Chapter 1. Evidence

In General

§ 13-1-1. Provisions of chapter applicable to all courts.

All provisions contained in this chapter, unless restricted by their nature or by express provision to particular courts, shall apply to and govern all courts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 1810; 1906, § 1987; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1647; 1930, § 1526; 1942, § 1687.

Cross References —

Relief under Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, see §99-39-1 et seq.

Applicability of the rules of evidence, see Miss. R. Evid. 101.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Waiver.

If suit is filed on either medical malpractice grounds or other grounds placing plaintiff’s condition in issue, scope of waiver of medical privilege is limited to medical information which is relevant to injury placed in issue by plaintiff. Scott by & Through Scott v. Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1996).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of court sitting as trier of fact to dismiss at close of plaintiff’s evidence, notwithstanding plaintiff has made out prima facie case. 55 A.L.R.3d 272.

Necessity, in criminal prosecution, of independent evidence of principal act to allow admission, under res gestae or excited utterance exception to hearsay rule, of statement made at time of, or subsequent to, principal act. 38 A.L.R.4th 1237.

Habit or routine practice evidence under Uniform Evidence Rule 406. 64 A.L.R.4th 567.

§ 13-1-3. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 190; 1871, § 756; 1880, § 1599; 1892, § 1738; 1906, § 1915; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1575; 1930, § 1527; 1942, § 1688]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-3 provided that a person was competent to give evidence in any suit even if he or she had an interest in the result thereof.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

McCormick, The Repealer: Conflicts in Evidence Created by Misapplication of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103. 67 Miss L J 547, Winter, 1997.

§ 13-1-5. Competency of husband and wife.

Husbands and wives may be introduced by each other as witnesses in all cases, civil or criminal, and shall be competent witnesses in their own behalf, as against each other, in all controversies between them. Either spouse is a competent witness and may be compelled to testify against the other in any criminal prosecution of either husband or wife for a criminal act against any child, for contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a child, or desertion or nonsupport of children under the age of sixteen (16) years, or abandonment of children. But in all other instances where either of them is a party litigant the other shall not be competent as a witness and shall not be required to answer interrogatories or to make discovery of any matters involved in any such other instances without the consent of both.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 193; 1871, §§ 759, 760; 1880, § 1601; 1892, § 1739; 1906, § 1916; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1576; 1930, § 1528; 1942, § 1689; Laws, 1928, ch. 35; Laws, 1954, ch. 236; Laws, 1978, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Cross References —

Husband-wife privilege, see §43-19-43.

Testimony by spouses in proceedings for protection from domestic abuse, see §93-21-19.

Husband-wife privilege, see Miss. R. Evid. 504.

General rule of competency, see Miss. R. Evid. 601.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application generally.

3. Competency of spouse as witness in general.

4. Witness for other spouse.

5. Witness against other spouse.

6. Controversies between spouses.

7. —Criminal prosecutions.

8. Communications between spouses.

9. Divorce, effect of.

10. Consent or waiver.

11. Failure of spouse to testify.

12. Evidence.

1. Validity.

Statutory provision that, where either husband or wife is party litigant, the other shall not be competent as a witness without consent of both, held not to deny due process by depriving opposing party of material evidence, since statute prescribes mere rule of evidence and does not affect substantial rights of parties. Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Stirling, 177 Miss. 325, 170 So. 692, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1936).

2. Construction and application generally.

In a divorce case, the chancellor did not err in allowing the husband’s previous wife to testify about the reason for her divorce, as it was relevant to the husband’s character and to child custody. She did not testify to any confidential communications under Miss. Code Ann. §13-1-5 or Miss. R. Evid. 504. McNeese v. McNeese, 119 So.3d 264, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 172 (Miss. 2013).

Law enforcement officers’ use of defendant’s wife as confidential informant did not violate statute concerning spousal competency or evidence rule concerning spousal privilege. Dowbak v. State, 666 So. 2d 1377, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1996).

Since the privilege protected by §13-1-5 extends only to communications which are intended to be confidential, the presence of another person, even a family member, is deemed to mean that the communication was not intended to be confidential. Fanning v. State, 497 So. 2d 70, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2645 (Miss. 1986).

This provision does not operate to exclude testimony of a third person as to declarations of the wife of the accused which are part of the res gestae. Eubanks v. State, 242 Miss. 372, 135 So. 2d 183, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 571 (Miss. 1961).

Statutory provisions that all persons, whether interested parties to suit, or not, make competent witnesses (Code 1942, § 1688), that either party to suit shall have right to force adversary to testify (Code 1942, § 1710), that examination of interested witnesses may be had in open court (Code 1942, § 1711), and the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1689], must be construed together, and so as to except this section from operation of other statutes. Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Stirling, 177 Miss. 325, 170 So. 692, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1936).

3. Competency of spouse as witness in general.

The prosecution cannot call the defendant’s wife to the stand to testify, thereby forcing the defendant to assert, before the jury, his right to have her testimony excluded. Simpson v. State, 497 So. 2d 424, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2724 (Miss. 1986).

Where judgment creditor obtained judgment plus interest and attorney fees against husband, and subsequently served writ of garnishment upon wife, wife could properly assert marital privilege under §13-1-5. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Center Management, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1406, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921 (S.D. Miss. 1984).

In a prosecution for murder or manslaughter, the deceased is in no sense a party to the suit, and the wife of deceased was competent to testify as to what occurred at the scene of the killing, and as to statements made by others, or statements made in the presence of others, bearing on the material issues in controversy. McBride v. State, 188 Miss. 620, 196 So. 633, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1940).

In suit against husband and wife and their grantee to set aside, as fraudulent, conveyance of homestead owned by wife and to enforce judgment against husband and wife, neither husband nor wife could be called as an adverse witness, though homestead was owned by wife, since husband had interest in homestead, and any material evidence that either would give would affect interest of both. Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Stirling, 177 Miss. 325, 170 So. 692, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1936).

4. Witness for other spouse.

Husband of beneficiary under will was competent attesting witness to will. Gore v. Dace, 157 Miss. 221, 127 So. 901, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 283 (Miss. 1930).

The widow is a competent witness on behalf of the estate of her deceased husband to prove a conversation between her husband in his lifetime and the opposing party. Stuhlmuller v. Ewing, 39 Miss. 447, 1860 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1860).

5. Witness against other spouse.

Because defense counsel failed to lodge an objection to the husband’s testimony against defendant at trial, defendant’s claim was barred from review. Sandlin v. State, 156 So.3d 813, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 538 (Miss. 2013).

In defendant’s trial for exploitation of children, defendant’s wife was not incompetent to testify against defendant because the privilege under Miss. R. Evid. 601(a)(2) and Miss. R. Evid. 504(d) did not apply, as defendant was being prosecuted for a criminal act against a child. Hood v. State, 17 So.3d 548, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2009).

Defendant’s marriage to his first wife ended in May 2002 when, upon the first wife’s petition, the Florida court declared that defendant died on August 13, 1998, in the Gulf of Mexico; as such, she was his ex-wife at the time of the trial and, therefore, competent to testify against him, and the information to which she testified was not privileged communication, so Miss. Code Ann. §13-1-5 did not apply to exclude her testimony. Butt v. State, 986 So. 2d 981, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 783 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Although testimony by third party as to substance of party’s conversation with criminal defendant’s spouse is prohibited, testimony as to fact that conversation with spouse took place is not. Davis v. State, 472 So. 2d 428, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2119 (Miss. 1985).

In a prosecution for child abuse, the trial court properly allowed defendant’s wife to testify against him, and to be cross-examined by the district attorney as an adverse witness, since §13-1-5 provides no spousal immunity in a prosecution for child abuse. Shelton v. State, 445 So. 2d 844, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1625 (Miss. 1984).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault by a wife against her husband, there was no error in compelling the husband to testify against his wife, even though this was against his wishes, where the husband was introduced as a witness by the State of Mississippi, not by his spouse, and the charge did not concern a criminal act against a child, notwithstanding §13-1-5. Stubbs v. State, 441 So. 2d 1386, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 3072 (Miss. 1983).

In a prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence the court improperly admitted statements made by defendant’s wife to an officer outside the defendant’s presence, where such testimony was hearsay and violated the confidential communication privilege between husband and wife. Bayse v. State, 420 So. 2d 1050, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2176 (Miss. 1982).

In a prosecution for murder, it was error to permit the state to cross-examine the defendant about the presence of his wife at the scene of the crime where the defense had successfully objected to the testimony of the wife when she had been called to the stand by the state. Owens v. State, 405 So. 2d 692, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2279 (Miss. 1981).

In the prosecution of the defendant for the murder of his wife’s father, the trial court properly permitted the wife to testify against the defendant where the nearly simultaneous assault upon the wife by her husband and his threat to kill her “next” on the occasion that he shot and killed her father was such a controversy between them as to make her a competent witness when she was willing to testify. Maiben v. State, 405 So. 2d 87, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2246 (Miss. 1981).

In a manslaughter prosecution based upon a death arising from child abuse, the child’s mother could not be compelled to testify against her husband. Tapp v. State, 347 So. 2d 974, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2062 (Miss. 1977).

A wife is a competent witness in the prosecution of her husband for crimes involving personal violence against their child. Merritt v. State, 339 So. 2d 1366, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1696 (Miss. 1976).

Peace officer’s testimony as to statements against accused husband’s interest made in his presence by accused’s wife was inadmissible, both as hearsay and as a violation of this section [Code 1942, § 1689]. Caldwell v. State, 194 So. 2d 878, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1419 (Miss. 1967).

In a criminal trial the defendant’s wife could not testify against him without the consent of both. Wallace v. State, 254 Miss. 944, 183 So. 2d 525, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1590 (Miss. 1966).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1689] a wife is a competent witness before the grand jury investigating a charge that her husband had incestuous relations with their minor daughter, and an indictment returned against the husband is not void. Graham v. State, 250 Miss. 816, 168 So. 2d 496, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 507 (Miss. 1964).

Where prosecutor erroneously called defendant’s estranged wife to the witness stand causing defendant to object in presence of the jury to her competency as witness against him, defendant was not entitled to reversal since he made no motion for a mistrial at time of trial. Blackwell v. State, 44 So. 2d 409, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1950).

In criminal prosecution against husband for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, it is improper for prosecution to call defendant’s wife and offer her as witness against him. Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 43 So. 2d 661, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 402 (Miss. 1949).

Wife is incompetent as witness against husband in prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor unless both she and her husband consent, and when case is close it is prejudicial error for prosecution to ask defendant and court to require answer as to whether defendant objected to wife’s testifying for state, particularly where statement of court impliedly left it entirely to the husband to consent or object. Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 43 So. 2d 661, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 402 (Miss. 1949).

Common-law husband is not competent witness against his common-law wife in criminal prosecution against her for forgery. Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37 So. 2d 19, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 1948).

Denial by court of motion for preliminary hearing on question of competency of state’s witness to testify in forgery prosecution against accused claiming to be common-law wife of witness is prejudicial error. Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37 So. 2d 19, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 1948).

Introduction in prosecution for bigamy of defendant’s first wife who was sworn but withdrawn before testifying, was harmless error, where guilt of accused was fully established by other evidence. Bryant v. State, 179 Miss. 739, 176 So. 590, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1937).

Husband not competent against wife suing third person. Spencer v. O'Bryant, 140 Miss. 474, 106 So. 6, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1925).

State may not introduce wife to prove former marriage in prosecution of husband for bigamy. McQueen v. State, 139 Miss. 457, 104 So. 168, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1925).

At common law one spouse could not be introduced to establish crime against other, except offenses committed by one against other. McQueen v. State, 139 Miss. 457, 104 So. 168, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1925).

Bill for discovery attempting to make husband and wife testify against one another, not maintainable. Strauss v. Hutson, 104 Miss. 637, 61 So. 594, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1913).

Wife not competent witness against accused prosecuted for burglary. Finklea v. State, 94 Miss. 777, 48 So. 1, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1909).

Witness before grand jury could not decline to identify woman returning stolen property because she was wife of the thief, on the theory that since she could not be compelled to testify against her husband, the witness could not be compelled to testify. Rogers v. State, 88 Miss. 38, 40 So. 744, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1906).

The wife is not a competent witness for a third person in a suit in chancery against the husband, who is joined as defendant, even though he be not a necessary party. Leach v. Shelby, 58 Miss. 681, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1881).

A wife is not a competent witness against her husband who is on trial for crime. Byrd v. State, 57 Miss. 243, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1879).

6. Controversies between spouses.

A husband’s assaults on his present wife, which formed the basis of a law suit by his former wife seeking custody of the parties’ minor child, constituted a “controversy” between the husband and his current wife under §13-5-1, and, thus, although the present wife could not be compelled to testify against her husband, she would, if willing, be competent to testify as to his acts of violence against her. McCuskey v. Jones, 441 So. 2d 1372, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 3062 (Miss. 1983).

7. —Criminal prosecutions.

Wife was incompetent as witness against husband to establish rape committed on her prior to marriage; wife is competent witness to acts of violence committed on her by husband only as to offenses during time marriage relation exists. Doss v. State, 156 Miss. 522, 126 So. 197, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 1930).

Prosecution of husband for vagrancy by wife is controversy between husband and wife. McRae v. State, 104 Miss. 861, 61 So. 977, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1913).

The wife is a competent witness against her husband if the crime be an assault and battery committed on her person. Turner v. State, 60 Miss. 351, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1882).

8. Communications between spouses.

Letter from wife to victim was privileged and should not have been admitted over wife’s objection, notwithstanding husband’s waiver of privilege, in prosecution of son for assault with intent to murder his father. Martin v. State, 203 Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1948).

Husband or wife cannot testify against other after divorce as to privileged communications. Hesdorffer v. Hiller, 111 Miss. 16, 71 So. 166, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1916).

Wife competent to relate conduct and declarations of husband in presence of others, but not to her alone. Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 85 (Miss. 1913).

9. Divorce, effect of.

In a prosecution for murder, a wife could testify against her husband regarding a statement made by him to her, in the presence of five other people where the parties had been divorced after the homicide but before the trial. Holden v. State, 399 So. 2d 1343, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2011 (Miss. 1981).

The husband or wife may testify against each other after divorce, if the testimony does not relate to privileged communications. Hesdorffer v. Hiller, 111 Miss. 16, 71 So. 166, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1916).

Divorced husband cannot testify against wife as to confidential communication between them. Hesdorffer v. Hiller, 111 Miss. 16, 71 So. 166, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1916).

10. Consent or waiver.

There is no merit to objection to testimony on ground of inter-spousal immunity where spouse testified voluntarily. Jordan v. State, 513 So. 2d 574, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2817 (Miss. 1987).

The competency of a wife to testify against her husband in a criminal prosecution may be waived, and either the husband or the wife may testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal, where both consent thereto. Brewer v. State, 233 So. 2d 779, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1669 (Miss. 1970).

In a workmen’s compensation proceeding wherein both alleged widows of employee claimed compensation, one of the claimants who did not object to testimony of a witness who was her undivorced husband in effect consented that such witness could testify and she could not thereafter be heard to say that her undivorced husband was not a competent witness under this section [Code 1942, § 1689]. United Timber & Lumber Co. v. Alleged Dependents of Hill, 226 Miss. 540, 84 So. 2d 921, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 432 (Miss. 1956).

Where defendant, in a prosecution for neglecting to provide for his children, attempted to explain why he was separated from wife and consented to wife stating her side of the matter, error if any in permitting wife to testify held not reversible. Clark v. State, 181 Miss. 455, 180 So. 602, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1938).

In larceny prosecution against husband for taking money belonging to the wife, permitting wife to testify was not reversible error, where objection to her competency was not made before reception of testimony. Huff v. State, 176 Miss. 443, 169 So. 839, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1936).

11. Failure of spouse to testify.

In a murder prosecution, the state is not entitled to an instruction regarding the defendant’s failure to call his wife to the stand. Simpson v. State, 497 So. 2d 424, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2724 (Miss. 1986).

At trial of murder charge to which defendant’s sole defense was self-defense, remarks by prosecutor, in closing argument, that the only reason defendant married his wife because he wanted to marry the only eyewitness to the murder he had committed, constituted an impermissible comment upon defendant’s failure to call his wife to testify, and the trial court’s refusal to sustain objections to such remarks was reversible error. Simpson v. State, 497 So. 2d 424, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2724 (Miss. 1986).

General rule that an unfavorable inference may be indulged against a party who fails to produce material and necessary testimony which is within his power to control did not apply in a case where the material witness in question was wife of the party, and remark made by appellee’s counsel during summation with reference to the failure of the appellant to call his wife to testify required reversal. Daniels v. Beeson, 312 So. 2d 441, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1643 (Miss. 1975).

Assignment of error that state was permitted to ask accused’s wife if she had testified at the preliminary trial and to make comment on such failure, without basis in record, will not be considered on appeal. Higgins v. State, 120 Miss. 823, 83 So. 245, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 134 (Miss. 1919).

Prosecuting attorney’s comment on failure of accused to call wife as witness, error. Smith v. State, 112 Miss. 802, 73 So. 793, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1916), overruled, Ladnier v. State, 155 Miss. 348, 124 So. 432, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1929).

Asking accused on cross-examination if wife would testify and if he would object to her testimony, improper but not reversible error. Carter v. State, 99 Miss. 435, 54 So. 734, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1911).

Error to refuse instruction to disregard comments of district attorney on failure of husband to call wife as witness. Johnson v. State, 94 Miss. 91, 47 So. 897, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1908).

The failure of the husband to call his wife as a witness for him in a criminal case is not a proper subject of comment by counsel. Johnson v. State, 63 Miss. 313, 1885 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1885); Cole v. State, 75 Miss. 142, 21 So. 706, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1897).

12. Evidence.

The court did not err when it admitted a pistol and jewelry into evidence, notwithstanding that those items were obtained by virtue of information obtained from the defendant’s wife; this section, insofar as it relates to a criminal prosecution, limits itself to the proper conduct of the trial itself and does not purport to regulate or restrict the conduct of police officers in an ongoing criminal investigation. Clunan v. State, 736 So. 2d 1078, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 75 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

Statement defendant’s wife made while in custody was inadmissible in light of explicit prohibition against spousal testimony. Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 15, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1996), overruled in part, Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 339 (Miss. 2008).

There was no violation of the statute concerning spousal competency, §13-1-5, or the evidence rule concerning the husband-wife privilege, Rule 504, Miss. R. Ev., where a defendant’s wife told the police where to locate certain items which were subsequently used as physical evidence in the prosecution of the defendant for capital murder committed during the commission of a robbery, since the location of the items did not fall within any protected class of communication, and no out-of-court statements or trial testimony of the wife was admitted against the defendant. Ladner v. State, 584 So. 2d 743, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1015, 112 S. Ct. 663, 116 L. Ed. 2d 754, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 7261 (U.S. 1991).

Although the intended victim of an attempted murder could testify that he was informed of the intended crime, it was reversible error to permit him to testify, over objection, to telephone conversations initiated by the defendant’s wife wherein she related to him the major details of the plot by her husband and others to take his life. Ford v. State, 218 So. 2d 731, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1616 (Miss. 1969).

Admission of statement made by defendant’s wife to witness in prosecution for murder that “he has killed Marvin and fixing to kill –,” was not prejudicial error where defendant admitted the killing. Harris v. State, 209 Miss. 141, 46 So. 2d 91, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1950).

Although wife’s letter to the prosecuting witness in a case of assault with intent to murder was privileged in the absence of a waiver by both husband and wife, the defendant could not set up its admission as error where its contents were not prejudicial to the defendant. Martin v. State, 203 Miss. 187, 33 So. 2d 825, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 1948).

No statement made by husband either as a witness or otherwise can be used against the wife in any litigation to which she is a party, unless the husband was acting as the authorized agent of the wife. Gunter v. Reeves, 198 Miss. 31, 21 So. 2d 468, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1945).

Rule that no statement made by husband can be used against the wife in a litigation to which she is a party is inapplicable so far as statement or admission is to explain the conduct of a third person. Gunter v. Reeves, 198 Miss. 31, 21 So. 2d 468, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1945).

Testimony of a third person in a murder prosecution as to statement made by defendant’s wife to the defendant was incompetent and prejudicial to the defendant, since the wife herself was incompetent to testify against her husband under this section [Code 1942, § 1689]. Smith v. State, 193 Miss. 474, 10 So. 2d 352, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1942).

Where wife testified against husband in larceny prosecution without objection, court’s denial of defendant’s motion made, at conclusion of State’s evidence, on ground that evidence was not sufficient to make out offense, held not reversible error, since court was not required to separate objectionable evidence from evidence which was free from objection. Huff v. State, 176 Miss. 443, 169 So. 839, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1936).

Evidence of charges made by wife against husband accusing him of crime not admissible as she could not testify that she made the accusation. Pearson v. State, 97 Miss. 841, 53 So. 689, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1910).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of one against whom testimony is offered to invoke privilege of communication between others. 2 A.L.R.2d 645.

Conversations between husband and wife relating to property or business as within rule excluding private communications between them. 4 A.L.R.2d 835.

“Communications” within testimonial privilege of confidential communications between husband and wife as including knowledge derived from observation by one spouse of acts of other spouse. 10 A.L.R.2d 1389.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution. 11 A.L.R.2d 646.

Calling or offering accused’s spouse as witness for prosecution as prejudicial. 76 A.L.R.2d 920.

Spouse as competent witness for or against co-offender with other spouse. 90 A.L.R.2d 648.

Criminal liability for contributing to delinquency of minor as affected by the fact that minor has not become a delinquent. 18 A.L.R.3d 824.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against third party as affected by fact that offense against spouse was involved in same transaction. 36 A.L.R.3d 820.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against child of both or either. 93 A.L.R.3d 1018.

Effect, on competency to testify against spouse or on martial communication privilege, of separation or other martial instability short of absolute divorce. 98 A.L.R.3d 1285.

Spouse’s betrayal or connivance as extending marital communications privilege to testimony of third person. 3 A.L.R.4th 1104.

Communication between unmarried couple living together as privileged. 4 A.L.R.4th 422.

Testimonial privilege for confidential communications between relatives other than husband and wife – state cases. 6 A.L.R.4th 544.

Existence of spousal privilege where marriage was entered into for purpose of barring testimony. 13 A.L.R.4th 1305.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor’s argument commenting on failure of defendant’s spouse to testify. 26 A.L.R.4th 9.

Presence of child at communication between husband and wife as destroying confidentiality of otherwise privileged communication between them. 39 A.L.R.4th 480.

Insured-insurer communications as privileged. 55 A.L.R.4th 336.

Communications between spouses as to joint participation in crime as within privilege of interspousal communications. 62 A.L.R.4th 1134.

Crimes against spouse within exception permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution – modern state cases. 74 A.L.R.4th 223.

Competency of one spouse to testify against other in prosecution for offense against third party as affected by fact that offense against spouse was involved in same transaction. 74 A.L.R.4th 277.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine spouse – modern cases. 79 A.L.R.4th 694.

Marital privilege under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence. 46 A.L.R. Fed. 735.

Situations in which federal courts are governed by state law of privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.48 A.L.R. Fed. 259.

Applicability, in civil action, of provisions of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1986, prohibiting interception of communications (18 USCS § 2511(1)), to interceptions by spouse, or spouse’s agent, of conversations of other spouse. 139 A.L.R. Fed. 517.

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Witnesses §§ 216, 236 et seq.

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 222 et seq.

Law Reviews.

McCormick, The Repealer: Conflicts in Evidence Created by Misapplication of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103. 67 Miss L J 547, Winter, 1997.

§§ 13-1-7. and 13-1-9. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-1-7. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 190; 1871, § 758; 1880, § 1602; 1892, § 1740; 1906, § 1917; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1577; 1930, § 1529; 1942, § 1690; Laws, 1896, p. 107]

§13-1-9. [Codes, 1880, § 1603; 1892, § 1741; 1906, § 1918; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1578; 1930, § 1530; 1942, § 1691; Laws, 1882, p. 109]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-7 concerned the competency of a claimant against the estate of a decedent or a person non compos mentis.

Former §13-1-9 related to competency of an accused.

§ 13-1-11. Conviction, except for perjury or subornation of perjury, as no disqualification.

A conviction of a person for any offense, except perjury or subornation of perjury, shall not disqualify such person as a witness, but such conviction may be given in evidence to impeach his credibility. A person convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury shall not afterwards be a competent witness in any case, although pardoned or punished for the same.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 64, art. 12, title 8 (18); 1857, ch. 61, art. 191; 1871, § 779; 1880, § 1600; 1892, § 1743; 1906, § 1920; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1580; 1930, § 1531; 1942, § 1692.

Cross References —

What constitutes perjury, see §97-9-59.

Commitment by court of party reasonably believed to have committed perjury before court, see §99-3-29.

Requisites of an indictment for perjury, see §99-7-39.

Requisites of an indictment for subornation of perjury, see §99-7-41.

Impeachment of witness by evidence of conviction of crime, see Miss. R. Evid. 609.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Criminal statute and rule of evidence rendering convicted perjurer incompetent to testify in criminal proceeding violated provision of state constitution entitling defendant to compulsory process, as evidentiary rule gave district attorney discretion as to whether to render particular witness incompetent by prosecuting him for perjury or preserve his competence by declining to prosecute known perjury. Fuselier v. State, 702 So. 2d 388, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 529 (Miss. 1997).

A state’s witness was not incompetent to testify at a capital murder trial on the basis that he was a conceded perjurer where he had not been convicted of perjury. White v. State, 532 So. 2d 1207, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 365 (Miss. 1988).

In ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, a trial judge must make a determination that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the record, and should articulate the reasons for his findings. As a framework for articulating the court’s determination on the record, the judge should consider the impeachment value of the crime, the point in time of the conviction and the witness’s subsequent history, the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. Johnson v. State, 525 So. 2d 809, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1988).

Under law preceding adoption of new Mississippi Rules of Evidence as of January 1, 1986, driving under influence of alcohol was misdemeanor of sufficient gravity that conviction thereof could be used to impeach witness. Wetz v. State, 503 So. 2d 803, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2362 (Miss. 1987).

Defendant charged with armed robbery is denied fair trial by introduction of detail surrounding prior conviction and evidence of other crimes not resulting in convictions; error may be raised on appeal notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at time of trial where development of inadmissible detail is lengthy and repetitious. Gallion v. State, 469 So. 2d 1247, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2096 (Miss. 1985).

In a prosecution for burglary and theft, the prosecutor was properly allowed to specify each crime that defendant had been convicted of prior to trial, since any felony may be used to impeach the testimony of a witness under §13-1-11. Johnson v. State, 452 So. 2d 850, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1764 (Miss. 1984), but see McCarty v. State, 554 So. 2d 909, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1989).

Under §13-1-11, defendant’s prior convictions were properly introduced to impeach him. Burns v. State, 438 So. 2d 1347, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2934 (Miss. 1983).

In a prosecution for the sale of marijuana, the trial court committed reversible error in limiting the impeachment of the state’s undercover informant to questions about the latter’s reputation for truth and veracity and excluding any cross-examination on the informant’s prior convictions. Valentine v. State, 396 So. 2d 15, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 1977 (Miss. 1981).

The trial court in an armed robbery prosecution erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to question an accomplice-prosecution witness concerning convictions of misdemeanors, since a witness’ credibility may be impeached by evidence of misdemeanors as well as infamous crimes; the trial court also erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to cross-examine another witness concerning the nature of the felonies of which he had previously been convicted. Sanders v. State, 352 So. 2d 822, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 1983 (Miss. 1977).

Although the defendant admitted on direct examination that he had been previously convicted of a crime this did not foreclose the prosecution from cross-examining him on this point. Wells v. State, 288 So. 2d 860, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1877 (Miss. 1974).

The jury in a robbery case may take into consideration admitted convictions of defendants testifying as witnesses of fighting, disorderly conduct, assault and battery, larceny, vagrancy, resisting arrest, and breaking jail. Parrish v. State, 237 Miss. 37, 112 So. 2d 548, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1959).

In a prosecution for the sale of intoxicating liquors, since defendant’s admission, upon cross-examination, that on the day prior to the date of the alleged offense he had been convicted of possessing liquor went to defendant’s credibility as a witness, and the loss or impairment of credibility affected both defendant’s character and reputation, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct that the jury was required to believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant made the particular sale of liquor, and that they were not warranted in convicting him for the sale merely because of his former conviction of possessing liquor and the probable attendant character and reputation arising therefrom. Hassell v. State, 229 Miss. 824, 92 So. 2d 194, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 330 (Miss. 1957).

At common law a person convicted of most felonies was disqualified as a witness, but the statute removes this disqualification and conviction now may be used to impeach his credibility and that is a question for the jury. Wetzel v. State, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188, 76 So. 2d 194, 76 So. 2d 846, 78 So. 2d 774, 84 So. 2d 429, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 607, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 608, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 601, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 602, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 396, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 1957).

Conviction of perjury, though creating a general disqualification to testify at common law and in Mississippi, goes only to the convict’s credit in the federal court, at least when the conviction was under the federal statute punishing perjury. Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2597 (5th Cir. Miss. 1945).

Evidence of conviction for offense except perjury and subornation of perjury is admissible to impeach the credibility of witness. Brister v. Dunaway, 149 Miss. 5, 115 So. 36, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 105 (Miss. 1927).

Accused testifying in his own behalf may be impeached on cross-examination by proof of prior convictions of crimes or misdemeanors. Williams v. State, 87 Miss. 373, 39 So. 1006, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 151 (Miss. 1905).

Under the statute a convicted principal may testify against his accessory. Keithler v. State, 18 Miss. 192, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1848).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Conviction in another jurisdiction as disqualifying witness. 2 A.L.R.2d 579.

Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in civil case by showing former conviction, of questions relating to nature and extent of punishment. 67 A.L.R.3d 761.

Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in criminal case by showing former conviction, of questions relating to nature and extent of punishment. 67 A.L.R.3d 775.

Use of unrelated misdemeanor conviction (other than for traffic offense) to impeach general credibility of witness in state civil case. 97 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Conviction by courts-martial as proper subject of cross-examination for impeachment purposes. 7 A.L.R.4th 468.

Propriety of jury instruction regarding credibility of witness who has been convicted of a crime. 9 A.L.R.4th 897.

Permissibility of impeaching credibility of witness by showing verdict of guilty without judgment of sentence thereon. 28 A.L.R.4th 647.

Materiality of testimony forming basis of perjury charge as question for court or jury in state trial. 37 A.L.R.4th 948.

Requirement that defendant in state court testify in order to preserve alleged trial error in rulings on admissibility of prior conviction impeachment evidence under Uniform Rule of Evidence 609, or similar provision or holding – post-Luce cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 1028.

Propriety of using prior conviction for drug dealing to impeach witness in criminal trial. 37 A.L.R.5th 319.

Review on appeal, where accused does not testify, of trial court’s preliminary ruling that evidence of prior convictions will be admissible under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence if accused does testify. 54 A.L.R. Fed. 694.

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Witnesses §§ 187, 189.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Character and Reputation, Proof No. 1 (general reputation in community or in place of employment, business, or profession).

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Conviction of Crime, Proof No. 1 (cross-examination concerning previous conviction).

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Conviction of Crime, Proof No. 2 (introduction of record after denial of previous conviction).

36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 747, Impeachment of Witness by Prior Criminal Conviction.

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 190-192.

Law Reviews.

McCormick, The Repealer: Conflicts in Evidence Created by Misapplication of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103. 67 Miss. L. J. 547, Winter, 1997.

§ 13-1-13. Witness may be examined touching interest or convictions.

Any witness may be examined touching his interest in the cause or his conviction of any crime, and his answers may be contradicted, and his interest or his conviction of a crime established by other evidence. A witness shall not be excused from answering any material and relevant question, unless the answer would expose him to criminal prosecution or penalty.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 208; 1871, § 778; 1880, § 1607; 1892, § 1746; 1906, § 1923; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1583; 1930, § 1532; 1942, § 1693.

Cross References —

Relevancy of evidence generally, see Miss. R. Evid. 401-412.

Admissibility of evidence of religious beliefs or opinions of witness with respect to issue of credibility, see Miss. R. Evid. 610.

Taking testimony, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 43.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Examination and cross-examination in general.

2. Interest in cause.

3. Conviction of crime.

4. Contradiction and impeachment of witness.

5. Evidence.

6. Instructions.

7. Punishment for contempt.

8. Judgment.

1. Examination and cross-examination in general.

A trial court did not err in refusing to permit cross-examination of a witness concerning her use of marijuana and involvement in a robbery since specific instances of conduct may be used to attack the credibility of a witness on cross-examination only if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, and neither robbery nor marijuana use were probative of the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Johnston v. State, 618 So. 2d 90, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 181 (Miss. 1993).

At a hearing on a former wife’s petition to hold her former husband in contempt for failure to pay child support, the wife could not invoke her right against self-incrimination to shield herself from questions on cross-examination as to whether she maintained that the husband had an account at a particular bank, where the wife had voluntarily taken the stand on direct examination and unequivocally identified the signature on the bank account as the husband’s. A party may not testify as to material facts in proceedings which he or she initiated, and later invoke the privilege against self-incrimination on those same matters. Thus, when the wife voluntarily took the stand and testified to material matters on direct examination, she also waived her right against self-incrimination. Wallace v. Jones, 572 So. 2d 371, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 565 (Miss. 1990).

Although a judge has wide discretionary control over the extent of cross-examination, the arbitrary curtailment upon a proper subject of cross-examination may be grounds for reversal. Thus, denial of a defendant’s right to a broad and extensive cross-examination of a prosecution witness substantially affected the defendant’s rights where the prosecution’s evidence was largely circumstantial, with the exception of that witness. Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1989).

A defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine a prosecution witness as to an alleged affair between the defendant and the witness’ wife, even though the affair took place approximately 2 to 5 years prior to the trial; it was still likely that the witness could or would have a grudge against the defendant, and this question should have been determined by the jury. Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1989).

Bias of mother, who had not testified at trial, was not allowed to be established, although bias, motive, or interest are always material and may be proven by extrinsic evidence, because fact that mother, standing alone, had extreme bias and motive to lie was too remote to impeach credibility of children. Cantrell v. State, 507 So. 2d 325, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2478 (Miss. 1987).

When witness voluntarily took the stand in a perjury trial and testified on behalf of the defendant therein as to the truthfulness of witness’ brother’s statements concerning a murder, to which witness had pled guilty and had been sentenced, witness waived his Fifth Amendment right and was subject to cross-examination on all relevant and material matters. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

Requiring witness, who had already pled guilty to the murder, to answer questions concerning that murder did not expose witness to prosecution for the murder and did not infringe upon his Fifth Amendment rights, where the witness’ petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, petition to withdraw his guilty plea, came months after the term of court expired wherein he had pled and sentence had been entered. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

In prosecution for false pretenses by delivery of a bad check, it was not error for the state to cross-examine a witness who had once been married to defendant and to whom defendant had been furnishing child support. Parker v. State, 484 So. 2d 1033, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2756 (Miss. 1986).

Code 1942 § 2120 [Code 1972 §13-1-13] does not permit the cross examination of an official charged with embezzlement as to censures by a grand jury. Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Western Waterproofing Co., 233 So. 2d 829, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1687 (Miss. 1970).

Where the accused had taken the stand as a witness in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a slot machine, he could not complain of being asked whether he had ever sold intoxicating liquor at his place of business wherein the slot machine was found. Brady v. State, 229 Miss. 677, 91 So. 2d 751, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1957).

Where the accused took the stand in prosecution for assault and battery and testified as a witness he necessarily placed his veracity at issue and this justified the state in attacking this veracity. Ables v. State, 223 Miss. 770, 79 So. 2d 241, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 437 (Miss. 1955).

It is only by virtue of this section [Code 1942, § 1693] that defendant’s conviction of former offenses could be inquired into on his cross-examination, and the statute must be strictly construed in favor of defendant. Berry v. State, 212 Miss. 164, 54 So. 2d 222, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1951).

No witness is exempt from right of fair cross-examination. Mississippi Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pearce, 161 Miss. 252, 134 So. 164, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1931).

2. Interest in cause.

Letters written by defendant to relatives and page from manuscript of book about defendant’s life, which expressed defendant’s hostile views toward blacks and civil rights leaders and proclaimed his involvement in the Ku Klux Klan, were relevant to establish defendant’s motive for killing black leader of civil rights organization, and more probative on such issue than prejudicial, especially as there was no evidence that defendant had ever met victim. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Testimony of federal agency informant who infiltrated Ku Klux Klan that defendant, a Klan member, discussed “selective killings” as a “partial solution to the right wing’s problem,” and then said that “he would never ask anyone to do anything that he hadn’t already done himself,” was relevant to show that defendant had violent tendencies towards his perceived political and social enemies, and therefore, testimony was admissible in prosecution for murder of black leader of civil rights organization. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Impeachment of former police officer through use of officer’s grand jury testimony was not error in murder prosecution; grand jury testimony was transcribed from tape recording, the transcript was provided to the defense, and the tape recording was offered to the defense. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Trial court improperly limited defendant’s right to testify and to cross-examine and impeach certain witnesses; trial court did not allow defendant to cross-examine co-indictee concerning his interest and bias in case by showing threats co-indictee made against defendant’s other witnesses; defendant also was prevented from questioning co-indictee regarding possible promises of leniency from prosecution in return for his testimony against defendant; trial court also improperly denied defendant opportunity to present witness to impeach co-indictee’s denial of threats against potential witnesses for defendant, on basis that proper predicate had not been laid for impeachment, where co-indictee had been asked if he threatened witness and he denied it; moreover, trial court sustained objections during co-indictee’s questioning which for all practical purposes prevented laying of full and proper predicate. Hill v. State, 512 So. 2d 883, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2782 (Miss. 1987).

Counsel is not precluded from seeking in good faith on cross-examination to elicit interest, bias, or prejudice of witness because his answer may reveal that liability insurance company is interested. Mississippi Ice & Utilities Co. v. Pearce, 161 Miss. 252, 134 So. 164, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1931).

3. Conviction of crime.

In a prosecution for sexual battery, the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion in limine to preclude admission, for impeachment use pursuant to Rule 609, Miss. R. Ev., of his prior conviction of touching a child for lustful purposes, even though a social worker testified that a general characteristic of pedophiles is an inability to be truthful, since admission of the prior conviction would have been manifestly prejudicial and mere reference to the conviction during the trial would have prejudiced the jury irreparably. Hopkins v. State, 639 So. 2d 1247, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 486 (Miss. 1993).

A prior arson conviction might be admissible for impeachment purposes as a crime involving dishonesty or false statement in situations, for example, where the defendant burned a building as part of a scheme to defraud an insurance company. However, where an arson conviction was admitted for impeachment purposes and the prosecution failed to offer prima facie evidence that the arson involved fraud, dishonesty, false statement or other elements suggesting a propensity for lying, the case would be reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues. McInnis v. State, 527 So. 2d 84, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1988), overruled in part, White v. State, 785 So. 2d 1059, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 2001).

The decision whether to give an advance ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes is discretionary with the trial judge. McInnis v. State, 527 So. 2d 84, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1988), overruled in part, White v. State, 785 So. 2d 1059, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 2001).

In ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, a trial judge must make a determination that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the record, and should articulate the reasons for his findings. As a framework for articulating the court’s determination on the record, the judge should consider the impeachment value of the crime, the point in time of the conviction and the witness’s subsequent history, the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. Johnson v. State, 525 So. 2d 809, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 1988).

Prosecutor’s question concerning prior conviction, asking whether that crime had involved breaking “in on a little 12-year old girl,” was improper because, while accused who has taken stand on his own behalf may be questioned regarding previous convictions, defendant may not be asked to divulge any details of convictions including whether or not he served time for conviction; asking of question did not constitute reversible error, because upon defense objection, jury was instructed to ignore question and this admonition came before defendant could answer. Williams v. State, 512 So. 2d 666, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2645 (Miss. 1987).

Police officer who arrests suspect may testify as subsequent trial that arrest was made pursuant to outstanding arrest warrant, where no mention is made of charges upon which warrant is based. Brown v. State, 483 So. 2d 328, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2372 (Miss. 1986).

Criminal defendant is entitled to cross-examine witnesses upon whom state relies heavily regarding pending criminal charges against witnesses, notwithstanding lack of evidence of bargain between state and witnesses. Hall v. State, 476 So. 2d 26, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2253 (Miss. 1985).

Defendant charged with armed robbery is denied fair trial by introduction of detail surrounding prior conviction and evidence of other crimes not resulting in convictions; error may be raised on appeal notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at time of trial where development of inadmissible detail is lengthy and repetitious. Gallion v. State, 469 So. 2d 1247, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2096 (Miss. 1985).

Prosecutor may not impeach witness by showing that witness’ relatives or acquaintances have prior convictions. Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1985).

In a prosecution for burglary, defendant was not entitled to a mistrial based on the prosecution’s failure to prove, by extrinsic evidence the prior convictions of a witness that the prosecution had attempted to introduce to impeach the witness, where the witness either denied or claimed not to remember a number of the incidents referred to, the witness was questioned about 12 specific prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes, the prosecution recited dates and crimes, no objection to the method of impeachment was made by the defendant, and where defendant’s attorney questioned the witness and then rested. Cummings v. State, 465 So. 2d 993, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1847 (Miss. 1985).

When prosecution questions, for impeachment purposes, defense witness about specific prior criminal convictions, reciting dates and crimes, and no objection to method of impeachment is made, defendant may not obtain mistrial on basis of assertion that state has failed to prove prior convictions by extrinsic evidence. Cummings v. State, 465 So. 2d 993, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1847 (Miss. 1985).

Limitation in §99-19-101 on use in sentencing phase of capital case of prior convictions for purpose of establishing aggravating circumstances in no way alters established rule of evidence (§13-1-13) under which defendant who testifies may have credibility impeached by prior convictions, whether misdemeanors or felonies. Mhoon v. State, 464 So. 2d 77, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1904 (Miss. 1985), limited, Dotson v. Mississippi (Miss. Ct. App. 1996).

Where a witness does not deny a previous conviction but states that he cannot recall the conviction, evidence of the prior conviction may be introduced under §13-1-13. Lovelace v. State, 410 So. 2d 876, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 1875 (Miss. 1982).

Where the defendant took the stand in his own defense, the district attorney had a right to cross-examine him as to his previous criminal convictions. Thornton v. State, 313 So. 2d 16, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1662 (Miss. 1975).

Evidence of a previous conviction, based on a plea of nolo contendere, is not admissible in another case. Dependents of Veasley v. Attala Co., 312 So. 2d 7, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1634 (Miss. 1975).

Trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense counsel to ask a prosecution witness if he had ever been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor, and such error was not harmless as the credibility of the witness was the real issue for the jury to determine in the case. Baker v. State, 307 So. 2d 545, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1819 (Miss. 1975), but see Bevill v. State, 556 So. 2d 699, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 27 (Miss. 1990).

Although the defendant admitted on direct examination that he had been previously convicted of a crime this did not foreclose the prosecution from cross-examining him on this point. Wells v. State, 288 So. 2d 860, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1877 (Miss. 1974).

It is proper to impeach a witness by showing previous conviction of crimes. Clanton v. State, 279 So. 2d 599, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1470 (Miss. 1973).

Nothing less than a final judgment, conclusively establishing guilt, will satisfy the meaning of the word “conviction” as used in Code 1942, § 1693. Murphree v. Hudnall, 278 So. 2d 427, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1441 (Miss. 1973).

Examination of defendant as to other crimes must be limited to convictions and even then the details of the crime cannot be inquired into. Allison v. State, 274 So. 2d 678, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1609 (Miss. 1973).

Even if defendant’s reputation for peace and violence was properly put in issue when defense counsel in effect inquired into the reputation of the defendant, nevertheless the district attorney went too far a field in attempting to contradict the testimony as to the good reputation of the defendant for peace and violence and to bring out details of crimes for which defendant had not even been indicted, such as 4 other assaults, an incident in which defendant allegedly killed a man, and an incident in which he also killed a baby with a stray shot. Allison v. State, 274 So. 2d 678, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1609 (Miss. 1973).

In view of the provision in Code 1942, § 8280 to the effect that a person convicted of a traffic offense cannot have his credibility impeached for convictions of such offenses as speeding, driving without proper driver’s license and the like, a person convicted of such offenses cannot be examined with respect thereto under earlier § 1693. Jones v. State, 268 So. 2d 348, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1198 (Miss. 1972).

The right to cross-examine a defendant with reference to his former convictions in order to impeach or discredit his testimony is limited to the fact that the defendant was convicted and does not include the right to go into the details of the former crime, nor into the punishment given as a result of the conviction. Murray v. State, 266 So. 2d 139, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1388 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 907, 93 S. Ct. 1534, 36 L. Ed. 2d 196, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2937 (U.S. 1973).

Where, after the defendant had admitted one previous conviction, and the prosecutor had inferred that the defendant had been absent without official leave and had been convicted of crimes in three different states, the prosecutor responded to the defense statement that if the prosecution had any evidence of other convictions they should produce it in the proper manner, replied before the jury, “I will be glad to produce it,” without thereafter producing a scintilla of evidence of other convictions, prejudicial error was committed. Johns v. State, 255 So. 2d 322, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1287 (Miss. 1971).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1693] the state may show that the defendant had been convicted of criminal offenses for the purpose of discrediting him as a witness, provided that the details of the same are not given. Benedetti v. State, 249 So. 2d 671, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1179 (Miss. 1971).

In a prosecution of a justice of the peace for embezzlement, the district attorney’s cross-examination of the defendant as to the number of times he had been criticized by the grand jury constituted reversible error, since, while the section [Code 1942, § 1693] permits a cross-examination of a defendant as to convictions, it never permits cross-examination as to indictments and certainly not as to censures by the grand jury, which are hearsay in nature and can only be enlisted for the purpose of degrading and prejudicing the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Interior Contractors, Inc. v. Western Waterproofing Co., 233 So. 2d 829, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1687 (Miss. 1970).

While the district attorney is not permitted to question a defendant about details of prior convictions, where a defendant in response to a question as to prior convictions, testified that he had been convicted of traffic violations and burglary, and that he had been sentenced to the penitentiary and had been released on parole, the district attorney was authorized, by this section [Code 1942, § 1693], to cross-examine the defendant about former offenses not mentioned on direct testimony, which questioning did not extend to details of convictions. Mangrum v. State, 232 So. 2d 703, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1634 (Miss. 1970).

Exclusion of certificates of conviction of adverse witnesses is not error where they admit having been convicted. Matthews v. State, 243 Miss. 568, 139 So. 2d 386, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1962).

A witness may be questioned only as to conviction, and not as to whether he has been indicted. Statham v. Blaine, 234 Miss. 649, 107 So. 2d 93, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1959).

Where the accused took the stand as a witness in a prosecution for second degree arson, he thereby subjected himself to cross-examination, and made competent his own testimony, or any other admissible evidence, tending to establish his former conviction of crimes. Dorroh v. State, 229 Miss. 315, 90 So. 2d 653, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 611 (Miss. 1956).

Questions to accused concerning his prior convictions were proper under this section [Code 1942, § 1693]. Jones v. State, 228 Miss. 458, 88 So. 2d 91, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 534 (Miss. 1956).

Error of the lower court in permitting the district attorney in prosecution for murder, over objection, to cross-examine the accused in regard to convictions while in the military service and in regard to the type of discharge he received from the military service, was harmless inasmuch as the accused freely and voluntarily confessed to a state of facts making out a clear case of murder and no question was raised in the record as to the confession not being entirely free and voluntary. McNair v. Mississippi, 223 Miss. 83, 77 So. 2d 306, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1955).

In an action by a passenger against an owner of a taxicab for personal injuries, questions as to indictments pending against the passenger would have been improper. Garraga v. Yellow Cab Co., 222 Miss. 739, 77 So. 2d 276, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 658 (Miss. 1955).

In an action by a passenger against owner of a taxicab for injuries sustained where passenger fell out of a moving cab, it was proper cross-examination to ask passenger of convictions for violations of internal revenue laws. Garraga v. Yellow Cab Co., 222 Miss. 739, 77 So. 2d 276, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 658 (Miss. 1955).

At common law a person convicted of most felonies was disqualified as a witness, but the statute removes this disqualification and conviction now may be used to impeach his credibility. Wetzel v. State, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188, 76 So. 2d 194, 76 So. 2d 846, 78 So. 2d 774, 84 So. 2d 429, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 607, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 608, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 601, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 602, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 396, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 1957).

In prosecution for murder where the defendant made no objection to prosecutor’s cross-examination of five defense witnesses concerning prior conviction, except as to one question asked the defendant, and that objection was properly sustained and where appellant made no motion for a mistrial, even if there was an error in cross-examination the accused failed to preserve that point on appeal. Wetzel v. State, 225 Miss. 450, 76 So. 2d 188, 76 So. 2d 194, 76 So. 2d 846, 78 So. 2d 774, 84 So. 2d 429, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 607, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 608, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 601, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 602, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 396, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 1957).

Examination of a witness touching his conviction of a crime may extend to misdemeanors as well as to infamous crimes and the record of conviction of a misdemeanor is admissible to impeach the veracity of a witness. Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 1954).

In a prosecution for unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, where the accused denied that he was ever convicted of a crime, it was an error to allow admission in evidence of a justice of peace court docket which showed only that the accused was charged with a crime. Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 1954).

This section [Code 1942, § 1693] permits a witness to be examined only concerning his conviction of a crime and not concerning its details. Smith v. State, 217 Miss. 123, 63 So. 2d 557, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 416 (Miss. 1953).

In prosecution for assault and battery with intent to kill, defendant’s prior conviction of drunkenness was competent evidence against him when both sides, without objection, entered upon proof of fact whether he was drunk or drinking on night of crime, and defendant took stand as witness, as his prior conviction of crime was competent as bearing upon weight of his testimony and his credibility as witness. Phillips v. State, 43 So. 2d 208 (Miss. 1949).

It is competent for state to question defendant in criminal prosecution in regard to previous convictions of crime when accused has taken witness stand in his own behalf. Scarbrough v. State, 204 Miss. 487, 37 So. 2d 748, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1948).

In criminal prosecution, it is not competent for state, in presenting its case in chief, to prove that defendant has been convicted or is guilty of other crimes wholly disconnected with, and having no direct bearing on, case under investigation. Scarbrough v. State, 204 Miss. 487, 37 So. 2d 748, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1948).

Where the defendant on trial for burglary, in answer to a question on direct examination, stated that he had previously been convicted of wilful trespass, it was prejudicial error for the prosecuting attorney to make further inquiries for the purpose of showing that the conviction had followed withdrawal of a plea of guilty to a greater offense, wholly disconnected with the charge on which defendant was being tried. White v. State, 201 Miss. 556, 29 So. 2d 650, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 1947).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1693], if the defendant, in a murder prosecution, offers himself as a witness, then proof of the fact that he has been previously convicted of a crime, but not the extent of the punishment imposed, would be competent to affect his credibility as a witness. Hartfield v. State, 186 Miss. 75, 189 So. 530, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1939).

Admission, on cross-examination, by party jointly indicted with defendant that, in addition to crime for which he and defendant were being tried, there were indictments pending against him for other offenses, held reversible error where he had not been convicted of those offenses. Graham v. State, 179 So. 340 (Miss. 1938).

Where defendant on cross-examination admitted previous conviction of grand larceny, fact that jurors were informed by further cross-examination that defendant had served penitentiary term held not to warrant reversal. Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 532, 142 So. 475, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1932).

Statute authorizing examination of witness regarding conviction does not permit details of crime to be shown. Walker v. State, 151 Miss. 862, 119 So. 796, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1929).

Witness may be cross-examined as to any and all convictions of crime affecting credibility. Brown v. State, 96 Miss. 534, 51 So. 273, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1910).

Proper to ask one accused of assault with intent to murder if he had been convicted of crime, but not, if he had been confined in penitentiary for cutting white man’s throat. Dodds v. State, 45 So. 863 (Miss. 1908).

Error to ask witness if he had ever been charged with committing an offense; statute allows only question as to conviction. Starling v. State, 89 Miss. 328, 42 So. 798, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1906); McClelland v. State, 98 Miss. 735, 54 So. 251, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1910).

The examination of witnesses may extend to misdemeanors as well as to infamous crimes. Lewis v. State, 85 Miss. 35, 37 So. 497, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1904).

4. Contradiction and impeachment of witness.

Defendant was properly precluded from giving impeachment testimony about taped conversations in which state witness allegedly said that district attorney’s office was threatening to revoke probation if he did not testify, where defendant did not tell counsel about conversations until after witness had been excused, thus preventing the laying of proper predicate for impeachment testimony, where defendant made no objection to release of witness, and where defense counsel did not reveal existence of tape pursuant to discovery requirements when trial commenced the next day, but waited until defendant’s testimony to try to elicit that information. (Per Smith, Justice, with three Justices concurring). Harris v. State, 704 So. 2d 1286, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 827, 118 S. Ct. 90, 139 L. Ed. 2d 47, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4857 (U.S. 1997).

A trial judge properly excluded evidence of a state witness’ refusal to talk to defense counsel prior to trial as irrelevant. The witness’ refusal to talk to the attorney was not indicative of a lack of veracity and was not relevant to credibility. Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 472 (Miss. 1989).

The manufacture, possession or transportation of untaxed liquor is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2), Miss. R. Ev., which permits impeachment of a witness’ testimony by evidence of conviction of such a crime. Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1988).

Trial court improperly limited defendant’s right to testify and to cross-examine and impeach certain witnesses; trial court did not allow defendant to cross-examine co-indictee concerning his interest and bias in case by showing threats co-indictee made against defendant’s other witnesses; defendant also was prevented from questioning co-indictee regarding possible promises of leniency from prosecution in return for his testimony against defendant; trial court also improperly denied defendant opportunity to present witness to impeach co-indictee’s denial of threats against potential witnesses for defendant, on basis that proper predicate had not been laid for impeachment, where co-indictee had been asked if he threatened witness and he denied it; moreover, trial court sustained objections during co-indictee’s questioning which for all practical purposes prevented laying of full and proper predicate. Hill v. State, 512 So. 2d 883, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2782 (Miss. 1987).

Where defendant did not testify at the guilt stage of his murder trial, evidence that defendant was on parole was not admissible for the purpose of impeaching his testimony under this section. Gray v. State, 351 So. 2d 1342, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 1951 (Miss. 1977).

Plea of guilty being tantamount to a conviction for purposes of this statute, the credibility as a witness of defendant in a burglary prosecution could properly be impeached by evidence of his prior plea of guilty in an out of state prosecution for forgery, even though sentence had not been imposed and final judgment had not been entered on that plea. Bridges v. State, 336 So. 2d 1309, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1554 (Miss. 1976).

In seeking to impeach a prosecution witness, defense counsel could not question the witness as to mere charges of the commission of offenses, especially where such charges were pending and the witness’s testimony might incriminate him. Further, the witness could not be asked nor proof made of the details of an alleged crime said to have been committed by the witness sought to be impeached. Haralson v. State, 314 So. 2d 722, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1682 (Miss. 1975).

If a defendant denies a former conviction he may be contradicted by the record of such conviction and such evidence goes only to the credibility of the witness. Berry v. State, 212 Miss. 164, 54 So. 2d 222, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1951).

Where witness is sought to be impeached on ground of conviction, details of crime are not admissible, and he cannot be examined as to such details; only fact of conviction is admissible; in seeking to impeach credibility of accused it was error to ask if he had not been convicted of beating wife and child and to contradict denial. Powers v. State, 156 Miss. 316, 126 So. 12, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1930).

Permitting state in murder prosecution to cross-examine husband of deceased as to statements relative to getting divorce and to contradict such testimony in rebuttal held proper. Hardy v. State, 143 Miss. 352, 108 So. 727, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1926).

Person jointly indicted with accused, not on trial but testifying for accused, may be impeached by contradictory statement made by him as to commission of offense. Pickett v. State, 139 Miss. 529, 104 So. 358, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1925).

5. Evidence.

Defendant could present evidence that police officers were biased and prejudiced against him during his direct testimony in armed robbery prosecution, and was not required to show bias during cross-examination of the officers. McLemore v. State, 669 So. 2d 19, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1996).

Before evidence may be received under the other bad acts exception to the primary relevancy rule, the proponent must articulate precisely the evidential hypothesis by which the consequential act may be inferred from the proffered evidence. Houston v. State, 531 So. 2d 598, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 426 (Miss. 1988).

The certified abstract of a court record showing a defendant’s prior conviction was competent evidence of such conviction and was not rendered incompetent by the fact that the abstract included the punishment inflicted for the prior offense. Lovelace v. State, 410 So. 2d 876, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 1875 (Miss. 1982).

In a robbery prosecution against a daughter, who had testified that she had grabbed her mother’s metal box containing money and a pistol and fled to prevent the mother from obtaining the pistol, evidence that on several occasions the mother had shot at members of the accused’s family should have been permitted to go to the jury as tending to show the bias and prejudice of the mother, who was a prosecuting witness, even though it was not part of the res gestae. Hardin v. State, 232 Miss. 470, 99 So. 2d 600, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1958).

Cross examination by district attorney in robbery prosecution of defendant’s witness as to number of times sheriff raided his place and concerning his sales of whisky was incompetent but not reversible error. Ivey v. State, 206 Miss. 734, 40 So. 2d 609, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1949).

Conviction of crime admissible to impeach veracity of witness only after he has denied conviction. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Thornhill, 106 Miss. 387, 63 So. 674, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1913), overruled, New Orleans & G. N. R. Co. v. Walden, 160 Miss. 102, 133 So. 241, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1931).

It is proper under this section [Code 1942, § 1693] to ask a witness on cross-examination if he had not confessed to having been a convict in the penitentiary, and his answer may be contradicted. The record of such conviction is only necessary where the object is to show conviction, but if the witness is asked for the purpose of discrediting him the question is competent without the production of the record. Jackson v. State, 75 Miss. 145, 21 So. 707, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1897).

The record of a conviction of a misdemeanor is admissible. Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, 7 So. 487, 1890 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1890).

6. Instructions.

Instruction that interest of witness might be considered not error, though defendant’s wife was his only witness. Jones v. State, 130 Miss. 703, 94 So. 851, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1922).

7. Punishment for contempt.

While undue delay in imposition of punishment for contempt will not be tolerated, withholding imposition of punishment on witness found guilty of direct criminal contempt until the day following the conclusion of the trial did not constitute undue delay. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

8. Judgment.

A judgment which simply stated that witness had been found in contempt 27 times for refusing to answer questions, and had been punished for 6 acts, but did not specify the 6 acts, was not sufficiently clear and explicit to warrant Supreme Court to affirm, annul, reverse, or modify it. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

While contempt proceeding is summary and the judge may act upon that which he personally knows is direct contempt, the judgment of conviction should contain material facts constituting the contempt, and, in rendering the judgment and making up the record, the causes for contempt should be separately stated so as to constitute res judicata. Hentz v. State, 496 So. 2d 668, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2712 (Miss. 1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Testifying in civil proceeding as waiver of privilege against self-incrimination. 72 A.L.R.2d 830.

Plea of guilty or conviction as resulting in loss of privilege against self-incrimination as to crime in question. 9 A.L.R.3d 990.

Witness’ refusal to testify on ground of self-incrimination as justifying reception of evidence of prior statements or admissions. 43 A.L.R.3d 1413.

Cross-examination of witness as to his mental state or condition, to impeach competency or credibility. 44 A.L.R.3d 1203.

Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in civil case by showing former conviction, of questions relating to nature and extent of punishment. 67 A.L.R.3d 761.

Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in criminal case by showing former conviction, of questions relating to nature and extent of punishment. 67 A.L.R.3d 775.

Right to impeach credibility of accused by showing prior conviction, as affected by remoteness in time of prior offense. 67 A.L.R.3d 824.

Right to impeach witness in criminal case by inquiry or evidence as to witness’ criminal activity not having resulted in arrest or charge – modern state cases. 24 A.L.R.4th 333.

Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as improper vouching for credibility of witness – state cases. 58 A.L.R.4th 1229.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine family member other than spouse – modern cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 337.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine witness with employment relationship to party – modern cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 405.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state’s failure to produce or examine informant in criminal prosecution – modern cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 547.

Requirement that defendant in state court testify in order to preserve alleged trial error in rulings on admissibility of prior conviction impeachment evidence under Uniform Rule of Evidence 609, or similar provision or holding – post-Luce cases. 80 A.L.R.4th 1028.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state’s failure to produce or examine law enforcement personnel – modern cases. 81 A.L.R.4th 872.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party’s failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue – modern cases. 81 A.L.R.4th 939.

Permissibility of testimony by telephone in state trial. 85 A.L.R.4th 476.

Propriety of using prior conviction for drug dealing to impeach witness in criminal trial. 37 A.L.R.5th 319.

Requirement that court advise accused of, and make inquiry with respect to, waiver of right to testify. 72 A.L.R.5th 403.

Propriety under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, permitting exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, of attack on credibility of witness for party. 48 A.L.R. Fed. 390.

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Witnesses §§ 743 et seq., 796 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Conviction of Crime, Proof No. 1 (cross-examination concerning previous conviction).

3 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Conviction of Crime, Proof No. 2 (introduction of record after denial of previous conviction).

36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 747, Impeachment of Witness by Prior Criminal Conviction.

6 Am. Jur. Trials, Cross-Examination of Defendant, §§ 17 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Trials, Cross-Examination of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Witnesses, §§ 26 et seq.

CJS.

31A C.J.S., Evidence §§ 891–897, 922.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 244, 247 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure: Rape. 53 Miss. L. J. 149, March 1983.

§ 13-1-15. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1880, § 1604; 1892, § 1742; 1906, § 1919; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1579; 1930, § 1533; 1942, § 1694]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-15 provided that a person shall not be incompetent as a witness because of his religious belief or want of it.

§ 13-1-16. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 414, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

§13-1-16. [En Laws, 1972, ch. 338, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Section 13-1-16 provided for the appointment of interpreters for deaf parties and witnesses and for the payment of fees. Section 13-1-301 et seq. now make provisions for such appointments.

§ 13-1-17. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (112); 1857, ch. 61, art. 206; 1871, § 776; 1880, § 1605; 1892, § 1744; 1906, § 1921; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1581; 1930, § 1534; 1942, § 1695]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-17 provided for the affirmation of witnesses.

§ 13-1-19. Witness to be committed for refusal to testify.

If any person subpoenaed as a witness in any case or matter, shall refuse to be sworn or affirmed, or to give evidence, he shall be committed to prison by the court, justice, master, commissioner, referee, or other person authorized to take his testimony, there to remain without bail until he shall be sworn or affirmed or shall give his evidence.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (108); 1857, ch. 61, art. 207; 1871, § 777; 1880, § 1606; 1892, § 1745; 1906, § 1922; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1582; 1930, § 1535; 1942, § 1696.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Refusal to answer questions before state grand jury as direct contempt of court. 69 A.L.R.3d 501.

Impeachment of defense witness in criminal case by showing witness’ prior silence or failure or refusal to testify. 20 A.L.R.4th 245.

Right of independent expert to refuse to testify as to expert opinion. Par Indus. v. Target Container Co., 708 So. 2d 44, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1998).

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 97–99, 104-115.

§ 13-1-21. Communications privileged; exception.

  1. All communications made to a physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor by a patient under his charge or by one seeking professional advice are hereby declared to be privileged, and such party shall not be required to disclose the same in any legal proceeding except at the instance of the patient or, in case of the death of the patient, at the instance of his personal representative or legal heirs in case there be no personal representative, or except, if the validity of the will of the decedent is in question, at the instance of the personal representative or any of the legal heirs or any contestant or proponent of the will.
  2. Waiver of the medical privilege of patients regarding the release of medical information to health care personnel, the State Board of Health or local health departments, made to comply with Sections 41-3-15, 41-23-1 and 41-23-2 and related rules, shall be implied. The medical privilege likewise shall be waived to allow any physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor to report to the State Department of Health necessary information regarding any person afflicted with any communicable disease or infected with the causative agent thereof who neglects or refuses to comply with accepted protective measures to prevent the transmission of the communicable disease.
  3. Willful violations of the provisions of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor and shall be punishable as provided for by law. Any physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, or chiropractor shall be civilly liable for damages for any willful or reckless and wanton acts or omissions constituting such violations.
  4. In any action commenced or claim made after July 1, 1983, against a physician, hospital, hospital employee, osteopath, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor for professional services rendered or which should have been rendered, the delivery of written notice of such claim or the filing of such an action shall constitute a waiver of the medical privilege and any medical information relevant to the allegation upon which the cause of action or claim is based shall be disclosed upon the request of the defendant, or his or her counsel.
  5. In any disciplinary action commencing on or after July 1, 1987, against a medical physician, an osteopathic physician or a podiatrist pursuant to the provisions of Sections 73-25-1 through 73-25-39, 73-25-51 through 73-25-67, 73-25-81 through 73-25-95 and 73-27-1 through 73-27-19, waiver of the medical privilege of a patient to the extent of any information other than that which would identify the patient shall be implied.

HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 3695; Hemingway’s 1917, § 6380; 1930, § 1536; 1942, § 1697; Laws, 1944, ch. 315; Laws, 1968, ch. 441, § 4; Laws, 1976, ch. 347; Laws, 1979, ch. 408; Laws, 1982, ch. 407; Laws, 1983, ch. 327; Laws, 1987, ch. 500, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 557, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1988.

Cross References —

Hospital records not generally constituting public records, see §41-9-67.

Confidentiality and inspection of hospital records of civilly committed patients, see §41-21-97.

What constitutes the practice of medicine, see §73-25-33.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

Additional provisions relative to privileged communications, see Miss. R. Evid. 501-505.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application generally.

3. Persons subject to privilege.

4. —Chiropractor.

5. —Dentist.

6. —Nurse.

7. Persons who may assert privilege.

8. Matters subject to privilege.

9. —X-rays.

10. —Hospital and other records.

11. Waiver.

12. —Waiver by contract.

13. —Persons who may waive.

14. Failure to call physician as subject of inference.

1. Validity.

This section is constitutional. French Drug Co. v. Jones, 367 So. 2d 431, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2444 (Miss. 1978).

Privileged communication statute is mere rule of evidence, and so not unconstitutional, though preventing proof by defendant on main issue. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Decker, 150 Miss. 621, 116 So. 287, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1928).

2. Construction and application generally.

Only privilege established by the clear and unambiguous language of Miss. Code Ann. §13-1-21 is for communications made to a physician by a patient under his or her charge or by one seeking professional advice; thus, if a court is to be faithful to the statute, it must limit what is privileged thereunder to communications made to a physician by a patient. Franklin Collection Serv. v. Kyle, 955 So. 2d 284, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 2007).

In a collection agency’s suit brought on an open account against a patient, the patient did not have a counterclaim for breach of a physician-patient privilege when the collection agency attached certain information to its complaint because Miss. Code Ann. §13-1-21 was too narrow to apply, and there was no privilege for this type of information under the broader Miss. R. Evid. 503. Franklin Collection Serv. v. Kyle, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 11 (Miss. Jan. 11, 2007), sub. op., op. withdrawn, 955 So. 2d 284, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 2007).

Although the urinalysis evidence came under the Miss. Code Ann. §3-1-21(1) physician-patient privilege, defendant could not rely on the privilege to exclude the incriminating evidence of cocaine in defendant’s system where the procedure allegedly failed to comply with Miss. Code Ann. §63-11-19. Jones v. State, 858 So. 2d 139, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 579 (Miss. 2003).

Defendant’s conviction for vehicular homicide was affirmed where the appellate court found that a hospital employee’s analysis of his urine that showed defendant had cocaine in his system at the time of the fatal accident was properly admitted; to ensure the proper administration of justice, the analysis of defendant’s urine specimen was removed from the protection of the physician-patient privilege. Jones v. State, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2002).

Where newborn was accidently taken by hospital staff to the wrong mother to be breast fed, the unidentified patient responsible for breast feeding newborn was a fact witness to the alleged negligence of the hospital; therefore, her identity had to be revealed and her medical records may be inspected by the judge in camera to determine whether the health of the newborn was at risk. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Union County v. Johnson, 754 So. 2d 1165, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 2000).

Under no circumstances should a court order require plaintiff in medical malpractice or other action to release medical information unconditionally. Scott by & Through Scott v. Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1996).

In cases involving personal injuries, where a plaintiff has, during pretrial discovery, expressly refused to waive the medical privilege provided for under §13-1-21, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction stating that the fact that the treating physicians were not called as witnesses by the plaintiff would justify an inference that their testimony would have been unfavorable, whether or not defendant subpoenaed them. Jackson v. Brumfield, 458 So. 2d 736, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1975 (Miss. 1984).

In a prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence resulting from an automobile collision, defendant was properly precluded from arguing that the prosecution had failed to prove the results of a blood test for alcohol, since the State in rebuttal could not reply to the defendant’s argument by discussing material protected by §13-1-21, the physician-patient privilege, which defendant had exercised. Alford v. State, 433 So. 2d 940, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2631 (Miss. 1983).

The testimony of two doctors as to their court-ordered examinations did not violate the physician-patient privilege statute which declared as privileged only those communications made to a physician by a patient under his charge or by one seeking professional advice. United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 7450 (5th Cir. Miss. 1971).

The purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to protect the patient by encouraging full and confidential disclosure to his physician of all information, however embarrassing, which might aid the physician in diagnosis and treatment. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

In Mississippi the physician-patient privilege arises only when the patient consults the physician in his professional capacity and generally for the purpose of treatment, and it would not apply to a physician appointed by a state court. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

To be privileged, physician-patient communications must be in a professional context and generally must be with the purpose of treatment. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

Under state law, the examining doctor’s testimony is not subject to medical privilege, and by federal standards Rule 35 overrides any conflicting state-created rule, procedural, or substantive, which would bar the testimony of an examining physician appointed by order of federal court. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

The physician-patient privilege is substantive for diversity purposes, requiring the application of state substantive law in diversity cases. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

Code 1942, § 6998-08 does not prohibit the invocation of the patient-physician communication privilege in proceedings before the Mississippi workmen’s compensation commission. Cooper's, Inc. of Mississippi v. Long, 224 So. 2d 866, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1301 (Miss. 1969).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1697], a decedent’s physician is properly permitted to testify for the proponent of his will. Grant v. Norwood, 248 Miss. 740, 161 So. 2d 189, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1964).

Error in permitting a physician to testify to a privileged communication held harmless, in view of the patient’s testimony as to what the doctor prescribed. Pullin v. Nabors, 240 Miss. 864, 128 So. 2d 117, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 518 (Miss. 1961).

A doctor may not be required to testify as to matters learned in treating a patient, where the patient’s widow objects. Donaldson v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 239 Miss. 635, 124 So. 2d 701, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1960).

The privileged communications statute is no prohibition against the offering of a physician as a witness since the patient may or may not waive the statute. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co. v. Smith, 210 Miss. 768, 50 So. 2d 898, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 1951).

The purpose of the privileged communication statute is to protect confidential matters growing out of the relation of physician and his assistants and patient. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss. 384, 177 So. 47, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1937).

The privileged communication statute and statute permitting introduction in evidence of vital statistics records must be construed together. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss. 384, 177 So. 47, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1937).

Statute declaring as privileged communications made to physician by patient or one seeking professional advice must be limited to its language and clear purpose, and should not be extended by construction. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Willis, 171 Miss. 739, 158 So. 551 (Miss. 1935).

Privileged communication statute is mere rule of evidence. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Decker, 150 Miss. 621, 116 So. 287, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1928).

State privileged communication statute held mere rule of evidence, applicable in action under Federal Employer’s Liability Act. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Jackson, 145 Miss. 702, 110 So. 586, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1926).

Physician cannot disclose patient’s communication except at patient’s instance. Hunter v. Hunter, 127 Miss. 683, 90 So. 440, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. 1921).

3. Persons subject to privilege.

Evidence rule creating psychotherapist-patient privilege defines “psychotherapist” not only by those persons who are licensed, but also by subjective impressions of patient. (Per Pittman, J., with two Justices concurring, two Justices concurring in the result only, and one Justice concurring in part.) Kolberg v. State, 704 So. 2d 1307, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1997).

Patient-psychotherapist relationship and privilege existed between defendant and witness, even though witness was not licensed psychologist, where defendant believed that witness was psychiatrist or psychologist and that anything he told witness was confidential. (Per Pittman, J., with two Justices concurring, two Justices concurring in the result only, and one Justice concurring in part.) Kolberg v. State, 704 So. 2d 1307, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1997).

In a proceeding by a wife seeking a divorce from her husband on the basis of excessive drug use, the physician-patient privilege of §13-1-21 did not extend to pharmacist-client communications, and thus, testimony of the husband’s pharmacist was properly introduced. Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So. 2d 1366, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2808 (Miss. 1983).

In personal injury action, physician who was partner of physician who treated plaintiff held incompetent to testify concerning plaintiff’s condition. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1932).

4. —Chiropractor.

Chiropractors are not within privilege of physicians. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 212 (Miss. 1930).

5. —Dentist.

Offer of proof of what was expected to be proved by dentist held insufficient to justify reversal of judgment for patient suing railroad for injuries on ground that dentist’s testimony was not privileged, where record did not disclose that dentist’s testimony would have contradicted that given by patient or would have mitigated damages awarded by jury. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Willis, 171 Miss. 739, 158 So. 551 (Miss. 1935).

Dentist is not a “physician” within statute declaring as privileged all communications made to a physician by a patient or by one seeking professional advice. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Willis, 171 Miss. 739, 158 So. 551 (Miss. 1935).

6. —Nurse.

In action on life policy excluding liability if insured was pregnant at date of policy and death resulted from such pregnancy, student nurse in hospital who prepared room for insured’s confinement, and who remained through the confinement, could testify regarding matters observed without violating the privileged communication statute. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss. 384, 177 So. 47, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1937).

Nurse employed by physician who treated plaintiff for injury would be competent as witness as to all matters learned when not assisting physician. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1932).

Nurse who was employee of physician who treated plaintiff for injury to leg held incompetent as witness. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1932).

Statute, making communications to physician privileged, held not to exclude testimony of nurses employed in hospitals and present when communications were made. Goodman v. Lang, 158 Miss. 204, 130 So. 50, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1930).

7. Persons who may assert privilege.

Testimony of a physician that the defendant informed him that he had a girl “in trouble” and asked whether the doctor could give her something to bring about menstruation, was not privileged, where the doctor specifically declined to have anything to do with the matter and never saw or had any communication with the prosecutrix, the relation of physician and patient never existing between any of the persons involved. Smith v. State, 188 Miss. 339, 194 So. 922, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1940).

The privilege conferred by the statute regarding communications between physician and patient is for the benefit of the patient alone, so that the testimony of a physician offered by the state in a criminal case to show that the wound suffered by a bystander was caused by the pistol of the accused, even if it was error to admit such testimony over the objection of such bystander, could not be complained of by the accused. Vance v. State, 182 Miss. 840, 183 So. 280, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 200 (Miss. 1938).

8. Matters subject to privilege.

Where an employer noticed that a return to work date on a medical leave form appeared to have been altered and asked the employee’s health care provider to provide another copy of the form, which revealed the employee’s alteration, the health care provider did not violate the physician-patient privilege under Miss. Code Ann. §13-1-21 because the privilege only applied to information provided by a patient to his or her doctor, and the employee’s return to work date did not qualify as such information. Thornton v. Statcare, PLLC, 988 So. 2d 387, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 416 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

A physician’s knowledge of a patient’s deafness, obtained while treating him, is privileged. New Orleans & N. R. Co. v. Shows, 240 Miss. 604, 128 So. 2d 381, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1961).

In matter involving merely conventional relation of physician and patient, as distinguished from matter in which it is necessary for physician to examine into case and apply his skill and knowledge to form an opinion, or to make preliminary preparation for purpose of qualifying himself to give expert testimony, physician is ordinarily subject to testify under subpoena as any other witness. Johns-Mansville Products Corp. v. Cather, 208 Miss. 268, 44 So. 2d 405, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1950).

This section [Code 1942, § 1697] has no application to a situation where one claiming disability benefits under a life insurance policy voluntarily presented himself to a physician employed by the insurance company solely for the purpose of an examination, and not for professional advice or treatment, so as to enable such physician to report the facts he might find to the insurance company; and under such circumstances, the privilege not only did not arise but was also waived. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 183 Miss. 859, 183 Miss. 860, 184 So. 426, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1938).

Where defendant, charged with assault and battery with intent to kill, testified that she acted in self-defense, having been assaulted by another who beat defendant over head, inflicting wounds treated by physician, physician’s testimony that he had not treated a wound on defendant’s head held admissible. Sproles v. State, 176 Miss. 810, 170 So. 293, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1936).

In murder prosecution, admitting testimony of physician, who attended deceased, with reference to nature and effects of wound found upon body of deceased, held not reversible error. Maddox v. State, 173 Miss. 799, 163 So. 449, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1935).

In action for death, communications made by decedent to his physician about a year before his death held privileged. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Humphries, 170 Miss. 840, 155 So. 421, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 174 (Miss. 1934).

Physician who treated plaintiff for former injury to leg held incompetent as witness, where such physician could not segregate knowledge acquired as physician from that learned from contact and association. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1932).

Nurse employed by physician who treated plaintiff for injury would be competent as witness as to all matters learned when not assisting physician. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1932).

Where physician investigates by direction of court or prosecuting attorney to ascertain condition of person for purposes of trial, statutory privilege does not arise. Norwood v. State, 158 Miss. 550, 130 So. 733, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1930).

Where person is examined by physician at instance or with approval of officers for purpose of law enforcement, and person examined knows, or facts reasonably give knowledge, that examination is for such purpose and no wrongful means are used, statute relating to privilege is not available. Norwood v. State, 158 Miss. 550, 130 So. 733, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1930).

Testimony of physician treating insured as to nature and character of disease is inadmissible. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v. Jemison, 153 Miss. 53, 120 So. 180, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1929).

What physician knows about patient by physical examination held privileged communication. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Decker, 150 Miss. 621, 116 So. 287, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1928).

Testimony of physician treating insured, together with hospital records, held properly excluded in beneficiary’s action on policy after insured’s death. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McSwain, 149 Miss. 455, 115 So. 555, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1928).

In trial of unlawful killing admitting testimony of physician, who attended deceased, with reference to condition of his wound, held not reversible error. Davenport v. State, 143 Miss. 121, 108 So. 433, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1926).

Physician cannot disclose deceased patient’s communication. Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1926).

Physician not competent to testify as to the facts and information received by him in professional capacity; physician competent to testify as to knowledge concerning mental condition derived from social or business relation; trial judge may determine competency of physician’s knowledge derived partly from his relation as physician and partly from social and business relations. Dabbs v. Richardson, 137 Miss. 789, 102 So. 769, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 20 (Miss. 1925).

Physician held not precluded from giving non-expert testimony as to facts and circumstances affecting testamentary capacity of patient, based on conversation derived from business and social relations. Estes v. McGehee, 133 Miss. 174, 97 So. 530, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1923).

In action against railway company for wrongful death, erroneous to permit defendant to prove by decedent’s physician that injuries sustained were not cause of death. Hamel v. Southern R. Co., 113 Miss. 344, 74 So. 276, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1917).

Word “communication” includes matters ascertained by railroad surgeon in examination of persons injured in wreck; communications need not be in words. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Messina, 109 Miss. 143, 67 So. 963, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1915), rev'd, 240 U.S. 395, 36 S. Ct. 368, 60 L. Ed. 709, 1916 U.S. LEXIS 1461 (U.S. 1916).

9. —X-rays.

Privileged communication statute held not to prevent physical and X-ray examination of parts of plaintiff’s body which were alleged to have been injured and which were voluntarily exhibited to jury for inspection and examination. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Matthews, 177 Miss. 103, 170 So. 686, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1936).

10. —Hospital and other records.

Without the results of defendant’s urine specimen and test, which specimen was taken and which test was performed by a hospital according to its policy, the State would have been unable to prove that defendant was under the influence of cocaine when defendant collided with the victim’s automobile; thus, to ensure the proper administration of justice, the medical records regarding the analysis of defendant’s urine specimen had to be removed from the protection of the physician-patient privilege under Miss. Code Ann. §13-1-21(1) and Miss. R. Evid. 503(b) and the trial court did not err in admitting this evidence. Jones v. State, 881 So. 2d 209, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 869 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), aff'd, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 588 (Miss. Oct. 30, 2003).

In light of the highly personal nature of a patient’s medical and hospital records and of the problems that could result from their improper release, a hospital properly refused to reproduce and release voluminous patient records when it received only a form request and offer to pay for “reasonable access”; a reasonable response would be to allow access if representatives of the requesting facility appeared personally at the hospital, checked the records, and indicated those for which they would be willing to pay for copies. Young v. Madison General Hospital, 337 So. 2d 931, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1600 (Miss. 1976).

The privileged communications statute does not preclude testimony from and concerning a patient’s hospital records, by doctors who had never seen or examined the patient. Reynolds v. West, 237 Miss. 613, 115 So. 2d 742, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 511 (Miss. 1959).

In action on life policy excluding liability if insured was pregnant at date of policy and death resulted from such pregnancy, certified copies of vital statistics, records, consisting of insured’s attending physician’s reports to the department of vital statistics showing required facts with reference to death of the insured and birth of child, were admissible, since, by adoption of statute permitting introduction of records of vital statistics, legislature intended to except from operation of the privileged communications statute the vital statistics records. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss. 384, 177 So. 47, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1937).

In homicide prosecution, exclusion of expert testimony of insane hospital physicians as to nature and character of mental disease with which deceased was afflicted held error, where knowledge of matters testified to was acquired by perusal of hospital records and not by a personal examination or by communications from deceased. Motley v. State, 174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 197 (Miss. 1936).

In homicide prosecution exclusion as privileged, of testimony of insane hospital physicians as to knowledge of deceased’s insanity acquired from perusal of hospital records, held error, where statute required that records of examinations of patients be kept. Motley v. State, 174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 197 (Miss. 1936).

Testimony of physician treating insured, together with hospital records, held properly excluded in beneficiary’s action on policy after insured’s death. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McSwain, 149 Miss. 455, 115 So. 555, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1928).

11. Waiver.

For purposes of determining scope of a waiver of medical privilege, relevancy of particular medical information to condition which plaintiff has placed in issue by filing medical malpractice or other type of action is to be determined at judicial relevancy hearing if that determination cannot be worked out on amicable terms between opposing counsel. Scott by & Through Scott v. Flynt, 704 So. 2d 998, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1996).

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff, by filing suit and submitting evidence on his injuries, waived the physician-patient privilege only to the extent of those injuries and expenses for treatment. Thus, information given to the plaintiff’s treating physician concerning the cause of the accident was privileged. Additionally, the plaintiff did not waive the privilege by answering questions on cross-examination and denying that he had made certain statements regarding the cause of the accident to the treating physician. The testimony of a plaintiff on cross-examination as to communications made to his or her physician is not voluntary so as to constitute a waiver of the physician-patient privilege. Sessums ex rel. Sessums v. McFall, 551 So. 2d 178, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 367 (Miss. 1989).

Where a patient has been treated or examined by different physicians at different times for the same ailment, and the patient permits one of his physicians to testify about his physical condition, he does not waive the right to assert his statutory privilege of confidential communication as to the other attending physicians. Hill v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 809, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1470 (Miss. 1968), overruled in part, Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1935 (Miss. 1985).

Although the testimony of one of the physicians who had treated the decedent during his terminal illness was introduced in evidence in a malpractice action, the depositions of other physicians who examined and diagnosed decedent’s illness and treated him according to their learning cannot be taken or introduced into evidence without the intentional or express waiver by the heirs of the deceased. Hill v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 809, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1470 (Miss. 1968), overruled in part, Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1935 (Miss. 1985).

The waiver of the physician-patient privilege as to one of a party’s physicians does not operate as a waiver of the privilege as to any other physicians. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

When a party to a law suit takes the stand and voluntarily testifies as to his injuries, their treatment by a physician, and what he and his physician said about them, he waives his privilege. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Miss. 1970).

Where a patient voluntarily goes into detail regarding the nature of her injuries and either testifies as to what a particular physician did or said while in attendance, or relates what she communicated to the physician, the privilege is waived and the adverse party may examine the physician. Dennis v. Prisock, 254 Miss. 574, 181 So. 2d 125, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 967 (Miss. 1965).

Plaintiff patient waives his rights to claim privileged communications under the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1697] when plaintiff makes effort to induce defendant to produce his doctor or to have defendant’s doctor testify concerning injuries received by plaintiff in defendant’s employ, but defendant is not required to accept or act upon such waiver. Johns-Mansville Products Corp. v. Cather, 208 Miss. 268, 44 So. 2d 405, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1950).

To effectively constitute a waiver of a physician’s testimony, the consent must make reasonably and readily available both the physician’s testimony and physical presence; this is not done by consent at trial time when the physician is known to be out of town. Gatlin v. Allen, 203 Miss. 135, 33 So. 2d 304, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1948).

Where plaintiff’s expressed willingness, on examination in action for personal injury, for any of the doctors who examined her to testify, constituted a waiver of her privilege under this section [Code 1942, § 1697], and such offer was made before the taking of testimony in the case had reached the halfway mark, and there was no showing that a specific physician, who had treated her, was not reasonably available and that his attendance could not have been procured without unreasonable delay or discomfiture to the court, an instruction that if said doctor was available as a witness in her behalf and she failed to introduce him as such witness, the presumption would be that his testimony would have been adverse to the plaintiff, was erroneous. Clary v. Breyer, 194 Miss. 612, 13 So. 2d 633, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1943).

This section [Code 1942, § 1697] has no application to a situation where one claiming disability benefits under a life insurance policy voluntarily presented himself to a physician employed by the insurance company solely for the purpose of an examination, and not for professional advice or treatment, so as to enable such physician to report the facts he might find to the insurance company; and under such circumstances, the privilege not only did not arise but was also waived. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 183 Miss. 859, 183 Miss. 860, 184 So. 426, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 300 (Miss. 1938).

Privileged communication statute held not to prevent physical and X-ray examination of parts of plaintiff’s body which were alleged to have been injured and which were voluntarily exhibited to jury for inspection and examination. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Matthews, 177 Miss. 103, 170 So. 686, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1936).

Plaintiff’s testifying on cross-examination that he was willing for physician to testify did not constitute waiver of right to claim privilege. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1930).

Testimony of plaintiff on cross-examination regarding communications made to physician is not “voluntary” in sense constituting waiver of privilege. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1930).

Testimony of physician attending patient not admissible unless consented to by patient; privilege not waived by placing other physicians on the witness stand. Davis v. Elzey, 126 Miss. 789, 88 So. 630, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1921).

Privilege respecting testimony of physician not waived by calling other physicians; testimony should not be received in absence of jury. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So. 115, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 546 (Miss. 1920).

Error in permitting privileged testimony by physician in behalf of defendant not cured by plaintiff introducing another physician to rebut such testimony. Hamel v. Southern R. Co., 113 Miss. 344, 74 So. 276, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1917).

12. —Waiver by contract.

Blood alcohol test administered as part of medical treatment is admissible in civil action where driver from whom blood is taken has made contractual waiver of physician-patient privilege. Edwards v. Ellis, 478 So. 2d 282, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2262 (Miss. 1985).

Under Mississippi law, the physician-patient privilege can be waived by a contractual provision contained in an application for life insurance. Leach v. Millers Life Ins. Co., 400 F.2d 179, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 5523 (5th Cir. Miss. 1968).

The benefits of the privileged communication statute may be waived by contract before trial. Fornea v. Goodyear Yellow Pine Co., 181 Miss. 50, 178 So. 914, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1938).

Testimony of physician who treated employee immediately after accident held admissible, over employee’s objection, where employee had executed contract waiving benefits of privileged communications statute. Fornea v. Goodyear Yellow Pine Co., 181 Miss. 50, 178 So. 914, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1938).

In action on life policy, testimony of physicians who had treated insured held admissible to prove that insured’s physical condition was impaired at time he secured reinstatement of policy in view of clause in policy waiving any provisions of law making such testimony inadmissible. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Burris, 174 Miss. 658, 165 So. 116, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 191 (Miss. 1936).

Patient may waive privilege; provision in insurance policy waiving privilege renders physician’s testimony competent as to health. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of World v. Farmer, 116 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 352 (Miss. 1917).

13. —Persons who may waive.

Nephew carried out his duty as personal representative by probating the decedent’s 2005 will and thus held the general medical privilege as the decedent’s personal representative under the rule; the statute also authorized the nephew to waive the entire medical privilege as a personal representative and contestant of the 2012 will, and thus the ex parte rule did not operate to bar his attorney from speaking alone with the physician witness. Estate of Lyons v. Lyons, 227 So.3d 910, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 131 (Miss. 2017).

The doctor-patient privilege applies in criminal proceedings, but the privilege may be waived. Accordingly, in a prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence, defendant waived the privilege when he called his physician to the stand as his own witness and the result of a blood alcohol test administered by the physician was elicited from the doctor on cross-examination without objection from defendant. Ashley v. State, 423 So. 2d 1311, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2266 (Miss. 1982).

Where the order appointing a temporary administratrix left part of the assets in the hands of an executor, either the temporary administratrix or the executor could waive the statutory privilege, thereby permitting the physician of the testatrix to give his opinion as to her competency on the date on which a purported will was executed. In re Will of McGough, 222 So. 2d 673, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1542 (Miss. 1969).

Physician’s privilege against testifying as to facts learned in employment may be waived in criminal case; consent of grandmother in loco parentis held waiver under statute so as to make admissible physician’s testimony as to condition of 12-year-old rape victim. Jenkins v. State, 146 Miss. 339, 111 So. 433, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1927).

Statutory prohibition against disclosure by physician of communications of patient survives patient’s death and cannot be waived by his heirs, executor, or administrator. McCaw v. Turner, 126 Miss. 260, 88 So. 705, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1921).

14. Failure to call physician as subject of inference.

In an action for injuries to plaintiff when automobile in which she was riding was struck from rear, where plaintiff pleaded privilege, the refusal to permit counsel for defendant to examine doctor who treated plaintiff, for the purpose of showing that a doctor was available as a witness, was not an error in view of the instructions that defendant could not compel a doctor to testify, and jury was warranted in inferring that the testimony of the doctor would be unfavorable to the plaintiff if he had been permitted to testify. Gulf Refining Co. v. Myrick, 220 Miss. 429, 71 So. 2d 217, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 458 (Miss. 1954).

An instruction would not be proper which stated that failure of the plaintiff to call his physician raised a presumption that the doctor’s testimony would be harmful to the plaintiff’s case. Gatlin v. Allen, 203 Miss. 135, 33 So. 2d 304, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1948).

Where plaintiff’s expressed willingness, on examination in action for personal injury, for any of the doctors who examined her to testify, constituted a waiver of her privilege under this section [Code 1942, § 1697], and such offer was made before the taking of testimony in the case had reached the halfway mark, and there was no showing that a specific physician, who had treated her, was not reasonably available and that his attendance could not have been procured without unreasonable delay or discomfiture to the court, an instruction that if said doctor was available as a witness in her behalf and she failed to introduce him as such witness, the presumption would be that his testimony would have been adverse to the plaintiff, was erroneous. Clary v. Breyer, 194 Miss. 612, 13 So. 2d 633, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1943).

An instruction that the plaintiff’s failure to produce as a witness one of three physicians who had attended him would justify the jury in inferring that the testimony of such physicians would have been unfavorable to the plaintiff, was proper. Killings v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1940).

Instruction that plaintiff’s failure to use physician, who attended him after injuries sued for, as witness may create presumption that such physician’s testimony would be unfavorable to plaintiff, held not erroneous as abolishing protection of privilege communications statute. Robinson v. Haydel, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1936).

