate issued pursuant to a statute that requires applicants to identify security interests, requires the issuing agency to indicate the identified security interests on the certificate, but is silent concerning the legal consequences of the indication would be a “certificate of title” if, under a judicial interpretation of the statute, perfection of a security interest is a legal consequence of the indication. Likewise, a certificate would be a “certificate of title” if another statute provides, expressly or as interpreted, the requisite connection between the indication and perfection.
The first sentence of the definition of “certificate of title” includes certificates consisting of tangible records, of electronic records, and of combinations of tangible and electronic records.
In many States, a certificate of title covering goods that are encumbered by a security interest is delivered to the secured party by the issuing authority. To eliminate the need for the issuance of a paper certificate under these circumstances, several States have revised their certificate-of-title statutes to permit or require a State agency to maintain an electronic record that evidences ownership of the goods and in which a security interest in the goods may be noted. The second sentence of the definition provides that such a record is a “certificate of title” if it is in fact maintained as an alternative to the issuance of a paper certificate of title, regardless of whether the certificate-of-title statute provides that the record is a certificate of title and even if the statute does not expressly state that the record is maintained instead of issuing a paper certificate.
Not every organization that may provide information about itself in the public records is a “registered organization.” For example, a general partnership is not a “registered organization,” even if it files a statement of partnership authority under Section 303 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1994) or an assumed name (“dba”) certificate. This is because such a partnership is not formed or organized by the filing of a record with, or the issuance of a record by, a State or the United States. In contrast, corporations, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships ordinarily are “registered organizations.” Not every record concerning a registered organization that is filed with, or issued by, a State or the United States is a “public organic record.” For example, a certificate of good standing issued with respect to a corporation or a published index of domestic corporations would not be a “public organic record” because its issuance or publication does not form or organize the corporations named.
When collateral is held in a trust, one must look to non-UCC law to determine whether the trust is a “registered organization.” Non-UCC law typically distinguishes between statutory trusts and common-law trusts. A statutory trust is formed by the filing of a record, commonly referred to as a certificate of trust, in a public office pursuant to a statute. See, e.g., Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act § 201 (2009); Delaware Statutory Trust Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3801 et seq. A statutory trust is a juridical entity, separate from its trustee and beneficial owners, that may sue and be sued, own property, and transact business in its own name. Inasmuch as a statutory trust is a “legal or commercial entity,” it qualifies as a “person other than an individual,” and therefore as an “organization,” under Section 1-201. A statutory trust that is formed by the filing of a record in a public office is a “registered organization,” and the filed record is a “public organic record” of the statutory trust, if the filed record is available to the public for inspection. (The requirement that a record be “available to the public for inspection” is satisfied if a copy of the relevant record is available for public inspection.)
Unlike a statutory trust, a common-law trust-whether its purpose is donative or commercial — arises from private action without the filing of a record in a public office. See Uniform Trust Code § 401 (2000); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10 (2003). Moreover, under traditional law, a common-law trust is not itself a juridical entity and therefore must sue and be sued, own property, and transact business in the name of the trustee acting in the capacity of trustee. A common-law trust that is a “business trust,” i.e., that has a business or commercial purpose, is an “organization” under Section 1-201. However, such a trust would not be a “registered organization” if, as is typically the case, the filing of a public record is not needed to form it.
In some states, however, the trustee of a common-law trust that has a commercial or business purpose is required by statute to file a record in a public office following the trust’s formation. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 182, § 2; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 609.02. A business trust that is required to file its organic record in a public office is a “registered organization” under the second sentence of the definition if the filed record is available to the public for inspection. Any organic record required to be filed, and filed, with respect to a common-law business trust after the trust is formed is a “public organic record” of the trust. Some statutes require a trust or other organization to file, after formation or organization, a record other than an organic record. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen Assn’s Law § 18 (requiring associations doing business within New York to file a certificate designating the secretary of state as an agent upon whom process may be served). This requirement does not render the organization a “registered organization” under the second sentence of the definition, and the record is not a “public organic record.”
Deposit-Account-Related Definitions: “Deposit Account”; “Bank.”
12. Deposit-Account-Related Definitions: “Deposit Account”; “Bank.” The revised definition of “deposit account” incorporates the definition of “bank,” which is new. The definition derives from the definitions of “bank” in Sections 4-105(1) and 4A-105(a)(2), which focus on whether the organization is “engaged in the business of banking.”
Deposit accounts evidenced by Article 9 “instruments” are excluded from the term “deposit account.” In contrast, former Section 9-105 excluded from the former definition “an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit.” The revised definition clarifies the proper treatment of nonnegotiable or uncertificated certificates of deposit. Under the definition, an uncertificated certificate of deposit would be a deposit account (assuming there is no writing evidencing the bank’s obligation to pay) whereas a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit would be a deposit account only if it is not an “instrument” as defined in this section (a question that turns on whether the nonnegotiable certificate of deposit is “of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.”) A deposit account evidenced by an instrument is subject to the rules applicable to instruments generally. As a consequence, a security interest in such an instrument cannot be perfected by “control” (see Section 9-104), and the special priority rules applicable to deposit accounts (see Sections 9-327 and 9-340) do not apply.
The term “deposit account” does not include “investment property,” such as securities and security entitlements. Thus, the term also does not include shares in a money-market mutual fund, even if the shares are redeemable by check.
Proceeds-Related Definitions: “Cash Proceeds”; “Noncash Proceeds”; “Proceeds.”
Distributions on Account of Collateral.
a. Distributions on Account of Collateral. The phrase “whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral,” in subparagraph (B), is broad enough to cover cash or stock dividends distributed on account of securities or other investment property that is original collateral. Compare former Section 9-306 (“Any payments or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are proceeds.”). This section rejects the holding of Hastie v. FDIC, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (postpetition cash dividends on stock subject to a prepetition pledge are not “proceeds” under Bankruptcy Code Section 552(b)), to the extent the holding relies on the Article 9 definition of “proceeds.”
Distributions on Account of Supporting Obligations.
b. Distributions on Account of Supporting Obligations. Under subparagraph (B), collections on and distributions on account of collateral consisting of various credit-support arrangements (“supporting obligations,” as defined in Section 9-102) also are proceeds. Consequently, they are afforded treatment identical to proceeds collected from or distributed by the obligor on the underlying (supported) right to payment or other collateral. Proceeds of supporting obligations also are proceeds of the underlying rights to payment or other collateral.
Proceeds of Proceeds.
Proceeds Received by Person Who Did Not Create Security Interest.
d. Proceeds Received by Person Who Did Not Create Security Interest. When collateral is sold subject to a security interest and the buyer then resells the collateral, a question arose under former Article 9 concerning whether the “debtor” had “received” what the buyer received on resale and, therefore, whether those receipts were “proceeds” under former Section 9-306(2). This Article contains no requirement that property be “received” by the debtor for the property to qualify as proceeds. It is necessary only that the property be traceable, directly or indirectly, to the original collateral.
Cash Proceeds and Noncash Proceeds.
Consignment-Related Definitions: “Consignee”; “Consignment”; “Consignor.”
14. Consignment-Related Definitions: “Consignee”; “Consignment”; “Consignor.” The definition of “consignment” excludes, in subparagraphs (B) and (C), transactions for which filing would be inappropriate or of insufficient benefit to justify the costs. A consignment excluded from the application of this Article by one of those subparagraphs may still be a true consignment; however, it is governed by non-Article 9 law. The definition also excludes, in subparagraph (D), what have been called “consignments intended for security.” These “consignments” are not bailments but secured transactions. Accordingly, all of Article 9 applies to them. See Sections 1-201(b)(35), 9-109(a)(1). The “consignor” is the person who delivers goods to the “consignee” in a consignment. The definition of “consignment” requires that the goods be delivered “to a merchant for the purpose of sale.” If the goods are delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or processing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless because a purpose of the delivery is “sale.” On the other hand, if a merchant-processor-bailee will not be selling the goods itself but will be delivering to buyers to which the owner-bailor agreed to sell the goods, the transaction would not be a consignment.
“Accounting.”
“Document.”
16. “Document.” The definition of “document” incorporates both tangible and electronic documents of title. See Section 1-201(b)(16) and Comment 16.
“Encumbrance”; “Mortgage.”
“Fixtures.”
18. “Fixtures.” This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9-313. See Section 9-334 (priority of security interests in fixtures and crops).
“Good Faith.”
19. “Good Faith.” This Article expands the definition of “good faith” to include “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The definition in this section applies when the term is used in this Article, and the same concept applies in the context of this Article for purposes of the obligation of good faith imposed by Section 1-203. See subsection (c).
“Lien Creditor”
“New Value.”
21. “New Value.” This Article deletes former Section 9-108. Its broad formulation of new value, which embraced the taking of after-acquired collateral for a pre-existing claim, was unnecessary, counterintuitive, and ineffective for its original purpose of sheltering after-acquired collateral from attack as a voidable preference in bankruptcy. The new definition derives from Bankruptcy Code Section 547(a). The term is used with respect to temporary perfection of security interests in instruments, certificated securities, or negotiable documents under Section 9-312(e) and with respect to chattel paper priority in Section 9-330.
“Person Related To.”
22. “Person Related To.” Section 9-615 provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus when “the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor” acquires the collateral at a foreclosure disposition. Separate definitions of the term are provided with respect to an individual secured party and with respect to a secured party that is an organization. The definitions are patterned on the corresponding definition in Section 1.301(32) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974).
“Proposal.”
“Software.”
Terminology: “Assignment” and “Transfer.”
26. Terminology: “Assignment” and “Transfer.” In numerous provisions, this Article refers to the “assignment” or the “transfer” of property interests. These terms and their derivatives are not defined. This Article generally follows common usage by using the terms “assignment” and “assign” to refer to transfers of rights to payment, claims, and liens and other security interests. It generally uses the term “transfer” to refer to other transfers of interests in property. Except when used in connection with a letter-of-credit transaction (see Section 9-107, Comment 4), no significance should be placed on the use of one term or the other. Depending on the context, each term may refer to the assignment or transfer of an outright ownership interest or to the assignment or transfer of a limited interest, such as a security interest.
§ 28-9-103. Purchase-money security interest — Application of payments — Burden of establishing.
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In this section:
- “Purchase-money collateral” means goods or software that secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral; and
- “Purchase-money obligation” means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.
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A security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest:
- To the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest;
- If the security interest is in inventory that is or was purchase-money collateral, also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to other inventory in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest; and
- Also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to software in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest.
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A security interest in software is a purchase-money security interest to the extent that the security interest also secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to goods in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest if:
- The debtor acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in which it acquired an interest in the goods; and
- The debtor acquired its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods.
- The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment is a purchase-money security interest in inventory.
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If the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money security interest depends on the application of a payment to a particular obligation, the payment must be applied:
- In accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties agree;
- In the absence of the parties’ agreement to a reasonable method, in accordance with any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment; or
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In the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely manifestation of the obligor’s intention, in the following order:
- to obligations that are not secured; and
- if more than one (1) obligation is secured, to obligations secured by purchase-money security interests in the order in which those obligations were incurred.
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A purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
- The purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation;
- Collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money obligation; or
- The purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated or restructured.
- A secured party claiming a purchase-money security interest has the burden of establishing the extent to which the security interest is a purchase-money security interest. History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-103, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-103, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-103, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 6, p. 781; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 45, p. 329; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 3, p. 873; am. 1996, ch. 7, § 5, p. 9,. was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
In the adoption of this section, Idaho differed from the varied application of this section to consumer-goods and other than consumer-goods transactions in the uniform code.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Commingling of Debt.
Where debtor purchased household furnishings and electronic equipment under a series of four agreements, since the third agreement constituted a novation of second agreement, debt was not incurred for the purpose of purchasing the collateral to the second agreement and creditor did not have a purchase money security interest (PMSI) in that collateral; however the fourth agreement did not constitute a novation of the third agreement, and so creditor retained a PMSI in the property purchased under the third agreement and also retained a PMSI in the property purchased under the fourth agreement; the commingling of the PMSI debt with non-PMSI debt in the third and fourth agreements did not transform the PMSI to a nonpurchase-money security interest; therefore, the debtors are entitled to avoid the liens against the property purchased by the second agreement but may not avoid the liens against property purchased under the third or fourth agreements. In re Butler, 160 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
Money Borrowed to Pay Existing Loan.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Where, because a bank advanced $12,346 for debtor to pay the first installment of loan made by a third party and secured by certain cows purchased by debtor with the proceeds of the original loan, and where it contends that it acquired the status of a lender with a purchase money security interest, at least in the amount of this advancement, although the money advanced by bank was not used by the debtor to acquire any rights in the cows or the use of them because he already had all the possible rights in the cows he could have, nevertheless, since the bank’s general security interest was perfected earlier in time than was that of the third party, accordingly, the third party could not prevail unless (1) he had the super priority of a purchase money security interest, and this would require that he had filed under existing law so as to perfect his purchase money security interest, (2) the bank subordinated its security interest to third party’s security interest, or (3) the bank was estopped to assert a prior security interest. Valley Bank v. Estate of Rainsdon, 117 Idaho 1085, 793 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1990). RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Official Comment
Source.
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. Under Section 9-309(1), a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods is perfected when it attaches. Sections 9-317 and 9-324 provide special priority rules for purchase-money security interests in a variety of contexts. This section explains when a security interest enjoys purchase-money status.
“Purchase-Money Collateral”; “Purchase-Money Obligation”; “Purchase-Money Security Interest.”
3. “Purchase-Money Collateral”; “Purchase-Money Obligation”; “Purchase-Money Security Interest.” Subsection (a) defines “purchase-money collateral” and “purchase-money obligation.” These terms are essential to the description of what constitutes a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b). As used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of “purchase-money obligation,” the “price” of collateral or the “value given to enable” includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and enforcement, attorney’s fees, and other similar obligations.
The concept of “purchase-money security interest” requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a security interest does not qualify as a purchase-money security interest if a debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security interest to secure the purchase price.
Cross-Collateralization of Purchase-Money Security Interests in Inventory.
4. Cross-Collateralization of Purchase-Money Security Interests in Inventory. Subsection (b)(2) deals with the problem of cross-collateralized purchase-money security interests in inventory. Consider a simple example:
Example:
Example: Seller (S) sells an item of inventory (Item-1) to Debtor (D), retaining a security interest in Item-1 to secure Item-1’s price and all other obligations, existing and future, of D to S. S then sells another item of inventory to D (Item-2), again retaining a security interest in Item-2 to secure Item-2’s price as well as all other obligations of D to S. D then pays to S Item-1’s price. D then sells Item-2 to a buyer in ordinary course of business, who takes Item-2 free of S’s security interest.
Purchase-Money Security Interests in Goods and Software.
Under subsection (b)(2), S’s security interest in Item-1 securing Item-2’s unpaid price would be a purchase-money security interest. This is so because S has a purchase-money security interest in Item-1, Item-1 secures the price of (a “purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to”) Item-2 (“other inventory”), and Item-2 itself was subject to a purchase-money security interest. Note that, to the extent Item-1 secures the price of Item-2, S’s security interest in Item-1 would not be a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b)(1). The security interest in Item-1 is a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b)(1) only to the extent that Item-1 is “purchase-money collateral,” i.e., only to the extent that Item-1 “secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral” (i.e., Item-1). See subsection (a)(1). 5. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Goods and Software. Subsections (b) and (c) limit purchase-money security interests to security interests in goods, including fixtures, and software. Otherwise, no change in meaning from former Section 9-107 is intended. The second sentence of former Section 9-115(5)(f) made the purchase-money priority rule (former Section 9-312(4)) inapplicable to investment property. This section’s limitation makes that provision unnecessary.
Subsection (c) describes the limited circumstances under which a security interest in goods may be accompanied by a purchase-money security interest in software. The software must be acquired by the debtor in a transaction integrated with the transaction in which the debtor acquired the goods, and the debtor must acquire the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods. “Software” is defined in Section 9-102.
Consignments.
6. Consignments. Under former Section 9-114, the priority of the consignor’s interest is similar to that of a purchase-money security interest. Subsection (d) achieves this result more directly, by defining the interest of a “consignor,” defined in Section 9-102, to be a purchase-money security interest in inventory for purposes of this Article. This drafting convention obviates any need to set forth special priority rules applicable to the interest of a consignor. Rather, the priority of the consignor’s interest as against the rights of lien creditors of the consignee, competing secured parties, and purchasers of the goods from the consignee can be determined by reference to the priority rules generally applicable to inventory, such as Sections 9-317, 9-320, 9-322, and 9-324. For other purposes, including the rights and duties of the consignor and consignee as between themselves, the consignor would remain the owner of goods under a bailment arrangement with the consignee. See Section 9-319.
Provisions Applicable Only to Non-Consumer-Goods Transactions.
“Dual-Status” Rule.
a. “Dual-Status” Rule. For transactions other than consumer-goods transactions, this Article approves what some cases have called the “dual-status” rule, under which a security interest may be a purchase-money security interest to some extent and a non-purchase-money security interest to some extent. (Concerning consumer-goods transactions, see subsection (h) and Comment 8.) Some courts have found this rule to be explicit or implicit in the words “to the extent,” found in former Section 9-107 and continued in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2). The rule is made explicit in subsection (e). For non-consumer-goods transactions, this Article rejects the “transformation” rule adopted by some cases, under which any cross-collateralization, refinancing, or the like destroys the purchase-money status entirely.
Consider, for example, what happens when a $10,000 loan secured by a purchase-money security interest is refinanced by the original lender, and, as part of the transaction, the debtor borrows an additional $2,000 secured by the collateral. Subsection (f) resolves any doubt that the security interest remains a purchase-money security interest. Under subsection (b), however, it enjoys purchase-money status only to the extent of $10,000.
Allocation of Payments.
b. Allocation of Payments. Continuing with the example, if the debtor makes a $1,000 payment on the $12,000 obligation, then one must determine the extent to which the security interest remains a purchase-money security interest—$9,000 or $10,000. Subsection (e)(1) expresses the overriding principle, applicable in cases other than consumer-goods transactions, for determining the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money security interest under these circumstances: freedom of contract, as limited by principle of reasonableness. An unconscionable method of application, for example, is not a reasonable one and so would not be given effect under subsection (e)(1). In the absence of agreement, subsection (e)(2) permits the obligor to determine how payments should be allocated. If the obligor fails to manifest its intention, obligations that are not secured will be paid first. (As used in this Article, the concept of “obligations that are not secured” means obligations for which the debtor has not created a security interest. This concept is different from and should not be confused with the concept of an “unsecured claim” as it appears in Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a).) The obligor may prefer this approach, because unsecured debt is likely to carry a higher interest rate than secured debt. A creditor who would prefer to be secured rather than unsecured also would prefer this approach. After the unsecured debt is paid, payments are to be applied first toward the obligations secured by purchase-money security interests. In the event that there is more than one such obligation, payments first received are to be applied to obligations first incurred. See subsection (e)(3). Once these obligations are paid, there are no purchase-money security interests and no additional allocation rules are needed.
Subsection (f) buttresses the dual-status rule by making it clear that (in a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction) cross-collateralization and renewals, refinancings, and restructurings do not cause a purchase-money security interest to lose its status as such. The statutory terms “renewed,” “refinanced,” and “restructured” are not defined. Whether the terms encompass a particular transaction depends upon whether, under the particular facts, the purchase-money character of the security interest fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that an identifiable portion of the purchase-money obligation could be traced to the new obligation resulting from a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring.
Burden of Proof.
c. Burden of Proof. As is the case when the extent of a security interest is in issue, under subsection (g) the secured party claiming a purchase-money security interest in a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction has the burden of establishing whether the security interest retains its purchase-money status. This is so whether the determination is to be made following a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring or otherwise.
Consumer-Goods Transactions; Characterization Under Other Law.
8. Consumer-Goods Transactions; Characterization Under Other Law. Under subsection (h), the limitation of subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than consumer-goods transactions leaves to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. Subsection (h) also instructs the court not to draw any inference from this limitation as to the proper rules for consumer-goods transactions and leaves the court free to continue to apply established approaches to those transactions.
This section addresses only whether a security interest is a “purchase-money security interest” under this Article, primarily for purposes of perfection and priority. See, e.g., Sections 9-317, 9-324. In particular, its adoption of the dual-status rule, allocation of payments rules, and burden of proof standards for non-consumer-goods transactions is not intended to affect or influence characterizations under other statutes. Whether a security interest is a “purchase-money security interest” under other law is determined by that law. For example, decisions under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dual-status and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law definition of “purchase-money security interest.” Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.
§ 28-9-104. Control of deposit account.
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A secured party has control of a deposit account if:
- The secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained;
- The debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the deposit account without further consent by the debtor; or
- The secured party becomes the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account.
- A secured party that has satisfied subsection (a) of this section has control, even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-104, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-104, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-104, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 7, p. 781; am. 1996, ch. 7, § 6, p. 9; am. 1996, ch. 178, § 1, p. 567, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Official Comment
Source.
Why “Control” Matters.
2. Why “Control” Matters. This section explains the concept of “control” of a deposit account. “Control” under this section may serve two functions. First, “control . . . pursuant to the debtor’s agreement” may substitute for an authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment. See Section 9-203(b)(3)(D). Second, when a deposit account is taken as original collateral, the only method of perfection is obtaining control under this section. See Section 9-312(b)(1).
Requirements for “Control.”
3. Requirements for “Control.” This section derives from Section 8-106 of Revised Article 8, which defines “control” of securities and certain other investment property. Under subsection (a)(1), the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has control. The effect of this provision is to afford the bank automatic perfection. No other form of public notice is necessary; all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor’s deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit account.
Example:
Example: D maintains a deposit account with Bank A. To secure a loan from Banks X, Y, and Z, D creates a security interest in the deposit account in favor of Bank A, as agent for Banks X, Y, and Z. Because Bank A is a “secured party” as defined in Section 9-102, the security interest is perfected by control under subsection (a)(1).
Under subsection (a)(2), a secured party may obtain control by obtaining the bank’s authenticated agreement that it will comply with the secured party’s instructions without further consent by the debtor. The analogous provision in Section 8-106 does not require that the agreement be authenticated. An agreement to comply with the secured party’s instructions suffices for “control” of a deposit account under this section even if the bank’s agreement is subject to specified conditions, e.g., that the secured party’s instructions are accompanied by a certification that the debtor is in default. (Of course, if the condition is the debtor’s further consent, the statute explicitly provides that the agreement would not confer control.) See revised Section 8-106, Comment 7.
Under subsection (a)(3), a secured party may obtain control by becoming the bank’s “customer,” as defined in Section 4-104. As the customer, the secured party would enjoy the right (but not necessarily the exclusive right) to withdraw funds from, or close, the deposit account. See Sections 4-401(a), 4-403(a).
As is the case with possession under Section 9-313, in determining whether a particular person has control under subsection (a), the principles of agency apply. See Section 1-103 and Restatement (3d), Agency § 8.12, Comment b .
Although the arrangements giving rise to control may themselves prevent, or may enable the secured party at its discretion to prevent, the debtor from reaching the funds on deposit, subsection (b) makes clear that the debtor’s ability to reach the funds is not inconsistent with “control.”
Perfection by control is not available for bank accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which by definition are “instruments” and not “deposit accounts.” See Section 9-102 (defining “deposit account” and “instrument”).
§ 28-9-105. Control of electronic chattel paper.
- A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the chattel paper reliably establishes the secured party as the person to which the chattel paper was assigned.
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A system satisfies subsection (a) of this section, and a secured party has control of electronic chattel paper, if the record or records comprising the chattel paper are created, stored and assigned in such a manner that:
- A single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is unique, identifiable and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) of this subsection, unalterable;
- The authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee of the record or records;
- The authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the secured party or its designated custodian;
- Copies or amendments that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the secured party;
- Each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
- Any amendment of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized or unauthorized.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-105, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 2, p. 381.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-105, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-105, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 8, p. 781; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 46, p. 329; am. 1990, ch. 205, § 1, p. 457; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 4, p. 873; am. 1996, ch. 7, § 7, p. 9; am. 1996, ch. 178, § 2, p. 567, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, added subsection (a), designated the existing provisions of the section as subsection (b); added “A system satisfies subsection (a) of this section” at the beginning of the introduction paragraph in subsection (b); substituted “consent” for “participation” near the end of paragraph (b)(4); and made stylistic changes throughout.
Effective Dates.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
Official Comment
Source.
“Control” of Electronic Chattel Paper.
2. “Control” of Electronic Chattel Paper. This Article covers security interests in “electronic chattel paper,” a new term defined in Section 9-102. This section governs how “control” of electronic chattel paper may be obtained. Subsection (a), which derives from Section 16 of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, sets forth the general test for control. Subsection (b) sets forth a safe harbor test that, if satisfied, establishes control under the general test in subsection (a).
A secured party’s control of electronic chattel paper (i) may substitute for an authenticated security agreement for purposes of attachment under Section 9-203, (ii) is a method of perfection under Section 9-314, and (iii) is a condition for obtaining special, non-temporal priority under Section 9-330. Because electronic chattel paper cannot be transferred, assigned, or possessed in the same manner as tangible chattel paper, a special definition of control is necessary. In descriptive terms, this section provides that control of electronic chattel paper is the functional equivalent of possession of “tangible chattel paper” (a term also defined in Section 9-102).
Development of Control Systems.
3. Development of Control Systems. This Article leaves to the marketplace the development of systems and procedures, through a combination of suitable technologies and business practices, for dealing with control of electronic chattel paper in a commercial context. Systems that evolve for control of electronic chattel paper may or may not involve a third party custodian of the relevant records. As under UETA, a system must be shown to reliably establish that the secured party is the assignee of the chattel paper. Reliability is a high standard and encompasses the general principles of uniqueness, identifiability, and unalterability found in subsection (b) without setting forth specific guidelines as to how these principles must be achieved. However, the standards applied to determine whether a party is in control of electronic chattel paper should not be more stringent than the standards now applied to determine whether a party is in possession of tangible chattel paper. For example, just as a secured party does not lose possession of tangible chattel paper merely by virtue of the possibility that a person acting on its behalf could wrongfully redeliver the chattel paper to the debtor, so control of electronic chattel paper would not be defeated by the possibility that the secured party’s interest could be subverted by the wrongful conduct of a person (such as a custodian) acting on its behalf.
This section and the concept of control of electronic chattel paper are not based on the same concepts as are control of deposit accounts (Section 9-104), security entitlements, a type of investment property (Section 9-106), and letter-of-credit rights (Section 9-107). The rules for control of those types of collateral are based on existing market practices and legal and regulatory regimes for institutions such as banks and securities intermediaries. Analogous practices for electronic chattel paper are developing nonetheless. The flexible approach adopted by this section, moreover, should not impede the development of these practices and, eventually, legal and regulatory regimes, which may become analogous to those for, e.g., investment property.
“Authoritative Copy” of Electronic Chattel Paper.
4. “Authoritative Copy” of Electronic Chattel Paper. One requirement for establishing control under subsection (b) is that a particular copy be an “authoritative copy.” Although other copies may exist, they must be distinguished from the authoritative copy. This may be achieved, for example, through the methods of authentication that are used or by business practices involving the marking of any additional copies. When tangible chattel paper is converted to electronic chattel paper, in order to establish that a copy of the electronic chattel paper is the authoritative copy it may be necessary to show that the tangible chattel paper no longer exists or has been permanently marked to indicate that it is not the authoritative copy.
§ 28-9-106. Control of investment property.
- A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security entitlement as provided in section 28-8-106[, Idaho Code].
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A secured party has control of a commodity contract if:
- The secured party is the commodity intermediary with which the commodity contract is carried; or
- The commodity customer, secured party and commodity intermediary have agreed that the commodity intermediary will apply any value distributed on account of the commodity contract as directed by the secured party without further consent by the commodity customer.
- A secured party having control of all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in a securities account or commodity account has control over the securities account or commodity account.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-106, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-106, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-106, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 9, p. 781; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 5, p. 873; am. 1996, ch. 7, § 8, p. 9, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion at the end of subsection (a) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-115(e).
“Control” Under Article 8.
“Control” of Commodity Contracts.
3. “Control” of Commodity Contracts. This section, as did former Section 9-115(1)(e), contains provisions relating to control of commodity contracts which are analogous to those in Section 8-106 for other types of investment property.
Securities Accounts and Commodity Accounts.
4. Securities Accounts and Commodity Accounts. For drafting convenience, control with respect to a securities account or commodity account is defined in terms of obtaining control over the security entitlements or commodity contracts. Of course, an agreement that provides that (without further consent of the debtor) the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary will honor instructions from the secured party concerning a securities account or commodity account described as such is sufficient. Such an agreement necessarily implies that the intermediary will honor instructions concerning all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the account and thus affords the secured party control of all the security entitlements or commodity contracts.
§ 28-9-107. Control of letter of credit right.
A secured party has control of a letter of credit right to the extent of any right to payment or performance by the issuer or any nominated person if the issuer or nominated person has consented to an assignment of proceeds of the letter of credit under section 28-5-114(3)[, Idaho Code,] or otherwise applicable law or practice.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-107, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-107, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-107, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in this section was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Official Comment
Source.
“Control” of Letter-of-Credit Right.
“Proceeds of a Letter of Credit.”
3. “Proceeds of a Letter of Credit.” Section 5-114 follows traditional banking terminology by referring to a letter of credit beneficiary’s assignment of its right to receive payment thereunder as an assignment of the “proceeds of a letter of credit.” However, as the seller of goods can assign its right to receive payment (an “account”) before it has been earned by delivering the goods to the buyer, so the beneficiary of a letter of credit can assign its contingent right to payment before the letter of credit has been honored. See Section 5-114(b). If the assignment creates a security interest, the security interest can be perfected at the time it is created. An assignment of, including the creation of a security interest in, a letter-of-credit right is an assignment of a present interest. 4. “Transfer” vs. “Assignment.” Letter-of-credit law and practice distinguish the “transfer” of a letter of credit from an “assignment.” Under a transfer, the transferee itself becomes the beneficiary and acquires the right to draw. Whether a new, substitute credit is issued or the issuer advises the transferee of its status as such, the transfer constitutes a novation under which the transferee is the new, substituted beneficiary (but only to the extent of the transfer, in the case of a partial transfer).
Section 5-114(e) provides that the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the beneficiary’s assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the assignee’s right to the proceeds. For this reason, transfer does not appear in this Article as a means of control or perfection. Section 9-109(c)(4) recognizes the independent and superior rights of a transferee beneficiary under Section 5-114(e); this Article does not apply to the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person to the extent that those rights are independent and superior under Section 5-114.
Supporting Obligation: Automatic Attachment and Perfection.
§ 28-9-108. Sufficiency of description.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c), (d) and (e) of this section, a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, a description of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral by:
- Specific listing;
- Category;
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a type of collateral defined in the uniform commercial code;
- Quantity;
- Computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
- A description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a description of a security entitlement, securities account or commodity account is sufficient if it describes:
- The collateral by those terms or as investment property; or
- The underlying financial asset or commodity contract.
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A description only by type of collateral defined in the uniform commercial code is an insufficient description of:
- A commercial tort claim; or
- In a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account or a commodity account.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-108, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-108, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-108, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
CASE NOTES
Cited
Attorney’s security interest in the promissory note automatically attached to any proceeds of the note, including any rights arising out of the note. The security agreement did not limit the types of proceeds to which the attorney’s security interest would attach, because the attorney identified specific proceeds in the security agreement, including any judgments arising out of a collection action; and a party who seeks to limit the type of statutory proceeds to which its security interest attaches must state an intent to limit proceeds in the security agreement. Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 118 P.3d 136 (2005). Cited Fin. Fed. Credit Inc. v. Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc. (In re Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc.), 436 B.R. 582 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010).
Decisions Under Prior Law
Description.
Mortgaged property was sufficiently described if a stranger to the instrument may be able to locate and identify the same by inquiries suggested by the instrument itself. McConnell v. Langdon, 3 Idaho 157, 28 P. 403 (1891).
Chattel mortgage describing property as “1333 early spring lambs, branded O—” was sufficient as between parties to mortgage. Hare v. Young, 26 Idaho 691, 146 P. 107 (1915).
Where a chattel mortgage purported to cover crops grown upon certain described lands, and then provided “also all hay grown or now growing or to be grown, on all land owned, leased or controlled by mortgagor,” this was sufficient to embrace crops grown on other land in the same county by the mortgagor, although the land was not described. Livestock Credit Corp. v. Corbett, 53 Idaho 190, 22 P.2d 874 (1933).
No security interest attached where security agreement did not describe land upon which crops were growing or were to be grown and the financing statement did not contain language granting a security interest. Kelley Bean Co. v. Victor, 122 Idaho 395, 834 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1992).
Liberal Construction.
The policy of the code with regard to this section is quite liberal. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
Proceeds Under Contract.
Where assignment described the collateral as “all moneys now due or to become due under certain grain contracts held in your warehouse,” such description minimally met the requirements of this section as to any grain contracts existing between assignor and grain concern at the time grain concern received notice of the assignment, but did not reasonably identify contracts subsequently entered into by the two parties. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
The designation of the county alone is a reasonable and legally sufficient description of the real estate on which farm products are grown or located, for the purpose of perfecting a security interest in farm products by filing a farm products financing statement. OAG 86-17. Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-110, 9-115(3).
General Rules.
2. General Rules. Subsection (a) retains substantially the same formulation as former Section 9-110. Subsection (b) expands upon subsection (a) by indicating a variety of ways in which a description might reasonably identify collateral. Whereas a provision similar to subsection (b) was applicable only to investment property under former Section 9-115(3), subsection (b) applies to all types of collateral, subject to the limitation in subsection (d). Subsection (b) is subject to subsection (c), which follows prevailing case law and adopts the view that an “all assets” or “all personal property” description for purposes of a security agreement is not sufficient. Note, however, that under Section 9-504, a financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it “covers all assets or all personal property.”
The purpose of requiring a description of collateral in a security agreement under Section 9-203 is evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a description under this section, as under former Section 9-110, is that the description do the job assigned to it: make possible the identification of the collateral described. This section rejects any requirement that a description is insufficient unless it is exact and detailed (the so-called “serial number” test).
After-Acquired Collateral.
3. After-Acquired Collateral. Much litigation has arisen over whether a description in a security agreement is sufficient to include after-acquired collateral if the agreement does not explicitly so provide. This question is one of contract interpretation and is not susceptible to a statutory rule (other than a rule to the effect that it is a question of contract interpretation). Accordingly, this section contains no reference to descriptions of after-acquired collateral.
Investment Property.
4. Investment Property. Under subsection (d), the use of the wrong Article 8 terminology does not render a description invalid (e.g., a security agreement intended to cover a debtor’s “security entitlements” is sufficient if it refers to the debtor’s “securities”). Note also that given the broad definition of “securities account” in Section 8-501, a security interest in a securities account also includes all other rights of the debtor against the securities intermediary arising out of the securities account. For example, a security interest in a securities account would include credit balances due to the debtor from the securities intermediary, whether or not they are proceeds of a security entitlement. Moreover, describing collateral as a securities account is a simple way of describing all of the security entitlements carried in the account.
Consumer Investment Property; Commercial Tort Claims.
5. Consumer Investment Property; Commercial Tort Claims. Subsection (e) requires greater specificity of description in order to prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property. Subsection (e) requires that a description by defined “type” of collateral alone of a commercial tort claim or, in a consumer transaction, of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account, is not sufficient. For example, “all existing and after-acquired investment property” or “all existing and after-acquired security entitlements,” without more, would be insufficient in a consumer transaction to describe a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account. The reference to “only by type” in subsection (e) means that a description is sufficient if it satisfies subsection (a) and contains a descriptive component beyond the “type” alone. Moreover, if the collateral consists of a securities account or commodity account, a description of the account is sufficient to cover all existing and future security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the account. See Section 9-203(h), (i).
Under Section 9-204, an after-acquired collateral clause in a security agreement will not reach future commercial tort claims. It follows that when an effective security agreement covering a commercial tort claim is entered into the claim already will exist. Subsection (e) does not require a description to be specific. For example, a description such as “all tort claims arising out of the explosion of debtor’s factory” would suffice, even if the exact amount of the claim, the theory on which it may be based, and the identity of the tortfeasor(s) are not described. (Indeed, those facts may not be known at the time.)
§ 28-9-109. Scope.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this chapter applies to:
- A transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract;
- An agricultural lien;
- A sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes;
- A consignment;
- A security interest arising under section 28-2-401, 28-2-505, 28-2-711(3) or 28-12-508(5)[, Idaho Code], as provided in section 28-9-110[, Idaho Code]; and
- A security interest arising under section 28-4-210 or 28-5-120[, Idaho Code].
- The application of this chapter to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which this chapter does not apply.
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This chapter does not apply to the extent that:
- A statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this chapter;
- Another statute of this state expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority or enforcement of a security interest created by this state or a governmental unit of this state;
- A statute of another state, a foreign country, or a governmental unit of another state or a foreign country, other than a statute generally applicable to security interests, expressly governs creation, perfection, priority or enforcement of a security interest created by the state, country or governmental unit; or
- The rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person under a letter of credit are independent and superior under section 28-5-114[, Idaho Code].
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This chapter does not apply to:
- A landlord’s lien, other than an agricultural lien;
- A lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials, but section 28-9-333[, Idaho Code,] applies with respect to priority of the lien;
- An assignment of a claim for wages, salary or other compensation of an employee;
- A sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose;
- An assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes which is for the purpose of collection only;
- An assignment of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee that is also obligated to perform under the contract;
- An assignment of a single account, payment intangible or promissory note to an assignee in full or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness;
- A transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than an assignment by or to a health care provider of a health care insurance receivable and any subsequent assignment of the right to payment, but sections 28-9-315 and 28-9-322[, Idaho Code,] apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds;
- An assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment taken on a right to payment that was collateral;
- A right of recoupment or set-off, but: (A) section 28-9-340[, Idaho Code,] applies with respect to the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or set-off against deposit accounts; and
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The creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a lease or rents thereunder, except to the extent that provision is made for:
- liens on real property in sections 28-9-203 and 28-9-308[, Idaho Code];
- fixtures in section 28-9-334[, Idaho Code];
- fixture filings in sections 28-9-501, 28-9-502, 28-9-512, 28-9-516 and 28-9-519[, Idaho Code]; and
- security agreements covering personal and real property in section 28-9-604[, Idaho Code];
- An assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim, but sections 28-9-315 and 28-9-322[, Idaho Code,] apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds;
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- A claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in (i) 26 U.S.C. section 104(a)(1) and (ii) on and after the effective date of this chapter, in 26 U.S.C. section 104(a)(2), as those sections may be amended from time to time. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this chapter (other than sections 28-9-406(d) and 28-9-408(a) and (c), Idaho Code, in the case of transfers made on and after the effective date of this chapter) shall apply to such compensation as described in 26 U.S.C. section 104(a)(2) if the sale, pledge, assignment or other transfer of rights to receive such compensation under a structured settlement is approved by the final order of a court pursuant to, and otherwise complies with, the requirements of paragraph (B) of this subsection. (13)(A) A claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in (i) 26 U.S.C. section 104(a)(1) and (ii) on and after the effective date of this chapter, in 26 U.S.C. section 104(a)(2), as those sections may be amended from time to time. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this chapter (other than sections 28-9-406(d) and 28-9-408(a) and (c), Idaho Code, in the case of transfers made on and after the effective date of this chapter) shall apply to such compensation as described in 26 U.S.C. section 104(a)(2) if the sale, pledge, assignment or other transfer of rights to receive such compensation under a structured settlement is approved by the final order of a court pursuant to, and otherwise complies with, the requirements of paragraph (B) of this subsection.
- (i) Definitions. For purposes of this subsection:
(B) section 28-9-404[, Idaho Code,] applies with respect to defenses or claims of an account debtor;
10. “qualified assignment agreement” means an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. section 130, as amended from time to time;
11. “settled claim” means the original tort claim resolved by a structured settlement;
12. “structured settlement” means an arrangement for periodic payment of damages for personal injuries or sickness established by settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim;
13. “structured settlement agreement” means the agreement, judgment, stipulation, or release embodying the terms of a structured settlement;
14. “structured settlement obligor” means, with respect to any structured settlement, the party that has the continuing obligation to make periodic payments to the payee under a structured settlement agreement or a qualified assignment agreement;
15. “structured settlement payment rights” means rights to receive periodic payments under a structured settlement, whether from the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer, where:
- the payee is domiciled in, or the domicile or principal place of business of the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer is located in, this state; or
- the structured settlement agreement was approved by a court in this state; or
- the structured settlement agreement is expressly governed by the laws of this state;
- a listing of each of the payee’s dependents, together with each dependent’s age;
- notification that any interested party is entitled to support, oppose or otherwise respond to the transferee’s application, either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to the court or by participating in the hearing; and
- notification of the time and place of the hearing and notification of the manner in which and the time by which written responses to the application must be filed (which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after service of the transferee’s notice) in order to be considered by the court.
16. “terms of the structured settlement” include, with respect to any structured settlement, the terms of the structured settlement agreement, the annuity contract, any qualified assignment agreement and any order or other approval of any court or other government authority that authorized or approved such structured settlement;
17. “transfer” means any sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation or other alienation or encumbrance of structured settlement payment rights made by a payee for consideration; provided that the term “transfer” does not include the creation or perfection of a security interest in structured settlement payment rights under a blanket security agreement entered into with an insured depository institution, in the absence of any action to redirect the structured settlement payments to such insured depository institution, or an agent or successor in interest thereof, or otherwise to enforce such blanket security interest against the structured settlement payment rights;
18. “transfer agreement” means the agreement providing for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights;
19. “transfer expenses” means all expenses of a transfer that are required under the transfer agreement to be paid by the payee or deducted from the gross advance amount, including, without limitation, court filing fees, attorney’s fees, escrow fees, lien recordation fees, judgment and lien search fees, finder’s fees, commissions, and other payments to a broker or other intermediary; “transfer expenses” do not include preexisting obligations of the payee payable for the payee’s account from the proceeds of a transfer;
20. “transferee” means a party acquiring or proposing to acquire structured settlement payment rights through a transfer.
- the amounts and due dates of the structured settlement payments to be transferred; 2. the aggregate amount of such payments;
- The transferee shall be liable to the structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer:
- Neither the annuity issuer nor the structured settlement obligor may be required to divide any periodic payment between the payee and any transferee or assignee or between two (2) or more transferees or assignees; and
- Any further transfer of structured settlement payment rights by the payee may be made only after compliance with all of the requirements of this subsection.
3. the discounted present value of the payments to be transferred, which shall be identified as the “calculation of current value of the transferred structured settlement payments under federal standards for valuing annuities,” and the amount of the applicable federal rate used in calculating such discounted present value;
4. the gross advance amount;
5. an itemized listing of all applicable transfer expenses, other than attorney’s fees and related disbursements payable in connection with the transferee’s application for approval of the transfer, and the transferee’s best estimate of the amount of any such fees and disbursements;
6. the net advance amount;
7. the amount of any penalties or liquidated damages payable by the payee in the event of any breach of the transfer agreement by the payee; and
8. a statement that the payee has the right to cancel the transfer agreement, without penalty or further obligation, not later than the third business day after the date the agreement is signed by the payee.
1. No direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be effective and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless the transfer has been approved in advance in a final court order based on express findings by such court that:
A. the transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents;
B. the payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived such advice in writing; and
C. the transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority.
1. The structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer shall, as to all parties except the transferee, be discharged and released from any and all liability for the transferred payments;
A. if the transfer contravenes the terms of the structured settlement, for any taxes incurred by such parties as a consequence of the transfer; and
B. for any other liabilities or costs, including reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, arising from compliance by such parties with the order of the court or arising as a consequence of the transferee’s failure to comply with this subsection;
1. An application under this subsection for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be made by the transferee and may be brought in the county in which the payee resides, in the county in which the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer maintains its principal place of business, or in any court which approved the structured settlement agreement. 2. Not less than twenty (20) days prior to the scheduled hearing on any application for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under paragraph (B)(iii) of this subsection, the transferee shall file with the court and serve on all interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and the application for its authorization, including with such notice:
A. a copy of the transferee’s application;
B. a copy of the transfer agreement;
C. a copy of the disclosure statement required under paragraph (B)(ii) of this subsection;
- The provisions of this subsection may not be waived by any payee.
- Any transfer agreement entered into on or after the effective date of this subsection by a payee who resides in this state shall provide that disputes under such transfer agreement, including any claim that the payee has breached the agreement, shall be determined in and under the laws of this state. No such transfer agreement shall authorize the transferee or any other party to confess judgment or consent to entry of judgment against the payee.
- No transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall extend to any payments that are life-contingent unless, prior to the date on which the payee signs the transfer agreement, the transferee has established and has agreed to maintain procedures reasonably satisfactory to the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor for (i) periodically confirming the payee’s survival, and (ii) giving the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor prompt written notice in the event of the payee’s death.
- No payee who proposes to make a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall incur any penalty, forfeit any application fee or other payment, or otherwise incur any liability to the proposed transferee or any assignee based on any failure of such transfer to satisfy the conditions of this subsection.
- Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to authorize any transfer of structured settlement payment rights in contravention of any law or to imply that any transfer under a transfer agreement entered into prior to the effective date of this subsection is valid or invalid.
- Compliance with the requirements set forth in paragraph (B)(ii) of this subsection and fulfillment of the conditions set forth in paragraph (B)(iii) of this subsection shall be solely the responsibility of the transferee in any transfer of structured settlement payment rights, and neither the structured settlement obligor nor the annuity issuer shall bear any responsibility for, or any liability arising from, noncompliance with such requirements or failure to fulfill such conditions.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-109, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2001, ch. 299, § 1, p. 1078.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-109, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-109, p. 351; am. 1987, ch. 284, § 3, p. 596, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout this section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
The phrase “the effective date of this chapter,” used twice in paragraph (d)(13)(A), refers to the effective date of S.L. 2001, ch. 299, which was July 1, 2001.
The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.
CASE NOTES
Assignment of Structured Settlement Rights.
Subsection (d)(13)(B)(v), “Structured Settlement Protection Act” does not affect transfer agreements reached prior to its enactment; thus, a settlement payee’s purported assignment of a payment transferred nothing, notwithstanding court approval of the assignment, because the payee had previously assigned the payment to another party and, thus, had lost control of the payment. Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530, 164 P.3d 810 (2007).
Security Interest.
Attorney’s security interest in the promissory note automatically attached to any proceeds of the note, including any rights arising out of the note. The attorney identified specific proceeds in the security agreement, including any judgments arising out of a collection action; and a party who seeks to limit the type of statutory proceeds to which its security interest attaches must state an intent to limit proceeds in the security agreement. Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 118 P.3d 136 (2005).
Cited
A perfected security interest created by security agreements and filings with the secretary of state continues notwithstanding sale of the collateral. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 311 P.3d 299 (2013). Cited Wiggins v. Peachtree Settlement Funding, 273 B.R. 839 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); Hillen v. Dennis Dillon Auto Park & Truck Center, Inc. (In re Byrd), 546 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2016).
Decisions Under Prior Law
Lease of Real Property.
A lease of real property is excluded from the scope of Title 28, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code (Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code) by this section. Trustee Servs. Corp. v. East River Lumber Co. (In re Hodge Forest Indus., Inc.), 59 Bankr. 801 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1986).
Security Interest.
Where the evidence was clear that although a lease agreement did contain some attributes of an installment sales contract, there was no oral or written option to purchase the equipment, and title did not pass to the lessee at the end of the term, and since no other relevant evidence was presented demonstrating that the parties intended the transaction to be anything other than a lease, the trial court properly held that the lease agreement was not a security interest subject to Article 9 of the UCC. W.L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 103 Idaho 736, 653 P.2d 791 (1982).
No magic words are necessary to create a security interest, and the agreement itself need not even contain the term “security interest”; this is in keeping with the policy of the code that form should not prevail over substance and that, whenever possible, effect should be given to the parties’ intent. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
Personal property tax liens are entitled to first priority, even over antecedent encumbrances, including prior perfected purchase money security interests.OAG 85-1.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
ALR.
Official Comment
Source.
Basic Scope Provision.
2. Basic Scope Provision. Subsection (a)(1) derives from former Section 9-102(1) and (2). These subsections have been combined and shortened. No change in meaning is intended. Under subsection (a)(1), all consensual security interests in personal property and fixtures are covered by this Article, except for transactions excluded by subsections (c) and (d). As to which transactions give rise to a “security interest,” the definition of that term in Section 1-201 must be consulted. When a security interest is created, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given to it Likewise, the subjective intention of the parties with respect to the legal characterization of their transaction is irrelevant to whether this Article applies, as it was to the application of former Article 9 under the proper interpretation of former Section 9-102. 3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (a)(2) is new. It expands the scope of this Article to cover agricultural liens, as defined in Section 9-102.
Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, Promissory Notes, and Other Receivables.
4. Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, Promissory Notes, and Other Receivables. Under subsection (a)(3), as under former Section 9-102, this Article applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper. This approach generally has been successful in avoiding difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold outright. In many commercial financing transactions the distinction is blurred.
Subsection (a)(3) expands the scope of this Article by including the sale of a “payment intangible” (defined in Section 9-102 as “a general intangible under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation”) and a “promissory note” (also defined in Section 9-102). To a considerable extent, this Article affords these transactions treatment identical to that given sales of accounts and chattel paper. In some respects, however, sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are treated differently from sales of other receivables. See, e.g., Sections 9-309 (automatic perfection upon attachment), 9-408 (effect of restrictions on assignment). By virtue of the expanded definition of “account” (defined in Section 9-102), this Article now covers sales of (and other security interests in) “health-care-insurance receivables” (also defined in Section 9-102). Although this Article occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an obligation, neither this Article nor the definition of “security interest” (Section 1-201(37)) delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left to the courts.
Transfer of Ownership in Sales of Receivables.
5. Transfer of Ownership in Sales of Receivables. A “sale” of an account, chattel paper, a promissory note, or a payment intangible includes a sale of a right in the receivable, such as a sale of a participation interest. The term also includes the sale of an enforcement right. For example, a “[p]erson entitled to enforce” a negotiable promissory note (Section 3-301) may sell its ownership rights in the instrument. See Section 3-203, Comment 1 (“Ownership rights in instruments may be determined by principles of the law of property, independent of Article 3, which do not depend upon whether the instrument was transferred under Section 3-203.”). Also, the right under Section 3-309 to enforce a lost, destroyed, or stolen negotiable promissory note may be sold to a purchaser who could enforce that right by causing the seller to provide the proof required under that section. This Article rejects decisions reaching a contrary result, e.g., Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broadcasting, 977 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1997).
Nothing in this section or any other provision of Article 9 prevents the transfer of full and complete ownership of an account, chattel paper, an instrument, or a payment intangible in a transaction of sale. However, as mentioned in Comment 4, neither this Article nor the definition of “security interest” in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation. This Article applies to both types of transactions. The principal effect of this coverage is to apply this Article’s perfection and priority rules to these sales transactions. Use of terminology such as “security interest,” “debtor,” and “collateral” is merely a drafting convention adopted to reach this end, and its use has no relevance to distinguishing sales from other transactions. See PEB Commentary No. 14. Following a debtor’s outright sale and transfer of ownership of a receivable, the debtor-seller retains no legal or equitable rights in the receivable that has been sold. See Section 9-318(a). This is so whether or not the buyer’s security interest is perfected. (A security interest arising from the sale of a promissory note or payment intangible is perfected upon attachment without further action. See Section 9-309.) However, if the buyer’s interest in accounts or chattel paper is unperfected, a subsequent lien creditor, perfected secured party, or qualified buyer can reach the sold receivable and achieve priority over (or take free of) the buyer’s unperfected security interest under Section 9-317. This is so not because the seller of a receivable retains rights in the property sold; it does not. Nor is this so because the seller of a receivable is a “debtor” and the buyer of a receivable is a “secured party” under this Article (they are). It is so for the simple reason that Sections 9-318(b), 9-317, and 9-322 make it so, as did former Sections 9-301 and 9-312. Because the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of and purchasers for value from the debtor-seller, under Section 9-318(b) the debtor-seller is deemed to have the rights and title it sold. Section 9-317 subjects the buyer’s unperfected interest in accounts and chattel paper to that of the debtor-seller’s lien creditor and other persons who qualify under that section.
Consignments.
6. Consignments. Subsection (a)(4) is new. This Article applies to every “consignment.” The term, defined in Section 9-102, includes many but not all “true” consignments (i.e., bailments for the purpose of sale). If a transaction is a “sale or return,” as defined in revised Section 2-326, it is not a “consignment.” In a “sale or return” transaction, the buyer becomes the owner of the goods, and the seller may obtain an enforceable security interest in the goods only by satisfying the requirements of Section 9-203.
