Cross References —

Program of driver’s education and training in public schools, see §§37-25-1 et seq.

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §§45-35-1 et seq.

Provision of this article applicable to Mississippi Commercial Driver’s License Law, see §63-1-202.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 100 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 319 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment, effective October 1, 2011, added (2).

The 2014 amendment added (1), (2), and (3), and redesignated former last undesignated paragraph as (4); in present (1)(a), deleted “other than a motorcycle” following “shall drive or operate a motor vehicle” and substituted “unless specifically” for “except those persons especially.”

The 2015 amendment inserted “or an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (1)(a).

The 2016 amendment, effective October 1, 2016, deleted “Ignition” and “ignition” preceding “interlock-restricted license” in (1)(b)(v) and (3), and made a related change.

Cross References —

Municipal licensing of drivers or operators of buses of transportation systems for transportation of passengers, see §§21-27-151 et seq.

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §45-35-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Deposit of driver’s license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see §63-9-25.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Charging instruments

Town provided defendant with charging instruments because the two traffic tickets a police officer issued to defendant met the requirements established by Miss. Code Ann. §63-9-21(3)(c) and complied with Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 7.06; in addition, the town supplemented its discovery disclosures and explicitly informed defendant that he was charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license and failing to maintain or provide proof of insurance. Caissie v. State, 254 So.3d 849, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 110 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 So.3d 170, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 100, 205 L. Ed. 2d 36, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4809 (U.S. 2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

There is no statutory prohibition to a trusty (inmate) without a valid driver’s license driving a county vehicle from a parking place to a wash rack, all on the same premises and without traveling on a public road. Kuykendall, Aug. 20, A.G. Op. 04-0397.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 3 of Chapter 406, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved March 23, 2015), amended this section. Section 4 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved April 20, 2015), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 4 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §63-1-6 as amended by Chapter 406, Laws of 2015.

Editor's Notes. —

Executive Order No. 1474, I., issued by Governor Tate Reeves on April 20, 2020, provides as follows:

“I. In order to cope with and respond to the COVID-19 emergency, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-11(c)(1), the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §§63-1-47, 63-1-6, 63-1-21, 45-9-101, 97-37-7, and 45-35-55 are hereby suspended to the extent necessary to delay the expiration of all valid driver's licenses, learner's permits, intermediate licenses, firearm permits, security guard permits and ID cards set to expire between March 14-2020 and June 30, 2020. Such licenses, permits and ID cards will instead expire on August 3, 2020.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment redesignated the former first and second undesignated paragraphs as (1) and (2)(a); deleted the last undesignated paragraph in its entirety regarding issuance of a restricted motorcycle operator’s license; and added (2)(b); in present (1), inserted “Unless excepted under Section 63-1-7,” at the beginning of the sentence preceding “no person shall drive”, substituted “an” for “either a regular”, and deleted the remainder of this subsection, which read “, or a restricted motorcycle operator’s license, except those persons especially exempted by Section 63-1-7, Mississippi Code of 1972; provided, however, that any person possessing a valid Mississippi operator’s license issued prior to July 1, 1985, may operate a motorcycle upon the highways of this state until such time as said license expires. Upon the expiration of a license issued prior to July 1, 1985, and the payment of One Dollar ($1.00), the applicant for renewal may obtain the necessary motorcycle endorsement without further examination”; in present (2)(a), substituted “a motorcycle” for “such” towards the end of the sentence, inserted “to” following “endorsement may be issued” at the beginning of the sentence, and added an “s” to “requirements.”

The first 2015 amendment (ch. 406), inserted “except for an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (1).

The second 2015 amendment (ch. 464), inserted “or Section 63-1-6.1” and “except for an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (1).

Cross References —

License requirement in general, see §63-1-5.

Exemptions from license requirement, see §63-1-7.

Persons not entitled to license, see §63-1-9.

Duties of license examiners, see §63-1-15.

Application for license, see §63-1-19.

Temporary driving permits, see §63-1-21.

Parental consent for application of person under age of 17, see §63-1-23.

Appeal of license denial, see §63-1-31.

Driver’s examination, see §63-1-33.

Form of license, see §63-1-35.

Duplicate licenses, see §63-1-37.

Signing of license by applicant, see §63-1-39.

Possession of license while driving, see §63-1-41.

Fee for restricted motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-43.

License examiners tender of fees and applications to commissioner, see §63-1-45.

Fee for reinstatement of license, see §63-1-46.

Duration and renewal of licenses, see §63-1-47.

Renewal of expired license, see §63-1-49.

Revocation of license, see §63-1-51.

Driving while license is suspended or revoked, see §63-1-57.

Using the operator’s license of another person, see §63-1-65.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Vehicle purchase.

Trial court erred by denying a seller’s motion for summary judgment in the parents’ wrongful death action, as Mississippi law did not impose a duty on the seller, sufficient to support a negligence claim, to restrict motor vehicle sales to licensed drivers or to determine the competence of drivers as part of the sale; the son was not required to have an “E” endorsement on his license to purchase the motorcycle, only to drive the motorcycle on a highway. Laurel Yamaha, Inc. v. Freeman, 956 So. 2d 897, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 316 (Miss. 2007).

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment added (e).

The 2005 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2016 amendment inserted “consecutive” in the next-to-last sentence of (b).

Cross References —

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Charging instruments

Town provided defendant with charging instruments because the two traffic tickets a police officer issued to defendant met the requirements established by Miss. Code Ann. §63-9-21(3)(c) and complied with Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 7.06; in addition, the town supplemented its discovery disclosures and explicitly informed defendant that he was charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license and failing to maintain or provide proof of insurance. Caissie v. State, 254 So.3d 849, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 110 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 So.3d 170, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 100, 205 L. Ed. 2d 36, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4809 (U.S. 2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Person who has had license revoked for DUI may legally operate road roller, road machinery, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry which is temporarily on highways. Harper, April 24, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0261.

An individual who has had his license suspended or revoked may still legally operate a road roller, road machinery, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry which is temporarily on the highways, in accordance with Section 63-1-7(c). Miletich, March 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0113.

A person who does not have a Mississippi driver’s license may operate machinery, such as backhoes, tractors, and other farm equipment on the public streets and highways. Brewer, June 23, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0345.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 21, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment in (1), substituted “other state or territory” for “other state and/or territory” and “if the revocation” for “and such revocation” in (b), substituted “and are driving a car” for “and have their car” in (d), and in (g), substituted “educational” for “education” everywhere it appears, inserted “on whose behalf” and “has not been received by the Department of Public Safety from that person or a school official verifying, and made minor stylistic changes; and in (2), substituted “July 31, 2009” for “June 30, 2000” and “August 1, 2009” for “July 1, 2000” in the introductory language, in (b), substituted “sixteen (16) years” for “fifteen (15) years,” “one (1) year” for “six (6) months” and “one-year requirement” for “six-month requirement,” and substituted “sixteen and one-half (16-) years” for “sixteen (16) years” each time it appears in (c) and (d).

The 2014 amendment, in (1), (2), and (3), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving”; in (1)(d), deleted “, in the opinion of the commissioner or other person authorized to grant an operator’s license,” from the first sentence; deleted (1)(e) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

Cross References —

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §45-35-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Driver license compact law, see §§63-1-101 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The provision fixing a minimum age for licensing drivers is a legislative determination that a child under that age does not possess sufficient judgment and discretion to operate an automobile. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So. 2d 240, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1959).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

There is no provision for the invalidation or revocation of the right to drive for a fifteen year old who ceases to be gainfully employed after obtaining a license that specifies the hours of the day within which he or she may drive; in that instance, the minor may continue to legally drive, but will still be restricted or prohibited from driving between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Darby, January 16, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-003.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: driving under the influence, or when addicted to the use, of drugs as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.3d 815.

Denial, suspension, or cancellation of driver’s license because of physical disease or defect. 38 A.L.R.3d 452.

Validity, construction, and application of age requirements for licensing of motor vehicle operators. 86 A.L.R.3d 475.

Liability of donor of motor vehicle for injuries resulting from owner’s operation. 22 A.L.R.4th 738.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 112-115.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 319, 331 et seq.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment rewrote the section to require public schools to submit documentation verifying applicant for driver’s license, intermediate license or temporary permit who is under the age of eighteen and has not yet graduated is enrolled in school or acceptably excused.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of driver’s license for reason unrelated to use of, or ability to operate, motor vehicle. 18 A.L.R.5th 542.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Commissioner may at his discretion waive or change any regulations or policies adopted by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol regarding road tests or any other policies adopted to carry out Section 63-1-11. Head, July 26, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0419.

The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt a method to assign an alternate identifier for a driver’s license for an individual who cannot obtain a Social Security number from the Social Security Administration. Head, September 14, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0553.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of highway user for injuries resulting from failure to remove or protect against material spilled from vehicle onto public street or highway. 34 A.L.R.4th 520.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment, substituted “to serve and be“ for “not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) in number” in the third sentence of the second paragraph.

Cross References —

Salaries of employees of highway safety patrol, see §45-3-7.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 388, Laws, 2002, eff from and after September 1, 2002 (approved March 19, 2002), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 584, Laws, 2002, eff from and after September 1, 2002 (approved April 11, 2002), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 584, Laws, 2002, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor’s Notes —

The Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx 451, referred to in this section, was renumbered 50 USCS § 3801 as part of the 2015 editorial reclassification of Title 50 and Title 50 Appendix.

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 22, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 150, provides as follows:

“SECTION 150. Any person or entity shall be absolutely immune from any liability arising from compliance with the dictates of this act unless such conduct by the person or entity is willful and intentional.”

Amendment Notes —

The first 2002 amendment (Ch. 388) rewrote the section.

The second 2002 amendment (Ch. 584) rewrote the section.

The 2005 amendment inserted (3); and renumbered former (3) as present (4).

Cross References —

Requirement that an application for an identification card issued by the department of public safety contain the information required on a driver’s license application, see §45-35-5.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Federal Aspects—

Registration in compliance with the requirements of § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, see 50 USCS § 3801 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of state statutes, regulations, or other identification requirements restricting or denying driver’s licenses to illegal aliens. 16 A.L.R.6th 131.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 103.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 339-343.

Editor's Notes. —

Executive Order No. 1474, I., issued by Governor Tate Reeves on April 20, 2020, provides as follows:

“I. In order to cope with and respond to the COVID-19 emergency, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-11(c)(1), the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §§63-1-47, 63-1-6, 63-1-21, 45-9-101, 97-37-7, and 45-35-55 are hereby suspended to the extent necessary to delay the expiration of all valid driver's licenses, learner's permits, intermediate licenses, firearm permits, security guard permits and ID cards set to expire between March 14-2020 and June 30, 2020. Such licenses, permits and ID cards will instead expire on August 3, 2020.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment added “Sunday through Thursday…directly to or from work” in (3); and added (5).

The 2011 amendment rewrote (1); substituted “two (2) years” for ”one (1) year” at the end of (2); redesignated former (3) and (4) as (3)(a) and (b); designated the formerly undesignated paragraph beginning “Except as otherwise provides . . .” as (4), and rewrote the introductory paragraph; and deleted former (5) which provided that the Department of Public Safety could accept bank credit cards and debit cards in payment of fees for identification card renewals under certain circumstances.

The 2013 amendment added (4); and redesignated former (4) as (5).

The 2014 amendment rewrote (1) regarding obtaining certain classes of driver’s license; in (2), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving” in two places, “if” for “provided” in the first sentence, “and” for “. A temporary driving permit” at the beginning of the former third sentence; in (3)(b), substituted “as prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “Five Dollars ($5.00)” at the end of the sentence; deleted (4) and (5) in their entireties regarding ignition-interlock-restricted driver’s license and restricted motorcycle operator’s license; and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Issuance, validity, and expiration of temporary permit for student enrolled in driver education and training program, see §37-25-7.

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Grandparent as licensee.

2. Construction.

1. Grandparent as licensee.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather’s vehicle with a learner’s permit and struck another driver because there was no Mississippi case law that extended the special duty recognized between the parent and child to other members of the family; Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21 only required that the licensee, in this case, the grandmother, be seated in the front passenger seat and over the age of 21. Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So. 2d 634, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

2. Construction.

Former Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21 did not impute the negligence of a permittee (under a learner’s permit) to the licensed driver who was occupying the seat beside the permittee. The 2000 legislative amendments to §63-1-21, specifically Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21(3) (2000), did not exist at the time of the accident in the case and thus were not applicable to impose any duty of supervision or liability upon the grandparent who was allowing the grandson to operate the grandparent’s vehicle. Warren v. Glascoe, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 327.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 24, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence of minor.

1. In general.

An automobile operator’s license is a privilege granted by the state, in accepting which the motorist accepts all reasonable conditions imposed by the state. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

2. Negligence of minor.

Negligence of a minor, whose application for a driver’s license was not signed by either his father or mother, in operating an automobile was not imputable to his parents even though the minor had exhibited his father’s driver’s license to the officer who examined the minor and took his application for a driver’s license. Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1957).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The term custody as used in this section means legal custody and therefore divorced parents who have joint legal custody would both have to sign the application of a person under the age of seventeen who is seeking a temporary driving permit, intermediate license or license. Busby, June 13, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0288.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Extent of liability-generally.

3. —Age of driver at time of accident.

4. —Application not signed by parents.

5. —Renewal license.

6. Limitations of actions.

1. In general.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment as to a passenger’s claims of negligent entrustment against a driver’s mother because the passenger’s reliance on the driver’s past alcohol and marijuana consumption was irrelevant to whether the mother was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to the driver since no issue of material fact existed that alcohol or other substances contributed to accident. the driver was not under the influence at the time of the accident. Garvin v. Tupelo Furniture Mkt., 127 So.3d 197, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 650 (Miss. 2013).

Former Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21 did not impute the negligence of a permittee (under a learner’s permit) to the licensed driver who was occupying the seat beside the permittee. The 2000 legislative amendments to §63-1-21, specifically Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21(3) (2000), did not exist at the time of the accident in the case and thus were not applicable to impose any duty of supervision or liability upon the grandparent who was allowing the grandson to operate the grandparent’s vehicle. Warren v. Glascoe, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable under Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-25, and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather’s vehicle with a learner’s permit and struck another driver. Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So. 2d 634, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

No liability can arise under this statute absent negligent use or willful misconduct in use of vehicle; therefore, same reasoning that would exclude coverage for liability on basis of negligent entrustment and negligent supervision, would apply to claim of coverage for statutory liability under this section. Love v. McDonough, 758 F. Supp. 397, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2968 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1486, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27242 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991).

An automobile operator’s license is a privilege granted by the state, in accepting which the motorist accepts all reasonable conditions imposed by the state. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

2. Extent of liability-generally.

One signing an application for an operator’s certificate for a minor is liable only for damages occurring during the year for which the license was issued. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

3. —Age of driver at time of accident.

Although parents signed their minor son’s application for an automobile operator’s license at a time when the son was under 17 years of age, they were not liable for damages allegedly caused by the son’s negligent operation of an automobile at a time when the son was over 17 years of age. Carter v. Graves, 230 Miss. 463, 93 So. 2d 177, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1957).

4. —Application not signed by parents.

Negligence of a minor, whose application for a driver’s license was not signed by either his father or mother, in operating an automobile was not imputable to his parents even though the minor had exhibited his father’s driver’s license to the officer who examined the minor and took his application for a driver’s license. Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1957).

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son’s negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

5. —Renewal license.

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son’s negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

6. Limitations of actions.

In an action by a plaintiff who was injured in automobile accident against parents who had enabled a minor to obtain driver’s license by agreeing to accept responsibility for negligence of the minor in operating a motor vehicle and to be liable for damages resulting from misconduct, this was an action ex delicto rather than ex contractu and when brought in a federal court of Alabama, it was subject to Alabama’s one year statute of limitations. Hickman v. Tullos, 121 F. Supp. 152, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3388 (D. Ala. 1954).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

Am. Jur.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 31, 32.

Editor’s Notes —

Former §63-1-29 related to revocation of license upon death of person signing minor’s application.

Amendment Notes —

The 2016 amendment substituted “the county or circuit court” for “the county circuit or chancery court” in the first sentence; deleted “or chancellor” following “The judge” in the second sentence; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist whose operator’s license was revoked following his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not entitled to proceed by writ of certiorari in the circuit court to review the action of the commissioner of public safety when he had previously failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Code 1942, § 8105. Mississippi State Dep't of Public Safety v. Berry, 217 So. 2d 11, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1249 (Miss. 1968).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Although a justice court judge may not suspend the minimum fine upon a nolo contendere plea on a DUI, he does not have to impose a fine on first offense DUI if he imposes a jail sentence or attendance at a victim impact panel. Sartin, Dec. 9, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0596.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 67.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 481, Laws of 2011, which amended this section, is known as “Nathan’s Law.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment added the subsection designations and the exceptions at the beginning in (1) and (2); and added (6).

The 2011 amendment added the last sentence in (2); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2014 amendment, in (1), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving”; in (3), substituted a comma for “and” following “lights, brakes, inspection certificate”; and inserted “and proof of liability coverage” following “vehicle registration”; in (5), deleted “or a restricted motorcycle operator’s license” following “for an original motorcycle endorsement.”

The 2015 amendment deleted “inspection certificate” following “horn, lights, brakes” in (3).

Cross References —

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

Requirements for temporary driving permits, see §63-1-21.

Video-taped instructional material to assist reading impaired applicants to prepare for driver’s examination, see §63-1-34.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Proper operation of vehicle.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather’s vehicle with a learner’s permit and struck another driver because the grandchild was operating the vehicle in accordance with directives required of him pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-33. Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So. 2d 634, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 115.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “Article 5 of this chapter” for “Article 2 of this chapter” in the first sentence.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment redesignated the first paragraph as (1) and inserted “except as otherwise provided under subsection (2) of this section” following “driver’s license number;” and added (2).

The 2007 amendment added (3).

The 2011 amendment rewrote (1).

The 2012 amendment added (4).

Cross References —

Registration of sex offenders generally, see §§45-33-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt a method to assign an alternate identifier for a driver’s license for an individual who cannot obtain a Social Security number from the Social Security Administration. Head, September 14, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0553.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2011 amendment, in the first paragraph, substituted “If” for “In the event that” at the beginning, substituted “Five Dollars ($5.00)” for “Three Dollars ($3.00),” and deleted “duplicate copy and a fee in the amount of Eight Dollars ($8.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for the second” preceding “and each subsequent duplicate copy” near the end of the first sentence.

The 2014 amendment, in the first undesignated paragraph, substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving”, “may obtain” for “shall obtain from the commissioner”, and “by paying the fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “thereof and shall pay a fee in the amount of Five Dollars ($5.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for the first and each subsequent duplicate copy”; and deleted the second undesignated paragraph in its entirety regarding depositing of fees into State General Fund.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Criminal offense of applying for duplicate license at time when license has been posted for appearance in court, see §63-9-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 340-343.

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “in ink” preceding “by the applicant.”

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Deposit of driver’s license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see §63-9-25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Persons who have authority under statute.

3. Authority to stop vehicle.

1. In general.

This provision is a valid exercise of the police power. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

2. Persons who have authority under statute.

A person never formally appointed in writing as required by law who was employed by a sheriff as a deputy, had signed an oath of office, and had acted for a long time as a deputy in uniform without challenge, had the right to arrest for motor vehicle violations and to demand driver’s licenses. United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10746 (5th Cir. Miss. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S. Ct. 908, 25 L. Ed. 2d 91, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2991 (U.S. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 968, 90 S. Ct. 1008, 25 L. Ed. 2d 262, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2728 (U.S. 1970).

3. Authority to stop vehicle.

This section [Code 1942, § 8108], authorizes, by implication, officers to stop a car and require exhibition of a driver’s license; but this right must be exercised in good faith for the purpose of determining whether the operator is licensed, and not as a blind search without warrant. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

The stopping of cars and detaining drivers momentarily for the purpose of checking the driver’s license does not constitute an arrest warranting an incidental search. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

One who evades a road block set up to check driver’s licenses may be pursued by the officer in good faith for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has a license. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of statute making it a criminal offense for the operator of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his operator’s license or the vehicle registration certificate. 6 A.L.R.3d 506.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 105, 106, 259.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 347, 348.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1631, 1748.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 433, Laws of 2012, effective July 1, 2012 (approved April 19, 2012), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 483, Laws of 2012, effective from and after July 1, 2009 (approved April 23, 2012), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all version of the same code section amended within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the August 16, 2012 meeting of the Committee.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2014, ch. 512, § 5 provides:

“SECTION 5. The State Fiscal Officer shall transfer all of the funds that are deposited into the Ignition Interlock Device Fund during fiscal year 2015 into the Drug Court Fund. This section shall stand repealed on July 1, 2015.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2009 amendment substituted “Article 5 of this chapter” for “Article 2 of this chapter” both times it appears in the first paragraph of (4).

The 2010 amendment, in (1)(c), substituted “Eighteen Dollars ($18.00)” for “Eight Dollars ($8.00)” and “photograph fee for a license for an applicant” for “photograph fee for a one-year license for each applicant.”

The 2011 amendment, effective October 1, 2011, added (1)(b), redesignated former (1)(b) and (c) as (1)(c) and (d), and made related changes; added “when issued as an endorsement to a four-year license, and Ten Dollars ($10.00) when issued as an endorsement to an eight-year license” to the end of the first sentence of (2); added (3)(c); and made a minor stylistic change.

The first 2012 amendment (ch. 433), added (1)(e); and made a minor stylistic change.

The second 2012 amendment (ch. 483), substituted “used by the department to defray the cost of future photography and driver’s license technology initiatives” for “deposited to the General Fund of the State of Mississippi” at the end of (6).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added (1)(e); and redesignated former (1)(e) as (1)(f).

The 2014 amendment rewrote the section to set forth a new fee schedule for permits and licenses.

Cross References —

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

Requirements for temporary driving permits, see §63-1-21.

Allocation of portion of certain fees charged under this section for licenses, to special fund for purchase of State Highway Safety Patrol cars, equipment, and weapons, see §63-1-45.

Fee for reinstatement of license subsequent to suspension, revocation or cancellation, see §63-1-46.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Private commercial carrier by motor vehicle.

1. In general.

Statute which provides that operator of a private commercial carrier must obtain a commercial driver’s license, applies uniformly to all persons regularly so engaged as operators of private commercial carriers and the statute is constitutional. Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 491 (Miss. 1951).

2. Private commercial carrier by motor vehicle.

A person employed by a railroad as an operator or driver of one of the railroad’s motor trucks in the transportation of other employees and tools to and from their work, was, in respect to the use of such truck, a private commercial carrier by motor vehicle within the statute requiring driver’s license, in that it was used in the furtherance of the commercial enterprise of railroading. Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 491 (Miss. 1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 344-346.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment rewrote the third through sixth sentences in the first paragraph; and rewrote the second paragraph.

The 2013 amendment designated former paragraphs as present (1) through (3); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References —

Highway patrol operating fund generally, see §45-1-23.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person’s driver’s license or driving privileges, see §63-1-52.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the last sentence of subsection (4). The words “This subsection (4) of Section (3) shall stand repealed” were changed to “This subsection (4) shall stand repealed”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 20, 1998 meeting.

Section 3 of Chapter 493, Laws of 2014, effective from and after July 1, 2014 (approved April 16, 2014), amended this section. Section 13 of Chapter 424, Laws of 2014, effective from and after October 1, 2014 (approved March 24, 2014), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section enacted within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the July 24, 2014, meeting of the Committee.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 26, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Chapter 489, Laws of 2013, referred to in (1)(b)(iv) and (2)(b)(iv), also amended Section 63-1-45 and enacted Section 63-1-16.

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment, in (1)(a), added the exception, substituted “One Hundred Dollars ($100.00)” for “Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00),”and deleted the former last sentence, which read: “This fee shall be in addition to the fee provided for in Section 63-1-43, Mississippi Code of 1972”; added (1)(b); deleted former (2), which read: “The funds received under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be deposited into the State General Fund in accordance with Section 45-1-23, Mississippi Code of 1972”; redesignated former (3) as (2), and increased the fees charged therein from ($75.00) to ($175.00); added (2)(b) and (3); redesignated former (5) as (4); added (5); and made minor stylistic changes.

The first 2014 amendment (ch. 424), effective October 1, 2014, added (4); redesignated former (4) as present (3)(b); and in (5), substituted “prescribed” for “provided for application for a driver’s license” and made a minor stylistic change.

The second 2014 amendment (ch. 493), effective July 1, 2014, in (1)(b)(iv) and (2)(b)(iv), deleted “Ignition” preceding “Interlock Device Fund” and substituted “Section 63-11-33” for “Section 63-1-43 by Chapter 489, Laws of 2013.”

The 2019 amendment deleted “or as a result of a conviction of a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Law under the provisions of Section 63-1-71” from the end of (2)(a).

Cross References —

Operation of disability and relief fund for members of Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, see §25-13-7.

Provision that future funding for members who elect early retirement under the Highway Safety Patrol Retirement System shall be provided from surplus funds of such system as deposited therein pursuant to this section, see §25-13-14.

Creation of highway patrol operating fund and budget therefor, see §45-1-23.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Fees for licenses generally, see §63-1-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 4 of ch. 448, Laws of 2009, effective July 1, 2009 (approved April 6, 2009), amended this section. Section 31 of ch. 560 Laws of 2009, effective from and after July 1, 2009 (approved April 17, 2009), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 31 of ch. 560, Laws of 2009, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor's Notes. —

Executive Order No. 1474, I., issued by Governor Tate Reeves on April 20, 2020, provides as follows:

“I. In order to cope with and respond to the COVID-19 emergency, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-11(c)(1), the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §§63-1-47, 63-1-6, 63-1-21, 45-9-101, 97-37-7, and 45-35-55 are hereby suspended to the extent necessary to delay the expiration of all valid driver's licenses, learner's permits, intermediate licenses, firearm permits, security guard permits and ID cards set to expire between March 14-2020 and June 30, 2020. Such licenses, permits and ID cards will instead expire on August 3, 2020.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The first 2009 amendment (ch. 488), deleted “and who is eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “entitled to same” in (1); deleted “of operators eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “all renewal licenses” in (1)(a); added (6)(b) and designated the former provisions of (6) as (6)(a); and in (6)(a), deleted the former first three sentences, which read: “Except as otherwise provided in this article, each applicant for an original driver’s license issued pursuant to this article, who is entitled to issuance of same, being under eighteen (18) years of age, shall be issued a one-year license which will expire at midnight on the licensee’s birthday. Renewal drivers’ licenses of operators under the age of eighteen (18) shall be for one-year periods and may be renewed any time within two (2) months before the expiration of the license upon application and payment of the required fee, unless required to be reexamined. An intermediate license shall be valid for one (1) year from its date of issue and may be renewed any time within fourteen (14) days before expiration of the license,” substituted “under eighteen (18) years of age” for “under the age of eighteen (18)” and inserted “used in establishing compliance.”

The second 2009 amendment (ch. 560), substituted “Article 5 of this chapter” for “Article 2 of this chapter” everywhere it appears in (1), (2), (4) and (5); in (1), deleted “and who is eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “issuance of same” in the introductory language, and deleted “of operators eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “renewal licenses” in (a); and rewrote (6).

The 2010 amendment added the (7)(a) designation, and therein rewrote the first sentence, which formerly read: “Any license issued under this article to a person who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government shall expire one (1) year from the date of issuance and may be renewed, if such person is otherwise qualified to renew such license, within thirty (30) days of expiration”; and added (7)(b).

The 2011 amendment, effective October 1, 2011, inserted “or an eight-year license, at the option of the applicant” following “a four-year license” in (1); inserted “period or an eight-year period, at the option of the applicant” after “shall be for a four-year” in (1)(a); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added (8); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2014 amendment redesignated former (1) as present (1)(a) and inserted “or renewal Class R or Class D” following “each applicant for an original”; deleted “Except as otherwise provided in this section, all renewal licenses shall be for a four-year period or an eight-year period, at the option of the applicant,” from the beginning of former (1)(a); added (1)(b) and (1)(c); in (2), deleted “this” following “commercial driver’s license issued under” at the beginning; and substituted “5 of this chapter shall be issued for a five-year term to expire at midnight on the licensee’s birthday” for the remainder of this subsection; deleted (3), (4), and (5) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; in present (3)(a), substituted “before” for “prior to” at the end; in present (3)(c), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary learning” twice; in present (4)(a), substituted “chapter” for “article” and deleted “and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government” following “who is not a United States citizen”; in present (4)(b), in the parentheses, substituted “4” for “7”; and deleted former (8) in its entirety regarding the term of an ignition-interlock-restricted driver’s license.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Fees for operators’ and commercial drivers’ licenses, see §63-1-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 100 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 340-343.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment added (2)(b) and redesignated former (2) as present (2)(a); and substituted “this paragraph (a)” for “this subsection” in (2)(a).

The 2005 amendment, in (2)(a) inserted “by mail or by on-line renewal services or” following “may renew the license” in the first sentence, and made minor stylistic changes; and substituted “a dependent” for “the spouse or a child” three times in (2)(b).

The 2014 amendment, in (1), in the first sentence, substituted “eighteen (18)” for “twelve (12)”, “the” for “said”, and “prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “of One Dollar ($1.00)” and deleted the last sentence in its entirety regarding a new license constituting a renewal of the previous license; in (2)(a), in the first sentence, deleted “such” following “after being discharged from”, a comma following “upon returning to the state”, and inserted “while out of state due to military service” following “by mail or by online renewal services”; in the last sentence deleted “event first” following “license, whichever”, inserted “in this state” following “person to operate a motor vehicle”, and “first” following “occurs”; substituted “who holds” for “holding”, “chapter” for “article”, “is” for “being”, “The” for “Such”, “the person’s current” for “such”, “or” for “and”, “the” for “such” twice, “discharge” for “he is discharged”, and “renewal of the” for “he renews his”; in (2)(b), substituted “the family member’s” for “his or her” and inserted “under the Administrative Procedures Act” following “adopt such rules and regulations”; in (3), deleted the last sentence, which read “Such reissuance of a license shall constitute a renewal of the previous license and not a new license.”; substituted “will” for “shall”, “the” for “said” twice, “before” for “prior to”, and “the” for “such”, and inserted “or eight (8) years” following “for four (4) years.”

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son’s negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 100 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 340-343.

Editor's Note —

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “duty of the court clerk” for “duty of the trial judge” near the beginning of (1).

The 2019 amendment deleted (1)(f), which read: “Contempt for failure to pay a fine or fee or to respond to a summons or citation pursuant to a charge of a violation of this title,” and made related changes.

Cross References —

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Revocation of municipal license of bus operator, see §21-27-155.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person’s driver’s license or driving privileges, see §63-1-52.

