Chapter 1. Driver’s License

Article 1. Driver’s License.

§ 63-1-1. Short title.

This article may be cited as the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver’s License Law of 1938.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8076; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

Cross References —

Program of driver’s education and training in public schools, see §§37-25-1 et seq.

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §§45-35-1 et seq.

Provision of this article applicable to Mississippi Commercial Driver’s License Law, see §63-1-202.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 100 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 319 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-1-3. Definitions.

The following words and phrases when used in this article shall, for the purpose of such law, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section:

The term “commissioner” means the commissioner of public safety of this state;

The term “highway” means every way or place of whatever nature open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel, and shall include streets of municipalities;

The term “operator” means any person in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the highway;

The term “owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle; in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8077; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

§ 63-1-5. Requirement of motor vehicle operator’s license; types of operator’s licenses; penalty for violation of section.

    1. No person shall drive or operate a motor vehicle or an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103 upon the highways of the State of Mississippi without first securing an operator’s license to drive on the highways of the state, unless specifically exempted by Section 63-1-7.
    2. The types of operator’s licenses are:
      1. Class R;
      2. Class D;
      3. Class A, B or C commercial license governed by Article 5 of this chapter;
      4. Intermediate license; and
      5. Interlock-restricted license as prescribed in Section 63-11-31.
    1. Every person who makes application for an original license or a renewal license to operate any single vehicle with a gross weight rating of less than twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or any vehicle towing a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating not in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds other than vehicles included in Class C, vehicles which require a special endorsement, or to operate a vehicle as a common carrier by motor vehicle, taxicab, passenger coach, dray, contract carrier or private commercial carrier as defined in Section 27-19-3, other than those vehicles for which a Class A, B or C license is required under Article 5 of this chapter, may, in lieu of the Class R regular driver’s license, apply for and obtain a Class D driver’s license. The fee for the issuance of a Class D driver’s license shall be as set forth in Section 63-1-43 and the Class D license shall be valid for the term prescribed in Section 63-1-47. Except as required under Article 5 of this chapter, no driver of a pickup truck shall be required to have a Class D or a commercial license regardless of the purpose for which the pickup truck is used.
    2. Persons operating vehicles listed in paragraph (a) of this subsection for private purposes or in emergencies need not obtain a Class D license.
  1. An interlock-restricted license allows a person to drive only a motor vehicle equipped with an iginition-interlock device.
  2. A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, may be punished by imprisonment for not less than two (2) days nor more than six (6) months, by a fine of not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or both.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8091; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 5; Laws, 2011, ch. 468, § 3; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 8; Laws, 2015, ch. 406, § 4; Laws, 2016, ch. 503, § 8, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2016.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment, effective October 1, 2011, added (2).

The 2014 amendment added (1), (2), and (3), and redesignated former last undesignated paragraph as (4); in present (1)(a), deleted “other than a motorcycle” following “shall drive or operate a motor vehicle” and substituted “unless specifically” for “except those persons especially.”

The 2015 amendment inserted “or an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (1)(a).

The 2016 amendment, effective October 1, 2016, deleted “Ignition” and “ignition” preceding “interlock-restricted license” in (1)(b)(v) and (3), and made a related change.

Cross References —

Municipal licensing of drivers or operators of buses of transportation systems for transportation of passengers, see §§21-27-151 et seq.

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §45-35-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Deposit of driver’s license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see §63-9-25.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Charging instruments

Town provided defendant with charging instruments because the two traffic tickets a police officer issued to defendant met the requirements established by Miss. Code Ann. §63-9-21(3)(c) and complied with Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 7.06; in addition, the town supplemented its discovery disclosures and explicitly informed defendant that he was charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license and failing to maintain or provide proof of insurance. Caissie v. State, 254 So.3d 849, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 110 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 So.3d 170, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 100, 205 L. Ed. 2d 36, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4809 (U.S. 2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

There is no statutory prohibition to a trusty (inmate) without a valid driver’s license driving a county vehicle from a parking place to a wash rack, all on the same premises and without traveling on a public road. Kuykendall, Aug. 20, A.G. Op. 04-0397.

§ 63-1-6. Requirement of motorcycle operator’s license; requirement of temporary motorcycle permit.

  1. Unless exempted under Section 63-1-7 or Section 63-1-6.1, no person shall drive or operate a motorcycle, except for an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103, upon the highways of the State of Mississippi without first securing an operator’s license with a motorcycle endorsement upon it.
    1. A motorcycle endorsement may be issued to any person who holds a valid Mississippi driver’s license and meets the other requirements for a motorcycle endorsement contained in this chapter.
    2. Every applicant for a motorcycle endorsement shall first obtain a temporary motorcycle permit, successfully complete the examination provided in Section 63-1-33, and pay the temporary motorcycle permit fee and examination fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43. Applicants for a temporary motorcycle permit shall:
      1. Be at least fifteen (15) years of age;
      2. Operate a motorcycle only under the direct supervision of a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age who possesses either a valid driver’s or operator’s license with a motorcycle endorsement or a valid restricted motorcycle operator’s license;
      3. Be prohibited from transporting a passenger on a motorcycle;
      4. Be prohibited from operating a motorcycle upon any controlled access highway; and
      5. Be prohibited from operating a motorcycle during the hours of 6:00 p.m. through 6:00 a.m.

      Temporary motorcycle driving permits shall be valid for the same period of time and may be renewed upon the same conditions as regular learner’s permits issued under Section 63-1-21.

HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 9; Laws, 2015, ch. 406, § 3; Laws, 2015, ch. 464, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 3 of Chapter 406, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved March 23, 2015), amended this section. Section 4 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved April 20, 2015), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 4 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §63-1-6 as amended by Chapter 406, Laws of 2015.

Editor's Notes. —

Executive Order No. 1474, I., issued by Governor Tate Reeves on April 20, 2020, provides as follows:

“I. In order to cope with and respond to the COVID-19 emergency, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-11(c)(1), the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §§63-1-47, 63-1-6, 63-1-21, 45-9-101, 97-37-7, and 45-35-55 are hereby suspended to the extent necessary to delay the expiration of all valid driver's licenses, learner's permits, intermediate licenses, firearm permits, security guard permits and ID cards set to expire between March 14-2020 and June 30, 2020. Such licenses, permits and ID cards will instead expire on August 3, 2020.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment redesignated the former first and second undesignated paragraphs as (1) and (2)(a); deleted the last undesignated paragraph in its entirety regarding issuance of a restricted motorcycle operator’s license; and added (2)(b); in present (1), inserted “Unless excepted under Section 63-1-7,” at the beginning of the sentence preceding “no person shall drive”, substituted “an” for “either a regular”, and deleted the remainder of this subsection, which read “, or a restricted motorcycle operator’s license, except those persons especially exempted by Section 63-1-7, Mississippi Code of 1972; provided, however, that any person possessing a valid Mississippi operator’s license issued prior to July 1, 1985, may operate a motorcycle upon the highways of this state until such time as said license expires. Upon the expiration of a license issued prior to July 1, 1985, and the payment of One Dollar ($1.00), the applicant for renewal may obtain the necessary motorcycle endorsement without further examination”; in present (2)(a), substituted “a motorcycle” for “such” towards the end of the sentence, inserted “to” following “endorsement may be issued” at the beginning of the sentence, and added an “s” to “requirements.”

The first 2015 amendment (ch. 406), inserted “except for an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (1).

The second 2015 amendment (ch. 464), inserted “or Section 63-1-6.1” and “except for an autocycle as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (1).

Cross References —

License requirement in general, see §63-1-5.

Exemptions from license requirement, see §63-1-7.

Persons not entitled to license, see §63-1-9.

Duties of license examiners, see §63-1-15.

Application for license, see §63-1-19.

Temporary driving permits, see §63-1-21.

Parental consent for application of person under age of 17, see §63-1-23.

Appeal of license denial, see §63-1-31.

Driver’s examination, see §63-1-33.

Form of license, see §63-1-35.

Duplicate licenses, see §63-1-37.

Signing of license by applicant, see §63-1-39.

Possession of license while driving, see §63-1-41.

Fee for restricted motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-43.

License examiners tender of fees and applications to commissioner, see §63-1-45.

Fee for reinstatement of license, see §63-1-46.

Duration and renewal of licenses, see §63-1-47.

Renewal of expired license, see §63-1-49.

Revocation of license, see §63-1-51.

Driving while license is suspended or revoked, see §63-1-57.

Using the operator’s license of another person, see §63-1-65.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Vehicle purchase.

Trial court erred by denying a seller’s motion for summary judgment in the parents’ wrongful death action, as Mississippi law did not impose a duty on the seller, sufficient to support a negligence claim, to restrict motor vehicle sales to licensed drivers or to determine the competence of drivers as part of the sale; the son was not required to have an “E” endorsement on his license to purchase the motorcycle, only to drive the motorcycle on a highway. Laurel Yamaha, Inc. v. Freeman, 956 So. 2d 897, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 316 (Miss. 2007).

§ 63-1-6.1. Rented motor scooters may be operated on public roads in or near universities without obtaining motorcycle endorsement under certain circumstances.

  1. No person shall be required to secure a driver’s license with a motorcycle endorsement upon it while operating a motor scooter as defined in Section 63-3-103 provided that:
    1. The person is not the owner of the motor scooter and is only renting the scooter for a period of time not to exceed forty-eight (48) hours.
    2. The person is operating the motor scooter within the corporate limits of a municipality in which a university campus is located or is immediately adjacent to, or within the limits of, the university’s campus.
    3. The person has been issued and has on their person a regular or commercial driver’s license issued by the State of Mississippi or the state of their residence.
  2. Any scooter operated on the roads or highways of this state under this section shall not be operated:
    1. At a rate of speed greater than thirty (30) miles per hour;
    2. On a road which has a speed limit greater than thirty-five (35) miles per hour; or
    3. On any road or highway which is prohibited under Section 63-3-210.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 464, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 63-1-7. Exemption from license requirement.

No license issued pursuant to this article shall be required of:

Any person while operating a motor vehicle for military purposes, if the person is a member of the United States Armed Forces or Reserves on active duty, a member of the National Guard on active duty or full-time National Guard duty, a National Guard military technician, or participating in part-time National Guard training.

Any nonresident person who has in his immediate possession a valid license to drive a motor vehicle on the highways of his home state or country, issued to him by the proper authorities of his home state or country, or of any nonresident person whose home state or country does not require the licensing of a person to operate a motor vehicle on the highways but does require him to be duly registered. Such person being eighteen (18) years of age or older may operate a motor vehicle in the state for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days without securing a license. However, any nonresident person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be subject to all the provisions of this article, except as specified above.

Any person while operating a road roller, road machinery or any farm tractor or implement of husbandry temporarily drawn, moved or propelled on the highways.

Any engineer or motorman using tracks for road or street, though used in the streets.

Any person while operating an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in Section 63-3-103.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8092; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 3; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 7; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 2016, ch. 342, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2016.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment added (e).

The 2005 amendment rewrote (a).

The 2016 amendment inserted “consecutive” in the next-to-last sentence of (b).

Cross References —

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Charging instruments

Town provided defendant with charging instruments because the two traffic tickets a police officer issued to defendant met the requirements established by Miss. Code Ann. §63-9-21(3)(c) and complied with Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 7.06; in addition, the town supplemented its discovery disclosures and explicitly informed defendant that he was charged with operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license and failing to maintain or provide proof of insurance. Caissie v. State, 254 So.3d 849, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 110 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 So.3d 170, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 2018), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 100, 205 L. Ed. 2d 36, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4809 (U.S. 2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Person who has had license revoked for DUI may legally operate road roller, road machinery, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry which is temporarily on highways. Harper, April 24, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0261.

An individual who has had his license suspended or revoked may still legally operate a road roller, road machinery, farm tractor, or implement of husbandry which is temporarily on the highways, in accordance with Section 63-1-7(c). Miletich, March 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0113.

A person who does not have a Mississippi driver’s license may operate machinery, such as backhoes, tractors, and other farm equipment on the public streets and highways. Brewer, June 23, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0345.

§ 63-1-8. Authorization to negotiate reciprocal driver’s license agreement with the Republic of China (Taiwan).

The Commissioner of Public Safety is authorized to negotiate a mutual agreement between the Mississippi Department of Public Safety and the Republic of China (Taiwan), through the Ministry of Transportation and Communications represented by the Director General of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Houston, Texas, for reciprocity in issuing driver’s licenses to citizens of the State of Mississippi residing in the Republic of China (Taiwan) and to Taiwanese citizens residing in the State of Mississippi. The mutual agreement shall be written and signed by the commissioner and Director General.

HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 438, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 26, 2014).

§ 63-1-9. Persons prohibited from obtaining license; issuance of regular learner’s permits, intermediate licenses and driver’s licenses.

  1. No driver’s license, intermediate license or regular learner’s permit shall be issued pursuant to this article:
    1. To any person under the age of eighteen (18) years except as provided in this article.
    2. To any person whose license to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of Mississippi has been previously revoked or suspended by this state or any other state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, if the revocation or suspension period has not expired.
    3. To any person who is an habitual drunkard or who is addicted to the use of other narcotic drugs.
    4. To any person who would not be able by reason of physical or mental disability to operate a motor vehicle on the highways with safety. However, persons who have one (1) arm or leg, or have arms or legs deformed, and are driving a car provided with mechanical devices whereby the person is able to drive in a safe manner over the highways, if otherwise qualified, shall receive an operator’s license the same as other persons. Moreover, deafness shall not be a bar to obtaining a license.
    5. To any person as an operator who has previously been adjudged to be afflicted with and suffering from any mental disability and who has not at time of application been restored to mental competency.
    6. To any unmarried person under the age of eighteen (18) years who does not at the time of application present a diploma or other certificate of high school graduation or a general educational development certificate issued to the person in this state or any other state; or on whose behalf documentation has not been received by the Department of Public Safety from that person or a school official verifying that the person:
      1. Is enrolled and making satisfactory progress in a course leading to a general educational development certificate;
      2. Is enrolled in school in this state or any other state;
      3. Is enrolled in a “nonpublic school,” as such term is defined in Section 37-13-91(2)(i); or
      4. Is unable to attend any school program due to circumstances deemed acceptable as set out in Section 63-1-10.
    7. To any person under the age of eighteen (18) years who has been convicted under Section 63-11-30.
  2. All permits and licenses issued on or before July 31, 2009, shall be valid according to the terms upon which issued. From and after August 1, 2009:
    1. A regular learner’s permit may be issued to any person who is at least fifteen (15) years of age who otherwise meets the requirements of this article.
    2. An intermediate license may be issued to any person who is at least sixteen (16) years of age who otherwise meets the requirements of this article and who has held a regular learner’s permit for at least one (1) year without any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation. Any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation shall restart the one-year requirement for the holding of a regular learner’s permit before an applicant can qualify for an intermediate license.
    3. A driver’s license may be issued to any person who is at least sixteen and one-half (16-1/2) years of age who otherwise meets the requirements of this article and who has held an intermediate license for at least six (6) months without any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation. Any conviction under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation shall restart the six-month requirement for the holding of an intermediate license before an applicant can qualify for a driver’s license. However, a person who is at least seventeen (17) years of age who has been issued a regular learner’s permit and who has never been convicted under Section 63-11-30 or of a moving violation shall not be required to have held an intermediate license.
    4. An applicant for a Mississippi driver’s license who, at the time of application, is at least sixteen and one-half (16-1/2) years of age and who has held a valid motor vehicle driver’s license issued by another state for at least six (6) months shall not be required to hold a regular learner’s permit or an intermediate license before being issued a driver’s license.
  3. The commissioner shall ensure that the regular learner’s permit, intermediate license and driver’s license issued under this article are clear, distinct and easily distinguishable from one another.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8093; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 7; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 540, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 2; Laws, 2009, ch. 488, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 19, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 21, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment in (1), substituted “other state or territory” for “other state and/or territory” and “if the revocation” for “and such revocation” in (b), substituted “and are driving a car” for “and have their car” in (d), and in (g), substituted “educational” for “education” everywhere it appears, inserted “on whose behalf” and “has not been received by the Department of Public Safety from that person or a school official verifying, and made minor stylistic changes; and in (2), substituted “July 31, 2009” for “June 30, 2000” and “August 1, 2009” for “July 1, 2000” in the introductory language, in (b), substituted “sixteen (16) years” for “fifteen (15) years,” “one (1) year” for “six (6) months” and “one-year requirement” for “six-month requirement,” and substituted “sixteen and one-half (16-) years” for “sixteen (16) years” each time it appears in (c) and (d).

The 2014 amendment, in (1), (2), and (3), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving”; in (1)(d), deleted “, in the opinion of the commissioner or other person authorized to grant an operator’s license,” from the first sentence; deleted (1)(e) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

Cross References —

Issuance of identification cards by the department of public safety, see §45-35-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Driver license compact law, see §§63-1-101 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The provision fixing a minimum age for licensing drivers is a legislative determination that a child under that age does not possess sufficient judgment and discretion to operate an automobile. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So. 2d 240, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1959).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

There is no provision for the invalidation or revocation of the right to drive for a fifteen year old who ceases to be gainfully employed after obtaining a license that specifies the hours of the day within which he or she may drive; in that instance, the minor may continue to legally drive, but will still be restricted or prohibited from driving between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Darby, January 16, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-003.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: driving under the influence, or when addicted to the use, of drugs as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.3d 815.

Denial, suspension, or cancellation of driver’s license because of physical disease or defect. 38 A.L.R.3d 452.

Validity, construction, and application of age requirements for licensing of motor vehicle operators. 86 A.L.R.3d 475.

Liability of donor of motor vehicle for injuries resulting from owner’s operation. 22 A.L.R.4th 738.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 112-115.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 319, 331 et seq.

§ 63-1-10. Educational requirements for issuance of license to person under eighteen years of age; documentation; appeal of denial of license.

  1. Upon the written request of a parent or guardian of any applicant for a license under eighteen (18) years of age, the school district in which the applicant is enrolled shall submit documentation to the Department of Public Safety verifying that the applicant is in compliance with Section 63-1-9(1)(g). The verification shall be signed by the school principal or his designee, or, in the case of a home study program, the parent, or the adult education supervisor of the General Educational Development Program or his designee. If the student is enrolled in a nonpublic school, the school principal or his designee is encouraged to submit the verification on behalf of the student. Documentation of the applicant’s enrollment status shall be submitted on a form designed by the State Department of Education that includes the written signed and notarized parent or guardian’s consent authorizing the release of the applicant’s attendance records to the Department of Public Safety, as approved by the Department of Public Safety, in a manner that insures the authenticity of the form and the information or signature contained thereon, including via facsimile. The forms required under this section to provide documentation shall be made available to all public high schools, private schools accredited by the State Board of Education, adult education supervisors at school board offices and, upon request, to others through the Department of Public Safety.
  2. Whenever an applicant or licensee who is under eighteen (18) years of age is unable to attend any school program due to acceptable circumstances, the school where the student last attended shall transmit documentation to the department to excuse such student from the provisions of Section 63-1-9(1)(g). The school principal or his designee shall determine whether nonattendance or absences are excused pursuant to Section 37-13-91. For purposes of this section, suspension or expulsion from school or incarceration in a correctional institution is not an acceptable circumstance for a person being unable to attend school.
  3. Any person denied a license for failure to satisfy the education requirements of Section 63-1-9(1)(g) shall have the right to file a request within thirty (30) days thereafter for a hearing before the Department of Public Safety to determine whether the person is entitled to a license or is subject to the cancellation of his license under the provisions of this section. The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days of the receipt by the department of the request. Appeal from the decision of the department may be taken under Section 63-1-31.

HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 2; Laws, 2009, ch. 488, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment rewrote the section to require public schools to submit documentation verifying applicant for driver’s license, intermediate license or temporary permit who is under the age of eighteen and has not yet graduated is enrolled in school or acceptably excused.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of driver’s license for reason unrelated to use of, or ability to operate, motor vehicle. 18 A.L.R.5th 542.

§ 63-1-10.1. Report when student under eighteen who has been issued license, intermediate license or temporary license is coded as drop out.

A school superintendent or designee shall report to the Department of Education on a schedule determined by the State Board of Education when a student under eighteen (18) years of age who has been issued a driver’s license, intermediate license or temporary learning permit has been coded as a “drop out” as defined by the State Board of Education. The Department of Education will provide notification to the Department of Public Safety of those students under eighteen (18) years of age who have obtained a driver’s license, intermediate license or temporary learning permit and have been coded by the local school district as a “drop out” upon verification that prior written parental consent for the release of educational records has been obtained in compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1972, as amended, 20 USC Section 1232.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 32, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

§ 63-1-11. Promulgation of rules and regulations.

The provisions of this article with reference to administration shall be under the supervision of the commissioner of public safety at Jackson, Mississippi, who, if not otherwise specifically authorized, is hereby empowered to make and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8099; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Commissioner may at his discretion waive or change any regulations or policies adopted by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol regarding road tests or any other policies adopted to carry out Section 63-1-11. Head, July 26, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0419.

The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt a method to assign an alternate identifier for a driver’s license for an individual who cannot obtain a Social Security number from the Social Security Administration. Head, September 14, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0553.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of highway user for injuries resulting from failure to remove or protect against material spilled from vehicle onto public street or highway. 34 A.L.R.4th 520.

§ 63-1-13. Driver Services Division; director; technical, professional and clerical assistants.

The commissioner is hereby authorized and empowered to appoint a Director of the Driver Services Division who is a qualified elector of the State of Mississippi. Such director shall execute and furnish a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) with a surety company authorized to do business in this state. The bond shall be conditioned on the faithful performance of his duties and be subject to the approval of the commissioner. The director shall have control and supervision of the Driver Services Division and shall be answerable to the commissioner in the performance of his duties.

The commissioner shall employ such other technical, professional and clerical assistants as may be needed to conduct the work of the division. The commissioner is also authorized to employ a Director of the Driver License Examining Bureau and the necessary supervising examiners to assist the Director of the Driver License Examining Bureau in the supervision of the license personnel. The commissioner is also authorized to employ the necessary additional personnel to serve and be designated as license examiners. The commissioner shall not adopt or enforce any policy or any rule or regulation which prohibits any Highway Patrol officer from being employed and serving in any position in the Driver License Examining Bureau. The commissioner shall employ such other technical, professional and clerical assistants as may be needed to conduct the work of the bureau.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8119; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 9; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 7; Laws, 1950, ch. 407, § 4; Laws, 1952, ch. 357, § 3; Laws, 1960, ch. 338, § 2; Laws, 1962, ch. 517; Laws, 1973, ch. 410, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 20; Laws, 1995, ch. 421, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 548, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 326, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment, substituted “to serve and be“ for “not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) in number” in the third sentence of the second paragraph.

Cross References —

Salaries of employees of highway safety patrol, see §45-3-7.

§ 63-1-15. Designation and duties of drivers’ license examiners.

The Commissioner of Public Safety shall be authorized to designate persons who may act as examiners for license or instruction permits.

It shall be the duty of the license examiners to forward to the commissioner all applications rejected or approved in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the commissioner.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 8099, 8102; Laws, 1938, 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 7; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 5; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 3; Laws, 1958, ch. 493; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 8; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

§ 63-1-16. Department of Public Safety to furnish permanent license kiosk or examiner in each county seat at least one day per month if requested.

The Department of Public Safety shall, upon request of the board of supervisors, furnish either a permanent driver’s license kiosk or a license examiner at a location in each county seat for at least one (1) day every month to conduct licensing examinations, road tests and renewals. It is the option of the board of supervisors so requesting to choose either the permanent driver’s license kiosk or a license examiner. The county shall furnish the office, heating and cooling, phone service and Internet connectivity at the location for the kiosk or license examiner.

HISTORY: Laws, 2013, ch. 517, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2013.

§ 63-1-17. Maintenance of records relating to licenses and permits.

As the license examiners file their statements showing the serial numbers of licenses and temporary driving permits issued pursuant to this article during the preceding month, the commissioner shall keep a record of all licenses and permits issued pursuant to this article by such examiners, a record of all licenses and permits revoked, a record of all perforated sections mailed to him by the trial judges, and such other information that he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8118; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 9; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 1989.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

§ 63-1-19. Application for license; notification of change of address or name by licensee; registration with Selective Service for certain males.