Under common law, creditors of a bailee were unable to reach the interest of the bailor (in the case of a consignment, the consignor-owner). Like former Section 2-326 and former Article 9, this Article changes the common-law result; however, it does so in a different manner. For purposes of determining the rights and interests of third-party creditors of, and purchasers of the goods from, the consignee, but not for other purposes, such as remedies of the consignor, the consignee is deemed to acquire under this Article whatever rights and title the consignor had or had power to transfer. See Section 9-319. The interest of a consignor is defined to be a security interest under revised Section 1-201(37), more specifically, a purchase-money security interest in the consignee’s inventory. See Section 9-103(d). Thus, the rules pertaining to lien creditors, buyers, and attachment, perfection, and priority of competing security interests apply to consigned goods. The relationship between the consignor and consignee is left to other law. Consignors also have no duties under Part 6. See Section 9-601(g).
Sometimes parties characterize transactions that secure an obligation (other than the bailee’s obligation to returned bailed goods) as “consignments.” These transactions are not “consignments” as contemplated by Section 9-109(a)(4). See Section 9-102. This Article applies also to these transactions, by virtue of Section 9-109(a)(1). They create a security interest within the meaning of the first sentence of Section 1-201(37).
This Article does not apply to bailments for sale that fall outside the definition of “consignment” in Section 9-102 and that do not create a security interest that secures an obligation.
Security Interest in Obligation Secured by Non-Article 9 Transaction.
7. Security Interest in Obligation Secured by Non-Article 9 Transaction. Subsection (b) is unchanged in substance from former Section 9-102(3). The following example provides an illustration. Example 1: O borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment obligation, evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M a mortgage on O’s land. This Article does not apply to the creation of the real-property mortgage. However, if M sells the promissory note to X or gives a security interest in the note to secure M’s own obligation to X, this Article applies to the security interest thereby created in favor of X. The security interest in the promissory note is covered by this Article even though the note is secured by a real-property mortgage. Also, X’s security interest in the note gives X an attached security interest in the mortgage lien that secures the note and, if the security interest in the note is perfected, the security interest in the mortgage lien likewise is perfected. See Sections 9-203, 9-308.
It also follows from subsection (b) that an attempt to obtain or perfect a security interest in a secured obligation by complying with non-Article 9 law, as by an assignment of record of a real-property mortgage, would be ineffective. Finally, it is implicit from subsection (b) that one cannot obtain a security interest in a lien, such as a mortgage on real property, that is not also coupled with an equally effective security interest in the secured obligation. This Article rejects cases such as In re Maryville Savings & Loan Corp. , 743 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984), clarified on reconsideration, 760 F.2d 119 (1985).
Federal Preemption.
8. Federal Preemption. Former Section 9-104(a) excluded from Article 9 “a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property.” Some (erroneously) read the former section to suggest that Article 9 sometimes deferred to federal law even when federal law did not preempt Article 9. Subsection (c)(1) recognizes explicitly that this Article defers to federal law only when and to the extent that it must-i.e., when federal law preempts it.
Governmental Debtors.
9. Governmental Debtors. Former Section 9-104(e) excluded transfers by governmental debtors. It has been revised and replaced by the exclusions in new paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c). These paragraphs reflect the view that Article 9 should apply to security interests created by a State, foreign country, or a “governmental unit” (defined in Section 9-102) of either except to the extent that another statute governs the issue in question. Under paragraph (2), this Article defers to all statutes of the forum State. (A forum cannot determine whether it should consult the choice-of-law rules in the forum’s UCC unless it first determines that its UCC applies to the transaction before it.) Paragraph (3) defers to statutes of another State or a foreign country only to the extent that those statutes contain rules applicable specifically to security interests created by the governmental unit in question.
Example 2:
Example 2: A New Jersey state commission creates a security interest in favor of a New York bank. The validity of the security interest is litigated in New York. The relevant security agreement provides that it is governed by New York law. To the extent that a New Jersey statute contains rules peculiar to creation of security interests by governmental units generally, to creation of security interests by state commissions, or to creation of security interests by this particular state commission, then that law will govern. On the other hand, to the extent that New Jersey law provides that security interests created by governmental units, state commissions, or this state commission are governed by the law generally applicable to secured transactions (i.e., New Jersey’s Article 9), then New York’s Article 9 will govern.
Example 3:
If a transaction does not bear an appropriate relation to the forum State, then that State’s Article 9 will not apply, regardless of whether the transaction would be excluded by paragraph (3).
Example 4:
Example 4: A Belgian governmental unit grants a security interest in its equipment to a Swiss secured party. The equipment is located in Belgium. A dispute arises and, for some reason, an action is brought in a New Mexico state court. Inasmuch as the transaction bears no “appropriate relation” to New Mexico, New Mexico’s UCC, including its Article 9, is inapplicable. See Section 1-105(1). New Mexico’s Section 9-109(c) on excluded transactions should not come into play. Even if the parties agreed that New Mexico law would govern, the parties’ agreement would not be effective because the transaction does not bear a “reasonable relation” to New Mexico. See Section 1-105(1).
Conversely, Article 9 will come into play only if the litigation arises in a UCC jurisdiction or if a foreign choice-of-law rule leads a foreign court to apply the law of a UCC jurisdiction. For example, if issues concerning a security interest granted by a foreign airline to a New York bank are litigated overseas, the court may be bound to apply the law of the debtor’s jurisdiction and not New York’s Article 9.
Certain Statutory and Common-Law Liens; Interests in Real Property.
10. Certain Statutory and Common-Law Liens; Interests in Real Property. With few exceptions (nonconsensual agricultural liens being one), this Article applies only to consensual security interests in personal property. Following former Section 9-104(b) and (j), paragraphs (1) and (11) of subsection (d) exclude landlord’s liens and leases and most other interests in or liens on real property. These exclusions generally reiterate the limitations on coverage (i.e., “by contract,” “in personal property and fixtures”) made explicit in subsection (a)(1). Similarly, most jurisdictions provide special liens to suppliers of many types of services and materials, either by statute or by common law. With the exception of agricultural liens, it is not necessary for this Article to provide general codification of this lien structure, which is determined in large part by local conditions and which is far removed from ordinary commercial financing. As under former Section 9-104(c), subsection (d)(2) excludes these suppliers’ liens (other than agricultural liens) from this Article. However, Section 9-333 provides a rule for determining priorities between certain possessory suppliers’ liens and security interests covered by this Article.
Wage and Similar Claims.
11. Wage and Similar Claims. As under former Section 9-104(d), subsection (d)(3) excludes assignments of claims for wages and the like from this Article. These assignments present important social issues that other law addresses. The Federal Trade Commission has ruled that, with some exceptions, the taking of an assignment of wages or other earnings is an unfair act or practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 16 C.F.R. Part 444. State statutes also may regulate such assignments.
Certain Sales and Assignments of Receivables; Judgments.
12. Certain Sales and Assignments of Receivables; Judgments. In general this Article covers security interests in (including sales of) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (d) exclude from the Article certain sales and assignments of receivables that, by their nature, do not concern commercial financing transactions. These paragraphs add to the exclusions in former Section 9-104(f) analogous sales and assignments of payment intangibles and promissory notes. For similar reasons, subsection (d)(9) retains the exclusion of assignments of judgments under former Section 9-104(h) (other than judgments taken on a right to payment that itself was collateral under this Article). 13. Insurance. Subsection (d)(8) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of interests in insurance policies under former Section 9-104(g). This Article now covers assignments by or to a health-care provider of “health-care-insurance receivables” (defined in Section 9-102).
Set-Off.
14. Set-Off. Subsection (d)(10) adds two exceptions to the general exclusion of set-off rights from Article 9 under former Section 9-104(i). The first takes account of new Section 9-340, which regulates the effectiveness of a set-off against a deposit account that stands as collateral. The second recognizes Section 9-404, which affords the obligor on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible the right to raise claims and defenses against an assignee (secured party).
Tort Claims.
15. Tort Claims. Subsection (d)(12) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of transfers of tort claims under former Section 9-104(k). This Article now applies to assignments of “commercial tort claims” (defined in Section 9-102) as well as to security interests in tort claims that constitute proceeds of other collateral (e.g., a right to payment for negligent destruction of the debtor’s inventory). Note that once a claim arising in tort has been settled and reduced to a contractual obligation to pay, the right to payment becomes a payment intangible and ceases to be a claim arising in tort.
This Article contains two special rules governing creation of a security interest in tort claims. First, a description of collateral in a security agreement as “all tort claims” is insufficient to meet the requirement for attachment. See Section 9-108(e). Second, no security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to a tort claim. See Section 9-204(b). In addition, this Article does not determine whom the tortfeasor must pay to discharge its obligation. Inasmuch as a tortfeasor is not an “account debtor,” the rules governing waiver of defenses and discharge of an obligation by an obligor (Sections 9-403, 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406) are inapplicable to tort-claim collateral.
Deposit Accounts.
16. Deposit Accounts. Except in consumer transactions, deposit accounts may be taken as original collateral under this Article. Under former Section 9-104(l), deposit accounts were excluded as original collateral, leaving security interests in deposit accounts to be governed by the common law. The common law is nonuniform, often difficult to discover and comprehend, and frequently costly to implement. As a consequence, debtors who wished to use deposit accounts as collateral sometimes were precluded from doing so as a practical matter. By excluding deposit accounts from the Article’s scope as original collateral in consumer transactions, subsection (d)(13) leaves those transactions to law other than this Article. However, in both consumer and non-consumer transactions, sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply to deposit accounts as proceeds and with respect to priorities in proceeds.
This Article contains several safeguards to protect debtors against inadvertently encumbering deposit accounts and to reduce the likelihood that a secured party will realize a windfall from a debtor’s deposit accounts. For example, because “deposit account” is a separate type of collateral, a security agreement covering general intangibles will not adequately describe deposit accounts. Rather, a security agreement must reasonably identify the deposit accounts that are the subject of a security interest, e.g., by using the term “deposit accounts.” See Section 9-108. To perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral, a secured party (other than the bank with which the deposit account is maintained) must obtain “control” of the account either by obtaining the bank’s authenticated agreement or by becoming the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account. See Sections 9-312(b)(1), 9-104. Either of these steps requires the debtor’s consent. This Article also contains new rules that determine which State’s law governs perfection and priority of a security interest in a deposit account (Section 9-304), priority of conflicting security interests in and set-off rights against a deposit account (Sections 9-327, 9-340), the rights of transferees of funds from an encumbered deposit account (Section 9-332), the obligations of the bank (Section 9-341), enforcement of security interests in a deposit account (Section 9-607(c)), and the duty of a secured party to terminate control of a deposit account (Section 9-208(b)).
§ 28-9-110. Security interests arising under chapter 2 or 12, title 28, Idaho Code.
A security interest arising under section 28-2-401, 28-2-505, 28-2-711(3) or 28-12-508(5)[, Idaho Code,] is subject to this chapter. However, until the debtor obtains possession of the goods:
- The security interest is enforceable, even if section 28-9-203(b)(3)[, Idaho Code,] has not been satisfied;
- Filing is not required to perfect the security interest;
- The rights of the secured party after default by the debtor are governed by chapter 2 or 12, title 28, Idaho Code; and
- The security interest has priority over a conflicting security interest created by the debtor.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-110, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-110, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-110, p. 351; am. 1987, ch. 284, § 4, p. 596, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in the introductory paragraph and in subsection (1) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Description Sufficient.
Attorney’s security interest in the promissory note automatically attached to any proceeds of the note, including any rights arising out of the note. The attorney identified specific proceeds in the security agreement, including any judgments arising out of a collection action. A party who seeks to limit the type of statutory proceeds to which its security interest attaches must state an intent to limit proceeds in the security agreement. Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 118 P.3d 136 (2005).
Ownership.
Cited
If an individual takes merchandise without any intent to pay for it, he or she has unlawfully obtained the merchandise and has no lawful ownership interest in it. State v. Dix, — Idaho —, — P.3d —, 2019 Ida. App. LEXIS 7 (Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2019). Cited Hillen v. Dennis Dillon Auto Park & Truck Center, Inc. (In re Byrd), 546 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2016).
Official Comment
Source.
Background.
2. Background. Former Section 9-113, from which this section derives, referred generally to security interests “arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) or the Article on Leases (Article 2A).” Views differed as to the precise scope of that section. In contrast, Section 9-110 specifies the security interests to which it applies.
Security Interests Under Articles 2 and 2A.
Sections 2-711(3) and 2A-508(5) create a security interest in favor of a buyer or lessee in possession of goods that were rightfully rejected or as to which acceptance was justifiably revoked. As did former Article 9, this Article governs a security interest arising solely under one of those sections; however, until the seller or lessor obtains possession of the goods, the security interest is enforceable even in the absence of a security agreement, filing is not necessary to perfect the security interest, and the secured party’s (buyer’s or lessee’s) rights on the debtor’s (seller’s or lessor’s) default are governed by Article 2 or 2A, as the case may be.
Priority.
4. Priority. This section adds to former Section 9-113 a priority rule. Until the debtor obtains possession of the goods, a security interest arising under one of the specified sections of Article 2 or 2A has priority over conflicting security interests created by the debtor. Thus, a security interest arising under Section 2-401 or 2-505 has priority over a conflicting security interest in the buyer’s after-acquired goods, even if the goods in question are inventory. Arguably, the same result would obtain under Section 9-322, but even if it would not, a purchase-money-like priority is appropriate. Similarly, a security interest under Section 2-711(3) or 2A-508(5) has priority over security interests claimed by the seller’s or lessor’s secured lender. This result is appropriate, inasmuch as the payments giving rise to the debt secured by the Article 2 or 2A security interest are likely to be included among the lender’s proceeds.
Example:
Example: Seller owns equipment subject to a security interest created by Seller in favor of Lender. Buyer pays for the equipment, accepts the goods, and then justifiably revokes acceptance. As long as Seller does not recover possession of the equipment, Buyer’s security interest under Section 2-711(3) is senior to that of Lender.
In the event that a security interest referred to in this section conflicts with a security interest that is created by a person other than the debtor, Section 9-325 applies. Thus, if Lender’s security interest in the example was created not by Seller but by the person from whom Seller acquired the goods, Section 9-325 would govern.
Relationship to Other Rights and Remedies Under Articles 2 and 2A.
5. Relationship to Other Rights and Remedies Under Articles 2 and 2A. This Article does not specifically address the conflict between (i) a security interest created by a buyer or lessee and (ii) the seller’s or lessor’s right to withhold delivery under Section 2-702(1), 2-703(a), or 2A-525, the seller’s or lessor’s right to stop delivery under Section 2-705 or 2A-526, or the seller’s right to reclaim under Section 2-507(2) or 2-702(2). These conflicts are governed by the first sentence of Section 2-403(1), under which the buyer’s secured party obtains no greater rights in the goods than the buyer had or had power to convey, or Section 2A-307(1), under which creditors of the lessee take subject to the lease contract.
§ 28-9-111. Applicability of bulk transfer laws. [Repealed.]
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
This section, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-111, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 1993, ch. 288, § 52, effective July 1, 1993.
Section 54 of S.L. 1993, ch. 288 read: “Rights and obligations that arose under Chapter 6, Title 28, Idaho Code, and Section 28-9-111, Idaho Code, before their repeal remain valid and may be enforced as though those statutes had not been repealed.”
§ 28-9-112 — 28-9-116. Where collateral is not owned by debtor. Security interests arising under chapter on sales or under chapter on leases. Consignment. Investment property. Security interest arising in purchase or delivery of financial asset. [Repealed.]
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The following sections were repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1:
28-9-112, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-112, p. 351.
28-9-113, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 28-9-113, p. 351; am. 1993, ch. 287, § 4, p. 977.
28-9-114, which comprised 28-9-114, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 10, p. 781.
28-9-115, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-115, as added by 1995, ch. 272, § 6, p. 873.
28-9-116, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-116, as added by 1995, ch. 272, § 7, p. 873.
Part 2 Effectiveness of Security Agreement — Attachment of Security Interest — Rights of Parties to Security Agreement
§ 28-9-201. General effectiveness of security agreement.
- Except as otherwise provided in the uniform commercial code, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.
- A transaction subject to this chapter is subject to any applicable rule of law which establishes a different rule for consumers, to the Idaho credit code, chapters 41 through 49, title 28, Idaho Code, and any rules promulgated thereunder and to the Idaho credit union act, chapter 21, title 26, Idaho Code, and any rules promulgated thereunder.
- In case of conflict between this chapter and a rule of law, statute or rule described in subsection (b) of this section, the rule of law, statute or rule controls. Failure to comply with a statute or rule described in subsection (b) of this section has only the effect the statute or rule specifies.
-
This chapter does not:
- Validate any rate, charge, agreement or practice that violates a rule of law, statute or rule described in subsection (b) of this section; or
- Extend the application of the rule of law, statute or rule to a transaction not otherwise subject to it.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-201, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-201, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-201, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
CASE NOTES
Loss of security interest.
Assignment of Contract Rights.
Where nothing in assignment to bank of rights under contracts between grain broker and grain concern indicated that it covered future advances made by bank, grain concern was justified in relying on assignment language in determining whether to follow broker’s request to discontinue issuing joint payment checks on subsequent contracts and grain concern’s course of conduct in providing joint payment checks up until that point did not establish that assignment was intended to cover future advances nor indicate that grain dealer had notice of that fact, particularly as grain concern was not a party to the assignment. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983). Loss of Security Interest.
Where the course of dealing between secured party and farmers clearly indicated the authorization to sell crops in which secured party held security interests and that secured party further authorized particular sale by the farmers to insolvent buyer, secured party lost its security interest in the collateral under the provisions of§ 28-9-306(2), notwithstanding argument that it merely “conditionally” authorized the sale and that, since the condition, i.e., payment, failed,§ 28-9-306(2) did not take effect. Western Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 678 P.2d 52 (1984).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-201, 9-203(4).
Effectiveness of Security Agreement.
2. Effectiveness of Security Agreement. Subsection (a) provides that a security agreement is generally effective. With certain exceptions, a security agreement is effective between the debtor and secured party and is likewise effective against third parties. Note that “security agreement” is used here (and elsewhere in this Article) as it is defined in Section 9-102: “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” It follows that subsection (a) does not provide that every term or provision contained in a record that contains a security agreement or that is so labeled is effective. Properly read, former Section 9-201 was to the same effect. Exceptions to the general rule of subsection (a) arise where there is an overriding provision in this Article or any other Article of the UCC. For example, Section 9-317 subordinates unperfected security interests to lien creditors and certain buyers, and several provisions in Part 3 subordinate some security interests to other security interests and interests of purchasers.
Law, Statutes, and Regulations Applicable to Certain Transactions.
3. Law, Statutes, and Regulations Applicable to Certain Transactions. Subsection (b) makes clear that certain transactions, although subject to this Article, also are subject to other applicable laws relating to consumers or specified in that subsection. Subsection (c) provides that the other law is controlling in the event of a conflict, and that a violation of other law does not ipso facto constitute a violation of this Article. Subsection (d) provides that this Article does not validate violations under or extend the application of the other applicable laws.
§ 28-9-202. Title to collateral immaterial.
Except as otherwise provided with respect to consignments or sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes, the provisions of this chapter with regard to rights and obligations apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-202, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-202, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-202, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Brands.
Title or indicia of title, such as a brand on cattle, is immaterial in determining the rights of parties to a secured transaction because their rights are determined solely by the nature and priority of their security interest. Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, 558 P.2d 1026 (1976).
Construction.
The U.C.C. has firmly rejected the concept of title as the dispositive factor in determining the rights and obligations of parties to personal property. State v. Burris, 101 Idaho 683, 619 P.2d 1136 (1980).
Official Comment
Source.
Title Immaterial.
Under This Article.
a. Under This Article. This section explicitly acknowledges two circumstances in which the effect of certain Article 9 provisions turns on ownership (title). First, in some respects sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes receive special treatment. See, e.g., Sections 9-207(a), 9-210(b), 9-615(e). Buyers of receivables under former Article 9 were treated specially, as well. See, e.g., former Section 9-502(2). Second, the remedies of a consignor under a true consignment and, for the most part, the remedies of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are determined by other law and not by Part 6. See Section 9-601(g).
Under Other Law.
b. Under Other Law. This Article does not determine which line of interpretation (e.g., title theory or lien theory, retained title or conveyed title) should be followed in cases in which the applicability of another rule of law depends upon who has title. If, for example, a revenue law imposes a tax on the “legal” owner of goods or if a corporation law makes a vote of the stockholders prerequisite to a corporation “giving” a security interest but not if it acquires property “subject” to a security interest, this Article does not attempt to define whether the secured party is a “legal” owner or whether the transaction “gives” a security interest for the purpose of such laws. Other rules of law or the agreement of the parties determines the location and source of title for those purposes.
§ 28-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest — Proceeds — Supporting obligations — Formal requisites.
- A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i) of this section, a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if:
- Value has been given;
- The debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and
-
One (1) of the following conditions is met:
- the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned;
- the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession of the secured party under section 28-9-313[, Idaho Code,] pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement;
- the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security certificate has been delivered to the secured party under section 28-8-301[, Idaho Code,] pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement; or
- the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, letter of credit rights, or electronic documents, and the secured party has control under section 28-7-106, 28-9-104, 28-9-105, 28-9-106 or 28-9-107[, Idaho Code,] pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement.
- Subsection (b) of this section is subject to section 28-4-210[, Idaho Code,] on the security interest of a collecting bank, section 28-5-120[, Idaho Code,] on the security interest of a letter of credit issuer or nominated person, section 28-9-110[, Idaho Code,] on a security interest arising under chapter 2 or 12, title 28[, Idaho Code], and section 28-9-206[, Idaho Code,] on security interests in investment property.
-
A person becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person if, by operation of law other than this chapter or by contract:
- The security agreement becomes effective to create a security interest in the person’s property; or
- The person becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person, including the obligation secured under the security agreement, and acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the other person.
-
If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person:
- The agreement satisfies subsection (b)(3) of this section with respect to existing or after-acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the agreement; and
- Another agreement is not necessary to make a security interest in the property enforceable.
- The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by section 28-9-315[, Idaho Code,] and is also attachment of a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.
- The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage or other lien.
- The attachment of a security interest in a securities account is also attachment of a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.
- The attachment of a security interest in a commodity account is also attachment of a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-203, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 22, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-203, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-203, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 12, p. 781; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 47, p. 329; am. 1993, ch. 288, § 53, p. 1019; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 8, p. 873, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout the section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Creation of Security Interest.
Attorney’s security interest in the promissory note automatically attached to any proceeds of the note, including any rights arising out of the note. The security agreement did not limit the types of proceeds to which the attorney’s security interest would attach, because the attorney identified specific proceeds in the security agreement. Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 118 P.3d 136 (2005).
Valid Secured Interest.
In Chapter 7 proceedings, since there was no written loan agreement between the debor and her creditor father, there was no perfected security interest which could be avoided by the bankruptcy trustee; thus, debtor was entitled to a $3800 exemption from proceeds of the sale of her vehicle. In re Seibold, 351 B.R. 741 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006).
In adversary proceeding subsequent to closing of bankruptcy case, debtor was not entitled to declaration that creditor was not the lienholder on three vehicles. Though the certificates of title were ambiguous, the balance of the evidence established that the debtor intended the vehicles to be security for his debt to the creditor, as evidenced by three separate IOUs, and the perfected liens passed through bankruptcy unaffected by debtor’s discharge. Owen v. Lundstrom (In re Owen), 349 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006). Under subsection (b), a security interest attaches to collateral and becomes enforceable when value has been given, the debtor has rights in the collateral, and the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral Gugino v. Rowley (In re Floyd), 540 B.R. 747 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015).
Cited
State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho 278, 246 P.3d 387 (2010); Hillen v. Dennis Dillon Auto Park & Truck Center, Inc. (In re Byrd), 546 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2016).
Decisions Under Prior Law
Improper acknowledgments.
Actual Notice.
Buyer with actual notice of seller’s conditional sales contract with the seller could not claim title as a bona fide purchaser on the ground that the contract was not recorded. Gordon v. Loer, 57 Idaho 269, 65 P.2d 148 (1937).
After-Acquired Property.
Mortgage given upon chattels to be afterward acquired was valid and binding upon parties thereto and all others having notice of it. Dover Lumber Co. v. Case, 31 Idaho 276, 170 P. 108 (1918). Constructive Notice.
A duly recorded mortgage was constructive notice to anyone who buys the mortgaged property. United States v. White, 143 F. Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1956).
Conversion of Property.
Defendant, who purchased mortgaged property on a ranch located in Gem County, was liable for conversion of mortgaged property where mortgage was recorded in Gem County, but defendant only searched records of Payette County where defendant did business. United States v. White, 143 F. Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1956).
Creation of Security Interest.
A security interest was created by two promissory notes, each containing the words “SECURITY: 1956 GMC bus,” and by a certificate of title endorsed and delivered to defendant; the promissory notes and the certificate of title served to satisfy the requirement of displaying both a loan and the taking of security for the payment thereof. Simplot v. Owens, 119 Idaho 243, 805 P.2d 449 (1990).
No security interest attached where security agreement did not describe land upon which crops were growing or were to be grown and the financing statement did not contain language granting a security interest. Kelley Bean Co. v. Victor, 122 Idaho 395, 834 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1992).
Crops Covered by Mortgage.
Lien of mortgage follows grain after severance and removal and was valid against purchaser from mortgagor. Adams v. Caldwell Milling & Elevator Co., 33 Idaho 677, 197 P. 723 (1921).
Where a chattel mortgage purported to cover crops grown upon certain described lands, and then provided “also all hay grown or now growing or to be grown, on all land owned, leased or controlled by mortgagor,” this was sufficient to embrace crops on other land in the same county by the mortgagor, although the land was not described, but upon which the mortgagor raised hay. Livestock Credit Corp. v. Corbett, 53 Idaho 190, 22 P.2d 874 (1933).
Delivery of Pledged Property.
Lien of pledge was dependent upon possession and no pledge was valid until property pledged was delivered to pledgee or pledge holder. Radke v. Liberty Ins. Co., 37 Idaho 436, 216 P. 1040 (1923).
Estoppel.
Where stranger to mortgage purchased mortgaged property and agreed that mortgage shall stand as security for purchase price, provisions of statute requiring mortgages to be in writing, had no application, and purchaser is estopped to deny validity of the agreement, although it was not executed in conformity with the statute. Burke Land & Livestock Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 7 Idaho 42, 60 P. 87 (1900). Improper Acknowledgments.
Appellants’ mortgages not having been properly acknowledged and not having been entitled to be filed for record, the result was the same as though they had never been filed at all, and the other creditors had acquired specific rights in the property by the assignments for benefit of creditors prior to the time of any valid filing. Jordan v. Securities Credit Corp., 79 Idaho 284, 314 P.2d 967 (1957).
Mortgage to Secure Antecedent Debt.
Holder of mortgage on personal property given to secure antecedent debt had superior lien over purchaser who failed to remove property from seller’s premises. Millick v. Stevens, 44 Idaho 347, 257 P. 30 (1927).
Necessity of Affidavit.
Affidavit required by former statute was necessary only to sustain validity of mortgage as against creditors and purchasers and did not affect it as between mortgagor and mortgagee. Marchand v. Ronaghan, 9 Idaho 95, 72 P. 731 (1903).
Necessity of Jurat.
Jurat to affidavit of good faith accompanying chattel mortgage was essential to validity of mortgage against subsequent good faith encumbrances for value, and lack of it could not be supplied by oral evidence that mortgagor was sworn. Grandview State Bank v. Torrance, 38 Idaho 388, 221 P. 145 (1923).
Pledge of Lease.
Where a lease had been recorded as a chattel mortgage, a delivery of a copy thereof to a party having a second mortgage on a portion of the leased property constituted a sufficient delivery of the lease to amount to a valid pledge thereof. Gem State Lumber Co. v. Galion Irrigated Land Co., 55 Idaho 314, 41 P.2d 620 (1935).
Possession by Mortgagor.
Consideration of statutes relating to chattel mortgages indicated that possession by the mortgagor or others, where the mortgage was authenticated and filed, was contemplated, and the lien preserved. Hopkins v. Hemsley, 53 Idaho 120, 22 P.2d 138 (1933).
Under common law, chattel mortgagee had both title and possession of mortgaged goods; but, under statute, mortgagee had no title but only lien on security. Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 266 P. 659 (1928). Presumption of Situs.
Mortgaged property was presumed to be in the county on the date the mortgage was recorded. United States v. White, 143 F. Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1956).
Prohibited Agreements.
Agreement to hold a mortgage for individual indebtedness when said mortgage has been included in a subsequent copartnership mortgage which had been satisfied is contrary to provisions of former law. Willows v. Rosenstien, 5 Idaho 305, 48 P. 1067 (1897).
Lien of mortgage could not be extended beyond its terms so as to secure a debt not named therein, or to hypothecate property not covered by the mortgage, except by a compliance with the provisions of statute requiring that a mortgage be in writing; but this did not preclude mortgagor from waiving statute of limitations as to mortgage debt by indorsing an acknowledgment to pay debt on note and mortgage. Moulton v. Williams, 6 Idaho 424, 55 P. 1019 (1899).
Parties to usurious contract secured by trust deed cannot remove usurious character of transaction by agreement between themselves and, thus, make trust deed a lien for interest and costs as against junior mortgagee, who was not a party to the agreement, and whose rights would be prejudiced thereby. Madsen v. Whitman, 8 Idaho 762, 71 P. 152 (1902).
Refusal to Return Collateral.
A cause of action for conversion is a remedy available to a pledgor against a secured party-pledgee who refuses to return the collateral, if a security agreement does not give a legal right to retain the collateral after a demand for return by the pledgor. If, at the time the pledgor makes the demand for the return of the collateral, the secured party has a contractual right to continue to retain the collateral, then secured party’s refusal to return the collateral would not be an act of dominion wrongfully asserted; if, however, the pledgor makes a rightful and reasonable demand for return of the collateral, the pledgee must act reasonably in either returning the collateral or in refusing to do so. Reasonableness becomes an issue in conversion after demand and notice to pledgee and pertains, among other things, to the good faith of the pledgee in dealing with the collateral thereafter. Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984).
Rights in Collateral.
Where the debtor had possession of the pledged automobile, as one of the principals of the used car dealership, he had authority to buy and sell cars, and there was no prohibition against selling a car to himself or against pledging a car as collateral for a loan. The debtor had authority to deal with the property of the business, and such authority was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of “rights in the collateral”; therefore, the bank obtained from the debtor a valid security interest, enforceable “against the debtor or third parties.” First Sec. Bank v. Woolf, 111 Idaho 680, 726 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1986). A debtor did not have rights in collateral crops until, at the earliest, its crops were planted. Tri River Chem. Co. v. TNT Farms, 226 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998).
Third Parties.
The debtor’s partner in a used car dealership was among the “third parties” bound by the bank’s imperfected security interest in the car, where even if the partner had a purchase money security interest. It was not “perfected” at the time the debtor acquired the automobile because the partner never filed a financing statement, nor did he “perfect” any purported security interest by taking possession of the collateral until long after the purchase had occurred. First Sec. Bank v. Woolf, 111 Idaho 680, 726 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1986).
Trust Receipts.
The interest of the holder of a trust receipt on a car sold by the trustee to another dealer was a property interest, and not a lien and holder of trust receipt was entitled to claim proceeds of sale which were deposited in trustee’s bank account and, subsequently attached by the sheriff for taxes due the federal government by the trustee. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955).
Under the terms of former statute, the security interest of the entruster could be derived from the trustee or any other person. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955).
Unacknowledged Mortgage.
Mortgage of personal property unacknowledged by husband and wife was valid against mortgagors and all persons not creditors of mortgagors or subsequent encumbrancers or purchasers of property in good faith and for value. Nohrnberg v. Boley, 42 Idaho 48, 246 P. 12 (1925).
Unrecorded Mortgages.
Agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee to withhold chattel mortgage from record was evidence of fraudulent intent. In re Hickerson, 162 F. 345 (D. Idaho 1908).
Where chattel mortgage was not filed for record as required by former statute, subsequent purchaser of property was not bound by mortgage unless he was shown to have actual notice of the same. Cowden v. Finney, 9 Idaho 619, 75 P. 765 (1904).
Purchaser at mortgage sale of property acquired by mortgagor subsequent to date of mortgage and mortgaged to another by unrecorded mortgage acquired no interest therein under former statute, making unrecorded mortgages void as to subsequent purchasers. Stoddard v. Ploeger, 42 Idaho 688, 247 P. 791 (1926).
Validity Between Parties.
As between the parties, the chattel mortgages were enforceable and would be given full weight even though they were ineffective as to third persons because of lack of notice. Jordan v. Securities Credit Corp., 79 Idaho 284, 314 P.2d 967 (1957). Writing Required.
Former statute requiring mortgages to be in writing applied to all mortgages whether real or chattel. Willows v. Rosenstien, 5 Idaho 305, 48 P. 1067 (1899); Keane v. Kibble, 28 Idaho 274, 154 P. 972 (1915).
Document assigning moneys due or to become due under certain grain contracts satisfied the requirement of former similar section that there be a written security agreement. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
72 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, § 130.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-203, 9-115(2), (6).
Creation, Attachment, and Enforceability.
2. Creation, Attachment, and Enforceability. Subsection (a) states the general rule that a security interest attaches to collateral only when it becomes enforceable against the debtor. Subsection (b) specifies the circumstances under which a security interest becomes enforceable. Subsection (b) states three basic prerequisites to the existence of a security interest: value (paragraph (1)), rights or power to transfer rights in collateral (paragraph (2)), and agreement plus satisfaction of an evidentiary requirement (paragraph (3)). When all of these elements exist, a security interest becomes enforceable between the parties and attaches under subsection (a). Subsection (c) identifies certain exceptions to the general rule of subsection (b).
Security Agreement; Authentication.
3. Security Agreement; Authentication. Under subsection (b)(3), enforceability requires the debtor’s security agreement and compliance with an evidentiary requirement in the nature of a Statute of Frauds. Paragraph (3)(A) represents the most basic of the evidentiary alternatives, under which the debtor must authenticate a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral. Under Section 9-102, a “security agreement” is “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” Neither that definition nor the requirement of paragraph (3)(A) rejects the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill of sale, although absolute in form, may be shown in fact to have been given as security. Under this Article, as under prior law, a debtor may show by parol evidence that a transfer purporting to be absolute was in fact for security. Similarly, a self-styled “lease” may serve as a security agreement if the agreement creates a security interest. See Section 1-203 (distinguishing security interest from lease).
Possession, Delivery, or Control Pursuant to Security Agreement.
4. Possession, Delivery, or Control Pursuant to Security Agreement. The other alternatives in subsection (b)(3) dispense with the requirement of an authenticated security agreement and provide alternative evidentiary tests. Under paragraph (3)(B), the secured party’s possession substitutes for the debtor’s authentication under paragraph (3)(A) if the secured party’s possession is “pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement.” That phrase refers to the debtor’s agreement to the secured party’s possession for the purpose of creating a security interest. The phrase should not be confused with the phrase “debtor has authenticated a security agreement,” used in paragraph (3)(A), which contemplates the debtor’s authentication of a record. In the unlikely event that possession is obtained without the debtor’s agreement, possession would not suffice as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement. However, once the security interest has become enforceable and has attached, it is not impaired by the fact that the secured party’s possession is maintained without the agreement of a subsequent debtor (e.g., a transferee). Possession as contemplated by Section 9-313 is possession for purposes of subsection (b)(3)(B), even though it may not constitute possession “pursuant to the debtor’s agreement” and consequently might not serve as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement under subsection (b)(3)(A). Subsection (b)(3)(C) provides that delivery of a certificated security to the secured party under Section 8-301 pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement is sufficient as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement. Similarly, under subsection (b)(3)(D), control of investment property, a deposit account, electronic chattel paper, a letter-of-credit right, or electronic documents satisfies the evidentiary test if control is pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement. 5. Collateral Covered by Other Statute or Treaty. One evidentiary purpose of the formal requisites stated in subsection (b) is to minimize the possibility of future disputes as to the terms of a security agreement (e.g., as to the property that stands as collateral for the obligation secured). One should distinguish the evidentiary functions of the formal requisites of attachment and enforceability (such as the requirement that a security agreement contain a description of the collateral) from the more limited goals of “notice filing” for financing statements under Part 5, explained in Section 9-502, Comment 2. When perfection is achieved by compliance with the requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a), such as a federal recording act or a certificate-of-title statute, the manner of describing the collateral in a registry imposed by the statute or treaty may or may not be adequate for purposes of this section and Section 9-108. However, the description contained in the security agreement, not the description in a public registry or on a certificate of title, controls for purposes of this section.
Debtor’s Rights; Debtor’s Power to Transfer Rights.
6. Debtor’s Rights; Debtor’s Power to Transfer Rights. Subsection (b)(2) conditions attachment on the debtor’s having “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party.” A debtor’s limited rights in collateral, short of full ownership, are sufficient for a security interest to attach. However, in accordance with basic personal property conveyancing principles, the baseline rule is that a security interest attaches only to whatever rights a debtor may have, broad or limited as those rights may be.
Certain exceptions to the baseline rule enable a debtor to transfer, and a security interest to attach to, greater rights than the debtor has. See Part 3, Subpart 3 (priority rules). The phrase, “or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party,” accommodates those exceptions. In some cases, a debtor may have power to transfer another person’s rights only to a class of transferees that excludes secured parties. See, e.g., Section 2-403(2) (giving certain merchants power to transfer an entruster’s rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business). Under those circumstances, the debtor would not have the power to create a security interest in the other person’s rights, and the condition in subsection (b)(2) would not be satisfied.
New Debtors.
7. New Debtors. Subsection (e) makes clear that the enforceability requirements of subsection (b)(3) are met when a new debtor becomes bound under an original debtor’s security agreement. If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person, the security agreement satisfies the requirement of subsection (b)(3) as to the existing and after-acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the agreement.
Supporting Obligations.
Subsection (d) explains when a new debtor becomes bound. Persons who become bound under paragraph (2) are limited to those who both become primarily liable for the original debtor’s obligations and succeed to (or acquire) its assets. Thus, the paragraph excludes sureties and other secondary obligors as well as persons who become obligated through veil piercing and other non-successorship doctrines. In many cases, paragraph (2) will exclude successors to the assets and liabilities of a division of a debtor. See also Section 9-508, Comment 3. 8. Supporting Obligations. Under subsection (f), a security interest in a “supporting obligation” (defined in Section 9-102) automatically follows from a security interest in the underlying, supported collateral. This result was implicit under former Article 9. Implicit in subsection (f) is the principle that the secured party’s interest in a supporting obligation extends to the supporting obligation only to the extent that it supports the collateral in which the secured party has a security interest. Complex issues may arise, however, if a supporting obligation supports many separate obligations of a particular account debtor and if the supported obligations are separately assigned as security to several secured parties. The problems may be exacerbated if a supporting obligation is limited to an aggregate amount that is less than the aggregate amount of the obligations it supports. This Article does not contain provisions dealing with competing claims to a limited supporting obligation. As under former Article 9, the law of suretyship and the agreements of the parties will control.
Collateral Follows Right to Payment or Performance.
9. Collateral Follows Right to Payment or Performance. Subsection (g) codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien. See Restatement (3d), Property (Mortgages) § 5.4(a) (1997). See also Section 9-308(e) (analogous rule for perfection).
Investment Property.
10. Investment Property. Subsections (h) and (i) make clear that attachment of a security interest in a securities account or commodity account is also attachment in security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the accounts.
§ 28-9-204. After-acquired property — Future advances.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collateral.
-
A security interest does not attach under a term constituting an after-acquired property clause to:
- Consumer goods, other than an accession when given as additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten (10) days after the secured party gives value; or
- A commercial tort claim.
- A security agreement may provide that collateral secures, or that accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes are sold in connection with, future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-204, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-204, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-204, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 14, p. 781, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Future advances.
Accounts Receivable.
Bank to which contractor had assigned accounts receivable did not waive rights under security agreement as to customer of contractor by failing to object when customer made several checks payable solely to the contractor, contrary to bank’s request that checks be issued payable jointly to the bank and the contractor, where customer had received proper notice of the security agreement and assignment of accounts receivable and had in fact made the first and last check payable jointly. Bank of Commerce v. Intermountain Gas Co., 96 Idaho 29, 523 P.2d 1375 (1974). After-Acquired Property.
A chattel mortgage describing certain property and also providing that the mortgage should cover property which the mortgagor “may hereafter acquire” included personal property acquired after execution of the mortgage. Poage v. Cooperative Publishing Co., 57 Idaho 561, 66 P.2d 1119 (1937).
It was sufficient that the intention of the parties was that after-acquired property should be covered by a chattel mortgage and held as security for the debt, where such was manifest from language of the instrument. Poage v. Cooperative Publishing Co., 57 Idaho 561, 66 P.2d 1119 (1937).
A security interest arising by virtue of an after-acquired property clause is no longer a disfavored arrangement; a security interest will attach in such collateral when value has been given and when the contract has been made. Nevertheless, to protect the interests of debtors, creditors, purchasers and other interested persons, some definiteness and clarity must be imparted by the security agreement itself. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
After-Raised Crop.
Where a mortgage was dated November 28, 1930, it was sufficient to embrace a lien upon a crop of hay raised in 1931 where it provided “all hay grown or now growing or to be grown, on all land owned, leased or controlled by mortgagor during the life of the mortgage.” Livestock Credit Corp. v. Corbett, 53 Idaho 190, 22 P.2d 874 (1933).
Description Sufficient.
Mortgaged property was sufficiently described if a stranger to the instrument would be able to locate and identify the same by inquiries suggested by the instrument itself. McConnell v. Langdon, 3 Idaho 157, 28 P. 403 (1891).
Chattel mortgage describing property as “1333 early spring lambs, branded O—” was sufficient as between parties to mortgage. Hare v. Young, 26 Idaho 691, 146 P. 107 (1915).
Effect of Mortgage.
If mortgage provided that mortgagee could take possession for breach of conditions of mortgage, then courts would have held that such breach of condition coupled with right to possession gave mortgagee such qualified ownership as would enable him to maintain action for conversion. Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 266 P. 659 (1928).
Fraud.
Evidence in the cited case held not to justify a judgment that the notes and mortgage were void for fraud in their execution. West v. Prater, 57 Idaho 583, 67 P.2d 273 (1937). Future Advances.
Absent a clause in the security agreement which clearly covers future advances, such advances do not fall within the scope of the agreement. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
An assignment of “all moneys now due or to become due under certain contracts” held by grain concern was inadequate in providing security for future advances, since there was absolutely no mention in the assignment of future advances. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 105 Idaho 83, 665 P.2d 1093 (Ct. App. 1983).
Mortgagee to Secure Preexisting Debt.
A creditor who accepted a mortgage to secure a preexisting debt could not maintain the position that he was an innocent mortgagee for valuable consideration. Livestock Credit Corp. v. Corbett, 53 Idaho 190, 22 P.2d 874 (1933).
Mortgage on Growing Crops.
When mortgage on growing crops had been recorded, it was notice to all persons claiming to have acquired rights to crop subsequent to record. Adams v. Caldwell Milling & Elevator Co., 33 Idaho 677, 197 P. 723 (1921).
Prior chattel mortgage on crops to be grown was valid, though given to a third party by lessee of premises on which crops were to be grown, after an agreement between him and lessor to cancel the existing lease, where later, with notice of such mortgage, permitted lessee to live on and cultivate premises and, thereafter, entered into a new lease of the premises to lessee. Bank of Roberts v. Olaveson, 38 Idaho 223, 221 P. 560 (1923).
Lien of chattel mortgage upon crop to be sown or grown would not attach to crops sown by others, except insofar as mortgagor had or retained interests in the crop. Lords v. Lava Hot Springs State Bank, 44 Idaho 316, 256 P. 761 (1927).
It must affirmatively appear that crops upon which lien was claimed because of crop mortgage were, in fact, sown by mortgagor or caused to be sown by him. Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 266 P. 659 (1928).
Lien of chattel mortgage did not attach until crop afterward sown, or caused to be sown by mortgagor, came into existence. Albrethsen v. Clements, 48 Idaho 80, 279 P. 1097 (1929).
Proof of Interest.
Although a security interest cannot attach until there is an agreement, the existence of an agreement creating a security interest does not require the use of the words “security interest” but may be based on the actions and conduct of the parties. Barney v. Rigby Loan & Inv. Co., 344 F. Supp. 694 (D. Idaho 1972).
Security Agreement.
This section provides that obligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances or other value; the official comment to this section stresses that the security agreement must so provide. Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994).
Official Comment
Source.
After-Acquired Property; Continuing General Lien.
2. After-Acquired Property; Continuing General Lien. Subsection (a) makes clear that a security interest arising by virtue of an after-acquired property clause is no less valid than a security interest in collateral in which the debtor has rights at the time value is given. A security interest in after-acquired property is not merely an “equitable” interest; no further action by the secured party-such as a supplemental agreement covering the new collateral-is required. This section adopts the principle of a “continuing general lien” or “floating lien.” It validates a security interest in the debtor’s existing and (upon acquisition) future assets, even though the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral. See Section 9-205. Subsection (a), together with subsection (c), also validates “cross-collateral” clauses under which collateral acquired at any time secures advances whenever made.
After-Acquired Consumer Goods.
3. After-Acquired Consumer Goods. Subsection (b)(1) makes ineffective an after-acquired property clause covering consumer goods (defined in Section 9-109), except as accessions (see Section 9-335), acquired more than 10 days after the secured party gives value. Subsection (b)(1) is unchanged in substance from the corresponding provision in former Section 9-204(2).
Commercial Tort Claims.
4. Commercial Tort Claims. Subsection (b)(2) provides that an after-acquired property clause in a security agreement does not reach future commercial tort claims. In order for a security interest in a tort claim to attach, the claim must be in existence when the security agreement is authenticated. In addition, the security agreement must describe the tort claim with greater specificity than simply “all tort claims.” See Section 9-108(e).
Future Advances; Obligations Secured.
5. Future Advances; Obligations Secured. Under subsection (c) collateral may secure future as well as past or present advances if the security agreement so provides. This is in line with the policy of this Article toward security interests in after-acquired property under subsection (a). Indeed, the parties are free to agree that a security interest secures any obligation whatsoever. Determining the obligations secured by collateral is solely a matter of construing the parties’ agreement under applicable law. This Article rejects the holdings of cases decided under former Article 9 that applied other tests, such as whether a future advance or other subsequently incurred obligation was of the same or a similar type or class as earlier advances and obligations secured by the collateral.
Sales of Receivables.
6. Sales of Receivables. Subsections (a) and (c) expressly validate after-acquired property and future advance clauses not only when the transaction is for security purposes but also when the transaction is the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. This result was implicit under former Article 9.
Financing Statements.
§ 28-9-205. Use or disposition of collateral permissible.
-
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors solely because:
-
The debtor has the right or ability to:
- use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral, including returned or repossessed goods;
- collect, compromise, enforce or otherwise deal with collateral;
- accept the return of collateral or make repossessions; or
- use, commingle or dispose of proceeds; or
- The secured party fails to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral.
-
The debtor has the right or ability to:
- This section does not relax the requirements of possession if attachment, perfection or enforcement of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured party.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-205, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-205, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-205, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 15, p. 781, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
While mortgage on a stock of goods which permitted mortgagor to remain in the full and free use and enjoyment of the same was void in that it permitted him to sell the goods in the usual course of trade, yet such a mortgage was valid when it covered wood corded and standing in forest where it had been cut. Meyer v. Munro, 9 Idaho 46, 71 P. 969 (1903).
Mortgage upon stock of goods remaining in hands of mortgagor with power to dispose of the same was void as to third parties. In re Hickerson, 162 F. 345 (D. Idaho 1908).
Official Comment
Source.
Validity of Unrestricted “Floating Lien.”
2. Validity of Unrestricted “Floating Lien.” This Article expressly validates the “floating lien” on shifting collateral. See Sections 9-201, 9-204 and Comment 2. This section provides that a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent by reason of the debtor’s liberty to dispose of the collateral without being required to account to the secured party for proceeds or substitute new collateral. As did former Section 9-205, this section repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), and other cases which held such arrangements void as a matter of law because the debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over collateral. The Benedict rule did not effectively discourage or eliminate security transactions in inventory and receivables. Instead, it forced financing arrangements to be self-liquidating. Although this section repeals Benedict, the filing and other perfection requirements (see Part 3, Subpart 2, and Part 5) provide for public notice that overcomes any potential misleading effects of a debtor’s use and control of collateral. Moreover, nothing in this section prevents the debtor and secured party from agreeing to procedures by which the secured party polices or monitors collateral or to restrictions on the debtor’s dominion. However, this Article leaves these matters to agreement based on business considerations, not on legal requirements.
Possessory Security Interests.
3. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (b) makes clear that this section does not relax the requirements for perfection by possession under Section 9-313. If a secured party allows the debtor access to and control over collateral its security interest may be or become unperfected.
Permissible Freedom for Debtor to Enforce Collateral.
§ 28-9-206. Security interest arising in purchase or delivery of financial asset.
-
A security interest in favor of a securities intermediary attaches to a person’s security entitlement if:
- The person buys a financial asset through the securities intermediary in a transaction in which the person is obligated to pay the purchase price to the securities intermediary at the time of the purchase; and
- The securities intermediary credits the financial asset to the buyer’s securities account before the buyer pays the securities intermediary.
- The security interest described in subsection (a) of this section secures the person’s obligation to pay for the financial asset.
-
A security interest in favor of a person that delivers a certificated security or other financial asset represented by a writing attaches to the security or other financial asset if:
-
The security or other financial asset:
- in the ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment; and
- is delivered under an agreement between persons in the business of dealing with such securities or financial assets; and
- The agreement calls for delivery against payment.
-
The security or other financial asset:
- The security interest described in subsection (c) of this section secures the obligation to make payment for the delivery.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-206, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-206, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-206, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Official Comment
Source.
Codification of “Broker’s Lien.”
2. Codification of “Broker’s Lien.” Depending upon a securities intermediary’s arrangements with its entitlement holders, the securities intermediary may treat the entitlement holder as entitled to financial assets before the entitlement holder has actually made payment for them. For example, many brokers permit retail customers to pay for financial assets by check. The broker may not receive final payment of the check until several days after the broker has credited the customer’s securities account for the financial assets. Thus, the customer will have acquired a security entitlement prior to payment. Subsection (a) provides that, in such circumstances, the securities intermediary has a security interest in the entitlement holder’s security entitlement. Under subsection (b) the security interest secures the customer’s obligation to pay for the financial asset in question. Subsections (a) and (b) codify and adapt to the indirect holding system the so-called “broker’s lien,” which has long been recognized. See Restatement, Security § 12. 3. Financial Assets Delivered Against Payment. Subsection (c) creates a security interest in favor of persons who deliver certificated securities or other financial assets in physical form, such as money market instruments, if the agreed payment is not received. In some arrangements for settlement of transactions in physical financial assets, the seller’s securities custodian will deliver physical certificates to the buyer’s securities custodian and receive a time-stamped delivery receipt. The buyer’s securities custodian will examine the certificate to ensure that it is in good order, and that the delivery matches a trade in which the buyer has instructed the seller to deliver to that custodian. If all is in order, the receiving custodian will settle with the delivering custodian through whatever funds settlement system has been agreed upon or is used by custom and usage in that market. The understanding of the trade, however, is that the delivery is conditioned upon payment, so that if payment is not made for any reason, the security will be returned to the deliverer. Subsection (c) clarifies the rights of persons making deliveries in such circumstances. It provides the person making delivery with a security interest in the securities or other financial assets; under subsection (d), the security interest secures the seller’s right to receive payment for the delivery. Section 8-301 specifies when delivery of a certificated security occurs; that section should be applied as well to other financial assets as well for purposes of this section.
Automatic Attachment and Perfection.
4. Automatic Attachment and Perfection. Subsections (a) and (c) refer to attachment of a security interest. Attachment under this section has the same incidents (enforceability, right to proceeds, etc.) as attachment under Section 9-203. This section overrides the general attachment rules in Section 9-203. See Section 9-203(c). A securities intermediary’s security interest under subsection (a) is perfected by control without further action. See Section 8-106 (control); 9-314 (perfection). Security interests arising under subsection (c) are automatically perfected. See Section 9-309(9).
§ 28-9-207. Rights and duties of secured party having possession or control of collateral.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, a secured party shall use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party’s possession. In the case of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, if a secured party has possession of collateral:
- Reasonable expenses, including the cost of insurance and payment of taxes or other charges, incurred in the custody, preservation, use or operation of the collateral are chargeable to the debtor and are secured by the collateral;
- The risk of accidental loss or damage is on the debtor to the extent of a deficiency in any effective insurance coverage;
- The secured party shall keep the collateral identifiable, but fungible collateral may be commingled; and
-
The secured party may use or operate the collateral:
- for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its value;
- as permitted by an order of a court having competent jurisdiction; or
- except in the case of consumer goods, in the manner and to the extent agreed by the debtor.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, a secured party having possession of collateral or control of collateral under section 28-7-106, 28-9-104, 28-9-105, 28-9-106 or 28-9-107[, Idaho Code]:
- May hold as additional security any proceeds, except money or funds, received from the collateral;
- Shall apply money or funds received from the collateral to reduce the secured obligation, unless remitted to the debtor; and
- May create a security interest in the collateral.