Instruction that jury should not draw unfavorable inferences against defendant because he did not introduce plaintiff’s physician as witness held reversible error as authorizing jury to draw unfavorable inference to plaintiff. Hobson v. McLeod, 165 Miss. 853, 147 So. 778, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 308 (Miss. 1933).

Jury had no right to draw any inference against plaintiff because he failed to offer his physician as witness. Hobson v. McLeod, 165 Miss. 853, 147 So. 778, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 308 (Miss. 1933).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Medical information contained in “run reports” from City EMS units which contain name of person treated, address of response, physical data, summary of any medical treatment or other action taken in response to run and other pertinent information, is confidential; other information in reports is public. Lawrence Oct. 6, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0592.

Generally, most medical records in a mental commitment file in the office of the Chancery Clerk will fall under one or more of the exemptions to the Public Records Act; exempt records should not be released or kept open to the public absent a court order or authorized consent. McGee, Dec. 2, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0543.

Whether county emergency medical service records, including health conditions of persons injured in an accident, constituted exempt “hospital records” under Section 41-9-68 or were otherwise privileged under Section 13-1-21 is a factual question. Lamar, Dec. 16, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0595.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of one against whom testimony is offered to invoke privilege of communication between others. 2 A.L.R.2d 645.

Inferences arising from refusal of witness other than accused to answer question on the ground that answer would tend to incriminate him. 24 A.L.R.2d 895.

Construction and effect of statute removing or modifying, in personal injury actions, patient’s privilege against disclosure by physician. 25 A.L.R.2d 1429.

Privileged nature of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient. 38 A.L.R.2d 778.

Privilege of communication by or to nurse or attendant. 47 A.L.R.2d 742.

Party’s waiver of privilege as to communications with counsel by taking stand and testifying. 51 A.L.R.2d 521.

Pleading or raising defense of privilege in defamation action. 51 A.L.R.2d 552.

Right of physician, notwithstanding physician-patient privilege, to give expert testimony based on hypothetical question. 64 A.L.R.2d 1056.

Who may waive privilege of confidential communication to physician by person since deceased. 97 A.L.R.2d 393.

Testimony as to communications or observations as to mental condition of patient treated for other condition. 100 A.L.R.2d 648.

Waiver of privilege as regards one physician as a waiver as to other physicians. 5 A.L.R.3d 1244.

Applicability in criminal proceedings of privilege as to communications between physician and patient. 7 A.L.R.3d 1458.

Physician’s tort liability, apart from defamation, for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information about patient. 20 A.L.R.3d 1109.

Admissibility of physician’s testimony as to patient’s statements or declarations, other than res gestae, during medical examination. 37 A.L.R.3d 778.

Privilege, in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, arising from relationship between psychiatrist or psychologist and patient. 44 A.L.R.3d 24.

Discovery, in medical malpractice action, of names of other patients to whom defendant has given treatment similar to that allegedly injuring plaintiff. 74 A.L.R.3d 1055.

Physician-patient privilege as applied to physician’s testimony concerning wound required to be reported to public authority. 85 A.L.R.3d 1196.

Physician-patient privilege as extending to patient’s medical or hospital records. 10 A.L.R.4th 552.

What constitutes physician-patient relationship for malpractice purposes. 17 A.L.R.4th 132.

Constitutionality, with respect to accused’s rights to information or confrontation, of statute according confidentiality to sex crime victim’s communications to sexual counselor. 43 A.L.R.4th 395.

Validity, construction, and application of statute limiting physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings relating to child abuse or neglect. 44 A.L.R.4th 649.

Physician’s tort liability for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information about patient. 48 A.L.R.4th 668.

Insured-insurer communications as privileged. 55 A.L.R.4th 336.

Waiver of evidentiary privilege by inadvertent disclosure – state law. 51 A.L.R.5th 603.

Construction and Application of Fiduciary Duty Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege. 47 A.L.R.6th 255.

Situations in which federal courts are governed by state law of privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.48 A.L.R. Fed. 259.

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses §§ 397 et seq, 463.

19A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers, Form 353 (complaint, petition, or declaration, plaintiff improperly diagnosed as suffering from dangerous communicable disease, plaintiff quarantined in hospital until condition correctly diagnosed).

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Privileged Communications between Physician and Patient, § 17 (proof that physician-patient relation existed between accused and examining physician).

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Privileged Communications between Physician and Patient, § 18 (proof that no physician-patient relation existed between accused and examining physician).

17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Privileged Communications between Physician and Patient, § 19 (use of nonprivileged information to establish physical condition of patient in civil action).

45 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 595, Protected Communication Between Physician And Patient.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 373, Existence of Physician and Patient Relationship.

2 Am. Jur. Trials, Selecting and Preparing Expert Witnesses, § 57.

32 Am. Jur. Trials 105, Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Patient Information.

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 411 et seq., 468, 469, 472, 477, 485 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1982 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 53 Miss. L. J. 167, March 1983.

Whitfield, Mississippi medical privilege: blessing or curse? 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 461, Spring, 1992.

McCormick, The Repealer: Conflicts in Evidence Created by Misapplication of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103. 67 Miss. L. J. 547, Winter, 1997.

§ 13-1-21.1. Medical privilege considered waived by and between defendants in medical malpractice suits involving multiple defendants.

In any medical malpractice action with multiple defendants, the medical privilege shall be considered waived by and between all defendants.

HISTORY: Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 17, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2007.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2004, 1st Extraordinary Session, ch. 1, § 20 provides:

“SECTION 20. Sections 8 through 15 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007; the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after September 1, 2004, and Sections 1 through 7 of this act shall apply to all causes of action filed on or after September 1, 2004.”

§ 13-1-22. Confidentiality of priest-penitent communications.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a church, religious organization, or religious denomination.
    2. A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
  2. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.
  3. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The clergyman shall claim the privilege on behalf of the person unless the privilege is waived.
  4. A clergyman’s secretary, stenographer or clerk shall not be examined without the consent of the clergyman concerning any fact, the knowledge of which was acquired in such capacity.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 453, eff from and after July 1, 1976.

Editor’s Notes —

The preamble to Chapter 453 of the Laws of 1976 provides as follows:

“Whereas, the emotional, mental and spiritual health of many of our citizens depends upon the free and confidential access to their clergymen or spiritual advisers; Now, therefore,

“Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi:”

Cross References —

Additional provisions relative to priest-penitent privilege, see Miss. R. Evid. 505.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of one against whom testimony is offered to invoke privilege of communications between others. 2 A.L.R.2d 645.

Matters to which the privilege covering communications to clergyman or spiritual adviser extends. 22 A.L.R.2d 1152.

Who is “clergyman” or the like entitled to assert privilege attaching to communications to clergymen or spiritual advisers. 49 A.L.R.3d 1205.

Matters to which the privilege covering communications to clergyman or spiritual adviser extends. 71 A.L.R.3d 794.

Insured-insurer communications as privileged. 55 A.L.R.4th 336.

Waiver of evidentiary privilege by inadvertent disclosure – state law. 51 A.L.R.5th 603.

Situations in which federal courts are governed by state law of privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.48 A.L.R. Fed. 259.

Communications to clergyman as privileged in federal proceedings. 118 A.L.R. Fed. 449.

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses §§ 474, 481, 482, 488.

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses § 501–503.

Law Reviews.

McCormick, The Repealer: Conflicts in Evidence Created by Misapplication of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103. 67 Miss. L. J. 547, Winter, 1997.

§ 13-1-22.1. Certain communications made to certified peer support member by emergency responder to be privileged; definitions; exception to privilege; penalties.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
    1. “Certified peer support member” means a law enforcement officer, fireman or emergency medical technician of an emergency service agency or entity who has received training in critical incident stress management and who is certified as a peer support member by the State Board of Health or the Department of Public Safety to provide emotional and moral support to an emergency responder who needs those services as a result of job-related stress or an incident in which the emergency responder was involved while acting in his official capacity.
    2. “Peer support event” means any debriefing, defusing or counseling session conducted by a certified peer support member that involves the emotional or moral support of an emergency responder who needs those services as a result of job-related stress or an incident in which the emergency responder was involved while acting in his official capacity.
  2. A certified peer support member shall not be compelled, without the consent of the emergency responder making the communication, to testify or in any way disclose the contents of any communication made to the certified peer support member by the emergency responder while engaged in a peer support event. This privilege only applies when the communication was made to the certified peer support member during the course of an actual peer support event.
  3. The privilege shall not apply if:
    1. The certified peer support member was an initial emergency service responder, a witness or a party to the incident that prompted the providing of the peer support event to the emergency responder;
    2. A communication reveals the intended commission of a crime or harmful act and such disclosure is determined to be necessary by the certified peer support member to protect any person from a clear, imminent risk of serious mental or physical harm or injury, or to forestall a serious threat to the public safety; or
    3. A crime has been committed and divulged.
  4. Any certified peer support member who reveals the contents of a privileged communication, or any person who threatens, intimidates, or in any way attempts to compel a certified peer support member to disclose the contents of a privileged communication, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

HISTORY: Laws, 2006, ch. 440, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2006.

§ 13-1-23. Presumption of death.

Any person who shall remain beyond the sea, or absent himself from this state, or conceal himself in this state, for seven years successively without being heard of, shall be presumed to be dead in any case where his death shall come in question, unless proof be made that he was alive within that time. Any property or estate recovered in any such case shall be restored to the person evicted or deprived thereof, if, in a subsequent action, it shall be proved that the person so presumed to be dead is living.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 252; 1871, § 882; 1880, § 1648; 1892, § 1737; 1906, § 1914; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1574; 1930, § 1537; 1942, § 1698.

Cross References —

Provisions of Uniform Simultaneous Death Law, see §§91-3-1 through91-3-15.

Crime of bigamy not extending to person whose spouse has been absent for seven years, see §97-29-15.

Presumptions in civil actions and proceedings generally, see Miss. R. Evid. 301.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence giving rise to presumption.

3. Application of presumption in marital situations.

4. Rebuttal of presumption.

1. In general.

If detrimental reliance upon decree pursuant to §13-1-23 can be shown, party presumed to be dead will not be allowed at some later date to be restored to property which was conveyed in reliance upon statute. Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2820 (Miss. 1987).

Burden of proof is upon party attempting to prove death at any particular time within 7 years; no presumption as to time of death. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 112 Miss. 828, 73 So. 806, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 188 (Miss. 1916); Clement v. Knights of Maccabees of World, 113 Miss. 392, 74 So. 287, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1917).

2. Evidence giving rise to presumption.

Clement v. Knights of Maccabees of World, 113 Miss. 392, 74 So. 287, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1917).

A grant of letters of administration on an estate is prima facie evidence of the death of a person upon whose estate the administration is granted. Cock v. Abernathy, 77 Miss. 872, 28 So. 18, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 47 (Miss. 1900).

This section [Code 1942, § 1698] does not justify the presumption of the death of three infant devisees, who at the time of their departure from their last-known residence in this state, about eleven years before the trial, were of very tender years, the eldest being only seven years old, and who disappeared along with their mother and stepfather, the last named being at the time under apprehension of a criminal prosecution. The presumption of death not arising in such case because of the number and youth of such devisees, their subjection to the will of others and their incapacity to absent themselves from and conceal themselves within the state, the burden of proving their death is on him who asserts it, and is not met by the testimony of one or two witnesses who casually learned that such devisees once lived in a certain town in the state, such witnesses having only slight opportunity of knowing the facts. Manley v. Patterson, 73 Miss. 417, 19 So. 236 (Miss. 1895).

The uncontradicted testimony of the mother that the last she ever heard of her son was that ten years before he sailed on board a vessel for a foreign port, and that about five days afterwards there was a storm at sea, and that neither the ship nor anyone on board has ever been heard of since, and that she is satisfied her son is dead, fully establishes the presumption of death authorized by the statute. Learned v. Corley, 43 Miss. 687, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1870), overruled, Cole v. Johnson, 53 Miss. 94, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1876).

3. Application of presumption in marital situations.

Where a woman, more than twenty years after her husband had left her and gone to Arkansas, and, after having been informed by his sister that a letter from a postmaster in Arkansas stated that her husband had been drowned, remarried, without any divorce having been granted, and it was thereafter discovered that her first husband was still living and had also remarried, the woman’s second marriage was invalid, and the heirs of her second husband were entitled, as against her, to the proceeds of an insurance association policy, a bylaw of which association provided that beneficiaries must be related by blood or by marriage, or must be persons upon whom the insured was wholly dependent for a living, notwithstanding she was designated in such policy as beneficiary. Frank v. Frank, 193 Miss. 605, 10 So. 2d 839, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1942).

Where woman’s undivorced husband lived openly within state after his release from penitentiary and kept in touch with near relatives living in county in which he had formerly resided, such woman’s subsequent marriage while husband lived held invalid, since inquiry would have disclosed that he was then alive, notwithstanding rumors that he was dead. Watson v. Watson, 177 Miss. 767, 171 So. 701, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 1937).

The presumption of the death of a husband or wife authorized by the statute will be applied in favor of the validity of a marriage contracted by the abandoned party after the expiration of the seven years. Spears v. Burton, 31 Miss. 547, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1856); Gibson v. State, 38 Miss. 313, 1860 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1860).

4. Rebuttal of presumption.

The presumption of one’s death arising from seven years’ absence without being heard from disappears when proof is made that he was alive within that time. Hill v. United Timber & Lumber Co., 68 So. 2d 420 (Miss. 1953).

This section [Code 1942, § 1698] embodies a rule at common law, and under it the presumption of death of a husband arising from seven years of absence without being heard from disappears when proof was made that he was alive within that time. Frank v. Frank, 193 Miss. 605, 10 So. 2d 839, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1942).

Statutory presumption of death ends when it is shown that person whose death is in question is, in fact, alive. Watson v. Watson, 177 Miss. 767, 171 So. 701, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 1937); Johnson v. Lee, 212 Miss. 603, 55 So. 2d 140, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 489 (Miss. 1951).

That person was fugitive from justice held insufficient to rebut statutory presumption of death from absence for 7 years. Parker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 142 Miss. 517, 107 So. 198, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 60 (Miss. 1926).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Absentees §§ 1 et seq.

22A Am. Jur. 2d, Death §§ 390- 392 et seq.

Affidavit of absence, 1 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Absentees § 2:11.

1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Absence, Proof No. 1.

CJS.

25A C.J.S., Death §§ 8-15.

§ 13-1-25. Presumptions as to status of military and naval personnel or federal civilian employees.

  1. A written finding of presumed death, made by any officer or employee of the United States authorized to make such finding, pursuant to federal law (5 USC §§ 5561-5568; 37 USC §§ 551-558), as now or hereafter amended, or a duly certified copy of such finding, shall be received in any court, office or other place in this state as prima facie evidence of the death of the person therein found to be dead, and the date, circumstances and place of his disappearance.
  2. An official written report or record, or duly certified copy thereof, that a person is missing, missing in action, interned in a neutral country, or beleaguered, besieged, or captured by an enemy, or is dead, or is alive, made by any officer or employee of the United States authorized by the laws referred to in subsection (1) of this section or by any other law of the United States to make same, shall be received in any court, office or other place in this state as prima facie evidence that such person is missing, missing in action, interned in a neutral country, or beleaguered, besieged, or captured by an enemy, or is dead, or is alive, as the case may be.
  3. For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) of this section any finding, report or record, or duly certified copy thereof, purporting to have been signed by such an officer or employee of the United States as is described in said subsections shall prima facie be deemed to have been signed and issued by such an officer or employee pursuant to law, and the person signing same shall prima facie be deemed to have acted within the scope of his authority. If a copy purports to have been certified by a person authorized by law to certify the same, such certified copy shall be prima facie evidence of his authority so to certify.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1698-01; Laws, 1946, ch. 353 §§ 1-3.

Cross References —

Presumptions in civil actions and proceedings generally, see Miss. R. Evid 301.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

22A Am. Jur. 2d, Death §§ 399 et seq.

§§ 13-1-27 through 13-1-75. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1975, ch. 501, § 22, eff from and after January 1, 1976.

§13-1-27. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (113, 114); 1857, ch. 61, art. 209, ch. 62, art. 88; 1871, §§ 788, 1079; 1880, §§ 1608, 1940; 1892, §§ 1747, 1759; 1906, §§ 1924, 1936; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 1584, 1596; 1930, § 1538; 1942, § 1699; Laws, 1948, ch. 231]

§13-1-29. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 50, art. 2 (13); 1857, ch. 58, art. 17; 1871, § 1314; 1880, § 2203; 1892, § 1748; 1906, § 1925; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1585; 1930, § 1552; 1942, § 1713]

§13-1-31. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 210; 1871, § 790; 1880, § 1609; 1892, § 1749; 1906, § 1926; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1586; 1930, § 1539; 1942, § 1700]

§13-1-33. [Codes, 1892, § 1750; 1906, § 1927; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1587; 1930, § 1540; 1942, § 1701; Laws, 1958, ch. 255]

§13-1-35. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (116); 1857, ch. 61, art. 212; 1871, § 791; 1880, § 1611; 1892, § 1751; 1906, § 1928; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1588; 1930, § 1542; 1942, § 1703]

§13-1-37. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 214; 1871, § 793; 1880, § 1613; 1892, § 1753; 1906, § 1930; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1590; 1930, § 1543; 1942, § 1704]

§13-1-39. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 14; 1857, ch. 61, art. 219; 1871, § 798; 1880, § 1618; 1892, § 1757; 1906, § 1934; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1594; 1930, § 1541; 1942, § 1702]

§13-1-41. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art 1 (120); 1857, ch. 61, art. 213; 1871, § 792; 1880, § 1612; 1892, § 1752; 1906, § 1929; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1589; 1930, § 1544; 1942, § 1705]

§13-1-43. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 215; 1871, § 794; 1880, § 1614; 1892, § 1754; 1906, § 1931; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1591; 1930, § 1545; 1942, § 1706]

§13-1-45. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 218; 1871, § 797; 1880, § 1617; 1892, § 1755; 1906, § 1932, Hemingway’s 1917, § 1592; 1930, § 1546; 1942, § 1707]

§13-1-47. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (117); 1857, ch. 61, art. 216; 1871, § 795; 1880, §§ 1615, 1946; 1892, § 1756; 1906, § 1933; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1593; 1930, § 1547; 1942, § 1708; Laws, 1956, ch. 236, eff. July 1, 1956]

§13-1-49. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 221, ch. 62, art. 93; 1871, § 1086; 1880, §§ 1620, 1948; 1892, § 1758; 1906, § 1935; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1595; 1930, § 1548; 1942, § 1709]

§13-1-51. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 92; 1871, § 1085; 1880, § 1943; 1892, § 1761; 1906, § 1938; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1598; 1930, § 1551; 1942, § 1712; Laws, 1956, ch. 237, eff. July 1, 1956]

§13-1-53. [Codes, 1880, § 1944; 1892, § 1762; 1906, § 1939; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1599; 1930, § 1549; 1942, § 1710]

§13-1-55. [Codes, 1871, § 1076; 1880, § 1945; 1892, § 1763; 1906, § 1940; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1600; 1930, § 1550; 1942, § 1711; Laws, 1882, p. 111]

§13-1-57. [Codes, 1880, § 1650; 1892, § 1766; 1907, § 1943; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1603; 1930, § 1553; 1942, § 1714]

§13-1-59. [Codes, 1880, § 1651; 1892, § 1767; 1906, § 1944; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1604; 1930, § 1554; 1942, § 1715]

§13-1-61. [Codes, 1880, § 1655; 1892, § 1768; 1906, § 1945; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1605; 1930, § 1555; 1942, § 1716]

§13-1-63. [Codes, 1880, § 1652; 1892, § 1769; 1906, § 1946; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1606; 1930, § 1556; 1942, § 1717]

§13-1-65. [Codes, 1880, § 1660; 1892, § 1770; 1906, § 1947; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1607; 1930, § 1557; 1942, § 1718]

§13-1-67. [Codes, 1880, §§ 1653, 1654; 1892, §§ 1771, 1772; 1906, §§ 1948, 1949; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 1608, 1609; 1930, §§ 1558, 1559; 1942, §§ 1719, 1720]

§13-1-69. [Codes, 1880, § 1656; 1892, § 1773; 1906, § 1950; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1610; 1930, § 1560; 1942, § 1721]

§13-1-71. [Codes, 1880, § 1657; 1892, § 1774; 1906, § 1951; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1611; 1930, § 1561; 1942, § 1722]

§13-1-73. [Codes, 1880, § 1658; 1892, § 1775; 1906, § 1952; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1612; 1930, § 1562; 1942, § 1723]

§13-1-75. [Codes, 1880, § 1659; 1892, § 1776; 1906, § 1953; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1613; 1930, § 1563; 1942, § 1724]

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 22, additionally provides that “the provisions of said section shall continue to apply to all actions and proceedings pending in the Supreme, chancery, circuit and county courts of this state prior to the repeal of said sections.” As to current statutory provisions for civil discovery, see §§13-1-201 et seq.

Former §13-1-27 related to depositions.

Former §13-1-29 related to deposition for use in a justice’s court.

Former §13-1-31 related to affidavit to be made by party desiring to take deposition.

Former §13-1-33 related to depositions of witnesses in state; before whom taken; notice.

Former §13-1-35 related to interrogatories to nonresident witness filed.

Former §13-1-37 related to persons to whom commissions may be directed.

Former §13-1-39 related to service of copies of interrogatories and notices.

Former §13-1-41 related to notice to nonresident or absent party.

Former §13-1-43 related to taking, returning, and opening depositions.

Former §13-1-45 related to examination from day to day.

Former §13-1-47 related to admissibility of depositions; attendance of witness may be procured.

Former §13-1-49 related to exceptions to depositions.

Former §13-1-51 related to obtaining pre-trial testimony of adversary.

Former §13-1-53 related to party may examine adversary in open court.

Former §13-1-55 related to interested witness may be examined in open court.

Former §13-1-57 related to filing of written statement to institute proceeding perpetuating testimony.

Former §13-1-59 related to notice in case of resident witness.

Former §13-1-61 related to notice in case of nonresident witness.

Former §13-1-63 related to service, return, and publication of notices.

Former §13-1-65 related to service of notice upon minor.

Former §13-1-67 related to perpetuation of testimony – taking of deposition of witness in state.

Former §13-1-69 related to perpetuation of testimony – taking of deposition of nonresident.

Former §13-1-71 related to depositions received and recorded.

Former §13-1-73 related to admissibility of depositions.

Former §13-1-75 related to costs paid by party procuring services.

§ 13-1-77. State custodian of books authorized to certify copies; admissibility of copies.

All public officers in this state having the charge or custody of any public books, records, papers, or writings, are authorized to certify copies of the same.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 235; 1871, § 814; 1880, § 1632; 1892, § 1791; 1906, § 1968; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1628; 1930, § 1564; 1942, § 1725; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 88, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Furnishing by secretary of state of certificate of the official character of any state officer, see §7-3-43.

Admissibility of bank’s copy of customer’s financial records, see §13-1-245.

Furnishing copy of municipal ordinance in judicial proceeding, see §21-13-17.

Prima facie evidentiary value of copies of records of state registrar of vital statistics, see §41-57-9.

When book of record of conveyances shall not be removed from courthouse, see §89-5-39.

Rule providing for the authentication of official documents, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 44.

Authentication and identification of evidence generally, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 901-903.

Evidence of contents of writings, recordings, and photographs generally, see Miss. R. Evid. 1001-1008.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Proof of prior convictions may be made by certified copies of judgments of convictions. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 612 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 6118 (U.S. 1990), overruled, Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 454 (Miss. 1991).

Certified copies of sentencing orders were proper proof of prior convictions, sufficient under habitual offender statute, where certification at issue contained attestation that copy was true and correct, and attestation bore seal of court; lack of book and page number were not fatal. Monroe v. State, 515 So. 2d 860, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2764 (Miss. 1987).

Introduction into evidence at capital murder trial of records of defendant’s conviction in municipal court via the custodian of such records was not error. Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2609 (Miss. 1986).

The certified abstract of a court record showing a defendant’s prior conviction was competent evidence of such conviction and was not rendered incompetent by the fact that the abstract included the punishment inflicted for the prior offense. Lovelace v. State, 410 So. 2d 876, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 1875 (Miss. 1982).

In a prosecution for the unlawful possession of a slot machine found upon the accused’s premises during a search by national guardsmen under authority of an executive order, and a search warrant issued by the county judge, it was not error to introduce in evidence a copy of the executive order, certified by the secretary of state, since whatever right, if any, accused had to subpoena witnesses and contradict the facts set forth in the original executive order applied as well to the copy as to the original. Brady v. State, 229 Miss. 677, 91 So. 2d 751, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1957).

This section [Code 1942, § 1725] is applicable to the commissioner of public safety and therefore certified copy of orders suspending defendant’s driving license was competent evidence in prosecution for driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway without a driving license. Middleton v. State, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 508 (Miss. 1952).

A certified copy of the docket entries of a justice of peace showing charge of illegal possession of liquor, issuance of warrant, trial, plea of guilty, fine and payment of fine is admissible in prosecution for second offense to show prior conviction. Vincent v. State, 200 Miss. 423, 27 So. 2d 556, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 305 (Miss. 1946).

Statute [Code 1942, § 568], regulating manner of probating claims and providing for withdrawal of original note of deceased, when clerk has made and retained copy thereof, authorized withdrawal of original attached affidavit where clerk made and retained certified copy thereof. Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Jordan's Estate, 171 Miss. 332, 157 So. 876, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1934).

For copy or excerpt from journal of senate deposited with secretary of state to be admissible in evidence it must be certified to by him. Witherspoon v. State, 138 Miss. 310, 103 So. 134, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1925).

A board of supervisors’ books showing duplicate receipts given by a convict contractor to a sheriff for convicts is admissible in an action against the contractor’s bondsmen. State use of Panola County v. Oliver, 78 Miss. 5, 27 So. 988, 1900 Miss. LEXIS 72 (Miss. 1900).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes books of original entry within rule as to admissibility of books of account. 17 A.L.R.2d 235.

Am. Jur.

29A Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Evidence, §§ 1270 et seq.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 621, Examination and Identification of Photocopies and Photocopiers.

CJS.

32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 1133, 1144, 1145.

Law Reviews.

McCormick, The Repealer: Conflicts in Evidence Created by Misapplication of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103. 67 Miss L J 547, Winter, 1997.

§ 13-1-79. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 230; 1871, § 809; 1880, § 1624; 1892, § 1783; 1906, § 1960; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1620; 1930, § 1583; 1942, § 1745]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-79 related to admissibility of certified copies of records of any united states office.

§ 13-1-81. Presumptions attending certificates, attestation, etc.

Any certificate, attestation, or authentication, purporting to have been made or given by any person as an officer of any state or of the United States, shall be prima facie evidence of the official character of such person.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1629; 1892, § 1796; 1906, § 1973; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1633; 1930, § 1565; 1942, § 1726.

Cross References —

Proof of documents generally, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 44.

Authentication and identification of evidence generally, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 901-903.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Judicial record of another state cannot be proved or admitted in courts of this state as evidence of a fact until there has been compliance with authentication act of Congress, 28 USC § 687. Wallace v. Herring, 207 Miss. 658, 43 So. 2d 100, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1949).

Certificates of clerk of circuit court of Cook County and of clerk of superior court of Cook County which do not show that the signer of certificate is in fact clerk are not admissible in court of this state to prove that there was no divorce between resident of this state and resident of Cook County, Illinois as certificates were not authenticated in manner provided by 28 USC § 687. Wallace v. Herring, 207 Miss. 658, 43 So. 2d 100, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1949).

Certificate of clerk of foreign court showing the amount paid under divorce decree directing payment in instalments of money for support of minor child is presumed to be correct and the clerk is presumed to have accounted for all payments received by him. Hatrak v. Hatrak, 206 Miss. 239, 39 So. 2d 779, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1949).

§§ 13-1-83 through 13-1-117. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-1-83. [Codes, 1880, § 1628; 1892, § 1795; 1906, § 1972; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1632; 1930, § 1566; 1942, § 1727]

§13-1-85. [Codes, 1942, § 4065.7-04; Laws, 1966, ch. 554, § 4]

§13-1-87. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 307; 1880, § 1787; 1892, § 1788; 1906, § 1965; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1625; 1930, § 1567; 1942, § 1728]

§13-1-89. [Codes, 1880, § 1749; 1892, § 1792; 1906, § 1969; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1629; 1930, § 1568; 1942, § 1729; Laws, 1896, ch. 101]

§13-1-91. [Codes, 1880, § 2211; 1892, § 1780; 1906, § 1957; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1617; 1930, § 1569; 1942, § 1730]

§13-1-93. [Codes, 1857, ch. 8, art. 3; 1880, § 2388; 1892, § 1790; 1906, § 1967; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1627; 1930, § 1570; 1942, § 1731]

§13-1-95. [Codes, 1892, § 1807; 1906, § 1984; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1644; 1930, § 1571; 1942, § 1732]

§13-1-97. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 11 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 228; 1871, § 807; 1880, § 1622; 1892, § 1779; 1906, § 1956; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1616; 1930, § 1572; 1942, § 1733; Laws, 1896, chs. 101, 102]

§13-1-99. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 228; 1871, § 807; 1880, § 1622; 1892, § 1778; 1906, § 1955; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1615; 1930, § 1584; 1942, § 1746]

§13-1-101. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 2; 1857, ch. 61, art. 227; 1871, § 806; 1880, § 1621; 1892, § 1777; 1906, § 1954; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1614; 1930, § 1585; 1942, § 1747]

§13-1-103. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 34, art. 1 (7); 1857, ch. 40, art 7; 1871, § 1761; 1880, § 1149; 1892, § 1789; 1906, § 1966; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1626; 1930, § 1573; 1942, § 1734]

§13-1-105. [Codes, 1857, ch. 60, art. 48; 1871, § 1104; 1880, § 1975; 1892, § 1781; 1906, § 1958; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1618; 1930, § 1574; 1942, § 1735]

§13-1-107. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 231; 1871, § 810; 1880, § 1625; 1892, § 1784; 1906, § 1961; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1621; 1930, § 1575; 1942, § 1736]

§13-1-109. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 4 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 232; 1871, § 811; 1880, § 1626; 1892, § 1785; 1906, § 1962; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1622; 1930, § 1576; 1942, § 1737]

§13-1-111. [Codes, 1942, § 1749; Laws, 1936, ch. 253]

§13-1-113. [Codes, 1892, § 1786; 1906, § 1963; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1623; 1930, § 1577; 1942, § 1738]

§13-1-114. [En Laws, 1979, ch. 389; Am 1986, ch. 359]

§13-1-115. [Codes, 1871, § 1700; 1880, § 526; 1892, § 1806; 1906, § 1983; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1643; 1930, § 1578; 1942, §§ 1739, 1740]

§13-1-117. [Codes, 1857, ch. 60, art. 131; 1871, § 1189; 1880, § 2091; 1892, § 1787; 1906, § 1964; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1624; 1930, § 1586; 1942, § 1748]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-83 related to admissibility and effect of certificate of officer of search in office.

Former §13-1-85 related to admissibility of state records preserved by department of archives and history.

Former §13-1-87 related to certificate of clerk of board of supervisors as evidence of default.

Former §13-1-89 related to evidence of enrollment of judgment.

Former §13-1-91 related to copies of records relating to conveyance under judgments of justices of the peace.

Former §13-1-93 related to copies of taxes bill of costs as evidence of amount due.

Former §13-1-95 related to admissibility and effect of certain transcribed records.

Former §13-1-97 related to admissibility of original writings and the like or records or copies thereof.

Former §13-1-99 related to admissibility of copies of writings recorded in any other state.

Former §13-1-101 related to admissibility of copies of foreign writings and the like.

Former §13-1-103 related to admissibility of certificates of marriages and copies thereof.

Former §13-1-105 related to admissibility of certified copies of wills and records thereof.

Former §13-1-107 related to admissibility and effect of certified copies from books of entries of land.

Former §13-1-109 related to admissibility of certified copies of field-notes and maps.

Former §13-1-111 related to admissibility of transcribed testimony.

Former §13-1-113 related to surveyor’s certificate as prima facie evidence of certain facts.

Former §13-1-114 permitted the certificate of a physician, chemist, or technician to be admitted as proof of the identity of a controlled substance if the analysis was performed in an approved laboratory and the certificate was properly attested to by the analyst.

Former §13-1-115 related to tax collector’s conveyance and list of lands sold as prima facie evidence.

Former §13-1-117 related to certified copy of appointment of foreign executor, administrator or guardian.

§ 13-1-119. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1989, ch. 465, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

[Codes, 1880, § 1059; 1892, § 1808; 1906, § 1985; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1645; 1930, § 1580; 1942, § 1741; Laws 1912, ch. 215]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-119 related to injuries to persons or property by railroads and certain others as prima facie evidence of want of skill.

§ 13-1-121. Injury to livestock in transit as prima facie evidence of carrier’s want of skill.

In all actions against common carriers for injury or damage done to livestock while in transit, proof that the injury inflicted or damage done was inflicted or done to the livestock while in transit, shall be prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the common carrier, their agents and employees in handling the shipment of livestock so injured or damaged.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1921 Supp., § 1647a; 1930, § 1581; 1942, § 1743; Laws, 1920, ch. 241.

Cross References —

Relevancy of evidence generally, see Rules 401-412, Mississippi Rules of Evidence.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

14 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers §§ 587, 588

29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence §§ 143, 229, 232.

13 Am. Jur. 2d(Rev), Carriers §§ 375 et seq.

14 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers §§ 587, 588; 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence §§ 143, 229, 232.

CJS.

13 C.J.S., Carriers §§ 400 et seq.

§ 13-1-123. Injury to persons or property from operation of motor vehicle as making out prima facie case.

In any action brought to recover any damages, either to person or property, caused by running or operating a motor vehicle in violation of any of the provisions of Chapters 3 and 5 of Title 63 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall be deemed to have made out a prima facie case by showing the fact of such injury, and that such person or persons operating, or causing to be run or operated, such motor vehicle, was at the time of the injury running or operating, or causing the said motor vehicle to be run or operated in a manner contrary to the provisions of Chapters 3 and 5 of Title 63 of the Mississippi Code of 1972.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 5785; 1930, § 5588; 1942, § 1742; Laws, 1916, ch. 116.

Cross References —

Other sections derived from same 1942 code section, see §§63-3-11,63-7-81.

Relevancy of evidence generally, see Miss. R. Evid. 401-412.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a personal injury action, a truck driver who struck a pedestrian was not negligent as a matter of law by virtue of the fact that he did not see the pedestrian in the highway in time to avoid striking him; the issue of the driver’s negligence was for the jury to decide. Hood v. Oakley, 519 So. 2d 1236, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1988).

In an action for damages resulting from an automobile accident, although negligence will not be presumed because the accident and the injury occurred, the accident is a proper circumstance or fact to be considered by the jury in deciding the issue of negligence. Bigelow v. Sports Cars, Ltd., 221 So. 2d 108, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1492 (Miss. 1969).

In an action for damages resulting from an automobile accident, an instruction to the effect that if the rights of the plaintiff were doubtful in the minds of the jury, the jury should find for the defendant, because the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove his case by the greater weight of the believable evidence or the plaintiff has no right to recover, was improper, as leading to the conclusion that the jury was required to believe that the plaintiff must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, placing a greater burden of proof on the plaintiff than is required in a civil case. Bigelow v. Sports Cars, Ltd., 221 So. 2d 108, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1492 (Miss. 1969).

While a patrolman or police officer, not an eyewitness to an accident, who investigates the accident shortly after it happens may properly testify as to the matters and things that he finds at the scene, he cannot be allowed to invade the province of the jury by giving his opinion as to how the accident happened. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

Automobile driver killing mule while driving at excessive speed was prima facie negligent. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

Automobile held not dangerous instrumentality, rendering owner liable for driver’s negligent use. Vicksburg Gas Co. v. Ferguson, 140 Miss. 543, 106 So. 258, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1925).

Judgment for guest injured in automobile not reversed because of instructions whose error, if any, was harmless. Friis v. Gahan, 139 Miss. 375, 104 So. 170, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1925).

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “operation” or “negligence in operation” within statute making owner of motor vehicle liable for negligence in its operation. 13 A.L.R.2d 378.

Admissibility, in civil motor vehicle accident case, of evidence that driver was or was not involved in previous accidents. 20 A.L.R.2d 1210.

Lack of proper automobile registration or operator’s license as evidence of operator’s negligence. 29 A.L.R.2d 963.

Admissibility of opinion evidence as to whether vehicle involved in collision was standing still or moving. 33 A.L.R.2d 866.

Admissibility in action involving motor vehicle accident of evidence as to manner in which participant was driving before reaching scene of accident. 46 A.L.R.2d 9.

Custom or practice of drivers of motor vehicles as affecting liability based on violation of law. 77 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Am. Jur.

7A Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 30, 31.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 360 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 582, 587 et seq.

§§ 13-1-124 through 13-1-129. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-1-124. [En Laws, 1981, ch. 361, § 1]

§13-1-125. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 233; 1871, § 812; 1880, § 1630; 1892, § 1793; 1906, § 1970; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1630; 1930, § 1593; 1942, § 1756]

§13-1-127. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 234; 1871, § 813; 1880, § 1631; 1892, § 1794; 1906, § 1971; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1631; 1930, § 1594; 1942, § 1757]

§13-1-129. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 9; 1857, ch. 61, art. 240; 1871, § 816; 1880, § 1636; 1892, § 1802; 1906, § 1979; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1639; 1930, § 1592; 1942, § 1755]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-124 provided that three forms of evidence, affidavits of the automobile owner and operator, an affidavit of the commissioner of public safety, or an affidavit of the claimant, would constitute prima facie evidence of an automobile owner and operator’s uninsured status.

Former §13-1-125 related to certified copies of bonds of officers and others as evidence.

Former §13-1-127 related to copies of writings filed in other courts as evidence.

Former §13-1-129 related to record of dishonor of bills and notes as evidence.

§ 13-1-131. Land-office certificates.

All certificates issued in pursuance of any act of Congress by any board of commissioners, register of any land office, or any other person authorized to issue such certificate, founded on any warrant, order of survey, entry, grant, confirmation, donation, preemption, or purchase from the United States of any land in this state, shall vest the full legal title to such land in the person to whom such certificate is granted, his heirs or assigns, so far as to enable the holder thereof to maintain an action thereon.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 11 (2); 1857, ch. 61, art. 229; 1871, § 808; 1880, § 1623; 1892, § 1782; 1906, § 1959; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1619; 1930, § 1582; 1942, § 1744; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 89, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Records of land office, see §§7-11-13 et seq.

What lands shall be conveyed only by a writing signed and delivered, see §89-1-3.

Recording of United States or state patents, see §89-5-11.

Evidence of public records generally, see Miss. R. Evid. 803.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Evidence held inadmissible to contradict official map on file in general land office. H. Weston Lumber Co. v. Strahan, 128 Miss. 54, 90 So. 452, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 298 (Miss. 1921).

Plaintiff introducing certificates from U. S. Land Office showing his entry of land involved and cancellation of prior entry under which defendants claimed, could bring ejectment. Gilleylen v. Isbel, 119 Miss. 566, 81 So. 161, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1919).

This section [Code 1942, § 1744] is only rule of evidence, and establishes only prima facie title which may be defeated by paramount title. Halloway v. Miles, 110 Miss. 532, 70 So. 697, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 1915).

Plaintiff holding letter or writing signed by register of U. S. Land Office allowing his application to make homestead entry, may maintain ejectment. Methodist Episcopal Camp Ground Ass'n v. Brown, 105 Miss. 313, 62 So. 276, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1913).

Receiver’s certificate to one in possession of public lands claiming as homestead constitutes title supporting action for cutting and removing timber. Hiwannee Lumber Co. v. McPhearson, 95 Miss. 589, 49 So. 741, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1909).

Grantee of certificate from register of land office holds full legal title to the land, and may maintain action thereon against a trespasser. Johnson v. Davis, 91 Miss. 708, 45 So. 979, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 207 (Miss. 1907).

The certificate vests title only when properly issued and while in full force and uncanceled. Where the certificate was indorsed “suspended for want of township plat,” and was deposited in the general land-office at Washington City, but was sent to the plaintiff to be used for the purpose of testing his title to the land, and then to be returned, it was insufficient to vest title and sustain ejectment. Davis v. Freeland's Lessee, 32 Miss. 645, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 1856).

The statute gives to the certificate the effect of vesting a complete legal title, to all intents and purposes, in the person to whom issued and his assignees, and not simply to entitle the holder to recover the land in an action. Lindsey v. Henderson, 27 Miss. 502, 1854 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1854).

A prior entry and a certificate thereof, without a patent, gives a better right in equity than a subsequent entry of the same land by another to whom a patent is issued; and a court of chancery, at the instance of the first enterer, will set aside the title of the patentee. Hester v. Kembrough, 20 Miss. 659, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 1849).

The certificate is but a substitute for a better title, and is not on an equal footing with a patent. If a patent be issued to another person to the same land after a certificate of entry to one without a patent, the holder of the patent will prevail in an action of ejectment against the holder of the certificate. Dickinson v. Brown, 17 Miss. 130, 1847 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1847).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

29A Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Evidence §§ 1226, 1227, 1229.

CJS.

32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 1133, 1135.

§§ 13-1-133 through 13-1-147. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-1-133. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 238; 1871, § 684; 1880, § 1634; 1892, § 1798; 1906, § 1975; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1635; 1930, § 1588; 1942, § 1751]

§13-1-135. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 239; 1871, § 685; 1880, § 1635; 1892, § 1799; 1906, § 1976; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1636; 1930, § 1589; 1942, § 1752]

§13-1-137. [Codes, 1892, § 1800; 1906, § 1977; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1637; 1930, § 1590; 1942, § 1753]

§13-1-139. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 237; 1871, § 683; 1880, § 1633; 1892, § 1797; 1906, § 1974, § 1974; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1634; 1930, § 1587; 1942, § 1750]

§13-1-141. [Codes, 1871, § 782; 1880, § 1627; 1892, § 1801; 1906, § 1978; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1638; 1930, § 1591; 1942, § 1754]

§13-1-143. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 7; 1857, ch. 61, art. 241; 1871, § 819; 1880, § 1637; 1892, § 1803; 1906, § 1980; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1640; 1930, § 1595; 1942, § 1758]

§13-1-145. [Codes, 1880, § 1639; 1892, § 1804; 1906, § 1981; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1641; 1930, § 1596; 1942, § 1759]

§13-1-147. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 1 (79); 1857, ch. 61, art. 224; 1871, § 688; 1880, § 2297; 1892, § 1809; 1906, § 1986; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1646; 1930, § 1597; 1942, § 1760]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-133 related to when partnership need not be proved.

Former §13-1-135 related to when subscription of stock need not be proved.

Former §13-1-137 related to when notice of dishonor of bills or notes need not be proved.

Former §13-1-139 related to when signature, execution of instrument, identity or names of persons, or the like, need not be proved.

Former §13-1-141 related to affidavit to correctness of account entitles affiant to judgment.

Former §13-1-143 related to proof of publication of notices.

Former §13-1-145 related to proof of posting of notice.

Former §13-1-147 related to private acts of legislative as evidence although not specially pleaded.

§ 13-1-149. Courts to take notice of law of United States, other states, territories and foreign countries.

When any question shall arise as to the law of the United States, or of any other state or territory of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, or of any foreign country, the court shall take notice of such law in the same manner as if the question arose under the law of this state.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 10; 1857, ch. 61, art. 226; 1871, § 805; 1880, § 2296; 1892, § 939; 1906, § 1015; Hemingway’s 1917, § 735; 1930, § 1598; 1942, § 1761.

Cross References —

Judicial notice of adjudicative facts, see Miss. R. Evid. 201.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Parties to controversy involving validity and effect of power of attorney which has not been acknowledged and recorded in manner of conveyance of land with respect to conveyance of real property situated in Greece may stipulate to application and enforcement of Mississippi rules of law, rather than otherwise applicable to Greek law; if parties do so, trial judge may proceed to adjudge all issues according to Mississippi law and enter final judgment which, subject to appeal, would not doubt be enforceable against parties in courts of Mississippi, even though, in Republic of Greece, judgment may not be worth paper it is written on. Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So. 2d 599, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2245 (Miss. 1985).

Before court may resolve question of whether power of attorney which has not been acknowledged and recorded in manner provided for instruments of conveyance of interests in land is valid and enforceable with respect to real property located in Republic of Greece, Greek law must be consulted to determine whether there is conflict between laws of Mississippi and those of Greece with respect to real property and powers of attorney. Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So. 2d 599, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2245 (Miss. 1985).

Proceeding for enforcement of purchase-money lien was not invalid because seller did not show notary public, before whom affidavit of seizure which was made in Ohio was taken, had authority to take and certify affidavits since court would take judicial notice of Ohio law authorizing notary public to administer and certify oaths. Parker v. McCaskey Register Co., 177 Miss. 347, 171 So. 337, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 277 (Miss. 1936).

Where right of action for employee’s death was based on foreign statute, it was unnecessary to plead statute. Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1930).

Courts will take judicial notice of another state’s statute regarding residence necessary to maintain divorce action. Williams v. State, 151 Miss. 82, 117 So. 360, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss. 1928).

In proceeding for custody of child in this state previous adjudication of another state not controlling. Haynie v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 85 So. 99, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 481 (Miss. 1920).

Injury occurring in Tennessee governed by Tennessee law. Turner v. Southern R. Co., 112 Miss. 359, 73 So. 62, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1916).

Action cannot be maintained in Mississippi for death in Louisiana unless permitted by law of Louisiana. Runt v. Illinois C. R. Co., 88 Miss. 575, 41 So. 1, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 157 (Miss. 1906).

Courts will not take judicial notice of town ordinances. Naul v. State, 70 Miss. 699, 12 So. 903 (Miss. 1893).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. 23 A.L.R.2d 1437.

Reception of evidence to contradict or rebut matters judicially noticed. 45 A.L.R.2d 1169.

Judicial notice of matters relating to public thoroughfares and parks. 48 A.L.R.2d 1102.

Federal or state law as governing federal court’s authority, in diversity action after Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, to take judicial notice of law of sister state or foreign country. 7 A.L.R. Fed. 921.

Am. Jur.

29 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Evidence §§ 117, 125, 126, 128 et seq.

CJS.

31A C.J.S., Evidence §§ 30-33, 38.

§ 13-1-151. Reproduction of business records; disposal of originals.

Any business may cause any or all records kept by such business in the regular course of its operation to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic or miniature photographic process which correctly, accurately and permanently copies, reproduces or forms a medium for copying or reproducing the original record on a film or other durable material, and such business may thereafter dispose of the original record, provided that every original record pertaining to any claim, tax or report due the State of Mississippi or any of its agencies shall be preserved for five (5) years from the thirty-first day of December of the year in which such claim arose, or such tax or report was due.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1761.5; Laws, 1964, ch. 488, §§ 1-5; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 90, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Admissibility of business records and copies, thereof, see Miss. R. Evid. 803 and 1001-1008.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A photostatic copy of a check from a purchaser of wood to the embezzler of it was properly admitted into evidence, and the original was not required, where absence of the original was explained and the photostatic copy was identified by an employee of the issuer of the check and the employee had signed the check. Bass v. State, 328 So. 2d 665, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1812 (Miss. 1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Admissibility in evidence of enlarged photographs or photostatic copies. 72 A.L.R.2d 308.

Photographic representation or photostat of writing as primary or secondary evidence within best evidence rule. 76 A.L.R.2d 1356.

Letters to or from customers or suppliers as business records under statutes authorizing reception of business records in evidence. 68 A.L.R.3d 1069.

Admissibility in state court proceedings of police reports as business records. 77 A.L.R.3d 115.

Business records: authentication and verification of bills and invoices under Rule 803(6) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 1 A.L.R.4th 316.

Admissibility of computerized private business records. 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Admissibility of school records under hearsay exemptions. 57 A.L.R.4th 1111.

Admissibility in state court proceedings of police reports as business records. 111 A.L.R.5th 1.

Admissibility of credit reports under Federal Business Records Act (28 USCS § 1732(a)). 19 A.L.R. Fed. 988.

Admissibility of records other than police reports, under Rule 803(6), Federal Rules of Evidence, providing for business records exception to hearsay rule. 61 A.L.R. Fed. 359.

Am. Jur.

29A Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Evidence § 1099.

CJS.

32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 1081, 1177, 1178 et seq.

§ 13-1-153. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1942, § 1761.7; Laws, 1966, ch. 525, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-153 related to settlement of property damage claim under motor vehicle liability policy; effect.

§ 13-1-155. Destruction or other disposal of exhibits following final determination of civil actions.

After not less than ninety (90) days after the final determination or disposition of any civil action, or if an appeal shall have been taken, then after not less than ninety (90) days after receiving a certificate of the final disposition of the action, the clerk of the court in which the action was filed or tried shall destroy, return or otherwise dispose of all exhibits which were filed in the action. Provided, however, that no exhibit shall be destroyed, returned or otherwise disposed of until after the expiration of the time within which a bill of review may be filed in applicable cases as provided in Section 11-5-121, Mississippi Code of 1972. The clerk shall notify the attorneys for all parties to the action and the owner or person having custody of the property prior to the court action before the expiration of the ninety (90) day period that the exhibits may be claimed.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 344, eff from and after passage (approved April 14, 1976).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 11-5-121 referred to in this section was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A court clerk may destroy, return, or dispose of all exhibits 90 days after the final disposition of a civil action, if the time for an appeal has expired; if a party has perfected an appeal, then the court clerk may destroy, return, or dispose of all exhibits 90 days after receiving a certificate of the final disposition of the action. Parker, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op #01-0159.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Consumption or destruction of physical evidence due to testing or analysis by prosecution’s expert as warranting suppression of evidence or dismissal of case against accused in state court. 40 A.L.R.4th 594.

Discovery Proceedings

§ 13-1-201. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-201 provided that §§13-1-226 through13-1-237, and §13-1-243 applied to civil proceedings in circuit, chancery, and county courts.

§§ 13-1-203 through 13-1-225. Reserved.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 2]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-226 contained general provisions governing discovery.

§ 13-1-227. Depositions before action or pending appeal.

Before action. —

  1. Petition. — A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of this state may file a verified petition in the circuit or chancery court in the county of the residence of any expected adverse party. The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show: (1) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of this state but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, (2) the subject matter of the expected action and his interest therein, (3) the facts which he desires to establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for desiring to perpetuate it, (4) the names or a description of the persons he expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known, and (5) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.
  2. Notice and service. — The petitioner shall thereafter serve a notice upon each person named in the petition as an expected adverse party, stating that the petitioner will apply to the court, at a time and place named therein, for the order described in the petition. At least twenty (20) days before the date of hearing the notice shall be served in the same manner of service of summons; but if such service cannot with due diligence be made upon any expected adverse party named in the petition, the court may make such order as is just for service by publication or otherwise, and shall appoint, for persons not served in the manner provided by law, an attorney who shall represent them, and, in case they are not otherwise represented, shall cross-examine the deponent.
  3. Order and examination. — If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226 through 13-1-237, 13-1-241, and 13-1-243; and the court may make orders of the character provided for by Section 13-1-234. For the purpose of applying Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226 through 13-1-237, 13-1-241, and 13-1-243, to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each reference therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the petition for such deposition was filed.
  4. Use of deposition. — If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226 through 13-1-237, 13-1-241, 13-1-243, it may be used in any action involving the same subject matter subsequently brought in a circuit, chancery or county court in accordance with Section 13-1-232(a).

Pending appeal. — If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the court in which the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the court. In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof as if the action was pending in the court. The motion shall show (1) the names and addresses of persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each; (2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the depositions to be taken and may make orders of the character provided for by Section 13-1-234, and thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under the same conditions as are prescribed in Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226 through 13-1-237, 13-1-241, and 13-1-243, for depositions taken in actions pending in the court.

Perpetuation by action.— This section does not limit the power of a court to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 3, eff from and after January 1, 1976.

Editor’s Notes —

Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226, 13-1-228, 13-1-230 to 13-1-237, 13-1-241 and 13-1-243 referred to in (a)(3), (a)(4) and (b) were repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Award of attorney fees and costs against attorney or party who abuses discovery procedures available under the rules of civil procedure, see §11-55-5.

Depositions in court-martial proceedings, see §33-13-327.

Depositions before action or pending appeal, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 27.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Section 13-1-227 refers only to the taking of depositions before an action is commenced or pending an appeal, and does not apply to the taking of a deposition after a law suit is filed but before trial. Wallace v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 443 So. 2d 843, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 3027 (Miss. 1983).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right to take depositions in perpetual remembrance for use in pending action. 70 A.L.R.2d 674.

Production and inspection of premises, persons, or things in proceeding to perpetuate testimony. 98 A.L.R.2d 909.

Use of videotape to take deposition for presentation at civil trial in state court. 66 A.L.R.3d 637.

Permissibility of testimony by telephone in state trial. 85 A.L.R.4th 476.

Right to perpetuation of testimony under Rule 27 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.60 A.L.R. Fed. 924.

Taxation of costs associated with videotaped depositions under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1920 and Rule 54(d) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 156 A.L.R. Fed. 311.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Depositions and Discovery §§ 4, 83.

8 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Depositions and Discovery, Forms 81 et seq. (depositions to perpetuate testimony before action).

8 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Depositions and Discovery, Forms 111-114 (depositions to perpetuate testimony pending appeal).

11 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Federal Practice and Procedure, Forms 891 et seq. (depositions to perpetuate testimony before action).

11 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Federal Practice and Procedure, Forms 911-913 (depositions to perpetuate testimony pending appeal).

For interpretative notes and decisions construing similar Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Court Rules volumes of the United States Code Service.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: Discovery-Rules 26-34, 36 and 37. 52 Miss. L. J. 119, March 1982.

§ 13-1-228. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 4]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-228 set forth persons before whom depositions could be taken.

§ 13-1-229. Stipulations regarding discovery procedure.

Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation (1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used like other depositions, and (2) modify the procedures provided by Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226 through 13-1-237, 13-1-241, and 13-1-243, for other methods of discovery, except that stipulations extending the time provided in Sections 13-1-233, 13-1-234 and 13-1-236 for responses to discovery may be made only with the approval of the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 5, eff from and after January 1, 1976.

Editor’s Notes —

Sections 13-1-201, 13-1-226, 13-1-228, 13-1-230 to 13-1-237, 13-1-241, and 13-1-243 referred to in this section were repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Award of attorney fees and costs against attorney or party who abuses discovery procedures available under the rules of civil procedure, see §11-55-5.

Stipulations regarding discovery procedure, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 29.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Depositions and Discovery, Forms 1 et seq. (stipulations relating to depositions).

11 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Federal Practice and Procedure, Forms 851-855 (stipulations relating to depositions).

For interpretative notes and decisions construing similar Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Court Rules volumes of the United States Code Service.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

§§ 13-1-230 through 13-1-243.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-1-230. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 6]

§13-1-231. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 7]

§13-1-232. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 8]

§13-1-233. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 9]

§13-1-234. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 10]

§13-1-236. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 11]

§13-1-237. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 12]

§13-1-241. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 13]

§13-1-243. [En Laws, 1975, ch. 501, § 14]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-230 governed the procedures for depositions upon oral examination.

Former §13-1-231 provided for procedures for depositions upon written questions.

Former §13-1-232 provided for the use of depositions in court proceedings.

Former §13-1-233 provided for the service of interrogatories upon parties and the use of responses at trial.

Former §13-1-234 provided for inspection by a party of documents or other evidence in another’s possession, and it prescribed procedure for entry upon another’s land for inspection.

Former §13-1-236 governed requests for admission.

Former §13-1-237 provided remedies and sanctions for failure to comply with discovery.

Former §13-1-241 governed methods of service of notices and other papers issued under §§13-1-226 through13-1-237, and §13-1-243.

Former §13-1-243 excluded discovery expenses from court costs.

§ 13-1-245. Bank expenses related to disclosure of customer’s financial records.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Bank” means any state or national bank located in Mississippi.
    2. “Custodian” includes a bank’s operations officer and any other person who is an official custodian of the bank’s records, as well as their deputies and assistants.
    3. “Customer” means any person or authorized representative of a person who has maintained or is maintaining an account or deposit of any type, or has utilized or is utilizing any service of a bank, or for whom a bank has acted or is acting as a fiduciary in relation to an account or deposit maintained in the person’s name.
    4. “Financial record” means any record in any form, or information derived from such record, that is maintained by a bank and pertains to a deposit or account of a customer, a service of the bank utilized by a customer or any other relationship between a customer and the bank.
    5. “Governmental authority” includes the state, any political subdivision, district and court, and any agency, department, officer or authorized employee of any of those entities.
  2. In any state court proceeding, if any party, including a governmental authority, requests a subpoena duces tecum (to be construed hereinafter to include a court order) to require a bank to assemble or provide a customer’s financial records, and the bank is not a party to the proceeding or is a party solely by reason of its holding assets of another party defendant with no cause of action alleged against the bank, the party requesting the subpoena shall pay to the court conducting the proceeding all reasonable charges of the bank in searching for, reproducing and transporting the records. This payment shall be made promptly when the copy of the records is delivered to the proper person, as provided in subsection (4) of this section, whether or not the financial records are entered into evidence, and the amount of the payment shall be the amount certified by the custodian in the affidavit required by subsection (6) of this section. The payment of these reasonable charges shall be in addition to any witness fees.
  3. Except as hereinafter provided, when a subpoena duces tecum is served upon a custodian of records of any bank in any state court proceeding in which the bank is not a party, or in which the bank is a party solely by reason of its holding assets of another party defendant with no cause of action alleged against the bank, and such subpoena requires the production of a customer’s financial records, it shall be deemed sufficient compliance if the custodian shall furnish a true and correct copy of all records described in the subpoena.
  4. The copy of the records shall be separately enclosed in an inner envelope or wrapper, sealed, with the title and number of the action, name of witness and date of subpoena clearly inscribed thereon. The sealed envelope or wrapper shall then be enclosed in an outer envelope or wrapper, sealed, and directed as follows: If the subpoena directs attendance in court, to the clerk of such court or to the judge thereof; if the subpoena directs attendance at a deposition, to the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken, at a place designated in the subpoena for the taking of the deposition or at his place of business; in other cases, to the officer, body or tribunal conducting the hearing, at a like address.
  5. Unless the sealed envelope or wrapper is returned to a witness who is to appear personally, the copy of the records shall remain sealed and shall be opened only at the time of trial, deposition or other hearing, upon the direction of the judge, court, officer, body or tribunal conducting the proceeding, in the presence of all parties who have appeared in person or by counsel at such trial, deposition or hearing. However, the sealed envelope or wrapper may be opened and the records examined prior to the trial, deposition or hearing upon written consent of all parties or their counsel of record.
  6. The records shall be accompanied by an affidavit of a custodian stating in substance: (a) that the affiant is a duly authorized custodian of the records and has authority to certify such records; (b) that the copy is a true copy of all the records described in the subpoena; (c) that the records were prepared by the personnel of the bank, bank officers or persons acting under the control of either, in the ordinary course of the bank’s business at or near the time of the act, condition or event reported therein; and (d) certifying the amount of the reasonable charges of the bank for furnishing such copies. If the bank has none of the records described or only part thereof, the custodian shall so state in the affidavit and furnish the affidavit and such records as are available. The furnishing of the affidavit with respect to such reasonable charges shall be sufficient proof of such expense, which shall be taxed as costs of the court. All reasonable charges paid hereunder shall be remitted to the bank not later than final determination of the suit by the court where the suit is initiated.
  7. The copy of the record shall be admissible in evidence to the same extent as though the original thereof were offered and the custodian had been present and testified to the matters stated in the affidavit. The affidavit shall be admissible in evidence and the matters stated therein shall be presumed true in the absence of a preponderance of evidence to the contrary.
  8. In rare cases where the personal attendance of the custodian may be required, the subpoena duces tecum shall contain a clause which reads: “The procedure authorized pursuant to subsection (3) of this section will not be deemed sufficient compliance with this subpoena.”
  9. In rare cases where the personal attendance of the custodian and the production of the original record may be required, the subpoena duces tecum shall contain a clause which reads: “Original records are required and the procedure authorized pursuant to subsection (3) of this section will not be deemed sufficient compliance with this subpoena.”

    If the bank does not have such original record, it shall furnish such copies as it may have and shall be compensated as provided for in this section.

  10. Original records may be withdrawn after introduction into evidence and copies substituted, unless otherwise directed for good cause by the court, judge, officer, body or tribunal conducting the hearing. The custodian may prepare copies of original records in advance of testifying for the purpose of making substitution of the original record, and reasonable charges for furnishing such copies shall be taxed as costs of the court. If copies are not prepared in advance, they can be made and substituted at any time after introduction of the original record, and reasonable charges for furnishing such copies shall be taxed as costs of the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 383, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

General duty of nondisclosure of depositors’ names, see §81-5-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Existence of fiduciary relationship between bank and depositor or customer so as to impose special duty of disclosure upon bank. 70 A.L.R.3d 1344.

Admissibility of computerized private business records. 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Dismissal of state court action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to obey request or order for production of documents or other objects. 27 A.L.R.4th 51.

Am. Jur.

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Depositions and Discovery §§ 231- 235.

29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 836.

29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 1255.

CJS.

32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 1197, 1198

32A C.J.S., §§ 1202, 1259, 1278, 1351-1355.

27 C.J.S., Discovery §§ 122-129.

32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 1197, 1198; 32A C.J.S., §§ 1202, 1259, 1278, 1351-1355.

§ 13-1-226. Repealed.

Examination of Judgment Debtor by Judgment Creditor

§ 13-1-261. Judgment creditor’s right to examination of judgment debtor.

  1. To aid in the satisfaction of a judgment of more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), the judgment creditor may examine the judgment debtor, his books, papers or documents, upon any matter relating to his property as provided in Sections 13-1-261 through 13-1-271; except that no single judgment creditor may cause a judgment debtor to submit to examination under this section more than once in a period of six (6) months.
  2. In addition to the method of examination prescribed in subsection (1), the judgment creditor may, in the alternative, utilize the discovery procedures set forth in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of examining the judgment debtor.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 381, § 1; Laws, 1977, ch. 407; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 91, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Depositions and discovery, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 26 through 37.

Judgment creditor’s examination of judgment debtor or other persons, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

Enforcement of judgments, see Uniform Rule of Procedure for Justice Court 2.15.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A judgment creditor may conduct a post-judgment examination of a third party who is not employed by nor an agent of the judgment debtor, but such an examination is limited in scope to nonprivileged matters which are relevant to the judgment creditor’s allegations that the judgment debtor has assets which properly should be discovered and used to satisfy the judgment. Ex parte Burchinal, 571 So. 2d 281, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 723 (Miss. 1990).

Circuit Court properly ordered examination of judgment debtor and production of documents in county where suit was filed, where judgment debtor had waived its right to argue that it could not be found in that county, and thus statute concerning examination of judgment debtor by judgment creditor was construed consistently with venue already established for trial of action. H & W Transfer & Cartage Service, Inc. v. Griffin, 511 So. 2d 895, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2610 (Miss. 1987).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A plaintiff may not file an examination of a judgment debtor more than once every six months, however there is no limit to the number of examinations that may be filed. Strahan, June 11, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0249.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Execution of Judgments §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

49 C.J.S., Judgments §§ 919-921, 923 et seq.

§ 13-1-263. Venue for filing motion for examination and for conducting examination.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the written motion for the examination of a judgment debtor shall be filed, and the proceedings conducted, in the court which rendered the judgment.
  2. If the judgment debtor is an individual who is domiciled in the state but not in the county where the judgment was rendered, or who has changed his domicile to another county after the institution of the suit, the written motion for his examination shall be filed, and the examination conducted, in a court of competent jurisdiction in the county of his then domicile. If the judgment debtor is a nonresident, the petition for his examination shall be filed, and the examination conducted, in a court of competent jurisdiction in any county where he may be found. In any case mentioned in this paragraph, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the written motion for examination.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 381, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1976).

Cross References —

Rule governing judgment creditor’s examination of judgment debtor or other persons, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Circuit Court properly ordered examination of judgment debtor and production of documents in county where suit was filed, where judgment debtor had waived its right to argue that it could not be found in that county, and thus statute concerning examination of judgment debtor by judgment creditor was construed consistently with venue already established for trial of action. H & W Transfer & Cartage Service, Inc. v. Griffin, 511 So. 2d 895, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2610 (Miss. 1987).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Where a person received a judgment in in the county of his residence against a defendant who is a resident of another county, since, pursuant to this section, the motion for examination is filed and the examination occurs in the county of the domicile of the defendant the fee would likewise be received by the court of that county. Court costs in connection with examination should be taxed against the judgment debtor unless the court determines that the creditor invoked the remedy needlessly, in which case the court may tax the costs against the creditor. Carlisle, Dec. 10, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0607.

§ 13-1-265. Order to appear for examination; effect of satisfaction of judgment.

On ex parte written motion of the judgment creditor, personally or through his attorney, the court shall order the judgment debtor to appear in court for examination at a time fixed by the court, not less than five (5) days from the date of service on him of the motion and order, and to produce any books, papers, and other documents relating to his property described in the motion; provided, however, that satisfaction of the judgment shall discharge the judgment debtor from his responsibility to appear for the examination as ordered by the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 381, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1976).

Cross References —

Rule governing judgment creditor’s examination of judgment debtor or other persons, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

An order to appear for an examination of judgment debtor should be served as in other civil cases and, therefore, may be posted on the door of the defendant’s usual place of abode; however, service of process by means of posting on a door would not subject a defendant to contempt for failure to appear for an examination of judgment debtor hearing. Parker, May 3, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0225.

Where a person received a judgment in in the county of his residence against a defendant who is a resident of another county, the motion of the judgment debtor filed in the county of domicile of the defendant and the order entered by that court should be served on the defendant by a process server. Carlisle, Dec. 10, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0607.

§ 13-1-267. Swearing of judgment debtor; use of testimony of judgment debtor in criminal proceeding.

  1. The debtor shall be sworn to tell the truth in the same manner as a witness in a civil action.
  2. No testimony given by a debtor shall be used in any criminal proceeding against him, except for perjury committed at such examination.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 381, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1976).

Cross References —

Rule governing judgment creditor’s examination of judgment debtor or other persons, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

§ 13-1-269. Court costs.

Court costs in connection with the examination shall be taxed against the judgment debtor, except that if the court determines that the creditor invoked the remedy needlessly, the court may tax the costs against the creditor.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 381, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1976).

§ 13-1-271. Contempt.

If the motion and order have been served personally on the judgment debtor, and he refuses to appear for the examination or to produce his books, papers, or other documents when ordered to do so, or if he refuses to answer any question held pertinent by the court, he may be punished for contempt.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 381, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 26, 1976).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Failure to comply with a court’s order for the examination of a judgment debtor amounts to civil contempt, and a defendant should be sentenced accordingly. Boykin, Oct. 6, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0586.

If a defendant fails to appear for an examination of judgment debtor hearing after being personally served, the court may issue a contempt warrant for the defendant’s arrest. The defendant may be jailed until he complies with the examination of judgment debtor order. Strahan, June 11, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0249.

Interpreters For the Deaf

§ 13-1-301. Definitions.

As used in Sections 13-1-301 through 13-1-315 the following terms shall have the definition ascribed to them herein unless the context requires otherwise:

“Deaf person” means any person whose hearing is totally impaired or whose hearing is so seriously impaired as to prohibit the person from understanding oral communications when spoken to in a normal conversational tone. The term further includes, but is not limited to, a person who is mute and a person who is both deaf and mute.

“Qualified interpreter” means an interpreter certified by the national registry of interpreters for the deaf, Mississippi Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf or, in the event a qualified interpreter so certified is not available, an interpreter whose qualifications are otherwise determined. Efforts to obtain the services of a qualified interpreter qualified with a legal skills certificate or a comprehensive skills certificate will be made prior to accepting services of an interpreter with lesser certification. No qualified interpreter may be appointed unless the appointing authority and the deaf person make a preliminary determination that the interpreter is able to interpret accurately the statements of the deaf person and interpret the proceedings in which a deaf person may be involved.

“Oral interpreter” means a person who interprets language through facial and lip movements only and who does not use manual communication. An oral interpreter shall be provided upon the request of a deaf person who does not communicate in sign language. The right of a deaf person to have an interpreter may not be waived except by a deaf person who does not use sign language and who initiates such request for waiver in writing. Such waiver is subject to approval of counsel of such deaf person, if existent, and is subject to approval of the appointing authority.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

Appointment of interpreter, see Uniform Rule of Procedure for Justice Court 1.15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: use or nonuse of interpreter at prosecution of hearing-impaired defendant. 86 A.L.R.4th 698.

Am. Jur.

75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trials §§ 105- 107.

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial § 112.

§ 13-1-303. Appointment of interpreter; court proceedings; policy custody; statements of deaf person as evidence.

  1. In any case in law or equity before any court or the grand jury, wherein any deaf person is a party to such action, either as a defendant or witness, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter of the deaf sign language to interpret the proceedings to the deaf person and interpret his testimony or statements and to assist in preparation with counsel.
  2. Whenever any deaf person is a party in interest, either as a defendant or witness at a proceeding before any department, board, commission, agency or licensing authority of the state or any political subdivision of the state, the department, board, commissioner, agency or licensing authority conducting the proceedings shall appoint a qualified interpreter of the deaf sign language to interpret the proceedings to the deaf person and to interpret any testimony he may give.
  3. In the event that a deaf person has been detained in police custody or has been arrested for any alleged violation of a criminal law, a qualified interpreter or, upon request, an oral interpreter shall be provided by the arresting officer and his superiors prior to any interrogation or taking of a statement from the person.
  4. In the event any interrogation statements in writing are made to the arresting officer by the deaf person with the qualified interpreter present, such interrogation and answers thereto shall be preserved and turned over to the court in the event such person is tried for the alleged offense.
  5. Any statement made by a deaf person to a law enforcement officer may be used as evidence against that person only if the statement was made, offered or elicited in the presence of a qualified interpreter of the deaf sign language. No statements taken from such deaf person prior to the presence of a qualified interpreter may be admissible in court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

Duty of state to support institutions for the deaf, see Miss. Const. Art. 8, § 209.

Registration of persons with impaired hearing, see §37-23-123.

Schools for the deaf, see §§43-5-1 et seq.

Rights and liabilities of deaf persons generally, see §§43-6-1 et seq.

Appointment of interpreter in criminal cases, see §99-17-7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for postconviction relief on his claim that he was denied due process by the State’s failure to provide an interpreter during his arrest, interrogation, and pretrial matters because there was no evidence in the record concerning the pre-court events other than defendant’s verified motion which was not even supported by his own affidavit; the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion on incompetency grounds because no evidence was presented by defendant to support his claim of mental incompetency. Easterling v. State, 281 So.3d 243, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

A search pursuant to a defendant’s consent was constitutionally valid, even though the defendant, who was deaf, was not afforded an interpreter in accordance with §13-1-303(3), where the testimony of the law enforcement officers clearly indicated that the defendant understood what he was doing when he agreed to the search, the defendant was asked questions to which he gave appropriate responses, he was specifically told that he did not have to consent to the search, both the request for and the granting of the consent were done in writing, and the defendant used communicative and cognitive faculties other than hearing when he consented to the search. Shook v. State, 552 So. 2d 841, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Deaf-mute as witness. 50 A.L.R.4th 1188.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: use or nonuse of interpreter at prosecution of hearing-impaired defendant. 86 A.L.R.4th 698.

Am. Jur.

75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trials § 107.

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial § 112.

§ 13-1-305. Hearing to determine need for interpreter; notification of need.

If the judge, or any other person charged under the provisions of Sections 13-1-301 through 13-1-315 with providing an interpreter, believes that a person claiming to be entitled to an interpreter may not actually be deaf or hearing impaired, unable to communicate verbally because of his hearing disability, or otherwise not entitled to such services, the judge may, on good cause shown, hold a hearing to determine the extent of the person’s handicap or disability and the bona fide need for interpreting services. If it is determined that the person is not entitled to such services, an interpreter shall not be provided. Except in a preliminary hearing in a criminal case, every deaf person whose appearance before a proceeding entitles him to an interpreter shall notify the appointing authority of his disability not less than five (5) days prior to any appearance and shall request at such time the services of an interpreter. When a deaf person reasonably expects to need an interpreter for more than a single day, he shall so notify the appointing authority, and such notification shall be sufficient for the duration of his participation in the proceedings. When a deaf person receives notification of an appearance less than five (5) days before such appearance, he shall provide his notification and request for an interpreter as soon thereafter as practicable.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

Registration of persons with impaired hearing, see §37-23-123.

Rights and liabilities of deaf persons generally, see §§43-6-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: use or nonuse of interpreter at prosecution of hearing-impaired defendant. 86 A.L.R.4th 698.

Am. Jur.

75 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Trials §§ 105- 107.

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial § 112.

§ 13-1-307. Duties of interpreter.

The duties of the interpreter may include:

Interpreting during court and court-related proceedings, including any and all meetings and conferences between client and his attorney;

Translating or interpreting documents;

Assisting in taking depositions;

Assisting in administering oaths; and

Such other duties as may be required by the judge of the court making the appointment.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Am. Jur.

75 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Trials §§ 105- 107.

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial § 112.

§ 13-1-309. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[En Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 5]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-1-309 made communications through an interpreter for the deaf between an attorney and client privileged.

§ 13-1-311. List of qualified interpreters.

It shall be the responsibility of the appointing authority to channel requests for qualified interpreters through (a) the Mississippi Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf; (b) the community services program at the Mississippi School for the Deaf, or, (c) any community resource wherein the appointing authority or the deaf person is knowledgeable that such qualified interpreters can be found. It shall be the responsibility of the community services program at the Mississippi School for the Deaf to compile and update annually a listing of qualified interpreters and to make this listing available to authorities in possible need of interpreter services as provided in Sections 13-1-301 through 13-1-315.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

Mississippi School for the Deaf, see Miss. Const. Art. 8, § 209 and Code §43-5-1 et seq.

Rights and liabilities of deaf persons generally, see §§43-6-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

CJS.

88 C.J.S. Trials § 52.

§ 13-1-313. Affirmation of true interpretation.

Before participating in any proceedings subsequent to an appointment under the provisions of Sections 13-1-301 through 13-1-315, an interpreter shall make an oath or affirmation that he will make a true interpretation in an understandable manner to the person for whom he is appointed and that he will repeat the statements of such persons in the English language to the best of his skill and judgment. The appointing authority shall provide recess periods as necessary for the interpreter when the interpreter so indicates.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

Cross References —

Oath or affirmation of witness, see Miss. R. Evid. 603.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial § 112.

§ 13-1-315. Fees for interpreters.

An interpreter appointed under the provisions of Sections 13-1-301 through 13-1-315 shall be entitled to a reasonable fee for such services in addition to actual expenses for travel and transportation. The court or appointing authority may consider standards established by the Mississippi Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf in determining a reasonable fee. When the interpreter is appointed by a court in a criminal case the fee shall be paid out of the general fund of the state, county or municipality, as the case may be. An interpreter’s fee in a civil action shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct and may be taxed ultimately as costs in the discretion of the court. When an interpreter is provided by an appointing authority pursuant to subsection (2) of Section 13-1-303, the fee shall be paid out of funds available to the appointing authority.

HISTORY: Laws, 1984, ch. 414, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal trial of deaf, mute, or blind person. 80 A.L.R.2d 1084.

Right of accused to have evidence or court proceedings interpreted. 36 A.L.R.3d 276.

Disqualification for bias of one offered as interpreter of testimony. 6 A.L.R.4th 158.

Admissibility of testimony concerning extrajudicial statements made to, or in presence of, witness through an interpreter. 12 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Am. Jur.

75 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Trials §§ 105- 107.

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial § 112.

Evidence of Child Abuse

§ 13-1-401. Applicability of special evidentiary provisions.

The rules of evidence prescribed in Sections 13-1-401 through 13-1-415 shall be applicable in any youth court proceeding and in any criminal prosecution under the following sections of the Mississippi Code of 1972:

Section 97-5-21, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to seduction of a child under age eighteen (18);

Section 97-5-23, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to the touching of a child for lustful purposes;

Section 97-5-35, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to the exploitation of children;

Section 97-5-39, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a child and felonious battery of a child;

Section 97-5-41, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to the carnal knowledge of a stepchild, adopted child or child of a cohabitating partner;

Section 97-3-95, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to sexual battery; or

Section 97-29-59, Mississippi Code of 1972, relating to unnatural intercourse.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Editor’s Notes —

Section97-5-21 referred to in (a) was repealed by Laws, 1998, ch. 549, § 7, effective from and after July 1, 1998. For similar provisions, see §§97-3-65,97-3-95,97-5-23, and97-3-101.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Law Reviews.

Comment: Recent amendments to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence – the rights of the victim v. the rights of the accused in child abuse prosecutions and dependency or neglect proceedings. 61 Miss. L. J. 367 (Fall 1991).

§ 13-1-403. Admissibility of child’s out-of-court statements.

  1. An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of twelve (12) describing any act of child abuse, sexual abuse or any other offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion or penetration performed in the presence of, with, by or on the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence to prove the contents thereof, if:
    1. Such statement is made for the purpose of receiving assistance or advice in order to prevent or mitigate the recurrence of the offenses, or in order to obtain advice about the psychological, social or familial consequences associated with the offenses; and
    2. Such statement is made to a person on whom the child should reasonably be able to rely for assistance, counseling or advice; and
    3. The child either:
      1. Is available to testify; or
      2. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense. A finding of unavailability, except in those situations specified by Rule 804 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, shall require a finding by the court, based on the specific behavioral indicators described in Section 13-1-411, that the child’s participation in the trial would result in a substantial likelihood of traumatic emotional or mental distress; and
    4. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. In determining the trustworthiness of the statement, the court may consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense alleged, factors which may detract from the declarant’s credibility, information provided about the child’s reliability based on the specific behavioral indicators described in Section 13-1-411, or any other factor deemed appropriate.
  2. The defendant shall be notified no later than ten (10) days before trial that an out-of-court statement as described in this section shall be offered in evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child’s statement, the time the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
  3. The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling under this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Since the promulgation of rules for the regulation of trial lie at the core of the judicial power, officers of neither the legislative nor executive departments of government, acting jointly or severally, had authority to confer legal validity upon the Evidence of Child Sexual Abuse Act. As that act enjoys no legal validity, it may not be regarded as “law” within Rule 802, Miss. R. Ev., which declares that hearsay is not admissible “except as provided by law.” Thus, a child’s out-of-court statements of complaints against his father were inadmissible in a child sexual battery prosecution of the father even though expert testimony indicated that the child would experience traumatic or emotional distress if he were required to testify against his father in open court. Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 104 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Requiring complaining witness in prosecution for sex crime to submit to psychiatric examination. 18 A.L.R.3d 1433.

Accused’s right to depose prospective witnesses before trial in state court. 2 A.L.R.4th 704.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Admissibility or use in criminal trial of testimony given at preliminary proceeding by witness not available at trial. 38 A.L.R.4th 378.

Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility of complainant in sexual offense prosecution. 45 A.L.R.4th 310.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent’s knowledge or allowance of child’s sexual abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for “allowing” or “knowingly allowing” such abuse to occur. 53 A.L.R.5th 499.

Validity, construction, and application of child hearsay statutes. 71 A.L.R.5th 637.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery §§ 125- 135.

41 Am. Jur. 2d, Incest §§ 27- 29, 38.

65 Am. Jur. 2d, Rape §§ 40-65.

70C Am. Jur. 2d, Sodomy §§ 25-29.

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 365-465, Child abuse-the battered child syndrome.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 665, Qualifying Child Witness to Testify.

18 Am. Jur. Trials, pp 342-441, Cross-examination in rape prosecution.

CJS.

75 C.J.S., Rape §§ 61–114.

81A C.J.S., Sodomy §§ 6-11.

§ 13-1-405. Use of closed circuit television to show child’s testimony.

  1. Upon motion and hearing in camera, the trial court may order that the testimony of a child under the age of sixteen (16) that an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, penetration or other sexual offense was committed upon him or her, or that he or she witnessed its perpetration upon another child, be taken outside of the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of closed circuit television, upon a finding based on specific behavioral indicators described in Section 13-1-411, that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer traumatic emotional or mental distress if compelled to testify in open court.
  2. The motion may be filed by the child, his attorney, parent, legal guardian or guardian ad litem, or any party to the case. The court may also raise the matter on its own motion.
  3. Upon stipulation of the parties, the court may appoint a person who is qualified as an expert and who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the offense to aid in formulating methods of questioning the child and to assist the court in interpreting the answers of the child.
  4. Closed circuit television testimony may be taken by any method not inconsistent with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. After a determination that the defendant’s presence would cause a substantial likelihood of traumatic emotional or mental distress to the child, the judge may exclude the defendant from the room where the testimony is taken. In any case in which the defendant is so excluded, arrangements must be made for the defense attorney to be in continual contact with the defendant by any appropriate private electronic or telephonic method throughout the questioning. The defendant and the jury must be able to observe the demeanor of the child witness at all times during the questioning.
  5. The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its rulings under this section.
  6. All parties must be represented by counsel at any taking of any testimony under this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Rights of children testifying in criminal proceedings, see §99-43-101.

Use of depositions in court proceedings, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 32.

Form and admissibility of evidence generally, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Requiring complaining witness in prosecution for sex crime to submit to psychiatric examination. 18 A.L.R.3d 1433.

Admissibility of videotape film in evidence in criminal trial. 60 A.L.R.3d 357.

Propriety of allowing absent witness to be examined over closed-circuit television. 80 A.L.R.3d 1212.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility of complainant in sexual offense prosecution. 45 A.L.R.4th 310.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery §§ 125- 135.

41 Am. Jur. 2d, Incest §§ 27- 29, 38.

65 Am. Jur. 2d, Rape §§ 40-65.

70C Am. Jur. 2d, Sodomy §§ 25-29.

18 Am. Jur. Trials, pp 342-441, Cross-examination in rape prosecution.

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 365-465, Child abuse – the battered child syndrome.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 665-690, Qualifying child witness to testify.

CJS.

75 C.J.S., Rape §§ 6-114.

81A C.J.S., Sodomy §§ 6-11.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 549–624.

Law Reviews.

Recent amendments to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence – the rights of the victim v. the rights of the accused in child abuse prosecutions and dependency or neglect proceedings. 61 Miss. L. J. 367 (Fall 1991).

§ 13-1-407. Use of child’s videotaped testimony; protective orders; destruction of videotape.

  1. On motion and hearing in camera and a finding based on information placed on the record which was subject to cross-examination:
    1. That there is a substantial likelihood, based on specific behavioral indicators described in Section 13-1-411 exhibited by the child, that a child who is under the age of sixteen (16) would suffer traumatic emotional or mental distress if he were required to testify in open court; or
    2. That such child is otherwise unavailable; a trial court may order the videotaping of the testimony of the victim or witness in a case in which the occurrence or non-occurrence of sexual abuse or child abuse is a material fact, which videotaped testimony is to be utilized at trial in lieu of testimony in open court.
  2. The motion may be made by:
    1. The child, or the attorney, parent, legal guardian or guardian ad litem of the child;
    2. The trial judge acting at his own discretion; or
    3. Any party to the case.
  3. The judge shall preside, or shall appoint a special master to preside, at the videotaping unless the following conditions are met:
    1. The child is represented by a guardian ad litem or counsel;
    2. The child’s representative and the counsel for each party stipulate that the requirement for the presence of the judge or special master may be waived; and
    3. The court finds, after a hearing, that the presence of a judge or special master is not necessary to protect the child.
  4. The defendant and the defendant’s counsel shall be present at the videotaping, unless the defendant has waived this right. Provided, however, that on motion of a party, or of the child’s representative and hearing in camera and a finding based on information placed on the record which was subject to cross-examination that there is a substantial likelihood, based on specific behavioral indicators exhibited by the child, as described in Section 13-1-411, that the child would suffer traumatic emotional or mental distress if he or she were required to testify in the presence of an adult who is alleged to have abused the child, or to have participated in, or concealed such abuse, the court may require that adult, including without limitation a defendant, to view the testimony from outside the presence of the child by means of a two-way mirror or another similar method that will ensure that the defendant can directly observe and hear the testimony of the child, but that the child cannot hear or see the adult. If the defendant is excluded from the room in which testimony is being taken, the defendant and the attorney for the defendant may communicate by any appropriate private electronic or telephonic method.
  5. All questioning shall be done by attorneys for the prosecution and the defense; however, upon stipulation of all parties, the court may appoint a person who is qualified as an expert and who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the offense to aid the court throughout proceedings conducted under this section.
  6. The motion for the taking of videotaped testimony may be made at any time with three (3) days’ written notice of the time and place of the taking of the testimony provided to all parties to the proceeding, to the child and to the child’s representative or guardian.
  7. Any videotape which is made pursuant to this section is subject to a protective order of the court for the purpose of protecting the privacy of the child. The court shall order the destruction of a videotape made pursuant to this section after five (5) years have elapsed since the entry of the judgment in the case in which the videotape was made. However, such order may be made before the expiration of five (5) years upon motion filed by the child, his attorney, parent, legal guardian or guardian ad litem after notice to the defendant. In no event shall such a videotape be destroyed before a final judgment has been rendered on an appeal.
  8. The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its rulings under this section.
  9. All parties must be represented by counsel at any taking of any testimony under this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Requiring complaining witness in prosecution for sex crime to submit to psychiatric examination. 18 A.L.R.3d 1433.

Admissibility of videotape film in evidence in criminal trial. 60 A.L.R.3d 357.

Propriety of allowing absent witness to be examined over closed – circuit television. 80 A.L.R.3d 1212.

Constitutionality of “rape shield” statute restricting evidence of victim’s sexual experiences. 1 A.L.R.4th 283.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Admissibility or use in criminal trial of testimony given at preliminary proceeding by witness not available at trial. 38 A.L.R.4th 378.

Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility of complainant in sexual offense prosecution. 45 A.L.R.4th 310.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent’s knowledge or allowance of child’s sexual abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for “allowing” or “knowingly allowing” such abuse to occur. 53 A.L.R.5th 499.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery §§ 125- 135.

41 Am. Jur. 2d, Incest §§ 27- 29, 38.

65 Am. Jur. 2d, Rape §§ 40-65.

70C Am. Jur. 2d, Sodomy §§ 25-29.

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 365-465, Child abuse – the battered child syndrome.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 665-690, Qualifying child witness to testify.

18 Am. Jur. Trials, pp 342-441, Cross-examination in rape prosecution.

CJS.

75 C.J.S., Rape §§ 61–114.

81A C.J.S., Sodomy §§ 6-11.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 549–624.

§ 13-1-409. Expert testimony as to meaning of child’s testimony; appointment of expert.

  1. If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the testimony of a child under the age of twelve (12) in a case in which the occurrence or non-occurrence of physical or sexual abuse of a child is a material issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify, based on such expertise, in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
  2. The facts or data in the particular case upon which such an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences about the occurrence or non-occurrence of physical or sexual abuse of children, or about children who may be victims or observers of such abuse, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
  3. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
  4. The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
  5. The court, in a case where the occurrence or non-occurrence of physical or sexual child abuse is a material issue, may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nomination. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him as a witness.
  6. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
  7. Nothing in this subsection limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Requiring complaining witness in prosecution for sex crime to submit to psychiatric examination. 18 A.L.R.3d 1433.

Necessity and admissibility of expert testimony as to credibility of witness. 20 A.L.R.3d 684.

Admissibility of expert medical testimony on battered child syndrome. 98 A.L.R.3d 306.

Constitutionality of “rape shield” statute restricting evidence of victim’s sexual experiences. 1 A.L.R.4th 283.

Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations made by one incompetent to testify at trial. 15 A.L.R.4th 1043.

Appealability of state criminal court order requiring witness other than accused to undergo psychiatric examination. 17 A.L.R.4th 867.

Modern status of rule regarding necessity for corroboration of victim’s testimony in prosecution for sexual offense. 31 A.L.R.4th 120.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Admissibility, at criminal prosecution, of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome. 42 A.L.R.4th 879.

Constitutionality, with respect to accused’s rights to information or confrontation, of statute according confidentiality to sex crime victim’s communications to sexual counselor. 43 A.L.R.4th 395.

Admissibility at criminal prosecution of expert testimony on battering parent syndrome. 43 A.L.R.4th 1203.

Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility of complainant in sexual offense prosecution. 45 A.L.R.4th 310.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent’s knowledge or allowance of child’s sexual abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for “allowing” or “knowingly allowing” such abuse to occur. 53 A.L.R.5th 499.

When will expert testimony “assist trier of fact” so as to be admissible at federal trial under Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence.75 A.L.R. Fed. 461.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery §§ 125- 135.

31A Am. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 116- 140.

41 Am. Jur. 2d, Incest §§ 27- 29, 38.

65 Am. Jur. 2d, Rape §§ 40-65.

70C Am. Jur. 2d, Sodomy §§ 25-29.

10 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Expert and Opinion Evidence, Forms 1 et seq. (appointment of expert witnesses).

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 365-465, Child abuse – the battered child syndrome.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 665-690, Qualifying child witness to testify.

18 Am. Jur. Trials, pp 342-441, Cross-examination in rape prosecution.

CJS.

32 C.J.S, Evidence §§ 649-651.

75 C.J.S., Rape §§ 61–114.

81A C.J.S., Sodomy §§ 6-11.

Law Reviews.

Posner, Who can speak for our children? Qualification of experts in cases of child sexual abuse. 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 493, Spring, 1992.

§ 13-1-411. Behavioral indicators used to determine applicability of evidentiary provisions.

The phrase “specific behavioral indicators” when used herein to refer to evidence (regardless of admissibility) that a child has suffered physical or sexual abuse or might suffer traumatic emotional or mental distress if required to testify in court, shall include, by way of illustration and not of limitation, indications of physical or psychological trauma which are (a) well defined, (b) positively correlated or causally linked with the likelihood of traumatic emotional or mental distress on testifying, and (c) rarely, if at all, present in children who have not suffered child abuse, considering the combination or intensity present in the child at issue.

The evidence described in this section shall be provided by competent witnesses, including but not limited to child psychologists, child psychiatrists and other qualified witnesses.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Relevance of the behavioral indicators described in this section to the admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statements, see §13-1-403.

Relevance of the behavioral factors described in this section to the use of closed circuit television to show a child’s testimony, see §13-1-405.

Relevance of the behavioral factors described in this section to the use of a child’s videotaped testimony, see §13-1-407.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Requiring complaining witness in prosecution for sex crime to submit to psychiatric examination. 18 A.L.R.3d 1433.

Necessity and admissibility of expert testimony as to credibility of witness. 20 A.L.R.3d 684.

Admissibility of expert medical testimony on battered child syndrome. 98 A.L.R.3d 306.

Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations made by one incompetent to testify at trial. 15 A.L.R.4th 1043.

Appealability of state criminal court order requiring witness other than accused to undergo psychiatric examination. 17 A.L.R.4th 867.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Admissibility, at criminal prosecution, of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome. 42 A.L.R.4th 879.

Constitutionality, with respect to accused’s rights to information or confrontation, of statute according confidentiality to sex crime victim’s communications to sexual counselor. 43 A.L.R.4th 395.

Admissibility at criminal prosecution of expert testimony on battering parent syndrome. 43 A.L.R.4th 1203.

Necessity or permissibility of mental examination to determine competency or credibility of complainant in sexual offense prosecution. 45 A.L.R.4th 310.

Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent’s knowledge or allowance of child’s sexual abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for “allowing” or “knowingly allowing” such abuse to occur. 53 A.L.R.5th 499.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery §§ 125- 135.

31A Am. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 116- 140.

41 Am. Jur. 2d, Incest §§ 27- 29, 38.

65 Am. Jur. 2d, Rape §§ 40-65.

70C Am. Jur. 2d, Sodomy §§ 25-29.

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 365-465, Child abuse – the battered child syndrome.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, pp 665-690, Qualifying child witness to testify.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 189, Corroboration of a Child’s Sexual Abuse Allegations With Behavioral Evidence.

18 Am. Jur. Trials, pp 342-441, Cross-examination in rape prosecution.

CJS.

32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 885, 886.

75 C.J.S., Rape 62-101.

81A C.J.S., Sodomy §§ 6-11.

Law Reviews.

Posner, Who can speak for our children? Qualification of experts in cases of child sexual abuse. 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 493, Spring, 1992.

§ 13-1-413. Court’s power to prohibit contact with child not affected by evidentiary provisions.

Sections 13-1-401 through 13-1-415 do not in any way affect any court’s power to order any person to refrain from contacting, or being in the presence of, any child.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

§ 13-1-415. Implementation of evidentiary provisions by rule.

The Mississippi Supreme Court may, by rule, provide procedures to implement Sections 13-1-401 through 13-1-415.

HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 345, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Chapter 3. Process, Notice, and Publication

§ 13-3-1. Provisions of chapter applicable to all courts.

The law of process as declared in this chapter, except where its provisions are provided for by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure or by the nature of the subject matter, shall govern in all courts.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3501; 1906, § 3999; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3006; 1930, § 3052; 1942, § 1940; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

For the rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Notice of sale sufficient.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 1940] has no application to newspaper notices given by a board of supervisors to the public that equalized tax rolls are ready for inspection. Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 325 (Miss. 1948).

This section [Code 1942, § 1940] applies only to process in courts proper where property rights are involved and not to the exercise of jurisdiction by the board of supervisors in binding out apprentices. Moore v. Allen, 72 Miss. 273, 16 So. 600, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 105 (Miss. 1894).

2. Notice of sale sufficient.

Although the Internal Revenue Service was correct that the company failed to meet its statutory duty to provide notice of the non-judicial foreclosure sale under 26 U.S.C.S. § 7425(c)(1), there was nothing in the record to suggest that the error was in any way wilful; as for the company’s efforts to market the property prior to obtaining it in the sale, there was no dispute that the company strictly followed Mississippi statutory law and published the Notices of Foreclosure Sale for four consecutive weeks pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-1 et seq., and it was not enough for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to simply claim that the company acted wilfully with respect to the sales. Moreover, although the IRS demonstrated a mistake, there was no evidence of a wilful act that transgressed equitable standards of conduct; therefore, as a matter of law, the company could rely on the equitable presumption against merger, its liens in the subject properties did not merge with legal title, and it maintained liens superior to the IRS’s tax liens as to the subject properties. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105390.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Civil liability of judicial officer for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. 64 A.L.R.3d 1251.

§ 13-3-3. Style and date of process.

The style of all process shall be, “The State of Mississippi.” It shall not be necessary that any process bear teste in the name of any judge or of any term of the court, but all process, except where otherwise provided, shall be issued and signed by the clerk of the court, with the seal of his office affixed, and shall bear date of the day on which the process shall be issued.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (20); 1857, ch. 61, art. 60, ch. 62, art. 26; 1871, §§ 689, 1002; 1880, § 2284; 1892, § 3413; 1906, § 3912; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2919; 1930, § 2964; 1942, § 1844.

Cross References —

Constitution provision for style of process, see Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 169.

Criminal offense of resisting authorized person attempting to serve process, see §97-9-75.

Criminal offense of forgery of process, see §97-21-35.

Process for arrest on an indictment against a natural person, see §99-9-1.

Issuance of process when an indictment is found against corporation, see §99-9-3.

For the rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Formal requisites.

3. Issuance of process.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 1844] has no application to newspaper notices given by a board of supervisors to the public that equalized tax rolls are ready for inspection. Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 325 (Miss. 1948).

The term “process,” within the meaning of the section [Code 1942, § 1844], stipulating that all process, except where otherwise provided, shall be issued and signed by the clerk of the court, includes the ordinary warrant for arrest, and certainly so when taken in connection with the section opening with the sentence that “the process for arrest on an indictment shall be a capias,” etc. Cooper v. State, 193 Miss. 672, 10 So. 2d 764, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1942).

This section [Code 1942, § 1844] was not applicable to require a seal of the court to be affixed to a printed notice to taxpayers of validation proceedings in connection with the issuance of bonds for the construction or purchase of a municipal electric plant, since the process referred to in this section [Code 1942, § 1844] is not a newspaper notice to taxpayers such as is required under Code of 1930, § 313 (Code 1942, § 4314). Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Batesville, 187 Miss. 737, 193 So. 814, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1940).

This section [Code 1942, § 1844] does not require a seal to be affixed to notices by the board of supervisors to taxpayers of tax assessments, since the statute requiring the seal to be upon process refers to process addressed to individuals and not publication of a general notice by a board of supervisors to the public or a part thereof not specifically named, the object of the statute as to seal being to advise the party upon whom the writ is to be served that its authenticity is genuine. Mullins v. Lyle, 183 Miss. 297, 183 So. 696, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 1938).

This statute has no application to process issued by justice of the peace, the justice of the peace not being required or authorized to have a seal. Matthews v. State, 134 Miss. 807, 100 So. 18, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 327 (Miss. 1924).

This section [Code 1942, § 1844] is not applicable to notices in disbarment proceedings. Ex parte Cashin, 128 Miss. 224, 90 So. 850, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1922).

In a disbarment proceeding reasonable notice so as to prevent injustice is all that is required. Ex parte Cashin, 128 Miss. 224, 90 So. 850, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1922).

2. Formal requisites.

A writ of garnishment is not rendered ineffective by an erroneous recital that judgment had been rendered in county court when in fact it was in circuit court, where it was issued under the signature of the clerk of the circuit court, bore its seal, was for an amount in excess of county court’s jurisdiction, and was returnable on a date when the circuit court term, and not that of the county court, would begin. Mid-South Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 239 Miss. 621, 124 So. 2d 697, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1960).

Sealing of a writ of execution is requisite to its validity. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Howell, 196 Miss. 489, 18 So. 2d 134, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1944).

Location of seal is not important in effecting authentication. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Howell, 196 Miss. 489, 18 So. 2d 134, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1944).

Mere fact that the seal had been placed upon a writ of execution elsewhere than upon the face of the writ proper, such as upon the unprinted margin or upon that part of the document utilized to detail accrued costs, does not render it invalid. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Howell, 196 Miss. 489, 18 So. 2d 134, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1944).

Affixing clerk’s seal to writ of execution, consisting of printed form upon single sheet, the right half of which contained the writ proper and the left half an itemized cost bill, at the lower lefthand corner of the part containing the cost bill instead of upon that part of the writ proper, sufficiently satisfied this section [Code 1942, § 1844].W. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Howell, 196 Miss. 489, 18 So. 2d 134, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 218 (Miss. 1944).

Although the original subpoena has no seal, after thirty years, in a collateral attack, the law presumes the execution of a proper subpoena. McAllum v. Spinks, 129 Miss. 237, 91 So. 694, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 13 (Miss. 1922).

All process of the court should bear a seal or should show there is no seal or it will be bad. Burton v. Cramer, 123 Miss. 848, 86 So. 578, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1920); McAllum v. Spinks, 129 Miss. 237, 91 So. 694, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 13 (Miss. 1922).

Process without the seal of the court, or if there be no seal without a statement of that fact, is bad. Pharis v. Conner, 11 Miss. 87, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1844).

3. Issuance of process.

The fact that a capias for arrest on a misdemeanor charge was issued on the affidavit of the county prosecuting attorney, by the clerk of the county court without any order therefor from the county judge did not render it invalid, or avoid jurisdiction, by the court over the person of the defendant, since, inasmuch as the affidavit of the county prosecuting attorney took the place of an indictment in the circuit court, the process on the charge of misdemeanor so made was a capias to be issued by the clerk of the county court. Cooper v. State, 193 Miss. 672, 10 So. 2d 764, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1942).

This section [Code 1942, § 1844], while it applies to the clerks of all courts, applies only as to process issuing out of the courts of which they are clerks, and vests no authority in a clerk of the circuit court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with the commission of a crime by an affidavit lodged with him. Martin v. State, 190 Miss. 32, 199 So. 98, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 188 (Miss. 1940).

If the process be issued by another, with the clerk’s consent in his name, it is sufficient. Barry v. Gamble, 44 U.S. 32, 11 L. Ed. 479, 1845 U.S. LEXIS 417 (U.S. 1845).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Omission of signature of issuing officer on civil process or summons as affecting jurisdiction of the person. 37 A.L.R.2d 928.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 60, 61 et seq.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 22, 23 et seq.

Law Reviews.

Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules 4, 5, 7-11, and 15. 52 Miss. L. J. 3, March 1982.

§ 13-3-5. The summons.

  1. The process to bring in defendants in all civil actions in all courts except justice court shall be a summons, the form, issuance, service, waiver, return, amendment and time limits of which shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. The process to bring in defendants in all civil actions in justice court shall be a summons which shall be served in one of the following modes:

    First.— Upon the defendant personally, if to be found in the county, by handing him a true copy of the process.

    Second.— If the defendant cannot himself be found in the county, then by leaving a true copy of the process at his usual place of abode, with his wife or some other person of his family above the age of sixteen (16) years, and willing to receive such copy.

    Third.— If the defendant cannot himself be found, and if no person of his family aged sixteen (16) years can be found at his usual place of abode who is willing to receive such copy, then by posting a true copy on a door of the defendant’s usual place of abode; provided, however, that if this mode is used when the defendant’s usual place of abode is a multi-family dwelling, a copy of the summons shall be mailed to the defendant by the clerk of the court upon return of service.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, §§ 693, 1001; 1880, §§ 1523, 1848; 1892, § 3414; 1906, § 3913; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2920; 1930, § 2965; 1942, § 1845; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 93; Laws, 1992, ch. 427 § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 4, 1992).

Cross References —

Power of chancery court to issue summons, see §9-5-85.

Notification and request for interpreter for deaf person following receipt of notice for appearance, see §13-1-305.

Subpoena of witnesses generally, see §13-3-93.

For the rule governing service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

Service of summons, see Uniform Rule of Procedure for Justice Court 2.04.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A writ of garnishment is not rendered ineffective by an erroneous recital that judgment had been rendered in county court when in fact it was in circuit court, where it was issued under the signature of the clerk of the circuit court, bore its seal, was for an amount in excess of the county court’s jurisdiction, and was returnable on a date when the circuit court term and not that of the county court would begin. Mid-South Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 239 Miss. 621, 124 So. 2d 697, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 331 (Miss. 1960).

The requisites of a summons in chancery should be complied with in order to authorize a pro confesso. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. F. L. Riley Mercantile Co., 139 Miss. 158, 104 So. 81, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss.), writ of error dismissed, 269 U.S. 597, 46 S. Ct. 120, 70 L. Ed. 432, 1925 U.S. LEXIS 293 (U.S. 1925).

A judgment by default, while not void, is erroneous where the return-day named in the summons is prior to the date of service of summons. T. A. Howard Lumber Co. v. Hopson, 136 Miss. 237, 101 So. 363, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1924).

A case where a bank is bound by service of summons although the summons was intended for a bank of like name which was defunct. Campbell & Campbell v. Pickens Bank, 134 Miss. 559, 99 So. 378, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 305 (Miss. 1924).

There must be a valid service of process, an appearance of defendant or a waiver of process before there can be a valid judgment. Boutwell v. Grayson, 118 Miss. 80, 79 So. 61, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1918), overruled, Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey, 130 Miss. 530, 92 So. 840, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1922).

The writ should show in proper case that partition as well as injunction was sought. Field v. Junkin, 99 Miss. 834, 56 So. 172, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1911).

The failure of a writ to apprise the defendant of the nature of the suit does not render it void. Guess v. Smith, 100 Miss. 457, 56 So. 166, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 1911).

The service of an injunction writ under a bill to restrain the commission of trespasses and demanding damages and the statutory penalty for cutting trees is not a summons and does not authorize a decree pro confesso. Sheffield v. Friedberg, 84 Miss. 188, 36 So. 242, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1904).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A sheriff may hire an individual to serve process on a fee basis. McWilliams, Nov. 14, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0711.

A summons for a replevin hearing wherein the property is not immediately seized may be served by placing a true copy on the door of the defendant’s usual place of abode. Parker, May 3, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0225.

A constable may serve a summons for a replevin by any of the means set forth in Section 13-3-5; if the constable is unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in possession of the property described in the declaration, he should note such on the return. Enlow, Nov. 15, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0646.

If a constable posts process on the door of a home as allowed by this section and the process is later returned to the court with credible information that the defendant does not live at that address, then the constable is not entitled to a fee for service of process. Davis, Mar. 5, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0093.

There is no statutory provision allowing for private process servers within the State of Mississippi other than the emergency situation. Process in criminal matters must be served by a constable or sheriff or sheriff’s deputy. Subpoenas may be served by private process servers. Huckaby, Aug. 25, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0378.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of service of summons or complaint on Sunday or holiday. 63 A.L.R.3d 423.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process §§ 8, 9.

Complaint, petition, or declaration against sheriff for failure to serve summons, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 31.

Summons, 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Process, Forms 12-14.

Summonses, 16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Process, Forms 16:208-16:214.

Complaint against sheriff for failure to serve summons, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 18:556.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 6-11.

§§ 13-3-7 through 13-3-13.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-7. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 29; 1871, § 1008; 1880, § 1853; 1892, § 3415; 1906, § 3914; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2921; 1930, § 2966; 1942, § 1846]

§13-3-9. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (24); 1857, ch. 61, art. 66; 1871, § 697; 1880, § 1524; 1892, § 3416; 1906, § 3915; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2922; 1930, § 2967; 1942, § 1847]

§13-3-11. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (20); 1857, ch. 61, art. 62; 1871, § 695; 1880, § 1525; 1892, § 3417; 1906, § 3916; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2923; 1930, § 2968; 1942, § 1848]

§13-3-13. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 26; 1871, § 1005; 1880, § 1848; 1892, § 3418; 1906, § 3917; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2924; 1930, § 2969; 1942, § 1849: Laws, 1924, ch. 151]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-7 provided that the names of all defendants who reside in the county where the process issues shall be included in the same summons.

Former §13-3-9 provided that if any of the defendants reside in different counties from that in which the suit is brought, original process may issue at the same time to each county in which any of the defendants reside, and the clerk shall indorse on each writ issued to another county than that in which the suit is brought the names of the defendants upon whom it is to be served, and that it is a duplicate of a writ issued to the other county for the same cause of action and the sheriff shall execute and return such process as in other cases, and under the same penalties.

Former §13-3-11 provided for when the summons, in actions in circuit court, shall be made returnable and when it shall be executed.

Former §13-3-13 specified when the summons was returnable and when it was to be executed in suits in chancery.

§ 13-3-15. Separate or additional summons; attachment against estate of defendant.

Upon the request of the plaintiff, separate or additional summons shall issue against any defendants. When the defendant shall not be found, the plaintiff may have an attachment against the estate of the defendant. If, upon such attachment, the sheriff shall seize or attach any property of the defendant, the same proceedings shall thereafter be had as if the suit had been originally commenced by attachment.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (40); 1857, ch. 61, art. 67; 1871, § 718; 1880, §§ 1534, 1851; 1892, § 3419; 1906, § 3918; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2925; 1930, § 2970; 1942, § 1850; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 94, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Issuance of duplicate and alias writs by an officer granting an attachment, see §11-33-21.

Return of alias where first process has been executed, see §13-3-75.

Issuance of an alias where a capias has been returned unexecuted, see §99-9-1.

For the rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

When an action has been begun in accordance with the law of venue in personal actions and the defendant shall not be found, the plaintiff may have an attachment under this section [Code 1942, § 1850], but the record must properly show that the action was rightfully commenced, and that defendant cannot be “found” in the county. McNair v. Kaiser, 62 Miss. 783, 1885 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 1885).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 120- 124.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 97, 133- 139, 140, 147, 148, 159170 et seq.

Alias summons, 16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Process, Form 16:223.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 119-130.

72 C.J.S., Process § 37.

§ 13-3-17. Substitution of parties in case of death of party.

Substitution of parties in case of death of a party shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 32; 1871, § 1072; 1880, § 1852; 1892, § 3420; 1906, § 3919; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2926; 1930, § 2971; 1942, § 1851.]; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 95, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

For the rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

An amended bill or bill of revivor in chancery is not required under this statute [Code 1942, § 1851]. Mitchell v. Conner, 42 Miss. 550, 1869 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1869).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62B Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process § 125.

§§ 13-3-19 through 13-3-23. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-19. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 34; 1871, § 1013; 1880, § 1855; 1892, § 3421; 1906, § 3920; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2927; 1930, § 2972; 1942, § 1852; Laws, 1924, ch. 151; Laws, 1946, ch. 170]

§13-3-21. [Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 34; 1871, § 1013; 1880, § 1856; 1892, § 3422; 1906, § 3921; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2928; 1930, § 2973; 1942, § 1853]

§13-3-23. [Codes 1880, § 1857; 1892, § 3423; 1906, § 3922; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2929; 1930, § 2974; 1942, § 1854]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-19 provided for service of summons by publication for nonresident or absent defendant.

Former §13-3-21 specified the duties of clerk when service of summons was by publication.

Former §13-3-23 provided that publication could be dispensed with if summons served on the absent party.

§ 13-3-25. Summons by publication for unknown heirs and unknown defendants.

When unknown heirs are made parties defendant in any proceeding in the chancery court, upon affidavit that the names of such heirs are unknown, the complainant may have publication of summons for them and such proceedings shall be had thereupon in all respects as are authorized in the case of a nonresident defendant. When the parties in interest are unknown, and affidavit of that fact be filed, they may be made parties by publication to them as unknown parties in interest.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 62, art. 35; 1871, § 1069; 1880, § 1858; 1892, § 3424; 1906, § 3923; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2930; 1930, § 2975; 1942, § 1855.

Cross References —

Summons by publication of the heirs of an intestate deceased in an action brought by those praying to be declared heirs of the deceased, see §91-1-29.

Amendment of an indictment where the name of an unknown defendant later becomes known, see §99-7-25.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62B Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process § 168.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Process, Forms 162-164, 181, 182, 191-193, 201 (affidavit in support of motion for service of process by publication).

16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Process, Forms 16:325-16:341 (affidavit for publication of summons).

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 118–120.

§ 13-3-27. Publication of summons.

Publication of summons in all cases and in every court, when authorized by law, shall be made as prescribed in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3425; 1906, § 3924; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2931; 1930, § 2976; 1942, § 1856; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 96, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

For the rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A judgment in personam cannot be rendered against a foreign corporation on publication of process. Columbia Star Milling Co. v. Brand, 115 Miss. 625, 76 So. 557, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1917).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 197- 198, 135, 140 et seq.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 206 et seq.

Affidavit in support of motion for service of process by publication, 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Process, Forms 162-164, 181, 182, 191-193, 201, 282.

Affidavit for publication of summons, 16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Process, Forms 16:325-16:341.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 117 et seq.

§ 13-3-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1880, § 462; 1892, § 3426; 1906, § 3925; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2932; 1930, § 2977; 1942, § 1857]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-29 provided for posting as a substitute for service by publication.

§ 13-3-31. Publication; requirements and procedures.

  1. Whenever it is required by law that any summons, order, citation, advertisement or other legal notice shall be published in a newspaper in this state, it shall mean, in addition to any other requirements imposed by law, publication in some newspaper which:
    1. Maintains a general circulation predominantly to bona fide paying subscribers within the political subdivision within which publication of such legal notice is required. The term “general circulation” means numerically substantial, geographically widespread, demographically diversified circulation to bona fide paying subscribers. In no event shall the term “general circulation” be interpreted to require that legal notices be published in a newspaper having the greatest circulation. The term “bona fide paying subscribers” means persons who have subscribed at a subscription rate which is not nominal, whether by mail subscriptions, purchases through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sellers, or any combination thereof, but shall not include free circulation, sales at a token or nominal subscription price and sales in bulk for purposes other than for resale for individual subscribers.
    2. Maintains a legitimate list of its bona fide paying subscribers by the following categories where applicable:
      1. Mail subscribers;
      2. Dealers and carriers; and
      3. Street vendors and counter sellers.
    3. Is not published primarily for advertising purposes and has not contained more than seventy-five percent (75%) advertising in more than one-half (1/2) of its issues during the period of twelve (12) months next prior to the first publication of any legal notice therein, excluding separate advertising supplements inserted into but separately identifiable from any regular issue or issues.
    4. Has been established and published continuously for at least twelve (12) months next prior to the first publication of such matter to be published, is regularly issued at stated intervals no less frequently than once a week, bears a date of issue, and is numbered consecutively; provided, however, that publication on legal holidays of this state or of the United States and on Saturdays and Sundays shall not be required, and failure to publish not more than two (2) regular issues in any calendar year shall not disqualify a paper otherwise qualified.
    5. Is issued from a known office of publication, which shall be the principal public business office of the newspaper and need not be the place at which the newspaper’s printing presses are physically located. A newspaper shall be deemed to be “published” at the place where its known office of publication is located.
    6. Is formed of printed sheets. However, the word “printed” does not include reproduction by the stencil, mimeograph or hectograph process.
    7. Is originated and published for the dissemination of current news and intelligence of varied, broad and general public interest, announcements and notices, opinions as editorials on a regular or irregular basis, and advertising and miscellaneous reading matter.
    8. Is not designed primarily for free circulation or for circulation at nominal rates.
  2. “Newspaper,” as used in this section, shall not include a newspaper, publication, or periodical which is published, sponsored by, is directly supported financially by, or is published to further the interests of, or is directed to, or has a circulation restricted in whole or in part to any particular sect, denomination, labor or fraternal organization or other special group or class of citizens, or which primarily contains information of a specialized nature rather than information of varied, broad and general interest to the general public, or which is directed to any particular geographical portion of any given political subdivision within which publication of such legal notice is required, rather than to such political subdivision as a whole. No newspaper otherwise qualified under this section shall be disqualified from publishing legal notices for the sole reason that such newspaper does not have as great a circulation as some other newspaper publishing in the same political subdivision.
  3. In the event of the discontinuance of the publication of all newspapers in any county qualified under this section to publish legal notices, any other such newspaper published in the same county, regardless of the length of time it has been published, shall be deemed qualified to publish such legal notices, provided such newspaper meets all requirements of this section other than the requirements of subsection (1) (d) of this section.
  4. A newspaper otherwise qualified under this section which is published in a municipality whose corporate limits encompass territory in more than one (1) county shall be qualified to publish legal notices, including foreclosure sale notices as described in Section 89-1-55, for any county a portion of whose territory is included within the municipality, irrespective of the actual physical location within the municipality of the principal public business office of the newspaper.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1858; Laws, 1936, ch. 313; Laws, 1948, ch. 427; Laws, 1976, ch. 479, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 400; Laws, 2004, ch. 453, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 28, 2004).

Editor’s Notes —

The preamble to Chapter 479 of the Laws of 1976 reads as follows:

“Whereas, it is in the public interest of the people of this state to assure that legal notices required by law to be published in a newspaper in this state are published in newspapers having numerically substantial, extensive and widespread circulation to bona fide paying subscribers, to the end that effective general notice to the public is given by such publication; now, therefore,

Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Mississippi:”

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment inserted “including foreclosure sale notices as described in Section 89-1-55” following “publish legal notices” in (4).

Cross References —

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. General circulation requirement.

1. In general.

City Board of Aldermen (Board) never concluded that the publisher was unqualified, and to the contrary, the Board expressly stated in its motion that no determination could be made whether the publisher was qualified or in compliance with Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31 since it did not receive any circulation information; the circuit court properly held that the determining issue in this case, however, was not that of circulation figures, but it was instead the lower bid submitted by the newspaper. Stone County Publ., Inc. v. Prout, 18 So.3d 300, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 341 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Judgment determining that appellee’s publication was a newspaper qualified to publish legal notices in DeSoto County within the meaning of Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31 was affirmed, where appellee presented sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that the publication’s principal public business office was in DeSoto County. The publication had more than 20 employees in Southaven, a city in De Soto County, including a general manager, editor, advertising staff, advertising manager, advertising sales staff, a deputy editor, several reporters, clerical staff, and circulation staff consisting of a district manager and one or two field representatives. DeSoto Times Today v. Memphis Publ. Co., 991 So. 2d 609, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 455 (Miss. 2008).

State supreme court reversed the denial of a summary judgment motion filed by bank and trustee as the city where the newspaper was published encompassed two different counties and thus, the newspaper was deemed to be published in both counties under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31(4) for purposes of the publication of foreclosure sale notices. Warren v. Johnston, 908 So. 2d 744, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 488 (Miss. 2005).

Trial court misapplied Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31 in finding that the successful bidder’s newspaper section was not adequate under §13-3-31 for the publication of legal notices, because it was not published every day, it was not identified by letter like other sections, and it contained different information depending upon its destination; § 13-3-31 did not determine when a section of the newspaper was treated as a separate and independent newspaper, and instead it simply defined a newspaper and provided the criteria that a newspaper had to satisfy in order to publish legal notices. Gannett River States Publ'g Corp. v. Jackson Advocate, 856 So. 2d 247, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 350 (Miss. 2003).

City council did not err in finding that the successful bidder satisfied the requirements under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-31 when it determined that the successful bidder’s proposal to publish the legal notices in a section of its newspaper that was published once a week was a qualified bid; the section of the paper at issue was sold with the newspaper, it was a section of the paper despite not being identified by letter like the other sections, and it did not matter that the section was only included in papers sold in the city, as notices only had to be published there. Gannett River States Publ'g Corp. v. Jackson Advocate, 856 So. 2d 247, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 350 (Miss. 2003).

Whether the publication of notice to creditors required by §91-7-145 is made in an appropriate newspaper brings into bearing §13-3-31, which sets forth the requirements a newspaper must meet in order to qualify as a valid publisher of legal notices. Estate of Myers v. Myers, 498 So. 2d 376, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2844 (Miss. 1986).

Contention that notice to creditors was not published in a newspaper which qualified as a valid publisher of legal notices, which was not raised in the court below, would not be considered by the Supreme Court on appeal. Estate of Myers v. Myers, 498 So. 2d 376, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2844 (Miss. 1986).

Municipal authorities cannot let a contract to publish legal notices to a newspaper not qualified under §13-3-31, regardless of whether or not it is the lowest bidder; thus a city council’s order dividing the publication of its legal notices equally among three newspapers was null and void where it was subsequently determined that one of the newspapers was not legally qualified; a subsequent order of the council awarding the contract to the other two newspapers was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal or without substantial basis and the circuit court thus erred in setting it aside. City of Jackson v. Capital Reporter Publishing Co., 373 So. 2d 802, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2300 (Miss. 1979).

Object of statute is to avoid publication of important notices in newspapers so recently established as not to assure general notice to the public. Elliott v. Board of Sup'rs, 182 Miss. 631, 179 So. 344, 180 So. 72, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1938).

Order of supervisors excluding beer and wine pursuant to popular vote held not invalid for failure to recite that newspaper in which notice of election published had been in existence for more than one year prior to publication, since such recital is not a jurisdictional requirement. Elliott v. Board of Sup'rs, 182 Miss. 631, 179 So. 344, 180 So. 72, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1938).

Proof of publication of notice of election, held not invalid because of failure to recite newspaper had been established for twelve months prior to first publication, in view of exception as to discontinuance of any newspaper in county qualified to publish legal notices. Elliott v. Board of Sup'rs, 182 Miss. 631, 179 So. 344, 180 So. 72, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1938).

2. General circulation requirement.

The statute does not require that a newspaper break down its subscription base by zip code in order to demonstrate that it is a newspaper of general circulation. Sunland Publ. Co. v. City of Jackson, 710 So. 2d 879, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1998).

Although a newspaper may be directed towards one particular area, locality or group within a relevant area, as long as that newspaper publishes news, human interest, advice columns, sports, arts, etc., which are of interest to the general public, its distribution is not entirely limited to one geographic area, is available to anyone who wishes to subscribe, and there exists paid subscribers, the newspaper is one of general circulation. Sunland Publ. Co. v. City of Jackson, 710 So. 2d 879, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1998).

A finding that three members of the city council had not personally seen a particular newspaper in their neighborhoods was insufficient to support a determination that the newspaper did not meet the general circulation requirement. Sunland Publ. Co. v. City of Jackson, 710 So. 2d 879, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1998).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

All qualifications of statute are equally important and newspaper must meet all qualifications to be qualified to publish legal notices. Haque, May 22, 1990, A.G. Op. #90-0336.

A newspaper with a principal public business office in a county in Mississippi is deemed to be published in Mississippi regardless of the fact it can be purchased only as part of a Tennessee newspaper. Chamberlin, Feb. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0033.

The fact that a subscription to a subsidiary Mississippi newspaper cannot be effected without a subscription to the Tennessee newspaper is immaterial to whether the Mississippi newspaper under the statute; similarly, the fact that the purchase price of a newspaper and the purchase price of the subsidiary Mississippi newspaper are part of a single price package is also immaterial. Chamberlin, Feb. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0033.

If a school district has either made a finding of fact that its current publisher is qualified under this section or has not made a finding of fact that it fails to meet the requirements and provisions of this section, there is no statutory requirement that the school district respond to a request by another newspaper to be designated as the official newspaper of the school district for legal notices. Wallace, January 15, 1999, A.G. Op. #98-0804.

As between qualified newspapers, a newspaper with a known office of publication within the municipality must be selected to publish the legal notices of that municipality. Edens, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0289.

The qualifications of the statute are equally important, and a newspaper must meet all the qualifications to publish legal notices. Dickerson, Dec. 3, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0630.

Notice must be published in a newspaper that is numbered consecutively. Chamberlin, Dec. 13, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0678.

If a newspaper was established and continued uninterrupted publication for twelve or more months and is now numbered consecutively, the fact that it was not numbered consecutively during the entire twelve or more months would not be material. Chamberlin, Dec. 13, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0678.

The best definition of the phrase “numbered consecutively” is found in its common usage: a series of items or events which are numbered beginning with the number one and continuing in unbroken, numerical sequence. Chamberlin, Dec. 13, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0678.

Municipal governing authorities may require newspapers submitting bids for the municipality’s publishing contract to provide evidence of compliance with Section 13-3-31. Taylor, Oct. 27, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0530.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of affidavit as to due diligence in attempting to learn whereabouts of party to litigation, for the purpose of obtaining service by publication. 21 A.L.R.2d 929.

Difference between date of affidavit for service by publication and date of filing or of order for publication as affecting validity of service. 46 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Application of requirement that newspaper be locally published for official notice publication. 85 A.L.R.4th 581.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process § 217.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process § 125.

Law Reviews.

Abbott, Some Basic Priority Problems in a Land Development Project in Mississippi with Emphasis Upon Power of Sale Foreclosure Procedures. 50 Miss. L. J. 665, September 1979.

1984 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 55 Miss. L.J. 49, March, 1985.

§ 13-3-32. Publication—in what newspaper—presumption of continued qualification.

All newspapers which were qualified to publish legal notices and which were publishing legal notices prior to July 1, 1976, shall be presumed to qualify under Section 13-3-31 unless and until a determination has been made by competent authority that such newspaper fails to meet the requirements and provisions of Section 13-3-31.

HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 479, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1976.

Cross References —

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

If, as a matter of fact, a newspaper was not qualified pursuant to this section to publish legal notices and publishing legal notices prior to July 1, 1976, then no presumption of validity of legal notices published therein could attach thereto. Wallace, January 15, 1999, A.G. Op. #98-0804.

§§ 13-3-33 and 13-3-35. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-33. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (44); 1857, ch. 61, art. 64; 1871, § 701; 1880, § 1527; 1892, § 3427; 1906, § 3926; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2933; 1930, § 2978; 1942, § 1859]

§13-3-35. [Codes, 1892, § 3428; 1906, § 3927; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2934; 1930, § 2980; 1942, § 1861]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-33 specified how a summons was to be executed.

Former §13-3-35 provided form for the sheriff’s return on original process.

§ 13-3-37. Sheriff to mark and return process.

The sheriff shall mark on all process the day of the receipt thereof by him, and he shall return the same promptly and in any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the process, with a written statement of his proceedings thereon, and of his fees, for serving it. For failing to note the time of the receipt of process, or for failing to return the same, the sheriff shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), and shall be liable for all damages, and the court may enforce return of the process by fine and imprisonment for contempt. Whenever a sheriff of any county shall receive from another county any writ or other process directed to him, he shall not be liable for a failure to return the same to the county from which the same was issued if he shall show to the court that he mailed the same in the post office, directed to the clerk of the court by whom the same was issued, at least two (2) days before the sitting of the court to which the same was returnable.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 63; 1871, § 700; 1880, § 1526; 1892, § 3429; 1906, § 3928; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2935; 1930, § 2981; 1942, § 1862; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 97, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear and determine all motions against sheriffs for money collected and not paid over to party entitled to same, see §9-7-89.

Showing the return of any officer serving process to be untrue, see §13-3-87.

Duty of the sheriff to execute and return process, see §19-25-37.

Liability of the sheriff for failing to execute or return process, see §19-25-37.

Liability of a sheriff for failing to return any execution, see §19-25-41.

Liability of the sheriff for making false return on any process, see §19-25-47.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The penalty provided under this section [Code 1942, § 1862] for a failure of the sheriff to note on the execution the date of its receipt, was not recoverable against the sheriff and his sureties where the execution plaintiffs suffered no loss or injury by reason thereof and were not “aggrieved.” McInnis v. Parker, 183 Miss. 648, 184 So. 418, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 277 (Miss. 1938).

List of special venire and copy of the indictment need not be served on accused by sheriff. Ivey v. State, 154 Miss. 60, 119 So. 507, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1928).

The officer’s return may be amended after judgment. H. Lupkin & Sons v. Russell, 108 Miss. 742, 67 So. 185, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1914).

An officer’s return of service of a summons which merely recites that the writ was on a certain day “executed by personal service” on the defendant is insufficient. The return should state the facts. Dogan v. Barnes, 76 Miss. 566, 24 So. 965, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1898).

A defective return attempting to show personal service of process is not equivalent to the general return “executed” heretofore authorized under Code 1880, § 1528. Dogan v. Barnes, 76 Miss. 566, 24 So. 965, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1898).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process § 258.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 150–152 et seq.

§ 13-3-39. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1942, § 2910-09; Laws, 1962, ch. 257, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962)]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-39 provided for the execution and return of process from courts of the separate district in Harrison County.

§ 13-3-41. Service on one carrying on business in state by or through trustee or attorney in fact.

All persons, firms, copartnerships or corporations carrying on business in the State of Mississippi, by or through trustees or attorneys in fact, may be served with process in all suits or proceedings in any court, by serving a copy of such process upon an agent of such trustees or attorneys in fact, in the same manner as is now provided for service of process upon foreign corporations.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 2979; 1942, § 1860; Laws, 1924, ch. 185.

Cross References —

Notice to attorney at law being as effectual as if made to his client, see §11-49-11.

Service of process upon a corporation, see §13-3-49.

Service of process upon nonresident doing business within the state, see §13-3-57.

Service of process upon nonresident motorist, see §13-3-63.

Notification given foreign insurance company when process is served upon insurance commissioner as attorney for insurance company, see §83-5-11.

For the rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

Requirement that corporate plaintiffs be represented by counsel, and circuit court rules concerning the filing and service of pleadings and motions, see Miss. Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice 1.06, 2.06.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

19 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Corporations §§ 1644- 1646, 1901 et seq.

36 Am. Jur. 2d, Foreign Corporations §§ 476 et seq.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership §§ 468-487.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Doing Business, Proof No. 1.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 75, 76, 103, 104.

Lawyers’ Edition.

State regulation of judicial proceedings as violating commerce clause (Art. I, § 8, cl 3) of Federal Constitution – Supreme Court cases. 100 L. Ed. 2d 1049.

§§ 13-3-43 through 13-3-47. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-43. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 64; 1871, § 704; 1880, § 1530; 1892, § 3430; 1906, § 3929; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2936; 1930, § 2982; 1942, § 1863]

§13-3-45. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 64; 1871, § 705; 1880, § 1531; 1892, § 3431; 1906, § 3930; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2937; 1930, § 2983; 1942, § 1864]

§13-3-47. [Codes, 1892, § 3432; 1906, § 3931; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2938; 1930, § 2984; 1942, § 1865]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-43 provided for service when defendant was an infant or an infant was a codefendant.

Former §13-3-45 provided for service when defendant was of unsound mind.

Former §13-3-47 provided for service when defendant was a county, city, town, or village.

§ 13-3-49. Service when defendant is a corporation.

If the defendant in any suit or legal proceeding be a corporation, process may be served on the president or other head of the corporation, upon the cashier, secretary, treasurer, clerk, or agent of the corporation, or upon any one of the directors of such corporation. If the defendant corporation be a sleeping-car company, process may be served upon any conductor thereof. If the defendant corporation be a steamboat company, process may be served upon the captain or other officer of a boat thereof. If no such person or persons be found in the county, then it shall be sufficient to post a true copy of the process on the door of the office or principal place of business of the corporation. In suits against railroads, sleeping-car, telegraph, telephone, express, steamboat, and insurance companies or corporations, or in suits against a receiver or receivers in charge of the property of any such companies or corporations, the process may be served on any agent of the defendant or sent to any county in which the office or principal place of business may be located, and there served as herein directed and authorized, or process may be served on any one of the foregoing officers of such corporation or company, and upon the secretary, cashier, treasurer, clerk, depot agent, attorney or any other officer or agent of such receiver or receivers, or upon them in person. When any writ or process against such corporation, company, receiver or receivers has been returned executed, the defendant or defendants shall be considered in court, and the action shall proceed as actions against natural persons. All process and notices to be served upon such companies, corporations, or receivers may be served as herein directed.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 15, art. 3 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 64; 1871, § 703; 1880, §§ 1035, 1529; 1892, § 3433; 1906, § 3932; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2939; 1930, § 2985; 1942, § 1866; Laws, 1894, ch. 61.

Cross References —

Service of process on one carrying on business in state by or through trustee or attorney in fact, see §13-3-41.

Issuance and execution of process when an indictment is found against a corporation, see §99-9-3.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

Circuit court filing and service requirements for pleadings and motions, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 2.06.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Service on railroad company.

3. Service on insurance company.

1. In general.

Where city’s process server placed summons and complaint for contract action in a box for registered agent of utility because the agent’s office was closed for holidays, service was not effected under Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) and Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-49 until five days later when the offices reopened and the papers could be processed and sent to the utility. Thus, filing of the utility’s removal notice was timely under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1446(b). City of Clarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 428 F.3d 206, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 21698 (5th Cir. Miss. 2005).

The Mississippi statutes providing for the method of services on a resident or a qualified foreign corporation, the “doing business” statute, and the statute providing for substituted service on any corporation doing business in the state, must be read together, and such reading leads to the inescapable conclusion that effective process under these statutes presupposes a factual determination that the foreign corporation is doing business in the state of Mississippi. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Summons was not effective where, at time received, there was no legal authority for service to be made by mail. Western Tar Products Corp. v. Alton Sheet Metal & Roofing Works, Inc., 515 So. 2d 932, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2892 (Miss. 1987).

An employee of a corporation whose duties are generally those of a stenographer and receptionist is not an “agent” or “clerk” of the corporation within the meaning of this section [Code 1942, § 1866], and the service upon her of a writ of garnishment issued against the corporation will not suffice to support a judgment against the corporation as garnishee where the writ was not brought to the attention of any of the corporation’s officers or agents. First Jackson Sec. Corp. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 253 Miss. 519, 176 So. 2d 272, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1010 (Miss. 1965).

This statute presupposes a doing of business in Mississippi in the case of a foreign corporation. Alabama, T. & N. R. Co. v. Howell, 244 Miss. 157, 141 So. 2d 242, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1962).

Where a copy of summons and complaint in a suit against a domestic corporation was delivered to an individual for delivery to the president of the corporation and this individual was a clerk who later delivered the process to the president, this did not constitute a personal service on the defendant corporation. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Elton Murphy-Walter Travis, Inc., 227 Miss. 615, 86 So. 2d 455, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 733 (Miss. 1956).

Suit having been filed and process for defendant having been issued promptly by a clerk, a suit was pending which tolled running of statute of limitations though process was served on plantation manager of defendant corporation and not on its designated agent for receiving of service of process. Frederick Smith Enterprise Co. v. Lucas, 204 Miss. 43, 36 So. 2d 812, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1948).

Service of process by person delivering copy of writ to president of corporation held not defective so as to make judgment void on collateral attack. McIntosh v. Munson Road Machinery Co., 167 Miss. 546, 145 So. 731, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1933).

This statute must be complied with substantially in service on a corporation or it will be void. Anderson Mercantile Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 127 Miss. 301, 90 So. 11, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1921).

Principal place of business is synonymous with domicile. Plummer-Lewis Co. v. Francher, 111 Miss. 656, 71 So. 907, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 360 (Miss. 1916).

A return of summons against a corporation where served on an agent should show that the party was an agent. Watkins Machine & Foundry Co. v. Cincinnati Rubber Mfg. Co., 96 Miss. 610, 52 So. 629, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1910).

A return of personal service by delivery of a copy of the summons to one described as the agent of a corporation, being good on its face, objection thereto should be made by plea. Lamb v. Russel, 81 Miss. 382, 32 So. 916, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1902).

2. Service on railroad company.

Service of summons on a foreign railroad company’s station agent is sufficient to bring it into court. Illinois C. R. Co. v. McDaniel, 246 Miss. 600, 151 So. 2d 805, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 486 (Miss. 1963).

In an attachment suit brought in chancery court by an Alabama citizen to recover damages from an Alabama corporation for personal injuries received as a result of a railroad crossing accident in Alabama, and to attach funds in the hands of a Mississippi corporation, where the defendant corporation owned no property or did no business in Mississippi, service of process upon an employee designated as a superintendent of the defendant corporation but who was employed by another corporation, and received no compensation from defendant corporation, was not effective to confer territorial jurisdiction over the defendant corporation. Alabama, T. & N. R. Co. v. Howell, 244 Miss. 157, 141 So. 2d 242, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1962).

Service of summons on a station agent of a railroad company is binding and this whether its principal place of business is in the county in which the suit is brought or not. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Bolding, 69 Miss. 255, 13 So. 844, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1891).

Where the declaration, summons, judgment by default and execution were against “Alabama & Vicksburg Railroad Company,” “The Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company,” the real corporation, whose station agent was served with the summons, having failed to appear at the return term and to object to the misnomer, is bound by the judgment. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Bolding, 69 Miss. 255, 13 So. 844, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1891).

3. Service on insurance company.

Under the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1866], process in suits against insurance companies may be served on any agent of the defendant. Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 75 Miss. 390, 23 So. 183, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1897).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A scire facias may be personally served on a limited surety agent, and that process will be binding on the insurer represented by that agent. Johnson, November 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0672.

A defendant corporation may be served by serving any of the persons enumerated in the statute, the president or other head of the corporation, the cashier, secretary, treasurer, clerk, or agent of the corporation; if garnishment papers are properly served on one of the required persons, the corporation is considered properly served even if the papers are not forwarded to the payroll department. Aldridge, Feb. 1, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0031.

A defendant corporation may be served by serving any of the persons enumerated in Section 13-3-49. A defendant does not have the option of “refusing service.” Refusing to accept service is equal to being served. Case, June 22, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0325.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Foreign corporation’s purchase within state of goods to be shipped into other state or country as doing business within state for purposes of jurisdiction or service of process. 12 A.L.R.2d 1439.

Service of process upon dissolved domestic corporation in absence of express statutory direction. 75 A.L.R.2d 1399.

Am. Jur.

19 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Corporations §§ 1644- 1646, 1901 et seq.

36 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Foreign Corporations §§ 476 et seq.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process § 127, 129.

CJS.

19 C.J.S., Corporations §§ 894, 895, 897 et seq.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 75, 76.

§ 13-3-51. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 64; 1871, § 706; 1880, § 1532; 1892, § 3434; 1906, § 3933; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2940; 1930, § 2986; 1942, § 1867]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-51 provided for service when defendant was a prisoner.

§ 13-3-53. Service on one of several executors or administrators.

If there be two or more executors or administrators of the same estate, if process cannot be served on all of them in suits against them, service on one shall be sufficient to authorize a judgment against all.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 60, art. 134; 1871, § 1192; 1880, § 1513; 1892, § 3435; 1906, § 3934; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2941; 1930, § 2987; 1942, § 1868.

Cross References —

Liability of executors and administrators to be sued in personal actions which might have been maintained against the deceased, see §91-7-233.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

Circuit court filing and service requirements for pleadings and motions, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 2.06.

§ 13-3-55. Suits by or against partnerships; service on one of several partners.

A partnership may sue or be sued in the partnership name, or in the names of the individuals composing the partnership, or both and service of process on any partner shall be sufficient to maintain the suit against all the partners so as to bind the assets of the partnership and of the individual summoned.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1519; 1892, § 3436; 1906, § 3935; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2942; 1930, § 2988; 1942, § 1869; Laws, 1977, ch. 405, eff from and after April 1, 1977.

Cross References —

Circuit court filing and service requirements for pleadings and motions, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 2.06.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Partnership property separate from partner’s personal property.

1. In general.

In action on partnership notes, one partner held not indispensable party since obligation joint and several and judgment against some would not affect plaintiff’s right against others unless satisfaction obtained. Enochs-Flowers, Ltd. v. Bank of Forest, 172 Miss. 36, 157 So. 711, 159 So. 407, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 1934).

A judgment against all of several partners, when only one has been summoned, is erroneous as to those not served, unless it appear by the return or elsewhere in the record that those not summoned were nonresident or could not be found. Tabler, Crudup & Co. v. Bryant, 62 Miss. 350, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 79 (Miss. 1884).

2. Partnership property separate from partner’s personal property.

Judgment of the district court in a case to determine ownership of cattle, granting summary judgment for the buyer of the cattle on the ground that the apparent seller was the owner and passed title to the buyer free of a lien, was reversed and remanded, because a fact issue existed on the ownership of the apparent seller; plaintiff bank’s and defendant bank’s security interests properly perfected on an individual and his property, attached to the cattle only if the apparent seller was a sole proprietorship of the individual, but if the apparent seller operated as a partnership or limited liability company, the individual did not have sufficient rights in the cattle to encumber them. Peoples Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24018 (5th Cir. Miss. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to doing business in a state within statute providing for service of process in action against nonresident natural person or persons doing business in state. 10 A.L.R.2d 200.

Am. Jur.

59A Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Partnership §§ 304- 308.

CJS.

68 C.J.S., Partnership §§ 252-256.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 103, 104.

§ 13-3-57. Service on nonresident business not qualified to do business in state; survival of cause of action in case of death or inability to act; service on nonresident executor, administrator, etc.

Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Service of summons and process upon the defendant shall be had or made as is provided by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

Any such cause of action against any such nonresident, in the event of death or inability to act for itself or himself, shall survive against the executor, administrator, receiver, trustee, or any other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident. Service of process or summons may be had or made upon such nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or any other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident as is provided by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, and when such process or summons is served, made or had against the nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident it shall be deemed sufficient service of such summons or process to give any court in this state in which such action may be filed, in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the State of Mississippi or the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction over the cause of action and over such nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or other selected or appointed representative of such nonresident insofar as such cause of action is involved.

The provisions of this section shall likewise apply to any person who is a nonresident at the time any action or proceeding is commenced against him even though said person was a resident at the time any action or proceeding accrued against him.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 1437, 1438; Laws, 1940, ch. 246; Laws, 1958, ch. 245, § 1; Laws, 1964, ch. 320, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 330, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 431, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 1980, ch. 437; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 98, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

For another section derived from same 1942 code section, see §11-11-11.

Service of process when defendant is a nonresident motorist, see §13-3-63.

Service of process upon carnivals, circuses, and fairs doing business in state but not permanently domiciled therein, see §§75-75-1 and75-75-3.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

Circuit court filing and service requirements for pleadings and motions, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 2.06.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application, generally.

3. What constitutes doing business within state.

4. Non-resident heirs of alleged tortfeasor.

5. Illustrative cases.

1. Validity.

Dismissal of the insured’s action against her insurer in Mississippi for bad faith was improper where there was no personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the insurer, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57; the only connection Mississippi had to the lawsuit was that the car accident occurred in Mississippi and the lawsuit was not about the accident. Hogrobrooks v. Progressive Direct, 858 So. 2d 913, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1029 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

The long-arm statute was clearly enacted for the benefit of residents only, and it has not been expanded through the process of judicial interpretation to include nonresident plaintiffs not qualified to do business within the state; there is no defect under federal constitutional standards for limiting the long-arm statute to resident plaintiffs, since the state is not obligated to make its courts available to nonresidents, who themselves are not doing business in the state, to sue other nonresidents. American International Pictures, Inc. v. Morgan, 371 F. Supp. 528, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12866 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

This section [Code 1942, § 1437] and Code 1942, § 8072 do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1959).

If a nonresident is doing such business in the state as would subject him to the jurisdiction of the court and such business is of such nature that it is hazardous or subject to the police powers of the state to be regulated, and the cause of action grows out of such business so done, then the substituted service is good and the statute is constitutional. Davis v. Nugent, 90 F. Supp. 522, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3816 (D. Miss. 1950).

There is no denial of due process under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution in extending this section [Code 1942, § 1437] to contract, as well as to tort actions, arising out of business or acts done within state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Nonresident who engages in business in this state which is subject to state control is subject to suit for damages in this state on cause of action accruing here out of business transacted in this state and is properly brought into court by service of process upon secretary of state in manner provided by Code 1942, § 1438, and statutes so providing do not violate due process or immunities and privileges clauses of federal constitution. Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 38 So. 2d 752, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1949).

This statute, as applied to a corporate citizen of another state engaged in levy construction work of large proportions in Mississippi employing many men to operate trucks and other heavy and cumbersome machinery and equipment, is not unconstitutional as denying defendant equal protection of the law, due process of law, or privileges and immunities afforded to residents, or as burdening interstate commerce. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (5th Cir. Miss. 1944).

Power of state to confer jurisdiction on courts over individual nonresidents by substituted service depends upon whether such enabling statute is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power to regulate the business of such nonresident, and if the regulation is one for the protection of health, safety and welfare of those within its borders, rather than a mere attempt to extend the jurisdiction of its courts over citizens beyond its borders, the state may properly legislate to that end. Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (5th Cir. Miss. 1944).

2. Construction and application, generally.

After an employee was terminated, and his employers refused to reimburse his expenses, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the individuals working for the employer as the employee alleged no facts supporting the individuals’ involvement in his tort claims. Smith v. Antler Insanity, LLC, 58 F. Supp. 3d 716, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152484 (S.D. Miss. 2014).

In a breach of contract and tortious inference with business relations case that was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1446 and in which the court accepted as true a Mississippi company’s assertion that it and a foreign company contemplated that the contract would be performed in part in Mississippi and that the contract was in fact performed in part in Mississippi, the district court had no difficulty concluding that Mississippi’s long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, was satisfied; since the district court also found that the requirements of due process were met, the foreign company’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss was denied. Barbour Int'l, Inc. v. Permasteel, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 602, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56518 (S.D. Miss. 2007).

In a matter arising out of a high speed chase, which allegedly resulted in decedents’ deaths, neither an Alabama county or that county’s sheriff from Alabama entered upon the highways of Mississippi, involving themselves in efforts to stop the fleeing felons, or in any other way subjected themselves to jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-63; therefore, the supreme court proceeded with a long-arm analysis to determine if jurisdiction could be conferred upon them under the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and the supreme court found no minimum contacts, so the county and the sheriff were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi. City of Cherokee v. Parsons, 944 So. 2d 886, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 2006).

To establish the “contract” prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, a plaintiff must show that a nonresident defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff which has been, or is to be, performed, at least in part, in Mississippi. Durham v. Katzman, 375 F. Supp. 2d 495, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17847 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Trial court erred in denying New York commuter van company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b) in the Mississippi residents’ wrongful death action that arose following an auto accident that occurred in New York because, although the van company was not qualified to do business in Mississippi and, therefore, met the threshold requirement for coverage by the long-arm statute, Miss. Rev. Stat. §13-3-57, there was no evidence in the record to demonstrate that the van company’s actions had brought it under either the contract, tort, or “doing business in” provisions of the long-arm statute. Rockaway Commuter Line, Inc. v. Denham, 897 So. 2d 156, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1325 (Miss. 2004).

Defendants, by demonstrating that the individuals’ claims against the non-diverse defendants were time-barred, sustained their burden of showing that no reasonable possibility of recovery existed against the non-diverse defendants on the claims raised in the individuals’ original complaint; while the individuals argued that their claims were not time-barred because defendants’ fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations, they were unable to support their fraudulent concealment claim. Thus, the individuals’ motion to remand was denied. White v. City Fin. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 646, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14205 (S.D. Miss. 2003).

The contract prong of the long-arm statute was satisfied by the allegations of breach of implied warranty of merchantability and the breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claims where at least part of the warranty work was performed in the forum state; the misrepresentation claim against the manufacturer was sufficient to support jurisdiction under the tort prong of the long-arm statute because the materials and a representative were sent to the forum state. Jones v. Tread Rubber Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 539, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

In an action arising from a contract under which the plaintiff was to sell 80 percent of its oil and gas working interest in an oil and gas field, the plaintiff set out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction under the contract prong of the statute and, therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction where the plaintiff argued that a codefendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff on behalf of itself and the defendant, which financed and purchased 75 percent of the 80 percent working interest in the oil and gas field. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29871 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).

The defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction within Mississippi in an action for libel and slander where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant published the alleged defamatory information complained of on the Internet and allowed access and publication within Mississippi and among Mississippi residents. Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 404, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4593 (N.D. Miss. 2000).

The defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in an action for breach of a contract regarding a distribution agreement where part of the contract required the plaintiff to perform acts in Mississippi and where the plaintiff also alleged, with evidentiary support, that the defendants committed various torts at least in part in Mississippi which resulted in injury to the plaintiff and that the defendants were engaged in doing business in Mississippi. Genesis Press, Inc. v. Carol Publ. Group, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4595 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000).

The parties did not enter into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by any party in Mississippi where the defendant agreed to provide certain land accommodations in Greece and round-trip airfare from New York to Greece, but did not agree to deliver air tickets to the plaintiffs in Mississippi. Christian Tours, Inc. v. Homeric Tours, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4594 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d 366, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30099 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).

A contract between the plaintiff Mississippi corporation and the defendant Tennessee corporation involving the purchase of the defendant’s assets required actions in Mississippi, and therefore, the defendant fell under the broad reach of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Willowbrook Found., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 87 F. Supp. 2d 629, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2105 (N.D. Miss. 2000).

Where resident plaintiffs alleged, with evidentiary support, that the defendants committed the torts of defamation and tortious interference with business relations, at least in part, through their activities in Mississippi, such was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under the tort prong of the statute. Wells v. Taylor, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17891 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 1999).

The defendant Arkansas corporation was not subject to personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute where the defendant had limited contact with Mississippi, such contacts were sporadic, incidental and indirectly associated with the forum, and the defendant did not and had not conducted business in Mississippi. Thrash Aviation, Inc. v. Kelner Turbine, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 709, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17788 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

Under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction is proper if any element of tort (or any part of any element) takes place in Mississippi. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Under Mississippi law, malicious prosecution requires institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; by, or at instance of defendants; termination of such proceedings in plaintiff’s favor; malice in instituting proceedings; want of probable cause in proceedings; and suffering of damages as result of action or prosecution complained of. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Suffering of damages within state from alleged malicious prosecution was insufficient, without more, to support personal jurisdiction under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

For purposes of Mississippi long-arm statute, injury suffered in malicious prosecution tort is institution of criminal or civil proceedings where institution ought not to have occurred (and occurred for an improper reason); Mississippi does not permit damages to serve as a proxy for injury in personal jurisdiction calculus. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

Service of process by certified mail from out of state, apart from actual filing of suit, was not basis for malicious prosecution claim and could not support exercise of personal jurisdiction under tort prong of Mississippi long-arm statute. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18148 (5th Cir. Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048, 118 S. Ct. 691, 139 L. Ed. 2d 637, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 71 (U.S. 1998).

In a medical malpractice action against a Tennessee hospital and its emergency room personnel arising from the death of a patient who was to be transported from Mississippi to the hospital, neither the contract nor the doing business prong of the long-arm statute (§13-3-57) was available to the plaintiff as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over the hospital where the plaintiff was a nonresident of Mississippi. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 F. Supp. 248, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 579 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

In a medical malpractice action against a Tennessee hospital and its emergency room personnel arising from the death of a patient who was allegedly treated with inappropriate medication while being transported from a Mississippi hospital to the hospital in Tennessee, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over the Tennessee hospital pursuant to §13-3-57 for the alleged actions of an emergency room physician who agreed to accept the transfer. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 F. Supp. 248, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 579 (S.D. Miss. 1996).

In an action by a Mississippi plaintiff alleging various torts arising from a Missouri defendant’s repair and replacement of the plaintiff’s diesel engines, the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi, although the tort prong of Mississippi’s long arm statute (§13-3-57) applied because the engines malfunctioned in Mississippi, where, inter alia, the defendant was not qualified to do business in Mississippi, had never done business in Mississippi, owned no property in Mississippi, had no place of business in Mississippi, did not advertise or sell products in Mississippi, and was careful to protect its distribution agreement, which forbid it from providing any sales and services outside Kansas and part of Missouri; exercise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute would not comport with the dictates of Fourteenth Amendment. Fava Custom Applicators v. Cummins Mid-America, 907 F. Supp. 224, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18797 (N.D. Miss. 1995).

A foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “contract” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) where the final version of the contract was signed in Louisiana, the parties never contemplated that the contract would be performed in whole or in part in Mississippi, and the work under the contract was actually performed in Algeria; the fact that the plaintiff flew to the job site in Algeria from Mississippi did not render his travel from Mississippi equivalent to part performance in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In an action for alleged interference with an employment contract, a foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “tort” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) where the plaintiff was hired to provide services in Algeria, and the alleged injury occurred in Algeria (where the plaintiff was terminated); the fact that the plaintiff, as a Mississippi resident, might have suffered adverse economic consequences in Mississippi from his termination in Algeria did not recategorize the tort as occurring “in whole or in part” in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In a personal injury action by a Mississippi plaintiff arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee, the nonresident defendant’s consummation of an agreement to breed her dog in Mississippi, and her installation of a telephone line at a friend’s home in Mississippi when she briefly stayed there, were insufficient to meet the “contract” prong of the Mississippi long arm statute (§13-3-57) where the Tennessee automobile accident was unrelated to the contracts performed by the defendant in Mississippi. McLaurin v. Nazar, 883 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5550 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 878, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36819 (5th Cir. Miss. 1995).

In an action for an alleged breach of an agreement to purchase shares of stock in a coal mining company located in Kentucky, the requirements of the Mississippi long-arm statute (§13-3-57) were met as to the Kentucky defendants where all parties had duties of performance in Mississippi under the sale and escrow agreements, and negotiations conducted by one defendant by telephone or facsimile to Mississippi were made on behalf of both defendants. First Miss. Corp. v. Thunderbird Energy, 876 F. Supp. 840, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1875 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In an action by a Mississippi insurer against an Alabama resident and his Alabama attorney for breach of a settlement agreement arising out of a medical malpractice action, the defendants were subject to jurisdiction under Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57), although the defendants received and cashed the settlement check in Alabama, and executed (and altered) the release document in Alabama, where the parties negotiated and ultimately entered the settlement agreement with the Mississippi insurance company in Mississippi, the settlement check was sent from Mississippi and ultimately paid by a Mississippi bank, and the release was sent to the defendants from Mississippi and was to be returned to Mississippi. Medical Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 864 F. Supp. 576, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14703 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

A nonresident defendant must do more than merely place its product in the “stream of commerce” before its actions will be deemed “purposefully directed” at Mississippi for purposes of due process analysis. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1994).

A nonresident manufacturer’s placement of its product into the stream of commerce did not constitute an act “purposefully directed” toward Mississippi where there was no evidence of any activity by the manufacturer indicative of an intent to serve the Mississippi market; thus, the limitations of the due process clause prevented utilization of §13-3-57 to gain personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1994).

In an action against a nonresident church and archdiocese, alleging that a priest engaged in homosexual activity with the plaintiff at homes in Mississippi and that church officials knew that the plaintiff was staying overnight with the priest, and should have known that homosexual activity would occur, personal jurisdiction did not exist over the church and archdiocese under the Mississippi long-arm statute (§13-3-57), since the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case on which jurisdiction was based predicated on theories of respondeat superior, negligent hiring, or negligent supervision. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Supp. 429, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20435 (E.D. La. 1993).

Long-arm statute could not be used as basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction in product liability action brought against non-resident defendants who were doing business in Mississippi and who were licensed as automobile manufacturers or dealers under Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Law, where defendants were not registered to do business in Mississippi, automobile accident which gave rise to action occurred in another state, and action was brought by non-resident plaintiffs. Herrley v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 957 F.2d 216, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

A Louisiana railroad corporation which was not qualified to do business in Mississippi was not amenable to suit in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where neither the plaintiff nor the accident giving rise to the action had any connection with Mississippi or with any business conducted by the railroad corporation in Mississippi. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 421 (Miss. 1992).

Personal jurisdiction could be exercised over a nonresident putative father in a paternity and support action where the nonresident had been present in the state as a student at a state university, he had sexual relations with the mother in the state, and he had subsequently failed to support the child who resided in the state. Jones v. Chandler, 592 So. 2d 966, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 984 (Miss. 1991).

“Doing business” prong of long-arm statute may not be utilized by nonresident plaintiff. Madison v. Revlon, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 758, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20080 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action, brought by truck driver who was injured when rubber strap broke as driver was attempting to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employee, evidence failed to establish that part of tort occurred in Mississippi for purposes of determining whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted there over Ohio manufacturer; although plaintiff made products liability allegation that he received box containing allegedly defective straps from his employer in Mississippi, plaintiff did not attempt to use strap until he reached Oklahoma, injury occurred in Oklahoma, none of manufacturer’s actions were directed towards Mississippi, and none of alleged acts took place in Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action, brought by truck driver injured when rubber strap broke as he attempted to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employer, evidence failed to establish sufficient basis to subject manufacturer to long-arm jurisdiction on theory of strict tort liability, notwithstanding that manufacturer was sufficiently engaged in business of selling rubber strap to be considered “seller,” as none of manufacturer’s sales activities or solicitations took place in or were directed towards Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Non-resident plaintiff may not use “doing business” prong of long-arm statute to obtain in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendant. Prince v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 780 F. Supp. 417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Assuming it was otherwise available to plaintiff, Mississippi statute providing that non-resident corporations found doing business in Mississippi would be subject to suit in state to same extent as domestic corporations, regardless of whether cause of action accrued within or outside of state, did not provide statutory basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in personal injury action by nonresident plaintiff, where Mississippi long-arm statute would not allow that result. Prince v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 780 F. Supp. 417, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresident defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in federal diversity case to extent permitted by state court in state in which federal court sits. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Under particular facts, it would not be unfair or offend due process for Mississippi court to exercise jurisdiction in suit by Mississippi corporation against Illinois corporation which had agreed to move Mississippi corporation’s barges which had become stranded in river; defendant’s activities in Mississippi were such that it could reasonably foresee being hailed into court in Mississippi. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In determining whether exercise of long arm jurisdiction under state statute comports with due process requirements, court must determine whether defendant has established sufficient contacts with forum state indicating purposeful availment of privilege of conducting activities within forum and thereby invoking benefits and protection of its laws, with focus of inquiry at this stage being upon nature of underlying litigation. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Extent of jurisdiction of federal court over nonresident defendant depends on whether defendant is amenable to service of process under forum state’s long arm statute and whether such exercise of jurisdiction would comport with dictates of due process. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In deciding whether federal court sitting in diversity has jurisdiction over nonresident defendant, reach of long arm statute should be determined before considering whether exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due process, for if service was defective under state statute, constitutional issue should not even be considered. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

State’s long-arm statute relating to tort actions did not authorize jurisdiction over foreign corporation which had entered into charter agreement with Mississippi corporation seeking damages for loss of use of barges which allegedly went aground as result of Illinois corporation’s negligence in maintaining and operating tug. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

Mississippi’s long arm statute’s contract provision served to confer personal jurisdiction over Illinois corporation which had entered into charter agreement with Mississippi corporation seeking damages for loss of use of barges which allegedly ran aground as result of Illinois corporation’s negligent maintenance and operation of tug. Falco Lime, Inc. v. Tide Towing Co., 779 F. Supp. 58, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17756 (N.D. Miss. 1991).

In order for “tort” prong of long-arm statute to apply, at least some part of tort must have been committed within Mississippi. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In products liability action brought against defendant manufacturer of rifle, tort provision of long-arm statute would not form basis for jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer where allegations are that injuries to various plaintiffs occurred in Texas, Washington, and Canada. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresident plaintiffs may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident defendant. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In products liability action, nonresident plaintiffs could not use “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant manufacturer, even if court considered as true, for purposes of litigation, assertion that defendant manufacturer was alter ego of co-defendant, its parent corporation, which had registered agent in state and had not challenged personal jurisdiction; there was no Mississippi law to support intended use of alter ego theory to impute residency of parent corporation to subsidiary. Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20550 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Nonresidents may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute to invoke jurisdiction in Mississippi over foreign corporation. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

For defendant to be amenable to process under “doing business” provision of long-arm statute, there must be nexus between defendant’s activities in Mississippi and plaintiff’s cause of action; however, there is no requirement that there be direct relation or nexus between the two, claim must merely be “incident to” such business. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

There was no sufficient connection, to form basis for long-arm jurisdiction, between defendant manufacturer’s business activity in Mississippi and injury sustained by plaintiffs’ deceased by machine manufactured by defendant, where defendant was New Jersey corporation which sold machine to deceased’s employer in Louisiana, deceased had lived and worked in Louisiana, and plaintiffs resided in Louisiana; all that appeared from submissions to court was that defendant sold equipment in interstate commerce and had sold equipment which was distributed to Mississippi purchasers. Ferry v. Langston Corp., 792 F. Supp. 512, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20053 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Nonresident of state of Mississippi may not utilize “doing business” provision of long-arm statute as basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporation in Mississippi. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Personal jurisdiction would not lie, over nonresident manufacturer, under long-arm statute or under due process clause, where manufacturer was organized or existed under laws of Federal Republic of Germany, was not qualified to do business in Mississippi, had no real estate, personal property, bank accounts, or other property in state, had never entered into contract to be performed within state, and had never performed any act which had or could have had effect within state. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Mississippi long-arm statute allows for assertion of jurisdiction over person of nonresident defendant who makes contract with resident of Mississippi to be performed in whole or in part, by either party, within Mississippi; or who commits tort in whole or in part in Mississippi; or who does any business or performs any character of work or service in state. Bailiff v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 792 F. Supp. 509, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20052 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

In action brought by California residents against asbestos products manufacturers alleging damages as result of presence of asbestos-containing materials in buildings located outside Mississippi, claims for fraud and conspiracy accrued at time of sale of products, which was before 1980 when §13-3-57 was amended, thus District Court in Mississippi lacked jurisdiction under tort prong of statute. Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20087 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

Sale of asbestos-containing products in Mississippi and alleged misrepresentation by defendant manufacturers as to consequences of exposure of such products did not subject defendants to service of process under tort provisions of §13-3-57; otherwise all manufacturers who commit mass torts would be subject to service of process under tort provisions of statute, which would swallow all restrictions placed on long-arm statute. Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1120, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20087 (S.D. Miss. 1990).

In order for jurisdiction to have been proper as to defendants who owned a weekend home in Mississippi but whose “usual place of abode” was in Louisiana, service of process should have been made pursuant to Mississippi’s long-arm statute, since the defendants owned real property in Mississippi, and thus had taken advantage of the laws of Mississippi and the protections afforded under such laws. Alpaugh v. Moore, 568 So. 2d 291, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 606 (Miss. 1990).

A court had personal jurisdiction over a former Mississippi resident in an action brought by his former wife who alleged that she incurred $5,000 in debts by reason of his desertion, where the allegations included a debt incurred in Mississippi by reason of the former husband’s conduct in Mississippi. Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1990).

By virtue of the supremacy clause, the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act overrides Mississippi’s long-arm statutes to the extent that Mississippi law would exceed the limitations of the federal enactment. Thus, a former husband’s absence from Mississippi for 15 continuous years precluded personal jurisdiction by reason of residence or domicile since the language of the federal Act makes it clear that only current domicile or residence may suffice to confer authority upon a court to adjudge rights in a former service person’s military retirement pension. Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1990).

Mississippi long-arm statute could not bring owners of trucking company located and primarily doing business in Nevada and Colorado into court in Mississippi where only contacts between defendants and Mississippi were permit to carry property through the state and purchase of operating authorities permitting shipment into Mississippi. Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18373 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

The “doing-business” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute may not be used by nonresident plaintiffs to bring nonresident defendants into court in the state; even residents must establish a nexus between plaintiff’s cause of action and defendant’s in-state business contacts to use such long-arm provision. Mills v. Dieco, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 296, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12349 (N.D. Miss. 1989).

Section 13-3-57 requires no direct nexus to the non-resident’s business done in Mississippi, but requires only that the claim be incident thereto. The statute thus requires far less than that the liability generating conduct have occurred in Mississippi. There is no constitutional imperative that the action arise out of the non-resident defendant’s contacts/activities in this state. All that is required is that the non-resident defendant have continuous and systematic general contacts with Mississippi. These contacts must amount to something more than occasional “fortuitous” instances where the defendant had in the past come into some casual, isolated contact with an in-state resident. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

An airline passenger’s personal representatives’ claim against the estate of an airline pilot arose out of facts sufficiently incident to business done by the pilot in Mississippi that the pilot’s estate was amenable to suit in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where the pilot and the passenger were employees of a Mississippi corporation which had an office in Mississippi, and the airplane crash which gave rise to the passenger’s claim occurred during a trip made on behalf of the corporation. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

The use of the word “representative” in §13-3-57 encompasses executors and administrators of an estate and contemplates that the actions of a decedent during his or her lifetime which would have rendered him or her amenable to suit will similarly subject his or her administrator or executor (i.e. his or her personal “representative”) to in personam jurisdiction in Mississippi. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So. 2d 303, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 501 (Miss. 1989).

Writers of book “published” or “communicated” allegedly defamatory writing to publisher, which republished book on widespread basis, and therefore writers are subject to in personam jurisdiction by virtue of fact that they committed tort within state. Mitchell v. Random House, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1250, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15738 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 664, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670 (5th Cir. Miss. 1989).

Negotiations conducted telephonically and through use of mails by out of state business do not evidence “purposeful availment” of benefits of forum state so as to permit in personam jurisdiction over business, where no representative of business ever visited state during negotiation process or at anytime, and where contract in question calls for performance and interpretation of contract under Pennsylvania law. General Equipment Mfrs. v. Coco Bros., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 608, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15313 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

When nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs need not make full showing on merits that jurisdiction is proper, but must make prima facie showing of facts upon which in personam jurisdiction is predicated; plaintiffs failed to come forward with proof in acceptable form to controvert defendant’s unrebutted affidavit, which conclusively established that defendant was not doing business and had never done business in Mississippi. Strong v. RG Industries, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1017, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9037 (S.D. Miss. 1988).

Jurisdiction under Mississippi Long-Arm statute based on contract with nonresident to be performed in whole or in part in Mississippi does not apply where patient alleging medical malpractice for acts that had taken place in Tennessee had not identified any act that she, doctor, or professional corporation had performed, or were to be performed, in Mississippi, pursuant to either explicit or implicit contract. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician and professional corporation were not amenable to jurisdiction under tort prong of long-arm statute because act of alleged negligence was committed and completed in Tennessee. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Non-resident defendant who initiated contractual relationship out of which litigation arose with resident plaintiff, was subject to exercise of personal jurisdiction of court pursuant to Miss Code §13-3-57 where language of contract itself and defendant’s subsequent correspondence with plaintiff clearly reflected defendant’s intent and understanding that critical and meaningful work in furtherance of contract was to be performed, and in fact was performed, in Mississippi. Owen v. Woods, 661 F. Supp. 15, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16354 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Individual defendants’ motions for dismissal are properly denied, where motions are apparently based on plaintiff’s failure to specifically designate in both his original and his first amended complaints the provision of §13-3-57 upon which jurisdiction is based, where plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed subsequent to defendants’ motions, premises long-arm jurisdiction on tort prong of statute, and where plaintiff has sufficiently alleged tortious acts committed in whole or in part in Mississippi to support long-arm jurisdiction against individual defendants in their individual capacities. White v. Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25121 (N.D. Miss. 1986).

Tests for determining whether foreign corporation is “doing business” includes purposeful commission of act which consummates in transaction in Mississippi with cause of action arising from or being connected with such acts or transactions and consistency of assumption of personal jurisdiction with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; foreign corporation’s mailing of royalty checks to Mississippi residents for oil and gas production of out of state properties is not sufficient for jurisdictional purposes; execution of employment contracts and power of attorney in foreign state concerning administration of estate located in foreign state does not support Mississippi jurisdiction over claim by Mississippi law firm concerning work performed in Alabama for Alabama residents. Martin & Martin v. Jones, 616 F. Supp. 339, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17567 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Sections 13-3-57 and 79-1-27[Repealed] must be harmonized to support state’s valid policy of opening doors of Mississippi courts to foreign corporations found doing business in state to sue and be sued from all bona fide causes of action; merely doing business in Mississippi is not sufficient to support exercise of personal jurisdiction, and business in Mississippi of non-resident defendant must be of systematic and ongoing nature, cause of action must be incident to business activity, and assertion of jurisdiction must not offend notions of fairness and substantial justice; busline which does not maintain ticket agents, representatives, employees, offices, or property in Mississippi and which does not advertise or solicit business or negotiate or execute contracts in Mississippi but whose charter service has merely passed through state is not subject to jurisdiction for cause of action which does not arise out of activities of busline in state. Allen v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 236, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19139 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Despite fact that none of the plaintiffs in wrongful death action is resident of Mississippi, long-arm statute is available to plaintiffs where decedents, in whose shoes plaintiffs stand, were residents of Mississippi. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

If plaintiffs in wrongful death action amend pleadings to specifically allege that automobile accident giving rise to suit was caused by defect in master cylinder, plaintiffs will have satisfied minimum contacts test for determining whether personal jurisdiction over defendant satisfies federal due process requirements, where, although vehicle in question was sold and delivered by defendant dealer, who is Alabama Corporation, to decedents in Alabama, dealer aided Mississippi dealership in latter’s attempt to repair brakes by selling and shipping master cylinder to Mississippi dealership. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Provision of §13-3-57 giving Mississippi courts jurisdiction over nonresident who commits tort in whole or in part in Mississippi potentially confers jurisdiction over Alabama car dealership in action arising from Mississippi automobile accident notwithstanding that dealer sold car involved in accident to decedent in Alabama, since tort is not complete until injury occurs and thus at least part of tort allegedly committed by dealer was committed in Mississippi. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Subjecting Alabama car dealership to jurisdiction of Mississippi court in wrongful death action arising from automobile accident occurring in Mississippi but allegedly resulting from dealer’s sale and shipment to Mississippi dealership of master cylinder for use in attempting to repair vehicle’s brakes would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice so as to violate federal due process requirements, where (1) most of witnesses reside in Mississippi, (2) two or three defendants reside in Mississippi, (3) only Mississippi court can resolve matter in single action, and (4) Alabama dealer is not inconvenienced unreasonably since distance between Alabama and Mississippi is not great; moreover, Mississippi has exceptionally strong interest in providing forum for redress of injuries to its residents occurring within its borders and caused by allegedly defective product shipped from outside state. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Tripartite test, under which applicability of long-arm statute is determined on basis of whether nonresident defendant has purposefully done act or consummated transaction in forum state, whether cause of action has arisen from or is connected with such act of transaction, and whether assumption of jurisdiction by forum state offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, applies only to “doing business” category of statute. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

1980 amendment to §13-3-57 allowing nonresident plaintiff to obtain service of process upon nonresident defendant who has committed tort in whole or in part in Mississippi against nonresident plaintiff applies so as to permit nonresident plaintiff injured in automobile accident to obtain service upon Alabama car dealership to extent that dealership is subject to in personam jurisdiction of Mississippi Court where accident occurred after effective date of amendment. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 28452 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985).

Where a New York resident brought an action against a nonresident for alienation of affection and criminal conversation with his wife, and where the complaint contained sufficient allegations that the defendant committed a tort at least in part within Mississippi, the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over defendant by virtue of §13-3-57. Camp v. Roberts, 462 So. 2d 726, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1858 (Miss. 1985).

Mississippi Code §79-1-27[Repealed], providing that any corporation doing business in Mississippi is subject to suit there, must be construed and harmonized with §13-3-57 “doing business” clause, which cannot be used by non-resident plaintiff; to extend jurisdiction over nonresident corporation in suit by non-resident plaintiff on authority of §79-1-27[Repealed] would be contrary to intention of Mississippi legislature. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Plaintiff in products liability action against Pennsylvania corporation cannot avoid requirements of Mississippi long-arm statute on ground that “equality of treatment” requires that Pennsylvania corporation, which would not be precluded from bringing suit in Mississippi, should also be subject to suit in Mississippi as defendant. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

“Doing-business” provision of §13-3-57 is not available to non-resident plaintiffs. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Nonresident plaintiff who serves process on registered agent of nonresident defendant, qualified to do business in Mississippi, acquires in personam jurisdiction over defendant, even though cause of action arose outside of Mississippi. Herrley v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 690, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21686 (S.D. Miss. 1984), aff'd, 957 F.2d 216, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

Mississippi long-arm statute applies in product liability action against foreign corporation where Mississippi resident employed as truckdriver died in Mississippi as result of accident caused by defective design and manufacture of hauler-container being transported by deceased at time of accident. Cannon v. Tokyu Car Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1451, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19082 (S.D. Miss. 1984).

In a diversity action one long-distance telephone call that was alleged to constitute a tort committed “in whole or in part” in Mississippi was a proper basis on which to predicate federal diversity jurisdiction under Code §13-3-57, since the statute includes in its reach defendants who commit a single tort, an alleged tortfeasor need not have been present in the state, and if the alleged tortfeasor causes injury in Mississippi he is covered by the statute. Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 25419 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023, 103 S. Ct. 1275, 75 L. Ed. 2d 496, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 4089 (U.S. 1983).

Service of process in an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident was improperly made pursuant to §13-3-57, where although the plaintiff was a Mississippi resident when the accident occurred, she was not a resident when suit was filed and, at that time, the Mississippi statute could be used against nonresident defendants only by a plaintiff who was a resident when the suit was filed. Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 115, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 17055 (5th Cir. Miss. 1982).

The 1980 amendment to §13-3-57 merely creates a right in nonresidents to make use of the statute where the tort is committed in whole or in part in the state; otherwise the statute remains the same and the amendment strengthens the view that a nonresident may not use the statute as a vehicle to bring suit in the courts of the state against nonresidents or foreign corporations not qualified under the constitution or state law to do business in the state when incidents giving rise to the cause of action occur outside of Mississippi. Thompson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 508 F. Supp. 522, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10531 (N.D. Miss. 1981).

In an action arising out of the sale of a grinding machine, service of summons on the nonresident defendants pursuant to the state long-arm statute was improper, notwithstanding plaintiff buyers’ allegations that defendants, the company’s owner and sales director, had committed a tort in part in Mississippi against a resident and that the owner had also made a contract to be performed by a party in Mississippi, where the sales had been made through a Tennessee corporation doing business in Tennessee, where the contacts leading up to the sales at issue had been made in Tennessee, and where the transactions had been closed in that state and the machines delivered to plaintiffs at their place of business in Tennessee; thus, the court did not possess in personam jurisdiction over defendants. Blanton v. American Tool & Grinding Co., 472 F. Supp. 257, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12938 (N.D. Miss. 1979).

In an action against a nonresident corporate landowner for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff’s minor child in the waters surrounding defendant’s land, the trial court committed reversible error in sustaining a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction where allegations of negligence and of knowledge of a dangerous condition in such waters were sufficient for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Mandel v. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1017, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2444 (Miss. 1979).

If a plaintiff can obtain process on a non-resident defendant, in a suit filed under the long arm statute, he will not be excused for his failure to sue and will not be entitled to claim that the statute of limitations is tolled during the absence of the defendant from the state; if a plaintiff makes such a claim, the burden is on him to show the duration of the defendant’s absence from the state and to show that defendant cannot be served with process under any of the ways provided by the long arm statute. Gulf Nat'l Bank v. King, 362 So. 2d 1253, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2162 (Miss. 1978).

The application of the long-arm statute did not deny defendants due process of law where, inter alia, the execution of the contract at issue occurred largely in Mississippi, following telephone negotiations initiated in the state, and where defendant partially performed its part of the contract in Mississippi. Sheridan, Inc. v. C. K. Marshall & Co., 360 So. 2d 1223, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2322 (Miss. 1978).

In an action to collect an amount allegedly due on a sale of products manufactured in Mississippi and sold to a Maine buyer on open account, the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over defendant buyer where the sale of the system at issue, for use on an egg farm, had been negotiated by telephone and correspondence, where defendant had not been present in Mississippi at any time and where he had no other business connections in the state; the only fact that could arguably justify in personam jurisdiction was that the system had been fabricated in Mississippi according to plans and specifications especially prepared in the state by plaintiff, but this activity was performed by plaintiff in order to place itself in a position to make the sale to its Maine customer. Reed-Joseph Co. v. De Coster, 461 F. Supp. 748, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16847 (N.D. Miss. 1978).

In an action arising when a Tennessee auctioneer sold certain livestock over which the Mississippi plaintiff had a security interest, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction would be granted, in accordance with the state long arm statute, where the contract between defendant and the plaintiff’s debtor was wholly performed in Tennessee and where, if treated as a tort action, the action in its entirety occurred in Tennessee; although defendant’s contacts with the state would satisfy the mandate of due process, the presence of one representative within the state and the act of advertising within the state would not constitute doing business within the meaning of the statute where there was no causal relationship between the cause of action alleged and the activities of the defendant within the forum state. Indianola Production Credit Asso. v. Burnette-Carter Co., 450 F. Supp. 303, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12823 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would be granted where, according to their uncontradicted affidavits, neither defendant was qualified to do business, was doing business, or had ever done business in the state, where neither had committed a tort in the state, and where neither had entered into a contract with a resident of the state to be performed in whole or in part in the state. Haire v. Miller, 447 F. Supp. 57, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

In an action for breach of contract brought by a New York corporation qualified to do and doing business in Mississippi against a Belgian corporation not otherwise connected with the state, in personam jurisdiction would be exercised pursuant to the long-arm statute and in accordance with the requirements of due process where the contract was partly performed in the state. Chromcraft Corp. v. Mirox, S. A., 446 F. Supp. 342, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14242 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

A Louisiana shipping corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi in an action for breach of contract where, inter alia, the shipper either loaded or unloaded petroleum products at a port in Mississippi on 8 different occasions and where it submitted reports concerning the movement of petroleum products to proper state officials. Smego Marine Transport, Inc. v. International Trading & Transport, Ltd., 446 F. Supp. 21, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14966 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

In personam jurisdiction over a third-party nonresident defendant was not available under the long-arm statute in an action concerning certain defective goods which it shipped to a Mississippi retailer and which were, in turn, delivered to a Mississippi buyer where the nonresident’s only contact with the state consisted of the isolated acts of receiving a telephone call and supplying goods from a point outside Mississippi; the exercise of personal jurisdiction under such circumstances would also be a violation of due process. R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12222 (N.D. Miss. 1977).

Service of process under this section was available to a non-resident plaintiff in an action against a non-resident corporate defendant arising from an injury arising in Mississippi. Daniels v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1203, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16159 (S.D. Miss. 1977).

In an action against a foreign corporation alleging that the corporation interfered in a business relationship between its Mississippi subsidiary and a Mississippi resident, a foreign merger agreement involving the subsidiary was not a contract with a Mississippi resident within the meaning of this section; The corporation’s exercise of its legitimate business interest in selling its subsidiary did not constitute a tort against a Mississippi resident within the meaning of this section; The corporation was not doing business in Mississippi within the meaning of this section, even though its Mississippi subsidiary was wholly owned, the subsidiary’s financing had to be obtained through the corporation, the subsidiary’s long range plans were submitted to the corporation for approval, the boards of directors of the two corporations were nearly identical and board meetings of the subsidiary were held at the corporate offices of the corporation, where the formal legal requirements dividing the two corporations were scrupulously observed, where the subsidiary was recognized as a corporate entity legally distinct from its parent, where the subsidiary was adequately financed, where the subsidiary paid all of the salaries of its employees and its own expenses, including payment for services rendered by its parent, where there was no commingling of funds, and where the subsidiary maintained its own books, records, and a balance sheet. Johnson v. Warnaco, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 44, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13363 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

Nonresident limited partners of a nonresident limited partnership doing business in the state could not be made subject to jurisdiction of the state’s courts in an action against the partnership where they had done none of the acts specified by the long arm statute (§13-3-57) as prerequisites to jurisdiction, and had paid their indebtedness to the partnership in full, thus, under the statute governing circumstances in which limited partners are proper parties to a suit against the partnership (§§79-13-3,79-13-51), not being subject to being made parties. Ga-Pak Lumber Co. v. Nalley, 337 So. 2d 1270, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1615 (Miss. 1976).

Where the notice of service of a non-resident corporation was delivered to the president of the corporation in accord with statutory requirements, and an interlocutory default judgment was entered upon failure of the defendant to answer, the default judgment could not be set aside on the grounds that the president of the corporation mislaid the notice due to anxiety over his wife’s recent death. Western Chain Co. v. Brownlee, 317 So. 2d 418, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1758 (Miss. 1975).

Where the consideration for a contract was the agreement between the plaintiff and the nonresident defendant to cause a merger of Mississippi and Arkansas corporations, which would require a partial performance of the contract by both plaintiff and defendant in Mississippi, the defendant was within the reach of this statute. Pierce v. Alleluia Cushion Co., 397 F. Supp. 338, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11329 (N.D. Miss. 1975).

The Mississippi long-arm statute could be utilized in an action for the wrongful death, pursuant to Code 1972, §11-7-13, of a nonresident decedent, where the plaintiff was a Mississippi resident suing as administrator of the decedent’s estate pursuant to letters of administration granted by a Mississippi chancery court. McAlpin v. James McKoane Enterprises, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 937, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12161 (N.D. Miss. 1975), disapproved, Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 730 F.2d 286, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23318 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

This statute (formerly § 1437, Mississippi Code (1942)) does not require the attachment of the complaint to the summons. Western Chain Co. v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 986, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 11213 (7th Cir. Ill. 1975).

Where the Associated Press sent a dispatch from Louisiana to its Mississippi members incorrectly indicating that plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, had been convicted of marijuana possession, the district court had jurisdiction of plaintiff’s libel action under the terms of the amended Mississippi long-arm statute; the AP’s contacts with Mississippi were sufficient to justify, under the due process clause, Mississippi’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 14945 (5th Cir. Miss. 1975).

A nonresident executor administering an estate in and under the supervision of the Tennessee courts, whose only contact with Mississippi touching upon the court administration of the estate had been the probation of the foreign will and the recording of a certified copy of the record of his appointment and qualification in Tennessee, had such minimal and tenuous contact with Mississippi as to be outside the coverage of this section [Code 1972, §13-3-57]. Riley v. Communications Consultants, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 296, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

The long-arm statute was clearly enacted for the benefit of residents only, and it has not been expanded through the process of judicial interpretation to include nonresident plaintiffs not qualified to do business within the state; there is no defect under federal constitutional standards for limiting the long-arm statute to resident plaintiffs, since the state is not obligated to make its courts available to nonresidents, who themselves are not doing business in the state, to sue other nonresidents. American International Pictures, Inc. v. Morgan, 371 F. Supp. 528, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12866 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

Process served pursuant to §13-3-57 is not valid or effective to subject the nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction unless the cause of action arises from, or is connected with, the consummation of some transaction or performance of some act within the state by such nonresident defendant. Holvitz v. Norfleet--Ashley, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 394, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10631 (N.D. Miss. 1973).

Code 1942, § 1437 could not be used to sustain in personam jurisdiction over individual defendants on grounds that the activities of the individual defendants in connection with the contract performed, or to be performed in Mississippi by the defendant corporation, created a situation under which this section would reach the individual defendants’ in personam jurisdiction, since jurisdiction over individual officers and employees of a corporation cannot be predicated merely upon the jurisdiction over the corporation itself. Webb v. Culberson, Heller & Norton, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 923, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13866 (N.D. Miss. 1973).

A “single contract” is sufficient to confer jurisdiction of a nonresident under Code 1942, § 1437. Kaydee Metal Products Corp. v. Sintex Machine Tool Mfg. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 902, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13806 (N.D. Miss. 1972).

An administratrix, residing outside and being a nonresident of the state of Mississippi has, by her actions in administering an estate in Mississippi, subjected herself to process under Code 1942, § 1437, on a cause of action arising out of an automobile accident which occurred in Alabama. Galloway v. Korcekwa, 339 F. Supp. 801, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14938 (N.D. Miss. 1972).

The statutory purpose is to afford to Mississippi residents a right of action locally against the nonresident who commits a tort, in whole or in part, in this state against a resident of this state, and to limit the reach of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] and products liability cases “to injuries in this state” unduly restricts the clear meaning of the statute. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1361, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

There is no statutory requirement that the part of the tort which causes the injury be committed in Mississippi; the words require only that a part of the tort be committed in this state. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1361, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

Through the enactment of Code 1942, § 1438, actions brought pursuant to this section [Code 1942, § 1437] shall be issued and served in the same manner and with the same effect as process issued and served pursuant to Code 1942, § 9352-61. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

Under Code 1942, § 1438, providing that service of process made upon the secretary of state shall be made in the same manner and by the same procedure and with the same force and effect as is provided by the nonresident motorist statute as amended and supplemented, service can be made pursuant to a subsequently inserted provision of the nonresident motorist statute, Code 1942, § 9352-61, so as to permit service upon any person who is a nonresident at the time the action is filed, even though at the time of the incident giving rise to the action, such person was a resident of Mississippi. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

In a malpractice action against a nonresident doctor who resided in Mississippi at the time of the alleged tort, the court held that the addition in this section [Code 1942, § 1438] of the words “as amended and supplemented” indicate that the legislature intended to give those suing nonresidents under Code 1942, § 1437 the same rights to service and effect of process as are given to those suing nonresident motorists under Code 1942, § 9352-61. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

It is well settled that the Mississippi “long arm” statute applies to individual as well as to corporate defendants. Alford v. Whitsel, 322 F. Supp. 358, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14729 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

For amenability of a nonresident individual defendant to process served pursuant to the Mississippi “long arm” statute, the nonresident must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in Mississippi, the cause of action must arise from or be connected with such act or transaction, and the assumption of jurisdiction by the state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in Mississippi, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. Alford v. Whitsel, 322 F. Supp. 358, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14729 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

The personal appearance of the defendant before a Mississippi grand jury, and his alleged malicious and willful withholding of facts which would have exonerated the plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, from criminal charges relating to a check given the defendant by the plaintiff, constituted the commission of a tort within Mississippi against a resident of the state, within the meaning of the Mississippi “long arm” statute. Alford v. Whitsel, 322 F. Supp. 358, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14729 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

In applying the so-called long-arm statute the courts should be sensitive to any conflict between the letter of the law and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and if the latter is offended, the former may have to yield. Beacham v. Beacham, 243 So. 2d 62, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1505 (Miss. 1971).