    1. Every applicant for a license or permit issued pursuant to this article, or for renewal of such license or permit, shall file an application for such license, permit or renewal, on a form provided by the Department of Public Safety, with the commissioner or an official license examiner of the department. All persons not holding valid, unexpired licenses issued in this state shall be required to secure an original license, except those specifically exempted from licensing under Section 63-1-7. The application shall state the name, date of birth, the social security number of the applicant unless the applicant is not a United States citizen and does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government, sex, race, color of eyes, color of hair, weight, height and residence address, and whether or not the applicant’s privilege to drive has been suspended or revoked at any time, and, if so, when, by whom, and for what cause, and whether any previous application by him has been denied, and whether he has any physical defects which would interfere with his operating a motor vehicle safely upon the highways.
    2. Every applicant for an original license shall show proof of domicile in this state. The commissioner shall promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to enforce this requirement and shall prescribe the means by which an applicant for an original license may show domicile in this state. Proof of domicile shall not be required of applicants under eighteen (18) years of age.
    3. Unless the applicant is not a United States citizen and does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government, each application or filing made under this section shall include the social security number(s) of the applicant in accordance with Section 93-11-64, Mississippi Code of 1972.
  1. No person who is illegally in the United States or Mississippi shall be issued a license. The application of a person who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government shall state the name, date of birth, sex, race, color of eyes, color of hair, weight, height and residence address, and whether or not the applicant’s privilege to drive has been suspended or revoked at any time, and, if so, when, by whom, and for what cause, and whether any previous application by him has been denied, and whether he has any physical defects which would interfere with his operating a motor vehicle safely upon the highways. The commissioner shall adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as he deems appropriate requiring additional documents, materials, information or physical evidence to be provided by the applicant as may be necessary to establish the identity of the applicant and that the applicant is not present in the United States or the State of Mississippi illegally.
  2. Whenever a person who has applied for or who has been issued a license or permit under this article moves from the address listed in the application or on the permit or license, or whenever the name of a licensee changes by marriage or otherwise, such person, within thirty (30) days thereafter, shall notify, in writing, the Department of Public Safety, Driver Services Division, and inform the department of his or her previous address and new address and of his or her former name and new name. The department shall not change the name of a licensee or permittee on his or her license or permit unless the applicant appears in person at an office of the department and provides a certified copy of his or her marriage license, court order, birth certificate or divorce decree changing the licensee’s or permittee’s name.
    1. Any male who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-six (26) years of age and who applies for a permit or license or a renewal of a permit or license under this chapter shall be registered in compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx 451, et seq., as amended.
    2. The department shall forward in an electronic format the necessary personal information of the applicant to the Selective Service System. The applicant’s submission of the application shall serve as an indication that the applicant either has already registered with the Selective Service System or that he is authorizing the department to forward to the Selective Service System the necessary information for registration. The commissioner shall notify the applicant on, or as a part of, the application that his submission of the application will serve as his consent to registration with the Selective Service System, if so required. The commissioner also shall notify any male applicant under the age of eighteen (18) that he will be registered upon turning age eighteen (18) as required by federal law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8094; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 10; Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 19; Laws, 1999, ch. 397, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 388, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 3; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2005.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 388, Laws, 2002, eff from and after September 1, 2002 (approved March 19, 2002), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 584, Laws, 2002, eff from and after September 1, 2002 (approved April 11, 2002), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 584, Laws, 2002, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor’s Notes —

The Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx 451, referred to in this section, was renumbered 50 USCS § 3801 as part of the 2015 editorial reclassification of Title 50 and Title 50 Appendix.

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 22, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 150, provides as follows:

“SECTION 150. Any person or entity shall be absolutely immune from any liability arising from compliance with the dictates of this act unless such conduct by the person or entity is willful and intentional.”

Amendment Notes —

The first 2002 amendment (Ch. 388) rewrote the section.

The second 2002 amendment (Ch. 584) rewrote the section.

The 2005 amendment inserted (3); and renumbered former (3) as present (4).

Cross References —

Requirement that an application for an identification card issued by the department of public safety contain the information required on a driver’s license application, see §45-35-5.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Federal Aspects—

Registration in compliance with the requirements of § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, see 50 USCS § 3801 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity of state statutes, regulations, or other identification requirements restricting or denying driver’s licenses to illegal aliens. 16 A.L.R.6th 131.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 103.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 339-343.

§ 63-1-21. Temporary permits; intermediate licenses.

  1. To obtain a new or original Class R, Class D or intermediate driver’s license, every applicant other than a person holding a valid out-of-state license shall first obtain a regular learner’s permit, successfully complete the examination provided for in Section 63-1-33, and pay the regular learner’s permit fee and examination fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43.
  2. A regular learner’s permit entitles the holder, if the permit is in his immediate possession, to drive a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle on the highways of the State of Mississippi only when accompanied by a licensed operator who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age and who is actually occupying the seat beside the driver. A regular learner’s permit may be issued to any applicant who is at least fifteen (15) years of age and shall be valid for a period of two (2) years from the date of issue.
    1. An intermediate license allows unsupervised driving from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. Sunday through Thursday and 6:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. Friday and Saturday, and allows unsupervised driving any time for a person traveling directly to or from work. At all other times the intermediate licensee must be supervised by a parent, guardian or other person aged twenty-one (21) years or older who holds a valid driver’s license under this article and who is actually occupying the seat beside the driver.
    2. The fee for issuance of an intermediate license shall be as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8095; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 2; Laws, 1964, ch. 454; Laws, 1966, ch. 570, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 6; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 3; Laws, 2009, ch. 488, § 3; Laws, 2011, ch. 467, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 489, § 3; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 10, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Editor's Notes. —

Executive Order No. 1474, I., issued by Governor Tate Reeves on April 20, 2020, provides as follows:

“I. In order to cope with and respond to the COVID-19 emergency, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-11(c)(1), the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §§63-1-47, 63-1-6, 63-1-21, 45-9-101, 97-37-7, and 45-35-55 are hereby suspended to the extent necessary to delay the expiration of all valid driver's licenses, learner's permits, intermediate licenses, firearm permits, security guard permits and ID cards set to expire between March 14-2020 and June 30, 2020. Such licenses, permits and ID cards will instead expire on August 3, 2020.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment added “Sunday through Thursday…directly to or from work” in (3); and added (5).

The 2011 amendment rewrote (1); substituted “two (2) years” for ”one (1) year” at the end of (2); redesignated former (3) and (4) as (3)(a) and (b); designated the formerly undesignated paragraph beginning “Except as otherwise provides . . .” as (4), and rewrote the introductory paragraph; and deleted former (5) which provided that the Department of Public Safety could accept bank credit cards and debit cards in payment of fees for identification card renewals under certain circumstances.

The 2013 amendment added (4); and redesignated former (4) as (5).

The 2014 amendment rewrote (1) regarding obtaining certain classes of driver’s license; in (2), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving” in two places, “if” for “provided” in the first sentence, “and” for “. A temporary driving permit” at the beginning of the former third sentence; in (3)(b), substituted “as prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “Five Dollars ($5.00)” at the end of the sentence; deleted (4) and (5) in their entireties regarding ignition-interlock-restricted driver’s license and restricted motorcycle operator’s license; and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References —

Issuance, validity, and expiration of temporary permit for student enrolled in driver education and training program, see §37-25-7.

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Grandparent as licensee.

2. Construction.

1. Grandparent as licensee.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather’s vehicle with a learner’s permit and struck another driver because there was no Mississippi case law that extended the special duty recognized between the parent and child to other members of the family; Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21 only required that the licensee, in this case, the grandmother, be seated in the front passenger seat and over the age of 21. Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So. 2d 634, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

2. Construction.

Former Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21 did not impute the negligence of a permittee (under a learner’s permit) to the licensed driver who was occupying the seat beside the permittee. The 2000 legislative amendments to §63-1-21, specifically Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21(3) (2000), did not exist at the time of the accident in the case and thus were not applicable to impose any duty of supervision or liability upon the grandparent who was allowing the grandson to operate the grandparent’s vehicle. Warren v. Glascoe, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 327.

§ 63-1-23. Signature and verification of application for license of person under seventeen years of age by parents or other responsible person.

The application of any person under the age of seventeen (17) years for a temporary driving permit, intermediate license or license issued pursuant to this article shall be signed and verified before a person authorized to administer oaths by both the father and mother of the applicant, if both are living and have custody of him, or in the event neither parent is living then by the person or guardian having such custody or by an employer of him, or in the event there is no guardian or employer then by any other responsible person who is willing to assume the obligation imposed under Section 63-1-25 upon a person signing the application of a minor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8096; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 11; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2000.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 24, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence of minor.

1. In general.

An automobile operator’s license is a privilege granted by the state, in accepting which the motorist accepts all reasonable conditions imposed by the state. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

2. Negligence of minor.

Negligence of a minor, whose application for a driver’s license was not signed by either his father or mother, in operating an automobile was not imputable to his parents even though the minor had exhibited his father’s driver’s license to the officer who examined the minor and took his application for a driver’s license. Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1957).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The term custody as used in this section means legal custody and therefore divorced parents who have joint legal custody would both have to sign the application of a person under the age of seventeen who is seeking a temporary driving permit, intermediate license or license. Busby, June 13, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0288.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

§ 63-1-25. Imputation of negligence or willful misconduct of driver under seventeen years of age to person signing application for license.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 63-1-27, any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor under the age of seventeen years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly or severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by such negligence or wilful misconduct.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8096; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Extent of liability-generally.

3. —Age of driver at time of accident.

4. —Application not signed by parents.

5. —Renewal license.

6. Limitations of actions.

1. In general.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment as to a passenger’s claims of negligent entrustment against a driver’s mother because the passenger’s reliance on the driver’s past alcohol and marijuana consumption was irrelevant to whether the mother was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to the driver since no issue of material fact existed that alcohol or other substances contributed to accident. the driver was not under the influence at the time of the accident. Garvin v. Tupelo Furniture Mkt., 127 So.3d 197, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 650 (Miss. 2013).

Former Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21 did not impute the negligence of a permittee (under a learner’s permit) to the licensed driver who was occupying the seat beside the permittee. The 2000 legislative amendments to §63-1-21, specifically Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-21(3) (2000), did not exist at the time of the accident in the case and thus were not applicable to impose any duty of supervision or liability upon the grandparent who was allowing the grandson to operate the grandparent’s vehicle. Warren v. Glascoe, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable under Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-25, and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather’s vehicle with a learner’s permit and struck another driver. Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So. 2d 634, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

No liability can arise under this statute absent negligent use or willful misconduct in use of vehicle; therefore, same reasoning that would exclude coverage for liability on basis of negligent entrustment and negligent supervision, would apply to claim of coverage for statutory liability under this section. Love v. McDonough, 758 F. Supp. 397, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2968 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1486, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27242 (5th Cir. Miss. 1991).

An automobile operator’s license is a privilege granted by the state, in accepting which the motorist accepts all reasonable conditions imposed by the state. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

2. Extent of liability-generally.

One signing an application for an operator’s certificate for a minor is liable only for damages occurring during the year for which the license was issued. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

3. —Age of driver at time of accident.

Although parents signed their minor son’s application for an automobile operator’s license at a time when the son was under 17 years of age, they were not liable for damages allegedly caused by the son’s negligent operation of an automobile at a time when the son was over 17 years of age. Carter v. Graves, 230 Miss. 463, 93 So. 2d 177, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 1957).

4. —Application not signed by parents.

Negligence of a minor, whose application for a driver’s license was not signed by either his father or mother, in operating an automobile was not imputable to his parents even though the minor had exhibited his father’s driver’s license to the officer who examined the minor and took his application for a driver’s license. Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1957).

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son’s negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

5. —Renewal license.

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son’s negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

6. Limitations of actions.

In an action by a plaintiff who was injured in automobile accident against parents who had enabled a minor to obtain driver’s license by agreeing to accept responsibility for negligence of the minor in operating a motor vehicle and to be liable for damages resulting from misconduct, this was an action ex delicto rather than ex contractu and when brought in a federal court of Alabama, it was subject to Alabama’s one year statute of limitations. Hickman v. Tullos, 121 F. Supp. 152, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3388 (D. Ala. 1954).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

§ 63-1-27. Request for cancellation of minor’s license by person signing application; release from liability for negligence or misconduct of minor.

Any person who has signed the application of a minor for a license may thereafter file with the commissioner a verified written request that the license of said minor so granted be canceled. Thereupon the commissioner shall cancel the license of said minor and the person who signed the application of such minor shall be relieved from the liability imposed under Section 63-1-25 by reason of having signed such application on account of any subsequent negligence or wilful misconduct of such minor in operating a motor vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8097; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Construction and effect of statutes which make parent, custodian, or other person signing minor’s application for vehicle operator’s license liable for licensee’s negligence or willful misconduct. 45 A.L.R.4th 87.

Am. Jur.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 31, 32.

§ 63-1-29. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 9, eff from and after September 1, 1995.

[Codes, 1942, § 8098; Laws, 1938, ch. 143]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §63-1-29 related to revocation of license upon death of person signing minor’s application.

§ 63-1-31. Appeal from denial of application for license or temporary permit.

When a person is denied a license or any temporary driving permit after filing the proper application, he shall have the right within sixty (60) days thereafter to file a petition, in the county or circuit court in the county wherein the application was filed, praying for a hearing in the matter before the judge of the court in which the application is presented. The judge is hereby vested with jurisdiction to hear such matters forthwith within termtime or during vacation, upon five (5) days’ written notice to the officer who refused to issue the license or any temporary driving permit. The hearing shall be conducted at a place as may suit the convenience of the court. On the hearing of the petition, testimony may be taken, and the court shall render judgment in the matter as it deems right and proper under the law and evidence.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8105; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 12; Laws, 2016, ch. 503, § 1, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2016.

Amendment Notes —

The 2016 amendment substituted “the county or circuit court” for “the county circuit or chancery court” in the first sentence; deleted “or chancellor” following “The judge” in the second sentence; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist whose operator’s license was revoked following his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not entitled to proceed by writ of certiorari in the circuit court to review the action of the commissioner of public safety when he had previously failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Code 1942, § 8105. Mississippi State Dep't of Public Safety v. Berry, 217 So. 2d 11, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1249 (Miss. 1968).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Although a justice court judge may not suspend the minimum fine upon a nolo contendere plea on a DUI, he does not have to impose a fine on first offense DUI if he imposes a jail sentence or attendance at a victim impact panel. Sartin, Dec. 9, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0596.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 67.

§ 63-1-33. Examination of applicant for license or regular learner’s permit; inspection of applicant’s automobile; certification of successful completion of driver education and training program at secondary school in lieu of examination.

  1. Except as otherwise provided under subsection (6) of this section, it shall be the duty of the license examiner, when application is made for an operator’s license or regular learner’s permit, to test the applicant’s ability to read and understand road signs and to give the required signals as adopted by the National Advisory Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.
  2. Except as otherwise provided under subsection (6) of this section, the commissioner shall have prepared and administer a test composed of at least ten (10) questions relating to the safe operation of a motor vehicle and testing the applicant’s knowledge of the proper operation of a motor vehicle. Every examination shall ensure adequate knowledge on the part of the applicant as to school bus safety requirements.
  3. Prior to the administration of the test, the license examiner shall inspect the horn, lights, brakes, vehicle registration and proof of liability coverage of the motor vehicle which the applicant expects to operate while being tested, and if he finds that any of the aforementioned items are deficient, no license or endorsement shall be issued to the applicant until same have been repaired.
  4. An applicant for a Mississippi driver’s license who, at the time of application, holds a valid motor vehicle driver’s license issued by another state shall not be required to take a written test.
  5. Except as otherwise provided by Section 63-1-6, when application is made for an original motorcycle endorsement, the applicant shall be required to pass a written test which consists of questions relating to the safe operation of a motorcycle and a skill test similar to the “Motorcycle Operator Skill Test,” which is endorsed by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. The commissioner may exempt any applicant from the skill test if the applicant presents a certificate showing successful completion of a course approved by the commissioner, which includes a similar examination of skills needed in the safe operation of a motorcycle.
  6. The Department of Public Safety may accept the certification of successful completion of an individual’s training in the knowledge and skills needed for the proper and safe operation of a motor vehicle from a driver education and training program at a secondary school that meets the standards of the department, in lieu of the department administering the examination of the individual for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The commissioner and the State Board of Education shall jointly promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of this subsection.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8100; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 3; Laws, 1998, ch. 352, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 393, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 614, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 346, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 481, § 5; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 20; Laws, 2015, ch. 417, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 481, Laws of 2011, which amended this section, is known as “Nathan’s Law.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment added the subsection designations and the exceptions at the beginning in (1) and (2); and added (6).

The 2011 amendment added the last sentence in (2); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2014 amendment, in (1), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving”; in (3), substituted a comma for “and” following “lights, brakes, inspection certificate”; and inserted “and proof of liability coverage” following “vehicle registration”; in (5), deleted “or a restricted motorcycle operator’s license” following “for an original motorcycle endorsement.”

The 2015 amendment deleted “inspection certificate” following “horn, lights, brakes” in (3).

Cross References —

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

Requirements for temporary driving permits, see §63-1-21.

Video-taped instructional material to assist reading impaired applicants to prepare for driver’s examination, see §63-1-34.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Proper operation of vehicle.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the grandparents was proper where they were not vicariously liable and did not negligently supervise their grandchild when he was driving the grandfather’s vehicle with a learner’s permit and struck another driver because the grandchild was operating the vehicle in accordance with directives required of him pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-33. Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So. 2d 634, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 68 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 880 So. 2d 1034, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 784 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 115.

§ 63-1-34. Provision of video-taped instructional material to assist reading impaired applicants in preparing for driver’s license examinations.

From and after January 1, 1991, the Mississippi Authority for Educational Television shall prepare and the Commissioner of Public Safety shall make available for loan to applicants for driving permits and licenses under this article and under Article 5 of this chapter, who are reading impaired, video tapes of instructional material designed to assist such applicants in preparing for driver’s license examinations. The commissioner shall be authorized to charge and collect a fee from any person to whom any such video tape is loaned, such fee to serve as security for the return of the video tape and which fee shall be refunded to the person upon return of the video tape to the commissioner. Such fee shall be in an amount as the commissioner determines necessary to defray the actual cost to the commissioner in replacing the video tape but shall not exceed the amount of the fee provided by law to be paid for the issuance of the class of driver’s license for which the person is applying. The video tape shall be returned, in good working order, to the location that such tape was borrowed in order for the individual to receive his security refund. In the event such tape is not returned within thirty (30) days from time of rental all security fees will be forfeited to the Department of Public Safety. Such security funds and all forfeited fees shall be placed in a separate interest-bearing account known as the “Driver License Educational Fund for the Reading Impaired.” All forfeited security fees shall be used to replace unreturned tapes and to offset the cost of this program.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 319, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 29, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “Article 5 of this chapter” for “Article 2 of this chapter” in the first sentence.

§ 63-1-34.1. Issuance of limited driver’s license for persons using bioptic telescopic lenses; rehabilitation permit.

  1. The Commissioner of Public Safety may issue a limited driver’s license for persons using bioptic telescopic lenses. The license shall be valid for one (1) year from the date of issuance. The commissioner may require the reevaluation of a licensee before the reissuance of a limited driver’s license.
  2. The commissioner shall prepare and administer a test for the central and peripheral vision of persons using bioptic telescopic lenses. If the person passes the test and is otherwise qualified, the person may receive a license under this section.
  3. The commissioner may issue a one-year driving rehabilitation permit subject to such restrictions as the commissioner may require.
  4. The fee for a license or permit issued under this section shall be the fee required for one-year licenses under Section 63-1-43, Mississippi Code of 1972.
  5. The commissioner may impose restrictions on any license or permit issued under this section and may issue rules and regulations governing such licenses and permits.

HISTORY: Laws, 1999, ch. 393, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.

§ 63-1-35. Form of license; use of Social Security Number of licensee; photograph of licensee; renewal of license by electronic means; registered sex offender’s license to identify licensee as sex offender; designation as veteran on license upon request of honorably discharged veteran.

  1. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall prescribe the form of license issued pursuant to this article which shall, among other features, include a driver’s license number assigned by the Department of Public Safety. A licensee shall list his social security number with the department which shall cross reference the social security number with the driver’s license number for purposes of identification. Additionally, each license shall bear a full-face color photograph of the licensee in such form that the license and the photograph cannot be separated. The photograph shall be taken so that one (1) exposure will photograph the applicant and the application simultaneously on the same film. The department shall use a process in the issuance of a license with a color photograph that shall prevent as nearly as possible any alteration, counterfeiting, duplication, reproduction, forging or modification of the license or the superimposition of a photograph without ready detection. The photograph shall be replaced by the department at the time of renewal. Drivers’ licenses, including photographs appearing thereon, may be renewed by electronic means according to rules and regulations promulgated by the commissioner in conformity to Section 27-104-33.
  2. The commissioner shall prescribe the form of license issued pursuant to this article to licensees who are not United States citizens and who do not possess a social security number issued by the United States government. The license of such persons shall include a number and/or other identifying features.
  3. Any new, renewal or duplicate driver’s license, temporary driving permit, intermediate license or commercial driver’s license issued to a person required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 45-33-25 shall bear a designation identifying the licensee or permittee as a sex offender.
  4. The commissioner is authorized to provide the new, renewal or duplicate driver’s license, temporary driving permit, intermediate license or commercial driver’s license to any honorably discharged veteran as defined in Title 38 of the United States Code, and such license or permit shall exhibit the letters “Vet” or any other mark identifying the person as a veteran. The veteran requesting the “Vet” designation shall present his DD-214 or equivalent document that includes a notation from the state Veterans Affairs Board that the applicant is a veteran.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8103; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1968, ch. 540, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 453, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 13; Laws, 1996, ch. 466, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 6; Laws, 2007, ch. 392, § 16; Laws, 2011, ch. 467, § 2; Laws, 2012, ch. 561, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 25, 2012.).

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment redesignated the first paragraph as (1) and inserted “except as otherwise provided under subsection (2) of this section” following “driver’s license number;” and added (2).

The 2007 amendment added (3).

The 2011 amendment rewrote (1).

The 2012 amendment added (4).

Cross References —

Registration of sex offenders generally, see §§45-33-1 et seq.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt a method to assign an alternate identifier for a driver’s license for an individual who cannot obtain a Social Security number from the Social Security Administration. Head, September 14, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0553.

§ 63-1-37. Issuance of duplicate license.

If a license or regular learner’s permit issued under the provisions of this article is lost or destroyed, the licensee may obtain a duplicate copy by paying the fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43. The license or permit shall be marked “Duplicate.”

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8104; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 4; Laws, 1984, ch. 349; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 14 eff from and after July 1, 1985; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 467, § 3; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 11, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2011 amendment, in the first paragraph, substituted “If” for “In the event that” at the beginning, substituted “Five Dollars ($5.00)” for “Three Dollars ($3.00),” and deleted “duplicate copy and a fee in the amount of Eight Dollars ($8.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for the second” preceding “and each subsequent duplicate copy” near the end of the first sentence.

The 2014 amendment, in the first undesignated paragraph, substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary driving”, “may obtain” for “shall obtain from the commissioner”, and “by paying the fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “thereof and shall pay a fee in the amount of Five Dollars ($5.00) plus the applicable photograph fee for the first and each subsequent duplicate copy”; and deleted the second undesignated paragraph in its entirety regarding depositing of fees into State General Fund.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Criminal offense of applying for duplicate license at time when license has been posted for appearance in court, see §63-9-25.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 340-343.

§ 63-1-39. Signatures on license.

No license issued pursuant to this article shall be valid under the provisions of this article until it has been signed by the applicant.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8101; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 15; Laws, 2015, ch. 436, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 13, 2015).

Amendment Notes —

The 2015 amendment deleted “in ink” preceding “by the applicant.”

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

§ 63-1-41. Possession and display of license upon demand.

Every licensee shall have the required license in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same, upon demand of a justice court judge, a peace officer or license examiner or other authorized employee of the commissioner. However, no person charged with violating this section shall be convicted if he produces in court a license theretofore issued to him and valid at the time of his arrest.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8108; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Deposit of driver’s license in lieu of bail in traffic cases, see §63-9-25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Persons who have authority under statute.

3. Authority to stop vehicle.

1. In general.

This provision is a valid exercise of the police power. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

2. Persons who have authority under statute.

A person never formally appointed in writing as required by law who was employed by a sheriff as a deputy, had signed an oath of office, and had acted for a long time as a deputy in uniform without challenge, had the right to arrest for motor vehicle violations and to demand driver’s licenses. United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10746 (5th Cir. Miss. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S. Ct. 908, 25 L. Ed. 2d 91, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2991 (U.S. 1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 968, 90 S. Ct. 1008, 25 L. Ed. 2d 262, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 2728 (U.S. 1970).

3. Authority to stop vehicle.

This section [Code 1942, § 8108], authorizes, by implication, officers to stop a car and require exhibition of a driver’s license; but this right must be exercised in good faith for the purpose of determining whether the operator is licensed, and not as a blind search without warrant. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

The stopping of cars and detaining drivers momentarily for the purpose of checking the driver’s license does not constitute an arrest warranting an incidental search. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

One who evades a road block set up to check driver’s licenses may be pursued by the officer in good faith for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has a license. Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1963).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of statute making it a criminal offense for the operator of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his operator’s license or the vehicle registration certificate. 6 A.L.R.3d 506.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 105, 106, 259.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 347, 348.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1631, 1748.

§ 63-1-43. Fees for licenses generally.

  1. The commissioner shall charge and collect the following fees:
    1. Fees to which the card stock fee authorized in Section 45-1-21 shall be added:

      Click to view

    2. Driver services fees to which the card stock fee authorized in Section 45-1-21 is not added:

      Click to view

    3. In addition to the fees required in this section, an applicant may contribute an additional One Dollar ($1.00) which shall be deposited into the Statewide Litter Prevention Fund. The applicant shall be informed that he may contribute an additional One Dollar ($1.00) which shall be deposited into the Statewide Litter Prevention Fund and shall be expended solely for the purpose of funding litter prevention projects or litter education programs, as recommended by the Statewide Litter Prevention Program of Keep Mississippi Beautiful, Inc.
  2. All originals and renewals of operators’ licenses shall be in compliance with Section 63-1-47.