-
If the secured party is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor:
-
Subsection (a) of this section does not apply unless the secured party is entitled under an agreement:
- to charge back uncollected collateral; or
- otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor based on the nonpayment or other default of an account debtor or other obligor on the collateral; and
- Subsections (b) and (c) of this section do not apply.
-
Subsection (a) of this section does not apply unless the secured party is entitled under an agreement:
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-207, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 23, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-207, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-207, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion at the end of the introductory paragraph in subsection (c) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Pledge of Stock.
Holder of stock as pledgee, having also a mortgage on land for improvement and benefit of which the pledged stock was used in the beginning and was used at time mortgage and pledge were taken, might, while debt remains unpaid, control the stock and its benefits. Feltham v. Sunnyside Pipe Line Co., 50 Idaho 349, 295 P. 1112 (1931).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
Official Comment
Source.
Duty of Care for Collateral in Secured Party’s Possession.
2. Duty of Care for Collateral in Secured Party’s Possession. Like former section 9-207, subsection (a) imposes a duty of care, similar to that imposed on a pledgee at common law, on a secured party in possession of collateral. See Restatement, Security §§ 17, 18. In many cases a secured party in possession of collateral may satisfy this duty by notifying the debtor of action that should be taken and allowing the debtor to take the action itself. If the secured party itself takes action, its reasonable expenses may be added to the secured obligation. The revised definitions of “collateral,” “debtor,” and “secured party” in Section 9-102 make this section applicable to collateral subject to an agricultural lien if the collateral is in the lienholder’s possession. Under Section 1-302 the duty to exercise reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agreement, although under that section the parties remain free to determine by agreement standards that are not manifestly unreasonable as to what constitutes reasonable care. Unless otherwise agreed, for a secured party in possession of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes the preservation of rights against prior parties. The secured party’s right to have instruments or documents indorsed or transferred to it or its order is dealt with in the relevant sections of Articles 3, 7, and 8. See Sections 3-203(c), 7-506, 8-304(d).
Specific Rules When Secured Party in Possession or Control of Collateral.
3. Specific Rules When Secured Party in Possession or Control of Collateral. Subsections (b) and (c) provide rules following common-law precedents which apply unless the parties otherwise agree. The rules in subsection (b) apply to typical issues that may arise while a secured party is in possession of collateral, including expenses, insurance, and taxes, risk of loss or damage, identifiable and fungible collateral, and use or operation of collateral. Subsection (c) contains rules that apply in certain circumstances that may arise when a secured party is in either possession or control of collateral. These circumstances include the secured party’s receiving proceeds from the collateral and the secured party’s creation of a security interest in the collateral. 4. Applicability Following Default. This section applies when the secured party has possession of collateral either before or after default. See Sections 9-601(b), 9-609. Subsection (b)(4)(C) limits agreements concerning the use or operation of collateral to collateral other than consumer goods. Under Section 9-602(1), a debtor cannot waive or vary that limitation.
“Repledges” and Right of Redemption.
5. “Repledges” and Right of Redemption. Subsection (c)(3) eliminates the qualification in former Section 9-207 to the effect that the terms of a “repledge” may not “impair” a debtor’s “right to redeem” collateral. The change is primarily for clarification. There is no basis on which to draw from subsection (c)(3) any inference concerning the debtor’s right to redeem the collateral. The debtor enjoys that right under Section 9-623; this section need not address it. For example, if the collateral is a negotiable note that the secured party (SP-1) repledges to SP-2, nothing in this section suggests that the debtor (D) does not retain the right to redeem the note upon payment to SP-1 of all obligations secured by the note. But, as explained below, the debtor’s unimpaired right to redeem as against the debtor’s original secured party nevertheless may not be enforceable as against the new secured party.
In resolving questions that arise from the creation of a security interest by SP-1, one must take care to distinguish D’s rights against SP-1 from D’s rights against SP-2. Once D discharges the secured obligation, D becomes entitled to the note; SP-1 has no legal basis upon which to withhold it. If, as a practical matter, SP-1 is unable to return the note because SP-2 holds it as collateral for SP-1’s unpaid debt, then SP-1 is liable to D under the law of conversion.
Whether SP-2 would be liable to D depends on the relative priority of SP-2’s security interest and D’s interest. By permitting SP-1 to create a security interest in the collateral (repledge), subsection (c)(3) provides a statutory power for SP-1 to give SP-2 a security interest (subject, of course, to any agreement by SP-1 not to give a security interest). In the vast majority of cases where repledge rights are significant, the security interest of the second secured party, SP-2 in the example, will be senior to the debtor’s interest. By virtue of the debtor’s consent or applicable legal rules, SP-2 typically would cut off D’s rights in investment property or be immune from D’s claims. See Sections 9-331, 3-306 (holder in due course), 8-303 (protected purchaser), 8-502 (acquisition of a security entitlement), 8-503(e) (action by entitlement holder). Moreover, the expectations and business practices in some markets, such as the securities markets, are such that D’s consent to SP-2’s taking free of D’s rights inheres in D’s creation of SP-1’s security interest which gives rise to SP-1’s power under this section. In these situations, D would have no right to recover the collateral or recover damages from SP-2. Nevertheless, D would have a damage claim against SP-1 if SP-1 had given a security interest to SP-2 in breach of its agreement with D. Moreover, if SP-2’s security interest secures an amount that is less than the amount secured by SP-1’s security interest (granted by D), then D’s exercise of its right to redeem would provide value sufficient to discharge SP-1’s obligations to SP-2.
“Repledges” of Investment Property.
Example.
Example. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Alpha does not have an account with Able. Alpha uses Beta Bank as its securities custodian. Debtor instructs Able to transfer the shares to Beta, for the account of Alpha, and Able does so. Beta then credits Alpha’s account. Alpha has control of the security entitlement for the 1000 shares under Section 8-106(d). (These are the facts of Example 2, Section 8-106, Comment 4.) Although, as between Debtor and Alpha, Debtor may have become the beneficial owner of the new securities entitlement with Beta, Beta has agreed to act on Alpha’s entitlement orders because, as between Beta and Alpha, Alpha has become the entitlement holder.
Next, Alpha grants Gamma Bank a security interest in the security entitlement with Beta that includes the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. In order to afford Gamma control of the entitlement, Alpha instructs Beta to transfer the stock to Gamma’s custodian, Delta Bank, which credits Gamma’s account for 1000 shares. At this point Gamma holds its securities entitlement for its benefit as well as that of its debtor, Alpha. Alpha’s derivative rights also are for the benefit of Debtor.
In many, probably most, situations and at any particular point in time, it will be impossible for Debtor or Alpha to “trace” Alpha’s “repledge” to any particular securities entitlement or financial asset of Gamma or anyone else. Debtor would retain, of course, a right to redeem the collateral from Alpha upon satisfaction of the secured obligation. However, in the absence of a traceable interest, Debtor would retain only a personal claim against Alpha in the event Alpha failed to restore the security entitlement to Debtor. Moreover, even in the unlikely event that Debtor could trace a property interest, in the context of the financial markets, normally the operation of this section, Debtor’s explicit agreement to permit Alpha to create a senior security interest, or legal rules permitting Gamma to cut off Debtor’s rights or become immune from Debtor’s claims would effectively subordinate Debtor’s interest to the holder of a security interest created by Alpha. And, under the shelter principle, all subsequent transferees would obtain interests to which Debtor’s interest also would be subordinate.
Buyers of Chattel Paper and Other Receivables; Consignors.
7. Buyers of Chattel Paper and Other Receivables; Consignors. This section has been revised to reflect the fact that a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes retains no interest in the collateral and so is not disadvantaged by the secured party’s noncompliance with the requirements of this section. Accordingly, subsection (d) provides that subsection (a) applies only to security interests that secure an obligation and to sales of receivables in which the buyer has recourse against the debtor. (Of course, a buyer of accounts or payment intangibles could not have “possession” of original collateral, but might have possession of proceeds, such as promissory notes or checks.) The meaning of “recourse” in this respect is limited to recourse arising out of the account debtor’s failure to pay or other default.
Subsection (d) makes subsections (b) and (c) inapplicable to buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes and consignors. Of course, there is no reason to believe that a buyer of receivables or a consignor could not, for example, create a security interest or otherwise transfer an interest in the collateral, regardless of who has possession of the collateral. However, this section leaves the rights of those owners to law other than Article 9.
§ 28-9-208. Additional duties of secured party having control of collateral.
- This section applies to cases in which there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.
-
Within ten (10) days after receiving an authenticated demand by the debtor:
- A secured party having control of a deposit account under section 28-9-104(a)(2)[, Idaho Code,] shall send to the bank with which the deposit account is maintained an authenticated statement that releases the bank from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party;
-
A secured party having control of a deposit account under section 28-9-104(a)(3)[, Idaho Code,] shall:
- pay the debtor the balance on deposit in the deposit account; or
- transfer the balance on deposit into a deposit account in the debtor’s name;
-
A secured party, other than a buyer, having control of electronic chattel paper under section 28-9-105[, Idaho Code,] shall:
- communicate the authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper to the debtor or its designated custodian;
- if the debtor designates a custodian that is the designated custodian with which the authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper is maintained for the secured party, communicate to the custodian an authenticated record releasing the designated custodian from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party and instructing the custodian to comply with instructions originated by the debtor; and
- take appropriate action to enable the debtor or its designated custodian to make copies of or revisions to the authoritative copy which add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy without the consent of the secured party;
- A secured party having control of investment property under section 28-8-106(4)(b) or 28-9-106(b)[, Idaho Code,] shall send to the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary with which the security entitlement or commodity contract is maintained an authenticated record that releases the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary from any further obligation to comply with entitlement orders or directions originated by the secured party; and
- A secured party having control of a letter of credit right under section 28-9-107[, Idaho Code,] shall send to each person having an unfulfilled obligation to pay or deliver proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party an authenticated release from any further obligation to pay or deliver proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party.
-
A secured party having control of an electronic document shall:
- Give control of the electronic document to the debtor or its designated custodian;
- If the debtor designates a custodian that is the designated custodian with which the authoritative copy of the electronic document is maintained for the secured party, communicate to the custodian an authenticated record releasing the designated custodian from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party and instructing the custodian to comply with instructions originated by the debtor; and
- Take appropriate action to enable the debtor or its designated custodian to make copies of or revisions to the authoritative copy which add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy without the consent of the secured party. History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-208, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 24, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-208, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-208, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout subsection (b) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Official Comment
Source.
Scope and Purpose.
2. Scope and Purpose. This section imposes duties on a secured party who has control of a deposit account, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or a letter-of-credit right. The duty to terminate the secured party’s control is analogous to the duty to file a termination statement, imposed by Section 9-513. Under subsection (a), it applies only when there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to give value. The requirements of this section can be varied by agreement under Section 1-102(3). For example, a debtor could by contract agree that the secured party may comply with subsection (b) by releasing control more than 10 days after demand. Also, duties under this section should not be read to conflict with the terms of the collateral itself. For example, if the collateral is a time deposit account, subsection (b)(2) should not require a secured party with control to make an early withdrawal of the funds (assuming that were possible) in order to pay them over to the debtor or put them in an account in the debtor’s name.
Remedy for Failure to Relinquish Control.
3. Remedy for Failure to Relinquish Control. If a secured party fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (b), the debtor has the remedy set forth in Section 9-625(e). This remedy is identical to that applicable to failure to provide or file a termination statement under Section 9-513.
Duty to Relinquish Possession.
§ 28-9-209. Duties of secured party if account debtor has been notified of assignment.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), this section applies if:
- There is no outstanding secured obligation; and
- The secured party is not committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.
- Within ten (10) days after receiving an authenticated demand by the debtor, a secured party shall send to an account debtor that has received notification of an assignment to the secured party as assignee under section 28-9-406(a)[, Idaho Code,] an authenticated record that releases the account debtor from any further obligation to the secured party.
- This section does not apply to an assignment constituting the sale of an account, chattel paper or payment intangible.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-209, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion near the end of subsection (b) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Scope and Purpose.
2. Scope and Purpose. Like Sections 9-208 and 9-513, which require a secured party to relinquish control of collateral and to file or provide a termination statement for a financing statement, this section requires a secured party to free up collateral when there no longer is any outstanding secured obligation or any commitment to give value in the future. This section addresses the case in which account debtors have been notified to pay a secured party to whom the receivables have been assigned. It requires the secured party (assignee) to inform the account debtors that they no longer are obligated to make payment to the secured party. See subsection (b). It does not apply to account debtors whose obligations on an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible have been sold. See subsection (c).
§ 28-9-210. Request for accounting — Request regarding list of collateral or statement of account.
-
In this section:
- “Request” means a record of a type described in paragraph (2), (3) or (4) of this subsection.
- “Request for an accounting” means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient provide an accounting of the unpaid obligations secured by collateral and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.
- “Request regarding a list of collateral” means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient approve or correct a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral securing an obligation and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.
- “Request regarding a statement of account” means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient approve or correct a statement indicating what the debtor believes to be the aggregate amount of unpaid obligations secured by collateral as of a specified date and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.
-
Subject to subsections (c), (d), (e) and (f) of this section, a secured party, other than a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor, shall comply with a request within fourteen (14) days after receipt:
- In the case of a request for an accounting, by authenticating and sending to the debtor an accounting; and
- In the case of a request regarding a list of collateral or a request regarding a statement of account, by authenticating and sending to the debtor an approval or correction.
- A secured party that claims a security interest in all of a particular type of collateral owned by the debtor may comply with a request regarding a list of collateral by sending to the debtor an authenticated record including a statement to that effect within fourteen (14) days after receipt.
-
A person that receives a request regarding a list of collateral, claims no interest in the collateral when it receives the request, and claimed an interest in the collateral at an earlier time shall comply with the request within fourteen (14) days after receipt by sending to the debtor an authenticated record:
- Disclaiming any interest in the collateral; and
- If known to the recipient, providing the name and mailing address of any assignee of or successor to the recipient’s interest in the collateral.
-
A person that receives a request for an accounting or a request regarding a statement of account, claims no interest in the obligations when it receives the request, and claimed an interest in the obligations at an earlier time shall comply with the request within fourteen (14) days after receipt by sending to the debtor an authenticated record:
- Disclaiming any interest in the obligations; and
- If known to the recipient, providing the name and mailing address of any assignee of or successor to the recipient’s interest in the obligations.
- A debtor is entitled without charge to one (1) response to a request under this section during any six (6) month period. The secured party may require payment of a charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each additional response. History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-210, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Scope and Purpose.
2. Scope and Purpose. This section provides a procedure whereby a debtor may obtain from a secured party information about the secured obligation and the collateral in which the secured party may claim a security interest. It clarifies and resolves some of the issues that arose under former Section 9-208 and makes information concerning the secured indebtedness readily available to debtors, both before and after default. It applies to agricultural lien transactions (see the definitions of “debtor,” “secured party,” and “collateral” in Section 9-102), but generally not to sales of receivables. See subsection (b).
Requests by Debtors Only.
3. Requests by Debtors Only. A financing statement filed under Part 5 may disclose only that a secured party may have a security interest in specified types of collateral. In most cases the financing statement will contain no indication of the obligation (if any) secured, whether any security interest actually exists, or the particular property subject to a security interest. Because creditors of and prospective purchasers from a debtor may have legitimate needs for more detailed information, it is necessary to provide a procedure under which the secured party will be required to provide information. On the other hand, the secured party should not be under a duty to disclose any details of the debtor’s financial affairs to any casual inquirer or competitor who may inquire. For this reason, this section gives the right to request information to the debtor only. The debtor may submit a request in connection with negotiations with subsequent creditors and purchasers, as well as for the purpose of determining the status of its credit relationship or demonstrating which of its assets are free of a security interest.
Permitted Types of Requests for Information.
4. Permitted Types of Requests for Information. Subsection (a) contemplates that a debtor may request three types of information by submitting three types of “requests” to the secured party. First, the debtor may request the secured party to prepare and send an “accounting” (defined in Section 9-102). Second, the debtor may submit to the secured party a list of collateral for the secured party’s approval or correction. Third, the debtor may submit to the secured party for its approval or correction a statement of the aggregate amount of unpaid secured obligations. Inasmuch as a secured party may have numerous transactions and relationships with a debtor, each request must identify the relevant transactions or relationships. Subsections (b) and (c) require the secured party to respond to a request within 14 days following receipt of the request.
Recipients Claiming No Interest in the Transaction.
5. Recipients Claiming No Interest in the Transaction. A debtor may be unaware that a creditor with whom it has dealt has assigned its security interest or the secured obligation. Subsections (d) and (e) impose upon recipients of requests under this section the duty to inform the debtor that they claim no interest in the collateral or secured obligation, respectively, and to inform the debtor of the name and mailing address of any known assignee or successor. As under subsections (b) and (c), a response to a request under subsection (d) or (e) is due 14 days following receipt. 6. Waiver; Remedy for Failure to Comply. The debtor’s rights under this section may not be waived or varied. See Section 9-602(2). Section 9-625 sets forth the remedies for noncompliance with the requirements of this section.
Limitation on Free Responses to Requests.
7. Limitation on Free Responses to Requests. Under subsection (f), during a six-month period a debtor is entitled to receive from the secured party one free response to a request. The debtor is not entitled to a free response to each type of request (i.e., three free responses) during a six-month period.
Part 3 Perfection and Priority
§ 28-9-301. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests.
Except as otherwise provided in sections 28-9-303 through 28-9-306[, Idaho Code], the following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:
- Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.
- While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, while tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money or tangible chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs:
- Perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing;
- Perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and
- The effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.
- The local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as-extracted collateral.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-301, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 25, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-301, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-301, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 16, p. 781; am. 1989, ch. 183, § 1, p. 458; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 9, p. 873, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in the introductory paragraph was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Failure to reperfect.
Actual Notice.
Buyer with actual notice of seller’s conditional sales contract with the seller cannot claim title as a bona fide purchaser on ground that the contract was not recorded. Gordon v. Loer, 57 Idaho 269, 65 P.2d 148 (1937).
After-Acquired Property.
Mortgage given upon chattels to be afterward acquired was valid and binding upon parties thereto and all others having notice of it. Dover Lumber Co. v. Case, 31 Idaho 276, 170 P. 108 (1918).
Applicable law.
In a dispute over whether a vehicle transaction was a true lease or disguised security interest, Idaho law applied because under a security agreement, certificate of title of the vehicle was issued in Idaho and under this section, Idaho law would apply. In re Bumgardner, 183 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995).
Constructive Notice.
A duly recorded mortgage was constructive notice to anyone who bought the mortgaged property. United States v. White, 143 F. Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1956).
Purchaser of potatoes subject to crop mortgage who refused to surrender potatoes after demand by mortgagee thereby became charged with constructive notice of mortgage. Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho 231, 266 P. 659 (1928).
Conversion of Property.
Defendant, who purchased mortgaged property on a ranch located in Gem County, was liable for conversion of mortgaged property where mortgage was recorded in Gem County, but defendant only searched records in Payette County where defendant did business. United States v. White, 143 F. Supp. 754 (D. Idaho 1956). Failure to Reperfect.
Failure to reperfect within four months carries two distinct consequences. First, the security interest becomes unperfected in the future as against the claims of all other secured creditors, regardless of whether they are “purchasers” and remains unperfected until reperfection occurs. Second, the security interest also is deemed to have been unperfected as against the claims of “purchasers” during the elapsed four-month period. Rockwell Int’l Credit Corp. v. Valley Bank, 109 Idaho 406, 707 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1985).
Lack of Knowledge of Unperfected Interest.
The mere fact that the purchaser knew, when he purchased the farm disc that consignment exchange owed the seller $3,000 for the disc was not equivalent to knowledge that the seller had retained a security interest; therefore, the buyer acquired the farm disc with priority over the seller’s unperfected security interest. Seitz v. Stecklein, 111 Idaho 364, 723 P.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1986).
Removal of Goods from Other Jurisdiction.
With regard to boat and motor originally purchased in Nevada, registration of the boat in Idaho did not defeat finance company’s security interest in the boat and motor where said security interest was perfected in Nevada. In re Aguiar, 116 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
Unperfected Interest.
The debtor’s partner in a used car dealership was among the “third parties” bound by the bank’s unperfected security interest in the car, where even if the partner had a purchase money security interest, it was not “perfected” at the time the debtor acquired the automobile because the partner never filed a financing statement, nor did he “perfect” any purported security interest by taking possession of the collateral until long after the purchase had occurred. First Sec. Bank v. Woolf, 111 Idaho 680, 726 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1986).
Unrecorded Mortgage.
Where chattel mortgage was not filed of record, subsequent purchaser of property was not bound by mortgage unless he was shown to have had actual notice of the same. Cowden v. Finney, 9 Idaho 619, 75 P. 765 (1904).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Idaho Law Review.
Idaho Law Review. — Choice of Law in Idaho: A Survey and Critique of Idaho Cases, Andrew S. Jorgensen. 49 Idaho L. Rev. 547 (2013).
Am. Jur. 2d.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-103(1)(a), (b), 9-103(3)(a), (b), 9-103(5), substantially modified.
Scope of This Subpart.
2. Scope of This Subpart. Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307) contains choice-of-law rules similar to those of former Section 9-103. Former Section 9-103 generally addresses which State’s law governs “perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of” security interests. See, e.g., former Section 9-103(1)(b). This Article follows the broader and more precise formulation in former Section 9-103(6)(b), which was revised in connection with the promulgation of Revised Article 8 in 1994: “perfection, the effect of perfection or non-perfection, and the priority of” security interests. Priority, in this context, subsumes all of the rules in Part 3, including “cut off” or “take free” rules such as Sections 9-317(b), (c), and (d), 9-320(a), (b), and (d), and 9-332. This subpart does not address choice of law for other purposes. For example, the law applicable to issues such as attachment, validity, characterization (e.g., true lease or security interest), and enforcement is governed by the rules in Section 1-301; that governing law typically is specified in the same agreement that contains the security agreement. And, another jurisdiction’s law may govern other third-party matters addressed in this Article. See Section 9-401, Comment 3.
Scope of Referral.
3. Scope of Referral. In designating the jurisdiction whose law governs, this Article directs the court to apply only the substantive (“local”) law of a particular jurisdiction and not its choice-of-law rules.
Example 1:
Example 1: Litigation over the priority of a security interest in accounts arises in State X. State X has adopted the official text of this Article, which provides that priority is determined by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. See Section 9-301(1). The debtor is located in State Y. Even if State Y has retained former Article 9 or enacted a nonuniform choice-of-law rule (e.g., one that provides that perfection is governed by the law of State Z), a State X court should look only to the substantive law of State Y and disregard State Y’s choice-of-law rule. State Y’s substantive law (e.g., its Section 9-501) provides that financing statements should be filed in a filing office in State Y. Note, however, that if the identical perfection issue were to be litigated in State Y, the court would look to State Y’s former Section 9-103 or nonuniform 9-301 and conclude that a filing in State Y is ineffective.
Example 2:
Example 2: In the preceding Example, assume that State X has adopted the official text of this Article, and State Y has adopted a nonuniform Section 9-301(1) under which perfection is governed by the whole law of State X, including its choice-of-law rules. If litigation occurs in State X, the court should look to the substantive law of State Y, which provides that financing statements are to be filed in a filing office in State Y. If litigation occurs in State Y, the court should look to the law of State X, whose choice-of-law rule requires that the court apply the substantive law of State Y. Thus, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the litigation arises, the financing statement should be filed in State Y.
Law Governing Perfection: General Rule.
4. Law Governing Perfection: General Rule. Paragraph (1) contains the general rule: the law governing perfection of security interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, as determined under Section 9-307.
Law Governing Perfection: Exceptions.
Paragraph (1) substantially simplifies the choice-of-law rules. Former Section 9-103 contained different choice-of-law rules for different types of collateral. Under Section 9-301(1), the law of a single jurisdiction governs perfection with respect to most types of collateral, both tangible and intangible. Paragraph (1) eliminates the need for former Section 9-103(1)(c), which concerned purchase-money security interests in tangible collateral that is intended to move from one jurisdiction to the other. It is likely to reduce the frequency of cases in which the governing law changes after a financing statement is properly filed. (Presumably, debtors change their own location less frequently than they change the location of their collateral.) The approach taken in paragraph (1) also eliminates some difficult priority issues and the need to distinguish between “mobile” and “ordinary” goods, and it reduces the number of filing offices in which secured parties must file or search when collateral is located in several jurisdictions. 5. Law Governing Perfection: Exceptions. The general rule is subject to several exceptions. It does not apply to goods covered by a certificate of title (see Section 9-303), deposit accounts (see Section 9-304), investment property (see Section 9-305), or letter-of-credit rights (see Section 9-306). Nor does it apply to possessory security interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking possession of the collateral (see paragraph (2)), security interests perfected by filing a fixture filing (see subparagraph (3)(A)), security interests in timber to be cut (subparagraph (3)(B)), or security interests in as-extracted collateral (see paragraph (4)).
Possessory Security Interests.
a. Possessory Security Interests. Paragraph (2) applies to possessory security interests and provides that perfection is governed by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. This is the rule of former Section 9-103(1)(b), except paragraph (2) eliminates the troublesome “last event” test of former law.
The distinction between nonpossessory and possessory security interests creates the potential for the same jurisdiction to apply two different choice-of-law rules to determine perfection in the same collateral. For example, were a secured party in possession of an instrument or document to relinquish possession in reliance on temporary perfection, the applicable law immediately would change from that of the location of the collateral to that of the location of the debtor. The applicability of two different choice-of-law rules for perfection is unlikely to lead to any material practical problems. The perfection rules of one Article 9 jurisdiction are likely to be identical to those of another. Moreover, under paragraph (3), the relative priority of competing security interests in tangible collateral is resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located, regardless of how the security interests are perfected.
Fixture Filings.
b. Fixture Filings. Under the general rule in paragraph (1), a security interest in fixtures may be perfected by filing in the office specified by Section 9-501(a) as enacted in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. However, application of this rule to perfection of a security interest by filing a fixture filing could yield strange results. For example, perfection of a security interest in fixtures located in Arizona and owned by a Delaware corporation would be governed by the law of Delaware. Although Delaware law would send one to a filing office in Arizona for the place to file a financing statement as a fixture filing, see Section 9-501, Delaware law would not take account of local, nonuniform, real-property filing and recording requirements that Arizona law might impose. For this reason, paragraph (3)(A) contains a special rule for security interests perfected by a fixture filing; the law of the jurisdiction in which the fixtures are located governs perfection, including the formal requisites of a fixture filing. Under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Fixtures are “goods” as defined in Section 9-102.
Timber to Be Cut.
The filing of a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral of a transmitting utility constitutes a fixture filing with respect to goods that are or become fixtures. See Section 9-501(b). Accordingly, to perfect a security interest in goods of this kind by a fixture filing, a financing statement must be filed in the office specified by Section 9-501(b) as enacted in the jurisdiction in which the goods are located. If the fixtures collateral is located in more than one State, filing in all of those States will be necessary to perfect a security interest in all the fixtures collateral by a fixture filing. Of course, a security interest in nearly all types of collateral (including fixtures) of a transmitting utility may be perfected by filing in the office specified by Section 9-501(b) as enacted in the jurisdiction in which the transmitting utility is located. However, such a filing will not be effective as a fixture filing except with respect to goods that are located in that jurisdiction. c. Timber to Be Cut. Application of the general rule in paragraph (1) to perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut would yield undesirable results analogous to those described with respect to fixtures. Paragraph (3)(B) adopts a similar solution: perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the timber is located. As with fixtures, under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Timber to be cut also is “goods” as defined in Section 9-102.
Paragraph (3)(B) applies only to “timber to be cut,” not to timber that has been cut. Consequently, once the timber is cut, the general choice-of-law rule in paragraph (1) becomes applicable. To ensure continued perfection, a secured party should file in both the jurisdiction in which the timber to be cut is located and in the state where the debtor is located. The former filing would be with the office in which a real property mortgage would be filed, and the latter would be a central filing. See Section 9-501.
As-Extracted Collateral.
d. As-Extracted Collateral. Paragraph (4) adopts the rule of former Section 9-103(5) with respect to certain security interests in minerals and related accounts. Like security interests in fixtures perfected by filing a fixture filing, security interests in minerals that are as-extracted collateral are perfected by filing in the office designated for the filing or recording of a mortgage on the real property. For the same reasons, the law governing perfection and priority is the law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located.
Change in Law Governing Perfection.
6. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under paragraph (1) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in collateral under paragraph (2) changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction. Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(a), (b).
Law Governing Effect of Perfection and Priority: Goods, Documents, Instruments, Money, Negotiable Documents, and Tangible Chattel Paper.
7. Law Governing Effect of Perfection and Priority: Goods, Documents, Instruments, Money, Negotiable Documents, and Tangible Chattel Paper. Under former Section 9-103, the law of a single jurisdiction governed both questions of perfection and those of priority. This Article generally adopts that approach. See paragraph (1). But the approach may create problems if the debtor and collateral are located in different jurisdictions. For example, assume a security interest in equipment located in Pennsylvania is perfected by filing in Illinois, where the debtor is located. If the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located were to govern priority, then the priority of an execution lien on goods located in Pennsylvania would be governed by rules enacted by the Illinois legislature.
To address this problem, paragraph (3)(C) divorces questions of perfection from questions of “the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a security interest.” Under paragraph (3)(C), the rights of competing claimants to tangible collateral are resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. A similar bifurcation applied to security interests in investment property under former Section 9-103(6). See Section 9-305. Paragraph (3)(C) applies the law of the situs to determine priority only with respect to goods (including fixtures), instruments, money, negotiable documents, and tangible chattel paper. Compare former Section 9-103(1), which applied the law of the location of the collateral to documents, instruments, and “ordinary” (as opposed to “mobile”) goods. This Article does not distinguish among types of goods. The ordinary/mobile goods distinction appears to address concerns about where to file and search, rather than concerns about priority. There is no reason to preserve this distinction under the bifurcated approach.
Particularly serious confusion may arise when the choice-of-law rules of a given jurisdiction result in each of two competing security interests in the same collateral being governed by a different priority rule. The potential for this confusion existed under former Section 9-103(4) with respect to chattel paper: Perfection by possession was governed by the law of the location of the paper, whereas perfection by filing was governed by the law of the location of the debtor. Consider the mess that would have been created if the language or interpretation of former Section 9-308 were to differ in the two relevant States, or if one of the relevant jurisdictions (e.g., a foreign country) had not adopted Article 9. The potential for confusion could have been exacerbated when a secured party perfected both by taking possession in the State where the collateral is located (State A) and by filing in the State where the debtor is located (State B)—a common practice for some chattel paper financers. By providing that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located governs priority, paragraph (3) substantially diminishes this problem.
Non-U.S. Debtors.
8. Non-U.S. Debtors. This Article applies the same choice-of-law rules to all debtors, foreign and domestic. For example, it adopts the bifurcated approach for determining the law applicable to security interests in goods and other tangible collateral. See Comment 5.a., above. The Article contains a new rule specifying the location of non-U.S. debtors for purposes of this Part. The rule appears in Section 9-307 and is explained in the Comments to that section. Former Section 9-103(3)(c), which contained a special choice-of-law rule governing security interests created by debtors located in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, proved unsatisfactory and was deleted.
§ 28-9-302. Law governing perfection and priority of agricultural liens.
While farm products are located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of an agricultural lien on the farm products.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-302, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-302, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-302, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 17, p. 781; am. 1981, ch. 246, § 1, p. 492; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 48, p. 329; am. 1988, ch. 265, § 566, p. 549; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 10, p. 873; am. 1996, ch. 178, § 3, p. 567, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Official Comment
Source.
Agricultural Liens.
§ 28-9-303. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title.
- This section applies to goods covered by a certificate of title, even if there is no other relationship between the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered and the goods or the debtor.
- Goods become covered by a certificate of title when a valid application for the certificate of title and the applicable fee are delivered to the appropriate authority. Goods cease to be covered by a certificate of title at the earlier of the time the certificate of title ceases to be effective under the law of the issuing jurisdiction or the time the goods become covered subsequently by a certificate of title issued by another jurisdiction.
- The local law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-303, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-303, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-303, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
CASE NOTES
Under subsection (b), Chapter 7 debtors’ vehicle ceased to be covered by a California certificate of title and became covered by the Idaho certificate of title laws at the time the application for an Idaho title was tendered; Idaho law, therefore, determined whether a creditor’s security interest was perfected prior to the 11 U.S.C.S. § 547 preference period. Gugino v. Wachovia Dealer Servs. (In re Owen), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3318 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 15, 2009).
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(2)(a), (b), substantially revised.
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. This section applies to “goods covered by a certificate of title.” The new definition of “certificate of title” in Section 9-102 makes clear that this section applies not only to certificate-of-title statutes under which perfection occurs upon notation of the security interest on the certificate but also to those that contemplate notation but provide that perfection is achieved by another method, e.g., delivery of designated documents to an official. Subsection (a), which is new, makes clear that this section applies to certificates of a jurisdiction having no other contacts with the goods or the debtor. This result comports with most of the reported cases on the subject and with contemporary business practices in the trucking industry. 3. Law Governing Perfection and Priority. Subsection (c) is the basic choice-of-law rule for goods covered by a certificate of title. Perfection and priority of a security interest are governed by the law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.
Normally, under the law of the relevant jurisdiction, the perfection step would consist of compliance with that jurisdiction’s certificate-of-title statute and a resulting notation of the security interest on the certificate of title. See Section 9-311(b). In the typical case of an automobile or over-the-road truck, a person who wishes to take a security interest in the vehicle can ascertain whether it is subject to any security interests by looking at the certificate of title. But certificates of title cover certain types of goods in some States but not in others. A secured party who does not realize this may extend credit and attempt to perfect by filing in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. If the goods had been titled in another jurisdiction, the lender would be unperfected.
Subsection (b) explains when goods become covered by a certificate of title and when they cease to be covered. Goods may become covered by a certificate of title, even though no certificate of title has issued. Former Section 9-103(2)(b) provided that the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate ceases to apply upon “surrender” of the certificate. This Article eliminates the concept of “surrender.” However, if the certificate is surrendered in conjunction with an appropriate application for a certificate to be issued by another jurisdiction, the law of the original jurisdiction ceases to apply because the goods became covered subsequently by a certificate of title from another jurisdiction. Alternatively, the law of the original jurisdiction ceases to apply when the certificate “ceases to be effective” under the law of that jurisdiction. Given the diversity in certificate-of-title statutes, the term “effective” is not defined.
Continued Perfection.
4. Continued Perfection. The fact that the law of one State ceases to apply under subsection (b) does not mean that a security interest perfected under that law becomes unperfected automatically. In most cases, the security interest will remain perfected. See Section 9-316(d), (e). Moreover, a perfected security interest may be subject to defeat by certain buyers and secured parties. See Section 9-337.
Inventory.
5. Inventory. Compliance with a certificate-of-title statute generally is not the method of perfecting security interests in inventory. Section 9-311(d) provides that a security interest created in inventory held by a person in the business of selling goods of that kind is subject to the normal filing rules; compliance with a certificate-of-title statute is not necessary or effective to perfect the security interest. Most certificate-of-title statutes are in accord.
The following example explains the subtle relationship between this rule and the choice-of-law rules in Section 9-303 and former Section 9-103(2):
Example:
Example: Goods are located in State A and covered by a certificate of title issued under the law of State A. The State A certificate of title is “clean”; it does not reflect a security interest. Owner takes the goods to State B and sells (trades in) the goods to Dealer, who is in the business of selling goods of that kind and is located (within the meaning of Section 9-307) in State B. As is customary, Dealer retains the duly assigned State A certificate of title pending resale of the goods. Dealer’s inventory financer, SP, obtains a security interest in the goods under its after-acquired property clause. Under Section 9-311(d) of both State A and State B, Dealer’s inventory financer, SP, must perfect by filing instead of complying with a certificate-of-title statute. If Section 9-303 were read to provide that the law applicable to perfection of SP’s security interest is that of State A, because the goods are covered by a State A certificate, then SP would be required to file in State A under State A’s Section 9-501. That result would be anomalous, to say the least, since the principle underlying Section 9-311(d) is that the inventory should be treated as ordinary goods.
Section 9-303 (and former Section 9-103(2)) should be read as providing that the law of State B, not State A, applies. A court looking to the forum’s Section 9-303(a) would find that Section 9-303 applies only if two conditions are met: (i) the goods are covered by the certificate as explained in Section 9-303(b), i.e., application had been made for a State (here, State A) to issue a certificate of title covering the goods and (ii) the certificate is a “certificate of title” as defined in Section 9-102, i.e., “a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor.” Stated otherwise, Section 9-303 applies only when compliance with a certificate-of-title statute, and not filing, is the appropriate method of perfection. Under the law of State A, for purposes of perfecting SP’s security interest in the dealer’s inventory , the proper method of perfection is filing-not compliance with State A’s certificate-of-title statute. For that reason, the goods are not covered by a “certificate of title,” and the second condition is not met. Thus, Section 9-303 does not apply to the goods. Instead, Section 9-301 applies, and the applicable law is that of State B, where the debtor (dealer) is located.
External Constraints on This Section.
6. External Constraints on This Section. The need to coordinate Article 9 with a variety of nonuniform certificate-of-title statutes, the need to provide rules to take account of situations in which multiple certificates of title are outstanding with respect to particular goods, and the need to govern the transition from perfection by filing in one jurisdiction to perfection by notation in another all create pressure for a detailed and complex set of rules. In an effort to minimize complexity, this Article does not attempt to coordinate Article 9 with the entire array of certificate-of-title statutes. In particular, Sections 9-303, 9-311, and 9-316(d) and (e) assume that the certificate-of-title statutes to which they apply do not have relation-back provisions (i.e., provisions under which perfection is deemed to occur at a time earlier than when the perfection steps actually are taken). A Legislative Note to Section 9-311 recommends the elimination of relation-back provisions in certificate-of-title statutes affecting perfection of security interests.
Ideally, at any given time, only one certificate of title is outstanding with respect to particular goods. In fact, however, sometimes more than one jurisdiction issues more than one certificate of title with respect to the same goods. This situation results from defects in certificate-of-title laws and the interstate coordination of those laws, not from deficiencies in this Article. As long as the possibility of multiple certificates of title remains, the potential for innocent parties to suffer losses will continue. At best, this Article can identify clearly which innocent parties will bear the losses in familiar fact patterns.
§ 28-9-304. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in deposit accounts.
- The local law of a bank’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a deposit account maintained with that bank.
-
The following rules determine a bank’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part:
- If an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this chapter, or the uniform commercial code, that jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction.
- If paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply and an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction.
- If neither paragraph (1) nor (2) of this subsection applies and an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that the deposit account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction.
- If none of the preceding paragraphs apply, the bank’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the customer’s account is located.
- If none of the preceding paragraphs apply, the bank’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the bank is located.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-304, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2002, ch. 107, § 2, p. 290.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-304, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-304, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 18, p. 781; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 49, p. 329; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 11, p. 873; am. 1996, ch. 7, § 9, p. 9, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. New; derived from Section 8-110(e) and former Section 9-103(6).
Deposit Accounts.
2. Deposit Accounts. Under this section, the law of the “bank’s jurisdiction” governs perfection and priority of a security interest in deposit accounts. Subsection (b) contains rules for determining the “bank’s jurisdiction.” The substance of these rules is substantially similar to that of the rules determining the “security intermediary’s jurisdiction” under former Section 8-110(e), except that subsection (b)(1) provides more flexibility than the analogous provision in former Section 8-110(e)(1). Subsection (b)(1) permits the parties to choose the law of one jurisdiction to govern perfection and priority of security interests and a different governing law for other purposes. The parties’ choice is effective, even if the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no relationship to the parties or the transaction. Section 8-110(e)(1) has been conformed to subsection (b)(1) of this section, and Section 9-305(b)(1), concerning a commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction, makes a similar departure from former Section 9-103(6)(e)(i). 3. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the bank’s jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Nevertheless, the change will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(f), (g).
§ 28-9-305. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in investment property.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, the following rules apply:
- While a security certificate is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in the certificated security represented thereby.
- The local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction as specified in section 28-8-110(4)[, Idaho Code,] governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in an uncertificated security.
- The local law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction as specified in section 28-8-110(5)[, Idaho Code,] governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a security entitlement or securities account.
- The local law of the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account.
-
The following rules determine a commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part:
- If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this chapter, or the uniform commercial code, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction.
- If paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply and an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction.
- If neither paragraph (1) nor (2) of this subsection applies and an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that the commodity account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction.
- If none of the preceding paragraphs apply, the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the commodity customer’s account is located.
- If none of the preceding paragraphs apply, the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the commodity intermediary is located.
-
The local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs:
- Perfection of a security interest in investment property by filing;
- Automatic perfection of a security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities intermediary; and
- Automatic perfection of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account created by a commodity intermediary.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-305, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-305, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-305, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 19, p. 781; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 50, p. 329; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 12, p. 873; am. 1996, ch. 7, § 10, p. 9, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(6).
Investment Property: General Rules.
2. Investment Property: General Rules. This section specifies choice-of-law rules for perfection and priority of security interests in investment property. Subsection (a)(1) covers security interests in certificated securities. Subsection (a)(2) covers security interests in uncertificated securities. Subsection (a)(3) covers security interests in security entitlements and securities accounts. Subsection (a)(4) covers security interests in commodity contracts and commodity accounts. The approach of each of these paragraphs is essentially the same. They identify the jurisdiction’s law that governs questions of perfection and priority by using the same principles that Article 8 uses to determine other questions concerning that form of investment property. Thus, for certificated securities, the law of the jurisdiction in which the certificate is located governs. Cf. Section 8-110(c). For uncertificated securities, the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction governs. Cf. Section 8-110(a). For security entitlements and securities accounts, the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction governs. Cf. Section 8-110(b). For commodity contracts and commodity accounts, the law of the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction governs. Because commodity contracts and commodity accounts are not governed by Article 8, subsection (b) contains rules that specify the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction. These are analogous to the rules in Section 8-110(e) specifying a securities intermediary’s jurisdiction. Subsection (b)(1) affords the parties greater flexibility than did former Section 9-103(6)(3). See also Section 9-304(b) (bank’s jurisdiction); Revised Section 8-110(e)(1) (securities intermediary’s jurisdiction).
Investment Property: Exceptions.
3. Investment Property: Exceptions. Subsection (c) establishes an exception to the general rules set out in subsection (a). It provides that perfection of a security interest by filing, automatic perfection of a security interest in investment property created by a debtor who is a broker or securities intermediary see Section 9-309(10), and automatic perfection of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account of a debtor who is a commodity intermediary see Section 9-309(11) are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located, as determined under Section 9-307.
Examples:
Example 1:
Example 1: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law but expressly provides that the law of California is Able’s jurisdiction for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code. Through the account the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer obtains a margin loan from Able. Subsection (a)(3) provides that California law-the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction-governs perfection and priority of the security interest, even if California has no other relationship to the parties or the transaction. Example 2: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law. Through the account the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer obtains a loan from a lender located in Illinois. The lender takes a security interest and perfects by obtaining an agreement among the debtor, itself, and Able, which satisfies the requirement of Section 8-106(d)(2) to give the lender control. Subsection (a)(3) provides that Pennsylvania law-the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction-governs perfection and priority of the security interest, even if Pennsylvania has no other relationship to the parties or the transaction.
Example 3:
Example 3: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law. Through the account, the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer borrows from SP-1, and SP-1 files a financing statement in New Jersey. Later, the customer obtains a loan from SP-2. SP-2 takes a security interest and perfects by obtaining an agreement among the debtor, itself, and Able, which satisfies the requirement of Section 8-106(d)(2) to give the SP-2 control. Subsection (c) provides that perfection of SP-1’s security interest by filing is governed by the location of the debtor, so the filing in New Jersey was appropriate. Subsection (a)(3), however, provides that Pennsylvania law-the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction-governs all other questions of perfection and priority. Thus, Pennsylvania law governs perfection of SP-2’s security interest, and Pennsylvania law also governs the priority of the security interests of SP-1 and SP-2.
Change in Law Governing Perfection.
5. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the issuer’s jurisdiction, the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction, or commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in a certificated security changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction, see subsection (a)(1), and the law governing perfection by filing changes when the debtor changes its location. See subsection (c). Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(f), (g).
§ 28-9-306. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in letter of credit rights.
- Subject to subsection (c) of this section, the local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction or a nominated person’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a letter of credit right if the issuer’s jurisdiction or nominated person’s jurisdiction is a state.
- For purposes of this part, an issuer’s jurisdiction or nominated person’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction whose law governs the liability of the issuer or nominated person with respect to the letter of credit right as provided in section 28-5-116[, Idaho Code].
- This section does not apply to a security interest that is perfected only under section 28-9-308(d)[, Idaho Code].
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-306, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-306, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-306, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 20, p. 781; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 13, p. 873, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions at the ends of subsections (b) and (c) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. New; derived in part from Section 8-110(e) and former Section 9-103(6).
Sui Generis Treatment.
2. Sui Generis Treatment. This section governs the applicable law for perfection and priority of security interests in letter-of-credit rights, other than a security interest perfected only under Section 9-308(d) (i.e., as a supporting obligation). The treatment differs substantially from that provided in Section 9-304 for deposit accounts. The basic rule is that the law of the issuer’s or nominated person’s (e.g., confirmer’s) jurisdiction, derived from the terms of the letter of credit itself, controls perfection and priority, but only if the issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction is a State, as defined in Section 9-102. If the issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction is not a State, the baseline rule of Section 9-301 applies-perfection and priority are governed by the law of the debtor’s location, determined under Section 9-307. Export transactions typically involve a foreign issuer and a domestic nominated person, such as a confirmer, located in a State. The principal goal of this section is to reduce the likelihood that perfection and priority would be governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction in a transaction that is essentially domestic from the standpoint of the debtor-beneficiary, its creditors, and a domestic nominated person. 3. Issuer’s or Nominated Person’s Jurisdiction. Subsection (b) defers to the rules established under Section 5-116 for determination of an issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction.
Example:
Example: An Italian bank issues a letter of credit that is confirmed by a New York bank. The beneficiary is a Connecticut corporation. The letter of credit provides that the issuer’s liability is governed by Italian law, and the confirmation provides that the confirmer’s liability is governed by the law of New York. Under Sections 9-306(b) and 5-116(a), Italy is the issuer’s jurisdiction and New York is the confirmer’s (nominated person’s) jurisdiction. Because the confirmer’s jurisdiction is a State, the law of New York governs perfection and priority of a security interest in the beneficiary’s letter-of-credit right against the confirmer. See Section 9-306(a). However, because the issuer’s jurisdiction is not a State, the law of that jurisdiction does not govern. See Section 9-306(a). Rather, the choice-of-law rule in Section 9-301(1) applies to perfection and priority of a security interest in the beneficiary’s letter-of-credit right against the issuer. Under that section, perfection and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor (beneficiary) is located. That jurisdiction is Connecticut. See Section 9-307.
Scope of this Section.
4. Scope of this Section. This section specifies only the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of security interests. Section 5-116 specifies the law governing the liability of, and Article 5 (or other applicable law) deals with the rights and duties of, an issuer or nominated person. Perfection, nonperfection, and priority have no effect on those rights and duties.
Change in Law Governing Perfection.
5. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the issuer’s jurisdiction, or nominated person’s jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Nevertheless, this change will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(f), (g).
§ 28-9-307. Location of debtor.
- In this section, “place of business” means a place where a debtor conducts its affairs.
-
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following rules determine a debtor’s location:
- A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual’s principal residence.
- A debtor that is an organization and has only one (1) place of business is located at its place of business.
- A debtor that is an organization and has more than one (1) place of business is located at its chief executive office.
- Subsection (b) of this section applies only if a debtor’s residence, place of business, or chief executive office, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. If subsection (b) of this section does not apply, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.
- A person that ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
- A registered organization that is organized under the law of a state is located in that state.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (i) of this section, a registered organization that is organized under the law of the United States and a branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a state are located:
- In the state that the law of the United States designates, if the law designates a state of location;
- In the state that the registered organization, branch or agency designates, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization, branch or agency to designate its state of location, including by designating its main office, home office or other comparable office; or
- In the District of Columbia, if neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) of this subsection applies.
-
A registered organization continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsection (e) or (f) of this section notwithstanding:
- The suspension, revocation, forfeiture or lapse of the registered organization’s status as such in its jurisdiction of organization; or
- The dissolution, winding up, or cancellation of the existence of the registered organization.
- The United States is located in the District of Columbia.
- A branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a state is located in the state in which the branch or agency is licensed, if all branches and agencies of the bank are licensed in only one (1) state.
- A foreign air carrier under the federal aviation act of 1958, as amended, is located at the designated office of the agent upon which service of process may be made on behalf of the carrier.
- This section applies only for purposes of this part. History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-307, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 3, p. 381.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-307, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-307, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 21, p. 781; am. 1986, ch. 338, § 1, p. 834; am. 1987, ch. 284, § 5, p. 596, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, inserted “including by designating its main office, home office or other comparable office” in paragraph (f)(2).
Federal References.
The federal aviation act of 1958, referred to in subsection (j), is codified as 49 U.S.C.S. § 40101 et seq.
Effective Dates.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Idaho Law Review.
Idaho Law Review. — Choice of Law in Idaho: A Survey and Critique of Idaho Cases, Andrew S. Jorgensen. 49 Idaho L. Rev. 547 (2013).
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(3)(d), substantially revised.
General Rules.
2. General Rules. As a general matter, the location of the debtor determines the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection of a security interest. See Sections 9-301(1), 9-305(c). It also governs priority of a security interest in certain types of intangible collateral, such as accounts, electronic chattel paper, and general intangibles. This section determines the location of the debtor for choice-of-law purposes, but not for other purposes. See subsection (k).
Subsection (b) states the general rules: An individual debtor is deemed to be located at the individual’s principal residence with respect to both personal and business assets. Any other debtor is deemed to be located at its place of business if it has only one, or at its chief executive office if it has more than one place of business.
As used in this section, a “place of business” means a place where the debtor conducts its affairs. See subsection (a). Thus, every organization, even eleemosynary institutions and other organizations that do not conduct “for profit” business activities, has a “place of business.” Under subsection (d), a person who ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction determined by subsection (b).
The term “chief executive office” is not defined in this Section or elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial Code. “Chief executive office” means the place from which the debtor manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs. This is the place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit information, and is the appropriate place for filing. With respect to most multi-state debtors, it will be simple to determine which of the debtor’s offices is the “chief executive office.” Even when a doubt arises, it would be rare that there could be more than two possibilities. A secured party in such a case may protect itself by perfecting under the law of each possible jurisdiction. Similarly, the term “principal residence” is not defined. If the security interest in question is a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods which is perfected upon attachment, see Section 9-309(1), the choice of law may make no difference. In other cases, when a doubt arises, prudence may dictate perfecting under the law of each jurisdiction that might be the debtor’s “principal residence.”
Questions sometimes arise about the location of the debtor with respect to collateral held in a common-law trust. A typical common-law trust is not itself a juridical entity capable of owning property and so would not be a “debtor” as defined in Section 9-102. Rather, the debtor with respect to property held in a common-law trust typically is the trustee of the trust acting in the capacity of trustee. (The beneficiary would be a “debtor” with respect to its beneficial interest in the trust, but not with respect to the property held in the trust.) If a common-law trust has multiple trustees located in different jurisdictions, a secured party who perfects by filing would be well advised to file a financing statement in each jurisdiction in which a trustee is located, as determined under Section 9-307. Filing in all relevant jurisdictions would insure perfection and minimize any priority complications that otherwise might arise.
The general rules are subject to several exceptions, each of which is discussed below.
Non-U.S. Debtors.
Accordingly, subsection (c) provides that the normal rules for determining the location of a debtor (i.e., the rules in subsection (b)) apply only if they yield a location that is “a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral.” The phrase “generally requires” is meant to include legal regimes that generally require notice in a filing or recording system as a condition of perfecting nonpossessory security interests, but which permit perfection by another method (e.g., control, automatic perfection, temporary perfection) in limited circumstances. A jurisdiction that has adopted this Article or an earlier version of this Article is such a jurisdiction. If the rules in subsection (b) yield a jurisdiction whose law does not generally require notice in a filing or registration system and none of the special rules in subsections (e), (f), (i), and (j) applies, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.