Applicability of Article IV of Driver License Compact Law to offenses enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, see §63-1-113.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist whose operator’s license was revoked following his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not entitled to proceed by writ of certiorari in the circuit court to review the action of the commissioner of public safety when he had previously failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Code 1942, § 8105. Mississippi State Dep't of Public Safety v. Berry, 217 So. 2d 11, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1249 (Miss. 1968).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In order to have a conviction as required under this section there must be a charge of contempt filed by way of citation or warrant of arrest and a subsequent finding of guilt of contempt. Markopoulos, Nov. 15, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0561.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “operation” or “negligence in operation” within statute making owner of motor vehicle liable for negligence in its operation. 13 A.L.R.2d 378.

Criminal responsibility of one other than driver under “hit-and-run” statute. 62 A.L.R.2d 1130.

What is a “motor vehicle” within statutes making it an offense to drive while intoxicated. 66 A.L.R.2d 1146.

What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver’s license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Suspension or revocation of driver’s license for refusal to take sobriety test. 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Ordinance providing for suspension or revocation of state-issued driver’s license as within municipal power. 92 A.L.R.2d 204.

Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspending automobile driver’s license as providing for trial de novo. 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Regulations establishing a “point system” as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.3d 690.

Construction and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference of intoxication from specified percentages of alcohol present in system. 16 A.L.R.3d 748.

Right to trial by jury in criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated or similar offense. 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.

Automobiles: driving under the influence, or when addicted to the use, of drugs as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.3d 815.

What amounts to negligence within meaning of statutes penalizing negligent homicide by operation of motor vehicle. 20 A.L.R.3d 473.

Homicide by automobile as murder. 21 A.L.R.3d 116.

Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor. 58 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Necessity of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 361.

Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 427.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance mandating imprisonment for habitual or repeated traffic offender. 2 A.L.R.4th 618.

Drunk driving: Motorist’s right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator’s license for “habitual,” “persistent,” or “frequent” violations of traffic regulations. 48 A.L.R.4th 367.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration – by license holder – against administrative agency – to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license – attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 49.1.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 23 of Title 43 (pertaining to family courts), referred to in (2)(b) and (3)(b), was repealed by Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 2, effective from and after May 28, 1999.

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment substituted “subsection” and “subsections” for “paragraph,” and deleted “or (2)(i)” following “(2)(h)” throughout the section; substituted “Certificate of Mailing” for “Certificate of Mail” in (2)(a); and made minor punctuation changes.

Cross References —

Suspension of driver’s license by commissioner for failure to respond to summons or citation or to pay fine, fees and assessments, see §63-1-51.

Notice of suspension of license without preliminary hearing, see §63-1-53.

Notice of suspension of license for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor, see §63-11-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration – by license holder – against administrative agency – to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license – Attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 25, amended this section effective July 1, 1990 provided that the Legislature, by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Laws, 1993, ch. 487, § 3, effective July 1, 1993, provides as follows:

“SECTION 3. The amendments to the sections of law contained in this act shall apply only to convictions occurring from and after July 1, 1993.”

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “to the commissioner” for “to the Commissioner of Public Safety” near the end of (1); substituted “as early as practicable, but not to exceed” for “as early as practical within not to exceed” in the first sentence of (3); and added (4).

The 2010 amendment, in (4), inserted “all cash appearance bonds authorized under Section 99-19-3 or” and made a stylistic change.

The 2019 amendment, in (1), in the first sentence, deleted “Upon failure of any person to respond timely and properly to a summons or citation charging such person with any violation of this title, or” from the beginning and made a related change, substituted “ninety (90) days” for “ten (10) days,” deleted “has not properly responded to the summons or citation or” preceding “has not paid the entire amount,” substituted “pursue collection as for any other delinquent payment, and shall be entitled to collection of all additional fees in accordance with subsection (4) of this section” for “give notice thereof to the Commissioner of Public Safety and the commissioner may suspend the driver’s license of such person” and deleted the former last two sentences, which related to suspension of driver's license for failure to satisfactorily dispose of the matter pending before the court; deleted (2)(h) and (i), which related to failure to pay a fine and failure to respond to summons, and redesignated former (j) as (h); and substituted “after receiving notice of the licensee's failure to pay all fines, fees or other assessments as provided in subsection (1) of this section” for “after the commissioner has suspended the license of a person under subsection (2) (i) of this section.”

Cross References —

Municipal and justice courts authorized to purge judgment rolls of all fines and fees owed by deceased person upon proof of death, see §9-1-47.

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Suspension of municipal license of bus operator, see §21-27-155.

Suspension of license for unlawfully parking in an area designated for handicapped parking, see §27-19-56.

Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§41-29-101 et seq.

Replacement of unexpired driver’s license surrendered or suspended for medical reasons by free identification card, see §45-35-7.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person’s driver’s license or driving privileges. see §63-1-52.

Forfeiture for 90 days of person under arrest who refuses to submit to chemical test mandated by Implied Consent Law, see §63-11-21.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As for revocation of licenses of persons for out-of-state convictions, Miss. Code Section 63-1-53(g) gives Commissioner of Public Safety authority to suspend license of any person who “has committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation”. O’Cain, Jan. 20, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0022.

In justice court, clerk or deputy clerk has power, under Miss. Code Section 63-1-53, to send out “fail to appear” notices to defendants on traffic or game and fish violations. Ferguson, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

A 10 day letter (commonly referred to as a DR15) on a traffic citation should be sent upon the failure of the defendant to appear on the date properly noticed or upon the failure of a defendant to pay any fine assessed; thus, if a defendant fails to appear for an initial appearance after receiving proper notice, the 10 day letter should be sent; in addition a 10 day letter should be sent if a defendant is tried in absentia, found guilty and assessed a fine. Mark, August 6, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0398.

No statute of limitation exists on the collection of unpaid fines, and there is no limit on the authority of the Commissioner of Public Safety to suspend the license of an individual who still owes a fine on a traffic offense conviction where such conviction occurred five or ten years prior. Via, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0185.

The purpose of Section 63-1-53 is to give a person 10 days to respond to a citation; therefore, it is necessary to wait until the 10-day period has expired before issuing a warrant. Reno, July 29, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0264.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Regulations establishing a “point system” as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.3d 690.

Necessity of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 361.

Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 427.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Admissibility, in motor vehicle license suspension proceedings, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure. 23 A.L.R.5th 108.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 34, 41-56.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

Cross References —

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Driver training penalty assessment fund generally, see §37-25-17.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 63-1-55 provides that justice court judge may suspend minor’s driver’s license in lieu of conviction, and in addition “may require the minor to successfully complete defensive driving course approved by the judge as a condition of the suspension.” Ferguson, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

Judge has the discretion over approval of the defensive driving school to be completed by a minor. Hood, Mar. 11, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0032.

Miss. Code Ann. §63-9-11(3)(d) clearly and unequivocally requires instruction of an approved traffic safety violator course by a human being when it specifies that the course “provide minimum qualifications for instructors.” This requirement does not conflict with Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-55 allowing computerized defensive driving instruction for minors. Dearing, March 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00091, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 80.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver’s license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspending automobile driver’s license as providing for trial de novo. 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Affidavit.

The gravamen of the crime under this section [Code 1942, § 8110] is the driving when the driver has no license to drive and the fact that the driver could not tell from the affidavit whether he was charged with so driving when his license had been suspended or when it had been revoked is immaterial. Middleton v. State, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 508 (Miss. 1952).

2. —Defect cured by amendment.

Where the original affidavit did not charge the defendant for driving motor vehicle without license upon a public highway in Mississippi the defect was cured by an amendment to the affidavit alleging that defendant was driving in District 5 of Marion County upon Highway No. 24 of the State of Mississippi. Middleton v. State, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 508 (Miss. 1952).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Amending a charge of violation of §63-11-40 to a violation of this section when the facts of the case do not merit such an amendment would constitute a violation of §63-11-39. Mitchell, Aug. 27, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0435.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: necessity or emergency as defense in prosecution for driving without operator’s license or while license is suspended. 61 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 260, 261.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1632-1635.

Cross References —

Punishment of person committing perjury, see §97-9-61.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Office supply store that allegedly made color photocopies of doctored driver’s license subsequently used by underage driver to buy alcohol (although not on night of accident that resulted in death of plaintiff’s decedent) was not negligent per se based on alleged violation of §63-1-60, which was designed to prevent persons from making and using fake or improper drivers’ licenses, as statute did not purport to prevent minors from purchasing alcoholic beverages and did not specifically state that it applied to businesses that had photocopying capability. Main v. Office Depot, 914 F. Supp. 1413, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1261 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 101 F.3d 700, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 34247 (5th Cir. Miss. 1996).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence insufficient.

1. In general.

A parent is negligent who permits a child under the statutory age for a licensed driver to drive his automobile on the highway, rendering him liable for the act of such child in permitting another to drive, even though he has forbidden child to do so, and to drive upon the road where the accident occurred. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So. 2d 240, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1959).

2. Evidence insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support a judgment against the defendant for property damage caused in an accident between the plaintiffs and the defendant’s 14 year old son since there was no evidence that the defendant knew that his son was taking the car. Chandler v. Coleman, 759 So. 2d 459, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 102 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction, application, and effect of legislation making it an offense to permit, or imputing negligence to one who permits an unauthorized or unlicensed person to operate motor vehicle. 69 A.L.R.2d 978.

Liability of donor of motor vehicle for injuries resulting from owner’s operation. 22 A.L.R.4th 738.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 262.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1751.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial court erred by denying a seller’s motion for summary judgment in the parents’ wrongful death action, as Mississippi law did not impose a duty on the seller, sufficient to support a negligence claim, to restrict motor vehicle sales to licensed drivers or to determine the competence of drivers as part of the sale; the son was not required to have an “E” endorsement on his license to purchase the motorcycle, but only to drive the motorcycle on a highway. Laurel Yamaha, Inc. v. Freeman, 956 So. 2d 897, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 316 (Miss. 2007).

In an action against the parents and a minor for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident, where there was no proof that the father or mother authorized or knowingly permitted the minor to drive on the occasion in question, the trial court properly peremptorily instructed the jury to return a verdict for the parents. Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction, application, and effect of legislation making it an offense to permit, or imputing negligence to one who permits, an unauthorized or unlicensed person to operate motor vehicle. 69 A.L.R.2d 978.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 262.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1751.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Burden on rental car companies.

Car rental agency was not alleged to have known of or to have had a duty to suspect any recklessness about the renter, and the renter’s valid license was inspected, and the required information was recorded on the rental contract; the car rental agency was a self-insurer and a clause recognizing the applicability of state motor-vehicle responsibility laws was printed on the reverse side of the rental agreement signed by the renter. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc. v. Bardin, 8 So.3d 866, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 2009).

Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-67 only places a burden on rental car companies to accept facially valid, unexpired driver’s licenses. Cousin v. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 2007).

Rental car companies comply with Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-67(1) by fulfilling their responsibilities as mandated under §63-1-67(2) and (3). Cousin v. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 2007).

Because defendant rental car rental company complied with Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-67 by checking a renter’s facially valid license according to the procedures set forth in §63-1-67(2) and (3) (even though the renter’s license had been suspended), the trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the car rental company on plaintiffs’ negligence per se action. Cousin v. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal offenses in connection with rental of motor vehicles. 38 A.L.R.3d 949.

Rental agency’s liability for negligent entrustment of vehicle. 78 A.L.R.3d 1170.

State regulation of motor vehicle rental (“you-drive”) business. 60 A.L.R.4th 784.

Cross References —

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 487, § 3, effective July 1, 1993, provides as follows:

“SECTION 3. The amendments to the sections of law contained in this act shall apply only to convictions occurring from and after July 1, 1993.”

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the UNHANDLEDCHAR Criminal Justice Reform Act. UNHANDLEDCHAR

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment, effective October 15, 2019, deleted the former first sentence, which read: “In addition to any penalty authorized by the Uniform Controlled Substances Law or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, every person convicted of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent in a court of this state for a violation of any offense defined in the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, and every person convicted of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent under the laws of the United States, another state, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of a violation for the use, distribution, possession, manufacture, sale, barter, transfer or dispensing of a UNHANDLEDCHAR controlled substance, UNHANDLEDCHAR UNHANDLEDCHAR counterfeit substance, UNHANDLEDCHAR UNHANDLEDCHAR narcotic drug UNHANDLEDCHAR or UNHANDLEDCHAR drug, UNHANDLEDCHAR as such terms are defined under Section 41-29-105, shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state for a period of six (6) months”; in the first sentence, substituted “Section 63-11-30(3)” for “Section 63-11-30(2)(a),” deleted “and every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of nolo contendere thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, in a court of this state, and every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of nolo contendere thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, under the laws of” following “court of this state”; substituted “sixteen (16)” for “fifteen (15)” twice in the second sentence; substituted “driving under the influence of a controlled substance” for “a violation of any offense defined in the Uniform Controlled Substances Law” in the third sentence of (1) and the first sentence of (2); and substituted “suspension” for “denial of which” in the first sentence of (3).

Cross References —

Fee for reinstatement of license suspended or revoked for violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §63-1-46.

Authority of commissioner to suspend operator’s license without preliminary hearing for violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §63-1-53.

Applicability of subsection (3) of this section to defendant who holds commercial driver’s license or was operating commercial motor vehicle when violation occurred and who is charged with violating state of local traffic law other than parking violation, see §63-1-222.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This section applies to everyone pleading nolo to, convicted, or adjudicated delinquent of a controlled substances violation. Hankins, Oct. 30, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0798.

Section 63-1-71(2) and Section 41-29-139(c)(2)(A) are not in conflict; report of conviction for less than one ounce of marijuana must be sent to the Bureau of Narcotics pursuant to 41-29-139, and, if court is unable to collect the license of person convicted, court shall also cause report of conviction to be sent to Commissioner of Public Safety, Driver Improvement Division. Lowe, Sept. 16, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0680.

A defendant’s driver’s license will be suspended for a conviction of possession of marijuana or for possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle or for possession of paraphernalia and a conviction for any of these should be reported to the Department of Public Safety. Shirley, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

Editor’s Notes —

Former §63-1-73 prohibited the use of a wireless communication device by persons authorized to drive under intermediate licenses or temporary learning or driving permits while the vehicle is in motion or by a person operating a passenger bus with a minor passenger on the bus, with some exceptions.

For present provisions relating to the prohibition against texting or reading or posting to social media network site while driving, see §63-33-1.

Editor’s Notes —

Former §63-1-74 provided the purpose and construction of the article. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-202.

Former §63-1-75 provided definitions for terms used in the article. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-203.

Former §63-1-76 provided that no person who drives a commercial motor vehicle could have more than one (1) driver’s license. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-204.

Former §63-1-77 required persons driving commercial motor vehicles to have commercial driver’s license.

Former §63-1-78 related to the applicability of provisions of the article. For present similar provisions relating to exemption of farm-related service industry employees, see §63-1-207.

Former §63-1-79 provided commercial driver’s license qualification standards. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-208.

Former §63-1-80 related to nonresident commercial driver’s licenses. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-209.

Former §63-1-81 related to the application for commercial driver’s licenses. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-210.

Former §63-1-82 related to commercial driver’s license content, classification, endorsement, and restrictions. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-211.

Former §63-1-83 related to the suspension of commercial driver’s licenses. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-216.

Former §63-1-84 related to implied consent to tests for presence of alcohol in the blood. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-224.

Former §63-1-85 provided classifications of offenses under article and relationship to other laws. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-225.

Former §63-1-86 related to notification of state licensing authority of suspension, revocation, cancellation, etc. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-212.

Former §63-1-87 provided for reciprocity. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-215.

Former §63-1-88 related to full faith and credit of out-of-state convictions. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-215.

Former §63-1-89 related to the promulgation of rules and regulations by the commissioner of public safety.

Former §63-1-90 provided for the use of inspection stations for commercial driver’s license testing sites. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-226.

Article 2 also contained a former §63-1-73 (Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 1, effective from and after January 1, 1990), which was repealed by Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 27, effective July 1, 2009. A new §63-1-73, enacted by Laws of 2009, ch. 488, § 5, effective from and after July 1, 2009, now appears in Article 1.

Comparable Laws from other States —

Code of Alabama §§32-6-30 et seq.

Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated §27-17-101.

Official Code of Georgia Annotated §40-5-5.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 1420.

Revised Statutes of Missouri § 302.600.

Tennessee Code Annotated §§55-50-701 et seq.

Texas Transportation Code §§ 523.001 et seq.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 141, 142.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration – by license holder – against administrative agency – to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license – attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 363.

Cross References —

Powers of governor generally, see §7-1-5.

Cross References —

Department of public safety and commissioner thereof generally, see Chapter 1 of Title 45.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purpose of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver’s license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Admissibility of traffic conviction in later state civil trial. 73 A.L.R.4th 691.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment, in (f)(v)3, inserted “and commercial,” “and Mississippi Military Department” and “employees of the Mississippi Military Department.”

Federal Aspects—

Section 12007 of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 [Pub. L. 99-570], see 49 USCS § 31309.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

There is a reference to “Section 63-3-205(c)” in subsection (1) of this section although there is no subsection (c) in Section 63-3-205. The section is set out above as it was enacted by Section 6 of Chapter 560, Laws of 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment, in (5)(a), deleted “from any jurisdiction” following “driver’s license” and inserted “Mississippi” following “individual who holds a valid”; in the first sentence of (5)(b), substituted “the” for “a” and “prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “of Twelve Dollars ($12.00)”; in the first sentence of (6), deleted the comma following “A commercial driver’s license”; and added (9).

The 2017 amendment, in (4), substituted “shall provide for a waiver” for “may provide for a waiver” in (a), added (c), and made a related stylistic change.

Cross References —

Mississippi Administrative Procedures Law, see §§25-43-1.101 et seq.

Federal Aspects—

Title XII of Public Law 99-570 [the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986], see generally 49 USCS §§ 31301 et seq.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

The Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx. 451, referred to in this section, was renumbered 50 USCS § 3801 as part of the 2015 editorial reclassification of Title 50 and Title 50 Appendix.

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment, in (1)(h), substituted “as prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00)”; in (2), deleted “forthwith” following “the licensee or permittee shall”; and inserted “within sixty (60) days” following “notify the commissioner” in the first sentence; and substituted “as prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “Six Dollars ($6.00)” at the end of the last sentence.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 18 of Chapter 424, Laws of 2014, effective from and after October 1, 2014 (approved March 24, 2014), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 508, Laws of 2014, effective from and after passage (approved April 23, 2014), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section enacted within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the July 24, 2014, meeting of the Committee.

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (c) by substituting “Commercial Driver’s License Information System” for “commercial driver’s license information system.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at the July 24, 2014, meeting of the Committee.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The first 2014 amendment (ch. 424), effective October 1, 2014, in (2)(a)(iv), deleted the first sentence, “Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or any such vehicle towing a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating not in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds except vehicles included in Class C or vehicles which require a special endorsement unless the proper endorsement appears on the license.”; and in the second sentence, deleted “be” preceding “commercial driver’s license”, substituted “are” for “shall”, and added “and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-1-5” to the end; in (2)(b), deleted the comma following “but are not limited” and inserted a comma after “to” in the last sentence.

The second 2014 amendment (ch. 508), effective April 23, 2014, added (7) and made a minor punctuation change in (2)(b).

The 2015 amendment added “that are not autocycles as defined in Section 63-3-103” at the end of (2)(b)(iii).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication corrected typographical errors in (1)(g) by substituting, “…under which a disqualification for life under this section, except for a disqualification issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subsection, may be reduced” for “…under which a disqualification for life under this section, except that a disqualification issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subsection may be reduced.” The Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation at their July 22, 2010, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment inserted “the person’s license or permit to drive has been administratively suspended under Section 63-11-23 or the person has been” near the end of (1)(a).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Cross References —

Mississippi Implied Consent Law, see §§63-11-1 et seq.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 403, § 3, provides:

“SECTION 3. This act shall be known as ‘Harlie’s Law.’ ”

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment rewrote (1).

The 2015 amendment inserted “that are not autocycles as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (2).

The 2017 amendment substituted “every operator and every passenger” for “every operator, every front-seat passenger and every child under seven (7) years of age who is not required to be protected by the use of a child passenger restraint device or system or a belt positioning booster seat system under the provisions of Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311, regardless of the seat that the child occupies” in (1); and added (e) and made related stylistic changes.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

2. Preservation for review.

3. Probable cause.

1. Applicability.

In a personal injury action, the trial court properly refused to grant certain jury instructions because the seat belt law–Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-1(2)–did not apply to a shuttle bus carrying more than 15 passengers, and the bus owner could not have been subjected to a claim of contributory negligence because of the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-3. Boyd Tunica, Inc. v. Premier Transp. Servs., 30 So.3d 1242, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

2. Preservation for review.

Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, careless driving, and driving without a seatbelt were appropriate because defendant failed to raise any of the issues he complained of on appeal in his motion for a directed verdict or new trial and because the facts of the case provided sufficient evidence to convict. Jones v. State, 958 So. 2d 840, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 423 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

3. Probable cause.

Controlled substances and firearm seized during a traffic stop was properly admitted because a deputy had sufficient reason and probable cause to stop defendant’s car when he observed defendant violating the seat belt law; when defendant drove the vehicle without wearing his seat belt he committed a traffic violation, which provided the deputy with probable cause to stop his car. Wallace v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019), cert. denied, 279 So.3d 1086, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 2019), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 2019).

Stop of defendant’s vehicle was not pretextual because the deputy knew the confidential informant and found that person reliable; the deputy testified that he followed defendant before turning on his blue lights and did not see any traffic violations during that span, but he realized that when he was driving by, the driver was not wearing his seatbelt, and that was sufficient for purposes of the original stop. Wallace v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019), cert. denied, 279 So.3d 1086, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 2019), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 2019).

Denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of defendant’s arrest during a traffic stop was appropriate because a police officer had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, as the officer noticed that neither the driver of a car, nor defendant, who was a passenger in the car, was wearing a seat belt, and a pouch containing methamphetamine, which the officer discovered in the car after a pouch containing methamphetamine fell out from the bottom of defendant’s pants, was in plain view. Nowell v. State, 246 So.3d 77, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 210 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Violators of seat belt law can not be adjudicated guilty because there is no criminal offense and no fines or assessments may be imposed; charges should be dismissed for failure to allege a crime. Stephens, Jan. 12, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0889.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seatbelt, the driver may be cited for the seatbelt violation only if he is cited for another non-seatbelt violation, and he may not be convicted of the seatbelt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seatbelt violation; however, if a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seatbelt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted without a violation of any other non-seatbelt law. Dykes, Feb. 4, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0031.

A person can be charged with the failure to utilize a child restraint device or seat belt and child abuse without violating the double jeopardy clause. Bishop, Feb. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0733.

A law enforcement officer may stop a motorist for a seatbelt violation and upon noticing another violation or some other illegal activity, the officer may cite the motorist for the other violation and the seatbelt violation. Phillips, Aug. 12, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0419.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability under state law for injuries resulting from defective automobile seatbelt, shoulder harness, or restraint system. 48 A.L.R.5th 1.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence.

1. In general.

In a personal injury action, bus owner’s voluntary enactment of a seat-belt policy, not required by statute, did not vitiate the protection of Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-3 that would be in place were its passengers required by statute to wear seat belts. Boyd Tunica, Inc. v. Premier Transp. Servs., 30 So.3d 1242, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

In a personal injury action, the trial court properly refused to grant certain jury instructions because the seat belt law–Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-1(2)–did not apply to a shuttle bus carrying more than 15 passengers, and the bus owner could not have been subjected to a claim of contributory negligence because of the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-3. Boyd Tunica, Inc. v. Premier Transp. Servs., 30 So.3d 1242, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

This section applies to crashworthiness actions. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So. 2d 1264, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1999).

In order to preserve the matter for appeal, the plaintiff was not required to make a contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence where he had already filed a motion in limine pertaining to such evidence. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So. 2d 774, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1998).

In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when his vehicle collided with a gravel pile the plaintiff was entitled to reversal on the basis of the improper introduction of evidence that he was not using his seat belt at the time of the collision. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So. 2d 774, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1998).

Statute barred cross-examination of passenger who brought action arising from single-vehicle accident as to whether she was wearing seat belt at time of accident. Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., 701 So. 2d 1093, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1997).

2. Evidence.

Trial court was correct to admit evidence tending to show that the family of a minor girl injured in a car accident did not regularly use their seat belts, but it should have given a cautionary instruction that the evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of showing that, even if the warnings had been adequate, the family would not have heeded them. Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 904 So. 2d 1077, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 2005).

Where a minor child was killed by an air bag that deployed when the car that she was riding in was involved in an accident while her teenage older sister was driving, evidence of the decedent’s failure to wear a seat belt was relevant and admissible, the admission of evidence of the driver’s non-use of a seat belt was error, and the admission of photographs of the seat belt latches and an expert’s opinion that the latches showed insufficient scratches for the family to have used the seat belts regularly was error. Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 905 So. 2d 564, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 752 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. Jan. 13, 2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 904 So. 2d 1077, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 2005).

The statute provides that failure to use a seat belt may not be considered as evidence of contributory or comparative negligence; however, it does not purport to bar the admission of seat belt non-usage in all cases and does not provide that the use of a seat belt may not be considered. Herring v. Poirrier, 797 So. 2d 797, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 2000).

Evidence of seat belt non-usage may constitute relevant evidence in some, but by no means all or even most, cases, so long as (1) the evidence has some probative value other than as evidence of negligence, (2) this probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and is not barred by some other rule of evidence, and (3) appropriate limiting instructions are given to the jury, barring the consideration of seat belt non-usage as evidence of negligence. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So. 2d 1264, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1999).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation, and whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2006, ch. 302, § 2 provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. All federal money that the State of Mississippi receives as an incentive grant for the enactment of a primary seat belt law under Section 1 of House Bill No. 409, 2006 Regular Session, shall be expended for highway safety infrastructure improvements except as otherwise conditioned or restricted by federal law or federal rules and regulations governing the expenditure of such funds.”

Laws of 2017, ch. 403, § 3, provides:

“SECTION 3. This act shall be known as ‘Harlie’s Law.’ ”

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment rewrote (1) to delete the provisions that permit a fine to be imposed for a violation of the seat belt law only if the violator is also charged and convicted of some other offense.

The 2008 amendment rewrote the first sentence of (1).

The 2017 amendment substituted “by the operator and any passengers” for “by the operator, for a violation of this chapter by a front seat passenger or for a violation of this chapter by a child who is under seven (7) years of age and who is not required to be protected by the use of a child passenger restraint device or system or a belt positioning booster seat system under the provisions of Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311, regardless of the seat that the child occupies” in (1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A court clerk should not accept a plea of guilty on a seat belt violation and accept the fine and costs when the clerk knows that the charge has been made without any other charge being made at the same time. Anderson, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0278.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seatbelt, the driver may be cited for the seatbelt violation only if he is cited for another non-seatbelt violation, and he may not be convicted of the seatbelt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seatbelt violation; however, if a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seatbelt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted without a violation of any other non-seatbelt law. Dykes, Feb. 4, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0031.

If a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seat belt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted under Section 63-2-1 without a violation of any other non-seat belt law. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seat belt as required by statute, the driver may be cited for the seat belt violation only if he is cited for another non-seat belt violation and may not be convicted of the seat belt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seat belt violation; further, an officer may not use a primary seat belt violation in order to charge an offender with a secondary seat belt violation. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

Cross References —

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – sizes, weight and load regulations, see §§63-5-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – equipment and identification regulations, see §§63-7-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – Traffic Violations Procedure, see §§63-9-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 220 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Mississippi Transportation Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation breached the ministerial duties imposed by Miss. Code Ann. §65-1-65 because the statute applied to the portion of the highway that was under construction and imposed a ministerial duty of maintenance and repair. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams, 197 So.3d 406, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reckless driving and careless driving may be enforced on commercial parking lots and the like; similarly, a law enforcement officer may investigate and complete an accident report for an accident that occurs on private property. Godfrey, Oct. 13, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0609.

Accident reports should be made for accidents occurring in parking lots. Conerly, Jan. 23, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0002.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 221.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Automobile held not dangerous instrumentality, rendering owner liable for driver’s negligent use. Vicksburg Gas Co. v. Ferguson, 140 Miss. 543, 106 So. 258, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1925).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Nonmonetary benefits or contributions by rider as affecting his status under automobile guest statute. 39 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Automobile guest statute: status of rider as affected by payment, amount of which is not determined by expenses incurred. 39 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Payments on expense-sharing basis as affecting guest status of automobile passenger. 39 A.L.R.3d 1224.

Motorist’s liability for striking person lying in road. 41 A.L.R.4th 303.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of Chapter 406, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved March 23, 2015), amended this section. Section 3 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved April 20, 2015), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §63-1-6 as amended by Chapter 406, Laws of 2015.

Section 1 of Chapter 304, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 5, 2018), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 445, Laws of 2018, effective from and after January 1, 2019 (approved April 12, 2018). As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109 which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section amended within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the August 14, 2018, meeting of the Committee.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment added the last sentence in (b) and added (h).

The 2004 amendment rewrote (d).

The 2012 amendment added “every Mississippi Emergency Management Agency vehicle as is designated or authorized by the Executive Director of MEMA” following “as defined in Section 41-59-3” in (d).

The first 2015 amendment (ch. 406), added (i).

The second 2015 amendment (ch. 464), added the last sentence in (c); added (i) and (j).

The first 2018 amendment (ch. 304) rewrote (i), which read: “ ‘Autocycle’ means a motorcycle with three (3) wheels that is completely enclosed with a roll cage or roll bar, automotive controls and seat belts.”

The second 2018 amendment (ch. 445), effective January 1, 2019, added (k).

Cross References —

Standards for design, construction, equipment and maintenance of ambulances, see §41-59-25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The mere fact that on occasion the motor of a vehicle is not operating, or cannot be operated, does not alter the fact that it is a “motor vehicle” as defined in this section [Code 1942, § 8127]. Farley v. State, 251 Miss. 497, 170 So. 2d 625, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 875 (Miss. 1965).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The definition of “authorized emergency vehicle” does not include the private vehicle of a volunteer fireman, and therefore, such a vehicle may not be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell as allowed by Section 63-7-65. Baker, November 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0702.

A device must be able to stand on its own without the aid of a stand or other similar mechanic prop to meet the definition of “electric personal assistive mobility device.” Hedglin, Mar. 5, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0092.

Four-wheelers, all terrain vehicles, go carts, dune buggies, golf carts, and riding lawn mowers [unless qualifying as an implement of husbandry] are “motor vehicles” and therefor require tags, inspection stickers, proper equipment and insurance. Gay, July 25, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0305.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1-16.

38 Am. Jur. Trials, All-Terrain Vehicle Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Defective Design of an All-Terrain Vehicle, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1-18.

Cross References —

Application of mandatory use of safety seat belts to farm vehicles, see §63-2-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “trailer” within coverage or exclusion provision of automobile liability policy. 65 A.L.R.3d 804.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2012, ch. 544, § 4 provides:

“SECTION 4. Section 2 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2012, and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment rewrote (d).