Class R original or renewal four-year license authorized in Section 63-1-5 $18.00 Class R original or renewal eight-year license authorized in Section 63-1-5 $36.00 Class D original or renewal four-year license authorized in Section 63-1-47 $23.00 Class D original or renewal eight-year license authorized in Section 63-1-47 $46.00 Four-year Identification Card authorized in Section 45-35-7 $11.00 Eight-year Identification Card authorized in Section 45-35-7 $22.00 Eight-year Identification Card for the blind authorized in Section 45-35-7 $11.00 Four-year Disability Identification Card authorized in Section 45-35-53 $11.00 Regular Learner’s Permit authorized in Section 63-1-21 $ 1.00 Duplicate Identification Card or Disability Identification Card $ 5.00 Intermediate license authorized in Section 63-1-21 $ 5.00 Duplicate Class R or Class D license authorized in Section 63-1-37 $ 5.00 Class A, B or C Commercial driver’s license authorized in Section 63-1-208 $48.00 CDL Learner’s Permit authorized in Section 63-1-208 $10.00 Duplicate CDL or CDL learner’s permit $ 5.00 Ignition-Interlock-Restricted License authorized in Section 63-11-31 $50.00

Temporary Motorcycle Permit $ 1.00 Four-year or eight-year Motorcycle Endorsement $ 5.00 Late Renewal Fee $ 1.00 Four-year Identification Card upon medical reason for surrender of a driver’s license as authorized in (one (1) time only) Section 45-35-7 No fee Hazardous Materials Background Check (federal) $63.00 Hazardous Materials Background Check (state) $37.00 CDL Application Fee $25.00 CDL Endorsements: Tanker Endorsement $ 5.00 Doubles/Triples Endorsement $ 5.00 Passenger Endorsement $ 5.00 Hazardous Materials Endorsement $ 5.00 School Bus Endorsement $ 5.00

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8102; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 7; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 5; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 3; Laws, 1958, ch. 493; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 383, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 453, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 4; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 23; Laws, 1992, ch. 469, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 8; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 3; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 5; Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 30; Laws, 2010, ch. 423, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 468, § 2; Laws, 2012, ch. 433, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 483, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 489, § 4; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 12, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 433, Laws of 2012, effective July 1, 2012 (approved April 19, 2012), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 483, Laws of 2012, effective from and after July 1, 2009 (approved April 23, 2012), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all version of the same code section amended within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the August 16, 2012 meeting of the Committee.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2014, ch. 512, § 5 provides:

“SECTION 5. The State Fiscal Officer shall transfer all of the funds that are deposited into the Ignition Interlock Device Fund during fiscal year 2015 into the Drug Court Fund. This section shall stand repealed on July 1, 2015.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2009 amendment substituted “Article 5 of this chapter” for “Article 2 of this chapter” both times it appears in the first paragraph of (4).

The 2010 amendment, in (1)(c), substituted “Eighteen Dollars ($18.00)” for “Eight Dollars ($8.00)” and “photograph fee for a license for an applicant” for “photograph fee for a one-year license for each applicant.”

The 2011 amendment, effective October 1, 2011, added (1)(b), redesignated former (1)(b) and (c) as (1)(c) and (d), and made related changes; added “when issued as an endorsement to a four-year license, and Ten Dollars ($10.00) when issued as an endorsement to an eight-year license” to the end of the first sentence of (2); added (3)(c); and made a minor stylistic change.

The first 2012 amendment (ch. 433), added (1)(e); and made a minor stylistic change.

The second 2012 amendment (ch. 483), substituted “used by the department to defray the cost of future photography and driver’s license technology initiatives” for “deposited to the General Fund of the State of Mississippi” at the end of (6).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added (1)(e); and redesignated former (1)(e) as (1)(f).

The 2014 amendment rewrote the section to set forth a new fee schedule for permits and licenses.

Cross References —

License of motorcycle operator, see §63-1-6.

Requirements for temporary driving permits, see §63-1-21.

Allocation of portion of certain fees charged under this section for licenses, to special fund for purchase of State Highway Safety Patrol cars, equipment, and weapons, see §63-1-45.

Fee for reinstatement of license subsequent to suspension, revocation or cancellation, see §63-1-46.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Private commercial carrier by motor vehicle.

1. In general.

Statute which provides that operator of a private commercial carrier must obtain a commercial driver’s license, applies uniformly to all persons regularly so engaged as operators of private commercial carriers and the statute is constitutional. Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 491 (Miss. 1951).

2. Private commercial carrier by motor vehicle.

A person employed by a railroad as an operator or driver of one of the railroad’s motor trucks in the transportation of other employees and tools to and from their work, was, in respect to the use of such truck, a private commercial carrier by motor vehicle within the statute requiring driver’s license, in that it was used in the furtherance of the commercial enterprise of railroading. Lumpkin v. Birdsong, 212 Miss. 616, 55 So. 2d 230, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 491 (Miss. 1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 344-346.

§ 63-1-45. Maintenance of records relating to application forms and fees; audit of forms and funds; receipt for fees; effect of dishonor of check; disposition of fees.

  1. License examiners shall keep a complete record of all funds received from applicants upon forms to be prescribed and furnished by the department out of the operating funds of the department. Application forms shall be printed in book form and serially numbered and in such form that the original thereof may be transmitted by the license examiner to the commissioner, together with the renewal fee. A copy signed by the examiner shall be given to the applicant, and a copy shall be retained by the examiner. The license examiner shall, not later than ten (10) days from the date of an application, transmit the application, together with the fee, to the commissioner. The application blanks and funds shall be subject to audit at any time. The commissioner shall maintain records of all application forms on hand and issued to the examiners, who shall be charged therewith. The receipt provided for in this section shall be the only valid and recognized form of receipt for fees paid by applicants, and the receipt shall be sufficient in lieu of the renewed license for a period of sixty (60) days or until the renewed license has been issued to the applicant by the commissioner.
  2. There shall be tendered with all applications for a temporary driving permit, temporary motorcycle driving permit, initial issuance of any license issued pursuant to this article, renewal licenses, duplicate licenses or any other services for which a fee is charged, the proper fee required by law by cash, certified check, money order or electronic payment as authorized under Section 27-104-33.
  3. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall deposit the amount of fees, together with all fees for duplicate licenses, permits, delinquent fees and reinstatement fees collected by him into the General Fund of the State Treasury, in accordance with the provisions of Section 45-1-23(2); however, Seven Dollars ($7.00) of the fee derived from the fee charged for original and renewal operators’ licenses imposed under Section 63-1-43(1) and Four Dollars ($4.00) of the fee derived from the fee charged for original and renewal Class D commercial drivers’ licenses under Section 63-1-43(4) shall be deposited into a special fund that is created in the State Treasury. Monies in the fund may be expended upon legislative appropriation solely for the purchase by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol of patrol cars, communications equipment and weapons.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 8102, 8114; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, §§ 7, 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, §§ 5, 6; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, §§ 3, 5; Laws, 1958, chs. 493, 509; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 396, § 5; Laws, 1978, ch. 422, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 17; Laws, 1992, ch. 469, § 2; Laws, 2011, ch. 467, § 4; Laws, 2013, ch. 517, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2013.

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment rewrote the third through sixth sentences in the first paragraph; and rewrote the second paragraph.

The 2013 amendment designated former paragraphs as present (1) through (3); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References —

Highway patrol operating fund generally, see §45-1-23.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person’s driver’s license or driving privileges, see §63-1-52.

§ 63-1-46. Fees for reinstatement of license subsequent to suspension, revocation or cancellation generally; disposition of fees; procedure and fees for reinstatement of license suspended for noncompliance with support order.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a fee of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) shall be charged for the reinstatement of a license issued under this article to every person whose license has been validly suspended, revoked or cancelled.
    2. The funds received under the provisions of this subsection shall be distributed as follows:
      1. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be deposited into the State General Fund in accordance with Section 45-1-23;
      2. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be paid to the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System for funding the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol Retirement System as provided under Section 25-13-7;
      3. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be deposited into the special fund created in Section 63-1-45(3) for purchases of equipment by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol; and
      4. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be deposited into the Interlock Device Fund created in Section 63-11-33.
    1. A fee of One Hundred Seventy-five Dollars ($175.00) shall be charged for the reinstatement of a license issued under this article to every person whose license has been validly suspended or revoked under the provisions of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law.
    2. The funds received under the provisions of this subsection shall be distributed as follows:
      1. One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) shall be deposited into the State General Fund in accordance with Section 45-1-23;
      2. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be paid to the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System for funding the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol Retirement System as provided under Section 25-13-7;
      3. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be deposited into the special fund created in Section 63-1-45(3) for purchases of equipment by the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol; and
      4. Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be deposited into the Interlock Device Fund created in Section 63-11-33.
    1. A fee of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) shall be charged for the reinstatement of a license issued under this article to every person whose license has been validly suspended for nonpayment of child support under the provisions of Sections 93-11-151 through 93-11-163. The funds received under the provisions of this subsection shall be deposited into the State General Fund in accordance with Section 45-1-23.
    2. The procedure for the reinstatement of a license issued under this article that has been suspended for being out of compliance with an order for support, as defined in Section 93-11-153, and the payment of any fees for the reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be.
  1. A fee of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) will be charged for the reinstatement of a license that was suspended due to payment by a draft or other instrument that is dishonored by the payor.
  2. All reinstatement fees charged under this section shall be in addition to the fees prescribed in Section 63-1-43.

HISTORY: Laws, 1980, ch. 335; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 18; Laws, 1989, ch. 501, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 468 § 3; Laws, 1996, ch. 507, § 11; Laws, 2013, ch. 517, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 13; Laws, 2014, ch. 493, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2014; Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 33, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the last sentence of subsection (4). The words “This subsection (4) of Section (3) shall stand repealed” were changed to “This subsection (4) shall stand repealed”. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its May 20, 1998 meeting.

Section 3 of Chapter 493, Laws of 2014, effective from and after July 1, 2014 (approved April 16, 2014), amended this section. Section 13 of Chapter 424, Laws of 2014, effective from and after October 1, 2014 (approved March 24, 2014), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section enacted within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the July 24, 2014, meeting of the Committee.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 26, amended this section effective July 1, 1990, provided the Legislature by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Chapter 489, Laws of 2013, referred to in (1)(b)(iv) and (2)(b)(iv), also amended Section 63-1-45 and enacted Section 63-1-16.

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment, in (1)(a), added the exception, substituted “One Hundred Dollars ($100.00)” for “Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00),”and deleted the former last sentence, which read: “This fee shall be in addition to the fee provided for in Section 63-1-43, Mississippi Code of 1972”; added (1)(b); deleted former (2), which read: “The funds received under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be deposited into the State General Fund in accordance with Section 45-1-23, Mississippi Code of 1972”; redesignated former (3) as (2), and increased the fees charged therein from ($75.00) to ($175.00); added (2)(b) and (3); redesignated former (5) as (4); added (5); and made minor stylistic changes.

The first 2014 amendment (ch. 424), effective October 1, 2014, added (4); redesignated former (4) as present (3)(b); and in (5), substituted “prescribed” for “provided for application for a driver’s license” and made a minor stylistic change.

The second 2014 amendment (ch. 493), effective July 1, 2014, in (1)(b)(iv) and (2)(b)(iv), deleted “Ignition” preceding “Interlock Device Fund” and substituted “Section 63-11-33” for “Section 63-1-43 by Chapter 489, Laws of 2013.”

The 2019 amendment deleted “or as a result of a conviction of a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Law under the provisions of Section 63-1-71” from the end of (2)(a).

Cross References —

Operation of disability and relief fund for members of Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, see §25-13-7.

Provision that future funding for members who elect early retirement under the Highway Safety Patrol Retirement System shall be provided from surplus funds of such system as deposited therein pursuant to this section, see §25-13-14.

Creation of highway patrol operating fund and budget therefor, see §45-1-23.

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Fees for licenses generally, see §63-1-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

§ 63-1-47. Duration and expiration of licenses; release of applicant’s school attendance records to department of public safety; suspension of license of certain students who drop out of school.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, each applicant for an original or renewal Class R or Class D license issued pursuant to this article, who is entitled to issuance of same, shall be issued a four-year license or an eight-year license, at the option of the applicant, which will expire at midnight on the licensee’s birthday and may be renewed any time within six (6) months before the expiration of the license upon application and payment of the required fee, unless required to be reexamined.
    2. The term of an intermediate license issued under this article shall be one (1) year.
    3. The term of an iginition-interlock-restricted license issued under this article shall be four (4) years.
  1. Any commercial driver’s license issued under Article 5 of this chapter shall be issued for a five-year term to expire at midnight on the licensee’s birthday.
    1. All applications by an operator under eighteen (18) years of age must be accompanied by documentation that the applicant is in compliance with the education requirements of Section 63-1-9(1)(g), and the documentation used in establishing compliance must be dated no more than thirty (30) days before the date of application.
    2. All applications by an operator under eighteen (18) years of age, if applicable, must be accompanied by documentation signed and notarized by the parent or guardian of the applicant and the appropriate school official, authorizing the release of the applicant’s attendance records to the Department of Public Safety as required under Section 63-1-10.
    3. The commissioner shall suspend the driver’s license, intermediate license or regular learner’s permit of a student under eighteen (18) years of age who has been reported by the Department of Education as required by Section 63-1-10.1, and shall give notice of the suspension to the licensee as provided in Section 63-1-52(4). A school superintendent or designee may request that the driver’s license, intermediate license or regular learner’s permit that has been suspended under the provisions of this subsection be reinstated after the student has successfully completed nine (9) weeks of school attendance without an unlawful absence.
    1. Any original or renewal license issued under this chapter to a person who is not a United States citizen shall expire four (4) years from the date of issuance or on the expiration date of the applicant’s authorized stay in the United States, whichever is the lesser period of time, and may be renewed, if the person is otherwise qualified to renew the license, within thirty (30) days of expiration. The fee for any such license and for renewal shall be as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.
    2. Any applicant for an original or renewal license under this subsection (4) must present valid documentary evidence documenting that the applicant:
      1. Is a citizen or national of the United States;
      2. Is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent or temporary residence in the United States;
      3. Has conditional permanent residence status in the United States;
      4. Has an approved application for asylum in the United States or has entered into the United States in refugee status;
      5. Has a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa or nonimmigrant visa status for entry into or lawful presence in the United States;
      6. Has a pending application for asylum in the United States;
      7. Has a pending or approved application for temporary protected status in the United States;
      8. Has approved deferred-action status;
      9. Has a pending application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in the United States; or
      10. Has a valid employment authorization card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8114; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, § 6; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, § 5; Laws, 1958, ch. 509; Laws, 1968, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 453, § 3; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 19; Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 24; Laws, 1990, ch. 310, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 7; Laws, 2000, ch. 624, § 5; Laws, 2002, ch. 584, § 4; Laws, 2009, ch. 488, § 4; Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 31; Laws, 2010, ch. 423, § 2; Laws, 2011, ch. 468, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 489, § 5; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 14, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 4 of ch. 448, Laws of 2009, effective July 1, 2009 (approved April 6, 2009), amended this section. Section 31 of ch. 560 Laws of 2009, effective from and after July 1, 2009 (approved April 17, 2009), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 31 of ch. 560, Laws of 2009, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor's Notes. —

Executive Order No. 1474, I., issued by Governor Tate Reeves on April 20, 2020, provides as follows:

“I. In order to cope with and respond to the COVID-19 emergency, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §33-15-11(c)(1), the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §§63-1-47, 63-1-6, 63-1-21, 45-9-101, 97-37-7, and 45-35-55 are hereby suspended to the extent necessary to delay the expiration of all valid driver's licenses, learner's permits, intermediate licenses, firearm permits, security guard permits and ID cards set to expire between March 14-2020 and June 30, 2020. Such licenses, permits and ID cards will instead expire on August 3, 2020.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

The first 2009 amendment (ch. 488), deleted “and who is eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “entitled to same” in (1); deleted “of operators eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “all renewal licenses” in (1)(a); added (6)(b) and designated the former provisions of (6) as (6)(a); and in (6)(a), deleted the former first three sentences, which read: “Except as otherwise provided in this article, each applicant for an original driver’s license issued pursuant to this article, who is entitled to issuance of same, being under eighteen (18) years of age, shall be issued a one-year license which will expire at midnight on the licensee’s birthday. Renewal drivers’ licenses of operators under the age of eighteen (18) shall be for one-year periods and may be renewed any time within two (2) months before the expiration of the license upon application and payment of the required fee, unless required to be reexamined. An intermediate license shall be valid for one (1) year from its date of issue and may be renewed any time within fourteen (14) days before expiration of the license,” substituted “under eighteen (18) years of age” for “under the age of eighteen (18)” and inserted “used in establishing compliance.”

The second 2009 amendment (ch. 560), substituted “Article 5 of this chapter” for “Article 2 of this chapter” everywhere it appears in (1), (2), (4) and (5); in (1), deleted “and who is eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “issuance of same” in the introductory language, and deleted “of operators eighteen (18) years of age or older” following “renewal licenses” in (a); and rewrote (6).

The 2010 amendment added the (7)(a) designation, and therein rewrote the first sentence, which formerly read: “Any license issued under this article to a person who is not a United States citizen and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government shall expire one (1) year from the date of issuance and may be renewed, if such person is otherwise qualified to renew such license, within thirty (30) days of expiration”; and added (7)(b).

The 2011 amendment, effective October 1, 2011, inserted “or an eight-year license, at the option of the applicant” following “a four-year license” in (1); inserted “period or an eight-year period, at the option of the applicant” after “shall be for a four-year” in (1)(a); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added (8); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2014 amendment redesignated former (1) as present (1)(a) and inserted “or renewal Class R or Class D” following “each applicant for an original”; deleted “Except as otherwise provided in this section, all renewal licenses shall be for a four-year period or an eight-year period, at the option of the applicant,” from the beginning of former (1)(a); added (1)(b) and (1)(c); in (2), deleted “this” following “commercial driver’s license issued under” at the beginning; and substituted “5 of this chapter shall be issued for a five-year term to expire at midnight on the licensee’s birthday” for the remainder of this subsection; deleted (3), (4), and (5) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; in present (3)(a), substituted “before” for “prior to” at the end; in present (3)(c), substituted “regular learner’s” for “temporary learning” twice; in present (4)(a), substituted “chapter” for “article” and deleted “and who does not possess a social security number issued by the United States government” following “who is not a United States citizen”; in present (4)(b), in the parentheses, substituted “4” for “7”; and deleted former (8) in its entirety regarding the term of an ignition-interlock-restricted driver’s license.

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

Fees for operators’ and commercial drivers’ licenses, see §63-1-43.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 100 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 340-343.

§ 63-1-49. Renewal of licenses.

  1. An expired license issued pursuant to this article may be renewed at any time within eighteen (18) months after the expiration date of the license upon application and payment of the required fee, and the payment of a delinquent fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43, in lieu of a driver examination, unless the holder of the expired license is required to be examined, or unless the department has reason to believe the licensee is no longer qualified to receive a license.
    1. Any person in the Armed Services of the United States, who holds a valid license issued pursuant to this chapter and is out of state due to military service at the time the license expires, may renew the license by mail or by online renewal services while out of state due to military service or at any time within ninety (90) days after being discharged from military service or upon returning to the state without payment of any delinquent fee or examination, unless the department has reason to believe that the licensee is no longer qualified to receive a license. The person shall make proof by affidavit of the fact of the person’s current military service or of the time of discharge or return. The expiration of the license of a military person under the provisions of this paragraph (a) shall not affect the validity of the license, but the license shall continue to be valid and permit the person to operate a motor vehicle in this state for a period of ninety (90) days after discharge from military service or return to the state or until renewal of the license, whichever occurs first.
    2. The provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) also apply to a dependent of a person in the armed services of the United States who is out of state due to military service if the dependent resides out of state with the armed services member and the license of the dependent expires during the family member’s absence from the state. The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt such rules and regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this paragraph.
  2. Any person holding a valid license issued pursuant to this article who is going overseas for two (2) to four (4) years and whose license will expire during the stay overseas may renew the license for four (4) years or eight (8) years before leaving. The person shall make proof by affidavit of the fact of the overseas travel.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 8102, 8114; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, chs. 157, 167; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, §§ 7, 8; Laws, 1948, ch. 343, §§ 5, 6; Laws, 1950, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 378, §§ 3, 5; Laws, 1958, chs. 493, 509; Laws, 1962, ch. 523; Laws, 1968, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 20; Laws, 1991, ch. 328 § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 339, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 407, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 15, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment added (2)(b) and redesignated former (2) as present (2)(a); and substituted “this paragraph (a)” for “this subsection” in (2)(a).

The 2005 amendment, in (2)(a) inserted “by mail or by on-line renewal services or” following “may renew the license” in the first sentence, and made minor stylistic changes; and substituted “a dependent” for “the spouse or a child” three times in (2)(b).

The 2014 amendment, in (1), in the first sentence, substituted “eighteen (18)” for “twelve (12)”, “the” for “said”, and “prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “of One Dollar ($1.00)” and deleted the last sentence in its entirety regarding a new license constituting a renewal of the previous license; in (2)(a), in the first sentence, deleted “such” following “after being discharged from”, a comma following “upon returning to the state”, and inserted “while out of state due to military service” following “by mail or by online renewal services”; in the last sentence deleted “event first” following “license, whichever”, inserted “in this state” following “person to operate a motor vehicle”, and “first” following “occurs”; substituted “who holds” for “holding”, “chapter” for “article”, “is” for “being”, “The” for “Such”, “the person’s current” for “such”, “or” for “and”, “the” for “such” twice, “discharge” for “he is discharged”, and “renewal of the” for “he renews his”; in (2)(b), substituted “the family member’s” for “his or her” and inserted “under the Administrative Procedures Act” following “adopt such rules and regulations”; in (3), deleted the last sentence, which read “Such reissuance of a license shall constitute a renewal of the previous license and not a new license.”; substituted “will” for “shall”, “the” for “said” twice, “before” for “prior to”, and “the” for “such”, and inserted “or eight (8) years” following “for four (4) years.”

Cross References —

Motorcycle operator’s license, see §63-1-6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Parent who signed application of minor son was not liable for property damages inflicted by son’s negligent operation of automobile under renewal license for succeeding year, where application for such renewal by minor while still under the age of seventeen years was not signed by parent. Houston v. Holmes, 202 Miss. 300, 32 So. 2d 138, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1947).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 100 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 340-343.

§ 63-1-51. Grounds and procedure for revocation of licenses; suspension of license for noncompliance with order for support.

  1. It shall be the duty of the court clerk, upon conviction of any person holding a license issued pursuant to this article where the penalty for a traffic violation is as much as Ten Dollars ($10.00), to mail a copy of abstract of the court record or provide an electronically or computer generated copy of abstract of the court record immediately to the commissioner at Jackson, Mississippi, showing the date of conviction, penalty, etc., so that a record of same may be made by the Department of Public Safety. The commissioner shall forthwith revoke the license of any person for a period of one (1) year upon receiving a duly certified record of each person’s convictions of any of the following offenses when such conviction has become final:
    1. Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
    2. Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
    3. Failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state in event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another;
    4. Perjury or the willful making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the department under this article or under any other law relating to the ownership or operation of motor vehicles; or
    5. Conviction, or forfeiture of bail not vacated, upon three (3) charges of reckless driving committed within a period of twelve (12) months.
  2. The commissioner shall revoke the license issued pursuant to this article of any person convicted of negligent homicide, in addition to any penalty now provided by law.
  3. In addition to the reasons specified in this section, the commissioner shall be authorized to suspend the license issued to any person pursuant to this article for being out of compliance with an order for support, as defined in Section 93-11-153. The procedure for suspension of a license for being out of compliance with an order for support, and the procedure for the reissuance or reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, and the payment of any fees for the reissuance or reinstatement of a license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be. If there is any conflict between any provision of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163 and any provision of this article, the provisions of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, shall control.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 8106, 8173; Laws, 1938, chs. 143, 200; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1956, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 26; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 21; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 50; Laws, 1995, ch. 506, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 12; Laws, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 17, 2009); Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 29, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Editor's Note —

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “duty of the court clerk” for “duty of the trial judge” near the beginning of (1).

The 2019 amendment deleted (1)(f), which read: “Contempt for failure to pay a fine or fee or to respond to a summons or citation pursuant to a charge of a violation of this title,” and made related changes.

Cross References —

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Revocation of municipal license of bus operator, see §21-27-155.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person’s driver’s license or driving privileges, see §63-1-52.

Applicability of Article IV of Driver License Compact Law to offenses enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, see §63-1-113.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist whose operator’s license was revoked following his conviction for driving while intoxicated was not entitled to proceed by writ of certiorari in the circuit court to review the action of the commissioner of public safety when he had previously failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Code 1942, § 8105. Mississippi State Dep't of Public Safety v. Berry, 217 So. 2d 11, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1249 (Miss. 1968).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In order to have a conviction as required under this section there must be a charge of contempt filed by way of citation or warrant of arrest and a subsequent finding of guilt of contempt. Markopoulos, Nov. 15, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0561.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “operation” or “negligence in operation” within statute making owner of motor vehicle liable for negligence in its operation. 13 A.L.R.2d 378.

Criminal responsibility of one other than driver under “hit-and-run” statute. 62 A.L.R.2d 1130.

What is a “motor vehicle” within statutes making it an offense to drive while intoxicated. 66 A.L.R.2d 1146.

What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver’s license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Suspension or revocation of driver’s license for refusal to take sobriety test. 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Ordinance providing for suspension or revocation of state-issued driver’s license as within municipal power. 92 A.L.R.2d 204.

Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspending automobile driver’s license as providing for trial de novo. 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Regulations establishing a “point system” as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.3d 690.

Construction and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference of intoxication from specified percentages of alcohol present in system. 16 A.L.R.3d 748.

Right to trial by jury in criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated or similar offense. 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.

Automobiles: driving under the influence, or when addicted to the use, of drugs as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.3d 815.