Where a nonresident corporation signed a sales representative agreement with a resident of Mississippi, which resident fully performed the contract in the state by making sales of the corporation’s products and furnishing other information to the corporation as well as supervising the installation of the product, which installation required representatives of the corporation to make numerous trips to the facility site to assist in the installation, the corporation was amenable to the process and jurisdiction of the courts of Mississippi in a suit by the Mississippi resident to recover commissions allegedly due under the agreement. Beacham v. Beacham, 243 So. 2d 62, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1505 (Miss. 1971).

In a suit to recover commissions allegedly due under a sales representative agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, a nonresident corporate manufacturer, where the defendant made a special appearance and moved for dismissal of the suit on the ground that it was not subject to process of the court, which motion was overruled, the corporate defendant’s action in answering the bill of complaint and in participating in defending the suit did not estop it from making a further attack on the court’s jurisdiction on appeal. Beacham v. Beacham, 243 So. 2d 62, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1505 (Miss. 1971).

The Mississippi statutes providing for the method of service on a resident or a qualified foreign corporation, the “doing business” statute, and the statute providing for substituted service on any corporation doing business in the state, must be read together, and such reading leads to the inescapable conclusion that effective process under these statutes presupposes a factual determination that the foreign corporation is doing business in the state of Mississippi. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

A foreign corporation qualified to do business in Mississippi is a resident within the meaning of subd (a) of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] so that it may bring a suit under the terms of the section. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

Nonresident plaintiff corporations qualified to do business in Mississippi are residents of the state within the meaning of the first category mentioned in subd (a) of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

A foreign corporation qualified to do business under the laws of Mississippi should have the same privileges and advantages of invoking the aid of the courts of this state under this section [Code 1942, § 1437] as resident corporations if they are to have equal protection of the laws. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

A foreign corporation qualified to do business in Mississippi may not be sued under the terms of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] because a foreign corporation, to be reached by the section, must not be qualified as doing business in the state. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

It is now settled that there is little reason to distinguish between nonresident individuals and foreign corporations with respect to obtaining jurisdiction over them under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Smith v. Barker, 306 F. Supp. 1173, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

The “long arm” amendment to this section [Code 1942, § 1437] which became effective July 1, 1964 does not apply retrospectively to torts committed prior to its effective date. Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So. 2d 481, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1321 (Miss. 1966).

The three basic factors which must coincide if jurisdiction is to be entertained by courts of this state over nonresident individuals and foreign corporations are (1) the nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposely do some act or consummate some transaction in the state, (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction, and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature and extent of activity in this state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of this state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d 785, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 451 (Miss. 1964); Republic-Transcon Industries, Inc. v. Templeton, 253 Miss. 132, 175 So. 2d 185, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 975 (Miss. 1965); Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 253 Miss. 835, 179 So. 2d 781, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1059 (Miss. 1965).

This is a remedial statute to be liberally construed and applied without enlarging upon its provisions. Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 11, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 662, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3743 (5th Cir. Miss. 1964).

In the absence of motion attacking the service of process under this section [Code 1942, § 1438], the court, although informed that the secretary of state had failed to mail a copy of the summons to defendant, may properly proceed with the trial. Aerial Agricultural Service v. Richard, 264 F.2d 341, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4250 (5th Cir. Miss. 1959).

While the statute forbidding access by foreign corporations to the courts of the state because of their failure to comply with statutory provisions for doing business is strictly construed so that exclusion from access to the courts of the state requires a strong showing that the statute has been violated, the statute providing for services on a designated agent where, without a compliance with the statute, a corporation has undertaken to do business in state is liberally construed since otherwise citizens of a state would be forced to resort to another jurisdiction in order to maintain suits against foreign corporations as to matters arising out of transactions had within the statute. Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2290 (5th Cir. Miss. 1953).

This section [Code 1942, §§ 1437, 1438] applies to contract, as well as to tort actions, growing out of business or acts done within the state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Change of status of defendant from that of resident of this state at time of entering into contract on which suit is brought to that of nonresident at time suit is filed does not affect validity of service of process under this section [Code 1942, § 1438] when defendant is still engaged in same business within state. Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 38 So. 2d 752, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1949).

This statute is to be given a prospective rather than a retrospective operation and therefore does not apply to an action arising out of an automobile accident occurring prior to its enactment. Bouchillon v. Jordan, 40 F. Supp. 354, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2937 (D. Miss. 1941).

3. What constitutes doing business within state.

In a case involving defendants who operated websites through which Mississippi customers could purchase alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court found that the doing-business component of the state’s long-arm statute was applicable to the defendants. While none of the defendants maintained a physical presence in Mississippi, they nonetheless conducted business in the state by means of their websites, which gave them a virtual presence in the state. Fitch ex rel. State v. Wine Express Inc., — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. Feb. 27, 2020).

In a case involving defendants who operated websites through which Mississippi customers could purchase alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court found that each of the defendants had established sufficient minimum contacts with Mississippi and that those contacts related to the State’s claims against the defendants. Regardless of the free on board contract terms used by the defendants in their sales contracts, the defendants stood ready and willing to do business with Mississippi residents, and knowingly did do business with Mississippi residents. Fitch ex rel. State v. Wine Express Inc., — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. Feb. 27, 2020).

Trial court erred in granting a limited liability company’s (LLC) motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction because it was “doing business” within the State under the long-arm statute; the LLC collaborated with a corporation about creating a sports-training facility in the State, communicated and planned furthering its formation, participated in meetings in the State, substantially participated in the creation of a Mississippi company, and became members of that company. Joshua Props., LLC v. D1 Sports Holdings, LLC, 130 So.3d 1089, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 2014).

Personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation of an extended care facility was lacking under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57 in an action alleging negligence in the facility’s care of a decedent, since there was no showing of sufficient domination by the parent to impute the alleged negligence of the facility to the parent; although the facility was a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent and the entities shared common officers, the parent and the facility meticulously observed corporate formalities in that they did not commingle funds, did not pool insurance coverage, and did not share financial books, records, or bank accounts, and the facility independently operated its own daily activities and paid its own operating expenses. Samples v. Vanguard Healthcare, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70822 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2008).

Where a pharmaceutical company sought a declaratory judgment regarding patent infringement, personal jurisdiction was lacking over a laboratory under a long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, as the laboratory’s mere plan to reintroduce a drug, which might place it into the state’s stream of commerce, did not qualify as doing business there. Further, the laboratory’s correspondence and license negotiations with the company did not support a finding that it was doing business in Mississippi as such would be inconsistent with due process. Cypress Pharm., Inc. v. Tiber Labs., LLC, 504 F. Supp. 2d 129, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52454 (S.D. Miss.), transferred, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67381 (N.D. Ga. 2007).

Mobile home moving service licensed to do business in Mississippi, which had performed some moves into or out of Mississippi over the years, was not “doing business” in the state for purposes of personal judgment in an out-of-state collision case, unrelated to any business in Mississippi. Williams v. Bud Wilson's Mobile Home Serv., 887 So. 2d 830, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 670 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 888 So. 2d 1177, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1437 (Miss. 2004).

Summary judgment granted against two corporations licensed to do business in the State of Mississippi on the grounds that the State’s three-year statute of limitations did not apply to an incident that occurred in the State because the corporations were foreign corporations was reversed because the two corporations should have been considered residents for purposes of invocation of the State statute of limitations, in much the same way as the corporations would be able to invoke the use of the Mississippi long arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Paw Paw's Camper City, Inc., 346 F.3d 153, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20081 (5th Cir. Miss. 2003).

An oral contract for goods to be manufactured in Mississippi for sale to the defendant in Florida was sufficient to support a finding that there was a contract to be performed in part in Mississippi. American Cable Corp. v. Trilogy Communs., Inc., 754 So. 2d 545, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

The parties’ agreement that an oral contract existed for goods to be manufactured in Mississippi for sale to the defendant was sufficient to support a finding that there was a contract to be performed in part in Mississippi, therefore, the defendant was amenable to suit under the long-arm statute. American Cable Corp. v. Trilogy Communs., Inc., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 566 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999), op. withdrawn, sub. op., different results reached on reh'g, 754 So. 2d 545, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

A corporation which owned drug stores in Louisiana did not do business in Mississippi so as to be subject to long arm jurisdiction since there were no substantial, continuous, and deliberate contacts with Mississippi, no purposeful availment of the Mississippi market, and no invocation of the benefits and protections of Mississippi laws, notwithstanding that the corporation paid for advertising by a separate corporation in Mississippi and ran advertisements on Louisiana television stations which broadcasted into Mississippi. Kekko v. K & B La. Corp., 716 So. 2d 682, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 504 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

In an action for alleged interference with an employment contract, a foreign defendant was not amenable to suit under the “doing business” provision of Mississippi’s long-arm statute (§13-3-57) on the sole basis that the contract was mailed to the plaintiff at his home address in Mississippi. Peterson v. Test Int'l, E.C., 904 F. Supp. 574, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17100 (S.D. Miss. 1995).

In a personal injury action by a Mississippi plaintiff arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Tennessee, the nonresident defendant’s consummation of an agreement to breed her dog in Mississippi, and her installation of a telephone line at a friend’s home in Mississippi when she briefly stayed there, were insufficient to meet the “doing business” prong of the Mississippi long arm statute (§13-3-57) where the Tennessee automobile accident was not incidental to the defendant’s activities in Mississippi. McLaurin v. Nazar, 883 F. Supp. 112, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5550 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 71 F.3d 878, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36819 (5th Cir. Miss. 1995).

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate nexus between defendant product manufacturer’s activities in Mississippi and plaintiff’s cause of action, as required for assertion of jurisdiction under “doing business” clause of §13-3-57, where only allegations contained in complaint were that defendant sells products nationwide and that these products have been purchased by Mississippians. Madison v. Revlon, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 758, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20080 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

In action by truckdriver injured when rubber strap broke as he attempted to attach it to tarp, against Ohio manufacturer of strap which sold strap to Alabama company which in turn sold it to plaintiff’s employee, evidence failed to establish that manufacturer was “doing business” in Mississippi so as to bring it within personal jurisdiction under statute, where there was no evidence that manufacturer had systematic and continuous contact with Mississippi. Yates v. Turzin, 786 F. Supp. 594, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20499 (S.D. Miss. 1991).

Federal Court in Mississippi properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over publishers of swinger magazines in action for defamation and invasion of privacy for publication of personal ad pertaining to plaintiff because such publication constituted commission of tort in the state which would be deemed to be doing business in the state. Mize v. Harvey Shapiro Enterprises, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 220, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6078 (N.D. Miss. 1989).

The Mississippi court had personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state bank since the bank’s financing of a customer’s gas well operation in Mississippi was an action purposefully directed toward Mississippi. By perfecting its security interests in the customer’s assets in Mississippi through filing financing statements and deeds of trust, the bank purposefully availed itself of the protection of Mississippi law. Wilkinson v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 529 So. 2d 616, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 335 (Miss. 1988).

Test to determine jurisdiction under “doing business” prong of long-arm statute is: (1) nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in forum state; (2) cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such action or transaction; and (3) assumption of jurisdiction by forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to quality, common nature, and extent of activity in forum state, relative convenience of parties, benefits and protection of laws of forum state afforded respective parties, and basic equities of situation. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician and professional corporation were not amenable to jurisdiction under doing business prong of Mississippi’s Long-Arm statute because relevant facts did not satisfy tri-partite test established to determine jurisdiction. There was no evidence in record that professional corporation ever purposefully did some act or consummated some transaction in Mississippi, instead confining practice to hospitals in Memphis, and corporation did not solicit patients from Mississippi or advertise there; based on this, plaintiff had not even shown that professional corporation met first element of tri-partite test. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Physician was not subject to jurisdiction, although physician had consummated transaction in Mississippi by purchasing property there, not related to lawsuit; therefore, nexus requirement was not satisfied. Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15605 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987), but see, Gross v. Chevrolet Country, 655 So. 2d 873, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094, 116 S. Ct. 817, 133 L. Ed. 2d 761, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 776 (U.S. 1996).

Out of state company which entered into contract with in-state company, which contract required at least partial performance within state, has purposefully availed itself of privileges of conducting activities within state and its connection with forum was such that it should reasonably have anticipated being brought into court within state, as certain elements of contract and subsequent agreements were to be performed by out of state company within state relating to specifications of work to be done and testing of completed work, all to be performed within state. Sorrels Steel Co. v. Great Southwest Corp., 651 F. Supp. 623, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20575 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Plaintiffs failed to make prima facie showing that corporate veil of subsidiary corporation should be preliminarily pierced for purposes of attaining long-arm jurisdiction over parent corporation or individual alleged to have been president of both corporations when cause of action arose, where, although there existed commonality of ownership or officers of both corporations, plaintiffs made no attempt to satisfy requirement of particularized factual allegations tending to show applicability of “piercing” doctrine, and they have not pled specific facts sufficient to establish that subsidiary corporation at anytime operated as alter ego of corporate officer. McCardle v. Arkansas Log Homes, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 897, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28846 (S.D. Miss. 1986).

Mississippi court lacks jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendant where corporate defendant has no contract with resident of state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in state and the corporate defendant has no other contacts with state; Mississippi court lacks jurisdiction over corporate defendant in transaction arising over sale of out-of-state property which took place outside of Mississippi where only arguable contact with State of Mississippi is assembly and transfer of collateral to plaintiff in Mississippi which would transpire between plaintiff and trustee bank. Cappaert v. Preferred Equities Corp., 613 F. Supp. 264, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17906 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

Miss. Code §13-3-57 does not confer jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendant in action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duties, and violations of federal commodities laws, notwithstanding plaintiff’s contentions (1) that his economic loss in Mississippi causes tort to have occurred in Mississippi, and (2) that defendant’s advertisement in Wall Street Journal circulated and read by plaintiff in Mississippi, telephone calls to and from Mississippi, and fact that plaintiff’s checks were drawn on his Mississippi account are sufficient bases for exercise of in personam jurisdiction. Paul v. International Precious Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp. 174, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18214 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

When defendant in securities action took funds beyond borders of Mississippi in violation of injunction and in furtherance of his plan to secrete funds with knowledge and consent of its agents, such action satisfied in-state requirement of §13-3-57 as far as agents are concerned. Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30619 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S. Ct. 794, 88 L. Ed. 2d 771, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 2324 (U.S. 1986).

Before personal jurisdiction may be exercised under “doing-business” provision of §13-3-57, there must be sufficient nexus between activities of defendant within state and plaintiff’s cause of action; mere fact that defendant power saw manufacturer markets its products nationally and that some of these goods find their way into Mississippi is not sufficient nexus to subject manufacturer, which is corporation domiciled in Pennsylvania and is division of Maryland corporation, to in-personam jurisdiction under “doing-business” provision. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 17911 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).

Contacts between defendant foreign corporation and forum state in wrongful death and negligence action were insufficient to assert in personam jurisdiction over defendant where contacts consisted of sending defendant’s chief executive officer to forum state for contract-negotiation session, accepting checks drawn on bank located in forum state, purchasing equipment and services from a manufacturer located in forum state, and sending personnel to manufacturer’s facilities for training in the state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 68 (U.S. 1984).

Publishing corporation’s regular circulation of magazines in forum state is sufficient to support assertion of jurisdiction in libel action based on contents of magazine, even where single publication rule is applied. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 40 (U.S. 1984).

In an action brought by a bank to foreclose its deed of trust executed by a corporation and secured by the personal guarantees of five of the corporation’s stockholders, the chancery court had jurisdiction under §13-3-57 over a non-resident stockholder, even though the instruments had been executed out of state, since they were to be performed in Mississippi, were construed according to Mississippi law, and were also excepted in Mississippi. First Mississippi Nat'l Bank v. S & K Enterprises, Inc., 460 So. 2d 839, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 2008 (Miss. 1984).

In an action by a Mississippi citizen charging breach of contract and fraud against a Texas corporation arising out of an oral agreement for an exclusive dealership to sell the corporation’s product in Mississippi, the trial court erred in granting the corporation’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where, by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of doing business with a Mississippi resident, accepting several orders made through the resident and shipping its product to the purchasers in Mississippi, the corporation subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Mississippi under the long arm statute. Murray v. Huggers Mfg., Inc., 398 So. 2d 1323, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2026 (Miss. 1981).

Personal jurisdiction over Louisiana corporation existed in Mississippi under §13-3-57 where Louisiana corporation did business of a systematic and ongoing nature in Mississippi, plaintiffs’ cause of action was incident to that business activity, and assertion of jurisdiction over Louisiana corporation did not offend notions of fairness or substantial justice. Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 617 F.2d 432, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 17435 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 1361, 67 L. Ed. 2d 343, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 829 (U.S. 1981).

A nonresident manufacturer of grinding machines was not amenable to suit in Mississippi by a Louisiana resident who had worked in Mississippi as an operator of such machine and who had allegedly become permanently disabled as a result of the constant inhalation of dust particles at work, where, inter alia, defendant manufacturer did not have a single employee in the state when the cause of action accrued or when the complaint was filed, even though a single corporate employee subsequently moved to the state and was served with process, and where defendant had never paid state taxes or availed itself of the protection of any state laws; further, plaintiff had only availed himself of the protection of Mississippi’s law to the limited extent that he worked and traveled in the state. Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17345 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S. Ct. 2886, 61 L. Ed. 2d 313, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 2186 (U.S. 1979).

The “doing business” provision of the Mississippi long-arm statute cannot be invoked by a nonresident plaintiff in a diversity action against a nonresident defendant and the statute, so construed, does not deny a nonresident plaintiff privileges and immunities secured under the federal constitution. Breeland v. Hide-A-Way Lake, Inc., 585 F.2d 716, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7655 (5th Cir. Miss. 1978).

A Mississippi court had jurisdiction under §13-3-57 in a breach of contract action involving the sale of a tractor by a non-resident seller to a resident purchaser where the contract was made by phone, payment was sent from Mississippi to the non-resident seller, and the seller delivered the tractor through its agent to the purchaser in Mississippi. Miller v. Glendale Equipment & Supply, Inc., 344 So. 2d 736, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2448 (Miss. 1977).

A foreign corporation which made advances by way of loans to a Mississippi corporation which were used by the latter corporation in its Mississippi operation was not doing business in Mississippi within the meaning of this section [Code 1972, §13-3-57]. Riley v. Communications Consultants, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 296, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

It is no longer necessary, in a products liability claim, to determine whether the manufacturer is “doing business”, as interpreted by earlier Mississippi decisions, to render the nonresident manufacturer subject to suit and jurisdiction under the state’s “long-arm” statute. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1361, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

A nonresident manufacturer, which had no representatives or any personal ties within the state, but which placed its manufactured heating unit in interstate commerce for distribution and sale to consumers, was subject to in personam jurisdiction within the state for purposes of a products liability action, when one of its heating units overheated and resulted in a fire which destroyed the plaintiffs’ home because of an alleged defect. Smith v. Temco, Inc., 252 So. 2d 212, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1194 (Miss. 1971).

A New Orleans television broadcasting station whose programs were regularly heard by thousands of residents of the Mississippi Gulf coast area, which regularly reported news events in that area, solicited advertising there, and carried advertising by New Orleans stores directed especially toward Gulf coast residents, had sufficient minimum contacts in Mississippi to be amenable to process under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Casano v. WDSU--TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11516 (S.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 464 F.2d 3, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8537 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972).

An action initiated in a Virginia federal district court by railroad companies against, among others, two car leasing companies for damages sustained as a result of a derailment occurring in Mississippi, would be transferred to a Mississippi federal court, where one of the companies leased cars with 6% of its lease revenue attributable to miles traveled over Mississippi tracks, and the other leasing company systematically solicited and did business within Mississippi and filed annual sales tax returns in Mississippi, and where, in both instances, such contacts were directly involved with the alleged cause of action; the contacts being sufficient to make the defendant leasing companies amenable, constitutionally, to service of process under the Mississippi “long arm” statute. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Allied Chemical Co., 312 F. Supp. 3, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12090 (E.D. Va. 1970).

Where a Wisconsin corporate manufacturer had 10 distributors in Mississippi, made substantial sales to its distributors, sent an average of 17 employees into the state each year to give assistance to its distributors, had several pieces of equipment operating within the state, extended and secured credit within the state and made contracts with its distributors, giving it considerable control over their activities, the corporation was “doing business” in Mississippi within the “long-arm” and “doing business” statutes. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Neither the fact that a manufacturer of equipment sold its products to Mississippi distributors or wholesalers, nor the fact that the manufacturer had employees on an average of 17 or 18 per year visiting within Mississippi to give assistance to the distributors in the sale of equipment manufactured by it and to help repair and adjust such equipment, standing alone, would compel a finding that the manufacturer is or was “doing business” within the state of Mississippi under the provisions of Code 1942, § 1437 or Code 1942, § 5345. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Where a Wisconsin corporation had ten distributors within Mississippi, making substantial sales, had equipment in the state, and was a creditor secured by security instruments in the state, and where its employees frequently visited the state, the corporation had sufficient contacts within Mississippi to satisfy due process for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 321 F. Supp. 1193, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13680 (D. Miss. 1969).

Where the contract between a nonresident distributor of foreign automobiles and a Mississippi dealer gave the distributor almost absolute control over the method and manner of doing business by the dealer, the distributor was doing business in Mississippi within the purview of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Easterling v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 966, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13400 (S.D. Miss. 1969).

The importer of foreign automobiles located in another state which did not enter into any contract with anyone to perform any services or do any work within Mississippi, did no business and performed no acts within that state which would constitute its doing business there, did not deliver any automobiles to anyone within the state, entered into no contract with anyone therein, maintained no corporate records or corporate office, had no telephone listing, no agents or employees of any kind and no “minimum contact” with anyone was not amenable to process under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Easterling v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 966, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13400 (S.D. Miss. 1969).

A nonresident individual who sold a portable elevator to a resident of Mississippi, and, through his agents and in his own truck, delivered it to the purchaser in Mississippi, had prior to sale assembled the elevator at his premises in Tennessee, and who over a period of 10 or 15 years made 15 percent of his total gross sales to residents of Mississippi, and who, in connection with these sales, it was his common practice to go to the customer’s home within the state to appraise property offered as trade-in on new equipment and delivered the merchandise within that state, was amenable to process under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Smith v. Barker, 306 F. Supp. 1173, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

A nonresident individual whose agents, trucks, and other property were brought into Mississippi in the ordinary course of his business, had contacts within that state which were purposeful, continuous, and systematic activities, and rendered him amenable to process, despite the fact that he maintained no telephone listing, bank account, office, warehouse, or storage facilities there. Smith v. Barker, 306 F. Supp. 1173, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

An elevator manufacturing company which markets its products through various distributors in the United States, but has never had any dealers or salesmen residing in Mississippi, has never solicited through salesmen any orders within the state, has never had a warehouse or inventory of any kind located there, never maintained an office, telephone listing, bank account, or agent for the service of process, made no sales to its customers directly in the state, has made no shipments into the state except an inconsequential amount of truck hoists and parts and, even in that case, the items delivered were sold to manufacturers’ representatives, none of whom resided in the state, and were transported into the state by common carrier and not in its own trucks, was not amenable to process under the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Smith v. Barker, 306 F. Supp. 1173, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7727 (N.D. Miss. 1968).

A nonresident defendant who entered into a contract to perform work in Mississippi and performed the work within the state is subject to suit in the courts of Mississippi under the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211 So. 2d 813, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1276 (Miss. 1968).

A nonresident employed by a crime commission of another state who, pursuant to invitation, and without remuneration or payment of expenses or without knowledge of his employers, came into Mississippi and delivered a speech before a religious group in which he allegedly slandered certain Mississippi residents was not amenable to the process and jurisdiction of a Mississippi court. Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d 785, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 451 (Miss. 1964).

Whether one is doing business within the state within the contemplation of this section [Code 1942, § 1437] must be determined from the facts of each case. Hazell Machine Co. v. Shahan, 249 Miss. 301, 161 So. 2d 618, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 392 (Miss. 1964).

A foreign corporation entering into a distributorship agreement, held to be doing business within the state within the meaning of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Hazell Machine Co. v. Shahan, 249 Miss. 301, 161 So. 2d 618, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 392 (Miss. 1964).

A press association organized as a mutual cooperative and nonprofit organization, formed to gather, collect, and interchange with its members news and intelligence which, under the terms of its charter, it could neither sell nor traffic in, but distributed only to its members who apportioned costs of the services among themselves in the form of assessments, and which only employed five persons within the state to collect and disseminate news and repair equipment, is not an organization doing business within the state and therefore is not amenable to process under the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4508 (5th Cir. Miss. 1964), limited, Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13676 (5th Cir. Tex. 1997).

A single isolated and incidental activity does not constitute doing business in the state within the meaning of this statute. Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 11, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 662, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3743 (5th Cir. Miss. 1964).

A foreign corporation which has appointed a franchise dealer within the state, indoctrinated him in the conduct of the business, and having the right under the franchise agreement to supervise it, is doing business in the state so as to be subject to service of process through the secretary of state. Century Brick Corp. v. Carroll, 247 Miss. 514, 153 So. 2d 683, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 319 (Miss. 1963).

Mere incidental inspection by a foreign corporation of a plant constructed by another in Mississippi, pursuant to an agreement made in another state to furnish the design and any necessary scientific and engineering advice does not constitute doing business in the state within the meaning of this provision. Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 11, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6402 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 662, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3743 (5th Cir. Miss. 1964).

Gathering and relaying of news in Mississippi by the Associated Press, held not to constitute doing business in the state so as to be subject to service of process there. Walker v. Savell, 218 F. Supp. 348, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7513 (N.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 536, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4508 (5th Cir. Miss. 1964).

Isolated acts, not amounting to a continuity, do not warrant substituted service of process under this section [Code 1942, § 1437]. Hudgins v. Tug Kevin Moran, 206 F. Supp. 339, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4700 (S.D. Miss. 1962).

Although it conducted occasional demonstrations of its products and sent complaint investigators into the state, a foreign corporation which had salesmen in the state doing promotional and sales work but who had no authority to close sales, and maintained no plant or sales office within the state, was not doing business in the state so as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the state court. Livestock Services, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 244 Miss. 531, 142 So. 2d 210, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 1962).

In determining whether a corporation is doing business in the state, each case must be decided upon its peculiar facts. Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1959).

Fact that under contract nonresident automotive distributors possessed almost absolute control over the method and manner of doing business by resident dealer, together with the failure of the nonresident distributors to comply with Code 1942, §§ 8072 and 8073, established that nonresident distributors were doing business within the state. Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1959).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1437] authorizing substituted service of process on foreign corporations doing business within state without having qualified therefor, jurisdiction is not conferred on a single act or acts, but a series of acts amounting to a continuity is required. Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2290 (5th Cir. Miss. 1953).

Whether a corporation is doing business in a state in the sense required for a process statute is a question dependent primarily upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

A less strict interpretation of the phrase doing business, is applied where there is an issue of whether a state board has jurisdiction, than is applied where the statute involved is one stating that a corporation must qualify before doing business in order to have access to the courts of state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Where a corporation has entered the state through its agent and is engaged in carrying on and transacting through them a substantial part of its ordinary business on the regular basis, it is doing business within the state so as to be subject to process. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Where a lumber company, a Louisiana corporation, executed in this state a contract for the manufacture of lumber and the contract was wholly performed in this state and also the contract involved continuous substantial series of transactions covering a period of two years during which the lumber company sent its trucks into the state several times each week to pick up the timber, the lumber company was doing business within the statute providing for service against nonresident corporation doing business in the state. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1951).

Nonresident engaging in business of termite eradication and control in this state under license from state plant board authorizing him to conduct such business is subject to action for damages in this state for breach of contract entered into and to be performed in this state and may be brought into court by service of process upon secretary of state in manner provided by Code 1942, § 1438. Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 38 So. 2d 752, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1949).

To constitute a foreign corporation doing business in a particular jurisdiction, the business must be of such nature and character as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction, and is by its duly authorized officers or agents present within the state where the service of process is attempted. Lee v. Memphis Pub. Co., 195 Miss. 264, 14 So. 2d 351, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1943).

Maintenance by a foreign newspaper corporation of a news-gathering office in the state, the employment of a resident contract man to recommend suitable persons to become local distributors in the state, and a contract with a truck operator to transport its papers into the state for sale and distribution by local distributor, did not constitute “doing business” in the state so as to make such corporation amenable to service of process in the state. Lee v. Memphis Pub. Co., 195 Miss. 264, 14 So. 2d 351, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1943).

4. Non-resident heirs of alleged tortfeasor.

Mississippi’s long-arm statute did not apply to nonresident individual heirs of deceased alleged tortfeasor as service could only be made upon nonresident executor, administrator, receiver, trustee or any other selected or appointed representative. Sealy v. Goddard, 910 So. 2d 502, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 91 (Miss. 2005).

5. Illustrative cases.

Motor vehicle accident victim did not properly serve a foreign corporation doing business in Mississippi because the only attempt to serve the corporation was via certified mail on its registered agent, which was located in Mississippi. Hadley v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 453 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2019).

Circuit court properly denied an insurer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because the insurer waived its defense, and the long-arm statute was irrelevant; the insurer’s implied consented to the State’s jurisdiction created an independent basis for jurisdiction. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hinton, 192 So.3d 966, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 2016).

Circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over a driver where regardless of whether the driver’s acts constituted doing business, the suing driver, as a Tennessee resident, could not utilize any of the three prongs of the long-arm statute. Williams v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 187 So.3d 166, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 379 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Because a nonresident paramour’s actions allegedly broke up a wife’s Mississippi marriage, the long-arm statute’s language was sufficiently broad enough to bring the paramour within its scope; however, since the wife did not meet her burden of showing the paramour had the constitutionally required purposeful minimum contacts in Mississippi, the circuit court erred in denying the paramour’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Nordness v. Faucheux, 170 So.3d 454, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 295 (Miss. 2015).

Former wife should not have been ordered to pay attorneys’ fees in an alienation of affection case because the claim was not frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious where there was personal jurisdiction over the claim in Mississippi; moreover, the court could not have concluded that the claim had no hope of success since it fell within the long-arm statute. Miller v. Provident Adver. & Mktg., 155 So.3d 181, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, 154 So.3d 33, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1036, 135 S. Ct. 2862, 192 L. Ed. 2d 897, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4230 (U.S. 2015).

Trial court had personal jurisdiction over a former wife’s alienation of affection claim under the Mississippi long-arm statute because there was an allegation of sexual activity between a paramour and the wife’s husband within the state of Mississippi that contributed to the breakup of the marriage; the fact that sexual activity occurred in Mississippi constituted purposeful availment for purposes of personal jurisdiction. However, the complaint did not allege that any of the acts relating to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress occurred in Mississippi or that the sexual activity that occurred in Mississippi inflicted emotional distress. Miller v. Provident Adver. & Mktg., 155 So.3d 181, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, 154 So.3d 33, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 29 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 2015), cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1036, 135 S. Ct. 2862, 192 L. Ed. 2d 897, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4230 (U.S. 2015).

Out-of-state law firm was subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi with respect to claims of legal malpractice and related other issues because firm committed tort against contractor within State of Mississippi, it had sufficient minimum contacts within State, and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice were not offended because it purposefully availed itself of benefits and protections of Mississippi law. Baker & McKenzie, LLP v. Evans, 123 So.3d 387, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 548 (Miss. 2013).

As neither a hotel management company nor its president were doing business in Mississippi for purposes of the long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, or had any reason to anticipate being haled into court there, dismissal of an action arising out of injuries a minor sustained at a Louisiana hotel for lack of personal jurisdiction was proper. Wilson v. Highpointe Hospitality, Inc., 62 So.3d 999, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 267 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

In a medical-malpractice action, the circuit court did not err in finding that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice were not offended in exercising personal jurisdiction over the doctor because nothing in the record suggested that the trial court was an inefficient method of resolving the dispute or that it imposed an undue burden to have the doctor defend the suit in Mississippi. Dunn v. Yager, 58 So.3d 1171, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss. 2011).

In a medical-malpractice action, the circuit court did not err in finding that the long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, applied to the doctor because the patient’s actual injury, not the mere consequences thereof, occurred in Mississippi. She filled the prescription in Mississippi, consumed the prescription drugs in Mississippi, and the effects of her injury were suffered in Mississippi. Dunn v. Yager, 58 So.3d 1171, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss. 2011).

Louisiana resident’s emails, phone calls, and text messages to a Mississippi resident were sufficient “minimum contacts” with Mississippi for the purposes of personal-jurisdiction analysis. Knight v. Woodfield, 50 So.3d 995, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 2011).

In a negligence case, the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction were met under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57 because a car wreck and alleged negligence occurred in Mississippi. Courtney v. McCluggage, 991 So. 2d 642, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 571 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

Physician, who was licensed and occasionally practiced medicine in Mississippi, and a medical clinic, which had an office and rented timeshare office space in Mississippi, subjected themselves to suit under the clear terms of the long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, by doing business in the state. Considering the interests of Mississippi in providing a forum for legal redress for residents who were negligently injured by out-of-state physicians, the court found that the circuit court’s assumption of personal jurisdiction over the physician comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and did not offend U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Estate of Jones v. Phillips, 992 So. 2d 1131, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 420 (Miss. 2008).

Trial court erred in dismissing the homeowners’ claims alleging that the original owners knew of a home’s defects at the time they sold it to the subsequent owners because the assertion that the original owners committed a Mississippi tort sustained personal jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, regardless of whether it was a tort against the homeowners or the subsequent owners. Estes v. Bradley, 954 So. 2d 455, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 912 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), overruled in part, Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So. 2d 608, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 2008).

Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57 permitted a district court in Mississippi to exercise personal jurisdiction over a helicopter lessor, which was a California corporation, and a platform designer, who was a Tennessee domiciliary, in an estate representative’s suit to recover damages for a decedent’s fall from a helicopter work platform because the fall occurred in Mississippi. Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 30391 (5th Cir. Miss. 2006), limited, Sutton v. Advanced Aquaculture Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 435, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55396 (W.D. Tex. 2007).

Mississippi attorney’s breach of contract suit, filed in a Mississippi federal district court against Louisiana and Pennsylvania attorneys seeking payment for litigation services, was transferred under the Fifth Circuit’s first-to-file rule to a Louisiana federal district court in which defendants had previously filed a declaratory judgment action raising similar issues, even though Mississippi was a proper venue under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1391(a) because some of the acts sued upon took place there, the court had long-arm personal jurisdiction over defendants under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and Mississippi was a convenient forum under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1404(a). Street v. Smith, 456 F. Supp. 2d 761, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62373 (S.D. Miss. 2006).

Where rental and financial services companies alleged that an affiliate of a rental services company tortiously interfered with a non-compete contract involving a Mississippi resident, the companies met the tort requirement of the long arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and also met the minimum contracts requirement of due process. U-Save Auto Rental of Am., Inc. v. Moses, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5284 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2006).

Under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, a district court in Mississippi had personal jurisdiction over a distributor in employees’ suit to recover funds for medical monitoring due to their exposure to beryllium-containing products sold by the distributor to their employer; although the distributor did not do business in Mississippi and sold the products to the employer in California, the injuries took place in Mississippi, and further, there was evidence that the distributor knew its products would be used only at the employer’s Mississippi facility. Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8509 (5th Cir. Miss. 2006).

In a products liability action, the injured worker’s motion for summary judgment was denied; it was premature in that he failed to allege any facts supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, other than that the subject incident and his injuries occurred in Mississippi. Sims v. A & A Saw & Mach. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34351 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 7, 2005).

Where the tort and its resultant injuries occurred within Mississippi, the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants was comfortably within the contours of the “tort prong” of Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57; the allegedly defective pipe collapsing completed the tort (damage requirement) and created numerous economic effects (costs associated with the collapsing pipe and subsequent redrilling of the oil well). Tellus Operating Group, L.L.C. v. R & D Pipe Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 604, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19159 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

In a fraud suit brought by investors against defendants, a Pennsylvania attorney and his law firm, it was appropriate to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants under the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, because the investors alleged that the actual invasion of their legal rights occurred in Mississippi when they were induced to invest in a trust in reliance on an opinion letter directed by defendants to them in Mississippi. Vig v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 2d 975, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18453 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss a physician’s breach of contract action for lack of personal jurisdiction because the fact that defendants sent an agent into Mississippi to help execute an additional portion of the contract was sufficient to satisfy the contract prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and perhaps even the doing business prong. Durham v. Katzman, 375 F. Supp. 2d 495, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17847 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Application of the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57 (Rev. 2002), was inappropriate in an action filed in Mississippi against an Illinois resident based on the fact that the Illinois resident struck a vehicle filled with Mississippi residents. Illinois was the place where the tort was completed. Yatham v. Young, 912 So. 2d 467, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 672 (Miss. 2005).

Employees claimed that the court could assert personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer, a foreign corporation with no contacts in the forum state, because it was insufficiently separate from its subsidiary, which did have contacts in the forum state; however, the manufacturer’s vice-president stated that the manufacturer was a holding company incorporated under the laws of Ohio, and the subsidiary was separately and adequately capitalized and the manufacturer did not pay the subsidiary’s expenses. Thus, the contacts between the manufacturer and its subsidiary were insufficient to satisfy Mississippi’s long arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57. Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 580, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 665 (S.D. Miss. 2005), rev'd, in part, 445 F.3d 809, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8509 (5th Cir. Miss. 2006), aff'd, 483 F.3d 383, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7398 (5th Cir. Miss. 2007).

Where the employees attached a one-page sheet from the manufacturer’s website, which showed the name of the fabricator, among others, the document clearly did not provide evidence of contacts between the fabricator and the forum state sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57. Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 580, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 665 (S.D. Miss. 2005), rev'd, in part, 445 F.3d 809, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8509 (5th Cir. Miss. 2006), aff'd, 483 F.3d 383, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7398 (5th Cir. Miss. 2007).

As a company’s business contacts with the state were not systematic and continuous, and the personal injury lawsuit filed by an individual did not arise from the company’s contacts in the state, the company’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed. Williams v. Bud Wilson's Mobile Home Serv., 887 So. 2d 830, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 670 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 888 So. 2d 1177, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1437 (Miss. 2004).

In a negligence action by property owners in Mississippi regarding flooding, Mississippi had a strong interest in adjudicating the dispute because Mississippi residents were injured, Mississippi property was destroyed, and the City of Mobile, Alabama, and the Board of Water & Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile continued to release water from the subject reservoir. Also, the interest of the hundreds of other Mississippi property owners in obtaining convenient and effective relief was furthered by keeping the suit in Mississippi because their property was located in the county where the suit was filed; maintenance of the suit did not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” and application of the “long-arm” statute in the case did not violate the United States Constitution. Horne v. Mobile Area Water & Sewer Sys., 897 So. 2d 972, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 846 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 922, 125 S. Ct. 1652, 161 L. Ed. 2d 479, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2480 (U.S. 2005), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 922, 125 S. Ct. 1662, 161 L. Ed. 2d 480, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2484 (U.S. 2005).

In a bad faith denial of insurance benefits suit filed by Florida residents, the district court in Mississippi lacked personal jurisdiction over an Iowa health management company that processed medical claims outside the forum. Walker v. World Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d 786, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19503 (S.D. Miss. 2003).

Where Louisiana auto dealer’s radio ads reached into Mississippi, it sold autos to Mississippi residents, and it contracted with plaintiff bank in Mississippi, its minimum contacts with Mississippi allowed that state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the dealer; moreover, since the dealer’s facilities were not far from the forum, it was not unfair to force it to defend in Mississippi. BankPlus v. Toyota of New Orleans, 851 So. 2d 439, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 684 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

In a Jones Act case, the trial court had jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant that had numerous employees from Mississippi and recruited employees from Mississippi by advertising in that state; further, the fact that the defendant had entered into a contract with the plaintiff in Mississippi was alone sufficient to subject the defendant to the personal jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts. Diamond Offshore Mgmt. Co. v. Marks, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. Feb. 27, 2003), op. withdrawn, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 237 (Miss. Apr. 26, 2007).

Court had personal jurisdiction over a Taiwanese manufacturer in a suit brought by two distributors for breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual and business relations; the manufacturer sent invoices to and received payment from the distributors’ Mississippi address and allegedly interfered with the distributors’ contracts and business relations in Mississippi. Madami Int'l, LLC v. Dinli Metal Indus. Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 586, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26630 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

In an action arising from the purchase from the defendant by the plaintiff of tubing that was to be regularly used as production tubing for down-hole use in oil wells and saltwater disposal wells, two defendants who previously purchased and resold the tubing at issue were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi where both were foreign corporations, neither had any dealings with the plaintiff in Mississippi or elsewhere, and the transactions in which they sold the tubing occurred outside Mississippi. Willow Creek Exploration Ltd. v. Tadlock Pipe & Equip. Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 675, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2570 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

The defendant nonresident corporation was entitled to dismissal of the complaint because the court had no basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over it, notwithstanding that the alleged tort was committed partly in Mississippi where the plaintiff was residing when he discovered an allegedly erroneous credit report by the defendant, since the defendant did not have minimum contacts with Mississippi and did not purposely avail itself of the benefits and privileges of the state. Shaw v. Excelon Corp., 167 F. Supp. 2d 917, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18090 (S.D. Miss. 2001).

The defendant foreign corporation was not subject to long arm jurisdiction where the contract between the defendant and the plaintiff Mississippi corporation was entered into in Tennessee and was to be performed in Tennessee. McCain Builders, Inc. v. Rescue Rooter, LLC, 797 So. 2d 952, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 2001).

The defendant was “doing business” within the contemplation of the long-arm statute where she allegedly transmitted an email to a recipient or recipients in Mississippi as an attempt to solicit business for a particular website. Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5128 (S.D. Miss. 2001).

The Mississippi long-arm statute did not allow a federal district court sitting in Mississippi to take jurisdiction over the defendant because the plaintiff, as a nonresident of Mississippi, could not take advantage of the contract portion of the Mississippi long-arm statute and any tort committed by the defendant was committed solely in Mexico. Submersible Sys. v. Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8083 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1055, 122 S. Ct. 646, 151 L. Ed. 2d 564, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10844 (U.S. 2001).

In an action arising from the plaintiff’s purchase of an airplane engine from an Arkansas corporation, the Arkansas corporation was not subject to jurisdiction in Mississippi since (1) no part of the contract between the parties was performed in whole or in part by either party in Mississippi, (2) no element of the alleged tortious conduct took place in Mississippi, (3) the defendants did not have a presence in Mississippi which was continuing and substantial in nature, (4) the defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Mississippi such that maintaining the action would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and (5) the defendants did not have continuous and systematic contacts with Mississippi such that due process was satisfied. Thrash Aviation, Inc. v. Kelner Turbine, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 709, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17788 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The statute does not conflict with Rule 2.04 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure for Justice Court and, therefore, it may be used to serve out-of-state defendants with process of the justice courts by a private process server. Aldridge, July 17, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0377

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes doing business within the state by a foreign newspaper corporation. 38 A.L.R.2d 747.

Venue of action against nonresident motorist served constructively under statute in that regard. 38 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Place or type of motor vehicle accident as affecting applicability of statute providing for constructive or substituted service upon nonresident. 73 A.L.R.2d 1351.

Holding directors’, officers’, stockholders’, or sales meetings or conventions in a state by foreign corporation as doing business or otherwise subjecting it to service of process and suit. 84 A.L.R.2d 412.

Manner of service of process upon foreign corporation which has withdrawn from state. 86 A.L.R.2d 1000.

Statutory service on nonresident motorists: return receipts. 95 A.L.R.2d 1033.

Applicability, to actions not based on products liability, of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers or distributors upon use of their goods within state. 20 A.L.R.3d 957.

In personam jurisdiction over nonresident director of forum corporation under long-arm statutes. 100 A.L.R.3d 1108.

Long-arm statutes: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident based on ownership, use, possession, or sale of real property. 4 A.L.R.4th 955.

Claim for punitive damages in tort action as surviving death of tortfeasor or person wronged. 30 A.L.R.4th 707.

Products liability: personal jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer of component incorporated in another product. 69 A.L.R.4th 14.

In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly defamatory letter from outside state. 83 A.L.R.4th 1006.

Execution, outside of forum, of guaranty of obligation under contract to be performed within forum state as conferring jurisdiction over nonresident guarantors under “long arm statute” or rule of forum. 28 A.L.R.5th 664.

Service of Process Via Computer or Fax. 30 A.L.R.6th 413.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Courts §§ 74, 75, 94 et seq.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership §§ 468-487.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process §§ 154, 155, 156.

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Foreign Corporations, Form 18.1 (Motion – To dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Foreign Corporations, Form 19.1 (Affidavit-In support of motion to dismiss complaint-Lack of jurisdiction over foreign corporation – Corporation not doing business in state – By president of corporation).

Service of process on foreign corporations, 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Process, Forms 261 et seq.

Substituted Service, 16 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Process, Form 16:297.

4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Doing Business, Proof No. 1 (doing business).

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 93–95 et seq.

Lawyers’ Edition.

State regulation of judicial proceedings as violating commerce clause (Art I, § 8, cl 3) of Federal Constitution – Supreme Court cases. 100 L. Ed. 2d 1049.

Law Reviews.

Note, Jurisdictional Analysis in Commercial Litigation – The Single Contract Case, 7 Miss. C. L. Rev. 87, Fall, 1986.

Hafter, Toward the Multistate Practice of Law Through Admission by Reciprocity. 53 Miss. L. J. 1, March 1983.

Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: Joinder of Claims and Parties – Rules 13, 14, 17 and 18. 52 Miss. L. J. 37, March 1982.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

§§ 13-3-59 and 13-3-61. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-59. [Codes, 1942, § 1439; Laws, 1940, ch. 246]

§13-3-61. [Codes, 1942, § 1440; Laws, 1940, ch. 246]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-59 authorized the court to order such continuances as necessary to afford a nonresident reasonable opportunity to defend the action, provided that no action was triable until after thirty (30) days from date of service of process upon the secretary of state, provided that the fee required to be paid to the sheriff of Hinds County shall be taxed as other costs, and required the secretary of state to keep a record of all process served upon him.

Former §13-3-61 provided for service when the defendant was a nonresident doing business in state, and provided that certain corporations were exempt.

§ 13-3-63. Service when defendant is nonresident motorist; appointment of secretary of state as agent.

The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred by the provisions of this section, as evidenced by his operating, either in person or by agent or employee, a motor vehicle upon any public street, road or highway of this state, or elsewhere in this state, or the operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle on any public street, road or highway of this state, or elsewhere in this state, other than under this section, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi to be his true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all lawful processes or summonses in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of any accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such street, road or highway, or elsewhere in this state, and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such process or summons against him which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him personally. Service of such process or summons shall be made by the sheriff of Hinds County, upon prepayment of the fees to which he is entitled by law, by serving two (2) copies of the process or summons for each nonresident defendant, with a fee of Fifteen Dollars ($15.00) for each such defendant on the Secretary of State or by leaving two (2) copies of said process or summons with the fee in the office of the Secretary of State, and such service shall be service upon said nonresident defendant with the same force and effect as if such nonresident had been personally served with such process or summons within the State of Mississippi. One (1) of the copies of such process or summons shall be preserved by the Secretary of State as a record of his office. Notice of such service, together with a copy of the process or summons, shall be mailed forthwith as certified or registered mail, restricted for delivery to addressee only and with postage prepaid, by the Secretary of State to each such nonresident defendant at his last known address, which address shall be written on the process or summons upon the issuance thereof by the clerk of the court wherein the action is pending, or notice of such service and copy of process or summons actually shall be delivered to the said defendant. The defendant’s return receipt or evidence of defendant’s refusal to accept delivery of such certified or registered mail, in case such notice and copy of process or summons are sent by certified or registered mail, or affidavit of the person delivering such notice and copy of process or summons, in case such notice and copy of process or summons actually are delivered, shall be filed in the court wherein such action is pending before judgment can be entered against such nonresident defendant. The Secretary of State, upon receipt of such return receipt or evidence of the refusal of such defendant to accept delivery of such certified or registered mail, shall promptly return same to the clerk of the court wherein such action is pending, and the said clerk of the court shall promptly file and preserve same among the records of such action or proceeding. The court in which the action is pending may order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action.

Any cause of action arising out of such accident or collision against any such nonresident, in case of the death of such nonresident, shall survive against his administrator, executor or other personal representative of his estate, and service of all necessary and lawful process or summons, when had or obtained upon any such nonresident owner, nonresident operator or agent or employee, or upon the executor, administrator or other legal representative of the estate of such nonresident owner or nonresident operator, in the manner as hereinbefore provided, for the service of all lawful processes or summonses, herein, shall be deemed sufficient service of process or summons to give any court of this state, in which such action may be filed in accordance with the statutes of the State of Mississippi, jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the nonresident owner, nonresident operator or agent or employee, or the nonresident executor, or administrator of such nonresident owner or nonresident operator, defendant or defendants, and shall warrant and authorize personal judgment against such nonresident owner, nonresident operator, agent, employee, executor or administrator or other legal representative of the estate of such nonresident owner or nonresident operator, defendant or defendants, in the event the plaintiff in such cause of action shall prevail.

The agency or relationship created under the provisions of this section by and between the nonresident owner or nonresident operator of a motor vehicle operating upon the public road, street or highway of this state, or elsewhere in this state, as hereinbefore set forth, in the event of the death of such nonresident owner or nonresident operator of such motor vehicle, shall survive and continue and extend to his executor, administrator or other legal representative of his estate, and the Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi shall be in the same position and relationship with respect to the executor, administrator or other legal representative of the estate of such nonresident owner or nonresident operator of such motor vehicle, as he was in or would have been in with the nonresident owner or nonresident operator of said motor vehicle, had such nonresident owner or nonresident operator survived, and in any action arising or growing out of such accident or collision in which such nonresident owner or nonresident operator of a motor vehicle may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such street, road or highway or elsewhere in this state, where the nonresident owner or nonresident operator of such motor vehicle has died prior to the commencement of an action against him because of or growing out of such accident or collision, service of process or summons may be had or made upon the nonresident executor, administrator or other legal representative of the estate of such nonresident owner or operator of the motor vehicle involved in such accident or collision, in the same manner and upon the same notice as hereinbefore provided in the case of process or summons upon the nonresident owner or nonresident operator of such motor vehicle. When such process or summons is served, made or had against the nonresident executor or administrator or such nonresident owner or such nonresident operator of such motor vehicle involved in such accident or collision, it shall be deemed sufficient service of such summons or process to give any court in this state in which such action may be filed, in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the State of Mississippi, jurisdiction over the cause of action and over such nonresident executor or administrator of such nonresident owner or operator of such motor vehicle insofar as such cause of action is involved.

The provisions of this section shall likewise apply to any person who is a nonresident at the time any action or proceeding is commenced against him, even though said person was a resident at the time any action or proceeding accrued against him.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 9352-61; Laws, 1938, chs. 148, 345; Laws, 1946, ch. 266, § 61; Laws, 1952, ch. 265, § 1; Laws, 1954, ch. 299, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1958, ch. 262; Laws, 1964, ch. 376, §§ 1-4; Laws, 1978, ch. 378, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 443, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

For another section derived from same 1942 code section, see §11-11-13.

Service of process on one carrying on business in state by or through a trustee or attorney in fact, see §13-3-41.

Service of process when defendant is nonresident doing business in the state, see §13-3-57.

Service of process upon nonresident operating a vessel or motorboat on any of the state’s waters, see §59-21-161.

Service of process on nonresident carnivals, circuses, fairs, and similar exhibitions, see §§75-75-1 to75-75-19.

Service of process upon carnivals, circuses, and fairs doing business in the state but not permanently domiciled therein, see §§75-75-1 et seq.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

Circuit court filing and service requirements for pleadings and motions, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 2.06.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Construction and application, generally.

2. Persons within purview of statute.

3. Giving of notice.

4. Quashal of service.

5. Decisions under former laws.

1. Construction and application, generally.

Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-63 is not the exclusive method by which nonresident motorists have to be served because §13-3-63 merely provides an alternative method to serve a particular class of out-of-state defendants; even if the statute provided an exclusive method of service, it would conflict with Miss. R. Civ. P. 4. Bloodgood v. Leatherwood, 25 So.3d 1047, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 25 (Miss. 2010).

Where plaintiffs delivered copies of a summons and complaint to the Mississippi Secretary of State who in turn sent the documents to a nonresident motorist by certified mail, restricted delivery, but the documents were returned to the Secretary as unclaimed, such service was insufficient to permit entry of a default judgment against the nonresident; despite case law indicating that service was complete upon delivery to the Secretary, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-63 clearly stated that judgment could not be entered against the nonresident until the return receipt was filed with the court, indicating that the nonresident either received or refused delivery of the documents. Arceneaux v. Davidson, 325 F. Supp. 2d 742, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13333 (S.D. Miss. 2004).

Circuit Court properly ordered examination of judgment debtor and production of documents in county where suit was filed, where judgment debtor had waived its right to argue that it could not be found in that county, and thus statute concerning examination of judgment debtor by judgment creditor was construed consistently with venue already established for trial of action. H & W Transfer & Cartage Service, Inc. v. Griffin, 511 So. 2d 895, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2610 (Miss. 1987).

The Federal Motor Carrier Act § 221(c), which provides that every motor carrier shall file in each state in which it operates a designation of a person to receive service on its behalf, does not preempt §13-3-63 and service may be made upon a non-resident motor carrier under either statute. Trailer Express, Inc. v. Gammill, 403 So. 2d 1292, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2189 (Miss. 1981).

Where the notice of service of a non-resident corporation was delivered to the president of the corporation in accord with statutory requirements, and an interlocutory default judgment was entered upon failure of the defendant to answer, the default judgment could not be set aside on the grounds that the president of the corporation mislaid the notice due to anxiety over his wife’s recent death. Western Chain Co. v. Brownlee, 317 So. 2d 418, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1758 (Miss. 1975).

The jurisdiction of the court under this statute is not restricted to suits by Mississippi residents, and the circuit court had jurisdiction over a suit arising out of an accident which occurred in Mississippi even though the suit did not involve the interests or rights of any resident of Mississippi. Vick v. Cochran, 316 So. 2d 242, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1705 (Miss. 1975).

Where default judgment in non-resident motorist case was entered on the first day of a scheduled two week return term, and, upon learning of decision, counsel for defendants promptly filed motion to set aside default judgment in which they set forth a meritorious defense, judgment should have been set aside and the case set for trial on its merits either immediately or on a day certain within the remainder of the term. Martin v. Palmertree, 312 So. 2d 447, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1645 (Miss. 1975).

Under Code 1942, § 1438, providing that service of process made upon the secretary of state shall be made in the same manner and by the same procedure and with the same force and effect as is provided by the nonresident motorist statute as amended and supplemented, service can be made pursuant to a subsequently inserted provision of the nonresident motorist statute, Code 1942, § 9352-61, so as to permit service upon any person who is a nonresident at the time the action is filed, even though at the time of the incident giving rise to the action, such person was a resident of Mississippi. McKnight v. Dyer, 331 F. Supp. 343, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12274 (N.D. Miss. 1971).

This section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] is strictly construed and the provisions thereof must be followed to give the court jurisdiction over a nonresident. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 438, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1448 (Miss. 1968).

This section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] reflects the legislature’s intent to create a service of process tantamount for all purposes to personal service. Ellis v. Milner, 194 So. 2d 232, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1406 (Miss. 1967).

This section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] has the purpose of placing a nonresident motorist summoned under it on a parity with a resident in all respects, it requires the nonresident using state highways to consent to service of process upon the secretary of state, it puts nonresidents on the same footing as residents in litigation of accidents growing out of the use of state highways, and they have equal procedural rights with residents once the prescribed service of process has been effected. Ellis v. Milner, 194 So. 2d 232, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1406 (Miss. 1967).

The term “personal representative” as used in this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] is the equivalent of “legal representative,” and is intended to include persons such as the administrator or executor of a nonresident deceased motorist. Hill v. James, 252 Miss. 501, 175 So. 2d 176, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1126 (Miss. 1965).

A Mississippi court does not acquire jurisdiction of the nonresident widow and minor children of a deceased out-of-state motorist sued in their individual capacities under the survival provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] which apply only to the administrator, executor, or other legal representative of the decedent. Hill v. James, 252 Miss. 501, 175 So. 2d 176, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1126 (Miss. 1965).

This provision, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 249 Miss. 141, 161 So. 2d 604, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1964).

The basic purposes of the statute are to subject to the jurisdiction of the Mississippi court nonresidents concerned in the operation of motor vehicles in Mississippi, in order that its citizens may assert in its courts any proper claims against such persons, and to afford a nonresident defendant the opportunity to adequately defend an accident suit. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 249 Miss. 141, 161 So. 2d 604, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1964).

A garnished liability insurer has the burden of disproving that the person served was the insured. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 249 Miss. 141, 161 So. 2d 604, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1964).

This is a procedural statute, remedial in nature, and as such to be given a liberal construction. Stroo v. Farmer, 200 F. Supp. 344, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2899 (S.D. Miss. 1961).

Where a truck from another state which had carried a load of hay to a Mississippi destination was, at the time of the accident, standing in a barn on private property while the driver was still in his seat and the engine was running, this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] applied regardless of whether the wheels of the truck were turning or not. Stroo v. Farmer, 200 F. Supp. 344, 1961 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2899 (S.D. Miss. 1961).

The purpose of this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] is to subject to the jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts nonresidents concerned in the operation of automobiles within the state within the terms of the statute, so that its citizens may assert as against such persons their claims in local courts. Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2724 (5th Cir. Miss. 1950).

The word “operation” includes all means and extent of use of the highways of Mississippi which nonresidents may acquire under the terms of the statute, and also any similar manner of use even though the privilege be not obtained precisely in accordance with the general statutory provisions; and, it, therefore, as a basis of acquiring jurisdiction, brings within its reach a nonresident owner in whose behalf the motor vehicle is driven over the Mississippi highways. Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2724 (5th Cir. Miss. 1950).

A distinction is made between “operator” and “driver”; the operator is recognized to be the owner operating the motor vehicle, and while the driver is recognized as also operating, he is the person actually driving at any given time. Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2724 (5th Cir. Miss. 1950).

2. Persons within purview of statute.

In a matter arising out of a high speed chase, which allegedly resulted in decedents’ deaths, neither an Alabama county or that county’s sheriff from Alabama entered upon the highways of Mississippi, involving themselves in efforts to stop the fleeing felons, or in any other way subjected themselves to jurisdiction under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-63; therefore, the supreme court proceeded with a long-arm analysis to determine if jurisdiction could be conferred upon them under the Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-57, and the supreme court found no minimum contacts, so the county and the sheriff were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mississippi. City of Cherokee v. Parsons, 944 So. 2d 886, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 2006).

City police officer and deputy sheriff from Alabama, who were involved in a high-speed chase in Mississippi that allegedly resulted in the decedents’ death, separately subjected themselves to the personal jurisdiction of Mississippi courts for actions arising out of accidents that occurred in Mississippi. City of Cherokee v. Parsons, 944 So. 2d 886, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 583 (Miss. 2006).

A nonresident owner of an automobile who operates it, or causes it to be operated by another, over the highways of the state of Mississippi, subjects himself, within the terms of the statute, to service of process which is sufficient to require him to defend a suit upon the merits. Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2724 (5th Cir. Miss. 1950).

Nonresident seller of automobiles who procured drivers, as purchaser’s agent, to deliver cars sold to purchaser residing in another state was neither operator nor driver within this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61]; and, therefore, he was not subject to substituted service of process in death action resulting from an accident involving one of the cars on a Mississippi highway. Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2724 (5th Cir. Miss. 1950).

3. Giving of notice.

Circuit court erred in dismissing a driver’s personal injury complaint with prejudice because the driver exhibited good cause for not timely serving process on the insured where the record clearly showed that over a period of almost two years, the driver unsuccessfully attempted to locate the insured, the Secretary of State attempted to forward the summons to the insured, but it was returned unclaimed, the insured could not be located by the driver, the courts, or his own insurance carrier, and the circuit court failed to consider that the statute of limitations could be tolled. Darville v. Mejia, 184 So.3d 312, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 3 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

In a tort action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, a nonresident defendant was properly served since (1) the plaintiffs complied with §13-3-63 by serving process on the secretary of state, providing the address given by the defendant to law enforcement officials on the date of the accident, and (2) the return receipt attached to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, showing that the parcel was sent to the motorist from the office of the secretary of state, constituted proof that the secretary of state complied with the mailing requirement. Wesley v. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n, 857 F. Supp. 523, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10036 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

A nonresident defendant was not entitled to dismissal of an action arising from a motor vehicle accident based on the provision of §13-3-63 which requires that notice of service of process on the secretary of state actually be delivered to the nonresident defendant, although he did not concede that he had received a copy of the summons and complaint, where he had actual knowledge of the commencement of the suit, the basis of the suit, and the identity of the other defendants in the action. Wesley v. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n, 857 F. Supp. 523, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10036 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

Notice to a nonresident motorist by one of the three methods provided by this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] is essential to confer jurisdiction upon the local courts. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 438, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1448 (Miss. 1968).

This section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] provides three methods for the service of process upon a nonresident, and it is essential to due process that a nonresident defendant be given notice of the action against him in accordance with the provisions of the section. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 438, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1448 (Miss. 1968).

Where it appears conclusively that the notice intended for a nonresident motorist was forwarded to an address which did not exist, that there was no return receipt from the defendant, no evidence of refusal of the letter by him, nor any evidence of actual delivery of the process to him, a default judgment entered by the court against such defendant was void. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 438, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1448 (Miss. 1968).

The general rule is that substituted service of process is complete when made upon the designated state official, and therefore receipt by the nonresident defendant of the specified notice of such service is not the determinative date for completion of process. Ellis v. Milner, 194 So. 2d 232, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1406 (Miss. 1967).

Where there was a passage of over a month between the date of service on the secretary of state and the rendition of a default judgment against a nonresident defendant, and he had no one file pleadings for him in the court or make any other representation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a default judgment. Ellis v. Milner, 194 So. 2d 232, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1406 (Miss. 1967).

Service under this section [Code 1942, § 9352-61] by mailing a summons to defendant at his correct address is good although another address is stated in the summons, and the name given therein was an alias. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 249 Miss. 141, 161 So. 2d 604, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 1964).

4. Quashal of service.

Upon consideration of a motion to quash service of summons in a death action growing out of an automobile accident, the question is whether the allegations of the complaint and the facts of the case as disclosed show that the defendant brought before the court is such a defendant as is subjected by the statute to substituted service of process. Tanksley v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925, 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 2724 (5th Cir. Miss. 1950).

5. Decisions under former laws.

Under the Alabama nonresident motorist statute, the Alabama court had jurisdiction where both parties were nonresidents and the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi. Burns v. Godwin, 211 Miss. 310, 51 So. 2d 486, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 357 (Miss. 1951).

The constitutionality of this statute is affirmed. Bouchillon v. Jordan, 40 F. Supp. 354, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2937 (D. Miss. 1941).

The fact that no venue is provided in the act itself does not render the act as so unreasonable as to offend any part of the constitution. Bouchillon v. Jordan, 40 F. Supp. 354, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2937 (D. Miss. 1941).

In cases not within the operation of Chapter 246 of the Act of 1940 fixing the venue in the county where the cause of action accrues, the proper venue of an action commenced as provided in this statute is the county where the secretary of state resides. Bouchillon v. Jordan, 40 F. Supp. 354, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2937 (D. Miss. 1941).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Constitutionality and construction of statute authorizing constructive or substituted service of process on, and continuation of pending action against, foreign representative of deceased nonresident driver of motor vehicle, arising out of accident occurring in state. 18 A.L.R.2d 544.

Venue of action against nonresident motorist served constructively under statute. 38 A.L.R.2d 1198.

What is “motor vehicle” or the like within statute providing for constructive or substituted service of process on nonresident motorists. 48 A.L.R.2d 1283.

Who is subject to constructive or substituted service of process under statutes providing for such service on nonresident motorists. 53 A.L.R.2d 1164.

Who subject to substituted service of process under statutes providing for such service on nonresident motorists. 53 A.L.R.2d 1164.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction in action between nonresident individuals based upon tort occurring within forum state. 92 A.L.R.3d 797.

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 742- 771.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1122, 1123 et seq.

§§ 13-3-65 and 13-3-67. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-65. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (43); 1857, ch. 61, art. 73; 1871, § 715; 1880, § 1535; 1892, § 3437; 1906, § 3936; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2943; 1930, § 2989; 1942, § 1870]

§13-3-67. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (95); 1857, ch. 61, art. 69; 1871, § 711; 1880, § 2285; 1892, § 3438; 1906, § 3937; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2944; 1930, § 2990; 1942, § 1871]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-65 provided for issuance, execution, and return of a writ of scire facias.

Former §13-3-67 stated that any process appearing to be in other respects duly served, shall be good, though not directed to any officer.

§ 13-3-69. Process not void for certain defects.

If any matter required to be inserted in or indorsed on any process be omitted, such process shall not on that account be void, but it may be set aside as irregular, or amended on such terms as the court shall deem proper. The amendment may be made upon an application to set aside or quash the writ.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 70; 1871, § 712; 1880, § 2286; 1892, § 3439; 1906, § 3938; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2945; 1930, § 2991; 1942, § 1873.

Cross References —

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Defects not amendable.

1. In general.

A search warrant delivered to the sheriff “to any lawful officer of said county” is not void. Such process is amendable. Matthews v. State, 134 Miss. 807, 100 So. 18, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 327 (Miss. 1924).

Where a deputy clerk issues an attachment writ in the name of the clerk, without affixing his own name as deputy, the writ may be amended. Wimberly v. Boland, 72 Miss. 241, 16 So. 905, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1894).

The failure of the circuit clerk to affix his signature to a venire facias is merely an irregularity amendable by motion and a motion to quash dispenses with amendment where the writ has already served its purpose. Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 16 So. 387, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1894).

A writ of seizure (under Laws 1876) which commanded a seizure of agricultural products, but named no defendant and contained no personal summons, was not void. Dogan v. Bloodworth, 56 Miss. 419, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1879).

Where the name of a defendant is changed both in the declaration and writ by the plaintiff, the writ will not for that reason be quashed. Maxey v. Strong, 53 Miss. 280, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1876).

Where the process is made returnable to the wrong term of the court, the defect may be amended on motion and the appearance of the party to the motion obviates the necessity of the amendment. Harrison v. Agricultural Bank, 10 Miss. 307, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 148 (Miss. 1844).

2. Defects not amendable.

Search warrant issued in connection with a prosecution for violation of intoxicating liquor laws with no return day named therein is void and cannot be amended. Buxton v. State, 205 Miss. 692, 39 So. 2d 310, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 460 (Miss. 1949).

A search warrant dated only “this the 12th day of Johnson, 194-” was void and not subject to amendment by permission of the court. Johnson v. State, 202 Miss. 233, 31 So. 2d 127, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 264 (Miss. 1947).

An execution issued to the sheriff of another county by the clerk of a circuit court on a duly enrolled judgment of a justice of the peace of his county, returnable before such a justice, is void and not amendable under this section [Code 1942, § 1873]. Smith v. Mixon, 73 Miss. 581, 19 So. 295, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1895).

A summons issued during a term of court returnable instanter is a nullity and therefore is not amendable under this section [Code 1942, § 1873]. Joiner v. Delta Bank, 71 Miss. 382, 14 So. 464, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 187 (Miss. 1893).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Mistake or error in middle initial or middle name of party as vitiating or invalidating civil process, summons, or the like. 6 A.L.R.3d 1179.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 60, 61.

Amendment of process, 20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Process, Forms 21-53.

§ 13-3-71. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1942, § 1872; Laws, 1936, ch. 244; Laws, 1956, ch. 238; Laws, 1966, ch. 355, § 1; Laws 1981, ch. 358, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-71 authorized a defendant to waive process and enter an appearance without pleading.

§ 13-3-73. Plaintiff’s options when sheriff kept off by force.

When the sheriff shall return, on any process, that he has been kept off by force, the plaintiff may issue an alias or pluries, as the case may be, or he may proceed in the action against the defendant as if the process had been returned executed.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (41); 1857, ch. 61, art. 71; 1871, § 713; 1880, § 2287; 1892, § 3440; Laws, 1906, § 3939; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2946; Laws, 1930, § 2992; Laws, 1942, § 1874.

Cross References —

Duty of the sheriff to execute and return process, see §19-25-37.

Criminal offense of resisting authorized person attempting to serve or execute process, see §97-9-75.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process §§ 54, 58.

Law Reviews.

Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules 4, 5, 7-11, and 15. 52 Miss. L. J. 3, March 1982.

§ 13-3-75. Return of alias where first writ served.

If any process be executed, and for want of a return thereof other process be issued, the sheriff or other officer shall not execute the subsequent process, but shall return the first process by him executed, if it be in his possession, and, if it be not in his possession, he shall return the subsequent process, with an indorsement of the execution of the first process, and how it was executed, on which there shall be the same proceedings as if the said first process had been duly returned.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 58, art. 1 (42); 1857, ch. 61, art. 72; 1871, § 714; 1880, § 2288; 1892, § 3441; 1906, § 3940; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2947; 1930, § 2993; 1942, § 1875.

Cross References —

Suing out of an alias when the defendant shall not be found, see §13-3-15.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 120- 122.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process §§ 250, 254 et seq.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 150–152 et seq.

§ 13-3-77. Process may be executed by an officer out of his county.

The sheriff or other proper officer of a county may execute process out of his county, in case the person to be served or property to be seized was in the officer’s county when the writ was received, but had removed or been carried into another county before its execution. In such case the officer shall state the facts in his return, and the writ and return shall have the same effect as if the process had been returned not executed and a testatum or duplicate writ had been issued to and executed and returned by an officer of the county where served.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3500; 1906, § 3998; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3005; 1930, § 3051; 1942, § 1939.

Cross References —

Duty of the sheriff to execute and return process, see §19-25-37.

Rule governing the service of summons, summons by publication, return of process, and the like, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 4.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sheriff’s deed as prima facie evidence of return. 36 A.L.R. 1001, 108 A.L.R. 672.

§ 13-3-79. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1880, § 2291; 1892, § 3443; 1906, § 3942; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2949; 1930, § 2995; 1942, § 1877; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 26]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-79 specified when persons other than sheriff or coroner could be appointed by a judge to execute process.

§ 13-3-81. When justice court judge may execute process.

If there be no sheriff in any county, or if good cause of exception exists against him, by reason of his being a party to or interested in the suit, or otherwise, the process may be directed to any justice court judge of the county, who shall be bound to execute the same, and to do all things which the sheriff would be bound to do if no exception existed against him. In case of any neglect or breach of such duty, the justice court judge shall be liable to the same penalties and subject to the same actions and remedies as sheriffs are subject to in like cases.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 75; 1871, § 699; 1880, § 2290; 1892, § 3445; 1906, § 3944; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2951; 1930, § 2997; 1942, § 1879; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 27, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Execution of process issued by the justice of the peace, see §11-9-107.

Power of the justice of the peace to appoint person to execute process when an authorized person cannot be had in time, see §11-9-109.

Authority of the justice of the peace to issue a warrant for the arrest of an offender coming into the county, see §99-3-21.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Process can only be served by an officer authorized by statute. This statute, authorizing the service of process in certain cases by justices of the peace, does not empower a justice of the peace to serve a summons issued by himself. McDugle v. Filmer, 79 Miss. 53, 29 So. 996, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1901).

Neither an interested sheriff nor his deputy, whether general or special, can serve the writ. Dyson v. Baker, 54 Miss. 24, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 1876).

Process addressed to an officer interested in the case will be quashed on timely application. McLeod v. Harper, 43 Miss. 42, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1870).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 122, 123, 127- 130.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 33-38.

§ 13-3-83. Service of notices, summonses, subpoenas, orders, pleadings, motions, etc.

All notices provided for by law appertaining to actions, suits or proceedings of any kind in any court shall be served and returned by the sheriff or any constable of the county, or the marshal of any city, town or village therein in which such notices are to be served, to whom such notices may be delivered for that purpose. However, service of summonses and subpoenas in all courts except justice court shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and in every instance, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal and similar paper shall be served and filed in accordance with the provisions of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 2289; 1892, § 3442; 1906, § 3941; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2948; 1930, § 2994; 1942, § 1876; Laws, 1971, ch. 353, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 99; Laws, 1992, ch. 427 § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 4, 1992).

Cross References —

Notice served on attorney of party being as valid and effectual as if served on party himself, see §11-49-11.

Duty of the sheriff to execute all orders and decrees of the circuit and chancery courts directed to him to be executed, see §19-25-35.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A bill of complaint was erroneously dismissed for the complainant’s failure to answer interrogatories within 30 days after service thereof, where the complainant had not been served with notice of the filing of the interrogatories by a sheriff or other legal officer. Robinson v. Hemphill, 229 So. 2d 827, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1257 (Miss. 1969).

List of special venire and copy of the indictment need not be served on accused by sheriff. Ivey v. State, 154 Miss. 60, 119 So. 507, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 198 (Miss. 1928).

Service under this section [Code 1942, § 1876] must be made by the sheriff or other lawful officer. Merchants' Grocery Co. v. Merchants' Trust & Banking Co., 119 Miss. 99, 80 So. 494, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 17 (Miss. 1918).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 43–46, 70–74.

§ 13-3-85. Notice by summons of motions against officers for neglect of duty.

In all cases where motions are made against officers, or officers and their sureties, for neglect of official duty under any law, five days’ notice shall be given by summons, to be served as in other cases, and this shall apply to motions against the personal representative of a deceased officer.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3444; 1906, § 3943; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2950; 1930, § 2996; 1942, § 1878.

Cross References —

Power of circuit court to hear and determine motions against officers for money collected but not paid on demand to party entitled thereto, see §9-7-89.

Summary proceeding on motion by client against attorney for failing to pay over money received on client’s behalf, see §11-49-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process §§ 99, 102.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process § 156.

§ 13-3-87. Return of officer may be questioned by parties.

The return of the officer serving any process may, in the same action, be shown to be untrue by either of the parties, but the officer himself shall not be permitted to question its truth.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 65; 1871, § 707; 1880, § 1533; 1892, § 3446; 1906, § 3945; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2952; 1930, § 2998; 1942, § 1880.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

No reversible error was found in trial judge excluding testimony directed toward identity of person who actually served summons; one acting generally as deputy sheriff, under written appointment from sheriff, although not having qualified according to law, is de facto officer and between third parties his actions are valid; and, in absence of proof to contrary, it is presumed that person whose name was appended to return on writ as special deputy was duly authorized as such. Pointer v. Huffman, 509 So. 2d 870, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2583 (Miss. 1987).

A motion by plaintiff to permit an amendment to the return of service of process to show that the person served was defendant’s designated agent for accepting service of process was improperly denied where the testimony of deputy sheriff who executed the summons was competent to amend his return for such purposes and where such an amendment would be a ministerial act permitted by this section. Taylor v. F. & C. Contracting Co., 362 So. 2d 625, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2118 (Miss. 1978).

Where a judgment by default has been rendered at the return term upon a return of personal service of a summons apparently regular such judgment may, at a subsequent term, be vacated by a motion showing that the return was false and that the summons had only been served four days before its return day, and the court will direct an issue of fact to try the truth of the return. If the motion be sustained, the suit will be a pending one. Meyer Bros. v. Whitehead, 62 Miss. 387, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 90 (Miss. 1884).

The statute clearly contemplates that the party objecting to the return in a pending action should plead the facts in the nature of a plea in abatement. A mere motion to set aside should be overruled and testimony thereon refused. Mayfield v. Barnard, 43 Miss. 270, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 1870).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of jurat or certificate to affidavit for publication. 1 A.L.R. 1573, 116 A.L.R. 589.

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d, Process §§ 264 et seq.

§ 13-3-89. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

[Codes, 1892, § 3447; 1906, § 3946; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2953; 1930, § 2999; 1942, § 1881]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-89 provided that when a summons or citation was quashed on motion of defendant, the case could be continued for the term, but that the defendant was deemed to have entered his appearance.

§ 13-3-91. Reversal, on appeal by defendant, for want of service or defective service as an appearance.

Where a judgment or decree is reversed on appeal taken by defendant for the want of service, or because of defective service of process, a new summons or citation need not be issued or served, but the defendant shall, without such process or service, be presumed to have entered his appearance to the cause in the court from which the appeal was taken when the mandate shall be filed therein.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3448; 1906, § 3947; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2954; 1930, § 3000; 1942, § 1882.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application.

1. Validity.

Similar legislation in Texas, forbidding the defendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action, without surrendering himself to the jurisdiction of the court, has been held not to deprive him of liberty or property within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 11 S. Ct. 9, 34 L. Ed. 604, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2057 (U.S. 1890); Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285, 11 S. Ct. 298, 34 L. Ed. 962, 1891 U.S. LEXIS 2082 (U.S. 1891).

2. Construction and application.

Following a successful appeal from an order overruling a motion to set aside a final decree because of defective process, the defendant is presumed to have entered her appearance and no new process is necessary. High v. High, 186 So. 2d 196, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1292 (Miss. 1966).

Defendant’s appeal from justice court and appearance in circuit court and motion to quash process and dismiss for want of jurisdiction constituted appearance and waiver of absence of process. Turner v. Williams, 162 Miss. 258, 139 So. 606, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 1932).

An appeal of a case from the justice of the peace court to the circuit court gives the circuit court jurisdiction of the defendant. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Swanson, 92 Miss. 485, 46 So. 83, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 214 (Miss. 1908).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass on right of other motor vehicle proceeding in same direction. 38 A.L.R.2d 114.

Am. Jur.

4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appearance §§ 2-4.

2 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Appearance, Forms 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14.

CJS.

6 C.J.S., Appearances § 12.

§ 13-3-93. Subpoenas for witnesses.

The first process, in all civil actions, and in all courts, to compel the attendance of a witness, shall be a subpoena, the procedural aspects of which shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (102); 1857, ch. 61, art. 194; 1871, § 761; 1880, § 1586; 1892, § 3449; 1906, § 3948; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2955; 1930, § 3001; 1942, § 1883; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 100, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Power of the chancery court to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, see §9-5-85.

Power of the justice of the peace to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, see §11-9-115.

Power of arbitrators in certain arbitration proceedings to subpoena witnesses, see §11-15-117.

Issuance of subpoenas in habeas corpus proceedings, see §11-43-39.

Summons generally, see §13-3-5.

Power of the foreman of a grand jury to issue subpoenas for attendance of witnesses, see §13-5-63.

Amounts of witness fees, see §25-7-47.

Summoning witnesses to appear before courts-martial, see §33-13-321.

Power of banking examiners and commissioner of banking and consumer finance to subpoena witnesses, see §81-1-85.

For another section derived from same 1942 code section, see §99-9-11.

Power of a conservator of the peace, in examinations had before him for offenses, to issue subpoenas, see §99-15-9.

Right to subpoena witnesses under Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, see §99-39-23.

For the rule governing subpoenas, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 45.

Procedural requirements for requests for subpoenas in circuit courts, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 2.01.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A witness attending court cannot claim attendance from the opposite party who loses the suit unless he has been subpoenaed. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Richardson, 104 Miss. 575, 61 So. 649, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1913).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses §§ 6 et seq.

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 21-66.

§§ 13-3-95 through 13-3-101. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1991, ch. 573, § 141, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

§13-3-95. [Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (119); 1857, ch. 61, art. 195; 1871,§ 762; 1880, §§ 1587, 1616; 1892, § 3450; 1906, § 3949; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2956; 1930, § 3002; 1942, § 1884.]

§13-3-97. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 195; 1871, § 763; 1880, § 1587; 1892, § 3451; 1906, § 3950; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2957; 1930, § 3003; 1942, § 1885.]

§13-3-99. [Codes, 1880, § 1594; 1892, § 3452; 1906, § 3951; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2958; 1930, § 3004; 1942, § 1886; Laws, 1936, ch. 250.]

§13-3-101. [Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 196; 1871, § 764; 1880, § 1588; 1892, § 3453; 1906, § 3952; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2959; 1930, § 3005; 1942, § 1887.]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-3-95 related to issuance of subpoena requiring attendance before master, commissioner, referee, or surveyor.

Former §13-3-97 related to issuance of subpoena for witness to give dispositions for use in other states.

Former §13-3-99 related to process to compel attendance of witness in certain counties during term.

Former §13-3-101 related to service of subpoena.

§ 13-3-103. Attachment for non-appearing subpoenaed witness.

If any person subpoenaed as a witness shall fail to appear and attend as required, an attachment shall be issued by order of the court or other authority before which he was subpoenaed to appear, returnable at such time as the court or authority may appoint. The court or authority shall, on ordering the attachment, direct whether the witness shall enter into bond for his appearance, and in what sum, and whether with or without sureties, which bond the sheriff, or other officer by whom the attachment is executed, is authorized to take, payable to the state. In case the witness shall appear in answer to the attachment, the court may discharge him therefrom, on good cause shown, or may require him to enter into recognizance or bond for his appearance until discharged, to testify in the cause. In case the witness shall not appear, in pursuance of his recognizance or bond, the same proceedings shall be had as upon the forfeiture of a recognizance in a criminal case.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (121); 1857, ch. 61, art. 197; 1871, § 765; 1880, § 1589; 1892, § 3454; 1906, § 3935; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2960; 1930, § 3006; 1942, § 1888.

Cross References —

Form of an attachment for a witness issued by a justice of the peace, see §11-9-121.

Witness not obeying a subpoena served on him in a habeas corpus proceeding, see §11-43-49.

For another section derived from same 1942 code section, see §99-9-19.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

Attachment of witness for failure to obey subpoena, 25 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Witnesses, Forms 96, 97.

Attachment of witness for failure to obey subpoena, 21 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Witnesses, Form 21:738.

CJS.

98 C.J.S., Witnesses §§ 92, 106–112, 128–137, 139.

§ 13-3-105. Subpoenaed witness to attend until discharged; scire facias for defaulters.

Every witness subpoenaed in any case, civil or criminal, shall attend, from day to day, and from term to term without further notice, until discharged by the court or by the party at whose instance he was subpoenaed, and in default thereof he shall be fined by the court not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), and a scire facias shall issue thereon, requiring him to appear at the next term of the court, to show cause why the fine should not be made absolute. If cause be not then shown, the fine shall be made final. In criminal cases, the court may cause the witnesses on either side to be bound by bond or recognizance to appear and testify until discharged.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 60, art. 1 (103, 105); 1857, ch. 61, arts. 196, 198; 1871, § 766; 1880, §§ 1590, 1591, 1592; 1892, § 3455; 1906, § 3954; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2961; 1930, § 3007; 1942, § 1889.

Cross References —

For another section derived from same 1942 code section, see §99-9-21.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

After the state rested its case in a prosecution for assault and battery with an intent to kill, the district attorney had authority to release a witness subpoenaed by the state, who had not been subpoenaed by the defendant. Nicholson v. State, 230 Miss. 267, 92 So. 2d 654, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 366 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Uniform Act to secure attendance of witnesses from without the state in criminal proceedings. 44 A.L.R.2d 732.

Am. Jur.

Scire facias on judgment against witness failing to obey subpoena, 25 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Witnesses, Form 93.

Writ of scire facias against defaulting witness, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Scire Facias, Forms 18:181, 18:182.

§ 13-3-107. Settlement of certain civil suits; notice to be given to subpoenaed witnesses and effect of failure to do so.

If a civil suit shall be settled in vacation, notice thereof shall be given to the witnesses subpoenaed to appear. If such notice is not given, they shall be entitled to the same compensation for their subsequent attendance in pursuance of the subpoena as if the suit had not been settled.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 196; 1871, § 764; 1880, § 1588; 1892, § 3453; 1906, § 3952; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2959; 1930, § 3005; 1942, § 1887.

Cross References —

For another section derived from same 1942 code section, see §99-9-17.

§ 13-3-109. Issuance of process by supreme court and its return.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue all process which may be ordered to issue by the court or any judge thereof. All process issuing from said court or on the order of any judge thereof, or which may be returnable therein, shall be under the seal of the court, and be signed by the clerk thereof, and may be directed to the sheriff or other proper officer of any county, who shall execute and return the same according to the command thereof. Whenever any such process shall not be executed or not returned, an alias may be issued by the clerk on the application of the person who sued out the former process.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 63, art. 28; 1871, § 430; 1880, § 1448; 1892, § 3458; 1906, § 3957; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2964; 1930, § 3010; 1942, § 1898; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 101, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Filing and service, see Miss. R. App. P. 25.

Substitution of parties, see Miss. R. App. P. 43.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where the landowners, the trustee, and the mortgagee in a deed of trust on property sought to be acquired by eminent domain proceedings were not summoned to appear in the supreme court, that court cannot proceed until they have been properly made parties on appeal. Mississippi State Highway Com. v. Nixon, 253 Miss. 636, 170 So. 2d 631, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1164 (Miss. 1965).

The appellee must have notice of an appeal to the supreme court. Beasley v. Cottrell, 94 Miss. 253, 47 So. 662, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 22 (Miss. 1908).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

62 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Process §§ 8, 9.

CJS.

72 C.J.S., Process §§ 6-11.

§ 13-3-111. Time when executions shall be issued.

The clerks of all courts of law or equity, after the adjournment of the court for the term shall, at the request and cost of the owner of the judgment or decree or his attorney, issue executions on all judgments and decrees rendered therein, and place the same in the hands of the sheriff of the county. The sheriff shall effectuate any execution on a judgment. If requested by such owner, they shall issue executions directed to the sheriff of any other county, and shall deliver the same to the owner or his attorney.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 59, art. 9 (4); 1857, ch. 61, art. 265; 1871, § 837; 1880, § 1742; 1892, § 3459; 1906, § 3958; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2965; 1930, § 3011; 1942, § 1899; Laws, 1976, ch. 331; Laws, 1990, ch. 408, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References —

Duty of attorney general to direct the issuing of process necessary to carry into execution judgment in any cause represented by him, see §7-5-33.

Power of the circuit court to award executions, see §9-7-91.

Execution on judgment or decree appealed from not being issued when a bond for stay of execution is given, see §11-51-59.

Power of court clerks to make out executions for unpaid costs, see §11-53-73.

Execution against collateral to enforce security interest, see §75-9-501.

Duties of clerks and sheriffs with respect to executions issued on judgments rendered in suits on promissory notes and bills of exchange, see §75-13-7.

Provisions to effect that procedure on execution shall be as provided by statute, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Bank executed on a summary judgment that was granted against corporation, and two other related actions were still pending; the pending lawsuits were choses in action and subject to a writ of execution, and the procedure selected by the bank, which was the initiation of a sheriff’s execution sale against the plaintiffs’ choses in action, was entirely appropriate. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 2006).

Prevailing party held not entitled to recover witness fees where certificate of allowance was not issued by clerk or demanded by witness during term of court or within five days thereafter, although witness made proper affidavit before clerk. Woodruff v. Bright, 175 Miss. 109, 166 So. 390, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1936).

A justice of the peace cannot purchase property at an execution sale on an execution issued from his court. E. E. Forbes Piano Co. v. Hennington, 98 Miss. 51, 53 So. 777, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 70 (Miss. 1910).

An execution issued to the sheriff of another county by the clerk of a circuit court, on a duly enrolled judgment of a justice of the peace of his county, returnable before such justice, is not authorized by this section (Code 1892, § 3459), but is void. Smith v. Mixon, 73 Miss. 581, 19 So. 295, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1895).

And such writ is not amendable under Code 1892, § 3439 (Code 1942, § 1873), and it is immaterial that the objection thereto was not made prior to a motion for new trial because the failure to object cannot vitalize a void writ. Smith v. Mixon, 73 Miss. 581, 19 So. 295, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1895).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Formal entry or docketing, of judgment as prerequisite to issuance of execution. 65 A.L.R.2d 1162.

Injury to credit standing, reputation, solvency, or profit potential as elements of damage resulting from wrongful execution against business property. 55 A.L.R.3d 911.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 82 et seq.

General executions, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 31-33.

Special executions, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 41-46.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 69, 85-88.

§ 13-3-113. Issuance, execution, and return of executions.

Writs of execution shall bear date and be issued in the same manner as original process, and shall be made returnable on the first day of the next term of the court in which the judgment or decree was rendered, if there be fifteen days between the issuance and return thereof, and, if not, on the first day of the term next thereafter. Such execution may be directed to the sheriff or other proper officer of any county, who shall serve and execute the same, and make return thereof to the court in which the judgment or decree was rendered.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (7); 1857, ch. 61, art. 267; 1871, § 839; 1880, § 1743; 1892, § 3460; 1906, § 3959; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2966; 1930, § 3012; 1942, § 1900.

Cross References —

Time within which execution shall not be issued on judgment of a justice of the peace, see §11-9-131.

Form of an execution issued on a judgment of a justice of the peace, see §11-9-133.

Selection by a defendant of exempt personal property where an officer is about to levy an execution or attachment on personal property, see §85-3-3.

Judgment for personal injury not exceeding $10,000 being exempt from execution, see §85-3-17.

Issuance of a special writ of execution for the sale of a house, building, structure, or fixture and land, see §85-7-153.

Executions on judgments rendered against a principal and surety, see §87-5-13.

Criminal offense of resisting authorized person attempting to serve process, see §97-9-75.

Provisions to effect that procedure on execution shall be as provided by statute, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The return of an officer showing the sale of land to a designated person does not transfer a title, it only gives the purchaser the right to demand a deed conveying title. Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802, 38 So. 742, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Kennedy v. Sanders, 90 Miss. 524, 43 So. 913, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1907), writ of error dismissed, 214 U.S. 196, 29 S. Ct. 635, 53 L. Ed. 965, 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1908 (U.S. 1909).

An execution issued to the sheriff of another county by the clerk of a circuit court on a duly enrolled judgment of a justice of the peace of his county is unauthorized. Smith v. Mixon, 73 Miss. 581, 19 So. 295, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1895).

A person is not disqualified to act as deputy sheriff in levying an execution because he is agent for the plaintiff in collecting the judgment and is to receive a commission on the collection. It is error to quash a levy because of such fact. Badley v. Ladd, 70 Miss. 688, 12 So. 832, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1893).

An execution issued seventeen days before the return term, and received by the sheriff ten days after issuance, is not void. Skinner v. Wilson, 61 Miss. 90, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1883); Williamson v. Williamson, 52 Miss. 725, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 284 (Miss. 1876).

An execution issued within five days of a term and made returnable thereto is void. Harris v. West, 25 Miss. 156, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1852).

A sale of land made under an execution after its return day does not pass title. Lehr v. Doe, 11 Miss. 468, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1844).

If an execution issued more than fifteen days before a term be made returnable to a later term, it will be void. Lehr v. Doe, 11 Miss. 468, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1844).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With respect to execution sales of mobile homes for unpaid ad valorem taxes and any excess funds over which the officer conducting the sale is entitled to retain after payment of judgment liens in order of priority, there is both a statutory method (Section 13-3-181) and a remedy by rule (M.R.C.P.) for distribution of funds when there are conflicting claims thereto. Blaker, II, January 30, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0023. Williamson v. Williamson, 52 Miss. 725, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 284 (Miss. 1876).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 98 et seq.

Complaint, petition, or declaration against sheriff for failure to return execution, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev) Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 91.