The 2012 amendment added “limited liability company or other legal business entity” and made a related grammatical change in the introductory language in (a); and added (e).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an “intersection” so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to §63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an “intersection” within the meaning of §63-3-129. An “intersection” requires the conjunction of “2 highways,” and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a “highway” where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a “Plant Entrance” sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. Stewart v. Davis, 571 So. 2d 926, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Public nature of way; driveways.

1. In general.

Where an intersection was formed by a north and south gravel road crossing a highway, running in an east and west direction, the area embraced within the lateral boundary lines of the two roadways at the point of junction constituted an intersection within the contemplation of this section [Code 1942, § 8138]. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1957).

2. Public nature of way; driveways.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an “intersection” so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to §63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an “intersection” within the meaning of §63-3-129. An “intersection” requires the conjunction of “2 highways,” and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a “highway” where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a “Plant Entrance” sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. Stewart v. Davis, 571 So. 2d 926, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1990).

Where a statute provided that no vehicle shall in overtaking and passing other vehicle be driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection, this statute was not applicable to overtaking automobile which attempted to pass truck as the truck driver attempted to make a left turn into a driveway leading to a store, where there was no showing that the driveway was a highway within the meaning of the statute. Frizell v. Guthrie, 222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 671 (Miss. 1954).

Cross References —

Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see §65-1-8.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jury instructions.

Trial court erred in its ruling related to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-313 and in refusing to give a jury instruction based on this statute, but the error was harmless because the weight of the evidence was against the driver who requested the instruction in a personal injury trial that arose out of a car accident. Etheridge v. Harold Case & Co., 960 So. 2d 474, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 623 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where a fatal accident occurred on an interstate highway, the trial judge should have held, as a matter of law, that the scene of the accident was outside of a “business district” under §63-3-139. Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc., 456 So. 2d 698, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1812 (Miss. 1984).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

Automobile driver is entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the streets and highways while operating his car in a careful and lawful manner, but the driver operating his car in a negligent and reckless manner in disregard of the rights and safety of others should be held strictly accountable both civilly and criminally. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

2. Jury instructions.

Court may instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff’s recovery. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Although Sections 63-3-201 and 63-9-11 provide that a violation of the rules of the road is a criminal violation, a city is not prohibited from enacting additional ordinances also making disobedience or disregard of a traffic control signal a civil offense. Mitchell, Dec. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0170.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 864.1 (Driving on wrong side of road – Failure to control vehicle – Crossing center line).

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the plaintiff had violated this section where (1) the officer stopped the plaintiff’s vehicle for speeding, (2) during the traffic stop, the officer ordered the plaintiff to return to his car and await further instruction, and (3) the plaintiff replied that he did not wish to return to his vehicle and preferred to remain on the roadside. Dallas v. City of Okolona, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19547 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 7, 1999).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury questions.

1. In general.

Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9 governs suits against governmental entities, and, therefore, Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-205 neither controls nor affects a municipality’s grant of immunity pursuant to the MTCA; the statutory language of §63-3-205 is unambiguous and serves as general guidelines for traffic regulations and rules of the road, and the language neither instructs nor implies that § 63-3-205 should be read in conjunction with the provisions of the MTCA. Carothers v. City of Water Valley, 242 So.3d 138, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 281 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, 246 So.3d 67, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 2018).

Notwithstanding Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303, the act giving rise to the injuries in this case was not the placement or maintenance of a traffic-control device – but rather a Department of Transportation (DOT) employee’s alleged negligent operation of a pickup truck; because the employee did not fall within the exceptions to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-205, and his duty to adhere to applicable traffic regulations was not discretionary, the circuit court erred in finding the DOT immune under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d). Mixon v. Miss. DOT, 183 So.3d 90, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 181 So.3d 1010, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 2016).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 8148] the nighttime operation of a sprinkling truck on the left side of a highway in preparing the surface thereof for receiving surfacing materials was not a violation of statute. Webb v. Brock, 232 Miss. 154, 98 So. 2d 139, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1957).

2. Jury questions.

In an action arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by a constable in pursuit of a reckless driver and one operated by plaintiff, where the evidence was in conflict as to such matters as to whether the siren on constable’s car was sounded, speed and position of vehicles at time of accident, the issue was properly submitted to a jury. Johnson v. Richardson, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1959).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent pedestrian or occupant of parked vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 100 A.L.R.3d 815.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 182, 183.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 79, Negligent Vehicular Police Chase.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

3. Verdict.

1. In general.

Motorist overtaking and passing bicycle is required to do so at safe distance; motorist’s admission that he did not entirely clear bicyclist’s lane of traffic as he passed bicyclist but was only straddling center line and was unaware of location of vehicle in relation to bicycle as he passed it is sufficient basis upon which jury may find that collision between motorist’s vehicle and bicycle was caused by motorist’s negligence. Rideout v. Knight, 463 So. 2d 1042, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1866 (Miss. 1985).

2. Jury instructions.

Since by this section [Code 1942, § 8149], the prohibitions of Code 1942, § 8188, apply to a person riding a bicycle, an instruction to the jury that if they believe that the plaintiff violated Code 1942, § 8188, providing that a person riding bicycle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for speed of other vehicle and traffic upon the conditions of the street, and such violation was proximate cause of accident they should find for the defendants, was proper in an action for injuries to the plaintiff bicyclist who, approaching defendant’s truck from the rear, tried to pass it at intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

3. Verdict.

In an action against an automobile driver for the alleged wrongful death of a minor who was riding a bicycle when it collided with the automobile, a jury verdict in favor of the driver foreclosed all questions of fact, resolved all conflicts in the evidence favorably to the driver, and also amounted to a factual finding by the jury that the driver of the automobile had not been negligent and had acted as a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances. McCollum v. Randolph, 220 So. 2d 310, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1452 (Miss. 1969).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Horseback riding or operation of horse-drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute. 71 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving statutes. 73 A.L.R.4th 1139.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 225, 226.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 570.1 (complaint in collision between bicyclists when minor bicyclist enters roadway from private driveway).

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident – Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Applicability of state law.

2. Municipal ordinances and power.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. Applicability of state law.

In an action arising out of an intersectional automobile collision, where it was not shown that any public authority had designated one street as a through highway and had directed the placing of stop signs on the intersecting street, state law was applicable, and the plaintiff was not under a duty to stop at the intersection even though someone had at some time placed a stop sign there, it being undisputed that the sign was down and not in place at the time of the collision. Skelton v. Turnipseed, 235 So. 2d 694, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1458 (Miss. 1970).

2. Municipal ordinances and power.

A municipal ordinance making it unlawful for anyone to operate or ride upon any two-wheeled, self propelled vehicle upon the public streets without wearing a crash helmet, was a reasonable traffic regulation, rather than an unreasonable limitation on the personal liberty of an individual motorcyclist constituting a violation of equal protection. City of Jackson v. Lee, 252 So. 2d 897, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1210 (Miss. 1971).

This section [Code 1942, § 8150] does not authorize a municipality to establish an automobile testing station and engage in the business of testing automobiles, and consequently a municipality had no authority to contract for the purchase of equipment for such purpose. Davenport v. Blackmur, 184 Miss. 836, 186 So. 321, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1939).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

An earlier statutory provision to the same effect as this section was held not to prohibit municipalities from requiring license for operation of motor vehicles on their streets. Wasson v. Greenville, 123 Miss. 642, 86 So. 450, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1920).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipalities are not authorized to restrict a particular type of vehicle, such as an all terrain vehicle, from municipal streets. Hight, December 6, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0806.

Cross References —

Power of governing authorities of municipalities to exercise full jurisdiction in matter of streets and sidewalks, see §21-37-3.

Power of county board of supervisors to prescribe kind of wheels which may be used on vehicles on county public roads, see §65-7-37.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence and witnesses.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. In general.

It is within the power and jurisdiction of a municipality to prescribe, within reason, the manner, the place at which and the time within which an automobile may be parked upon any street in the municipality, including those streets which are part of a state highway. Ellisville v. State Highway Com., 186 Miss. 473, 191 So. 274, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 1939).

This section [Code 1942, § 8151] does not authorize a municipality to establish an automobile testing station and engage in the business of testing automobiles, and consequently a municipality had no authority to contract for the purchase of equipment for such purpose. Davenport v. Blackmur, 184 Miss. 836, 186 So. 321, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1939).

2. Evidence and witnesses.

In a suit for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was struck by an automobile, the court properly refused to permit a police officer to testify as to what was permissible to be done under a city traffic ordinance with reference to a left turn from the highway into the parking area of a restaurant. Briscoe v. Jones, 233 So. 2d 125, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1651 (Miss. 1970).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Under an earlier statute, not wholly parallel, it was held that where a city had regulated traffic within its limits, state regulation of eight miles an hour in passing pedestrians was inapplicable. Meridian Coca-Cola Co. v. Watson, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1931).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A private contractor hired by a municipality to operate public parking may not issue traffic tickets or citations. A city could authorize the contractor to immobilize or tow illegally parked vehicles if requested by law enforcement. Kohnke, May 27, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0186.

Community college police have the powers of a constable pursuant to Miss Code Ann. §37-29-275 and are authorized to enforce state laws within their jurisdiction, but do not have authority to enforce municipal or campus ordinances on municipal streets that run through the campus. Campus police officers may assist in the enforcement of municipal parking ordinances on municipal streets by notifying municipal authorities when violations occur. A determination of the validity of “campus tickets” may only be made by a court of competent jurisdiction. Graham, March 16, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00138, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 102.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Public regulation and prohibition of sound amplifiers or loudspeaker broadcasts in streets and other public places. 10 A.L.R.2d 627.

Right of municipality or public to use of subsurface of street or highway for purposes other than sewers, pipes, conduits for wires, and the like. 11 A.L.R.2d 180.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 2002, ch. 491, was House Bill 1551, 2002 Regular Session, and originally passed the House of Representatives on January 31, 2002, and the Senate on March 7, 2002. The Governor vetoed House Bill 1551 on March 22, 2002. The veto was overridden by both the House of Representatives and the Senate on March 27, 2002.

Cross References —

Power of governing authorities of municipalities to exercise full jurisdiction in matter of streets and sidewalks, see §21-37-3.

Enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities, see §63-3-211.

Cross References —

Duty of railroads to erect and maintain warning signboards at intersections of tracks and public roads or streets, see §77-9-247.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Department not immune.

Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) was not immune in a wrongful death claim alleging that a failure to place warning signs around a highway culvert, as required by Miss. Code Ann. §65-21-1, resulted in an auto accident that caused the decedent’s death because §65-21-1 imposed a ministerial duty, and, as Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-301 and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 included no language suggesting abrogation or repeal of § 65-21-1, that section-narrowly, precisely, and specifically requiring warning posts around culverts-remained in effect as an exception to the general rule of §63-3-303 that the MDOT had discretion over such placement; Miss. Code Ann. § 65-21-1 controlled the specific issue of guide and warning posts around culverts, and § 63-3-303 controlled the discretionary placement of traffic devices that were not the subject of a specific statutory mandate. Miss. DOT v. Nosef, 110 So.3d 317, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Highways: governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Cross References —

Definitions of traffic signals, see §63-3-133.

Erection of highway signs or guide boards on public highways, see §§65-7-13 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Railroads.

1. In general.

Decisions by the Mississippi Transportation Commission regarding placement of traffic control devices were discretionary for purposes of immunity given Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303’s assignment of authority and the economic, political, or social concerns associated with installing warning lights or signs at intersections. Smith v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 292 So.3d 231, 2020 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 2020).

Placement and maintenance of traffic-control devices is discretionary, unless narrower duties encompassed in that function, such as placing and maintaining edge lines, have been rendered ministerial through statute or regulation. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams, 197 So.3d 406, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2016).

Trial court did not err in finding that the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) and the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) were not entitled to discretionary-function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act because a widow produced evidence that MTC and MDOT breached specific ministerial duties imposed by their duly adopted regulations. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams, 197 So.3d 406, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2016).

Notwithstanding Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303, the act giving rise to the injuries in this case was not the placement or maintenance of a traffic-control device – but rather a Department of Transportation (DOT) employee’s alleged negligent operation of a pickup truck; because the employee did not fall within the exceptions to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-205, and his duty to adhere to applicable traffic regulations was not discretionary, the circuit court erred in finding the DOT immune under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d). Mixon v. Miss. DOT, 183 So.3d 90, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 181 So.3d 1010, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 2016).

Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) was not immune in a wrongful death claim alleging that a failure to place warning signs around a highway culvert, as required by Miss. Code Ann. §65-21-1, resulted in an auto accident that caused the decedent’s death because §65-21-1 imposed a ministerial duty, and, as Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-301 and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 included no language suggesting abrogation or repeal of § 65-21-1, that section-narrowly, precisely, and specifically requiring warning posts around culverts-remained in effect as an exception to the general rule of §63-3-303 that the MDOT had discretion over such placement; Miss. Code Ann. § 65-21-1 controlled the specific issue of guide and warning posts around culverts, and § 63-3-303 controlled the discretionary placement of traffic devices that were not the subject of a specific statutory mandate. Miss. DOT v. Nosef, 110 So.3d 317, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 2013).

Because Miss. Code Ann. §65-1-65 and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 do not impose any specific directives as to the time, manner, and conditions for carrying out the Mississippi Transportation Commission’s duty in maintaining highways or posting traffic-control or warning devices, those duties are not ministerial in nature but are discretionary. Further, the duty to maintain highways and place warning signs clearly requires the Mississippi Transportation Commission to consider the policy considerations of doing so. Knight v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 10 So.3d 962, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), overruled, Little v. Miss. DOT, 129 So.3d 132, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 551 (Miss. 2013).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) in appellants’ action for injuries and death resulting from a two-vehicle collision because the MTC’s duty to place warning signs was discretionary under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303; hence, the MTC’s failure to place warning signs was shielded from liability according to Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d). Willingham v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 944 So. 2d 949, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 916 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Clear meaning of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 is to create a statutory duty that must be carried out in a discretionary matter. Willingham v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 944 So. 2d 949, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 916 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Under this section, the placement of traffic control signs or devices is dependent upon the discretion of the responsible entity. Jones v. Mississippi DOT, 744 So. 2d 256, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1999).

2. Railroads.

Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 (Rev. 2013) allowed the Mississippi Department of Transportation, in its discretion, to determine the appropriate type, number, and location of traffic-control devices, making it immune from liability for a claim of failure to erect or maintain appropriate and reasonable signs, signals, warning devices, illumination devices, or guardrails and/or barriers despite actual or constructive notice of the absence and/or inadequate condition of the existing devices under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d) (Rev. 2012). Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Jobes, 156 So.3d 871, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 2015).

In an action arising from a collision between a train and a car that was allegedly caused, in part, by a lack of active protection at a crossing and vegetation that obstructed the view of the operator of the car, the court rejected the railroad’s contention that §§63-3-303 and63-3-305 removed any and all responsibility from its shoulders and transferred the duty to the Mississippi Department of Transportation, as §§77-9-245,77-9-247,77-9-248,77-9-251, and77-9-253 all clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of public safety. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S. Ct. 43, 151 L. Ed. 2d 15, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5524 (U.S. 2001).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the intersection of a county road and a state highway, under this section, the state is responsible for erecting and maintaining traffic control devices unless the county receives state permission to do the same. Austin, July 26, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0453.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Burden of proof.

3. Jury instructions.

4. Railroads.

5. Liability under statute.

1. In general.

Under this section, the placement of traffic control signs or devices is dependent upon the discretion of the responsible entity. Jones v. Mississippi DOT, 744 So. 2d 256, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1999).

In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when his vehicle collided with a gravel pile built on a road as a barrier to an out-of-service bridge on the road, it was error for the court to prevent the plaintiff from introducing the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as proof of the applicable standard of care concerning the placement of warning signs and barricades on public roads where the defendant county did not dispute that such manual is the system approved by the American Association of State Highway Officials. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So. 2d 774, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1998).

In cases involving injuries arising out of vehicular traffic on municipal streets or county roads where special municipal or county speed restrictions have been placed in effect, the party expecting to rely upon a violation of such restrictions should plead the existence of the special speed limit established by local authority, and its violation. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

2. Burden of proof.

If the existence of a special county or municipal speed restriction is alleged and denied, or if its legality is put in issue by a responsive pleading, proof should then be required, the burden resting upon the party having the affirmative, as in other cases of disputed fact; but where the existence of the speed zone and rate of speed are properly alleged and not denied, proof that speed signs were in fact posted is sufficient to create a presumption that they reflect appropriate action by competent authority in restricting speeds. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

3. Jury instructions.

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that a driver was required to reduce his speed as he approached a special hazard as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-505, because the instructions as a whole adequately instructed the jury as to the duties of the driver and §63-3-505 did not tie into the facts of the case as the driver struck the individual when passing the individual and the individual began to make a left-hand turn. Good v. Indreland, 910 So. 2d 688, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 176 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

4. Railroads.

In an action arising from a collision between a train and a car that was allegedly caused, in part, by a lack of active protection at a crossing and vegetation that obstructed the view of the operator of the car, the court rejected the railroad’s contention that §§63-3-303 and63-3-305 removed any and all responsibility from its shoulders and transferred the duty to the Mississippi Department of Transportation, as §§77-9-245,77-9-247,77-9-248,77-9-251, and77-9-253 all clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of public safety. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S. Ct. 43, 151 L. Ed. 2d 15, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5524 (U.S. 2001).

5. Liability under statute.

Circuit court erred in granting the motions filed by a county board of supervisors and a city to dismiss a driver’s personal injury action based on discretionary-function immunity because the driver alleged a simple act of negligence, where the allegedly tortious act was a construction crew’s alleged failure to barricade or warn against the significant drop-off in the road—a condition it created—and not the result of statutory noncompliance or the result of a policy decision. Wilcher v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So.3d 177, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 229 (Miss. 2018).

While Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-305 contains the term “shall”, it also contains the phrase, “as they may deem necessary”, which, as state legal precedent suggests, means that a local authority’s placement of traffic control devices is a discretionary duty. Because the placement of traffic control devices, including road construction signs, is a discretionary duty, Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d) applies, and a county cannot be liable with regard to the placement of such signs, regardless of whether or not it abused its discretion in doing so. Dozier v. Hinds County, 379 F. Supp. 2d 834, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15666 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Mississippi county was fraudulently joined in a suit, arising out of a fatal car accident because: (1) the county did not have any legal responsibility with regard to the posting of a stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred, (2) Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-305 granted discretionary authority to the county to place and maintain traffic control devices upon highways within the county, (3) under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d), the county could not be held liable for its exercise of discretionary power under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-305, even if an abuse of discretion was shown, and (4) although there was precedent under Mississippi law to hold municipalities liable, either under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(b) or (1)(w), for failing to warn about known dangerous conditions on roads, no reasonable factfinder would find that the motorist who caused the accident was not adequately warned about the approaching intersection. Dozier v. Hinds County, 379 F. Supp. 2d 834, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15666 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Counties are responsible for the installation and maintenance of necessary warning signs and pavement markings at rail crossings on roads under their jurisdiction subject to approval by the State Highway Commission. Fortier, Mar. 29, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0109.

The mandate to maintain pavement markings and advance warning signs at public railroad crossing intersections on roads under local jurisdiction carries with it the responsibility to pay for this continued maintenance. Brown, Apr. 4, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0769.

A local jurisdiction, in the exercise of its sound discretion, is responsible for paying for the materials and the installation of pavement markings and advance warning signs at public railroad crossing intersections on roads under local jurisdiction; both the materials and the installation of same are subject to approval by the Department of Transportation. Brown, Apr. 4, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0769.

If the public roadway/railroad crossing involves roads which are under different jurisdictions, the funding responsibilities should be allocated proportionately among the respective jurisdictions. Brown, Apr. 4, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0769.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way. 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Liability of municipality for failure to erect traffic warnings against entering or using street partially barred or obstructed by construction or improvement work. 52 A.L.R.2d 689.

Highways: governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A driver turning left at a T-intersection onto a one-way street must signal his intention to turn for a reasonable distance. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

Where a solid white line marks a turn lane, a driver in such lane must signal his intention to turn for a reasonable distance as determined by all the facts and circumstances then present. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

Where a driver is in a turn lane controlled by a green arrow or is approaching a T-intersection from a two-way street that intersects with a one-way street, where there is no option other than turning left, the driver must signal his intention to turn for a reasonable distance. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

A driver is allowed to make a lane change if the movement can be made with reasonable safety and the driver gives a signal if any other vehicle may be affected by such movement. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

3. Jury issues.

1. In general.

One who had turned left at an intersection while the traffic signal was red, pursuant to a green arrow signal, and who had traversed almost the entire distance of the intersection before another car, when the signal turned from red to green, had entered the intersection, is not required to yield the right of way. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So. 2d 674, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1963).

2. Jury instructions.

A party is not entitled to an instruction that one should yield to the car first entering an intersection where the statute requires stopping before entering the intersection in response to a red signal light, and Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. Gates v. Green, 214 So. 2d 828, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1337 (Miss. 1968).

3. Jury issues.

In tort action stemming from motor vehicle accident where both automobiles collided while going through yellow traffic signal following green signal, question whether party accused of negligence had right to and did cautiously proceed through yellow signal under circumstances at issue was question to be decided by jury, and directed verdict favoring defendant was inappropriate. Collins v. Ringwald, 502 So. 2d 677, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2319 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and Application of Statutory Provision Requiring Motorists to Yield Right-of-Way to Emergency Vehicle. 87 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 238.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 794-801.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 891-893, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 161-163.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 835-841.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1756.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Where a motorist approaching an intersection with the signal lights flashing red in her direction, failed to stop before entering therein, the court properly submitted to the jury the issue as to whether such negligence was a sole cause of the collision. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1958).

2. Jury instructions.

In an action for damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s motorcycle and defendant’s automobile in an intersection with a flashing red light and stop sign facing plaintiff and a flashing yellow light and warning sign facing defendant, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff’s standard of care instruction which included the language, “the defendant had no lawful right to go forward. . . under the assumption that it would be open and clear,” where a granted instruction detailed the crucial point that the yellow light facing defendant demanded caution, and that a finding of negligence would flow from her failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff if, as he claimed, he had lawfully entered the intersection and stalled unexpectedly. The trial court also properly refused to grant an instruction which stated in part, “the driver of a motor vehicle has a lawful duty to decrease his speed upon approaching an intersection,” since §63-3-311(2) merely states that a driver “may proceed. . . only with caution” and caution is a relative concept not necessarily entailing decrease in speed since the current speed may already be a cautious speed. Allen v. Blanks, 384 So. 2d 63, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2000 (Miss. 1980).

Where a motorist had approached an intersection with the signal light flashing red in her direction, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, she was not entitled to an instruction under Code 1942, § 8195, providing that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 238.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 800, 801.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 165.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 894, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1756.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §63-3-313 as he did not obey an official traffic-control device. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

Trial court erred in its ruling related to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-313 and in refusing to give a jury instruction based on this statute, but the error was harmless because the weight of the evidence was against the driver who requested the instruction in a personal injury trial that arose out of a car accident. Etheridge v. Harold Case & Co., 960 So. 2d 474, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 623 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way. 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 794 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 171.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1342-1524, 1531-2060.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 838.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Deputy, who stopped at an intersection and, with his blue lights and sirens activated, slowly proceeded across in a stop-and-start fashion, exercised sufficient safety measures to prompt other drivers near the intersection to yield the right-of-way, including the driver traveling in the lane ahead of plaintiffs. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the deputy’s conduct did not demonstrate a conscious indifference to consequences, nor did it rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of persons not engaged in criminal activity, so as subject the county to liability under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c). Rayner v. Pennington, 25 So.3d 305, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 12 (Miss. 2010).

Evidence showed the officer was traveling approximately 37 miles per hour with lights and sirens activated, there was nothing obstructing the view of either the person later injured or the officer, and the greater weight of evidence also proved that the person’s left turn signal was not activated. In addition, the officer had consciously stopped at the previous two intersections because the officer considered both of those to be blind intersections, and therefore, the officer’s behavior supported the finding that the officer appreciated the risk involved in approaching the intersection and did not act with reckless disregard. Davis v. Latch, 873 So. 2d 1059, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 445 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, a driver who had a green light was not negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to an emergency police vehicle pursuant to §63-3-809 because the driver of an emergency vehicle has a duty under §63-3-315 to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching a red traffic light controlling an intersection. Andrews v. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 537 So. 2d 447, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk. 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like. 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures. 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway. 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of private person negligently causing malfunctioning, removal, or extinguishment of traffic signal or sign for subsequent motor vehicle accident. 64 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Automobiles: sudden emergency as exception to rule requiring motorist to maintain ability to stop within assured clear distance ahead. 75 A.L.R.3d 327.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty of highway construction contract or to provide temporary way or detour around obstruction. 29 A.L.R.2d 876.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation.

Cross References —

Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see §63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment substituted “imprisonment for not less than five (5) nor more than twenty (20) years” for “imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years” in (4).

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Indictment — held sufficient.

2. Double jeopardy.

3. Illustrative cases.

1. Indictment — held sufficient.

That an indictment charging appellant with aggravated assault and leaving the scene of the accident did not state the location of the incident and whether the victims were pedestrians did not entitle him to post-conviction collateral relief, because he demonstrated no uncertainty as to these facts during his testimony at his sentencing hearing, and he waived any non-jurisdictional defects in the indictment when he pled guilty. Fox v. State, 129 So.3d 208, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 223 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 131 So.3d 577, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 2014).

Indictment charging appellant with leaving the scene of the accident was sufficient and not vague; as it included the phrase “wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,” it was apparent that he was charged under the felony, not the misdemeanor, portion of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-401. Fox v. State, 129 So.3d 208, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 223 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 131 So.3d 577, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 2014).

Denial of petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief was proper where his indictment was not defective because the indictment clearly charged an offense cognizable under the laws of Mississippi; it tracked the language in Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-401 and was therefore sufficient. Holifield v. State, 852 So. 2d 653, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 67 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 847 So. 2d 866, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 902 (Miss. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 957, 124 S. Ct. 409, 157 L. Ed. 2d 294, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7587 (U.S. 2003).

2. Double jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated because the drunk-driving statute established separate crimes for each of the victims identified and the offense of leaving the scene of an accident contained different elements from the offenses established by the drunk-driving statute. Buckner v. State, 135 So.3d 915, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 682 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 136 So.3d 437, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 2014).

3. Illustrative cases.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior driving under the influence conviction; the trial court found the evidence was clearly probative as to defendant’s motive for leaving the scene of the accident, and any potential prejudice was outweighed by its enormous amount of probative value. Manyfield v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 319 (Miss. Ct. App. May 26, 2020).

Jury could have found that defendant was the driver of the truck when it caused the accident that killed the victim and that defendant left the scene, and thus the evidence supported his convictions; his parents loaned him the truck, his books were found inside, before the accident he was seen at a bar, he had a motive to leave the scene given his recent conviction of driving under the influence and his license suspension, and his DNA also matched the DNA on the truck’s driver’s side airbag. Manyfield v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 319 (Miss. Ct. App. May 26, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for attempting to leave the scene of an accident that resulted in an injury because defendant tried to open the door to a car and get in the car after wrecking a car which defendant had taken in a carjacking. The jury was free to infer that defendant did so with the intent to steal the car and then flee the scene of an auto accident in which another motorist was severely injured, but was frustrated by a locked car door or defendant’s own physical condition, not a voluntary abandonment of purpose. Moffett v. State, 287 So.3d 975, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 549 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

Defendant, an off-duty police officer, was properly convicted of felony leaving the scene of an accident because, while it was later determined that he was not at fault for a fatal accident with a pedestrian, returned to the scene, and admitted to hitting the pedestrian, more than one witness testified to seeing him leave the scene of the accident for as long as 15 minutes. Snyder v. State, 204 So.3d 859, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 261 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 205 So.3d 1085, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the felony of leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in injury or death because, although defendant stated that he assumed that he possibly hit a bird, the jury heard testimony from three witnesses that the victim’s bicycle was equipped with a blinking strobe light and an orange medical flag, which sat atop a five-foot-high plastic pole; defendant’s collision with the victim not only damaged the right fender of defendant’s truck but also broke his passenger-side mirror and tore off the accompanying mirror cover; and defendant called his girlfriend and asked her to call the hospital to see whether any reports had come in regarding someone struck by a vehicle. Brown v. State, 169 So.3d 897, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 85 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.2d 564.

Criminal responsibility of one other than driver at time of accident, under “hit-and-run” statute. 62 A.L.R.2d 1130.

Applicability of criminal “hit-and-run” statute to accidents occurring on private property. 77 A.L.R.2d 1171.

Instructions on sudden emergency in motor vehicle cases. 80 A.L.R.2d 5.

Violation of statute requiring one involved in accident to stop and render aid as affecting civil liability. 80 A.L.R.2d 299.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 287, Identification of Hit-and-Run Vehicle and Driver.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 287, Identification of Hit-and-Run Vehicle and Driver.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 887, December, 1979.

Cross References —

“Good Samaritan” statute, see §73-25-37.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Application.

3. Construction.

4. Procedural matters.

1. In general.

A state “hit and run” statute, requiring the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property to stop at the scene and give his name and address, does not violate the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 128 (U.S. 1971).

2. Application.

This section [Code 1942, § 8163], which makes it mandatory for the driver of a vehicle to stop such vehicle at the scene of accident and render reasonable assistance to the person injured, is not limited in its application to persons who have contributed to the accident in the sense that such persons must be shown to have been at fault or to have been guilty of negligence, which was a contributing approximate cause of the accident. Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 1951).

3. Construction.

The duty to “render assistance” to persons injured in the first accident did not relieve the defendant, whose negligence caused the first accident, of the duty of removing or attempting to remove his disabled vehicle from the highway where his vehicle was struck by a second vehicle. Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1496 (Miss. 1971).

One of the main purposes of this section [Code 1942, § 8163] is to enable the persons injured and the officers investigating the accident to determine who is at fault, and to compel the driver of the car involved in the accident to render humanitarian assistance to the persons injured, whether he was guilty of negligence in the operation of his vehicle at the time of the accident or not. Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 1951).

4. Procedural matters.

Since no question of negligence is involved in the failure to comply with this section [Code 1942, § 8163], the trial court properly refused to instruct that the fact that the defendant left the scene of the motor vehicle accident was a strong presumption that he was guilty of negligence by failing to stay at the scene of the accident and rendering first aid to the plaintiff and assisting in calling an ambulance and discharging other duties owed to the plaintiff. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1957).

An indictment under this section [Code 1942, § 8163] was not defective where it did not show the highway on which the accident occurred, or described the scene of accident or show the extent of injuries of the persons involved in the accident. Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of compliance with requirement of criminal “hit and run” statute that motorist identify himself. 48 A.L.R.3d 685.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property. 73 A.L.R.4th 737.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment deleted former (2) which read: “The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an apparent extent of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or more shall forward within ten (10) days after such accident, a written report of such accident to the department” and redesignated former (3) through (6) as present (2) through (5).