What amounts to negligence within meaning of statutes penalizing negligent homicide by operation of motor vehicle. 20 A.L.R.3d 473.

Homicide by automobile as murder. 21 A.L.R.3d 116.

Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor. 58 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Necessity of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 361.

Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 427.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance mandating imprisonment for habitual or repeated traffic offender. 2 A.L.R.4th 618.

Drunk driving: Motorist’s right to private sobriety test. 45 A.L.R.4th 11.

Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator’s license for “habitual,” “persistent,” or “frequent” violations of traffic regulations. 48 A.L.R.4th 367.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration – by license holder – against administrative agency – to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license – attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms, Rev, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 49.1.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

§ 63-1-52. Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of person’s driver’s license or driving privileges.

  1. Whenever the Commissioner of Public Safety suspends, cancels or revokes the driver’s license or driving privileges of any person, notice of the suspension, cancellation or revocation shall be given to such person by the commissioner, or his duly authorized agent, in the manner provided in subsection (2) of this section and at the time provided in subsection (3) of this section or in the manner and at the time provided in subsection (4) of this section.
  2. Notice shall be given in the following manner:
    1. In writing, (i) by United States Certificate of Mailing; or (ii) by personal service at the person’s address as it appears on the driving record maintained by the Department of Public Safety or at the person’s last-known address; or (iii) by personal notice being given by any law enforcement officer of this state or any duly authorized agent of the Commissioner of Public Safety on forms prescribed and furnished by the Commissioner of Public Safety; whenever a person’s driver’s license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Driver License Compact Law, the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law or subsection (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e) or (2)(f) of Section 63-1-53.
    2. In writing, by United States first class mail, whenever a person’s driver’s license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Commercial Driver’s License Law, the Youth Court Law, Chapter 23 of Title 43, Mississippi Code of 1972, Section 63-1-45, Section 63-1-51, subsection (2)(g) or (2)(h) of Section 63-1-53, or Section 63-9-25.
  3. Notice shall be given at the following time:
    1. Before suspension, revocation or cancellation, whenever a person’s driver’s license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Driver License Compact Law, the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law or subsection (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e) or (2)(f) of Section 63-1-53.
    2. Unless otherwise specifically provided for by law, at the time of suspension, revocation or cancellation, whenever a person’s driver’s license or driving privileges are suspended, revoked or cancelled in accordance with the Mississippi Commercial Driver’s License Law, the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, the Youth Court Law, Chapter 23 of Title 43, Mississippi Code of 1972, Section 63-1-45, Section 63-1-51, subsection (2)(g) or (2)(h) of Section 63-1-53, or Section 63-9-25.
  4. Whenever the Commissioner of Public Safety suspends, revokes or cancels the driver’s license or driving privileges of any person in accordance with some provision of law other than a provision of law referred to in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, and the manner and time for giving notice is not provided for in such law, then notice of such suspension, revocation or cancellation shall be given in the manner and at the time provided for under subsections (2)(b) and (3)(b) of this section.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 412, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991; Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 31, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 23 of Title 43 (pertaining to family courts), referred to in (2)(b) and (3)(b), was repealed by Laws, 1999, ch. 432, § 2, effective from and after May 28, 1999.

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment substituted “subsection” and “subsections” for “paragraph,” and deleted “or (2)(i)” following “(2)(h)” throughout the section; substituted “Certificate of Mailing” for “Certificate of Mail” in (2)(a); and made minor punctuation changes.

Cross References —

Suspension of driver’s license by commissioner for failure to respond to summons or citation or to pay fine, fees and assessments, see §63-1-51.

Notice of suspension of license without preliminary hearing, see §63-1-53.

Notice of suspension of license for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor, see §63-11-23.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration – by license holder – against administrative agency – to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license – Attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

§ 63-1-53. Notice to accused upon failure to pay fine; notice to Commissioner of Public Safety; authority of commissioner to suspend license without preliminary hearing; notice of suspension; hearing.

  1. Upon failure of any person to pay timely any fine, fee or assessment levied as a result of any violation of this title, the clerk of the court shall give written notice to such person by United States first-class mail at his last known address advising such person that, if within ninety (90) days after such notice is deposited in the mail, the person has not paid the entire amount of all fines, fees and assessments levied, then the court will pursue collection as for any other delinquent payment, and shall be entitled to collection of all additional fees in accordance with subsection (4) of this section.
  2. The commissioner is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:
    1. Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license is required upon conviction except under the provisions of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law;
    2. Has been involved as a driver in any accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another or serious property damage;
    3. Is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle;
    4. Has been convicted with such frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways;
    5. Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle;
    6. Has permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of such license;
    7. Has committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation; or
    8. Has committed a violation for which mandatory revocation of license is required upon conviction, entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudication of delinquency, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 63-1-71.
  3. Notice that a person’s license is suspended or will be suspended under subsection (2) of this section shall be given by the commissioner in the manner and at the time provided for under Section 63-1-52, and upon such person’s request, he shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing as early as practicable, but not to exceed twenty (20) days after receipt of such request in the county wherein the licensee resides unless the department and the licensee agree that such hearing may be held in some other county. Upon such hearing the commissioner, or his duly authorized agent, may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers and may require a reexamination of the licensee. Upon such hearing the commissioner shall either rescind any order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may extend any suspension of such license or revoke such license.
  4. If a licensee has not paid all cash appearance bonds authorized under Section 99-19-3 or all fines, fees or other assessments levied as a result of a violation of this title within ninety (90) days after receiving notice of the licensee’s failure to pay all fines, fees or other assessments as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the court is authorized to pursue collection under Section 21-17-1(6) or 19-3-41(2) as for any other delinquent payment, and shall be entitled to collection of all additional fees authorized under those sections.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8107; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1956, ch. 379, § 2; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 27; Laws, 1986, ch. 500, § 51; Laws, 1991, ch. 403, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 468 § 7; Laws, 1991, ch. 615 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch 487, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 499, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 517, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2010; Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 30, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1990, Chapter 588, § 25, amended this section effective July 1, 1990 provided that the Legislature, by concurrent resolution adopted by the House and Senate in session prior to July 1, 1990, declared that sufficient funds were dedicated and made available for the implementation of Chapter 588. Funds, however, were not made available by the Legislature prior to July 1, 1990, and by direction of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, the amendatory provisions were not implemented. The text of the proposed amendment can be found in the 1990 General Laws of Mississippi.

Laws, 1993, ch. 487, § 3, effective July 1, 1993, provides as follows:

“SECTION 3. The amendments to the sections of law contained in this act shall apply only to convictions occurring from and after July 1, 1993.”

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”

Amendment Notes —

The 2009 amendment substituted “to the commissioner” for “to the Commissioner of Public Safety” near the end of (1); substituted “as early as practicable, but not to exceed” for “as early as practical within not to exceed” in the first sentence of (3); and added (4).

The 2010 amendment, in (4), inserted “all cash appearance bonds authorized under Section 99-19-3 or” and made a stylistic change.

The 2019 amendment, in (1), in the first sentence, deleted “Upon failure of any person to respond timely and properly to a summons or citation charging such person with any violation of this title, or” from the beginning and made a related change, substituted “ninety (90) days” for “ten (10) days,” deleted “has not properly responded to the summons or citation or” preceding “has not paid the entire amount,” substituted “pursue collection as for any other delinquent payment, and shall be entitled to collection of all additional fees in accordance with subsection (4) of this section” for “give notice thereof to the Commissioner of Public Safety and the commissioner may suspend the driver’s license of such person” and deleted the former last two sentences, which related to suspension of driver's license for failure to satisfactorily dispose of the matter pending before the court; deleted (2)(h) and (i), which related to failure to pay a fine and failure to respond to summons, and redesignated former (j) as (h); and substituted “after receiving notice of the licensee's failure to pay all fines, fees or other assessments as provided in subsection (1) of this section” for “after the commissioner has suspended the license of a person under subsection (2) (i) of this section.”

Cross References —

Municipal and justice courts authorized to purge judgment rolls of all fines and fees owed by deceased person upon proof of death, see §9-1-47.

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Suspension of municipal license of bus operator, see §21-27-155.

Suspension of license for unlawfully parking in an area designated for handicapped parking, see §27-19-56.

Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§41-29-101 et seq.

Replacement of unexpired driver’s license surrendered or suspended for medical reasons by free identification card, see §45-35-7.

Notice by Commissioner of Public Safety to person concerning suspension, cancellation or revocation of such person’s driver’s license or driving privileges. see §63-1-52.

Forfeiture for 90 days of person under arrest who refuses to submit to chemical test mandated by Implied Consent Law, see §63-11-21.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As for revocation of licenses of persons for out-of-state convictions, Miss. Code Section 63-1-53(g) gives Commissioner of Public Safety authority to suspend license of any person who “has committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension or revocation”. O’Cain, Jan. 20, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0022.

In justice court, clerk or deputy clerk has power, under Miss. Code Section 63-1-53, to send out “fail to appear” notices to defendants on traffic or game and fish violations. Ferguson, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

A 10 day letter (commonly referred to as a DR15) on a traffic citation should be sent upon the failure of the defendant to appear on the date properly noticed or upon the failure of a defendant to pay any fine assessed; thus, if a defendant fails to appear for an initial appearance after receiving proper notice, the 10 day letter should be sent; in addition a 10 day letter should be sent if a defendant is tried in absentia, found guilty and assessed a fine. Mark, August 6, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0398.

No statute of limitation exists on the collection of unpaid fines, and there is no limit on the authority of the Commissioner of Public Safety to suspend the license of an individual who still owes a fine on a traffic offense conviction where such conviction occurred five or ten years prior. Via, Apr. 19, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0185.

The purpose of Section 63-1-53 is to give a person 10 days to respond to a citation; therefore, it is necessary to wait until the 10-day period has expired before issuing a warrant. Reno, July 29, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0264.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Regulations establishing a “point system” as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle. 5 A.L.R.3d 690.

Necessity of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 361.

Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver’s license. 60 A.L.R.3d 427.

State’s liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver. 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Admissibility, in motor vehicle license suspension proceedings, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure. 23 A.L.R.5th 108.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 34, 41-56.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

§ 63-1-55. Suspension of license of minor by trial judge; requirement of completion of defensive driving course; costs and assessments; procedure upon appeal of suspension.

A trial judge, in his discretion, if the person so convicted or who has entered a plea of guilty for any traffic violation, except the offenses enumerated in paragraphs (a) through (e) of subsection (1) of Section 63-1-51 and violations of the Implied Consent Law and the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, is a minor and dependent upon and subject to the care, custody and control of his parents or guardian, may, in lieu of the penalties otherwise provided by law and the provision of said section, suspend such minor’s driver’s license by taking and keeping same in custody of the court for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days. The judge so ordering such suspension shall enter upon his docket “DEFENDANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENDED FOR_______________DAYS IN LIEU OF CONVICTION” and such action by the trial judge shall not constitute a conviction. The trial judge also may require the minor to successfully complete a defensive driving course approved by the judge as a condition of the suspension. Costs of court and penalty assessment for driver education and training program may be imposed in such actions within the discretion of the court. Should a minor appeal, in the time and manner as by law provided, the decision whereby his license is suspended, the trial judge shall then return said license to the minor and impose the fines and/or penalties that he would have otherwise imposed and same shall constitute a conviction.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8106; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1940, ch. 167; Laws, 1956, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 1968, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 515, § 26; Laws, 1992, ch. 323, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 527, § 2, eff from and after July 2, 1996.

Cross References —

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Driver training penalty assessment fund generally, see §37-25-17.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 63-1-55 provides that justice court judge may suspend minor’s driver’s license in lieu of conviction, and in addition “may require the minor to successfully complete defensive driving course approved by the judge as a condition of the suspension.” Ferguson, June 9, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0331.

Judge has the discretion over approval of the defensive driving school to be completed by a minor. Hood, Mar. 11, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0032.

Miss. Code Ann. §63-9-11(3)(d) clearly and unequivocally requires instruction of an approved traffic safety violator course by a human being when it specifies that the course “provide minimum qualifications for instructors.” This requirement does not conflict with Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-55 allowing computerized defensive driving instruction for minors. Dearing, March 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00091, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 80.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver’s license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspending automobile driver’s license as providing for trial de novo. 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 116 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 353 et seq.

§ 63-1-57. Driving while license or driving privilege cancelled, suspended or revoked.

Any person whose license issued pursuant to this article or driving privilege as a nonresident has been canceled, suspended or revoked as provided in this title or in Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended or revoked, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two (2) days or more than six (6) months. There may be imposed in addition thereto a fine of not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for each offense.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8110; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 22; Laws, 1988, ch. 563, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 507, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 1996.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Affidavit.

The gravamen of the crime under this section [Code 1942, § 8110] is the driving when the driver has no license to drive and the fact that the driver could not tell from the affidavit whether he was charged with so driving when his license had been suspended or when it had been revoked is immaterial. Middleton v. State, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 508 (Miss. 1952).

2. —Defect cured by amendment.

Where the original affidavit did not charge the defendant for driving motor vehicle without license upon a public highway in Mississippi the defect was cured by an amendment to the affidavit alleging that defendant was driving in District 5 of Marion County upon Highway No. 24 of the State of Mississippi. Middleton v. State, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So. 2d 320, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 508 (Miss. 1952).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Amending a charge of violation of §63-11-40 to a violation of this section when the facts of the case do not merit such an amendment would constitute a violation of §63-11-39. Mitchell, Aug. 27, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0435.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: necessity or emergency as defense in prosecution for driving without operator’s license or while license is suspended. 61 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 260, 261.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1632-1635.

§ 63-1-58. License suspensions and restrictions to run consecutively.

Suspension or restriction of driving privileges for any person convicted of or nonadjudicated for violations of the Implied Consent Law or any administrative suspension imposed under this chapter shall run consecutively and not concurrently.

HISTORY: Laws, 2016, ch. 503, § 2, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2016.

§ 63-1-59. Making false affidavit or statements.

Any person who makes any false affidavit, or knowingly swears or affirms falsely to any matter or thing required by the terms of this article to be sworn to or affirmed, is guilty of perjury and upon conviction shall be punishable by fine or imprisonment as other persons committing perjury are punishable.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8109; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

Cross References —

Punishment of person committing perjury, see §97-9-61.

§ 63-1-60. Alteration, fraudulent use, or fraudulent procurement of license.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any person:
    1. To display, cause or permit to be displayed, or have in his possession, any fictitious, fraudulently altered or fraudulently obtained driver’s license;
    2. To display or represent any driver’s license not issued to him as being his own driver’s license;
    3. To photograph, photostat, duplicate or in any way reproduce, manufacture, sell or distribute or alter any driver’s license, or facsimile thereof, in such a manner that it could be mistaken for a valid driver’s license;
    4. To display or have in his possession any photograph, photostat, duplicate, reproduction or facsimile of a driver’s license unless authorized by law; or
    5. To take a driver’s license examination for another or to use any other name, other than his own, on the driver’s license application in an attempt to take the driver’s license examination for another.
  2. Any person convicted of a violation of paragraph (a), (b), (d) or (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
  3. Any person under twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of the offense who is convicted of a violation of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section shall be punished as follows:
    1. A first offense shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
    2. A second or subsequent offense, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
  4. Any person twenty-one (21) years of age or older at the time of the offense who is convicted of a violation of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 479; Laws, 1998, ch. 558, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 551, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2001.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Office supply store that allegedly made color photocopies of doctored driver’s license subsequently used by underage driver to buy alcohol (although not on night of accident that resulted in death of plaintiff’s decedent) was not negligent per se based on alleged violation of §63-1-60, which was designed to prevent persons from making and using fake or improper drivers’ licenses, as statute did not purport to prevent minors from purchasing alcoholic beverages and did not specifically state that it applied to businesses that had photocopying capability. Main v. Office Depot, 914 F. Supp. 1413, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1261 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd, 101 F.3d 700, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 34247 (5th Cir. Miss. 1996).

§ 63-1-61. Causing or permitting child or ward under sixteen years of age to drive without authorization.

No person shall cause or knowingly permit his child or ward under the age of sixteen (16) years to drive a motor vehicle upon any highway if such minor is not authorized under the provisions of this article or is in violation of any of the provisions of this article. Any penalty imposed under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to any penalty imposed against the minor for a violation of this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8111; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1994, ch. 588, § 4, eff from and after September 1, 1995.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence insufficient.

1. In general.

A parent is negligent who permits a child under the statutory age for a licensed driver to drive his automobile on the highway, rendering him liable for the act of such child in permitting another to drive, even though he has forbidden child to do so, and to drive upon the road where the accident occurred. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Jones, 236 Miss. 471, 111 So. 2d 240, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1959).

2. Evidence insufficient.

Evidence was insufficient to support a judgment against the defendant for property damage caused in an accident between the plaintiffs and the defendant’s 14 year old son since there was no evidence that the defendant knew that his son was taking the car. Chandler v. Coleman, 759 So. 2d 459, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 102 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction, application, and effect of legislation making it an offense to permit, or imputing negligence to one who permits an unauthorized or unlicensed person to operate motor vehicle. 69 A.L.R.2d 978.

Liability of donor of motor vehicle for injuries resulting from owner’s operation. 22 A.L.R.4th 738.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 262.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1751.

§ 63-1-63. Permitting operation of vehicle by another person in violation of article.

No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized under the provisions of this article or in violation of any of the provisions of this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8112; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Trial court erred by denying a seller’s motion for summary judgment in the parents’ wrongful death action, as Mississippi law did not impose a duty on the seller, sufficient to support a negligence claim, to restrict motor vehicle sales to licensed drivers or to determine the competence of drivers as part of the sale; the son was not required to have an “E” endorsement on his license to purchase the motorcycle, but only to drive the motorcycle on a highway. Laurel Yamaha, Inc. v. Freeman, 956 So. 2d 897, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 316 (Miss. 2007).

In an action against the parents and a minor for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident, where there was no proof that the father or mother authorized or knowingly permitted the minor to drive on the occasion in question, the trial court properly peremptorily instructed the jury to return a verdict for the parents. Prewitt v. Walker, 231 Miss. 860, 97 So. 2d 514, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 575 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction, application, and effect of legislation making it an offense to permit, or imputing negligence to one who permits, an unauthorized or unlicensed person to operate motor vehicle. 69 A.L.R.2d 978.

Negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to unlicensed driver. 55 A.L.R.4th 1100.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 262.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1751.

§ 63-1-65. Loan of license or temporary permit to another or use of another’s permit or license.

It shall be unlawful for any person to lend or borrow any temporary driving permit or license issued pursuant to this article, or to display or represent a license or temporary permit not issued to himself. Any person violating this section shall be fined not less than Five Dollars ($5.00) and costs and not more than Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) and costs.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8116; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

§ 63-1-67. Renting motor vehicle to another.

  1. No person shall rent a motor vehicle to any other person unless the latter person is then duly licensed under the provisions of this article, or, in the case of a nonresident, then duly licensed under the laws of the state or country of his residence except a nonresident whose home state or country does not require that an operator be licensed.
  2. No person shall rent a motor vehicle to another until he has inspected the license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared and verified the signature thereon with the signature of such person written in his presence.
  3. Every person renting a motor vehicle to another shall keep a record of the registration number of the motor vehicle so rented, the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle is rented, the number of the license of said latter person and the date and place when and where said license was issued. Such record shall be open to inspection by any police officer or officers or employee of the commissioner.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8113; Laws, 1938, ch. 143; Laws, 1985, ch. 376, § 24, eff from and after July 1, 1985.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Burden on rental car companies.

Car rental agency was not alleged to have known of or to have had a duty to suspect any recklessness about the renter, and the renter’s valid license was inspected, and the required information was recorded on the rental contract; the car rental agency was a self-insurer and a clause recognizing the applicability of state motor-vehicle responsibility laws was printed on the reverse side of the rental agreement signed by the renter. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc. v. Bardin, 8 So.3d 866, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 220 (Miss. 2009).

Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-67 only places a burden on rental car companies to accept facially valid, unexpired driver’s licenses. Cousin v. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 2007).

Rental car companies comply with Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-67(1) by fulfilling their responsibilities as mandated under §63-1-67(2) and (3). Cousin v. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 2007).

Because defendant rental car rental company complied with Miss. Code Ann. §63-1-67 by checking a renter’s facially valid license according to the procedures set forth in §63-1-67(2) and (3) (even though the renter’s license had been suspended), the trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the car rental company on plaintiffs’ negligence per se action. Cousin v. Enter. Leasing Company-South Cent., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1287, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 39 (Miss. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Criminal offenses in connection with rental of motor vehicles. 38 A.L.R.3d 949.

Rental agency’s liability for negligent entrustment of vehicle. 78 A.L.R.3d 1170.

State regulation of motor vehicle rental (“you-drive”) business. 60 A.L.R.4th 784.

§ 63-1-69. Punishment for violations where no specific penalty provided.

Any person convicted of a violation of this article or any provisions of said article for which no other penalty is provided shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars ($5.00) and costs and not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) and costs, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of from one to six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8117; Laws, 1938, ch. 143.

Cross References —

Prohibition against suspending or revoking a person’s driver’s license for violations of laws and ordinances in regard to the parking of vehicles, see §21-23-19.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

§ 63-1-71. Revocation or suspension of driving privilege of person convicted of violation of Uniform Controlled Substance Law or violation of similar law of another jurisdiction; reduction of suspension in hardship cases.

[Effective from and after October 15, 2019, this section will read as follows:]

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 63-11-30(3) and in addition to any penalty authorized by the Uniform Controlled Substances Law or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of nolo contendere thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, in a court of this state, the United States, another state, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state for a period of not less than six (6) months. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence does not have a driver’s license or is less than sixteen (16) years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of not less than six (6) months after the day the person obtains a driver’s license or reaches the age of sixteen (16). If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for driving under the influence of a controlled substance, the revocation or suspension period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension.
  2. The court in this state before whom any person is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for driving under the influence of a controlled substance shall collect forthwith the Mississippi driver’s license of the person and forward such license to the Department of Public Safety along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or revocation period imposed pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the Commissioner of Public Safety. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or revocation period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or revocation imposed pursuant to this section, the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in Section 63-11-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of Section 63-11-40. If the person is the holder of a driver’s license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the Commissioner of Public Safety who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person’s nonresident driving privilege in this state.
  3. The county court or circuit court having jurisdiction, on petition, may reduce the suspension of driving privileges under this section if the suspension would constitute a hardship on the offender. When the petition is filed, such person shall pay to the circuit clerk of the court where the petition is filed a fee of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) for each year, or portion thereof, of license revocation or suspension remaining under the original sentence, which shall be deposited into the State General Fund to the credit of a special fund hereby created in the State Treasury to be used for alcohol or drug abuse treatment and education, upon appropriation by the Legislature. This fee shall be in addition to any other court costs or fees required for the filing of petitions.

HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 468 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch 487, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1993; Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 32, eff from and after October 15, 2019.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 1993, ch. 487, § 3, effective July 1, 1993, provides as follows:

“SECTION 3. The amendments to the sections of law contained in this act shall apply only to convictions occurring from and after July 1, 1993.”

Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:

“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the UNHANDLEDCHAR Criminal Justice Reform Act. UNHANDLEDCHAR

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment, effective October 15, 2019, deleted the former first sentence, which read: “In addition to any penalty authorized by the Uniform Controlled Substances Law or any other statute indicating the dispositions that can be ordered for an adjudication of delinquency, every person convicted of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent in a court of this state for a violation of any offense defined in the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, and every person convicted of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent under the laws of the United States, another state, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of a violation for the use, distribution, possession, manufacture, sale, barter, transfer or dispensing of a UNHANDLEDCHAR controlled substance, UNHANDLEDCHAR UNHANDLEDCHAR counterfeit substance, UNHANDLEDCHAR UNHANDLEDCHAR narcotic drug UNHANDLEDCHAR or UNHANDLEDCHAR drug, UNHANDLEDCHAR as such terms are defined under Section 41-29-105, shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state for a period of six (6) months”; in the first sentence, substituted “Section 63-11-30(3)” for “Section 63-11-30(2)(a),” deleted “and every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of nolo contendere thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, in a court of this state, and every person convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, or entering a plea of nolo contendere thereto, or adjudicated delinquent therefor, under the laws of” following “court of this state”; substituted “sixteen (16)” for “fifteen (15)” twice in the second sentence; substituted “driving under the influence of a controlled substance” for “a violation of any offense defined in the Uniform Controlled Substances Law” in the third sentence of (1) and the first sentence of (2); and substituted “suspension” for “denial of which” in the first sentence of (3).

Cross References —

Fee for reinstatement of license suspended or revoked for violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §63-1-46.

Authority of commissioner to suspend operator’s license without preliminary hearing for violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §63-1-53.

Applicability of subsection (3) of this section to defendant who holds commercial driver’s license or was operating commercial motor vehicle when violation occurred and who is charged with violating state of local traffic law other than parking violation, see §63-1-222.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This section applies to everyone pleading nolo to, convicted, or adjudicated delinquent of a controlled substances violation. Hankins, Oct. 30, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0798.

Section 63-1-71(2) and Section 41-29-139(c)(2)(A) are not in conflict; report of conviction for less than one ounce of marijuana must be sent to the Bureau of Narcotics pursuant to 41-29-139, and, if court is unable to collect the license of person convicted, court shall also cause report of conviction to be sent to Commissioner of Public Safety, Driver Improvement Division. Lowe, Sept. 16, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0680.

A defendant’s driver’s license will be suspended for a conviction of possession of marijuana or for possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle or for possession of paraphernalia and a conviction for any of these should be reported to the Department of Public Safety. Shirley, Mar. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0167.