Complaint, petition, or declaration against sheriff for false return of execution, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Forms 93, 94.

Complaint, petition, or declaration against sheriff for neglect of deputy in failing to levy execution, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 32.

Complaint, petition, or declaration against surety to recover unsatisfied judgment against defaulting sheriff and deputy, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 21.

9A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Form 21.1 (Affidavit – For issuance of execution).

Directions to execution officer, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 71-76.

Return to writ of execution, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 171-181.

Complaint against sheriff for failure to levy or return execution, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Forms 18:558-18:560, 18:562.

Complaint against sheriff for false return of execution, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 18:564.

Complaint on sheriff’s bond for failure to levy execution, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 18:592.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 93 et seq.

§ 13-3-115. Issuance of subsequent execution.

If a first writ of execution shall not have been returned and shall not have been executed, the clerk may issue another execution at the cost of any party in whose favor the execution was issued, if such party shall desire to take out another execution.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (3); 1857, ch. 61, art. 269; 1871, § 840; 1880, § 1774; 1892, § 3461; 1906, § 3960; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2967; 1930, § 3013; 1942, § 1901.

Cross References —

For other sections derived from same 1942 code section, see §§13-3-117,13-3-119.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. Rule Civil Proc. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 120- 122.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 119-130.

§ 13-3-117. Issuance of execution against several defendants.

When one judgment has been recovered against several defendants, execution shall issue thereon against all the defendants, and not otherwise.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1(3); 1857, ch. 61, art. 269; 1871, § 840; 1880, § 1774; 1892, § 3461; 1906, § 3960; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2967; 1930, § 3013; 1942, § 1901.

Cross References —

For other sections derived from same 1942 code section, see §§13-3-115,13-3-119.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Under Section 13-3-117, the court should issue a writ of execution against all defendants who have had a judgment rendered against them. The sheriff has no duty under Section 13-3-117, except to serve the writs of execution which are issued by the court. Hooks, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0163.

A taking, under Section 13-3-117, may be constructive rather than actual, so long as the officer assumes dominion and control over the property. Hooks, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0163.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

Executions against multiple debtors, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 51-53.

§ 13-3-119. Effect of death of one or more of several defendants before issuance of execution.

If one or more of several defendants have died before the issuance of a writ of execution, and a revivor shall not have been had, the fact of the death shall be noted on the writ, and the property of the survivors only shall be liable to the execution in such case.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (3); 1857, ch. 61, art. 269; 1871, § 840; 1880, § 1774; 1892, § 3461; 1906, § 3960; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2967; 1930, § 3013; 1942, § 1901.

Cross References —

For other sections derived from same 1942 code section, see §§13-3-115,13-3-117.

For the rule governing substitution upon the death of a party, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 25.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where before the issuance of execution one of several judgment defendants dies, a sale of his property thereunder without previous revivor against the heirs is void. Faison v. Johnson, 70 Miss. 214, 12 So. 152, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1892).

The plaintiff may have execution against survivors though it must issue against all by name, with suggestion of death noted on the writ. Bowen v. Bonner, 45 Miss. 10, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1871).

The failure to note the death of one will not vitiate the execution as to the other defendants. Wade v. Watt, Noble & Mobley, 41 Miss. 248, 1866 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1866).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions § 56.

Proceedings where judgment debtor is deceased, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 401-411.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 80-84.

§ 13-3-121. Execution for costs of Supreme Court.

In cases decided in the Supreme Court, or dismissed or otherwise disposed of, the clerk of the court may issue executions for costs accrued in the Supreme Court, in excess of the filing fee, in the same manner that the clerks of the circuit courts are authorized to issue executions against any party liable therefor. Such executions may be directed to the sheriff of any county, and shall be returned in the same manner and under like penalties as in case of executions returnable to the circuit court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 63, art. 31; 1871, § 433; 1880, § 1449; 1892, § 3462; 1906, § 3961; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2968; 1930, § 3014; 1942, § 1902; Laws, 1978, ch. 335, § 34, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Cross References —

Power of court clerks to make out executions for unpaid costs, see §11-53-73.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Clerk of supreme court is not authorized to issue writs of garnishment on judgments by supreme court for costs incurred on appeal thereto. State v. Keeton, 176 Miss. 590, 169 So. 760, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1936).

A case determining the application of costs collected on appeal without supersedeas. Boyd v. Applewhite, 123 Miss. 185, 85 So. 87, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 17 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs §§ 98-101.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Civil Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 719, December 1979.

§ 13-3-123. Levy of writs of execution and attachments—on land.

In case of a levy of an attachment on real estate in the occupancy of any person, the officer shall go to the house or upon the land of the defendant, and there declare that he attaches the same at the suit of the plaintiff, but if the land be unoccupied, or if the process be an execution, he may attach or levy upon the same by returning that he has attached or levied upon the land, describing it by numbers or otherwise properly, and, if the process be an attachment, stating that the land is unoccupied; and in all cases the return of the officer shall be conclusive of the facts stated therein, except on timely motion to quash.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3464; 1906, § 3963; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2970; 1930, § 3016; 1942, § 1904.

Cross References —

Service of a writ of attachment generally, see §11-33-23.

Duty of officer levying upon real estate by virtue of any process other than an execution upon a judgment to file notice with the chancery court clerk, see §11-47-5.

Limitation period applicable to executions on domestic judgments, see §15-1-43.

Domestic judgment not being a lien on a defendant’s property for longer than 7 years unless an action be brought thereon before the expiration of such time, see §15-1-47.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In attachment suit in chancery against land of nonresident, no lien is created until mandatory provisions of Code 1942, §§ 756, 2731, and this section [Code 1942, § 1904] are complied with by issuance and levy of writ of attachment and filing of notice of levy, and mere filing of lis pendens notice is insufficient to create lien. Ryals v. Douglas, 205 Miss. 695, 39 So. 2d 311, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 461 (Miss. 1949).

In attachment suit in chancery against nonresident, alleged to own land in this state, for damages arising out of breach of warranty in sale of automobile, person claiming lis pendens notice filed in suit creates cloud upon his superior interest in the land may become party to suit on motion for purpose of protecting his interest and by his appearance in suit intervenor does not waive necessity of issuance and levy of writ of attachment. Ryals v. Douglas, 205 Miss. 695, 39 So. 2d 311, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 461 (Miss. 1949).

A sheriff holding an attachment writ against a corporation may refuse the demand of the plaintiff to levy it on the property of the individuals who compose it and manage its affairs, and by such refusal he does not incur liability to the plaintiff. State use of Owen v. Marshall, 69 Miss. 486, 13 So. 668, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1891).

His liability cannot be affected by showing that if the levy had been made the property might thereafter have been subjected in a chancery proceeding to the demand of the plaintiff. State use of Owen v. Marshall, 69 Miss. 486, 13 So. 668, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1891).

A service or levy of an attachment by an interested party is void. Dyson v. Baker, 54 Miss. 24, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 1876).

The directions of the statute as to the manner of levying an attachment must be complied with. Tucker v. Byars, 46 Miss. 549, 1872 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1872).

It is not necessary to the validity of the return that it should state that the property belonged to the defendant; that fact will be intended. Saunders v. Columbus Life & General Ins. Co., 43 Miss. 583, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1870).

If the return show a substantial compliance with the statute, the levy will be valid. The return need not follow the exact language used in the statute. Saunders v. Columbus Life & General Ins. Co., 43 Miss. 583, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1870).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The sheriff is not required to search the title to land to determine ownership or the identity of mortgagees before levying execution. The act of levying execution would entail going on the land and posting notice of the service of the writ. See Section 13-3-123. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 58, 272- 276.

9A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 31 et seq. (writs of execution).

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment §§ 100-103, 311-321.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 40, 143, 144.

§ 13-3-125. Levy of writs of execution and attachments — on personalty.

If the levy be upon personal property the officer shall take the same into his possession and dispose of it according to law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3465; 1906, § 3964; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2971; 1930, § 3017; 1942, § 1905.

Cross References —

Delivery of property seized in execution of process by one appointed by a justice of the peace to execute it, see §11-9-111.

Service of a writ of attachment generally, see §11-33-23.

Selection of exempt personal property where an officer is about to levy an execution or attachment on personal property, see §85-3-3.

Indemnity bond to be furnished officer levying an execution or attachment on personal property claimed to be exempt, see §85-3-5.

Liability of sheriff seizing personal property exempt from execution, see §85-3-5.

Replevy by defendant whose exempt personal property is seized pursuant to an execution or attachment, see §85-3-9.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where the sheriff left the automobiles upon which he levied execution in the possession of the judgment debtor but took the serial numbers of the vehicles and advised the debtor not to dispose of them in any manner, he took constructive possession of them and the levy was valid. Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Woodham, 208 So. 2d 56, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1395 (Miss. 1968).

The seizure may be constructive. Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1962).

A valid levy may be made by taking down serial or model numbers of appliances and leaving them in the debtor’s store under an agreement that they were not to be sold. Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1962).

An instance of an unsuccessful effort to levy on a warrant in chancery clerk’s custody. Mulford v. Roberts, 112 Miss. 573, 73 So. 609, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 148 (Miss. 1916).

A sheriff holding an attachment writ against a corporation may refuse the demand of the plaintiff to levy it on the property of the individuals who compose it and manage its affairs, and by such refusal he does not incur liability to the plaintiff. State use of Owen v. Marshall, 69 Miss. 486, 13 So. 668, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1891).

His liability cannot be affected by showing that if the levy had been made the property might thereafter have been subjected to the demand of the plaintiff. State use of Owen v. Marshall, 69 Miss. 486, 13 So. 668, 1891 Miss. LEXIS 141 (Miss. 1891).

It is essential to the validity of the levy of an attachment on personalty that the officer take the possession of the same. Gates & Pleasants v. Flint, 39 Miss. 365, 1860 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1860).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 59, 258 et seq.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions § 168.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment §§ 89–97, 101, 556–560.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 28, 146-153, 156-159.

§ 13-3-127. Levy of writs of execution and attachments — on choses in action.

In case an attachment be levied on rights, credits, and choses in action, the officer shall take into his possession the books of accounts and other evidences of debt belonging to the defendant, and if the plaintiff so direct, he shall summon all persons appearing to be indebted to the defendant, or to have effects of his in their hands, as garnishees, in the manner prescribed by law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3466; 1906, § 3965; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2972; 1930, § 3018; 1942, § 1906.

Cross References —

Sale or assignment of any chose in action after suit thereon has been filed, see §11-7-7.

Service of a writ of attachment generally, see §11-33-23.

Liability to levy of money, banknotes, judgments and the like, see §13-3-133.

Purchaser’s title to chose in action of defendant sold under execution or attachment, see §13-3-135.

Duties of clerks and sheriffs with respect to executions issued on judgments rendered in suits on promissory notes and bills of exchange, see §75-13-7.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Nothing in Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-127, which was limited to attachments, supported the argument that a chose in action was not subject to a writ of execution. Maranatha Faith Ctr., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 904 So. 2d 1004, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1405 (Miss. 2004).

A suggestion in the writ that a certain person is indebted to the defendant makes it the duty of the officer to summon that person as garnishee, even though the writ contains no direct command that he do so. Semmes v. Patterson, 65 Miss. 6, 3 So. 35, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 1887).

The officer is not required to summon as garnishees all persons shown by the books of account to be indebted to defendant, but only such as may be alleged so to be. Boone v. McIntosh, 62 Miss. 744, 1885 Miss. LEXIS 135 (Miss. 1885).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Attachment and Garnishment §§ 63 et seq., 269.

General Executions, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Form 51.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment § 98.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 35-37, 154, 534.

§ 13-3-129. Levy of writs of execution and attachments — on corporate stock and the like.

In case of the levy of an execution or attachment on the stock, shares, or interest of the defendant in any corporation or joint stock company, the officer shall go to the office or principal place of business of the corporation or company, and there declare that he attaches or levies upon the stock, shares, or interest of the defendant therein at the suit of the plaintiff. The officer shall demand of any officer, agent, or clerk of such corporation or company there present, and who is not the defendant, a statement in writing, under oath, of the amount of the defendant’s stock, the number of his shares, or extent of his interest in such corporation or company, and shall leave with the officer, agent, or clerk, a copy of the writ. If no such officer, agent, or clerk be present, the officer shall post conspicuously at such office or place of business a copy of the writ, with a statement therewith that he has attached or levied upon the stock, shares, or interest of the defendant at the suit of the plaintiff, and that he demands of the corporation or company the statement, under oath, of the defendant’s stock, share, or interest therein. The stock, shares, and interest of the defendant in the corporation or company, including all dividends that may accrue after such levy, shall be bound by the lien of the execution or attachment. The corporation or company shall, within a reasonable time, not longer than ten days after the levy, deliver to the officer a statement in writing, under oath, of the particulars demanded by the officer, and of the value of the defendant’s stock, shares, or interest, and in case the corporation or company shall neglect or refuse to do so, or shall wilfully make any false statement thereof, such corporation or company shall be liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the judgment or decree, or of such judgment as the plaintiff shall recover if the process be an attachment. The failure of the corporation or company to make such statement shall not affect the right of the officer to sell the stock, shares, or interest of the defendant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3467; 1906, § 3966; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2973; 1930, § 3019; 1942, § 1907.

Cross References —

Service of a writ of attachment generally, see §11-33-23.

Seizure and sale of corporate property and franchise when a judgment is returned against a corporation, see §79-1-13.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A certificate of shares of corporate stock issued to the judgment debtor, found in the custody of his agent or trustee, was held to be a proper subject of levy and sale under a similar provision contained in Code 1871, § 849. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10, 42 S. Ct. 27, 66 L. Ed. 104, 1921 U.S. LEXIS 1309 (U.S. 1921).

Legislature may fix situs of stock of domestic corporation at its domicile for purposes of execution and attachment. Grenada Bank v. Glass, 150 Miss. 164, 116 So. 740, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 1928).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of equity court to reach or to sequester, for seizure and sale, beneficial equitable interests in corporate stock shares. 42 A.L.R.2d 920.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Attachment and Garnishment § 270.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 150, 169.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment §§ 99, 318–321..

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 39-159.

§ 13-3-131. Levy of writs of execution and attachments — on interest of partners or co-owners.

When a defendant in execution shall own or be entitled to an undivided interest in any property not exclusively in his own possession, such interest may be levied on and sold by the sheriff without taking the property into actual possession, and such sale shall vest in the purchaser all the interest of the defendant in such property.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3468; 1906, § 3967; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2974; 1930, § 3020; 1942, § 1908.

Cross References —

Service of a writ of attachment generally, see §11-33-23.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A voluntary partition of land between co-tenants by agreement will not affect the right of a judgment creditor having a lien upon the interest of one tenant. Simmons v. Gordon, 98 Miss. 316, 53 So. 623, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 64 (Miss. 1910).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Judgment lien or levy of execution on one joint tenant’s share or interest as severing joint tenancy. 51 A.L.R.4th 906.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 121, 122.

59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership §§ 500 et seq.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment §§ 459–461.

33 C.J.S., Executions § 45.

§ 13-3-133. Money, banknotes, judgments and the like may be levied on; endorsement and negotiation of seized instruments; proceeds to be applied against judgment debtor’s obligations.

  1. Money, banknotes, bills, evidences of debt circulating as money, and any judgment or decree belonging to the defendant, may be taken under an execution or attachment and sold or disposed of according to law, or applied to the payment of the execution or in satisfaction of the judgment in attachment.
  2. The officer serving a writ may endorse all warrants, checks or drafts seized under execution or attachment. The officer serving the writ shall endorse on the warrant, check or draft the day and date it was received, shall take into possession, as they shall become due to the judgment debtor, monies, checks, drafts, warrants, vouchers or other evidences of indebtedness, and shall issue a receipt to the paying, disbursing or auditing officer therefor, and shall endorse, in the name of the judgment debtor, any and all checks, drafts, warrants, vouchers or other evidences of indebtedness delivered under the writ. The seized instruments may be negotiated and the proceeds thereof, or so much thereof as necessary, shall be applied to the payment of the execution or in satisfaction of the judgment in attachment in order of priority.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 285; 1871, § 849; 1880, § 1765; 1892, § 3470; 1906, § 3968; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2975; 1930, § 3021; 1942, § 1909; Laws, 2008, ch. 324, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2008.

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment added (2).

Cross References —

Levy of writs of execution and attachment on choses in action, see §13-3-127.

Service of a writ of attachment generally, see §99-23-7.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A certificate of shares of corporate stock issued to the judgment debtor, found in the custody of his agent or trustee, was held to be a proper subject of levy and sale under a similar provision contained in Code 1871, § 849. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10, 42 S. Ct. 27, 66 L. Ed. 104, 1921 U.S. LEXIS 1309 (U.S. 1921).

Although Miss. Code Ann. §93-11-71(3) provides an expedited execution process for judgments for child support arrearages, if the judgment is not executed, it creates no legal right or interest superior to competing claims or interests in funds forfeited by the government under 21 USCS § 853(n); thus, defendant’s former wife and a department of human services had no claim to the forfeited bank accounts of defendant because they had no legal interest to the funds superior to defendant at the time of the commission of his drug crimes which gave rise to the government’s forfeiture; even if the judgment lien had been enrolled, it did not attach to intangible property, such as the bank accounts, as defined under Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-133. United States v. Butera, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65729 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 13, 2006).

Where it appeared that judgment on which appealing execution creditor relied had been levied on and transferred to appellee, appeal held dismissed. McInnis v. Simmons, 162 Miss. 606, 139 So. 872, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 162 (Miss. 1932).

One whose sole property in this state is money on deposit subjects himself to attachment by going out of the state and taking the money with him, although he expects to return. Philadelphia Inv. Co. v. Bowling, 72 Miss. 565, 17 So. 231, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1895).

A constable having money collected by him under execution, which is payable to the plaintiff therein, is subject to garnishment. Burleson v. Milan, 56 Miss. 399, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1879).

A judgment debtor of a debtor may be garnisheed. Gray v. Henby, 9 Miss. 598, 1844 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1844); O'Brien v. Liddell, 18 Miss. 371, 1848 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1848).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Under Sections 11-9-127 and 13-3-133, to enforce the final judgment of the court it is legal to specify money on defendant’s person and/or money in cash drawer of a business on the same execution. However, the sheriff may not conduct a search of a person or premises without a warrant from a court, but may seize any property that is in plain view. Aldridge, May 2, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0156.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Attachment and Garnishment §§ 76, 80- 91— 101, 233.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment § 88.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 31, 36, 38, 534.

§ 13-3-135. Purchaser’s title to certain interests of defendant sold under execution or attachment.

The purchaser of any chose in action, stock, share, interest, judgment, or decree of the defendant, sold under execution or attachment, shall become the owner thereof, in the same manner as if it had been regularly assigned to him by the defendant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 285; 1880, § 1765; 1892, § 3471; 1906, § 3969; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2976; 1930, § 3022; 1942, § 1910.

Cross References —

Levy of writs of execution and attachment on choses in action, see §13-3-127.

Property purchased at an execution sale being discharged of all liens of judgments, see §13-3-185.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

When bank purchased a corporation’s choses in action at a sheriff’s sale, it also purchased lawsuits; as such, it became the owner of the lawsuits, and the trial court erred in not substituting the bank as a party plaintiff and in not dismissing the litigation. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 2006).

As Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-135 addresses the rights of a purchaser of a chose of action sold under an execution, the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that implicit in a reading of §13-3-135 is the that a chose of action may be sold under execution. Maranatha Faith Ctr., Inc. v. Colonial Trust Co., 904 So. 2d 1004, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1405 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of equity court to reach or to sequester, for seizure and sale, beneficial equitable interests in corporate stock shares. 42 A.L.R.2d 920.

§ 13-3-137. Growing crop shall not be levied upon.

An execution shall nor be levied upon a growing crop, nor shall the same be seized under an attachment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1764; 1892, § 3472; 1906, § 3970; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2977; 1930, § 3023; 1942, § 1911.

Cross References —

Growing crop not being subject to a judgment lien, see §11-7-199.

Right of purchaser or mortgagor to cultivate and gather crops in cases of forfeiture under contract of purchaser or foreclosure of deeds in trust or mortgages, see §11-25-25.

Chancery court decrees for the sale of a crop growing at the time of death of a deceased, see §91-7-169.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Statute prohibiting sale of growing crops under execution must be strictly construed. Harris v. Harris, 150 Miss. 729, 116 So. 731, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1928).

Where crop had matured and was ready for harvest, lien of levy attached. Harris v. Harris, 150 Miss. 729, 116 So. 731, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1928).

Trust deed, executed after levy by sheriff under execution upon matured ungathered crop of cotton, cannot prevail as against judgment creditor. Harris v. Harris, 150 Miss. 729, 116 So. 731, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1928).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 62, 63.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment §§ 96, 97, 101.

33 C.J.S., Executions § 29.

§ 13-3-139. Lien of executions, and priority thereof.

Writs of executions, where there is no judgment lien, shall bind the property of defendant only from the time of the levy thereof. If two or more writs shall be delivered to the officer for execution against the same person, that which was first delivered shall be the first levied and satisfied. It shall be the duty of the sheriff or other officer, on receipt of an execution, to indorse thereon the day of the month and the year and the hour when he received the same. For a failure to make such indorsement, the sheriff or other officer shall be liable to a penalty of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), to the use of the plaintiff, recoverable by motion before the court from which the execution issued, and the sheriff or other officer shall, moreover, be liable for all damages sustained by any party aggrieved.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (8); 1857, ch. 61, art. 270; 1871, § 841; 1892, § 3473; 1906, § 3971; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2978; 1930, § 3024; 1942, § 1912.

Cross References —

Lien created by and priority of judgment of circuit court entered on the judgment roll, see §11-7-191.

Forfeiture of priority of judgment of circuit court entered on judgment roll, see §11-7-193.

Criminal offenses of removal out of state of personal property subject to liens, see §§97-17-73 through97-17-77.

Obstructing justice by removing property levied on by virtue of any legal process, see §97-9-69.

Criminal offense of disposing property on which there exists a lien by law without notifying purchaser of said lien, see §97-19-51.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 159 et seq.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 203-208, 210, 219 et seq.

§ 13-3-141. Officer to care for property and allowed expenses.

When a sheriff or other officer shall levy an execution on livestock, he shall provide for its sustenance until sold or otherwise legally discharged from the execution. Upon the return of the execution, the court, in cases where the compensation is not fixed by law, shall settle and adjust what the officer shall be allowed for his expenses incurred by providing for the stock, and also reasonable expenses of keeping personal property levied on by him, and the same shall be taxed as costs. The officer may retain the same out of the money arising from the sale of the property.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 274; 1871, § 843; 1880, § 1746; 1892, § 3474; 1906, § 3972; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2979; 1930, § 3025; 1942, § 1913.

Cross References —

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The expenses incurred under Section 13-3-141, if not fixed by law, shall be settled by the court on return of the execution and taxed as costs. The sheriff can retain these costs out of the proceeds from the sale of the property. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

If necessary to provide for the “sustenance” of the livestock levied under Section 13-3-141, the sheriff may hire someone to move and/or keep and feed the cattle and submit the expense to the court to be taxed as costs. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d(Rev), Executions §§ 177 et seq.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 183, 191.

§ 13-3-143. Manner by which personal representative or successor thereof of plaintiff may have execution.

When the executor or administrator of a plaintiff who dies before satisfaction of his judgment shall file with the clerk a copy of his letters testamentary or of administration, duly certified, execution may be issued on the judgment as if such death had not occurred, and the clerk shall indorse on the execution the fact of the death of the plaintiff, and that the execution is at the instance of his executor or administrator, stating the name of the executor or administrator. When an administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person acting in a fiduciary or official capacity, who recovered a judgment, shall die, resign, or be removed without having obtained satisfaction thereof, his successor may have execution of the judgment in the same manner, without revival of the judgment by scire facias.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1747; 1892, § 3475; 1906, § 3973; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2980; 1930, § 3026; 1942, § 1914.

Cross References —

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The section [Code 1942, § 1914] does not apply in favor of a foreign administrator who has not complied with the statutory requirements authorizing such administrator to act in this state. Jackson v. Scanland, 65 Miss. 481, 4 So. 552, 1888 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss. 1888).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions § 55.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 80-84.

§ 13-3-145. Effect of death of one or more of several plaintiffs before issuance of execution.

The death of one or more of several plaintiffs in a judgment shall not prevent the issuance of execution in favor of the survivors.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1748; 1892, § 3476; 1906, § 3974; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2981; 1930, § 3027; 1942, § 1915.

Cross References —

For the rule governing substitution upon the death of a party, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 25.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 80-84.

§ 13-3-147. Assignee of a judgment may have execution.

The assignee of a judgment, where the plaintiff has died, may have execution thereof for his use as if such death had not occurred, upon filing with the clerk his affidavit of the death of the plaintiff and the assignment, and, where the plaintiff has not died, the assignee of a judgment may have an execution for his use in the same manner.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1749; 1892, § 3477; 1906, § 3975; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2982; 1930, § 3028; 1942, § 1916.

Cross References —

Sale or assignment of any chose in action after suit thereon has been filed, see §11-7-7.

Assignment of negotiable instruments, see §75-13-1.

For the rule governing substitution upon the death of a party, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 25.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 1916] recognizes the validity of an assignment of a judgment, and a municipality has the power to make an assignment of a judgment in its favor, it being shown that it received the full amount of the judgment rendered. Wilkinson v. Hutto, 157 Miss. 358, 128 So. 93, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 292 (Miss. 1930).

City may assign judgment recovered on bail bond to sheriff who negligently fails to execute it. Wilkinson v. Hutto, 157 Miss. 358, 128 So. 93, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 292 (Miss. 1930).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 55, 72.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 80-83, 132, 133.

§ 13-3-149. Effect of death of party after execution issued.

The death of any plaintiff or defendant after the issuance or the levy of an execution on personal or real estate, shall not affect the duty of the officer making the levy to proceed and sell as if such death had not occurred.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1750; 1892, § 3478; 1906, § 3976; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2983; 1930, § 3029; 1942, § 1917.

Cross References —

Judgment surviving where one or more of several defendants against whom judgment has been entered die, see §11-7-29.

For the rule governing substitution upon the death of a party, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 25.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 55, 56, 72.

Proceedings where judgment debtor is deceased, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 401-411.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions § 80-84.

§ 13-3-151. Execution issued against dead defendant.

After one year from the death of any defendant in a judgment for money, execution thereof may be had by leave of the court rendering the judgment, or of the judge thereof in vacation, upon cause shown, against any property on which such judgment was a lien at the time of the death of the defendant, and a sale of such property may be made in the same manner and with the same effect as if the defendant were living. In case of the death of the defendant in a judgment for the recovery of real or personal property, execution may be had without revival, in the same manner as if the defendant had not died.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1751; 1892, § 3479; 1906, § 3977; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2984; 1930, § 3030; 1942, § 1918.

Cross References —

Judgment surviving where one or more of several defendants against whom judgment has been entered die, see §11-7-29.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

For the rule governing substitution upon the death of a party, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Execution under the statute must be obtained from the court or from the judge in vacation, on cause shown, on motion or petition, and formal notice or process is not required. The “cause shown” relates only to the judge in vacation. Alsop v. Cowan, 66 Miss. 451, 6 So. 208, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1889).

The petition is insufficient if it fail to show that the judgment was a lien at the time of defendant’s death and a demurrer thereto should be sustained. Alsop v. Cowan, 66 Miss. 451, 6 So. 208, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 1889).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions § 56.

Proceedings where judgment debtor is deceased, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 401-411.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 80-84.

§ 13-3-153. Motion to revive judgment.

Those provisions of the Mississippi Code of 1972 relating to the execution of judgments without revival shall not prevent a revival in any case by a motion to revive judgment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1752; 1892, § 3480; 1906, § 3978; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2985; 1930, § 3031; 1942, § 1919; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 102, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Necessity of revival of judgment by scire facias where no execution issued within year and day after its rendition, see §11-7-201.

Issuance of scire facias in criminal case where defendant, prosecutor, or witness fails to comply with terms of bail bond or recognizance, see §99-5-25.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

Applicability of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 81.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

Petition or application for scire facias to revive judgment, 15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Judgments, Forms 153.

Scire facias to revive judgment-writ and citation, 15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Judgments, Form 168.

Writ of scire facias to revive pending action, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Scire Facias, Forms 18:201-18:211.

Writ of scire facias to revive judgment, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Scire Facias, Forms, 18:221-18:244.

§ 13-3-155. Execution and garnishment on certain judgments and decrees of other courts may be issued by clerk.

The clerk of the circuit court in whose office any judgment or decree shall be enrolled, may issue execution and writs of garnishment thereon, directed to the sheriff of his county, returnable before the court which rendered the judgment or decree.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1738; 1892, § 3481; 1906, § 3979; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2986; 1930, § 3032; 1942, § 1920; Laws, 1890, p. 66; Laws, 1990, ch. 408, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Cross References —

Lien created by and priority of judgment of circuit court entered on the judgment roll, see §11-7-191.

Forfeiture of priority of judgment of circuit court entered on judgment roll, see §11-7-193.

Issuance of a writ of garnishment on suggestion of plaintiff in judgment or decree, see §11-35-1.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Circuit court lacked enforcement authority.

1. In general.

Clerk of trial court held without authority to issue writ of garnishment for collection of costs incurred on appeal to supreme court. State v. Keeton, 176 Miss. 590, 169 So. 760, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1936).

The plaintiff in a judgment obtained in a justice’s court may, under this section [Code 1942, § 1920], have it enrolled in the manner specified in any other county where property of the debtor may be situated, and have execution issued by the circuit clerk of such county to an officer of that county, returnable to the court of the justice who rendered the judgment. Smith v. Mixon, 73 Miss. 581, 19 So. 295, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1895).

2. Circuit court lacked enforcement authority.

Dismissal of the judgment creditor’s garnishment proceeding was proper where the circuit court lacked any authority to entertain the enforcement action of a judgment rendered in federal district court; it was plain that Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-155, while imposing certain duties upon the circuit clerk once a judgment was enrolled did not grant to that circuit court any authority in the handling of an execution or garnishment issued by the clerk under the authority of §13-3-155. Buckley v. Pers. Support Sys., 852 So. 2d 648, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 65 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 So. 2d 392, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 380 (Miss. 2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 347 et seq.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions §§ 73, 89 et seq.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 61, 62 et seq.

§ 13-3-157. When a bond of indemnity shall be required.

If the sheriff shall levy an execution, attachment, or writ of seizure for the purchase-money on any personal property, and a doubt shall arise whether the right to the property be in the defendant or not, the sheriff may demand of the plaintiff a bond with sufficient sureties, payable to the officer, in a penalty equal to double the value of the property, conditioned that the obligors therein will indemnify and save harmless the officer against all damages which he may sustain in consequence of the seizure or sale of the property, and will pay to and satisfy any person claiming title to the property all damages which such person may sustain in consequence of the seizure or sale. If such bond be not given on or before the day of the sale or the return day of the attachment, the sheriff shall be justified in releasing the levy and delivering the property to the party from whose possession it was taken; but the plaintiff or his agent or attorney shall have reasonable notice, in writing, before the day of sale or return day of the writ, that the bond is required.

However, in instances where a warrant is issued by the Chairman of the State Tax Commission, as the commissioner, under the authority of any statute by which such commissioner is authorized to issue such warrants, and where the officer to whom such warrant is directed shall demand of the commissioner an indemnifying bond under the circumstances and conditions hereinbefore provided, the commissioner is hereby authorized to execute such indemnifying bond demanded and pay all obligations which may accrue by reason of the execution of such bond out of the funds appropriated by the Legislature to defray the expenses of the State Tax Commission.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (12); 1857, ch. 61, art. 275; 1871, § 844; 1880, § 1754; 1892, § 3482; 1906, § 3980; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2987; 1930, § 3033; 1942, § 1921; Laws, 1952, ch. 404; Laws, 1956, ch. 409; Laws, 1990, ch. 408, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1990.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Chairman of the Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘Chairman of the State Tax Commission,’ “Chairman of the Tax Commission’ and ‘chairman’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Chairman of the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the Chairman of the State Tax Commission or the Chairman of the Tax Commission shall mean the Commissioner of Revenue of the Department of Revenue.”

Cross References —

Interposition of a claim by a person not a party to an execution who alleges to be the owner or to have a lien on the personal property levied upon, see §11-23-7.

Selection by a defendant of exempt personal property where an officer is about to levy an execution or attachment on personal property, see §85-3-3.

Indemnity bond to be furnished officer about to levy execution or attachment on personal property claimed to be exempt, see §85-3-5.

Exemption from execution of property when the purchase-money thereof forms the debt on which the judgment is founded, see §85-3-47.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Right of action on bond.

3. Time for giving bond.

4. —Reasonable notice.

5. Liability.

6. Defenses.

7. Damages recoverable.

1. In general.

Where sheriff had no right to demand indemnity bond, because the property in question was part of the realty, bond taken by him was not valid. Chenault v. W. T. Adams Mach. Co., 98 Miss. 326, 53 So. 629, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1910).

Where an officer takes a bond conditioned under this section [Code 1942, § 1921] by mistake for one conditioned under Code 1906, § 2143, it will in a suit thereon be treated as properly conditioned by reason of Code 1942, § 1022. Bank of Gulfport v. O'Neal, 86 Miss. 45, 38 So. 630, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1905).

The section [Code 1942, § 1921] does not apply to an attachment for rent. Gibson v. Lock & Smith, 58 Miss. 298, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1880).

2. Right of action on bond.

The statute does not confer a right of action on the bond upon one who could not at common law have maintained an action against the officer. Moore v. Allen, 25 Miss. 363, 1853 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1853); Marshall v. Stewart, 67 Miss. 494, 7 So. 284, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 1889).

3. Time for giving bond.

The statute only provides for an indemnifying bond after levy, though a bond taken before a levy is a good common-law obligation. Forniquet v. Tegarden, 24 Miss. 96, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1852).

4. —Reasonable notice.

Where the sheriff wrote to a judgment creditor in Illinois two weeks before the first day of the court, demanding a bond to indemnify him against liability for levying an execution and advising such creditor that the execution would be held unexecuted until such bond was furnished, and the creditor failed to answer, two weeks was not an unreasonable time for the sheriff to wait for the creditor to furnish the bond so as to charge the sheriff with liability for failure to return the execution on the return day thereof. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Foxworth, 194 Miss. 205, 11 So. 2d 919, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1943).

5. Liability.

Only liability of attaching creditors and sureties on attachment bond was for wrongful suing out of attachment and alone to defendant therein. Jamison v. Wilson, 152 Miss. 382, 119 So. 800, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1928).

6. Defenses.

Whatever would have been a defense to the sheriff, if bond had not been taken, will be a defense to a suit on the bond. Moore v. Allen, 25 Miss. 363, 1853 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1853).

7. Damages recoverable.

Attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred sustaining a claimant’s issue for property seized under attachment are not recoverable in a suit on an indemnifying bond required by this section [Code 1942, § 1921]. Moore v. Lowrey, 74 Miss. 413, 21 So. 237, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 1896).

The sureties on an indemnifying bond are not liable for damages resulting from the negligent failure of the officer to safely keep the property. Smokey v. Peters & Calhoun Co., 66 Miss. 471, 5 So. 632, 1889 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1889).

The obligors in an indemnifying bond are bound to pay such damages as result from the seizure, and not attorney’s fees or other expenses incurred in defending the title to the property. Brinker v. Leinkauff, 64 Miss. 236, 1 So. 170, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 1886).

The obligators in the bond are only liable for such damages as the sheriff would be liable for had bond not been taken. Moore v. Allen, 25 Miss. 363, 1853 Miss. LEXIS 1 (Miss. 1853).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

While Section 13-3-157 only provides for a bond after levy, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that a bond taken before levy is not illegal and void; such a bond given before a levy is valid. See Forniquet v. Tegarden, 24 Miss 96 (1850). Hooks, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0163.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Judgment avoiding indemnity or liability policy for fraud as barring recovery from insurer by or on behalf of third person. 18 A.L.R.2d 891.

Amendment of attachment or garnishment bond. 47 A.L.R.2d 971.

Posting of redelivery bond as waiver of damages for wrongful attachment. 57 A.L.R.2d 1376.

Injury to credit standing, reputation, solvency, or profit potential as elements of damage resulting from wrongful execution against business property. 55 A.L.R.3d 911.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 456, 458 et seq.

Bond to indemnify sheriff before levy on personal property, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 111.

Bond to indemnify officer before levy of execution on personal property, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 18:645.

CJS.

7 C.J.S., Attachment §§ 597, 598.

§ 13-3-159. Remedy on bond of indemnity.

If the bond and security required under Section 13-3-157 be given, it shall be returned with the writ, and the person claiming the property levied on may prosecute a suit upon the bond, with the name of the payee or his representatives, for the use of the claimant, and recover such damages as he may sustain by the seizure or sale of the property or levy of process; and the claimant shall, after the due execution of the bond, be barred of any action against the officer levying the process, unless the obligors in the bond shall be or become insolvent, or the bond be otherwise invalid.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (12); 1857, ch. 61, art. 276; 1871, § 845; 1880, § 1755; 1892, § 3483; 1906, § 3981; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2988; 1930, § 3034; 1942, § 1922.

Cross References —

Actions on indemnity bond furnished officer about to levy an execution or attachment on personal property claimed to be exempt, see §85-3-7.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Judgment avoiding indemnity or liability policy for fraud as barring recovery from insurer by or on behalf of third person. 18 A.L.R.2d 891.

Amendment of attachment or garnishment bond. 47 A.L.R.2d 971.

Perjury or false swearing as contempt. 89 A.L.R.2d 1258.

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment §§ 479- 482.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions § 553.

Complaint, petition, or declaration by sheriff for indemnity against sureties on bond indemnifying officer against liability for execution, levy, and sale, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 114.

Complaint, petition, or declaration by sheriff for indemnity against execution creditor causing sheriff to levy on goods of person other than execution debtor, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 113.

Complaint by sheriff against execution creditor causing sheriff to levy upon goods of third person, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 18:643.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 640, 641.

§ 13-3-161. Where sales under execution or other process are to be made.

All sales by any sheriff by virtue of an execution or other process, when not issued by a justice court, shall be made at the courthouse of the county. The sheriff shall effectuate any execution on a judgment. However, personal property too cumbersome to be removed, may be sold at the place where the same may be, or at any convenient place. Cattle, sheep, or stock, other than horses and mules, may be sold at any public place in the neighborhood of the defendant’s residence.

Sales of personal property under execution or other process from a justice court may be made at any convenient point in the county where it is found, or at the courthouse of the county. The sheriff shall effectuate any execution on a judgment. The sale of lands under executions or other process from such courts shall be made as under execution from the circuit courts.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (21); 1857, ch. 61, art. 277; 1871, §§ 846, 1345; 1880, §§ 1757, 2208; 1892, §§ 3484, 3485; 1906, §§ 3982, 3983; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 2989, 2990; 1930, §§ 3035, 3036; 1942, §§ 1923, 1924; Laws, 1981, ch. 471, § 42; Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28; Laws, 1990, ch. 408, § 4; brought forward without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 418, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Editor's Notes —

Laws of 1981, ch. 471, § 60, provides as follows:

“SECTION 60. Section 8 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after the date it is finally effectuated under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended. Sections 4, 48 and 59 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after passage. Sections 17 and 22 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after March 31, 1982. Sections 15, 16 and 58 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1983. Sections 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 57 of this act shall take effect from and after January 1, 1984, or with respect to a given county, from and after such earlier date as such county elects to employ a clerk for the justice court of such county in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 7 of this act. Sections 9, 10, 18, 19 and 43 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1984.” (Amended by Laws, 1982, ch. 423, § 28, eff from and after March 31, 1982).

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment brought forward the section without change.

Cross References —

Sales of real estate ordered by decree of the chancery court, see §11-5-93.

Sales of house, building, structure, or fixture and land, pursuant to a special writ of execution, see §85-7-155.

Sales after condition broken where deed of trust or mortgage, with a power of sale, is silent as to the place and terms of sale, see §89-1-57.

Provision for suspension of inconsistent laws regarding foreclosure of mortgaged property in certain emergency situations, see §89-1-319.

Sales of perishable property in estate proceedings, see §91-7-175.

Power of the chancery court to authorize executor or administrator to sell personal property at private sale, see §91-7-177.

Authority of an executor or administrator to sell, at public or private sale, perishable goods or chattels or livestock of the decedent, see §91-7-179.

Authority of an executor or administrator to sell the interest of the decedent in watercraft or other property which cannot be produced, see §91-7-181.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Sales under process issued other than by justice of the peace.

2. — Personal property.

3. —Application to federal marshals.

4. Sales under process issued by justice of the peace.

1. Sales under process issued other than by justice of the peace.

Statutes fixing the place for the sale of lands under execution are mandatory, and a sale made contrary to such a statute is void. Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802, 38 So. 742, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Kennedy v. Sanders, 90 Miss. 524, 43 So. 913, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1907), writ of error dismissed, 214 U.S. 196, 29 S. Ct. 635, 53 L. Ed. 965, 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1908 (U.S. 1909).

2. — Personal property.

When bank purchased a corporation’s choses in action at a sheriff’s sale, it also purchased lawsuits, and as such, it became the owner of the lawsuit; no one disputed that the sheriff’s sale was properly conducted, and the trial court erred in not substituting the bank as a party plaintiff and in not dismissing the litigation. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 2006).

An execution sale of gas ranges, refrigerators, and television sets may permissibly be held at the debtor’s place of business. Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1962).

A tax sale of personal property at the courthouse is illegal where it was not feasible to have it all present there. State use of Stevens Enterprises, Inc. v. McDonnell, 236 Miss. 841, 111 So. 2d 662, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 381 (Miss. 1959).

3. —Application to federal marshals.

The requirement, under a former enactment of this provision (Code 1871, § 846), that execution sales be made at the county courthouse was not made applicable by the Conformity Act to execution of sales of personal property by a United States marshal and an execution sale may therefore be made at the courthouse of the United States where the judgment was rendered and the execution issued. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10, 42 S. Ct. 27, 66 L. Ed. 104, 1921 U.S. LEXIS 1309 (U.S. 1921).

As a general rule United States marshals in making sales of land under execution are required (U. S. Rev. Stat., § 914, 28 USC § 724) to conform to the laws of the state governing the subject of such sales and they must be made at the place provided by the law of the state for sheriff’s sales of land under execution. Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802, 38 So. 742, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Kennedy v. Sanders, 90 Miss. 524, 43 So. 913, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1907), writ of error dismissed, 214 U.S. 196, 29 S. Ct. 635, 53 L. Ed. 965, 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1908 (U.S. 1909).

The word “place” in a statute (Act of Congress Feb. 16, 1838), authorizing marshal’s sales of land under execution in Mississippi to be made upon written request of defendant “at the place where the United States court for the district is holden” does not mean any place in the town or city where the court was held, but a particular place in which the court held its sittings. Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802, 38 So. 742, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Kennedy v. Sanders, 90 Miss. 524, 43 So. 913, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1907), writ of error dismissed, 214 U.S. 196, 29 S. Ct. 635, 53 L. Ed. 965, 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1908 (U.S. 1909).

4. Sales under process issued by justice of the peace.

Execution sale, although advertised once each week for three weeks pursuant to statute, held void where less than three weeks elapsed between first publication and sale. Vansant v. Dodds, 164 Miss. 787, 144 So. 688, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1932).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With respect to sale of property deeded to state as result of civil prosecution pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, public auction at County courthouse should be conducted as set out in Sections 13-3-161, et seq., except that Secretary of State rather than Sheriff should conduct sale. Nelson, March 23, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0059.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Rights and remedies of purchaser at judicial or execution sale where there was misrepresentation or mistake as to acreage or boundaries. 69 A.L.R.2d 254.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions § 327.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions § 357.

§ 13-3-163. When sales of land may be made; advertising of sale.

  1. Sales of land may be made on any day except Sunday and any legal holiday as defined by Section 3-3-7, Mississippi Code of 1972, and shall be advertised by the plaintiff in a newspaper published in the county, once in each week for three (3) successive weeks, or, if no newspaper is so published, in some newspaper having a general circulation therein once in each week for three (3) successive weeks.
  2. In addition to effectuating the advertisement, any expense or cost incurred by advertising and providing notice for the sale of land pursuant to subsection (1) of this section in justice court shall be paid by the plaintiff, and said expenses shall be taxed as costs.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (21); 1857, ch. 61, art. 277; 1871, § 846; 1880, § 1759; 1892, § 3486; 1906, § 3984; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2991; 1930, § 3037; 1942, § 1925; Laws, 1960, ch. 239; Laws, 1978, ch. 398, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 405, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References —

Execution of warrant by sheriff or special agent; fees, see §27-65-63.

Preference in sales of property when decedent’s estate consists of both real and personal property and it is necessary to sell a portion thereof, see §91-7-187.

Sales of the real estate of decedent where the personal property will not suffice to pay debts and expenses, see §91-7-191.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a partition action, the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees payable by the appealing parties, and assessed against the sale proceeds, was error, as there was no evidence that said fees were reasonable and there was no bad faith shown. Further, as to notice of the sale, Miss. Code Ann. §13-3-163 did not apply where the chancellor gave specific instruction for terms of the sale pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§11-5-93 and11-5-95, and while the sale price was low, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to set aside the sale. Necaise v. Ladner, 910 So. 2d 699, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 194 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

A deed of trust which provides that in case of default the trustee shall take possession without notice, and after duly advertising, sell for cash, at public auction at the courthouse door, a sufficiency of the property to make payment, is not silent as to the place and terms of sale and mode of advertising within the meaning of Code 1942, § 891. Gardner v. State, 235 Miss. 119, 108 So. 2d 592, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1959).

Where sale of land under execution was advertised one day a week for three successive weeks, lapse of two weeks between time of last advertisement and time of sale held not to invalidate sale advertisement not being required for three successive weeks next preceding day of sale. Walton v. Gregory Funeral Home, 170 Miss. 129, 154 So. 717, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1934).

Statute requiring advertisement of execution sales once each week for three weeks should be construed with statute defining meaning of requirements for three weeks’ publication. Vansant v. Dodds, 164 Miss. 787, 144 So. 688, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1932).

Execution sale advertised once each week for three weeks, held void where less than three weeks elapsed between first publication and sale. Vansant v. Dodds, 164 Miss. 787, 144 So. 688, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1932).

As to sales under deeds of trust, see Davis v. O'Connell, 92 Miss. 348, 47 So. 672, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1908); Melsheimer v. McKnight, 92 Miss. 386, 46 So. 827, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1908); Lynchburg Shoe Co. v. Castleman, 116 Miss. 188, 76 So. 878, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1917).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sections 13-3-163 and 13-3-165 provide that the costs of advertising and providing notice of the sale shall be paid by the plaintiff and the expense then taxed as costs. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

The Legislature amended Sections 13-3-163 and 13-3-165 to provide that any expense or cost incurred by advertising and providing notice for legal sales shall be paid by the plaintiff. The amendments did not relieve the sheriff from liability for ensuring that proper notice is given prior to a legal sale. A sheriff may provide for the advertisement of such sales and then charge the cost of such advertisement to the plaintiff. Hooks, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0163.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in execution or judicial sale. 2 A.L.R.2d 6.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 312, 313, 322.

Notice of execution sale, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Form 121.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Newspapers, Proof No. 1 (establishing newspaper as one of general circulation).

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 357, 370-375.

§ 13-3-165. When sales of personalty may be made; advertising of sale.

  1. Sales of personalty may be made on any day except Sunday and any legal holiday as defined by Section 3-3-7, Mississippi Code of 1972, and shall be advertised by the plaintiff ten (10) days before the day of sale by posting notices of the time, terms and place of sale in three (3) public places in the county, one (1) of which shall be at the courthouse.
  2. In addition to effectuating the advertisement, any expense or cost incurred by advertising and providing notice for the sale of personalty pursuant to subsection (1) of this section in justice court shall be paid by the plaintiff, and said expenses shall be taxed as costs.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (21); 1857, ch. 61, art. 277; 1871, § 846; 1880, § 1759; 1892, § 3487; 1906, § 3984; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2992; 1930, § 3038; 1942, § 1926; Laws, 1978, ch. 398, § 2; Laws, 1989, ch. 405, § 2; brought forward without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 418, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment brought forward the section without change.

Cross References —

Execution of warrant by sheriff or special agent; fees, see §27-65-63.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Generally.

2. Liability of sheriff.

3. —Defenses.

4. Passage of title.

1. Generally.

When bank purchased a corporation’s choses in action at a sheriff’s sale, it also purchased lawsuits, and as such, it became the owner of the lawsuit; no one disputed that the sheriff’s sale was properly conducted, and the trial court erred in not substituting the bank as a party plaintiff and in not dismissing the litigation. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 2006).

A sheriff’s sale was in compliance with the ten day advertisement requirements of Code 1972 §13-3-165, where the first notice was posted on November 14, 1975, and the sale occurred on November 24, 1975; the provisions of Code 1972 §1-3-67 prescribe the applicable formula for computing such ten day period, in that the first day is to be excluded and the last included. Combs v. Adams, 350 So. 2d 41, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2206 (Miss. 1977).

Posted notices of the time and place of public sale of a repossessed automobile which comply with the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1926] are the only form of notice the seller is required to give the buyer, and notice to the buyer of the time and place of sale by means of a letter is not necessary. Ward v. McPhail Oldsmobile, Inc., 203 So. 2d 491, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1378 (Miss. 1967).

Where the retained title contract provided that the seller could purchase an automobile at public sale, the sale at which the seller purchased the repossessed vehicle was valid. Ward v. McPhail Oldsmobile, Inc., 203 So. 2d 491, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1378 (Miss. 1967).

The seller of an automobile, under the terms of a retained title contract, has a right to sell the repossessed automobile at public sale, either in the county where the contract was made and where the automobile was returned to the seller by the finance company, or in the county of the residence of the purchaser. Ward v. McPhail Oldsmobile, Inc., 203 So. 2d 491, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1378 (Miss. 1967).

The requirement that the sale be made to the highest bidder does not preclude a sale where there is only one bidder. Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1962).

2. Liability of sheriff.

Fact that sheriff gave only eight days’ notice of sale of merchandise for failure to pay sales tax and not the ten days’ notice as required by statute constituted such misconduct that the sheriff was no longer entitled to protection of the writ, and, if sued in trespass, his defense could not rest upon the process nor could it be used in diminution of damages. Rigby v. Whitten, 196 Miss. 661, 18 So. 2d 152, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1944).

A sheriff, liable to property owner for the sale of his goods and the collection of sales taxes as provided under sales tax statutes because the sale was not advertised for ten days as provided hereunder, was guilty of conversion, the measure of damages for which, in the absence of special circumstances, is the value of the property, market value if such it has, at the time and place of its conversion with interest thereon. Rigby v. Stone, 194 Miss. 775, 13 So. 2d 230 (Miss. 1943).

3. —Defenses.

Owner of merchandise sold by sheriff for failure to pay sales tax at sale which was invalid because the required ten days’ notice had not been given, who acquiesced in the sale, gave no notice to the purchaser, and delivered the property to the purchaser, was not entitled as against the sheriff to demand more than the latter received from the purchaser at the sale, and the sheriff was protected to the extent of the amount remitted to the state tax commission as directed by warrant, but the owner was entitled to the amount retained by the sheriff as costs since the sheriff did not act as the warrant directed. Rigby v. Whitten, 196 Miss. 661, 18 So. 2d 152, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1944).

4. Passage of title.

Where owner of personalty which has been sold under a void warrant of sale, or at an improper time, of which the owner then knows, voluntarily delivers the property to the purchaser or takes active steps to that end without giving any warning or notice whatever at any time or in any manner to purchaser and the latter pays his money without notice, title passes to the purchaser on such delivery and the owner cannot thereafter disturb him. Rigby v. Whitten, 196 Miss. 661, 18 So. 2d 152, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 248 (Miss. 1944).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sections 13-3-163 and 13-3-165 provide that the costs of advertising and providing notice of the sale shall be paid by the plaintiff and the expense then taxed as costs. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

The Legislature amended Sections 13-3-163 and 13-3-165 to provide that any expense or cost incurred by advertising and providing notice for legal sales shall be paid by the plaintiff. The amendments did not relieve the sheriff from liability for ensuring that proper notice is given prior to a legal sale. A sheriff may provide for the advertisement of such sales and then charge the cost of such advertisement to the plaintiff. Hooks, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0163.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Estoppel of or waiver by parties or participants regarding irregularities or defects in execution or judicial sale. 2 A.L.R.2d 6.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 312, 313, 322.

Notice of execution sale, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Form 121.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 357, 370-375.

§ 13-3-167. Sale of perishable goods.

When goods and chattels are levied on, which by their nature are perishable and in danger of immediate waste or decay, the officer levying shall sell them at such time, and on such notice, and at such place as a sound discretion may warrant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, §§ 1466-1469; 1880, § 1758; 1892, § 3488; 1906, § 3986; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2993; 1930, § 3039; 1942, § 1927; brought forward without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 418, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment brought forward the section without change.

Cross References —

Attaching, replevying, sequestering, or seizing perishable commodities passing through the ports of entry in the state, see §§11-1-43 through11-1-49.

Execution of warrant by sheriff or special agent; fees, see §27-65-63.

Warehouseman’s options with regard to perishable goods, see §75-7-206.

Sales of perishable property in estate proceedings, see §91-7-175.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Railroad crossties, though liable to be burned, are not “in danger of immediate waste or decay.” Goodman v. Moss, 64 Miss. 303, 1 So. 241, 1886 Miss. LEXIS 61 (Miss. 1886).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

With respect to execution sales of mobile homes for unpaid ad valorem taxes and any excess funds over which the officer conducting the sale is entitled to retain after payment of judgment liens in order of priority, there is both a statutory method (Section 13-3-181) and a remedy by rule (M.R.C.P.) for distribution of funds when there are conflicting claims thereto. Blaker, II, January 30, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0023.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and effect of provision for execution sale on short notice, or sale in advance of judgment under writ of attachment, where property involved is subject to decay or depreciation. 3 A.L.R.3d 593.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions § 320.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 357-359, 370-375.

§ 13-3-169. Hours and mode of sale.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, sales under execution shall not commence sooner than eleven o’clock in the forenoon, nor continue later than four o’clock in the afternoon. All such sales shall be by auction, to the highest bidder for cash, and only so much of the property levied on shall be sold as will satisfy the execution and costs.
  2. Sales under execution conducted by a special agent of the State Tax Commission pursuant to a warrant, jeopardy warrant or alias warrant issued by the Chairman of the State Tax Commission, shall commence and be conducted at the times specified by the Chairman of the State Tax Commission or his duly authorized agent. All such sales shall be by auction to the highest bidder for cash or for cash equivalent deemed acceptable by the Chairman of the State Tax Commission. Only so much of the property levied on shall be sold as will satisfy the execution and costs.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (21); 1857, ch. 61, art. 277; 1871, § 846; 1880, § 1759; 1892, § 3489; 1906, § 3987; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2994; 1930, § 3040; 1942, § 1928; Laws, 2005, ch. 382, § 1; brought forward without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 418, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Chairman of the Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘Chairman of the State Tax Commission,’ “Chairman of the Tax Commission’ and ‘chairman’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Chairman of the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the Chairman of the State Tax Commission or the Chairman of the Tax Commission shall mean the Commissioner of Revenue of the Department of Revenue.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2005 amendment added “Except as otherwise provided in this section” at the beginning of (1); and added (2).

The 2011 amendment brought forward the section without change.

Cross References —

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

When bank purchased a corporation’s choses in action at a sheriff’s sale, it also purchased lawsuits, and as such, it became the owner of the lawsuit; no one disputed that the sheriff’s sale was properly conducted, and the trial court erred in not substituting the bank as a party plaintiff and in not dismissing the litigation. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Dixieland Forest Prods., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 2006).

The commissioner appointed by the trial court to conduct a partition sale of real estate violated neither the court order nor §13-3-169 when he accepted a cashier’s check in lieu of cash for the bid, since the commissioner cashed the check and invested the funds pending confirmation of the sale by the court and no prejudice resulted. McCormick v. McCormick, 449 So. 2d 1209, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1711 (Miss. 1984).

The requirement that the sale be made to the highest bidder does not preclude a sale where there is only one bidder. Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1962).

Resale under deed of trust at 3 p. m. held invalid notwithstanding sale was advertised for about noon, and resale if successful bidder defaulted was announced before bidders dispersed. Gray v. Sullivan, 162 Miss. 610, 139 So. 855, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1932).

Announcement of resale, if successful bidder defaulted, would not authorize resale even if unconditional notice would authorize it. Gray v. Sullivan, 162 Miss. 610, 139 So. 855, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Propriety of setting minimum or “upset price” for sale of property at judicial foreclosure. 4 A.L.R.5th 693.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 322, 328 et seq.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 358, 359, 376, 377.

§ 13-3-171. Lands to be sold to be offered in subdivisions and as an entirety.

All lands comprising a single tract, sold under execution, shall be first offered in subdivisions not exceeding one hundred and sixty (160) acres, or one-quarter section, and then offered as an entirety, and the price bid for the latter shall control only when it shall exceed the aggregate of the bids for the same in subdivisions.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 3491; 1906, § 3989; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2996; 1930, § 3042; 1942, § 1930; brought forward without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 418, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Cross References —

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff’s sale-modern cases. 5 A.L.R.4th 794.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 333, 334.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 361, 362.

§ 13-3-173. Sale may be adjourned or continued from day to day.

Whenever, from a defect of bidders, caused by inclement weather or otherwise, the property shall not be likely to command a reasonable price, the officer may adjourn the sale and readvertise the same for a subsequent day. Whenever a sale advertised for a particular day shall not be completed on that day, the same may be continued from day to day.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (21); 1857, ch. 61, art. 278; 1871, § 847; 1880, § 1760; 1892, § 3490; 1906, § 3988; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2995; 1930, § 3041; 1942, § 1929; brought forward without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 418, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment brought forward the section without change.

Cross References —

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where bids are grossly low, and generally by only one bidder, the sale should be adjourned and readvertised. Industries Sales Corp. v. Reliance Mfg. Co., 243 Miss. 463, 138 So. 2d 484, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 363 (Miss. 1962).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Where a property does not command a reasonable price, or where the bids are of a grossly low character, the sheriff should adjourn the sale and readvertise it for another day, as provided by Section 13-3-173. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

Section 13-3-173 indicates that it is the duty of the sheriff to re-advertise for a subsequent sale. However, the cost of re-advertising would still lie with the plaintiff. Hooks, April 5, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0163.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Executions § 324.

Notice of adjournment of execution sale, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Form 122.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions § 360.

§ 13-3-175. Venditioni exponas.

If any property taken in execution shall remain in the hands of the officer unsold, he shall so return on the execution, and thereupon a writ of venditioni exponas shall issue, directed to the officer, upon which the like proceedings shall be had as might and ought to have been had on the first execution. And if property sold on a venditioni exponas shall not bring enough to satisfy the judgment, the officer shall forthwith return the same, and thereupon another proper execution for the balance remaining unpaid may be issued.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (18); 1857, ch. 61, art. 279; 1871, § 848; 1880, § 1761; 1892, § 3492; 1906, § 3990; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2997; 1930, § 3043; 1942, § 1931.

Cross References —

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A sale of land under an alias execution instead of a venditioni exponas to an innocent purchaser does not render the sale invalid. Baldwin v. Dreyfus, 92 Miss. 94, 45 So. 428, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 1907).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions § 307.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 349, 350.

§ 13-3-177. Venditioni exponas to issue when officer taking property dies.

When the officer taking property under execution shall die before the sale thereof, a writ of venditioni exponas shall issue, directed to the proper officer of the county in which the property was taken, and such officer shall, under the writ of venditioni exponas, receive the property from the representatives of the former sheriff, or other officer, who are required to deliver the same to the officer having the venditioni exponas, on his producing the same and executing a receipt for the property, and the officer shall proceed to sell the same as in other cases.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (52); 1847, ch. 61, art. 292; 1871, § 856; 1880, § 1771; 1892, § 3493; 1906, § 3991; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2998; 1930, § 3044; 1942, § 1932.

Cross References —

Duty to pay of legal representative of deceased public officer owing public money, see §25-1-67.

Payment by personal representative of the debts due by decedent’s estate generally, see §85-7-261.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 160 et seq., 307.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 348-350.

§ 13-3-179. Procedure to be followed where property is not delivered by representatives of deceased officer taking property.

If the representatives of the deceased officer shall refuse or neglect to deliver the property on demand, or if there shall not be an executor or administrator of his estate, the officer having the writ of venditioni exponas may seize the property taken by the former officer wherever it may be found, and sell the same as in other cases, or the plaintiff may move in the court from which the execution issued against the representatives of the deceased officer and his sureties, and thereupon a judgment shall be entered against the representatives of the deceased officer and his sureties for the amount of the execution which came to the hands of such deceased officer, with interest and costs.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (52); 1857, ch. 61, art. 293; 1871, § 857; 1880, § 1772; 1892, § 3494; 1906, § 3992; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2999; 1930, § 3045; 1942, § 1933.

Cross References —

Suits on bonds of public officers generally, see §25-1-17.

Duty to pay of legal representative of public officer owing public money, see §25-1-67.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

§ 13-3-181. Duty of officer to examine judgment-roll; priority of liens.

After the sale of any property by the sheriff or other officer on execution, before the money is paid over by him, he shall examine the judgment-roll to ascertain if there by any elder judgment or judgments, decree or decrees, enrolled against the defendant or defendants in execution, having a priority of lien. If there be, he shall apply the proceeds of the sale to the judgment or decree having the priority of lien, and return such application upon the execution. Should there by any dispute as to which judgment or decree has the priority of lien, the officer shall make a statement of the fact of the dispute, and return the same, with the execution and the money raised thereon, into the court to which the same is returnable, and the court shall, on motion and examination of the facts, determine to whom the money so raised on execution shall be paid.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1762; 1892, § 3495; 1906, § 3993; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3000; 1930, § 3046; 1942, § 1934.

Cross References —

Lien created by and priority of judgment of circuit court entered on the judgment roll, see §11-7-191.

Interposition of claim by a person not a party to execution who alleges to be owner or to have lien on personal property levied upon, see §11-23-7.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Application of proceeds.

1. In general.

The statute has no application to voluntary payments made by the defendant to the sheriff. Johnson v. Edde, 58 Miss. 664, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1881); Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Harkness, 32 Miss. 203, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 1856).

2. Application of proceeds.

Where judgments are recovered by different holders of several promissory notes given for land and secured by express lien, each judgment is in equity entitled to share in the proceeds of the land without reference to the time of their enrollment, the debtor being insolvent. Aaron & Lindenmayer v. Warner, 62 Miss. 370, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1884).

When two judgment against different defendants are liens upon the same property and it is sold under the judgment with the junior lien, the senior judgment lien is unimpaired by the sale, and the purchaser takes subject to the maxim, “caveat emptor.” Hall v. Meridian Sav. Institution, 56 Miss. 674, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1879).

The lien created by the levy of an execution can only be defeated by a lien existing anterior to the levy, hence the enrollment of a judgment after the levy of an execution does not create a superior lien to that created by the levy. S. Botters & Co. v. Edrington, 30 Miss. 580, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1856).

The money should be appropriated to the oldest lien, whether the judgment having the prior lien be rendered in a state or a United States court. Bonaffee v. Fisk, 21 Miss. 682, 1850 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1850).

Where, on motion of the sheriff in the court below to appropriate money made on several executions, that court awards the sum to a particular one, from which only one of the excluded parties appeals, the supreme court, in reversing the judgment, will order the money to be paid to that creditor entitled to it, without regard to his not having made objection to the decision below. Heizer v. Fisher, 21 Miss. 672, 1850 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1850).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The levying officer is required under Section 13-3-181 to examine the judgment roll in the county to determine if there are prior judgment liens against the defendant or defendants in execution. If there are prior judgment liens, then the proceeds of the execution sale shall be first applied to the prior liens until they are satisfied. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

Under Section 13-3-181, if there is a dispute as to the priority of judgment liens, then the officer shall make a statement of this fact and return the execution and the money raised thereon into the proper court, which shall decide the issue. Richardson, September 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 436, 439.

Complaint, petition, or declaration against sheriff and his surety for failure to pay judgment creditor moneys collected on execution sale, 22 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Form 81.

Complaint on sheriff’s bond for failure to pay over money received on execution, 18 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, Forms 18:597-18:599.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 426-429.

§ 13-3-183. Officer to restore money on injunction of execution.

When an officer shall receive under execution the whole or any part of the money for which the same was issued, and the defendant, before payment thereof to the plaintiff, obtain an injunction against the execution, the officer shall pay over to the defendant the money received, or such part thereof as may be enjoined. If an officer shall, when required, fail to pay over the money so received and enjoined to the person having a right to demand the same, such officer and his sureties shall be liable to the same remedies as are given by law to the plaintiff for the nonpayment of money levied on execution.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (16); 1857, ch. 61, art. 286; 1871, § 850; 1880, § 1766; 1892, § 3496; 1906, § 3994; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3001; 1930, § 3047; 1942, § 1935.

Cross References —

Bond required to stay proceedings at law, see §11-13-3.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

§ 13-3-185. How purchaser takes property sold at execution sale.

The purchaser of any property sold at execution sale by the sheriff or other officer shall take the same discharge of all liens of judgments and decrees, whether the same be sold under an execution issued upon the elder or junior judgment or decree.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1763, 1892, § 3497; 1906, § 3995; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3002; 1930, § 3048; 1942, § 1936.

Cross References —

Sales of real estate ordered by decrees of the chancery court generally, see §11-5-93.

Purchaser’s title to certain interests of defendant sold under execution or attachment, see §13-3-135.

Sales of lands under mortgages and deeds of trust generally, see §89-1-55.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The statute only applies where the judgments are against the same person. Hall v. Meridian Sav. Institution, 56 Miss. 674, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 1879).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 413 et seq.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 464 et seq.

§ 13-3-187. Conveyance of land sold under execution or other process.

When lands are sold by virtue of any writ of execution or other process, the officer making the sale shall, on payment of the purchase-money, execute to the purchaser a conveyance which shall vest in the purchaser all the right, title and interest which the defendant had in and to such lands, and which, by law, could be sold under such execution or other process.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 62, art. 1 (55); 1857, ch. 61, art. 290; 1871, § 854; 1880, § 1769; 1892, § 3498; 1906, § 3996; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3003; 1930, § 3049; 1942, § 1937.

Cross References —

Form of conveyance of land sold by a sheriff under execution, see §89-1-65.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The return of an officer on an execution showing the sale of land to a designated person does not transfer the title, it only gives the purchaser the right to demand a deed conveying title. Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802, 38 So. 742, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 106 (Miss. 1904), overruled, Kennedy v. Sanders, 90 Miss. 524, 43 So. 913, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1907), writ of error dismissed, 214 U.S. 196, 29 S. Ct. 635, 53 L. Ed. 965, 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1908 (U.S. 1909).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Consistent with Section 13-3-187, State should execute conveyance of property deeded to state as result of civil prosecution pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by patent, as authorized by Section 29-1-81, upon payment of purchase money. Nelson, March 23, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0059.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Lien of purchaser at judicial or execution sale, where sale is void or is set aside because proceedings are imperfect or irregular. 142 A.L.R. 325.

Right of purchaser at execution sale, upon failure of title, to reimbursement or restitution from judgment creditor. 33 A.L.R.4th 1206.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 363 et seq.

Certificate of sale, 9 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Executions, Forms 131, 132.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 449, 459 et seq.

§ 13-3-189. Completion of title under justice’s execution.

The title to land sold under execution issued by a justice of the peace shall not be complete in the purchaser until he shall have obtained from the justice a certified transcript of the proceedings had before him in the suit, including a copy of the execution and the officer’s return on it, which shall be filed with the conveyance made by the officer in the chancery clerk’s office and recorded with the conveyance. Upon filing such transcript and conveyance for record in the chancery clerk’s office of the county where the land lies, the title of the purchaser shall be as full and complete as if the sale had been under a judgment and execution from a circuit court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 2211; 1892, § 3499; 1906, § 3997; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3004; 1930, § 3050; 1942, § 1938.

Editor’s Notes —

Pursuant to Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 171, all reference in the Mississippi Code to justice of the peace shall mean justice court judge.

Cross References —

Time period within which an execution shall not issue on judgment of justice of the peace, see §11-9-131.

Form of an execution issued on judgment of justice of the peace, see §11-9-133.

Issuance, execution, and return of execution, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 69.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Absence of entries in docket of justice of peace showing that writ of attachment was issued, return of officer thereon, and mailing of notice to defendant in attachment, held not to invalidate proceedings under attachment, where proceedings were in all respects regular, especially where record of deed was accompanied by complete transcript of all proceedings showing every necessary step leading up to judgment and sale under attachment was taken. Walton v. Gregory Funeral Home, 170 Miss. 129, 154 So. 717, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 132 (Miss. 1934).

This statute must be strictly complied with in all substantial requirements to render a sale of land under execution from a justice of the peace valid. Foote-Patrick Co. v. Merkle, 116 Miss. 720, 77 So. 661, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1917).

Where sales of land are made under judgment of a justice of the peace, the title is not complete until a certified transcript of the proceedings before the justice is filed with conveyance in the proper chancery clerk’s office as provided by this section [Code 1942, § 1938]. Dunlap v. Fant, 74 Miss. 197, 20 So. 874, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. 1896).

The “certified transcript” must include the docket entries, and, if these be correctly kept, need include nothing else. Hughston v. Cornish, 59 Miss. 372, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1882).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sheriff’s deed as prima facie evidence of return. 36 A.L.R. 1001, 108 A.L.R. 672.

Jurisdiction of justice’s court (or similar court) of action to foreclose lien on land. 115 A.L.R. 539.

Am. Jur.

30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions §§ 363 et seq.

CJS.

33 C.J.S., Executions §§ 449, 459 et seq.

Chapter 5. Juries

§ 13-5-1. Who are competent jurors; determination of literacy.

Every citizen not under the age of twenty-one years, who is either a qualified elector, or a resident freeholder of the county for more than one year, is able to read and write, and has not been convicted of an infamous crime, or the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors within a period of five years and who is not a common gambler or habitual drunkard, is a competent juror. No person who is or has been within twelve months the overseer of a public road or road contractor shall, however, be competent to serve as a grand juror. The lack of any such qualifications on the part of one or more jurors shall not, however, vitiate an indictment or verdict. Moreover, no talesman or tales juror shall be qualified who has served as such talesman or tales juror in the last preceding two years, and no juror shall serve on any jury who has served as such for the last preceding two years. No juror shall serve who has a case of his own pending in that court, provided there are sufficient qualified jurors in the district, and for trial at that term.

In order to determine that prospective jurors can read and write, the presiding judge shall, with the assistance of the clerk, distribute to the jury panel a form to be completed personally by each juror prior to being empaneled as follows:

“1. Your name Last First Middle initial 2. Your home address 3. Your occupation 4. Your age 5. Your telephone number If none, write none 6. If you live outside the county seat, the number of miles you live from the courthouse Miles Sign your name”

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The judge shall personally examine the answers of each juror prior to empaneling the jury and each juror who cannot complete the above form shall be disqualified as a juror and discharged.

A list of any jurors disqualified for jury duty by reason of inability to complete the form shall be kept by the circuit clerk and their names shall not be placed in the jury box thereafter until such person can qualify as above provided.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 1 (138); 1857, ch. 61, art. 126; 1871, § 724; 1880, § 1661; 1892, § 2354; 1906, § 2684; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2176; 1930, § 2029; 1942, § 1762; Laws, 1894, ch. 69; Laws, 1914, ch. 208; Laws, 1938, ch. 303; Laws, 1962, ch. 308, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 335, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 339, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 2, 1970).

Cross References —

Constitutional authority for the legislature to provide for qualifications of grand and petit jurors, see Miss. Const. Art. 14, § 264.

Compensation paid jurors and determination thereof, see §§25-7-61,25-7-63.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Constitutionality.

3. Construction and application, generally.

4. Exclusion of women.

5. Exclusion of Afro-Americans.

6. Powers and function of court.

7. Examination on voir dire.

8. Qualifications of jurors.

9. —Qualified elector.

10. —Prior service as juror.

11. —Opinion and prior knowledge.

12. —Miscellaneous.

13. Want of qualification, effect of.

1. Validity.

The statute does not place improper restrictions as to who can serve on a jury and is not unconstitutional. Milano v. State, 790 So. 2d 179, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 2001).

The literacy requirements of this section are constitutional. Edwards v. State, 737 So. 2d 275, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 1999).

The literacy and age requirements of §13-5-1 do not violate the constitutional rights of accused persons to be tried by an impartial jury. The literacy requirements of the statute are constitutional, and the statute does not bar persons over 65 years of age from serving on a jury, but merely grants those individuals the privilege to claim an exemption should they desire not to serve. Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1324, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 845 (Miss. 1990).

Mississippi’s exemption of jurors who are illiterate or under 21 years of age, pursuant to §13-5-1, or over 65 years of age, pursuant to §13-5-25, did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 792 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910, 111 S. Ct. 1695, 114 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2522 (U.S. 1991).

Section13-5-1 is not unconstitutional because it prevents those between the ages of 18 and 21 from serving on juries. Irving v. State, 498 So. 2d 305, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2518 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S. Ct. 1986, 95 L. Ed. 2d 826, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2032 (U.S. 1987).

With the variety of cases now in the courts and the multitude of written documents entered into evidence, the requirement that a juror be able to read and write is a reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation which operates equally against all persons tried by juries, and is as essential to the state’s obligation to afford an accused a fair trial as it is to assure a fair trial for the state. Terrell v. State, 262 So. 2d 179, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1305 (Miss. 1972).

The question of whether this section [Code 1942, § 1762] is unconstitutional due to sex discrimination is now moot, since in its revised form it applies to every citizen without regard to sex. Willis v. Carson, 324 F. Supp. 1144, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14114 (S.D. Miss. 1971).

Persons alleging discrimination in the jury selection system have the burden of proving it. Ford v. White, 299 F. Supp. 772, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12607 (S.D. Miss. 1969).

Code 1942, §§ 1762, 1762-03, and 1766 which deal with the qualifications and selection of jurors are in pari materia and, when considered as a whole, are not void for vagueness. King v. Cook, 297 F. Supp. 99, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9067 (N.D. Miss. 1969).

2. Constitutionality.

In a capital murder case, excusing a juror who responded affirmatively when asked if any jurors could not read or write did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury; the requirement of Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-1 that a juror be able to read and write is a reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation that operates equally against all persons tried by juries. Dycus v. State, 875 So. 2d 140, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 366 (Miss. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 901, 125 S. Ct. 1589, 161 L. Ed. 2d 271, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2212 (U.S. 2005).

The defendant, who was under 21 years old, was not denied his Sixth Amendment fair cross-section right by the fact that a qualified juror is defined, in part, as being over the age of 21. Williams v. State, 772 So. 2d 1113, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 572 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

3. Construction and application, generally.

To the extent that Fleming v. State, 687 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1997) stands for the proposition that a violation of the first section of the statute requires an automatic reversal or invokes a presumption of prejudice, it is hereby overruled. Roberts Co. v. Moore, 214 So.3d 202, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 2017).

Statute did not violate due process rights of appellant by excluding from jury service persons in his age group, 18 to 20 years; amendment of U.S. Constitution by Twenty-Sixth Amendment did not qualify persons under 21 years of age as jurors under state laws. Joyce v. State, 327 So. 2d 255, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1768 (Miss. 1976).

Code 1942, §§ 1762, 1762-03, and 1766 which deal with the qualifications and selection of jurors are in pari materia and, when considered as a whole, are not void for vagueness. King v. Cook, 297 F. Supp. 99, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9067 (N.D. Miss. 1969).

The direction given by Code 1942, § 1766 to the board of supervisors of the respective counties to select and list the names of qualified persons of good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character is directive and shall be construed with the other sections of the Code relating to the selection of jurors. Reeves v. Reeves, 210 So. 2d 780, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1521 (Miss. 1968).

Code 1942, §§ 1762, 1762-03, and 1766 with respect to the selection of jurors are in pari materia. Reed v. State, 199 So. 2d 803, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1309 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 413, 88 S. Ct. 1113, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 2174 (U.S. 1968).

4. Exclusion of women.

Rule that exclusion of women from jury service violates state criminal defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to impartial jury trial held not to apply retroactively. Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 95 S. Ct. 704, 42 L. Ed. 2d 790, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 27 (U.S. 1975), overruled in part, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 283 (U.S. 1987).

The requirement that a petit jury be selected from a representative cross section of the community, which is fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is violated by the systematic exclusion of women from jury panels. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2 (U.S. 1975).

A state criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is violated by the operation of a state’s constitutional and statutory provisions which operate to exclude women from jury service. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2 (U.S. 1975).

The Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable on the issue as to whether or not women will be required to serve as jurors in a state court, the power to prescribe the qualifications of jurors being in the legislature, which may include or exclude women from jury duty. Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1246 (Miss. 1969).

A defendant appealing a conviction of rape did not have standing to raise the issue as to whether failure to include women as qualified jurors was in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1246 (Miss. 1969).

Where the jury for the term of court at which the defendant was tried was drawn prior to the effective date of the amendment permitting women to serve on juries, a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that women were excluded from the jury by statute was properly overruled. Gordon v. State, 222 So. 2d 141, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1522 (Miss. 1969).

Limiting jury service to males and excluding women from such service does not constitute a denial to a female defendant of equal protection of the laws. White v. State, 214 So. 2d 467, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1310 (Miss. 1968).

The exclusion of women from jury service does not constitute an invalid discrimination. Reed v. State, 199 So. 2d 803, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1309 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 413, 88 S. Ct. 1113, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 2174 (U.S. 1968).

Women are not required to perform jury duty in Mississippi; nor does the federal constitution require women to serve on juries in state courts. Shinall v. State, 199 So. 2d 251, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1290 (Miss.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014, 88 S. Ct. 590, 19 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 27 (U.S. 1967), overruled, Flowers v. State, 473 So. 2d 164, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2140 (Miss. 1985).

Unlike classification by race, classification of persons eligible for jury duty on the basis of sex, applicable alike to all races, is not unconstitutional. Cobb v. Greenville, 187 So. 2d 861, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1364 (Miss. 1966).

5. Exclusion of Afro-Americans.

The trial court in a narcotics prosecution did not err in overruling defendant’s motion to quash the indictment and petit venire, which motion alleged that the statutory exclusion of persons 18, 19 and 20 years of age to serve on grand and petit juries violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights and systematically excluded black persons from grand and petit juries; the fact that such age group has been permitted to register and vote by amendment to the U.S. Constitution did not qualify persons under 21 to serve as jurors under state law. Fermo v. State, 370 So. 2d 930, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2028 (Miss. 1979).

The contention that there had been a systematic exclusion of Negroes and Indians from grand juries was not supported where, though names of prospective jurors had to be drawn from a list of voters or people owning real estate and it was difficult to get names of people who don’t vote or own real property, and though there was a small number of Indians in the county, Indians and Negroes were on the venire from which the grand jury was chosen. Tubby v. State, 327 So. 2d 272, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1780 (Miss. 1976).

Where county officials charged with grand jury selection knew or had reason to know that the voter registration lists failed to be representative of adult black males, they were under an affirmative duty to utilize a selection method which had the potential for yielding juries which represented a fair cross-section of the qualified citizens of the community, and this duty included a resort to the county land rolls as an additional source of qualified blacks. Ford v. Hollowell, 385 F. Supp. 1392, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11740 (N.D. Miss. 1974).

Under-registration of Negroes on jury lists because of failure to register to vote does not constitute discrimination. Ford v. White, 299 F. Supp. 772, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12607 (S.D. Miss. 1969).

The voter registration rolls of April 1966 of Quitman County were unconstitutionally tainted by the vestiges of a state-sanctioned discriminatory voter registration procedure, the effect of which was to prevent adequate representation of Negroes on the jury lists. King v. Cook, 298 F. Supp. 584, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12753 (N.D. Miss. 1969).

Jurors are not to be summoned because of their race, but rather summoned without discrimination from all persons qualified as jurors, and where a record does not show a systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service, the state has met the burden of proof necessary to show that there is no systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury. Smith v. State, 229 So. 2d 551, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1246 (Miss. 1969).

Where defendant’s proof showed that a disproportion between Negroes and whites on the jury lists had existed over a long period of time, he had made out a prima facie case of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury which indicted him, and it was incumbent upon the state to show that there was no systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury and that defendant’s constitutional rights were not infringed by the manner and procedure in which the grand jurors were drawn, and in the absence of such rebuttal testimony on the part of the state the presumption of purposeful prior exclusion stands and the motion to quash the indictment should have been sustained. Reeves v. Reeves, 210 So. 2d 780, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1521 (Miss. 1968).

Allegations that because of the interrelationship between the racial restrictions of the Mississippi voter qualification laws and requirements with respect to the selection of grand and petit jurors a defendant would be denied his equal civil rights to trial by a jury free from exclusion were insufficient to justify the removal to the federal courts of the trial of a Negro charged with the crime of rape. Bass v. Mississippi, 381 F.2d 692, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5438 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967).

In order for the state to sustain the burden of refuting the defendant’s prima facie case that Negroes had been systematically excluded from the juries of the county in which he was tried, it must be shown that the board of supervisors had abandoned its former practice of systematic exclusion and that Negroes were currently being selected for jury service as other qualified citizens. Black v. State, 187 So. 2d 815, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1355 (Miss. 1966).

Where the state did not sustain burden of refuting the prima facie case made by the defendant that Negroes had been systematically excluded from juries of Chickasaw County, the defendant’s conviction could not be allowed to stand and the indictment against him was quashed and the cause remanded to await the action of a qualified grand jury summoned from a proper jury list. Black v. State, 187 So. 2d 815, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1355 (Miss. 1966).

Issue whether Negroes were systematically excluded from grand and petit juries held waived by failure of competent counsel for Negro defendant to raise it in the trial court. Gordon v. State, 160 So. 2d 73 (Miss. 1964).

The complete exclusion from jury service, of Negroes in a county in which they are a majority, violates the constitutional rights of a Negro charged with crime. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4557 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838, 80 S. Ct. 58, 4 L. Ed. 2d 78, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 522 (U.S. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850, 80 S. Ct. 109, 4 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 613 (U.S. 1959).

Whether there has been a systematic racial discrimination by administrative officials in the selection of jurors is a question to be determined from the facts in each particular case. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

The board of supervisors is not required to place in a jury box the names of all the Negroes who meet the qualifications for jury service, since they do not now and have never placed in a jury box for any one year the names of all the white men who meet such qualifications. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

In a prosecution of a Negro for the rape of a white woman the conclusion of the trial judge, in passing upon the issue of fact presented by a motion to quash the indictment, that there had been no systematic, intentional, deliberate discrimination on account of race, was not manifestly wrong in view of the evidence. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

The proof by a Negro defendant on a charge for an offense against a white person, that no Negro had served on a grand jury for the past thirty years is very strong evidence of purposeful racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the state has the burden of disproving by showing that the names of Negroes were not placed in the jury box for some other reason than the fact that they are Negroes. Seay v. State, 212 Miss. 712, 55 So. 2d 430, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1951).

In a prosecution of Negro defendant for felonious assault of white person where the evidence failed to disclose any reason for the absence of the names of Negroes in the jury boxes other than the mere fact that supervisors just did not place their names in the box, and no reason was given for the absence of the names of Negroes in the jury boxes, the conviction of the defendant will be reversed. Seay v. State, 212 Miss. 712, 55 So. 2d 430, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 1951).

Where, in a county the adult population of which is more than 35% Negro, no Negro has served on a grand or petit criminal court jury for 30 years, the inference of systematic exclusion is not sufficiently repelled by showing that a relatively small number of Negroes meet a requirement that a juror must be a qualified elector. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 68 S. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76, 1947 U.S. LEXIS 1545 (U.S. 1947).

Where murder indictment was quashed on ground that Negroes were omitted from jury box from which grand jury was drawn, defendant could not complain of trial court’s refusal to quash second indictment on ground that grand jury was drawn from registration books and not from jury box. Pearson v. State, 176 Miss. 9, 167 So. 644, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 1936).

6. Powers and function of court.

Error of court in refusing to excuse jurors for cause in criminal case will not be considered on appeal where it appears from record that appellant used only five peremptory challenges and hence his peremptory challenges were not exhausted. Bone v. State, 207 Miss. 20, 41 So. 2d 347, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1949).

Opinion of a juror formed on rumor does not disqualify him if he is fair and impartial. The trial judge should resolve all doubts as to juror’s fairness, impartiality, and freedom from bias and prejudice in favor of the accused and the judgment of the circuit court as to qualifications of juror is prima facie correct. Donahue v. State, 142 Miss. 20, 107 So. 15, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1926).

It is proper for the court to excuse the jailer. Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 16 So. 387, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1894).

7. Examination on voir dire.

Although a prospective juror did not initially disclose knowledge of defendant, this omission was later cured when the trial judge conducted a second voir dire and discovered the prospective juror and defendant were distantly related. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it accepted the prospective juror’s assurance that she could render a fair and impartial judgment. Johnson v. State, 224 So.3d 549, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 104 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

Trail judge complied with this section by asking if anyone had a conviction resulting in imprisonment. Hall v. State, 201 So.3d 424, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 540 (Miss. 2016).

Errors relating to the jury selection process were forfeited on appeal due to a failure to object contemporaneously below; at any rate, the outcome would have been the same because, while the trial court erred in appointing a foreperson, the trial court either did not commit error or cured other errors. Personal privilege exemptions had to be asserted by the individual, jurors who sat on a jury in the last two years could have been required to serve due to a lack of potential jurors, an error relating to a failure to complete the jury questionnaire was corrected during direct questioning at voir dire, and a juror’s answer to a question about prior convictions fulfilled the statutory requirements. Hall v. State, — So.3d —, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. Mar. 17, 2016).

A trial court’s discretion in passing upon the extent and propriety of questions addressed to prospective jurors is not unlimited and the Supreme Court will take note of abuse on appeal where prejudice to the accused is present. Williams v. State, 544 So. 2d 782, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2843 (Miss. 1987).

Although the trial court properly condemned the conduct of a district attorney in asking jurors during voir dire whether or not they would vote guilty if the state proved its case and whether they would vote for death if the state proved that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the district attorney’s conduct did not constitute reversible error where, in context with the jury instructions given to the jury by the trial judge, it was clear that the jurors were aware of their proper role in determining guilt and sentence. Williams v. State, 544 So. 2d 782, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2843 (Miss. 1987).

A trial court cannot disparage the defense set up in the case before the jury trying the case. Leverett v. State, 112 Miss. 394, 73 So. 273, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1916).

8. Qualifications of jurors.

Defendant’s claims of error as to an allegedly illiterate juror were without merit because under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-1, a juror’s illiteracy would not vitiate the verdict. Also the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a person who can read and write only a few words is qualified as a juror and the record showed that the juror testified that he could read the Bible, road signs and “anything in Wal-Mart.” Burnside v. State, 912 So. 2d 1018, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 204 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 344, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 679 (Miss. 2005).

In a capital murder case, a court properly removed a juror from the panel where she stated that she could only fill out some of the form and she had her sister-in-law actually fill out the form for her. Scott v. State, 878 So. 2d 933, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 650 (Miss. 2004).

Issue raised at trial and on direct appeal from an inmate’s capital murder conviction concerning the exclusion of a juror for failing to meet the qualifications of Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-1 was found to be without merit, and the issue was therefore barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-21(2); because the trial court committed no error in excusing this juror and another juror for not meeting the qualifications under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-1, then the attorneys were not ineffective for failing to object to the jurors’ dismissal, and in any event, the attorneys’ decisions regarding the final composition of the jury were generally determined to be matters of trial strategy. Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 2004).

Section13-5-67 is read against the backdrop of the general rule that a party who fails to object to the jury’s composition before it is impaneled waives any right to complain thereafter. The word “disqualified” in §13-5-67 has breadth considerably beyond that of §13-5-1’s initial qualifications for jury service. Myers v. State, 565 So. 2d 554, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1990).

The right to a jury of one’s peers does not entitle the defendant in a criminal case to a jury which includes convicted felons or bootleggers. Shows v. State, 267 So. 2d 811, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1428 (Miss. 1972).

The legislature has a right to impose reasonable qualifications for jurors when such qualifications do not violate the constitutional rights of accused persons to be tried by an impartial jury. Shows v. State, 267 So. 2d 811, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1428 (Miss. 1972).

A defendant is entitled to be tried in a county where a reasonable proportion of the citizens are qualified for jury service. Magness v. State, 103 Miss. 30, 60 So. 8, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1912).

9. —Qualified elector.

Juror who had paid one-half of his taxes on or before February 1, remaining half not being due under statute at time of murder trial, held, as respects payment of taxes, qualified juror. Myers v. State, 167 Miss. 76, 147 So. 308, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1933).

10. —Prior service as juror.

Although defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excusing two potential jurors because they had served on a jury in the past two years, rather than permitting those jurors the discretion to decide whether or not to serve, procedural bar aside, the error was harmless because defendant did not claim any constitutional violation or that he was in any manner prejudiced by the dismissal of the potential jurors. Gause v. State, 65 So.3d 295, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 2011), limited, Hall v. State, 127 So.3d 202, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 649 (Miss. 2013).

A member of an indicting grand jury may not serve on the defendant’s petit jury. The accuser may not also be the trier of fact since such a practice is inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of an impartial jury. Hood v. State, 523 So. 2d 302, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1988).

The fact that the foreman of the grand jury which indicted the defendant had also served on a petit jury in the circuit court approximately 6 months before did not vitiate the indictment and make it subject to be quashed, for the prohibition in this section [Code 1942, § 1762] specifically relates to talesmen or tales jurors who are served in the two preceding years and does not prohibit a qualified elector from serving as a grand juror or as foreman of a grand jury. Russell v. Bailey, 197 So. 2d 469, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1525 (Miss. 1967).

Affidavit and allegation that defendant and his counsel did not know of the situation, is necessary with respect to motion for new trial on ground that trial juror was disqualified as having been member of indicting grand jury. Ratcliff v. State, 197 Miss. 289, 20 So. 2d 69, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1944).

Defendant convicted in homicide prosecution, was not entitled to new trial on ground that a trial juror was disqualified as having been a member of the indicting grand jury, where neither defendant nor his counsel made affidavit that they did not know of the situation, and defendant failed to testify at the hearing on the motion, and where counsel’s ignorance of the juror’s identity persisted past the voir dire examination and escaped the admitted practice of scanning such jury list. Ratcliff v. State, 197 Miss. 289, 20 So. 2d 69, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1944).

That portion of the statute relating to the service by a juror in the trial of as many as three cases does not apply to members of the regular panel. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738, 2 So. 360, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1887).

A member of the grand jury which found the indictment is incompetent as a petit juror on the trial of the accused. Beason v. State, 34 Miss. 602, 1857 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1857); House v. State, 96 Miss. 653, 51 So. 274, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 169 (Miss. 1910).

11. —Opinion and prior knowledge.

When a juror, who knew the victim’s mother, swore that he would be impartial in defendant’s trial for fondling, the trial court did not err in allowing the juror to sit on the jury. Wright v. State, 9 So.3d 447, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 243 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

There was no ground for a new trial in the fact that one juror was an employee of one of the defendant’s witnesses in a suit arising out of an automobile collision, where such witness was an engineer who had no interest whatever in the case but who made a map of the road where the accident occurred, and in testifying, simply identified the map as that made by him and stated nothing as to how or why the accident happened, since a juror is not rendered incompetent to sit in the trial of a case, by virtue of knowledge of incidental or collateral facts or facts about which there is no controversy. Wells v. Autry, 235 So. 2d 706, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1463 (Miss. 1970).