Cross References —

Accident report required to be furnished sheriff following boating accident or collision, see §§59-21-51,59-21-53.

Use of statewide uniform traffic accident report forms, see §63-3-415.

Confidentiality of accident reports, see §63-3-417.

Accident report required to be furnished public service commission by proper officer of motor carrier, see §77-7-181.

Accident report required to be furnished public service commission following railway accident, see §77-9-431.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A separate investigative report prepared by an officer on a form other than that required by Section 63-3-411 and Section 63-3-415 would be considered a supplemental report as referenced by section 63-3-417, and would be subject to the confidentiality requirements contained therein. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.2d 564.

Admissibility of police officer’s testimony at state trial relating to motorist’s admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law. 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 38.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), deleted “without cost to other agencies” following “shall prepare and furnish,” inserted “other agencies” preceding “municipal police departments,” and added the last two sentences; and inserted “traffic” preceding “accident” in (4).

Cross References —

Witnesses to accident to furnish phone numbers in order to assist investigation by law enforcement officers, see §63-3-411.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Traffic accident reports prepared by law enforcement agencies are subject to the confidentiality requirements of Section 63-3-417 and they are not available to the general public pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

A separate investigative report prepared by an officer on a form other than that required by Section 63-3-411 and Section 63-3-415 would be considered a supplemental report as referenced by section 63-3-417, and would be subject to the confidentiality requirements contained therein. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 313, Laws of 2005, effective from and after July 1, 2005 (approved March 10, 2005), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 314, Laws of 2005, effective July 1, 2005 (approved March 10, 2005), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 314, Laws of 2005, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 13-1-124, referred to in subsection (2), was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.

Amendment Notes —

The first 2005 amendment (ch. 313) rewrote the former first sentence of (1); and added (3).

The second 2005 amendment (ch. 314) inserted “except as otherwise provided in this section” following “individual so reporting and” near the beginning of the first sentence of (1); inserted (2); and renumbered former (2) as present (3).

The 2007 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), inserted “the spouse or next of kin of any such person, or any person against whom a claim is made as a result of the accident” and deleted “his surviving spouse or one or more of his surviving next of kin” preceding “disclose to such requester”; and added (4).

Cross References —

Similar provision regarding use of accident report required by the motor vehicle safety-responsibility law as evidence of uninsured status, see §63-15-23.

Action against owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, see §83-11-105.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Reports by law enforcement.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] applies only to reports required to be filed by parties involved in accidents. Boyd v. Donald, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1964).

2. Reports by law enforcement.

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] does not require the police officer investigating an accident to make a report. Boyd v. Donald, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1964).

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] did not preclude the admission of a report prepared by highway patrolman who had investigated the accident for the purpose of impeaching the officer’s testimony. Boyd v. Donald, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1964).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Accident report or portions of it written by persons involved giving their version of facts are private and are not to be released under our law, including copies in possession of police department; however, police officer’s investigative report, including officer’s report or oral statements of persons involved, is not prohibited from release. Twiford, July 22, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0496.

Municipalities and police departments may adopt reasonable procedures, including release forms, to verify that persons requesting accident report information are eligible, under statute, to receive it. Long, March 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0092.

Traffic accident reports prepared by law enforcement agencies are subject to the confidentiality requirements of Section 63-3-417 and they are not available to the general public pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

A separate investigative report prepared by an officer on a form other than that required by Section 63-3-411 and Section 63-3-415 would be considered a supplemental report as referenced by section 63-3-417, and would be subject to the confidentiality requirements contained therein. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records. 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

Admissibility of police officer’s testimony at state trial relating to motorist’s admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law. 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Cross References —

Mississippi Medical Examiner Act of 1986, see §§41-61-51 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records. 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment (ch. 2, 1st Ex Sess) substituted “Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person” for “No person” at the beginning of the first paragraph; and added the third paragraph.

Cross References —

Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see §65-1-8.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Duty of motorists.

3. Presumption of negligence.

4. Liability.

5. Proximate cause.

6. Comparative negligence.

7. Manslaughter.

8. Evidence.

9. Questions for jury.

10. Instructions.

11. Verdict.

12. Miscellaneous.

13.-20. [Reserved for future use.]

21. Under former law.

1. In general.

The law fixing a permissible speed presupposes a compliance with the duty to keep the car under control and be on the alert for objects on the highway. Robertson v. Welch, 242 Miss. 110, 134 So. 2d 491, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 536 (Miss. 1961).

A motorist about to turn left in front of an approaching car may assume that such car is not exceeding a lawful speed, only until he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the speed is such that the turn cannot be safely made. Cothern v. Brewer, 234 Miss. 676, 107 So. 2d 361, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 538 (Miss. 1958).

This section [Code 1942, § 8176] makes the prohibited speed prima facie evidence of guilt, but does not exclude any valid defense. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Maximum speed allowed is such rate of speed as is reasonable and proper having due regard to the traffic or use of the highway, or such as will not endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

2. Duty of motorists.

The presence of an intersection with which the motorist was fully familiar heightened his duty to exercise reasonable care in operating his car at such speed as would permit him to take the necessary steps to avoid colliding with a pedestrian using the road, and within his length of vision ahead as provided by his headlights. Parkins v. Brown, 241 F.2d 367, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

“Control” of vehicles within statute requiring control of vehicles at all times means that driver shall have ability to stop readily and easily. Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1932).

Motorist must drive at rate of speed enabling him to avoid injury to persons who should come under his observation. Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1930).

Driver must keep automobile under control and be on alert for pedestrians. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

Automobile driver must keep his machine constantly under control and be on the alert for and anticipate the presence of pedestrians and others using the streets. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

3. Presumption of negligence.

In an action arising out of intersection motor vehicle collision, the court’s instruction that if the driver of a truck which was not a “pick-up” truck, was violating the law in driving the truck at a speed of more than 45 miles per hour, such fact did not raise any presumptions of negligence on the part of the driver, was error in view of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream & Creamery Co., 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1957).

Motorist approaching and entering intersection at unabated speed of approximately 30 miles per hour is prima facie negligent. Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

Statutory presumption of negligence on part of party shown to have violated motor vehicle law disappears when all facts and circumstances on issue of liability are in evidence. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

One driving automobile at more than ten miles an hour at night without lights was prima facie negligent. McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 365 (Miss. 1933), overruled, Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1988).

Prima facie case of negligence arising from violation of statute governing speed of automobile is rebuttable. Rhodes v. Fullilove, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 840, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1931).

Automobile driver, killing mule while driving at excessive speed, was prima facie negligent. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

4. Liability.

Driving an automobile on a highway under the influence of intoxicants, or at a high and unlawful rate of speed, is not only dangerous but is negligence per se, and if such negligence contributes to an injury the defendant is liable in damages. Freeze v. Taylor, 257 So. 2d 509, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1459 (Miss. 1972).

Motorist prevented by bright lights of truck standing on highway from seeing beyond such lights, held negligent in failing to reduce speed and to proceed with caution, rendering him liable for striking person standing on highway. Kettle v. Musser's Potato Chips, Inc., 249 Miss. 212, 162 So. 2d 243, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1964).

Motorist failing to slow down on being blinded by lights of approaching car held liable for death of pedestrian struck while walking on side of road. Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 293 (Miss. 1964).

Motorist who, while traveling at unlawful rate of speed, struck pedestrian after seeing him on highway, held liable for injuries to pedestrian, even though pedestrian was contributorily negligent, since damages recoverable would be reduced in proportion to pedestrian’s negligence. Hadad v. Lockeby, 176 Miss. 660, 169 So. 691, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1936).

Presence of ditched car on right-hand side of road and another automobile backed near it to render aid, held not independent intervening cause of passenger’s injury when bus, claimed to have been operated at excessive speed and without proper lookout on approaching curve, ran into ditch to avoid collision. Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1935).

Employer held liable for wilful and wanton acts resulting in injury to boy whom driver of truck had invited to ride thereon. Trico Coffee Co. v. Clemens, 168 Miss. 748, 151 So. 175, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1933).

Motorist exceeding legal speed limit, and as a result inflicting injury on another, is liable therefor. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Bateman, 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1932), overruled in part, Twin County Elec. Power Ass'n v. McKenzie, 823 So. 2d 464, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 2002).

Driving automobile at night at speed not permitting driver to avoid injury to persons coming within range of lights is negligence. Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1930).

Pedestrian’s negligence does not relieve automobile driver from exercising reasonable care. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

Pedestrian’s recovery for injuries by automobile should be reduced in proportion to negligence in crossing street. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

Driving automobile at dangerous rate of speed upon a populous and frequently used street is negligence per se. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

5. Proximate cause.

Presence of ditched car on right-hand side of road and another automobile backed near it to render aid, held not independent intervening cause of passenger’s injury when bus, claimed to have been operated at excessive speed and without proper lookout on approaching curve, ran into ditch to avoid collision. Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1935).

Court may, notwithstanding all facts regarding automobile collision are in evidence, instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by defendant is negligence and entitles plaintiff to recover where it is proximate cause of injury, or that violation of statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff’s recovery. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

Bus company was liable for injury to automobile occupant if proximately caused by gravel thrown by bus because of its reckless negligence and excessive speed. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Bateman, 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1932), overruled in part, Twin County Elec. Power Ass'n v. McKenzie, 823 So. 2d 464, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 2002).

Undisputed testimony held to establish that automobile driver’s violation of state statute regulating speed, constituting negligence, was proximate cause of collision. Terry v. Smylie, 161 Miss. 31, 133 So. 662, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1931).

Unlawful speed of automobile must be proximate contributing cause of injury to make unlawful speed an element of liability. Pounders v. Day, 151 Miss. 436, 118 So. 298, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 324 (Miss. 1928); Rowlands v. Morphis, 158 Miss. 662, 130 So. 906, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1930).

6. Comparative negligence.

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff’s coal truck struck defendant’s pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. Cobb v. Williams, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1956).

Where defendant’s driver was grossly negligent in entering intersection at 50 miles per hour without stopping as required by Code 1942, § 8213, and collided with plaintiff’s driver who, in entering the intersection on a through street at unabated speed of 30 miles per hour, was prima facie negligent under this section [Code 1942, § 8176], the negligence of plaintiff’s driver was a contributing factor to the accident and warranted application of the comparative negligence statute (Code 1942, § 1454). Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

7. Manslaughter.

Motorist exceeding speed fixed by law fails to exercise legal measure of due care prescribed by state, and speed so much above legal rate as to leave no doubt that excess was intentional and wilful constitutes culpable want of due care as respects injuries proximately resulting therefrom, so that homicide proximately caused by such wilfully excessive speed is manslaughter. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1935).

Motorists’ habitual violation of statute, limiting speed in closely built-up territory to twenty miles an hour, and disregard of pedestrians’ rights by many motorists, furnish no excuse for courts to refuse to enforce law or depart therefrom in case wherein facts justify conviction of motorist for manslaughter in causing pedestrian’s death by wilful violation of speed law. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1935).

8. Evidence.

Where the speed of a vehicle is a factor in determining the proximate cause of a collision, evidence as to speed should be limited to the time of, or immediately before, the collision, and the court should exclude, evidence of speed prior to and remote from the collision in question; but evidence of prior speed may be admitted if the evidence shows that the vehicle continued to be operated at approximately the same speed until collision occurs, or where the circumstances are such that prior speed has substantial evidential values as to the speed of the vehicle at the time of, or immediately before, the collision. Barrett v. Shirley, 231 Miss. 364, 95 So. 2d 471, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 521 (Miss. 1957).

Error in personal injury case in admitting evidence of a municipal speed ordinance because it was not pleaded in the declaration could not be complained of where the pertinent provision of the ordinance as to the applicable speed limit was identical with that of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] and it was alleged in the declaration that defendant was running at a reckless speed in violation of the law. Howell v. George, 201 Miss. 783, 30 So. 2d 603, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1947).

Defendant could not complain of conviction for violating city ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] on ground that the summons or notice to appear and defend contained no specification of speed at which defendant was charged to have driven, where defendant appeared and defended without making such point in the trial court. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Evidence that defendant was driving at greater speed than that prescribed by this section [Code 1942, § 8176], or by city ordinance adopting provisions thereof, establishes defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, where defendant fails to offer any evidence in justification thereof. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

In an action by an automobile owner to recover for personal injuries sustained by him when he attempted to avoid an anticipated collision with the defendant’s truck which was entering the intersection from a side road, evidence of the physical condition at the scene of the accident and that the truck stopped either before entering the paved part of the intersection or when it reached the center thereof, disproved any contention that the truck was driving at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable and proper when it approached the intersection in question or that the driver in any manner violated the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Hand, 186 Miss. 893, 191 So. 674, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. 1939).

Evidence as to bus driver’s violation of speed statute and sharp curve statute and of failure to keep proper lookout held sufficient to make issue for jury of driver’s negligence in action for passenger’s injuries when bus ran into ditch as result of driver’s effort to avoid striking automobile on side of road. Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1935).

Evidence of motorists’ wilful and intentional operation of automobile at speed grossly exceeding statutory limit across pedestrians’ path alongside railroad track at street crossing and death of pedestrian as proximate or concurrently proximate result of such law violation held to sustain conviction of manslaughter. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1935).

Privilege tax statute defining trucks as motor vehicles used in business of transporting property not applying to statute restricting speed of trucks to thirty miles per hour, plaintiff in personal injury action held not required to show that defendant’s automobile exceeding speed limit for trucks was engaged in business of transporting property. Pollard v. Stansell, 169 Miss. 136, 152 So. 646, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1934).

In prosecution against automobile driver for failure to reasonably turn to right, evidence showing defendant exceeded speed limit was inadmissible. Naylor v. State, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1930).

Under evidence jury could not find defendant motorist’s negligent speed did not contribute to injury of plaintiff struck when replacing tools in automobile on highway at night. Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1930).

9. Questions for jury.

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant’s driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

In an action for the death of eight-year-old child killed when struck by a large diesel trailer truck, not equipped with service brakes, it was for the jury to determine whether the truck driver was negligent in driving at a speed in excess of 45 miles an hour, in failing to maintain a proper lookout for persons on the highway, and failing to observe the movements of a child crossing the highway in time to avoid injuring her; in failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle after he saw, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have seen the child on the highway, and whether the driver’s negligence, if any, was the approximate or contributing cause of the death of the child. Reed v. Eubanks, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1957).

In an action by occupant of a truck against driver to recover for injuries sustained when the truck went off highway on curve, where evidence was conflicting to some extent, there was no prejudicial error in submitting issue of negligence for determination of jury. Shearron v. Shearron, 219 Miss. 27, 68 So. 2d 71, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 369 (Miss. 1953), modified, 219 Miss. 27, 69 So. 2d 801, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1954).

Whether bus driver could have reasonably foreseen possibility of injury, held for jury. Wheat v. Teche Lines, Inc., 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1938).

Under evidence, question whether bus driver was traveling at reasonable rate of speed, and whether bus was in such close proximity to plaintiff as to endanger life or limb, held for jury. Wheat v. Teche Lines, Inc., 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1938).

Automobile chauffeur’s negligence in permitting owner’s son to drive automobile while intoxicated, resulting in injury to child, held for jury. Slaughter v. Holsomback, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1933).

Whether motorist in rear had automobile under control and whether truck driver ahead, stopping on bridge, exercised ordinary care at and immediately before collision held for jury. Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1932).

Whether excessive speed of truck, or plaintiff’s act in placing himself at rear of stalled automobile, was proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, held for jury under evidence. Rhodes v. Fullilove, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 840, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1931).

Whether automobile driver was exceeding fifteen miles per hour at time of striking mule held for jury. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

Negligence in driving automobile fifteen miles per hour at time of striking pedestrian crossing the street held for jury. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

10. Instructions.

In a suit for the death of a child pedestrian struck by an automobile, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by reason of the driver’s alleged failure to decrease the speed of his automobile as he approached the intersection, where the evidence as to the automobile’s speed was in conflict. Young v. Schwarz, 230 So. 2d 583, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1560 (Miss. 1970).

The admission of a defendant motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to reduce her speed on approaching the intersection would only entitle the plaintiff to an instruction that the defendant’s failure to reduce her speed was negligence and that if such negligence caused or contributed to the accident then he was entitled to a verdict against her. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

Where there was evidence that defendant’s truck was traveling at about 60 miles an hour as it approached and entered the intersection, the lower court properly instructed the jury that if the truck was being operated at a greater rate of speed than 50 miles per hour immediately before the collision such speed would constitute negligence, and if such negligence proximately contributed to the collision then the verdict should be for the plaintiffs. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of the plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit, instructions, which when read together, focused the attention of the jury on the real issue of whether the plaintiff’s truck was overtaken from behind, run into and damaged by the negligence of the defendant’s driver in operating his truck without proper control, without keeping a proper lookout, and at a negligent rate of speed, or whether plaintiff’s driver negligently stopped his truck on the half-moon curve in the right lane of the pavement when it was unnecessary and impractical to do so, and, if so, whether such negligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision, were not reversibly erroneous, even though some imperfections could be found therein. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

In an action against an automobile driver for injuries sustained by a bicyclist, where in instructions the jury was told that the plaintiff failed to keep his bicycle under control and to keep a proper lookout for others on the highway and to use due care not to place himself in a place of danger and not to create emergency he could not recover, the instruction failed to take into account the provisions of comparative negligence statutes which provide that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, if the proof showed that the defendant was negligent and the defendant’s negligence was the proximate contributing cause to the plaintiff’s injuries. Rivers v. Turner, 223 Miss. 673, 78 So. 2d 903, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1955).

An instruction that if driver of plaintiff’s bus was operating it at night over public streets at such speed as not to permit driver to avoid striking vehicles coming within range of his lights, which was sole proximate cause of collision with defendant, jury should return verdict for defendant, announced sound law. Jackson City Lines v. Harkins, 204 Miss. 707, 38 So. 2d 102, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1948).

Instruction authorizing jury to find defendant guilty of violating city ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176], if jury believed from the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully drove automobile on city street more than 55 miles per hour, was proper, where defendant made no attempt to overcome prima facie case. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

In action for injuries sustained in collision between trucks in municipality, instructions which did not refer to regulatory statutes which were allegedly violated by defendant’s truck driver, or declare that violation of statutes must contribute proximately to the collision, but which left jury to guess at what constituted negligence, were insufficient. McDonough Motor Express v. Spiers, 180 Miss. 88, 177 So. 655 (Miss. 1937).

Instruction that it was truck driver’s duty to operate truck at safe rate of speed held properly refused; law requiring only reasonably safe rate. Robinson v. Haydel, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1936).

In action for injuries sustained when automobile in which plaintiff was riding was struck by truck, instruction which invoked for plaintiff aid of statute regarding excessive speed and prima facie rule of evidence held erroneous, where declaration was merely sufficient to state case of common-law liability for negligence. Gulf Research Dev. Co. v. Linder, 177 Miss. 123, 170 So. 646, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1936).

In prosecution for manslaughter by automobile, instruction that, if defendant was exceeding twenty miles per hour and exceeding speed at which reasonable or prudent man would have driven, he was guilty of culpable negligence, and authorizing conviction if death was proximate result of such culpable negligence, held reversible error. Bailey v. State, 176 Miss. 579, 169 So. 765, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1936).

Instruction that it is violation of state law to drive automobile on public highway at greater speed than reasonable and proper, having due regard to traffic and use of highway, and that motorist must anticipate presence of other persons and vehicles on highway and drive at such rate of speed as to enable him to avoid injury to such persons, held proper. Hadad v. Lockeby, 176 Miss. 660, 169 So. 691, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1936).

In action arising out of collision between automobile and truck on bridge, deficiency in instruction relating to precautions truck driver should have taken in approaching bridge held cured by instruction setting out statutory provisions defining duty of operator of automobile approaching bridge. Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Screws, 175 Miss. 383, 166 So. 754, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1936).

Court may, notwithstanding all facts regarding automobile collision are in evidence, instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by defendant is negligence and entitles plaintiff to recover where it is proximate cause of injury, or that violation of statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff’s recovery. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

Instruction that plaintiff, if exceeding speed permitted by statute, was prima facie negligent, held erroneous, where all facts and circumstances of collision were in evidence, since violation of statute would not prevent recovery unless it was sole proximate cause of collision. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

Instruction on rate of speed on highway where territory contiguous thereto was closely built up held erroneous under evidence. Bradford v. State, 158 Miss. 210, 127 So. 277, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1930).

11. Verdict.

A verdict of $25,000 for the loss of an arm was excessive where the evidence showed that the negligence of the plaintiff to a very large extent contributed proximately to the injury, in that he was driving a truck without any brakes with knowledge thereof, and was violating the 30-mile speed limit for trucks prescribed by previous enactment of similar section (Code 1930, § 5569 [repealed]), during the nighttime and while he was crossing three bridges in a creek bottom one of which was very narrow. E. L. Bruce Co. v. Bramlett, 188 So. 532 (Miss. 1939).

12. Miscellaneous.

A declaration in an action seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident which charged special hazards, excessive rate of speed, and that the defendant negligently and in complete disregard of the rights and safety of others attempted to drive his truck between two vehicles, one stalled on the left hand lane and the other traveling in the right hand lane, was sufficient to state a cause of action. Bullock v. Sim Ramsey, Jr. Trucking Co., 207 So. 2d 628, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1621 (Miss. 1968).

In an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, where the evidence as to whether at the time defendant entered the intersection the plaintiff’s vehicle was approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard was in sharp conflict, and the plaintiff admitted that he did not reduce his speed as he approached the intersection, the trial court did not err in refusing plaintiff’s request for directed verdict. Junakin v. Kuykendall, 237 Miss. 255, 114 So. 2d 661, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 1959).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes a misdemeanor and fine of $100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Affidavit that defendant wilfully and unlawfully drove automobile over public street or highway in city at rate of more than fifty-five miles per hour, contrary to laws and ordinances of city, sufficiently charges offense of violating ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Recovery could not be sustained for death of truck driver occurring at night when he drove his truck into an unlighted railroad car on a railroad crossing, where if the decedent had been observing the requirements of this section [Code 1942, § 8176], and of the law with respect to lights on motor vehicles, the accident would not have occurred. Mississippi E. R. Co. v. Summers, 194 Miss. 179, 11 So. 2d 429, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1943).

13.-20. [Reserved for future use.]

21. Under former law.

Ford coupe, equipped with pick-up body and capable of carrying half ton of freight, was “truck” within statute prohibiting driving of truck on highway at speed exceeding thirty miles per hour. Pollard v. Stansell, 169 Miss. 136, 152 So. 646, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1934).

Highway running through unincorporated village, with railroad depot and several buildings, was public highway where territory contiguous thereto is closely built up within statute. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

Ordinance regulating pedestrian’s use of the street held reasonable. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Where State Highway Commission has acted in response to federal laws, speed limit on county roads is automatically reduced to 55 miles per hour, regardless of whether board of supervisors has passed ordinance or resolution setting limit. Clark, Dec. 9, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0908.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert’s testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 263 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 760 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 201-210.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 887.1 (speed contest), 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 671 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1641 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor or felony violation, see §99-19-73.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes misdemeanor and fine of $100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert’s testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 265.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 887.1 (speed contest).

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 671 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1641 et seq.

Cross References —

Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see §65-1-8.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Criminal sanctions.

3. Jury instructions.

4. Jury issues.

5. Directed verdict.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Mother was required under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505 to decrease the speed of her vehicle when she approached the intersection; the mother failed to keep a proper lookout as she approached the intersection, where a reasonable person would have recognized the need to slow the vehicle down when approaching the intersection. Clark v. Clark, 863 So. 2d 1027, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 38 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In an action arising from an accident at an intersection between a bus with the right-of-way and an automobile which failed to stop at a stop sign, the statute was properly applied to require the bus driver to slow down as he approached the intersection and to brake when it became apparent that the automobile was not going to stop. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 2000).

A truckdriver, in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, should have reduced the speed of his truck so as to enable him to keep his truck under control and avoid striking the decedent when decedent came within the range of truck’s headlights; the fact that the decedent was at or near the center of the road, under the influence of intoxicating liquor and a black man dressed in black clothing does not in and of itself absolve the truckdriver of his liability. Hornburger v. Baird, 508 F. Supp. 84, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16076 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

A motorist driving approximately 85 miles per hour who failed to reduce his speed while approaching an intersection was liable for injuries sustained by a passenger during a collision where the motorist’s speed was a proximate contributing cause of the collision. Youngblood v. Monteith, 340 So. 2d 4, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1702 (Miss. 1976).

Notwithstanding that it was raining hard on the morning of an accident, neither the owner nor the operator of a tractor-semi-trailer were guilty of negligence per se for failing to reduce speed from 50 to 45 miles per hour, where the operator testified that visibility was approximately one-quarter of a mile, and other witnesses for the plaintiff testified to the fact that it was raining but that they had no trouble seeing the highway and automobiles in front of them. Harpole v. Harrison, 279 So. 2d 150, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1458 (Miss. 1973).

Motorist who, in violation of ¶ 2 of subd (b) of Code 1942, § 8185, attempted to pass another car on the left within 100 feet of a dangerous intersection, and at the same time failed to decrease his speed as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8176] was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision at the intersection. McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 253 Miss. 169, 175 So. 2d 480, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 979 (Miss. 1965).

Motorist approaching and entering intersection at unabated speed of approximately 30 miles per hour is prima facie negligent. Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

2. Criminal sanctions.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes misdemeanor and fine of $100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

3. Jury instructions.

In a suit brought by a widow against a company, alleging that her decedent was struck and killed by a truck negligently driven by one of the company’s employees, the trial court did not err in refusing a peremptory instruction, to the effect that the employee was negligent in failing to decrease his speed as he approached the intersection where the decedent’s vehicle was, as, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505 (Rev. 2004), the employee, who was already traveling 10 to 25 miles per hour below the speed limit, was not required to reduce his speed further upon approaching the intersection. Martin v. B&B Concrete Co., 71 So.3d 611, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 210 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 71 So.3d 1207, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 487 (Miss. 2011).

Where a driver turned left in front of another vehicle, causing an accident, there was no error in the trial court’s refusal to give a special hazard instruction, as there were no stalled or wrecked vehicles obstructing the highway, no emergency vehicles, and no emergency lights; the Supreme Court of Mississippi has never held, and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505 did not provide, that a momentarily inattentive driver was a special hazard for which another driver had to reduce speed. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So. 2d 1051, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 2003).

In an action arising from a one-car accident that occurred when the 16-year-old driver lost control of her car when she hit some loose asphalt or gravel as she entered a curve, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury either that it was their sworn duty to return a verdict for the plaintiff or that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of her motor vehicle as a matter of law where (1) the defendant estimated her speed at around 35 to 40 mph, but contended that she did not believe she was speeding, and (2) her response to the question of whether she slowed down before entering the curve was, “I do not recall applying my brakes before I entered the curve,” but slowing down can also be accomplished by letting off the gas, as opposed to braking. Jones v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 86 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2001), aff'd, 822 So. 2d 946, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 224 (Miss. 2002).

The court properly instructed the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff to reduce her speed when approaching and going around a curve and that if the jury believed from the evidence that the plaintiff failed to reduce the speed of her automobile on approaching and going around a curve and, in the exercise of reasonable care, she should have reduced her speed while traveling on a wet highway, then she was guilty of negligence. Fielder v. Magnolia Bev. Co., 757 So. 2d 925, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1999).

A jury instruction in a negligence action arising from an automobile accident that required the defendant to “decrease her speed as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on the highway in compliance with legal requirements” was erroneous because it placed a higher burden on the defendant than that of reasonable care. Similarly, an instruction that required the defendant to be “vigilant and to anticipate the presence of vehicles at all times and under all circumstances” was erroneous for the same reason, and also warranted reversal and remand of the case. Turner v. Turner, 524 So. 2d 942, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1988).

In a suit for the death of a child pedestrian struck by an automobile, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by reason of the driver’s alleged failure to decrease the speed of his automobile as he approached the intersection, where the evidence as to the automobile’s speed was in conflict. Young v. Schwarz, 230 So. 2d 583, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1560 (Miss. 1970).

The admission of a defendant motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to reduce her speed on approaching the intersection would only entitle the plaintiff to an instruction that the defendant’s failure to reduce her speed was negligence and that if such negligence caused or contributed to the accident then he was entitled to a verdict against her. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

4. Jury issues.

In a motorist’s suit to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained in a car accident with a construction worker, the construction company and the worker’s motions for summary judgment were denied because even though it was undisputed that the motorist did not slow down when he approached the intersection at which the accident occurred, thereby violating Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505, whether this was negligence per se was for a jury to decide. Moran v. Callahan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94573 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007).

In order to be in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] a motorist must fail to reduce his speed from a maximum provided when one of the conditions set out in this section is present, and the question of whether the plaintiff motorist involved in an intersectional accident when travelling at a speed less than the maximum failed further to reduce his speed under the prevailing circumstances constituted negligence was one for the jury to determine. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

Evidence that motorist approached intersection without reducing speed in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] was sufficient to submit to the jury the question of whether he was guilty of any negligence which proximately caused or contributed to the accident. Shaw v. Phillips, 193 So. 2d 717, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1559 (Miss. 1967).

5. Directed verdict.

The admission by a motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to decrease her speed upon approaching the intersection is not sufficient ground to support a directed verdict for the plaintiff on the basis of the contention that the defendant motorist was in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] and therefore negligent as a matter of law. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

6. Miscellaneous.

The trial court did not err in finding in favor of a driver in her action against a city and a police officer stemming from a vehicular accident in which the driver was struck by the officer, because the city’s argument that the driver was contributorily negligent under Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-805 and63-3-505 contained no evidentiary basis. The driver’s view was blocked by a truck and therefore, she was unable to see the officer approach; the driver had a green light at the intersection and she was not speeding or violating any other rule of the road. City of Jackson v. Presley, 40 So.3d 578, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd, 40 So.3d 520, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 2010).

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff’s coal truck struck defendant’s pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. Cobb v. Williams, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1956).

Duty of drivers of motor vehicles in approaching curves defined. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert’s testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am. Jur.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 201-210.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 191, Meteorological Conditions at a Particular Time and Place.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 675.

Cross References —

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law –Traffic Violations Procedure, see Chapter 9 of this title.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence.

1. In general.

Defendant could not complain of conviction for violating city ordinance adopting provisions of Code 1942, § 8176, on ground that the summons or notice to appear and defend contained no specification of speed at which defendant was charged to have driven, where defendant appeared and defended without making such point in the trial court. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

2. Evidence.

Error in personal injury case in admitting evidence of a municipal speed ordinance because it was not pleaded in the declaration could not be complained of where the pertinent provision of the ordinance as to the applicable speed limit was identical with that of Code 1942, § 8176, and it was alleged in the declaration that defendant was running at a reckless speed in violation of the law. Howell v. George, 201 Miss. 783, 30 So. 2d 603, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1947).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 63-3-507 requires that speed alleged to have been traveled needs to be on ticket. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

Miss. Code Section 63-3-507 deals specifically with speeding; although helpful, it is not mandated that exact speed be alleged when driving in excess of speed limit is part of reckless driving charge. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1649.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. In general.