§ 63-1-73. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws of 2015, ch. 326, § 2, effective July 1, 2015.

§63-1-73. [Laws, 2009, ch. 488, § 5; Laws, 2011, ch. 481, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2011.]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §63-1-73 prohibited the use of a wireless communication device by persons authorized to drive under intermediate licenses or temporary learning or driving permits while the vehicle is in motion or by a person operating a passenger bus with a minor passenger on the bus, with some exceptions.

For present provisions relating to the prohibition against texting or reading or posting to social media network site while driving, see §63-33-1.

Article 2. Mississippi Commercial Driver’s License Law.

§§ 63-1-74 through 63-1-90. Repealed.

Repealed by Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 27, effective July 1, 2009.

§63-1-74. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-75. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 3; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 8; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2005.]

§63-1-76. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 4, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-77. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 5, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-78. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 6; Laws, 1992, ch. 304 § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2005.]

§63-1-79. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 7; Laws, 1992, ch. 467, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 407, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 322, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.]

§63-1-80. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 8, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-81. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 9; Laws, 1997, ch. 588, § 20; Laws, 2002, ch. 388, § 2; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2005.]

§63-1-82. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 10; Laws, 1992, ch. 488, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 535, § 4; Laws, 2004, ch. 322, § 2; Laws, 2005, ch. 332, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2005.]

§63-1-83. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 11; Laws, 1996, ch. 507, § 14; Laws, 2005, ch. 541, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2005.]

§63-1-84. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 12, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-85. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 13, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-86. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 14, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-87. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 15, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-88. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 16, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-89. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 17, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

§63-1-90. [Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 18, eff from and after January 1, 1990.]

Editor’s Notes —

Former §63-1-74 provided the purpose and construction of the article. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-202.

Former §63-1-75 provided definitions for terms used in the article. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-203.

Former §63-1-76 provided that no person who drives a commercial motor vehicle could have more than one (1) driver’s license. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-204.

Former §63-1-77 required persons driving commercial motor vehicles to have commercial driver’s license.

Former §63-1-78 related to the applicability of provisions of the article. For present similar provisions relating to exemption of farm-related service industry employees, see §63-1-207.

Former §63-1-79 provided commercial driver’s license qualification standards. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-208.

Former §63-1-80 related to nonresident commercial driver’s licenses. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-209.

Former §63-1-81 related to the application for commercial driver’s licenses. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-210.

Former §63-1-82 related to commercial driver’s license content, classification, endorsement, and restrictions. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-211.

Former §63-1-83 related to the suspension of commercial driver’s licenses. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-216.

Former §63-1-84 related to implied consent to tests for presence of alcohol in the blood. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-224.

Former §63-1-85 provided classifications of offenses under article and relationship to other laws. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-225.

Former §63-1-86 related to notification of state licensing authority of suspension, revocation, cancellation, etc. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-212.

Former §63-1-87 provided for reciprocity. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-215.

Former §63-1-88 related to full faith and credit of out-of-state convictions. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-215.

Former §63-1-89 related to the promulgation of rules and regulations by the commissioner of public safety.

Former §63-1-90 provided for the use of inspection stations for commercial driver’s license testing sites. For present similar provisions, see §63-1-226.

Article 2 also contained a former §63-1-73 (Laws, 1989, ch. 482, § 1, effective from and after January 1, 1990), which was repealed by Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 27, effective July 1, 2009. A new §63-1-73, enacted by Laws of 2009, ch. 488, § 5, effective from and after July 1, 2009, now appears in Article 1.

Article 3. Driver License Compact Law.

§ 63-1-101. Short title.

This article may be cited as the Mississippi Driver License Compact Law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-01; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Comparable Laws from other States —

Code of Alabama §§32-6-30 et seq.

Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated §27-17-101.

Official Code of Georgia Annotated §40-5-5.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32: 1420.

Revised Statutes of Missouri § 302.600.

Tennessee Code Annotated §§55-50-701 et seq.

Texas Transportation Code §§ 523.001 et seq.

§ 63-1-103. Form of compact.

The Driver License Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:

DRIVER LICENSE COMPACT

ARTICLE I

Findings and Declaration of Policy

The party states find that:

  1. The safety of their streets and highways is materially affected by the degree of compliance with state and local ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles.
  2. Violation of such a law or ordinance is evidence that the violator engages in conduct which is likely to endanger the safety of persons and property.
  3. The continuance in force of a license to drive is predicated upon compliance with laws and ordinances relating to the operation of motor vehicles, in whichever jurisdiction the vehicle is operated.

    ARTICLE II

    Definitions

    As used in this compact:

    1. “State” means a state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
    2. “Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
    3. “Conviction” means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance or administrative rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.

      ARTICLE III

      Reports of Conviction

      The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted; describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated; identify the court in which action was taken; indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered, or whether the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond or other security; and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.

      ARTICLE IV

      Effect of Conviction

      1. The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of conviction for:
  4. Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.

    ARTICLE V

    Application for New Licenses

    Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:

    ARTICLE VI

    Applicability of Other Laws

    Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a party state and a nonparty state.

    ARTICLE VII

    Compact Administrator and Interchange of Information

    1. The head of the licensing authority of each party state shall be the administrator of this compact for his state. The administrators, acting jointly, shall have the power to formulate all necessary and proper procedures for the exchange of information under this compact.
    2. The administrator of each party state shall furnish to the administrator of each other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of this compact.

      ARTICLE VIII

      Entry Into Force and Withdrawal

      1. This compact shall enter into force and become effective as to any state when it has enacted the same into law.
      2. Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same, but no such withdrawal shall take effect until six months after the executive head of the withdrawing state has given notice of the withdrawal to the executive heads of all other party states. No withdrawal shall affect the validity or applicability by the licensing authorities of states remaining party to the compact of any report of conviction occurring prior to the withdrawal.

      ARTICLE IX

      Construction and Severability

      This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

It is the policy of each of the party states to:

Promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of the jurisdictions where such operators drive motor vehicles.

Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.

Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;

Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;

Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;

As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the home state shall give such effect to the conduct as is provided by the laws of the home state.

If the laws of a party state do not provide for offenses or violations denominated or described in precisely the words employed in subdivision (a) of this Article, such party state shall construe the denomination and description appearing in subdivision (a) hereof as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of a substantially similar nature and the laws of such party state shall contain such provisions as may be necessary to ensure that full force and effect is given to this Article.

The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension period has not terminated.

The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.

The applicant is the holder of a license to drive issued by another party state and currently in force unless the applicant surrenders such license.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-02; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 141, 142.

1A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Administrative Law, Form 341.2 (complaint, petition, or declaration – by license holder – against administrative agency – to enjoin further proceedings to suspend or revoke license – attempt to suspend or revoke license on grounds not listed in statute authorizing suspension or revocation of license.)

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 363.

§ 63-1-105. Governor as “executive head.”

As used in the compact, with reference to this state, the term “executive head” shall mean the governor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-05; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References —

Powers of governor generally, see §7-1-5.

§ 63-1-107. Commissioner of public safety as “licensing authority;” duties of commissioner.

As used in the compact, the term “licensing authority” with reference to this state, shall mean the department of public safety. The commissioner of public safety shall furnish to the appropriate authorities of any other party state any information or documents reasonably necessary to facilitate the administration of Articles III, IV and V of the compact.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-03; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References —

Department of public safety and commissioner thereof generally, see Chapter 1 of Title 45.

§ 63-1-109. Compensation of commissioner as compact administrator.

The commissioner of public safety as compact administrator provided for in Article VII of the compact shall not be entitled to any additional compensation on account of his service as such administrator. However, he shall be entitled to expenses incurred in connection with his duties and responsibilities as such administrator, in the same manner as for expenses incurred in connection with any other duties or responsibilities of his office or employment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-04; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

§ 63-1-111. Reports by courts or other state agencies to commissioner.

Any court or other agency of this state, or a subdivision thereof, which has jurisdiction to take any action suspending, revoking or otherwise limiting a license to drive, shall report any such action and the adjudication upon which it is based to the commissioner of public safety in the manner and within the time provided by subsection (1) of section 63-1-51 and section 63-1-55.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-06; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purpose of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver’s license. 79 A.L.R.2d 866.

Admissibility of traffic conviction in later state civil trial. 73 A.L.R.4th 691.

§ 63-1-113. Applicability of Article IV of compact to certain offenses.

Article IV of the compact, set forth in section 63-1-103, shall apply to those offenses enumerated in subsection (1) of section 63-1-51, and any suspension therefor shall be governed by the provisions of section 63-1-53.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8125-07; Laws, 1962, ch. 514, § 7, eff from and and after July 1, 1962.

Cross References —

Revocation and suspension of licenses generally, see §§63-1-51 to63-1-55.

Article 5. Commercial Driver’s License Act.

§ 63-1-201. Short title.

This article may be cited as the Commercial Driver’s License Act.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-202. Statement of intent and purpose.

The purpose of this article is to implement the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (49 USCS Appx. Section 2701 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as “CMVSA,” and thereby prevent the loss to the State of Mississippi of substantial federal highway funds as a penalty for failure to comply therewith.

This article is a remedial law which should be liberally construed to promote public health, safety and welfare. The provisions of Article 1 of this chapter, being the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver’s License Law of 1938, and the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 11, Mississippi Code of 1972, being the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, including penalties for violations thereof, shall be applicable to the provisions of this article to the extent that such laws do not conflict with the provisions of this article. If any provisions of this article conflict with the provisions of the Highway Safety Patrol and Driver’s License Law of 1938 or the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, then the provisions of this article shall control.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-203. Definitions.

As used in this article:

“Alcohol” means any substance containing any form of alcohol including, but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, propanol and isopropanol.

“Alcohol concentration” means the concentration of alcohol in a person’s blood or breath. When expressed as a percentage it means:

The number of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood; or

The number of grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath.

“Commercial driver’s license” or “CDL” means a license issued by a state or other jurisdiction, in accordance with the standards contained in 49 CFR, Part 383, to an individual which authorizes the individual to operate a class of commercial motor vehicle.

“Commercial driver’s license information system” or “CDLIS” means the CDLIS established by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) pursuant to Section 12007, of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986.

“Commercial learner’s permit” means a permit issued pursuant to Section 63-1-208(5).

“Commercial motor vehicle” or “CMV” means a motor vehicle or combination of motor vehicles used in commerce to transport passengers or property if the motor vehicle:

Has a gross combination weight rating of eleven thousand seven hundred ninety-four (11,794) kilograms or more (twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or more) inclusive of a towed unit(s) with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than four thousand five hundred thirty-six (4,536) kilograms (ten thousand (10,000) pounds);

Has a gross vehicle weight rating of eleven thousand seven hundred ninety-four (11,794) or more kilograms (twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or more);

Is designed to transport sixteen (16) or more passengers, including the driver;

Is of any size and is used in the transportation of hazardous materials as defined in this section; or

The term shall not include:

1. Authorized emergency vehicles as defined in Section 63-3-103;

2. Motor homes as defined in Section 63-3-103; however, this exemption shall only apply to vehicles used strictly for recreational, noncommercial purposes;

3. Military and commercial equipment owned or operated by the United States Department of Defense, including the National Guard and Mississippi Military Department, and operated by: active duty military personnel; members of the military reserves; members of the National Guard on active duty, including personnel on full-time National Guard duty; personnel on part-time National Guard training; National Guard military technicians (civilians who are required to wear military uniforms); employees of the Mississippi Military Department; and active duty United States Coast Guard personnel. This exception is not applicable to United States Reserve technicians;

4. Farm vehicles, which are vehicles:

a. Controlled and operated by a farmer;

b. Used to transport either agricultural products, farm machinery, farm supplies, or both, to or from a farm;

c. Not used in the operations of a common or contract motor carrier; and

d. Used within one hundred fifty (150) miles of the farm.

“Controlled substance” means any substance so classified under Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USCS 802(6), and includes all substances listed on Schedules I through V of 21 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308, as they may be revised from time to time, any substance so classified under Sections 41-29-113 through 41-29-121, Mississippi Code of 1972, and any other substance which would impair a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle.

“Conviction” means an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or a determination by a judge or hearing officer that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person’s appearance in court, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended or probated. Conviction shall also mean a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which has been accepted by the court.

“Disqualification” means any of the following three (3) actions:

The suspension, revocation or cancellation of a commercial driver’s license by the state or jurisdiction of issuance;

Any withdrawal of a person’s privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle by a state or other jurisdiction as the result of a violation of state or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than parking, vehicle weight or vehicle defect violations; or

A determination by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration that a person is not qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle under 49 CFR, Part 391.

“Driver” means any person who drives, operates or is in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle on a public highway or who is required to hold a commercial driver’s license.

“Employer” means any person, including the United States, a state, the District of Columbia or a political subdivision of a state, who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle or assigns employees to operate a commercial motor vehicle.

“Foreign” means outside the fifty (50) United States and the District of Columbia.

“Gross combination weight rating” or “GCWR” means the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a combination (articulated) vehicle. In the absence of a value specified by the manufacturer, gross combination weight rating will be determined by adding the gross vehicle weight rating of the power unit and the total weight of the towed unit and any load thereon.

“Gross vehicle weight rating” or “GVWR” means the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single vehicle.

“Hazardous materials” means any material that has been designated as hazardous under 49 USCS Section 5103 and is required to be placarded under subpart F of 49 CFR, Part 172 or any quantity of a material listed as a select agent or toxin in 42 CFR, Part 73.

“Imminent hazard” means the existence of a condition that presents a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal injury, or a substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment may occur before the reasonably foreseeable completion date of a formal proceeding begun to lessen the risk of that death, illness, injury, or endangerment.

“Nonresident commercial driver’s license” or “nonresident CDL” means a commercial driver’s license issued by a state to an individual under either of the following two (2) conditions:

To an individual domiciled in a foreign country meeting the requirements of 49 CFR, Part 383.23(b)(1); or

To an individual domiciled in another state meeting the requirements of 49 CFR, Part 383.23(b)(2).

“Serious traffic violation” means conviction at any time when operating a commercial motor vehicle or at those times when operating a noncommercial motor vehicle when the conviction results in the revocation, cancellation, or suspension of the operator’s license or operating privilege, of:

Excessive speeding, involving a single charge of any speed fifteen (15) miles per hour or more, above the posted speed limit;

Reckless driving, as defined under state or local law;

Improper traffic lane changes, as defined in Section 63-3-601, 63-3-603, 63-3-613 or 63-3-803;

Following the vehicle ahead too closely, as defined in Section 63-3-619;

A violation of any state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with an accident or collision resulting in death to any person;

Operating a commercial motor vehicle without obtaining a commercial driver’s license;

Operating a commercial motor vehicle without a commercial driver’s license in the driver’s possession;

Operating a commercial motor vehicle without the proper class of commercial driver’s license or endorsements, or both.

“Out-of-service order” means a declaration by an authorized enforcement officer of a federal, state, Canadian, Mexican, or local jurisdiction, that a driver, or a commercial motor vehicle, or a motor carrier operation, is out of service pursuant to 49 CFR, Part 386.72, 392.5, 395.13, 396.9 or compatible laws, or the North American Uniform Out-of-Service Criteria.

“State of domicile” means that state where a person has a true, fixed and permanent home and principal residence and to which the person has the intention of returning whenever the person is absent.

“Tank vehicle” means any commercial motor vehicle that is designed to transport any liquid or gaseous materials within a tank that is either permanently or temporarily attached to the vehicle or the chassis. Such vehicles include, but are not limited to, cargo tanks and portable tanks, as defined in 49 CFR, Part 171. However, they do not include portable tanks having a rated capacity under one thousand (1,000) gallons.

“United States” means the fifty (50) states and the District of Columbia.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2009; Laws, 2019, ch. 311, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2019 amendment, in (f)(v)3, inserted “and commercial,” “and Mississippi Military Department” and “employees of the Mississippi Military Department.”

Federal Aspects—

Section 12007 of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 [Pub. L. 99-570], see 49 USCS § 31309.

§ 63-1-204. Limitation on number of driver’s licenses.

No person who drives a commercial motor vehicle shall have more than one (1) driver’s license.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-205. Notification required by driver.

The driver of a commercial motor vehicle shall notify the state and employers of convictions as follows:

The state. — Any driver of a commercial motor vehicle holding a driver’s license issued by this state who is convicted of violating any state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control in any other state or federal, provincial, territorial, or municipal laws of Canada, other than parking violations, shall notify the commissioner in the manner specified by the commissioner within thirty (30) days of the date of conviction.

Employers. — Any driver of a commercial motor vehicle holding a driver’s license issued by this state who is convicted of violating any state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control in this or any other state or federal, provincial, territorial, or municipal laws of Canada, other than parking violations, shall notify the driver’s employer in writing of the conviction within thirty (30) days of the date of conviction.

Notification of suspensions, revocations and cancellations.— A driver whose driver’s license is suspended, revoked, or cancelled by any state, who loses the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle in any state for any period, or who is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for any period, shall notify the driver’s employer of that fact before the end of the business day following the day the driver received notice of that fact.

Notification of previous employment. — Any person who applies to be a commercial motor vehicle driver must provide the employer, at the time of the application, with the following information for the ten (10) years preceding the date of application:

A list of the names and addresses of the applicant’s previous employers for which the applicant was a driver of a commercial motor vehicle;

The dates between which the applicant drove for each employer; and

The reason for leaving that employer.

The applicant must certify that all information furnished is true and complete. An employer may require an applicant to provide additional information.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-206. Employer responsibilities.

  1. Each employer shall require the applicant to provide the information specified in Section 63-3-205(c).
  2. No employer may knowingly allow, require, permit or authorize a driver to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the United States:
    1. During any period in which the driver has a CMV driver’s license suspended, revoked, or cancelled by a state or has lost the privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in a state, or has been disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle;
    2. During any period in which the driver has more than one (1) CMV driver’s license;
    3. During any period in which the driver, or the CMV the driver is driving, or the motor carrier operation, is subject to an out-of-service order; or
    4. In violation of a federal, state or local law or regulation pertaining to railroad-highway grade crossings.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

There is a reference to “Section 63-3-205(c)” in subsection (1) of this section although there is no subsection (c) in Section 63-3-205. The section is set out above as it was enacted by Section 6 of Chapter 560, Laws of 2009.

§ 63-1-207. Commercial driver’s license required.

  1. Except when driving under a commercial learner’s permit and accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver’s license valid for the vehicle being driven, no person may drive a commercial motor vehicle on the highways of this state unless the person:
    1. Holds a commercial driver’s license;
    2. Is in immediate possession of the license; and
    3. The license has the applicable endorsements valid for the vehicle the person is driving.
  2. No person may be found to have committed a violation of subsection (1) of this section if the person provides proof to the court having jurisdiction of the traffic complaint that the individual held a commercial driver’s license valid for the vehicle the person was driving on the date the complaint was issued.
  3. No person may drive a commercial motor vehicle while the person’s driving privilege is suspended, revoked, or cancelled, while subject to a disqualification.
  4. No person may drive a commercial motor vehicle in violation of an out-of-service order.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, employees of farm-related service industries shall be exempt from the knowledge and skills tests required under this article, and shall be issued restricted commercial driver’s licenses as long as the applicants meet the requirements of 49 CFR, Part 383, as amended from time to time, and upon payment of the appropriate fee.
    2. “Farm-related service industries” shall include farm retail outlets and suppliers, agri-chemical businesses, custom harvesters, and livestock feeders.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-208. Commercial driver’s license qualification standards.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, the commissioner shall not issue a commercial driver’s license and commercial learner’s permit to any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years.
  2. No person may be issued a commercial driver’s license unless that person is domiciled in this state and has passed a knowledge and skills test for driving a commercial motor vehicle which complies with minimum federal standards established by federal regulation enumerated in 49 CFR, Part 383, subparts F, G and H and has satisfied all other requirements of Title XII of Public Law 99-570 in addition to other requirements imposed by state law or federal regulation. The tests shall be prescribed and conducted by the commissioner. If the applicant wishes to have a hazardous materials endorsement, the written test for a hazardous materials endorsement must be taken and passed. In addition, the applicant must successfully complete the security threat assessment required by 49 CFR, Part 1572.
  3. The commissioner may authorize a person, including an agency of this or another state, an employer, a private driver training facility, or other private institution, or a department, agency or instrumentality of local government, to administer the skills test specified by this section, provided:
    1. The test is the same as would otherwise be administered by the state; and
    2. The third party has entered into an agreement with this state which complies with requirements of 49 CFR, Part 383.75.
  4. A skills test may be waived as follows:
    1. The commissioner, by rules adopted pursuant to the Mississippi Administrative Procedures Law, shall provide for a waiver of the skills test specified in this section for a commercial driver’s license applicant who meets the requirements of 49 CFR, Part 383.77;
    2. The rules may establish deadlines by which applicants must claim entitlement and qualification to skills test waivers and may provide for the scheduling of group knowledge testing;
    3. The commissioner shall adopt rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this subsection (4) as soon as practicable after July 1, 2017, but in any case no later than July 1, 2018.
  5. A commercial learner’s permit shall be issued as follows:
    1. A commercial learner’s permit may be issued to an individual who holds a valid Mississippi driver’s license who has passed the vision and written tests required for the class of license authorizing the operation of the type of vehicle for which the permit application is being made;
    2. The commercial learner’s permit shall be issued for a period of six (6) months for the fee prescribed in Section 63-1-43. Only one (1) renewal or reissuance may be granted within a two-year period. The holder of a commercial learner’s permit may, unless otherwise disqualified, drive a commercial motor vehicle on a highway only when accompanied by the holder of a commercial driver’s license valid for the type of vehicle driven who occupies a seat beside the individual for the purpose of giving instruction in driving the commercial motor vehicle.
  6. A commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit may not be issued to a person while the person is subject to a disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle, or while the person’s driver’s license is suspended, revoked or cancelled in any state. A driver’s license may not be issued to a person who has a commercial driver’s license issued by any state unless the person first surrenders all driver’s licenses issued by any state, which licenses shall be returned to the issuing states for cancellation.
  7. A person shall be entitled to take the test for a commercial driver’s license unless the person’s driver’s license is, at the time of the requested test, suspended, revoked, cancelled or disqualified in any other state.
  8. Notwithstanding any requirement imposed by state law or state or federal regulations restricting the issuance of a commercial driver’s license to a person suffering from diabetes, a person suffering from diabetes may be issued a commercial driver’s license if the person otherwise meets all qualifications for issuance provided:
    1. The driver is physically examined every year, including an examination by a board-certified/eligible endocrinologist attesting to the fact that the driver is:
      1. Free of insulin reactions (an individual is free of insulin reactions if that individual does not have severe hypoglycemia or hypoglycemia unawareness, and has less than one (1) documented, symptomatic hypoglycemic reaction per month);
      2. Able to and has demonstrated willingness to properly monitor and manage the person’s diabetes; and
      3. Not likely to suffer any diminution in driving ability due to the person’s diabetic condition.
    2. The driver agrees to and complies with the following conditions:
      1. A source of rapidly absorbable glucose shall be carried at all times while driving;
      2. Blood glucose levels shall be self-monitored one (1) hour prior to driving and at least once every four (4) hours while driving or on duty prior to driving using a portable glucose monitoring device equipped with a computerized memory;
      3. Submit blood glucose logs to the endocrinologist or medical examiner at the annual examination or when otherwise directed by the Department of Public Safety;
      4. Provide a copy of the endocrinologist’s report to the medical examiner at the time of the annual medical examination; and
      5. Provide a copy of the annual medical certification to the person’s employer for retention in the driver’s qualification file and retain a copy of the certification on his person while driving for presentation to a duly authorized federal, state or local enforcement official.
    3. The commercial license issued under this subsection (8) will bear an endorsement restricting commercial driving on the license to driving only within the boundaries of Mississippi.
  9. The fees for all licenses, permits, renewals and endorsements shall be as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 8; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 16; Laws, 2017, ch. 353, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2017.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment, in (5)(a), deleted “from any jurisdiction” following “driver’s license” and inserted “Mississippi” following “individual who holds a valid”; in the first sentence of (5)(b), substituted “the” for “a” and “prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “of Twelve Dollars ($12.00)”; in the first sentence of (6), deleted the comma following “A commercial driver’s license”; and added (9).

The 2017 amendment, in (4), substituted “shall provide for a waiver” for “may provide for a waiver” in (a), added (c), and made a related stylistic change.

Cross References —

Mississippi Administrative Procedures Law, see §§25-43-1.101 et seq.

Federal Aspects—

Title XII of Public Law 99-570 [the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986], see generally 49 USCS §§ 31301 et seq.

§ 63-1-209. Nonresident commercial driver’s license.

The commissioner may issue a nonresident commercial driver’s license to a person domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction if the United States Secretary of Transportation has determined that the commercial motor vehicle testing and licensing standards in the foreign jurisdiction do not meet the testing standards established in 49 CFR, Part 383. In addition, the commissioner may issue a nonresident commercial driver’s license to a person domiciled in a state while that state is prohibited from issuing commercial driver’s licenses in accordance with 49 CFR, Part 384.405. The word “nonresident” must appear on the face of the nonresident commercial driver’s license. An applicant shall surrender any nonresident commercial driver’s license issued by another state. Prior to issuing a nonresident commercial driver’s license, the commissioner shall establish the practical capability of revoking or suspending the nonresident commercial driver’s license.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-210. Application for commercial driver’s license.