Example 1:
Example 1: Debtor is an English corporation with 7 offices in the United States and its chief executive office in London, England. Debtor creates a security interest in its accounts. Under subsection (b)(3), Debtor would be located in England. However, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) applies only if English law generally conditions perfection on giving public notice in a filing, recording, or registration system. Otherwise, Debtor is located in the District of Columbia. Under Section 9-301(1), perfection, the effect of perfection, and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location-here, England or the District of Columbia (depending on the content of English law). Example 2: Debtor is an English corporation with 7 offices in the United States and its chief executive office in London, England. Debtor creates a security interest in equipment located in London. Under subsection (b)(3) Debtor would be located in England. However, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) applies only if English law generally conditions perfection on giving public notice in a filing, recording, or registration system. Otherwise, Debtor is located in the District of Columbia. Under Section 9-301(1), perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, whereas, under Section 9-301(3), the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located—here, England—governs priority.
The foregoing discussion assumes that each transaction bears an appropriate relation to the forum State. In the absence of an appropriate relation, the forum State’s entire UCC, including the choice-of-law provisions in Article 9 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307), will not apply. See Section 9-109, Comment 9.
Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of a State.
4. Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of a State. Under subsection (e), a “registered organization” (defined in Section 9-102 so as to ordinarily include corporations, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and statutory trusts) organized under the law of a “State” (defined in Section 9-102) is located in its State of organization. The term “registered organization” includes a business trust described in the second sentence of the term’s definition. See Section 9-102. The trust’s public organic record, typically the trust agreement, usually will indicate the jurisdiction under whose law the trust is organized.
Subsection (g) makes clear that events affecting the status of a registered organization, such as the dissolution of a corporation or revocation of its charter, do not affect its location for purposes of subsection (e). However, certain of these events may result in, or be accompanied by, a transfer of collateral from the registered organization to another debtor. This section does not determine whether a transfer occurs, nor does it determine the legal consequences of any transfer.
Determining the registered organization-debtor’s location by reference to the jurisdiction of organization could provide some important side benefits for the filing systems. A jurisdiction could structure its filing system so that it would be impossible to make a mistake in a registered organization-debtor’s name on a financing statement. For example, a filer would be informed if a filed record designated an incorrect corporate name for the debtor. Linking filing to the jurisdiction of organization also could reduce pressure on the system imposed by transactions in which registered organizations cease to exist—as a consequence of merger or consolidation, for example. The jurisdiction of organization might prohibit such transactions unless steps were taken to ensure that existing filings were refiled against a successor or terminated by the secured party.
Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of United States; Branches and Agencies of Banks Not Organized Under Law of United States.
5. Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of United States; Branches and Agencies of Banks Not Organized Under Law of United States. Subsection (f) specifies the location of a debtor that is a registered organization organized under the law of the United States. It defers to law of the United States, to the extent that that law determines, or authorizes the debtor to determine, the debtor’s location. Thus, if the law of the United States designates a particular State as the debtor’s location, that State is the debtor’s location for purposes of this Article’s choice-of-law rules. Similarly, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization to designate its State of location, the State that the registered organization designates is the State in which it is located for purposes of this Article’s choice-of-law rules. In other cases, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia. In some cases, the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization to designate a main office, home office, or other comparable office. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. Sections 22 and 1464(a); 12 C.F.R. Section 552.3. Designation of such an office constitutes the designation of the State of location for purposes of Section 9-307 (f)(2).
Subsection (f) also specifies the location of a branch or agency in the United States of a foreign bank that has one or more branches or agencies in the United States. The law of the United States authorizes a foreign bank (or, on behalf of the bank, a federal agency) to designate a single home state for all of the foreign bank’s branches and agencies in the United States. See 12 U.S.C. Section 3103(c) and 12 C.F.R. Section 211.22. As authorized, the designation constitutes the State of location for the branch or agency for purposes of Section 9-307(f), unless all of a foreign bank’s branches or agencies that are in the United States are licensed in only one State, in which case the branches and agencies are located in that State. See subsection (i).
In cases not governed by subsection (f) or (i), the location of a foreign bank is determined by subsections (b) and (c).
United States.
6. United States. To the extent that Article 9 governs (see Sections 1-301, 9-109(c)), the United States is located in the District of Columbia for purposes of this Article’s choice-of-law rules. See subsection (h).
Foreign Air Carriers.
7. Foreign Air Carriers. Subsection (j) follows former Section 9-103(3)(d). To the extent that it is applicable, the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (Geneva Convention) supersedes state legislation on this subject, as set forth in Section 9-311(b), but some nations are not parties to that Convention.
§ 28-9-308. When security interest or agricultural lien is perfected — Continuity of perfection.
- Except as otherwise provided in this section and section 28-9-309[, Idaho Code], a security interest is perfected if it has attached and all of the applicable requirements for perfection in sections 28-9-310 through 28-9-316[, Idaho Code,] have been satisfied. A security interest is perfected when it attaches if the applicable requirements are satisfied before the security interest attaches.
- An agricultural lien is perfected if it has become effective and all of the applicable requirements for perfection in section 28-9-310[, Idaho Code,] have been satisfied. An agricultural lien is perfected when it becomes effective if the applicable requirements are satisfied before the agricultural lien becomes effective.
- A security interest or agricultural lien is perfected continuously if it is originally perfected by one (1) method under this chapter and is later perfected by another method under this chapter, without an intermediate period when it was unperfected.
- Perfection of a security interest in collateral also perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.
- Perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.
- Perfection of a security interest in a securities account also perfects a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.
- Perfection of a security interest in a commodity account also perfects a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-308, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-308, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-308, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 23, p. 781, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (a) and (b) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Perfecting process. Perfection date.
Perfecting Process.
According to the language of§ 49-510, not only must a lienholder file the proper paperwork with the agency to have its security interest deemed perfected under state law, but the notation of that security interest on the actual title certificate is another distinct “condition of perfection”. Additionally, under§ 49-510, a security interest is deemed perfected according to the date noted by the state on the title certificate. Fitzgerald v. First Sec. Bank (In re Walker), 161 Bankr. 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), aff’d, 178 Bankr. 497 (D. Idaho 1994), aff’d, 77 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1996).
The creditor must provide the lien creation date on the title certificate application in order for the state to perform its duty of noting such as the recording date on the title certificate. Failure to note this crucial information is just as fatal to proper perfection of a lien as would be neglecting to supply the name of the lienholder. Fitzgerald v. First Sec. Bank (In re Walker), 161 Bankr. 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), aff’d, 178 Bankr. 497 (D. Idaho 1994), aff’d, 77 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1996).
Perfection Date.
The date on the title certificate constitutes the lender’s perfection date; great uncertainty would be injected into transactions involving motor vehicles if parties were allowed to impeach or contradict the lien recording information on title certificates with non-record facts. Fitzgerald v. First Sec. Bank (In re Walker), 161 Bankr. 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), aff’d, 178 Bankr. 497 (D. Idaho 1994), aff’d, 77 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1996).
When Not Perfected.
The function of the financing statement requirement is to give notice of a potential interest in property of a specifically identified debtor as well as means by which an inquiring party may acquire more detailed information concerning that interest; therefore, a financing statement which did not contain the address of either the debtor or the creditor did not contain the information required, and the filing of such a statement did not constitute perfection of the security interest. Wood v. Pillsbury Co., 38 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983).
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-303, 9-115(2).
General Rule.
2. General Rule. This Article uses the term “attach” to describe the point at which property becomes subject to a security interest. The requisites for attachment are stated in Section 9-203. When it attaches, a security interest may be either perfected or unperfected. “Perfected” means that the security interest has attached and the secured party has taken all the steps required by this Article as specified in Sections 9-310 through 9-316. A perfected security interest may still be or become subordinate to other interests. See, e.g., Sections 9-320, 9-322. However, in general, after perfection the secured party is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and, in particular, against any representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor. See, e.g., Section 9-317. Subsection (a) explains that the time of perfection is when the security interest has attached and any necessary steps for perfection, such as taking possession or filing, have been taken. The “except” clause refers to the perfection-upon-attachment rules appearing in Section 9-309. It also reflects that other subsections of this section, e.g., subsection (d), contain automatic-perfection rules. If the steps for perfection have been taken in advance, as when the secured party files a financing statement before giving value or before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral, then the security interest is perfected when it attaches.
Agricultural Liens.
3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (b) is new. It describes the elements of perfection of an agricultural lien.
Continuous Perfection.
4. Continuous Perfection. The following example illustrates the operation of subsection (c):
Example 1:
Example 1: Debtor, an importer, creates a security interest in goods that it imports and the documents of title that cover the goods. The secured party, Bank, takes possession of a tangible negotiable bill of lading covering certain imported goods and thereby perfects its security interest in the bill of lading and the goods. See Sections 9-313(a), 9-312(c)(1). Bank releases the bill of lading to the debtor for the purpose of procuring the goods from the carrier and selling them. Under Section 9-312(f), Bank continues to have a perfected security interest in the document and goods for 20 days. Bank files a financing statement covering the collateral before the expiration of the 20-day period. Its security interest now continues perfected for as long as the filing is good.
If the successive stages of Bank’s security interest succeed each other without an intervening gap, the security interest is “perfected continuously,” and the date of perfection is when the security interest first became perfected (i.e., when Bank received possession of the tangible bill of lading). If, however, there is a gap between stages-for example, if Bank does not file until after the expiration of the 20-day period specified in Section 9-312(f) and leaves the collateral in the debtor’s possession-then, the chain being broken, the perfection is no longer continuous. The date of perfection would now be the date of filing (after expiration of the 20-day period). Bank’s security interest would be vulnerable to any interests arising during the gap period which under Section 9-317 take priority over an unperfected security interest.
Supporting Obligations.
5. Supporting Obligations. Subsection (d) is new. It provides for automatic perfection of a security interest in a supporting obligation for collateral if the security interest in the collateral is perfected. This is unlikely to effect any change in the law prior to adoption of this Article.
Example 2:
Example 2: Buyer is obligated to pay Debtor for goods sold. Buyer’s president guarantees the obligation. Debtor creates a security interest in the right to payment (account) in favor of Lender. Under Section 9-203(f), the security interest attaches to Debtor’s rights under the guarantee (supporting obligation). Under subsection (d), perfection of the security interest in the account constitutes perfection of the security interest in Debtor’s rights under the guarantee.
Rights to Payment Secured by Lien.
6. Rights to Payment Secured by Lien. Subsection (e) is new. It deals with the situation in which a security interest is created in a right to payment that is secured by a security interest, mortgage, or other lien.
Example 3:
Example 3: Owner gives to Mortgagee a mortgage on Blackacre to secure a loan. Owner’s obligation to pay is evidenced by a promissory note. In need of working capital, Mortgagee borrows from Financer and creates a security interest in the note in favor of Financer. Section 9-203(g) adopts the traditional view that the mortgage follows the note; i.e., the transferee of the note acquires the mortgage, as well. This subsection adopts a similar principle: perfection of a security interest in the right to payment constitutes perfection of a security interest in the mortgage securing it. An important consequence of the rules in Section 9-203(g) and subsection (e) is that, by acquiring a perfected security interest in a mortgage (or other secured) note, the secured party acquires a security interest in the mortgage (or other lien) that is senior to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor of the mortgagee (Article 9 debtor). See Section 9-317(a)(2). This result helps prevent the separation of the mortgage (or other lien) from the note.
Under this Article, attachment and perfection of a security interest in a secured right to payment do not of themselves affect the obligation to pay. For example, if the obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note, then Article 3 dictates the person whom the maker must pay to discharge the note and any lien securing it. See Section 3-602. If the right to payment is a payment intangible, then Section 9-406 determines whom the account debtor must pay.
Similarly, this Article does not determine who has the power to release a mortgage of record. That issue is determined by real-property law.
Investment Property.
7. Investment Property. Subsections (f) and (g) follow former Section 9-115(2).
§ 28-9-309. Security interest perfected upon attachment.
The following security interests are perfected when they attach:
- A purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-311(b)[, Idaho Code,] with respect to consumer goods that are subject to a statute or treaty described in section 28-9-311(a)[, Idaho Code];
- An assignment of accounts or payment intangibles which does not by itself or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the assignor’s outstanding accounts or payment intangibles;
- A sale of a payment intangible;
- A sale of a promissory note;
- A security interest created by the assignment of a health care insurance receivable to the provider of the health care goods or services;
- A security interest arising under section 28-2-401, 28-2-505, 28-2-711(3) or 28-12-508(5)[, Idaho Code], until the debtor obtains possession of the collateral;
- A security interest of a collecting bank arising under section 28-4-210[, Idaho Code];
- A security interest of an issuer or nominated person arising under section 28-5-120[, Idaho Code];
- A security interest arising in the delivery of a financial asset under section 28-9-206(c)[, Idaho Code];
- A security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities intermediary;
- A security interest in a commodity contract or a commodity account created by a commodity intermediary;
- An assignment for the benefit of all creditors of the transferor and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder;
- A security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a decedent’s estate; and
- A sale by an individual of an account that is a right to payment of winnings in a lottery or other game of chance.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-309, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2002, ch. 107, § 3, p. 290.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-309, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-309, p. 351; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 51, p. 329; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 14, p. 873, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (1) and (6) to (9) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Derived from former Sections 9-302(1), 9-115(4)(c), (d), 9-116.
Automatic Perfection.
2. Automatic Perfection. This section contains the perfection-upon-attachment rules previously located in former Sections 9-302(1), 9-115(4)(c), (d), and 9-116. Rather than continue to state the rule by indirection, this section explicitly provides for perfection upon attachment.
Purchase-Money Security Interest in Consumer Goods.
3. Purchase-Money Security Interest in Consumer Goods. Former Section 9-302(1)(d) has been revised and appears here as paragraph (1). No filing or other step is required to perfect a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, other than goods, such as automobiles, that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a). However, filing is required to perfect a non-purchase-money security interest in consumer goods and is necessary to prevent a buyer of consumer goods from taking free of a security interest under Section 9-320(b). A fixture filing is required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9-334.
Rights to Payment.
4. Rights to Payment. Paragraph (2) expands upon former Section 9-302(1)(e) by affording automatic perfection to certain assignments of payment intangibles as well as accounts. The purpose of paragraph (2) is to save from ex post facto invalidation casual or isolated assignments-assignments which no one would think of filing. Any person who regularly takes assignments of any debtor’s accounts or payment intangibles should file. In this connection Section 9-109(d)(4) through (7), which excludes certain transfers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes from this Article, should be consulted.
Paragraphs (3) and (4), which are new, afford automatic perfection to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, respectively. They reflect the practice under former Article 9. Under that Article, filing a financing statement did not affect the rights of a buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes, inasmuch as the former Article did not cover those sales. To the extent that the exception in paragraph (2) covers outright sales of payment intangibles, which automatically are perfected under paragraph (3), the exception is redundant.
Paragraph (14), which is new, affords automatic perfection to sales by individuals of an “account” (as defined in Section 9-102) consisting of the right to winnings in a lottery or other game of chance. Payments on these accounts typically extend for periods of twenty years or more. It would be unduly burdensome for the secured party, who would have no other reason to maintain contact with the seller, to monitor the seller’s whereabouts for such a length of time. This paragraph was added in 2001. It applies to a sale of an account described in it, even if the sale was entered into before the effective date of the paragraph. However, if the relative priorities of conflicting claims to the account were established before the paragraph took effect, Article 9 as in effect immediately prior to the date the paragraph took effect determines priority.
Health-Care-Insurance Receivables.
5. Health-Care-Insurance Receivables. Paragraph (5) extends automatic perfection to assignments of health-care-insurance receivables if the assignment is made to the health-care provider that provided the health-care goods or services. The primary effect is that, when an individual assigns a right to payment under an insurance policy to the person who provided health-care goods or services, the provider has no need to file a financing statement against the individual. The normal filing requirements apply to other assignments of health-care-insurance receivables covered by this Article, e.g., assignments from the health-care provider to a financer. 6. Investment Property. Paragraph (9) replaces the last clause of former Section 9-116(2), concerning security interests that arise in the delivery of a financial asset.
Paragraphs (10) and (11) replace former Section 9-115(4)(c) and (d), concerning secured financing of securities and commodity firms and clearing corporations. The former sections indicated that, with respect to certain security interests created by a securities intermediary or commodity intermediary, “[t]he filing of a financing statement . . . has no effect for purposes of perfection or priority with respect to that security interest.” No change in meaning is intended by the deletion of the quoted phrase.
Secured financing arrangements for securities firms are currently implemented in various ways. In some circumstances, lenders may require that the transactions be structured as “hard pledges,” where the securities are transferred on the books of a clearing corporation from the debtor’s account to the lender’s account or to a special pledge account for the lender where they cannot be disposed of without the specific consent of the lender. In other circumstances, lenders are content with so-called “agreement to pledge” or “agreement to deliver” arrangements, where the debtor retains the positions in its own account, but reflects on its books that the positions have been hypothecated and promises that the securities will be transferred to the secured party’s account on demand.
The perfection and priority rules of this Article are designed to facilitate current secured financing arrangements for securities firms as well as to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate new arrangements that develop in the future. Hard pledge arrangements are covered by the concept of control. See Sections 9-314, 9-106, 8-106. Non-control secured financing arrangements for securities firms are covered by the automatic perfection rule of paragraph (10). Before the 1994 revision of Articles 8 and 9, agreement to pledge arrangements could be implemented under a provision that a security interest in securities given for new value under a written security agreement was perfected without filing or possession for a period of 21 days. Although the security interests were temporary in legal theory, the financing arrangements could, in practice, be continued indefinitely by rolling over the loans at least every 21 days. Accordingly, a knowledgeable creditor of a securities firm realizes that the firm’s securities may be subject to security interests that are not discoverable from any public records. The automatic-perfection rule of paragraph (10) makes it unnecessary to engage in the purely formal practice of rolling over these arrangements every 21 days.
Beneficial Interests in Trusts.
In some circumstances, a clearing corporation may be the debtor in a secured financing arrangement. For example, a clearing corporation that settles delivery-versus-payment transactions among its participants on a net, same-day basis relies on timely payments from all participants with net obligations due to the system. If a participant that is a net debtor were to default on its payment obligation, the clearing corporation would not receive some of the funds needed to settle with participants that are net creditors to the system. To complete end-of-day settlement after a payment default by a participant, a clearing corporation that settles on a net, same-day basis may need to draw on credit lines and pledge securities of the defaulting participant or other securities pledged by participants in the clearing corporation to secure such drawings. The clearing corporation may be the top-tier securities intermediary for the securities pledged, so that it would not be practical for the lender to obtain control. Even where the clearing corporation holds some types of securities through other intermediaries, however, the clearing corporation is unlikely to be able to complete the arrangements necessary to convey “control” over the securities to be pledged in time to complete settlement in a timely manner. However, the term “securities intermediary” is defined in Section 8-102(a)(14) to include clearing corporations. Thus, the perfection rule of paragraph (10) applies to security interests in investment property granted by clearing corporations. 7. Beneficial Interests in Trusts. Under former Section 9-302(1)(c), filing was not required to perfect a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust. Because beneficial interests in trusts are now used as collateral with greater frequency in commercial transactions, under this Article filing is required to perfect a security interest in a beneficial interest.
Assignments for Benefit of Creditors.
§ 28-9-310. When filing required to perfect security interest or agricultural lien — Security interests and agricultural liens to which filing provisions do not apply.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 28-9-312(b)[, Idaho Code], a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.
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The filing of a financing statement is not necessary to perfect a security interest:
- That is perfected under section 28-9-308(d), (e), (f) or (g)[, Idaho Code];
- That is perfected under section 28-9-309[, Idaho Code,] when it attaches;
- In property subject to a statute, regulation or treaty described in section 28-9-311(a)[, Idaho Code];
- In goods in possession of a bailee which is perfected under section 28-9-312(d)(1) or (2)[, Idaho Code];
- In certificated securities, documents, goods or instruments which is perfected without filing, control, or possession under section 28-9-312(e), (f) or (g)[, Idaho Code];
- In collateral in the secured party’s possession under section 28-9-313[, Idaho Code];
- In a certificated security which is perfected by delivery of the security certificate to the secured party under section 28-9-313[, Idaho Code];
- In deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, investment property, or letter of credit rights which is perfected by control under section 28-9-314[, Idaho Code];
- In proceeds which is perfected under section 28-9-315[, Idaho Code];
- That is perfected under section 28-9-316[, Idaho Code]; or
- In timber sold by the state of Idaho.
- If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest or agricultural lien, a filing under this chapter is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-310, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 26, p. 77; am. 2010, ch. 154, § 1, p. 329.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-310, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-310, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
The 2010 amendment, by ch. 154, added paragraph (b)(11).
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout the section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style. CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Failure to File Financing Statement.
The debtor’s partner in a used car dealership was among the “third parties” bound by the bank’s unperfected security interest in the car. Even if the partner had a purchase money security interest, it was not “perfected” at the time the debtor acquired the automobile, because the partner never filed a financing statement, nor did he “perfect” any purported security interest by taking possession of the collateral until long after the purchase had occurred. First Sec. Bank v. Woolf, 111 Idaho 680, 726 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1986).
Incomplete Financing Statement.
The function of the financing statement requirement is to give notice of a potential interest in property of a specifically identified debtor, as well as means by which an inquiring party may acquire more detailed information concerning that interest; therefore, a financing statement which did not contain the address of either the debtor or the creditor did not contain the information required by statute, and the filing of such a statement did not constitute perfection of the security interest. Wood v. Pillsbury Co., 38 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983).
Lack of Knowledge of Unperfected Interest.
The mere fact that the purchaser knew, when he purchased the farm disc, that consignment exchange owed the seller $3,000 for the disc was not equivalent to knowledge that the seller had retained a security interest; therefore, the buyer acquired the farm disc with priority over the seller’s unperfected security interest. Seitz v. Stecklein, 111 Idaho 364, 723 P.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1986).
Motor Vehicles.
The Idaho vehicle titles act exclusively governs the perfection of security interests in motor vehicles, unless the vehicles are held in inventory for sale. Simplot v. Owens, 119 Idaho 243, 805 P.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1990).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
ALR. — Construction and effect of UCC art. 9, dealing with secured transactions, sales of accounts, contract rights and chattel paper. 30 A.L.R.3d 9; 25 A.L.R.5th 696. Sufficiency of description of crops under UCC§§ 9-203(1)(b) and 9-402(1). 67 A.L.R.3d 308.
Secured transactions: Priorities as between previously perfected security interest and repairman’s lien on motor vehicle under Uniform Commercial Code. 69 A.L.R.3d 1162.
Equipment leases as security interest within Uniform Commercial Code§ 1-201-37. 76 A.L.R.3d 11.
Determination of purchase price of farm equipment for purposes of UCC§ 9-302(1)(c) excusing filing of financing statement. 85 A.L.R.3d 1037.
When is filing of financing statement necessary to perfect an assignment of accounts under UCC§ 9-302(1)(e). 85 A.L.R.3d 1050.
Sufficiency of address of debtor in financing statement required by UCC§ 9-402(1). 99 A.L.R.3d 807.
Sufficiency and address of secured party in financing statement required under UCC§ 9-402(1). 99 A.L.R.3d 1080.
Sufficiency of description of collateral in financing statement under UCC§§ 9-110 and 9-402. 100 A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of description of collateral in security agreement under UCC§§ 9-110 and 9-203. 100 A.L.R.3d 940.
What is “commercially reasonable” disposition of collateral required by UCC§ 9-504(3). 7 A.L.R.4th 308.
Sufficiency of secured party’s notification of sale or other intended disposition of collateral under UCC§ 9-504(3). 11 A.L.R.4th 241.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-302(1), (2).
General Rule.
2. General Rule. Subsection (a) establishes a central Article 9 principle: Filing a financing statement is necessary for perfection of security interests and agricultural liens. However, filing is not necessary to perfect a security interest that is perfected by another permissible method, see subsection (b), nor does filing ordinarily perfect a security interest in a deposit account, letter-of-credit right, or money. See Section 9-312(b). Part 5 of the Article deals with the office in which to file, mechanics of filing, and operations of the filing office.
Exemptions from Filing.
3. Exemptions from Filing. Subsection (b) lists the security interests for which filing is not required as a condition of perfection, because they are perfected automatically upon attachment (subsections (b)(2) and (b)(9)) or upon the occurrence of another event (subsections (b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(9)), because they are perfected under the law of another jurisdiction (subsection (b)(10)), or because they are perfected by another method, such as by the secured party’s taking possession or control (subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8)).
Assignments of Perfected Security Interests.
4. Assignments of Perfected Security Interests. Subsection (c) concerns assignment of a perfected security interest or agricultural lien. It provides that no filing is necessary in connection with an assignment by a secured party to an assignee in order to maintain perfection as against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
Example 1:
Example 1: Buyer buys goods from Seller, who retains a security interest in them. After Seller perfects the security interest by filing, Seller assigns the perfected security interest to X. The security interest, in X’s hands and without further steps on X’s part, continues perfected against Buyer’s transferees and creditors. Example 2: Dealer creates a security interest in specific equipment in favor of Lender. After Lender perfects the security interest in the equipment by filing, Lender assigns the chattel paper (which includes the perfected security interest in Dealer’s equipment) to X. The security interest in the equipment, in X’s hands and without further steps on X’s part, continues perfected against Dealer’s transferees and creditors. However, regardless of whether Lender made the assignment to secure Lender’s obligation to X or whether the assignment was an outright sale of the chattel paper, the assignment creates a security interest in the chattel paper in favor of X. Accordingly, X must take whatever steps may be required for perfection in order to be protected against Lender’s transferees and creditors with respect to the chattel paper.
Subsection (c) applies not only to an assignment of a security interest perfected by filing but also to an assignment of a security interest perfected by a method other than by filing, such as by control or by possession. Although subsection (c) addresses explicitly only the absence of an additional filing requirement, the same result normally will follow in the case of an assignment of a security interest perfected by a method other than by filing. For example, as long as possession of collateral is maintained by an assignee or by the assignor or another person on behalf of the assignee, no further perfection steps need be taken on account of the assignment to continue perfection as against creditors and transferees of the original debtor. Of course, additional action may be required for perfection of the assignee’s interest as against creditors and transferees of the assignor .
Similarly, subsection (c) applies to the assignment of a security interest perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty under Section 9-311(b), such as a certificate-of-title statute. Unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary, the security interest will remain perfected against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor, even if the assignee takes no action to cause the certificate of title to reflect the assignment or to cause its name to appear on the certificate of title. See PEB Commentary No. 12, which discusses this issue under former Section 9-302(3). Compliance with the statute is “equivalent to filing” under Section 9-311(b).
§ 28-9-311. Perfection of security interests in property subject to certain statutes, regulations and treaties.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, the filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to:
- A statute, regulation or treaty of the United States whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt section 28-9-310(a), Idaho Code;
- Section 49-510, Idaho Code; or
- A statute of another jurisdiction which provides for a security interest to be indicated on a certificate of title as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property.
- Compliance with the requirements of a statute, regulation or treaty described in subsection (a) of this section for obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this chapter. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section and sections 28-9-313 and 28-9-316(d) and (e), Idaho Code, for goods covered by a certificate of title, a security interest in property subject to a statute, regulation or treaty described in subsection (a) of this section may be perfected only by compliance with those requirements, and a security interest so perfected remains perfected notwithstanding a change in the use or transfer of possession of the collateral.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section and section 28-9-316(d) and (e), Idaho Code, duration and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected by compliance with the requirements prescribed by a statute, regulation or treaty described in subsection (a) of this section are governed by the statute, regulation or treaty. In other respects, the security interest is subject to this chapter.
- During any period in which collateral subject to a statute specified in subsection (a)(2) of this section is inventory held for sale or lease by a person or leased by that person as lessor and that person is in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind, this section does not apply to a security interest in that collateral created by that person as debtor.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-311, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 4, p. 381.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-311, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-311, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
Effective Dates.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, substituted “A statute of another jurisdiction which provides for a security interest to be indicated on a certificate of title as a condition” for “A certificate of title statute of another jurisdiction which provides for a security interest to be indicated on the certificate as a condition” in paragraph (a)(3). Effective Dates.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
CASE NOTES
Automobiles.
A security interest in an automobile is perfected under§§ 49-504 and 49-510, not this section. Gugino v. GMAC (In re Laursen), 391 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008).
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-302(3), (4).
Federal Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties.
2. Federal Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties. Subsection (a)(1) exempts from the filing provisions of this Article transactions as to which a system of filing-state or federal-has been established under federal law. Subsection (b) makes clear that when such a system exists, perfection of a relevant security interest can be achieved only through compliance with that system (i.e., filing under this Article is not a permissible alternative).
An example of the type of federal statute referred to in subsection (a)(1) is 49 U.S.C. §§ 44107-11, for civil aircraft of the United States. The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, as amended, provides for notice to contracting and disbursing officers and to sureties on bonds but does not establish a national filing system and therefore is not within the scope of subsection (a)(1). An assignee of a claim against the United States may benefit from compliance with the Assignment of Claims Act. But regardless of whether the assignee complies with that Act, the assignee must file under this Article in order to perfect its security interest against creditors and transferees of its assignor.
Subsection (a)(1) provides explicitly that the filing requirement of this Article defers only to federal statutes, regulations, or treaties whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor preempt Section 9-310(a). The provision eschews reference to the term “perfection,” inasmuch as Section 9-308 specifies the meaning of that term and a preemptive rule may use other terminology.
State Statutes.
3. State Statutes. Subsections (a)(2) and (3) exempt from the filing requirements of this Article transactions covered by State certificate-of-title statutes covering motor vehicles and the like. The description of certificate-of-title statutes in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) tracks the language of the definition of “certificate of title” in Section 9-102. For a discussion of the operation of state certificate-of-title statutes in interstate contexts, see the Comments to Section 9-303.
Some states have enacted central filing statutes with respect to secured transactions in kinds of property that are of special importance in the local economy. Subsection (a)(2) defers to these statutes with respect to filing for that property.
Inventory Covered by Certificate of Title.
4. Inventory Covered by Certificate of Title. Under subsection (d), perfection of a security interest in the inventory of a person in the business of selling goods of that kind is governed by the normal perfection rules, even if the inventory is subject to a certificate-of-title statute. Compliance with a certificate-of-title statute is both unnecessary and ineffective to perfect a security interest in inventory to which this subsection applies. Thus, a secured party who finances an automobile dealer that is in the business of selling and leasing its inventory of automobiles can perfect a security interest in all the automobiles by filing a financing statement but not by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. Subsection (d), and thus the filing and other perfection provisions of this Article, does not apply to inventory that is subject to a certificate-of-title statute and is of a kind that the debtor is not in the business of selling. For example, if goods are subject to a certificate-of-title statute and the debtor is in the business of leasing but not of selling, goods of that kind, the other subsections of this section govern perfection of a security interest in the goods. The fact that the debtor eventually sells the goods does not, of itself, mean that the debtor “is in the business of selling goods of that kind.”
The filing and other perfection provisions of this Article apply to goods subject to a certificate-of-title statute only “during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale or lease or leased.” If the debtor takes goods of this kind out of inventory and uses them, say, as equipment, a filed financing statement would not remain effective to perfect a security interest.
Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute.
5. Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute. Subsection (b) makes clear that compliance with the perfection requirements (i.e., the requirements for obtaining priority over a lien creditor), but not other requirements, of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) is sufficient for perfection under this Article. Perfection of a security interest under such a statute, regulation, or treaty has all the consequences of perfection under this Article.
The interplay of this section with certain certificate-of-title statutes may create confusion and uncertainty. For example, statutes under which perfection does not occur until a certificate of title is issued will create a gap between the time that the goods are covered by the certificate under Section 9-303 and the time of perfection. If the gap is long enough, it may result in turning some unobjectionable transactions into avoidable preferences under Bankruptcy Code Section 547. (The preference risk arises if more than 30 days passes between the time a security interest attaches (or the debtor receives possession of the collateral, in the case of a purchase-money security interest) and the time it is perfected.) Accordingly, the Legislative Note to this section instructs the legislature to amend the applicable certificate-of-title statute to provide that perfection occurs upon receipt by the appropriate State official of a properly tendered application for a certificate of title on which the security interest is to be indicated.
Under some certificate-of-title statutes, including the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act, perfection generally occurs upon delivery of specified documents to a state official but may, under certain circumstances, relate back to the time of attachment. This relation-back feature can create great difficulties for the application of the rules in Sections 9-303 and 9-311(b). Accordingly, the Legislative Note also recommends to legislatures that they remove any relation-back provisions from certificate-of-title statutes affecting security interests.
Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute as Equivalent to Filing.
6. Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute as Equivalent to Filing. Under Subsection (b), compliance with the perfection requirements (i.e., the requirements for obtaining priority over a lien creditor) of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) “is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement.”
Perfection by Possession of Goods Covered by Certificate-of-Title Statute.
The quoted phrase appeared in former Section 9-302(3). Its meaning was unclear, and many questions arose concerning the extent to which and manner in which Article 9 rules referring to “filing” were applicable to perfection by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. This Article takes a variety of approaches for applying Article 9’s filing rules to compliance with other statutes and treaties. First, as discussed above in Comment 5, it leaves the determination of some rules, such as the rule establishing time of perfection (Section 9-516(a)), to the other statutes themselves. Second, this Article explicitly applies some Article 9 filing rules to perfection under other statutes or treaties. See, e.g., Section 9-505. Third, this Article makes other Article 9 rules applicable to security interests perfected by compliance with another statute through the “equivalent to . . . filing” provision in the first sentence of Section 9-311(b). The third approach is reflected for the most part in occasional Comments explaining how particular rules apply when perfection is accomplished under Section 9-311(b). See, e.g., Section 9-310, Comment 4; Section 9-315, Comment 6; Section 9-317, Comment 8. The absence of a Comment indicating that a particular filing provision applies to perfection pursuant to Section 9-311(b) does not mean the provision is inapplicable. 7. Perfection by Possession of Goods Covered by Certificate-of-Title Statute. A secured party who holds a security interest perfected under the law of State A in goods that subsequently are covered by a State B certificate of title may face a predicament. Ordinarily, the secured party will have four months under State B’s Section 9-316(c) and (d) in which to (re)perfect as against a purchaser of the goods by having its security interest noted on a State B certificate. This procedure is likely to require the cooperation of the debtor and any competing secured party whose security interest has been noted on the certificate. Comment 4(e) to former Section 9-103 observed that “that cooperation is not likely to be forthcoming from an owner who wrongfully procured the issuance of a new certificate not showing the out-of-state security interest, or from a local secured party finding himself in a priority contest with the out-of-state secured party.” According to that Comment, “[t]he only solution for the out-of-state secured party under present certificate of title statutes seems to be to reperfect by possession, i.e., by repossessing the goods.” But the “solution” may not have worked: Former Section 9-302(4) provided that a security interest in property subject to a certificate-of-title statute “can be perfected only by compliance therewith.”
Sections 9-316(d) and (e), 9-311(c), and 9-313(b) of this Article resolve the conflict by providing that a security interest that remains perfected solely by virtue of Section 9-316(e) can be (re)perfected by the secured party’s taking possession of the collateral. These sections contemplate only that taking possession of goods covered by a certificate of title will work as a method of perfection. None of these sections creates a right to take possession. Section 9-609 and the agreement of the parties define the secured party’s right to take possession.
§ 28-9-312. Perfection of security interests in chattel paper, deposit accounts, documents, goods covered by documents, instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights and money — Perfection by permissive filing — Temporary perfection without filing or transfer of possession.
- A security interest in chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments or investment property may be perfected by filing.
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Except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-315(c) and (d)[, Idaho Code,] for proceeds:
- A security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by control under section 28-9-314[, Idaho Code];
- And except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-308(d)[, Idaho Code], a security interest in a letter of credit right may be perfected only by control under section 28-9-314[, Idaho Code]; and
- A security interest in money may be perfected only by the secured party’s taking possession under section 28-9-313[, Idaho Code].
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While goods are in the possession of a bailee that has issued a negotiable document covering the goods:
- A security interest in the goods may be perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document; and
- A security interest perfected in the document has priority over any security interest that becomes perfected in the goods by another method during that time.
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While goods are in the possession of a bailee that has issued a nonnegotiable document covering the goods, a security interest in the goods may be perfected by:
- Issuance of a document in the name of the secured party;
- The bailee’s receipt of notification of the secured party’s interest; or
- Filing as to the goods.
- A security interest in certificated securities, negotiable documents or instruments is perfected without filing or the taking of possession or control for a period of twenty (20) days from the time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given under an authenticated security agreement.
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A perfected security interest in a negotiable document or goods in possession of a bailee, other than one that has issued a negotiable document for the goods, remains perfected for twenty (20) days without filing if the secured party makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods for the purpose of:
- Ultimate sale or exchange; or
- Loading, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing or otherwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange.
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A perfected security interest in a certificated security or instrument remains perfected for twenty (20) days without filing if the secured party delivers the security certificate or instrument to the debtor for the purpose of:
- Ultimate sale or exchange; or
- Presentation, collection, enforcement, renewal or registration of transfer. (h) After the twenty (20) day period specified in subsection (e), (f) or (g) of this section expires, perfection depends upon compliance with this chapter.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-312, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 27, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-312, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-312, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 24, p. 781; am. 1985, ch. 135, § 52, p. 329; am. 1990, ch. 154, § 1, p. 339; am. 1995, ch. 272, § 15, p. 873, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout subsection (b) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Official Comment
Source.
Instruments.
2. Instruments. Under subsection (a), a security interest in instruments may be perfected by filing. This rule represents an important change from former Article 9, under which the secured party’s taking possession of an instrument was the only method of achieving long-term perfection. The rule is likely to be particularly useful in transactions involving a large number of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but continues to collect from the makers. A security interest perfected by filing is subject to defeat by certain subsequent purchasers (including secured parties). Under Section 9-330(d), purchasers for value who take possession of an instrument without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party generally would achieve priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by filing. In addition, Section 9-331 provides that filing a financing statement does not constitute notice that would preclude a subsequent purchaser from becoming a holder in due course and taking free of all claims under Section 3-306.
Chattel Paper; Negotiable Documents.
3. Chattel Paper; Negotiable Documents. Subsection (a) further provides that filing is available as a method of perfection for security interests in chattel paper and negotiable documents. Tangible chattel paper is sometimes delivered to the assignee, and sometimes left in the hands of the assignor for collection. Subsection (a) allows the assignee to perfect its security interest by filing in the latter case. Alternatively, the assignee may perfect by taking possession. See Section 9-313(a). An assignee of electronic chattel paper may perfect by taking control. See Sections 9-314(a), 9-105. The security interest of an assignee who takes possession or control may qualify for priority over a competing security interest perfected by filing. See Section 9-330.
Investment Property.
Negotiable documents may be, and usually are, delivered to the secured party. The secured party’s taking possession will suffice as a perfection step. See Section 9-313(a). However, as is the case with chattel paper, a security interest in a negotiable document may be perfected by filing. 4. Investment Property. A security interest in investment property, including certificated securities, uncertificated securities, security entitlements, and securities accounts, may be perfected by filing. However, security interests created by brokers, securities intermediaries, or commodity intermediaries are automatically perfected; filing is of no effect. See Section 9-309(10), (11). A security interest in all kinds of investment property also may be perfected by control, see Sections 9-314, 9-106, and a security interest in a certificated security also may be perfected by the secured party’s taking delivery under Section 8-301. See Section 9-313(a). A security interest perfected only by filing is subordinate to a conflicting security interest perfected by control or delivery. See Section 9-328(1), (5). Thus, although filing is a permissible method of perfection, a secured party who perfects by filing takes the risk that the debtor has granted or will grant a security interest in the same collateral to another party who obtains control. Also, perfection by filing would not give the secured party protection against other types of adverse claims, since the Article 8 adverse claim cut-off rules require control. See Section 8-510.
Deposit Accounts.
5. Deposit Accounts. Under new subsection (b)(1), the only method of perfecting a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral is by control. Filing is ineffective, except as provided in Section 9-315 with respect to proceeds. As explained in Section 9-104, “control” can arise as a result of an agreement among the secured party, debtor, and bank, whereby the bank agrees to comply with instructions of the secured party with respect to disposition of the funds on deposit, even though the debtor retains the right to direct disposition of the funds. Thus, subsection (b)(1) takes an intermediate position between certain non-UCC law, which conditions the effectiveness of a security interest on the secured party’s enjoyment of such dominion and control over the deposit account that the debtor is unable to dispose of the funds, and the approach this Article takes to securities accounts, under which a secured party who is unable to reach the collateral without resort to judicial process may perfect by filing. By conditioning perfection on “control,” rather than requiring the secured party to enjoy absolute dominion to the exclusion of the debtor, subsection (b)(1) permits perfection in a wide variety of transactions, including those in which the secured party actually relies on the deposit account in extending credit and maintains some meaningful dominion over it, but does not wish to deprive the debtor of access to the funds altogether.
Letter-of-Credit Rights.
6. Letter-of-Credit Rights. Letter-of-credit rights commonly are “supporting obligations,” as defined in Section 9-102. Perfection as to the related account, chattel paper, document, general intangible, instrument, or investment property will perfect as to the letter-of-credit rights. See Section 9-308(d). Subsection (b)(2) provides that, in other cases, a security interest in a letter-of-credit right may be perfected only by control. “Control,” for these purposes, is explained in Section 9-107.
Goods Covered by Document of Title.
7. Goods Covered by Document of Title. Subsection (c) applies to goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a negotiable document covering the goods. Subsection (d) applies to goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a nonnegotiable document of title, including a document of title that is “non-negotiable” under Section 7-104. Section 9-313 governs perfection of a security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a document of title.
Example 1:
Subsection (c) clarifies the perfection and priority rules in former Section 9-304(2). Consistently with the provisions of Article 7, subsection (c) takes the position that, as long as a negotiable document covering goods is outstanding, title to the goods is, so to say, locked up in the document. Accordingly, a security interest in goods covered by a negotiable document may be perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document. The security interest also may be perfected by another method, e.g., by filing. The priority rule in subsection (c) governs only priority between (i) a security interest in goods which is perfected by perfecting in the document and (ii) a security interest in the goods which becomes perfected by another method while the goods are covered by the document. Example 1: While wheat is in a grain elevator and covered by a negotiable warehouse receipt, Debtor creates a security interest in the wheat in favor of SP-1 and SP-2. SP-1 perfects by filing a financing statement covering “wheat.” Thereafter, SP-2 perfects by filing a financing statement describing the warehouse receipt. Subsection (c)(1) provides that SP-2’s security interest is perfected. Subsection (c)(2) provides that SP-2’s security interest is senior to SP-1’s.
Example 2:
Example 2: The facts are as in Example 1, but SP-1’s security interest attached and was perfected before the goods were delivered to the grain elevator. Subsection (c)(2) does not apply, because SP-1’s security interest did not become perfected during the time that the wheat was in the possession of a bailee. Rather, the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule applies. See Section 9-322.
A secured party may become “a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated” under Section 7-501. If so, the secured party acquires the rights specified by Article 7. Article 9 does not limit those rights, which may include the right to priority over an earlier-perfected security interest. See Section 9-331(a).
Subsection (d) takes a different approach to the problem of goods covered by a nonnegotiable document. Here, title to the goods is not looked on as being locked up in the document, and the secured party may perfect its security interest directly in the goods by filing as to them. The subsection provides two other methods of perfection: issuance of the document in the secured party’s name (as consignee of a straight bill of lading or the person to whom delivery would be made under a non-negotiable warehouse receipt) and receipt of notification of the secured party’s interest by the bailee. Perfection under subsection (d) occurs when the bailee receives notification of the secured party’s interest in the goods, regardless of who sends the notification. Receipt of notification is effective to perfect, regardless of whether the bailee responds. Unlike former Section 9-304(3), from which it derives, subsection (d) does not apply to goods in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a document of title. Section 9-313(c) covers that case and provides that perfection by possession as to goods not covered by a document requires the bailee’s acknowledgment.
Temporary Perfection Without Having First Otherwise Perfected.
8. Temporary Perfection Without Having First Otherwise Perfected. Subsection (e) follows former Section 9-304(4) in giving perfected status to security interests in certificated securities, instruments, and negotiable documents for a short period (reduced from 21 to 20 days, which is the time period generally applicable in this Article), although there has been no filing and the collateral is in the debtor’s possession. The 20-day temporary perfection runs from the date of attachment. There is no limitation on the purpose for which the debtor is in possession, but the secured party must have given “new value” (defined in Section 9-102) under an authenticated security agreement.
Maintaining Perfection After Surrendering Possession.
9. Maintaining Perfection After Surrendering Possession. There are a variety of legitimate reasons — many of them are described in subsections (f) and (g) — why certain types of collateral must be released temporarily to a debtor. No useful purpose would be served by cluttering the files with records of such exceedingly short term transactions. Subsection (f) affords the possibility of 20-day perfection in negotiable documents and goods in the possession of a bailee but not covered by a negotiable document. Subsection (g) provides for 20-day perfection in certificated securities and instruments. These subsections derive from former Section 9-305(5). However, the period of temporary perfection has been reduced from 21 to 20 days, which is the time period generally applicable in this Article, and “enforcement” has been added in subsection (g) as one of the special and limited purposes for which a secured party can release an instrument or certificated security to the debtor and still remain perfected. The period of temporary perfection runs from the date a secured party who already has a perfected security interest turns over the collateral to the debtor. There is no new value requirement, but the turnover must be for one or more of the purposes stated in subsection (f) or (g). The 20-day period may be extended by perfecting as to the collateral by another method before the period expires. However, if the security interest is not perfected by another method until after the 20-day period expires, there will be a gap during which the security interest is unperfected.
Temporary perfection extends only to the negotiable document or goods under subsection (f) and only to the certificated security or instrument under subsection (g). It does not extend to proceeds. If the collateral is sold, the security interest will continue in the proceeds for the period specified in Section 9-315.
Subsections (f) and (g) deal only with perfection. Other sections of this Article govern the priority of a security interest in goods after surrender of the document covering them. In the case of a purchase-money security interest in inventory, priority may be conditioned upon giving notification to a prior inventory financer. See Section 9-324.
§ 28-9-313. When possession by or delivery to secured party perfects security interest without filing.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a secured party may perfect a security interest in tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money or tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the collateral. A secured party may perfect a security interest in certificated securities by taking delivery of the certificated securities under section 28-8-301[, Idaho Code].
- With respect to goods covered by a certificate of title issued by this state, a secured party may perfect a security interest in the goods by taking possession of the goods only in the circumstances described in section 28-9-316(d)[, Idaho Code].
-
With respect to collateral other than certificated securities and goods covered by a document, a secured party takes possession of collateral in the possession of a person other than the debtor, the secured party or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business, when:
- The person in possession authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit; or
- The person takes possession of the collateral after having authenticated a record acknowledging that it will hold possession of collateral for the secured party’s benefit.
- If perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by a secured party, perfection occurs no earlier than the time the secured party takes possession and continues only while the secured party retains possession.
- A security interest in a certificated security in registered form is perfected by delivery when delivery of the certificated security occurs under section 28-8-301[, Idaho Code], and remains perfected by delivery until the debtor obtains possession of the security certificate.
- A person in possession of collateral is not required to acknowledge that it holds possession for a secured party’s benefit.
-
If a person acknowledges that it holds possession for the secured party’s benefit:
- The acknowledgment is effective under subsection (c) of this section or section 28-8-301(1)[, Idaho Code], even if the acknowledgment violates the rights of a debtor; and
- Unless the person otherwise agrees, or law other than this chapter otherwise provides, the person does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the acknowledgment to another person.
-
A secured party having possession of collateral does not relinquish possession by delivering the collateral to a person other than the debtor or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business if the person was instructed before the delivery or is instructed contemporaneously with the delivery:
- To hold possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit; or
- To redeliver the collateral to the secured party.
- A secured party does not relinquish possession, even if a delivery under subsection (h) of this section violates the rights of a debtor. A person to which collateral is delivered under subsection (h) of this section does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the delivery to another person unless the person otherwise agrees, or law other than this chapter otherwise provides. History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-313, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 28, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-313, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-313, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 26, p. 781, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (a), (b), (e), and (g) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Bailment.
Fact that checks held by bailee-trustee in which respondents had a security interest had not been indorsed by payee did not affect respondent’s perfected security interest since possession is sufficient under this section and legal title in bailee-trustee is not required. Barney v. Rigby Loan & Inv. Co., 344 F. Supp. 694 (D. Idaho 1972).
Respondent’s security interest in checks became perfected when bailee-trustee of checks learned of respondent’s security interest since respondent was deemed to have possession at that point, and perfected security interest was not contingent on state court, recognition of the trust, or bailment. Barney v. Rigby Loan & Inv. Co., 344 F. Supp. 694 (D. Idaho 1972).
Possession as Cure of Void Mortgage.
Where chattel mortgage was valid between parties, though for some reason it was void as to creditors, yet, if property be delivered to mortgagee prior to time any specific right or lien thereon is acquired by creditor, possession of such mortgagee was valid, and may be maintained, and property sold under provisions of the mortgage. Equitable Trust Co. v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Power Co., 245 F. 697 (9th Cir. 1917).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-305, 9-115(6).
Perfection by Possession.
2. Perfection by Possession. As under the common law of pledge, no filing is required by this Article to perfect a security interest if the secured party takes possession of the collateral. See Section 9-310(b)(6).
This section permits a security interest to be perfected by the taking of possession only when the collateral is goods, instruments, negotiable documents, money, or tangible chattel paper. Accounts, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction are excluded. (But see Comment 6, below, regarding certificated securities.) A security interest in accounts and payment intangibles—property not ordinarily represented by any writing whose delivery operates to transfer the right to payment—may under this Article be perfected only by filing. This rule would not be affected by the fact that a security agreement or other record described the assignment of such collateral as a “pledge.” Section 9-309(2) exempts from filing certain assignments of accounts or payment intangibles which are out of the ordinary course of financing. These exempted assignments are perfected when they attach. Similarly, under Section 9-309(3), sales of payment intangibles are automatically perfected.
“Possession.”
3. “Possession.” This section does not define “possession.” It adopts the general concept as it developed under former Article 9. As under former Article 9, in determining whether a particular person has possession, the principles of agency apply. For example, if the collateral is in possession of an agent of the secured party for the purposes of possessing on behalf of the secured party, and if the agent is not also an agent of the debtor, the secured party has taken actual possession, and subsection (c) does not apply. Sometimes a person holds collateral both as an agent of the secured party and as an agent of the debtor. The fact of dual agency is not of itself inconsistent with the secured party’s having taken possession (and thereby having rendered subsection (c) inapplicable). The debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the secured party for purposes of the secured party’s taking possession. And, under appropriate circumstances, a court may determine that a person in possession is so closely connected to or controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession, even though the person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the secured party. If so, the person’s taking possession would not constitute the secured party’s taking possession and would not be sufficient for perfection. See also Section 9-205(b). In a typical escrow arrangement, where the escrowee has possession of collateral as agent for both the secured party and the debtor, the debtor’s relationship to the escrowee is not such as to constitute retention of possession by the debtor.
Goods in Possession of Third Party: Perfection.
4. Goods in Possession of Third Party: Perfection. Former Section 9-305 permitted perfection of a security interest by notification to a bailee in possession of collateral. This Article distinguishes between goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a document of title covering the goods and goods in the possession of a third party who has not issued a document. Section 9-312(c) or (d) applies to the former, depending on whether the document is negotiable. Section 9-313(c) applies to the latter. It provides a method of perfection by possession when the collateral is possessed by a third person who is not the secured party’s agent.
Notification of a third person does not suffice to perfect under Section 9-313(c). Rather, perfection does not occur unless the third person authenticates an acknowledgment that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit. Compare Section 9-312(d), under which receipt of notification of the security party’s interest by a bailee holding goods covered by a nonnegotiable document is sufficient to perfect, even if the bailee does not acknowledge receipt of the notification. A third person may acknowledge that it will hold for the secured party’s benefit goods to be received in the future. Under these circumstances, perfection by possession occurs when the third person obtains possession of the goods. Under subsection (c), acknowledgment of notification by a “lessee . . . in . . . ordinary course of . . . business” (defined in Section 2A-103) does not suffice for possession. The section thus rejects the reasoning of In re Atlantic Systems, Inc. , 135 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that notification to debtor-lessor’s lessee sufficed to perfect security interest in leased goods). See Steven O. Weise, Perfection by Possession: The Need for an Objective Test , 29 Idaho Law Rev. 705 (1992-93) (arguing that lessee’s possession in ordinary course of debtor-lessor’s business does not provide adequate public notice of possible security interest in leased goods). Inclusion of a per se rule concerning lessees is not meant to preclude a court, under appropriate circumstances, from determining that a third person is so closely connected to or controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession. If so, the third person’s acknowledgment would not be sufficient for perfection.