In an action for personal injuries and property damages resulting when plaintiff’s automobile ran into defendant’s truck which was going in the same direction on a U. S. highway, where it appeared that the speed of defendant’s truck at the time of the accident was from 10 to 20 miles per hour, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge that the jury should find for plaintiff if the defendant was driving his vehicle on a federal designated highway at the time and place of the accident at a speed of less than 30 miles per hour where no fact existed justifying such slow speed under this section [Code 1942, § 8178], and the reduced speed was the proximate, or a contributory cause of the accident. Netterville v. Crawford, 233 Miss. 562, 103 So. 2d 1, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 418 (Miss. 1958).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Truckdriver traveling less than 30 miles per hour on highway is not negligent if reduced speed is out of necessity; physical limitation on rate of acceleration of tractor trailer which is traveling at reduced speed due to just having entered highway falls within “necessary” exception to minimum speed. Byrd v. F-S Prestress, 464 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1899 (Miss. 1985).

Operation of motor vehicle at less than fixed maximum rate of speed may be negligence. Wheat v. Teche Lines, Inc., 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1938).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Mississippi Department of Transportation has the duty to post signs indicating the minimum speed limit on any portion of the Interstate Highway System or on four-laned U.S. designated highways wherein the Mississippi Transportation Commission has established the maximum speed limit to be 70 miles per hour. Brown, Apr. 16, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0162.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 263 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 766.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 674.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1641.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Cross References —

Provision that speed limits within the grounds of correctional facilities may be enforced by employees of the Department of Corrections by citation or otherwise, see §47-5-54.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Burden of proof.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. In general.

In cases involving injuries arising out of vehicular traffic on municipal streets or county roads where special municipal or county speed restrictions have been placed in effect, the party expecting to rely upon a violation of such restrictions should plead the existence of the special speed limit established by local authority, and its violation. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

2. Burden of proof.

If the existence of a special county or municipal speed restriction is alleged and denied, or if its legality is put in issue by a responsive pleading, proof should then be required, the burden resting upon the party having the affirmative, as in other cases of disputed fact; but where the existence of the speed zone and rate of speed are properly alleged and not denied, proof that speed signs were in fact posted is sufficient to create a presumption that they reflect appropriate action by competent authority in restricting speeds. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

In action for injuries sustained in collision alleged to have resulted from defendant’s negligence in driving truck in excess of thirty miles per hour on left side of highway through municipality, in absence of showing city ordinance limiting speed of motor vehicles within its limits, statutes limiting maximum speed of thirty miles per hour would apply. McDonough Motor Express v. Spiers, 180 Miss. 88, 177 So. 655 (Miss. 1937).

City ordinance, fixing automobile speed limit outside business district, not statute fixing lower limit on highways in closely built-up territory, controls speed in city outside such district. Robinson v. Haydel, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1936).

Former statute, since repealed [Code 1930, § 5569] delegated, with certain limitations, to governing authorities of municipalities power to fix their own traffic rules within corporate limits within bounds fixed. Meridian Coca-Cola Co. v. Watson, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1931).

Where city had regulated traffic within its limits, state regulation of eight miles an hour in passing pedestrians held inapplicable. Meridian Coca-Cola Co. v. Watson, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1931).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 264, 266.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 71-73.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The statute prohibiting drivers from passing a school during regular school hours faster than ten miles per hour was not repealed by implication by a subsequent statute prohibiting a motorist from driving faster than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances where the two statutes could be harmonized and expressed a clear legislative intent. Brown v. McCoy, 362 So. 2d 186, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2080 (Miss. 1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Meaning of “residence district,” “business district,” “school area,” and the like, in statutes and ordinances regulating speed of motor vehicles. 50 A.L.R.2d 343.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 276-278.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, in (1), inserted “for a first offense” preceding “by a fine of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00)” and added “and for second, third and subsequent offenses by a fine of double the maximum fine imposed for second third or subsequent offenses under Section 63-9-11”; and rewrote (2).

The 2019 amendment rewrote (3), which read: “Nothing in this section shall preclude the prosecution or conviction for reckless driving of any motor vehicle operator whose operation of a motor vehicle in a highway work zone, apart from speed, demonstrates a reckless disregard for life, limb or property”; and added (4) and (5).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Controlling Statute.

1. In general.

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §63-3-313 as he did not obey an official traffic-control device. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §65-1-71 as he did not obey a sign that was erected to control the use of the road during construction. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §65-1-8, which allows the Transportation Commission to adopt rules, regulations and ordinances for the control of and the policing of the traffic on the state highways. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

2. Controlling Statute.

Specific provision of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-516 prevails over the general speeding statutes. Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Law enforcement immunity.

1. In general.

In an action arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by a constable in pursuit of a reckless driver and one operated by plaintiff, where the evidence was in conflict as to such matters as to whether the siren on constable’s car was sounded, speed, and position of vehicles at time of accident, the issue was properly submitted to a jury. Johnson v. Richardson, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1959).

2. Law enforcement immunity.

Police officer’s decision to answer a burglary call without lights or sirens was not a discretionary decision entitling him and his employer to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§11-46-1 through11-46-23, because the officer had no element of choice or judgment in how to respond to an emergency dispatch, pursuant to the terms of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-517. City of Jackson v. Lipsey, 834 So. 2d 687, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 8 (Miss. 2003).

Directed verdict in favor of the sheriff and county in the family’s action alleging reckless disregard by an auxiliary deputy sheriff concerning an accident involving the deputy and their son was appropriate under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c) because the deputy’s actions, at the most, amounted to negligence; the deputy was traveling no more than five miles over the speed limit and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-517 permitted him to do so because he was responding to an accident. Peebles v. Winston County, 929 So. 2d 385, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 373 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipal law enforcement officers of a municipality with a population of 2,000 or more may operate radar speed-detection equipment upon a state-designated highway projecting through its corporate limits as well as on other public streets; however, officers of a municipality having a population of less than 15,000 cannot lawfully operate such equipment on any federally designated highway within the corporate limits of the municipality; this is true even if the federally designated highway is also designated a city street. Levingston, Feb. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0062.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damages to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 4 A.L.R.4th 865.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 945, 946.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The court would reject the contention that a state highway running through a municipality is not a “public street” within the meaning of the exception stated in subparagraph (1). Moore v. City of Louisville, 716 So. 2d 1136, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 513 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The federal census requirement applies to the provisions of Section 63-3-519(1). Rogers, April 10, 1991, [no A.G. opinion number in the original], 1991 Miss. AG LEXIS 323; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §65-7-95, a municipality having a population of 2,000 or more may purchase and operate radar on its public streets. The most authentic proof of population is the census, but the municipality may use another official count. Any speeding conviction resulting from radar evidence would have to be based on both proof of the offense and proof of the town’s population. Adams, June 13, 1974, [no A.G. opinion number in original] 1974 Miss. AG LEXIS 8.

In order to come within the exception to the rule that only the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol can use radar speed detection equipment, a municipality must have, according to the latest federal census, a population of 2,000 or more. Hickman, June 24, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0441, 1992 Miss. AG LEXIS 339; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

Intent of Miss. Code Section 63-3-519 is to prohibit use of all devices for detection of speed of automobiles, not just those which use emission of electronic waves; system of using table to calculate speed of car, which is timed between two points falls, within statutory prohibition of use of radar speed-detection equipment. Ewing, Feb. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0002.

Municipality with population of over 2,000 but under 15,000 may use radar on state highways within municipal corporate limits. Gentry, Feb. 16, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0067.

VASCAR, time and motion device, is within prohibition of radar speed detection equipment in Section 63-3-519; intent of statute is to prohibit use of all devices for detection of speed of automobiles, not just those which use emission of electronic waves. Chism, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0013.

Laser speed detection device falls within prohibition of radar speed detection equipment in Section 63-3-519. Schwing, March 31, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0176.

The only census that can be used to establish the minimum population necessary for the use of radar is the latest federal census. Shows, April 20, 1994, A.G. Op. # 94-0160, 1994 Miss. AG LEXIS 235; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

This section requires a municipality to have a population of two thousand or more according to the latest federal census in order to operate radar upon the public streets of the municipality. Davis, July 19, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0473, 1996 Miss. AG LEXIS 324; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

A town may not use electronic timing devices to calculate the speed of an automobile since the statute prohibits the use of all devices for the detection of the speed of automobiles except for the use of radar as limited by statute. Moore, August 10, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0461.

Since the statute only allows the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol to use radar speed detection equipment on federally designated highways located within the corporate limits of a municipality having a population of 15,000 or less according to the latest federal census, a city could not use a radar-based traffic monitoring device on federally designated highways within the corporate limits, although it could be used on other public streets of the municipality. Johnson, November 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0688 (superseded by Payne, Jan. 18, 2000, A.G. op. #99-0709).

Municipal law enforcement officers of a municipality with a population of 2,000 or more may operate radar speed detection equipment upon a state designated highway, however, such officers of a municipality having a population of less than 15,000 cannot lawfully operate such equipment on any federally designated highway. Scruggs, December 11, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0752.

The legislative intent of the statute does not prohibit the purchase and use of a radar-based device that will be used for driver safety awareness and not for enforcement purposes. Payne, Jr., Jan. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #1999-0709.

A city is entitled to use radar speed detection equipment on any portion of a federally designated highway lying within its corporate limits which is removed from the state maintained system and, if the population of the city exceeds 15,000, radar may be used regardless of whether the street is a public street of the municipality. Lawrence, Apr. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0164.

A radar unit can be located on private property, including church and bank parking lots, as long as the vehicle being timed is located on a public street, and the radar unit can be operated safely and accurately. The private property owner may allow or disallow such use of its property. Russell, Jan. 14, 2005, A.G. Op. 04-0642.

City police department cannot use radar speed detection equipment on a federal within the corporate limits of the city. Fazente, May 13, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0231.

In order to operate radar, a municipality must have a population of 2,000 according to the latest federal census. May, Oct. 7, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0465, 2005 Miss. AG LEXIS 254; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

The use of all devices for the detection of the speed of automobiles is prohibited under the terms of Section 63-3-519 and this would include VASCAR. Magee, Oct. 21, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0496.

The legislature clearly intended municipal radar on a highway designated both federal and state to be used only in municipalities of a population of 15,000 or more. Walker, Apr. 28, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0137.

There is no reason in the law to imply that the census requirement found in 63-3-519(3) applies to 63-3-519(1). A town my use some other official population count to prove its current population. Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Proof, by radar or other mechanical or electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations. 47 A.L.R.3d 822.

Possession or operation of device for detecting or avoiding traffic radar as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.4th 1334.

Am. Jur.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

Cross References —

Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see §63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Particular circumstances as negligence.

3. Exception in emergency.

4. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop because driving in the left-hand lane of a four-lane highway did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 or Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 should be read in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611, which addresses the exceptions to §63-3-601’s requirement that traffic remain on the right side of the roadway. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop for driving in the left-hand lane because Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601(4) exempted roadways designated and signposted for one-way traffic. Hence, the traffic stop was not valid. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

When a motor vehicle is driven upon the wrong side of the highway at a time not within the exception set out in this section [Code 1942, § 8181], such an operation of the vehicle is negligence, and if the driver’s negligence is the sole cause of the accident, damages cannot be recovered for his injury caused by his own act. Lum v. Jackson Industrial Uniform Service, Inc., 253 Miss. 342, 175 So. 2d 501, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 992 (Miss. 1965).

2. Particular circumstances as negligence.

Driver of automobile who, in attempt to avoid hitting dead possum on road, loses control of automobile causing it to go off to right side and hit tree is liable for resulting injury to passenger; passenger who advises driver to avoid hitting possum is not contributorily negligent. Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Patrick, 469 So. 2d 92, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2087 (Miss. 1985).

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child’s parents’ home, the driver was not negligent per se for driving on the “wrong” side of the street where the infant was not within the protected class of pedestrians or drivers who act in reliance upon the orderly flow of traffic dictated by the statute and where the driver’s admitted violation of this section was not the proximate cause of the injuries since the accident would have been no less likely to occur if the automobile had been facing in the opposite direction. Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1980).

The fact that driver of pulpwood truck, in which plaintiff was riding, was violating this section [Code 1942, § 8181] by having a portion of the truck on the left side of the highway at the time of colliding with a pickup truck which was coming out of a driveway, would only constitute contributory negligence which, under the comparative negligence statute, would cause damages to be reduced, and a mere violation of the law in the operation of a motor vehicle would not entitle the opposite party to a peremptory instruction. Winfield v. Magee, 232 Miss. 57, 98 So. 2d 130, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 443 (Miss. 1957).

3. Exception in emergency.

This section [Code 1942, § 8181] would not prevent a motorist turning to the left hand in an emergency, upon giving the proper and timely signal, to avoid striking a pedestrian. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

4. Jury instructions.

Instructions granted under this section [Code 1942, § 8181] were not applicable to a city street with two traffic lanes and one parking lane. Critelli v. Blair, 203 So. 2d 604, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1389 (Miss. 1967).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Driving in the left lane of a four lane highway does not violate this section or §63-3-611. Blakney, Oct. 11, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0566.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Rights, duties, and liability with respect to narrow bridge or passage as between motor vehicle approaching from opposite directions. 47 A.L.R.2d 142.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobile and Highway Traffic, Forms 291 et seq., 311-326, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 812-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1659.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment added (2), and designated the previously undesignated first paragraph (1).

The 2018 amendment, in the first sentence of (7), inserted “the unit prices contained within the procurement contracts” and “overall.”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Liability for negligence.

3. —Particular circumstances.

4. Proximate cause.

5. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop because there was no evidence that defendant violated Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-603 in moving from the right-hand lane to the left-hand lane. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Liability for collision resulting when automobile proceeding east on 4 lane highway collides with truck which is blocking eastbound lanes while preparing to turn left onto westbound lanes is determined under statute governing right of way at intersection (§63-3-805), not under change of lane statute (§63-3-603). Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2017 (Miss. 1985).

2. Liability for negligence.

A violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8187], when neither explained nor excused, constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Vicksburg Concrete Co. v. Poindexter, 198 So. 2d 245, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1257 (Miss. 1967).

A motorist who drives his vehicle into the lane of opposing traffic without first ascertaining that it is free of oncoming vehicles or other obstructions is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Vicksburg Concrete Co. v. Poindexter, 198 So. 2d 245, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1257 (Miss. 1967).

3. —Particular circumstances.

Automobile driver making a left turn at an intersection, who stopped his vehicle 3 or 4 feet across the center line into the lane of an oncoming police motorcycle, violated Mississippi Code 63-3-603, and was guilty of negligence, and, if such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, motorist would be liable for injuries sustained by police officer when his motorcycle struck the stopped car. McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2617 (Miss. 1986).

Motorist held negligent in turning into another lane to avoid stalled car without first ascertaining the position of a following car. Cipriani v. Miller, 248 Miss. 672, 160 So. 2d 87, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1964).

4. Proximate cause.

The alleged negligence, in driving contrary to part one of this section, by a truck driver who collided head-on with a station wagon was not, even if it occurred, the proximate cause of the accident where evidence indicated that the accident was inevitable because of the negligence of the station wagon’s driver, who was going in the wrong direction on a four lane divided highway. Ward v. Valley Steel Products Co., 339 So. 2d 1361, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1695 (Miss. 1976).

5. Directed verdict.

Under this section, a violation of which constitutes negligence as a matter of law, a municipality was entitled to a directed verdict, where the evidence showed that plaintiff-motorist moved into the adjoining left lane of southbound traffic to pass a vehicle at night and ran through a barricade before falling into a shallow excavation dug earlier in the day to repair a water line leak, and where the barricade was lit by smudge pots; plaintiff failed to ascertain that the adjoining lane was clear before she proceeded to pass the vehicle in front of her. City of Jackson v. Sullivan, 349 So. 2d 527, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2157 (Miss. 1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 311-326, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident – Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1659.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 236.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861 et seq., 872, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 51.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury issues.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former laws.

1. In general.

Instructions granted under this section [Code 1942, § 8182] were not applicable to a city street with two traffic lanes and one parking lane. Critelli v. Blair, 203 So. 2d 604, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1389 (Miss. 1967).

In action arising out of collision of two trucks on highway, plaintiff insurer is entitled to peremptory instruction on whole question of liability of defendants when it is shown without any dispute that defendants’ truck came approximately thirty inches across center line and onto wrong side of highway and ran into left rear wheel of insured truck at time when two trucks were meeting each other and at time when insured truck was wholly upon its side of highway, and peremptory instruction on behalf of defendants is properly refused. West v. Aetna Ins. Co., 208 Miss. 776, 45 So. 2d 585, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1950).

2. Jury issues.

Where evidence showed that defendant’s vehicle, encountering an icy patch of pavement, slid over into its left lane in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8182] and struck plaintiff’s automobile proceeding in the opposite direction, the question of negligence was one for the jury. Kight v. Murdock, 253 Miss. 572, 176 So. 2d 320, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1014 (Miss. 1965).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former laws.

In prosecution against automobile driver for failure to seasonably turn to right, evidence showing defendant exceeded speed limit was inadmissible. Naylor v. State, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1930).

Affidavit in prosecution of automobile driver for failure to seasonably turn to right held sufficient, if defective, for purposes of res judicata. Naylor v. State, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1930).

Instruction authorizing recovery for damages in automobile collision, in case defendant undertook to pass plaintiff at more than 8 miles per hour, held erroneous. Gardner v. Comer, 151 Miss. 443, 118 So. 300, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 325 (Miss. 1928).

Affidavit in prosecution for failing to turn motor truck to right of center of highway on meeting another held sufficient. Sullivan v. State, 150 Miss. 542, 117 So. 374, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1928).

Defendant held entitled to instruction on theory that automobile driver turned left to avoid collision. Priestley v. Hays, 147 Miss. 843, 112 So. 788, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1927).

Instruction making it absolute duty of automobile driver to turn right held erroneous, where defense was defendant turned left to avoid collision. Priestley v. Hays, 147 Miss. 843, 112 So. 788, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1927).

Automobile held required to turn to right of center of highway on meeting automobile. Crystal v. State, 147 Miss. 40, 112 So. 687, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1927).

Failure to look for motor vehicle on wrong side of street held not contributory negligence. Clarke v. Hughes, 134 Miss. 377, 99 So. 6, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1924).

Driver of motor vehicle not turning to right is liable for colliding with other vehicle on proper side of highway. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for collision due to swaying or swinging of motor vehicle or trailer. 1 A.L.R.2d 167.

Liability for accident arising from failure of motorist to give signal for left turn at intersection, as against oncoming or intersecting motor vehicle. 39 A.L.R.2d 65.

Rights, duties, and liability with respect to narrow bridge or passage as between motor vehicle approaching from opposite directions. 47 A.L.R.2d 142.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the right. 48 A.L.R.2d 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 252, 253.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic §§ 816 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 291-304, 311-326, 331-336, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898, 1981-1984.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 707 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1750.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

3. Jury issues.

1. In general.

Motorist overtaking and passing bicycle is required to do so at safe distance; motorist’s admission that he did not entirely clear bicyclist’s lane of traffic as he passed bicyclist but was only straddling center line and was unaware of location of vehicle in relation to bicycle as he passed it is sufficient basis upon which jury may find that collision between motorist’s vehicle and bicycle was caused by motorist’s negligence. Rideout v. Knight, 463 So. 2d 1042, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1866 (Miss. 1985).

2. Instructions.

The trial court in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident properly granted plaintiff’s peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, where defendant driver testified that on the day of the accident it was raining and the road was wet, where he admitted knowing that oil rises to the surface of wet asphalt and admitted seeing a roadsign that said “slippery when wet,” and where he further stated that, while passing plaintiff, he had lost control of his truck, in that §§63-3-609 and63-3-611 imposed upon defendant a duty of care in passing plaintiff, a duty he failed to exercise in ignoring the danger he knew lay ahead, which resulted in the loss of control of his truck. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So. 2d 416, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1693 (Miss. 1984).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant’s driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

3. Jury issues.

Where defendant driver of overtaken truck permitted his vehicle to drift across the centerline and speeded up when plaintiff attempted to pass on the left, the evidence was sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of the truckdriver’s negligence. Lewis Grocery Co. v. Blackwell, 209 So. 2d 639, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1465 (Miss. 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty and liability of overtaken driver with respect to adjusting speed to that of passing vehicle. 91 A.L.R.2d 1260.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 247-251.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 843, 850 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 231-239, 411.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 911-924, 1341-1524, 1971-1973.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 723 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1750.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

3. Negligence.

4. Contributory negligence.

5. Proximate cause.

6. Instructions.

1. In general.

Code 1972 §63-3-611(2)(a) is concerned not only with oncoming traffic but also with traffic to the rear, and if a driver cannot see to the rear, he cannot comply with the requirements of Code 1972 §63-3-707. Gates v. Murphree, 286 So. 2d 291, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1316 (Miss. 1973).

In enacting this section [Code 1942, § 8185] it was the intention of the legislature to prohibit a car from being on the left hand side of the road undertaking to pass another car going in the same direction while within 100 feet of any hazards, and the entire statute puts emphasis upon prohibiting overtaking and passing another car headed in the same direction except at a safe distance from places where hazards and dangers might be anticipated. Rayborn v. Freeman, 209 So. 2d 193, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1446, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1968).

An intersection not marked by signs and not observable by reasonably careful motorist is not an intersection within the meaning of the statute. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

Violation of this provision is negligence. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

2. Applicability.

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop because driving in the left-hand lane of a four-lane highway did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 or Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 should be read in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611, which addresses the exceptions to §63-3-601’s requirement that traffic remain on the right side of the roadway. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Where a statute provided that no vehicle shall in overtaking and passing other vehicle be driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection, this statute was not applicable to overtaking automobile which attempted to pass truck as the truck driver attempted to make a left turn into a driveway leading to a store, where there was no showing that the driveway was a highway within the meaning of the statute. Frizell v. Guthrie, 222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 671 (Miss. 1954).

3. Negligence.

Where the driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle on a curve testified that he looked in his rear view mirror and did not see a third vehicle which was overtaking him, even accepting his testimony as true, this did not absolve him from negligence, since he was violating Code 1972 §63-3-611 intended to prevent passing when a driver cannot see a vehicle behind him because of a curve. Gates v. Murphree, 286 So. 2d 291, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1316 (Miss. 1973).

In attempting to pass three motor vehicles within 100 feet of an intersection, the existence of which was well known to him, the defendant was clearly negligent. Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1496 (Miss. 1971).

A truck driver who drove on the left side of a highway while attempting to pass an automobile while both vehicles were approaching an unmarked T intersection which was difficult to see, was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law on the theory that he violated the statute prohibiting driving on the left side of the highway when approaching within 100 feet of any intersection, since it would be unreasonable to require a motorist to observe this statute with respect to intersections which are not marked by signs or observable by the operator of a vehicle in the exercise of reasonable care. Coleman v. Ward, 232 So. 2d 731, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1642 (Miss. 1970).

Motorist who, in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8185], attempted to pass another car on the left within 100 feet of a dangerous intersection, and at the same time failed to decrease his speed as required by subd (b) of Code 1942, § 8176 was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision at the intersection. McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 253 Miss. 169, 175 So. 2d 480, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 979 (Miss. 1965).

A bus driver did not have the right under the law to overtake and pass a preceding vehicle, regardless of the fact that the vision of the driver of the preceding vehicle was lessened or obscured, when the bus driver observed conditions that would cause a reasonably prudent driver to proceed with caution. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

To cross a yellow line marking center of a highway in making a left turn into an intersecting road or a driveway is not negligence per se. Edwards v. Murphree, 249 Miss. 78, 160 So. 2d 689, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1964).

Violation of this provision is negligence. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

4. Contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s truck, in violating this section [Code 1942, § 8185] and failing to observe other requirements of the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law when it collided with defendant’s car, negligently stopped on the traveled highway at the entrance to bridge, warranted reduction of verdict for plaintiff by 50 per cent. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

5. Proximate cause.

Even if a railroad company were negligent for placing its guard rail too close to the paved portion of a highway, the acts of the host driver and of an overtaken motorist in attempting to pass a pickup truck within 100 feet of a railroad crossing, were the efficient, independent intervening proximate causes of the fatal accident resulting in decedent’s death when the host driver’s automobile smashed into the guard rail. Milam v. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co., 284 So. 2d 309, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1258 (Miss. 1973).

6. Instructions.

Trial court did not in err when it refused to give a motor vehicle accident victim’s peremptory instruction on negligence per se because the question of whether the intersection where the accident occurred as the victim was making a left turn when hit by a passing vehicle was marked or readily distinguishable was left for the jury to determine. McLaughlin v. North Drew Freight, Inc., 249 So.3d 1081, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 291 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an “intersection” so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to §63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an “intersection” within the meaning of §63-3-129. An “intersection” requires the conjunction of “2 highways,” and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a “highway” where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a “Plant Entrance” sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. Stewart v. Davis, 571 So. 2d 926, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1990).

Instruction to jury that it would constitute negligence per se if tractor-trailer was attempting to pass another vehicle and crossed double-yellow no passing line going up hill with 79,000 pound load would be proper. Blackmon v. Payne, 510 So. 2d 483, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2522 (Miss. 1987).

The trial court in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident properly granted plaintiff’s peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, where defendant driver testified that on the day of the accident it was raining and the road was wet, where he admitted knowing that oil rises to the surface of wet asphalt and admitted seeing a roadsign that said “slippery when wet,” and where he further stated that, while passing plaintiff, he had lost control of his truck, in that §§63-3-609 and63-3-611 imposed upon defendant a duty of care in passing plaintiff, a duty he failed to exercise in ignoring the danger he knew lay ahead, which resulted in the loss of control of his truck. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So. 2d 416, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1693 (Miss. 1984).

In a personal injury suit, instructions which required the defendant overtaking motorist under all circumstances to be diligent and to anticipate the presence of others, and placing an absolute duty to pass safely and to avoid injury to others on such defendant, who collided with an oncoming motorist, were erroneous in placing a higher standard of care on the defendant than required by law and providing no factual guide for determining his negligence, since the standard of the law is reasonable care. Acord v. Moore, 243 So. 2d 55, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1501 (Miss. 1971).

It was erroneous to grant the “emergency instruction” where it raised an inference that if the driver of a truck had suddenly turned his vehicle across the center line into the left lane of the highway at the time when the defendant’s bus was about to pass, that then the defendant was not guilty of contributory negligence in driving at an unlawful speed and approaching the truck at an unreasonable rate in an unreasonable manner. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

It was erroneous to instruct the jury that a bus driver could pass a preceding truck regardless of the surrounding circumstances if he did not know of the iced-over condition of the rear and side windows of the truck, because these instructions told the jury the defendant bus driver was not guilty of contributory negligence, regardless of the known surrounding circumstances and his duty to foresee the changes and to proceed with caution at a speed at which he could control the operation of the bus. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

An instruction is erroneous which tells the jury for the defendant bus driver that the defendant cannot be held for negligence if, while exercising ordinary care to see, he did not see or know the condition of the glass on the rear and sides of the preceding pickup truck, when the evidence showed in fact that before attempting to pass the truck the bus driver was aware of the iced-over condition of the rear and side windows of the truck. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

In a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, an instruction that if the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding negligently attempted to pass the defendant’s vehicle within 100 feet of an intersection, and such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the jury could find for the defendant, was correct, where the defendant’s proof showed that the attempt to pass was made within 50 or 60 feet of the intersection, and the intersection involved was one coming within the contemplation of the statute. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1957).

Peremptory instruction to jury, that plaintiff violated Mississippi statute providing that a person riding a bicycle is prohibited from passing another vehicle going in the same direction on the right hand side of said vehicle and is also prohibited from passing another vehicle under any circumstances when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection, was proper in an action for injuries where plaintiff bicyclist, approaching defendant’s truck from rear, tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Driving in the left lane of a four lane highway does not violate this section or §63-3-601. Blakney, Oct. 11, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0566.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence of motorist colliding with vehicle approaching in wrong lane. 47 A.L.R.2d 6.

Negligence of motorist as to injury or damage occasioned in avoiding collision with vehicle approaching in wrong lane. 47 A.L.R.2d 119.

Construction, applicability, and effect of traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from passing one another at street or highway intersection. 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 247-251.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 843, 850 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 231-239, 411.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 911-924, 1341-1524, 1971-1973.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 723 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1750.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Where a driver of an oil truck in order to make a right turn first swung to the left, the driver of following pole truck ought not to have attempted to pass on the right unless the vehicle in front of him was making or about to make a left turn. American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros., Inc., 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1951).

Evidence in prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence in the operation of a motor truck supported defense that defendant had right to pass to the right of an overtaken wagon which was making or about to make a turn to the left. Goudy v. State, 203 Miss. 366, 35 So. 2d 308, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss. 1948).

2. Instructions.

Peremptory instruction to jury, that plaintiff violated Mississippi statute providing that a person riding a bicycle is prohibited from passing another vehicle going in the same direction on the right hand side of said vehicle and is also prohibited from passing another vehicle under any circumstances when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection, was proper in an action for injuries where plaintiff bicyclist approaching defendant’s truck from rear tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass on right of other motor vehicle proceeding in same direction. 38 A.L.R.2d 114.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the right. 48 A.L.R.2d 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 251.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 847 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 921-923, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 744.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 481, Laws of 2011, which amended this section, is known as “Nathan’s Law.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2016 amendment rewrote (1)(b), which read: “The driver of a vehicle upon a highway that has four (4) lanes or more, whether or not there is a median or turn lane, need not stop upon meeting or passing a school bus that is on a different roadway or when upon a controlled-access highway if the school bus is stopped in a loading zone that is a part of or adjacent to the highway and where pedestrians are not permitted to cross the roadway.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “If any person witnesses the driver of any vehicle violating the provisions of this section” for “If the driver of any vehicle is witnessed by a law enforcement officer or the driver of a school bus to have violated this section” in (4).

Cross References —

Transportation of school children generally, see §37-41-1 et seq.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 280.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. No violation of statute.

State failed to prove the elements of the offense of driving in or near the center of any highway for a distance of more than 200 yards because there was no proof that defendant drove more than 200 yards in or near the center line of any highway in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-617; although a highway patrolman testified that defendant’s vehicle was behind two other cars and that it was traveling close to the center line, there was no mention or indication that the patrolman observed defendant following too close to the center line of any highway, and there was no evidence to suggest that he observed defendant driving in such a manner as to impede a driver of any truck or vehicle from overtaking and passing him. Fluker v. State, 44 So.3d 1029, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 95 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), cert. denied, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 509 (Miss. Sept. 30, 2010), cert. denied, 49 So.3d 106, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 522 (Miss. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 847, 852, 853.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 924, 1341-1524, 1972.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 738-740.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added (3), and inserted “(300)” in (2).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

1.5. Constitutionality.

2. Negligence.

3. —Proximate cause.