The exclusion by the court, of its own motion, of a juror who heard part of former trial held not reversible error. Barnett v. State, 146 Miss. 893, 112 So. 586, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1927).

Opinion of a juror formed on rumor does not disqualify him if he is fair and impartial, it being for the court to determine his fitness. Donahue v. State, 142 Miss. 20, 107 So. 15, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1926).

12. —Miscellaneous.

Trial court properly failed to strike prospective jurors for cause because there was no showing that either juror had a close personal relationship with the victim’s son, but rather, there was only a showing that the jurors and the son had worked together and that the brother of one of the jurors was friends with the son; the relationships disclosed were insufficient to disturb the trial court’s judgment that both prospective jurors on their oaths could be impartial in defendant’s trial. Patton v. State, 248 So.3d 763, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 2018).

Trial court erred in granting a customer a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was a convicted felon because it should not have relied upon the supreme court’s opinion in a prior case since the customer made no claim and presented no proof of a constitutional violation; while the supreme court mandated a new trial where a juror was a convicted felon, it addressed a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury and did not analyze the “vitiate” language of the statute. Roberts Co. v. Moore, 214 So.3d 202, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 2017).

Denial of the inmate’s petition for postconviction relief under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-1 was proper where the issue was procedurally barred from being raised for the first time in that petition; further, inmate’s contention was without merit because the record indicated that the inmate had affirmed the juror’s presence after fully exploring her abilities to read, write, and comprehend English. Puckett v. State, 879 So. 2d 920, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 592 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924, 125 S. Ct. 1638, 161 L. Ed. 2d 483, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2506 (U.S. 2005).

Persons convicted of infamous crimes are not competent to serve on juries. Fleming v. State, 687 So. 2d 146, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1997), overruled in part, Roberts Co. v. Moore, 214 So.3d 202, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 2017).

A trial judge in a murder prosecution did not err in refusing to exclude a juror after she had been accepted, even though the juror’s daughter had been murdered six years earlier, where the attorneys inadvertently failed to ask the juror during voir dire whether a member of her family had been a victim of a crime, and therefore the juror neither withheld nor misrepresented information. Spivey v. Mowdy, 617 So. 2d 999, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 688 (Miss. 1992).

Under §13-5-1, which declares ineligible jurors who have been “convicted of an infamous crime, or the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor within a period of 5 years,” a juror’s competency was not corrupted by her husband’s prior liquor-related convictions. Myers v. State, 565 So. 2d 554, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1990).

The trial court did not err in refusing to declare a mistrial on the basis that a juror was unable to read and write, where the evidence on such issue was conflicting, thereby creating a factual dispute for resolution by the trial judge. Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 383, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 1935 (Miss. 1982).

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in overruling defendant’s motion to quash his indictment for breaking and entering with intent to commit rape on grounds that the husband of the prosecutrix and the wife of a first cousin of the husband of the prosecutrix were members of the grand jury which indicted the defendant, where the evidence showed that the husband of the prosecutrix was not present during deliberations concerning the charges against defendant and the other grand juror complained of, though present during the deliberations, did not “open her mouth,” nor did she do anything to influence the other grand jurors. Southward v. State, 293 So. 2d 343, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1785 (Miss. 1974).

Where a juror in a civil case told the trial judge that he did not at that time employ a lawyer but might have to do so if his son were indicted in another case, but that employment of a lawyer would have no effect on his deliberation, and the juror later employed one of the defense counsel in the civil case as his son’s attorney, and the judge noted that he knew the juror to be an honest and upright person, there was no reversible error in the trial judge’s failure to notify counsel with reference to what he had been told by the juror. Loden v. Joslin, 229 So. 2d 825, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1256 (Miss. 1969).

It is only sale of intoxicating liquors within past five years that disqualifies person from jury service under this section [Code 1942, § 1762] and person is not disqualified from jury service by plea of guilty or by conviction of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor in state courts or by being under bond to await action of federal grand jury for possession of intoxicating liquors on which federal tax had not been paid. Ferrell v. State, 208 Miss. 539, 45 So. 2d 127, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1950).

Indictment in murder prosecution held not void because grand juror allegedly served both as election commissioner and grand juror in finding and presentment of indictment. Robinson v. State, 178 Miss. 568, 173 So. 451, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 228 (Miss. 1937).

A drunk man is incompetent. Guice v. State, 60 Miss. 714, 1883 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1883); Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738, 2 So. 360, 1887 Miss. LEXIS 100 (Miss. 1887).

An employee of one of the parties is incompetent as a juror. Hubbard v. Rutledge, 57 Miss. 7, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1879).

13. Want of qualification, effect of.

Juror’s service did not prejudice defendant, and her verdict and sentence would not be overturned because, although the juror had not been a resident of the county long enough to meet the qualification requirements of this statute, defendant’s attorney did not object to the juror’s admission on his juror card that he had only lived in the county for two months; despite knowing that the juror had only lived in the county for two months, when defendant and her attorney decided between challenging that juror or another juror with their last challenge, defendant’s attorney chose the other juror and made no request for additional challenges; there was no evidence of fault on the juror’s part; and he served as a fair and impartial juror. Dewitt v. State, 269 So.3d 388, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 231 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 258 So.3d 286, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 528 (Miss. 2018).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial when it was determined that one juror was a resident of Memphis, Tennessee, thereby violating the freeholder requirement of Miss. Code. Ann. §13-5-1 (1972). By its own terms, the statute provides that a lack of qualifications on the part of a juror shall not vitiate a verdict. Wright v. State, 805 So. 2d 577, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 375 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

A defendant’s motion for a new trial should have been granted where the parties stipulated that a juror had served in violation of §13-5-1, which prohibits service of any juror who has a case pending in that court, and neither the state nor the defense was aware of such. Brown v. State, 529 So. 2d 537, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 197 (Miss. 1988).

Verdict of jury in prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor is not invalid because one of jurors was not qualified elector, was not drawn, but was summoned by mistake, was accepted and served. Serio v. Brookhaven, 208 Miss. 620, 45 So. 2d 257, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1950).

Inability of a juror to read and write does not disqualify him although unknown to defendant, so as to entitle defendant to a new trial. Huggins v. State, 103 Miss. 227, 60 So. 209, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1912).

An objection that a juror was an alien and therefore not a qualified elector, cannot be made after verdict. Where it is not shown that the facts upon which an objection to a juror is based were unknown when the juror was accepted, the objection will be unavailing. Fulcher v. State, 82 Miss. 630, 35 So. 170, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 188 (Miss. 1903).

Under Const. 1890 § 264, as it formerly read, providing certain qualifications for jurors, but directing that the want thereof shall not vitiate any verdict, which section of the Constitution is substantially embodied in this section [Code 1942, § 1762], it is not cause for reversing a conviction of murder that it was discovered after the verdict that one of the jurors was not a qualified elector and had not been drawn on the venire but had been summoned by mistake in place of a person by the same name who was drawn. Complaint may be made only where that occurs which impugns the fairness of the trial. Tolbert v. State, 71 Miss. 179, 14 So. 462, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 185 (Miss. 1893).

Const. 1890 § 264, as that section formerly read, declaring that “the want of such qualification in any juror shall not vitiate any indictment or verdict,” which section of the Constitution is substantially embodied in this section [Code 1942, § 1762], does not apply where the judgment is assailed because of the court’s action in overruling an exception seasonably made to a juror. Nail v. State, 70 Miss. 32, 11 So. 793, 1892 Miss. LEXIS 79 (Miss. 1892).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Only those persons who are registered to vote in state and local elections should be included on the certified list of registered voters. Those voters who are registered to vote pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act only are not registered to vote in state and local elections and therefore should not be included on the certified voter registration list certified by the circuit clerk for purposes of jury selection. See Sections 13-5-8 and 13-5-4(d). Carpenter, January 10, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0002.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Proof as to exclusion of or discrimination against eligible class or race in respect to jury in criminal case. 1 A.L.R.2d 1291.

Separation of jury in criminal case. 21 A.L.R.2d 1088.

Mandamus or prohibition as remedy to enforce right to jury trial. 41 A.L.R.2d 780.

Juror’s previous knowledge of facts of civil case as disqualification. 73 A.L.R.2d 1312.

Disqualification, as jurors, of resident or taxpayers of litigating political subdivision. 81 A.L.R.2d 708.

Use of intoxicating liquor by jurors: civil cases. 6 A.L.R.3d 934.

Grand jury: Admission of hearsay evidence incompetent at trial as affecting, in absence of statutory regulation, validity of indictment or conviction. 37 A.L.R.3d 612.

Propriety and prejudicial effect, in criminal case, of placing jury in charge of officer who is a witness in the case. 38 A.L.R.3d 1012.

Jury: membership in racially biased or prejudiced organization as proper subject of voir dire inquiry or ground for challenge. 63 A.L.R.3d 1052.

Juror’s voir dire denial or nondisclosure of acquaintance or relationship with attorney in case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial. 64 A.L.R.3d 126.

Competency of juror as affected by his membership in co-operative association interested in the case. 69 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Similarity of occupation between proposed juror and alleged victim of crime as affecting juror’s competency. 71 A.L.R.3d 974.

Law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal case. 72 A.L.R.3d 895.

Former law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal cases. 72 A.L.R.3d 958.

Validity of enactment requiring juror to be an elector or voter or have qualifications thereof. 78 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground for challenge on voir dire. 95 A.L.R.3d 172.

Jury: visual impairment as disqualification. 48 A.L.R.4th 1154.

Fact that juror in criminal case, or juror’s relative or friend, has previously been victim of criminal incident as ground of disqualification. 65 A.L.R.4th 743.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury–post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

Exclusion of women from grand or trial jury or jury panel in criminal case as violation of constitutional rights of accused or as ground for reversal of conviction – state cases. 70 A.L.R.5th 587.

Disqualification or exemption of juror for conviction of, or prosecution for, criminal offense. 75 A.L.R.5th 295.

Prejudical effect of juror’s inability to comprehend English. 117 A.L.R.5th 1.

Purposeful inclusion of Negroes in grand or petit jury as unconstitutional discrimination. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 449.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 9 et seq.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 126- 140.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 11, 24-36.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 262, 263, 268, 278-285, 426.

Lawyers’ Edition.

Prospective juror in capital case whose views on death penalty would prevent or impair performance of duties as juror held subject to exclusion for cause. 80 L. Ed. 2d 841.

Law Reviews.

1989 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Voir Dire. 59 Miss. L. J. 865, Winter, 1989.

§ 13-5-2. Public policy stated.

It is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered for jury service in this state and an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. A citizen shall not be excluded from jury service in this state on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch 378, § 1, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 12 of Chapter 378, Laws of 1974, which chapter enacted this section, reads as follows:

“SECTION 12. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1975, except that jurors shall continue to be drawn in accordance with the provisions of present law until implementation of the juror selection procedure herein provided for in April 1975.”

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Peremptory challenges.

3. Random selection.

4. No systematic exclusion.

1. In general.

Although provisions for jury selection are merely directory, courts must make every reasonable effort to comply with the statutory method of drawing, selecting and serving jurors; the jury system must remain untainted and beyond suspicion. Avery v. State, 555 So. 2d 1039, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 1990), overruled, Mayfield v. State, 612 So. 2d 1120, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 861 (Miss. 1992).

In civil jury trial in Federal District Court, equal protection component of Fifth Amendment due process clause prohibits private litigant from using peremptory challenge to exclude prospective jurors on account of race because such race-based exclusion violates equal protection rights of excluded jurors; opposing litigant has third-party standing to raise excluded jurors’ rights in opposing litigant’s own behalf; and, while role of litigants in determining jury’s composition may provide one reason for wide acceptance of jury system and its verdicts, if race stereotypes are price for acceptance of jury panel, price is too high to meet standard of constitution. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3023 (U.S. 1991).

“Significant period of time” for purposes of determining federal constitutional violation is not limited to period of time after passage of Miss. Jury Selection Act which was a step forward in eradicating racial discrimination in selection of juries; plaintiff black state prisoner indicted for and convicted of murder who claimed denial of equal protection because for 20 year period up to and including his indictment all 42 grand jury foremen appointed by circuit judges of county he was indicted were white even though population of county was 43% black, established prima facie case of racial discrimination in county, which State failed to rebut inasmuch as its rebuttal testimony merely indicated that judges in county never indicated to circuit clerk that they selected grand jury foremen based on race, and testimony neither denied use of racial criteria nor advanced any other objective non-discriminatory criteria; and conviction would be vacated. Johnson v. Puckett, 929 F.2d 1067, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7522 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S. Ct. 274, 116 L. Ed. 2d 226, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 5358 (U.S. 1991).

Although persons over 65 years of age and persons who have served on a jury within 2 years are exempt from jury service under §13-5-25, neither the circuit court nor the deputy circuit clerk have authority to act unilaterally and strike such persons from the jury list. Such persons are eligible for jury service and have every lawful right and authority to serve if called and selected. When their names are drawn, such persons must be summoned the same as other prospective jurors and no one has authority to exempt any such juror from service unless he or she claims the privilege and asks to be excused. Thus, a judgment of conviction and sentence was reversed where the deputy circuit clerk unilaterally struck from the jury list all persons over 65 years of age and all persons who had served on a jury within the 2 preceding years. Adams v. State, 537 So. 2d 891, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1989).

A defendant indicted by a county grand jury on various drug-related offenses was not entitled to removal of the indictments to federal court, notwithstanding his contention that the grand juries were illegally constituted in that blacks had not been considered for appointment as forepersons, where state law clearly provided that no one could be excluded from jury service because of race and where there was no equivalent basis for a prediction that defendant could not enforce his federal rights in state court. Williams v. Mississippi, 608 F.2d 1021, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 9387 (5th Cir. Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 804, 101 S. Ct. 49, 66 L. Ed. 2d 8, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 2550 (U.S. 1980).

In a homicide prosecution, the trial judge correctly overruled a defense motion to quash the indictment, venire and panel on the ground that blacks and women were systematically excluded from serving as grand jury foremen, where Mississippi followed the “random” method of jury selection and where the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jury foremen by trial judges. Herring v. State, 374 So. 2d 784, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2347 (Miss. 1979).

2. Peremptory challenges.

In a robbery case, the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s Batson challenge against the State’s peremptory strike of a member of the venire was not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Payne v. State, 207 So.3d 1282, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 493 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

Mississippi caselaw did not extend the Batson protection to religiously based peremptory strikes of jurors; the only objection offered by defendant was a Batson objection. Because defendant did not object that religiously based peremptory strikes violated Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 18 and Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-2, the trial judge did not err in accepting the reason offered by the State as a race-neutral reason not prohibited by Batson. Jackson v. State, 910 So. 2d 658, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 904 So. 2d 184, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 402 (Miss. 2005).

Peremptory challenges to jurors may not be exercised to exclude a juror on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 392 (Miss. 1998).

3. Random selection.

In a drug case, a trial court did not err by denying a motion to quash the venire due to the fact that less than three percent were minorities; there was no evidence to show that the jury was not selected at random under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-2. Magee v. State, 951 So. 2d 589, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

In defendant’s trial for the sale of cocaine, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the fair cross-section requirement was violated; defendant also failed to show that there was a systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury pool. Yarbrough v. State, 911 So. 2d 951, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 610 (Miss. 2005).

Where defendant failed to show that the under-representation of a racial group on his jury was based on a systematic exclusion in selection of the jury venire, defendant was not denied a jury that was a fair cross-section of the community. Pratt v. State, 870 So. 2d 1241, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 273 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

4. No systematic exclusion.

Defendant’s conviction for the sale of cocaine was appropriate because a single venire wherein a distinctive group was underrepresented did not constitute systematic exclusion of that group from the jury-selection process. Simmons v. State, 13 So.3d 844, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 471 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Proof as to exclusion or discrimination against eligible class or race in respect to jury in criminal case. 1 A.L.R.2d 1291.

Exclusion of attorneys from jury list in criminal cases. 32 A.L.R.2d 890.

Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in state criminal case. 94 A.L.R.3d 15.

Propriety of asking prospective female jurors questions on voir dire not asked of prospective male jurors, or vice versa. 39 A.L.R.4th 450.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury–post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from criminal jury based on religious affiliation – post-Batson state cases. 63 A.L.R.5th 375.

Exclusion of women from grand or trial jury or jury panel in criminal case as violation of constitutional rights of accused or as ground for reversal of conviction – state cases. 70 A.L.R.5th 587.

Purposeful inclusion of Negroes in grand or petit jury as unconstitutional discrimination justifying relief in Federal Court. 4 A.L.R. Fed. 449.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 8-10, 19, 21.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Discrimination in Jury Selection – Systematic Exclusion or Underrepresentation of Identifiable Group, §§ 19 et seq. (proof of systematic underrepresentation of identifiable group in selection of prospective jurors).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 11, 18-20, 22-35.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 263, 278-280, 284-301, 310-322.

§ 13-5-3. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 8 (1); 1857, ch. 61, arts. 128, 135; 1871, §§ 726, 736; 1880, § 1681; 1892, § 2358; 1906, § 2688; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2180; 1930, § 2033; 1942, § 1766; Laws, 1896, ch. 84; Laws, 1938, ch. 298; Law, 1938, Ex. ch. 84; Laws, 1962, ch. 308, § 2; Laws, 1964, ch. 326; Laws, 1968, ch. 338, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-3 specified how the list of jurors was to be procured.

§ 13-5-4. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

“Court” means the circuit, chancery and county courts of this state and includes, when the context requires, any judge of the court.

“Clerk” and “clerk of the court” means the circuit clerk of the county and any deputy clerk.

“Master list” means the voter registration lists for the county.

“Voter registration lists” means the official records of persons registered to vote in the county.

“Jury wheel” means any physical device or electronic system for the storage of the names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors.

“Jury box” means the jury wheel in which is placed the names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors whose names are drawn at random from the jury wheel and who are not disqualified.

“Senior judge” means the circuit or chancery judge, as the case may be, who has the longest continuous service on the court in a particular judicial district which has more than one (1) such judge, or if the judges are equal in time of service, then the judge who has been engaged for the longest time continuously in the practice of law in this state.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 2, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Only those persons who are registered to vote in state and local elections should be included on the certified list of registered voters. Those voters who are registered to vote pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act only are not registered to vote in state and local elections and therefore should not be included on the certified voter registration list certified by the circuit clerk for purposes of jury selection. See Sections 13-5-1, 13-5-8 and 13-5-4(d). Carpenter, January 10, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0002.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of requirement or practice of selecting prospective jurors exclusively from list of registered voters. 80 A.L.R.3d 869.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 1, 3.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 1, 40.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 2-5, 9, 108, 109.

50A C.J.S., Juries §§ 1, 2.

§ 13-5-5. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1942, § 1762-01; Laws, 1964, ch. 327, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-5 provided a procedure by which resident freeholders not qualified as electors could be made competent jurors by court order.

§ 13-5-6. Jury commission—number, appointment, terms, qualifications, and compensation of members.

  1. A jury commission shall be established in each county to manage the jury selection process under the supervision and control of the court. The jury commission shall be composed of three (3) members who will serve a four-year term beginning on January 1, 1975, as follows: One (1) member shall be appointed by the circuit judge of said county; one (1) member shall be appointed by the chancery judge of said county; and one (1) member shall be appointed by the board of supervisors of said county. If there is more than one (1) circuit or chancery judge in a judicial district, then the senior circuit or chancery judge, as the case may be, shall make the said appointment for each county in his district. Any unexpired term shall be filled by the appropriate appointing authority who is in office at the time the vacancy occurs.
  2. A jury commissioner shall have the following qualifications:
    1. He shall be a duly qualified elector at the time of his appointment;
    2. He shall be a resident citizen in the county in which he is to serve; and
    3. He shall not be an attorney nor an elected public official.
  3. Each jury commissioner shall receive compensation at a per diem rate as provided in Section 25-3-69.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 3; Laws, 1989, ch. 395, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

An individual cannot continue to serve as jury commissioner and as a member of the board of aldermen at the same time. Tucker, July 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0335.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 106- 108.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 42, 44.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 270, 312.

§ 13-5-7. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1942, § 1762-02; Laws, 1964, ch. 327, § 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 336, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-7 specified who were competent jurors after entry of a court order provided for in former §13-5-5.

§ 13-5-8. Master list consisting of county voter registration list to be compiled and maintained; exclusion of persons permanently excused from jury service from list; reinstatement of permanently excused persons.

  1. In April of each year, the jury commission for each county shall compile and maintain a master list consisting of the voter registration list for the county.
  2. The circuit clerk of the county and the registrar of voters shall have the duty to certify to the commission during the month of January of each year under the seal of his office the voter registration list for the county; the list shall exclude any person who has been permanently excused from jury service pursuant to Section 13-5-23(4). Any person who has been excluded from the master list for jury service may be reinstated to the master list after one (1) year by requesting that the circuit clerk reinstate him to the master list.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 4; Laws, 2010, ch. 456, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2010.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment rewrote (2).

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Only those persons who are registered to vote in state and local elections should be included on the certified list of registered voters. Those voters who are registered to vote pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act only are not registered to vote in state and local elections and therefore should not be included on the certified voter registration list certified by the circuit clerk for purposes of jury selection. See Sections 13-5-1 and 13-5-4(d). Carpenter, January 10, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0002.

The master voter registration list of persons available for selection on juries should not include the names of persons who are on the National Voter Registration Act “inactive” list. Carpenter, March 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0124.

Maintenance of the master list means that the list is not to include the names of individuals no longer eligible to serve on a jury. Ashley, March 17, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0117.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Exclusion of attorneys from jury list in criminal cases. 32 A.L.R.2d 890.

Inclusion or exclusion or first and last days in computing time for jury drawing, or furnishing of jury list, which must take place a certain number of days before a known future date. 98 A.L.R.2d 1421.

Validity of requirement or practice of selecting prospective jurors exclusively from list of registered voters. 80 A.L.R.3d 869.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d(Rev), Grand Jury §§ 8, 10, 19, 21.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 102- 104, 108, 110- 113, 115, 131, 134.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selection, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 39–45.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 266-270, 298, 307-310.

§ 13-5-9. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 2, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1942, § 1762-03; Laws, 1964, ch. 327, § 3; Am Laws, 1972, ch. 372, § 2]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-9 provided an alternate procedure by which lists of jurors were to be procured under the alternative procedures of former §13-5-5.

§ 13-5-10. Jury wheel; selection and deposit of names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors; number required; refilling.

The jury commission for each county shall maintain a jury wheel into which the commission shall place the names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors taken from the master list. If the total number of prospective jurors on the master list is one thousand (1,000) or less, the names or identifying numbers of all of them shall be placed in the jury wheel. In all other cases, the number of prospective jurors to be placed in the jury wheel shall be one thousand (1,000) plus not less than one percent (1%) of the total number of names on the master list. From time to time a larger or additional number may be determined by the jury commission or ordered by the court to be placed in the jury wheel. In April of each year, beginning in 1976, the wheel shall be emptied and refilled as prescribed in this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 5(1), eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 104, 105.

9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Discrimination in Jury Selection – Systematic Exclusion or Underrepresentation of Identifiable Group, §§ 19 et seq. (proof of systematic underrepresentation of identifiable group in selection of prospective jurors).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 308-309.

§ 13-5-11. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1942, § 1762-04; Laws, 1964, ch. 327, § 4]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-11 stated when the alternate procedures pertaining to jurors set forth in former §§13-5-5,13-5-7 and13-5-9 became operative.

§ 13-5-12. Jury wheel—selection and deposit of names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors—procedure where less than all names on master list used.

Unless all the names on the master list are to be placed in the jury wheel pursuant to Section 13-5-10, the names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors to be placed in the jury wheel shall be selected by the jury commission at random from the master list in the following manner: The total number of names on the master list shall be divided by the number of names to be placed in the jury wheel; the whole number nearest the quotient shall be the “key number,” except that the key number shall never be less than two (2). A “starting number” for making the selection shall then be determined by a random method from the number from one (1) to the key number, both inclusive. The required number of names shall then be selected from the master list by taking in order the first name on the master list corresponding to the starting number and then successively the names appearing in the master list at intervals equal to the key number, recommencing if necessary at the start of the list until the required number of names has been selected. The name of any person who is under the age of twenty-one (21) years and the name of any person who has been permanently excused from jury service pursuant to Section 13-5-23(4) shall be passed over without interrupting the sequence of selection. Any person who has been excluded from the master list for jury service may be reinstated to the master list after one (1) year by requesting that the circuit clerk reinstate him to the master list. Upon recommencing at the start of the list, names previously selected from the master list shall be disregarded in selecting the additional names. The jury commission may use an electronic or mechanical system or device in carrying out its duties.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 5(2); Laws, 2010, ch. 456, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2010.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment rewrote the fourth sentence; and added the fifth sentence.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

It is not necessary to maintain physical jury wheel and jury box if clerk is using computer, as long as clerk is capable of printing out physical record of contents of jury wheel and jury box if it becomes necessary to do so. Salazar, Dec. 3, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0901.

§ 13-5-13. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1880, § 1682; 1892, § 2359; 1906, § 2689; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2181; 1930, § 2034; 1942, § 1767]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-13 specified the number of names to be contained on the jury list.

§ 13-5-14. List of names placed in jury wheel to be delivered to senior circuit judge—minute entry.

At any time the jury commission places names in the jury wheel, the jury commission shall also deliver to the senior circuit judge a list of all names placed on or in the jury wheel, and said circuit judge shall spread upon the minutes of the circuit court all of the names so placed in the jury wheel.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 5(3), eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d(Rev), Jury §§ 104, 105, 110, 123, 146, 226, 227, 251.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selection, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 289, 308, 324, 328, 329, 333, 335, 336, 417.

§ 13-5-15. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 8 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 135; 1871, § 736; 1880, § 1684; 1892, § 2360; 1906, § 2690; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2182; 1930, § 2035; 1942, § 1768]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-15 provided that the jury list be delivered to the clerk of the circuit court, filed, and not thereafter altered.

§ 13-5-16. Random drawing of names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors; alphabetical list; prohibition against disclosure of names drawn; use of computer or electronic device for random selection.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by subsection (2) of this section, from time to time and in a manner prescribed by the court, a private citizen who does not have an interest in a case pending trial and who is not a practicing attorney publicly shall draw at random from the jury wheel the names or identifying numbers of as many prospective jurors as the court by order requires. The clerk shall prepare an alphabetical list of the names drawn. Neither the names drawn nor the list shall be disclosed to any person other than pursuant to this chapter or specific order of the court.
  2. The court may order that the drawing of names or identifying numbers pursuant to subsection (1) of this section may be performed by random selection of a computer or electronic device pursuant to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 5(4); Laws, 1986, ch. 312, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Application of this section to selection of jurors for state grand jury, see §13-7-15.

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a homicide prosecution, the trial judge correctly overruled a defense motion to quash the indictment, venire and panel on the ground that blacks and women were systematically excluded from serving as grand jury foremen, where Mississippi followed the “random” method of jury selection and where the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jury foremen by trial judges. Herring v. State, 374 So. 2d 784, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2347 (Miss. 1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 104, 105, 108, 120, 199, 220.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selection, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 308, 324, 328, 329, 333, 335, 336, 417.

§ 13-5-17. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 139; 1871, § 740; 1880, § 1688; 1892, § 2362; 1906, § 2691; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2183; 1930, § 2036; 1942, § 1769]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-17 provided that the slips containing the names of the jurors not serving were to be returned to the box.

§ 13-5-18. Telephone answering device required; cost of device.

The clerk of the circuit court in each county shall purchase and install a telephone answering device for the purpose of providing a recorded message after 5:00 p.m. to jurors who have been summoned to jury duty, in order for such jurors to inquire as to whether their presence will be required in court the following day. The cost of purchasing and maintaining said telephone answering device shall be paid by the board of supervisors from the county general fund.

HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 395, § 3, eff from and after January 1, 1990.

§ 13-5-19. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1880, § 1690; 1892, § 2364; 1906, § 2693; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2185; 1930, § 2038; 1942, § 1771]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-19 provided for the making and keeping of a list of jurors who did not serve.

§ 13-5-21. Jury list in counties with two circuit court districts.

In counties where there are two (2) circuit court districts, the jury commission shall make a list of jurors for each district in the manner directed for a county, and the same shall be treated in all respects as for an entire county. In such counties a juror shall not be required to serve out of his district, except should the court, in its discretion, otherwise direct, and except when drawn on a special venire. In either of such excepted cases, the jury shall be drawn from the two (2) jury boxes if the court so direct, one (1) name for each alternately.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 755; 1880, § 1689; 1892, § 2363; 1906, § 2692; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2184; 1930, § 2037; 1942, § 1770; Laws, 1904, ch. 151; Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 8, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury selection.

1. In general.

In defendant’s trial for wire fraud, the trial court properly ordered the circuit court clerk to draw the jury from both judicial districts within the county in order to expand the jury pool, and to be certain that a fair and impartial jury as nearly as possible, could be impaneled; there was no prejudice to defendant as a result. McGee v. State, 853 So. 2d 125, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 159 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 852 So. 2d 577, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 834 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion under Miss. Code Ann.§13-5-21 in empanelling a jury to try defendant for aggravated driving while intoxicated where the jury panel consisted of jurors who resided in different judicial districts within the same county. Gates v. State, 829 So. 2d 1283, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 591 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Defendant in a murder trial failed to show that a jury selection method of drawing juries from two judicial districts did not result in a fair cross-section of the community. Thomas v. State, 818 So. 2d 335, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 2002).

Trial court’s decision to draw jury venire from both judicial districts, rather than just a jury venire from the district where the burglary victims were likely less well known, was not error as the record did not show that the jury selection process was fraudulent, unfair, or deprived defendant of due process. Cunningham v. State, 828 So. 2d 208, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 11 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

Fact that special venire in transferee county was drawn randomly from county as a whole, rather than alternately from each of county’s two judicial districts as required by statute, did not amount to reversible error in murder prosecution, as defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from noncompliance with statute and failed to demonstrate that jury was not chosen from fair cross-section of community. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Statutory method of selecting jurors in criminal prosecution is directory, not mandatory, and unless it is shown that method used was fraudulent or such radical departure from method prescribed by the statute as to be unfair to defendant or to prevent due process of law, appellate court will not reverse. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

A murder defendant did not establish that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing the defendant’s request to draw venire members from both of the county’s judicial districts where the defendant did not offer evidence indicating that the jury selected was biased or partial. Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1684, 134 L. Ed. 2d 785, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3101 (U.S. 1996).

Under this section, trial court may require juror to serve out of his district (1) in its discretion and (2) when such juror is drawn on special venire; special venire may be drawn from both districts of county, in discretion of trial judge. Myers v. State, 353 So. 2d 1364, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2068 (Miss. 1978).

In homicide prosecution, where court ordered special venire from first district of county, refusal to order one from second district held not error, statute being directory. Taylor v. State, 148 Miss. 621, 114 So. 390, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1927).

This section [Code 1942, § 1770] is directory. Haney v. State, 129 Miss. 486, 92 So. 627, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 68 (Miss. 1922); Taylor v. State, 148 Miss. 621, 114 So. 390, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1927).

In a county having two circuit court districts the venire may be drawn from both districts of the county, but where one jury box is exhausted it is not reversible error for the trial court to draw all names from the other district. Ferguson v. State, 107 Miss. 559, 65 So. 584, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1914).

This section [Code 1942, § 1770] applies to Perry county notwithstanding the Act March 6, 1892 (Acts 1892 ch. 116) dividing it into two judicial districts and providing that no person shall be liable to jury service outside the district in which he lives. Burt v. State, 86 Miss. 280, 38 So. 233, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 17 (Miss. 1905).

2. Jury selection.

Where defendant failed to show that the under-representation of a racial group on his jury was based on a systematic exclusion in selection of the jury venire, defendant was not denied a jury that was a fair cross-section of the community. Pratt v. State, 870 So. 2d 1241, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 273 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

§ 13-5-23. Exemptions; length of service of tales and grand jurors.

  1. All qualified persons shall be liable to serve as jurors, unless excused by the court for one (1) of the following causes:
    1. When the juror is ill and, on account of the illness, is incapable of performing jury service;
    2. When the juror’s attendance would cause undue or extreme physical or financial hardship to the prospective juror or a person under his or her care or supervision; or
    3. When the potential juror is a breast-feeding mother.
  2. An excuse of illness under subsection (1)(a) of this section may be made to the clerk of court outside of open court by providing the clerk with a certificate of a licensed physician, stating that the juror is ill and is unfit for jury service, in which case the clerk may excuse the juror. If the excuse of illness is not supported by a physician’s certificate, a judge of the court for which the individual was called to jury service shall decide whether to excuse an individual under subsection (1)(a) of this section.
    1. The test of an excuse under subsection (1)(b) of this section for undue or extreme physical or financial hardship shall be whether the individual would either:
      1. Be required to abandon a person under his or her personal care or supervision due to the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate substitute caregiver during the period of participation in the jury pool or on the jury; or
      2. Incur costs that would have a substantial adverse impact on the payment of the individual’s necessary daily living expenses or on those for whom he or she provides the principal means of support; or
      3. Suffer physical hardship that would result in illness or disease.
    2. “Undue or extreme physical or financial hardship” does not exist solely based on the fact that a prospective juror will be required to be absent from his or her place of employment or business.
    3. A judge of the court for which the individual was called to jury service shall decide whether to excuse an individual under subsection (1)(b) of this section.
    4. A person asking to be excused based on a finding of undue or extreme physical or financial hardship must take all actions necessary to have obtained a ruling on that request by no later than the date on which the individual is scheduled to appear for jury duty.
    5. A person asking a judge to grant an excuse under subsection (1)(b) of this section may be required to provide the judge with documentation such as, but not limited to, federal and state income tax returns, medical statements from licensed physicians, proof of dependency or guardianship and similar documents, which the judge finds to clearly support the request to be excused.Failure to provide satisfactory documentation may result in a denial of the request to be excused.
    6. In cases under subsection (1)(c) of this section, the excuse must be made by the juror in open court under oath.
  3. A person is excused from jury service permanently only when the deciding judge determines that the underlying grounds for being excused are of a permanent nature. A person who has been summoned for jury duty who meets the age threshold for exemption from jury service shall have the option to be permanently excused from jury service due to age by filing with the circuit clerk a notarized request to be permanently excused.
  4. Grand jurors shall serve until discharged by the court.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 10 (4); 1857, ch. 61, art. 127; 1871, § 735; 1880, § 1662; 1892, § 2356; 1906, § 2686; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2178; 1930, § 2031; 1942, § 1764; Laws, 1938, ch. 302; Laws, 1944, ch. 197; Laws, 1976, ch. 464, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 438; Laws, 1990, ch. 360, § 1; Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 8; Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 520, § 10; Laws, 2007, ch. 433, § 1, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2008.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 437 Laws of 2006, effective from and after passage (approved March 20, 2006), amended this section. Section 10 of ch. 520, Laws of 2006, effective from and after passage (approved April 3, 2006), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 10 of ch. 520, Laws of 2006, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2007, rewrote the section.

The first 2006 amendment (ch. 437), in the version of the section effective until January 1, 2008, substituted “Until January 1, 2008” for “Until January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language, and substituted “paragraph” or “paragraphs” for “clause” or “clauses” throughout; and in the version of the section effective from and after January 1, 2008, substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language.

The second 2006 amendment (ch. 520), in the version effective until January 1, 2008, substituted “Until January 1, 2008” for “Until January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language, substituted “paragraphs or paragraph” for “clauses or clause” throughout, added (d), inserted “and (d)” following “under paragraphs (c)” near the end of the second undesignated paragraph, and made minor stylistic changes; and in the version effective from and after January 1, 2008, substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language, added (1)(c); added (3)(f), and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

The 2007 amendment, in the version effective from and after January 1, 2008, in (3)(e), substituted “may be required” for “shall be required” and “may result in a denial” for “shall result in a denial”; in (4), deleted “After two (2) years” from the beginning, and added the last sentence; and deleted the former first sentence of (5), which read: “A tales juror shall not be compelled to serve two (2) days successively unless the case in which the juror is impaneled continues longer than one (1) day.”

Cross References —

Exemption from jury duty as personal privilege, see §13-5-25.

Exemption of officers and employees of the state penitentiary from jury duty, see §47-5-55.

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a doctor’s motion to quash the jury panel—when the doctor contended that the doctor was denied a fair trial in a medical malpractice action because the doctor, who was Caucasian, had an all-African-American venire in a county that was 25 percent Caucasian—because the appellate court found no evidence showing any actual fraud, prejudice, or such a flagrant violation of duty as to amount to fraud. Kronfol v. Johnson, 283 So.3d 1162, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 183 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 283 So.3d 733, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 2019), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 459 (Miss. 2019).

Although defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excusing two potential jurors because they had served on a jury in the past two years, rather than permitting those jurors the discretion to decide whether or not to serve, procedural bar aside, the error was harmless because defendant did not claim any constitutional violation or that he was in any manner prejudiced by the dismissal of the potential jurors. Gause v. State, 65 So.3d 295, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 2011), limited, Hall v. State, 127 So.3d 202, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 649 (Miss. 2013).

A trial court’s excusal of a potential juror on hardship grounds was not an abuse of discretion where the juror had 4 children at home with no one to care for them. Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2917 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102, 109 S. Ct. 2458, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1012, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2745 (U.S. 1989), overruled, Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 576 (Miss. 1998).

Non-compliance with §13-5-23, on exemption of jurors, does not warrant quashing of venire unless there is showing of actual fraud, prejudice, or such flagrant violation of duty as to amount to fraud. Pulliam v. State, 515 So. 2d 945, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2895 (Miss. 1987).

The exemptions from jury duty set forth in this section [Code 1942, § 1764] are not unreasonable or discriminatory, and a defendant, indicted and tried for murder, was not thereby prejudiced in his right to a fair trial. Capler v. State, 237 So. 2d 445, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1509 (Miss. 1970), vacated, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2862, 33 L. Ed. 2d 754, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 1910 (U.S. 1972).

The trial court did not commit reversible error in overruling defendant’s motion for a mistrial, or that a new panel of jurors be tendered to him, where, after ten jurors had been finally accepted to try the defendant for murder, the court, out of the presence of defendant or his counsel, excused a juror because illness required the juror’s presence at home, but allowed the defendant one additional peremptory challenge. Upshaw v. State, 231 Miss. 158, 94 So. 2d 337, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1957).

While it is obvious that there may be circumstances, making strict compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 1764] impossible as regards presenting excuses from jury service, the trial judge is under a duty to require compliance therewith except where it is impracticable to do so. Parker v. State, 201 Miss. 579, 29 So. 2d 910, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 423 (Miss. 1947).

As regards the matter of presenting excuses from jury service, the rule is that it is not enough to warrant the court in quashing the venire that the trial judge has violated or failed to do his duty in this regard, but, to so warrant, the evidence and circumstances must show actual fraud or such flagrant violation of duty in this respect as that the proven facts and circumstances show a legal fraud on the rights of the defendant. Parker v. State, 201 Miss. 579, 29 So. 2d 910, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 423 (Miss. 1947).

In the absence of a showing of fraud on the rights of the accused in a criminal case, it was not reversible error for the trial court to excuse from jury service, for good cause, before the case was called for trial and in chambers without notice to the accused, 26 of the 74 persons who appeared in response to an order for a special venire of 90 persons. Parker v. State, 201 Miss. 579, 29 So. 2d 910, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 423 (Miss. 1947).

Indictment for murder held not void because grand juror allegedly served as both election commissioner and grand juror. Robinson v. State, 178 Miss. 568, 173 So. 451, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 228 (Miss. 1937).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Since no state or federal statute requires private employer to pay wages or salary to employee serving on grand or petit jury, and who is therefore not working in employer’s business during this time, simple refusal of employer to pay employee under these circumstances would not constitute violation of Miss. Code Section 13-5-23. Pacific, Apr. 7, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0112.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of grand jury after term of court for which organized. 75 A.L.R.2d 544.

Religious belief as ground for exemption or excuse from jury service. 2 A.L.R.3d 1392.

Excusing, on account of public, charitable, or educational employment, one qualified and not specifically exempted as juror in state criminal case, as ground of complaint by accused. 99 A.L.R.3d 1261.

Impeachment of verdict by juror’s evidence that he was coerced or intimidated by fellow juror. 39 A.L.R.4th 800.

Jury: who is lawyer or attorney disqualified or exempt from service, or subject to challenge for cause. 57 A.L.R.4th 1260.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Grand Jury §§ 9, 12.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Jury §§ 143.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 131 (order excusing juror).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries § 37.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 285, 286, 302-305.

§ 13-5-25. Who is exempt as a personal privilege.

Every citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age, and everyone who has served as a grand juror or as a petit juror in the trial of a litigated case within two (2) years, shall be exempt from service if the juror claims the privilege.No qualified juror shall be excluded because of any such reasons, but the same shall be a personal privilege to be claimed by any person selected for jury duty.Any citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age may claim this personal privilege outside of open court by providing the clerk of court with information that allows the clerk to determine the validity of the claim.

Provided, however, that no person who has served as a grand juror or as a petit juror in a trial of a litigated case in one (1) court may claim the exemption in any other court where the juror may be called to serve.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, §§ 1661, 1683; 1892, § 2357; 1906, § 2687; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2179; 1930, § 2032; 1942, § 1765; Laws, 1958, ch. 287; Laws, 1960, ch. 236; Laws, 1966, ch. 353, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 464, § 2; Laws, 1990, ch. 360, § 2, eff from and and after July 1, 1990; Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 9; Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 2; Laws, 2007, ch. 433, § 2, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2008.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2007, deleted “but the latter class shall serve as talesmen, and on special venire, and on the regular panel, if there be a deficiency of jurors” at the end of the first sentence.

The 2006 amendment, in the version of the section effective until January 1, 2008, substituted “Until January 1, 2008” for “Until January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language; and in the version of the section effective from and after January 1, 2008, substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language.

The 2007 amendment, in the version effective from and after January 1, 2008, rewrote the first sentence of the first paragraph and rewrote the second paragraph.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Harmless error.

3. Illustrative cases.

1. In general.

The exemptions under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-25 are not mandatory and must be asserted by the individual. Trevillion v. State, 26 So.3d 1098, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 828 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Although a trial court erred in removing a potential juror, defendant failed to object at trial; therefore, he was procedurally barred from arguing the error at trial. Moreover, the error was harmless. Spires v. State., 10 So.3d 477, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 2009).

The exemption contemplated by this section does not apply to service within a designated venire period. Galloway v. State, 735 So. 2d 1117, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 158 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

Transfer of venue to another county for trial proceedings did not deprive defendant in murder prosecution of his right to be tried by jury chosen from fair cross-section of community including senior citizens, despite defendant’s contention that moving jurors to the other county made elderly persons more inclined to exercise their statutory exemption from jury service; defendant failed to present any evidence indicating that jury lists were not representative of community. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Mississippi’s exemption of jurors who are illiterate or under 21 years of age, pursuant to §13-5-1, or over 65 years of age, pursuant to §13-5-25, did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 792 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910, 111 S. Ct. 1695, 114 L. Ed. 2d 89, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2522 (U.S. 1991).

Although persons over 65 years of age and persons who have served on a jury within 2 years are exempt from jury service under §13-5-25, neither the circuit court nor the deputy circuit clerk have authority to act unilaterally and strike such persons from the jury list. Such persons are eligible for jury service and have every lawful right and authority to serve if called and selected. When their names are drawn, such persons must be summoned the same as other prospective jurors and no one has authority to exempt any such juror from service unless he or she claims the privilege and asks to be excused. Thus, a judgment of conviction and sentence was reversed where the deputy circuit clerk unilaterally struck from the jury list all persons over 65 years of age and all persons who had served on a jury within the 2 preceding years. Adams v. State, 537 So. 2d 891, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1989).

It was not error to excuse veniremen who had served as petit jurors a few weeks prior to the trial. Brown v. State, 38 So. 316 (Miss. 1905).

2. Harmless error.

Although defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excusing two potential jurors because they had served on a jury in the past two years, rather than permitting those jurors the discretion to decide whether or not to serve, procedural bar aside, the error was harmless because defendant did not claim any constitutional violation or that he was in any manner prejudiced by the dismissal of the potential jurors. Gause v. State, 65 So.3d 295, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 2011), limited, Hall v. State, 127 So.3d 202, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 649 (Miss. 2013).

Although the trial court erred by informing two potential jurors that he was required to dismiss them because they had previously served on a jury in the last two years, the error was harmless, and defendant had not preserved his challenge for appellate review since there had not been a contemporaneous objection to the error. Trevillion v. State, 26 So.3d 1098, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 828 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

3. Illustrative cases.

Errors relating to the jury selection process were forfeited on appeal due to a failure to object contemporaneously below; at any rate, the outcome would have been the same because, while the trial court erred in appointing a foreperson, the trial court either did not commit error or cured other errors. Personal privilege exemptions had to be asserted by the individual, jurors who sat on a jury in the last 2 years could have been required to serve due to a lack of potential jurors, an error relating to a failure to complete the jury questionnaire was corrected during direct questioning at voir dire, and a juror’s answer to a question about prior convictions fulfilled the statutory requirements. Hall v. State, — So.3d —, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 125 (Miss. Mar. 17, 2016).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Grand Jury §§ 9, 12.

47 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev, Jury §§ 143-146.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 131 (order excusing juror).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries § 37.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 285, 286, 302-305.

Law Reviews.

1989 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Challenge to Jury. 59 Miss. L. J. 868, Winter, 1989.

§ 13-5-26. Jury box; deposit of names drawn from jury wheel; drawing and assignment of jurors; use of computer or electronic device for random selection.

  1. The circuit clerk shall maintain a jury box and shall place therein the names or identifying numbers of all prospective jurors drawn from the jury wheel.
  2. A judge or any court or any other state or county official having authority to conduct a trial or hearing with a jury within the county may direct the circuit clerk to draw and assign to that court or official the number of jurors he deems necessary for one or more jury panels or as required by law for a grand jury, except as otherwise provided by subsection (3) of this section. Upon receipt of the direction, and in a manner prescribed by the court, the circuit clerk shall publicly draw at random from the jury box the number or jurors specified.
  3. The court may order that the drawing and assigning of jurors pursuant to subsection (2) of this section may be performed by random selection of a computer or electronic device pursuant to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the court. The jurors drawn for jury service shall be assigned at random by the clerk to each jury panel in a manner prescribed by the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 6(1, 2); Laws, 1986, ch. 312, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. No deficiency in jury selection.

1. In general.

Trial judge’s questioning of circuit clerk established that clerk had complied, or substantially complied, with statute with respect to random selection of jurors to try defendant charged with attempting to obtain controlled substance by misrepresentation or fraud. Griffin v. State, 494 So. 2d 376, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2651 (Miss. 1986).

2. No deficiency in jury selection.

Jury was properly impaneled because the selected jurors were thoroughly questioned and deemed qualified for service during the voir dire examination and prior to being sworn in. Hall v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 610 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2019).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash a venire because defendant did not show that the exclusion of persons with surnames beginning with “T-Z,” which was due to an algorithm used by the county’s computer system, disproportionally affected any distinctive group in the county; defendant alleged no prejudice resulting from the trial court’s noncompliance with the statute, and failed to show that persons whose surnames began with “A” through “S” did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. Presley v. State, 9 So.3d 442, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 213 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

Under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-26, the circuit court did not violate method of drawing and summoning jury where defendant did not allege that any deficiency in jury selection resulted in prejudice to his case or that the nine jurors were not qualified to serve. Havard v. State, 986 So. 2d 333, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 756 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 987 So. 2d 451, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 557 (Miss. 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 8, 13, 19, 21.

47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 104, 105, 108, 120, 132, 133, 148, 199.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selection, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 7, 8, 39–42, 44, 45.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 308, 309, 311-313, 324, 328, 329, 333, 335, 336.

§ 13-5-27. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, effective from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1892, § 2365; 1906, § 2694; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2186; 1930, § 2039; 1942, § 1772; Laws, 1938, ch. 298; 1938, Ex. ch. 84; 1960, ch. 237; Am Laws, 1972, ch. 372, § 1]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-27 provided for the drawing of grand and petit jurors in open court.

§ 13-5-28. Summoning of person drawn for jury duty.

If a grand, petit or other jury is ordered to be drawn, the clerk thereafter shall cause each person drawn for jury service to be served with a summons, either personally or by mail, addressed to the juror at the juror’s usual residence, business or post office address, requiring the juror to report for jury service at a specified time and place.The summons shall include instructions to the potential jurors that explain, in layman’s terms, the provisions of Section 13-5-23.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 6(3); Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 10; Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 3; Laws, 2007, ch. 433, § 3, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2008.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2007, added the second sentence.

The 2006 amendment, in the version of the section effective until January 1, 2008, substituted “Until January 1, 2008” for “Until January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language; and in the version of the section effective from and after January 1, 2008, substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language.

The 2007 amendment, in the first sentence of both versions, inserted “the juror” following “addressed to” and “requiring,” and inserted “the juror’s” preceding “usual residence.”

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

When a jury is needed in justice court, the justice court clerk must notify the circuit clerk of the number of jurors to be summoned and the circuit clerk must draw the jury pool and issue summonses to those jurors. Section 13-5-28 allows the circuit clerk to serve the summonses either personally or by mail. Wilson, November 15, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0792.

§ 13-5-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1892, § 2366; 1906, § 2695; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2187; 1930, § 2040; 1942, § 1773]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-29 provided for the envelopes containing slips with jurors’ names to be opened and venire facias to be issued.

§ 13-5-30. Summoning of jurors where there is shortage of petit jurors drawn from jury box.

If there is an unanticipated shortage of available petit jurors drawn from a jury box, the court may require the sheriff to summon a sufficient number of petit jurors selected at random by the clerk from the jury box in a manner prescribed by the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 6(4), eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury § 22.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 108, 120.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selection, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 48-51.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 317-319, 326, 331.

§ 13-5-31. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 8 (3); 1857, ch. 61, art. 138; 1871, § 739; 1880, § 1687; 1892, § 2367; 1906, § 2696; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2188; 1930, § 2041; 1942, § 1774]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-31 pertained to the drawing of jurors in vacation term.

§ 13-5-32. Names of jurors drawn from jury box to be made public; exception.

The names of jurors drawn from the jury box shall be made available to the public unless the court determines in any instance that this information in the interest of justice should be kept confidential or its use limited in whole or in part.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 6(5), eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial court did not improperly sequester the names of the jurors in defendant’s trial for tax evasion. The judge decided in the case at bar to keep the jurors’ names secret based on events from defendant’s previous prosecution; moreover, defendant failed to properly brief this issue. King v. State, 897 So. 2d 981, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 689 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 896 So. 2d 373, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 224 (Miss. 2005).

Because defendant adopted son failed to show that sealing of the venire panel list pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-32 without notice or opportunity for a hearing prejudiced him in any way, the error was not a basis for reversal. King v. State, 857 So. 2d 702, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 450 (Miss. 2003).

Before a trial judge makes a determination not to make a jury list available to litigants or trial attorneys whose clients will have a cause for trial, he should cause the record clearly to demonstrate good and sufficient reason “in the interest of justice” as the section provides. Before making his determination to keep confidential or secret the names of the jurors drawn from the jury box, the litigants or counsel should have notice that such action is being considered by the trial judge; then the court should make its decision only after a hearing is accorded the defendant on the issue. Valentine v. State, 396 So. 2d 15, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 1977 (Miss. 1981).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 307, 308, 315.

§ 13-5-33. Juror may postpone jury service one time only; conditions for postponement; extreme emergency exception.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, individuals scheduled to appear for jury service have the right to postpone the date of their initial appearance for jury service one (1) time only. Postponements shall be granted upon request, provided that:
    1. The juror has not been granted a postponement within the past two (2) years;
    2. The prospective juror appears in person or contacts the clerk of the court by telephone, electronic mail or in writing to request a postponement; and
    3. Prior to the grant of a postponement with the concurrence of the clerk of the court, the prospective juror fixes a date certain to appear for jury service that is not more than six (6) months or two (2) terms of court after the date on which the prospective juror originally was called to serve and on which date the court will be in session, whichever is the longer period.
  2. A subsequent request to postpone jury service may be approved by a judicial officer only in the event of an extreme emergency, such as a death in the family, sudden illness, or a natural disaster or a national emergency in which the prospective juror is personally involved, that could not have been anticipated at the time the initial postponement was granted. Prior to the grant of a second postponement, the prospective juror must fix a date certain on which the individual will appear for jury service within six (6) months or two (2) terms of court after the postponement on a date when the court will be in session.
  3. The Administrative Office of Courts shall promulgate rules for the implementation of this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 14; Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 20, 2006).

Editor’s Notes —

A former §13-5-33 [Codes, 1892, § 2368; 1906, § 2697; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2190; 1930, § 2043; 1942, § 1776; Repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975] provided for the coroner or justice of the peace to perform the duties of the chancery clerk in relation to juries when the same person holds both clerks’ offices, and for the performance of such duties in case of absence or illness of a clerk or sheriff.

Laws of 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 20 provides:

“SECTION 20. Sections 8 through 15 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007.” Laws of 2006, ch. 437, § 4, extended the effective date of this section until January 1, 2008.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language.

§ 13-5-34. Punishment for failure to appear or to complete jury service.

  1. A person summoned for jury service who fails to appear or to complete jury service as directed, and who has failed to obtain a postponement in compliance with the provisions for requesting a postponement, or who fails to appear on the date set pursuant to Section 13-5-33, may be ordered by the court to appear and show cause for failure to comply with the summons.If the juror fails to show good cause for noncompliance with the summons, the juror may be held in civil contempt of court and may be fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or imprisoned not more than three (3) days, or both.The prospective juror may be excused from paying sanctions for good cause shown or in the interest of justice.
  2. In addition to, or in lieu of, the fine or imprisonment provided in subsection (1) of this section, the court may order that the prospective juror complete a period of community service for a period no less than if the prospective juror would have completed jury service, and provide proof of completion of this community service to the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 6(6); Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 11; Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 5; Laws, 2007, ch. 433, § 4, eff from and after Jan. 1, 2008.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, effective January 1, 2007, rewrote the section.

The 2006 amendment, in the version of the section effective until January 1, 2008, substituted “Until January 1, 2008” for “Until January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language; and in the version of the section effective from and after January 1, 2008, substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language.

The 2007 amendment made a minor stylistic change in the version effective until January 1, 2008; and in the version effective from and after January 1, 2008, substituted “may be ordered” for “shall be ordered” and “the juror may be held in civil contempt” for “he is in civil contempt,” and made gender neutral and minor stylistic changes.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 93- 99.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 122 (order for defaulting juror to show cause).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 345, 346.

§ 13-5-35. Employment protections for jurors.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any employer or any other person to persuade or attempt to persuade any juror to avoid jury service; to intimidate or to threaten any juror in that respect; or to remove or otherwise subject an employee to adverse employment action as a result of jury service if the employee notifies his or her employer that he or she has been summoned to serve as a juror within a reasonable period of time after receipt of a summons.
  2. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require or request an employee to use annual, vacation or sick leave for time spent responding to a summons for jury duty, time spent participating in the jury selection process, or time spent actually serving on a jury. Nothing in this provision shall be construed to require an employer to provide annual, vacation or sick leave to employees under the provisions of this statute who otherwise are not entitled to such benefits under company policies.
  3. Any violation of subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall be deemed an interference with the administration of justice and a contempt of court and punishable as such.
  4. A court shall automatically postpone and reschedule the service of a summoned juror employed by an employer with five (5) or fewer full-time employees, or their equivalent, if another employee of that employer has previously been summoned to appear during the same period. Such postponement will not constitute the excused individual’s right to one (1) automatic postponement under Section 13-5-33.

HISTORY: Laws, 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 15; Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 20, 2006).

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in an internal statutory reference by substituting “Section 13-5-33” for “Section 13-5-24” at the end of subsection (4). The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 12, 2019, meeting.

Editor's Notes —

Laws of 2004, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 1, § 20 provides:

“SECTION 20. Sections 8 through 15 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 2007.” Laws, 2006, ch. 437, § 6, extended the effective date of this section until January 1, 2008.

A former §13-5-35 [Codes, Hutchinson's 1848, ch. 61, art. 8 (5); 1857, ch. 61, art. 140; 1871, § 741; 1880, § 1692; 1892, § 2369; 1906, § 2698; Hemingway's 1917, § 2191; 1930, § 2044; 1942, § 1777; Repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975] provided for the summoning of jurors and penalties for failure of a juror to attend.

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment substituted “From and after January 1, 2008” for “From and after January 1, 2007” in the bracketed effective date language.

§ 13-5-36. Preservation of records and papers in connection with selection and service of jurors.

All records and papers compiled and maintained by the jury commission or the clerk in connection with selection and service of jurors shall be preserved by the clerk for four (4) years after the jury wheel used in their selection is emptied and refilled, and for any longer period ordered by the court.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 368 § 7, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

§ 13-5-37. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

[Codes, 1892, § 2370; 1906, § 2699; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2192; 1930, § 2045; 1942, § 1778]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-37 provided for a fine and contempt of court for officials who failed to perform specified duties pertaining to juries.

§ 13-5-38. Payment of cost of implementation of law.

In counties where the implementation of Sections 13-5-2 through 13-5-16, 13-5-21, 13-5-26 through 13-5-38, and 13-5-41, requires additional clerical or other personnel, the board of supervisors, in its discretion, may pay for such services out of the general county fund of the respective county.

HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 10, eff from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Editor’s Notes —

Sections 13-5-27, 13-5-29, 13-5-31 and 13-5-37 referred to in the paragraph were repealed by Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 11, effective from and after Jan. 1, 1975.

Cross References —

Selection and service of jurors, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47.

§ 13-5-39. Terms of grand juries limited.

Unless otherwise directed by an order of the senior circuit judge, not more than two (2) grand juries shall be drawn or impaneled during a calendar year at or for a term or terms of the circuit court in any county or judicial district of a county; provided, however, upon impanelment, a grand jury may be convened and reconvened in termtime and in vacation. It shall continue to serve from term to term until the next grand jury is impaneled, and it may return indictments to any term of court, notwithstanding that a term of court at which criminal business may be conducted shall intervene between the time the grand jury is impaneled and the time an indictment is returned.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 2189; 1930, § 2042; 1942, § 1775; Laws, 1910, ch. 107; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 1; Laws, 1984, ch. 351, eff from and after July 1, 1984.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Post-conviction relief was denied in a case where defendant entered a guilty plea to the crime of the sale of cocaine because an indictment was not void due to the fact that it was returned during a July term, but filed during a November term, since this was not prohibited under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-39; the grand jury continued to serve from term to term until the next grand jury was impaneled, and it was allowed to return indictments at any term of court. Belton v. State, 968 So. 2d 501, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 179 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 643 (Miss. 2007).

An indictment returned by grand jury impaneled in April and reconvened in September after an intervening term of court in July was not void since the statute fixing court terms in the county, §9-7-49, specifically provided that a grand jury should be impaneled at the April and October terms but left the question of impaneling for the January and July terms discretionary with the judge. J. B. Womack Constr. Co. v. Laws Constr. Co., 330 So. 2d 602, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1867 (Miss. 1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power of grand jury after term of court for which organized. 75 A.L.R.2d 544.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury § 15.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 88–91.

§ 13-5-41. Number of grand jurors.

The number of grand jurors shall not be less than fifteen (15) nor more than twenty-five (25), in the discretion of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2371; 1906, § 2700; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2193; 1930, § 2046; 1942, § 1779; Laws, 1896, ch. 84; Laws, 1974, ch. 378, § 9; Laws, 2013, ch. 476, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2013.

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment substituted “twenty-five (25)” for “twenty (20).”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Even if the appellate court assumed the person that sat on the grand jury was the same person that sat on the petit jury, it was unable to determine whether that person took part in the grand jury deliberations incident to the indictment against defendant. Havard v. State, 986 So. 2d 333, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 756 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 987 So. 2d 451, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 557 (Miss. 2008).

Where ground of motion to quash indictment in murder prosecution “for defects and irregularities in the drawing, summoning, impaneling and organization of the grand jury” was too broad, the supreme court would assume, to the advantage of defendant, that the basis was made particular by the introduction of testimony purporting to relate to the method of summoning and impaneling the grand jury. Gipson v. State, 203 Miss. 434, 35 So. 2d 327, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1948).

The trial judge cannot lawfully draw out and select only such names from the box as he desires in the formation of a grand jury and on proper objection to such grand jury an indictment found by them will be quashed. Sheppard v. State, 89 Miss. 147, 42 So. 544, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1906).

Where a grand jury of sixteen men was determined on by the court and after the impaneling of such a jury two of them were excused, the court was authorized to cause the number of jurymen to be increased to any number not exceeding twenty. Posey v. State, 86 Miss. 141, 38 So. 324, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1905).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury § 17.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selecting, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 55, 61–64.

§ 13-5-43. Impaneling as conclusive evidence of competency and qualifications.

Before swearing any grand juror as such, he shall be examined by the court, on oath, touching his qualification. After the grand jurors shall have been sworn and impaneled, no objection shall be raised, by plea or otherwise, to the grand jury, but the impaneling of the grand jury shall be conclusive evidence of its competency and qualifications. However, any party interested may challenge or except to the array for fraud.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 131; 1871, § 729; 1880, § 1667; 1892, § 2375; 1906, § 2704; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2197; 1930, § 2050; 1942, § 1784.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Swearing the jurors.

3. Time for objections.

4. Irregularities cured by statute.

5. Irregularities not cured by statute.

6. Challenge or exception to array.

7. Validity of indictments.

8. Impeachment of indictment by juror.

1. In general.

Supreme Court must indulge presumption that grand jury is composed of persons who have reasonable degree of intelligence and would perform their duties in accordance with law and evidence before them. State v. Pacific (Ex parte Jones County Grand Jury, First Judicial Dist.), 705 So. 2d 1308, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 747 (Miss. 1997).

Petitioner’s allegation in an application for writ of habeas corpus that his conviction constituted a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because of the systematic exclusion of members of his race from the lists from which grand and petit juries were selected in the county where he was indicted and convicted, and because of his ignorance and circumstances of his arrest and incarceration, and as a consequence of the law of Mississippi he was not able to challenge the competency of the grand jury, together with a showing of the speed in which the petitioner was tried following his indictment, were sufficient to entitle the petitioner to a hearing on the question of whether he had adequately safeguarded his constitutional rights during his trial for murder. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4002 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

Grand jury which returned indictment is not shown to be illegal on hearing on motion for new trial after conviction of felonious assault by cutting with knife when circuit clerk merely stated that all jurors were white men, and it was neither shown nor intimated that there were no names of Negroes in jury box out of which grand and petit jury were drawn, but it did appear that jury boxes were practically exhausted after these juries had been drawn, it being common knowledge that number of Negroes who register and qualify for jury service are almost nominal in comparison with number of white persons who do so. Ferrell v. State, 208 Miss. 539, 45 So. 2d 127, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1950).

It is duty of circuit and chancery clerks, board of supervisors and sheriff to comply strictly with all of requirements of statutes in manner of listing, drawing and selecting jurors, compiling jury lists, and summoning and impaneling juries, but since statutes on the subject are merely directory, judgment will not be reversed where there was no radical departure from statutory scheme of selecting and impaneling jury and jury selected was fair and impartial. Lott v. State, 204 Miss. 610, 37 So. 2d 782, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 394 (Miss. 1948).

On motion to quash jury list from which grand and petit juries were to be chosen, for alleged reason that board of supervisors had not selected names of jurors in manner required by law governing selection of qualified electors, placing names in jury box, and subsequent drawing of juries, it is competent to show by testimony of chancery and circuit clerks manner in which statutory requirements were complied with. Lott v. State, 204 Miss. 610, 37 So. 2d 782, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 394 (Miss. 1948).

The strict language of this section [Code 1942, § 1784], that the impaneling of the grand jury shall be conclusive evidence of its competence and qualification, permits of no exception. Reynolds v. State, 199 Miss. 409, 24 So. 2d 781, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1946).

Unless the contrary appear from the record, the presumption is that the grand jury was legally organized. Chase v. State, 46 Miss. 683, 1872 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1872).

This statute completely cuts off the plea in abatement challenging the fitness and qualifications of the grand jury or of any of its members. Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1871), overruled, Smith v. State, 58 Miss. 867, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1881), overruled, Flowers v. State, 473 So. 2d 164, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2140 (Miss. 1985); Durrah v. State, 44 Miss. 789, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1871).

2. Swearing the jurors.

A defendant may, in the discretion of the court, after a plea of not guilty, move to quash the indictment on the ground that the record failed to show that the grand jury was sworn. Hardy v. State, 96 Miss. 844, 51 So. 460, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1910).

A motion in an arrest of judgment should be overruled where based on objection that grand jury was not sworn in the absence of a record to the contrary. Hays v. State, 96 Miss. 153, 50 So. 557, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 30 (Miss. 1909).

3. Time for objections.

Defendant argued, on appeal, that his indictment on two counts of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon should have been dismissed because the alleged victim’s brother-in-law sat on the grand jury that indicted defendant; however, defendant failed to submit this issue to the trial court, either in a motion to dismiss, or in defendant’s motion for J.N.O.V. Townsend v. State, 939 So. 2d 796, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 552 (Miss. 2006).

Where the accused had been in jail during the session of the grand jury throughout the previous week, the court-appointed defense counsel resided in the county seat of the county where the rape indictment was returned, and it was not claimed that no opportunity was afforded to the defense for the making of a motion to quash the indictment at the time required by this section [Code 1942, § 1784], a later motion to quash indictment was properly overruled. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

It is matter of state procedure as to when objections to indictment shall be raised to avoid expense and delay where no right of accused under federal Constitution is involved. Flowers v. State, 209 Miss. 86, 41 So. 2d 352, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 800, 94 L. Ed. 1360, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2045 (U.S. 1950).

Manner in which lists of jurors are selected by board of supervisors and placed in jury box involves solely question of state procedure and trial court is not in error in overruling motion to quash indictment on that ground when objections to qualification of grand jurors is not made before they are impaneled and defendant was at time represented by able lawyer and had reason to believe his case would be investigated by grand jury and he could have obtained information as to venire from which grand jury would be drawn. Flowers v. State, 209 Miss. 86, 41 So. 2d 352, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 800, 94 L. Ed. 1360, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2045 (U.S. 1950).

This section [Code 1942, § 1784], requires that objections to qualifications of grand jurors be made, if at all, before they are impaneled, unless accused has been denied opportunity for doing so, and objection cannot be raised afterward. Flowers v. State, 209 Miss. 86, 41 So. 2d 352, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 800, 94 L. Ed. 1360, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2045 (U.S. 1950); Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958); Gordon v. State, 160 So. 2d 73 (Miss. 1964).

Motion to quash jury list from which grand jury was chosen, made by defendant after indictment by grand jury, but before arraignment, is made too late as strict language of this section [Code 1942, § 1784] that impaneling of grand jury shall be conclusive evidence of its competence and qualifications admits of no exceptions. Lott v. State, 204 Miss. 610, 37 So. 2d 782, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 394 (Miss. 1948).

It is too late to make a motion to quash an indictment where objection to the illegal organization of a grand jury had not been made before it was impaneled. State v. Forbes, 134 Miss. 425, 98 So. 844, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1924).

In a motion to quash an indictment on a right claimed under the United States Constitution, the state court is bound by decisions of the United States court and the objection may be taken by plea in abatement or motion to quash before a plea of not guilty is entered. Hill v. State, 89 Miss. 23, 42 So. 380, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 42 (Miss. 1906).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1784] challenges to grand jurors for disqualifications must be submitted before the grand jury is impaneled, regardless of whether the disqualification arises from bias or personal incompetency. Cain v. State, 86 Miss. 505, 38 So. 227, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1905).

The statute applies to the case of a defendant who was not advised that his case was to come before the grand jury for investigation and precludes him from raising any question as to the competency of any one or more grand jurors by motion to quash the indictment. Cain v. State, 86 Miss. 505, 38 So. 227, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1905).

This section [Code 1942, § 1784] requires that objections to the qualifications of grand jurors must be made, if at all, before they are impaneled, and they cannot be raised afterward. Dixon v. State, 74 Miss. 271, 20 So. 839, 1896 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1896).

4. Irregularities cured by statute.

After the impaneling of a grand jury, certain members having been excused, the court directed that certain bystanders serve as grand jurors, though such persons were not among those listed by the supervisors for jury service, and though their names were not on the venire drawn for service during that term, defendant made no direct challenge and took no exception at the time. In the absence of any showing that the grand jury was not fair and impartial, there was no ground for reversal of a conviction on an indictment found by it. Posey v. State, 86 Miss. 141, 38 So. 324, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1905).

In the absence of evidence that a grand jury was unfair and of an objection at the time, the court may select grand jurors from bystanders. Posey v. State, 86 Miss. 141, 38 So. 324, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1905).

5. Irregularities not cured by statute.

The trial judge should not select a jury from slips with jurors’ names thereon turned up where he ignores the names of those he does not wish to serve and exceptions to his actions should be sustained and his error is not cured by the statute. Sheppard v. State, 89 Miss. 147, 42 So. 544, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1906).

6. Challenge or exception to array.

Even though grand jury was improperly selected, once it had been impaneled defendant could not thereafter challenge its competency or qualifications except as to a challenge to the array for fraud, and consequently where there was no such challenge, motion to quash indictment after jury had been impaneled was properly overruled. Reynolds v. State, 199 Miss. 409, 24 So. 2d 781, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1946).

An objection to the grand jury as a body, on the ground that the sheriff, whom defendant was charged with assaulting, assisted in the drawing of the jury, could not be made by motion to quash indictment but only by a challenge to the array for fraud. Long v. State, 133 Miss. 33, 96 So. 740, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1923).

7. Validity of indictments.

An indictment charging the defendant with the crimes of perjury and conspiracy to commit perjury would not be quashed based upon the fact that the same grand jurors who heard the defendant testify, and were therefore witnesses to his alleged perjury, were the same grand jurors who returned the indictment against him, even though it would have been the better practice not to have sought the perjury and conspiracy indictments from the same grand jury who heard the alleged perjury, where there was no evidence of any fraud or wrongdoing on the part of the grand jurors. Smallwood v. State, 584 So. 2d 733, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1991).

Where the accused had been in jail during the session of the grand jury throughout the previous week, the court-appointed defense counsel resided in the county seat of the county where the rape indictment was returned, and it was not claimed that no opportunity was afforded to the defense for the making of a motion to quash the indictment at the time required by this section [Code 1942, § 1784], a later motion to quash indictment was properly overruled. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

Indictment for murder held not void because grand juror allegedly serves as both election commissioner and grand juror. Robinson v. State, 178 Miss. 568, 173 So. 451, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 228 (Miss. 1937).

A county prosecuting attorney may be present with the grand jury while considering a case and may find a valid indictment while he is present but he must not improperly influence the jury. State v. Coulter, 104 Miss. 764, 61 So. 706, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1913); Le Barron v. State, 107 Miss. 663, 65 So. 648, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 128 (Miss. 1914).

An indictment found when only fourteen grand jurors were present and twelve or more concurred when finding it and was returned into court by the full grand jury of eighteen members was valid. McCoy v. State, 101 Miss. 613, 57 So. 622, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1911).

The foreman of a grand jury has no authority to discharge a member thereof but the court may do so and he should supply the place by selecting another juror. McCoy v. State, 101 Miss. 613, 57 So. 622, 1911 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1911).

It is unlawful for the sheriff to be called into the grand jury room to aid in examining a witness and an indictment based on such testimony is invalid. Herrington v. State, 98 Miss. 410, 53 So. 783, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1910).

The minutes of the court must show that the grand jury was sworn, otherwise an indictment found by them is void. Hardy v. State, 96 Miss. 844, 51 So. 460, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1910).

A plea of not guilty does not waive the right to file a motion to quash a void indictment since permitting such motion is discretionary. Hardy v. State, 96 Miss. 844, 51 So. 460, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1910).

8. Impeachment of indictment by juror.

Grand jurors cannot impeach their indictment by their testimony. Lewis v. State, 132 Miss. 200, 96 So. 169, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1923).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 9-12, 18.

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Grand Jury, Form 2 (challenge to array of grand jury).

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 11, 24-36.

§ 13-5-45. Foreman to be appointed and all to be sworn.

The court shall appoint one of the grand jurors to be foreman of the grand jury, to whom the following oath shall be administered in open court, in the presence of the rest of the grand jurors, to wit:

“You, as foreman of this grand inquest, shall diligently inquire into, and true presentment make, of all such matters and things as shall be given you in charge, or otherwise come to your knowledge, touching the present service. The counsel of the state, your fellows, and your own you will keep secret. You shall not present any person through malice, hatred or ill will, nor shall you leave any person unpresented through fear, favor or affection, or for any reward, hope or promise thereof, but in all your presentments, you shall present the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to the best of your skill and understanding. So help you God.”

And the following oath shall be administered to the other jurors, to wit:

“The same oath that your foreman has now taken before you on his part, you, and each of you, shall well and truly observe, and keep on your respective parts. So help you God.”

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 1 (128); 1857, ch. 61, art. 130; 1871, § 731; 1880, § 1666; 1892, § 2372; 1906, § 2701; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2194; 1930, § 2047; 1942, § 1780.

Cross References —

Swearing of state grand jurors pursuant to this section, see §13-7-15.

Foreman and deputy foreman to be sworn pursuant to this section, see §13-7-17.

Grand juror compensation, see §25-7-61.

Rules pertaining to grand juries, see MRCrP 13.1 through 13.7.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A trial court did not err in overruling a defendant’s motion to quash the indictment and/or demur to the indictment, even though the minutes of the court did not reflect that a grand jury foreman was appointed or that the foreman was given the oath as required by §13-5-45, where one of the names of the grand jurors was listed on the indictment as the grand jury foreman, the foreman signed the grand jury report and indictment in the slot where the foreman signs, and the foreman’s name was listed along with the other sworn grand jurors, since the statute does not provide that the court minutes must reflect that a grand jury foreman was appointed and sworn. Rogers v. State, 599 So. 2d 930, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss.), overruled in part, Mayfield v. State, 612 So. 2d 1120, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 861 (Miss. 1992).

A defendant’s claim that his indictment for murder was void on the ground that black foremen were systematically not appointed to the grand jury would be rejected where there was no testimony in the record to the effect that failure to select a black grand jury foreman had been intentionally or purposely done and where the crucial period for determining discrimination did not begin until 1975 when the new Jury Selection Act went into effect and there was an insufficient period of time to enable the Court to determine whether there had been constitutionally prohibited discrimination. Johnson v. State, 404 So. 2d 553, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2234 (Miss. 1981).

In a homicide prosecution, the trial judge correctly overruled a defense motion to quash the indictment, venire and panel on the ground that blacks and women were systematically excluded from serving as grand jury foremen, where Mississippi followed the “random” method of jury selection and where the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of jury foremen by trial judges. Herring v. State, 374 So. 2d 784, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2347 (Miss. 1979).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

If a grand juror, including a foreman, is absent, the court shall have the authority to cause another to be sworn in his place. The court, not the District Attorney, is responsible for appointing a “substitute” foreman if necessary, who must be administered the foreman’s oath in open court, in the presence of the rest of the grand jurors. Peterson, March 9, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00113, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 90.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury § 26.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 60, 65–71.

§ 13-5-47. Judge to charge the grand jury.

The judge shall charge the grand jury concerning its duties and expound the law to it as he shall deem proper, and he shall particularly charge it concerning enforcement of the following statutes:

  1. those against gambling and the unlawful selling and handling of intoxicating liquors;
  2. those relating to gambling with minors, and the giving or selling to them tobacco, narcotics, or liquors;
  3. those providing for the assessment, collection and disbursement of the public revenues, both state and county;
  4. those defining the duties of public officers;
  5. those relating to the collection and paying over of fines and forfeitures;
  6. those relating to providing fire escapes in hotels, theaters and other buildings;
  7. those relating to the management of sixteenth section school trust lands; and
  8. all such other statutes as he shall deem proper at any time.

    Moreover, the judge shall especially charge the grand jury with respect to the state forest fire laws as set forth in Section 95-5-25 and Section 92-17-13, and charge that the grand jury shall report to him as to the status of forest protection in the county.

    It shall be unlawful for the district attorney or other officer, or person, to deliver to the grand jury the charge required by this section to be delivered by the judge, but this shall not prevent the judge from having the circuit clerk read the charge proposed by the judge, to the grand jury in the presence of the judge, when, by reason of physical infirmity, the judge shall be unable to deliver his charge.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2373; 1906, § 2702; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2195; 1930, § 2048; 1942, §§ 1781, 1782; Laws, 1908, ch. 179; Laws, 1932, ch. 145; Laws, 1970, ch. 340, § 1; Laws, 1978, ch. 525, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1978.

Cross References —

Application of this section to swearing of jurors for state grand jury, see §13-7-15.

Duty of grand jury to inquire into violations of laws relating to wild animals, birds and fish, see §49-5-47.

Duty of grand jury to inquire into condition of county roads, see §65-7-119.

Criminal offense of firing woods or fields of another, see §97-17-13.

Necessity that indictment or presentment be concurred in by twelve grand jurors, see §99-7-11.

Duty of grand jury to inquire into breaches of peace bonds, see §99-23-17.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Extent of authority to charge.

3. Subpoena.

1. In general.

A circuit judge’s supplemental charge to the grand jury that citizens had reported to the court that the district attorney had “failed to investigate and prosecute” certain crimes and that, if the jurors should “determine that the district attorney has actively disobeyed investigation of these matters,” they were to apply to the court for further instructions singled out the district attorney and his office as targets for grand jury action and should have been expunged for exceeding the judge’s authority which did not extend to denunciation of individuals. Necaise v. Logan, 341 So. 2d 91, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1492 (Miss. 1976).

One indicted for robbery committed seven months prior thereto is not prejudiced by circuit judge’s charge to grand jury which made indictment that “there has been a series of outbreaks of crime in your community recently. I _______________ want you to bring me these indictments by noon today,” as remark did not direct undue attention to any particular single crime. Goss v. State, 205 Miss. 177, 38 So. 2d 700, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 424 (Miss. 1949).

Where the defendant charged with selling liquor relies solely on her testimony as her only evidence, jurors to try the same are incompetent who have heard the judge charge the grand jury that “blind tigers” were unworthy of belief and would commit perjury. Johnson v. State, 106 Miss. 598, 64 So. 261, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 167 (Miss. 1913).

It was prejudicial error as against one convicted of unlawfully selling liquor for the court in charging the grand jury relative to such offense to say, “Have you ever heard the name of C. F. [defendant’s name]?” Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1904).

It is improper for a judge, directly or indirectly, to designate a particular individual as making unlawful sales of intoxicants. If he does and the individual is indicted on seasonable motion the indictment will be quashed. Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1904).

A conviction for such unlawful sale will be reversed if on overruling an application for a continuance the judge announces, in the presence of jurors, that there has been much complaint about the failure to convict “these criminals” and that the court feared it largely due to continuances. Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1904).

It is sufficient ground for quashing an indictment under Code 1892 §§ 1120, 1121 (Code 1906 §§ 1201, 1202) that the grand jury sought to be finally discharged without indicting defendant and the court refused to discharge them and instructed them specifically as to the criminal character of defendant’s business, saying that the law was plain and it was of opinion that it had sufficient evidence to find an indictment, that other grand juries had indicted, and that the business in which defendant was engaged was a flagrant violation of the statute. Blau v. State, 82 Miss. 514, 34 So. 153, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1903).

2. Extent of authority to charge.

Grand juries are statutorily charged to investigate possible violations of statutes related to expenditure of county funds by county officials. State v. Pacific (Ex parte Jones County Grand Jury, First Judicial Dist.), 705 So. 2d 1308, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 747 (Miss. 1997).

Judge cannot charge grand jury to investigate and/or indict a particular person and, thus, cannot charge grand jury not to investigate and/or indict a particular person. State v. Pacific (Ex parte Jones County Grand Jury, First Judicial Dist.), 705 So. 2d 1308, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 747 (Miss. 1997).

Trial court did not have authority to enjoin county grand jury from investigating district attorney’s alleged receipt of improper payments. State v. Pacific (Ex parte Jones County Grand Jury, First Judicial Dist.), 705 So. 2d 1308, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 747 (Miss. 1997).

3. Subpoena.

Trial court properly denied a public utility’s motion to quash a grand jury subpoena because issuance of the subpoena was a lawful exercise of the grand jury’s investigative authority, and the evidence was relevant to its investigation and had the potential to result in criminal indictments; when the grand jury seeks information relevant to a legitimate criminal investigation, and that information has the potential to support probable cause to indict, the grand jury should not be hindered. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. State, 132 So.3d 568, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 2014).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Modern status of rule regarding necessity of instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal trial-state cases. 36 A.L.R.4th 1046.

Necessity and content of instructions to jury respecting reasons for or inferences from accused’s absence from state criminal trial. 31 A.L.R.4th 676.

Instructions to jury as to credibility of child’s testimony in criminal case. 32 A.L.R.4th 1196.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury § 26.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 100–103.

§ 13-5-49. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1973, ch. 342, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 22, 1973).

[Codes, 1892, § 2374; 1906, § 2703; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2196; 1930, § 2049; 1942, § 1783]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-49 required all county officers to attend court, hear the charges of the grand jury, and be charged as to their duties.

§ 13-5-51. Places of absent jurors to be filled.

If, after the grand jury has been sworn, any of the members thereof should absent themselves from any cause, or become incompetent to sit, or be excused by the court, the court shall have power to cause others to be sworn in their places.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 1 (131); 1857, ch. 61, art. 132; 1871, § 730; 1880, § 1669; 1892, § 2376; 1906, § 2705; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2198; 1930, § 2051; 1942, § 1785.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

After impaneling a grand jury of sixteen and excusing two members thereof the court was authorized to increase the number of grand jurors to eighteen. Posey v. State, 86 Miss. 141, 38 So. 324, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1905).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Based on the Section 13-5-51 and Posey v. State, 38 So. 324 (Miss. 1905), the court, in accordance with the public policy of the state, may fill the vacancies on a grand jury by the same or a similar method or provided by statute for the selection of the original jurors. Landrum, March 29, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0176.

If a grand juror, including a foreman, is absent, the court shall have the authority to cause another to be sworn in his place. The court, not the District Attorney, is responsible for appointing a “substitute” foreman if necessary, who must be administered the foreman’s oath in open court, in the presence of the rest of the grand jurors. Peterson, March 9, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00113, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 90.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury § 16.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries § 65.

§ 13-5-53. Adjournment of grand jury to a day; pay in such case.

The court or judge, in its discretion, may adjourn the grand jury to a subsequent day in termtime or vacation, and the jurors shall receive pay only for the number of days they shall be actually engaged in the performance of their duties.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1670; 1892, § 2377; 1906, § 2706; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2199; 1930, § 2052; 1942, § 1786; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 19, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References —

Keeping of jury fee book by circuit court clerk, see §9-7-131.

Imposition and collection of jury-tax in circuit court, see §9-7-133.

Making and filing of bill of costs generally, see §11-53-65.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In a prosecution for capital murder an indictment returned by a grand jury was not void on the asserted ground that the grand jury was recalled by the district attorney’s office, where the judge recalled the grand jury initially, where once the grand jury was impanelled or recalled it was in session for the duration of the term or until discharged, and where in the present case the district attorney merely selected the days it would actually meet and was not recalling the grand jury. Oates v. State, 421 So. 2d 1025, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2267 (Miss. 1982).

The fact that the grand jury was in session at the time defendant was arrested for armed robbery and then adjourned without returning an indictment, has no bearing on the question of the right to release on bail, in absence of proof of any investigation of the case by the grand jury. Wooton v. Bethea, 209 Miss. 374, 47 So. 2d 158, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 401 (Miss. 1950).

A grand jury may be recalled after it is discharged. Bell v. State, 118 Miss. 140, 79 So. 85, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1918); Kyzar v. State, 125 Miss. 79, 87 So. 415, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1921).

Under ch. 253 Laws of 1916 it is mandatory that a circuit judge impanel a grand jury during the first half of each term of court but there is no limitation as to how long it shall continue. Bell v. State, 118 Miss. 140, 79 So. 85, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1918).

Under Code 1906, §§ 2706, 2718, the court may reassemble the grand jury after its discharge when necessary during the same term of the court. Haynes v. State, 93 Miss. 670, 47 So. 522 (Miss. 1908).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 95–98, 100, 101.

§ 13-5-55. Grand jury to inspect jail; sheriff punishable.

Each grand jury which is impaneled shall make a personal inspection of the county jail, its condition, sufficiency for the safekeeping of prisoners, and their accommodation and health, and make reports thereof to the court. For any violation or neglect of duty as to the jail, the sheriff may be punished as for a misdemeanor, or may be fined as for a contempt, such not to exceed Fifty Dollars ($50.00).

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 64, art. 251; 1871, § 2844; 1880, § 1673; 1892, § 2378; 1906, § 2707; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2200; 1930, § 2053; 1942, § 1787; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 20.

Cross References —

Duty of sheriff to furnish prisoners proper necessities, see §§19-25-71,47-1-51.

Criminal offense of maltreating county prisoners, see §47-1-27.

Duty of grand jury to examine records of county prisoners and their treatment and condition, see §47-1-31.

Clothing and food to be furnished county convicts, see §47-1-47.

Hours of labor of county convicts, see §47-1-47.

Furnishing of medical and surgical aid to county prisoners, see §47-1-57.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A sheriff may provide a meal from the county jail at no cost to the members of the grand jury as part of their inspection of the county jail. Caranna, April 21, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0207.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 2, 3, 33, 34 et seq.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 104–115, 116, 117, 123–133.

§ 13-5-57. Grand jury may examine all county offices.

The grand jury shall have free access at all proper hours to the papers, records, accounts and books of all county officers, for all examinations which, in its discretion, it may see fit to make, and may make report to the court in relation thereto.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 64, art. 251; 1871, § 2845; 1880, § 1674; 1892, § 2379; 1906, § 2708; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2201; 1930, § 2054; 1942, § 1788.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of statute authorizing grand jury to submit report concerning public servant’s noncriminal misconduct. 63 A.L.R.3d 586.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 2, 3, 33, 34 et seq.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 104–115, 116, 117, 123–133.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 137, March 1979.

§ 13-5-59. Grand jury to examine tax collector’s books.

It shall be the duty of each grand jury which is impaneled to examine the tax collector’s books and his reports and settlements, and make report thereon.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 1675; 1892, § 2380; 1906, § 2709; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2202; 1930, § 2055; 1942, § 1789; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 21.

Cross References —

Duty of clerk of board of supervisors to examine accounts, dockets and records of county officers and to report to grand jury, see §19-17-17.

Monthly report of county tax collector of all taxes collected by him during previous month, see §27-29-11.

Report and settlement of county tax collector at end of fiscal year, see §27-29-13.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 104–115, 116, 117, 123–133.

§ 13-5-61. Grand jury not to disclose secrets of jury-room.

A grand juror, except when called as a witness in court, shall not disclose any proceeding or action had by the grand jury in relation to offenses brought before it, within six (6) months after final adjournment of the grand jury upon which he served, nor shall any grand juror disclose the name or testimony of any witness who has been before the grand jury on pain of fine or imprisonment for contempt of court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 64, art. 252; 1871, § 2846; 1880, § 1676; 1892, § 2381; 1906, § 2710; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2203; 1930, § 2056; 1942, § 1790; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Cross References —

Exemption of jury deliberations from provisions of open meetings law, see §25-41-3.

Penalty on grand juror for disclosing facts about indictments, see §97-9-53.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The general rules of grand jury secrecy have no application to testimony given by witnesses who are to be used by the State at a pretrial hearing or at trial with respect to charges lodged by an indictment rendered and served as a result of such testimony. Addkison v. State, 608 So. 2d 304, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 452 (Miss. 1992).

Grand jurors are prohibited from giving evidence under oath and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing to determine the effect of improper influences on a grand jury would be prohibited. Hood v. State, 523 So. 2d 302, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1988).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discovery, in civil proceeding, of records of criminal investigation by state grand jury. 69 A.L.R.4th 298.

What are “matters occurring before the grand jury” within prohibition of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.50 A.L.R. Fed. 675.

What is “judicial proceeding” within Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permitting disclosure of matters occurring before grand jury when so directed by court preliminarily to or in connection with such proceeding. 52 A.L.R. Fed. 411.

Who are “government personnel” within meaning of Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to whom matters occurring before grand jury may be disclosed. 54 A.L.R. Fed. 805.

Relief remedy, or sanction for violation of Rule 6(e) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, prohibiting disclosure of matters occurring before grand jury. 73 A.L.R. Fed. 112.

§ 13-5-63. Witnesses before grand jury may be subpoenaed and sworn.

The foreman of the grand jury shall have power to order subpoenas for all witnesses desired to be produced, and he shall also have power to swear all witnesses. A record shall be kept by the foreman and returned to court, certified and signed by the foreman, of the names of all witnesses sworn before the grand jury.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 61, art. 134; 1871, § 735; 1880, § 1677; 1892, § 2382; 1906, § 2711; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2204; 1930, § 2057; 1942, § 1791.

Cross References —

Issuance of subpoenas to compel attendance of witnesses in court, see §§13-3-93,99-9-11.

Applications by district attorney to clerk of circuit court in vacation for subpoena for witnesses to attend before grand jury at next term, see §99-9-23.

Attachment of witnesses failing to appear before grand jury, see §99-9-25.

Issuance of subpoena for a witness by justice of the peace, see §99-33-5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The opinion of a well-respected federal judge was improper influence and such evidence should not have been presented to the grand jury. Hood v. State, 523 So. 2d 302, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 74 (Miss. 1988).

The filing of the list of witnesses sworn before the grand jury in the circuit clerk’s grand jury docket prior to trial fulfilled the requirements of §13-5-63. Shaw v. State, 521 So. 2d 1278, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2953 (Miss. 1987).

Statute was complied with where list of witnesses was filed with clerk, which constituted return to court. Shaw v. State, 513 So. 2d 916, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2816 (Miss. 1987).

The important and solemn responsibilities of the grand jury ought to be performed without fear or favor and without any manner of influence, and the door to the grand jury should be closed to outsiders who are not witnesses and who have no official business to perform. Case v. State, 220 So. 2d 289, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1969).

It is improper for a private prosecuting attorney to go before the grand jury. Case v. State, 220 So. 2d 289, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1969).

A committee of the bar association whose motives were admittedly good should not be permitted to appear before the grand jury. Case v. State, 220 So. 2d 289, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1969).

The fact that a forestry commission employee, who investigated a forest fire and talked to the witnesses but had no personal knowledge of the facts, testified before the grand jury that he brought the case up in justice of the peace court and had the witnesses there for the preliminary hearing, did not place him in the category of a special prosecutor employed to assist with the prosecution, and hence his appearance before the grand jury was not an improper influence. Case v. State, 220 So. 2d 289, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1969).

The appearance of a forestry commission employee, who had investigated a forest fire and talked to the witnesses, but had no personal knowledge of the facts, did not constitute an improper influence on the grand jury which indicted the defendant on a charge of feloniously firing woods not his own. Case v. State, 220 So. 2d 289, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1969).

Witnesses who voluntarily appear before grand juries and other investigative bodies have a constitutional right not to be required to testify against themselves. Kellum v. State, 194 So. 2d 492, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1410 (Miss. 1967).