In some cases, it may be uncertain whether a person who has possession of collateral is an agent of the secured party or a non-agent bailee. Under those circumstances, prudence might suggest that the secured party obtain the person’s acknowledgment to avoid litigation and ensure perfection by possession regardless of how the relationship between the secured party and the person is characterized.
No Relation Back.
5. No Relation Back. Former Section 9-305 provided that a security interest is perfected by possession from the time possession is taken “without a relation back.” As the Comment to former Section 9-305 observed, the relation-back theory, under which the taking of possession was deemed to relate back to the date of the original security agreement, has had little vitality since the 1938 revision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The theory is inconsistent with former Article 9 and with this Article. See Section 9-313(d). Accordingly, this Article deletes the quoted phrase as unnecessary. Where a pledge transaction is contemplated, perfection dates only from the time possession is taken, although a security interest may attach, unperfected. The only exceptions to this rule are the short, 20-day periods of perfection provided in Section 9-312(e), (f), and (g), during which a debtor may have possession of specified collateral in which there is a perfected security interest.
Certificated Securities.
6. Certificated Securities. The second sentence of subsection (a) reflects the traditional rule for perfection of a security interest in certificated securities. Compare Section 9-115(6) (1994 Official Text); Sections 8-321, 8-313(1)(a) (1978 Official Text); Section 9-305 (1972 Official Text). It has been modified to refer to “delivery” under Section 8-301. Corresponding changes appear in Section 9-203(b).
Subsection (e) which is new, applies to a secured party in possession of security certificates or another person who has taken delivery of security certificates and holds them for the secured party’s benefit under Section 8-301. See Comment 8.
Under subsection (e), a possessory security interest in a certificated security remains perfected until the debtor obtains possession of the security certificate. This rule is analogous to that of Section 9-314(c), which deals with perfection of security interests in investment property by control. See Section 9-314, Comment 3.
Goods Covered by Certificate of Title.
7. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. Subsection (b) is necessary to effect changes to the choice-of-law rules governing goods covered by a certificate of title. These changes are described in the Comments to Section 9-311. Subsection (b), like subsection (a), does not create a right to take possession. Rather, it indicates the circumstances under which the secured party’s taking possession of goods covered by a certificate of title is effective to perfect a security interest in the goods: the goods become covered by a certificate of title issued by this State at a time when the security interest is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction. 8. Goods in Possession of Third Party: No Duty to Acknowledge; Consequences of Acknowledgment. Subsections (f) and (g) are new and address matters as to which former Article 9 was silent. They derive in part from Section 8-106(g). Subsection (f) provides that a person in possession of collateral is not required to acknowledge that it holds for a secured party. Subsection (g)(1) provides that an acknowledgment is effective even if wrongful as to the debtor. Subsection (g)(2) makes clear that an acknowledgment does not give rise to any duties or responsibilities under this Article. Arrangements involving the possession of goods are hardly standardized. They include bailments for services to be performed on the goods (such as repair or processing), for use (leases), as security (pledges), for carriage, and for storage. This Article leaves to the agreement of the parties and to any other applicable law the imposition of duties and responsibilities upon a person who acknowledges under subsection (c). For example, by acknowledging, a third party does not become obliged to act on the secured party’s direction or to remain in possession of the collateral unless it agrees to do so or other law so provides.
Delivery to Third Party by Secured Party.
9. Delivery to Third Party by Secured Party. New subsections (h) and (i) address the practice of mortgage warehouse lenders. These lenders typically send mortgage notes to prospective purchasers under cover of letters advising the prospective purchasers that the lenders hold security interests in the notes. These lenders relied on notification to maintain perfection under former 9-305. Requiring them to obtain authenticated acknowledgments from each prospective purchaser under subsection (c) could be unduly burdensome and disruptive of established practices. Under subsection (h), when a secured party in possession itself delivers the collateral to a third party, instructions to the third party would be sufficient to maintain perfection by possession; an acknowledgment would not be necessary. Under subsection (i), the secured party does not relinquish possession by making a delivery under subsection (h), even if the delivery violates the rights of the debtor. That subsection also makes clear that a person to whom collateral is delivered under subsection (h) does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the delivery to another person unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this Article provides otherwise.
§ 28-9-314. Perfection by control.
- A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letter of credit rights, electronic chattel paper, or electronic documents may be perfected by control of the collateral under section 28-7-106, 28-9-104, 28-9-105, 28-9-106 or 28-9-107[, Idaho Code].
- A security interest in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, letter of credit rights, or electronic documents is perfected by control under section 28-7-106, 28-9-104, 28-9-105 or 28-9-107[, Idaho Code], when the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party retains control.
-
A security interest in investment property is perfected by control under section 28-9-106[, Idaho Code,] from the time the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by control until:
- The secured party does not have control; and
-
One (1) of the following occurs:
- if the collateral is a certificated security, the debtor has or acquires possession of the security certificate;
- if the collateral is an uncertificated security, the issuer has registered or registers the debtor as the registered owner; or
- if the collateral is a security entitlement, the debtor is or becomes the entitlement holder.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-314, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 29, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-314, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-314, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout this section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Substantially new; derived in part from former Section 9-115(4).
Control.
2. Control. This section provides for perfection by control with respect to investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, and electronic chattel paper. For explanations of how a secured party takes control of these types of collateral, see Sections 9-104 through 9-107. Subsection (b) explains when a security interest is perfected by control and how long a security interest remains perfected by control. Like Section 9-313(d) and for the same reasons, subsection (b) makes no reference to the doctrine of “relation back.” See Section 9-313, Comment 5. 3. Investment Property. Subsection (c) provides a special rule for investment property. Once a secured party has control, its security interest remains perfected by control until the secured party ceases to have control and the debtor receives possession of collateral that is a certificated security, becomes the registered owner of collateral that is an uncertificated security, or becomes the entitlement holder of collateral that is a security entitlement. The result is particularly important in the “repledge” context. See Section 9-207, Comment 5.
In a transaction in which a secured party who has control grants a security interest in investment property or sells outright the investment property, by virtue of the debtor’s consent or applicable legal rules, a purchaser from the secured party typically will cut off the debtor’s rights in the investment property or be immune from the debtor’s claims. See Section 9-207, Comments 5 and 6. If the investment property is a security, the debtor normally would retain no interest in the security following the purchase from the secured party, and a claim of the debtor against the secured party for redemption (Section 9-623) or otherwise with respect to the security would be a purely personal claim. If the investment property transferred by the secured party is a financial asset in which the debtor had a security entitlement credited to a securities account maintained with the secured party as a securities intermediary, the debtor’s claim against the secured party could arise as a part of its securities account notwithstanding its personal nature. (This claim would be analogous to a “credit balance” in the securities account, which is a component of the securities account even though it is a personal claim against the intermediary.) In the case in which the debtor may retain an interest in investment property notwithstanding a repledge or sale by the secured party, subsection (c) makes clear that the security interest will remain perfected by control.
§ 28-9-315. Secured party’s rights on disposition of collateral and in proceeds.
-
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and in section 28-2-403(2)[, Idaho Code]:
- A security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien; and
- A security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral.
-
Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds:
- If the proceeds are goods, to the extent provided by section 28-9-336[, Idaho Code]; and
- If the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this chapter with respect to commingled property of the type involved.
- A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected.
-
A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the twenty-first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless:
-
The following conditions are satisfied:
- a filed financing statement covers the original collateral;
- the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office in which the financing statement has been filed; and
- the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds;
- The proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or
- The security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under subsection (c) of this section when the security interest attaches to the proceeds or within twenty (20) days thereafter.
-
The following conditions are satisfied:
-
If a filed financing statement covers the original collateral, a security interest in proceeds which remains perfected under subsection (d)(1) of this section becomes unperfected at the later of:
- When the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses under section 28-9-515[, Idaho Code,] or is terminated under section 28-9-513[, Idaho Code]; or
- The twenty-first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-315, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-315, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-315, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in the introductory paragraph in subsection (a), in paragraph (b)(1), and in paragraph (e)(1) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Interest In Proceeds.
Attorney’s security interest in the promissory note automatically attached to any proceeds of the note, including any rights arising out of the note. The security agreement did not limit the types of proceeds to which the attorney’s security interest would attach, because the attorney identified specific proceeds in the security agreement, including any judgments arising out of a collection action. Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 118 P.3d 136 (2005).
Perfected security interest survived the secured creditor’s failure to comply with§ 11-203 because the secured creditor did not forfeit its security interest by virtue of failing to file a third-party claim, and the doctrine of quasi-estoppel did not bar the creditor from recovering. The security interest extended to the proceeds which a judgment creditor realized from the sheriff’s sale of the collateral. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 311 P.3d 299 (2013).
Proceeds.
Debtors settled with an electrical company whose negligence had caused injuries to debtors’ cattle; the settlement constituted proceeds under this section, making it subject to the interests of creditors who held a security interest in the cattle. In re Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002), aff’d in part, 324 Bankr. 92 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
Decisions Under Prior Law
Loss of security interest.
Interest in Proceeds.
Holder of trust receipt on car sold by trustee to another dealer was entitled to recognize the sale and pursue its remedy against proceeds of the sale deposited in trustee’s bank account. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955).
The interest of the holder of a trust receipt on a car sold by the trustee to another dealer was a property interest and not a lien and a holder of trust receipt was entitled to claim proceeds of sale, which were deposited in trustee’s bank account and subsequently attached by sheriff for taxes due the federal government by the trustee. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955). Loss of Security Interest.
Where the course of dealing between secured party and farmers clearly indicated the authorization to sell crops in which secured party held security interest and that secured party further authorized particular sale by the farmers to insolvent buyer, secured party lost its security interest in the collateral, notwithstanding argument that it merely “conditionally” authorized the sale. Western Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 678 P.2d 52 (1984).
A secured party’s perfected security interest lapses when the collateral is sold with the secured party’s consent, where the secured party does not condition its consent to the transfer upon the simultaneous execution of a security agreement and financing statement by the transferee in favor of the secured party. Trustee Servs. Corp v. East River Lumber Co. (In re Hodge Forest Indus., Inc.), 59 Bankr. 801 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1986).
Sales Agreement.
A sales agreement, executed at the same time as a security agreement and making reference to it, must be construed with the security agreement to determine the meaning of the parties’ entire agreement. Newgen v. OK Livestock Exch., 117 Idaho 445, 788 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1990).
Unauthorized Transfer.
In action for conversion of inventory of debtor against supplier who held perfected security interest in inventory, the return of the inventory to the supplier because it was a major part in value of debtor’s business inventory and was transferred to satisfy an existing debt due to supplier, was not in the ordinary course of debtor’s business, and, therefore, was not authorized by the express terms of the security agreement that permitted sale or disposal of collateral only in ordinary course of business. First Sec. Bank v. Absco Whse., Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 664 P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1983).
Waiver.
The district court erred in determining that the holders of security interest in cows waived their interest by authorizing the sale of culled cows, as no such authorization could be inferred from the language of the sale agreement. Newgen v. OK Livestock Exch., 117 Idaho 445, 788 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1990).
Official Comment
Source.
Continuation of Security Interest or Agricultural Lien Following Disposition of Collateral.
2. Continuation of Security Interest or Agricultural Lien Following Disposition of Collateral. Subsection (a)(1), which derives from former Section 9-306(2), contains the general rule that a security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, may have only one satisfaction. In many cases, a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security interest, and the secured party’s only right will be to proceeds. For example, the general rule does not apply, and a security interest does not continue in collateral, if the secured party authorized the disposition, in the agreement that contains the security agreement or otherwise. Subsection (a)(1) adopts the view of PEB Commentary No. 3 and makes explicit that the authorized disposition to which it refers is an authorized disposition “free of” the security interest or agricultural lien. The secured party’s right to proceeds under this section or under the express terms of an agreement does not in itself constitute an authorization of disposition. The change in language from former Section 9-306(2) is not intended to address the frequently litigated situation in which the effectiveness of the secured party’s consent to a disposition is conditioned upon the secured party’s receipt of the proceeds. In that situation, subsection (a) leaves the determination of authorization to the courts, as under former Article 9.
This Article contains several provisions under which a transferee takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien. For example, Section 9-317 states when transferees take free of unperfected security interests; Sections 9-320 and 9-321 on goods, 9-321 on general intangibles, 9-330 on chattel paper and instruments, and 9-331 on negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and securities state when purchasers of such collateral take free of a security interest, even though perfected and even though the disposition was not authorized. Section 9-332 enables most transferees (including non-purchasers) of funds from a deposit account and most transferees of money to take free of a perfected security interest in the deposit account or money.
Likewise, the general rule that a security interest survives disposition does not apply if the secured party entrusts goods collateral to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind and the merchant sells the collateral to a buyer in ordinary course of business. Section 2-403(2) gives the merchant the power to transfer all the secured party’s rights to the buyer, even if the sale is wrongful as against the secured party. Thus, under subsection (a)(1), an entrusting secured party runs the same risk as any other entruster.
Secured Party’s Right to Identifiable Proceeds.
3. Secured Party’s Right to Identifiable Proceeds. Under subsection (a)(2), which derives from former Section 9-306(2), a security interest attaches to any identifiable “proceeds,” as defined in Section 9-102. See also Section 9-203(f). Subsection (b) is new. It indicates when proceeds commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds and permits the use of whatever methods of tracing other law permits with respect to the type of property involved. Among the “equitable principles” whose use other law may permit is the “lowest intermediate balance rule.” See Restatement (2d), Trusts § 202.
Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: General Rule.
4. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: General Rule. Under subsection (c), a security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected. This Article extends the period of automatic perfection in proceeds from 10 days to 20 days. Generally, a security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds. See subsection (d). The loss of perfected status under subsection (d) is prospective only. Compare, e.g., Section 9-515(c) (deeming security interest unperfected retroactively).
Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Proceeds Acquired with Cash Proceeds.
5. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Proceeds Acquired with Cash Proceeds. Subsection (d)(1) derives from former Section 9-306(3)(a). It carries forward the basic rule that a security interest in proceeds remains perfected beyond the period of automatic perfection if a filed financing statement covers the original collateral (e.g., inventory) and the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office where the financing statement has been filed (e.g., equipment). A different rule applies if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, as is the case if the original collateral (inventory) is sold for cash (cash proceeds) that is used to purchase equipment (proceeds). Under these circumstances, the security interest in the equipment proceeds remains perfected only if the description in the filed financing indicates the type of property constituting the proceeds (e.g., “equipment”). This section reaches the same result but takes a different approach. It recognizes that the treatment of proceeds acquired with cash proceeds under former Section 9-306(3)(a) essentially was superfluous. In the example, had the filing covered “equipment” as well as “inventory,” the security interest in the proceeds would have been perfected under the usual rules governing after-acquired equipment (see former Sections 9-302, 9-303); paragraph (3)(a) added only an exception to the general rule. Subsection (d)(1)(C) of this section takes a more direct approach. It makes the general rule of continued perfection inapplicable to proceeds acquired with cash proceeds, leaving perfection of a security interest in those proceeds to the generally applicable perfection rules under subsection (d)(3).
Example 1:
Example 1: Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s inventory by filing a financing statement covering “inventory.” Debtor sells the inventory and deposits the buyer’s check into a deposit account. Debtor draws a check on the deposit account and uses it to pay for equipment. Under the “lowest intermediate balance rule,” which is a permitted method of tracing in the relevant jurisdiction, see Comment 3, the funds used to pay for the equipment were identifiable proceeds of the inventory. Because the proceeds (equipment) were acquired with cash proceeds (deposit account), subsection (d)(1) does not extend perfection beyond the 20-day automatic period.
Example 2:
Example 2: Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s inventory by filing a financing statement covering “all debtor’s property.” As in Example 1, Debtor sells the inventory, deposits the buyer’s check into a deposit account, draws a check on the deposit account, and uses the check to pay for equipment. Under the “lowest intermediate balance rule,” which is a permitted method of tracing in the relevant jurisdiction, see Comment 3, the funds used to pay for the equipment were identifiable proceeds of the inventory. Because the proceeds (equipment) were acquired with cash proceeds (deposit account), subsection (d)(1) does not extend perfection beyond the 20-day automatic period. However, because the financing statement is sufficient to perfect a security interest in debtor’s equipment, under subsection (d)(3) the security interest in the equipment proceeds remains perfected beyond the 20-day period.
Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Lapse or Termination of Financing Statement During 20-Day Period; Perfection Under Other Statute or Treaty.
6. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Lapse or Termination of Financing Statement During 20-Day Period; Perfection Under Other Statute or Treaty. Subsection (e) provides that a security interest in proceeds perfected under subsection (d)(1) ceases to be perfected when the financing statement covering the original collateral lapses or is terminated. If the lapse or termination occurs before the 21st day after the security interest attaches, however, the security interest in the proceeds remains perfected until the 21st day. Section 9-311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) “is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement.” It follows that collateral subject to a security interest perfected by such compliance under Section 9-311(b) is covered by a “filed financing statement” within the meaning of Section 9-315(d) and (e).
Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Continuation of Perfection in Cash Proceeds.
7. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Continuation of Perfection in Cash Proceeds. Former Section 9-306(3)(b) provided that if a filed financing statement covered original collateral, a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of the collateral remained perfected beyond the ten-day period of automatic perfection. Former Section 9-306(3)(c) contained a similar rule with respect to identifiable cash proceeds of investment property. Subsection (d)(2) extends the benefits of former Sections 9-306(3)(b) and (3)(c) to identifiable cash proceeds of all types of original collateral in which a security interest is perfected by any method. Under subsection (d)(2), if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds will remain perfected indefinitely, regardless of whether the security interest in the original collateral remains perfected. In many cases, however, a purchaser or other transferee of the cash proceeds will take free of the perfected security interest. See, e.g., Sections 9-330(d) (purchaser of check), 9-331 (holder in due course of check), 9-332 (transferee of money or funds from a deposit account). 8. Insolvency Proceedings; Returned and Repossessed Goods. This Article deletes former Section 9-306(4), which dealt with proceeds in insolvency proceedings. Except as otherwise provided by the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s entering into bankruptcy does not affect a secured party’s right to proceeds.
This Article also deletes former Section 9-306(5), which dealt with returned and repossessed goods. Section 9-330, Comments 9 to 11 explain and clarify the application of priority rules to returned and repossessed goods as proceeds of chattel paper.
Proceeds of Collateral Subject to Agricultural Lien.
9. Proceeds of Collateral Subject to Agricultural Lien. This Article does not determine whether a lien extends to proceeds of farm products encumbered by an agricultural lien. If, however, the proceeds are themselves farm products on which an “agricultural lien” (defined in Section 9-102) arises under other law, then the agricultural-lien provisions of this Article apply to the agricultural lien on the proceeds in the same way in which they would apply had the farm products not been proceeds.
§ 28-9-316. Effect of change in governing law.
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A security interest perfected pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301(1) or 28-9-305(c), Idaho Code, remains perfected until the earliest of:
- The time perfection would have ceased under the law of that jurisdiction;
- The expiration of four (4) months after a change of the debtor’s location to another jurisdiction; or
- The expiration of one (1) year after a transfer of collateral to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction.
- If a security interest described in subsection (a) of this section becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event described in that subsection, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
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A possessory security interest in collateral, other than goods covered by a certificate of title and as-extracted collateral consisting of goods, remains continuously perfected if:
- The collateral is located in one (1) jurisdiction and subject to a security interest perfected under the law of that jurisdiction;
- Thereafter the collateral is brought into another jurisdiction; and
- Upon entry into the other jurisdiction, the security interest is perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title which is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction when the goods become covered by a certificate of title from this state remains perfected until the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods not become so covered.
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A security interest described in subsection (d) of this section becomes unperfected as against a purchaser of the goods for value and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the goods for value if the applicable requirements for perfection under section 28-9-311(b) or 28-9-313, Idaho Code, are not satisfied before the earlier of:
- The time the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods not become covered by a certificate of title from this state; or
- The expiration of four (4) months after the goods had become so covered.
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A security interest in deposit accounts, letter of credit rights, or investment property which is perfected under the law of the bank’s jurisdiction, the issuer’s jurisdiction, a nominated person’s jurisdiction, the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction, or the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction, as applicable, remains perfected until the earlier of:
- The time the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of that jurisdiction; or
- The expiration of four (4) months after a change of the applicable jurisdiction to another jurisdiction.
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If a security interest described in subsection (f) of this section becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the time or the end of the period described in that subsection, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of that time or the end of that period, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
(h) The following rules apply to collateral to which a security interest attaches within four (4) months after the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction:
- A financing statement filed before the change pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301(1) or 28-9-305(c), Idaho Code, is effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral if the financing statement would have been effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral if the debtor had not changed its location.
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If a security interest that is perfected by a financing statement that is effective under paragraph (1) of this subsection becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the time the financing statement would have become ineffective under the law of the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301(1) or 28-9-305(c), Idaho Code, or the expiration of the four (4) month period, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier time or event, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
- If a financing statement naming an original debtor is filed pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301(1) or 28-9-305(c), Idaho Code, and the new debtor is located in another jurisdiction, the following rules apply:
(1) The financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral in which the new debtor has or acquires rights before or within four (4) months after the new debtor becomes bound under section 28-9-203(d), Idaho Code, if the financing statement would have been effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral if the collateral had been acquired by the original debtor.
(2) A security interest that is perfected by the financing statement and that becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the expiration of the four (4) month period or the time the financing statement would have become ineffective under the law of the jurisdiction designated in section 28-9-301(1) or 28-9-305(c), Idaho Code, remains perfected thereafter. A security interest that is perfected by the financing statement but that does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier time or event becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-316, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 5, p. 381.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-316, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-316, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
Effective Dates.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, substituted “Effect of change” for “Continued perfection of security interest following change” in the section heading and added subsections (h) and (i). Effective Dates.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
CASE NOTES
Cited
Gugino v. Wachovia Dealer Servs. (In re Owen), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3318 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 15, 2009).
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(1)(d), (2)(b), (3)(e), as modified.
Continued Perfection.
2. Continued Perfection. Subsections (a) through (g) deal with continued perfection of security interests that have been perfected under the law of another jurisdiction. The fact that the law of a particular jurisdiction ceases to govern perfection under Sections 9-301 through 9-307 does not necessarily mean that a security interest perfected under that law automatically becomes unperfected. To the contrary: This section generally provides that a security interest perfected under the law of one jurisdiction remains perfected for a fixed period of time (four months or one year, depending on the circumstances), even though the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection changes. However, cessation of perfection under the law of the original jurisdiction cuts short the fixed period. The four-month and one-year periods are long enough for a secured party to discover in most cases that the law of a different jurisdiction governs perfection and to reperfect (typically by filing) under the law of that jurisdiction. If a secured party properly reperfects a security interest before it becomes unperfected under subsection (a), then the security interest remains perfected continuously thereafter. See subsection (b).
Example 1:
Example 1: Debtor is a general partnership whose chief executive office is in Pennsylvania. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s equipment by filing in Pennsylvania on May 15, 2002. On April 1, 2005, without Lender’s knowledge, Debtor moves its chief executive office to New Jersey. Lender’s security interest remains perfected for four months after the move. See subsection (a)(2).
Example 2:
Example 2: Debtor is a general partnership whose chief executive office is in Pennsylvania. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s equipment by filing in Pennsylvania on May 15, 2002. On April 1, 2007, without Lender’s knowledge, Debtor moves its chief executive office to New Jersey. Lender’s security interest remains perfected only through May 14, 2007, when the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses. See subsection (a)(1). Although, under these facts, Lender would have only a short period of time to discover that Debtor had relocated and to reperfect under New Jersey law, Lender could have protected itself by filing a continuation statement in Pennsylvania before Debtor relocated. By doing so, Lender would have prevented lapse and allowed itself the full four months to discover Debtor’s new location and refile there or, if Debtor is in default, to perfect by taking possession of the equipment.
Example 3:
Example 3: Under the facts of Example 2, Lender files a financing statement in New Jersey before the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania financing statement lapses. Under subsection (b), Lender’s security interest is continuously perfected beyond May 14, 2007, for a period determined by New Jersey’s Article 9. Subsection (a)(3) allows a one-year period in which to reperfect. The longer period is necessary, because, even with the exercise of due diligence, the secured party may be unable to discover that the collateral has been transferred to a person located in another jurisdiction. In any event, the period is cut short if the financing statement becomes ineffective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed.
Example 4:
Example 4: Debtor is a Pennsylvania corporation. On January 1, Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s equipment by filing in Pennsylvania. Debtor’s shareholders decide to “reincorporate” in Delaware. On March 1, they form a Delaware corporation (Newcorp) into which they merge Debtor. The merger effectuates a transfer of the collateral from Debtor to Newcorp, which thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction. Under subsection (a)(3), the security interest remains perfected for one year after the merger. If a financing statement is filed in Delaware against Newcorp within the year following the merger, then the security interest remains perfected thereafter for a period determined by Delaware’s Article 9.
Note that although Newcorp is a “new debtor” as defined in Section 9-102, the application of subsection (a)(3) is not limited to transferees who are new debtors. Note also that, under Section 9-507, the financing statement naming Debtor remains effective even though Newcorp has become the debtor.
Subsection (a) addresses security interests that are perfected (i.e., that have attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken) before the debtor changes its location. Subsection (h) applies to security interests that have not attached before the location changes. See Comment 7.
Retroactive Unperfection.
3. Retroactive Unperfection. Subsection (b) sets forth the consequences of the failure to reperfect before perfection ceases under subsection (a): the security interest becomes unperfected prospectively and, as against purchasers for value, including buyers and secured parties, but not as against donees or lien creditors, retroactively. The rule applies to agricultural liens, as well. See also Section 9-515 (taking the same approach with respect to lapse). Although this approach creates the potential for circular priorities, the alternative-retroactive unperfection against lien creditors — would create substantial and unjustifiable preference risks.
Example 5:
Example 5: Under the facts of Example 4, six months after the merger, Buyer bought from Newcorp some equipment formerly owned by Debtor. At the time of the purchase, Buyer took subject to Lender’s perfected security interest, of which Buyer was unaware. See Section 9-315(a)(1). However, subsection (b) provides that if Lender fails to reperfect in Delaware within a year after the merger, its security interest becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected against Buyer. Having given value and received delivery of the equipment without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected, Buyer would take free of the security interest. See Section 9-317(b).
Example 6:
Example 6: Under the facts of Example 4, one month before the merger, Debtor created a security interest in certain equipment in favor of Financer, who perfected by filing in Pennsylvania. At that time, Financer’s security interest is subordinate to Lender’s. See Section 9-322(a)(1). Financer reperfects by filing in Delaware within a year after the merger, but Lender fails to do so. Under subsection (b), Lender’s security interest is deemed never to have been perfected against Financer, a purchaser for value. Consequently, under Section 9-322(a)(2), Financer’s security interest is now senior.
Possessory Security Interests.
Of course, the expiration of the time period specified in subsection (a) does not of itself prevent the secured party from later reperfecting under the law of the new jurisdiction. If the secured party does so, however, there will be a gap in perfection, and the secured party may lose priority as a result. Thus, in Example 6, if Lender perfects by filing in Delaware more than one year under the merger, it will have a new date of filing and perfection for purposes of Section 9-322(a)(1). Financer’s security interest, whose perfection dates back to the filing in Pennsylvania under subsection (b), will remain senior. 4. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (c) deals with continued perfection of possessory security interests. It applies not only to security interests perfected solely by the secured party’s having taken possession of the collateral. It also applies to security interests perfected by a method that includes as an element of perfection the secured party’s having taken possession, such as perfection by taking delivery of a certificated security in registered form, see Section 9-313(a), and perfection by obtaining control over a certificated security. See Section 9-314(a).
Goods Covered by Certificate of Title.
5. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. Subsections (d) and (e) address continued perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title. The following examples explain the operation of those subsections.
Example 7:
Example 7: Debtor’s automobile is covered by a certificate of title issued by Illinois. Lender perfects a security interest in the automobile by complying with Illinois’ certificate-of-title statute. Thereafter, Debtor applies for a certificate of title in Indiana. Six months thereafter, Creditor acquires a judicial lien on the automobile. Under Section 9-303(b), Illinois law ceases to govern perfection; rather, once Debtor delivers the application and applicable fee to the appropriate Indiana authority, Indiana law governs. Nevertheless, under Indiana’s Section 9-316(d), Lender’s security interest remains perfected until it would become unperfected under Illinois law had no certificate of title been issued by Indiana. (For example, Illinois’ certificate-of-title statute may provide that the surrender of an Illinois certificate of title in connection with the issuance of a certificate of title by another jurisdiction causes a security interest noted thereon to become unperfected.) If Lender’s security interest remains perfected, it is senior to Creditor’s judicial lien.
Example 8:
Example 8: Under the facts in Example 7, five months after Debtor applies for an Indiana certificate of title, Debtor sells the automobile to Buyer. Under subsection (e)(2), because Lender did not reperfect within the four months after the goods became covered by the Indiana certificate of title, Lender’s security interest is deemed never to have been perfected against Buyer. Under Section 9-317(b), Buyer is likely to take free of the security interest. Lender could have protected itself by perfecting its security interest either under Indiana’s certificate-of-title statute, see Section 9-311, or, if it had a right to do so under an agreement or Section 9-609, by taking possession of the automobile. See Section 9-313(b).
The results in Examples 7 and 8 do not depend on the fact that the original perfection was achieved by notation on a certificate of title. Subsection (d) applies regardless of the method by which a security interest is perfected under the law of another jurisdiction when the goods became covered by a certificate of title from this State.
Section 9-337 affords protection to a limited class of persons buying or acquiring a security interest in the goods while a security interest is perfected under the law of another jurisdiction but after this State has issued a clean certificate of title.
Deposit Accounts, Letter-of-Credit Rights, and Investment Property.
6. Deposit Accounts, Letter-of-Credit Rights, and Investment Property. Subsections (f) and (g) address changes in the jurisdiction of a bank, issuer of an uncertificated security, issuer of or nominated person under a letter of credit, securities intermediary, and commodity intermediary. The provisions are analogous to those of subsections (a) and (b). 7. Security Interests that Attach after Debtor Changes Location. In contrast to subsections (a) and (b), which address security interests that are perfected (i.e., that have attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken) before the debtor changes its location, subsection (h) addresses security interests that attach within four months after the debtor changes its location. Under subsection (h), a filed financing statement that would have been effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral if the debtor had not changed its location is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired within four months after the relocation.
Example 9:
Example 9: Debtor, an individual whose principal residence is in Pennsylvania, grants to Lender a security interest in Debtor’s existing and after-acquired inventory. Lender perfects the security interest by filing a proper financing statement in Pennsylvania on January 2, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Debtor’s principal residence is relocated to New Jersey. Upon the relocation, New Jersey law governs perfection of a security interest in Debtor’s inventory. See Sections 9-301, 9-307. Under New Jersey’s Section 9-316(a), Lender’s security interest in Debtor’s inventory on hand at the time of the relocation remains perfected for four months thereafter. Had Debtor not relocated, the financing statement filed in Pennsylvania would have been effective to perfect Lender’s security interest in inventory acquired by Debtor after March 31, 2014. Accordingly, under subsection (h), the financing statement is effective to perfect Lender’s security interest in inventory that Debtor acquires within the four months after Debtor’s location changed.
In Example 9, Lender’s security interest in the inventory acquired within the four months after Debtor’s relocation will be perfected when it attaches. It will remain perfected if, before the expiration of the four-month period, the security interest is perfected under the law of New Jersey. Otherwise, the security interest will become unperfected at the end of the four-month period and will be deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser for value. See subsection (h)(2).
Collateral Acquired by New Debtor.
8. Collateral Acquired by New Debtor. Subsection (i) is similar to subsection (h). Whereas subsection (h) addresses security interests that attach within four months after a debtor changes its location, subsection (i) addresses security interests that attach within four months after a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person. Subsection (i) also addresses collateral acquired by the new debtor before it becomes bound.
Example 10:
Example 10: Debtor, a Pennsylvania corporation, grants to Lender a security interest in Debtor’s existing and after-acquired inventory. Lender perfects the security interest by filing a proper financing statement in Pennsylvania on January 2, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Debtor merges into Survivor, a Delaware corporation. Because Survivor is located in Delaware, Delaware law governs perfection of a security interest in Survivor’s inventory. See Sections 9-301, 9-307. Under Delaware’s Section 9-316(a), Lender’s security interest in the inventory that Survivor acquired from Debtor remains perfected for one year after the transfer. See Comment 2. By virtue of the merger, Survivor becomes bound as debtor by Debtor’s security agreement. See Section 9-203(d). As a consequence, Lender’s security interest attaches to all of Survivor’s inventory under Section 9-203, and Lender’s collateral now includes inventory in which Debtor never had an interest. The financing statement filed in Pennsylvania against Debtor is effective under Delaware’s Section 9-316(i) to perfect Lender’s security interest in inventory that Survivor acquired before, and within the four months after, becoming bound as debtor by Debtor’s security agreement. This is because the financing statement filed in Pennsylvania would have been effective to perfect Lender’s security interest in this collateral had Debtor, rather than Survivor, acquired it. If the financing statement is effective, Lender’s security interest in the collateral that Survivor acquired before, and within four months after, Survivor became bound as debtor will be perfected upon attachment. It will remain perfected if, before the expiration of the four-month period, the security interest is perfected under Delaware law. Otherwise, the security interest will become unperfected at the end of the four-month period and will be deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser for value.
Section 9-325 contains special rules governing the priority of competing security interests in collateral that is transferred, by merger or otherwise, to a new debtor or other person who becomes a debtor with respect to the collateral. Section 9-326 contains special rules governing the priority of competing security interests in collateral acquired by a new debtor other than by transfer from the original debtor.
Agricultural Liens.
Example 11:
Example 11: Supplier holds an agricultural lien on corn. The lien arises under an Iowa statute. Supplier perfects by filing a financing statement in Iowa, where the corn is located. See Section 9-302. Debtor stores the corn in Missouri. Assume the Iowa agricultural lien survives or an agricultural lien arises under Missouri law (matters that this Article does not govern). Once the corn is located in Missouri, Missouri becomes the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection. See Section 9-302. Thus, the agricultural lien will not be perfected unless Supplier files a financing statement in Missouri.
§ 28-9-317. Interests that take priority over or take free of security interest or agricultural lien.
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A security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights of:
- A person entitled to priority under section 28-9-322, Idaho Code; and
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a person that becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of the time:
- the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected; or
- one (1) of the conditions specified in section 28-9-203(b)(3), Idaho Code, is met and a financing statement covering the collateral is filed.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a buyer, other than a secured party, of tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments or a certificated security takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a lessee of goods takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the lessee gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.
- A licensee of a general intangible or a buyer, other than a secured party, of collateral other than tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments or a certificated security takes free of a security interest if the licensee or buyer gives value without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
- Except as otherwise provided in sections 28-9-320 and 28-9-321, Idaho Code, if a person files a financing statement with respect to a purchase-money security interest before or within twenty (20) days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of a buyer, lessee, or lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-317, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 30, p. 77; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 6, p. 381.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-317, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-317, p. 351, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Amendments.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, substituted “of collateral other than tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments or” for “of accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, general intangibles, or investment property other than” in subsection (d).
Effective Dates.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-301, 2A-307(2).
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. As did former Section 9-301, this section lists the classes of persons who take priority over, or take free of, an unperfected security interest. Section 9-308 explains when a security interest or agricultural lien is “perfected.” A security interest that has attached (see Section 9-203) but as to which a required perfection step has not been taken is “unperfected.” Certain provisions have been moved from former Section 9-301. The definition of “lien creditor” now appears in Section 9-102, and the rules governing priority in future advances are found in Section 9-323.
Competing Security Interests.
Filed but Unattached Security Interest vs. Lien Creditor.
4. Filed but Unattached Security Interest vs. Lien Creditor. Under former Section 9-301(1)(b), a lien creditor’s rights had priority over an unperfected security interest. Perfection required attachment (former Section 9-303), and attachment required the giving of value (former Section 9-203). It followed that, if a secured party had filed a financing statement but the debtor had not entered into a security agreement and value had not yet been given, an intervening lien creditor whose lien arose after filing but before attachment of the security interest acquired rights that are senior to those of the secured party who later gives value. This result comported with the nemo dat concept: When the security interest attached, the collateral was already subject to the judicial lien.
On the other hand, this approach treated the first secured advance differently from all other advances, even in circumstances in which a security agreement covering the collateral had been entered into before the judicial lien attached. The special rule for future advances in former Section 9-301(4) (substantially reproduced in Section 9-323(b)) afforded priority to a discretionary advance made by a secured party within 45 days after the lien creditor’s rights arose as long as the secured party was “perfected” when the lien creditor’s lien arose-i.e., as long as the advance was not the first one and an earlier advance had been made.
Subsection (a)(2) revises former Section 9-301(1)(b) and, in appropriate cases, treats the first advance the same as subsequent advances. More specifically, a judicial lien that arises after the security-agreement condition of Section 9-203(b)(3) is satisfied and a financing statement is filed, but before the security interest attaches and becomes perfected is subordinate to all advances secured by the security interest, even the first advance, except as otherwise provided in Section 9-323(b). However, if the security interest becomes unperfected (e.g., because the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses) before the judicial lien arises, the security interest is subordinate. If a financing statement is filed but a security interest does not attach, then no priority contest arises. The lien creditor has the only enforceable claim to the property.
Security Interest of Consignor or Receivables Buyer vs. Lien Creditor.
5. Security Interest of Consignor or Receivables Buyer vs. Lien Creditor. Section 1-201(b)(35) defines “security interest” to include the interest of most true consignors of goods and the interest of most buyers of certain receivables (accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes). A consignee of goods or a seller of accounts or chattel paper each is deemed to have rights in the collateral which a lien creditor may reach, as long as the competing security interest of the consignor or buyer is unperfected. This is so even though, as between the consignor and the debtor-consignee, the latter has only limited rights, and, as between the buyer and debtor-seller, the latter does not have any rights in the collateral. See Sections 9-318 (seller), 9-319 (consignee). Security interests arising from sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are automatically perfected. See Section 9-309. Accordingly, a subsequent judicial lien always would be subordinate to the rights of a buyer of those types of receivables. 6. Purchasers Other Than Secured Parties. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) afford priority over an unperfected security interest to certain purchasers (other than secured parties) of collateral. They derive from former Sections 9-301(1)(c), 2A-307(2), and 9-301(d). Former Section 9-301(1)(c) and (1)(d) provided that unperfected security interests are “subordinate” to the rights of certain purchasers. But, as former Comment 9 suggested, the practical effect of subordination in this context is that the purchaser takes free of the security interest. To avoid any possible misinterpretation, subsections (b) and (d) of this section use the phrase “takes free.”
Subsection (b) governs goods, as well as intangibles of the type whose transfer is effected by physical delivery of the representative piece of paper (tangible chattel paper, documents, instruments, and security certificates). To obtain priority, a buyer must both give value and receive delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the existing security interest and before perfection. Even if the buyer gave value without knowledge and before perfection, the buyer would take subject to the security interest if perfection occurred before physical delivery of the collateral to the buyer. Subsection (c) contains a similar rule with respect to lessees of goods. Note that a lessee of goods in ordinary course of business takes free of all security interests created by the lessor, even if perfected. See Section 9-321.
Normally, there will be no question when a buyer of chattel paper, documents, instruments, or security certificates “receives delivery” of the property. See Section 1-201 (defining “delivery”). However, sometimes a buyer or lessee of goods, such as complex machinery, takes delivery of the goods in stages and completes assembly at its own location. Under those circumstances, the buyer or lessee “receives delivery” within the meaning of subsections (b) and (c) when, after an inspection of the portion of the goods remaining with the seller or lessor, it would be apparent to a potential lender to the seller or lessor that another person might have an interest in the goods.
The rule of subsection (b) obviously is not appropriate where the collateral consists of intangibles and there is no representative piece of paper whose physical delivery is the only or the customary method of transfer. Therefore, with respect to such intangibles (including accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, general intangibles, and investment property other than certificated securities), subsection (d) gives priority to any buyer who gives value without knowledge, and before perfection, of the security interest. A licensee of a general intangible takes free of an unperfected security interest in the general intangible under the same circumstances. Note that a licensee of a general intangible in ordinary course of business takes rights under a nonexclusive license free of security interests created by the licensor, even if perfected. See Section 9-321.
Agricultural Liens.
Unless Section 9-109 excludes the transaction from this Article, a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is a “secured party” (defined in Section 9-102), and subsections (b) and (d) do not determine priority of the security interest created by the sale. Rather, the priority rules generally applicable to competing security interests apply. See Section 9-322. 7. Agricultural Liens. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) subordinate unperfected agricultural liens in the same manner in which they subordinate unperfected security interests.
Purchase-Money Security Interests.
8. Purchase-Money Security Interests. Subsection (e) derives from former Section 9-301(2). It provides that, if a purchase-money security interest is perfected by filing no later than 20 days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of buyers, lessees, or lien creditors which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing. Subsection (e) differs from former Section 9-301(2) in two significant respects. First, subsection (e) protects a purchase-money security interest against all buyers and lessees, not just against transferees in bulk. Second, subsection (e) conditions this protection on filing within 20, as opposed to ten, days after delivery.
Section 9-311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) “is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement.” It follows that a person who perfects a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title by complying with the perfection requirements of an applicable certificate-of-title statute “files a financing statement” within the meaning of subsection (e).
§ 28-9-318. No interest retained in right to payment that is sold — Rights and title of seller of account or chattel paper with respect to creditors and purchasers.
- A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.
- For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-318, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-318, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-318, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 27, p. 781, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Official Comment
Source.
Sellers of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes.
2. Sellers of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes. Section 1-201(b)(35) defines “security interest” to include the interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. See also Section 9-109(a) and Comment 5. Subsection (a) makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under former Article 9: The fact that a sale of an account or chattel paper gives rise to a “security interest” does not imply that the seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold. To the contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest whatsoever in the property to the extent that it has been sold. Subsection (a) also applies to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, transactions that were not covered by former Article 9. Neither this Article nor the definition of “security interest” in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation.
Buyers of Accounts and Chattel Paper.
3. Buyers of Accounts and Chattel Paper. Another aspect of sales of accounts and chattel paper also was implicit, and equally obvious, under former Article 9: If the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, then for purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the seller (debtor) is deemed to have all rights and title that the seller sold. The seller is deemed to have these rights even though, as between the parties, it has sold all its rights to the buyer. Subsection (b) makes this explicit. As a consequence of subsection (b), if the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the seller can transfer, and the creditors of the seller can reach, the account or chattel paper as if it had not been sold.
Example:
Example: Debtor sells accounts or chattel paper to Buyer-1 and retains no interest in them. Buyer-1 does not file a financing statement. Debtor then sells the same receivables to Buyer-2. Buyer-2 files a proper financing statement. Having sold the receivables to Buyer-1, Debtor would not have any rights in the collateral so as to permit Buyer-2’s security (ownership) interest to attach. Nevertheless, under this section, for purposes of determining the rights of purchasers for value from Debtor, Debtor is deemed to have the rights that Debtor sold. Accordingly, Buyer-2’s security interest attaches, is perfected by the filing, and, under Section 9-322, is senior to Buyer-1’s interest. 4. Effect of Perfection. If the security interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper is perfected the usual result would take effect: transferees from and creditors of the seller could not acquire an interest in the sold accounts or chattel paper. The same result generally would occur if payment intangibles or promissory notes were sold, inasmuch as the buyer’s security interest is automatically perfected under Section 9-309. However, in certain circumstances a purchaser who takes possession of a promissory note will achieve priority, under Sections 9-330 or 9-331, over the security interest of an earlier buyer of the promissory note. It necessarily follows that the seller in those circumstances retains the power to transfer the promissory note, as if it had not been sold, to a purchaser who obtains priority under either of those sections. See Section 9-203(b)(3), Comment 6.
§ 28-9-319. Rights and title of consignee with respect to creditors and purchasers.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee, while the goods are in the possession of the consignee, the consignee is deemed to have rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had or had power to transfer.
- For purposes of determining the rights of a creditor of a consignee, law other than this chapter determines the rights and title of a consignee while goods are in the consignee’s possession if, under this part, a perfected security interest held by the consignor would have priority over the rights of the creditor.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-319, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Consignments.
2. Consignments. This section takes an approach to consignments similar to that taken by Section 9-318 with respect to buyers of accounts and chattel paper. Revised Section 1-201(b)(35) defines “security interest” to include the interest of a consignor of goods under many true consignments. Section 9-319(a) provides that, for purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the consignee is deemed to acquire all rights and title that the consignor had, if the consignor’s security interest is unperfected. The consignee acquires these rights even though, as between the parties, it purchases a limited interest in the goods (as would be the case in a true consignment, under which the consignee acquires only the interest of a bailee). As a consequence of this section, creditors of the consignee can acquire judicial liens and security interests in the goods.
Insofar as creditors of the consignee are concerned, this Article to a considerable extent reformulates the former law, which appeared in former Sections 2-326 and 9-114, without changing the results. However, neither Article 2 nor former Article 9 specifically addresses the rights of non-ordinary course buyers from the consignee. Former Section 9-114 contained priority rules applicable to security interests in consigned goods. Under this Article, the priority rules for purchase-money security interests in inventory apply to consignments. See Section 9-103(d). Accordingly, a special section containing priority rules for consignments no longer is needed. Section 9-317 determines whether the rights of a judicial lien creditor are senior to the interest of the consignor, Sections 9-322 and 9-324 govern competing security interests in consigned goods, and Sections 9-317, 9-315, and 9-320 determine whether a buyer takes free of the consignor’s interest. The following example explains the operation of this section:
Example 1:
Example 1: SP-1 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a “consignment” as defined in Section 9-102. SP-1 does not file a financing statement. Debtor then grants a security interest in the goods to SP-2. SP-2 files a proper financing statement. Assuming Debtor is a mere bailee, as in a “true” consignment, Debtor would not have any rights in the collateral (beyond those of a bailee) so as to permit SP-2’s security interest to attach to any greater rights. Nevertheless, under this section, for purposes of determining the rights of Debtor’s creditors, Debtor is deemed to acquire SP-1’s rights. Accordingly, SP-2’s security interest attaches, is perfected by the filing, and, under Section 9-322, is senior to SP-1’s interest.
Effect of Perfection.
3. Effect of Perfection. Subsection (b) contains a special rule with respect to consignments that are perfected. If application of this Article would result in the consignor having priority over a competing creditor, then other law determines the rights and title of the consignee.
Example 2:
Example 2: SP-1 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a “consignment” as defined in Section 9-102. SP-1 files a proper financing statement. Debtor then grants a security interest in the goods to SP-2. Under Section 9-322, SP-1’s security interest is senior to SP-2’s. Subsection (b) indicates that, for purposes of determining SP-2’s rights, other law determines the rights and title of the consignee. If, for example, a consignee obtains only the special property of a bailee, then SP-2’s security interest would attach only to that special property.
Example 3:
Example 3: SP-1 obtains a security interest in all Debtor’s existing and after-acquired inventory. SP-1 perfects its security interest with a proper filing. Then SP-2 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a “consignment” as defined in Section 9-102. SP-2 files a proper financing statement but does not send notification to SP-1 under Section 9-324(b). Accordingly, SP-2’s security interest is junior to SP-1’s under Section 9-322(a). Under Section 9-319(a), Debtor is deemed to have the consignor’s rights and title, so that SP-1’s security interest attaches to SP-2’s ownership interest in the goods. Thereafter, Debtor grants a security interest in the goods to SP-3, and SP-3 perfects by filing. Because SP-2’s perfected security interest is senior to SP-3’s under Section 9-322(a), Section 9-319(b) applies: Other law determines Debtor’s rights and title to the goods insofar as SP-3 is concerned, and SP-3’s security interest attaches to those rights.
§ 28-9-320. Buyer of goods.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a buyer in ordinary course of business, other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations, takes free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence. A buyer who, in the ordinary course of business, buys farm products from a person engaged in farming operations or a commission merchant or selling agent who in the ordinary course of business sells farm products for a person engaged in farming operations shall take and sell free of a security interest created by his seller, even though the security interest is perfected and the buyer or commission merchant or selling agent knows of the existence of such interest, if he has registered with the secretary of state pursuant to section 28-9-523(h)[, Idaho Code,] and the security interest is not listed on the most recent master list or cumulative supplement distributed by the secretary of state pursuant to section 28-9-523(i)[, Idaho Code], unless he has received written notification, as that term is used in applicable federal law and regulation, of the security interest from the secretary of state, his seller or the secured party.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a buyer of goods from a person who used or bought the goods for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes takes free of a security interest, even if perfected, if the buyer buys:
- Without knowledge of the security interest;
- For value;
- Primarily for the buyer’s personal, family or household purposes; and
- Before the filing of a financing statement covering the goods.
- To the extent that it affects the priority of a security interest over a buyer of goods under subsection (b) of this section, the period of effectiveness of a filing made in the jurisdiction in which the seller is located is governed by section 28-9-316(a) and (b)[, Idaho Code].
- A buyer in ordinary course of business buying oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead or after extraction takes free of an interest arising out of an encumbrance.
- Subsections (a) and (b) of this section do not affect a security interest in goods in the possession of the secured party under section 28-9-313.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-320, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (a), (c), and (e) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Buyer.
It is clear that an auctioneer is not a “buyer” who has the protection of this section. Newgen v. OK Livestock Exch., 117 Idaho 445, 788 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1990).
Farm Products.
Where secured party authorized sale of grain to insolvent buyer, subsequent purchaser took free of the security interest. Western Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260, 678 P.2d 52 (1984).
Right of Mortgagee to Sell.
Mortgage upon stock of goods remaining in hands of mortgagor with power to dispose of the same was void as to third parties. In re Hickerson, 162 F. 345 (D. Idaho 1908).
While mortgage on a stock of goods which permitted mortgagor to remain in the full and free use and enjoyment of the same was void in that it permitted him to sell the goods in the usual course of trade, yet such a mortgage was valid when it covered wood corded and standing in forest where it had been cut. Meyer v. Munro, 9 Idaho 46, 71 P. 969 (1903).
Trust Receipts.
Holder of trust receipt on car sold by trustee to another dealer was entitled to recognize the sale and pursue its remedy against proceeds of sale deposited in trustee’s bank. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bosse, 76 Idaho 409, 283 P.2d 937 (1955).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
ALR. — Who is “person in business of selling goods of that kind” within provision of UCC § 1-201(9), defining buyer in ordinary course of business for purposes of UCC § 9-307(1). 73 A.L.R.3d 338. Official Comment
Source.
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. This section states when buyers of goods take free of a security interest even though perfected. Of course, a buyer who takes free of a perfected security interest takes free of an unperfected one. Section 9-317 should be consulted to determine what purchasers, in addition to the buyers covered in this section, take free of an unperfected security interest. Article 2 states general rules on purchase of goods from a seller with defective or voidable title (Section 2-403).
Buyers in Ordinary Course.
3. Buyers in Ordinary Course. Subsection (a) derives from former Section 9-307(1). The definition of “buyer in ordinary course of business” in Section 1-201 restricts its application to buyers “from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind.” Thus subsection (a) applies primarily to inventory collateral. The subsection further excludes from its operation buyers of “farm products” (defined in Section 9-102) from a person engaged in farming operations. The buyer in ordinary course of business is defined as one who buys goods “in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person and in the ordinary course.” Subsection (a) provides that such a buyer takes free of a security interest, even though perfected, and even though the buyer knows the security interest exists. Reading the definition together with the rule of law results in the buyer’s taking free if the buyer merely knows that a security interest covers the goods but taking subject if the buyer knows, in addition, that the sale violates a term in an agreement with the secured party.
As did former Section 9-307(1), subsection (a) applies only to security interests created by the seller of the goods to the buyer in ordinary course. However, under certain circumstances a buyer in ordinary course who buys goods that were encumbered with a security interest created by a person other than the seller may take free of the security interest, as Example 2 explains. See also Comment 6, below.
Example 1:
Example 1: Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Even if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, Buyer does not take free of Lender’s security interest under subsection (a), because Dealer did not create the security interest; Manufacturer did.
Example 2:
Example 2: Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Lender learns of the sale but does nothing to assert its security interest. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Inasmuch as Lender’s acquiescence constitutes an “entrusting” of the goods to Dealer within the meaning of Section 2-403(3) Buyer takes free of Lender’s security interest under Section 2-403(2) if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course of business.
Buyers of Farm Products.
4. Buyers of Farm Products. This section does not enable a buyer of farm products to take free of a security interest created by the seller, even if the buyer is a buyer in ordinary course of business. However, a buyer of farm products may take free of a security interest under Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 1631. 5. Buyers of Consumer Goods. Subsection (b), which derives from former Section 9-307(2), deals with buyers of collateral that the debtor-seller holds as “consumer goods” (defined in Section 9-102). Under Section 9-309(1), a purchase-money interest in consumer goods, except goods that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) (such as automobiles that are subject to a certificate-of-title statute), is perfected automatically upon attachment. There is no need to file to perfect. Under subsection (b) a buyer of consumer goods takes free of a security interest, even though perfected, if the buyer buys (1) without knowledge of the security interest, (2) for value, (3) primarily for the buyer’s own personal, family, or household purposes, and (4) before a financing statement is filed.