4. —Sudden emergency.

5. Instructions.

6. Directed verdict.

7. Sufficiency of evidence.

1. In general.

Minimum following distances specified in §63-3-619 are applicable to vehicle approaching slow moving truck which has just turned into left-easternmost lane of southbound lanes of 4 lane highway. Byrd v. F-S Prestress, 464 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1899 (Miss. 1985).

One truck should not follow another truck more closely than is reasonable and prudent. American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros., Inc., 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1951).

1.5. Constitutionality.

Tailgating statute is not impermissibly vague and does not fail to give a driver notice of the prohibited conduct; the statute, coupled with the rules of the road, is sufficiently definite such that an ordinary person can understand the prohibited conduct and that law enforcement can avoid arbitrary enforcement. The statute is sufficiently specific to pass constitutional scrutiny. Nolan v. State, 182 So.3d 484, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

2. Negligence.

Trial court did not err in failing to find that a police officer committed a traffic violation by tailgating a driver’s vehicle because the driver had to show more than mere negligence to establish reckless disregard and remove a city’s immunity; the statute applies to traffic regulations but does not address governmental immunity. Carothers v. City of Water Valley, 242 So.3d 138, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 281 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, 246 So.3d 67, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 2018).

Driver of motor vehicle was entitled to peremptory instruction or directed verdict on liability, although there is no per se rule that driver of following car is negligent if he collides with rear of preceding vehicle, where driver of following car did not know her approximate speed, was driving approximately one car length behind preceding vehicle when she saw truck turn off in front of preceding vehicle, and saw preceding vehicle’s brake lights come on; there was no way any rational jury could reach any conclusion but that following driver failed in either one or more of her duties to keep proper lookout ahead, keep her car under proper control, and drive at speed and sufficient distance behind preceding vehicle to stop without colliding into its rear end when that vehicle stopped to allow truck to turn off street. White v. Miller, 513 So. 2d 600, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2833 (Miss. 1987).

One who on attempting to pass a car ahead of him was prevented by an approaching car and on returning to his proper lane was obliged to apply his brakes to avoid striking the car ahead, resulting in a skid, held negligent toward a passenger. Gregory v. Thompson, 248 Miss. 431, 160 So. 2d 195, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. 1964).

Evidence held to show negligence in following another’s car too closely on a highway made slippery by hail. Klumok v. Young, 239 Miss. 393, 123 So. 2d 535, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1960).

Where, under either plaintiff’s or defendant’s evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the collision and death. Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1957).

3. —Proximate cause.

Where the driver of a cattle truck suddenly pulled his truck across the wrong lane of traffic in order to avoid the danger created by the action of a bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop which was stopped suddenly, partially on traveled portion of a highway, the action of the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop partly on the paved and main portion of the highway was a proximate cause of the collision. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

4. —Sudden emergency.

In an action for injuries sustained in a three vehicle collision, it was error to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine with respect to the defendant motorist, where it was shown that just before striking the plaintiff’s vehicle, the defendant had been following behind at a distance of only 36 feet while traveling 45 miles per hour in violation of Code 1942, § 8188. Dailey v. Acme Finance Corp., 234 So. 2d 902, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1423 (Miss. 1970).

Where, under either plaintiff’s or defendant’s evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the collision and death; and the defendant could not invoke the sudden emergency rule because his own testimony showed that the emergency was proximately caused by his own fault. Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1957).

Where the death of a driver of an automobile resulted from collision from an oncoming truck which entered the wrong lane when a truck before it stopped to avoid hitting a bus which suddenly stopped partially on a highway, and the driver of the truck was found to be following too closely, the driver of the truck was not entitled to invoke the doctrine of sudden emergency in order to show that the sole proximate cause of the collision was negligence of the bus driver, since the emergency was caused by truck driver. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

5. Instructions.

Jury was clearly instructed on Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-809(1),63-3-619(2), and as they fairly announced the applicable law in this wrongful death case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s proposed instruction. Rushing v. Mobile Forest Prods., 282 So.3d 708, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 370 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

In an action for injuries sustained in a three vehicle collision, it was error to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine with respect to the defendant motorist, where it was shown that just before striking the plaintiff’s vehicle, the defendant had been following behind at a distance of only 36 feet while traveling 45 miles per hour in violation of Code 1942, § 8188. Dailey v. Acme Finance Corp., 234 So. 2d 902, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1423 (Miss. 1970).

Court’s instruction for plaintiff that it was the duty of the driver of defendant’s truck at all times to maintain a reasonably safe and proper distance between his vehicle and any vehicle proceeding in front of his truck, that it was his duty to anticipate that preceding vehicles would slow or would stop on the highway, and that it was his duty to keep the truck under reasonable control at all times and to take reasonable precautions commensurate with the type of vehicle and load thereon, imposed no absolute liability on the truckdriver for the consequences of his actions. Bill Hunter Truck Lines, Inc. v. Jernigan, 384 F.2d 361, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4789 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit, instructions, which when read together, focused the attention of the jury on the real issue of whether the plaintiff’s truck was overtaken from behind, run into and damaged by the negligence of the defendant’s driver in operating his truck without proper control, without keeping a proper lookout, and at a negligent rate of speed, or whether plaintiff’s driver negligently stopped his truck on the half-moon curve in the right lane of the pavement when it was unnecessary and impractical to do so, and, if so, whether such negligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision, were not reversibly erroneous, even though some imperfections could be found therein. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant’s driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

Where, under either plaintiff’s or defendant’s evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the collision and death. Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1957).

Since Code 1942, § 8149, provides that this section [Code 1942, § 8188] is applicable to a person riding a bicycle, an instruction to the jury, that if they believe that the plaintiff violated this section [Code 1942, § 8188] and such violation was proximate cause of accident they should find for the defendants, was proper in an action for injuries to the plaintiff bicyclist who, approaching the defendant’s truck from the rear, tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

In action for damages to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, it was error for court to refuse plaintiff instruction that failure of any person to perform duty imposed by statute is negligence in itself, and that should jury find that defendant in his truck immediately prior to and at time of collision followed vehicle of plaintiff more closely than was reasonable and prudent, having due regard to speed of such vehicles and traffic upon and condition of highway, and that such failure was proximate cause of collision, his conduct constituted actionable negligence, and refusal to grant this instruction is not cured by granting of instruction which also includes another point. Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1950).

6. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

7. Sufficiency of evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support a tailgating conviction under this statute because an officer was able to articulate an objective basis for the stop by stating that defendant’s vehicle was following another vehicle more closely than was reasonable and prudent, and defendant admitted that he was following a business associate’s car too closely to a hotel because he was unfamiliar with the area and did not want to get separated. The conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence either. Nolan v. State, 182 So.3d 484, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for following too closely where the officer testified that defendant was traveling at about 50 miles per hour, there was only one car length between her and the car in front of her, she was tapping her brakes, and she was operating her vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Robinette v. State, 189 So.3d 675, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 593 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of tailgating, under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-619(1), because a police officer made it clear from the start that appellant’s following a sport-utility vehicle so closely was what drew his attention to appellant, and appellant offered no evidence to contradict the officer’s testimony. Barrow v. State, 121 So.3d 935, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Driver’s failure to maintain proper distance from motor vehicle ahead. 85 A.L.R.2d 613.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 246.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 829, 838 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 266-277, 412.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 933-935, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

19 Am. Jur. Trials 567, Handling a Rear-End Collision Case.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 43, Tailgating.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 736, 737.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment added the second sentence.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-2. [Reserved for future use].

3. Instructions.

1.-2. [Reserved for future use].

3. Instructions.

Finding in favor of a trucking company and truck driver in a wrongful-death action brought by the decedent’s widow was proper because the trial court did not err in refusing the widow’s requested jury instructions under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-701. There was no evidence to support the instruction that the tractor-trailer could not be operated or moved safely at the time that it left the trucking company’s lot. Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., 32 So.3d 450, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 200 (Miss. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 16 A.L.R.2d 979.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 309.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 927.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 805, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 693, 694.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence.

3. Evidence.

4. Instructions.

1. In general.

Officer had probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle based on his observation of an improper turn and a missing headlight, notwithstanding the fact that the officer had received word from dispatch to be on the lookout for a vehicle matching that description. Scott v. City of Booneville, 962 So. 2d 698, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 637 (Miss. 2007).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8189] may warrant a jury in finding that an automobile was being negligently operated. West v. Armstrong, 248 Miss. 617, 159 So. 2d 805, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1964).

2. Negligence.

Motorist who turns into left hand-easternmost lane of southbound lane of 4 lane highway is not negligent as matter of law. Byrd v. F-S Prestress, 464 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1899 (Miss. 1985).

In an action by a motorcyclist against a motorist for injuries resulting from an intersectional collision which occurred when the automobile driver made a left turn in front of the motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction immediately prior to the collision, evidence that the motorcycle struck the front bumper of the car to the left of center, together with the motorist’s admission that his vehicle was at an angle with the direction of the highway from which he was turning, at the time of the collision, clearly established that the automobile driver made his left turn by “cutting the corner” before reaching the center of the intersection, in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8189]. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

3. Evidence.

Testimony of accident reconstruction expert is admissible to prove the relative speed of vehicles, the angle of impact of vehicles, and what diverted their course. Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1942 (Miss. 1985).

Allowing an investigating officer not an eyewitness to an accident, to give his opinion, in an action for injuries resulting from the collision, as to the place of impact and to depict this point on a map, was harmless error where the negligence of the defendant motorist was clearly established by other evidence. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

In an action for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision, it was proper for the investigating officer to testify as to the location of the vehicles at the time of his investigation, the location of the injured plaintiff, and the location of debris created by the impact, and equally proper for him to mark the location of these things on the map of the intersection. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

4. Instructions.

In an action for injuries sustained by a 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to this section [Code 1942, § 8189], and a city ordinance, “cut the corner” in making a left turn, the court properly instructed that the truck driver was guilty of negligence which was a proximate, contributing cause of the collision. City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1958).

In action by wife for damages for injuries sustained in automobile collision when husband’s and defendant’s cars, both going east, attempted to make left turn from different traffic lanes, refusal of defendant’s instruction predicated upon theory that plaintiff’s husband had no right to drive car in north lane of south half of highway and granting to plaintiff of instruction on facts of case under which jury found plaintiff’s husband was in proper lane for left turn and defendant in wrong lane, was proper. Kouvarakis v. Hawver, 208 Miss. 697, 45 So. 2d 278, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for accident arising from failure of motorist to give signal for left turn between intersections. 39 A.L.R.2d 103.

Automobiles: liability for U-turn collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 241-244.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 864 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 181-186.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 961-967, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Motorcycle Accidents.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 405, Negligent Left Turn of Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 863 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: liability for U-turn collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 241-244.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 872-874.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 405, Negligent Left Turn of Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 706.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence.

3. Contributory negligence.

4. Instructions.

5. Searches and seizures.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

A motorist is not only under a duty to keep a proper lookout and be on the alert for other vehicles using the highway, but is also under duty not to turn his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal by hand, arm or other signal device, in the event that any other vehicle might be affected by such movement. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1957).

Where a driver of an oil truck turned to the left on a highway before making a right turn and he was hit by a truck attempting to pass, the driver of the oil truck was under a duty to give the proper sign for stopping, or turning right or left. American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros., Inc., 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1951).

2. Negligence.

Jury verdict defied all logic, as the evidence presented at trial established that the driver was negligent as a matter of law for failing to maintain a proper lookout and to yield the right-of-way by executing a turn across the insured’s lane of travel. A verdict should have been returned in favor of the insured because the violation of said statutory duties by the driver was the unequivocal proximate cause of the insured’s injury; even if the driver was not negligent per se, the facts presented at trial unconditionally demonstrated that the collision was the result of her negligence and the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply Miss. R. Civ. P. 50, and by denying the insured’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. State Farm Auto Ins. Cos. v. Davis, 887 So. 2d 192, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1065 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

That a motorist actuated a stop signal on the automobile by applying the brake does not necessarily exonerate the motorist from a charge of negligence toward a following car. Box v. Swindle, 306 F.2d 882, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4242 (5th Cir. Miss. 1962).

A motorist who signaled an intention to stop may be found negligent if there was insufficient time and distance to bring a following car to a halt. Box v. Swindle, 306 F.2d 882, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4242 (5th Cir. Miss. 1962).

Code 1972 §63-3-611(2)(a) is concerned not only with oncoming traffic but also with traffic to the rear, and if a driver cannot see to the rear, he cannot comply with the requirements of Code 1972 §63-3-707. Gates v. Murphree, 286 So. 2d 291, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1316 (Miss. 1973).

The fact that a motorist, who had previously given a lawful notice that she was reducing the speed of her vehicle, failed to signal of her ultimate intention to make a right turn, this was not a proximate contributing cause of the collision which resulted when she was struck in the rear by the plaintiff’s automobile which was following too closely, being driven at a high, excessive and unlawful rate of speed, at a time when its driver was not maintaining a proper lookout ahead, and did not have the vehicle under control. Callender v. Cockrell, 217 So. 2d 643, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1580 (Miss. 1969).

3. Contributory negligence.

Plaintiff’s testimony that he observed defendant’s approaching vehicle until it was about 150 feet behind him and although he realized it was traveling at a faster speed and overtaking him, he drove about 15 seconds from the time he last looked before he made his left turn, that by merely glancing in his rear view mirror he could have ascertained the location of the defendant’s car before he began his left turn, and that he relied completely on his blinker signal to keep traffic behind him from coming around him, established that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Stockton v. Lamberth, 278 So. 2d 423, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1440 (Miss. 1973).

Failure to give a signal at a reasonable distance of intention to make a left turn is contributory negligence. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

A motorist was guilty of contributory negligence who, without giving any warning signal of any kind to indicate her intention, had turned from her right lane of traffic and was proceeding across the left or oncoming traffic lane of the highway to enter a driveway when she was struck by defendant’s automobile, which, at the time of the motorist’s turn, had been approaching some 40 to 60 feet away. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1957).

4. Instructions.

A plaintiff motorist was entitled to an instruction that a preceding motorist was negligent as a matter of law under §63-3-707, which provides that a driver should not turn a vehicle from a highway unless the turn can be made with reasonable safety, where the preceding driver admitted that he turned his vehicle to the left out of his lane of traffic without first looking to see whether the plaintiff was following him, and the court’s refusal to give this requested instruction was reversible error. Conner v. Harris, 624 So. 2d 482, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1993).

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2232 (Miss. 1982).

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident at an intersection in which the defendant was struck by the plaintiff’s automobile as he made a left turn across the plaintiff’s traffic lane, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed that the accident had been proximately caused by the negligence of a truck driver who had allegedly indicated to the defendant that he could safely cross the plaintiff’s traffic lane; the defendant did not have the legal right to rely on the truck driver and had a duty to ascertain whether he could cross the traffic lane with reasonable safety. Boyd v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 994, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2155 (Miss. 1980).

Where the evidence made a jury issue as to whether defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to give a signal indicating his intention to turn left for a reasonable distance before turning, and in turning his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway when such movement could not be made with reasonable safety, the trial court should not have granted defendant’s motion for a peremptory instruction. Cronier v. Denson, 198 So. 2d 252, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1260 (Miss. 1967).

In a wrongful death action arising out of a collision of defendant’s automobile with a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon a highway, the trial court did not err in instructing that the rider of a bicycle or other vehicle along a public highway should not turn from a direct course unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving an appropriate signal, and the signal for a left turn should be given by extending the hand and arm horizontally. Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 376 (Miss. 1957).

The trial court properly refused defendant a peremptory instruction where, in an action for a personal injury sustained when the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger was struck by defendant’s automobile while undertaking to turn from the right lane of traffic across the oncoming traffic lane to enter a driveway, the jury was warranted in finding that the truck driver’s movements were consistent with reasonable safety as required by this section. [Code 1942, § 8192], and that, in view of defendant’s admission that although she saw the truck slowing down for one-half mile and thought he was going to turn in to the driveway, she did not slow down, but continued to operate her automobile at 50 miles per hour, the contributing, if not the sole, cause of accident was defendant’s negligence. Hamilton v. McCry, 229 Miss. 481, 91 So. 2d 564, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 629 (Miss. 1956).

In action for damages to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, there being no controversy in record that car was equipped with signal light in rear in good order, instruction for defendant that person driving upon highway is required by law, before stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of his automobile, to give proper signal of such intention, and if jury believe from evidence in case that plaintiff so stopped or decreased his speed without giving such proper signal, then jury must find plaintiff was negligent is reversibly erroneous and cannot be cured by other instructions in conflict with it. Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1950).

5. Searches and seizures.

In a felony fleeing case, an argument that an officer lacked probable cause to make a traffic stop was rejected because the officer testified that he personally observed defendant make a right turn onto a state highway without signaling while traffic was present. Moreover, defendant admitted to committing the offense. Johnson v. State, 228 So.3d 933, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 112 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 120, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2017).

Defendant was legally stopped under the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. IV, and Miss. Const. Art. III, § 23 as: (1) he failed to use his turn signal and violated Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-707, even though there was no imminent threat of a collision between his vehicle and an officer’s vehicle that was traveling at a safe distance behind defendant’s vehicle; (2) the subsequent searches of defendant and his vehicle were lawful; (3) defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license; (4) the glass pipes were found in a search incident to defendant’s arrest; and (5) the inventory search of defendant’s vehicle, during which the methamphetamine was discovered, was conducted according to police department policy and was limited to the areas of the vehicle where defendant’s property could reasonably be expected to be found.. Melton v. State, 118 So.3d 605, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 618 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 117 So.3d 330, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 375 (Miss. 2013).

6. Miscellaneous.

In an action by a passenger for injuries sustained when the taxicab, which was stopped upon a highway, was struck from behind by a motorist, in view of the uncontradicted testimony that when the motorist first saw the taxicab it had already stopped and its headlights and taillights were burning, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of the alleged negligence of the taxicab driver in stopping upon the highway without giving any warning by hand signals, arm signals, blinker lights or other signals. Snowden v. Skipper, 230 Miss. 684, 93 So. 2d 834, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for accident arising from motorist’s failure to give signal for right turn. 38 A.L.R.2d 143.

Duty and liability as to signaling following driver to pass or giving him warning of approaching danger. 48 A.L.R.2d 252.

Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle in public street or highway. 63 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle from private premises into public street or highway. 63 A.L.R.2d 108.

Liability for injury or damage occasioned by backing of motor vehicle within private premises. 63 A.L.R.2d 184.

Automobiles: duty and liability with respect to giving audible signal at intersection. 21 A.L.R.3d 268.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 227, 242, 279, 280.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 830, 875 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 961-963, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 701, 702, 743.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist is not only under a duty to keep a proper lookout and be on the alert for other vehicles using the highway, but is also under duty not to turn his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal by hand, arm or other signal device, in the event that any other vehicle might be affected by such movement. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am. Jur.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2232 (Miss. 1982).

2. Instructions.

In a wrongful death action arising out of a collision between defendant’s automobile and a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon the highway, the trial court properly instructed that the rider of a bicycle along a public highway should not turn from a direct course unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving the appropriate signal, and the signal for a left turn should be given by extending the hand and arm horizontally. Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 376 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty and liability as to signaling following driver to pass or giving him warning of approaching danger. 48 A.L.R.2d 252.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Right of way, generally.

3. Instructions.

4. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. Gates v. Green, 214 So. 2d 828, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1337 (Miss. 1968).

The statutory rule announced in subsection (2) of this section [Code 1942, § 8195] is inapplicable to the intersection of an existing public road and a new highway under construction which is not yet open for general vehicular traffic. Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Constr. Co., 238 Miss. 681, 119 So. 2d 918, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1960).

Right-of-way statutes have no legal application to traffic on private property. Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 1959).

Violation of statutory rules of the road is negligence per se. Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 1959).

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1942).

2. Right of way, generally.

Unless priority is otherwise given, the vehicle first entering an intersection has the right of way. Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 1959).

If two vehicles arrive at an intersection at the same time, it is the duty of the driver to yield to the other driver who is on the right. Herring v. Hart, 225 Miss. 115, 82 So. 2d 710, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 564 (Miss. 1955).

Where an automobile was first to reach an intersection, a driver of a truck approaching from the other street had the duty to yield the right of way to the first automobile and if necessary, to stop so as to permit him to pass through the intersection without interference. Jefferson v. Pinson, 219 Miss. 427, 69 So. 2d 234, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 350 (Miss. 1954).

3. Instructions.

Finding in favor of a trucking company and truck driver in a wrongful-death action brought by the decedent’s widow was proper because the trial court did not err in refusing the widow’s requested jury instructions under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-801 since the record contained no evidence to show that the truck driver or decedent were in close proximity to each other at an intersection when the truck driver entered the highway. The accident occurred two and one-half miles after the truck driver had entered the highway from the trucking company’s lot and had been traveling in the right-hand lane. Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., 32 So.3d 450, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 200 (Miss. 2010).

A party is not entitled to an instruction that one should yield to the car first entering an intersection where the statute requires stopping before entering the intersection in response to a red signal light, and Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. Gates v. Green, 214 So. 2d 828, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1337 (Miss. 1968).

Since common-law principles of negligence applied to an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision at an intersection of an existing public road, and a new highway under construction which was not open to general vehicular traffic, the court committed reversible error in giving the favored driver instruction which is solely statutory in origin. Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Constr. Co., 238 Miss. 681, 119 So. 2d 918, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1960).

A motorist who approached an intersection with the signal light flashing red in her direction, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, was not entitled to an instruction under this section [Code 1942, § 8195], providing that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1958).

The action of the trial court in a manslaughter prosecution in instructing the jury in reference to the so-called “rules of the road” as contained in previous repealed section (Code 1930, § 5574) was not error as against the contention that such rules had no application in a criminal case, since the jury was entitled to know the relative rights and duties of the driver of the truck and of the driver of the automobile in order to be able to determine who was at fault when the driver of the automobile was killed in a collision. Turner v. State, 183 Miss. 658, 183 So. 522, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1938).

4. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of motorist on through, favored, or arterial street or highway to proceed where lateral view at intersection is obstructed by physical obstacle. 59 A.L.R.2d 1202.

Duty and liability of vehicle drivers approaching intersection of one-way street with other street. 62 A.L.R.2d 275.

Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highway as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to collisions between motor vehicles crossing at intersection. 20 A.L.R.3d 124.

Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to intersectional collision between motor vehicles meeting from opposite directions. 20 A.L.R.3d 287.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 281 et seq.

Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 865 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 141 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898, 899, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 843 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1755.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence.

3. Evidence.

4. Questions for jury.

5. Instructions.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

One who had turned left at an intersection while the traffic signal was red, pursuant to a green arrow signal, and who had traversed almost the entire distance of the intersection before another car, when the signal turned from red to green, had entered the intersection, is not required to yield the right of way. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So. 2d 674, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1963).

2. Negligence.

Jury verdict defied all logic, as the evidence presented at trial established that the driver was negligent as a matter of law for failing to maintain a proper lookout and to yield the right-of-way by executing a turn across the insured’s lane of travel. A verdict should have been returned in favor of the insured because the violation of said statutory duties by the driver was the unequivocal proximate cause of the insured’s injury; even if the driver was not negligent per se, the facts presented at trial unconditionally demonstrated that the collision was the result of her negligence and the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply Miss. R. Civ. P. 50, and by denying the insured’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. State Farm Auto Ins. Cos. v. Davis, 887 So. 2d 192, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1065 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In an action by a police officer for personal injuries sustained when his motorcycle struck a left turning automobile which had come to a stop 3 or 4 feet across the center line into the officer’s lane, §63-3-803 was a more appropriate basis, than §63-3-603, for an instruction that violation thereof constituted negligence. McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2617 (Miss. 1986).

In an action by a motorcyclist against a motorist for injuries resulting from an intersectional collision, testimony of the automobile driver that he did not see the motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction until the instant of collision which occurred when the automobile turned left in front of the motorcycle, together with the acknowledged fact that the intersection was well lighted, indicated that the motorist was negligent in making a left turn without making sure that he could do so in safety, and failing to keep a proper lookout for approaching traffic. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

3. Evidence.

Testimony of accident reconstruction expert is admissible to prove the relative speed of vehicles, the angle of impact of vehicles, and what diverted their course. Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1942 (Miss. 1985).

Allowing an investigating officer, not an eyewitness to an accident, to give his opinion, in an action for injuries resulting from the collision, as to the place of impact and to depict this point on a map, was harmless error where the negligence of the defendant motorist was clearly established by other evidence. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

In an action for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision, it was proper for the investigating officer to testify as to the location of the vehicles at the time of his investigation, the location of the injured plaintiff, and the location of debris created by the impact, and equally proper for him to mark the location of these things on the map of the intersection. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

4. Questions for jury.

In action for injuries sustained by a 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to Code 1942, § 8189(a), and a city ordinance, “cut the corner” in making a left turn, the question of whether the truck driver’s negligence was a proximate, contributing cause of the collision was for the jury. City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1958).

5. Instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident at an intersection in which the defendant was struck by the plaintiff’s automobile as he made a left turn across the plaintiff’s traffic lane, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed that the accident had been proximately caused by the negligence of a truck driver who had allegedly indicated to the defendant that he could safely cross the plaintiff’s traffic lane; the defendant did not have the legal right to rely on the truck driver and had a duty to ascertain whether he could cross the traffic lane with reasonable safety. Boyd v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 994, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2155 (Miss. 1980).

An instruction that the operator of a vehicle continuing its course is bound to have his vehicle under such control that another vehicle, entering the intersection first, can safely make the left turn, is improper as making such operator the insurer of the other’s safety without regard to whether such other had at the time a right to turn across the traffic lane, and without regard to whether or not he was in such close proximity to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard. Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Brown, 236 Miss. 253, 109 So. 2d 858, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1959).

An instruction that the driver of an oncoming truck who saw a car signalling at a controlled-traffic intersection for a left turn but continued on a green light was bound to know that the car’s driver contemplated turning, is objectionable as ignoring whatever right the truck driver had to assume that the car would wait until the traffic lane was clear. Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Brown, 236 Miss. 253, 109 So. 2d 858, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1959).

In an action for injuries sustained by 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to Code 1942, § 8189(a), and a city ordinance, “cut the corner” in making a left turn, instructions permitting the jury to find that the motorcycle had already entered the intersection at the time of the left turn, and was readily visible to the truck driver, was not reversible error, where, under conflicting evidence, the jury could, and evidently did, reject the version of defendant’s witnesses. City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1958).

6. Miscellaneous.

The action of a truckdriver, whose view of the road ahead was admittedly obstructed by a preceding pulpwood truck, who pulled into the left lane of traffic in order to make a turn into a county road was guilty of violating this section [Code 1942, § 8196] and should have stopped or slowed down until the pulpwood truck ceased to obstruct his view. Necaise v. Blalock, 210 So. 2d 637, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1499 (Miss. 1968).

In an action for injuries sustained when plaintiff’s truck was struck by defendant’s truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, where the defendant’s own testimony showed that he had failed to maintain a proper lookout, and was negligent in failing to comply with this section [Code 1942, § 8196], the jury’s verdict for defendant was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Cobb v. Williams, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1956).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 285, 286.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 144, 145, 182-186.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898, 899, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 865-868.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

3. Construction.

4. What constitutes immediate hazard.

5. Negligence — In general.

6. —Contributory negligence.

7. —Comparative negligence.

8. Questions for jury.

9. Instructions.

10. Negligence not found.

1. In general.

Record showed substantial evidence that a jury could reasonably base their verdict on in favor of the truck driver in a car accident; the jury found that the car driver had time to react at the intersection. Phan v. Denley, 915 So. 2d 504, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 901 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

As the driver failed to reduce his speed and keep a lookout as he approached an intersection that he knew was dangerous, the trial court did not err in assessing 54 percent liability against him. Classic Coach, Inc. v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 517, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 2002), amended, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. Feb. 20, 2003).

Although this section places a burden on a driver to yield the right-of-way before entering a through highway, and further provides that when a STOP sign is present the driver is to observe the sign, it does not mandate that the state or a county place a STOP sign at an intersection. Jones v. Mississippi DOT, 744 So. 2d 256, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1999).

The general rule is that a vehicle which first enters and occupies the intersection has the right of way. Tant v. Fairchild, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1956).

The general rule that the first vehicle in intersection has the right of way does not relieve a truck owner from the duty of having a flagman present to direct and stop traffic at busy intersection where the truck carried a huge cargo and was very slow in going through the intersection. Tant v. Fairchild, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1956).

2. Applicability.

Employee was required to obey the stop sign and then proceed onto the highway intersection only after yielding to automobiles that were approaching and were close enough to be considered an immediate hazard; however, the mother failed to keep a proper lookout when approaching the intersection, and a reasonable person would have recognized the need to slow the vehicle when approaching the intersection, and the employee was unable to avoid an accident. Clark v. Clark, 863 So. 2d 1027, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 38 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Liability for collision resulting when automobile proceeding east on 4 lane highway collides with truck which is blocking eastbound lanes while preparing to turn left onto westbound lanes is determined under statute governing right of way at intersection (§63-3-805), not under change of lane statute (§63-3-603). Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2017 (Miss. 1985).

3. Construction.

Injured party’s interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-805, was incorrect because the injured party seemed to contend that the uncontradicted proof that the injured party was traveling on the through highway at the time of the accident necessarily establishes the driver’s negligence for the accident, but because the driver testified that the injured party’s vehicle was not in sight just moments before the collision and the driver made reference to the degree of damage inflicted on the driver’s truck as evidence tending to show that the injured party’s vehicle was speeding, there was evidence that the injured party was speeding, which supported an inference that the injured party’s speeding was the cause of the collision; thus, the jury verdict in favor of the driver and against the injured party was not against the weight of the evidence. Redmond v. Breakfield, 840 So. 2d 828, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 235 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

A motorist either at, or when entering, an intersection to cross a through highway has no right of way, and must yield to another car farther from the intersection but yet so close as to present a hazardous situation. Walton v. Owens, 244 F.2d 383, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

The standard of care required of a motorist backing a vehicle into a public street is defined in this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Ramage v. Kelly, 253 Miss. 582, 176 So. 2d 324, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1016 (Miss. 1965).

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1942).

The statute requires that motorists must stop and look at the intersection of a highway with a through highway. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

No driver of an automobile is absolved from exercising care and diligence when proceeding upon a crossing which is much traveled and at which people are known to travel at a high rate of speed, notwithstanding such driver may have stopped at a stop sign before entering into the intersection. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

4. What constitutes immediate hazard.

Where plaintiff’s automobile which was approaching intersection in highway was only sixty to one hundred feet away, at a time defendant’s truck entered intersection, plaintiff’s automobile constituted an immediate hazard within this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Meo v. Miller, 227 Miss. 11, 85 So. 2d 568, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 651 (Miss. 1956).