  1. The application for a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit shall include the following:
    1. The full name and current mailing and residential addresses of the person.
    2. A physical description of the person, including sex, height and weight.
    3. Date of birth.
    4. The applicant’s social security number.
    5. The person’s signature.
    6. Certifications that:
      1. For an applicant who operates or expects to operate in interstate or foreign commerce or who is otherwise subject to 49 CFR, Part 391, the applicant meets the qualification requirements contained in Part 391; or for an applicant who operates or expects to operate entirely in intrastate commerce and who is not subject to Part 391, that the applicant is subject to state driver qualification requirements and is not subject to Part 391;
      2. The motor vehicle in which the applicant’s skills test will be taken is representative of the type of motor vehicle that the applicant operates or expects to operate;
      3. The applicant is not subject to any disqualification under 49 CFR, Part 385.51, or any license suspension, revocation, or cancellation under state law; and
      4. The applicant does not have a driver’s license from more than one (1) state or jurisdiction.
    7. Any other information required by the commissioner, including, but not limited to, the names of all states or jurisdictions where the applicant has been licensed to operate any type of motor vehicle during the previous ten (10) years.
    8. The application shall be accompanied by a fee as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.
  2. When a licensee or permittee changes his or her name, mailing address, or residence or in the case of the loss, mutilation, or destruction of a license or permit, the licensee or permittee shall notify the commissioner within sixty (60) days and apply in person for a duplicate license or permit in the same manner as set forth in subsection (1) of this section. The fee for a duplicate license or permit shall be as prescribed in Section 63-1-43.
  3. A person who has been a resident of this state for more than thirty (30) days shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle under the authority of a commercial driver’s license issued by another jurisdiction.
  4. Any person who knowingly falsifies information or certifications required under subsection (1) of this section shall have the person’s commercial driver’s license revoked. Such persons may reapply for a commercial driver’s license no sooner than sixty (60) days after the revocation.
    1. Any male who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-six (26) years of age and who applies for or renews a commercial driver’s license or renewal of a commercial learner’s permit under this article shall be registered in compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx. 451 et seq., as amended.
    2. The department shall forward in an electronic format the necessary personal information of the applicant to the Selective Service System. The applicant’s submission of the application shall serve as an indication that the applicant either has already registered with the Selective Service System or that he is authorizing the department to forward to the Selective Service System the necessary information for registration. The commissioner shall notify the applicant on, or as a part of, the application that his submission of the application will serve as his consent to registration with the Selective Service System, if so required. The commissioner also shall notify any male applicant under the age of eighteen (18) that he will be registered upon turning age eighteen (18) as required by federal law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 10; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 17, eff from and after Oct. 1, 2014.

Editor’s Notes —

The Military Selective Service Act, 50 USCS Appx. 451, referred to in this section, was renumbered 50 USCS § 3801 as part of the 2015 editorial reclassification of Title 50 and Title 50 Appendix.

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2014 amendment, in (1)(h), substituted “as prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00)”; in (2), deleted “forthwith” following “the licensee or permittee shall”; and inserted “within sixty (60) days” following “notify the commissioner” in the first sentence; and substituted “as prescribed in Section 63-1-43” for “Six Dollars ($6.00)” at the end of the last sentence.

§ 63-1-211. Commercial driver’s license.

  1. Contents of license. —A commercial driver’s license shall be marked “commercial driver’s license” or “CDL,” and shall be, to the maximum extent practicable, tamper proof, and shall include, but not be limited to, the following information:
    1. The name and residential address of the person.
    2. The person’s color photograph or imaged likeness.
    3. A physical description of the person including sex, height, and weight.
    4. Date of birth.
    5. Any number or identifier deemed appropriate by the commissioner.
    6. The person’s signature.
    7. The class or type of commercial motor vehicle or vehicles which the person is authorized to drive together with any endorsements or restrictions.
    8. The name of this state.
    9. The dates between which the license is valid.
  2. Classifications, endorsements and restrictions. —Driver’s licenses may be issued with the following classifications, endorsements, and restrictions:
    1. Classifications. —Licensees may drive all vehicles in the class for which the license is issued and all lesser classes of vehicles, except those requiring special endorsements.

      1. Vehicles designed to transport sixteen (16) or more passengers, including the driver; and

      2. Vehicles used in the transportation of hazardous materials as defined in Section 63-1-203.

      1. Class A – Any combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or more, provided the gross vehicle weight rating of the vehicle being towed is in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds.
      2. Class B – Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or more, and any such vehicle towing a vehicle not in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds.
      3. Class C – Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds:
      4. Class D – Class D licenses are not commercial driver’s licenses and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-1-5.
    2. Licenses may be issued with appropriate endorsements and restrictions noted thereon. The commissioner shall determine the manner of notation. Endorsements and restrictions may include, but are not limited to, those which:
      1. Authorize a driver to drive a vehicle transporting hazardous materials;
      2. Restrict the driver to vehicles not equipped with air brakes when the person either fails the air brake component of the knowledge test or performs the skills test in a vehicle not equipped with air brakes;
      3. Authorize driving motorcycles that are not autocycles as defined in Section 63-3-103;
      4. Authorize driving tank vehicles;
      5. Authorize driving vehicles carrying passengers;
      6. Authorize driving school buses;
      7. Authorize driving double trailers;
      8. Restrict the driver to operation solely within this state. A commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit with this restriction may be issued to any person who has attained the age of eighteen (18) years.
  3. Before issuing a commercial driver’s license, the commissioner shall request the applicant’s complete operating record from any state in which the applicant was previously licensed to operate any type of motor vehicle in the past ten (10) years, conduct a check of the applicant’s operating record by querying the national driver register, established under 49 USCS Section 30302, and the Commercial Driver’s License Information System, established under 49 USCS Section 31309, to determine if:
    1. The applicant has already been issued a commercial driver’s license; and the applicant’s commercial driver’s license has been suspended, revoked, or canceled;
    2. The applicant had been convicted of any offenses contained in Section 205(a) (3) of the National Driver Register Act of 1982 (23 USCS Section 401 note).
  4. Within ten (10) days after issuing a commercial driver’s license, the commissioner shall notify the Commercial Driver License Information System of that fact, providing all information required to ensure identification of the person.
  5. The commercial driver’s license shall expire in the manner set forth in Section 63-1-47.
  6. When applying for renewal of a commercial driver’s license, the applicant shall complete the application form required by Section 63-1-210, providing updated information and required certifications. If the applicant wishes to retain a hazardous materials endorsement, the written test for a hazardous materials endorsement must be taken and passed. In addition, the applicant must successfully complete the security threat assessment required by 49 CFR, Part 1572. If notice is received from the United States Transportation Security Administration that the applicant poses a security risk, the commissioner shall refuse to issue, or revoke within fifteen (15) days of receipt of the notice, a hazardous materials endorsement.
  7. The department shall provide a means for electronic transmission of a medical card and may charge a vendor convenience fee in an amount not to exceed Two Dollars and Fifty Cents ($2.50) per transmission.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 11; Laws, 2014, ch. 424, § 18; Laws, 2014, ch. 508, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 406, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 18 of Chapter 424, Laws of 2014, effective from and after October 1, 2014 (approved March 24, 2014), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 508, Laws of 2014, effective from and after passage (approved April 23, 2014), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section enacted within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the July 24, 2014, meeting of the Committee.

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (c) by substituting “Commercial Driver’s License Information System” for “commercial driver’s license information system.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at the July 24, 2014, meeting of the Committee.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The first 2014 amendment (ch. 424), effective October 1, 2014, in (2)(a)(iv), deleted the first sentence, “Any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds or any such vehicle towing a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating not in excess of ten thousand (10,000) pounds except vehicles included in Class C or vehicles which require a special endorsement unless the proper endorsement appears on the license.”; and in the second sentence, deleted “be” preceding “commercial driver’s license”, substituted “are” for “shall”, and added “and shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-1-5” to the end; in (2)(b), deleted the comma following “but are not limited” and inserted a comma after “to” in the last sentence.

The second 2014 amendment (ch. 508), effective April 23, 2014, added (7) and made a minor punctuation change in (2)(b).

The 2015 amendment added “that are not autocycles as defined in Section 63-3-103” at the end of (2)(b)(iii).

§ 63-1-212. Records; notification.

  1. After suspending, revoking, or disqualifying a person from holding a commercial driver’s license, the commissioner shall update the person’s records to reflect that action within ten (10) days. After suspending, revoking or disqualifying a nonresident commercial driver’s privileges, the commissioner shall notify the licensing authority of the state which issued the commercial driver’s license or commercial driver certificate within ten (10) days, including in the notice both the disqualification period and the reason for the disqualification.
  2. Upon receipt from another jurisdiction of the prior record of an applicant for a commercial driver’s license or a commercial learner’s permit, the commissioner shall incorporate the prior record into the applicant’s driver record and, in the case of adverse information, promptly implement any disqualification, licensing limitations, denials, and penalties that are required under 49 CFR, Part 384, that have not been applied by those jurisdictions where the applicant was previously licensed.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-213. Notification of traffic convictions.

When any person operating a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a commercial driver’s license issued by another state is convicted in this state of any violation of state law or local ordinance relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than parking violations, the commissioner shall notify the driver licensing authority in the licensing state of the conviction within ten (10) days of the date of conviction.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-214. Agreements.

The commissioner may enter into or make agreements, arrangements or declarations to carry out the provisions of this article.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-215. Reciprocity.

  1. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a person may drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if the person has a valid commercial driver’s license issued by:
    1. Any state of the United States;
    2. Any province or territory of Canada in accordance with the minimum federal standards for the issuance of commercial motor vehicle driver’s licenses; or
    3. The Licensia Federal de Conductor issued by the Republic of Mexico, if the person’s license is not suspended, revoked, or canceled and if the person is not disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle and is not in violation of an out-of-service order.
  2. The commissioner shall give all out-of-state convictions full faith and credit and treat them for sanctioning purposes under this article as if they occurred in this state.
  3. The commissioner shall record disqualifications and convictions received from other jurisdictions regarding Mississippi operators.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-216. Disqualification and suspension.

    1. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of one (1) year if the person’s license or permit to drive has been administratively suspended under Section 63-11-23 or the person has been convicted of a first violation of:
      1. Operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle on a highway with an alcohol concentration of four one-hundredths percent (0.04%) or more, or under the influence as provided in Section 63-11-30;
      2. Failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another;
      3. Using a motor vehicle in the commission of any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one (1) year;
      4. Refusal to submit to a test to determine the operator’s alcohol concentration, as provided in Title 63, Chapter 11, Mississippi Code of 1972;
      5. Operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway with an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths percent (0.08%) or more, or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or other substance, as provided in Section 63-11-30;
      6. Operating, attempting to operate, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway when the person is under the influence of any other drug or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of driving safely as provided in Section 63-11-30;
      7. Operating or attempting to operate a commercial motor vehicle while the license is revoked, suspended, cancelled, or disqualified;
      8. Operating a commercial motor vehicle in a negligent manner resulting in a fatal injury.
    2. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for three (3) years if convicted of a violation listed in subsection (1) of this section, if the violation occurred while transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded.
    3. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life if convicted of two (2) or more violations or a combination of them listed in subsection (1) of this section arising from two (2) or more separate occurrences.
    4. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of sixty (60) days if convicted of two (2) serious traffic violations, or one hundred twenty (120) days if convicted of three (3) serious traffic violations, arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period. A disqualification for three (3) serious traffic violations must be imposed consecutively to any other previous period of disqualification.
    5. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life if the person uses a motor vehicle in the commission of any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one (1) year involving the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a regulated drug, or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a regulated drug and for which the person was convicted.
    6. A person who is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle shall surrender the person’s Mississippi commercial driver’s license no later than the effective date of the disqualification. Upon receipt of the person’s commercial driver’s license, that person, if otherwise eligible, may apply for a non-CDL, and upon payment of sufficient fees receive the driver’s license.
    7. The commissioner shall adopt rules establishing guidelines, including conditions, under which a disqualification for life under this section, except for a disqualification issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subsection, may be reduced to a period of not less than ten (10) years.
    8. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of sixty (60) days if the driver is convicted of a first violation of a railroad-highway grade crossing violation.
    9. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if, during any three-year period, the driver is convicted of a second railroad-highway grade crossing violation in a separate incident.
    10. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of one (1) year if, during any three-year period, the driver is convicted of a third or subsequent railroad-highway grade crossing violation in separate incidents.
    11. A person who is simultaneously subject to a disqualification issued by the administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration pursuant to 49 CFR, Part 383.52 and a disqualification under any other provision of this section shall serve those disqualification periods concurrently.
    1. A person’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Mississippi shall be suspended for one (1) year, if:
      1. The person is convicted of a first violation of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle on a highway with an alcohol concentration of four one-hundredths percent (0.04%) or more, or under the influence, as provided in Section 63-11-30; and
      2. The person’s commercial driver’s license is issued by a state or country that does not issue commercial driver’s licenses and disqualify persons in accordance with 49 CFR, Parts 383 and 384.
    2. A person’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Mississippi shall be suspended for three (3) years if the person is convicted of violating subsection (1) of this section, and the violation occurred while the person was transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded.
    3. A person’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Mississippi shall be suspended for life if the person is convicted a second time of violating subsection (1) of this section, and both convictions arise out of separate occurrences.
    4. A person’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Mississippi shall be suspended for sixty (60) days if the person is convicted of two (2) serious traffic violations, or for one hundred twenty (120) days if the person is convicted of three (3) serious traffic violations, arising from separate incidents occurring within a three-year period.
    5. A person’s privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Mississippi shall be suspended for life if the person uses a commercial motor vehicle in the commission of any offense under state or federal law that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one (1) year, involving the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of a regulated drug, or possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a regulated drug, and for which the person was convicted.
    6. In addition to the reasons specified in this section for suspension of the commercial driver’s license, the commissioner shall be authorized to suspend the commercial driver’s license of any person for being out of compliance with an order for support, as defined in Section 93-11-153. The procedure for suspension of a commercial driver’s license for being out of compliance with an order for support, and the procedure for the reissuance or reinstatement of a commercial driver’s license suspended for that purpose, and the payment of any fees for the reissuance or reinstatement of a commercial driver’s license suspended for that purpose, shall be governed by Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be. If there is any conflict between any provision of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163 and any provision of this article, the provisions of Section 93-11-157 or 93-11-163, as the case may be, shall control.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 16; Laws, 2013, ch. 454, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2013.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication corrected typographical errors in (1)(g) by substituting, “…under which a disqualification for life under this section, except for a disqualification issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subsection, may be reduced” for “…under which a disqualification for life under this section, except that a disqualification issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subsection may be reduced.” The Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation at their July 22, 2010, meeting.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2013 amendment inserted “the person’s license or permit to drive has been administratively suspended under Section 63-11-23 or the person has been” near the end of (1)(a).

§ 63-1-217. Suspensions and disqualifications to run concurrently.

A suspension of a person’s operating privilege or license and a disqualification imposed under Section 63-1-216 imposed for the same violation, shall run concurrently.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-218. Effective date of disqualification; hearing.

  1. A disqualification from driving a commercial motor vehicle shall be effective on not less than ten (10) days’ notice.
  2. If requested, a hearing on the disqualification shall be conducted, under Section 63-1-53. The scope of the hearing shall be limited to verification of the conviction.
  3. A person aggrieved by a decision resulting from a hearing under this section may have the decision reviewed on the record. The appeal shall be to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County or, in the discretion of the licensee, to the circuit court of the county in which the licensee resides or has a principal place of business.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 18, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-219. Disqualification from operation of vehicle.

  1. Any person convicted for violating an out-of-service order shall be disqualified as follows except as provided in subsection (2) of this section:
    1. A person shall be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of ninety (90) days if convicted of a first violation of an out-of-service order.
    2. A person shall be disqualified for a period of one (1) year if convicted of a second violation of an out-of-service order during any ten-year period, arising from separate incidents.
    3. A person shall be disqualified for a period of three (3) years if convicted of a third or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order during any ten-year period, arising from separate incidents.
  2. Any person convicted for violating an out-of-service order while transporting hazardous materials or while operating a commercial motor vehicle designed or used to transport sixteen (16) or more passengers, including the driver, shall be disqualified as follows:
    1. A person shall be disqualified for a period of one hundred eighty (180) days if convicted of a first violation of an out-of-service order.
    2. A person shall be disqualified for a period of three (3) years if convicted of a second or subsequent violation of an out-of-service order during any ten-year period, arising from separate incidents.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 19, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-220. Penalties.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any driver who violates or fails to comply with an out-of-service order is subject to a penalty of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), in addition to disqualification under this article.
  2. Any employer who violates an out-of-service order, or who knowingly requires or permits a driver to violate or fail to comply with an out-of-service order, is subject to a penalty of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00).
  3. The fine imposed for a speeding violation of a commercial motor vehicle operating in excess of fifteen (15) miles per hour over the legally posted speed limit on any highway shall be one and one-half (1-1/2) times the fine imposed for a speeding violation in other vehicles.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 20, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-221. Applicants for school bus endorsements.

  1. An applicant for a school bus endorsement shall satisfy the following requirements:
    1. Pass the knowledge and skills test for obtaining a passenger vehicle endorsement.
    2. Pass the knowledge test covering the following topics, at minimum:
      1. Loading and unloading children, including the safe operation of stop signal devices, external mirror systems, flashing lights, and other warning and passenger safety devices required for school buses by state or federal law or regulation.
      2. Emergency exits and procedures for safely evacuating passengers in an emergency.
      3. State and federal laws and regulations related to traversing safely highway rail grade crossings.
    3. Pass a skills test in a school bus of the same vehicle group as the applicant will operate.
  2. The department may waive the skills test required in subsection (1) (a) of this section for an applicant who:
    1. Is currently licensed, has experience operating a school bus, and has a good operating record;
    2. Certifies, and whose certification is verified by the department, that, during the two-year period immediately prior to applying for the school bus endorsement, the applicant:
      1. Held a valid commercial driver’s license with a passenger endorsement to operate a school bus representative of the group the applicant will be operating;
      2. Has not had the applicant’s operator’s license or commercial driver’s license suspended, revoked, or cancelled or been disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle;
      3. Has not been convicted of any offense that would require disqualification under Section 63-1-216 or 49 CFR, Part 383.51(b);
      4. Has not had more than one (1) conviction for a serious traffic violation while operating any type of motor vehicle;
      5. Has not had any conviction for a violation of state or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with any traffic accident;
      6. Has not been convicted of any motor vehicle traffic violation that resulted in an accident; and
      7. Has been regularly employed as a school bus driver and provides evidence of such employment.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 21, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-222. Deferring imposition of sentence.

No judge or court may utilize the provisions of Section 63-1-71(3) or 63-9-11(3) or any other program to defer imposition of sentence or judgment if the defendant holds a commercial driver’s license or was operating a commercial motor vehicle when the violation occurred and is charged with violating any state or local traffic law other than a parking violation.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 22, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-223. Penalty for authorizing railroad crossing violations.

Any employer who knowingly requires, allows, authorizes or permits a driver to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of Section 77-9-249 is subject to a penalty of not more than Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00).

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 23, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-224. Implied consent to chemical tests; administration of tests; effect of refusal to submit to test.

  1. A person who holds a commercial driver’s license and drives a motor vehicle within this state or a person who drives a commercial motor vehicle within this state for which a commercial learner’s permit or a commercial driver’s license is required under this article is deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of his blood. A person may give his consent to a chemical test or tests of his blood or urine for the purpose of determining the presence in his body of any other substance which would impair a person’s ability to drive a motor vehicle.
  2. The tests shall be administered, and all procedures and proceedings relating thereto shall be performed, as nearly as practicable, in accordance with the provisions of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law. However, from and after April 1, 1992, refusal of any such person to submit to such test or a test given which indicates that such person was driving such motor vehicle within this state with any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in his system or while under the influence of a controlled substance shall require such person to be immediately placed out of service for twenty-four (24) hours and shall require suspension of the commercial driver’s license of such person for the applicable period of time prescribed in this article.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 24, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Cross References —

Mississippi Implied Consent Law, see §§63-11-1 et seq.

§ 63-1-225. Classification of offenses under this article; relationship to other laws.

Except as otherwise specifically provided by this article, any violation of this article for which the only penalty under this article is the requirement that the commissioner suspend the commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license of a person shall not, for the purposes of this article, constitute a criminal offense. However, if a violation of this article also constitutes a criminal offense under the provisions of some other law, then any criminal penalty which may be imposed for violation of such criminal law shall be in addition to suspension of a person’s license under this article.

If violation of any law of this state other than a violation of this article requires that the driver’s license or driving privileges of a person be suspended, cancelled or revoked, then any suspension, cancellation or revocation imposed for violation of such law shall also result in suspension, revocation or cancellation of the person’s commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver’s license under the provisions of this article for the same period of time and to run concurrently therewith.

If any person is disqualified under the provisions of this article and the violation is not an offense for which a person’s driver’s license or driving privilege is suspended, revoked or cancelled under the provisions of some law other than the provisions of this article, then the person may apply for and obtain, upon meeting all qualifications as required by law, any type of driver’s license other than a commercial driver’s license or commercial learner’s permit issued under the provisions of this article.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 25, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

§ 63-1-226. Use of certain facilities and property for commercial driver’s license testing sites.

The commissioner is authorized to make use of the facilities and property upon which are located inspection stations, as prescribed in Sections 27-5-71 and 27-5-73, for the purpose of commercial driver’s license testing sites under the Mississippi Commercial Driver’s License Law. The State Tax Commission shall cooperate with the Commissioner of Public Safety in making such property and facilities available for such use; however, the use of the inspection stations by the Commissioner of Public Safety shall not unreasonably interfere with the duties of the State Tax Commission.

HISTORY: Laws, 2009, ch. 560, § 26, eff from and after July 1, 2009.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2009, ch. 560, § 28, provides:

“It is the intent of the Legislature that Sections 1 through 26 of this act be codified as Article 5 of Title 63, Chapter 1, Mississippi Code of 1972.”

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Chapter 2. Mandatory Use of Safety Seat Belts

§ 63-2-1. Requirement of use of safety seat belt system by operator and passengers in passenger motor vehicle; protection of children.

  1. When a passenger motor vehicle is operated in forward motion on a public road, street or highway within this state, every operator and every passenger shall wear a properly fastened safety seat belt system, required to be installed in the vehicle when manufactured pursuant to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208.
  2. “Passenger motor vehicle” for purposes of this chapter means a motor vehicle designed to carry fifteen (15) or fewer passengers, including the driver, but does not include motorcycles that are not autocycles as defined in Section 63-3-103, mopeds, all-terrain vehicles or trailers.
  3. This section shall not apply to:
    1. Vehicles which may be registered for “farm” use, including “implements of husbandry” as defined in Section 63-21-5(d), and “farm tractors” as defined in Section 63-3-105(a);
    2. An operator or passenger possessing a written verification from a licensed physician that he is unable to wear a safety belt system for medical reasons;
    3. A passenger car operated by a rural letter carrier of the United States Postal Service or by a utility meter reader while on duty;
    4. Buses; or
    5. A child who is required to be protected by the use of a child passenger restraint device or system or a belt-positioning booster seat system under the provisions of Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 501, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 520, § 2; Laws, 2015, ch. 406, § 6; Laws, 2017, ch. 403, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2017.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2017, ch. 403, § 3, provides:

“SECTION 3. This act shall be known as ‘Harlie’s Law.’ ”

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment rewrote (1).

The 2015 amendment inserted “that are not autocycles as defined in Section 63-3-103” in (2).

The 2017 amendment substituted “every operator and every passenger” for “every operator, every front-seat passenger and every child under seven (7) years of age who is not required to be protected by the use of a child passenger restraint device or system or a belt positioning booster seat system under the provisions of Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311, regardless of the seat that the child occupies” in (1); and added (e) and made related stylistic changes.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

2. Preservation for review.

3. Probable cause.

1. Applicability.

In a personal injury action, the trial court properly refused to grant certain jury instructions because the seat belt law–Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-1(2)–did not apply to a shuttle bus carrying more than 15 passengers, and the bus owner could not have been subjected to a claim of contributory negligence because of the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-3. Boyd Tunica, Inc. v. Premier Transp. Servs., 30 So.3d 1242, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

2. Preservation for review.

Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, careless driving, and driving without a seatbelt were appropriate because defendant failed to raise any of the issues he complained of on appeal in his motion for a directed verdict or new trial and because the facts of the case provided sufficient evidence to convict. Jones v. State, 958 So. 2d 840, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 423 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

3. Probable cause.

Controlled substances and firearm seized during a traffic stop was properly admitted because a deputy had sufficient reason and probable cause to stop defendant’s car when he observed defendant violating the seat belt law; when defendant drove the vehicle without wearing his seat belt he committed a traffic violation, which provided the deputy with probable cause to stop his car. Wallace v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019), cert. denied, 279 So.3d 1086, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 2019), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 2019).

Stop of defendant’s vehicle was not pretextual because the deputy knew the confidential informant and found that person reliable; the deputy testified that he followed defendant before turning on his blue lights and did not see any traffic violations during that span, but he realized that when he was driving by, the driver was not wearing his seatbelt, and that was sufficient for purposes of the original stop. Wallace v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019), cert. denied, 279 So.3d 1086, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 2019), cert. denied, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 449 (Miss. 2019).

Denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of defendant’s arrest during a traffic stop was appropriate because a police officer had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, as the officer noticed that neither the driver of a car, nor defendant, who was a passenger in the car, was wearing a seat belt, and a pouch containing methamphetamine, which the officer discovered in the car after a pouch containing methamphetamine fell out from the bottom of defendant’s pants, was in plain view. Nowell v. State, 246 So.3d 77, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 210 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Violators of seat belt law can not be adjudicated guilty because there is no criminal offense and no fines or assessments may be imposed; charges should be dismissed for failure to allege a crime. Stephens, Jan. 12, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0889.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seatbelt, the driver may be cited for the seatbelt violation only if he is cited for another non-seatbelt violation, and he may not be convicted of the seatbelt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seatbelt violation; however, if a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seatbelt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted without a violation of any other non-seatbelt law. Dykes, Feb. 4, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0031.

A person can be charged with the failure to utilize a child restraint device or seat belt and child abuse without violating the double jeopardy clause. Bishop, Feb. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0733.

A law enforcement officer may stop a motorist for a seatbelt violation and upon noticing another violation or some other illegal activity, the officer may cite the motorist for the other violation and the seatbelt violation. Phillips, Aug. 12, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0419.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability under state law for injuries resulting from defective automobile seatbelt, shoulder harness, or restraint system. 48 A.L.R.5th 1.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-2-3. Duty, standard of care, right or liability between operator and passenger; contributory or comparative negligence; entry of violation on driving record.

This chapter shall not be construed to create a duty, standard of care, right or liability between the operator and passenger of any passenger motor vehicle which is not recognized under the laws of the State of Mississippi as such laws exist on the date of passage of this chapter or as such laws may at any time thereafter be constituted by statute or court decision. Failure to provide and use a seat belt restraint device or system shall not be considered contributory or comparative negligence, nor shall the violation be entered on the driving record of any individual.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 20, 1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence.

1. In general.

In a personal injury action, bus owner’s voluntary enactment of a seat-belt policy, not required by statute, did not vitiate the protection of Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-3 that would be in place were its passengers required by statute to wear seat belts. Boyd Tunica, Inc. v. Premier Transp. Servs., 30 So.3d 1242, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

In a personal injury action, the trial court properly refused to grant certain jury instructions because the seat belt law–Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-1(2)–did not apply to a shuttle bus carrying more than 15 passengers, and the bus owner could not have been subjected to a claim of contributory negligence because of the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §63-2-3. Boyd Tunica, Inc. v. Premier Transp. Servs., 30 So.3d 1242, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 123 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).

This section applies to crashworthiness actions. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So. 2d 1264, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1999).

In order to preserve the matter for appeal, the plaintiff was not required to make a contemporaneous objection to the introduction of evidence where he had already filed a motion in limine pertaining to such evidence. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So. 2d 774, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1998).

In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when his vehicle collided with a gravel pile the plaintiff was entitled to reversal on the basis of the improper introduction of evidence that he was not using his seat belt at the time of the collision. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So. 2d 774, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1998).

Statute barred cross-examination of passenger who brought action arising from single-vehicle accident as to whether she was wearing seat belt at time of accident. Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., 701 So. 2d 1093, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 261 (Miss. 1997).

2. Evidence.

Trial court was correct to admit evidence tending to show that the family of a minor girl injured in a car accident did not regularly use their seat belts, but it should have given a cautionary instruction that the evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of showing that, even if the warnings had been adequate, the family would not have heeded them. Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 904 So. 2d 1077, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 2005).

Where a minor child was killed by an air bag that deployed when the car that she was riding in was involved in an accident while her teenage older sister was driving, evidence of the decedent’s failure to wear a seat belt was relevant and admissible, the admission of evidence of the driver’s non-use of a seat belt was error, and the admission of photographs of the seat belt latches and an expert’s opinion that the latches showed insufficient scratches for the family to have used the seat belts regularly was error. Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 905 So. 2d 564, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 752 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. Jan. 13, 2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 904 So. 2d 1077, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 2005).

The statute provides that failure to use a seat belt may not be considered as evidence of contributory or comparative negligence; however, it does not purport to bar the admission of seat belt non-usage in all cases and does not provide that the use of a seat belt may not be considered. Herring v. Poirrier, 797 So. 2d 797, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 176 (Miss. 2000).

Evidence of seat belt non-usage may constitute relevant evidence in some, but by no means all or even most, cases, so long as (1) the evidence has some probative value other than as evidence of negligence, (2) this probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect and is not barred by some other rule of evidence, and (3) appropriate limiting instructions are given to the jury, barring the consideration of seat belt non-usage as evidence of negligence. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So. 2d 1264, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1999).

§ 63-2-5. Education program; erection of highway signs notifying public of seat-belt-use requirement; notices of requirement accompanying vehicle license tags or decals.

The Department of Public Safety shall initiate an education program designed to encourage the use of safety belts with emphasis on the effectiveness of safety belts, the monetary savings and other benefits to the public. Funds for such educational program shall be made available through the office of the Governor’s representative for highway safety programs.

The State Highway Commission is authorized to direct the Highway Department to erect signs along the highways of this state notifying the traveling public that Mississippi is a mandatory seat-belt-use state.

The State Tax Commission shall provide notices of the requirement for safety belt use which shall accompany the delivery of a passenger motor vehicle license tag or decal.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 20, 1990).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 27-3-4 provides that the terms “‘Mississippi State Tax Commission,’ ‘State Tax Commission,’ ‘Tax Commission’ and ‘commission’ appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of the duties and functions by the Mississippi State Tax Commission, the State Tax Commission or Tax Commission shall mean the Department of Revenue.”

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation, and whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

§ 63-2-7. Offenses and penalties; recording of violations.

  1. A violation of this chapter shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) upon conviction; however, only the operator of a vehicle may be fined for a violation of this chapter by the operator and any passengers. The maximum fine that may be imposed against the operator of a vehicle for a violation of this chapter by the operator or for a violation of this chapter by one or more passengers shall be Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) in the aggregate.
  2. A violation of this chapter shall not be entered on the driving record of any individual so convicted, nor shall any state assessment provided for by Section 99-19-73, or any other state law, be imposed or collected.

HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 436, § 4; Laws, 1994, ch. 567, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 501, § 2; Laws, 2006, ch. 302, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 520, § 3; Laws, 2017, ch. 403, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2017.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2006, ch. 302, § 2 provides as follows:

“SECTION 2. All federal money that the State of Mississippi receives as an incentive grant for the enactment of a primary seat belt law under Section 1 of House Bill No. 409, 2006 Regular Session, shall be expended for highway safety infrastructure improvements except as otherwise conditioned or restricted by federal law or federal rules and regulations governing the expenditure of such funds.”

Laws of 2017, ch. 403, § 3, provides:

“SECTION 3. This act shall be known as ‘Harlie’s Law.’ ”

Amendment Notes —

The 2006 amendment rewrote (1) to delete the provisions that permit a fine to be imposed for a violation of the seat belt law only if the violator is also charged and convicted of some other offense.

The 2008 amendment rewrote the first sentence of (1).

The 2017 amendment substituted “by the operator and any passengers” for “by the operator, for a violation of this chapter by a front seat passenger or for a violation of this chapter by a child who is under seven (7) years of age and who is not required to be protected by the use of a child passenger restraint device or system or a belt positioning booster seat system under the provisions of Sections 63-7-301 through 63-7-311, regardless of the seat that the child occupies” in (1).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A court clerk should not accept a plea of guilty on a seat belt violation and accept the fine and costs when the clerk knows that the charge has been made without any other charge being made at the same time. Anderson, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0278.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seatbelt, the driver may be cited for the seatbelt violation only if he is cited for another non-seatbelt violation, and he may not be convicted of the seatbelt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seatbelt violation; however, if a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seatbelt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted without a violation of any other non-seatbelt law. Dykes, Feb. 4, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0031.

If a child between the ages of four and eight is not wearing a seat belt, regardless of where he is seated, the driver of the car may be cited and convicted under Section 63-2-1 without a violation of any other non-seat belt law. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

If a driver or a front-seat passenger is not wearing a seat belt as required by statute, the driver may be cited for the seat belt violation only if he is cited for another non-seat belt violation and may not be convicted of the seat belt violation unless he is also convicted of the non-seat belt violation; further, an officer may not use a primary seat belt violation in order to charge an offender with a secondary seat belt violation. Gordon, Sept. 14, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0573.

Chapter 3. Traffic Regulations and Rules of the Road

Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 63-3-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – Rules of the Road.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References —

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – sizes, weight and load regulations, see §§63-5-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – equipment and identification regulations, see §§63-7-1 et seq.

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law – Traffic Violations Procedure, see §§63-9-1 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 220 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 43 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-3. Construction of chapter.

This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8282; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Mississippi Transportation Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation breached the ministerial duties imposed by Miss. Code Ann. §65-1-65 because the statute applied to the portion of the highway that was under construction and imposed a ministerial duty of maintenance and repair. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams, 197 So.3d 406, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2016).

§ 63-3-5. Application of provisions of chapter relating to operation of vehicles.

The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except:

1. Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section.

2. The provisions of Articles 9 and 25 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8145; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Reckless driving and careless driving may be enforced on commercial parking lots and the like; similarly, a law enforcement officer may investigate and complete an accident report for an accident that occurs on private property. Godfrey, Oct. 13, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0609.

Accident reports should be made for accidents occurring in parking lots. Conerly, Jan. 23, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0002.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 221.

§ 63-3-7. Compilation, printing and distribution of provisions of chapter.

The Commissioner of Public Safety is hereby authorized and directed to compile in a condensed form the Rules of the Road as set out by this chapter and have sufficient copies printed in pocket size booklet form. The booklets shall be made available to the various law enforcement departments, other agencies and members of the public. The Department of Public Safety may charge another department or agency an amount not exceeding the actual costs incurred by the department in compiling, printing and distributing the booklets; however, no charge may be made by the Department of Public Safety or any other department or agency for distribution of the booklets to the public. The Department of Public Safety also may compile a condensed form of the “Rules of the Road” in electronic format, which shall be accessible by law enforcement departments, other agencies and the public without charge.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8284; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2002, ch. 446, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment rewrote the section.

§ 63-3-9. Teaching of provisions of chapter in public schools.

The provisions of this chapter shall be taught in the eighth grade of each and every public school of this state. The state superintendent of public education and the county superintendent of each county are hereby directed and required to carry out the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8285; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-11. Right to recover damages in civil suit unaffected by provisions of chapter.

Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to curtail or abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil suit for damages by reason of injuries to person or property resulting from the negligent use of the highways by any motor vehicle, or its owner, or his employee or agent.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 5785; 1930, § 5588; 1942, § 1742; Laws, 1916, ch. 116.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Automobile held not dangerous instrumentality, rendering owner liable for driver’s negligent use. Vicksburg Gas Co. v. Ferguson, 140 Miss. 543, 106 So. 258, 1925 Miss. LEXIS 289 (Miss. 1925).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Nonmonetary benefits or contributions by rider as affecting his status under automobile guest statute. 39 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Automobile guest statute: status of rider as affected by payment, amount of which is not determined by expenses incurred. 39 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Payments on expense-sharing basis as affecting guest status of automobile passenger. 39 A.L.R.3d 1224.

Motorist’s liability for striking person lying in road. 41 A.L.R.4th 303.

Article 3. Definitions.

General Provisions

§ 63-3-101. Applicability of definitions.

The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for purposes of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8126; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Vehicles, Equipment and the Like Defined

§ 63-3-103. Vehicles.

“Vehicle” means every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

“Motor vehicle” means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails. The term “motor vehicle” shall not include electric personal assistive mobility devices.

“Motorcycle” means every motor vehicle having a saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground but excluding a tractor. The term “motorcycle” includes motor scooters as defined in paragraph (j) of this subsection.

“Authorized emergency vehicle” means every vehicle of the fire department (fire patrol), every police vehicle, every 911 Emergency Communications District vehicle, every such ambulance and special use EMS vehicle as defined in Section 41-59-3, every Mississippi Emergency Management Agency vehicle as is designated or authorized by the Executive Director of MEMA and every emergency vehicle of municipal departments or public service corporations as is designated or authorized by the commission or the chief of police of an incorporated city.

“School bus” means every motor vehicle operated for the transportation of children to or from any school, provided same is plainly marked “School Bus” on the front and rear thereof and meets the requirements of the State Board of Education as authorized under Section 37-41-1.

“Recreational vehicle” means a vehicular type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is mounted on or drawn by another vehicle and includes travel trailers, fifth-wheel trailers, camping trailers, truck campers and motor homes.

“Motor home” means a motor vehicle that is designed and constructed primarily to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use.

“Electric assistive mobility device” means a self-balancing two-tandem wheeled device, designed to transport only one (1) person, with an electric propulsion system that limits the maximum speed of the device to fifteen (15) miles per hour.

“Autocycle” means a three-wheel motorcycle with a steering wheel, nonstraddle seating, rollover protection and seat belts.

“Motor scooter” means a two-wheeled vehicle that has a seat for the operator, one (1) wheel that is ten (10) inches or more in diameter, a step-through chassis, a motor with a rating of two and seven-tenths (2.7) brake horsepower or less if the motor is an internal combustion engine, an engine of 50cc or less and otherwise meets all safety requirements of motorcycles.

“Platoon” means a group of individual motor vehicles traveling in a unified manner at electronically coordinated speeds at following distances that are closer than would be reasonable and prudent without such coordination.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8127; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1973, ch. 338, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 348; Laws, 1980, ch. 316, § 2; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 1; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 35; Laws, 2000, ch. 318, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 9; Laws, 2004, ch. 425, § 3; Laws, 2012, ch. 452, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 406, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 464, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2015; Laws, 2018, ch. 304, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 2018; Laws, 2018, ch. 445, § 1, eff from and after January 1, 2019.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of Chapter 406, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved March 23, 2015), amended this section. Section 3 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved April 20, 2015), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of Chapter 464, Laws of 2015, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §63-1-6 as amended by Chapter 406, Laws of 2015.

Section 1 of Chapter 304, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 5, 2018), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 445, Laws of 2018, effective from and after January 1, 2019 (approved April 12, 2018). As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109 which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication of Legislation authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section amended within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication of Legislation ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the August 14, 2018, meeting of the Committee.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment added the last sentence in (b) and added (h).

The 2004 amendment rewrote (d).

The 2012 amendment added “every Mississippi Emergency Management Agency vehicle as is designated or authorized by the Executive Director of MEMA” following “as defined in Section 41-59-3” in (d).

The first 2015 amendment (ch. 406), added (i).

The second 2015 amendment (ch. 464), added the last sentence in (c); added (i) and (j).

The first 2018 amendment (ch. 304) rewrote (i), which read: “ ‘Autocycle’ means a motorcycle with three (3) wheels that is completely enclosed with a roll cage or roll bar, automotive controls and seat belts.”

The second 2018 amendment (ch. 445), effective January 1, 2019, added (k).

Cross References —

Standards for design, construction, equipment and maintenance of ambulances, see §41-59-25.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The mere fact that on occasion the motor of a vehicle is not operating, or cannot be operated, does not alter the fact that it is a “motor vehicle” as defined in this section [Code 1942, § 8127]. Farley v. State, 251 Miss. 497, 170 So. 2d 625, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 875 (Miss. 1965).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The definition of “authorized emergency vehicle” does not include the private vehicle of a volunteer fireman, and therefore, such a vehicle may not be equipped with a siren, whistle, or bell as allowed by Section 63-7-65. Baker, November 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0702.

A device must be able to stand on its own without the aid of a stand or other similar mechanic prop to meet the definition of “electric personal assistive mobility device.” Hedglin, Mar. 5, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0092.

Four-wheelers, all terrain vehicles, go carts, dune buggies, golf carts, and riding lawn mowers [unless qualifying as an implement of husbandry] are “motor vehicles” and therefor require tags, inspection stickers, proper equipment and insurance. Gay, July 25, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0305.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1-16.

38 Am. Jur. Trials, All-Terrain Vehicle Litigation, §§ 1 et seq.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Defective Design of an All-Terrain Vehicle, §§ 1 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1-18.

§ 63-3-105. Tractors.

“Farm tractor” means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and other implements of husbandry.

“Road tractor” means every motor vehicle designed and used for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry any load thereon either independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so drawn.

“Truck tractor” means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry a load other than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8128; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References —

Application of mandatory use of safety seat belts to farm vehicles, see §63-2-1.

§ 63-3-107. Trailers.

“Trailer” means every vehicle without motive power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle.

“Semitrailer” means every vehicle without motive power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of its weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8129; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What constitutes “trailer” within coverage or exclusion provision of automobile liability policy. 65 A.L.R.3d 804.

§ 63-3-109. Railroads.

“Railroad” means a carrier of persons or property upon cars, other than street cars, operated upon stationary rails.

“Railroad train” means a steam engine, electric or other motor, with or without cars coupled thereto, operated upon rails, except street cars.

“Street car” means a car other than a railroad train for transporting persons or property and operated upon rails principally within a municipality.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8131; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-111. Tires.

“Metal tire” means every tire the surface of which in contact with the highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilient material.

“Pneumatic tire” means every tire in which compressed air is designed to support the load.

“Solid tire” means every tire of rubber or other resilient material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the load.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8130; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-113. Explosives and flammable liquids.

“Explosive” means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packing that an ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonator of any part of the compound or mixture may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructible effects on contiguous objects or of destroying life or limb.

“Flammable liquid” means any liquid which has a flash point of 70 degrees F., or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equivalent closed cup test device.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8132; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Governmental Agencies, Owners, Police Officers and Other Persons Defined

§ 63-3-115. Department of public safety.

“Commissioner” means the commissioner of public safety.

“Department” means the department of public safety.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8133; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-117. Local authorities.

“Local authority” means every county, municipal, and other local board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations under the constitution and laws of this state.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8136; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-119. Police officers.

“Police officer” means every officer authorized to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic regulations.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8135; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-121. Individuals.

“Person” means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, corporation, limited liability company or other legal business entity.

“Driver” means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.

“Owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle; in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this chapter.

“Pedestrian” means any person afoot or a person who uses an electric personal assistive mobility device or a manual or motorized wheelchair.

“Instructor” means any person who gives instruction in a course related to this Title 63, whether given in person, recorded, transmitted by electronic means, or any combination thereof.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8134; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 10; Laws, 2012, ch. 544, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 26, 2012.).

Editor’s Notes —

Laws of 2012, ch. 544, § 4 provides:

“SECTION 4. Section 2 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2012, and the remainder of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment rewrote (d).

The 2012 amendment added “limited liability company or other legal business entity” and made a related grammatical change in the introductory language in (a); and added (e).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Highways, Districts, Signals, and the Like Defined

§ 63-3-123. Traffic.

“Traffic” means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, street cars, and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for purposes of travel.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8143; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-125. Streets, roads, and highways.

“Street or highway” means the entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.

“Laned highway” means a highway the roadway of which is divided into three or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic.

“Roadway” means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.

“Sidewalk” means that portion of a street between curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for the use of pedestrians.

“Private road or driveway” means every way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner but not by other persons.

“Through highway” means every highway or portion thereof at the entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to stop before entering or crossing the same and when stop signs are erected as provided in this chapter.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8137; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an “intersection” so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to §63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an “intersection” within the meaning of §63-3-129. An “intersection” requires the conjunction of “2 highways,” and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a “highway” where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a “Plant Entrance” sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. Stewart v. Davis, 571 So. 2d 926, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1990).

§ 63-3-127. Crosswalks.

“Crosswalk” means that portion of a roadway ordinarily included within the prolongation or connection of the lateral lines of sidewalks at intersections, or any portion of a roadway distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8139; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-129. Intersections.

“Intersection” means the area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8138; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Public nature of way; driveways.

1. In general.

Where an intersection was formed by a north and south gravel road crossing a highway, running in an east and west direction, the area embraced within the lateral boundary lines of the two roadways at the point of junction constituted an intersection within the contemplation of this section [Code 1942, § 8138]. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1957).

2. Public nature of way; driveways.

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an “intersection” so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to §63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an “intersection” within the meaning of §63-3-129. An “intersection” requires the conjunction of “2 highways,” and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a “highway” where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a “Plant Entrance” sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. Stewart v. Davis, 571 So. 2d 926, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1990).

Where a statute provided that no vehicle shall in overtaking and passing other vehicle be driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection, this statute was not applicable to overtaking automobile which attempted to pass truck as the truck driver attempted to make a left turn into a driveway leading to a store, where there was no showing that the driveway was a highway within the meaning of the statute. Frizell v. Guthrie, 222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 671 (Miss. 1954).

§ 63-3-131. Safety zones.

“Safety zone” means the area or space officially set apart within a roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected or is so marked or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all times while set apart as a safety zone.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8140; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-133. Traffic signals or devices.

“Official traffic-control devices” means all signs, signals, markings, and devices not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.

“Official traffic-control signal” means any device, whether manually, electrically or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed to stop and to proceed.

“Railroad sign or signal” means any sign, signal, or device erected by authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad train.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8142; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References —

Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see §65-1-8.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Jury instructions.

Trial court erred in its ruling related to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-313 and in refusing to give a jury instruction based on this statute, but the error was harmless because the weight of the evidence was against the driver who requested the instruction in a personal injury trial that arose out of a car accident. Etheridge v. Harold Case & Co., 960 So. 2d 474, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 623 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 2007).

§ 63-3-135. Right-of-way.

“Right-of-way” means the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8144; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 327.

§ 63-3-137. Stopping, standing, and parking.

“Stop,” when required, means the complete cessation from movement.

“Stop, stopping or standing,” when prohibited, means any stopping or standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or of a traffic control sign or signal.

“Park,” when prohibited, means the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8144; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 327.

§ 63-3-139. Districts.

“Business district” means the territory contiguous to and including a highway when fifty percent (50%) or more of the frontage thereon for a distance of 300 feet or more is occupied by buildings in use for business.

“Residence district” means the territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district when the property on such highway for a distance of 300 feet or more is in the main improved with residences or residences and buildings in use for business.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8141; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Where a fatal accident occurred on an interstate highway, the trial judge should have held, as a matter of law, that the scene of the accident was outside of a “business district” under §63-3-139. Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc., 456 So. 2d 698, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1812 (Miss. 1984).

Article 5. Obedience to and Effect of Traffic Laws.

§ 63-3-201. Offenses and penalties generally.

It is unlawful and, unless otherwise declared in this title with respect to particular offenses, it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden by this chapter or to fail to perform any act required in this chapter.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8146; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

Automobile driver is entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the streets and highways while operating his car in a careful and lawful manner, but the driver operating his car in a negligent and reckless manner in disregard of the rights and safety of others should be held strictly accountable both civilly and criminally. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

2. Jury instructions.

Court may instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff’s recovery. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Although Sections 63-3-201 and 63-9-11 provide that a violation of the rules of the road is a criminal violation, a city is not prohibited from enacting additional ordinances also making disobedience or disregard of a traffic control signal a civil offense. Mitchell, Dec. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0170.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 864.1 (Driving on wrong side of road – Failure to control vehicle – Crossing center line).

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-203. Failure or refusal to comply with order or direction of police officer.

No person shall wilfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8147; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the plaintiff had violated this section where (1) the officer stopped the plaintiff’s vehicle for speeding, (2) during the traffic stop, the officer ordered the plaintiff to return to his car and await further instruction, and (3) the plaintiff replied that he did not wish to return to his vehicle and preferred to remain on the roadside. Dallas v. City of Okolona, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19547 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 7, 1999).

§ 63-3-205. Applicability of chapter to various public officers and employees.

The provisions of this chapter applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this state or any county, city, town, district, or any other political subdivision of the state, subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this chapter with respect to authorized emergency vehicles.

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling to or from such work.

No driver of any authorized emergency vehicle shall assume any special privilege under this chapter except when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8148; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury questions.

1. In general.

Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9 governs suits against governmental entities, and, therefore, Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-205 neither controls nor affects a municipality’s grant of immunity pursuant to the MTCA; the statutory language of §63-3-205 is unambiguous and serves as general guidelines for traffic regulations and rules of the road, and the language neither instructs nor implies that § 63-3-205 should be read in conjunction with the provisions of the MTCA. Carothers v. City of Water Valley, 242 So.3d 138, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 281 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, 246 So.3d 67, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 2018).

Notwithstanding Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303, the act giving rise to the injuries in this case was not the placement or maintenance of a traffic-control device – but rather a Department of Transportation (DOT) employee’s alleged negligent operation of a pickup truck; because the employee did not fall within the exceptions to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-205, and his duty to adhere to applicable traffic regulations was not discretionary, the circuit court erred in finding the DOT immune under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d). Mixon v. Miss. DOT, 183 So.3d 90, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 181 So.3d 1010, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 2016).

Under this section [Code 1942, § 8148] the nighttime operation of a sprinkling truck on the left side of a highway in preparing the surface thereof for receiving surfacing materials was not a violation of statute. Webb v. Brock, 232 Miss. 154, 98 So. 2d 139, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 456 (Miss. 1957).

2. Jury questions.

In an action arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by a constable in pursuit of a reckless driver and one operated by plaintiff, where the evidence was in conflict as to such matters as to whether the siren on constable’s car was sounded, speed and position of vehicles at time of accident, the issue was properly submitted to a jury. Johnson v. Richardson, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1959).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent pedestrian or occupant of parked vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 100 A.L.R.3d 815.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 182, 183.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 79, Negligent Vehicular Police Chase.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

§ 63-3-207. Applicability of chapter to persons riding bicycles or animals or driving animal-drawn vehicles.