As to purchase money-security interests which are perfected without filing under Section 9-309(1): A secured party may file a financing statement, although filing is not required for perfection. If the secured party does file, all buyers take subject to the security interest. If the secured party does not file, a buyer who meets the qualifications stated in the preceding paragraph takes free of the security interest.
As to security interests for which a perfection step is required: This category includes all non-purchase-money security interests, and all security interests, whether or not purchase-money, in goods subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a), such as automobiles covered by a certificate-of-title statute. As long as the required perfection step has not been taken and the security interest remains unperfected, not only the buyers described in subsection (b) but also the purchasers described in Section 9-317 will take free of the security interest. After a financing statement has been filed or the perfection requirements of the applicable certificate-of-title statute have been complied with (compliance is the equivalent of filing a financing statement; see Section 9-311(b)), all subsequent buyers, under the rule of subsection (b), are subject to the security interest.
The rights of a buyer under subsection (b) turn on whether a financing statement has been filed against consumer goods. Occasionally, a debtor changes his or her location after a filing is made. Subsection (c), which derives from former Section 9-103(1)(d)(iii), deals with the continued effectiveness of the filing under those circumstances. It adopts the rules of Sections 9-316(a) and (b). These rules are explained in the Comments to that section.
Authorized Dispositions.
6. Authorized Dispositions. The limitations that subsections (a) and (b) impose on the persons who may take free of a security interest apply of course only to unauthorized sales by the debtor. If the secured party authorized the sale in an express agreement or otherwise, the buyer takes free under Section 9-315(a) without regard to the limitations of this section. (That section also states the right of a secured party to the proceeds of a sale, authorized or unauthorized.) Moreover, the buyer also takes free if the secured party waived or otherwise is precluded from asserting its security interest against the buyer. See Section 1-103.
Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals.
7. Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals. Under subsection (d), a buyer in ordinary course of business of minerals at the wellhead or minehead or after extraction takes free of a security interest created by the seller. Specifically, it provides that qualified buyers take free not only of Article 9 security interests but also of interests “arising out of an encumbrance.” As defined in Section 9-102, the term “encumbrance” means “a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property.” Thus, to the extent that a mortgage encumbers minerals not only before but also after extraction, subsection (d) enables a buyer in ordinary course of the minerals to take free of the mortgage. This subsection does not, however, enable these buyers to take free of interests arising out of ownership interests in the real property. This issue is significant only in a minority of states. Several of them have adopted special statutes and nonuniform amendments to Article 9 to provide special protections to mineral owners, whose interests often are highly fractionalized in the case of oil and gas. See Terry I. Cross, Oil and Gas Product Liens — Statutory Security Interests for Producers and Royalty Owners Under the Statutes of Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming, 50 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 418 (1996). Inasmuch as a complete resolution of the issue would require the addition of complex provisions to this Article, and there are good reasons to believe that a uniform solution would not be feasible, this Article leaves its resolution to other legislation.
Possessory Security Interests.
8. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (e) is new. It rejects the holding of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976) and, together with Section 9-317(b), prevents a buyer of goods collateral from taking free of a security interest if the collateral is in the possession of the secured party. “The secured party” referred in subsection (e) is the holder of the security interest referred to in subsection (a) or (b). Section 9-313 determines whether a secured party is in possession for purposes of this section. Under some circumstances, Section 9-313 provides that a secured party is in possession of collateral even if the collateral is in the physical possession of a third party.
§ 28-9-321. Licensee of general intangible and lessee of goods in ordinary course of business.
- In this section, “licensee in ordinary course of business” means a person that becomes a licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights of another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the business of licensing general intangibles of that kind. A person becomes a licensee in the ordinary course if the license to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor’s own usual or customary practices.
- A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general intangible created by the licensor, even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its existence.
- A lessee in ordinary course of business takes its leasehold interest free of a security interest in the goods created by the lessor, even if the security interest is perfected and the lessee knows of its existence.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-321, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Derived from Sections 2A-103(1)(o), 2A-307(3).
Licensee in Ordinary Course.
2. Licensee in Ordinary Course. Like the analogous rules in Section 9-320(a) with respect to buyers in ordinary course and subsection (c) with respect to lessees in ordinary course, the new rule in subsection (b) reflects the expectations of the parties and the marketplace: a licensee under a nonexclusive license takes subject to a security interest unless the secured party authorizes the license free of the security interest or other, controlling law such as that of this section (protecting ordinary-course licensees) dictates a contrary result. See Sections 9-201, 9-315. The definition of “licensee in ordinary course of business” in subsection (a) is modeled upon that of “buyer in ordinary course of business.”
Lessee in Ordinary Course.
3. Lessee in Ordinary Course. Subsection (c) contains the rule formerly found in Section 2A-307(3). The rule works in the same way as that of Section 9-320(a).
§ 28-9-322. Priorities among conflicting security interests in and agricultural liens on same collateral.
-
Except as otherwise provided in this section, priority among conflicting security interests and agricultural liens in the same collateral is determined according to the following rules:
- Conflicting perfected security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security interest or agricultural lien is first perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
- A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting unperfected security interest or agricultural lien.
- The first security interest or agricultural lien to attach or become effective has priority if conflicting security interests and agricultural liens are unperfected.
-
For the purposes of subsection (a)(1) of this section:
- The time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in proceeds; and
- The time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral supported by a supporting obligation is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in the supporting obligation.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f) of this section, a security interest in collateral which qualifies for priority over a conflicting security interest under section 28-9-327, 28-9-328, 28-9-329, 28-9-330 or 28-9-331 [, Idaho Code,] also has priority over a conflicting security interest in:
- Any supporting obligation for the collateral; and
-
Proceeds of the collateral if:
- the security interest in proceeds is perfected;
- the proceeds are cash proceeds or of the same type as the collateral; and
- in the case of proceeds that are proceeds of proceeds, all intervening proceeds are cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral, or an account relating to the collateral.
- Subject to subsection (e) of this section and except as otherwise provided in subsection (f) of this section, if a security interest in chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter of credit rights is perfected by a method other than filing, conflicting perfected security interests in proceeds of the collateral rank according to priority in time of filing.
- Subsection (d) of this section applies only if the proceeds of the collateral are not cash proceeds, chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property or letter of credit rights.
-
Subsections (a) through (e) of this section are subject to:
- Subsection (g) of this section and the other provisions of this part;
- Section 28-4-210[, Idaho Code,] with respect to a security interest of a collecting bank;
- Section 28-5-120[, Idaho Code,] with respect to a security interest of an issuer or nominated person; and
- Section 28-9-110[, Idaho Code,] with respect to a security interest arising under chapter 2 or 12[, title 28, Idaho Code]. (g) A perfected agricultural lien on collateral has priority over a conflicting security interest in or agricultural lien on the same collateral if the statute creating the agricultural lien so provides.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-322, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in the introductory paragraph in subsection (c) and in paragraphs (f)(2), (f)(3), and (f)(4) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Deed of trust.
Purchase money security interest.
Absence of Knowledge.
An examination of the priority and foreclosure scheme of article 9 demonstrates that absence of knowledge of subordinate security interests could not be a prerequisite for a purchaser to buy property free of encumbrances at a foreclosure sale; for, if absence of knowledge were required, the party whose interest would be undermined would be the secured party who was conducting the sale. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Crop Liens.
Creditor 1 took priority over creditor 2 with respect to a security interest arising from a line of credit, due no more than six months prior to the planting of crops, but creditor 2 took priority over creditor 1’s security interest relating to a promissory note due and payable to creditor 1 over a year prior to the crops being planted, where creditor 2 had provided chemicals necessary for the production of the crops. Tri River Chem. Co. v. TNT Farms, 226 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998). Deed of Trust.
Where the small business administration held a security interest in fruit packing machinery under its real estate deed of trust which covered the real property to which the machinery was affixed, and where the SBA had purchased the entire interest of the original mortgagees of the property without knowledge of a purchase money security interest retained by the seller of the machinery, the SBA’s interest was prior to the purchase money security interest. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Growing Crops.
When mortgage on growing crops had been recorded, it was notice to all persons claiming to have acquired rights to crop subsequent to record. Adams v. Caldwell Milling & Elevator Co., 33 Idaho 677, 197 P. 723 (1921).
Prior chattel mortgage on crops to be grown was valid, though given to a third party by lessee of premises on which crops were to be grown, after an agreement between him and lessor to cancel the existing lease, where latter, with notice of such mortgage, permitted lessee to live on and cultivate premises and thereafter entered into a new lease of the premises to lessee. Bank of Roberts v. Olaveson, 38 Idaho 223, 221 P. 560 (1923).
Lien of chattel mortgage upon crop to be sown or grown would not attach to crops sown by others, except so far as mortgagor had or retains interests in the crops. Devereaux Mtg. Co. v. Walker, 46 Idaho 431, 268 P. 37 (1926); Lords v. Lava Hot Springs State Bank, 44 Idaho 316, 356 P. 761 (1927); Albrethsen v. Clements, 48 Idaho 80, 279 P. 1097 (1929).
Possession.
“Possession” for the purpose of this section should not be construed to occur at the time when cattle purchasers completed selection of cows to be purchased from seller’s herd; the ten-day grace period for filing a financing statement commenced when the security agreement was executed and the purchasers were in possession of all the cows. Valley Bank v. Estate of Rainsdon, 117 Idaho 1085, 793 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1990).
Proper Filing Required.
This section exclusively delimits the priority of competing security interests where the facts clearly establish that the security interests have been properly filed, providing that the first interest properly filed holds a superior claim over all other secured and unsecured creditors as a matter of law. Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994).
Purchase at Foreclosure Sale.
Although the seller of various items of fruit packing machinery had retained a security interest to secure the purchase price, a subsequent foreclosure sale of the real property to which the machinery was affixed discharged the security interest held by the seller of the machinery, where the purchase at the foreclosure sale of the real estate and fruit packing machinery was in good faith. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980). Purchase Money Security Interest.
Where, because a bank advanced $12,346 for debtor to pay the first installment of loan made by a third party and secured by certain cows purchased by debtor with the proceeds of the original loan, and where it contends that it acquired the status of a lender with a purchase money security interest, at least in the amount of this advancement, although the money advanced by bank was not used by the debtor to acquire any rights in the cows or the use of them because he already had all the possible rights in the cows he could have, nevertheless, since the bank’s general security interest was perfected earlier in time than was that of the third party, accordingly, the third party could not prevail unless: (1) he had the super priority of a purchase money security interest, and this would require that he had filed so as to perfect his purchase money security interest, (2) the bank subordinated its security interest to third party’s security interest, or (3) the bank was estopped to assert a prior security interest. Valley Bank v. Estate of Rainsdon, 117 Idaho 1085, 793 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1990).
Warehouseman’s Liens.
Warehouseman’s lien on seed was not effective against equipment manufacturer’s security interest in seed since its security interest in the seed was perfected before the seed was delivered to the warehouseman; therefore, the manufacturer’s security interest had priority. Curry Grain Storage, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 120 Idaho 328, 815 P.2d 1068 (1991).
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-312(5), (6).
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. In a variety of situations, two or more people may claim a security interest in the same collateral. This section states general rules of priority among conflicting security interests. As subsection (f) provides, the general rules in subsections (a) through (e) are subject to the rule in subsection (g) governing perfected agricultural liens and to the other rules in this Part of this Article. Rules that override this section include those applicable to purchase-money security interests (Section 9-324) and those qualifying for special priority in particular types of collateral. See, e.g., Section 9-327 (deposit accounts); Section 9-328 (investment property); Section 9-329 (letter-of-credit rights); Section 9-330 (chattel paper and instruments); Section 9-334 (fixtures). In addition, the general rules of sections (a) through (e) are subject to priority rules governing security interests arising under Articles 2, 2A, 4, and 5.
General Rules.
3. General Rules. Subsection (a) contains three general rules. Subsection (a)(1) governs the priority of competing perfected security interests. Subsection (a)(2) governs the priority of competing security interests if one is perfected and the other is not. Subsection (a)(3) governs the priority of competing unperfected security interests. The rules may be regarded as adaptations of the idea, deeply rooted at common law, of a race of diligence among creditors. The first two rules are based on precedence in the time as of which the competing secured parties either filed their financing statements or obtained perfected security interests. Under subsection (a)(1), the first secured party who files or perfects has priority. Under subsection (a)(2), which is new, a perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected one. Under subsection (a)(3), if both security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority. Note that Section 9-709(b) may affect the application of subsection (a) to a filing that occurred before the effective date of this Article and which would be ineffective to perfect a security interest under former Article 9 but effective under this Article. 4. Competing Perfected Security Interests. When there is more than one perfected security interest, the security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. “Filing,” of course, refers to the filing of an effective financing statement. “Perfection” refers to the acquisition of a perfected security interest, i.e., one that has attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken. See Sections 9-308 and 9-309.
Example 1:
The problem stated in Example 1 is peculiar to a notice-filing system under which filing may occur before the security interest attaches (see Section 9-502). The justification for determining priority by order of filing lies in the necessity of protecting the filing system-that is, of allowing the first secured party who has filed to make subsequent advances without each time having to check for subsequent filings as a condition of protection. Note, however, that this first-to-file protection is not absolute. For example, Section 9-324 affords priority to certain purchase-money security interests, even if a competing secured party was the first to file or perfect.
Under a notice-filing system, a filed financing statement indicates to third parties that a person may have a security interest in the collateral indicated. With further inquiry, they may discover the complete state of affairs. When a financing statement that is ineffective when filed becomes effective thereafter, the policy underlying the notice-filing system determines the “time of filing” for purposes of subsection (a)(1). For example, the unauthorized filing of an otherwise sufficient initial financing statement becomes authorized, and the financing statement becomes effective, upon the debtor’s post-filing authorization or ratification of the filing. See Section 9-509, Comment 3. Because the notice value of the financing statement is independent of the timing of authorization or ratification, the time of the unauthorized filing is the “time of filing” for purposes of subsection (a)(1). The same policy applies to the other priority rules in this part.
Example 2:
Example 2: A and B make non-purchase-money advances secured by the same collateral. The collateral is in Debtor’s possession, and neither security interest is perfected when the second advance is made. Whichever secured party first perfects its security interest (by taking possession of the collateral or by filing) takes priority. It makes no difference whether that secured party knows of the other security interest at the time it perfects its own.
Example 3:
The rule of subsection (a)(1), affording priority to the first to file or perfect, applies to security interests that are perfected by any method, including temporarily (Section 9-312) or upon attachment (Section 9-309), even though there may be no notice to creditors or subsequent purchasers and notwithstanding any common-law rule to the contrary. The form of the claim to priority, i.e., filing or perfection, may shift from time to time, and the rank will be based on the first filing or perfection as long as there is no intervening period without filing or perfection. See Section 9-308(c). Example 3: On October 1, A acquires a temporarily perfected (20-day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable document in the debtor’s possession under Section 9-312(e). On October 5, B files and thereby perfects a security interest that previously had attached to the same document. On October 10, A files. A has priority, even after the 20-day period expires, regardless of whether A knows of B’s security interest when A files. A was the first to perfect and maintained continuous perfection or filing since the start of the 20-day period. However, the perfection of A’s security interest extends only “to the extent it arises for new value given.” To the extent A’s security interest secures advances made by A beyond the 20-day period, its security interest would be subordinate to B’s, inasmuch as B was the first to file.
In general, the rule in subsection (a)(1) does not distinguish among various advances made by a secured party. The priority of every advance dates from the earlier of filing or perfection. However, in rare instances, the priority of an advance dates from the time the advance is made. See Example 3 and Section 9-323.
Priority in After-Acquired Property.
Example 4:
When after-acquired collateral is encumbered by more than one security interest, one of the security interests often is a purchase-money security interest that is entitled to special priority under Section 9-324.
Priority in Proceeds: General Rule.
6. Priority in Proceeds: General Rule. Subsection (b)(1) follows former Section 9-312(6). It provides that the baseline rules of subsection (a) apply generally to priority conflicts in proceeds except where otherwise provided (e.g., as in subsections (c) through (e)). Under Section 9-203, attachment cannot occur (and therefore, under Section 9-308, perfection cannot occur) as to particular collateral until the collateral itself comes into existence and the debtor has rights in it. Thus, a security interest in proceeds of original collateral does not attach and is not perfected until the proceeds come into existence and the debtor acquires rights in them.
Example 5:
Example 5: On April 1, Debtor authenticates a security agreement granting to A a security interest in all Debtor’s existing and after-acquired inventory. The same day, A files a financing statement covering inventory. On May 1, Debtor authenticates a security agreement granting B a security interest in all Debtor’s existing and future accounts. On June 1, Debtor sells inventory to a customer on 30-day unsecured credit. When Debtor acquires the account, B’s security interest attaches to it and is perfected by B’s financing statement. At the very same time, A’s security interest attaches to the account as proceeds of the inventory and is automatically perfected. See Section 9-315. Under subsection (b) of this section, for purposes of determining A’s priority in the account, the time of filing as to the original collateral (April 1, as to inventory) is also the time of filing as to proceeds (account). Accordingly, A’s security interest in the account has priority over B’s. Of course, had B filed its financing statement before A filed (e.g., on March 1), then B would have priority in the accounts. Section 9-324 governs the extent to which a special purchase-money priority in goods or software carries over into the proceeds of the original collateral.
Priority in Proceeds: Special Rules.
7. Priority in Proceeds: Special Rules. Subsections (c), (d), and (e), which are new, provide additional priority rules for proceeds of collateral in situations where the temporal (first-in-time) rules of subsection (a)(1) are not appropriate. These new provisions distinguish what these Comments refer to as “non-filing collateral” from what they call “filing collateral.” As used in these Comments, non-filing collateral is collateral of a type for which perfection may be achieved by a method other than filing (possession or control, mainly) and for which secured parties who so perfect generally do not expect or need to conduct a filing search. More specifically, non-filing collateral is chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights. Other collateral-accounts, commercial tort claims, general intangibles, goods, nonnegotiable documents, and payment intangibles — is filing collateral.
Proceeds of Non-Filing Collateral: Non-Temporal Priority.
8. Proceeds of Non-Filing Collateral: Non-Temporal Priority. Subsection (c)(2) provides a baseline priority rule for proceeds of non-filing collateral which applies if the secured party has taken the steps required for non-temporal priority over a conflicting security interest in non-filing collateral (e.g., control, in the case of deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, and investment property). This rule determines priority in proceeds of non-filing collateral whether or not there exists an actual conflicting security interest in the original non-filing collateral. Under subsection (c)(2), the priority in the original collateral continues in proceeds if the security interest in proceeds is perfected and the proceeds are cash proceeds or non-filing proceeds “of the same type” as the original collateral. As used in subsection (c)(2), “type” means a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code and should be read broadly. For example, a security is “of the same type” as a security entitlement (i.e., investment property), and a promissory note is “of the same type” as a draft (i.e., an instrument).
Example 6:
Example 6: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security. Debtor receives cash proceeds of the security (e.g., dividends deposited into Debtor’s deposit account). If the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of subsection (a)(1) were applied, SP-1’s security interest in the cash proceeds would be senior, although SP-2’s security interest continues perfected under Section 9-315 beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. This was the result under former Article 9. Under subsection (c), however, SP-2’s security interest is senior.
Note that a different result would obtain in Example 6 (i.e., SP-1’s security interest would be senior) if SP-1 were to obtain control of the deposit-account proceeds. This is so because subsection (c) is subject to subsection (f), which in turn provides that the priority rules under subsections (a) through (e) are subject to “the other provisions of this part.” One of those “other provisions” is Section 9-327, which affords priority to a security interest perfected by control. See Section 9-327(1).
Example 7:
Example 7: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a new certificated security issued as a stock dividend on the original collateral. Although the new security is of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property), once the 20-day period of automatic perfection expires (see Section 9-315(d)), SP-2’s security interest is unperfected. (SP-2 has not filed or taken delivery or control, and no temporary-perfection rule applies.) Consequently, once the 20-day period expires, subsection (c) does not confer priority, and, under subsection (a)(2), SP-1’s security interest in the security is senior. This was the result under former Article 9. Example 8: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a new certificated security issued as a stock dividend of the collateral. Because the new security is of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property) and (unlike Example 7) SP-2’s security interest is perfected by filing, SP-2’s security interest is senior under subsection (c). If the new security were redeemed by the issuer upon surrender and yet another security were received by Debtor, SP-2’s security interest would continue to enjoy priority under subsection (c). The new security would be proceeds of proceeds.
Example 9:
Example 9: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 subsequently perfects its security interest in investment property by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a dividend check that it deposits to a deposit account. Because the check and the deposit account are cash proceeds, SP-1’s and SP-2’s security interests in the cash proceeds are perfected under Section 9-315 beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. However, SP-2’s security interest is senior under subsection (c).
Example 10:
Example 10: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives an instrument as proceeds of the security. (Assume that the instrument is not cash proceeds.) Because the instrument is not of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property), SP-2’s security interest, although perfected by filing, does not achieve priority under subsection (c). Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of subsection (a)(1), SP-1’s security interest in the proceeds is senior.
The proceeds of proceeds are themselves proceeds. See Section 9-102 (defining “proceeds” and “collateral”). Sometimes competing security interests arise in proceeds that are several generations removed from the original collateral. As the following example explains, the applicability of subsection (c) may turn on the nature of the intervening proceeds.
Example 11:
Example 11: SP-1 perfects its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against inventory, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor’s existing and after-acquired inventory. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase inventory, which SP-1 can trace as identifiable proceeds of its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account, and which SP-2 claims as original collateral. The inventory is sold and the proceeds deposited into another deposit account, as to which SP-1 has not obtained control. Subsection (c) does not govern priority in this other deposit account. This deposit account is cash proceeds and is also the same type of collateral as SP-1’s original collateral, as required by subsections (c)(2)(A) and (B). However, SP-1’s security interest does not satisfy subsection (c)(2)(C) because the inventory proceeds, which intervened between the original deposit account and the deposit account constituting the proceeds at issue, are not cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral (original deposit account), or an account relating to the collateral. Stated otherwise, once proceeds other than cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the original collateral, or an account relating to the original collateral intervene in the chain of proceeds, priority under subsection (c) is thereafter unavailable. The special priority rule in subsection (d) also is inapplicable to this case. See Comment 9, Example 13, below. Instead, the general first-to-file-or-perfect rule of subsections (a) and (b) apply. Under that rule, SP-1 has priority unless its security interest in the inventory proceeds became unperfected under Section 9-315(d). Had SP-2 filed against inventory before SP-1 obtained control of the original deposit account, then SP-2 would have had priority even if SP-1’s security interest in the inventory proceeds remained perfected. If two security interests in the same original collateral are entitled to priority in an item of proceeds under subsection (c)(2), the security interest having priority in the original collateral has priority in the proceeds.
Proceeds of Non-Filing Collateral: Special Temporal Priority.
9. Proceeds of Non-Filing Collateral: Special Temporal Priority. Under subsections (d) and (e), if a security interest in non-filing collateral is perfected by a method other than filing (e.g., control or possession), it does not retain its priority over a conflicting security interest in proceeds that are filing collateral. Moreover, it is not entitled to priority in proceeds under the first-to file-or-perfect rule of subsections (a)(1) and (b). Instead, under subsection (d), priority is determined by a new first-to-file rule.
Example 12:
Example 12: SP-1 perfects its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against equipment, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor’s equipment. SP-1 then files against Debtor’s equipment. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase equipment, which SP-1 can trace as proceeds of its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account. If the first-to-file-or-perfect rule were applied, SP-1’s security interest would be senior under subsections (a)(1) and (b), because it was the first to perfect in the original collateral and there was no period during which its security interest was unperfected. Under subsection (d), however, SP-2’s security interest would be senior because it filed first. This corresponds with the likely expectations of the parties.
Note that under subsection (e), the first-to-file rule of subsection (d) applies only if the proceeds in question are other than non-filing collateral (i.e., if the proceeds are filing collateral). If the proceeds are non-filing collateral, either the first-to-file-or-perfect rule under subsections (a) and (b) or the non-temporal priority rule in subsection (c) would apply, depending on the facts.
Example 13:
Example 13: SP-1 perfects its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against inventory, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor’s existing and after-acquired inventory. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase inventory, which SP-1 can trace as identifiable proceeds of its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account, and which SP-2 claims as original collateral. The inventory is sold and the proceeds deposited into another deposit account, as to which SP-1 has not obtained control. As discussed above in Comment 8, Example 11, subsection (c) does not govern priority in this deposit account. Subsection (d) also does not govern, because the proceeds at issue (the deposit account) are cash proceeds. See subsection (e). Rather, the general rules of subsections (a) and (b) govern.
Priority in Supporting Obligations.
10. Priority in Supporting Obligations. Under subsections (b)(2) and (c)(1), a security interest having priority in collateral also has priority in a supporting obligation for that collateral. However, the rules in these subsections are subject to the special rule in Section 9-329 governing the priority of security interests in a letter-of-credit right. See subsection (f). Under Section 9-329, a secured party’s failure to obtain control (Section 9-107) of a letter-of-credit right that serves as supporting collateral leaves its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take control. 11. Unperfected Security Interests. Under subsection (a)(3), if conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority. This rule may be of merely theoretical interest, inasmuch as it is hard to imagine a situation where the case would come into litigation without either secured party’s having perfected its security interest. If neither security interest had been perfected at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, ordinarily neither would be good against the trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code.
Agricultural Liens.
12. Agricultural Liens. Statutes other than this Article may purport to grant priority to an agricultural lien as against a conflicting security interest or agricultural lien. Under subsection (g), if another statute grants priority to an agricultural lien, the agricultural lien has priority only if the same statute creates the agricultural lien and the agricultural lien is perfected. Otherwise, subsection (a) applies the same priority rules to an agricultural lien as to a security interest, regardless of whether the agricultural lien conflicts with another agricultural lien or with a security interest.
Inasmuch as no agricultural lien on proceeds arises under this Article, subsections (b) through (e) do not apply to proceeds of agricultural liens. However, if an agricultural lien has priority under subsection (g) and the statute creating the agricultural lien gives the secured party a lien on proceeds of the collateral subject to the lien, a court should apply the principle of subsection (g) and award priority in the proceeds to the holder of the perfected agricultural lien.
§ 28-9-322A. Security interests in crops for provision of agricultural chemicals. — (a) As used in this section:
- “Agricultural chemical” means fertilizers and other chemicals applied to crops or land which is to be used for the raising of crops, including pesticides, soil amendments and plant regulators.
-
“Fall agricultural chemical security interest” means a security interest in specific crops growing or to be grown granted by a grower to a supplier to secure the grower’s obligation to repay value given by the supplier to enable the grower to purchase from the supplier (A) agricultural chemicals to apply to such crops or to land on which such crops will be grown, and (B) application of such agricultural chemicals if such application is performed by the supplier. To qualify as a fall agricultural chemical security interest, the security interest must also satisfy the following conditions:
- Before supplying the agricultural chemicals to the grower, the supplier and grower provide the lender with a notification statement and opportunity to respond in accordance with this section;
- The security interest is perfected within twenty (20) days after the agricultural chemicals are delivered to the grower; and
- The agricultural chemicals are actually applied to the grower’s land or crops during the period September 1 through December 15.
- “Grower” shall mean a specified debtor of a lender.
- “Lender” shall mean the holder of an existing perfected security interest in crops of a grower.
- “Letter of response” shall mean a statement by a lender containing the information specified in subsection (j) of this section.
- “Notification statement” shall mean a statement by a supplier containing the information specified in subsection (h) of this section.
- “Supplier” shall mean a person who supplies agricultural chemicals to a grower.
- The name and address of the owner (if other than the grower) of such real property;
- A description of the crops growing or to be grown on such real property as to which the supplier intends to supply agricultural chemicals and upon which the supplier claims or intends to obtain a security interest;
- The social security number or federal tax identification number of the grower to whom the supplier intends to provide agricultural chemicals; and
-
The social security number or federal tax identification number of the supplier providing the notice.
- Within fifteen (15) days after actual receipt of a notification statement, the lender shall deposit in the U.S. mail, certified, a letter of response to the supplier. A copy of the lender’s letter of response shall be sent to the grower.
(b) A supplier may obtain a fall agricultural chemical security interest as provided in this section. To the extent not otherwise expressly provided in this section, the provisions of this chapter apply to a fall agricultural chemical security interest. The amount secured by a fall agricultural security interest shall be the lesser of: (i) the agreed charges for the agricultural chemicals and application costs provided pursuant to the notification statement; or (ii) the amount of the anticipated charges as reflected in the notification statement.
(c) A fall agricultural chemical security interest attaches to the existing crops upon the land where the agricultural chemical is applied, or if crops are not planted at the time of the application, to the next production crop from that land. It does not attach to crops already harvested or which are harvested before December 15 from such land, or to crops to be grown on such land after the next production crop, or to crops grown on other land than that identified in the notification statement.
(d) A fall agricultural chemical security interest is perfected by filing a financing statement.
(e) A fall agricultural chemical security interest shall have priority over a conflicting security interest in the same crops and identifiable proceeds thereof except for a prior perfected fall agricultural chemical security interest. In the event of any commingling of crops or proceeds covered by a fall agricultural chemical security interest with other crops or proceeds, the burden of proving the applicability of the fall agricultural chemical security interest to any particular crops or proceeds is on the supplier asserting it.
(f) Nothing in this section is intended to limit the priority of agricultural liens established by the statutes creating such liens, and a perfected agricultural lien shall have priority over a conflicting security interest (including a fall agricultural chemical security interest) if the statute creating the agricultural lien provides such priority.
(g) A supplier may notify the lender that the supplier intends to supply agricultural chemicals to the grower and that the supplier requests the lender to issue a letter of response. In order to so notify the lender, the supplier shall provide a notification statement to the lender in an envelope marked CROP SECURITY INTEREST NOTIFICATION STATEMENT, sent by certified mail addressed to the lender at the address for such lender shown on such lender’s most recently filed UCC-1F financing statement regarding that grower.
(h) A notification statement shall contain:
(1) The name, address and signature of the supplier providing the notification statement;
(2) The date the notification statement was prepared;
(3) The name and address of the lender;
(4) The name and address of the person to whom the lender’s response to the supplier should be addressed;
(5) A description and anticipated date of the application of agricultural chemicals and the anticipated charges for the agricultural chemicals, including anticipated application costs;
(6) The name, address and signature of the grower to whom the supplier furnished or intends to furnish agricultural chemicals;
(7) A reasonable description of the real estate sufficient to identify the same where the agricultural chemicals are to be applied;
(j) A letter of response shall contain the name, address and signature of the lender, and either
(1) A statement by the lender that there is an outstanding commitment for operating financing from the lender to the grower, and that the lender shall reserve the amount in the notification statement for the purpose of honoring drafts or other demands for payment by the supplier accompanied by invoices signed by the grower or other proof of delivery signed by the grower; or
(2) A statement by the lender that the lender shall subordinate the priority of its security interest in specified crops of the grower to the priority of the security interest in such crops obtained or to be obtained by the supplier, and specifying that the maximum amount of such subordination shall be the amount stated in the notification statement; or (3) A statement by the lender that it declines to either reserve funds or subordinate its security interest.
(k) If the lender’s letter of response states that the lender declines to either reserve funds or subordinate its security interest, the respective rights of the lender and the supplier are not affected by this section and the relative priority between the lender’s security interest in crops, and any security interest obtained by the supplier in such crops, shall be determined according to the ordinary rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in the same collateral, unless the supplier’s security interest is a fall agricultural chemical security interest.
( l ) If the lender does not mail its letter of response to the supplier within fifteen (15) days after receiving the notification statement, and the supplier has perfected a security interest in such crops or perfects such security interest within ten (10) days after the expiration of the fifteen (15) day period for the lender to respond, the supplier’s perfected security interest in such crops shall take priority over the lender’s perfected security interest in such crops, but only to the extent of the lesser of (1) the amount stated in the notification statement, or (2) the unpaid agreed charges for the agricultural chemicals identified in the notification statement and actually applied to, or for the benefit of, such crops.
(m) Any amounts repaid by any person on the grower’s obligation for which the supplier has obtained an agricultural chemical security interest shall reduce the value of the agricultural chemical security interest on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and amounts may not be reborrowed or readvanced under the same notification statement. If the supplier receives proceeds of any collateral of the lender (other than proceeds of the crops covered by the fall agricultural security interest), such proceeds shall be turned over to the lender. In order to obtain the benefits of this section, any additional sales of agricultural chemicals not included in the original notification statement must be the subject of a new notification statement, to which the lender may issue a new letter of response.
(n) No one but the supplier shall be entitled to rely on a letter of response. Rights (if any) under a letter of response are not assignable, except in connection with an assignment by the supplier of the entire security interest to which such letter of response relates. By issuing a letter of response and performing thereunder, the lender does not become a partner, joint venturer or fiduciary of either the grower or the supplier.
(o)(1) The secretary of state shall publish a form substantially as follows:
Name of supplier ...............................
Address ...............................
SSN/TIN ...............................
Date notification statement was prepared ...............................
Name of lender ...............................
Address ...............................
Name of person to whom lender’s response to supplier should be addressed ...............................
Address ...............................
Description and anticipated date of the application of agricultural chemicals ...............................
Anticipated charges for the agricultural chemicals ...............................
Anticipated charges for application, if not included in charges for chemicals ............................... Name of grower ...............................
Address ...............................
SSN/TIN ...............................
Reasonable description of the real estate where the agricultural chemicals are to be applied ...............................
...............................
Name of owner of real property (if other than grower) ...............................
...............................
Address ...............................
Crops growing or to be grown on such real property as to which the supplier intends to supply agricultural chemicals and upon which supplier intends to obtain a security interest ...............................
...............................
Signature of supplier ...............................
Signature of grower ...............................
(2) On the reverse side of the form described in subsection (1) of this section, the secretary of state shall provide a form for the lender’s letter of response, substantially as follows:
Name of lender ...............................
Address ...............................
Lender responds to notification statement as follows (choose one):
An outstanding commitment for operating financing exists for this grower. Of that commitment, lender hereby reserves the amount specified in the notification statement for the purpose of honoring drafts or other demands for payment by supplier, accompanied by invoices signed by grower or other proof of delivery signed by grower.
Lender hereby subordinates the priority of its security interest in (specify crops) .................... of grower to the priority of the security interest in such crops obtained or to be obtained by supplier, such subordination to be in the amount specified in the notification statement.
Lender declines to either reserve funds or subordinate its security interest.
Signature of lender ........................................
(3) Suppliers and lenders are required to use the form published by the secretary of state.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-322A, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
This section is not derived from the uniform code.
The words enclosed in parentheses so appeared in the law as enacted.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
§ 28-9-323. Future advances.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, for purposes of determining the priority of a perfected security interest under section 28-9-322(a)(1)[, Idaho Code], perfection of the security interest dates from the time an advance is made to the extent that the security interest secures an advance that:
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Is made while the security interest is perfected only:
- under section 28-9-309[, Idaho Code,] when it attaches; or
- temporarily under section 28-9-312(e), (f) or (g)[, Idaho Code]; and
- Is not made pursuant to a commitment entered into before or while the security interest is perfected by a method other than under section 28-9-309 or 28-9-312(e), (f) or (g)[, Idaho Code].
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Is made while the security interest is perfected only:
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor to the extent that the security interest secures an advance made more than forty-five (45) days after the person becomes a lien creditor unless the advance is made:
- Without knowledge of the lien; or
- Pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.
- Subsections (a) and (b) of this section do not apply to a security interest held by a secured party that is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, a buyer of goods other than a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances made after the earlier of:
- The time the secured party acquires knowledge of the buyer’s purchase; or
- Forty-five (45) days after the purchase.
- Subsection (d) of this section does not apply if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the buyer’s purchase and before the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period.
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Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a lessee of goods, other than a lessee in ordinary course of business, takes the leasehold interest free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances made after the earlier of:
- The time the secured party acquires knowledge of the lease; or
- Forty-five (45) days after the lease contract becomes enforceable.
- Subsection (f) of this section does not apply if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lease and before the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-323, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout subsection (a) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Sections 9-312(7), 9-301(4), 9-307(3), 2A-307(4).
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. A security agreement may provide that collateral secures future advances. See Section 9-204(c). This section collects all of the special rules dealing with the priority of advances made by a secured party after a third party acquires an interest in the collateral. Subsection (a) applies when the third party is a competing secured party. It replaces and clarifies former Section 9-312(7). Subsection (b) deals with lien creditors and replaces former Section 9-301(4). Subsections (d) and (e) deal with buyers and replace former Section 9-307(3). Subsections (f) and (g) deal with lessees and replace former Section 2A-307(4).
Competing Security Interests.
3. Competing Security Interests. Under a proper reading of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) (and former Section 9-312(5)), it is abundantly clear that the time when an advance is made plays no role in determining priorities among conflicting security interests except when a financing statement was not filed and the advance is the giving of value as the last step for attachment and perfection. Thus, a secured party takes subject to all advances secured by a competing security interest having priority under Section 9-322(a)(1). This result generally obtains regardless of how the competing security interest is perfected and regardless of whether the advances are made “pursuant to commitment” (Section 9-102). Subsection (a) of this section states the only other instance when the time of an advance figures in the priority scheme in Section 9-322: when the security interest is perfected only automatically under Section 9-309 or temporarily under Section 9-312(e), (f), or (g), and the advance is not made pursuant to a commitment entered into while the security interest was perfected by another method. Thus, an advance has priority from the date it is made only in the rare case in which it is made without commitment and while the security interest is perfected only temporarily under Section 9-312.
The new formulation in subsection (a) clarifies the result when the initial advance is paid and a new (“future”) advance is made subsequently. Under former Section 9-312(7), the priority of the new advance turned on whether it was “made while a security interest is perfected.” This section resolves any ambiguity by omitting the quoted phrase.
Example 1:
Example 1: On February 1, A makes an advance secured by machinery in the debtor’s possession and files a financing statement. On March 1, B makes an advance secured by the same machinery and files a financing statement. On April 1, A makes a further advance, under the original security agreement, against the same machinery. A was the first to file and so, under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322(a)(1), A’s security interest has priority over B’s, both as to the February 1 and as to the April 1 advance. It makes no difference whether A knows of B’s intervening advance when A makes the second advance. Note that, as long as A was the first to file or perfect, A would have priority with respect to both advances if either A or B had perfected by taking possession of the collateral. Likewise, A would have priority if A’s April 1 advance was not made under the original agreement with the debtor, but was under a new agreement. Example 2: On October 1, A acquires a temporarily perfected (20-day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable document in the debtor’s possession under Section 9-312(e) or (f). The security interest secures an advance made on that day as well as future advances. On October 5, B files and thereby perfects a security interest that previously had attached to the same document. On October 8, A makes an additional advance. On October 10, A files. Under Section 9-322(a)(1), because A was the first to perfect and maintained continuous perfection or filing since the start of the 20-day period, A has priority, even after the 20-day period expires. See Section 9-322, Comment 4, Example 3. However, under this section, for purposes of Section 9-322(a)(1), to the extent A’s security interest secures the October 8 advance, the security interest was perfected on October 8. Inasmuch as B perfected on October 5, B has priority over the October 8 advance.
The rule in subsection (a) is more liberal toward the priority of future advances than the corresponding rules applicable to intervening lien creditors (subsection (b)), buyers (subsections (d) and (e)), and lessees (subsections (f) and (g)).
Competing Lien Creditors.
4. Competing Lien Creditors. Subsection (b) replaces former Section 9-301(4) and addresses the rights of a “lien creditor,” as defined in Section 9-102. Under Section 9-317(a)(2), a security interest is senior to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor, unless the person becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected and before a financing statement covering the collateral is filed and Section 9-203(b)(3) is satisfied. Subsection (b) of this section provides that a security interest is subordinate to those rights to the extent that the specified circumstances occur. Subsection (b) does not elevate the priority of a security interest that is subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor under Section 9-317(a)(2); it only subordinates.
As under former Section 9-301(4), a secured party’s knowledge does not cut short the 45-day period during which future advances can achieve priority over an intervening lien creditor’s interest. Rather, because of the impact of the rule in subsection (b) on the question whether the security interest for future advances is “protected” under Section 6323(c)(2) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the priority of the security interest for future advances over a lien creditor is made absolute for 45 days regardless of knowledge of the secured party concerning the lien. If, however, the advance is made after the 45 days, the advance will not have priority unless it was made or committed without knowledge of the lien.
Sales of Receivables; Consignments.
5. Sales of Receivables; Consignments. Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to outright sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, nor do they apply to consignments.
Competing Buyers and Lessees.
6. Competing Buyers and Lessees. Under subsections (d) and (e), a buyer will not take subject to a security interest to the extent it secures advances made after the secured party has knowledge that the buyer has purchased the collateral or more than 45 days after the purchase unless the advances were made pursuant to a commitment entered into before the expiration of the 45-day period and without knowledge of the purchase. Subsections (f) and (g) provide an analogous rule for lessees. Of course, a buyer in ordinary course who takes free of the security interest under Section 9-320 and a lessee in ordinary course who takes free under Section 9-321 are not subject to any future advances. Subsections (d) and (e) replace former Section 9-307(3), and subsections (f) and (g) replace former Section 2A-307(4). No change in meaning is intended.
§ 28-9-324. Priority of purchase-money security interests.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a perfected purchase-money security interest in goods other than inventory or livestock has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same goods and, except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-327[, Idaho Code], a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, if the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within twenty (20) days thereafter.
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Subject to subsection (c) of this section and except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a perfected purchase-money security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory, has priority over a conflicting security interest in chattel paper or an instrument constituting proceeds of the inventory and in proceeds of the chattel paper, if so provided in section 28-9-330[, Idaho Code], and, except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-327[, Idaho Code], also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds of the inventory to the extent the identifiable cash proceeds are received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer, if:
- The purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory;
- The purchase-money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the holder of the conflicting security interest;
- The holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within five (5) years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
- The notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects to acquire a purchase-money security interest in inventory of the debtor and describes the inventory.
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Subsections (b)(2) through (b)(4) of this section apply only if the holder of the conflicting security interest had filed a financing statement covering the same types of inventory:
- If the purchase-money security interest is perfected by filing, before the date of the filing; or
- If the purchase-money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession under section 28-9-312(f)[, Idaho Code], before the beginning of the twenty (20) day period thereunder.
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Subject to subsection (e) of this section and except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a perfected purchase-money security interest in livestock that are farm products has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same livestock and, except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-327[, Idaho Code], a perfected security interest in their identifiable proceeds and identifiable products in their unmanufactured states also has priority, if:
- The purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the livestock;
- The purchase-money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the holder of the conflicting security interest;
- The holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within six (6) months before the debtor receives possession of the livestock; and (4) The notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects to acquire a purchase-money security interest in livestock of the debtor and describes the livestock.
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Subsections (d)(2) through (d)(4) of this section apply only if the holder of the conflicting security interest had filed a financing statement covering the same types of livestock:
- If the purchase-money security interest is perfected by filing, before the date of the filing; or
- If the purchase-money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession under section 28-9-312(f)[, Idaho Code], before the beginning of the twenty (20) day period thereunder.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a perfected purchase-money security interest in software has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral and, except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-327[, Idaho Code], a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, to the extent that the purchase-money security interest in the goods in which the software was acquired for use has priority in the goods and proceeds of the goods under this section.
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If more than one (1) security interest qualifies for priority in the same collateral under subsection (a), (b), (d) or (f) of this section:
- A security interest securing an obligation incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral has priority over a security interest securing an obligation incurred for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral; and
- In all other cases, section 28-9-322(a)[, Idaho Code,] applies to the qualifying security interests.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-324, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout this section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-312(3), (4).
Priority of Purchase-Money Security Interests.
2. Priority of Purchase-Money Security Interests. This section contains the priority rules applicable to purchase-money security interests, as defined in Section 9-103. It affords a special, non-temporal priority to those purchase-money security interests that satisfy the statutory conditions. In most cases, priority will be over a security interest asserted under an after-acquired property clause. See Section 9-204 on the extent to which security interests in after-acquired property are validated. A purchase-money security interest can be created only in goods and software. See Section 9-103. Section 9-324(a), which follows former Section 9-312(4), contains the general rule for purchase-money security interests in goods. It is subject to subsections (b) and (c), which derive from former Section 9-312(3) and apply to purchase-money security interests in inventory, and subsections (d) and (e), which apply to purchase-money security interests in livestock that are farm products. Subsection (f) applies to purchase-money security interests in software. Subsection (g) deals with the relatively unusual case in which a debtor creates two purchase-money security interests in the same collateral and both security interests qualify for special priority under one of the other subsections.
Former Section 9-312(2) contained a rule affording special priority to those who provided secured credit that enabled a debtor to produce crops. This rule proved unworkable and has been eliminated from this Article. Instead, model Section 9-324A contains a revised production-money priority rule. That section is a model, not uniform, provision. The sponsors of the UCC have taken no position as to whether it should be enacted, instead leaving the matter for state legislatures to consider if they are so inclined.
Purchase-Money Priority in Goods Other Than Inventory and Livestock.
3. Purchase-Money Priority in Goods Other Than Inventory and Livestock. Subsection (a) states a general rule applicable to all types of goods except inventory and farm-products livestock: the purchase-money interest takes priority if it is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 20 days thereafter. (As to the 20-day “grace period,” compare Section 9-317(e). Former Sections 9-312(4) and 9-301(2) contained a 10-day grace period.) The perfection requirement means that the purchase-money secured party either has filed a financing statement before that time or has a temporarily perfected security interest in goods covered by documents under Section 9-312(e) and (f) which is continued in a perfected status by filing before the expiration of the 20-day period specified in that section. A purchase-money security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (a), even if the purchase-money secured party knows that a conflicting security interest has been created and/or that the holder of the conflicting interest has filed a financing statement covering the collateral.
Normally, there will be no question when “the debtor receives possession of the collateral” for purposes of subsection (a). However, sometimes a debtor buys goods and takes possession of them in stages, and then assembly and testing are completed (by the seller or debtor-buyer) at the debtor’s location. Under those circumstances, the buyer “takes possession” within the meaning of subsection (a) when, after an inspection of the portion of the goods in the debtor’s possession, it would be apparent to a potential lender to the debtor that the debtor has acquired an interest in the goods taken as a whole.
A similar issue concerning the time when “the debtor receives possession” arises when a person acquires possession of goods under a transaction that is not governed by this Article and then later agrees to buy the goods on secured credit. For example, a person may take possession of goods as lessee under a lease contract and then exercise an option to purchase the goods from the lessor on secured credit. Under Section 2A-307(1), creditors of the lessee generally take subject to the lease contract; filing a financing statement against the lessee is unnecessary to protect the lessor’s leasehold or residual interest. Once the lease is converted to a security interest, filing a financing statement is necessary to protect the seller’s (former lessor’s) security interest. Accordingly, the 20-day period in subsection (a) does not commence until the goods become “collateral” (defined in Section 9-102), i.e., until they are subject to a security interest.
Purchase-Money Security Interests in Inventory.
4. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Inventory. Subsections (b) and (c) afford a means by which a purchase-money security interest in inventory can achieve priority over an earlier-filed security interest in the same collateral. To achieve priority, the purchase-money security interest must be perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory. For a discussion of when “the debtor receives possession,” see Comment 3, above. The 20-day grace period of subsection (a) does not apply. The arrangement between an inventory secured party and its debtor typically requires the secured party to make periodic advances against incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the secured party for advances even though it has already given a purchase-money security interest in the inventory to another secured party. For this reason, subsections (b)(2) through (4) and (c) impose a second condition for the purchase-money security interest’s achieving priority: the purchase-money secured party must give notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest who filed against the same item or type of inventory before the purchase-money secured party filed or its security interest became perfected temporarily under Section 9-312(e) or (f). The notification requirement protects the non-purchase-money inventory secured party in such a situation: if the inventory secured party has received notification, it presumably will not make an advance; if it has not received notification (or if the other security interest does not qualify as purchase-money), any advance the inventory secured party may make ordinarily will have priority under Section 9-322. Inasmuch as an arrangement for periodic advances against incoming goods is unusual outside the inventory field, subsection (a) does not contain a notification requirement.
Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Timing.
5. Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Timing. Under subsection (b)(3), the perfected purchase-money security interest achieves priority over a conflicting security interest only if the holder of the conflicting security interest receives a notification within five years before the debtor receives possession of the purchase-money collateral. If the debtor never receives possession, the five-year period never begins, and the purchase-money security interest has priority, even if notification is not given. However, where the purchase-money inventory financing began by the purchase-money secured party’s possession of a negotiable document of title, to retain priority the secured party must give the notification required by subsection (b) at or before the usual time, i.e., when the debtor gets possession of the inventory, even though the security interest remains perfected for 20 days under Section 9-312(e) or (f).
Some people have mistakenly read former Section 9-312(3)(b) to require, as a condition of purchase-money priority in inventory, that the purchase-money secured party give the notification before it files a financing statement. Read correctly, the “before” clauses compare (i) the time when the holder of the conflicting security interest filed a financing statement with (ii) the time when the purchase-money security interest becomes perfected by filing or automatically perfected temporarily. Only if (i) occurs before (ii) must notification be given to the holder of the conflicting security interest. Subsection (c) has been rewritten to clarify this point.
Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Address.
6. Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Address. Inasmuch as the address provided as that of the secured party on a filed financing statement is an “address that is reasonable under the circumstances,” the holder of a purchase-money security interest may satisfy the requirement to “send” notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest in inventory by sending a notification to that address, even if the address is or becomes incorrect. See Section 9-102 (definition of “send”). Similarly, because the address is “held out by [the holder of the conflicting security interest] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests],” the holder is deemed to have “received” a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1-202(e). 7. Consignments. Subsections (b) and (c) also determine the priority of a consignor’s interest in consigned goods as against a security interest in the goods created by the consignee. Inasmuch as a consignment subject to this Article is defined to be a purchase-money security interest, see Section 9-103(d), no inference concerning the nature of the transaction should be drawn from the fact that a consignor uses the term “security interest” in its notice under subsection (b)(4). Similarly, a notice stating that the consignor has delivered or expects to deliver goods, properly described, “on consignment” meets the requirements of subsection (b)(4), even if it does not contain the term “security interest,” and even if the transaction subsequently is determined to be a security interest. Cf. Section 9-505 (use of “consignor” and “consignee” in financing statement).
Priority in Proceeds: General.
8. Priority in Proceeds: General. When the purchase-money secured party has priority over another secured party, the question arises whether this priority extends to the proceeds of the original collateral. Subsections (a), (d), and (f) give an affirmative answer, but only as to proceeds in which the security interest is perfected (see Section 9-315). Although this qualification did not appear in former Section 9-312(4), it was implicit in that provision.
In the case of inventory collateral under subsection (b), where financing frequently is based on the resulting accounts, chattel paper, or other proceeds, the special priority of the purchase-money secured interest carries over into only certain types of proceeds. As under former Section 9-312(3), the purchase-money priority in inventory under subsection (b) carries over into identifiable cash proceeds (defined in Section 9-102) received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer.
As a general matter, also like former Section 9-312(3), the purchase-money priority in inventory does not carry over into proceeds consisting of accounts or chattel paper. Many parties financing inventory are quite content to protect their first-priority security interest in the inventory itself. They realize that when the inventory is sold, someone else will be financing the resulting receivables (accounts or chattel paper), and the priority for inventory will not run forward to the receivables constituting the proceeds. Indeed, the cash supplied by the receivables financer often will be used to pay the inventory financing. In some situations, the party financing the inventory on a purchase-money basis makes contractual arrangements that the proceeds of receivables financing by another be devoted to paying off the inventory security interest.
However, the purchase-money priority in inventory does carry over to proceeds consisting of chattel paper and its proceeds (and also to instruments) to the extent provided in Section 9-330. Under Section 9-330(e), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory is deemed to give new value for proceeds consisting of chattel paper. Taken together, Sections 9-324(b) and 9-330(e) enable a purchase-money inventory secured party to obtain priority in chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory, even if the secured party does not actually give new value for the chattel paper, provided the purchase-money secured party satisfies the other conditions for achieving priority.
When the proceeds of original collateral (goods or software) consist of a deposit account, Section 9-327 governs priority to the extent it conflicts with the priority rules of this section.
Priority in Accounts Constituting Proceeds of Inventory.