Presence during session in grand jury room of any person other than the witness undergoing examination and the duly authorized prosecuting officer is improper, in the absence of any imperative necessity therefor. Sanders v. State, 198 Miss. 587, 22 So. 2d 500, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1945).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of indictment where grand jury heard incompetent witness. 39 A.L.R.3d 1064.

Am. Jur.

12 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Grand Jury, Form 1 (subpoena to appear before grand jury).

38 Am. Jur. Trials, Representing the Grand Jury Target Witness, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 113, 134, 145-149, 159-225.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 137, March 1979.

§ 13-5-65. Impaneling of petit juries.

After the drawing of the grand jury, the remaining jurors in attendance shall be impaneled into three petit juries for the first week of court if there be a sufficient number left, and, if not, the court may direct a sufficient number for that purpose to be drawn and summoned. If there be more than enough jurors for the three juries, or for two juries if the court shall direct only two to be impaneled, the excess may be discharged, or they may be retained, in the discretion of the court, to serve as talesmen. If so retained, they shall have the privilege of members of the regular panel, of exemption from service.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2383; 1906, § 2712; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2205; 1930, § 2058; 1942, § 1792; Laws, 1938, ch. 301.

Cross References —

Summoning and impaneling of jurors for special court of eminent domain, see §§11-27-11,11-27-13.

Summoning of jurors for trial before justice of peace, see §11-9-143.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Drawing jurors from bystanders.

1. In general.

In prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, where only four jurors were on the jury panel and presumably twelve jurors were at the time deliberating another case, and trial judge entered order adjudicating that there were insufficient number of jurors on the petit jury panels for the week from which to obtain a jury to try the case and the sheriff was directed to summon from the body of the county twelve men to serve as jurors in the case and the sheriff called additional jurors from the bystanders in the courtroom and the jury so impaneled was tendered for trial, defendant’s motion to quash the panel should have been sustained and enough jurors to compute the jury panels should have been drawn from the jury box and summoned. Moffett v. State, 220 Miss. 587, 71 So. 2d 303, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 475 (Miss. 1954).

It is only when the full panels have been drawn and made up and are subsequently exhausted that the trial judge may direct the sheriff to select additional men from the body of the county without drawing them from the jury box. Moffett v. State, 220 Miss. 587, 71 So. 2d 303, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 475 (Miss. 1954).

A fairer trial was assured the defendant in a murder prosecution by the court’s overruling a motion, made after the case had been called for trial and while the jury was being selected, to call additional jurors from the jury box after the regular panel and special venire had both been exhausted, leaving the defendant with only two peremptory challenges which he immediately expended, than would have been by drawing from the general jury box which was so nearly depleted that many jurors would have had to be drawn from the box of the district where the homicide occurred. Lewis v. State, 201 Miss. 48, 28 So. 2d 122, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 785, 67 S. Ct. 1305, 91 L. Ed. 1816 (U.S. 1947).

This section [Code 1942, § 1792], applies to drawing of jurors for regular panels, and is inapplicable to jurors summoned to complete a panel for the trial of a particular case made necessary by the exhaustion of regular panels for the week. Smith v. State, 196 Miss. 524, 18 So. 2d 300, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1944).

Where both of two regular panels for the week became exhausted before the jury in a criminal case was completed, whereupon the court ordered the sheriff “to go into the body of the county and bring in 13 jurors,” which the sheriff did, summoning no jurors who were then in the courtroom, defendant’s objection that jurors for completion of the panel should be drawn from the jury box as required by this section [Code 1942, § 1792] and not from a panel composed in whole or in part of jurors so summoned by sheriff, was without merit. Smith v. State, 196 Miss. 524, 18 So. 2d 300, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1944).

The court should not lecture the petit jury and acquaint them with his desire to have a business term and have the court self-supporting, although such lecture is not ground for reversal. Butler v. State, 102 Miss. 575, 59 So. 845, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1912); Cook v. State, 59 So. 846 (Miss. 1912).

2. Drawing jurors from bystanders.

The circuit court did not err in refusing defendant’s request in a prosecution for burglary to complete the jury, where there was an insufficient number, by drawing additional names from the general jury box of the county, and in directing the sheriff to complete the required number from bystanders, where the words providing that juries might be completed from the bystanders as it appeared in the former enactment and omitted under the amendatory act, applied only to the original organization of the court in the first week of the term; in other words, neither Code 1930, § 2058, nor chapter 301, Laws of 1938, dealt with or gave directions to the trial court as to the procedure in handling a jury after the original organization of the court in the first week of that term. McCary v. State, 187 Miss. 78, 192 So. 442, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Miss. 1939).

Where only sixteen of twenty jurors summoned were present and court excused eight, there was no irregularity where rest were called from bystanders sheriff requested to be present. Harris v. State, 155 Miss. 794, 125 So. 253, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1929).

Panel should not be quashed except for fraud and unless there was total departure from course described by statute. Harris v. State, 155 Miss. 794, 125 So. 253, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1929).

Persons whom sheriff had previously notified to be at court were bystanders within jury statute. Harris v. State, 155 Miss. 794, 125 So. 253, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1929).

That judge anticipated shortage of jurors and asked sheriff to request persons to be present at court did not show departure from statute. Harris v. State, 155 Miss. 794, 125 So. 253, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1929).

Where the regular panel are disqualified the court trying the case may form a jury with talesmen summoned from the bystanders. Whitehead v. State, 97 Miss. 537, 52 So. 259, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1910).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Impaneling or selection of jury in accused’s absence. 26 A.L.R.2d 762.

Juror’s reading of newspaper account of trial in criminal case during its progress as ground for mistrial, new trial or reversal. 31 A.L.R.2d 417.

Cure of prejudice resulting from statement by prospective juror during voir dire, in presence of other prospective jurors, as to defendant’s guilt. 50 A.L.R.4th 969.

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 148 et seq.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 91-112 (selecting, drawing, and summoning of jurors).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 514 et seq.

§ 13-5-67. Impaneling of alternate jurors.

Except in cases in which jury selection and selection of alternate jurors is governed by rules promulgated by the Mississippi Supreme Court, whenever, in the opinion of a circuit judge or chancellor presiding in a case in which a jury is to be used, the trial is likely to be a protracted one, such circuit judge or chancellor, in his discretion, may direct that one (1) or two (2) jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges for cause, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged at the time the jury retires to consider its verdict. In capital cases the defendant and the state shall each be allowed two (2) peremptory challenges to alternate jurors in addition to those otherwise provided by law. In all other cases each party shall be allowed one (1) peremptory challenge to alternate jurors in addition to those otherwise provided by law. In any criminal case all peremptory challenges by the state shall be made before the alternate juror is presented to the defendant. The additional peremptory challenges provided for herein may be used against an alternate juror only, and other peremptory challenges allowed by law may not be used against an alternate juror.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1792.5; Laws, 1954, ch. 241, §§ 1, 2 [¶¶ 1-2]; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 103, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

Rules relative to jurors, juries, and jury verdicts, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47 and 48.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Application.

1. In general.

Defendant’s allegation on appeal that a juror should have been stricken was procedurally barred because defendant failed to object to the juror’s competency at trial. Wright v. State, 9 So.3d 447, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 243 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).

At the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial, the juror testified that she did not know why she did not respond when asked if anyone knew defendant, adding that she did not know defendant, only that she knew of him from seeing him around the community and was aware he had dated her daughter some 10 years earlier. The juror testified that she held no bias or hard feelings towards defendant, and the trial court properly found incredible defendant’s testimony that he was unaware of the juror’s presence on the jury until after trial, and found it more likely that defendant believed the juror would have been a favorable juror, and therefore he did not challenge her; thus, the denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial on the alleged basis that the juror withheld information and precluded defendant from having an impartial jury was not an abuse of discretion. Doss v. State, 906 So. 2d 836, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1150 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Defendant’s murder conviction was proper where the denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial was permissible, even though a juror failed to disclose certain information during voir dire, because the jury panel was untainted; the juror stated that she never discussed the case with other jurors, and she was removed from the panel. Ables v. State, 850 So. 2d 172, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 635 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Where a driver sued a utility company for negligence after the driver drove into utility poles stacked in a trailer parked off a highway, on voir dire, the jurors did not conceal material information that denied the driver the right of a fair and impartial jury. Myles v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 828 So. 2d 861, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 547 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

It was harmless error for trial judge to allow an alternate juror to retire to the deliberation room with the rest of the jury after the close of the trial because the alternate juror did not contribute to the deliberations in any way and the trial judge actually polled the jurors to be certain that no harm was done. Maldonado v. State, 796 So. 2d 247, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 298 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

The mere presence of an alternate juror during jury deliberation, without evidence that the deliberation was affected by it, does not constitute reversible error. Department of Human Servs. v. Moore, 632 So. 2d 929, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Miss. 1994).

A trial judge in a murder prosecution did not err in refusing to exclude a juror after she had been accepted, even though the juror’s daughter had been murdered six years earlier, where the attorneys inadvertently failed to ask the juror during voir dire whether a member of her family had been a victim of a crime, and therefore the juror neither withheld nor misrepresented information. Spivey v. Mowdy, 617 So. 2d 999, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 688 (Miss. 1992).

It was error for a trial court to excuse a juror and replace her with an alternate after the jury had retired to deliberate a sentencing verdict, since substitution of a juror with an alternate must occur prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict. Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 131 (Miss. 1992).

In civil jury trial in Federal District Court, equal protection component of Fifth Amendment due process clause prohibits private litigant from using peremptory challenge to exclude prospective jurors on account of race because such race-based exclusion violates equal protection rights of excluded jurors; opposing litigant has third-party standing to raise excluded jurors’ rights in opposing litigant’s own behalf; and, while role of litigants in determining jury’s composition may provide one reason for wide acceptance of jury system and its verdicts, if race stereotypes are price for acceptance of jury panel, price is too high to meet standard of constitution. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3023 (U.S. 1991).

A trial court erred when it seated an alternate juror after the alternate jurors had been dismissed from jury service and after the jury had been in deliberations for almost 2 hours, where the alternate juror had been neither sequestered nor instructed regarding the case for the period beginning when the jury retired and until he was placed on the jury panel. Folk v. State, 576 So. 2d 1243, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1991).

In determining whether a juror is “disqualified” within the meaning of §13-5-67 when he or she has withheld information or misrepresented material facts on voir dire examination, the test is whether the juror withheld substantial information or misrepresented material facts in the face of a clearly worded question which was relevant to the case at bar. Voir dire examination is often the most crucial crucible in forging the primary instrument of justice-the fair and impartial jury. When offering challenges for cause and challenges peremptory, parties and their lawyers must rely on the objective candor and responsiveness of prospective jurors, and nothing turns on who asks the question, so long as it was clearly worded. Following a jury’s verdict, where a party shows that a juror withheld substantial information or misrepresented material facts, and where a full and complete response would have a provided a valid basis for challenge for cause, the trial court must grant a new trial; prejudice is presumed. Where, as a matter common experience, a full and correct response would have provided the basis for a peremptory challenge, not rising to the dignity of a challenge for cause, the courts have greater discretion, though a discretion that should always be exercised against the backdrop of the duty to secure to each party trial before a fair and impartial jury. Thus, in a prosecution for felony sale of alcoholic and intoxicating beverages, the circuit court’s action in removing a juror was within the scope of its authority where the juror failed to respond on 3 separate occasions during voir dire to defense counsel’s questions as to whether any prospective juror or any “relative or member of the juror’s immediate family” had been involved in a criminal proceeding, and the juror’s husband had 2 liquor-related criminal convictions. Myers v. State, 565 So. 2d 554, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1990).

Section13-5-67 is read against the backdrop of the general rule that a party who fails to object to the jury’s composition before it is impaneled waives any right to complain thereafter. The word “disqualified” in §13-5-67 has breadth considerably beyond that of §13-5-1’s initial qualifications for jury service. Myers v. State, 565 So. 2d 554, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1990).

It was harmless error for trial judge to allow 2 alternate jurors to retire with jury where there was no showing of any resulting prejudice, although action of trial judge was clearly in violation of statute and alternate jurors are to be discharged and not be present or participate in deliberations under any circumstances not prescribed by statute. Luster v. State, 515 So. 2d 1177, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2912 (Miss. 1987).

Trial judge who chose to hear matter concerning dismissal of juror for good cause, and replacement of her with an alternate, in chambers should have informed counsel for both sides and given opportunity for them to be present, or at least to object and make record; however, counsel cited no actual prejudice to defendant arising out of substitution of jurors, and court assumed that juror was excused for good cause. Stevens v. State, 513 So. 2d 603, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2834 (Miss. 1987).

Fact that a juror subpoenaed to appear before a county court had been placed onto a circuit court jury panel, which panel tried a homicide case did not require reversal of panel’s verdict, although when the error was discovered and defendant’s motion made, after both sides had rested but before the case was submitted to the jury, however, the juror mistakenly sitting should have been replaced with an alternate juror. Porter v. State, 492 So. 2d 970, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2534 (Miss. 1986).

When bailiff excuses juror on last day of murder trial on basis of death of juror’s grandmother, rather than escorting juror back to court and informing trial judge of situation so judge can determine whether juror is unable to perform duty and order excusal, and trial court subsequently impanels alternate juror without objection by defense, and defendant fails to show prejudice resulting from impaneling of alternate, conviction is not subject to reversal on basis of improper excusal of original juror. Fuller v. State, 468 So. 2d 68, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2055 (Miss. 1985).

In a prosecution for capital murder, the trial court erred in permitting the state to peremptorily challenge on juror after the panel had been accepted on the grounds that the juror’s son was under indictment in a criminal matter where the record did not show that the juror was incompetent to serve and where the challenged juror could not be presumed to be incompetent merely because her son had been indicted; the trial court further erred by denying defendant’s peremptory challenge to the alternate juror, where it seemed to discriminate against defendant in favor of the state. Fairness required that defendant be granted a new trial. Caldwell v. State, 381 So. 2d 591, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 1862 (Miss. 1980).

Absent a showing that the defendant was prejudiced thereby, the fact that it was discovered during the course of a misdemeanor trial in circuit court one of the jurors had served upon the jury which heard the case in justice of the peace court, was thereby removed, and replaced with an alternate juror, such did not constitute error. Russell v. State, 220 So. 2d 334, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1457 (Miss. 1969).

2. Application.

While a juror’s note-taking, which resulted in a communication to an attorney, may not have been intentional misconduct, the juror’s notes indicated that he had made up his mind about the case before all evidence had been presented by both sides, and therefore could not be impartial. The trial judge acted within his discretion in excusing the juror and replacing him with an alternate juror. Young v. State, 276 So.3d 1170, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 209 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 258 So.3d 286, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 519 (Miss. 2018).

Seating of an alternate juror during the sentencing phase did not violate Mississippi’s capital sentencing scheme, Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101, as this section allowed the substitution of alternative jurors in capital cases. Evans v. State, 226 So.3d 1, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 249 (Miss. 2017).

Defendant made no assertion that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated due to the jury-selection process because he did not claim the jury was composed of incompetent jurors; defendant failed to show how the departure from that statute and rules regarding peremptory challenges affected his fundamental, substantive rights or otherwise led to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Carr v. State, 190 So.3d 1, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 605 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Misallocation of defendant’s peremptory challenges did not affect a fundamental, substantive right because so long as the jury that sat was impartial, the fact that defendant had to pool his regular and alternate peremptory challenges to achieve that result did not mean his Sixth Amendment rights were violated; despite being selected in an irregular manner, the jury was a legal jury with the authority to render a verdict against defendant. Carr v. State, 190 So.3d 1, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 605 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Circuit court properly exercised its discretion in excusing a juror who was allegedly sleeping during the presentation of the audio evidence of the victim’s interview with the doctor and replacing him with an alternate juror. Carpenter v. State, 132 So.3d 1053, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 551 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 132 So.3d 579, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 142 (Miss. 2014).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct because a juror testified that she did not have any of information sought during voir dire prior to trial or during voir dire. Vaughn v. State, 111 So.3d 1289, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 225 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Defendant’s convictions for manslaughter and rape were proper because there was no error in the trial court’s dismissal of a juror. The trial court specifically found on the record that the particular juror had failed to follow clear instructions given numerous times during the trial not to speak to outside persons; the trial court further noted that the failure to follow basic instructions demonstrated additional concern that the juror might be unable to follow other, more important instructions to the jury concerning the law in the case. Brown v. State, 999 So. 2d 853, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 320 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 852, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 2009).

Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault was appropriate because a juror’s statement that she could not sit in judgment of another person properly led to her excuse for cause; additionally, she was excused immediately following the impaneling of the jury, which was within the time frame allotted in Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-67. Hawthorne v. State, 944 So. 2d 928, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 910 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Trial judge was in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-67 where, although the judge attempted to assess and rectify the damage done by the alternate juror, it was apparent that there may have been a contaminated verdict by having the alternate juror sit in on jury deliberations, and defendant was prejudiced by the presence of the alternate juror; therefore, defendant was entitled to a new trial. Archie v. State, 844 So. 2d 1173, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 401 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

The court did not abuse its discretion when it replaced a juror who disappeared from the courthouse after the jury was sworn in. Vaughn v. State, 712 So. 2d 721, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 146 (Miss. 1998).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Constitutionality and construction of statute or court rule relating to alternate or additional jurors or substitution of jurors during trial. 84 A.L.R.2d 1288.

Presence of alternate juror in jury room as ground for reversal of state criminal conviction. 15 A.L.R.4th 1127.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury–post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Selection and impaneling of alternate jurors under Rule 24(c) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.119 A.L.R. Fed. 589.

Am. Jur.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 131 (order excusing juror).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 254-261, 519.

Law Reviews.

Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: Juries and Jury Verdicts – Rules 38, 48-51, and 59. 52 Miss. L. J. 163, March 1982.

§ 13-5-69. Examination of jurors by attorneys or litigants.

Except in cases in which the examination of jurors is governed by rules promulgated by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the parties or their attorneys in all jury trials shall have the right to question jurors who are being impaneled with reference to challenges for cause, and for peremptory challenges, and it shall not be necessary to propound the questions through the presiding judge, but they may be asked by the attorneys or by litigants not represented by attorneys.

HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 2068; 1942, § 1802; Laws, 1922, ch. 294; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 104, eff from and after July 1, 1991.

Cross References —

When an opinion as to guilt or innocence will not render person incompetent in a criminal case, see §13-5-79.

Challenges to arrays and quashals of venires facias generally, see §13-5-81.

Number of peremptory challenges allowed in criminal cases, see §99-17-3.

Peremptory challenges of jointly tried defendants, see §99-17-5.

Rules relative to jurors, juries, and jury verdicts, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47 and 48.

Voir dire examination of jurors in circuit and county courts, see Miss. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 3.05.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application, generally.

3. Examination as to particular matters.

1. Validity.

Trial court did not err in refusing to enforce a blanket denial of the use of peremptory strikes in jury selection where there was no Mississippi precedent binding on the appellate court that suggested that Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-69 was unconstitutional under any provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. Plair v. State, 867 So. 2d 289, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 192 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

This section [Code 1942, § 1802] is not unconstitutional as taking away the inherent powers of the court. House v. State, 133 Miss. 675, 98 So. 156, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1923).

2. Construction and application, generally.

Juror is disqualified under statute where on voir dire examination he or she has withheld information or misrepresented material facts. Collins v. State, 691 So. 2d 918, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 877, 118 S. Ct. 198, 139 L. Ed. 2d 135, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 5567 (U.S. 1997).

Trial court has considerable discretion in determining when questions asked by prosecutors to probe prejudices of prospective jurors are improper. Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 193 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994, 117 S. Ct. 486, 136 L. Ed. 2d 379, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7020 (U.S. 1996).

Trial court’s failure to move prospective jurors to one side of courtroom, which was crowded with spectators, and instead requiring defendant to conduct voir dire with jury panel scattered throughout courtroom, interspersed with spectators, was not clear error in armed robbery prosecution, where defendant counsel asked questions to the panel and was able to ask questions to individuals who responded to his questions. McLemore v. State, 669 So. 2d 19, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1996).

It is up to court to ensure that defendant in fact received effective voir dire. McLemore v. State, 669 So. 2d 19, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1996).

Defendant was not denied opportunity to intelligently use peremptory challenges when trial court conducted voir dire itself; trial court asked venire whether anyone would automatically vote for death penalty regardless of mitigating circumstances, counsel for both sides stated they were satisfied with voir dire, and defendant did not ask trial court to further voir dire jurors and did not ask that she be allowed to do so. Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 451 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1025, 116 S. Ct. 2565, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1082, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4177 (U.S. 1996).

Voir dire is conducted under supervision of trial court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion. Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 451 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1025, 116 S. Ct. 2565, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1082, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4177 (U.S. 1996).

Court has duty to see that competent, fair and impartial jury is empaneled. Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So. 2d 1337, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1995).

To ensure party’s right to fair trial and impartial jury, free of bias and prejudice, Mississippi law allows broad latitude on voir dire. Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So. 2d 1337, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1995).

While it is error to refuse to allow party to question prospective jurors to determine whether they are biased, prejudiced or have any interest in outcome of case, counsel is not free of limits during voir dire; rather, voir dire examination is subject to reasonable limitations, especially in insurance cases. Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So. 2d 1337, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1995).

A trial court in a capital murder prosecution did not err by allowing the prosecutor to question potential jurors first in individual sequestered voir dire or by allowing the prosecutor to use leading questions during voir dire. Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1684, 134 L. Ed. 2d 785, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3101 (U.S. 1996).

A trial court in a capital murder prosecution did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the defendant’s motion for individual sequestered voir dire of the entire venire where the court asked the collective venire about the effect of pretrial publicity or information received about the case, and the court later asked if there was any reason that a juror felt that he or she could not be fair and impartial, and anyone who responded affirmatively was questioned individually in chambers. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S. Ct. 783, 133 L. Ed. 2d 734, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 547 (U.S. 1996).

United States Supreme Court has found that, in civil case, use of peremptory challenge based on race violates Fifth Amendment; however, where at time of trial Fifth Circuit operated under rule that such holding did not apply to civil trials, failure to object on voir dire to counsel’s use of challenge against black prospective juror foreclosed post trial objection. Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1166, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 387 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 978 F.2d 205, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 31059 (5th Cir. Miss. 1992).

Batson claim of racial discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenge to juror requires 3-step process: party claiming discrimination must make prima facie showing that challenge was on basis of race; burden then shifts to striking party to articulate race-neutral explanation; and ultimately trial court must determine whether claimant has proven purposeful discrimination. Moore v. Keller Industries, Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28882 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1945, 118 L. Ed. 2d 550, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. 1992).

In determining peremptory challenge was unlawfully exercised on racial grounds in contravention of Batson, District Court has discretion to fashion procedure necessary to evaluate counsel’s race-neutral explanation; trial court’s decision on ultimate question of discriminatory intent is finding of fact usually accorded great deference on appeal, because of inherent credibility assessment. Moore v. Keller Industries, Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28882 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1945, 118 L. Ed. 2d 550, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. 1992).

In determining race-neutrality for purposes of assessing peremptory challenge to jurors, neutral explanation being one “based upon something other than race of juror,” legitimate reasons undergirding court’s allowing trial counsel to exercise challenge relying upon counsel’s intuitive assumptions, include age, appearance, familial relationships, responsiveness to questions, and background knowledge that raised possibility of bias; explanation “need not be quantifiable” provided the intent is not race-based. Moore v. Keller Industries, Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28882 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1945, 118 L. Ed. 2d 550, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. 1992).

Disproportionate exclusion from jury of members of certain race, while not itself prohibited, may nevertheless constitute evidence that counsel’s stated reason for exercising challenge was mere pretext for racial discrimination. Moore v. Keller Industries, Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28882 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1945, 118 L. Ed. 2d 550, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. 1992).

Fact that counsel did not use third peremptory challenge against black prospective juror substantially supports finding that counsel did not exercise discrimination in using challenges against other 2 black prospective jurors. Moore v. Keller Industries, Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28882 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1945, 118 L. Ed. 2d 550, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. 1992).

On particular facts of case, articulated race-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenge to strike 2 black prospective jurors in diversity suit arising out of automobile accident were not pretextual. Moore v. Keller Industries, Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28882 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1945, 118 L. Ed. 2d 550, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2754 (U.S. 1992).

In action against insurance company in which verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of defendant company, and plaintiffs raised claim charging that court erred in refusing to require defense counsel to indicate non-racial motive for exercising 2 of its peremptory challenges, case would be remanded to District Court to determine whether plaintiffs presented prima facie case of racial discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenges; if District Court determines such case is presented, it shall afford defendant opportunity to show challenges were made for non-racial reasons, failing which, court shall grant plaintiffs new trial. Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 943 F.2d 553, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22127 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991).

An opening statement during voir dire is permitted as long as the attorney confines the statement to the facts expected to be proved. Woodward v. State, 533 So. 2d 418, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S. Ct. 1767, 104 L. Ed. 2d 202, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2004 (U.S. 1989).

A defendant was not entitled to individual sequestered voir dire to allow him to individually examine jurors out of the presence of the others. White v. State, 532 So. 2d 1207, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 365 (Miss. 1988).

Trial judge did not err in failing to excuse members of jury panel who were members of defendant electric power association, where jury venire was asked and responded affirmatively that they could be fair and impartial even though they might be members of association; plaintiff did not ask for change of venue, and his attorneys chose not to exercise right to challenge juror for cause. Williams v. Dixie Electric Power Asso., 514 So. 2d 332, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2797 (Miss. 1987).

Under this section, counsel for the defense has the right to question the jurors for cause after they have been determined to be qualified jurors on voir dire by the court, but this does not mean that he may not be required to interrogate the jurors before the state accepts the jury. Peters v. State, 314 So. 2d 724, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1683 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S. Ct. 457, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3639 (U.S. 1975).

Jury selection procedure provided in Circuit Court Rule 13, which requires that counsel for the defendant direct his questions on voir dire to the entire group of jurors presented, is not improper, so long as the defendant is given a fair opportunity to ask questions of individual jurors which may enable the defendant to determine his right to challenge a juror. Peters v. State, 314 So. 2d 724, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1683 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S. Ct. 457, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3639 (U.S. 1975).

It was within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to how many jurors would be submitted to the litigant for their voir dire. Bright v. State, 293 So. 2d 818, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1814 (Miss. 1974).

District attorney has right to examine jurors after trial judge has satisfied himself as to competency of panel. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

To allow attorneys in a case to examine jurors does not deprive the court of its inherent power. House v. State, 133 Miss. 675, 98 So. 156, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 183 (Miss. 1923).

A denial of the right under this section [Code 1942, § 1802] is reversible error. Jones v. State, 133 Miss. 684, 98 So. 150, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 182 (Miss. 1923).

3. Examination as to particular matters.

New trial was not warranted because defendant failed to show that the juror had substantial knowledge of his relationship with the prosecution’s witness, which was that of the brother of the prosecution witness’s great uncle by marriage. Walker v. State, 121 So.3d 320, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 579 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Defendant’s conviction for manslaughter was appropriate because he had, or should have had, actual knowledge that a juror was untruthful during voir dire in regard to knowing defendant’s mother, yet, defendant remained silent; further, the trial court clearly found that defendant’s mother’s affidavit lacked credibility. Lindsey v. State, 965 So. 2d 712, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 357 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Where defendant’s first trial resulted in a mistrial based on a Batson challenge, because the jury had not been sworn, the rules prohibiting double jeopardy were not violated; double jeopardy protection did not attach to defendant’s first proceeding, so as to preclude a second trial. Gaskin v. State, 856 So. 2d 363, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 164 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

Prosecutor’s question to prospective jurors during voir dire asking whether they would be influenced by fact that thirty years had passed between murder and current trial was appropriate to determine whether any jurors were predisposed to finding defendant not guilty simply due to passage of such length of time. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

It is perfectly proper for counsel to ask questions during voir dire that are beyond court’s inquiries reasonably necessary to assure himself and court that jurors selected will give his client benefit of every right to which he is entitled under the law, as well as to reveal or signify particular antipathies that could prejudice his client before any proposed juror. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Prosecutor’s question to potential jurors asking whether they could conceive of imposing death penalty in murder case with no eyewitness was proper means of probing into their prejudices to get insight into their thoughts. Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 193 (Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994, 117 S. Ct. 486, 136 L. Ed. 2d 379, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7020 (U.S. 1996).

Trial court’s questioning and dismissal of 6 venire members who expressed opposition to the death penalty was adequate, even though defense counsel was not allowed to repeat questions in his own words to prospective jurors during court’s voir dire, where trial court rephrased questions as requested, defense did not request permission to ask further questions, and there was no showing that further questioning would have rehabilitated dismissed venire members. Jackson v. State, 672 So. 2d 468, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 718 (Miss. 1996).

Defense counsel’s extensive voir dire of venire members regarding attitudes toward death penalty precluded claim on appeal that trial court’s inadequate voir dire questioning permitted seating of jurors with bias in favor of death penalty. Jackson v. State, 672 So. 2d 468, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 718 (Miss. 1996).

Circuit court should take substantial role in conducting voir dire to determine whether prospective jurors would vote automatically for death penalty regardless of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 451 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1025, 116 S. Ct. 2565, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1082, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4177 (U.S. 1996).

Trial court erred by refusing to allow medical malpractice plaintiff to ask questions during voir dire to determine if prospective jurors had been exposed to and/or affected by media campaign on tort reform; however, error was harmless, as advertisements in question were geared towards reducing amount of damages and did not suggest that jurors should find defendants not liable, and plaintiff was allowed to ask jurors whether they belonged to any tort reform group, whether they had personal feelings that there were too many lawsuits, whether they felt medical doctors should not be sued, and whether they should give large damages if they were justified by proof. Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So. 2d 1337, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1995).

A prosecutor’s request of jurors during individual voir dire to give the particular circumstances that each would require in order to return a death sentence were not improperly designed to extract a promise from the jurors that they would certainly vote in favor of the death penalty given a specific set of circumstances, and therefore did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 670 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S. Ct. 1365, 131 L. Ed. 2d 221, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2061 (U.S. 1995).

Personal opposition to capital punishment is not a constitutional impediment to juror service so long as the juror is able to set aside his or her personal belief and fairly consider all sentencing options under the law; it was therefore error for a trial court to refuse defense counsel an opportunity to further voir dire potential jurors who had expressed reluctance to vote for the death penalty. Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 131 (Miss. 1992).

In civil jury trial in Federal District Court, equal protection component of Fifth Amendment due process clause prohibits private litigant from using peremptory challenge to exclude prospective jurors on account of race because such race-based exclusion violates equal protection rights of excluded jurors; opposing litigant has third-party standing to raise excluded jurors’ rights in opposing litigant’s own behalf; and, while role of litigants in determining jury’s composition may provide one reason for wide acceptance of jury system and its verdicts, if race stereotypes are price for acceptance of jury panel, price is too high to meet standard of constitution. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3023 (U.S. 1991).

Prospective jurors in a capital murder prosecution who had stated their opposition to the death penalty were improperly excluded without allowing the defense counsel the opportunity to question them. However, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the answers the jurors gave were substantially clear, it was reasonably certain that the jurors were “Witherspoon-excludable,” and it was unlikely that voir dire examination by the defense counsel would have rehabilitated the jurors sufficient to take them out of Witherspoon. Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 876 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S. Ct. 1970, 118 L. Ed. 2d 570, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2882 (U.S. 1992).

A defendant was not denied his right to use a peremptory challenge on a juror who failed to answer the defense attorney’s question during voir dire as to whether any of the jurors knew either attorney in the case, even though the juror had been injured when the defense attorney collided with him during a softball game 3 years earlier, where the juror did not recognize the defense attorney at the time of voir dire and only sometime thereafter recognized him as being the person who had collided with him at the ball game, the juror had not seen the defense attorney since that time, and the juror said that he felt no ill will toward the attorney for the injury he received and that the incident did not color his judgments during trial. Bush v. State, 585 So. 2d 1262, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 589 (Miss. 1991).

A juror’s failure to respond to a voir dire question asking whether any of the potential jurors were related by blood or marriage to the victim was proper, where the juror was the aunt of a man who had at one time lived with the victim and had 2 children with the victim, but had never been married to the victim. Lewis v. State, 580 So. 2d 1279, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 314 (Miss. 1991).

Although an attorney may probe the prejudices of prospective jurors to the end that all will understand the juror’s thoughts on matters directly related to the issues to be tried, it is impermissible for an attorney to attempt to secure from the juror a pledge that, if a certain set of facts occur or are presented, the juror will vote a certain way. There may well be other facts which would require a conscientious juror to do otherwise even though the assumed hypothetical fact comes to pass. Furthermore, in the course of deliberation a juror should be encumbered by his or her oath, the evidence and the instructions from the trial court, and nothing more. Baker v. Baker, 553 So. 2d 8, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 537 (Miss. 1989).

In a capital murder prosecution, the court’s failure to excuse for cause a potential juror who stated during voir dire that in order for him not to impose the death penalty the defendant would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he should not be executed, was not reversible error where defense counsel used his twelfth peremptory challenge to remove the juror, defense counsel had not exhausted his peremptory challenges and did not challenge anyone else for cause or ask for more peremptory challenges. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 612 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 6118 (U.S. 1990), overruled, Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 454 (Miss. 1991).

A trial judge properly sustained the state’s objections to a defense counsel’s voir dire questions which particularized what the facts would show and then asked the jurors if they would return a verdict of not guilty. Harris v. State, 532 So. 2d 602, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 502 (Miss. 1988).

A potential juror, who is a member or customer of a co-operative electrical power association, is not per se disqualified from sitting as a juror in a lawsuit to which the co-operative is a party. Garcia v. Coast Elec. Power Ass'n, 493 So. 2d 380, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2576 (Miss. 1986).

When asked on voir dire examination whether any juror had a close relative who was involved in law enforcement, the failure of one juror to disclose that his brother was one of the police officers who was involved in the investigation of the burglary being prosecuted gave rise to a reasonable inference of prejudice to the defendant in selecting the jury. Odom v. State, 355 So. 2d 1381, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2006 (Miss. 1978).

Where the prosecution, on voir dire, asked a prospective juror in effect if he would return a verdict of guilty if the state should prove that the prosecutrix was a female child under the age of 12 and that the defendant attempted forcibly to have carnal knowledge of her and that her body was thereby torn or lacerated, and the question was not objected to by the defendant, the question was harmless or was waived by the defendant’s failure to object, and its allowance not an abuse of discretion, particularly in view of later proper instructions defining the crime. South Mississippi Electric Power Ass'n v. Pryor, 246 So. 2d 920, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1431 (Miss. 1971).

The statutory scheme embodied in Code 1942, §§ 1202, 1803, 1832, 1839, 2435, 2535, and 3915 clearly embraces sufficient safeguards for fair jury trials in justice of the peace courts, composed of a fair cross-section of the citizens of the community, completely without regard to race or sex, and the justice must conform his judgment to the verdict of such a jury. Shaffer v. Bridges, 295 F. Supp. 869, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8348 (S.D. Miss. 1969), dismissed, Hall v. Baum, 397 U.S. 93, 90 S. Ct. 818, 25 L. Ed. 2d 79, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2741 (U.S. 1970), dismissed, 397 U.S. 94, 90 S. Ct. 818, 25 L. Ed. 2d 80, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2742 (U.S. 1970).

Where funds to pay special prosecutor, in prosecution for murder, were raised by public subscription, court stated it would have been better to grant defendant’s request for list of contributors to aid in selection of jury, but added it was not reversible error to refuse since each prospective juror could have been asked if he had contributed. Seals v. State, 208 Miss. 236, 44 So. 2d 61, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 1950).

In a capital case, trial judge must ask every juror tendered on trial panel whether he has any conscientious scruples against infliction of capital punishment and must exclude any juror who has such scruples. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

If the juror has not understood meaning of question as to “conscientious scruples” against capital punishment, trial judge should explain it to him in simple form by asking whether juror is opposed to hanging, etc. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

District attorney may examine jurors as to “conscientious scruples” against death penalty, although jury has passed judge’s examination. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

District attorney’s examination as to “conscientious scruples” against death penalty should be in the abstract and must not go to extent of forcing a committal with respect to what juror or jury would do in the particular case, nor should examination create impression juror would be looked upon with displeasure unless he returned death verdict. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

District attorney’s statements to jury on voir dire that state was going to ask death penalty, and anyone opposed to death penalty would be excused, held erroneous, but error was cured by statements of trial judge and district attorney that it was for jury to say whether capital punishment should be inflicted, and by instruction for state that if guilty verdict was returned, jury could fix punishment at death or life imprisonment. Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1938).

Error, if any, in sustaining objection to question to jurors, on voir dire examination held not to warrant reversal, where question was in form of statement of principle of law. Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 532, 142 So. 475, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1932).

Sustaining objection to question pertaining to reasonable doubt in mind of any one juror was not error. Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 532, 142 So. 475, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 196 (Miss. 1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Questions to jurors in personal injury or death action as to interest in, or connection with, indemnity insurance company. 4 A.L.R.2d 761.

Racial, religious, economic, social, or political prejudice of proposed juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in criminal case. 54 A.L.R.2d 1204.

Juror’s false or erroneous answer on voir dire as to previous claims or actions against himself or family. 63 A.L.R.2d 1061.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause. 72 A.L.R.2d 673.

Racial, religious, economic, social, or political prejudice of proposed juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in civil case. 72 A.L.R.2d 905.

Right of counsel in criminal case personally to conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors. 73 A.L.R.2d 1187.

Propriety and effect of asking prospective jurors hypothetical questions, on voir dire, as to how they would decide issues of case. 99 A.L.R.2d 7.

Propriety, on voir dire in criminal case, of inquiries as to juror’s possible prejudice if informed of defendant’s prior convictions. 43 A.L.R.3d 1081.

Jury: membership in racially biased or prejudiced organization as proper subject of voir dire inquiry or ground for challenge. 63 A.L.R.3d 1052.

Juror’s voir dire denial or nondisclosure of acquaintance or relationship with attorney in case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial. 64 A.L.R.3d 126.

Competency of juror as affected by his membership in co-operative association interested in the case. 69 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground for challenge on voir dire. 95 A.L.R.3d 172.

Validity of jury selection as affected by accused’s absence from conducting of procedures for selection and impaneling of final jury panel for specific cases. 33 A.L.R.4th 429.

Effect of juror’s false or erroneous answer on voir dire in personal injury or death action as to previous claims or actions for damages by himself or his family. 38 A.L.R.4th 267.

Cure of prejudice resulting from statement by prospective juror during voir dire, in presence of other prospective jurors, as to defendant’s guilt. 50 A.L.R.4th 969.

Professional or business relations between proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause. 52 A.L.R.4th 964.

Effect of juror’s false or erroneous answer on voir dire regarding previous claims or actions against himself or his family. 66 A.L.R.4th 509.

Counsel’s argument or comment stating or implying that defendant is not insured and will have to pay verdict himself as prejudicial error. 68 A.L.R.4th 954.

Prejudicial effect of bringing to jury’s attention fact that plaintiff in personal injury or death action is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. 69 A.L.R.4th 131.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s reference or suggestion in medical malpractice case that defendant is insured. 71 A.L.R.4th 1025.

Prospective juror’s connection with insurance company as ground for challenge for cause. 9 A.L.R.5th 102.

Am. Jur.

Note, Beyond Batson: eliminating gender-based peremptory challenges. 105 Harv L Rev 1920, June 1992.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 150 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Criminal Procedure, Form 264 (challenge to panel of jurors).

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 141(request that court examine panel on voir dire with respect to certain matters); Forms 171-186 (challenges to poll).

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Bias or Prejudice, Proof No. 1 (bias or prejudice of juror).

20 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Religious Prejudice, § 32 (proof of prejudice of prospective juror – trial of a challenge on voir dire).

5 Am. Jur. Trials, Selecting the jury, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 215, 238, 352, 367, 371, 424, et seq.

Lawyers’ Edition.

Effect of accused’s federal constitutional rights on scope of voir dire examination of prospective jurors – Supreme Court cases. 114 L. Ed. 2d 763.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 59, March 1979.

§ 13-5-71. Oath of petit jurors.

Petit jurors shall be sworn in the following form:

“You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will well and truly try all issues and execute all writs of inquiry that may be submitted to you, or left to your decision by the court, during the present term, and true verdicts give according to the evidence. So help you God.”

The oath shall authorize the jury to try all issues and execute all writs of inquiry which may be submitted to it during that term of the court. Talesmen, if any be summoned or retained, shall in like manner be sworn to try all issues and execute all writs of inquiry which may be submitted to them during the day for which they are summoned or the time for which they are retained.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 1 (132); 1857, ch. 61, art. 143; 1871, § 744; 1880, § 1697; 1892, § 2384; 1906, § 2713; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2206; 1930, § 2059; 1942, § 1793.

Cross References —

Oath of jurors serving in special court of eminent domain, see §11-27-17.

Oath of jurors in capital case, see §13-5-73.

Petit juror compensation, see §25-7-61.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Oath, necessity and sufficiency of.

2. —Capital cases.

3. Swearing jurors after commencement of trial.

4. Disability of juror.

1. Oath, necessity and sufficiency of.

Defendant argued that a trial judge failed to swear in a jury during defendant’s trial for kidnapping, sexual battery, and aggravated assault; however, while the record did not explicitly reflect a reading of the oath, the record did include references to the oath. The trial judge was presumed to have performed his duties. Moore v. State, 996 So. 2d 756, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 601 (Miss. 2008).

There was no plain error because defendant did not overcome the presumption that the jury was sworn since the sole mention in the record of the administration of the oath reflected that the jury was sworn, counsel never objected to a failure to swear the jury, and counsel did not object to the giving of a jury instruction that acknowledged that the jury was sworn. Holbrook v. State, 4 So.3d 382, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 573 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 2009).

Transcript did not indicate the actual giving of the oath under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-71, but the cover page of the transcript stated that the jury was duly impaneled and an instruction stated that the jury took an oath, and defendant’s assertion that the jury was not properly sworn was insufficient to overcome the established presumption that the trial court properly performed its duties; however, because this issue causes concern to members of court, the court urges the lower courts to place in every official record evidence that the trial jury took the official oath to well and truly try the issues. Wilson v. State, 990 So. 2d 798, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 572 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

Although the trial court administered an oath different than that mandated by the Legislature, defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection; because the trial judge did not have an opportunity to pass on the question, this issue was not preserved for appellate review. Debrow v. State, 972 So. 2d 550, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 647 (Miss. 2007).

In a drug case, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) he offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that the jury had been properly sworn, so no objection by counsel was required; (2) defense counsel was not required to request an instruction regarding an accomplice because the State’s evidence did not rest upon the testimony of two others involved; (3) defense counsel’s failure to request an additional instruction when mention was made of defendant’s prior incarceration was not deficient where an objection was made immediately and a curative instruction was given; and (4) the failure to object to defendant’s criminal record was not deficient since the testimony of a correctional department custodian was permissible to authenticate such under Miss. R. Evid. 901. Vardaman v. State, 966 So. 2d 885, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 706 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

In a prosecution of defendant for exploitation of a minor, defendant’s assertion that the petit jury was not properly sworn as required by Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-71 was insufficient to overcome the established presumption that the trial court properly performed its duties. Allen v. State, 945 So. 2d 422, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 677 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

In a drug case, defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the trial judge administered the oath to the jury because, although the record did not explicitly reflect a reading of the oath, the record did reveal references made by the court to the oath; furthermore, the court’s judgment of conviction stated that “a trial before a jury has been duly sworn,” and therefore it could be presumed that the jury was sworn. Carlisle v. State, 936 So. 2d 415, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 481 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Court rejected defendant’s claim that his conviction for felony shoplifting should be reversed due to the lack of evidence in the record that the petit jury was sworn in as required by Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-71 because the record did not indicate that the jury was not sworn and there was no objection by trial counsel to the failure to administer the oath. The sole mention of the oath in the record indicated that the oath was administered. Biggs v. State, 942 So. 2d 185, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 1 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 942 So. 2d 164, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 715 (Miss. 2006).

Defendant did not present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the judge properly performed his duties by placing the jury under oath where a boilerplate warning was present and there were references throughout the record by the judge, prosecutor, and even defense counsel to an oath being given. Lawrence v. State, 928 So. 2d 894, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 745 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

Defendant’s conviction for three counts of armed robbery was proper where the failure to administer a second oath to the jurors, as set out in Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-73, was not reversible error; the oath administered under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-71 was sufficient. Boggans v. State, 867 So. 2d 279, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 190 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Recital in the judgment and sentence that the jury was specially sworn is conclusive of the fact. Ratcliff v. State, 201 Miss. 259, 29 So. 2d 321, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 396 (Miss. 1947).

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that the jury were sworn. Waddell v. Magee, 53 Miss. 687, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 134 (Miss. 1876).

If the record recite that the jury were “impaneled and sworn to sit as jurors in the case,” it will be presumed that they were legally sworn. Furniss v. Meredith, 43 Miss. 302, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 1870).

Where the jury appeared to have been sworn “truly to try the issue joined between the parties,” it was held sufficient. Windham v. Williams, 27 Miss. 313, 1854 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1854).

It is not necessary to swear the jury for the week in each case, and talesmen will be presumed to have been duly sworn unless the record shows the contrary. Pierce v. Tate, 27 Miss. 283, 1854 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1854).

2. —Capital cases.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-73, jurors in a capital case should be sworn to well and truly try the issue between the state and the prisoner, and a true verdict should be given according to the evidence and law, and because the crime of forcible rape was a capital crime under Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-65(4)(a), defendant was entitled to have the capital oath administered to the jurors, but the trial judge failed to administer that oath; however, the capital oath given in the middle of the trial, together with the petit oath given at the beginning of defendant’s trial, which were substantially the same, were sufficient to instruct the jury of their duty. Golden v. State, 968 So. 2d 378, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 2007), cert. dismissed, 977 So. 2d 343, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 2008).

In a prosecution for forcible rape of a female adult, the failure to administer to the jury the special oath in capital cases required by §13-5-73 was not error where the jury received the oath of petit jurors prescribed by §13-5-71 which is substantially equivalent to the special oath, the defendant refused any attempt by the trial judge to cure the omission, the defendant was not taxed by the jury with the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and a special venire was neither requested nor empaneled in the trial of the case, but rather the jury was selected and accepted from the regular panel for the week. Wilburn v. State, 608 So. 2d 702, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 677 (Miss. 1992).

Defendants charged with capital offenses are entitled to have the jury trying them impaneled and specially sworn as the law directs. Miller v. State, 122 Miss. 19, 84 So. 161, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 415 (Miss. 1920).

The voir dire oath is not sufficient in a capital case. Miller v. State, 122 Miss. 19, 84 So. 161, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 415 (Miss. 1920).

3. Swearing jurors after commencement of trial.

Defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the trial judge administered the oath to the jury. Although the record did not expressly reflect a reading of the oath, the record did reveal, however, that the trial court made two references to an oath during trial; the appellate court had to presume that the trial judge properly performed his duties, and it failed to find reversible error or harm that would have warranted a reversal of defendant’s conviction under the plain error doctrine. Acreman v. State, 907 So. 2d 1005, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

An instance where the oath was administered in a felony case over the objection of the defendant after the state had closed its evidence and the error held to be harmless. Stark v. State, 133 Miss. 275, 97 So. 577, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 136 (Miss. 1923).

A failure to swear seven tales jurors until the case was closed will not vitiate a verdict of guilty unless the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Boroum v. State, 105 Miss. 887, 63 So. 297, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 1913).

4. Disability of juror.

If on the trial of a case a juror should become insane the court should begin the trial de novo, and the defendant should have the whole jury, as reconstituted for new trial, tendered to him, with the right to exercise all his challenges given him by law. Dennis v. State, 96 Miss. 96, 50 So. 499, 1909 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1909).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 168 et seq.

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 520 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 59, March 1979.

§ 13-5-73. Oath of jurors and bailiffs in capital cases.

The jurors in a capital case shall be sworn to “well and truly try the issue between the state and the prisoner, and a true verdict give according to the evidence and the law.” Bailiffs may be specially sworn by the court, or under its direction, to attend on such jury and perform such duties as the court may prescribe for them.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3060; 1892, § 1410; 1906, § 1483; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1241; 1930, § 1264; 1942, § 2507.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-73, jurors in a capital case should be sworn to well and truly try the issue between the state and the prisoner, and a true verdict should be given according to the evidence and law, and because the crime of forcible rape was a capital crime under Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-65(4)(a), defendant was entitled to have the capital oath administered to the jurors, but the trial judge failed to administer that oath; however, the capital oath given in the middle of the trial, together with the petit oath given at the beginning of defendant’s trial, which were substantially the same, were sufficient to instruct the jury of their duty. Golden v. State, 968 So. 2d 378, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 530 (Miss. 2007), cert. dismissed, 977 So. 2d 343, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 111 (Miss. 2008).

In a capital murder case, excusing a juror who was ambivalent as to whether she could impose the death penalty was proper and reflected the public policy set forth in Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-73. Dycus v. State, 875 So. 2d 140, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 366 (Miss. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 901, 125 S. Ct. 1589, 161 L. Ed. 2d 271, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2212 (U.S. 2005).

Defendant’s conviction for three counts of armed robbery was proper where the failure to administer a second oath to the jurors, as set out in Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-73, was not reversible error; the oath administered under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-71 was sufficient. Boggans v. State, 867 So. 2d 279, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 190 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Trial court in county where venue in murder prosecution was transferred following jury selection had jurisdiction to re-administer oath to jurors before trial, following administration of oath in county of jury selection that did not conform to special statutory requirements for oaths in capital cases. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Fact that bailiffs accompanied jurors to their respective homes after jurors were administered improper oath, but before re-administration of correct oath the following day was not prejudicial error in capital murder prosecution. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

In a prosecution for forcible rape of a female adult, the failure to administer to the jury the special oath in capital cases required by §13-5-73 was not error where the jury received the oath of petit jurors prescribed by §13-5-71 which is substantially equivalent to the special oath, the defendant refused any attempt by the trial judge to cure the omission, the defendant was not taxed by the jury with the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and a special venire was neither requested nor empaneled in the trial of the case, but rather the jury was selected and accepted from the regular panel for the week. Wilburn v. State, 608 So. 2d 702, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 677 (Miss. 1992).

Although the beginning of the record did not indicate whether or not the jury was specially sworn as required by Miss Code §13-5-73, the first part of the judgment indicated the jury was specially sworn prior to the introduction of evidence. Young v. State, 425 So. 2d 1022, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2327 (Miss. 1983).

Although the record in a murder prosecution did not reflect that the jury had been specially sworn, as required by statute, such omission was not reversible error where the rebuttable presumption that the trial judge properly performed his duty had not been overcome. Bell v. State, 360 So. 2d 1206, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2318 (Miss. 1978).

Where the trial court’s failure to have the jury sworn as required by this section [Code 1972, §13-5-73] was brought to its attention immediately after a few preliminary questions had been asked of the first witness in the case, after which the jury was sworn as required by law and the few questions that had been asked were repeated, there was a technical error but it was harmless error and not reversible. Thomas v. State, 298 So. 2d 690, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1560 (Miss. 1974).

That the oath administered to a jury calls for a true “and good” verdict is not reversible error. Simmons v. State, 241 Miss. 481, 130 So. 2d 860, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 366 (Miss. 1961).

By virtue of this provision, in capital cases the accused is entitled to have the jury sworn specially. Miller v. State, 122 Miss. 19, 84 So. 161, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 415 (Miss. 1920).

The failure of the court to specially swear a jury in a capital case is waived where no objection is made thereto by the defendant until after a verdict against him. Hill v. State, 112 Miss. 375, 73 So. 66, 1916 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1916).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 168 et seq.

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 520 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 59, March 1979.

§ 13-5-75. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 1974, ch. 378, § 11.

[Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 10 (2); 1857, ch. 61, art. 141; 1871, § 742; 1880, § 1693; 1892, § 2385; 1906, § 2714; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2207; 1930, § 2060; 1942, § 1794; Laws, 1938, ch. 304]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §13-5-75 specified when the circuit court was to order jurors drawn and summoned.

§ 13-5-77. Special venire facias to issue in certain criminal cases.

When any person charged with a capital crime, or with the crime of manslaughter, shall have been arraigned and the plea of not guilty entered, the accused or the district attorney in any such case shall, upon demand, be entitled to a special venire. If at a term of court a special venire has been demanded for any case or cases, it shall be the duty of the court to cause to be drawn, in open court, from the jury box as many names as the judge in his discretion may direct, not to be less than forty (40) for each special venire as the judge in his discretion may direct to be called, and it shall be the duty of the clerk to issue a special venire facias, commanding the sheriff to summon the persons whose names are so drawn, to attend the court on a particular day to be named in the writ. It shall not be necessary that a separate special venire be drawn for each case in which a special venire is demanded. Those persons summoned pursuant to the issuance of a special venire facias shall attend the court on the day named in the writ and shall serve as the court may direct on any case for which a special venire has been demanded; provided, however, no juror summoned as a special venireman shall be impaneled or serve on more than one (1) case. In the event a special venire be exhausted in a case without a jury being impaneled from those summoned and in attendance, the court shall proceed to make up the jury for the trial of the case from the regular panel and tales jurors who may have been summoned for the day. If, after exhausting said regular panel and tales jurors, a competent jury be not obtained, the court shall direct the sheriff to summon forthwith as many tales jurors as shall be sufficient to complete the jury.

In the event that there should be no such box, or the same should be mislaid, or the names therein have been exhausted, then the court may order a special venire facias to be issued by the clerk, directing the sheriff to summon as many jurors as may be necessary, not less than forty (40) for each special venire as the judge in his discretion may direct to be called and, after exhausting a special venire in any case, to impanel the jury as hereinbefore directed. The slips containing the names of all jurors drawn or summoned on a special venire, and not impaneled on a jury, shall be returned to the box from which they were drawn immediately after a jury shall be impaneled. If a special venire be not demanded, the jury in each case shall be composed of the regular venire for the week and as many talesmen and bystanders as may be required, to be summoned under the order of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 65, art. 7 (1); 1857, ch. 64, art. 295; 1871, § 2759; 1880, § 3058; 1892, § 2386; 1906, § 2715; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2208; 1930, § 2061; 1942, § 1795; Laws, 1985, ch. 443, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References —

Criminal defendant’s right to jury trial in case before a justice of the peace, see §99-33-9.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Special venire.

3. Time for requesting special venire.

4. Second special venire.

5. Drawing and executing special venire.

6. —Summoning venire.

7. —Number of persons.

8. —Waiver.

9. Selecting jurors from bystanders.

10. Discharge of venireman.

11. Quashing special venire.

1. In general.

Supreme Court will not overrule lower court’s denial of motion for special venire except upon showing of abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 684 So. 2d 643, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 292 (Miss. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1170, 117 S. Ct. 1437, 137 L. Ed. 2d 544, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2295 (U.S. 1997).

In a prosecution for murder in which defendant moved for a special venire, the trial court committed reversible error where, instead of filling the panel with members of that week’s regular jury panel who were in the courtroom, it presented defendant with 11 jurors who had been accepted by the State, and, over objection, required the defense to make its peremptory challenges to the 11 accepted jurors, in violation of statute mandating that in capital cases the defendant must be presented a full panel before being called upon to make his 12 peremptory challenges. Sellen v. State, 374 So. 2d 781, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2346 (Miss. 1979).

Under this section, which permits the jurors to be impaneled from those “summoned and in attendance” under the special venire, the trial judge in an armed robbery prosecution did not err in sua sponte excusing the husband of a prospective juror named in the venire facias, where the mistake of serving the husband for jury service rather than his wife was not discovered until after the jury and an alternate juror had been accepted and impaneled, where the trial judge initially offered the defense an extra challenge as to the husband following such discovery, where the defense rejected such offer and moved for a new panel, and where the trial judge placed the alternate juror on the panel following the excusing of the husband from service. Thorne v. State, 348 So. 2d 1011, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2113 (Miss. 1977).

Where special venire of 75 prospective jurors was called at defendant’s request but was exhausted before 12 jurors were qualified and accepted by both sides, trial judge did not err in completing jury selection process by using members of regular panel. Odom v. State, 311 So. 2d 346, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1606 (Miss. 1975).

The statutory method of selecting jurors is directory, not mandatory, and unless it is shown that the method used was fraudulent or such a radical departure from the method prescribed by the statute as to be unfair to the defendant or to prevent due process of law, the supreme court will not reverse. Armstrong v. State, 214 So. 2d 589, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1317 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965, 89 S. Ct. 2109, 23 L. Ed. 2d 750, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 1312 (U.S. 1969).

The provisions of the law in regard to the listing, drawing, summoning or impaneling of juries are directory merely. Smith v. State, 242 Miss. 728, 137 So. 2d 172, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 586 (Miss. 1962).

A fairer trial was assured the defendant in a murder prosecution by the court’s overruling a motion, made after the case had been called for trial and while the jury was being selected, to call additional jurors from the jury box after the regular panel and special venire had both been exhausted, leaving the defendant with only two peremptory challenges which he immediately expended, than would have been by drawing from the general jury box which was so nearly depleted that many jurors would have had to be drawn from the box of the district where the homicide occurred. Lewis v. State, 201 Miss. 48, 28 So. 2d 122, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 356 (Miss. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 785, 67 S. Ct. 1305, 91 L. Ed. 1816 (U.S. 1947).

This section [Code 1942, § 1795] is directory. Buchanan v. State, 84 Miss. 332, 36 So. 388, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1904); McVey v. State, 117 Miss. 243, 78 So. 150, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1918); Taylor v. State, 148 Miss. 621, 114 So. 390, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1927).

2. Special venire.

In a manslaughter case, a trial court did not err by denying a motion for a special venire under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-77 because sufficient steps were taken to see that defendant received the benefits of such around the holidays; the granting of the motion would have delayed the trial for at least six months. Speagle v. State, 956 So. 2d 237, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 616 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 957 So. 2d 1004, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 2007).

In a capital murder case, the inmate’s counsel were not ineffective for removing a request for a special venire under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-77 because nothing in the record indicated that the jury panel was insufficient or that a special venire was necessary. Wilcher v. State, 863 So. 2d 776, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 942, 124 S. Ct. 2917, 159 L. Ed. 2d 821, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4678 (U.S. 2004).

Procedure for special venire is available to persons accused of certain serious crimes as matter of right, and such persons are entitled to have sheriff proceed in good faith and with due diligence to end that all persons listed upon special venire in fact be served and summoned for jury duty; it is not within sheriff’s authority to decide unilaterally that there will be enough jurors at trial and make no further effort to summon unserved jurors after certain number of persons have been served. Ratliff v. State, 515 So. 2d 877, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2874 (Miss. 1987).

Defendant in a capital murder prosecution waived his request pursuant to §§13-5-77 and99-15-27 for a special venire and for a list of the veniremen so summoned, where he never objected to the failure to provide for the special venire, and where at least fifty jurors were considered prior to impaneling the twelve jurors and two alternates. Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1777 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S. Ct. 1232, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 171 (U.S. 1985).

The trial judge in a prosecution for capital murder complied with the requirement of §13-5-77 in directing the clerk to draw 150 names from the jury wheel for a special venire, notwithstanding the fact that only 67 of the names drawn were statutorily qualified to serve on the special venire, where the statute required that no fewer than 40 names be drawn. Booker v. State, 449 So. 2d 209, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1682 (Miss.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 230, 83 L. Ed. 2d 159, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 368 (U.S. 1984).

In a prosecution for cattle theft in which the indictment advised the defendant that he was subject to a life imprisonment punishment as an habitual criminal under §99-19-83, the defendant’s demand for a special venire under §13-5-77 and for 12 peremptory challenges under §99-17-3 was properly denied where, although the defendant might receive a life sentence if convicted, the underlying offense of cattle theft was not a capital crime; §99-19-83 does not make it a crime for one to be a multiple offender even though it affects the severity of punishment. However, the case would be remanded for resentencing where the defendant at the time of his indictment in the present cause had not served terms of one year or more for his prior convictions dated March 14 and April 4, 1980, and subsequent to the date of the present offense before the court: September 1979. Yates v. State, 396 So. 2d 629, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 1992 (Miss. 1981).

Where the charge is for manslaughter, the defendant has a right to call a special venire. Hathorn v. State, 225 Miss. 77, 82 So. 2d 653, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 561 (Miss. 1955).

A jury impaneled from a special venire and accepted by the accused without objection, is not illegal because of failure of the court to examine the jurors. Skinner v. State, 53 Miss. 399, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1876).

If, on defendant’s motion, the special venire be quashed because the box from which it was drawn was not legally prepared, he cannot be heard to complain of the court ordering a special venire summoned. Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1876), limited, Smith v. State, 55 Miss. 410, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1877).

A direction in a special venire to summon a jury “residing as near as may be to the place where the murder was committed,” is erroneous. Shaffer v. State, 2 Miss. 238, 1835 Miss. LEXIS 14 (Miss. 1835).

3. Time for requesting special venire.

Capital murder defendant was not entitled to special venire without making timely request before trial, notwithstanding that state made such request. Davis v. State, 684 So. 2d 643, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 292 (Miss. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1170, 117 S. Ct. 1437, 137 L. Ed. 2d 544, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2295 (U.S. 1997).

Although a special venire could have been demanded in an armed robbery prosecution if the demand had been timely made, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the defendant’s motion for a special venire where the motion was made just prior to the start of trial. Williams v. State, 590 So. 2d 1374, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 801 (Miss. 1991).

A motion for a special venire was properly denied where the motion was not filed until approximately one week before the start of trial, even though the court had announced that the case was ready for trial some two weeks earlier, and where the motion was not called to the court’s attention until the day of trial. Sharplin v. State, 357 So. 2d 940, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2519 (Miss. 1978).

It is not necessary that a special venire, if desired, be requested immediately upon the entry of a plea of not guilty, the purpose of the statute being accomplished if such request be made when the court ascertains and announces that the case is ready for trial. Porter v. State, 193 Miss. 774, 10 So. 2d 377, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1942).

When court in a capital case announced ready for trial, the request for a special venire became due without reference to the time then set for trial, and, counsel for the accused having failed at that time to request a special venire or to obtain permission from the court to make such request at a later date, denial of counsel’s request for special venire, when the case was called for trial, was proper, notwithstanding counsel stated to the court, when the case was set for trial, that he would decide later whether he wanted a special venire, in the absence of any understanding to that effect on the part of the court or of its doing anything to mislead counsel into thinking the contrary. Porter v. State, 193 Miss. 774, 10 So. 2d 377, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 1942).

4. Second special venire.

Upon exhaustion of special venire, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant’s motion for continuance and that another special venire be drawn, since it could properly resort to the regular venire to complete the jury. McBride v. State, 492 So. 2d 581, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2539 (Miss. 1986).

Where all except about twelve of special venire were found disqualified on voir dire, court properly disallowed second special venire. Harrison v. State, 168 Miss. 699, 152 So. 494, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 380 (Miss. 1934).

Second special venire is allowed only when first has been quashed for reasons which so completely dislodge first special venire that it never became special venire. Harrison v. State, 168 Miss. 699, 152 So. 494, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 380 (Miss. 1934).

5. Drawing and executing special venire.

Capital murder defendant’s absence during the drawing of a special venire was not reversible error and did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where no prejudice resulted. Burns v. State, 813 So. 2d 668, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 2001).

While it would be the better practice to have the accused present when a special venire is drawn, the drawing of a special venire for a robbery prosecution, in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, was not reversible error, particularly where the defendant did not claim that he was prejudiced or that his case was not heard by an impartial jury, the drawing of a special venire not being a part of the actual trial. Kendall v. State, 249 So. 2d 657, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1171 (Miss. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040, 92 S. Ct. 725, 30 L. Ed. 2d 733, 1972 U.S. LEXIS 3956 (U.S. 1972).

In selecting the members of a special venire, pursuant to the court’s order because the jury box was empty, it was proper for the sheriff’s office deputy to make that selection from the registration list with the view of obtaining only qualified electors who were not exempt from jury service. Dampier v. State, 31 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1947).

In homicide prosecution, where court ordered special venire from first district of county, refusal to order one from second district held not error, statutes being directory. Taylor v. State, 148 Miss. 621, 114 So. 390, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1927).

The special venire should be drawn from the jury box as directed where it contains sufficient names and a failure to do so is error. Lee v. State, 138 Miss. 474, 103 So. 233, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1925).

The statute is directory merely and any irregularity of the court in the drawing of a special venire is not prejudicial where the jury drawn is an impartial one. Buchanan v. State, 84 Miss. 332, 36 So. 388, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1904).

A special venire may be drawn during the pendency of another case. Penn v. State, 62 Miss. 450, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1884).

6. —Summoning venire.

The fact that the trial court gave an order for the issuance of a special venire facias directed to the sheriff instead of to the circuit clerk did not require that the special venire be quashed, for the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1795] are directory only. Moore v. State, 237 So. 2d 844, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1511 (Miss. 1970).

Sheriff may be directed to summon qualified electors as a special venire, without all of them having been drawn from the jury box. Dean v. State, 234 Miss. 376, 106 So. 2d 501, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 506 (Miss. 1958).

All provisions of law for impaneling juries are directory merely and where there are not sufficient names in the jury box for the venire the court may order the jury summoned by him. McVey v. State, 117 Miss. 243, 78 So. 150, 1918 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 1918).

The sheriff is not required to furnish a list of those who would be summoned to the clerk before summoning them but it is sufficient to furnish their names after they are summoned. Walford v. State, 106 Miss. 19, 63 So. 316, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1913).

It is not reversible error in a capital case to refuse, both before and after exhausting the regular venire, to receive as a juror a member of the special venire who was absent on the call thereof but present when offered by the defense, and who thereupon ordered talesmen to be summoned where the whole record shows that the accused was not thereby prejudiced. Steele v. State, 76 Miss. 387, 24 So. 910, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1898).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1795], requiring that where a special venire is ordered, the jury shall be impaneled from those “examined and in attendance,” it is not error to refuse accused compulsory process for a venireman summoned and not in attendance. Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 16 So. 387, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1894).

In executing a special venire, where the names are not drawn, the sheriff is not bound to summon every man he meets until he gets the required number. Cavanah v. State, 56 Miss. 299, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1879).

7. —Number of persons.

In directing clerk to draw 150 names, trial judge complies with statutory requirement of §13-5-77 for the number of names to be drawn for special venire even though of 150 names drawn, only 67 were statutorily qualified to serve on special venire. Booker v. State, 449 So. 2d 209, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1682 (Miss.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 230, 83 L. Ed. 2d 159, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 368 (U.S. 1984).

Unless record shows that defendant requested larger number, limitation and special venire to forty men at instance of state is not ground for complaint, even though all of the special veniremen except eleven were excused at the trial and only three of these were accepted to serve as jurors. Williams v. State, 26 So. 2d 64 (Miss. 1946).

In murder prosecution, limiting number of special venire to 100 citizens after granting motion for special venire by defendant who asked for 250 citizens held not abuse of trial court’s discretion. Owens v. State, 169 Miss. 141, 152 So. 651, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 1934).

Where the sheriff served only thirty men instead of forty as directed from which a jury was obtained the defendant cannot complain where it is not shown that the jury was prejudiced or impartial. Walford v. State, 106 Miss. 19, 63 So. 316, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 1913).

8. —Waiver.

Defendant in capital case not having interposed objections to manner of drawing of special venire at time venire was being drawn waived objection. Arnold v. State, 171 Miss. 164, 157 So. 247, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1934).

9. Selecting jurors from bystanders.

In the absence of fraud or other improper motive the fact that a bailiff summoned additional prospective jurors by telephone rather than selecting them from among the bystanders was not reversible error. Boles v. State, 288 So. 2d 718, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1859 (Miss. 1974).

Where on the motion of the defendant in a capital case the court directed the sheriff to summon a jury from the bystanders the defendant cannot complain thereat after conviction. Cook v. State, 90 Miss. 137, 43 So. 618, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1907).

10. Discharge of venireman.

The judge has no authority to discharge one of the special venire without sufficient cause shown. Boles v. State, 21 Miss. 398, 1850 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 1850); Boles v. State, 24 Miss. 445, 1852 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 1852).

It is a proper exercise of the discretion of the court to set aside a venireman who is the acting jailer of a county. Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 16 So. 387, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 88 (Miss. 1894).

After the jury had been impaneled and sworn, a juror arose and informed the court that he had been of the grand jury that found the bill. It was not error for the court to set him aside, complete the jury and have it resworn. Jefferson v. State, 52 Miss. 767, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1876).

11. Quashing special venire.

A special venire will not be quashed because only eleven of the forty called are available. Smith v. State, 242 Miss. 728, 137 So. 2d 172, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 586 (Miss. 1962).

Special venire will not be quashed except for fraud or a total departure from procedure laid down by the statute. Riley v. State, 208 Miss. 336, 44 So. 2d 455, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1950); Smith v. State, 242 Miss. 728, 137 So. 2d 172, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 586 (Miss. 1962).

Special venire will not be set aside merely because sheriff did not follow court’s recommended procedure in selecting panel where time was short and fair and impartial panel was summoned. Riley v. State, 208 Miss. 336, 44 So. 2d 455, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1950).

Drawing of special venire in capital case where regular jury box was exhausted from jury list made up by board of supervisors for succeeding year, although thirty days had not yet elapsed since making up of list as required by statute before persons on list became eligible as jurors, held mere irregularity only and not to warrant quashing of panel. Arnold v. State, 171 Miss. 164, 157 So. 247, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1934).

A special jury properly summoned under this statute will not be quashed unless fraud is shown. Bond v. State, 128 Miss. 792, 91 So. 461, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 167 (Miss. 1922).

A special venire will not be quashed because the trial judge caused the sheriff to submit to him before the service of the writ the names of the deputies selected to execute it, that they might be shown to the attorneys in the case with a view of receiving objections to them, or because on objection by the state’s attorney two of the persons named were not appointed, the sheriff appointing two unobjectionable persons in their place. If such a proceeding be irregular, it is cured by Code 1906, § 2718 (Code 1942, § 1798) providing that juries irregularly summoned shall be deemed legal after being impaneled and sworn. Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss. 223, 25 So. 158, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1898).

It is no ground to quash a special venire that one of the jurors was not a citizen of the United States. Durrah v. State, 44 Miss. 789, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 38 (Miss. 1871).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of accused to insist, over objection of prosecution or court, upon trial by court without a jury. 51 A.L.R.2d 1346.

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 110, 123.

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 322 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 59, March 1979.

§ 13-5-79. When opinion as to guilt or innocence will not render one incompetent in a criminal case.

Any person, otherwise competent, who will make oath that he is impartial in the case, shall be competent as a juror in any criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he has an impression or an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if it appear to the satisfaction of the court that he has no bias or feeling or prejudice in the case, and no desire to reach any result in it, except that to which the evidence may conduct. Any juror shall be excluded, however, if the court be of opinion that he cannot try the case impartially, and the exclusion shall not be assignable for error.

HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3072; 1892, § 2355; 1906, § 2685; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2177; 1930, § 2030; 1942, § 1763.

Cross References —

Examination of jurors by attorneys or litigants, see §13-5-69.

Challenges to arrays and quashals of venires facias generally, see §13-5-81.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application generally.

3. Power and duty of court.

4. Examination on voir dire.

5. —Concealment of facts.

6. Impartiality of jurors in general.

7. Interest, bias or prejudice.

8. Formation or expression of opinion.

9. —Opinion not affecting competency.

10. —Opinion rendering juror incompetent.

11. —Prior knowledge.

12. Non-belief in, or opposition to, capital punishment.

13. Opposition to circumstantial evidence.

14. Rulings on challenges.

15. Review.

1. Validity.

This section [Code 1942, § 1763] is not in violation of Const. 1890 § 26, securing the right of an accused person to an “impartial jury.” Alfred v. State, 37 Miss. 296, 1859 Miss. LEXIS 19 (Miss. 1859); Green v. State, 72 Miss. 522, 17 So. 381, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1895).

2. Construction and application generally.

In a capital case each juror must be sworn to try the case. Miller v. State, 122 Miss. 19, 84 So. 161, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 415 (Miss. 1920).

The intention of the laws is that the juror shall be unaffected by any previous judgment, opinion or bias, either as respects the parties or the subject-matter in controversy. Brown v. State, 57 Miss. 424, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1879).

3. Power and duty of court.

Before any juror is excused from service, he or she must be found to be unable to decide the case fairly and impartially on the merits and the reason, whatever it may be, should always be noted on the record. Brown v. State, 763 So. 2d 189, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 118 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

A judge has broad discretion to determine whether a prospective juror can be impartial, notwithstanding the juror’s admission under oath that he or she can be impartial. Coverson v. State, 617 So. 2d 642, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1993).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding for cause a potential juror who was a double first cousin to a defendant charged with uttering a forgery, and with whom defendant had discussed the case prior to trial, despite the juror’s testimony that she could still be fair and impartial. Burt v. State, 493 So. 2d 1325, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2490 (Miss. 1986).

One may not complain of exclusion of jurors by trial judge, if those selected were fair and impartial. Sherman v. State, 234 Miss. 775, 108 So. 2d 205, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 554 (Miss. 1959).

Where qualification of prospective juror is a close question but he is held to be qualified and defendant peremptorily excuses such juror, there is no legal duty on the court to grant an extra peremptory challenge to the defendant. Shimniok v. State, 197 Miss. 179, 19 So. 2d 760, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1944).

If a doubt arises as to the competency of a juror he should be excluded. The court has the discretion to do this at any time before evidence is submitted. Mabry v. State, 71 Miss. 716, 14 So. 267, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1893).

The court always has power to impanel an impartial jury, and when it is apparent that such only is the effect of its ruling, the same will be sustained. Smith v. State, 61 Miss. 754, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1884).

The court may discharge from the panel a juror who has been accepted and sworn before testimony is introduced, if it be discovered that he is incompetent. Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1856).

The court must examine into the sufficiency of every objection to a juror. The consent of the other party to the objection does not deprive the court of the power. McCarty v. State, 26 Miss. 299, 1853 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1853).

The court may set aside a juror who has not been challenged by either party. Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. 115, 1847 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1847); Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1856).

It is the duty of the court to see that a fair, competent and impartial jury is selected to try every case. Ferriday v. Selser, 5 Miss. 506, 1840 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1840); Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641, 1870 Miss. LEXIS 73 (Miss. 1870); White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 1876).

4. Examination on voir dire.

Defendant cited no authority for his proposition that the trial judge’s actions during voir dire were inappropriate, nor did he cite any evidence in the record that indicated the jury was prejudiced against him. Neal v. State, 15 So.3d 388, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 2009), dismissed, — So.3d —, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 340 (Miss. 2016).

A trial court in a capital murder prosecution did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the defendant’s motion for individual sequestered voir dire of the entire venire where the court asked the collective venire about the effect of pretrial publicity or information received about the case, and the court later asked if there was any reason that a juror felt that he or she could not be fair and impartial, and anyone who responded affirmatively was questioned individually in chambers. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S. Ct. 783, 133 L. Ed. 2d 734, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 547 (U.S. 1996).

Ruling out defendant’s questions to jurors as to effect on them of federal government’s participation in prosecution held not prejudicial error. Eaton v. State, 163 Miss. 130, 140 So. 729, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Miss. 1932).

In personal injury for punitive damages plaintiff may inquire of jurymen whether they would impose punitive damages if so instructed. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Roberts, 88 Miss. 80, 40 So. 481, 1906 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1906).

A man’s conception of a reasonable doubt is not a proper subject of inquiry when he is presented as a juror in a criminal case and examined on his voir dire. Fugitt v. State, 85 Miss. 86, 37 So. 557, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1904).

Whether a juror would believe certain witnesses for the state on oath is not a proper subject of inquiry upon his voir dire examination in a criminal case. Fugitt v. State, 85 Miss. 86, 37 So. 557, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1904).

It is the duty of the court to see that an impartial jury is impaneled and it may in a murder case ask each juror if he is opposed to capital punishment. White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 1876).

5. —Concealment of facts.

Court rejected defendant’s argument that the jury panel was tained by the foreperson, who was a retired law enforcement officer who had previously had a civil conflict with defendant’s father, because, although the juror did not provide any information about a prior relationship or interaction with defendant’s father during the voir dire, the juror took an oath to be fair and impartial. Jordan v. State, 995 So. 2d 94, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 489 (Miss. 2008).

If a juror on his voir dire conceals facts which render him incompetent and serves upon the jury, a verdict of conviction will be set aside and a new trial granted. Sheppric v. State, 79 Miss. 740, 31 So. 416 (Miss. 1901).

A juror who on his voir dire conceals the fact from the court that he has formed and expressed such an opinion, is not rendered competent by this section [Code 1942, § 1763], and a verdict of guilty found by a jury of which he is a member should be set aside. The juror must disclose all of the facts, and then the court, under the statute, must pass upon his competency. Jeffries v. State, 74 Miss. 675, 21 So. 526, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1897).

6. Impartiality of jurors in general.

In a thirteen-year-old defendant’s trial for murder, the trial court properly excluded jurors that it determined would be influenced by defendant’s age. Edmonds v. State, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 88 (Miss. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2006), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 955 So. 2d 864, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 311 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

The trial court did not err in failing to dismiss a juror whose sister-in-law was in some manner (unknown by the juror) related to the victim’s nephew by marriage. Langston v. State, 791 So. 2d 273, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 206 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

A murder defendant was not denied a fair trial by virtue of the fact that 9 of the 42 members of the regular and special venire panels had relatives who had been murdered where 7 of the members of the venire who had had relatives murdered did not serve on the jury and the defense had sufficient peremptory challenges remaining to remove the other 2 jurors if they so desired. Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1989), rev'd, in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 313, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5501 (U.S. 1990).

Where a venireman, contrary to the trial judge’s instructions at the beginning of the voir dire examination, volunteered in the presence of others that in his opinion the accused was automatically guilty of rape, whereupon the trial court sent the offending juror to jail and interrogated the other veniremen as to whether they could disregard the expressed opinion and base a verdict solely upon the evidence of the case, and the court’s instructions, which was answered in the affirmative by all of the veniremen, the trial court did not err in overruling the accused’s motion to enter a mistrial and quash the venire. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

In action against city for damages, error in excusing prospective jurors from city on ground that being taxpayers, of itself, disqualified them did not require reversal, where it did not appear that the jurors who were impaneled and before whom case was tried were not fair and impartial. City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1937).

Jury hearing testimony in liquor case could try similar case in which same witness testified regarding alleged liquor sales made same night. Ladner v. State, 148 Miss. 243, 114 So. 341, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1927).

The juror who was an employee of the party alleged to be robbed of electricity is not impartial and cannot be allowed to sit in the case. Berbette v. State, 109 Miss. 94, 67 So. 853, 1915 Miss. LEXIS 119 (Miss. 1915).

Every defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. Collins v. State, 99 Miss. 47, 54 So. 665, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 12 (Miss. 1910).

The competency of jurors is not determined by the character of evidence expected to be introduced, but by the fitness or unfitness of the juror with respect to the standard erected by law for every character of case. Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1882).

7. Interest, bias or prejudice.

Trial court properly failed to strike prospective jurors for cause because there was no showing that either juror had a close personal relationship with the victim’s son, but rather, there was only a showing that the jurors and the son had worked together and that the brother of one of the jurors was friends with the son; the relationships disclosed were insufficient to disturb the trial court’s judgment that both prospective jurors on their oaths could be impartial in defendant’s trial. Patton v. State, 248 So.3d 763, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 62 (Miss. 2018).

That a juror in an armed robbery case knew the victim and had herself been a robbery victim did not disqualify her from serving as a juror and did not require the trial court to sua sponte disqualify her because the juror affirmatively indicated that neither her relationship with the victim nor her prior circumstance as a robbery victim would prevent her from being fair and impartial and would not affect her ability to render a judgment based solely on the evidence presented. Archer v. State, 986 So. 2d 951, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 2008).

Where a juror in a sexual battery case admitted that she knew many of the witnesses who were going to be called to testify, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss the juror for cause under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-79. The juror did not have a close personal relationship with the witnesses, but only knew them as members of the community; the juror confirmed that she could be fair and impartial. Smith v. State, 989 So. 2d 973, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 255 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

The court properly excused a juror for cause in a murder prosecution where the juror was related to the defendant and her stepfather was going to be called as a witness during the case in chief. Humphrey v. State, 759 So. 2d 368, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 101 (Miss. 2000).

In a case where defendant was convicted of simple assault and kidnapping, a juror was properly excluded for cause under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-79 for going off on a tangent during questioning; inter alia, the juror started asking about when it would be permissible to hit a woman, such as in a case of self-defense, and this issue was totally irrelevant to the case. Williams v. State, 960 So. 2d 506, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 786 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1068, 128 S. Ct. 722, 169 L. Ed. 2d 565, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 12894 (U.S. 2007).

A juror in a criminal prosecution should have been struck for cause where his sister was employed as an assistant district attorney. Hartfield v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 104, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1995).

A trial court in a robbery prosecution did not err in excusing a juror where the juror indicated extra-judicial knowledge concerning the person with whom the defendant was living at or near the time of the robbery, his statements were confusing concerning the effect of this knowledge, and it was not clear whether this knowledge would affect his verdict. Green v. State, 644 So. 2d 860, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1994).

While a prospective juror is not per se precluded from serving on the jury where the juror or a member of his or her family has been represented by an attorney who is involved in the case, a trial judge should carefully consider those instances in which a prospective juror or a family member has been represented by one of the attorney’s involved in the matter before him or her; despite a prospective juror’s honest and sincere belief that he or she can be completely fair and impartial, that person may find it very difficult to return a verdict against the client of an attorney to whom that person or a family member has turned for legal counsel in the past. Toyota Motor Corp. v. McLaurin, 642 So. 2d 351, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 320 (Miss. 1994).

In a capital murder case, the trial court properly excused a juror whose wife was defendant’s second cousin. Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2437 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867, 104 S. Ct. 40, 78 L. Ed. 2d 179, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 1737 (U.S. 1983), disapproved, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 150 (U.S. 1986).

Action of court, in murder prosecution wherein defendants were convicted and death sentence imposed, in holding as qualified a prospective juror who was present at deceased’s funeral, did not prejudice defendants where they peremptorily excused the juror. Shimniok v. State, 197 Miss. 179, 19 So. 2d 760, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1944).

The fact that prospective juror from city is a taxpayer may be basis of bias or prejudice that might, owing to existence of such bias or prejudice, disqualify the prospective juror in action against city, and, if trial judge is of the opinion, after inquiry, that prospective juror is not fair and impartial, he may be excused. City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1937).

The mere fact that a prospective juror from city is a taxpayer with no interest different from other taxpayers of city does not, per se, disqualify prospective juror in action against city. City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1937).

In action against city for damages, excusing prospective jurors from city on ground that being taxpayers, of itself, disqualified them, constituted error. City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1937).

Where a material witness for the state is a Negro the admission of a juror that he would not convict on Negro testimony renders such juror incompetent. Burrage v. State, 101 Miss. 598, 58 So. 217, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 10 (Miss. 1912).

The statement of juror that he would give defendant “a life time sentence anyway” renders him prejudiced. Martin v. State, 98 Miss. 676, 54 So. 148, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1910).

A venireman who believed an insult given by a Negro would fully justify a white man in killing him is unfit for jury service in the prosecution at bar. Stricklin v. State, 13 So. 898 (Miss. 1893).

One who has no hostility to the accused, and who is not shown to be so biased by a preconceived opinion as to render him incompetent as a juror, is not disqualified though he may have a bad opinion of the defendant’s character. Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, 7 So. 487, 1890 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1890).

The cousin of a party indicted for the same offense as the prisoner, and also one who states he sympathizes with defendants, are incompetent. Smith v. State, 61 Miss. 754, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1884).

8. Formation or expression of opinion.

Prospective jurors’ answer to one question about whether they would automatically impose a life sentence on a person convicted of rape was insufficient to establish a clear showing of impaired ability to perform the responsibilities of a juror, as required to strike prospective jurors for cause. Martin v. State, 592 So. 2d 987, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 963 (Miss. 1991).

That a juror has formed an impression about the case does not disqualify him where he states that his opinion is not fixed and that he will decide the case on the evidence. Simmons v. State, 241 Miss. 481, 130 So. 2d 860, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 366 (Miss. 1961).

Where a venireman, contrary to the trial judge’s instructions at the beginning of the voir dire examination, volunteered in the presence of others that in his opinion the accused was automatically guilty of rape, whereupon the trial court sent the offending juror to jail and interrogated the other veniremen as to whether they could disregard the expressed opinion and base a verdict solely upon the evidence of the case, and the court’s instructions, which was answered in the affirmative by all of the veniremen, the trial court did not err in overruling the accused’s motion to enter a mistrial and quash the venire. Cameron v. State, 233 Miss. 404, 102 So. 2d 355, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 1958).

This section [Code 1942, § 1763] does not necessarily imply that a man is incompetent who has an opinion. The onus is on the court in the exercise of its enlightened discretion to decide whether the person tendered can “try the case impartially.” Klyce v. State, 79 Miss. 652, 31 So. 339, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1901).

9. —Opinion not affecting competency.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s challenges for cause to three jurors as each took an oath that they were able to remain impartial; the fact that some of the jurors wondered why defendant was in the room was not dispositive that they could not be impartial. White v. State, 969 So. 2d 72, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 247 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 658 (Miss. 2007).

Trial court’s refusal to excuse for cause jurors who stated on voir dire that they had read newspaper articles or seen television newscasts about the case after being admonished by trial court not to do so was not prejudicial error in murder prosecution; upon questioning, none of these jurors said that his or her opinion would be affected by anything they had read or seen. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S. Ct. 187, 142 L. Ed. 2d 153, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5751 (U.S. 1998).

Proposed juror, although having fixed opinion as disclosed by voir dire examination, held competent, where entire examination disclosed he had no interest, bias, or prejudice, and that personal opinion would yield to evidence. Wampold v. State, 170 Miss. 732, 155 So. 350, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1934).

A mere opinion formed on rumor may not render a juror incompetent. Donahue v. State, 142 Miss. 20, 107 So. 15, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1926).

Opinions founded on rumor will not render incompetent one who declares he can bring in an impartial verdict. Sam v. State, 21 Miss. 189, 1849 Miss. LEXIS 160 (Miss. 1849); Nelms v. State, 21 Miss. 500, 1850 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1850); Ogle v. State, 33 Miss. 383, 1857 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 1857); Logan v. State, 50 Miss. 269, 1874 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1874).

Merely slight impressions in the mind of a juror that will not influence him do not disqualify him. Schwartz v. State, 103 Miss. 711, 60 So. 732, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 1912); Howell v. State, 107 Miss. 568, 65 So. 641, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1914).

Superficial impressions which will yield to testimony readily do not disqualify a juror. Whitehead v. State, 97 Miss. 537, 52 So. 259, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1910); Howell v. State, 107 Miss. 568, 65 So. 641, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 120 (Miss. 1914).

Under Code 1892, § 2355 (Code 1942, § 2177), jurors who have an opinion based on rumors which they have heard, which may be removed by evidence, and who have not talked to witnesses, have no prejudice against accused, and state that they can give him a fair trial on the evidence, uninfluenced by the rumors, are competent. Evans v. State, 87 Miss. 459, 40 So. 8, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1905); Cook v. State, 90 Miss. 137, 43 So. 618, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1907).

A juror who had heard rumors but had never heard any of the witnesses and who had an opinion from what he had heard, but could give defendant a fair trial, or a juror who had heard nothing from anyone who personally knew the facts, but who had formed an opinion from what he had seen in the newspapers and could give defendant a fair trial, is competent. Gammons v. State, 85 Miss. 103, 37 So. 609, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 1904).

If a juror states that he had formed and expressed an opinion but that it was not fixed and would not affect his verdict, and the accused, without having exhausted his peremptory challenges, does not offer to challenge him either for cause or peremptorily, he will not, after conviction, be granted a new trial because the juror had expressed the opinion that he ought to be convicted. Schrader v. State, 84 Miss. 593, 36 So. 385, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1904).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1763] one is not incompetent merely because on his voir dire he states that he lives in the immediate neighborhood where the crime was committed, had heard it discussed and had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of accused of such a fixed character that it would require evidence to remove it, provided that he makes oath that he can try the case fairly and impartially according to the evidence. Green v. State, 72 Miss. 522, 17 So. 381, 1895 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1895).

The fact that a juror had conversed with a witness does not disqualify him if he have not a “fixed opinion” as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Penn v. State, 62 Miss. 450, 1884 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1884).

A juror, accepted by the accused, who had expressed an opinion founded on rumors but who stated he could do justice is not incompetent, where one of the counsel for accused knew that the juror had expressed such opinion. Parker v. State, 55 Miss. 414, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 151 (Miss. 1877).

A mere opinion on rumor that requires no testimony to remove will not render a juror incompetent. Lee v. State, 45 Miss. 114, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 57 (Miss. 1871); White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 1876); Evans v. State, 87 Miss. 459, 40 So. 8, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1905); Cook v. State, 90 Miss. 137, 43 So. 618, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1907).

10. —Opinion rendering juror incompetent.

Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault was appropriate pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-67 and Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-79 because a juror’s statement that she could not sit in judgment of another person properly led to her excuse for cause. Hawthorne v. State, 944 So. 2d 928, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 910 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

A juror fully acquainted with all testimony in the case by hearsay who has an opinion is disqualified. Darby v. State, 128 Miss. 438, 91 So. 37, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1922).

A juror who has expressed an opinion that defendant should be convicted on general principles and his voir dire examination did not disclose such statement entitles defendant to a new trial. Martin v. State, 98 Miss. 676, 54 So. 148, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 109 (Miss. 1910).

Only strong and deep impressions that will preclude the mind against testimony in opposition thereto constitute objections that disqualify. Whitehead v. State, 97 Miss. 537, 52 So. 259, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 226 (Miss. 1910).

An opinion as to the guilt of the party which will require strong evidence to remove renders juror incompetent, although juror swears that he will be controlled by the evidence. Murphy v. State, 92 Miss. 203, 45 So. 865, 1908 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1908).

Where it develops on a motion for a new trial that the juror had expressed an adverse opinion a new trial should be granted. Dennis v. State, 91 Miss. 221, 44 So. 825, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1907).

The oath of the proffered juror is not conclusive, nor is he the judge of his own competency. A person is not qualified as a juror who has an opinion about the case and cannot say positively that he can try the case as though he had none, or who has an opinion about the case and from what he knows could bring in a verdict other than one predicated of a want of further knowledge without further evidence, or who has an opinion which it would require strong testimony to remove. Fugitt v. State, 82 Miss. 189, 33 So. 942, 1903 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1903).

A juror in a criminal case who before the trial heard all the facts of the case from an eyewitness whom he regarded as truthful, whose statements he believed, and on them he had formed a fixed opinion, is incompetent under Const. 1890 § 26, securing a trial by an impartial jury and is not within this section [Code 1942, § 1763]. Sheppric v. State, 79 Miss. 740, 31 So. 416 (Miss. 1901).

A venireman who testifies on his voir dire that he had heard witnesses for the state talk about the case and believes what they told him and has formed and expressed an opinion which he still retains, and which he supposes would require testimony to remove, is incompetent under the Const. 1890 § 26, guaranteeing a trial by an impartial jury, although he further testifies that what he had heard would not prevent him from rendering a fair and impartial verdict. Klyce v. State, 79 Miss. 652, 31 So. 339, 1901 Miss. LEXIS 113 (Miss. 1901).

If a juror on his voir dire disclose that he has an opinion touching defendant’s guilt which would require testimony to remove, or has doubts as to his ability to render an impartial verdict, it is not error for the court under this section [Code 1942, § 1763] to exclude him from the panel. McGuire v. State, 76 Miss. 504, 25 So. 495, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 148 (Miss. 1898).