5. Negligence — In general.

Expert witness testified that a driver was at fault for pulling out in front of a truck, and the driver’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident; substantial evidence supported the verdict that the driver was negligent for disregarding an immediate hazard. Etheridge v. Harold Case & Co., 960 So. 2d 474, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 623 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 2007).

Failure of motorist on unfavored street to continue to look for approaching vehicles after having stopped at stop sign and looked at intersection of highway with through highway constitutes negligence; motorist who claims to have looked and failed to see vehicles in intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute immediate hazard is guilty of negligence as matter of law. Dogan v. Hardy, 587 F. Supp. 967, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15383 (N.D. Miss. 1984).

Defendant motorist who drove to within a car’s length of a highway stop sign located 40 feet from paved portion of intersecting road, looked to her right and left and did not see any traffic approaching, remained motionless quite a while and then proceeded upon the highway without again looking to her right or left was guilty of negligence. Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So. 2d 87, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1436 (Miss. 1967).

6. —Contributory negligence.

There was sufficient evidence to find that a driver was contributorily negligent including driver’s duty of common sense under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-805, the fact that a good portion of the bus was past the center line before colliding with the car, and the disputed testimony with regard to the amount of time between when the bus pulled into the road and when the bus arrived at the point of collision. Callahan v. Ledbetter, 992 So. 2d 1220, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 547 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

Court’s finding of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff was proper where defendant bus driver testified that he came to a complete stop at the stop sign, he looked both ways for oncoming traffic before entering the intersection, both parties had a clear unobstructed view of the intersection as they approached from their respective directions, and defendant’s bus was hit by plaintiff’s truck, thus indicating a lack of evasive action on the part of plaintiff. Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Lee County Sch. Dist., 925 So. 2d 57, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 2006).

Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence where it appeared that while traveling on his side of a city street, without excessive speed, he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, who, upon entering the intersection, had seen the plaintiff’s automobile approaching at such a distance as to constitute an immediate hazard, but, without looking again, continued across the intersection. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

Since defendant’s own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff’s approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

The doctrine of contributory negligence applies to a suit brought against a driver who allegedly violated this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Baird v. Harrington, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1947).

7. —Comparative negligence.

Circuit court did not err, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§85-5-7(5) and63-3-805, in refusing an apportionment-of-fault jury instruction because the uncontested evidence presented at trial demonstrated that it was one motorist’s negligence that was the sole proximate cause of the accident at an intersection and the injuries sustained by the other motorist and the other motorist’s spouse. Dunnam v. Abney, 137 So.3d 876, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 770 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 139 So.3d 74, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 2014).

Since defendant’s own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff’s approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

In action for injuries resulting from automobile collision at intersection of cross road with through traffic lane, failure to give a comparative negligence instruction on behalf of plaintiff is not erroneous when instruction was not requested and plaintiff predicated liability on finding that defendant was negligent and defendant’s negligence was the sole, proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Davidian v. Wendell, 37 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1948).

8. Questions for jury.

When ultimate issue in intersection collision negligence case is relative position and speed of parties in moments prior to collision and evidence offered by witnesses is sharply conflicting, it is proper for jury to resolve conflict. Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2017 (Miss. 1985).

In an action for personal injuries arising out of a multiple vehicle collision, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant where a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant had been negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff’s vehicle. Marshall v. Conley, 391 So. 2d 656, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2183 (Miss. 1980).

What is a “through highway” may be answered categorically and absolutely, but the question who has the “right of way” cannot, since the answer to that question is variable, changing as the circumstances and facts of each situation change, so that it must be for the jury to decide under the facts of a particular case. Shivel v. Ferguson, 259 So. 2d 123, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1524 (Miss. 1972).

Although the driver of the automobile in which the infant decedent was riding was guilty of negligence in entering the intersection, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict in an action for the wrongful death of the child, where the evidence raised a jury question as to whether defendant’s driver was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the collision. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8197] may warrant a jury in finding that an automobile was being negligently operated. West v. Armstrong, 248 Miss. 617, 159 So. 2d 805, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1964).

Evidence, although conflicting, was sufficient to present question for jury as to whether truck driven from private road onto highway in front of an approaching car at nighttime constituted an immediate hazard. Miller Petroleum Transporters, Ltd. v. Price, 237 Miss. 284, 114 So. 2d 756, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 466 (Miss. 1959).

Whether one entering a through highway intersection after stopping should have yielded a right of way to an approaching car as presenting an immediate hazard, held for the jury where there was evidence that when he started, 15 to 20 feet from the edge of the highway, the approaching car was still several hundred feet distant and that its driver did not reduce speed after he saw or should have seen the other car entering the intersection. Junakin v. Kuykendall, 237 Miss. 255, 114 So. 2d 661, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 1959).

In an action for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and that of the defendant when defendant allegedly drove, without stopping, from a private driveway into the highway upon which plaintiff was proceeding in such manner that plaintiff could not avoid striking him, conflicting evidence raised jury questions as to defendant’s negligence, and whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Stewart v. Madden, 233 Miss. 206, 101 So. 2d 353, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1958).

Since defendant’s own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff’s approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

It was for the jury to say whether the defendants, in an action for death of a motorist resulting from an automobile collision, were negligent in entering an intersection without looking in the direction from which another motorist was coming, after making a stop at a stop sign some distance from the intersection. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

The fact that the defendants stopped at a stop sign a short distance from the intersection before proceeding into the intersection of a through highway would not discharge them of their duty to exercise ordinary care and diligence in proceeding upon the crossing and whether their failure to look to the south in entering the intersection was negligence proximately causing or contributing to the injury or death of a motorist approaching from that direction was for the jury. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

9. Instructions.

In an action for damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s motorcycle and defendant’s automobile in an intersection with a flashing red light and stop sign facing plaintiff and a flashing yellow light and warning sign facing defendant, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff’s standard of care instruction which included the language, “the defendant had no lawful right to go forward. . . under the assumption that it would be open and clear,” where a granted instruction detailed the crucial point that the yellow light facing defendant demanded caution, and that a finding of negligence would flow from her failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff if, as he claimed, he had lawfully entered the intersection and stalled unexpectedly. The trial court also properly refused to grant an instruction which stated in part, “the driver of a motor vehicle has a lawful duty to decrease his speed upon approaching an intersection,” since §63-3-311(2) merely states that a driver “may proceed. . . only with caution” and caution is a relative concept not necessarily entailing decrease in speed since the current speed may already be a cautious speed. Allen v. Blanks, 384 So. 2d 63, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2000 (Miss. 1980).

An instruction to the effect that it is the duty of a motorist approaching a through highway to anticipate the presence of other persons and vehicles thereon and keep a reasonable lookout for them, and to stop for the stop sign at the intersection and yield the right of way to traffic on the through highway, and to see if she could enter the intersection with safety to herself and the traveling public, and that if she failed in any one of those particulars or respects such failure was the sole proximate cause of an intersectional accident then it was the jury’s duty to find against her, is erroneous in the absence of a further statement that after complying with these stated conditions the motorist had a right to enter the intersection and that vehicles on the through highway must yield the right of way to her. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

An instruction was properly refused where it would have told the jury that when the operator of an automobile is confronted with a stop sign at an intersection, he, before entering the intersection, is under a duty to appraise traffic on the intersecting highway and to make certain that the way is clear for him to make a safe passage across the highway. Such an instruction would make the person entering the intersection an insurer of his own safety, regardless of the negligence of others. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

Although the defendant was entitled to an instruction under this section [Code 1942, § 8197], the trial court properly refused to give an instruction which was calculated to confuse the jury and did not properly present the issues. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

Trial court did not err in refusing an instruction that would have required a holding that defendant, who was traveling along a through highway, was guilty of negligence as a matter of law even though the jury could have found that, when plaintiff had entered the intersection, defendant was so close at hand that he could not possibly have stopped or averted a collision. Walton v. Owens, 244 F.2d 383, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

In cross actions for damages and personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle intersectional collision, the trial court erred in instructing that the defendant who had been traveling along a road upon which a stop sign was located, not only had the duty to stop his automobile at the intersection but “to wait until he could safely proceed,” since that duty is not required by this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream & Creamery Co., 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1957).

Where the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which he was riding both testified that before entering the intersection of a through highway they had looked to the north and the south, the trial court committed reversible error in instructing that the driver of the car was guilty of negligence in driving his car into the intersection without looking to the north immediately before doing so. Moore v. Herman Guy Auto Parts, Inc., 230 Miss. 189, 92 So. 2d 373, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 358 (Miss. 1957).

Where defendant testified that at the time he had stopped before entering a through street he had seen plaintiff’s car approaching thereon from a distance of about 100 yards and traveling at about 40 miles per hour, but that he did not look any further before driving slowly into the through street where the collision occurred, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction in his action for personal injuries sustained as the result of the collision. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

In action for injuries resulting from automobile collision at intersection of cross road with through traffic lane, failure to give a comparative negligence instruction on behalf of plaintiff is not erroneous when instruction was not requested and plaintiff predicated liability on finding that defendant was negligent and defendant’s negligence was the sole, proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Davidian v. Wendell, 37 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1948).

10. Negligence not found.

In a widow’s wrongful-death action, the trial court properly entered a directed verdict in favor of an employer and an employee because the employee had the right of way to proceed onto the highway unless the decedent’s pickup truck was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and the employee testified that the truck was approximately three-fourths of a mile away. Moreno v. TLSL, Inc., 187 So.3d 127, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 2016).

The trial court did not err in finding in favor of a driver in her action against a city and a police officer stemming from a vehicular accident in which the driver was struck by the officer, because he city’s argument that the driver was contributorily negligent under Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-805 and63-3-505 contained no evidentiary basis. The driver’s view was blocked by a truck and therefore, she was unable to see the officer approach; the driver had a green light at the intersection and she was not speeding or violating any other rule of the road. City of Jackson v. Presley, 40 So.3d 578, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd, 40 So.3d 520, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 2010).

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at a prudent speed, keeping a proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 66, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 858 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Automobiles: accidents arising from merger of traffic on limited access highway with that from service road or ramp. 40 A.L.R.3d 1429.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 239, 240, 281 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 141-148.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898-904, 1341-1524, 1954.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury questions.

1. In general.

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1942).

2. Jury questions.

In an action for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and that of defendant when defendant allegedly drove, without stopping, from a private driveway into the highway upon which plaintiff was proceeding in such a manner that plaintiff could not avoid striking him, conflicting evidence raised jury questions as to defendant’s negligence, and whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Stewart v. Madden, 233 Miss. 206, 101 So. 2d 353, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 287.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 939.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 221-223, 570.1 (complaint in collision between bicyclists when minor bicyclist enters roadway from private driveway).

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 900, 901, 1341-1524, 1955.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 792 et seq.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the subsection designations. Laws of 2007, ch. 315, § 1, inserted new subsections (2) through (5) but failed to renumber the original subsection (2) as present subsection (6). The Joint Committee ratified the correction, renumbering former (2) as present (6), at its June 26, 2007, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment substituted “roadway” for “highway” throughout; substituted “law enforcement officer” for “police officer” at the end of (1); added (2) through (5); redesignated former (2) as present (6); and inserted “a recovery vehicle or a highway maintenance vehicle” in (6).

The 2012 amendment added (3)(c); and added “a utility service vehicle” and/or “the utitlity service vehicle” following “stationery recovery vehicle” throughout the section.

The 2014 amendment in (3), substituted “sanitation vehicle, or” for “or a” preceding “highway maintenance vehicle, when” and substituted “the stationary” for “such” thereafter; deleted “recovery vehicle, the utility service vehicle or the highway maintenance” following “lane change into a lane not adjacent to the stationary” in (3)(a); added (4)(d); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2017 amendment added (5) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and in (6)(i) and (7), inserted references to “sanitation vehicle” and “rural mail carrier vehicle” and made related stylistic changes.

Cross References —

Warning lights used on authorized emergency vehicles, see §63-7-19.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for misdemeanors and felonies, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Illustrative Cases.

1. In general.

Evidence showed the officer was traveling approximately 37 miles per hour with lights and sirens activated, there was nothing obstructing the view of either the person later injured or the officer, and the greater weight of evidence also proved that the person’s left turn signal was not activated. In addition, the officer had consciously stopped at the previous two intersections because the officer considered both of those to be blind intersections, and therefore, the officer’s behavior supported the finding that the officer appreciated the risk involved in approaching the intersection and did not act with reckless disregard. Davis v. Latch, 873 So. 2d 1059, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 445 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, a driver who had a green light was not negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to an emergency police vehicle pursuant to §63-3-809 because the driver of an emergency vehicle has a duty under §63-3-315 to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching a red traffic light controlling an intersection. Andrews v. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 537 So. 2d 447, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1989).

Even though engaged on an emergency call, the driver of a vehicle is subject to the doctrine of contributory negligence. Baird v. Harrington, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1947).

2. Illustrative Cases.

Jury was clearly instructed on Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-809(1),63-3-619(2), and as they fairly announced the applicable law in this wrongful death case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s proposed instruction. Rushing v. Mobile Forest Prods., 282 So.3d 708, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 370 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

Deputy, who stopped at an intersection and, with his blue lights and sirens activated, slowly proceeded across in a stop-and-start fashion, exercised sufficient safety measures to prompt other drivers near the intersection to yield the right-of-way, including the driver traveling in the lane ahead of plaintiffs. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the deputy’s conduct did not demonstrate a conscious indifference to consequences, nor did it rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of persons not engaged in criminal activity, so as subject the county to liability under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c). Rayner v. Pennington, 25 So.3d 305, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 12 (Miss. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Construction and Application of Statutory Provision Requiring Motorists to Yield Right-of-Way to Emergency Vehicle. 87 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 296-298.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 815.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 79, Negligent Vehicular Police Chase.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Parking vehicle.

2. Slowing vehicle down.

3. Standing or stopping.

1. Parking vehicle.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile intersectional collision allegedly caused by defendant’s bus being parked in such a manner as to obscure a stop sign, any negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which he was riding, as well as the driver of the other automobile, did not supersede defendant’s negligence. Meridian Hatcheries, Inc. v. Troutman, 230 Miss. 493, 93 So. 2d 472, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1957).

In an action to recover for the death of a child who was fatally injured when thrown from an automobile fender on which she was riding when the automobile struck an unattended parked automobile on a bridge, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the parking of the automobile upon the bridge and leaving it there unattended for a period of eleven hours was not a proximate contributing cause of the death of the child. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

When the legislature has said that there shall be a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of the main traveled portion of the highway for the free passage of vehicles, and that an automobile shall not be parked upon a bridge, it cannot be reasonably contended that the parking of an automobile upon a bridge nineteen feet three inches in width and leaving the car unattended for a period of eleven hours did not constitute an act of negligence. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

2. Slowing vehicle down.

Since this statute does not require that a motorist drive his vehicle off the pavement while slowing down but only requires him to do so before coming to a stop, it was not violated by a truck driver who, after his airbrakes failed, slowed down but was still moving toward the shoulder of the highway when the truck was struck by an automobile. Sprayberry v. Blount, 336 So. 2d 1289, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1546 (Miss. 1976).

The general rule that the first vehicle in intersection has the right of way does not relieve a truck owner from the duty of having a flagman present to direct and stop traffic at busy intersection where the truck carried a huge cargo and was very slow in going through the intersection. Tant v. Fairchild, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1956).

3. Standing or stopping.

Where defendant stopped his car, to aid a pedestrian, on the traveled portion of the highway with part of his car extending on a highway bridge, so as to leave less than 20 feet clearance, although shoulders of the road were such that defendant could have parked entirely off highway, and plaintiff’s truck struck the rear of defendant’s car causing the damage complained of, defendant was guilty of violation of paragraph m of subsection (1) of this section [Code 1942, § 8217]. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s truck, in colliding with defendant’s car, stopped on the traveled highway and at the entrance to a highway bridge in violation of law, was more responsible for the damages sued for than negligence of defendant and warranted reduction of recovery by 50 per cent. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A private contractor hired by a municipality to operate public parking may not issue traffic tickets or citations. A city could authorize the contractor to immobilize or tow illegally parked vehicles if requested by law enforcement. Kohnke, May 27, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0186.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 811 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 341-363, 431-434.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 971-980, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 575, Feasibility of Stopping or Parking Vehicle off Roadway.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 727 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753-1754.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

3. Construction in general.

4. Impossibility of leaving highway unobstructed.

5. Leaving disabled vehicle on highway.

6. Parked vehicle.

7. Slow moving vehicle.

8. Standing or stopped vehicle.

9. Turning.

10. Questions for jury.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2232 (Miss. 1982).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] will not support an action for injury unless it is the proximate cause thereof. Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1943).

2. Applicability.

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] applies only to highways outside of a business or residence district. Filgo v. Crider, 251 Miss. 234, 168 So. 2d 805, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 343 (Miss. 1964).

3. Construction in general.

The two paragraphs of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] should be construed together so as to give effect to their true meaning. Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1964).

The constitutionality of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] can be sustained by giving the word “practical” in subsection (1) an operation throughout the entire section, and by preserving as referable to the words, “in any event,” the provision that, when possible, a clear view for 200 feet shall be available. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

4. Impossibility of leaving highway unobstructed.

The word “impossible” as used in subsection (2) should be construed as “not reasonably practical”. Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1964).

Where the driver of a motor vehicle was actually negligent in bringing his motor vehicle to a stop partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, the fact that he may have pulled his motor vehicle as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, and that there may have been a clear view of this stopped vehicle for a distance of 200 feet in each direction, does not relieve him from the liability for injuries proximately caused by his negligence. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] is to be construed to the effect that when 20 feet of clearance is impossible, the vehicle shall turn as far to the right as practical including sound and safe shoulders, but must not stop upon any part of the traveled highway unless and until at least 200 feet clear view is available in each direction from the point where the stop is made, save when the vehicle is disabled, as provided for under subsection (2); and save further, when on account of obstructions or equivalent conditions ahead, it is impossible to proceed so as to leave the 200 feet of clear view; and that all this is for the determination of the jury. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

In construing this section [Code 1942, § 8215] the court will take judicial notice that at least 85 per cent of the public highways in the state are of such width that it is only occasionally possible, and that at distant intervals, to stop a vehicle so as to leave as much as 20 feet of unobstructed highway. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

5. Leaving disabled vehicle on highway.

Truck driver negligently violated this section where, though he made several attempts to start his truck after it became disabled and stopped on the highway, he did not look under the hood and thus did not discover that a recently installed battery cable had become unfastened and was the cause of the problem. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Condict, 417 F. Supp. 63, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15305 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] does not relieve the driver of negligence in leaving his disabled vehicle on the highway where it was disabled as a result of an earlier accident caused by his negligence. Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1496 (Miss. 1971).

Motorist who, without negligence on his part, struck a car making a left turn ahead of him, disabling it, is under no duty to other motorists to remove it from traveled portion of highway. Brent v. Heath, 235 Miss. 324, 109 So. 2d 314, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 432 (Miss. 1959).

6. Parked vehicle.

Parking of a tractor and trailers at least two feet on the paved portion of the road, although there was room to park them entirely off, on a dark, foggy night, without rear lights, reflectors, or flares, is a violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215]. Jester v. Bailey, 239 Miss. 384, 123 So. 2d 442, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1960).

When the legislature has said that there shall be a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of the main traveled portion of the highway for the free passage of vehicles, and that an automobile shall not be parked upon a bridge, it cannot be reasonably contended that the parking of an automobile upon a bridge nineteen feet three inches in width and leaving the car unattended for a period of eleven hours did not constitute an act of negligence. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

In an action for personal injuries where the plaintiff’s car ran into defendant’s truck parked on a highway the court did not err in giving an instruction based on this section [Code 1942, § 8215] which requires any vehicle parking upon a highway to leave a width of at least twenty feet of the highway opposite such standing vehicle for the passage of other cars, where the parked truck could have been moved back from seven to ten feet. Planters Wholesale Grocery v. Kincade, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So. 2d 578, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 309 (Miss. 1951).

7. Slow moving vehicle.

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

Where defendant’s truck became partially disabled because of water damage to engine and was proceeding slowly ahead of plaintiff’s automobile, which was struck in the rear by an overtaking truck, and at the time of the collision the driver of defendant’s truck was attempting to move it to place where he could get off the highway and the forward movement of defendant’s truck was halted for very brief intervals, the driver of the defendant’s truck did not violate the parking statute. Fant v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 210 Miss. 474, 49 So. 2d 887, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 284 (Miss. 1951).

8. Standing or stopped vehicle.

Where an injured motorist, who was experiencing chest discomfort, pulled his vehicle partly off the highway, but partly obstructed the right-hand lane of travel in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-903, the motorist’s act was a proximate and contributing cause an accident, and the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to apportion fault. Meka v. Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Co., 67 So.3d 18, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 402 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

Although a county was not liable for an individual’s injuries after a third party hit the individual and forced her into a county garbage truck because weather conditions were determined to be the sole cause of the accident, the county also would have been immune under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-903, as there was no evidence that any negligence was attributed to the driver of the garbage truck. Hayes v. Greene County, 932 So. 2d 831, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 774 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 933 So. 2d 303, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 521 (Miss. 2006).

Where a truck driver stopped his rig on an interstate highway to aid a disabled motorist, §63-3-903 required him to pull off the road to the extent practicable. Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc., 456 So. 2d 698, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1812 (Miss. 1984).

Where the driver of a tractor-trailer, while attempting to turn the rig around, had stopped the vehicle in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] in such a fashion that it was blocking both lanes of a two way highway, the fact that there was no time later in which he could extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had deliberately placed himself cannot excuse his original act of negligence. Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 81, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10685 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

Where the exigencies of the traffic situation require, a motorist can stop momentarily in the highway without being guilty of negligence and is not required to drive the vehicle off the main portion of the highway prior to stopping. Burt v. Duckworth, 206 So. 2d 850, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1592 (Miss. 1968).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] should be construed in a practical manner, and it does not mean that a motorist forced to stop momentarily upon the paved portion of a highway because the vehicle in front of him stopped and oncoming traffic prevented him from passing is guilty of negligence in not immediately driving from the highway onto the shoulder. Whitten v. Land, 188 So. 2d 246, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1375 (Miss. 1966).

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

The driver of a passenger bus, like the operator of any other motor vehicle on the public highway, must not only observe the statutory requirements of bringing his vehicle to a stop, but he must also exercise due care not to endanger the safety of other persons using the highway and this duty to exercise due care exists independently of any statutory regulation. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s truck, in colliding with defendant’s car, stopped on the traveled highway and at the entrance to a highway bridge in violation of law, was more responsible for the damages sued for than negligence of defendant and warranted reduction of recovery by 50 per cent. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

Where defendant stopped his car, to aid pedestrian, on traveled portion of highway at entrance to bridge so as to leave less than 20 feet clearance, although the shoulders of the road were in such condition that defendant could have parked entirely off the highway, and plaintiff’s truck struck the rear of defendant’s car causing the damage complained of, trial judge was warranted in finding that the stopping of defendant’s car at the particular place shown by the evidence was in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215], and constituted actionable negligence. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] by stopping a bus with the rear end thereof out into the highway was not the proximate cause of injury to a passenger, who after alighting from the bus passed around the rear end of the bus into traffic and was struck by an automobile. Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1943).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

The right to travel being the right to go from one place to another includes the right to stop on the way, temporarily, for a legitimate or necessary purpose when that purpose is an immediate incident to travel; and such rights, being fundamental, are constitutional rights which the legislature may regulate in pursuance of the police power but may not arbitrarily or unreasonably restrict. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

9. Turning.

Where the driver of a tractor-trailer, while attempting to turn the rig around, had stopped the vehicle in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] in such a fashion that it was blocking both lanes of a two way highway, the fact that there was no time later in which he could extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had deliberately placed himself cannot excuse his original act of negligence. Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 81, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10685 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

10. Questions for jury.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when pickup truck in which he was riding collided with a passenger bus where the bus driver stopped his bus to discharge passengers at nighttime in the rain with approximately one-half of the bus on paved portion of the highway whether the bus driver was negligent in not parking entirely off the paved portion of the highway was a question for the jury. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 226 Miss. 624, 85 So. 2d 179, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 440 (Miss. 1956).

In an action to recover for the death of a child who was fatally injured when thrown from an automobile fender on which she was riding when the automobile struck an unattended parked automobile on a bridge, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the parking of the automobile upon the bridge and leaving it there unattended for a period of eleven hours was not a proximate contributing cause of the death of the child. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duties and liabilities between owners or drivers of parked or parking vehicles. 25 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Sudden or unsignalled stop or slowing of motor vehicle as negligence. 29 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability for injury or damage growing out of pulling out of parked motor vehicle. 29 A.L.R.2d 107.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle stops on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 153.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 884 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Accidents, Forms 341-363, 431-434.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 971-979, 1341-1524, 2002.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 575, Feasibility of Stopping or Parking Vehicle off Roadway.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 727 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In view of the statute requiring police officers to remove a vehicle from the highway when it is a danger to the traveling public, the partial unloading of a rental truck, which was so heavily loaded that it could not be moved without being partially unloaded, and the removal of the truck to the courthouse, was not an illegal search, where at the time the officers moved the truck, they did not search it or seize any of its contents, and did not know that a crime had been committed. Williamson v. State, 248 So. 2d 634, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1476 (Miss. 1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 311.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles Municipal police officers may issue citations for violations of this section within the corporate limits. In addition, municipal governing authorities may adopt ordinances regulating parking of vehicles and setting forth penalties for parking violations. Hamilton, April 12, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0210.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 312.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 887.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 761, 762-766.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Estoppel by acquiescence.

1. In general.

Owner, who parked his automobile and left it unattended, without removing the ignition key, was not liable for injuries caused when his automobile, driven by a thief, ran through a red traffic light at a reckless rate of speed and crashed into the car in which the plaintiff was riding. Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So. 2d 243, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 618 (Miss. 1956).

2. Estoppel by acquiescence.

In an action based on the negligence of defendant car dealer in placing plaintiff’s car on its parking lot with the key in the ignition, which resulted in its theft, the county judge was in error in sustaining the affirmative defense of estoppel by acquiescence, because the custom and usage of the defendant in parking the cars of its customers on its parking lot with the keys in the ignition was against public policy. Gates v. Owen Chevrolet Co., 294 So. 2d 179, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1818 (Miss. 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 16 A.L.R.2d 979.

Liability for damage or injury by stranger starting motor vehicle left parked on street. 51 A.L.R.2d 633.

Failure of motorist to cramp wheels against curb or turn them away from traffic, or to shut off engine, as causing accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 42 A.L.R.3d 1283.

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Liability of motorist who left key in ignition for damage or injury caused by stranger operating the vehicle. 45 A.L.R.3d 787.

Presumption of negligence and application of Res ipsa loquitur Doctrine in action for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of a parked motor vehicle. 55 A.L.R.3d 1260.

Liability for personal injury or property damage caused by unauthorized use of automobile which has been parked with keys removed from ignition. 70 A.L.R.4th 276.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 922-925.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 363.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1341-1524, 2001.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 767-771.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. “Clearly marked.”

The area in which the defendant parked was clearly marked to restrict access to emergency vehicles, notwithstanding that there were no signs posted to indicate that the area was restricted, where there was evidence presented that the area was marked with yellow and black stripes. Langston v. City of Iuka, 792 So. 2d 1013, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 171 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 303.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 762, 763, 765 et seq.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Where defendant’s driver was grossly negligent in entering intersection at 50 miles per hour without stopping as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8213], and collided with plaintiff’s driver who, in entering the intersection on a through street at unabated speed of 30 miles per hour, was prima facie negligent under Code 1942, § 8176, the negligence of plaintiff’s driver was a contributing factor to the accident and warranted application of the comparative negligence statute (Code 1942, § 1454). Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

2. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 239, 240.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic §§ 804-810.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 166-170.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 895, 896, 1341-1524, 1876.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 837.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1756.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Negligence per se.

Just as one seeking relief for any other cause of action needs not refer to the case establishing the particular tort at the center of his case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not demand that a plaintiff claiming negligence per se include within his complaint an explicit citation to authority simply for the sake of doing so; so long as the complaint alleges particular conduct that clearly violates a statute or regulation, it pleads negligence per se with sufficient particularity. Therefore, summary judgment was denied in a negligence per se case where there was no citation to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1003 since a complaint was sufficient where it alleged that a truck driver failed to adhere to the proper standard of care when he did not yield the right of way. Welch v. Loftus, 776 F. Supp. 2d 222, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17963 (S.D. Miss. 2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 810.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 842.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

The failure of a motorist, who was backing his automobile out of his driveway onto the street in a thickly populated neighborhood, to stop his automobile upon the rear of the driveway before reaching the sidewalk was prima facie negligence. Hatten v. Brame, 233 Miss. 509, 103 So. 2d 4, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1958).

2. Instructions.

In an action for personal injuries sustained when a blind pedestrian was struck when defendant backed his automobile from his driveway to a public street in a thickly populated neighborhood, where the evidence established that the defendant failed to stop his automobile upon the rear of the driveway before entering the sidewalk area, the trial court properly granted the pedestrian a peremptory instruction on liability. Hatten v. Brame, 233 Miss. 509, 103 So. 2d 4, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 287.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 939 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 221-223.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 941-949, 1341-1524, 1991, 1992.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 792-803.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in (1); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2018 amendment inserted “or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment” in (1) and (2).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Proof of violation of statute is not necessary in order to prove negligence, and injured party established prima facie case of negligence by proving that driver violated statute by not stopping at crossing even though approaching train was plainly visible and in dangerous proximity to crossing, and by proving that driver was negligent in that he failed to keep proper lookout by looking back as he approached railroad crossing, rejecting contention of driver that because there was no evidence crossing was marked by signal or stop sign injured party had failed to prove driver had violated statute and therefore had failed to prove negligence. Dale v. Bridges, 507 So. 2d 375, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2525 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 439, Inadequacy of Warning Device at Railroad Crossing.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “Mississippi Transportation Commission” for “state highway commission” in the first sentence; substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in the second sentence; and made a minor stylistic change.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-2. [Reserved for future use.]

3. Negligence.

1.-2. [Reserved for future use.]

3. Negligence.

Federal district court did not err in rejecting an injured contract worker’s contention that a railroad was negligent per se for failing to install a flagman near a crossing 20-30 feet from where the worker was removing obstructions from the right-of-way; although the worker’s truck was hit by a train while crossing the tracks, the evidence showed that the location of the work zone did not force the worker to “foul the tracks” while maneuvering his truck and that he had violated three separate laws when he crossed the tracks: not stopping after hearing the locomotive’s whistle in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §77-9-249(1), failing to stop at a crossbuck in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §77-9-249(4), and failing to stop at a stop sign in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1009, any of which could have been the proximate cause of the accident. Baker v. Canadian National/Illinois Cent. R.R., 536 F.3d 357, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15178 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1171, 129 S. Ct. 1317, 173 L. Ed. 2d 585, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1320 (U.S. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in (1); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Violation of this requirement held to establish negligence of driver of truck struck by train at crossing. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Nelson, 245 Miss. 395, 146 So. 2d 69, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 560, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 527, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure of occupants of motor vehicle stalled on railroad crossing to get out and move to place of safety as contributory negligence. 21 A.L.R.2d 742.