9. Priority in Accounts Constituting Proceeds of Inventory. The application of the priority rules in subsection (b) is shown by the following examples:
Example 1:
Example 1: Debtor creates a security interest in its existing and after-acquired inventory in favor of SP-1, who files a financing statement covering inventory. SP-2 subsequently takes a purchase-money security interest in certain inventory and, under subsection (b), achieves priority in this inventory over SP-1. This inventory is then sold, producing accounts. Accounts are not cash proceeds, and so the special purchase-money priority in the inventory does not control the priority in the accounts. Rather, the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) applies. The time of SP-1’s filing as to the inventory is also the time of filing as to the accounts under Section 9-322 (b). Assuming that each security interest in the accounts proceeds remains perfected under Section 9-315, SP-1 has priority as to the accounts. Example 2: In Example 1, if SP-2 had filed directly against accounts, the date of that filing as to accounts would be compared with the date of SP-1’s filing as to the inventory. The first filed would prevail under Section 9-322(a)(1).
Example 3:
Example 3: If SP-3 had filed against accounts in Example 1 before either SP-1 or SP-2 filed against inventory, SP-3’s filing against accounts would have priority over the filings of SP-1 and SP-2. This result obtains even though the filings against inventory are effective to continue the perfected status of SP-1’s and SP-2’s security interest in the accounts beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. See Section 9-315. SP-1’s and SP-2’s position as to the inventory does not give them a claim to accounts (as proceeds of the inventory) which is senior to someone who has filed earlier against accounts. If, on the other hand, either SP-1’s or SP-2’s filing against the inventory preceded SP-3’s filing against accounts, SP-1 or SP-2 would outrank SP-3 as to the accounts.
Purchase-Money Security Interests in Livestock.
10. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Livestock. New subsections (d) and (e) provide a purchase-money priority rule for farm-products livestock. They are patterned on the purchase-money priority rule for inventory found in subsections (b) and (c) and include a requirement that the purchase-money secured party notify earlier-filed parties. Two differences between subsections (b) and (d) are noteworthy. First, unlike the purchase-money inventory lender, the purchase-money livestock lender enjoys priority in all proceeds of the collateral. Thus, under subsection (d), the purchase-money secured party takes priority in accounts over an earlier-filed accounts financer. Second, subsection (d) affords priority in certain products of the collateral as well as proceeds.
Purchase-Money Security Interests in Aquatic Farm Products.
11. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Aquatic Farm Products. Aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations (e.g., catfish raised on a catfish farm) are farm products. See Section 9-102 (definition of “farm products”). The definition does not indicate whether aquatic goods are “crops,” as to which the model production money security interest priority in Section 9-324A applies, or “livestock,” as to which the purchase-money priority in subsection (d) of this section applies. This Article leaves courts free to determine the classification of particular aquatic goods on a case-by-case basis, applying whichever priority rule makes more sense in the overall context of the debtor’s business.
Purchase-Money Security Interests in Software.
12. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Software. Subsection (f) governs the priority of purchase-money security interests in software. Under Section 9-103(c), a purchase-money security interest arises in software only if the debtor acquires its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in goods subject to a purchase-money security interest. Under subsection (f), a purchase-money security interest in software has the same priority as the purchase-money security interest in the goods in which the software was acquired for use. This priority is determined under subsections (b) and (c) (for inventory) or (a) (for other goods).
Multiple Purchase-Money Security Interests.
13. Multiple Purchase-Money Security Interests. New subsection (g) governs priority among multiple purchase-money security interests in the same collateral. It grants priority to purchase-money security interests securing the price of collateral (i.e., created in favor of the seller) over purchase-money security interests that secure enabling loans. Section 7.2(c) of the Restatement (3d) of the Law of Property (Mortgages) (1997) adopts this rule with respect to real property mortgages. As Comment d to that section explains: The equities favor the vendor. Not only does the vendor part with specific real estate rather than money, but the vendor would never relinquish it at all except on the understanding that the vendor will be able to use it to satisfy the obligation to pay the price. This is the case even though the vendor may know that the mortgagor is going to finance the transaction in part by borrowing from a third party and giving a mortgage to secure that obligation. In the final analysis, the law is more sympathetic to the vendor’s hazard of losing real estate previously owned than to the third party lender’s risk of being unable to collect from an interest in real estate that never previously belonged to it.
The first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322 applies to multiple purchase-money security interests securing enabling loans.
§ 28-9-325. Priority of security interests in transferred collateral.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, a security interest created by a debtor is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral created by another person if:
- The debtor acquired the collateral subject to the security interest created by the other person;
- The security interest created by the other person was perfected when the debtor acquired the collateral; and
- There is no period thereafter when the security interest is unperfected.
-
Subsection (a) of this section subordinates a security interest only if the security interest:
- Otherwise would have priority solely under section 28-9-322(a) or 28-9-324[, Idaho Code]; or
- Arose solely under section 28-2-711(3) or 28-12-508(5)[, Idaho Code].
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-325, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
“Double Debtor Problem.”
Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest.
Example 1:
Example 1: A owns an item of equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP-A. A sells the equipment to B, not in the ordinary course of business. B acquires its interest subject to SP-A’s security interest. See Sections 9-201, 9-315(a)(1). Under this section, if B creates a security interest in the equipment in favor of SP-B, SP-B’s security interest is subordinate to SP-A’s security interest, even if SP-B filed against B before SP-A filed against A, and even if SP-B took a purchase-money security interest. Normally, SP-B could have investigated the source of the equipment and discovered SP-A’s filing before making an advance against the equipment, whereas SP-A had no reason to search the filings against someone other than its debtor, A. 4. Taking Subject to Unperfected Security Interest. This section applies only if the security interest in the transferred collateral was perfected when the transferee acquired the collateral. See subsection (a)(2). If this condition is not met, then the normal priority rules apply.
Example 2:
Example 2: A owns an item of equipment subject to an unperfected security interest in favor of SP-A. A sells the equipment to B, who gives value and takes delivery of the equipment without knowledge of the security interest. B takes free of the security interest. See Section 9-317(b). If B then creates a security interest in favor of SP-B, no priority issue arises; SP-B has the only security interest in the equipment.
Example 3:
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that B knows of SP-A’s security interest and therefore takes the equipment subject to it. If B creates a security interest in the equipment in favor of SP-B, this section does not determine the relative priority of the security interests. Rather, the normal priority rules govern. If SP-B perfects its security interest, then, under Section 9-322(a)(2), SP-A’s unperfected security interest will be junior to SP-B’s perfected security interest. The award of priority to SP-B is premised on the belief that SP-A’s failure to file could have misled SP-B.
Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest that Becomes Unperfected.
5. Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest that Becomes Unperfected. This section applies only if the security interest in the transferred collateral did not become unperfected at any time after the transferee acquired the collateral. See subsection (a)(3). If this condition is not met, then the normal priority rules apply.
Example 4:
Example 4: As in Example 1, A owns an item of equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP-A. A sells the equipment to B, not in the ordinary course of business. B acquires its interest subject to SP-A’s security interest. See Sections 9-201, 9-315(a)(1). B creates a security interest in favor of SP-B, and SP-B perfects its security interest. This section provides that SP-A’s security interest is senior to SP-B’s. However, if SP-A’s financing statement lapses while SP-B’s security interest is perfected, then the normal priority rules would apply, and SP-B’s security interest would become senior to SP-A’s security interest. See Sections 9-322(a)(2), 9-515(c).
Unusual Situations.
6. Unusual Situations. The appropriateness of the rule of subsection (a) is most apparent when it works to subordinate security interests having priority under the basic priority rules of Section 9-322(a) or the purchase-money priority rules of Section 9-324. The rule also works properly when applied to the security interest of a buyer under Section 2-711(3) or a lessee under Section 2A-508(5). However, subsection (a) may provide an inappropriate resolution of the “double debtor” problem in some of the wide variety of other contexts in which the problem may arise. Although subsection (b) limits the application of subsection (a) to those cases in which subordination is known to be appropriate, courts should apply the rule in other settings, if necessary to promote the underlying purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Section 1-103(a).
§ 28-9-326. Priority of security interests created by new debtor.
- Subject to subsection (b) of this section, a security interest that is created by a new debtor in collateral in which the new debtor has or acquires rights and [is] perfected by a filed financing statement that would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of sections 28-9-316(i)(1) and 28-9-508, Idaho Code, is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral which is perfected other than by such a filed financing statement.
- The other provisions of this part determine the priority among conflicting security interests in the same collateral perfected by filed financing statements described in subsection (a) of this section. However, if the security agreements to which a new debtor became bound as debtor were not entered into by the same original debtor, the conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of the new debtor’s having become bound.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-326, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2012, ch. 145, § 7, p. 381.
STATUTORY NOTES
Amendments.
The 2012 amendment, by ch. 145, substituted “in collateral in which the new debtor has or acquires rights and perfected by a filed financing statement that would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of sections 28-9-316(i)(1) and 28-9-508, Idaho Code, is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral which is perfected other than by such a filed financing statement” for “which is perfected by a filed financing statement that is effective solely under section 28-9-508 in collateral in which a new debtor has or acquires rights is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral which is perfected other than by a filed financing statement that is effective solely under section 28-9-508” in subsection (a) and substituted “described in subsection (a) of this section” for “that are effective solely under section 28-9-508” in subsection (b).
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in subsection (a) was added by the compiler to add a word seemingly missing from the 2012 amendment of this section.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Section 22 of S.L. 2012, ch 145 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2013.
CASE NOTES
Pursuant to former§ 28-9-312(5)(a), the priority of the bank’s security interest granted under the March 5, 1999 security agreement related back to February 3, 1999, which was when it had filed a financing statement to perfect its security interest in the debtor’s collateral, which included its equipment; thus, the bank had priority over the security interest of the investor, which was perfected on March 1, 1999. If the investor wanted a security interest in the equipment that had priority over the bank’s security interest, then the investor needed to contact the bank to reach such an agreement. Bank of the West v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 139 Idaho 445, 80 P.3d 1046 (2003).
Official Comment
Source.
Subordination of Security Interests Created by New Debtor.
Subsection (a) subordinates the original debtor’s secured party’s security interest perfected against the new debtor by a filed financing statement that would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for Section 9-508 or, if the original debtor and new debtor are located in different jurisdictions, Section 9-316(i)(1). The security interest is subordinated to security interests in the same collateral perfected by another method, e.g., by filing against the new debtor. This section does not subordinate a security interest perfected by a new initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor, even if the initial financing statement is filed to maintain the effectiveness of a financing statement under the circumstances described in Section 9-508(b). Nor does it subordinate a security interest perfected by a financing statement filed against the original debtor which remains effective against collateral transferred by the original debtor to the new debtor. See Section 9-508(c). Concerning priority contests involving transferred collateral, see Sections 9-325 and 9-507.
Example 1:
Example 1: SP-X holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in X Corp’s existing and after-acquired inventory, and SP-Z holds a perfected-by-possession security interest in an item of Z Corp’s inventory. Both X Corp and Z Corp are located in the same jurisdiction under Section 9-307. Z Corp becomes bound as debtor by X Corp’s security agreement (e.g., Z Corp buys X Corp’s assets and assumes its security agreement). See Section 9-203(d). But for Section 9-508, SP-X’s financing statement would be ineffective to perfect a security interest in the item of inventory in which Z Corp has rights. However, subsection (a) provides that SP-X’s perfected security interest is subordinate to SP-Z’s, regardless of whether SP-X’s financing statement was filed before SP-Z perfected its security interest.
Example 2:
Example 2: SP-X holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in X Corp’s existing and after-acquired inventory, and SP-Z holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in Z Corp’s existing and after-acquired inventory. Both X Corp and Z Corp are located in the same jurisdiction under Section 9-307. Z Corp becomes bound as debtor by X Corp’s security agreement. Immediately thereafter, and before the effectiveness of SP-X’s financing statement lapses, Z Corp acquires a new item of inventory. But for Section 9-508, SP-X’s financing statement would be ineffective to perfect a security interest in the new item of inventory in which Z Corp has rights. However, because SP-Z’s security interest was perfected by a filing whose effectiveness does not depend on Section 9-316(i)(1) or 9-508, subsection (a) subordinates SP-X’s perfected security interest to SP-Z’s. This would be the case even if SP-Z filed after Z Corp became bound by X Corp’s security agreement, and regardless of which financing statement was filed first. The same result would obtain if X Corp and Z Corp were located in different jurisdictions. SP-X’s security interest would be perfected by a financing statement that would be ineffective but for Section 9-316(i)(1), whereas the effectiveness of SP-Z’s filing does not depend on Section 9-316(i)(1) or 9-508.
Other Priority Rules.
3. Other Priority Rules. Subsection (b) addresses the priority among security interests created by the original debtor (X Corp). By invoking the other priority rules of this subpart, as applicable, subsection (b) preserves the relative priority of security interests created by the original debtor.
Example 3:
Example 3: Under the facts of Example 2, SP-Y also holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in X Corp’s existing and after-acquired inventory. SP-Y filed after SP-X. Inasmuch as both SP-X’s and SP-Y’s security interests in inventory acquired by Z Corp after it became bound would be unperfected but for the application of Section 9-508, the normal priority rules determine their relative priorities. Under the “first-to-file-or-perfect” rule of Section 9-322(a)(1), SP-X has priority over SP-Y.
Example 4:
Example 4: Under the facts of Example 3, after Z Corp became bound by X Corp’s security agreement, SP-Y promptly filed a new initial financing statement against Z Corp. SP-X’s security interest remains perfected only by virtue of its original filing against X Corp which “would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of Section 9-508.” Because SP-Y’s security interest is perfected by the filing of a financing statement whose effectiveness does not depend on Section 9-508 or 9-316(i)(1), subsection (a) subordinates SP-X’s security interest to SP-Y’s. If both SP-X and SP-Y file a new initial financing statement against Z Corp, then the “first-to-file-or-perfect” rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) governs their priority inter se as well as their priority against SP-Z.
The second sentence of subsection (b) effectively limits the applicability of the first sentence to situations in which a new debtor has become bound by more than one security agreement entered into by the same original debtor. When the new debtor has become bound by security agreements entered into by different original debtors, the second sentence provides that priority is based on priority in time of the new debtor’s becoming bound.
Example 5:
Example 5: Under the facts of Example 2, SP-W holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in W Corp’s existing and after-acquired inventory. After Z Corp became bound by X Corp’s security agreement in favor of SP-X, Z Corp became bound by W Corp’s security agreement. Under subsection (b), SP-W’s security interest in inventory acquired by Z Corp is subordinate to that of SP-X, because Z Corp became bound under SP-X’s security agreement before it became bound under SP-W’s security agreement. This is the result regardless of which financing statement (SP-X’s or SP-W’s) was filed first.
The second sentence of subsection (b) reflects the generally accepted view that priority based on the first-to-file rule is inappropriate for resolving priority disputes when the filings were made against different debtors. Like subsection (a) and the first sentence of subsection (b), however, the second sentence of subsection (b) relates only to priority conflicts among security interests that would be unperfected but for the application of Section 9-316(i)(1) or 9-508.
Example 6:
Example 6: Under the facts of Example 5, after Z Corp became bound by W Corp’s security agreement, SP-W promptly filed a new initial financing statement against Z Corp. At that time, SP-X’s security interest was perfected only pursuant to its original filing against X Corp which “would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of Section 9-508.” Because SP-W’s security interest is perfected by the filing of a financing statement whose effectiveness does not depend on Section 9-316(i)(1) or 9-508, subsection (a) subordinates SP-X’s security interest to SP-W’s. If both SP-X and SP-W file a new initial financing statement against Z Corp, then the “first-to-file-or-perfect” rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) governs their priority inter se as well as their priority against SP-Z.
§ 28-9-327. Priority of security interests in deposit account.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same deposit account:
- A security interest held by a secured party having control of the deposit account under section 28-9-104[, Idaho Code,] has priority over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, security interests perfected by control under section 28-9-314[, Idaho Code,] rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
- A security interest perfected by control under section 28-9-104(a)(3)[, Idaho Code,] has priority over a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-327, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (1), (2), and (4) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. New; derived from former Section 9-115(5).
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. This section contains the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in deposit accounts. It overrides conflicting priority rules. See Sections 9-322(f)(1), 9-324(a), (b), (d), (f). This section does not apply to accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which by definition are not “deposit accounts.”
Control.
3. Control. Under paragraph (1), security interests perfected by control (Sections 9-314, 9-104) take priority over those perfected otherwise, e.g., as identifiable cash proceeds under Section 9-315. Secured parties for whom the deposit account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum, insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon the debtor’s default (i.e., control). Those secured parties for whom the deposit account is less essential will not take control, thereby running the risk that the debtor will dispose of funds on deposit (either outright or for collateral purposes) after default but before the account can be frozen by court order or the secured party can obtain control. Paragraph (2) governs the case (expected to be very rare) in which a bank enters into a Section 9-104(a)(2) control agreement with more than one secured party. It provides that the security interests rank according to time of obtaining control. If the bank is solvent and the control agreements are well drafted, the bank will be liable to each secured party, and the priority rule will have no practical effect
Priority of Bank.
4. Priority of Bank. Under paragraph (3), the security interest of the bank with which the deposit account is maintained normally takes priority over all other conflicting security interests in the deposit account, regardless of whether the deposit account constitutes the competing secured party’s original collateral or its proceeds. A rule of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without the need to examine either the public record or their own records to determine whether another party might have a security interest in the deposit account.
A secured party who takes a security interest in the deposit account as original collateral can protect itself against the results of this rule in one of two ways. It can take control of the deposit account by becoming the bank’s customer. Under paragraph (4), this arrangement operates to subordinate the bank’s security interest. Alternatively, the secured party can obtain a subordination agreement from the bank. See Section 9-339.
A secured party who claims the deposit account as proceeds of other collateral can reduce the risk of becoming junior by obtaining the debtor’s agreement to deposit proceeds into a specific cash-collateral account and obtaining the agreement of that bank to subordinate all its claims to those of the secured party. But if the debtor violates its agreement and deposits funds into a deposit account other than the cash-collateral account, the secured party risks being subordinated.
Priority in Proceeds of, and Funds Transferred from, Deposit Account.
5. Priority in Proceeds of, and Funds Transferred from, Deposit Account. The priority afforded by this section does not extend to proceeds of a deposit account. Rather, Section 9-322(c) through (e) and the provisions referred to in Section 9-322(f) govern priorities in proceeds of a deposit account. Section 9-315(d) addresses continuation of perfection in proceeds of deposit accounts. As to funds transferred from a deposit account that serves as collateral, see Section 9-332.
§ 28-9-328. Priority of security interests in investment property.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same investment property:
- A security interest held by a secured party having control of investment property under section 28-9-106[, Idaho Code,] has priority over a security interest held by a secured party that does not have control of the investment property.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, conflicting security interests held by secured parties each of which has control under section 28-9-106[, Idaho Code,] rank according to priority in time of:
- If the collateral is a security, obtaining control;
-
If the collateral is a security entitlement carried in a securities account and:
- if the secured party obtained control under section 28-8-106(4)(a)[, Idaho Code], the secured party’s becoming the person for which the securities account is maintained;
- if the secured party obtained control under section 28-8-106(4)(b)[, Idaho Code], the securities intermediary’s agreement to comply with the secured party’s entitlement orders with respect to security entitlements carried or to be carried in the securities account; or
- if the secured party obtained control through another person under section 28-8-106(4)(c)[, Idaho Code], the time on which priority would be based under this paragraph if the other person were the secured party; or
- A security interest held by a securities intermediary in a security entitlement or a securities account maintained with the securities intermediary has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
- A security interest held by a commodity intermediary in a commodity contract or a commodity account maintained with the commodity intermediary has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
- A security interest in a certificated security in registered form which is perfected by taking delivery under section 28-9-313(a)[, Idaho Code,] and not by control under section 28-9-314[, Idaho Code,] has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by a method other than control.
- Conflicting security interests created by a broker, securities intermediary or commodity intermediary which are perfected without control under section 28-9-106[, Idaho Code,] rank equally.
- In all other cases, priority among conflicting security interests in investment property is governed by sections 28-9-322 and 28-9-323[, Idaho Code].
(C) If the collateral is a commodity contract carried with a commodity intermediary, the satisfaction of the requirement for control specified in section 28-9-106(b)(2)[, Idaho Code,] with respect to commodity contracts carried or to be carried with the commodity intermediary.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-328, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout this section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Former Section 9-115(5).
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. This section contains the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in investment property. Paragraph (1) states the most important general rule-that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control. Paragraphs (2) through (4) deal with conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by control. Paragraph (5) addresses the priority of a security interest in a certificated security which is perfected by delivery but not control. Paragraph (6) deals with the relatively unusual circumstance in which a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary has created conflicting security interests none of which is perfected by control. Paragraph (7) provides that the general priority rules of Sections 9-322 and 9-323 apply to cases not covered by the specific rules in this section. The principal application of this residual rule is that the usual first in time of filing rule applies to conflicting security interests that are perfected only by filing. Because the control priority rule of paragraph (1) provides for the ordinary cases in which persons purchase securities on margin credit from their brokers, there is no need for special rules for purchase-money security interests. See also Section 9-103 (limiting purchase-money collateral to goods and software).
General Rule: Priority of Security Interest Perfected by Control.
3. General Rule: Priority of Security Interest Perfected by Control. Under paragraph (1), a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control. The control priority rule does not turn on either temporal sequence or awareness of conflicting security interests. Rather, it is a structural rule, based on the principle that a lender should be able to rely on the collateral without question if the lender has taken the necessary steps to assure itself that it is in a position where it can foreclose on the collateral without further action by the debtor. The control priority rule is necessary because the perfection rules provide considerable flexibility in structuring secured financing arrangements. For example, at the “retail” level, a secured lender to an investor who wants the full measure of protection can obtain control, but the creditor may be willing to accept the greater measure of risk that follows from perfection by filing. Similarly, at the “wholesale” level, a lender to securities firms can leave the collateral with the debtor and obtain a perfected security interest under the automatic perfection rule of Section 9-309(10), but a lender who wants to be entirely sure of its position will want to obtain control. The control priority rule of paragraph (1) is an essential part of this system of flexibility. It is feasible to provide more than one method of perfecting security interests only if the rules ensure that those who take the necessary steps to obtain the full measure of protection do not run the risk of subordination to those who have not taken such steps. A secured party who is unwilling to run the risk that the debtor has granted or will grant a conflicting control security interest should not make a loan without obtaining control of the collateral.
As applied to the retail level, the control priority rule means that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by filing without regard to inquiry into whether the control secured party was aware of the filed security interest. Prior to the 1994 revisions to Articles 8 and 9, Article 9 did not permit perfection of security interests in securities by filing. Accordingly, parties who deal in securities never developed a practice of searching the UCC files before conducting securities transactions. Although filing is now a permissible method of perfection, in order to avoid disruption of existing practices in this business it is necessary to give perfection by filing a different and more limited effect for securities than for some other forms of collateral. The priority rules are not based on the assumption that parties who perfect by the usual method of obtaining control will search the files. Quite the contrary, the control priority rule is intended to ensure that, with respect to investment property, secured parties who do obtain control are entirely unaffected by filings. To state the point another way, perfection by filing is intended to affect only general creditors or other secured creditors who rely on filing. The rule that a security interest perfected by filing can be primed by a control security interest, without regard to awareness, is a consequence of the system of perfection and priority rules for investment property. These rules are designed to take account of the circumstances of the securities markets, where filing is not given the same effect as for some other forms of property. No implication is made about the effect of filing with respect to security interests in other forms of property, nor about other Article 9 rules, e.g., Section 9-330, which govern the circumstances in which security interests in other forms of property perfected by filing can be primed by subsequent perfected security interests. The following examples illustrate the application of the priority rule in paragraph (1):
Example 1:
Example 1: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock for which Debtor has a certificate. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor delivers the certificate, properly indorsed, to Beta. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock. Beta has control, see Section 8-106(b)(1), and hence has priority over Alpha.
Example 2:
Example 2: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor instructs Able to have the 1000 shares transferred through the clearing corporation to Custodian Bank, to be credited to Beta’s account with Custodian Bank. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock. Beta has control, see Section 8-106(d)(1), and hence has priority over Alpha.
Example 3:
Example 3: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, which is held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock (more precisely, in the Debtor’s security entitlement to the financial asset consisting of the XYZ Co. stock). Beta has control, see Section 8-106(d)(2), and hence has priority over Alpha. Example 4: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Debtor’s agreement with Able & Co. provides that Able has a security interest in all securities carried in the account as security for any obligations of Debtor to Able. Debtor incurs obligations to Able and later defaults on the obligations to Alpha and Able. Able has control by virtue of the rule of Section 8-106(e) that if a customer grants a security interest to its own intermediary, the intermediary has control. Since Alpha does not have control, Able has priority over Alpha under the general control priority rule of paragraph (1).
Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Priority of Securities Intermediary or Commodity Intermediary.
4. Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Priority of Securities Intermediary or Commodity Intermediary. Paragraphs (2) through (4) govern the priority of conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by control. The following example explains the application of the rules in paragraphs (3) and (4):
Example 5:
Example 5: Debtor holds securities through a securities account with Able & Co. Debtor’s agreement with Able & Co. provides that Able has a security interest in all securities carried in the account as security for any obligations of Debtor to Able. Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock carried in the account. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Debtor incurs obligations to Able and later defaults on the obligations to Beta and Able. Both Beta and Able have control, so the general control priority rule of paragraph (1) does not apply. Compare Example 4. Paragraph (3) provides that a security interest held by a securities intermediary in positions of its own customer has priority over a conflicting security interest of an external lender, so Able has priority over Beta. (Paragraph (4) contains a parallel rule for commodity intermediaries.) The agreement among Able, Beta, and Debtor could, of course, determine the relative priority of the security interests of Able and Beta, see Section 9-339, but the fact that the intermediary has agreed to act on the instructions of a secured party such as Beta does not itself imply any agreement by the intermediary to subordinate.
Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Temporal Priority.
5. Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Temporal Priority. Former Section 9-115 introduced into Article 9 the concept of conflicting security interests that rank equally. Paragraph (2) of this section governs priority in those circumstances in which more than one secured party (other than a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary) has control. It replaces the equal-priority rule for conflicting security interests in investment property with a temporal rule. For securities, both certificated and uncertificated, under paragraph (2)(A) priority is based on the time that control is obtained. For security entitlements carried in securities accounts, the treatment is more complex. Paragraph (2)(B) bases priority on the timing of the steps taken to achieve control. The following example illustrates the application of paragraph (2).
Example 6:
Example 6: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through a securities account with Able & Co. Debtor, Able, and Alpha enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Alpha will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in all its investment property, existing and after-acquired. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Alpha and Beta both have perfected-by-control security interests in the security entitlement to the XYZ Co. stock by virtue of their agreements with Able. See Sections 9-314(a), 9-106(a), 8-106(d)(2). Under paragraph (2)(B)(ii), the priority of each security interest dates from the time of the secured party’s agreement with Able. Because Alpha’s agreement was first in time, Alpha has priority. This priority applies equally to security entitlements to financial assets credited to the account after the agreement was entered into. The priority rule is analogous to “first-to-file” priority under Section 9-322 with respect to after-acquired collateral. Paragraphs (2)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(iii) provide similar rules for security entitlements as to which control is obtained by other methods, and paragraph (2)(C) provides a similar rule for commodity contracts carried in a commodity account. Section 8-510 also has been revised to provide a temporal priority conforming to paragraph (2)(B).
Certificated Securities.
6. Certificated Securities. A long-standing practice has developed whereby secured parties whose collateral consists of a security evidenced by a security certificate take possession of the security certificate. If the security certificate is in bearer form, the secured party’s acquisition of possession constitutes “delivery” under Section 8-301(a)(1), and the delivery constitutes “control” under Section 8-106(a). Comment 5 discusses the priority of security interests perfected by control of investment property.
If the security certificate is in registered form, the secured party will not achieve control over the security unless the security certificate contains an appropriate indorsement or is (re)registered in the secured party’s name. See Section 8-106(b). However, the secured party’s acquisition of possession constitutes “delivery” of the security certificate under Section 8-301 and serves to perfect the security interest under Section 9-313(a), even if the security certificate has not been appropriately indorsed and has not been (re)registered in the secured party’s name. A security interest perfected by this method has priority over a security interest perfected other than by control (e.g., by filing). See paragraph (5).
The priority rule stated in paragraph (5) may seem anomalous, in that it can afford less favorable treatment to purchasers who buy collateral outright that to those who take a security interest in it. For example, a buyer of a security certificate would cut off a security interest perfected by filing only if the buyer achieves the status of a protected purchaser under Section 8-303. The buyer would not be a protected purchaser, for example, if it does not obtain “control” under Section 8-106 (e.g., if it fails to obtain a proper indorsement of the certificate) or if it had notice of an adverse claim under Section 8-105. The apparent anomaly disappears, however, when one understands the priority rule not as one intended to protect careless or guilty parties, but as one that eliminates the need to conduct a search of the public records only insofar as necessary to serve the needs of the securities markets.
Secured Financing of Securities Firms.
7. Secured Financing of Securities Firms. Priority questions concerning security interests granted by brokers and securities intermediaries are governed by the general control-beats-non-control priority rule of paragraph (1), as supplemented by the special rules set out in paragraphs (2) (temporal priority-first to control), (3) (special priority for securities intermediary), and (6) (equal priority for non-control). The following examples illustrate the priority rules as applied to this setting. (In all cases it is assumed that the debtor retains sufficient other securities to satisfy all customers’ claims. This section deals with the relative rights of secured lenders to a securities firm. Disputes between a secured lender and the firm’s own customers are governed by Section 8-511.) Example 7: Able & Co., a securities dealer, enters into financing arrangements with two lenders, Alpha Bank and Beta Bank. In each case the agreements provide that the lender will have a security interest in the securities identified on lists provided to the lender on a daily basis, that the debtor will deliver the securities to the lender on demand, and that the debtor will not list as collateral any securities which the debtor has pledged to any other lender. Upon Able’s insolvency it is discovered that Able has listed the same securities on the collateral lists provided to both Alpha and Beta. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests under the automatic-perfection rule of Section 9-309(10). Neither Alpha nor Beta has control. Paragraph (6) provides that the security interests of Alpha and Beta rank equally, because each of them has a non-control security interest granted by a securities firm. They share pro-rata.
Example 8:
Example 8: Able enters into financing arrangements, with Alpha Bank and Beta Bank as in Example 7. At some point, however, Beta decides that it is unwilling to continue to provide financing on a non-control basis. Able directs the clearing corporation where it holds its principal inventory of securities to move specified securities into Beta’s account. Upon Able’s insolvency it is discovered that a list of collateral provided to Alpha includes securities that had been moved to Beta’s account. Both Alpha and Beta have perfected security interests; Alpha under the automatic-perfection rule of Section 9-309(10), and Beta under that rule and also the perfection-by-control rule in Section 9-314(a). Beta has control but Alpha does not. Beta has priority over Alpha under paragraph (1).
Example 9:
Example 9: Able & Co. carries its principal inventory of securities through Clearing Corporation, which offers a “shared control” facility whereby a participant securities firm can enter into an arrangement with a lender under which the securities firm will retain the power to trade and otherwise direct dispositions of securities carried in its account, but Clearing Corporation agrees that, at any time the lender so directs, Clearing Corporation will transfer any securities from the firm’s account to the lender’s account or otherwise dispose of them as directed by the lender. Able enters into financing arrangements with two lenders, Alpha and Beta, each of which obtains such a control agreement from Clearing Corporation. The agreement with each lender provides that Able will designate specific securities as collateral on lists provided to the lender on a daily or other periodic basis, and that it will not pledge the same securities to different lenders. Upon Able’s insolvency, it is discovered that Able has listed the same securities on the collateral lists provided to both Alpha and Beta. Both Alpha and Beta have control over the disputed securities. Paragraph (2) awards priority to whichever secured party first entered into the agreement with Clearing Corporation.
Relation to Other Law.
Some circumstances in which other law is clearly displaced by the UCC rules are readily identifiable. Common law “first in time, first in right” principles, or correlative tort liability rules such as common law conversion principles under which a purchaser may incur liability to a person with a prior property interest without regard to awareness of that claim, are necessarily displaced by the priority rules set out in this section since these rules determine the relative ranking of security interests in investment property. So too, Article 8 provides protections against adverse claims to certain purchasers of interests in investment property. In circumstances where a secured party not only has priority under Section 9-328, but also qualifies for protection against adverse claims under Section 8-303, 8-502, or 8-510, resort to other law would be precluded. In determining whether it is appropriate in a particular case to look to other law, account must also be taken of the policies that underlie the commercial law rules on securities markets and security interests in securities. A principal objective of the 1994 revision of Article 8 and the provisions of Article 9 governing investment property was to ensure that secured financing transactions can be implemented on a simple, timely, and certain basis. One of the circumstances that led to the revision was the concern that uncertainty in the application of the rules on secured transactions involving securities and other financial assets could contribute to systemic risk by impairing the ability of financial institutions to provide liquidity to the markets in times of stress. The control priority rule is designed to provide a clear and certain rule to ensure that lenders who have taken the necessary steps to establish control do not face a risk of subordination to other lenders who have not done so.
The control priority rule does not turn on an inquiry into the state of a secured party’s awareness of potential conflicting claims because a rule under which a person’s rights depended on that sort of after-the-fact inquiry could introduce an unacceptable measure of uncertainty. If an inquiry into awareness could provide a complete and satisfactory resolution of the problem in all cases, the priority rules of this section would have incorporated that test. The fact that they do not necessarily means that resort to other law based solely on that factor is precluded, though the question whether a control secured party induced or encouraged its financing arrangement with actual knowledge that the debtor would be violating the rights of another secured party may, in some circumstances, appropriately be treated as a factor in determining whether the control party’s action is the kind of egregious conduct for which resort to other law is appropriate.
§ 28-9-329. Priority of security interests in letter of credit right.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same letter of credit right:
- A security interest held by a secured party having control of the letter of credit right under section 28-9-107[, Idaho Code,] has priority to the extent of its control over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.
- Security interests perfected by control under section 28-9-314[, Idaho Code,] rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-329, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (1) and (2) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. New; loosely modeled after former Section 9-115(5).
General Rule.
2. General Rule. Paragraph (1) awards priority to a secured party who perfects a security interest directly in letter-of-credit rights (i.e., one that takes an assignment of proceeds and obtains consent of the issuer or any nominated person under Section 5-114(c)) over another conflicting security interest (i.e., one that is perfected automatically in the letter-of-credit rights as supporting obligations under Section 9-308(d)). This is consistent with international letter-of-credit practice and provides finality to payments made to recognized assignees of letter-of-credit proceeds. If an issuer or nominated person recognizes multiple security interests in a letter-of-credit right, resulting in multiple parties having control (Section 9-107), under paragraph (2) the security interests rank according to the time of obtaining control.
Drawing Rights; Transferee Beneficiaries.
3. Drawing Rights; Transferee Beneficiaries. Drawing under a letter of credit is personal to the beneficiary and requires the beneficiary to perform the conditions for drawing under the letter of credit. Accordingly, a beneficiary’s grant of a security interest in a letter of credit includes the beneficiary’s “letter-of-credit right” as defined in Section 9-102 and the right to “proceeds of [the] letter of credit” as defined in Section 5-114(a), but does not include the right to demand payment under the letter of credit.
Section 5-114(e) provides that the “[r]ights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the beneficiary’s assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the assignee’s right to the proceeds.” To the extent the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent and superior, this Article does not apply. See Section 9-109(c). Under Article 5, there is in effect a novation upon the transfer with the issuer becoming bound on a new, independent obligation to the transferee. The rights of nominated persons and transferee beneficiaries under a letter of credit include the right to demand payment from the issuer. Under Section 5-114(e), their rights to payment are independent of their obligations to the beneficiary (or original beneficiary) and superior to the rights of assignees of letter-of-credit proceeds (Section 5-114(c)) and others claiming a security interest in the beneficiary’s (or original beneficiary’s) letter-of-credit rights.
A transfer of drawing rights under a transferable letter of credit establishes independent Article 5 rights in the transferee and does not create or perfect an Article 9 security interest in the transferred drawing rights. The definition of “letter-of-credit right” in Section 9-102 excludes a beneficiary’s drawing rights. The exercise of drawing rights by a transferee beneficiary may breach a contractual obligation of the transferee to the original beneficiary concerning when and how much the transferee may draw or how it may use the funds received under the letter of credit. If, for example, drawing rights are transferred to support a sale or loan from the transferee to the original beneficiary, then the transferee would be obligated to the original beneficiary under the sale or loan agreement to account for any drawing and for the use of any funds received. The transferee’s obligation would be governed by the applicable law of contracts or restitution.
Secured Party-Transferee Beneficiaries.
4. Secured Party-Transferee Beneficiaries. As described in Comment 3, drawing rights under letters of credit are transferred in many commercial contexts in which the transferee is not a secured party claiming a security interest in an underlying receivable supported by the letter of credit. Consequently, a transfer of a letter of credit is not a method of “perfection” of a security interest. The transferee’s independent right to draw under the letter of credit and to receive and retain the value thereunder (in effect, priority) is not based on Article 9 but on letter-of-credit law and the terms of the letter of credit. Assume, however, that a secured party does hold a security interest in a receivable that is owned by a beneficiary-debtor and supported by a transferable letter of credit. Assume further that the beneficiary-debtor causes the letter of credit to be transferred to the secured party, the secured party draws under the letter of credit, and, upon the issuer’s payment to the secured party-transferee, the underlying account debtor’s obligation to the original beneficiary-debtor is satisfied. In this situation, the payment to the secured party-transferee is proceeds of the receivable collected by the secured party-transferee. Consequently, the secured party-transferee would have certain duties to the debtor and third parties under Article 9. For example, it would be obliged to collect under the letter of credit in a commercially reasonable manner and to remit any surplus pursuant to Sections 9-607 and 9-608.
This scenario is problematic under letter-of-credit law and practice, inasmuch as a transferee beneficiary collects in its own right arising from its own performance. Accordingly, under Section 5-114, the independent and superior rights of a transferee control over any inconsistent duties under Article 9. A transferee beneficiary may take a transfer of drawing rights to avoid reliance on the original beneficiary’s credit and collateral, and it may consider any Article 9 rights superseded by its Article 5 rights. Moreover, it will not always be clear (i) whether a transferee beneficiary has a security interest in the underlying collateral, (ii) whether any security interest is senior to the rights of others, or (iii) whether the transferee beneficiary is aware that it holds a security interest. There will be clear cases in which the role of a transferee beneficiary as such is merely incidental to a conventional secured financing. There also will be cases in which the existence of a security interest may have little to do with the position of a transferee beneficiary as such. In dealing with these cases and less clear cases involving the possible application of Article 9 to a nominated person or a transferee beneficiary, the right to demand payment under a letter of credit should be distinguished from letter-of-credit rights. The courts also should give appropriate consideration to the policies and provisions of Article 5 and letter-of-credit practice as well as Article 9.
§ 28-9-330. Priority of purchaser of chattel paper or instrument.
-
A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if:
- In good faith and in the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business, the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under section 28-9-105[, Idaho Code]; and
- The chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.
- A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed other than merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under section 28-9-105[, Idaho Code,] in good faith, in the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
-
Except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-327[, Idaho Code], a purchaser having priority in chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) of this section also has priority in proceeds of the chattel paper to the extent that:
- Section 28-9-322[, Idaho Code,] provides for priority in the proceeds; or
- The proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or cash proceeds of the specific goods, even if the purchaser’s security interest in the proceeds is unperfected.
- Except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-331(a)[, Idaho Code], a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
- For purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory gives new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory.
- For purposes of subsections (b) and (d) of this section, if chattel paper or an instrument indicates that it has been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, a purchaser of the chattel paper or instrument has knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-330, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions throughout this section were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Non-Temporal Priority.
2. Non-Temporal Priority. This Article permits a security interest in chattel paper or instruments to be perfected either by filing or by the secured party’s taking possession. This section enables secured parties and other purchasers of chattel paper (both electronic and tangible) and instruments to obtain priority over earlier-perfected security interests, thereby promoting the negotiability of these types of receivables.
Chattel Paper.
3. Chattel Paper. Subsections (a) and (b) follow former Section 9-308 in distinguishing between earlier-perfected security interests in chattel paper that is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest and chattel paper that is claimed other than merely as proceeds. Like former Section 9-308, this section does not elaborate upon the phrase “merely as proceeds.” For an elaboration, see PEB Commentary No. 8.
This section makes explicit the “good faith” requirement and retains the requirements of “the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business” and the giving of “new value” as conditions for priority. Concerning the last, this Article deletes former Section 9-108 and adds to Section 9-102 a completely different definition of the term “new value.” Under subsection (e), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory is deemed to give “new value” for chattel paper constituting the proceeds of the inventory. Accordingly, the purchase-money secured party may qualify for priority in the chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b), whichever is applicable, even if it does not make an additional advance against the chattel paper.
If a possessory security interest in tangible chattel paper or a perfected-by-control security interest in electronic chattel paper does not qualify for priority under this section, it may be subordinate to a perfected-by-filing security interest under Section 9-322(a)(1).
Possession and Control.
4. Possession and Control. To qualify for priority under subsection (a) or (b), a purchaser must “take[ ] possession of the chattel paper or obtain[ ] control of the chattel paper under Section 9-105.” When chattel paper comprises one or more tangible records and one or more electronic records, a purchaser may satisfy the possession-or-control requirement by taking possession of the tangible records under Section 9-313 and having control of the electronic records under Section 9-105. In determining which of several related records constitutes chattel paper and thus is relevant to possession or control, the form of the records is irrelevant. Rather, the touchstone is whether possession or control of the record would afford the public notice contemplated by the possession and control requirements. For example, because possession or control of an amendment extending the term of a lease would not afford the contemplated public notice, the amendment would not constitute chattel paper regardless of whether the amendment is in tangible form and the lease is in electronic form, the amendment is electronic and the lease is tangible, the amendment and lease are both tangible, or the amendment and lease are both electronic.
Two common practices have raised particular concerns with respect to the possession requirement. First, in some cases the parties create more than one copy or counterpart of chattel paper evidencing a single secured obligation or lease. This practice raises questions as to which counterpart is the “original” and whether it is necessary for a purchaser to take possession of all counterparts in order to “take possession” of the chattel paper. Second, parties sometimes enter into a single “master” agreement. The master agreement contemplates that the parties will enter into separate “schedules” from time to time, each evidencing chattel paper. Must a purchaser of an obligation or lease evidenced by a single schedule also take possession of the master agreement as well as the schedule in order to “take possession” of the chattel paper? The problem raised by the first practice is easily solved. The parties may in the terms of their agreement and by designation on the chattel paper identify only one counterpart as the original chattel paper for purposes of taking possession of the chattel paper. Concerns about the second practice also are easily solved by careful drafting. Each schedule should provide that it incorporates the terms of the master agreement, not the other way around. This will make it clear that each schedule is a “stand alone” document.
A secured party may wish to convert tangible chattel paper to electronic chattel paper and vice versa. The priority of a security interest in chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) may be preserved, even if the form of the chattel paper changes. The principle implied in the preceding paragraph, i.e., that not every copy of chattel paper is relevant, applies to “control” as well as to “possession.” When there are multiple copies of chattel paper, a secured party may take “possession” or obtain “control” of the chattel paper if it acts with respect to the copy or copies that are reliably identified as the copy or copies that are relevant for purposes of possession or control. This principle applies as well to chattel paper that has been converted from one form to another, even if the relevant copies are not the “original” chattel paper.
Chattel Paper Claimed Merely as Proceeds.
5. Chattel Paper Claimed Merely as Proceeds. Subsection (a) revises the rule in former Section 9-308(b) to eliminate reference to what the purchaser knows. Instead, a purchaser who meets the possession or control, ordinary course, and new value requirements takes priority over a competing security interest unless the chattel paper itself indicates that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser. Thus subsection (a) recognizes the common practice of placing a “legend” on chattel paper to indicate that it has been assigned. This approach, under which the chattel paper purchaser who gives new value in ordinary course can rely on possession of unlegended, tangible chattel paper without any concern for other facts that it may know, comports with the expectations of both inventory and chattel paper financers.
Chattel Paper Claimed Other Than Merely as Proceeds.
6. Chattel Paper Claimed Other Than Merely as Proceeds. Subsection (b) eliminates the requirement that the purchaser take without knowledge that the “specific paper” is subject to the security interest and substitutes for it the requirement that the purchaser take “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.” This standard derives from the definition of “buyer in ordinary course of business” in Section 1-201(b)(9). The source of the purchaser’s knowledge is irrelevant. Note, however, that “knowledge” means “actual knowledge.” Section 1-202(b).
Instruments.
In contrast to a junior secured party in accounts, who may be required in some special circumstances to undertake a search under the “good faith” requirement, see Comment 5 to Section 9-331, a purchaser of chattel paper under this section is not required as a matter of good faith to make a search in order to determine the existence of prior security interests. There may be circumstances where the purchaser undertakes a search nevertheless, either on its own volition or because other considerations make it advisable to do so, e.g., where the purchaser also is purchasing accounts. Without more, a purchaser of chattel paper who has seen a financing statement covering the chattel paper or who knows that the chattel paper is encumbered with a security interest, does not have knowledge that its purchase violates the secured party’s rights. However, if a purchaser sees a statement in a financing statement to the effect that a purchase of chattel paper from the debtor would violate the rights of the filed secured party, the purchaser would have such knowledge. Likewise, under new subsection (f), if the chattel paper itself indicates that it had been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, the purchaser would have wrongful knowledge for purposes of subsection (b), thereby preventing the purchaser from qualifying for priority under that subsection, even if the purchaser did not have actual knowledge. In the case of tangible chattel paper, the indication normally would consist of a written legend on the chattel paper. In the case of electronic chattel paper, this Article leaves to developing market and technological practices the manner in which the chattel paper would indicate an assignment. 7. Instruments. Subsection (d) contains a special priority rule for instruments. Under this subsection, a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest perfected by a method other than possession (e.g., by filing, temporarily under Section 9-312(e) or (g), as proceeds under Section 9-315(d), or automatically upon attachment under Section 9-309(4) if the security interest arises out of a sale of the instrument) if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party. Generally, to the extent subsection (d) conflicts with Section 3-306, subsection (d) governs. See Section 3-102(b). For example, notice of a conflicting security interest precludes a purchaser from becoming a holder in due course under Section 3-302 and thereby taking free of all claims to the instrument under Section 3-306. However, a purchaser who takes even with knowledge of the security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the holder of the security interest. Likewise, a purchaser qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes for “value” as defined in Section 1-201, even if it does not take for “value” as defined in Section 3-303.
Subsection (d) is subject to Section 9-331(a), which provides that Article 9 does not limit the rights of a holder in due course under Article 3. Thus, in the rare case in which the purchaser of an instrument qualifies for priority under subsection (d), but another person has the rights of a holder in due course of the instrument, the other person takes free of the purchaser’s claim. See Section 3-306.
The rule in subsection (d) is similar to the rules in subsections (a) and (b), which govern priority in chattel paper. The observations in Comment 6 concerning the requirement of good faith and the phrase “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party” apply equally to purchasers of instruments. However, unlike a purchaser of chattel paper, to qualify for priority under this section a purchaser of an instrument need only give “value” as defined in Section 1-201; it need not give “new value.” Also, the purchaser need not purchase the instrument in the ordinary course of its business.
Subsection (d) applies to checks as well as notes. For example, to collect and retain checks that are proceeds (collections) of accounts free of a senior secured party’s claim to the same checks, a junior secured party must satisfy the good-faith requirement (honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) of this subsection. This is the same good-faith requirement applicable to holders in due course. See Section 9-331, Comment 5.
Priority in Proceeds of Chattel Paper.
8. Priority in Proceeds of Chattel Paper. Subsection (c) sets forth the two circumstances under which the priority afforded to a purchaser of chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) extends also to proceeds of the chattel paper. The first is if the purchaser would have priority under the normal priority rules applicable to proceeds. The second, which the following Comments discuss in greater detail, is if the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper. Former Article 9 generally was silent as to the priority of a security interest in proceeds when a purchaser qualifies for priority under Section 9-308 (but see former Section 9-306(5)(b), concerning returned and repossessed goods). 9. Priority in Returned and Repossessed Goods. Returned and repossessed goods may constitute proceeds of chattel paper. The following Comments explain the treatment of returned and repossessed goods as proceeds of chattel paper. The analysis is consistent with that of PEB Commentary No. 5, which these Comments replace, and is based upon the following example:
Example:
Example: SP-1 has a security interest in all the inventory of a dealer in goods (Dealer); SP-1’s security interest is perfected by filing. Dealer sells some of its inventory to a buyer in the ordinary course of business (BIOCOB) pursuant to a conditional sales contract (chattel paper) that does not indicate that it has been assigned to SP-1. SP-2 purchases the chattel paper from Dealer and takes possession of the paper in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of SP-1. Subsequently, BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer because they are defective. Alternatively, Dealer acquires possession of the goods following BIOCOB’s default.
Assignment of Non-Lease Chattel Paper.
Loan by SP-2 to Dealer Secured by Chattel Paper (or Functional Equivalent Pursuant to Recourse Arrangement).
- a. Loan by SP-2 to Dealer Secured by Chattel Paper (or Functional Equivalent Pursuant to Recourse Arrangement).
Returned Goods.
(1) Returned Goods. If BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer for repairs, Dealer is merely a bailee and acquires thereby no meaningful rights in the goods to which SP-1’s security interest could attach. (Although SP-1’s security interest could attach to Dealer’s interest as a bailee, that interest is not likely to be of any particular value to SP-1.) Dealer is the owner of the chattel paper (i.e., the owner of a right to payment secured by a security interest in the goods); SP-2 has a security interest in the chattel paper, as does SP-1 (as proceeds of the goods under Section 9-315). Under Section 9-330, SP-2’s security interest in the chattel paper is senior to that of SP-1. SP-2 enjoys this priority regardless of whether, or when, SP-2 filed a financing statement covering the chattel paper. Because chattel paper and goods represent different types of collateral, Dealer does not have any meaningful interest in goods to which either SP-1’s or SP-2’s security interest could attach in order to secure Dealer’s obligations to either creditor. See Section 9-102 (defining “chattel paper” and “goods”).
Now assume that BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer under circumstances whereby Dealer once again becomes the owner of the goods. This would be the case, for example, if the goods were defective and BIOCOB was entitled to reject or revoke acceptance of the goods. See Sections 2-602 (rejection), 2-608 (revocation of acceptance). Unless BIOCOB has waived its defenses as against assignees of the chattel paper, SP-1’s and SP-2’s rights against BIOCOB would be subject to BIOCOB’s claims and defenses. See Sections 9-403, 9-404. SP-1’s security interest would attach again because the returned goods would be proceeds of the chattel paper. Dealer’s acquisition of the goods easily can be characterized as “proceeds” consisting of an “in kind” collection on or distribution on account of the chattel paper. See Section 9-102 (definition of “proceeds”). Assuming that SP-1’s security interest is perfected by filing against the goods and that the filing is made in the same office where a filing would be made against the chattel paper, SP-1’s security interest in the goods would remain perfected beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. See Section 9-315(d).
Repossessed Goods.
Because Dealer’s newly reacquired interest in the goods is proceeds of the chattel paper, SP-2’s security interest also would attach in the goods as proceeds. If SP-2 had perfected its security interest in the chattel paper by filing (again, assuming that filing against the chattel paper was made in the same office where a filing would be made against the goods), SP-2’s security interest in the reacquired goods would be perfected beyond 20 days. See Section 9-315(d). However, if SP-2 had relied only on its possession of the chattel paper for perfection and had not filed against the chattel paper or the goods, SP-2’s security interest would be unperfected after the 20-day period. See Section 9-315(d). Nevertheless, SP-2’s unperfected security interest in the goods would be senior to SP-1’s security interest under Section 9-330(c). The result in this priority contest is not affected by SP-2’s acquiescence or non-acquiescence in the return of the goods to Dealer. (2) Repossessed Goods. As explained above, Dealer owns the chattel paper covering the goods, subject to security interests in favor of SP-1 and SP-2. In Article 9 parlance, Dealer has an interest in chattel paper, not goods. If Dealer, SP-1, or SP-2 repossesses the goods upon BIOCOB’s default, whether the repossession is rightful or wrongful as among Dealer, SP-1, or SP-2, Dealer’s interest will not change. The location of goods and the party who possesses them does not affect the fact that Dealer’s interest is in chattel paper, not goods. The goods continue to be owned by BIOCOB. SP-1’s security interest in the goods does not attach until such time as Dealer reacquires an interest (other than a bare possessory interest) in the goods. For example, Dealer might buy the goods at a foreclosure sale from SP-2 (whose security interest in the chattel paper is senior to that of SP-1); that disposition would cut off BIOCOB’s rights in the goods. Section 9-617.