A juror who has formed and expressed the opinion that defendant charged with murder “was not justified in killing deceased,” is incompetent. Jeffries v. State, 74 Miss. 675, 21 So. 526, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1897).

A juror who on his voir dire conceals the fact from the court that he has formed and expressed such an opinion is not rendered competent by this section [Code 1942, § 1763], and a verdict of guilty found by a jury of which he is a member should be set aside. The juror must disclose all the facts, and then the court, under the statute, must pass upon his competency. Jeffries v. State, 74 Miss. 675, 21 So. 526, 1897 Miss. LEXIS 45 (Miss. 1897).

One who has heard parts of a former trial, who declares that he has a fixed and definite opinion and will not say positively that he could try the accused as though he had no opinion, is not a competent juror. Mabry v. State, 71 Miss. 716, 14 So. 267, 1893 Miss. LEXIS 76 (Miss. 1893).

On a trial for perjury, one who has a fixed opinion as to the guilt of the person on whose trial the perjury is charged to have been committed, is disqualified although he has neither formed nor expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Brown v. State, 57 Miss. 424, 1879 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1879).

A juror whose opinion is formed on common rumor which would require evidence to remove, is not an impartial juror. Cotton v. State, 31 Miss. 504, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 108 (Miss. 1856).

11. —Prior knowledge.

Where the record does not show prejudice-the objection that a grand jury’s report was read in the hearing of some of the jury trying the case, where there is no objection then made, cannot be assigned as error. Spence v. State, 131 Miss. 91, 95 So. 97, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. 1922).

Jurors who heard the evidence on a former trial of a co-defendant are incompetent. Langston v. State, 129 Miss. 394, 92 So. 554, 1922 Miss. LEXIS 54 (Miss. 1922).

In a murder case one is not incompetent because he heard the killing talked of at the time it occurred, but does not think he formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Skinner v. State, 53 Miss. 399, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1876).

12. Non-belief in, or opposition to, capital punishment.

A trial judge in a capital murder prosecution did not abuse his discretion by excusing a potential juror who initially indicated that she could not impose the death penalty, even though she subsequently indicated that there were some circumstances under which she could impose the death penalty, where she failed to clearly indicate that she was willing to set aside her own beliefs and follow the instructions and law as to the death penalty. Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1684, 134 L. Ed. 2d 785, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3101 (U.S. 1996).

A prospective juror may not be struck from the jury venire for cause simply because the juror voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against infliction of the death penalty. If a juror indicates that if he or she was convinced of the guilt of the defendant and the circumstances warranted a verdict of guilty, he or she could return a verdict of guilty although that verdict could result in the death penalty, then the juror may not be struck from the jury venire for cause, despite his or her objections and concerns. A prospective juror may be struck if the juror indicates that he or she cannot consider and decide the facts impartially or cannot conscientiously apply the law or the court’s instructions. The juror need not expressly state that he or she absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty; an equivalent response made in any reasonable manner which indicates that the juror’s position is firm will suffice. Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 454 (Miss. 1991).

“Death qualification” of jurors prior to the guilt phase in a capital murder prosecution did not deprive the defendant of a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 612 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 6118 (U.S. 1990), overruled, Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 454 (Miss. 1991).

The exclusion of jurors who would not consider the death penalty under any circumstances was not error. Cole v. State, 525 So. 2d 365, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2655 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S. Ct. 330, 102 L. Ed. 2d 348, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 4775 (U.S. 1988).

Although excusing a prospective juror who would not vote to impose the death penalty under any facts or circumstances may have been error, it was harmless error where the defendant was indicted for murder but convicted of manslaughter. Wash v. State, 241 So. 2d 155, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1326 (Miss. 1970).

A juror is not rendered incompetent who when asked if he had conscientious scruples against capital punishment replied that he “would not like for a man to be hung.” Smith v. State, 55 Miss. 410, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1877).

In a capital case the court of its own motion and over defendant’s objection may reject a juror who is opposed to capital punishment. White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 1876); Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367, 1876 Miss. LEXIS 82 (Miss. 1876), limited, Smith v. State, 55 Miss. 410, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 150 (Miss. 1877); Cooper v. State, 59 Miss. 267, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1881).

A juror who has conscientious scruples about the infliction of capital punishment is incompetent when a verdict might be followed by the infliction of the death penalty. Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. 115, 1847 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1847); Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1856); Jones v. State, 57 Miss. 684, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1880); Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 66 (Miss. 1881).

A person who states on his voir dire that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment is not impartial between the state and the prisoner. Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389, 1856 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 1856); Fortenberry v. State, 55 Miss. 403, 1877 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 1877); Jones v. State, 57 Miss. 684, 1880 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1880).

13. Opposition to circumstantial evidence.

Jurors who will not on circumstantial evidence convict of murder may be rejected in a case depending on direct testimony. Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484, 1882 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1882).

14. Rulings on challenges.

Trial court could excuse prospective juror from serving on panel hearing capital murder case, on grounds that prospect was mother of 8-year-old boy and that she would feel apprehensive and be distracted if required to be away from child in event jury was sequestered. Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d 581, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 494 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011, 117 S. Ct. 518, 136 L. Ed. 2d 406, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7236 (U.S. 1996).

Trial court did not improperly excuse prospective juror from service in capital murder case; prospect tailored her response to question whether she could follow the law at both phases of trial to whichever counsel was questioning her, and she indicated she did not want to be involved in jury service and only “guessed” that she would “try” to listen to evidence and be fair to both sides. Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d 581, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 494 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011, 117 S. Ct. 518, 136 L. Ed. 2d 406, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 7236 (U.S. 1996).

A capital murder defendant was not denied a fair trial because he was forced to use his last peremptory challenge to remove a juror who was allegedly potentially biased since the loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury so long as the jury that sits is impartial, and the defendant did not show that an incompetent juror was forced to sit on the jury. Mettetal v. State, 615 So. 2d 600, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 96 (Miss. 1993).

A murder defendant was not denied a fair trial on the ground that the trial court refused to accept his challenges for cause to 3 potential jurors where the defendant used peremptory challenges to remove those jurors, since the loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury; so long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use peremptory challenges to achieve that result does not mean that the defendant was denied his or her constitutional rights. Mettetal v. State, 602 So. 2d 864, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1992).

A prerequisite to presentation of a claim of a denial of constitutional rights due to denial of a challenge for cause is a showing that the defendant had exhausted all of his or her peremptory challenges and that the incompetent juror was forced to sit on the jury due to the trial court’s erroneous ruling. Mettetal v. State, 602 So. 2d 864, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1992).

The denial of a challenge for cause is not error where it is not shown that the defense has exhausted peremptory challenges and is thus forced to accept the juror. Thus, a trial court’s refusal to remove 6 jurors for cause did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial where only one of the 6 actually served on the jury and she was not challenged at a time when the defense had 12 peremptory challenges, the defense still had one challenge left as well as an alternate challenge at the completion of the selection process, and the defense counsel never raised any objection to the other 5 jurors. Berry v. State, 575 So. 2d 1, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 849 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S. Ct. 2042, 114 L. Ed. 2d 126, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2673 (U.S. 1991).

In a capital murder prosecution, the court’s failure to excuse for cause a potential juror who stated during voir dire that in order for him not to impose the death penalty the defendant would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he should not be executed, was not reversible error where defense counsel used his twelfth peremptory challenge to remove the juror, defense counsel had not exhausted his peremptory challenges and did not challenge anyone else for cause or ask for more peremptory challenges. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 612 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 6118 (U.S. 1990), overruled, Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 454 (Miss. 1991).

Defendant cannot lawfully complain of the action of the court in sustaining a challenge to a juror by the state for cause. Smith v. State, 103 Miss. 356, 60 So. 330, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 179 (Miss. 1912).

15. Review.

Although defendant argued the circuit court erred in instructing potential jurors regarding the fact that defendant was 14 years old at the time he was accused of murder, the circuit court was bound by Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-79 to exclude potential jurors who stated they would be influenced by defendant’s age and could not try the case impartially. Evans v. State, 109 So.3d 1056, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 343 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), rev'd, 109 So.3d 1044, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 31 (Miss. 2013).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed two jurors for cause based on the prosecution’s representation that the jurors were under investigation by a grand jury because defendant’s claim of error was procedurally barred by Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-79, which provided that where the trial court was of the opinion that the prospective juror could not try the case impartially, the exclusion would not be assignable for error. Defendant failed to cite any authority for his proposition that the trial court’s acceptance of the representations of the prosecutor as to the two jurors was an abuse of discretion; and the trial court properly recognized that matters that have been or would be presented to the grand jury are uniquely known to the prosecutor. Burnside v. State, 912 So. 2d 1018, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 204 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 344, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 679 (Miss. 2005).

The defendant was barred from challenging the trial court’s dismissal of a venire member who heard impermissible comments made by another venire member, but indicated that she could nevertheless keep a fair and open mind and render a fair verdict in the case, as the end result was a jury composed of fair and impartial jurors. Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 1999).

On appeal, a defendant may not challenge the dismissal of a juror for cause. Edwards v. State, 723 So. 2d 1221, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 959 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

Once a judge has exercised his or her discretion and determined that a juror probably could not be impartial, that determination may not be assigned on appeal as error. Coverson v. State, 617 So. 2d 642, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 168 (Miss. 1993).

In a burglary prosecution, although a prospective juror who expressed uncertainty as to her ability to be a fair juror because of her sympathy for the elderly victim should have been excused for cause, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant suffered no actual prejudice. Carr v. State, 555 So. 2d 59, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 505 (Miss. 1989).

Under statute, the excusing of prospective juror by trial judge, in exercise of discretion vested in him, is final. City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1937).

After jury had been accepted, but before evidence is introduced, court may examine juror as to alleged disqualification not previously known, and if examination leaves juror’s qualification in doubt, may stand him aside or sustain challenge for cause, and such action does not require reversal in absence of abuse of discretion. Sullivan v. State, 155 Miss. 629, 125 So. 115, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 354 (Miss. 1929).

Exclusion by court, of own motion, of juror who heard part of former trial held not reversible error. Barnett v. State, 146 Miss. 893, 112 So. 586, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 255 (Miss. 1927).

On appeal the finding of the circuit court as to a juror’s qualifications is prima facie correct. Donahue v. State, 142 Miss. 20, 107 So. 15, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1926).

The action of the court in setting aside a juror of its own motion is not assignable for error and neither is its action in sustaining a challenge on the ground that there is a criminal case pending against the challenged juror. Lewis v. State, 85 Miss. 35, 37 So. 497, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1904).

It is nonreversible error to sustain the state’s challenge of a juror for the cause that there was a criminal case pending against him in the courts, since if the court had set him aside of its own motion, it could not have been assigned for error. Lewis v. State, 85 Miss. 35, 37 So. 497, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1904).

A finding by the trial court on motion for a new trial that a juror was not hostile to the accused will not be reversed where the testimony on the subject is conflicting. Schrader v. State, 84 Miss. 593, 36 So. 385, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 1904).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Admissibility in civil case of affidavit or testimony of juror in support of verdict attacked on ground of bias or disqualification of juror. 30 A.L.R.2d 914.

Admissibility, in civil case, of juror’s affidavit or testimony to show bias, prejudice, or disqualification of a juror not disclosed on voir dire examination. 48 A.L.R.2d 971.

Racial, religious, economic, social, or political prejudice of proposed juror as subject of inquiry or ground of challenge in criminal case. 54 A.L.R.2d 1204.

Religious belief as ground for exemption or excuse from jury service. 2 A.L.R.3d 1392.

Beliefs regarding capital punishment as disqualifying juror in capital case – post-Witherspoon cases. 39 A.L.R.3d 550.

Cure of prejudice resulting from statement by prospective juror during voir dire, in presence of other prospective jurors, as to defendant’s guilt. 50 A.L.R.4th 969.

Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Caucasian persons, as a racial group, from criminal jury–post-Batson state cases. 47 A.L.R.5th 259.

Am. Jur.

2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, Bias or Prejudice, Proof No. 1 (bias or prejudice – of juror).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 390-402, 357-364.

Law Reviews.

1978 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 59, March 1979.

§ 13-5-81. Challenge to array; quashing of venire.

A challenge to the array shall not be sustained, except for fraud, nor shall any venire facias, except a special venire facias in a criminal case, be quashed for any cause whatever.

HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 61, art. 10 (1); 1857, ch. 61, art. 142; 1871, § 743; 1880, § 1694; 1892, § 2387; 1906, § 2716; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2209; 1930, § 2062; 1942, § 1796.

Cross References —

Examination of jurors by attorneys or litigants, see §13-5-69.

Criminal offense of bribing jurors, see §97-9-5.

Peremptory challenges of jointly tried defendants, see §99-17-5.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Under the Batson test, the prosecutor satisfied the burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for striking a black juror where he explained that he struck the juror because the juror had long unkempt hair, a mustache and a beard, since the wearing of beards and long unkempt hair are not characteristics that are particular to any race. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3181 (U.S. 1995).

In a prosecution for capital murder and conspiracy to commit capital murder, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to place the initial burden on the State to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the defendant’s use of his peremptory challenges, before concluding that the defendant failed to offer a race-neutral reason for challenging one of the jurors, since the defendant was arbitrarily and erroneously denied the use of one of his peremptory challenges, and the composition of the jury was directly altered as a result. Colosimo v. Senatobia Motor Inn, 662 So. 2d 552, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 479 (Miss. 1995).

A prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for peremptorily striking a potential juror need not rise to the level of justifying the exercise of a challenge for cause. Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S. Ct. 1684, 134 L. Ed. 2d 785, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3101 (U.S. 1996).

In a capital murder prosecution in which a black defendant was convicted and sentenced by an all-white jury for the murders of 4 white victims, the trial court did not err by allowing the State to peremptorily strike the sole potential black juror, since the reason stated by the prosecution for the peremptory challenge-that the juror indicated she would have difficulty finding suitable child care during the trial-was sufficiently race-neutral. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S. Ct. 783, 133 L. Ed. 2d 734, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 547 (U.S. 1996).

The trial court in a capital murder prosecution erred by not requiring the State to give racially-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenges against 7 out of 13 black jurors on the venire, even though there was no showing that the defendant was of a minority class, and therefore the case would be remanded for a hearing on whether the Batson criteria were violated by the State’s exercise of its peremptory challenges. Thorson v. State, 653 So. 2d 876, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 600 (Miss. 1994).

In a personal injury action against an automobile manufacturer arising out of a one-vehicle accident, the automobile manufacturer was not afforded the fair and impartial jury to which it was entitled where a substantial number of the jurors had in the past been represented by the attorney for the plaintiff, or had a family member who was represented by the attorney; due to the number of persons on the venire and the jury who had been represented by the plaintiff’s attorney or whose family members had been clients of the attorney, there was a “statistical aberration” in the make-up of the venire and the jury, so that the opportunity for these jurors to exercise their influence over the remainder of the jury was too great a risk to be taken. Toyota Motor Corp. v. McLaurin, 642 So. 2d 351, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 320 (Miss. 1994).

The reasons proffered by the State for using 5 of its 7 peremptory challenges against black jurors were sufficient to withstand a Batson challenge where the reasons given were (1) the juror had a brother in the penitentiary; (2) the juror had attended high school with the defendant; (3) the juror wore dark glasses in the courtroom; (4) the juror was employed in a company in which there had been a riot which was quelled by the police; and (5) the juror shared a last name with many persons in the penitentiary and the prosecutor believed he was related to an inmate, and the defense made no attempt to show that the reasons proffered were pretextual, of disparate impact, or not true. Henderson v. State, 641 So. 2d 1184, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 374 (Miss. 1994).

Some acceptable race-neutral reasons for challenging a juror are: (1) involvement in criminal activity; (2) unemployment; (3) employment history; (4) relative of juror involved in crime; (5) low income occupation; (6) juror wore gold chains, rings and watch; and (7) dress and demeanor. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 670 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S. Ct. 1365, 131 L. Ed. 2d 221, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2061 (U.S. 1995).

The State’s reasons for using 4 of its 5 peremptory challenges against black jurors were sufficiently race-neutral where the first juror had a pending civil lawsuit, the second juror had worked with a defense witness and the prosecution objected to his age and demeanor, the third juror had previously sat on 2 criminal juries which resulted in one “not guilty” verdict and one mistrial, and the prosecutor was unable to make eye contact with the fourth juror while the juror continuously made eye contact with the defendant. Harper v. State, 635 So. 2d 864, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1994), limited, Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 2007).

A trial judge is required to make an on-the-record factual determination that each reason proffered by the State for exercising a peremptory challenge is, in fact, race neutral; this requirement is to be prospective in nature. Hatten v. State, 628 So. 2d 294, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 522 (Miss. 1993).

The State successfully rebutted a black defendant’s Batson challenge to the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges to eliminate four black venire members where 2 of the venire members were challenged because they were of an age to be employed and had no occupation, and the other 2 were challenged because they were acquainted with the defendant or her family. Porter v. State, 616 So. 2d 899, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 115 (Miss. 1993).

The Batson rule applies to both a prosecutor’s and a defendant’s peremptory challenges. Griffin v. State, 610 So. 2d 354, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 749 (Miss. 1992).

A defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in the defendant’s case; a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. Griffin v. State, 607 So. 2d 1197, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 1992).

A white defendant had standing to object to the State’s use of 5 of its 6 peremptory challenges to strike black jurors; however, the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination where the State offered race neutral reasons for striking each individual black juror and the defendant’s attorney offered no evidence to rebut the State’s reasons for striking the jurors. Green v. State, 597 So. 2d 656, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 1992).

A defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection, even though the defendant was black and the prosecution exercised preemptory challenges to eliminate 3 black jurors, where the jurors were excluded because they were acquainted with the defendant; while excluding jurors on the ground that they were acquainted with the defendant might have had a discriminatory effect since the defendant’s acquaintances were primarily black, the law does not proscribe the mere incidental exclusion of blacks from a jury. Govan v. State, 591 So. 2d 428, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 836 (Miss. 1991).

A county’s jury venire selection did not systematically exclude blacks in violation of a black defendant’s constitutional equal protection rights, even though there were only 2 blacks out of 12 on the jury which rendered a verdict against the defendant when 37 percent of the county was black, where the jury selection was based upon voter registration lists of the county without regard to race. Harris v. State, 576 So. 2d 1262, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 121 (Miss. 1991).

The reasons given by a district attorney for exercising a peremptory challenge to excuse a black juror were sufficiently race-neutral where the district attorney stated that the juror was a truck driver “which may or may not mean he’s a transient,” the juror wore overalls with a black T-Shirt in the courtroom, and he was unmarried and did not have children “which shows that he doesn’t have a stake in the community like somebody that’s established.” Bradley v. State, 562 So. 2d 1276, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 267 (Miss. 1990).

A murder defendant’s argument that the jury was patently flawed because the jury was white and the defendant was black was without merit. The mere fact that a jury is white and a defendant is black does not violate Batson, but rather it is the racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors from the jury that violates the Batson rule. Sudduth v. State, 562 So. 2d 67, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 235 (Miss. 1990).

A defendant’s motion to quash the array of jurors was properly denied where nothing in the record indicated that the sheriff, his deputies, or any other person tampered with the jury or purposely evaded serving jurors in order to stack the jury, even though 100 jurors were summoned and 53 of them were not found or marked “out of the county.” Avery v. State, 555 So. 2d 1039, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 1990), overruled, Mayfield v. State, 612 So. 2d 1120, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 861 (Miss. 1992).

No prima facie case of racial discrimination was shown in the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges, even though the prosecutor exercised 5 of his 7 peremptory challenges against black jurors, where the victim of the crime charged and the defendant were black, the prosecutor and the defendant had several challenges left, numerous potential black jurors were left uncalled, and one black juror was in the jury box. Dennis v. State, 555 So. 2d 679, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 465 (Miss. 1989).

A murder defendant was not denied a fair trial by virtue of the fact that 9 of the 42 members of the regular and special venire panels had relatives who had been murdered where 7 of the members of the venire who had had relatives murdered did not serve on the jury and the defense had sufficient peremptory challenges remaining to remove the other 2 jurors if they so desired. Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss. 1989), rev'd, in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 313, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5501 (U.S. 1990).

After the State has supplied a neutral nonracial explanation for peremptory challenges, in the absence of an actual proffer of evidence by the defendant concerning this issue, the Supreme Court may not reverse on this point. It is incumbent upon the defendant to come forward with proof when given the opportunity for rebuttal. Davis v. State, 551 So. 2d 165, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 364 (Miss. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S. Ct. 1796, 108 L. Ed. 2d 797, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1741 (U.S. 1990).

A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case was denied her right to an impartial jury where there were over 40,000 persons in the county from which a jury could have been drawn and the plaintiff was limited to a jury pool of 25, 48 percent of which were connected in some way to the defendant doctor, because of the “statistical aberration” of the makeup of the venire and the strong likelihood that the opportunity for undue influence over other jurors in the case was too great. Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So. 2d 359, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1989).

A defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of a petit jury where he showed that he was a black person and that the district attorney had exercised peremptory challenges to remove 5 black persons from the jury. The fact that the prosecution used all of the peremptory strikes necessary to remove all but one black person from the jury satisfied the requirement of raising an inference of racial discrimination. Conerly v. State, 544 So. 2d 1370, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 265 (Miss. 1989).

When a criminal defendant establishes a prima facie case of the impermissible exclusion of black jurors through the use of peremptory challenges, the burden of proof shifts to the state to come forward with a racially neutral explanation for each of the challenges that must be related to the particular case being tried. Dedeaux v. State, 519 So. 2d 886, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1988).

The provisions of the law in regard to the listing, drawing, summoning or impaneling of juries are directory merely. Smith v. State, 242 Miss. 728, 137 So. 2d 172, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 586 (Miss. 1962).

The trial court did not commit reversible error in overruling defendant’s motion for a mistrial, or that a new panel of jurors be tendered to the defendant, where, after ten jurors had been finally accepted to try the defendant for murder, the court, out of the presence of defendant or his counsel, excused one of the jurors because illness required the juror’s presence at home, where the court had allowed the defendant one additional peremptory challenge. Upshaw v. State, 231 Miss. 158, 94 So. 2d 337, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1957).

In prosecution for contributing to delinquency of minor under 18 years of age, failure to quash jury panel is not error when trial judge in sentencing defendant in case immediately preceding trial of defendant, involving similar circumstances, stated as reason for imposing fine and jail sentence that he was interested in protection of boys and girls, though statement was in presence of prospective jurors, since degree of punishment is matter with which trial jury has no concern. Broadstreet v. State, 208 Miss. 789, 45 So. 2d 590, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1950).

Special venire will not be set aside merely because sheriff did not follow court’s recommended procedure in selecting panel where time was short and a fair and impartial panel was summoned. Riley v. State, 208 Miss. 336, 44 So. 2d 455, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1950).

Denial of motion to quash special venire in homicide prosecution against Negro defendant because under the voir dire examination there appeared only one member of the Negro race did not constitute error where there was no showing how many other, if any, Negroes were summoned and failed to respond. Patton v. State, 207 Miss. 120, 40 So. 2d 592, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 855, 70 S. Ct. 104, 94 L. Ed. 523, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 1796 (U.S. 1949).

Special venire will not be quashed except for fraud or total departure from procedure laid down. Moon v. State, 176 Miss. 72, 168 So. 476, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1936); Riley v. State, 208 Miss. 336, 44 So. 2d 455, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 252 (Miss. 1950).

Motion to quash special venire on ground that it should have been summoned from new jury list held properly overruled where new list had been in jury box less than thirty days before special venire was granted and trial had. Moon v. State, 176 Miss. 72, 168 So. 476, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 1936).

Where trial was had during second week of term, overruling defendant’s motion to quash jury panel summoned for first week held harmless. Mississippi & S. V. R. Co. v. Brown, 160 Miss. 123, 132 So. 556, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1931).

Panel should not be quashed except for fraud and unless there was total departure from course described by statute. Harris v. State, 155 Miss. 794, 125 So. 253, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1929).

No one of the twelve jurors can impeach the verdict where the verdict was reached by only nine. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

The testimony must show that fraud was committed or flagrant violations of the jury laws that constitute fraud in law before the court is authorized to quash a jury box. Cook v. State, 90 Miss. 137, 43 So. 618, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1907).

The venire in a criminal case will not be quashed because the jury was not drawn from the legal box prepared by the board of supervisors. Campbell v. State, 17 So. 441 (Miss. 1895).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Bias, prejudice, or conduct of individual member of jury panel as ground for challenge to entire panel. 76 A.L.R.2d 678.

Age group underrepresentation in grand jury or petit jury venire. 62 A.L.R.4th 859.

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury §§ 191- 199.

8 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Criminal Procedure, Form 264 (challenge to panel of jurors).

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Forms 151-166 (challenges to array).

CJS.

50 C.J.S., Juries §§ 357-364.

§ 13-5-83. Intoxicated jurors; jurors under the control of the court.

If any juror summoned to appear at court, should render himself unfit for service by intoxication before his name is called in court, he shall be fined in a sum not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), and be imprisoned for a term not exceeding twenty-four hours. After grand and petit jurors are impaneled they shall be under the control of the court, and, for any breach of duty or contempt of court, may be fined and imprisoned.

HISTORY: Codes, 1871, § 752; 1880, § 1696; 1892, § 2388; 1906, § 2717; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2210; 1930, § 2063; 1942, § 1797.

Cross References —

Sheriffs, bailiffs, or other officers not being in room or conversing with a retired jury, see §11-7-149.

Criminal offense of officer being guilty of habitual drunkenness, see §97-11-23.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In prosecution for rape, new trial was not required by fact that during progress of trial, two jurors were inadvertently separated from the others for a period of approximately 15 or 20 minutes, where there was no suggestion that the separated jurors were contacted by anyone. Lampley v. State, 291 So. 2d 707, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1736 (Miss. 1974).

No new trial was warranted on grounds that a deputy sheriff without court authorization drove a bus and ate in the same room with the jurors where the deputy did not testify as a witness in the case on its merits, he did not even appear in the courtroom at any time in the course of the trial, his function was to assist in the process of making it possible for the jurors to eat, his only activity was to respond to the sheriff’s direction that he drive the members of the jury, together with the two bailiffs, to the restaurant in the bus, and at all times complained of the jurors were in the protective custody of the bailiff; however, it would have been better policy for the bus driver to receive in open court detailed instructions from the trial judge in the presence of jurors, bailiffs, counsel, and the defendant. Bickcom v. State, 286 So. 2d 823, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1324 (Miss. 1973).

A conversation between a juror and a material witness in a prosecution, the witness being a deputy sheriff and jailer, and having served as a courtroom deputy, just after the witness had testified for the state, was reversible error, where the defendant had, prior to the introduction of evidence, moved the court to direct police officers, including the instant witness, to remove themselves from close proximity to the jury box, and had moved for a mistrial immediately after the observed conversation, both of which requests were denied. Perkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 414, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1336 (Miss. 1971).

Undue pressure upon jury to reach verdict is not shown by fact that court ordered jury to retire to jury room at 6 p. m. and kept them in room until almost 8 p. m., without supper, or without asking them if they desired supper, where record is silent as to existence of any of the facts upon which this contention is predicated. Broadstreet v. State, 208 Miss. 789, 45 So. 2d 590, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 299 (Miss. 1950).

One who attempts to bribe or influence decision of juror is guilty of contempt of court, regardless of whether act which constitutes contempt is committed in or out of presence of court, or whether juror is actually sworn on particular case or is only member of panel from which trial jury is to be selected. Jones v. State, 208 Miss. 762, 45 So. 2d 576, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1950).

Person is guilty of contempt of court when he approaches prospective juror, who has been summoned for trial of murder case, at juror’s home and advises juror that there are some things in favor of defendant that court will not permit to go to jury, that deceased had been running over defendant, but that fact would be kept from jury and if it wasn’t brought out juror should give defendant a break. Jones v. State, 208 Miss. 762, 45 So. 2d 576, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1950).

Inquiries or requests made of bailiff by jury after it has retired to consider case should be reported to trial judge, and bailiff should never give opinion about anything involved in case. Passons v. State, 208 Miss. 545, 45 So. 2d 131, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 273 (Miss. 1950), overruled, Simmons v. State, 568 So. 2d 1192, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 605 (Miss. 1990).

No meddling with, or intent to influence, jury is shown which could cause any harm by fact that after jury had retired for deliberation, one asked bailiff if judge would further instruct them if liquor had any legal property value, bailiff stated that he did not think judge would give further instructions and that jury had their instructions, and door was shut and jury said nothing further. Passons v. State, 208 Miss. 545, 45 So. 2d 131, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 273 (Miss. 1950), overruled, Simmons v. State, 568 So. 2d 1192, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 605 (Miss. 1990).

The mere fact that a jury in a capital case was allowed to separate because of sickness is held to be no ground for a new trial. Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87, 85 So. 129, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 8 (Miss. 1920).

It is not error for a jury to be retired pending argument to the court on the competency of a witness. Lewis v. State, 85 Miss. 35, 37 So. 497, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 1904).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Indoctrination by court of persons summoned for jury service. 89 A.L.R.2d 197.

Admissibility, in civil case, of juror’s affidavit or testimony relating to juror’s misconduct outside jury room. 32 A.L.R.3d 1356.

Holding jurors in contempt under state law. 93 A.L.R.5th 493.

Am. Jur.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 121 (order of attachment of defaulting juror – failure to serve as juror); Form 122 (order for defaulting juror to show cause); Form 123 (order convicting defaulting juror of contempt).

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 633, Jury Misconduct Warranting New Trial.

§ 13-5-85. Selection of and service on juries in Harrison County.

In Harrison County, a county having two judicial districts, the law in relation to the selection and liability to jury service of grand and petit juries shall be applicable to each of the two judicial districts of the county in the same manner as if each district were a separate county, so far as the same may be made to apply. No person shall be made to serve as a grand or petit juror except in the district in which he resides. Lists of persons subject and liable to jury duty shall be made and grand and petit jurors shall be selected and empaneled in each of said districts in the same manner as if each were a separate county, except in such cases where it is otherwise provided by law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 2910-08; Laws, 1962, ch. 257, § 8, eff. from and after passage (approved June 1, 1962).

§ 13-5-87. Laws as to listing, drawing, summoning and impaneling of juries are directory.

All the provisions of law in relation to the listing, drawing, summoning and impaneling juries are directory merely, and a jury listed, drawn, summoned or impaneled, though in an informal or irregular manner, shall be deemed a legal jury after it shall have been impaneled and sworn, and it shall have the power to perform all the duties devolving on the jury.

HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 64, art. 250; 1871, § 2843; 1880, § 1672; 1892, § 2389; 1906, § 2718; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2211; 1930, § 2064; 1942, § 1798.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Irregularities cured by statute.

3. Defects and errors not cured.

4. Review.

5. Prayer prior to jury venire.

1. In general.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a doctor’s motion to quash the jury panel—when the doctor contended that the doctor was denied a fair trial in a medical malpractice action because the doctor, who was Caucasian, had an all-African-American venire in a county that was 25 percent Caucasian—because the appellate court found no evidence showing any actual fraud, prejudice, or such a flagrant violation of duty as to amount to fraud. Kronfol v. Johnson, 283 So.3d 1162, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 183 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 283 So.3d 733, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 430 (Miss. 2019), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 459 (Miss. 2019).

Jury was properly impaneled because the selected jurors were thoroughly questioned and deemed qualified for service during the voir dire examination and prior to being sworn in. Hall v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 610 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2019).

Misallocation of defendant’s peremptory challenges did not affect a fundamental, substantive right because so long as the jury that sat was impartial, the fact that defendant had to pool his regular and alternate peremptory challenges to achieve that result did not mean his Sixth Amendment rights were violated; despite being selected in an irregular manner, the jury was a legal jury with the authority to render a verdict against defendant. Carr v. State, 190 So.3d 1, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 605 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Trial judge’s questioning of circuit clerk established that clerk had complied, or substantially complied, with statute with respect to random selection of jurors to try defendant charged with attempting to obtain controlled substance by misrepresentation or fraud. Griffin v. State, 494 So. 2d 376, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2651 (Miss. 1986).

In a prosecution for robbery by assault, there was no reversible error in impaneling the juries where the system used consisted of a court administrator’s shuffling information cards filled out by prospective jurors and arranging those cards in groups of 12, with the groups designated as Juries 1, 2 and 3. Harris v. State, 406 So. 2d 823, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2437 (Miss. 1981).

The method of selecting a jury is ordinarily within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, except in those circumstances where the jury selection method is set forth by statute. Peters v. State, 314 So. 2d 724, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1683 (Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S. Ct. 457, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3639 (U.S. 1975).

It was within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to how many jurors would be submitted to the litigant for their voir dire. Bright v. State, 293 So. 2d 818, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1814 (Miss. 1974).

The statutory method of selecting a jury is discretionary and not mandatory. Henry v. State, 209 So. 2d 614, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1454 (Miss. 1968).

Considered as a whole, the statutes providing for the selection of jurors are not void for vagueness. Reed v. State, 199 So. 2d 803, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1309 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 413, 88 S. Ct. 1113, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 2174 (U.S. 1968).

The jury laws of Mississippi are directory and the selection of the jury list in an informal or irregular manner does not render it illegal. Shinall v. State, 199 So. 2d 251, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1290 (Miss.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014, 88 S. Ct. 590, 19 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 27 (U.S. 1967), overruled, Flowers v. State, 473 So. 2d 164, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2140 (Miss. 1985).

The jury laws are merely directory, and a jury drawn informally or in an irregular manner is legal “after it shall have been impaneled and sworn.” Ladner v. State, 197 So. 2d 257, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1524 (Miss. 1967).

The provisions of the law in regard to the listing, drawing, summoning or impaneling of juries are directory merely. Smith v. State, 242 Miss. 728, 137 So. 2d 172, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 586 (Miss. 1962); Williams v. State, 220 So. 2d 325, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1455 (Miss. 1969).

Petitioner’s allegation in an application for writ of habeas corpus that his conviction constituted a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because of the systematic exclusion of members of his race from the lists from which grand and petit juries were selected in the county where he was indicted ad convicted, and that because of his ignorance and circumstances of his arrest and incarceration, and as a consequence of the law of Mississippi, he was not able to challenge the competency of the grand jury, together with a showing of the speed in which the petitioner was tried following his indictment, were sufficient to entitle the petitioner to a hearing on the question of whether he had adequately safeguarded his constitutional rights during his trial for murder. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4002 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

Since the laws with reference to the impaneling of jurors are directory, the trial court did not commit reversible error in overruling defendant’s motion for a mistrial, or that a new panel be tendered him, where, after ten jurors had been finally accepted to try defendant for murder, the court, out of the presence of the defendant or his counsel, excused a juror because illness required the juror’s presence at home, but allowed defendant one additional peremptory challenge. Upshaw v. State, 231 Miss. 158, 94 So. 2d 337, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1957).

A Negro convicted of feloniously receiving stolen property was not entitled to a new trial upon the ground of unproven allegations of prejudice against members of his race by the jurors trying him, where no objection had been made to the qualifications of the jurors before the jury had been impaneled and sworn. Walker v. State, 229 Miss. 540, 91 So. 2d 548, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 638 (Miss. 1956).

This section [Code 1942, § 1798] in relation to the listing, drawing, summoning, and impaneling of juries is directory merely and not mandatory. Wiggins v. State, 224 Miss. 414, 80 So. 2d 17, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 505 (Miss. 1955).

The trial court in a prosecution for murder did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash a jury panel for the reason that the names of the jurors in the compartment of the jury box representing a particular supervisor’s district had been exhausted and the jury was selected from other supervisors’ districts. Wiggins v. State, 224 Miss. 414, 80 So. 2d 17, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 505 (Miss. 1955).

Where the statute provides that not less than twenty names nor more than forty names are to be drawn for a jury box for each week of county term, the statute is mandatory as to the minimum number but only directory as to the maximum number. Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 72 So. 2d 211, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1954).

Where the statute provides that a maximum of forty names should be drawn from the jury box for week of term, a defendant was not prejudiced by the drawing of sixty names. Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 72 So. 2d 211, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 500 (Miss. 1954).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 1798] jury laws are directory and not mandatory and case will not be reversed unless there is radical departure from statutory scheme of summoning and impaneling juries. Kouvarakis v. Hawver, 208 Miss. 697, 45 So. 2d 278, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1950).

Motion to quash indictment against Negro on ground that there were no Negro names listed or placed in jury box from which grand jury was drawn is properly overruled when it appears that there were only two Negroes in the county who were qualified electors and who could have served on either grand or petit juries at time juries were impaneled. Flowers v. State, 209 Miss. 86, 41 So. 2d 352, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 800, 94 L. Ed. 1360, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2045 (U.S. 1950).

Manner in which lists of jurors is selected by board of supervisors and placed in jury box involves solely question of state procedure and trial court is not in error in overruling motion to quash indictment on that ground when objections to qualification of grand jurors is not made before they are impaneled and defendant was at time represented by able lawyer and had reason to believe his case would be investigated by grand jury and he could have obtained information as to venire from which grand jury would be drawn. Flowers v. State, 209 Miss. 86, 41 So. 2d 352, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 800, 94 L. Ed. 1360, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2045 (U.S. 1950).

It is duty of circuit and chancery clerks, board of supervisors and sheriff to comply strictly with all of requirements of statutes in manner of listing, drawing and selecting jurors, compiling jury lists, and summoning and impaneling juries, but since statutes on the subject are merely directory, judgment will not be reversed where there was no radical departure from statutory scheme of selecting and impaneling jury and jury selected was fair and impartial. Lott v. State, 204 Miss. 610, 37 So. 2d 782, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 394 (Miss. 1948).

On motion to quash jury list from which grand and petit juries were to be chosen, for alleged reason that board of supervisors had not selected names of jurors in manner required by law governing selection of qualified electors, placing names in jury box, and subsequent drawing of juries, it is competent to show by testimony of chancery and circuit clerks manner in which statutory requirements were compiled with. Lott v. State, 204 Miss. 610, 37 So. 2d 782, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 394 (Miss. 1948).

Custom in selecting grand and petit jurors by clerks of circuit and chancery courts and the sheriff, pursuant to direction by a circuit judge, gathering together and taking slips out of the jury box and spreading them face up on a table so that they could see the names of the prospective jurors, and laying aside the names of those whom they did not think would make good jurors or who would be unable to serve, condemned as improper, since such action in effect constitutes a purging or revision of the board of supervisors’ list regularly selected pursuant to law. Reynolds v. State, 199 Miss. 409, 24 So. 2d 781, 1946 Miss. LEXIS 211 (Miss. 1946).

This section [Code 1942, § 1798] and other statutory provisions relating to listing, drawing, summoning, and impaneling juries are directory merely, and jury listed, drawn, summoned, and impaneled in irregular manner constitutes legal jury after it has been impaneled and sworn. Wampold v. State, 170 Miss. 732, 155 So. 350, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1934).

Statute declaring jury laws to be directory undertakes only to cure irregularities and defects in listing, drawing, summoning, and impaneling juries. Rhodman v. State, 153 Miss. 15, 120 So. 201, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 6 (Miss. 1929).

In view of the directory character of the jury laws, the court, where the public interest requires, has the power to reassemble the grand jury during the term. Haynes v. State, 93 Miss. 670, 47 So. 522 (Miss. 1908).

2. Irregularities cured by statute.

Even conceding that the trial judge should have adopted some other and different mode of procuring additional members for a grand jury, still, after the jury was sworn and impaneled, it was by the law deemed a legal jury, and any error of the court was cured by the express terms of the statute. Page v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc., 728 So. 2d 1075, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 507 (Miss. 1998).

Section13-5-9 is directory only and the selection of a jury under the section does not render the jury illegal. Polk v. State, 288 So. 2d 452, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1839 (Miss.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 867, 95 S. Ct. 123, 42 L. Ed. 2d 104, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 2747 (U.S. 1974).

In the absence of a showing of fraud on the rights of the accused in a criminal case, it was not reversible error for the trial court to excuse from jury service, for good cause, before the case was called for trial and in chambers without notice to the accused, 26 of the 74 persons who appeared in response to an order for a special venire of 90 persons. Parker v. State, 201 Miss. 579, 29 So. 2d 910, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 423 (Miss. 1947).

The fact that the trial judge required inquires as to challenges for cause to be directed to eighteen men instead of twelve men did not make the impanelment of the jury improper. Smith v. State, 190 Miss. 24, 198 So. 562, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 180 (Miss. 1940).

Defendant in capital case not objecting to manner of drawing special venire at time of drawing, waived objection. Arnold v. State, 171 Miss. 164, 157 So. 247, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1934).

Where regular jury box exhausted, drawing special venire from jury list prepared for succeeding year, held mere irregularity. Arnold v. State, 171 Miss. 164, 157 So. 247, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 217 (Miss. 1934).

Where regular jury panel was exhausted and the court directed the sheriff to fill the panel, which he did by summoning bystanders, rather than from the jury box, the court order not requiring this to be done, it was too late for defendant to complain of such procedure after the trial was over in view of the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 1798]. Wampold v. State, 170 Miss. 732, 155 So. 350, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1934).

Error, if any, in proceedings for making up grand jury list pursuant to order directing issuance of special venire facias held mere irregularity, cured when jury was impaneled and sworn. Nelson v. State, 160 Miss. 401, 133 So. 248, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 159 (Miss. 1931).

Error, if any, in not keeping jury box locked and sealed and prematurely preparing jury list was cured where jury was impaneled and sworn to try case in view of this section [Code 1942, § 1798]. Wells v. State, 160 Miss. 298, 133 So. 227, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1931).

Where trial was had during second week of term, overruling defendant’s motion to quash jury panel summoned for first week held harmless. Mississippi & S. V. R. Co. v. Brown, 160 Miss. 123, 132 So. 556, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 1931).

In homicide prosecution, where court ordered special venire from first district of county, refusal to order one from second district held not error, statutes being directory. Taylor v. State, 148 Miss. 621, 114 So. 390, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 48 (Miss. 1927).

The fact that the board of supervisors failed to select the jury from the districts in proportion to the qualified persons therein does not authorize the quashing of the venire in the absence of proof that the grand jury was composed of impartial and fair men. Atkinson v. State, 137 Miss. 42, 101 So. 490, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 195 (Miss. 1924).

In the absence of proof that the jury was not fair and impartial a mere irregularity in summoning the jury does not constitute reversible error. Ferguson v. State, 107 Miss. 559, 65 So. 584, 1914 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1914).

After the impaneling of a grand jury certain members having been excused, the court directed that bystanders (designating them) serve as grand jurors, though such persons were not among those listed by the supervisors for jury service and though their names were not on the venire drawn for service during the term, defendant made no direct challenge and took no exception at the time. In the absence of any showing that the grand jury was not fair and impartial, there was no ground for reversal of a conviction on an indictment found by it. Posey v. State, 86 Miss. 141, 38 So. 324, 1905 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1905).

If an impartial jury be obtained in a murder case the defendant cannot, after conviction, predicate error of an irregularity in drawing a special venire, the statutes on the subject being directory. Buchanan v. State, 84 Miss. 332, 36 So. 388, 1904 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Miss. 1904).

A special venire will not be quashed because the trial judge caused the sheriff to submit to him before the service of the writ the names of the deputies selected to execute it, that they might be shown to the attorneys in the case with a view of receiving objections to them, or because on objection by the state’s attorney two of the persons named were not appointed, the sheriff appointing two unobjectionable persons in their place. If such a proceeding be irregular, it is cured by this section [Code 1942, § 1798], declaring that juries irregularly summoned shall be deemed legal after being impaneled and sworn. Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss. 223, 25 So. 158, 1898 Miss. LEXIS 130 (Miss. 1898).

Where a special venire is ordered without application by the district attorney or defendant, it may be quashed on motion, but, after the jury is impaneled, the irregularity is cured by the statute. Gavigan v. State, 55 Miss. 533, 1878 Miss. LEXIS 5 (Miss. 1878).

3. Defects and errors not cured.

Although persons over 65 years of age and persons who have served on a jury within 2 years are exempt from jury service under §13-5-25, neither the circuit court nor the deputy circuit clerk have authority to act unilaterally and strike such persons from the jury list. Such persons are eligible for jury service and have every lawful right and authority to serve if called and selected. When their names are drawn, such persons must be summoned the same as other prospective jurors and no one has authority to exempt any such juror from service unless he or she claims the privilege and asks to be excused. Thus, a judgment of conviction and sentence was reversed where the deputy circuit clerk unilaterally struck from the jury list all persons over 65 years of age and all persons who had served on a jury within the 2 preceding years. Adams v. State, 537 So. 2d 891, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1989).

Statutory provision (Code 1942, § 1794) that if at any term of court it appears that there are not a sufficient number of jurors present to make a jury, the court shall immediately cause the proper number of jurors to be drawn from the jury box and summoned, and, if there be no jury box to be drawn from, the court shall direct the requisite number of persons, qualified as jurors, to be summoned to appear, is mandatory, and is not affected by this section [Code 1942, § 1798].J. J. W. Sanders Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Moody, 191 Miss. 604, 2 So. 2d 815, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1941).

Where, in a personal injury action, only twelve jurors drawn from the jury box qualified, and, though there was a jury box from which to draw talesman, the tales-jurors were summoned by the constable at the direction of the court, the panel should have been quashed on motion of the defendant. J. W. Sanders Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Moody, 191 Miss. 604, 2 So. 2d 815, 1941 Miss. LEXIS 156 (Miss. 1941).

Where there was a total departure by the board of supervisors from the provisions of law in selecting a jury list, the jury list was illegal, and it was error, not cured by this section [Code 1942, § 1798], to make up the juries from such list. Ellis v. State, 142 Miss. 468, 107 So. 757, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 1926).

Refusal of the court to select the special venire from the jury boxes when properly requested by the defendant, is error not cured by this section [Code 1942, § 1798]. Lee v. State, 138 Miss. 474, 103 So. 233, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1925).

Failure to have a jury sworn truly to try the issues between the state and the accused and render a true verdict, as distinguished from the oath on voir dire, prior to the reception of evidence, is not aided by this section [Code 1942, § 1798]. Miller v. State, 122 Miss. 19, 84 So. 161, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 415 (Miss. 1920).

4. Review.

Although the circuit court deviated from a legal rule in the manner in which it selected alternate jurors, there was no proof that the error was prejudicial to defendant. Consequently, the appellate court found no plain error in the manner in which jury was selected that would require reversal of defendant’s fondling conviction. Giles v. State, 282 So.3d 519, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 294 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

Jury laws held directory; unless there is radical departure from statutory scheme of selecting juries, court will not reverse because trial court excused certain jurors for cause and filled their places with others. Sullivan v. State, 155 Miss. 629, 125 So. 115, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 354 (Miss. 1929); Harris v. State, 155 Miss. 794, 125 So. 253, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1929).

Where unfairness in the method of securing jurors is shown, a substantial right of a litigant is invaded, and the supreme court will set aside the verdict of such a jury on timely objection being made, notwithstanding this section [Code 1942, § 1798]. Cook v. State, 90 Miss. 137, 43 So. 618, 1907 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 1907).

If a juror on his voir dire disclose facts which render him disqualified, a defendant who declines to object to him for that cause cannot, after verdict, in view of Code 1892 § 4370, (Code 1942, § 1987), complain of the disqualification. West v. State, 80 Miss. 710, 32 So. 298, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 313 (Miss. 1902).

The supreme court will not interfere with the discretion of the lower court in impaneling the jury unless it appear that there was a gross and injurious exercise of it. Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731, 1871 Miss. LEXIS 34 (Miss. 1871), overruled, Smith v. State, 58 Miss. 867, 1881 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1881), overruled, Flowers v. State, 473 So. 2d 164, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2140 (Miss. 1985).

5. Prayer prior to jury venire.

Although defendant argued that he was entitled to a mistrial based on the fact the trial judge opened courtroom with a prayer prior to jury venire, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash the jury panel based on the prayer because defendant did not show how the prayer violated the jury-selection statute or resulted in fraud or prejudice. Young v. State, 264 So.3d 797, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 423 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 263 So.3d 666, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 80 (Miss. 2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury § 104.

§ 13-5-89. Juries in condemnation proceedings.

In all cases where a jury is required in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the sheriff and clerks of the circuit and chancery courts shall draw eighteen names from the jury box, and the slips containing the names shall be returned to the box. The sheriff shall summon the jury thus drawn, and the jurors shall attend, under the same penalties as in the circuit court, and the penalties may be enforced therein at the next term, on complaint of the proper party or of the sheriff.

HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2390; 1906, § 2719; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2212; 1930, § 2065; 1942, § 1799.

Cross References —

Summoning and impaneling of jurors for a special court of eminent domain, see §§11-27-11,11-27-13.

Summoning of jurors to assess damages in proceedings to establish landings, see §59-19-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right to view by jury in condemnation proceedings. 77 A.L.R.2d 548.

How to obtain jury trial in eminent domain: waiver. 12 A.L.R.3d 7.

Am. Jur.

27 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Eminent Domain § 485, 486, 491.

CJS.

29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain §§ 560, 570, 577–579, 593, 594 et seq.

§ 13-5-91. Jury may view the place.

When, in the opinion of the court, on the trial of any cause, civil or criminal, it is proper, in order to reach the ends of justice, for the court and jury to have a view or inspection of the property which is the subject of litigation, or the place at which the offense is charged to have been committed, or the place or places at which any material fact occurred, or of any material object or thing in any way connected with the evidence in the case, the court may, at its discretion, enter an order providing for such view or inspection as is herein below directed. After such order is entered, the whole organized court, consisting of the judge, jury, clerk, sheriff, and the necessary number of deputy sheriffs, shall proceed, in a body, to such place or places, property, object or thing to be so viewed or inspected, which shall be pointed out and explained to the court and jury by the witnesses in the case, who may, at the discretion of the court, be questioned by the court and by the representative of each side at the time and place of such view or inspection, in reference to any material fact brought out by such view or inspection. The court on such occasion shall remain in session from the time it leaves the courtroom till it returns thereto, and while so in session outside the courtroom it shall have full power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to preserve order, to prevent disturbance and to punish for contempt such as it has when sitting in the courtroom. In criminal trials all such views or inspections must be had before the whole court and in the presence of the accused, and the production of all evidence from all witnesses or objects, animate or inanimate, must be in his presence.

HISTORY: Codes 1892, § 2391; 1906, § 2720; Hemingway’s 1917, § 2213; 1930, § 2066; 1942, § 1800.

Cross References —

Sheriffs, bailiffs, or other officers not being in room or conversing with a retired jury, see §11-7-149.

Taking of view by jury in special court of eminent domain, see §11-27-19.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Validity.

2. Construction and application, generally.

3. Request for view.

4. Granting or refusing request for view.

5. Presence of accused.

6. Keeping jury together.

7. Proceedings at view.

8. Review.

1. Validity.

This section [Code 1942, § 1800] does not violate § 26 of the Constitution of 1890. Bailey v. State, 147 Miss. 428, 112 So. 594, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1927).

2. Construction and application, generally.

Statute providing for view of premises must be interpreted so that view is allowable only when the necessity therefor in order to reach ends of justice bears some fair relation by way of equivalency, in that interest, to the right which otherwise would be unhampered and unimpaired to have verdict reviewed on record evidence. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Davis, 177 Miss. 562, 171 So. 550, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1937).

This statute [Code 1942, § 1800] is in derogation of common law and must be strictly followed. Jones v. State, 141 Miss. 894, 107 So. 8 (Miss. 1926).

A Court in viewing the place where the facts occurred must not go beyond the stipulation of the statute in moving from place to place and if it does so the presumption prevails that such conduct is harmful to defendant. Jones v. State, 141 Miss. 894, 107 So. 8 (Miss. 1926).

The court is authorized to repair to the place of the homicide after the judge has discharged the judicial function of making the order therefor, leaving the mere mechanical or ministerial act of spreading the order on the minutes to be afterwards performed by the clerk. McPherson v. State, 124 Miss. 361, 86 So. 854, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 520 (Miss. 1920).

3. Request for view.

A motion for a jury view should never have been made in the presence of the jury and the order should have been entered upon the minutes instead of merely being dictated into the record, but since no objections were made to any of the proceedings and apparently agreed thereto, there was no reversible error committed by the trial court. Mississippi State Highway Com. v. Williamson, 227 Miss. 580, 86 So. 2d 670, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 729 (Miss. 1956).

In a murder prosecution where there was a request to permit the jury to view the scene of the homicide and this request came more than a month after the occurrence of the crime and there was nothing to show that the condition at the scene of the homicide remained the same, the trial court did not err in refusing the request. Parnell v. State, 211 Miss. 100, 50 So. 2d 925, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 336 (Miss. 1951).

Where a party is about to make request for a view of premises by jury he must first request court to retire jury, and if such request is made in presence of jury judge should then and there overrule it without waiting for an objection from other side, and, if not immediately overruled, and if the other side does not immediately announce whether he will or will not join in the request, the judge should, of his own motion, retire the jury. Poteete v. Water Valley, 207 Miss. 173, 42 So. 2d 112, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 327 (Miss. 1949).

Motion to view and inspect must set out the grounds therefor with opportunity to adverse party to controvert and disprove them, and the granting, over objection, of such a motion which fails to set out any grounds or reasons therefor other than “in order to reach the ends of justice,” constitutes reversible error, even though prior testimony taken on the merits showed justifiable reasons for such view and inspection. Leflore v. State, 196 Miss. 632, 18 So. 2d 132, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1944).

Permitting counsel for plaintiff to renew motion for view of scene of accident, in jury’s presence, was not reversible error, where opposing counsel had already reserved objection to such motion and hence did not have to renew objection. Mississippi Power Co. v. McCrary, 179 Miss. 427, 176 So. 165, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1937).

Request for view of premises may be made orally, in absence of jury, and transcribed into court reporter’s record, but request must state facts which show that view would be of essential aid, and, if other party objects or challenges facts, court must hear evidence or sworn statements touching those facts which must be reported in transcript. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Davis, 177 Miss. 562, 171 So. 550, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1937).

Request that view of the premises be had by the jury should not be made in the presence of the jury. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

Request that view of premises be had by jury made in presence of jury should be overruled without objection from opposing litigant except where opposing litigant joins in request. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

Refusal to retire jury after request whereby opposing litigant is forced to object to requirement that view of premises be had by jury is reversible error, whether or not view is made. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

4. Granting or refusing request for view.

Trial judge was allowed pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-91 to determine at the judge’s discretion whether the jury needed to view a particular crime scene – defendant’s vehicle in this case – in order to reach the ends of justice; the judge decided against allowing the jury to view the truck and did so correctly. Smith v. State, 839 So. 2d 489, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 2003).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to view the scene of the murder at issue, notwithstanding the assertion that a view was necessary for the jury to see the conditions under which a witness made her identification of the defendant; the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about her ability to make an identification and stated at the pretrial hearing that he intended to present at least one witness who would give testimony that would contradict the witness’s testimony that she was able to make an identification from the distance and under the lighting conditions that existed at the time of the crime. Lindsey v. State, 754 So. 2d 506, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 588 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

In a capital murder prosecution arising from the shooting death of a police officer, the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to view the officer’s “shot-up” police vehicle where the vehicle was housed near the courthouse, the police car was in substantially the same condition as when the shooting occurred and the jury was informed of the minor differences which existed, the State justified the inspection, and it was reasonable that the inspection was an aid to the jury so that the location of bullet holes and further damage to the vehicle could be seen, which were details that would be difficult to depict in a photograph. Green v. State, 614 So. 2d 926, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 822 (Miss. 1992).

Motion to view premises was properly granted and requirements of statute were followed in permitting jury to view house, construction of which was basis of contract dispute, where motion was granted for purpose of rebutting copious amounts of testimony as to defective condition of house. Hutchins v. Page Contractors, Inc., 513 So. 2d 944, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2837 (Miss. 1987).

Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow jury to view scene of accident where scene was established by photographs, diagrams, and testimony at trial, and over 3 years had elapsed since incident had occurred, and therefore there was reasonable probability that there had been material change in physical characteristics of scene. Tolbert v. State, 511 So. 2d 1368, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2681 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1016, 108 S. Ct. 723, 98 L. Ed. 2d 672, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 259 (U.S. 1988).

A view of the scene of a railroad crossing accident held permissible under the facts disclosed by the record. Illinois C. R. Co. v. McDaniel, 246 Miss. 600, 151 So. 2d 805, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 486 (Miss. 1963).

The allowance or refusal of the view by the jury is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Laurel Equipment Co. v. Matthews, 218 Miss. 718, 67 So. 2d 258, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 595 (Miss. 1953).

In a suit by property owners to recover damages against operator of an adjacent paint shop on the ground that the vegetables, flowers and shrubbery were ruined and that the odors made them sick and prevented them from enjoying the peaceful occupancy and habitation of their premises, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a view by the jury of the premises. Laurel Equipment Co. v. Matthews, 218 Miss. 718, 67 So. 2d 258, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 595 (Miss. 1953).

It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the jury to view the scene of the homicide. Parnell v. State, 211 Miss. 100, 50 So. 2d 925, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 336 (Miss. 1951).

Permitting jury to view premises damaged by surface water allegedly diverted by city onto plaintiff’s lot, over plaintiff’s objection, was error under this section [Code 1942, § 1800] where defendant made request in presence of jury, conditions had since changed, no order was entered providing for such view, no witnesses were produced at scene to make explanation to jury, and no showing was made that a view would promote ends of justice. Poteete v. Water Valley, 207 Miss. 173, 42 So. 2d 112, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 327 (Miss. 1949).

Chancellor’s refusal to view premises is not reversible error since this is matter of judge’s discretion. Brinkley v. Eaton, 205 Miss. 815, 39 So. 2d 491, 1949 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1949).

Request for jury to view premises should not be granted unless it appears reasonably certain that it will be of essential aid, and not merely of some aid, to the jury in reaching a correct verdict, and that it is distinctly impracticable and inefficient to present the material elements to the jury by photographs, diagrams, maps, measurements, and the like. Floyd v. Williams, 198 Miss. 350, 22 So. 2d 365, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1945).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting jury to view the premises where ornamental trees reserved in timber deed had been cut and removed from the land, in action to recover actual damages and statutory penalties therefor, where diagrams, photographs, and testimony were sufficient to enable the jury to understand the respective contentions of the parties, notwithstanding that the photographs could not accurately disclose the number of trees cut and even though the plaintiffs joined with the defendant in the request for a view. Floyd v. Williams, 198 Miss. 350, 22 So. 2d 365, 1945 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1945).

Granting in murder prosecution, over defendant’s objection, of motion to view and inspect scenes of crime, setting out no ground or reason therefor other than “in order to reach the ends of justice,” constituted reversible error, even though prior testimony taken on the merits showed justifiable reasons for such view and inspection, where scenes were about 20 miles from the courthouse and ranged over distance of quarter of mile, and evidence at scenes consisted almost entirely of appearances of nature in July whereas trial took place in September. Leflore v. State, 196 Miss. 632, 18 So. 2d 132, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1944).

Error, if any, in permitting the jury to view premises, and taking testimony thereat, in a county other than that in which trial was in progress for recovery of damages resulting from a railroad’s digging a ditch along its right of way and causing overflow on the lands of an adjoining owner, was not prejudicial where there was no evidence that the work done by the railroad could have been accomplished by another method, equally safe, convenient and inexpensive without damage to the adjoining landowner. Miller v. Ervin, 192 Miss. 712, 6 So. 2d 910, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 1942).

The granting of a request for a view by the court and jury of the place at which the crime was committed, rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Gordon v. State, 188 Miss. 708, 196 So. 507, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 1940).

Denial of a view of the scene of the crime, requested by defendant to demonstrate that deceased was not struck by a bullet from defendant’s pistol, was not an abuse of discretion where such a view could not have given the jury any more definite information in the matter than did an engineer’s diagram introduced in evidence. Gordon v. State, 188 Miss. 708, 196 So. 507, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 1940).

The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a view of the defendant’s plant in an action to recover damages for injury sustained from the presence of a fly in a bottle of Coca Cola, where the evidence was very full and complete of the precautions taken by defendant to prevent any contamination in the process of bottling the Coca Cola and putting it upon the market. Meridian Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Illges, 187 Miss. 27, 191 So. 817, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1939).

In action for death of truck driver killed in automobile collision, permitting jury to view scene of accident was within court’s discretion, notwithstanding changes in situation since time of accident, which were not such as to interfere with jury’s determining at what point drivers of colliding automobiles could see each other. Mississippi Power Co. v. McCrary, 179 Miss. 427, 176 So. 165, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 46 (Miss. 1937).

In action for personal injuries allegedly resulting from defective floor, permitting the jury to view the premises without inquiry into the facts which would disclose the necessity therefor held error. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Davis, 177 Miss. 562, 171 So. 550, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1937).

Request for view should not be granted unless it is reasonably certain that it will be of essential aid to jury in reaching correct verdict, and that it is distinctly impracticable to present material elements to jury by photographs, diagrams, and measurements. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

Upon request for view of premises by jury, considerations of inconvenience, distance, delay, and expenses are to be determined by court, although such matters may be urged in objection, because refusal of request is in trial court’s discretion. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

Trial court is not required to allow view of premises by jury because both parties request it or consent to it, because refusal of request is in trial court’s discretion. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

View of premises by jury should not be allowed when there have been material changes in place or premises. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

5. Presence of accused.

That defendant, while jury were viewing room in which homicide occurred, stood in door or hall held not in violation of constitutional right to be present. Bailey v. State, 147 Miss. 428, 112 So. 594, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1927).

6. Keeping jury together.

Inspection of court by some jurors while others remain in hall held not to be such a separation of jury as to violate defendant’s rights, where the entire jury remained in the control of the bailiffs. Bailey v. State, 147 Miss. 428, 112 So. 594, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1927).

7. Proceedings at view.

In an eminent domain case, the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the jury to view the property in the absence of the judge and the court reporter, the heir being aggravated by the additional fact that the highway department engineer, while at the view, answered questions propounded to him by members of the jury. Gunn v. Mississippi State Highway Com., 229 So. 2d 828, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1258 (Miss. 1969).

Examination away from the courthouse under this section [Code 1942, § 1800] must be devoted to the explanation of the scene, location of distances, and such testimony as tends to make a complete map of the situation. Jones v. State, 141 Miss. 894, 107 So. 8 (Miss. 1926).

Where the proceedings at the place of view changed from an examination of the location to an inquiry into defendant’s guilt of the crime charged, timely objected to, defendant was prejudiced. Jones v. State, 141 Miss. 894, 107 So. 8 (Miss. 1926).

8. Review.

Assignment of error predicated on district attorney’s statement in presence of jury, upon introduction of photographs of scene of killing in murder prosecution, that he would like jury to view the premises, objection to which was made and sustained, was not sufficiently preserved for review in the absence of a motion for a mistrial; and by failing to make such a motion defendant waived the point. Johnson v. State, 46 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1950).

Where order permitting jury to view premises was erroneously made and it improperly hampered appealing defendant in respect to valuable constitutional right to have verdict reviewed on assignment that it was contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence, error held reversible where such assignment, when reviewed aside from evidence taken at scene, presented serious question. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Davis, 177 Miss. 562, 171 So. 550, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 139 (Miss. 1937).

Where there has been view or inspection of place or premises by jury, supreme court will not reverse on evidence, if there be any substantial testimony, delivered by sworn witnesses in support of verdict. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

Objection to request for view by jury asked for by opposing counsel did not apply to later request for view asked for by jury, so as to preserve later request for review in supreme court. National Box Co. v. Bradley, 171 Miss. 26, 157 So. 91 (Miss. 1934).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Prejudicial effect of misconduct by one other than juror during authorized view by jury in civil case. 45 A.L.R.2d 1128.

Necessity for presence of judge at view by jury in criminal case. 47 A.L.R.2d 1227.

Prejudicial effect of indicating to the jury in a civil case the desire of a party for a view by the jury. 76 A.L.R.2d 766.

Unauthorized view of premises by juror or jury in criminal case as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial. 50 A.L.R.4th 995.

Am. Jur.

75 Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Trial §§ 133 et seq.

23 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Trial, Forms 91-95 (view by jury).

CJS.

88 C.J.S., Trial §§ 133-135.

§ 13-5-93. Nine jurors may return a verdict in civil cases.

In the trial of all civil suits in the circuit or chancery courts of this state, nine or more jurors may agree on the verdict and return it into court as the verdict of the jury. Either party may request an instruction in writing to this effect and it shall thereupon be the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury in writing that if nine or more jurors agree on the verdict that they may return the same into open court as the verdict of the jury.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 2214; 1930, § 2067; 1942, § 1801; Laws, 1916, ch. 162.

Cross References —

Return of verdict by nine jurors in a special court of eminent domain, see §11-27-23.

Provision that no special form of verdict is required in criminal cases, see §99-19-9.

Rules governing jurors, juries, and jury verdicts, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 47 and 48.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Compromise verdict.

1. In general.

It is permissible to question jurors, with respect to their verdict, as to any extraneous prejudicial information which was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Schmiz v. Illinois C. G. R. Co., 546 So. 2d 693, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 320 (Miss. 1989).

Defendant in a personal injury action did not waive his right to be tried before 12 jurors when, after the jury was reduced to 11 members, he made only a general objection and did not move for a mistrial. Brame v. Garwood, 339 So. 2d 978, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1679 (Miss. 1976).

Trial judge’s conduct in going to jury room during deliberation and speaking to jury on inquiry by jury whether nine members of jury could sign verdict, there being no showing on what was said, is not reversible error when an instruction had been given authorizing nine members of jury to agree upon and bring in verdict, and verdict, when brought in, was signed by all members of jury. Stevenson v. Robinson, 37 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1948).

Instruction that verdict of nine jurors should be verdict of jury held harmless, where it did not appear instruction was acted on. Reith v. Ansley, 162 Miss. 886, 140 So. 521, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 1932).

Where verdict showing ten to two for plaintiff was returned without instruction regarding agreement by nine jurors or more, court could enter judgment for plaintiff. Ricketts v. Drew Grocery Co., 155 Miss. 459, 124 So. 495, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 312 (Miss. 1929).

A lottery verdict cannot be amended but a new trial should be granted. Hines v. Lockhart, 105 So. 449 (Miss. 1925).

Finding by verdict of more than is necessary does not vitiate it, but may be disregarded as surplusage. Hines v. Lockhart, 105 So. 449 (Miss. 1925).

When requested the jury should be polled but if not polled before it becomes impossible to do so the court has power to render judgment on the verdict rendered. Archer v. State, 140 Miss. 597, 105 So. 747, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 295 (Miss. 1925).

A jury is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones, 134 Miss. 53, 98 So. 230, 1923 Miss. LEXIS 234 (Miss. 1923).

A nine jury verdict applies to bastardy proceedings. Welford v. Havard, 127 Miss. 88, 89 So. 812, 1921 Miss. LEXIS 203 (Miss. 1921).

The verdict of nine jurors in a civil case becomes the verdict of the jury and is constitutional. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

2. Compromise verdict.

Although a trial judge was unable to instruct a jury regarding a compromise verdict before the jury returned with a verdict, the failure to give the instruction did not warrant reversal because on both occasions the jury was polled, at least nine members of the jury found a subcontractor was entitled to damages in its breach of contract action against a general contractor, and on both occasions, the jury awarded $41,500, and, as such, the jury’s conclusion that the subcontractor was entitled to damages both times indicated no compromise was needed. DC General Contractors, Inc. v. Slay Steel, Inc., 109 So.3d 577, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 50 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and effect of verdict in civil action finding defendant “not guilty.” 7 A.L.R.2d 1341.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of trial court’s inquiry as to numerical division of jury. 77 A.L.R.3d 769.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of sending written instructions with retiring jury in civil case. 91 A.L.R.3d 336.

Propriety and prejudicial effect of sending written instructions with retiring jury in criminal case. 91 A.L.R.3d 382.

Validity of agreement, by stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept verdict by number proportion of jurors less than that constitutionally permitted. 15 A.L.R.4th 213.

Am. Jur.

75B Am. Jur. 2d (Rev), Trial § 1270- 1273, 1276, 1278.

CJS.

89 C.J.S., Trials § 1016–1018.

Law Reviews.

Symposium on Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: Juries and Jury Verdicts-Rules 38, 48-51, and 59. 52 Miss. L. J. 163, March 1982.

§ 13-5-95. Separate accommodations and bailiffs for male and female jurors.

In selecting overnight accommodations for jurors, the court shall provide separate housing for men and women jurors. Male bailiffs shall accompany the male jurors, and female bailiffs the female jurors. At least one bailiff shall accompany each group, and the court in its sound discretion shall require as many bailiffs as are necessary. Either group may be housed in private premises if necessary.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 1762-07; Laws, 1968, ch. 337, § 1, eff. from and after passage (approved July 9, 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

15 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Jury, Form 208 (jurors’ board bill).

§ 13-5-97. Certain jury records exempt from public access requirements.

Records in the possession of a public body, as defined by paragraph (a) of Section 25-61-3, which are developed among juries concerning judicial decisions, shall be exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983.

HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 424, § 11.

Cross References —

Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983, see §25-61-1 et seq.

Chapter 7. State Grand Jury Act

§ 13-7-1. Short title; citation of state grand juries [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

This chapter may be cited as the “State Grand Jury Act,” and any state grand jury which may be convened as provided herein shall be known as “State Grand Jury of Mississippi.”

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

Cross References —

Rules pertaining to grand juries in circuit and county courts, see MRCrP 13.2.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 1, 3, 5.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries §§ 1-9, 108, 109 et seq.

§ 13-7-3. Definitions [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

For purposes of this chapter:

The phrase “Attorney General or his designee” also includes:

The Attorney General or his designees;

The Attorney General and his designee or designees.

The term “impaneling judge” means any senior circuit court judge of any circuit court district who, upon petition by the Attorney General, impanels a state grand jury under the provisions of this chapter and shall also include any successor to such judge as provided by law.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 1, 3, 5.

§ 13-7-5. State grand jury system established; number of jurors; meeting location; quorum [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

There is established a state grand jury system. Each state grand jury shall consist of twenty (20) persons who may be impaneled and who may meet at any suitable location within the state as designated by the impaneling judge. Fifteen (15) members of a state grand jury constitute a quorum.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury, §§ 9-12, 17.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries § 63, 64.

§ 13-7-7. Jurisdiction of state grand jury; petition to impanel state grand jury; impaneling state grand jury; powers and duties of impaneling judge [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

  1. The jurisdiction of a state grand jury impaneled under this chapter extends throughout the state. The subject matter jurisdiction of a state grand jury in all cases is limited to offenses involving any and all conduct made unlawful by the Mississippi Uniform Controlled Substances Law or any other provision of law involving narcotics, dangerous drugs or controlled substances, or any crime arising out of or in connection with a crime involving narcotics, dangerous drugs or controlled substances, and crimes involving any attempt, aiding, abetting, solicitation or conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned crimes if the crimes occur within more than one (1) circuit court district or have transpired or are transpiring or have significance in more than one (1) circuit court district of this state.
  2. Whenever the Attorney General considers it necessary, and normal investigative or prosecutorial procedures are not adequate, the Attorney General may petition in writing to the senior circuit court judge of any circuit court district in this state for an order impaneling a state grand jury. For the purposes of this chapter, such judge shall be referred to as the impaneling judge. The petition must allege the following:
    1. The type of offenses to be inquired into;
    2. That the state grand jury has jurisdiction to consider such matters;
    3. That the offenses to be inquired into have occurred within more than one (1) circuit court district or have transpired or are transpiring or have significance in more than one (1) circuit court district of this state;
    4. That the Attorney General has conferred with the Commissioner of Public Safety and the Director of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and that each of such officials join in the petition; and
    5. That the Attorney General has conferred with the appropriate district attorney for each jurisdiction in which the crime or crimes are alleged to have occurred.
  3. The impaneling judge, after due consideration of the petition, may order the impanelment of a state grand jury in accordance with the petition for a term of twelve (12) calendar months. Upon petition by the Attorney General, the impaneling judge, by order, may extend the term of that state grand jury for a period of six (6) months, but the term of that state grand jury, including any extension thereof, shall not exceed two (2) years.
  4. The impaneling judge shall preside over the state grand jury until its discharge.
  5. The impaneling judge may discharge a state grand jury prior to the end of its original term or any extensions thereof, upon a determination that its business has been completed, or upon the request of the Attorney General.
  6. If, at any time within the original term of any state grand jury or any extension thereof, the impaneling judge determines that the state grand jury is not conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity, the impaneling judge may limit the investigations so that the investigation conforms with the jurisdiction of the state grand jury and existing law or he may discharge the state grand jury. An order issued pursuant to this subsection or under subsection (5) of this section shall not become effective less than ten (10) days after the date on which it is issued and actual notice given to the Attorney General and the foreman of the state grand jury, and may be appealed by the Attorney General to the Supreme Court. If an appeal from the order is made, the state grand jury, except as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, shall continue to exercise its powers pending disposition of the appeal.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the second sentence of subsection (1), as reenacted by Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 4. The words “Mississippi Controlled Substance Law” were changed to “Mississippi Controlled Substances Law.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 16, 2002 meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

Cross References —

Use of procedures specified in this section to amend petition and order, see §13-1-23.

Mississippi Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§41-29-101 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Jurisdiction or power of grand jury after expiration of term of court for which organized. 75 A.L.R.2d 544.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 13 et seq.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries §§ 1-94.

§ 13-7-9. Return of indictment by state grand jury; powers and duties of and law applicable to state grand juries [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

A state grand jury may return indictments irrespective of the county or judicial district where the offense is committed. If an indictment is returned, it must be certified and transferred for prosecution to the county designated by the impaneling judge. The powers and duties of and the law applicable to county grand juries apply to the state grand jury, except when such powers and duties and applicable law are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-11. Duties of Attorney General or designee [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The Attorney General or his designee shall attend sessions of a state grand jury and shall serve as its legal advisor. The Attorney General or his designee shall examine witnesses, present evidence, and draft indictments and reports upon the direction of a state grand jury.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of statutes permitting grand jury witnesses to be accompanied by counsel. 90 A.L.R.3d 1340.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Presence of unauthorized persons during state grand jury proceedings as affecting indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 397.

Duty of prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to state grand jury. 49 A.L.R.5th 639.

§ 13-7-13. Clerk of state grand jury; compensation [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The impaneling judge shall appoint a circuit clerk who shall serve as the clerk of the state grand jury. The compensation of the state grand jury clerk shall be paid out of any available funds appropriated for that purpose.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-15. Creation of list of potential jurors; selection of jurors; grounds for excusing juror from service; swearing of jurors; compensation of jurors [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

After the impaneling judge orders a term for the state grand jury on petition of the Attorney General, the impaneling judge shall order that the circuit clerk for each county shall proceed to draw at random from the jury box as provided by Section 13-5-26, the name of one (1) voter of such county for each two thousand (2,000) voters or fraction thereof registered in such county and shall place these names on a list. The circuit clerk shall not disqualify or excuse any individual whose name is drawn. When the list is compiled, the clerk of the circuit court for each county shall forward the list to the clerk of the state grand jury. Upon receipt of all the lists from the clerks of the circuit courts, the clerk of the state grand jury shall place all the names so received upon a list which shall be known as the master list.

The impaneling judge shall order the clerk of the state grand jury to produce the master list and shall direct the random drawing of the names of one hundred (100) persons from the master list. The names drawn shall be given to the clerk of the state grand jury who shall cause each person drawn for service to be served with a summons either personally by the sheriff of the county where the juror resides or by mail, addressed to the juror at his usual residence, business or post office address, requiring him to report for state grand jury service at a specified time and place as designated by the impaneling judge. From the one hundred (100) persons summoned, a state grand jury shall be drawn for that term consisting of twenty (20) persons. State grand jurors must be drawn in the same manner as jurors are drawn for service on the county grand jury.

All qualified persons shall be liable to serve as state grand jurors, unless excused by the court for one (1) of the following causes:

When the juror is ill, or when on account of serious illness in the juror’s family, the presence of the juror is required at home;

When the juror’s attendance would cause a serious financial loss to the juror or to the juror’s business; or

When the juror is under an emergency, fairly equivalent to those mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs (a) and (b).

An excuse of illness under paragraph (a) may be made to the state grand jury clerk outside of open court by providing the clerk with either a certificate of a licensed physician or an affidavit of the juror, stating that the juror is ill or that there is a serious illness in the juror’s family. The test of an excuse under paragraph (b) shall be whether, if the juror were incapacitated by illness or otherwise for a week, some other persons would be available or could reasonably be procured to carry on the business for the week, and the test of an excuse under paragraph (c) shall be such as to be the fair equivalent, under the circumstances of that prescribed under paragraph (b). In cases under paragraphs (b) and (c) the excuse must be made by the juror, in open court, under oath.

It shall be unlawful for any employer or other person to persuade or attempt to persuade any juror to avoid jury service, or to intimidate or to threaten any juror in that respect. So to do shall be deemed an interference with the administration of justice and a contempt of court and punishable as such.

Every citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age shall be exempt from service if he claims the privilege. No qualified juror shall be excluded because of such reason, but the same shall be a personal privilege to be claimed by any person selected for state grand jury duty. Any citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age may claim this personal privilege outside of open court by providing the clerk of court with information that allows the clerk to determine the validity of the claim.

The state grand jurors shall be charged by the impaneling judge as to their authority and responsibility under the law and each juror shall be sworn pursuant to Section 13-5-45. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the right of the Attorney General or his designee to request that a potential state grand juror be excused for cause. The jury selection process shall be conducted by the impaneling judge. Jurors of a state grand jury shall receive reimbursement for travel and mileage as provided for state employees by Section 25-3-41 and shall be paid per diem compensation in the amount provided by Section 25-3-69. All compensation and expenses for meals and lodging of state grand jurors shall be paid out of any available funds appropriated for that purpose.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal cases. 72 A.L.R.3d 895.

Former law enforcement officers as qualified jurors in criminal cases. 72 A.L.R.3d 958.

Jury: who is lawyer or attorney disqualified or exempt from service, or subject to challenge for cause. 57 A.L.R.4th 1260.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury, §§ 8, 17-26.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries §§ 23, 39-66, 100-103.

§ 13-7-17. Foreman and deputy foreman of grand jury [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The impaneling judge shall appoint one (1) of the jurors to be a foreman and another to be deputy foreman. During the absence of the foreman, the deputy foreman shall act as foreman. The foreman and deputy foreman shall be sworn pursuant to Section 13-5-45.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-19. Challenging the grand jury [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

After the state grand jurors shall have been sworn and impaneled, no objections shall be raised by plea or otherwise, to the state grand jury, but the impaneling of the state grand jury shall be conclusive evidence of its competency and qualifications. However, any party interested may challenge the jury, except to the array, for fraud.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury, §§ 27-32.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries §§ 31–33, 73–83.

§ 13-7-21. Subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum; contempt [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The clerk of the state grand jury, upon request of the Attorney General or his designee, shall issue subpoenas, or subpoenas duces tecum to compel individuals, documents or other materials to be brought from anywhere in the state or another state to a state grand jury. In addition, a state grand jury may proceed in the same manner as is provided for by law in relation to the issuance of subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum; however, the provisions of such law shall not be considered a limitation upon this section, but shall be supplemental thereto. The subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum may be for investigative purposes and for the retention of documents or other materials so subpoenaed for proper criminal proceedings. Any investigator employed by the Attorney General or any law enforcement officer with appropriate jurisdiction is empowered to serve such subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and receive such documents and other materials for return to a state grand jury. Any person violating a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to this chapter, or who fails to fully answer all questions put to him before proceedings of the state grand jury whenever the response thereto is not privileged or otherwise protected by law, including the granting of immunity as authorized by this chapter, or any other law, may be punished by the impaneling judge for contempt provided the response is not privileged or otherwise protected by law. The Attorney General or his designee may petition the impaneling judge to compel compliance by the person alleged to have committed the violation or who has failed to answer. If the impaneling judge considers compliance is warranted, he may order compliance and may punish the individual for contempt, as provided in Section 9-1-17, where the compliance does not occur. The clerk of the state grand jury may also issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum to compel individuals, documents or other materials to be brought from anywhere in the state to the trial of any indictment returned by a state grand jury or the trial of any civil forfeiture action arising out of an investigation conducted by a state grand jury.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of indictment where grand jury heard incompetent witness. 39 A.L.R.3d 1064.

Power of court to control evidence or witnesses going before grand jury. 52 A.L.R.3d 1316.

Refusal to answer questions before state grand jury as direct contempt of court. 69 A.L.R.3d 501.

Validity and construction of statutes permitting grand jury witnesses to be accompanied by counsel. 90 A.L.R.3d 1340.

Privilege of news gatherer against disclosure of confidential sources or information. 99 A.L.R.3d 37.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Presence of unauthorized persons during state grand jury proceedings as affecting indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 397.

Individual’s right to present complaint or evidence of criminal offense to grand jury. 24 A.L.R.4th 316.

Rights and remedies of financial institution customer in relation to subpoena duces tecum exception to general prohibition of state right to financial privacy statute. 43 A.L.R.4th 1157.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 2, 3, 33-37.

§ 13-7-23. Amending petition and order establishing and impaneling state grand jury [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

Once a state grand jury has entered into a term, the petition and order establishing and impaneling the state grand jury may be amended as often as necessary and appropriate so as to expand the areas of inquiry authorized by the order or to add additional areas of inquiry thereto, consistent with the provisions of this chapter. The procedures for amending this authority are the same as those for filing the original petition and order.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

Cross References —

Procedures for filing original order and petition, see §13-7-7.

§ 13-7-25. Recording of proceedings of state grand jury; defendants right to review record; custody of records [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

A court reporter shall record either stenographically or by use of an electronic recording device, all state grand jury proceedings except when the state grand jury is deliberating or voting. Subject to the limitations of Section 13-7-29 and any rule of court, a defendant has the right to review and to reproduce the stenographically or electronically recorded materials. Transcripts of the recorded testimony or proceedings must be made when requested by the Attorney General or his designee. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of the testimony or proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter’s notes or any transcript prepared therefrom and all books, papers, records and correspondence produced before the state grand jury shall remain in the custody and control of the Attorney General or his designee unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Accused’s right to inspect minutes of state grand jury. 20 A.L.R.3d 7.

Discovery, in civil proceeding, of records of criminal investigation by state grand jury. 69 A.L.R.4th 298.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury § 46.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries §§ 136, 158.

§ 13-7-27. Administering oath to witnesses [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The foreman shall administer an oath or affirmation in the manner prescribed by law to any witness who testifies before a state grand jury.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to swear or irregularity in swearing witnesses appearing before grand jury as ground for dismissal of indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 154.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 7, 39, 41, 43 et seq.

CJS.

38A C.J.S. Grand Juries §§ 137, 145-149, 159-225.

§ 13-7-29. Secrecy of proceedings; exceptions; penalties for violation [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

  1. State grand jury proceedings are secret, and a state grand juror shall not disclose the nature or substance of the deliberations or vote of the state grand jury. The only persons who may be present in the state grand jury room when a state grand jury is in session, except for deliberations and voting, are the state grand jurors, the Attorney General or his designees, an interpreter if necessary and the witness testifying. A state grand juror, the Attorney General or his designees, any interpreter used and any person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to subsection (2)(b) of this section may not disclose the testimony of a witness examined before a state grand jury or other evidence received by it except when directed by a court for the purpose of:
    1. Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before the court in any subsequent criminal proceedings;
    2. Determining whether the witness is guilty of perjury;
    3. Assisting local, state or federal law enforcement or investigating agencies, including another grand jury, in investigating crimes under their investigative jurisdiction;
    4. Providing the defendant the materials to which he is entitled pursuant to Section 13-7-25; or
    5. Complying with constitutional, statutory or other legal requirements or to further justice.

      If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before a state grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in that manner, at that time, and under those conditions as the court directs.

  2. In addition, disclosure of testimony of a witness examined before a state grand jury or other evidence received by it may be made without being directed by a court to:
    1. The Attorney General or his designees for use in the performance of their duties; or
    2. Those governmental personnel, including personnel of the state or its political subdivisions, as are considered necessary by the Attorney General or his designee to assist in the performance of their duties to enforce the criminal laws of the state; however, any person to whom matters are disclosed under this paragraph (b) shall not utilize the state grand jury material for purposes other than assisting the Attorney General or his designee in the performance of their duties to enforce the criminal laws of this state. The Attorney General or his designees shall promptly provide the impaneling judge the names of the persons to whom the disclosure has been made and shall certify that he has advised these persons of their obligations of secrecy under this section.
  3. Nothing in this section affects the attorney-client relationship. A client has the right to communicate to his attorney any testimony given by the client to a state grand jury, any matters involving the client discussed in the client’s presence before a state grand jury and evidence involving the client received by a proffer to a state grand jury in the client’s presence.
  4. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one (1) year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
  5. State grand jurors, the Attorney General and his designee, any interpreter used and the clerk of the state grand jury shall be sworn to secrecy and also may be punished for criminal contempt for violations of this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

Cross References —

Right of defendant to review records of grand jury proceedings, subject to limitations of this section, see §13-7-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Accused’s right to inspect minutes of state grand jury. 20 A.L.R.3d 7.

Validity and construction of statutes permitting grand jury witnesses to be accompanied by counsel. 90 A.L.R.3d 1340.

Presence of unauthorized persons during state grand jury proceedings as affecting indictment. 23 A.L.R.4th 397.

Discovery, in civil proceeding, of records of criminal investigation by state grand jury. 69 A.L.R.4th 298.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 53-56.

§ 13-7-31. Authority of impaneling judge to hear matters arising from grand jury proceedings [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

Except for the prosecution of cases arising from indictments issued by the state grand jury, the impaneling judge has jurisdiction to hear all matters arising from the proceedings of a state grand jury, including, but not limited to, matters related to the impanelment or removal of state grand jurors, the quashing of subpoenas and the punishment for contempt.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 16; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 16; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 16; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 16; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 16; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-33. Attorney general or designee to coordinate scheduling activities [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The Attorney General or his designee shall coordinate the scheduling of activities of any state grand jury.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 17; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 17; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 17; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 17; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 17; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-35. Requirements for “True Bill” of indictment; place where indictment is to be tried [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

  1. In order to return a “True Bill” of indictment, twelve (12) or more state grand jurors must find that probable cause exists for the indictment and vote in favor of the indictment. Upon indictment by a state grand jury, the indictment shall be returned to the impaneling judge. If the impaneling judge considers the indictment to be within the authority of the state grand jury and otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, he shall order the clerk of the state grand jury to certify the indictment and return the indictment to the county designated by the impaneling judge as the county in which the indictment shall be tried.
  2. Indictments returned by a state grand jury are properly triable in any county of the state where any of the alleged conduct occurred. The impaneling judge to whom the indictment is returned shall designate the county in which the indictment shall be tried. If a multicount indictment returned by a state grand jury is properly triable in a single proceeding as otherwise provided by law, all counts may be tried in the county designated by the impaneling judge notwithstanding the fact that different counts may have occurred in more than one (1) county.
  3. In determining the venue for indictments returned by a state grand jury, the impaneling judge shall select the county in which the state and defendant may receive a fair trial before an impartial jury taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances of each case.
  4. When the indictment has been returned to the circuit clerk of the county designated by the impaneling judge, the capias shall be issued as otherwise provided by law. The indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 18; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 18; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 18; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 18; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 18; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 18, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-37. Immunity or privilege given on account of testimony; waiver [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

If any person asks to be excused from testifying before a state grand jury or from producing any books, papers, records, correspondence or other documents before a state grand jury on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or forfeiture and such person, notwithstanding such ground, is directed by the impaneling judge to give the testimony or produce the evidence, he shall comply with this direction, but no testimony so given or evidence produced may be received against him in any criminal action, investigation or criminal proceeding. No individual testifying or producing evidence or documents is exempt from prosecution or punishment for any perjury committed by him while so testifying, and the testimony or evidence given or produced is admissible against him upon any criminal action, criminal investigation or criminal proceeding concerning this perjury; however, any individual may execute, acknowledge and file a statement with the appropriate court expressly waiving immunity or privilege in respect to any testimony given or produced and thereupon the testimony or evidence given or produced may be received or produced before any judge or justice, court tribunal, grand jury or otherwise, and if so received or produced, the individual is not entitled to any immunity or privilege on account of any testimony he may give or evidence produced.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 19; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 19; , reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 19; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 19; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 19; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 19, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Privilege against self-incrimination as to testimony before grand jury. 38 A.L.R.2d 225.

Use in disbarment proceeding of testimony given by attorney in criminal proceeding under grant of immunity. 62 A.L.R.3d 1145.

Refusal to answer questions before state grand jury as direct contempt of court. 69 A.L.R.3d 501.

Admissibility of former testimony of nonparty witness, present in jurisdiction, who refuses to testify at subsequent trial without making claim of privilege. 92 A.L.R.3d 1138.

Privilege of news gatherer against disclosure of confidential sources or information. 99 A.L.R.3d 37.

Privilege of witness to refuse to give answers tending to disgrace or degrade him or his family. 88 A.L.R.3d 304.

Propriety of blanket or per se rule prohibiting federal grand jury from indicting witness who has previously testified before same grand jury under grant of use immunity. 139 A.L.R. Fed. 489.

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury § 51.

Lawyers’ Edition.

Supreme Court’s views as to application of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to compulsory production of documents. 48 L. Ed. 2d 852.

§ 13-7-39. Sealing of records, orders and subpoenas of grand jury [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

Records, orders and subpoenas related to state grand jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for the time that is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a state grand jury.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 20; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 20; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 20; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 20; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 20; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 20, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Grand Jury §§ 53-56.

§ 13-7-41. Space for grand jury; cooperation of Department of Public Safety and Bureau of Narcotics [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The Attorney General shall make available suitable space for state grand juries to meet. The Mississippi Department of Public Safety and the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics may provide such services as required by the Attorney General and the state grand juries.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 21; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 21; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 21; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 21; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 21; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-43. Authority of Supreme Court to promulgate rules for operation of grand jury system [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

The Supreme Court may promulgate rules as are necessary for the operation of the state grand jury system established by this chapter.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 23; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 22; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 22; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 22; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 22; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-45. Severability provision [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

If any part of this chapter is declared invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, that part shall be severable from the remaining portions of this chapter, which portions shall remain in full force and effect as if the invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional portion were omitted.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 24; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 23; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 23; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 23; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 23; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-47. Retroactivity of chapter [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

This chapter applies to offenses committed both before and after its effective date.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 25; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 24; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 24; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 24; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 24; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 24, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.

§ 13-7-49. Chapter does not amend, repeal or supersede other laws governing grand juries, investigations, indictments or prosecutions [Repealed effective July 1, 2024].

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as amending, repealing or superseding any other law of this state governing the powers and duties of county grand jurors, district attorneys or law enforcement agencies or other officials with regard to their authority to investigate, indict or prosecute offenses that are prescribed by this chapter as within the jurisdiction of the state grand jury.

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 553, § 26; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 382, § 25; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 480, § 25; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 471, § 25; reenacted without change, Laws, 2011, ch. 337, § 25; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 526, § 25, eff from and after July 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 1993, ch. 553, § 27, as amended by Laws of 1998, ch. 382 § 27, as amended by Laws of 1999, ch. 480, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2002, ch. 471, § 27, as amended by Laws of 2005, ch. 506, § 2, as amended by Laws of 2011, ch. 337, § 27, and as amended by Laws of 2014, ch. 526, § 27, provides:

“SECTION 27. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and, with the exception of Section 22 (codified as Section 99-11-3), shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2024.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2011 amendment reenacted the section without change.

The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.