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in the second paragraph; and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2018 amendment inserted “or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment” twice in the second paragraph and once in the last paragraph.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Ordinance regulating pedestrian’s use of streets held reasonable because of automobile traffic. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Application of “assured clear distance ahead” or “radius of lights” doctrine to accident involving pedestrian crossing street or highway. 31 A.L.R.2d 1424.

Contributory negligence of one standing in highway to attempt to warn approaching motorists of dangerous situation. 53 A.L.R.2d 1002.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 320.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 464, 465, 468 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 895, 896.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Motorist’s duty is to drive upon a highway at no greater speed than is reasonable, having regard to traffic, and to keep his car under control and to be on the alert for other persons and vehicles, and to anticipate their presence. Williams v. Moses, 234 Miss. 453, 106 So. 2d 45, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1958).

2. Instructions.

An instruction as to the liability of a motorist to a pedestrian who unexpectedly walks in front of his car is not proper in a case in which the pedestrian had almost completed the crossing of a three-lane highway and was within 3 feet of the curb. Williams v. Moses, 234 Miss. 453, 106 So. 2d 45, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 299, 302, 320 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 453, 467.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 481-505, 903, 904, 1341-1524, 1784-1789, 1985.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 895, 896.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Duty of motorists-In general.

2. —To sound horn.

3. Duty of pedestrians.

4. Jury instructions.

5. Questions for jury.

6. Negligence not found.

7.-15. [Reserved for future use.]

16. Under former laws.

1. Duty of motorists-In general.

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child’s parents’ home, the trial court properly declined to give a peremptory instruction on liability favorable to the parents where the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, portrayed circumstances from which reasonable minds could find that the driver had afforded the infant all of the care which was due under the circumstances, including the presence of her parents in the immediate vicinity, and where the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the driver had violated the duty imposed by statute to “exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.” Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1980).

The absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal; The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. Smith v. Walton, 271 So. 2d 409, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1507 (Miss. 1973).

If a pedestrian, standing stationary at the edge of a paved portion of a highway is a child of tender years, or communicates by appearance or action that he is intoxicated, ill, or otherwise not in possession of his faculties, the approaching driver may be bound to anticipate that he will, or that there is sufficient risk that he might, leave his place of safety and come on to the traveled highway. Wendelken v. McMurray, 388 F.2d 553, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 952, 88 S. Ct. 1850, 20 L. Ed. 2d 864, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1581 (U.S. 1968).

2. —To sound horn.

In an action for death of pedestrian who was struck by a motorist as she was crossing a highway, it was an error to peremptorily instruct the jury that it was the duty of a driver of the truck to sound his horn. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

It is unnecessary for a motorist to blow his horn at a pedestrian who knows that the car is overtaking or meeting him or her on the highway, and the purpose of the blowing of horn is to give notice of approach of the automobile. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

3. Duty of pedestrians.

Where the collision which resulted in the decedent’s death occurred at a point in the roadway where there was not a marked crosswalk or an intersection, the decedent owed a duty to yield the right-of-way to the defendant’s truck and his failure to do so was negligent. Hornburger v. Baird, 508 F. Supp. 84, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16076 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

The absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal; The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. Smith v. Walton, 271 So. 2d 409, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1507 (Miss. 1973).

4. Jury instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an accident in which a pedestrian was struck by an automobile, an instruction which conformed to the first part of §63-3-1105, dealing with the duty of a pedestrian to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles operating on the road, but which failed to incorporate the last portion of §63-3-1105, dealing with the duty of a driver to pedestrians already within a roadway, was incomplete; the instruction as worded was virtually peremptory for defendant, and thus plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. Ross v. Miller, 441 So. 2d 541, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 3025 (Miss. 1983).

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child’s parents’ home, the trial court properly declined to give a peremptory instruction on liability favorable to the parents where the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, portrayed circumstances from which reasonable minds could find that the driver had afforded the infant all of the care which was due under the circumstances, including the presence of her parents in the immediate vicinity, and where the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the driver had violated the duty imposed by statute to “exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.” Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1980).

In an action for death of pedestrian who was struck by a motorist as she was crossing a highway, it was an error to peremptorily instruct the jury that it was the duty of a driver of the truck to sound his horn. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

5. Questions for jury.

In a personal injury action, a truck driver who struck a pedestrian was not negligent as a matter of law by virtue of the fact that he did not see the pedestrian in the highway in time to avoid striking him; the issue of the driver’s negligence was for the jury to decide. Hood v. Oakley, 519 So. 2d 1236, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1988).

6. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at a prudent speed, keeping a proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 66, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 858 (Miss. 2004).

7.-15. [Reserved for future use.]

16. Under former laws.

Negligence of pedestrian, under the circumstances, was very slight, consisting of being on the right-hand side of the highway instead of the left side, but off the traveled part of the highway where it was unlikely that any injury would be inflicted by automobiles passing along the same side of the highway in the same direction, because the paved part of the highway was ample for the passage of the vehicles, without leaving the pavement. Evans Motor Freight Lines v. Fleming, 184 Miss. 808, 185 So. 821, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1939).

Issue of injured pedestrian’s contributory negligence in walking on right side of highway was properly submitted to jury, under statute requiring pedestrians to walk on left side. Basque v. Anticich, 177 Miss. 855, 172 So. 141, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1937).

Motorist had duty upon observing pedestrian walking on right side of highway with back to automobile to sound horn until pedestrian became aware of approach, and, if pedestrian continued unaware, to slow down and come to stop, if necessary. Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695, 158 So. 552, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1934).

Motorist who, although observing that boy walking on right side of road with back to approaching automobile was unaware of automobile, failed to slacken speed, and drove on left side to pass boy, who suddenly, becoming aware of automobile, jumped to left into its path, held liable for death of boy. Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695, 158 So. 552, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1934).

Instruction that automobile driver was under no duty to sound horn to warn pedestrian, walking along left side of street, if he saw him so close to automobile that he had no time to do so, held erroneous. Reid v. McDevitt, 163 Miss. 226, 140 So. 722, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1932).

It was duty of automobile driver on left side of street to give signals of his approach to pedestrian walking ahead of him on such side. Reid v. McDevitt, 163 Miss. 226, 140 So. 722, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to comply with statute regulating travel by pedestrian along highway as affecting right to recovery for injuries or death resulting from collision with automobile. 45 A.L.R.3d 658.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 301, 320.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 457-459.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 481-505, 1341-1524, 1784-1789, 1959.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 595, Motorist’s Negligence in Striking Person Lying in Road.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 895, 897.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Anti-hitchhiking laws: their construction and effect in action for injury to hitchhiker. 46 A.L.R.3d 964.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment brought the section forward without change.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 506.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 885.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at prudent speed, keeping proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 66, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 858 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Motorist’s liability for striking person lying in road. 41 A.L.R.4th 303.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 230.

Cross References —

Careless driving, see §63-3-1213.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

Imposition of standard state assessmen in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for speeding, reckless and careless driving violations, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. What constitutes reckless driving, in general.

3. Reckless driving under particular circumstances.

4. —Weaving.

5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

The evident purpose of this section [Code 1942, § 8175] is not to punish as criminal acts of simple negligence, or even where gross negligence is shown, in traffic accidents, unless it is of such character as to evince a wilful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property on the highways. Sanford v. State, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1944).

2. What constitutes reckless driving, in general.

Conviction for reckless driving did not require that defendant pose a danger to another person, but to himself and his property; therefore, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction due to the fact that defendant posed a danger to himself and an officer where he was proceeding at a high rate of speed on the wrong side of the road. Ouzts v. State, 947 So. 2d 1005, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 698 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Reckless driving means the commission of conscious acts or omissions which the driver knows or should know create an unreasonable risk of injury or damage either to the driver and his property, or to the person or property of others. Barnes v. State, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1964).

A motorist is not guilty of reckless driving where there are no persons or vehicles on the highway ahead of and in view of the motorist or where the driving allegedly reckless did not occur on the highway. Gause v. State, 203 Miss. 377, 34 So. 2d 729, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1948).

3. Reckless driving under particular circumstances.

Evidence was sufficient to establish reckless driving by the defendant where (1) a police officer observed the defendant driving at an excessively high rate of speed while weaving in and out of traffic in a 45 mile per hour speed zone and passing other vehicles at an excessive rate of speed, and (2) the officer testified that after questioning the defendant about his speed, the defendant responded and admitted to driving at a speed of 135 miles per hour (although a passenger in his car stated that the defendant drove at 60 to 65 miles per hour) and that he drove at that rate because “I wanted to.” Nix v. State, 763 So. 2d 896, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 175 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

Where defendant drives through a village and he is committing no crime and violating no law, and where two men without possession of any authority undertake to stop him he continues wherein two men shoot at him or at his vehicle and where one of the men jumps into automobile and pursues him and during that pursuit he drives motor vehicle faster than legal speed limit, all as a result of then being pursued by one who had tried to shoot him or the vehicle in which he was riding, the defendant is not guilty of the crime of reckless driving of an automobile. Brown v. State, 227 Miss. 823, 87 So. 2d 84, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 758 (Miss. 1956).

Evidence that state witness approached intersection at a speed of 15 or 20 miles per hour and that accused was approaching intersection from another direction at about the same speed and that accused neglected to be on a constant lookout to see the other vehicle in time to stop his car before striking it, did not establish reckless driving which would subject accused to conviction under this section [Code 1942, § 8175]. Sanford v. State, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1944).

In the absence of proof that accused was driving in a reckless manner or at a rate of speed such as to indicate a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, it is to be assumed that the presence of passengers for hire in his own car would indicate a contrary state of mind. Sanford v. State, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1944).

4. —Weaving.

Where police officers observed the defendant motorist’s vehicle weaving from side to side from one traffic lane to the other they were justified in arresting him on a charge of reckless driving. Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1475 (Miss. 1967).

The driving of a vehicle so as to weave back and forth across the line separating two traffic lanes is such reckless driving as to warrant a constable in stopping it, although there was no traffic. Barnes v. State, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1964).

5. Miscellaneous.

There was no error in failing to give a lesser included offense instruction because reckless driving was not a lesser included offense of the crime of failing to yield to a law enforcement officer; no element of the crime of reckless driving was included in the crime of fleeing a law-enforcement officer. Johnson v. State, 228 So.3d 933, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 112 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 120, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2017).

Circuit court improperly ruled for a family in their action against the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks (MDWFP) because it erroneously applied the legal standard for reckless disregard under the Mississippi Torts Claim Act; MDWFP officers possessed the discretion to request that boaters pull out of the hazardous and high-traffic area of a river, and the MDWFP possessed the authority to regulate the boating traffic on the river and the discretion to do so in a safe manner. Miss. Dep't of Wildlife, Fisheries, & Parks v. Webb, 248 So.3d 823, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), rev'd, 248 So.3d 772, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 2018).

There was no error in failing to give a lesser included offense instruction because reckless driving was not a lesser included offense of the crime of failing to yield to a law enforcement officer; no element of the crime of reckless driving was included in the crime of fleeing a law-enforcement officer. Johnson v. State, 228 So.3d 933, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 112 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 120, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2017).

Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser non-included offense of reckless driving at his trial for aggravated assault, Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-7 (Rev. 2006), where he requested the charge because a conviction for aggravated assault required proof of intent, the crimes had different elements, and there was conflicting evidence as to whether defendant intended to injure police officers when he failed to stop and engaged them in a multiple-vehicle chase. Brooks v. State, 18 So.3d 833, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 471 (Miss. 2009).

City police officers, who, while pursuing motorists for reckless driving and breach of peace, shot at and deflated the rear tires of the automobile, were not liable for property damages or personal injuries sustained by the motorists in view of the jury’s adoption of the testimony of officers that they did not shoot at the motorist or automobile generally but aimed at the rear tires. State use of Holmes v. Pope, 212 Miss. 446, 54 So. 2d 658, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1951).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a county constable under Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 in a personal injury suit because the constable had immunity, under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c), for injuries to a father, which occurred when the constable’s car collided with his four-wheeler, because there was significant evidence that the father was engaged in criminal activity that had a causal nexus to the accident; the father was driving on a suspended license and pled guilty to reckless driving, however summary judgment against the father’s sons was improper because genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the sons were engaged in criminal activity, whether any criminal activity on the part of the sons had a “causal nexus” to the accident, and whether the constable acted with reckless disregard in his pursuit of appellants. Giles v. Brown, 962 So. 2d 612, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 930 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 962 So. 2d 38, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 477 (Miss. 2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Under Miss. Code Section 63-3-1201, speeding in and of itself is not reckless; however, other circumstances may exist which would cause speeding to be considered reckless driving; such circumstances must appear on ticket. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

For charges to be considered reckless driving there must be a “wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Gordon, Sept. 21, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0574.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Statute prohibiting reckless driving: Definiteness and certainty. 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 337 et seq.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 647, Driver’s Negligence in Backing Up.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1547 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 1802.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 647, Driver’s Negligence in Backing Up.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 389, Premises Liability: Obstruction of Visibility at Intersection.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 677, Liability of Motor Vehicle Passenger for Accident.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 733.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 678.

Cross References —

Reckless driving, see §63-3-1201.

Imposition of standard state assessmen in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for speeding, reckless and careless driving violations, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

2. Instructions.

3. Probable cause.

4. Preservation for review.

5. Evidence sufficient.

1. Constitutionality.

The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as, although the language of the statute was broad, ordinary people could understand its meaning. United States v. Escalante, 239 F.3d 678, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 614 (5th Cir. Miss. 2001).

This section is not unconstitutionally vague, notwithstanding the contention that the phrase “careless or imprudent manner” is vague and subjective and provides no objective criteria by which an individual is put on notice of what conduct the statute proscribes. Leuer v. City of Flowood, 744 So. 2d 266, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 216 (Miss. 1999).

2. Instructions.

The court properly instructed the jury with regard to careless, rather than reckless, driving where the defendant was cited for careless driving after he was stopped after an officer observed him driving 20 to 25 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone and weaving between 2 northbound lanes. Varvaris v. City of Pearl, 723 So. 2d 1215, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 986 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

3. Probable cause.

Because a police officer observed defendant’s vehicle cross the right lane fog line once, and then again approach or “bump” the fog line, and the video evidence from the officer’s car camera, while unclear, did not directly contradict the officer’s testimony, there was sufficient evidence that the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had driven in a careless or imprudent manner, without due regard for the width and use of the streets and highways, and to stop defendant’s vehicle. Martin v. State, 240 So.3d 1047, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 424 (Miss. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2592, 201 L. Ed. 2d 307, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3234 (U.S. 2018).

Testimony from the arresting officer that he observed defendant’s truck pass so close to a deputy that the outside mirror could have struck the officer and that the truck then ran off the road provided sufficient probable cause for a traffic stop based on careless driving. Ludwig v. State, 122 So.3d 1229, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Defendants’ convictions for possession of more than five kilograms of marijuana were appropriate because, under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213, defendants’ vehicle was seen driving in a careless or imprudent manner and the deputy had the authority to stop them. When defendants acted nervous, the deputy’s retrieval of a drug-detecting dog was appropriate and the drug-detecting dog’s positive alerts created probable cause for the deputy to search the trunk of the rental car. Shelton v. State, 45 So.3d 1203, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 141 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 49 So.3d 636, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 548 (Miss. 2010), cert. denied, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 553 (Miss. Oct. 21, 2010).

Court could not say that it was clear that a police officer’s observation of a driver driving in the middle of two lanes did not or could not constitute a violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213, nor could it say that there was no objective basis for the stop of the driver’s vehicle; thus the case was not one in which the officer acted without any objective reason or on the basis of a purely subjective feeling or “hunch.” On the contrary, the officer did have an objective, reasonable suspicion that the driver had committed the traffic violation of careless driving, even though he was ultimately acquitted of the careless driving charge. Adams v. City of Booneville, 910 So. 2d 720, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

There was probable cause for the stop of a driver’s vehicle because the time of night was very late (2:30 a.m.), the particular night, New Year’s Eve, was one on which persons were widely known to celebrate and often consume alcohol, and in the officer’s observation, the vehicle was traveling without due regard for the width and use of the highway by traveling in the middle of two lanes of traffic, and the reserve officer accompanying the officer saw the vehicle swerve. All of these circumstances served to bolster the conclusion that the driver appeared to the officer to be driving in violation of the careless driving statute, Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213. Adams v. City of Booneville, 910 So. 2d 720, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine found during a strip search conducted after defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence. There was probable cause for the traffic stop where a police officer witnessed the vehicle defendant was driving approach the curb twice; the presence or absence of traffic is not controlling to a determination of carelessness. Henderson v. State, 878 So. 2d 246, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 657 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence, first offense, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-11-30(1)(a), was proper where there was probable cause for the stop because she had repeatedly crossed over the center line and that constituted careless driving pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213; thus, there was probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had been committed and defendant was properly stopped for further police action. Saucier v. City of Poplarville, 858 So. 2d 933, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1025 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

4. Preservation for review.

Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, careless driving, and driving without a seatbelt were appropriate because defendant failed to raise any of the issues he complained of on appeal in his motion for a directed verdict or new trial and because the facts of the case provided sufficient evidence to convict. Jones v. State, 958 So. 2d 840, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 423 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

5. Evidence sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of running a red light and careless driving where a police officer testified that she observed defendant drive his entire vehicle over a concrete median and saw him run a red light. Lobo v. City of Ridgeland, 135 So.3d 148, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 300 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for careless driving because a police sergeant, who responded to two independent calls from drivers who reported that defendant was driving carelessly, testified that defendant was kind of drifting from right to left, that it was pretty obvious that defendant could not maintain control of defendant’s vehicle to keep it in defendant’s direct lane, and that defendant did not stop when the sergeant turned on the police car’s blue lights and did not come to a complete stop at a stop sign. McMurtry v. State, 105 So.3d 395, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 531 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Speeding does not in and of itself constitute careless driving; speeding with other attendant circumstances would constitute careless driving. Mixon, March 10, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0883.

A violation of the statute for careless driving is not based solely on whether traffic is present but should be based on all the combined factors listed in the statute. Gordon, Sept. 21, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0574.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Statute prohibiting reckless driving: definiteness and certainty. 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 358.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 582-587, 652 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal Liability for Street Racing (Drag Racing). 89 A.L.R.6th 565.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state fee in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

Cross References —

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – Rules of the Road, see §§63-3-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – Equipment and Identification Regulations, see §§63-7-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – Traffic Violations Procedure, see §§63-9-1 et seq.

Authority of county board of supervisors to declare unusual or uncommon load or weight to be conveyed on or over county roads, etc, see §65-7-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Automobiles: construction and operation of statutes or regulations restricting the weight of motor vehicles or their loads. 45 A.L.R.3d 503.

Authority of Public Official, Whose Duties or Functions Generally Do Not Entail Traffic Stops, To Effectuate Traffic Stop of Vehicle. 18 A.L.R.6th 519.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 208, 213.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 212.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1709-1714.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment inserted present (e) and redesignated former (e) as present (f); and made minor punctuation changes throughout the section.

The 2003 amendment added (g).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The exception of implements of husbandry temporarily moved upon a highway does not apply to a farm tractor driven thirty miles along a highway from one farm of its owner to another. Farmer v. Humphreys County Memorial Hospital, 236 Miss. 35, 109 So. 2d 356, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1959).

Cross References —

Power of county board of supervisors to declare what is an unusual or uncommon load or weight to be conveyed on or over roads or bridges, see §65-7-43.

Power of county board of supervisors, by order, to regulate tire width and maximum load of any vehicle using public roads and bridges, see §§65-7-45 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 209, 211.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment added (4).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The limitation of the width of farm tractors moving upon a highway, to ten feet, includes attachments thereto. Farmer v. Humphreys County Memorial Hospital, 236 Miss. 35, 109 So. 2d 356, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1959).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 210.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 747.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Liability for injury or damage caused by collision with portion of load projecting beyond rear or side of motor vehicle or trailer. 21 A.L.R.3d 371.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 210.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 747.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 49, 50.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

1. In general.

In view of the maximum height permissible for vehicles under this section [Code 1942, § 8267], a railroad is negligent in maintaining an underpass not affording sufficient clearance for such vehicles. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Farris, 259 F.2d 445, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 4753 (5th Cir. Miss. 1958).

2. Applicability.

In a case in which it was undisputed that the height of the load hauled by a trucking company exceeded twelve feet, six inches, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-5-17, the trucking company was not strictly liable for the damage to a car when the load snagged a telephone wire and caused a telephone company’s pole to fall and damage the car. The statute’s imposition of strict liability did not apply to claims for damage to “structures” other than the overhead structure or structure supporting the overhead wire, thus the statute was inapplicable to the claims for recovery for damage to the car or for personal injuries.” Moncrief v. Bennett Truck Transp., LLC, 631 F. Supp. 2d 841, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46915 (S.D. Miss. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 210.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 747 et seq

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Law Reviews.

Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment added (9).

The 2003 amendment substituted “fifty-three (53)” for “fifty (50)” in (2).

The 2019 amendment added “or as otherwise allowable by federal law” at the end of (7).

Cross References —

Additional exceptions to maximum vehicle length, see §63-5-21.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The towing of more than two trailers is prohibited by Section 63-5-19(4), however, it is legal to pull two trailers simultaneously; with regard to the maximum length of the towing vehicle and the trailers, subsection (1) limits a vehicle to a length of no more than forty (40) feet while subsection (3) limits trailers drawn in a double trailer combination to a length of thirty (30) feet each. Joseph, May 9, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0205.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Federal regulation of tractor-trailer configuration under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (49 USCS Appendix §§ 2301 et seq). 77 A.L.R. Fed. 350.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 210.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 747.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Law Reviews.

Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability or recovery in automobile negligence action arising out of collision or upset as affected by operation of vehicle without, or with improper, clearance, load, or similar auxiliary lights. 62 A.L.R.3d 844.

Federal regulation of tractor-trailer configuration under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (49 USCS Appendix §§ 2301 et seq). 77 A.L.R. Fed. 350.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 210.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 747-749.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 49, 50.

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment, inserted “(3)” and added “or as otherwise allowable by federal law.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 210.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 747 et seq

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Cross References —

Sanitary regulation of mobile homes, house trailers, trailer and tourist camps, see §41-25-13.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Safety chain requirement.

1. In general.

This statute being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed, and since it does not identify the protected class or group of persons, and has no exclusions, and does not exclude one riding in a trailer, it can be assumed that it is a safety measure enacted for the benefit and protection of pedestrians, bystanders, motorists, and other individuals who reasonably might be expected to be affected by a violation of the statute, and that the plaintiff in a personal injury suit who was injured while riding in the trailer, was one of the class of persons which the statute was intended to protect. U-Haul Co. v. White, 232 So. 2d 705, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1635 (Miss. 1970).

2. Safety chain requirement.

Given Legislative intent under this section to protect public from damage and injury resulting from runaway trailers which have separated from towing vehicle, provisions of statute requiring safety chain would be construed as applicable to trailer which was coupled with vehicle being towed in excess of 20 miles per hour even though vehicle and trailer were temporarily slowed to less than 20 miles per hour at which time trailer became uncoupled. Bullock v. Fairburn, 353 So. 2d 759, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: liability for accident arising from escape of trailer. 43 A.L.R.3d 725.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Federal regulation of tractor-trailer configuration under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (49 USCS Appendix §§ 2301 et seq). 77 A.L.R. Fed. 350.

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 751, 932-938.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 789, 790.

Cross References —

Maximum allowable gross weights of vehicles and loads, see §§63-5-29,63-5-31,63-5-33.

Authority of county board of supervisors to declare unusual or uncommon load or weight to be conveyed on or over county roads, etc, see §65-7-43.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The statute grants the Transportation Commission the authority to enact police and protective regulations for the control of traffic on the state highways, which may include setting limits that would have the effect of limiting truck traffic on certain highways for public safety reasons; however, the Commission should, in the exercise of this power, establish procedures and criteria for determining the necessity of any such action, and apply those procedures consistently. Hall, Oct. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0499.

A municipality may impose weight limits on streets and issue tickets for violations; however, such limitations may not effective solely upon vehicles associated with the oil industry – they must be uniformly applicable to all vehicles exceeding the determined weight limit. Thach, Apr. 23, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0221.

There is no authority for the board of supervisors to ban or limit the type of trucks, i.e. gravel trucks, traveling over county roads without regard to size or weight. Sherard, Aug. 30, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0501.

A municipality has authority to set weight limits of vehicles passing over municipal streets, and any driver operating a vehicle in contravention of any weight limit shall be liable for all damage which the highway or street may sustain as a result of that operation; further, municipal governing authorities may seek damages in a civil action. Richardson, May 16, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Violation of regulation governing size or weight of motor vehicles, or combinations of vehicles and loads, on the highway as basis of liability for personal injury, death, or damage to private property. 21 A.L.R.3d 989.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 208.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 747 et seq

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Law Reviews.

Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

Cross References —

Fee for emergency permit to haul weight in excess of that authorized by this section, see §27-19-81.

Exceptions made for the purpose of calculating weight limits under this section, see §63-5-34.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A County Board of Supervisors has the authority to prohibit full 80,000 loads of logs produced on “such places of production” from being transported by the “nearest route” if such nearest route has a low weight limit imposed on it by the county. Barrett, Dec. 5, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0723.

Concrete trucks must comply with the maximum gross weight of 57,650 pounds and the gross weight requirements based upon the axle spacing when traveling upon the highways designated by this section and otherwise known as low weight roads. Warren, August 13, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0420.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 208.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 747 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Cross References —

Fee for emergency permit to haul weight in excess of that authorized by this section, see §27-19-81.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 208.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 747.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in a statutory reference in (5)(c) by substituting “paragraph (b) of this subsection” for “paragraph (b) of this section.” The Joint Legislative Committee ratified the correction at its July 22, 2010 meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment inserted “wood chips, wood shavings, sawdust” preceding “fill dirt” in the fifth sentence of (3); and substituted “July 1, 2005” for “July 1, 2002,” in (5)(d).

The 2005 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the date of the repealer for (5), located in (5)(d), from “July 1, 2005” until “July 1, 2009”; and making minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment substituted “July 1, 2013” for “July 1, 2009” at the end of (5)(d).

The 2013 amendment extended the date of the repealer for subsection (5) from “July 1, 2013” to “July 1, 2016” in (5)(d).

The 2016 amendment substituted “July 1, 2019” for “July 1, 2016” in (5)(d).

The 2018 amendment, in (3), added the third sentence, substituted “ten percent (10%)” for “five percent (5%)” in the fourth sentence, and deleted the former last sentence, which read: “The tolerance shall not be allowed for vehicles loading at a point of origin having scales available for weighing each individual axle of the vehicle; provided, however, that vehicles loading at a point of origin having scales available for weighing the vehicle shall not be eligible for any tolerance over the gross weight limit of eighty thousand (80,000) pounds”; substituted “ten percent (10%)” for “five percent (5%)” in (4); and extended the date of the repealer for subsection (5) by substituting “July 1, 2022” for “July 1, 2019.”

Cross References —

Fee for emergency permit to haul weight in excess of that authorized by this section, see §27-19-81.

Exceptions made for the purpose of calculating weight limits under this section, see §63-5-34.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Amended statutes allowing operators of vehicles hauling sand and gravel to apply for harvest permit to be issued by Transportation Commission, for purpose of authorizing such vehicles to operate on non-federal highways within state at maximum weight of 84,000 pounds, were unconstitutional in that they removed discretion over maximum vehicle weight limits on county roads from county boards of supervisors and vested this authority in Department of Transportation. State v. Mississippi Ass'n of Supervisors, 699 So. 2d 1221, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 448 (Miss. 1997).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A Supreme Court decision invalidated only those portions of the harvest permit statutes that allow the holder of such a permit to travel county roads without regard to county-set weight limits; the remaining portions of the statute, including the requirement to collect and distribute fees to the counties, continue in effect and should be carried out by the Department of Transportation. Warren, May 12, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0230.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 208.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 747.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 49, 50.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The statute does not grant the Transportation Commission the authority to limit weights of vehicles traveling state highways solely for public safety reasons. Hall, Oct. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0499.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment added (3).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Editor’s Notes —

The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See §27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Cross References —

Personnel charged with enforcement of weight and tax laws pursuant to this section required to complete course of instruction, see §65-1-44.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

For the purposes of Section 45-2-1, weight enforcement officers employed by the Mississippi Department of Transportation are “law enforcement officers” and their beneficiaries would be eligible to receive the death benefits provided for by that statute. Brown, Jan. 17, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0009.

Editor’s Notes —

The Office of Motor Vehicle Comptroller has been abolished and the functions transferred to the State Tax Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. See §27-5-153 for description of transfer of functions.

Cross References —

Special tax on carriers of property for each motor vehicle, truck tractor, or road tractor operated pursuant to this section, see §27-19-15.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

For the purposes of Section 45-2-1, weight enforcement officers employed by the Mississippi Department of Transportation are “law enforcement officers” and their beneficiaries would be eligible to receive the death benefits provided for by that statute. Brown, Jan. 17, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0009.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Authority of Public Official, Whose Duties or Functions Generally Do Not Entail Traffic Stops, To Effectuate Traffic Stop of Vehicle. 18 A.L.R.6th 519.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 219.

Law Reviews.

Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

Cross References —

Prohibition against registration of vehicle and issuance of license tag where gross weight of the vehicle exceeds legal limits except where excess weight authorization is obtained from Mississippi Transportation Commission or local authority, see §27-19-81.

Permit for excess length of load on vehicle transporting forest or agricultural products in natural state, see §63-5-19.

Exceptions to maximum vehicle length, see §63-5-21.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Power to limit weight of vehicle or its load with respect to use of streets or highways. 75 A.L.R.2d 376.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 214.

Law Reviews.

Ogletree, A primer concerning industrial timber litigation with emphasis upon Mississippi law. 59 Miss. L. J. 387, Fall 1989.

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment deleted former (2), which contained a July 1, 2006, repealer for the section.

The 2008 amendment substituted “one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)” for “one hundred forty thousand (140,000)” in the first sentence; deleted “and shall be nontransferable” from the end of the second sentence; and added the third sentence.

Cross References —

Prohibition against registration of vehicle and issuance of license tag where gross weight of the vehicle exceeds legal limits except where excess weight authorization is obtained from Mississippi Transportation Commission or local authority, see §27-19-81.

Penalty for failure to obtain permit, see §27-19-89.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A municipality has authority to set weight limits of vehicles passing over municipal streets, and any driver operating a vehicle in contravention of any weight limit shall be liable for all damage which the highway or street may sustain as a result of that operation; further, municipal governing authorities may seek damages in a civil action. Richardson, May 16, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0229.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load. 53 A.L.R.3d 1035.

Am. Jur.

40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges §§ 670-672.

Cross References —

Requirements for open top vehicles when carrying certain loads, see §§63-7-83 through63-7-89.