In many cases the matter would end upon sale of the goods to Dealer at a foreclosure sale and there would be no priority contest between SP-1 and SP-2; Dealer would be unlikely to buy the goods under circumstances whereby SP-2 would retain its security interest. There can be exceptions, however. For example, Dealer may be obliged to purchase the goods from SP-2 and SP-2 may be obliged to convey the goods to Dealer, but Dealer may fail to pay SP-2. Or, one could imagine that SP-2, like SP-1, has a general security interest in the inventory of Dealer. In the latter case, SP-2 should not receive the benefit of any special priority rule, since its interest in no way derives from priority under Section 9-330. In the former case, SP-2’s security interest in the goods reacquired by Dealer is senior to SP-1’s security interest under Section 9-330.
Dealer’s Outright Sale of Chattel Paper to SP-2.
b. Dealer’s Outright Sale of Chattel Paper to SP-2. Article 9 also applies to a transaction whereby SP-2 buys the chattel paper in an outright sale transaction without recourse against Dealer. Sections 1-201(37), 9-109(a). Although Dealer does not, in such a transaction, retain any residual ownership interest in the chattel paper, the chattel paper constitutes proceeds of the goods to which SP-1’s security interest will attach and continue following the sale of the goods. Section 9-315(a). Even though Dealer has not retained any interest in the chattel paper, as discussed above BIOCOB subsequently may return the goods to Dealer under circumstances whereby Dealer reacquires an interest in the goods. The priority contest between SP-1 and SP-2 will be resolved as discussed above; Section 9-330 makes no distinction among purchasers of chattel paper on the basis of whether the purchaser is an outright buyer of chattel paper or one whose security interest secures an obligation of Dealer.
Assignment of Lease Chattel Paper.
The analysis with respect to lease chattel paper is similar to that set forth above with respect to non-lease chattel paper. It is complicated, however, by the fact that, unlike the case of chattel paper arising out of a sale, Dealer retains a residual interest in the goods . See Section 2A-103(1)(q) (defining “lessor’s residual interest”); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc. , 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973) (lessor’s residual interest under true lease is an interest in goods and is a separate type of collateral from lessor’s interest in the lease). If Dealer leases goods to a “lessee in ordinary course of business” (LIOCOB), then LIOCOB takes its interest under the lease (i.e., its “leasehold interest”) free of the security interest of SP-1. See Sections 2A-307(3), 2A-103(1)(m) (defining “leasehold interest”), (1)(o) (defining “lessee in ordinary course of business”). SP-1 would, however, retain its security interest in the residual interest. In addition, SP-1 would acquire an interest in the lease chattel paper as proceeds. If Dealer then assigns the lease chattel paper to SP-2, Section 9-330 gives SP-2 priority over SP-1 with respect to the chattel paper, but not with respect to the residual interest in the goods . Consequently, assignees of lease chattel paper typically take a security interest in and file against the lessor’s residual interest in goods, expecting their priority in the goods to be governed by the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322.
If the goods are returned to Dealer, other than upon expiration of the lease term, then the security interests of both SP-1 and SP-2 normally would attach to the goods as proceeds of the chattel paper. (If the goods are returned to Dealer at the expiration of the lease term and the lessee has made all payments due under the lease, however, then Dealer no longer has any rights under the chattel paper. Dealer’s interest in the goods consists solely of its residual interest, as to which SP-2 has no claim.) This would be the case, for example, when the lessee rescinds the lease or when the lessor recovers possession in the exercise of its remedies under Article 2A. See, e.g., Section 2A-525. If SP-2 enjoyed priority in the chattel paper under Section 9-330, then SP-2 likewise would enjoy priority in the returned goods as proceeds. This does not mean that SP-2 necessarily is entitled to the entire value of the returned goods. The value of the goods represents the sum of the present value of (i) the value of their use for the term of the lease and (ii) the value of the residual interest. SP-2 has priority in the former, but SP-1 ordinarily would have priority in the latter. Thus, an allocation of a portion of the value of the goods to each component may be necessary. Where, as here, one secured party has a security interest in the lessor’s residual interest and another has a priority security interest in the chattel paper, it may be advisable for the conflicting secured parties to establish a method for making such an allocation and otherwise to determine their relative rights in returned goods by agreement.
§ 28-9-331. Priority of rights of purchasers of instruments, documents and securities under other chapters — Priority of interests in financial assets and security entitlements under chapter 8.
- This chapter does not limit the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, or a protected purchaser of a security. These holders or purchasers take priority over an earlier security interest, even if perfected, to the extent provided in chapters 3, 7 and 8[, title 28, Idaho Code].
- This chapter does not limit the rights of or impose liability on a person to the extent that the person is protected against the assertion of a claim under chapter 8[, title 28, Idaho Code].
- Filing under this chapter does not constitute notice of a claim or defense to the holders, or purchasers, or persons described in subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-331, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions at the end of subsections (a) and (b) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
“Priority.”
2. “Priority.” In some provisions, this Article distinguishes between claimants that take collateral free of a security interest (in the sense that the security interest no longer encumbers the collateral) and those that take an interest in the collateral that is senior to a surviving security interest. See, e.g., Section 9-317. Whether a holder or purchaser referred to in this section takes free or is senior to a security interest depends on whether the purchaser is a buyer of the collateral or takes a security interest in it. The term “priority” is meant to encompass both scenarios, as it does in Section 9-330.
Rights Acquired by Purchasers.
3. Rights Acquired by Purchasers. The rights to which this section refers are set forth in Sections 3-305 and 3-306 (holder in due course), 7-502 (holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated), and 8-303 (protected purchaser). The holders and purchasers referred to in this section do not always take priority over a security interest. See, e.g., Section 7-503 (affording paramount rights to certain owners and secured parties as against holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated). Accordingly, this section adds the clause, “to the extent provided in Articles 3, 7, and 8” to former Section 9-309. 4. Financial Assets and Security Entitlements. New subsection (b) provides explicit protection for those who deal with financial assets and security entitlements and who are immunized from liability under Article 8. See, e.g., Sections 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510, 8-511. The new subsection makes explicit in Article 9 what is implicit in former Article 9 and explicit in several provisions of Article 8. It does not change the law.
Collections by Junior Secured Party.
5. Collections by Junior Secured Party. Under this section, a secured party with a junior security interest in receivables (accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, or payment intangibles) may collect and retain the proceeds of those receivables free of the claim of a senior secured party to the same receivables, if the junior secured party is a holder in due course of the proceeds. In order to qualify as a holder in due course, the junior must satisfy the requirements of Section 3-302, which include taking in “good faith.” This means that the junior not only must act “honestly” but also must observe “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” under the particular circumstances. See Section 9-102(a). Although “good faith” does not impose a general duty of inquiry, e.g., a search of the records in filing offices, there may be circumstances in which “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” would require such a search.
Consider, for example, a junior secured party in the business of financing or buying accounts who fails to undertake a search to determine the existence of prior security interests. Because a search, under the usages of trade of that business, would enable it to know or learn upon reasonable inquiry that collecting the accounts violated the rights of a senior secured party, the junior may fail to meet the good-faith standard. See Utility Contractors Financial Services, Inc. v. Amsouth Bank, NA, 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993). Likewise, a junior secured party who collects accounts when it knows or should know under the particular circumstances that doing so would violate the rights of a senior secured party, because the debtor had agreed not to grant a junior security interest in, or sell, the accounts, may not meet the good-faith test. Thus, if a junior secured party conducted or should have conducted a search and a financing statement filed on behalf of the senior secured party states such a restriction, the junior’s collection would not meet the good-faith standard. On the other hand, if there was a course of performance between the senior secured party and the debtor which placed no such restrictions on the debtor and allowed the debtor to collect and use the proceeds without any restrictions, the junior secured party may then satisfy the requirements for being a holder in due course. This would be more likely in those circumstances where the junior secured party was providing additional financing to the debtor on an on-going basis by lending against or buying the accounts and had no notice of any restrictions against doing so. Generally, the senior secured party would not be prejudiced because the practical effect of such payment to the junior secured party is little different than if the debtor itself had made the collections and subsequently paid the secured party from the debtor’s general funds. Absent collusion, the junior secured party would take the funds free of the senior security interests. See Section 9-332. In contrast, the senior secured party is likely to be prejudiced if the debtor is going out of business and the junior secured party collects the accounts by notifying the account debtors to make payments directly to the junior. Those collections may not be consistent with “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”
Whether the junior secured party qualifies as a holder in due course is fact-sensitive and should be decided on a case-by-case basis in the light of those circumstances. Decisions such as Financial Management Services Inc. v. Familian, 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. App. Div. 1995) (finding holder in due course status) could be determined differently under this application of the good-faith requirement. The concepts addressed in this Comment are also applicable to junior secured parties as purchasers of instruments under Section 9-330(d). See Section 9-330, Comment 7.
§ 28-9-332. Transfer of money — Transfer of funds from deposit account.
- A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.
- A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-332, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. This section affords broad protection to transferees who take funds from a deposit account and to those who take money. The term “transferee” is not defined; however, the debtor itself is not a transferee. Thus this section does not cover the case in which a debtor withdraws money (currency) from its deposit account or the case in which a bank debits an encumbered account and credits another account it maintains for the debtor.
A transfer of funds from a deposit account, to which subsection (b) applies, normally will be made by check, by funds transfer, or by debiting the debtor’s deposit account and crediting another depositor’s account.
Example 1:
Example 1: Debtor maintains a deposit account with Bank A. The deposit account is subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Debtor draws a check on the account, payable to Payee. Inasmuch as the check is not the proceeds of the deposit account (it is an order to pay funds from the deposit account), Lender’s security interest in the deposit account does not give rise to a security interest in the check. Payee deposits the check into its own deposit account, and Bank A pays it. Unless Payee acted in collusion with Debtor in violating Lender’s rights, Payee takes the funds (the credits running in favor of Payee) free of Lender’s security interest. This is true regardless of whether Payee is a holder in due course of the check and even if Payee gave no value for the check.
Example 2:
Example 2: Debtor maintains a deposit account with Bank A. The deposit account is subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. At Bank B’s suggestion, Debtor moves the funds from the account at Bank A to Debtor’s deposit account with Bank B. Unless Bank B acted in collusion with Debtor in violating Lender’s rights, Bank B takes the funds (the credits running in favor of Bank B) free from Lender’s security interest. See subsection (b). However, inasmuch as the deposit account maintained with Bank B constitutes the proceeds of the deposit account at Bank A, Lender’s security interest would attach to that account as proceeds. See Section 9-315. Subsection (b) also would apply if, in the example, Bank A debited Debtor’s deposit account in exchange for the issuance of Bank A’s cashier’s check. Lender’s security interest would attach to the cashier’s check as proceeds of the deposit account, and the rules applicable to instruments would govern any competing claims to the cashier’s check. See, e.g., Sections 3-306, 9-322, 9-330, 9-331.
If Debtor withdraws money (currency) from an encumbered deposit account and transfers the money to a third party, then subsection (a), to the extent not displaced by federal law relating to money, applies. It contains the same rule as subsection (b).
Subsection (b) applies to transfers of funds from a deposit account; it does not apply to transfers of the deposit account itself or of an interest therein. For example, this section does not apply to the creation of a security interest in a deposit account. Competing claims to the deposit account itself are dealt with by other Article 9 priority rules. See Sections 9-317(a), 9-327, 9-340, 9-341. Similarly, a corporate merger normally would not result in a transfer of funds from a deposit account. Rather, it might result in a transfer of the deposit account itself. If so, the normal rules applicable to transferred collateral would apply; this section would not.
Policy.
3. Policy. Broad protection for transferees helps to ensure that security interests in deposit accounts do not impair the free flow of funds. It also minimizes the likelihood that a secured party will enjoy a claim to whatever the transferee purchases with the funds. Rules concerning recovery of payments traditionally have placed a high value on finality. The opportunity to upset a completed transaction, or even to place a completed transaction in jeopardy by bringing suit against the transferee of funds, should be severely limited. Although the giving of value usually is a prerequisite for receiving the ability to take free from third-party claims, where payments are concerned the law is even more protective. Thus, Section 3-418(c) provides that, even where the law of restitution otherwise would permit recovery of funds paid by mistake, no recovery may be had from a person “who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment.” Rather than adopt this standard, this section eliminates all reliance requirements whatsoever. Payments made by mistake are relatively rare, but payments of funds from encumbered deposit accounts (e.g., deposit accounts containing collections from accounts receivable) occur with great regularity. In most cases, unlike payment by mistake, no one would object to these payments. In the vast proportion of cases, the transferee probably would be able to show a change of position in reliance on the payment. This section does not put the transferee to the burden of having to make this proof.
“Bad Actors.”
4. “Bad Actors.” To deal with the question of the “bad actor,” this section borrows “collusion” language from Article 8. See, e.g., Sections 8-115, 8-503(e). This is the most protective (i.e., least stringent) of the various standards now found in the UCC. Compare, e.g., Section 1-201(b)(9) (“without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person”); Section 1-201(b)(20) (“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”); Section 3-302(a)(2)(v) (“without notice of any claim”).
Transferee Who Does Not Take Free.
Example 3:
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, but, in wrongfully moving the funds from the deposit account at Bank A to Debtor’s deposit account with Bank B, Debtor acts in collusion with Bank B. Bank B does not take the funds free of Lender’s security interest under this section. If Debtor grants a security interest to Bank B, Section 9-327 governs the relative priorities of Lender and Bank B. Under Section 9-327(3), Bank B’s security interest in the Bank B deposit account is senior to Lender’s security interest in the deposit account as proceeds. However, Bank B’s senior security interest does not protect Bank B against any liability to Lender that might arise from Bank B’s wrongful conduct.
§ 28-9-333. Priority of certain liens arising by operation of law.
-
In this section, “possessory lien” means an interest, other than a security interest or an agricultural lien:
- Which secures payment or performance of an obligation for services or materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of the person’s business;
- Which is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person; and
- Whose effectiveness depends on the person’s possession of the goods.
- A possessory lien on goods has priority over a security interest in the goods unless the lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-333, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
CASE NOTES
Warehouseman’s lien on seed was not effective against equipment manufacturer’s security interest in seed, since its security interest in the seed was perfected before the seed was delivered to the warehouseman; therefore, the manufacturer’s security interest had priority. Curry Grain Storage, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 120 Idaho 328, 815 P.2d 1068 (1991).
Official Comment
Source.
“Possessory Liens.”
§ 28-9-334. Priority of security interests in fixtures and crops.
- A security interest under this chapter may be created in goods that are fixtures or may continue in goods that become fixtures. A security interest does not exist under this chapter in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land.
- This chapter does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures under real property law.
- In cases not governed by subsections (d) through (h) of this section, a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real property other than the debtor.
-
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (h) of this section, a perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property and:
- The security interest is a purchase-money security interest;
- The interest of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures; and
- The security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within twenty (20) days thereafter.
-
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if:
-
The debtor has an interest of record in the real property or is in possession of the real property and the security interest:
- is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record; and
- has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner;
-
Before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is perfected by any method permitted by this chapter and the fixtures are readily removable:
- factory or office machines;
- equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property; or
- replacements of domestic appliances that are consumer goods;
- The conflicting interest is a lien on the real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method permitted by this chapter; or
-
The security interest is:
- created in a manufactured home in a manufactured home transaction; and
- perfected pursuant to a statute described in section 28-9-311(a)(2)[, Idaho Code].
-
The debtor has an interest of record in the real property or is in possession of the real property and the security interest:
-
A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if:
- The encumbrancer or owner has, in an authenticated record, consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
-
The debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner.
(g) The priority of the security interest under subsection (f)(2) of this section continues for a reasonable time if the debtor’s right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner terminates.
- A perfected security interest in crops growing on real property has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property.
(h) A mortgage is a construction mortgage to the extent that it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land, including the acquisition cost of the land, if a recorded record of the mortgage so indicates. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (e) and (f) of this section, a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction mortgage if a record of the mortgage is recorded before the goods become fixtures and the goods become fixtures before the completion of the construction. A mortgage has this priority to the same extent as a construction mortgage to the extent that it is given to refinance a construction mortgage.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-334, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in paragraph (e)(4)(B) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Deed of trust.
Absence of Knowledge.
An examination of the priority and foreclosure scheme of article 9 demonstrates that absence of knowledge of subordinate security interests could not be a prerequisite for a purchaser to buy property free of encumbrances at a foreclosure sale; for, if absence of knowledge were required, the party whose interest would be undermined would be the secured party who was conducting the sale. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980). Deed of Trust.
Where the small business administration held a security interest in fruit packing machinery under its real estate deed of trust which covered the real property to which the machinery was affixed, and where the SBA had purchased the entire interest of the original mortgagees of the property without knowledge of a purchase money security interest retained by the seller of the machinery, the SBA’s interest was prior to the purchase money security interest. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Personalty.
Where an irrigation pump could be removed from a concrete foundation by loosening the bolts and removing its coupling with an irrigation line, and where “lateral” irrigation lines were above-ground and could be removed from the property by uncoupling them from the subsurface lines which supplied water to them, the district court could conclude that these pieces of equipment were not fixtures attached to the realty and had retained their character as personalty. Duff v. Draper, 98 Idaho 379, 565 P.2d 572 (1977).
Purchase at Foreclosure Sale.
Although the seller of various items of fruit packing machinery had retained a security interest to secure the purchase price, a subsequent foreclosure sale of the real property to which the machinery was affixed discharged the security interest held by the seller of the machinery, where the purchase at the foreclosure sale of the real estate and fruit packing machinery was in good faith. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Subsequent Purchaser.
In a suit brought by seller of fruit packing equipment alleging a priority interest in machinery affixed to real property which was the subject of a mortgage foreclosure, where the subsequent purchaser at the foreclosure sale had agreed to pay rent for use of the machinery before default on the mortgage, and where the record title holder of the property had contracted for and consented to the machinery being affixed to the real estate, the subsequent purchaser did not have priority either as subsequent purchaser for value without knowledge or as successor in interest to record owner who had withheld consent to preservation of a security interest. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 543 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976).
Official Comment
Source.
Scope of This Section.
2. Scope of This Section. This section contains rules governing the priority of security interests in fixtures and crops as against persons who claim an interest in real property. Priority contests with other Article 9 security interests are governed by the other priority rules of this Article. The provisions with respect to fixtures follow those of former Section 9-313. However, they have been rewritten to conform to Section 2A-309 and to prevailing style conventions. Subsections (i) and (j), which apply to crops, are new. 3. Security Interests in Fixtures. Certain goods that are the subject of personal-property (chattel) financing become so affixed or otherwise so related to real property that they become part of the real property. These goods are called “fixtures.” See Section 9-102 (definition of “fixtures”). Some fixtures retain their personal-property nature: a security interest under this Article may be created in fixtures and may continue in goods that become fixtures. See subsection (a). However, if the goods are ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land, no security interest in them exists. Rather, the priority of claims to the building materials are determined by the law governing claims to real property. (Of course, the fact that no security interest exists in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land does not prejudice any rights the secured party may have against the debtor or any other person who violated the secured party’s rights by wrongfully incorporating the goods into real property.)
Thus, this section recognizes three categories of goods: (1) those that retain their chattel character entirely and are not part of the real property; (2) ordinary building materials that have become an integral part of the real property and cannot retain their chattel character for purposes of finance; and (3) an intermediate class that has become real property for certain purposes, but as to which chattel financing may be preserved.
To achieve priority under certain provisions of this section, a security interest must be perfected by making a “fixture filing” (defined in Section 9-102) in the real-property records. Because the question whether goods have become fixtures often is a difficult one under applicable real-property law, a secured party may make a fixture filing as a precaution. Courts should not infer from a fixture filing that the secured party concedes that the goods are or will become fixtures.
Priority in Fixtures: General.
4. Priority in Fixtures: General. In considering priority problems under this section, one must first determine whether real-property claimants per se have an interest in the crops or fixtures as part of real property. If not, it is immaterial, so far as concerns real property parties as such, whether a security interest arising under this Article is perfected or unperfected. In no event does a real-property claimant (e.g., owner or mortgagee) acquire an interest in a “pure” chattel just because a security interest therein is unperfected. If on the other hand real-property law gives real-property parties an interest in the goods, a conflict arises and this section states the priorities.
Priority in Fixtures: Residual Rule.
5. Priority in Fixtures: Residual Rule. Subsection (c) states the residual priority rule, which applies only if one of the other rules does not: A security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real property other than the debtor.
Priority in Fixtures: First to File or Record.
6. Priority in Fixtures: First to File or Record. Subsection (e)(1), which follows former Section 9-313(4)(b), contains the usual priority rule of conveyancing, that is, the first to file or record prevails. In order to achieve priority under this rule, however, the security interest must be perfected by a “fixture filing” (defined in Section 9-102), i.e., a filing for record in the real property records and indexed therein, so that it will be found in a real-property search. The condition in subsection (e)(1)(B), that the security interest must have had priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the conflicting encumbrancer or owner, appears to limit to the first-in-time principle. However, this apparent limitation is nothing other than an expression of the usual rule that a person must be entitled to transfer what he has. Thus, if the fixture security interest is subordinate to a mortgage, it is subordinate to an interest of an assignee of the mortgage, even though the assignment is a later recorded instrument. Similarly if the fixture security interest is subordinate to the rights of an owner, it is subordinate to a subsequent grantee of the owner and likewise subordinate to a subsequent mortgagee of the owner. 7. Priority in Fixtures: Purchase-Money Security Interests. Subsection (d), which follows former Section 9-313(4)(a), contains the principal exception to the first-to-file-or-record rule of subsection (e)(1). It affords priority to purchase-money security interests in fixtures as against prior recorded real-property interests, provided that the purchase-money security interest is filed as a fixture filing in the real-property records before the goods become fixtures or within 20 days thereafter. This priority corresponds to the purchase-money priority under Section 9-324(a). (Like other 10-day periods in former Article 9, the 10-day period in this section has been changed to 20 days.)
It should be emphasized that this purchase-money priority with the 20-day grace period for filing is limited to rights against real-property interests that arise before the goods become fixtures. There is no such priority with the 20-day grace period as against real-property interests that arise subsequently. The fixture security interest can defeat subsequent real-property interests only if it is filed first and prevails under the usual conveyancing rule in subsection (e)(1) or one of the other rules in this section.
Priority in Fixtures: Readily Removable Goods.
8. Priority in Fixtures: Readily Removable Goods. Subsection (e)(2), which derives from Section 2A-309 and former Section 9-313(4)(d), contains another exception to the usual first-to-file-or-perfect rule. It affords priority to the holders of security interests in certain types of readily removable goods-factory and office machines, equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property, and (as discussed below) certain replacements of domestic appliances. This rule is made necessary by the confusion in the law as to whether certain machinery, equipment, and appliances become fixtures. It protects a secured party who, perhaps in the mistaken belief that the readily removable goods will not become fixtures, makes a UCC filing (or otherwise perfects under this Article) rather than making a fixture filing.
Frequently, under applicable law, goods of the type described in subsection (e)(2) will not be considered to have become part of the real property. In those cases, the fixture security interest does not conflict with a real-property interest, and resort to this section is unnecessary. However, if the goods have become part of the real property, subsection (e)(2) enables a fixture secured party to take priority over a conflicting real-property interest if the fixture security interest is perfected by a fixture filing or by any other method permitted by this Article. If perfection is by fixture filing, the fixture security interest would have priority over subsequently recorded real-property interests under subsection (e)(1) and, if the fixture security interest is a purchase-money security interest (a likely scenario), it would also have priority over most real property interests under the purchase-money priority of subsection (d). Note, however, that unlike the purchase-money priority rule in subsection (d), the priority rules in subsection (e) override the priority given to a construction mortgage under subsection (h).
Priority in Fixtures: Judicial Liens.
The rule in subsection (e)(2) is limited to readily removable replacements of domestic appliances. It does not apply to original installations. Moreover, it is limited to appliances that are “consumer goods” (defined in Section 9-102) in the hands of the debtor. The principal effect of the rule is to make clear that a secured party financing occasional replacements of domestic appliances in noncommercial, owner-occupied contexts need not concern itself with real-property descriptions or records; indeed, for a purchase-money replacement of consumer goods, perfection without any filing will be possible. See Section 9-309(1). 9. Priority in Fixtures: Judicial Liens. Subsection (e)(3), which follows former Section 9-313(4)(d), adopts a first-in-time rule applicable to conflicts between a fixture security interest and a lien on the real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings. Such a lien is subordinate to an earlier-perfected security interest, regardless of the method by which the security interest was perfected. Judgment creditors generally are not reliance creditors who search real-property records. Accordingly, a perfected fixture security interest takes priority over a subsequent judgment lien or other lien obtained by legal or equitable proceedings, even if no evidence of the security interest appears in the relevant real-property records. Subsection (e)(3) thus protects a perfected fixture security interest from avoidance by a trustee in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), regardless of the method of perfection.
Priority in Fixtures: Manufactured Homes.
10. Priority in Fixtures: Manufactured Homes. A manufactured home may become a fixture. New subsection (e)(4) contains a special rule granting priority to certain security interests created in a “manufactured home” as part of a “manufactured-home transaction” (both defined in Section 9-102). Under this rule, a security interest in a manufactured home that becomes a fixture has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the security interest is perfected under a certificate-of-title statute (see Section 9-311). Subsection (e)(4) is only one of the priority rules applicable to security interests in a manufactured home that becomes a fixture. Thus, a security interest in a manufactured home which does not qualify for priority under this subsection may qualify under another.
Priority in Fixtures: Construction Mortgages.
11. Priority in Fixtures: Construction Mortgages. The purchase-money priority presents a difficult problem in relation to construction mortgages. The latter ordinarily will have been recorded even before the commencement of delivery of materials to the job, and therefore would take priority over fixture security interests were it not for the purchase-money priority. However, having recorded first, the holder of a construction mortgage reasonably expects to have first priority in the improvement built using the mortgagee’s advances. Subsection (g) expressly gives priority to the construction mortgage recorded before the filing of the purchase-money security interest in fixtures. A refinancing of a construction mortgage has the same priority as the construction mortgage itself. The phrase “an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement” covers both optional advances and advances pursuant to commitment. Both types of advances have the same priority under subsection (g).
The priority under this subsection applies only to goods that become fixtures during the construction period leading to the completion of the improvement. The construction priority will not apply to additions to the building made long after completion of the improvement, even if the additions are financed by the real-property mortgagee under an open-end clause of the construction mortgage. In such case, subsections (d), (e), and (f) govern.
Although this subsection affords a construction mortgage priority over a purchase-money security interest that otherwise would have priority under subsection (d), the subsection is subject to the priority rules in subsections (e) and (f). Thus, a construction mortgage may be junior to a fixture security interest perfected by a fixture filing before the construction mortgage was recorded. See subsection (e)(1).
Crops.
12. Crops. Growing crops are “goods” in which a security interest may be created and perfected under this Article. In some jurisdictions, a mortgage of real property may cover crops, as well. In the event that crops are encumbered by both a mortgage and an Article 9 security interest, subsection (i) provides that the security interest has priority. States whose real-property law provides otherwise should either amend that law directly or override it by enacting subsection (j).
§ 28-9-335. Accessions.
- A security interest may be created in an accession and continues in collateral that becomes an accession.
- If a security interest is perfected when the collateral becomes an accession, the security interest remains perfected in the collateral.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (g) of this section, the other provisions of this part determine the priority of a security interest in an accession.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) of this section, a security interest in an accession is subordinate to a security interest in the whole which is perfected by compliance with the requirements of a certificate of title statute under section 28-9-311(b)[, Idaho Code].
- After default, subject to part 6[, chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Code], a secured party may remove an accession from other goods if the security interest in the accession has priority over the claims of every person having an interest in the whole.
- A secured party that removes an accession from other goods under subsection (e) of this section shall promptly reimburse any holder of a security interest or other lien on, or owner of, the whole or of the other goods, other than the debtor, for the cost of repair of any physical injury to the whole or the other goods. The secured party need not reimburse the holder or owner for any diminution in value of the whole or the other goods caused by the absence of the accession removed or by any necessity for replacing it. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate assurance for the performance of the obligation to reimburse.
- A security interest in an accession has priority over a security interest in the whole which is perfected by compliance with the requirements of a certificate-of-title statute under subsection (b) of section 28-9-311, Idaho Code, if the security interest in the accession is a purchase money security interest that is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the accession or within twenty (20) days thereafter.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-335, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (d) and (e) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Absence of Knowledge.
An examination of the priority and foreclosure scheme of article 9 demonstrates that absence of knowledge of subordinate security interests could not be a prerequisite for a purchaser to buy property free of encumbrances at a foreclosure sale; for, if absence of knowledge were required, the party whose interest would be undermined would be the secured party who was conducting the sale. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Deed to Real Property.
Where the small business administration held a security interest in fruit packing machinery under its real estate deed of trust which covered the real property to which the machinery was affixed, and where the SBA had purchased the entire interest of the original mortgagees of the property without knowledge of a purchase money security interest retained by the seller of the machinery, the SBA’s interest was prior to the purchase money security interest. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Purchase at Foreclosure Sale.
Although the seller of various items of fruit packing machinery had retained a security interest to secure the purchase price, a subsequent foreclosure sale of the real property to which the machinery was affixed discharged the security interest held by the seller of the machinery, where the purchase at the foreclosure sale of the real estate and fruit packing machinery was in good faith. Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 623 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
Official Comment
Source.
“Accession.”
“Accession” vs. “Other Goods.”
Example 1:
Example 1: SP-1 holds a security interest in the debtor’s tractors (which are not subject to a certificate-of-title statute), and SP-2 holds a security interest in a particular tractor engine. The engine is installed in a tractor. From the perspective of SP-1, the tractor becomes an “accession” and the engine is the “other goods.” From the perspective of SP-2, the engine is the “accession” and the tractor is the “other goods.” The completed tractor — tractor cum engine — constitutes the “whole.” 4. Scope. This section governs only a few issues concerning accessions. Subsection (a) contains rules governing continuation of a security interest in an accession. Subsection (b) contains a rule governing continued perfection of a security interest in goods that become an accession. Subsection (d) contains a special priority rule governing accessions that become part of a whole covered by a certificate of title. Subsections (e) and (f) govern enforcement of a security interest in an accession.
Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Attachment and Perfection.
Example 2:
Similarly, this section does not determine whether perfection against collateral that becomes an accession is effective to perfect a security interest in the whole. Other provisions of this Article, including the requirements for indicating the collateral covered by a financing statement, resolve that question.
Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Priority.
6. Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Priority. With one exception, concerning goods covered by a certificate of title (see subsection (d)), the other provisions of this Part, including the rules governing purchase-money security interests, determine the priority of most security interests in an accession, including the relative priority of a security interest in an accession and a security interest in the whole. See subsection (c).
Example 3:
Example 3: Debtor owns an office computer subject to a security interest in favor of SP-1. Debtor acquires memory and grants a perfected security interest in the memory to SP-2. Debtor installs the memory in the computer, at which time (one assumes) SP-1’s security interest attaches to the memory. The first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322 governs priority in the memory. If, however, SP-2’s security interest is a purchase-money security interest, Section 9-324(a) would afford priority in the memory to SP-2, regardless of which security interest was perfected first.
Goods Covered by Certificate of Title.
7. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. This section does govern the priority of a security interest in an accession that is or becomes part of a whole that is subject to a security interest perfected by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. Subsection (d) provides that a security interest in the whole, perfected by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute, takes priority over a security interest in the accession. It enables a secured party to rely upon a certificate of title without having to check the UCC files to determine whether any components of the collateral may be encumbered. The subsection imposes a corresponding risk upon those who finance goods that may become part of goods covered by a certificate of title. In doing so, it reverses the priority that appeared reasonable to most pre-UCC courts.
Example 4:
§ 28-9-336. Commingled goods.
- In this section, “commingled goods” means goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass.
- A security interest does not exist in commingled goods as such. However, a security interest may attach to a product or mass that results when goods become commingled goods.
- If collateral becomes commingled goods, a security interest attaches to the product or mass.
- If a security interest in collateral is perfected before the collateral becomes commingled goods, the security interest that attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c) of this section is perfected.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f) of this section, the other provisions of this part determine the priority of a security interest that attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c) of this section.
-
If more than one (1) security interest attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c) of this section, the following rules determine priority:
- A security interest that is perfected under subsection (d) of this section has priority over a security interest that is unperfected at the time the collateral becomes commingled goods.
- If more than one (1) security interest is perfected under subsection (d) of this section, the security interests rank equally in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-336, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
“Commingled Goods.”
2. “Commingled Goods.” Subsection (a) defines “commingled goods.” It is meant to include not only goods whose identity is lost through manufacturing or production (e.g., flour that has become part of baked goods) but also goods whose identity is lost by commingling with other goods from which they cannot be distinguished (e.g., ball bearings).
Consequences of Becoming “Commingled Goods.”
3. Consequences of Becoming “Commingled Goods.” By definition, the identity of the original collateral cannot be determined once the original collateral becomes commingled goods. Consequently, the security interest in the specific original collateral alone is lost once the collateral becomes commingled goods, and no security interest in the original collateral can be created thereafter except as a part of the resulting product or mass. See subsection (b).
Priority of Perfected Security Interests That Attach Under This Section.
Once collateral becomes commingled goods, the secured party’s security interest is transferred from the original collateral to the product or mass. See subsection (c). If the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, the security interest in the product or mass is a perfected security interest. See subsection (d). This perfection continues until lapse. 4. Priority of Perfected Security Interests That Attach Under This Section. This section governs the priority of competing security interests in a product or mass only when both security interests arise under this section. In that case, if both security interests are perfected by operation of this section (see subsections (c) and (d)), then the security interests rank equally, in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods. See subsection (f)(2).
Example 1:
Example 1: SP-1 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s eggs, which have a value of $300 and secure a debt of $400, and SP-2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s flour, which has a value of $500 and secures a debt of $700. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes, which have a value of $1000. The two security interests rank equally and share in the ratio of 3:5. Applying this ratio to the entire value of the product, SP-1 would be entitled to $375 (i.e., 3/8 x $1000), and SP-2 would be entitled to $625 (i.e., 5/8 x $1000).
Example 2:
Example 2: Assume the facts of Example 1, except that SP-1’s collateral, worth $300, secures a debt of $200. Recall that, if the cake is worth $1000, then applying the ratio of 3:5 would entitle SP-1 to $375 and SP-2 to $625. However, SP-1 is not entitled to collect from the product more than it is owed. Accordingly, SP-1’s share would be only $200, SP-2 would receive the remaining value, up to the amount it is owed ($700).
Example 3:
Example 3: Assume that the cakes in the previous examples have a value of only $600. Again, the parties share in the ratio of 3:5. If, as in Example 1, SP-1 is owed $400, then SP-1 is entitled to $225 (i.e., 3/8 x $600), and SP-2 is entitled to $375 (i.e., 5/8 x $600). Debtor receives nothing. If, however, as in Example 2, SP-1 is owed only $200, then SP-2 receives $400.
The results in the foregoing examples remain the same, regardless of whether SP-1 or SP-2 (or each) has a purchase-money security interest.
Perfection: Unperfected Security Interests.
5. Perfection: Unperfected Security Interests. The rule explained in the preceding Comment applies only when both security interests in original collateral are perfected when the goods become commingled goods. If a security interest in original collateral is unperfected at the time the collateral becomes commingled goods, subsection (f)(1) applies.
Example 4:
Example 4: SP-1 has a perfected security interest in the debtor’s eggs, and SP-2 has an unperfected security interest in the debtor’s flour. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes. Under subsection (c), both security interests attach to the cakes. But since SP-1’s security interest was perfected at the time of commingling and SP-2’s was not, only SP-1’s security interest in the cakes is perfected. See subsection (d). Under subsection (f)(1) and Section 9-322(a)(2), SP-1’s perfected security interest has priority over SP-2’s unperfected security interest.
If both security interests are unperfected, the rule of Section 9-322(a)(3) would apply.
Multiple Security Interests.
6. Multiple Security Interests. On occasion, a single input may be encumbered by more than one security interest. In those cases, the multiple secured parties should be treated like a single secured party for purposes of determining their collective share under subsection (f)(2). The normal priority rules would determine how that share would be allocated between them. Consider the following example, which is a variation on Example 1 above:
Example 5:
Example 5: SP-1A has a perfected, first-priority security interest in Debtor’s eggs. SP-1B has a perfected, second-priority security interest in the same collateral. The eggs have a value of $300. Debtor owes $200 to SP-1A and $200 to SP-1B. SP-2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s flour, which has a value of $500 and secures a debt of $600. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes, which have a value of $1000. For purposes of subsection (f)(2), SP-1A and SP-1B should be treated like a single secured party. The collective security interest would rank equally with that of SP-2. Thus, the secured parties would share in the ratio of 3 (for SP-1A and SP-1B combined) to 5 (for SP-2). Applying this ratio to the entire value of the product, SP-1A and SP-1B in the aggregate would be entitled to $375 (i.e., 3/8 x $1000), and SP-2 would be entitled to $625 (i.e., 5/8 x $1000).
SP-1A and SP-1B would share the $375 in accordance with their priority, as established under other rules. Inasmuch as SP-1A has first priority, it would receive $200, and SP-1B would receive $175.
Priority of Security Interests That Attach Other Than by Operation of This Section.
7. Priority of Security Interests That Attach Other Than by Operation of This Section. Under subsection (e), the normal priority rules determine the priority of a security interest that attaches to the product or mass other than by operation of this section. For example, assume that SP-1 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s existing and after-acquired baked goods, and SP-2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s flour. When the flour is processed into cakes, subsections (c) and (d) provide that SP-2 acquires a perfected security interest in the cakes. If SP-1 filed against the baked goods before SP-2 filed against the flour, then SP-1 will enjoy priority in the cakes. See Section 9-322 (first-to-file-or-perfect). But if SP-2 filed against the flour before SP-1 filed against the baked goods, then SP-2 will enjoy priority in the cakes to the extent of its security interest.
§ 28-9-337. Priority of security interests in goods covered by certificate of title.
If, while a security interest in goods is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction, this state issues a certificate of title that does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or contain a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate:
- A buyer of the goods, other than a person in the business of selling goods of that kind, takes free of the security interest if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest; and
- The security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security interest in the goods that attaches, and is perfected under section 28-9-311(b)[, Idaho Code], after issuance of the certificate and without the conflicting secured party’s knowledge of the security interest.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-337, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in subsection (2) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. Derived from former Section 9-103(2)(d).
Protection for Buyers and Secured Parties.
2. Protection for Buyers and Secured Parties. This section affords protection to certain good-faith purchasers for value who are likely to have relied on a “clean” certificate of title, i.e., one that neither shows that the goods are subject to a particular security interest nor contains a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate. Under this section, a buyer can take free of, and the holder of a conflicting security interest can acquire priority over, a security interest that is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction. The fact that the security interest has been reperfected by possession under Section 9-313 does not of itself disqualify the holder of a conflicting security interest from protection under paragraph (2).
§ 28-9-338. Priority of security interest or agricultural lien perfected by filed financing statement providing certain incorrect information.
If a security interest or agricultural lien is perfected by a filed financing statement providing information described in section 28-9-516(b)(5)[, Idaho Code,] which is incorrect at the time the financing statement is filed:
- The security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to a conflicting perfected security interest in the collateral to the extent that the holder of the conflicting security interest gives value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information; and
- A purchaser, other than a secured party, of the collateral takes free of the security interest or agricultural lien to the extent that, in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments, or a security certificate, receives delivery of the collateral.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-338, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704; am. 2004, ch. 42, § 31, p. 77.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in the introductory paragraph was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Effect of Incorrect Information in Financing Statement.
2. Effect of Incorrect Information in Financing Statement. Section 9-520(a) requires the filing office to reject financing statements that do not contain information concerning the debtor as specified in Section 9-516(b)(5). An error in this information does not render the financing statement ineffective. On rare occasions, a subsequent purchaser of the collateral (i.e., a buyer or secured party) may rely on the misinformation to its detriment. This section subordinates a security interest or agricultural lien perfected by an effective, but flawed, financing statement to the rights of a buyer or holder of a perfected security interest to the extent that, in reasonable reliance on the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of tangible collateral, receives delivery of the collateral. A purchaser who has not made itself aware of the information in the filing office with respect to the debtor cannot act in “reasonable reliance” upon incorrect information.
Relationship to Section 9-507.
3. Relationship to Section 9-507. This section applies to financing statements that contain information that is incorrect at the time of filing and imposes a small risk of subordination on the filer. In contrast, Section 9-507 deals with financing statements containing information that is correct at the time of filing but which becomes incorrect later. Except as provided in Section 9-507 with respect to changes in the name that is sufficient as the name of the debtor under Section 9-503(a), an otherwise effective financing statement does not become ineffective if the information contained in it becomes inaccurate.
§ 28-9-339. Priority subject to subordination.
This article does not preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to priority.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-339, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Subordination by Agreement.
§ 28-9-340. Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set-off against deposit account.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, a bank with which a deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or set-off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, the application of this chapter to a security interest in a deposit account does not affect a right of recoupment or set-off of the secured party as to a deposit account maintained with the secured party.
- The exercise by a bank of a set-off against a deposit account is ineffective against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account which is perfected by control under section 28-9-104(a)(3)[, Idaho Code], if the set-off is based on a claim against the debtor.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-340, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in subsection (c) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. New; subsection (b) is based on a nonuniform Illinois amendment.
Set-off vs. Security Interest.
Subsection (a) states the general rule and provides that the bank may effectively exercise rights of recoupment and set-off against the secured party. Subsection (c) contains an exception: if the secured party has control under Section 9-104(a)(3) (i.e., if it has become the bank’s customer), then any set-off exercised by the bank against a debt owed by the debtor (as opposed to a debt owed to the bank by the secured party) is ineffective. The bank may, however, exercise its recoupment rights effectively. This result is consistent with the priority rule in Section 9-327(4), under which the security interest of a bank in a deposit account is subordinate to that of a secured party who has control under Section 9-104(a)(3).
This section deals with rights of set-off and recoupment that a bank may have under other law. It does not create a right of set-off or recoupment, nor is it intended to override any limitations or restrictions that other law imposes on the exercise of those rights.
Preservation of Set-Off Right.
3. Preservation of Set-Off Right. Subsection (b) makes clear that a bank may hold both a right of set-off against, and an Article 9 security interest in, the same deposit account. By holding a security interest in a deposit account, a bank does not impair any right of set-off it would otherwise enjoy. This subsection does not pertain to accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which are excluded from the definition of “deposit accounts.”
§ 28-9-341. Bank’s rights and duties with respect to deposit account.
Except as otherwise provided in section 28-9-340(c)[, Idaho Code], and unless the bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a bank’s rights and duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with the bank are not terminated, suspended or modified by:
- The creation, attachment or perfection of a security interest in the deposit account;
- The bank’s knowledge of the security interest; or
- The bank’s receipt of instructions from the secured party.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-341, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in the introductory paragraph was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
Free Flow of Funds.
2. Free Flow of Funds. This section is designed to prevent security interests in deposit accounts from impeding the free flow of funds through the payment system. Subject to two exceptions, it leaves the bank’s rights and duties with respect to the deposit account and the funds on deposit unaffected by the creation or perfection of a security interest or by the bank’s knowledge of the security interest. In addition, the section permits the bank to ignore the instructions of the secured party unless it had agreed to honor them or unless other law provides to the contrary. A secured party who wishes to deprive the debtor of access to funds on deposit or to appropriate those funds for itself needs to obtain the agreement of the bank, utilize the judicial process, or comply with procedures set forth in other law. Section 4-303(a), concerning the effect of notice on a bank’s right and duty to pay items, is not to the contrary. That section addresses only whether an otherwise effective notice comes too late; it does not determine whether a timely notice is otherwise effective.
Operation of Rule.
3. Operation of Rule. The general rule of this section is subject to Section 9-340(c), under which a bank’s right of set-off may not be exercised against a deposit account in the secured party’s name if the right is based on a claim against the debtor. This result reflects current law in many jurisdictions and does not appear to have unduly disrupted banking practices or the payments system. The more important function of this section, which is not impaired by Section 9-340, is the bank’s right to follow the debtor’s (customer’s) instructions (e.g., by honoring checks, permitting withdrawals, etc.) until such time as the depository institution is served with judicial process or receives instructions with respect to the funds on deposit from a secured party who has control over the deposit account. 4. Liability of Bank. This Article does not determine whether a bank that pays out funds from an encumbered deposit is liable to the holder of a security interest. Although the fact that a secured party has control over the deposit account and the manner by which control was achieved may be relevant to the imposition of liability, whatever rule applies generally when a bank pays out funds in which a third party has an interest would determine liability to a secured party. Often, this rule is found in a non-UCC adverse claim statute.
Certificates of Deposit.
5. Certificates of Deposit. This section does not address the obligations of banks that issue instruments evidencing deposits (e.g., certain certificates of deposit).
§ 28-9-342. Bank’s right to refuse to enter into or disclose existence of control agreement.
This chapter does not require a bank to enter into an agreement of the kind described in section 28-9-104(a)(2)[, Idaho Code], even if its customer so requests or directs. A bank that has entered into such an agreement is not required to confirm the existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do so by its customer.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-342, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in the first sentence was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
Effective Dates.
Section 31 of S.L. 2001, ch. 208 provided that the act should take effect on and after July 1, 2001.
Official Comment
Source.
1. Source. New; derived from Section 8-106(g).
Protection for Bank.
Part 4 Rights of Third Parties
§ 28-9-401. Alienability of debtor’s rights.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section and sections 28-9-406, 28-9-407, 28-9-408 and 28-9-409[, Idaho Code], whether a debtor’s rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is governed by law other than this chapter.
- An agreement between the debtor and secured party which prohibits a transfer of the debtor’s rights in collateral or makes the transfer a default does not prevent the transfer from taking effect.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-401, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-401, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-401, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 28, p. 781; am. 1986, ch. 338, § 2, p. 834, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertion in subsection (a) was added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.
CASE NOTES
Decisions Under Prior Law
Effect of Payment by Creditor.
Where creditor, in order to subject mortgaged property of his debtor to the payment of his claim, paid amount of mortgage to mortgagee, mortgage was discharged and creditor could not thereafter enforce the same. Baumgartner v. Vollmer, 5 Idaho 340, 49 P. 729 (1897).
Instruction to Jury.
Instruction that sheriff was not liable for damages for acts of keeper whose appointment was requested by plaintiff was harmless error. Applebaum v. Stanton, 47 Idaho 395, 276 P. 47 (1929).
Rents Not Impressed With Lien.
Where a creditor held notes of the lessor, and the lease had been filed as a chattel mortgage, he acquired no rights in and to rent money due under the lease by service of notice or attachment of the lease and filing the same of record or by serving a notice of garnishment on lessee. Gem State Lumber Co. v. Galion Irrigated Land Co., 55 Idaho 314, 41 P.2d 620 (1935).
Official Comment
Source.
Scope of This Part.
2. Scope of This Part. This Part deals with several issues affecting third parties (i.e., parties other than the debtor and the secured party). These issues are not addressed in Part 3, Subpart 3, which deals with priorities. This Part primarily addresses the rights and duties of account debtors and other persons obligated on collateral who are not, themselves, parties to a secured transaction.
Governing Law.
3. Governing Law. There was some uncertainty under former Article 9 as to which jurisdiction’s law (usually, which jurisdiction’s version of Article 9) applied to the matters that this Part addresses. Part 3, Subpart 1, does not determine the law governing these matters because they do not relate to perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, or priority. However, it might be inappropriate for a designation of applicable law by a debtor and secured party under Section 1-301 to control the law applicable to an independent transaction or relationship between the debtor and an account debtor.
Consider an example under Section 9-408.
Example 1:
Example 1: State X has adopted this Article; former Article 9 is the law of State Y. A general intangible (e.g., a franchise agreement) between a debtor-franchisee, D, and an account debtor-franchisor, AD, is governed by the law of State Y. D grants to SP a security interest in its rights under the franchise agreement. The franchise agreement contains a term prohibiting D’s assignment of its rights under the agreement. D and SP agree that their secured transaction is governed by the law of State X. Under State X’s Section 9-408, the restriction on D’s assignment is ineffective to prevent the creation, attachment, or perfection of SP’s security interest. State Y’s former Section 9-318(4), however, does not address restrictions on the creation of security interests in general intangibles other than general intangibles for money due or to become due. Accordingly, it does not address restrictions on the assignment to SP of D’s rights under the franchise agreement. The non-Article-9 law of State Y, which does address restrictions, provides that the prohibition on assignment is effective.
Inalienability Under Other Law.
This Article does not provide a specific answer to the question of which State’s law applies to the restriction on assignment in the example. However, assuming that under non-UCC choice-of-law principles the effectiveness of the restriction would be governed by the law of State Y, which governs the franchise agreement, the fact that State X’s Article 9 governs the secured transaction between SP and D would not override the otherwise applicable law governing the agreement. Of course, to the extent that jurisdictions eventually adopt identical versions of this Article and courts interpret it consistently, the inability to identify the applicable law in circumstances such as those in the example may be inconsequential. 4. Inalienability Under Other Law. Subsection (a) addresses the question whether property necessarily is transferable by virtue of its inclusion (i.e., its eligibility as collateral) within the scope of Article 9. It gives a negative answer, subject to the identified exceptions. The substance of subsection (a) was implicit under former Article 9.
Negative Pledge Covenant.
5. Negative Pledge Covenant. Subsection (b) is an exception to the general rule in subsection (a). It makes clear that in secured transactions under this Article the debtor has rights in collateral (whether legal title or equitable) which it can transfer and which its creditors can reach. It is best explained with an example.
Example 2:
Subsection (b) validates D’s creation of the subsequent (prohibited) security interest, which might even achieve priority over the earlier security interest. See Comment 7. However, unlike some other provisions of this Part, such as Section 9-406, subsection (b) does not provide that the agreement restricting assignment itself is “ineffective.” Consequently, the debtor’s breach may create a default.
Rights of Lien Creditors.
Sale of Receivables.
7. Sale of Receivables. If a debtor sells an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note outright, as against the buyer the debtor has no remaining rights to transfer. If, however, the buyer fails to perfect its interest, then solely insofar as the rights of certain third parties are concerned, the debtor is deemed to retain its rights and title. See Section 9-318. The debtor has the power to convey these rights to a subsequent purchaser. If the subsequent purchaser (buyer or secured lender) perfects its interest, it will achieve priority over the earlier, unperfected purchaser. See Section 9-322(a)(1).
§ 28-9-402. Secured party not obligated on contract of debtor or in tort.
The existence of a security interest, agricultural lien, or authority given to a debtor to dispose of or use collateral, without more, does not subject a secured party to liability in contract or tort for the debtor’s acts or omissions.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-402, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-402, which comprised 1967, ch. 161,§ 9-402, p. 351; am. 1979, ch. 299, § 29, p. 781; am. 1980, ch. 156, § 1, p. 326; am. 1986, ch. 338, § 4, p. 834; am. 1987, ch. 284, § 7, p. 596; am. 1989, ch. 239, § 1, p. 583; am. 1990, ch. 421, § 1, p. 1166; am. 1991, ch. 69, § 1, p. 165; am. 1996, ch. 307, § 1, p. 1006, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Official Comment
Source.
Nonliability of Secured Party.
§ 28-9-403. Agreement not to assert defenses against assignee.
- In this section, “value” has the meaning provided in section 28-3-303(1)[, Idaho Code].
-
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor not to assert against an assignee any claim or defense that the account debtor may have against the assignor is enforceable by an assignee that takes an assignment:
- For value;
- In good faith;
- Without notice of a claim of a property or possessory right to the property assigned; and
- Without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment of the type that may be asserted against a person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument under section 28-3-305(1)[, Idaho Code].
- Subsection (b) of this section does not apply to defenses of a type that may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under section 28-3-305(2)[, Idaho Code].
-
In a consumer transaction, if a record evidences the account debtor’s obligation, law other than this chapter requires that the record include a statement to the effect that the rights of an assignee are subject to claims or defenses that the account debtor could assert against the original obligee, and the record does not include such a statement:
- The record has the same effect as if the record included such a statement; and
- The account debtor may assert against an assignee those claims and defenses that would have been available if the record included such a statement.
- This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
- Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) of this section, this section does not displace law other than this chapter which gives effect to an agreement by an account debtor not to assert a claim or defense against an assignee.
History.
I.C.,§ 28-9-403, as added by 2001, ch. 208, § 2, p. 704.
STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws.
Former§ 28-9-403, which comprised I.C.,§ 28-9-403, as added by 1979, ch. 299, § 31, p. 781; am. 1980, ch. 156, § 2, p. 326; am. 1981, ch. 203, § 1, p. 364; am. 1986, ch. 338, § 5, p. 834; am. 1987, ch. 284, § 8, p. 596; am. 1990, ch. 205, § 2, p. 457; am. 1990, ch. 421, § 2, p. 1166; am. 1991, ch. 69, § 2, p. 165; am. 1991, ch. 70, § 1, p. 171; am. 1992, ch. 164, § 1, p. 525, was repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 208, § 1.
Compiler’s Notes.
The bracketed insertions in subsections (a) and (c) and paragraph (b)(4) were added by the compiler to conform to the statutory citation style.