Every person riding a bicycle or an animal or driving any animal drawing a vehicle upon a highway shall have all of the rights and all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle under this chapter, except those provisions of this chapter which by their nature can have no application.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8149; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

3. Verdict.

1. In general.

Motorist overtaking and passing bicycle is required to do so at safe distance; motorist’s admission that he did not entirely clear bicyclist’s lane of traffic as he passed bicyclist but was only straddling center line and was unaware of location of vehicle in relation to bicycle as he passed it is sufficient basis upon which jury may find that collision between motorist’s vehicle and bicycle was caused by motorist’s negligence. Rideout v. Knight, 463 So. 2d 1042, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1866 (Miss. 1985).

2. Jury instructions.

Since by this section [Code 1942, § 8149], the prohibitions of Code 1942, § 8188, apply to a person riding a bicycle, an instruction to the jury that if they believe that the plaintiff violated Code 1942, § 8188, providing that a person riding bicycle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for speed of other vehicle and traffic upon the conditions of the street, and such violation was proximate cause of accident they should find for the defendants, was proper in an action for injuries to the plaintiff bicyclist who, approaching defendant’s truck from the rear, tried to pass it at intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

3. Verdict.

In an action against an automobile driver for the alleged wrongful death of a minor who was riding a bicycle when it collided with the automobile, a jury verdict in favor of the driver foreclosed all questions of fact, resolved all conflicts in the evidence favorably to the driver, and also amounted to a factual finding by the jury that the driver of the automobile had not been negligent and had acted as a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances. McCollum v. Randolph, 220 So. 2d 310, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1452 (Miss. 1969).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Horseback riding or operation of horse-drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute. 71 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving statutes. 73 A.L.R.4th 1139.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 225, 226.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 570.1 (complaint in collision between bicyclists when minor bicyclist enters roadway from private driveway).

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident – Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

§ 63-3-208. Use of electric personal assistive mobility devices allowed on highways and sidewalks; restrictions.

An electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in Section 63-3-103, may be operated:

On a marked bicycle path;

On any street or road where bicycles are permitted; or

On a sidewalk, if the person operating the device yields the right-of-way to pedestrians and gives an audible signal before overtaking and passing a pedestrian.

HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

§ 63-3-209. Uniformity of application of chapter throughout state; local traffic regulation generally.

The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8150; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Applicability of state law.

2. Municipal ordinances and power.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. Applicability of state law.

In an action arising out of an intersectional automobile collision, where it was not shown that any public authority had designated one street as a through highway and had directed the placing of stop signs on the intersecting street, state law was applicable, and the plaintiff was not under a duty to stop at the intersection even though someone had at some time placed a stop sign there, it being undisputed that the sign was down and not in place at the time of the collision. Skelton v. Turnipseed, 235 So. 2d 694, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1458 (Miss. 1970).

2. Municipal ordinances and power.

A municipal ordinance making it unlawful for anyone to operate or ride upon any two-wheeled, self propelled vehicle upon the public streets without wearing a crash helmet, was a reasonable traffic regulation, rather than an unreasonable limitation on the personal liberty of an individual motorcyclist constituting a violation of equal protection. City of Jackson v. Lee, 252 So. 2d 897, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1210 (Miss. 1971).

This section [Code 1942, § 8150] does not authorize a municipality to establish an automobile testing station and engage in the business of testing automobiles, and consequently a municipality had no authority to contract for the purchase of equipment for such purpose. Davenport v. Blackmur, 184 Miss. 836, 186 So. 321, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1939).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

An earlier statutory provision to the same effect as this section was held not to prohibit municipalities from requiring license for operation of motor vehicles on their streets. Wasson v. Greenville, 123 Miss. 642, 86 So. 450, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1920).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipalities are not authorized to restrict a particular type of vehicle, such as an all terrain vehicle, from municipal streets. Hight, December 6, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0806.

§ 63-3-210. Prohibition of operation of motor scooters rented in accordance with Section 63-1-6.1 on certain roads or highways under certain circumstances.

  1. The Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning may, in accordance with Section 37-105-1, enact rules and regulations that prohibit the operation of motor scooters, which are rented in accordance with Section63-1-6.1, on certain roads or highways, if the board deems the prohibition to be in the interest of public safety.
  2. The governing board of any municipality may enact rules and regulations that prohibit the operation of motor scooters, which are rented in accordance with Section63-1-6.1, on certain roads or highways, if the board deems the prohibition to be in the interest of public safety.

HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 464, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2015.

§ 63-3-211. Enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities.

The provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from-

1. Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles;

2. Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic control signals;

3. Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;

4. Designating particular highways as one-way highways and requiring that all vehicles thereon be moved in one specific direction;

5. Regulating the speed of vehicles in public parks;

6. Designating any highway as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles stop before entering or crossing the same or designating any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop at one or more entrances to such intersections;

7. Restricting the use of highways as authorized in Chapter 5 of this title.

No ordinance or regulation enacted under subdivision 4, 5, 6, or 7 of this section shall be effective until signs giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrances to the highway or part thereof affected as may be most appropriate.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8151; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References —

Power of governing authorities of municipalities to exercise full jurisdiction in matter of streets and sidewalks, see §21-37-3.

Power of county board of supervisors to prescribe kind of wheels which may be used on vehicles on county public roads, see §65-7-37.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence and witnesses.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. In general.

It is within the power and jurisdiction of a municipality to prescribe, within reason, the manner, the place at which and the time within which an automobile may be parked upon any street in the municipality, including those streets which are part of a state highway. Ellisville v. State Highway Com., 186 Miss. 473, 191 So. 274, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 1939).

This section [Code 1942, § 8151] does not authorize a municipality to establish an automobile testing station and engage in the business of testing automobiles, and consequently a municipality had no authority to contract for the purchase of equipment for such purpose. Davenport v. Blackmur, 184 Miss. 836, 186 So. 321, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 59 (Miss. 1939).

2. Evidence and witnesses.

In a suit for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was struck by an automobile, the court properly refused to permit a police officer to testify as to what was permissible to be done under a city traffic ordinance with reference to a left turn from the highway into the parking area of a restaurant. Briscoe v. Jones, 233 So. 2d 125, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1651 (Miss. 1970).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Under an earlier statute, not wholly parallel, it was held that where a city had regulated traffic within its limits, state regulation of eight miles an hour in passing pedestrians was inapplicable. Meridian Coca-Cola Co. v. Watson, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1931).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A private contractor hired by a municipality to operate public parking may not issue traffic tickets or citations. A city could authorize the contractor to immobilize or tow illegally parked vehicles if requested by law enforcement. Kohnke, May 27, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0186.

Community college police have the powers of a constable pursuant to Miss Code Ann. §37-29-275 and are authorized to enforce state laws within their jurisdiction, but do not have authority to enforce municipal or campus ordinances on municipal streets that run through the campus. Campus police officers may assist in the enforcement of municipal parking ordinances on municipal streets by notifying municipal authorities when violations occur. A determination of the validity of “campus tickets” may only be made by a court of competent jurisdiction. Graham, March 16, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00138, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 102.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Public regulation and prohibition of sound amplifiers or loudspeaker broadcasts in streets and other public places. 10 A.L.R.2d 627.

Right of municipality or public to use of subsurface of street or highway for purposes other than sewers, pipes, conduits for wires, and the like. 11 A.L.R.2d 180.

§ 63-3-212. Localities prohibited from enacting ordinances restricting cell phone use in motor vehicles.

No county, municipality or other political subdivision shall enact any ordinance restricting the use of cellular phones in any motor vehicle until such time as the state may authorize a county, municipality or other political subdivision to enact such an ordinance.

HISTORY: Laws, 2002, ch. 491, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Editor’s Notes —

Laws, 2002, ch. 491, was House Bill 1551, 2002 Regular Session, and originally passed the House of Representatives on January 31, 2002, and the Senate on March 7, 2002. The Governor vetoed House Bill 1551 on March 22, 2002. The veto was overridden by both the House of Representatives and the Senate on March 27, 2002.

Cross References —

Power of governing authorities of municipalities to exercise full jurisdiction in matter of streets and sidewalks, see §21-37-3.

Enactment of traffic regulations by local authorities, see §63-3-211.

§ 63-3-213. Effect of chapter upon rights of owners of certain real property.

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the owner of real property used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner and not as a matter of right from prohibiting such use, or from requiring other or different or additional conditions than those specified in this chapter, or otherwise regulating such use as may seem best to such owner.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8152; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Article 7. Traffic Signs, Signals and Markings.

§ 63-3-301. Adoption of uniform system of traffic-control devices.

The commissioner of public safety shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this chapter for use upon highways within this state. Such uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible conform to the system then current as approved by the American Association of State Highway Officials.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8153; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Cross References —

Duty of railroads to erect and maintain warning signboards at intersections of tracks and public roads or streets, see §77-9-247.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Department not immune.

Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) was not immune in a wrongful death claim alleging that a failure to place warning signs around a highway culvert, as required by Miss. Code Ann. §65-21-1, resulted in an auto accident that caused the decedent’s death because §65-21-1 imposed a ministerial duty, and, as Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-301 and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 included no language suggesting abrogation or repeal of § 65-21-1, that section-narrowly, precisely, and specifically requiring warning posts around culverts-remained in effect as an exception to the general rule of §63-3-303 that the MDOT had discretion over such placement; Miss. Code Ann. § 65-21-1 controlled the specific issue of guide and warning posts around culverts, and § 63-3-303 controlled the discretionary placement of traffic devices that were not the subject of a specific statutory mandate. Miss. DOT v. Nosef, 110 So.3d 317, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Highways: governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-303. Placing and maintaining of traffic-control devices upon state and county highways; placement of devices upon such highways by local authorities.

The commissioner of public safety and the state highway commission shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices conforming to its manual and specifications, upon all state and county highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic.

No local authority shall place or maintain any traffic-control device upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of public safety and the state highway commission except by the latter’s permission.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8154; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Cross References —

Definitions of traffic signals, see §63-3-133.

Erection of highway signs or guide boards on public highways, see §§65-7-13 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Railroads.

1. In general.

Decisions by the Mississippi Transportation Commission regarding placement of traffic control devices were discretionary for purposes of immunity given Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303’s assignment of authority and the economic, political, or social concerns associated with installing warning lights or signs at intersections. Smith v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 292 So.3d 231, 2020 Miss. LEXIS 77 (Miss. 2020).

Placement and maintenance of traffic-control devices is discretionary, unless narrower duties encompassed in that function, such as placing and maintaining edge lines, have been rendered ministerial through statute or regulation. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams, 197 So.3d 406, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2016).

Trial court did not err in finding that the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) and the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) were not entitled to discretionary-function immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act because a widow produced evidence that MTC and MDOT breached specific ministerial duties imposed by their duly adopted regulations. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams, 197 So.3d 406, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 232 (Miss. 2016).

Notwithstanding Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303, the act giving rise to the injuries in this case was not the placement or maintenance of a traffic-control device – but rather a Department of Transportation (DOT) employee’s alleged negligent operation of a pickup truck; because the employee did not fall within the exceptions to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-205, and his duty to adhere to applicable traffic regulations was not discretionary, the circuit court erred in finding the DOT immune under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d). Mixon v. Miss. DOT, 183 So.3d 90, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 181 So.3d 1010, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 52 (Miss. 2016).

Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) was not immune in a wrongful death claim alleging that a failure to place warning signs around a highway culvert, as required by Miss. Code Ann. §65-21-1, resulted in an auto accident that caused the decedent’s death because §65-21-1 imposed a ministerial duty, and, as Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-301 and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 included no language suggesting abrogation or repeal of § 65-21-1, that section-narrowly, precisely, and specifically requiring warning posts around culverts-remained in effect as an exception to the general rule of §63-3-303 that the MDOT had discretion over such placement; Miss. Code Ann. § 65-21-1 controlled the specific issue of guide and warning posts around culverts, and § 63-3-303 controlled the discretionary placement of traffic devices that were not the subject of a specific statutory mandate. Miss. DOT v. Nosef, 110 So.3d 317, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 143 (Miss. 2013).

Because Miss. Code Ann. §65-1-65 and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 do not impose any specific directives as to the time, manner, and conditions for carrying out the Mississippi Transportation Commission’s duty in maintaining highways or posting traffic-control or warning devices, those duties are not ministerial in nature but are discretionary. Further, the duty to maintain highways and place warning signs clearly requires the Mississippi Transportation Commission to consider the policy considerations of doing so. Knight v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 10 So.3d 962, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), overruled, Little v. Miss. DOT, 129 So.3d 132, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 551 (Miss. 2013).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) in appellants’ action for injuries and death resulting from a two-vehicle collision because the MTC’s duty to place warning signs was discretionary under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303; hence, the MTC’s failure to place warning signs was shielded from liability according to Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d). Willingham v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 944 So. 2d 949, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 916 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Clear meaning of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 is to create a statutory duty that must be carried out in a discretionary matter. Willingham v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 944 So. 2d 949, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 916 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Under this section, the placement of traffic control signs or devices is dependent upon the discretion of the responsible entity. Jones v. Mississippi DOT, 744 So. 2d 256, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1999).

2. Railroads.

Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-303 (Rev. 2013) allowed the Mississippi Department of Transportation, in its discretion, to determine the appropriate type, number, and location of traffic-control devices, making it immune from liability for a claim of failure to erect or maintain appropriate and reasonable signs, signals, warning devices, illumination devices, or guardrails and/or barriers despite actual or constructive notice of the absence and/or inadequate condition of the existing devices under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d) (Rev. 2012). Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Jobes, 156 So.3d 871, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 2015).

In an action arising from a collision between a train and a car that was allegedly caused, in part, by a lack of active protection at a crossing and vegetation that obstructed the view of the operator of the car, the court rejected the railroad’s contention that §§63-3-303 and63-3-305 removed any and all responsibility from its shoulders and transferred the duty to the Mississippi Department of Transportation, as §§77-9-245,77-9-247,77-9-248,77-9-251, and77-9-253 all clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of public safety. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S. Ct. 43, 151 L. Ed. 2d 15, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5524 (U.S. 2001).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the intersection of a county road and a state highway, under this section, the state is responsible for erecting and maintaining traffic control devices unless the county receives state permission to do the same. Austin, July 26, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0453.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

§ 63-3-305. Placing and maintaining of traffic-control devices upon highways under local jurisdiction.

Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall place and maintain such traffic control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they may deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or provisions of local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All such traffic-control devices hereafter erected shall conform to the state manual and specifications.

Local authorities in exercising those functions referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be subject to the direction and control of the state highway commission.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8155; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Burden of proof.

3. Jury instructions.

4. Railroads.

5. Liability under statute.

1. In general.

Under this section, the placement of traffic control signs or devices is dependent upon the discretion of the responsible entity. Jones v. Mississippi DOT, 744 So. 2d 256, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1999).

In an action to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when his vehicle collided with a gravel pile built on a road as a barrier to an out-of-service bridge on the road, it was error for the court to prevent the plaintiff from introducing the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as proof of the applicable standard of care concerning the placement of warning signs and barricades on public roads where the defendant county did not dispute that such manual is the system approved by the American Association of State Highway Officials. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So. 2d 774, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 244 (Miss. 1998).

In cases involving injuries arising out of vehicular traffic on municipal streets or county roads where special municipal or county speed restrictions have been placed in effect, the party expecting to rely upon a violation of such restrictions should plead the existence of the special speed limit established by local authority, and its violation. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

2. Burden of proof.

If the existence of a special county or municipal speed restriction is alleged and denied, or if its legality is put in issue by a responsive pleading, proof should then be required, the burden resting upon the party having the affirmative, as in other cases of disputed fact; but where the existence of the speed zone and rate of speed are properly alleged and not denied, proof that speed signs were in fact posted is sufficient to create a presumption that they reflect appropriate action by competent authority in restricting speeds. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

3. Jury instructions.

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that a driver was required to reduce his speed as he approached a special hazard as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-505, because the instructions as a whole adequately instructed the jury as to the duties of the driver and §63-3-505 did not tie into the facts of the case as the driver struck the individual when passing the individual and the individual began to make a left-hand turn. Good v. Indreland, 910 So. 2d 688, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 176 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

4. Railroads.

In an action arising from a collision between a train and a car that was allegedly caused, in part, by a lack of active protection at a crossing and vegetation that obstructed the view of the operator of the car, the court rejected the railroad’s contention that §§63-3-303 and63-3-305 removed any and all responsibility from its shoulders and transferred the duty to the Mississippi Department of Transportation, as §§77-9-245,77-9-247,77-9-248,77-9-251, and77-9-253 all clearly refer to duties of the railroad in the interest of public safety. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 26 (Miss.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816, 122 S. Ct. 43, 151 L. Ed. 2d 15, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5524 (U.S. 2001).

5. Liability under statute.

Circuit court erred in granting the motions filed by a county board of supervisors and a city to dismiss a driver’s personal injury action based on discretionary-function immunity because the driver alleged a simple act of negligence, where the allegedly tortious act was a construction crew’s alleged failure to barricade or warn against the significant drop-off in the road—a condition it created—and not the result of statutory noncompliance or the result of a policy decision. Wilcher v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So.3d 177, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 229 (Miss. 2018).

While Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-305 contains the term “shall”, it also contains the phrase, “as they may deem necessary”, which, as state legal precedent suggests, means that a local authority’s placement of traffic control devices is a discretionary duty. Because the placement of traffic control devices, including road construction signs, is a discretionary duty, Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d) applies, and a county cannot be liable with regard to the placement of such signs, regardless of whether or not it abused its discretion in doing so. Dozier v. Hinds County, 379 F. Supp. 2d 834, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15666 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

Mississippi county was fraudulently joined in a suit, arising out of a fatal car accident because: (1) the county did not have any legal responsibility with regard to the posting of a stop sign at the intersection where the accident occurred, (2) Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-305 granted discretionary authority to the county to place and maintain traffic control devices upon highways within the county, (3) under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(d), the county could not be held liable for its exercise of discretionary power under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-305, even if an abuse of discretion was shown, and (4) although there was precedent under Mississippi law to hold municipalities liable, either under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(b) or (1)(w), for failing to warn about known dangerous conditions on roads, no reasonable factfinder would find that the motorist who caused the accident was not adequately warned about the approaching intersection. Dozier v. Hinds County, 379 F. Supp. 2d 834, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15666 (S.D. Miss. 2005).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Counties are responsible for the installation and maintenance of necessary warning signs and pavement markings at rail crossings on roads under their jurisdiction subject to approval by the State Highway Commission. Fortier, Mar. 29, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0109.

The mandate to maintain pavement markings and advance warning signs at public railroad crossing intersections on roads under local jurisdiction carries with it the responsibility to pay for this continued maintenance. Brown, Apr. 4, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0769.

A local jurisdiction, in the exercise of its sound discretion, is responsible for paying for the materials and the installation of pavement markings and advance warning signs at public railroad crossing intersections on roads under local jurisdiction; both the materials and the installation of same are subject to approval by the Department of Transportation. Brown, Apr. 4, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0769.

If the public roadway/railroad crossing involves roads which are under different jurisdictions, the funding responsibilities should be allocated proportionately among the respective jurisdictions. Brown, Apr. 4, 2003, A.G. Op. #02-0769.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way. 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Liability of municipality for failure to erect traffic warnings against entering or using street partially barred or obstructed by construction or improvement work. 52 A.L.R.2d 689.

Highways: governmental duty to provide curve warnings or markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342.

Am. Jur.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

§ 63-3-307. Reflectors on bridges in state highway system.

The state highway commission is hereby authorized, in its discretion, to place amber reflectors on each end and on both sides of all bridges on all roads on the state highway system, which will permit a person to see such reflectors so that he might know that he is about to approach a bridge.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8154; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A driver turning left at a T-intersection onto a one-way street must signal his intention to turn for a reasonable distance. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

Where a solid white line marks a turn lane, a driver in such lane must signal his intention to turn for a reasonable distance as determined by all the facts and circumstances then present. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

Where a driver is in a turn lane controlled by a green arrow or is approaching a T-intersection from a two-way street that intersects with a one-way street, where there is no option other than turning left, the driver must signal his intention to turn for a reasonable distance. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

A driver is allowed to make a lane change if the movement can be made with reasonable safety and the driver gives a signal if any other vehicle may be affected by such movement. Phillips, Apr. 8, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0077.

§ 63-3-309. Traffic-control signal colors and rules.

Whenever traffic is controlled by traffic-control signals exhibiting the words “Go,” “Caution,” or “Stop,” or exhibiting different colored lights successively one (1) at a time, only the following colors shall be used and said terms and lights shall indicate as follows:

  1. Green alone or “Go.”
    1. Vehicular traffic facing the signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. However, vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection at the time such signal is exhibited.
    2. Pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk.
  2. Yellow alone or “Caution” when shown following the green or “Go” signal.
    1. Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at the intersection, but if such stop cannot be made in safety a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection.
    2. Pedestrians facing such signal are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway, and any pedestrian then starting to cross shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles.
  3. Red alone or “Stop.”
    1. Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at such other point as may be indicated by a clearly visible line and shall remain standing until green or “Go” is shown alone, except as provided in (b) and (c) of this paragraph (3);
    2. Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal may cautiously enter the intersection to turn right after stopping as required by paragraph (3)(a), unless a sign stating “No Turn On Red” is in place prohibiting such a turn. Such vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other vehicular traffic lawfully using the intersection.
    3. Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal at the intersection of two (2) one-way streets may cautiously enter the intersection to turn left in the direction designated for one-way traffic, after stopping as required by paragraph (3)(a), unless a sign stating “No Turn On Red” is in place prohibiting such a turn. Such vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk and to other vehicular traffic lawfully using the intersection.
    4. No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway unless he can do so safely and without interfering with any vehicular traffic.
  4. Red with green arrow.
    1. Vehicular traffic facing such signal may cautiously enter the intersection only to make movement indicated by such arrow but shall not interfere with other traffic or endanger pedestrians lawfully within a crosswalk.
    2. No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway unless he can do so safely and without interfering with any vehicular traffic.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8157; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1974, ch. 399; Laws, 1976, ch. 308; Laws, 1987, ch. 412, eff from and after July 1, 1987.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

3. Jury issues.

1. In general.

One who had turned left at an intersection while the traffic signal was red, pursuant to a green arrow signal, and who had traversed almost the entire distance of the intersection before another car, when the signal turned from red to green, had entered the intersection, is not required to yield the right of way. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So. 2d 674, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1963).

2. Jury instructions.

A party is not entitled to an instruction that one should yield to the car first entering an intersection where the statute requires stopping before entering the intersection in response to a red signal light, and Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. Gates v. Green, 214 So. 2d 828, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1337 (Miss. 1968).

3. Jury issues.

In tort action stemming from motor vehicle accident where both automobiles collided while going through yellow traffic signal following green signal, question whether party accused of negligence had right to and did cautiously proceed through yellow signal under circumstances at issue was question to be decided by jury, and directed verdict favoring defendant was inappropriate. Collins v. Ringwald, 502 So. 2d 677, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2319 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Construction and Application of Statutory Provision Requiring Motorists to Yield Right-of-Way to Emergency Vehicle. 87 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 238.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 794-801.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 891-893, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 161-163.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 835-841.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1756.

§ 63-3-311. Flashing signal colors and rules.

Whenever flashing red or yellow signals are used they shall require obedience by vehicular traffic as follows:

1. Flashing red (stop signal).— When a red lens is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked and the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign.

2. Flashing yellow (caution signal).— When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8158; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Where a motorist approaching an intersection with the signal lights flashing red in her direction, failed to stop before entering therein, the court properly submitted to the jury the issue as to whether such negligence was a sole cause of the collision. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1958).

2. Jury instructions.

In an action for damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s motorcycle and defendant’s automobile in an intersection with a flashing red light and stop sign facing plaintiff and a flashing yellow light and warning sign facing defendant, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff’s standard of care instruction which included the language, “the defendant had no lawful right to go forward. . . under the assumption that it would be open and clear,” where a granted instruction detailed the crucial point that the yellow light facing defendant demanded caution, and that a finding of negligence would flow from her failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff if, as he claimed, he had lawfully entered the intersection and stalled unexpectedly. The trial court also properly refused to grant an instruction which stated in part, “the driver of a motor vehicle has a lawful duty to decrease his speed upon approaching an intersection,” since §63-3-311(2) merely states that a driver “may proceed. . . only with caution” and caution is a relative concept not necessarily entailing decrease in speed since the current speed may already be a cautious speed. Allen v. Blanks, 384 So. 2d 63, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2000 (Miss. 1980).

Where a motorist had approached an intersection with the signal light flashing red in her direction, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, she was not entitled to an instruction under Code 1942, § 8195, providing that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 238.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 800, 801.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 165.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 894, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1756.

§ 63-3-313. Disobedience of official traffic-control devices.

No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the instructions of any official traffic-control device placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police officer.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8156; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §63-3-313 as he did not obey an official traffic-control device. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

Trial court erred in its ruling related to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-313 and in refusing to give a jury instruction based on this statute, but the error was harmless because the weight of the evidence was against the driver who requested the instruction in a personal injury trial that arose out of a car accident. Etheridge v. Harold Case & Co., 960 So. 2d 474, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 623 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit for collision with safety and traffic-control devices in traveled way. 7 A.L.R.2d 226.

Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 794 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 171.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1342-1524, 1531-2060.

20 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Products Liability, Form 294.1 (complaint, petition, or declaration against manufacturer of automatic computerized traffic-control device used to control operation of traffic signal lights, motor vehicle accident caused by defective traffic-control device).

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 683, Defective Design or Setting of Traffic Control Signal.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 838.

§ 63-3-315. Obedience of official traffic-control devices by emergency vehicles.

The driver of any authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call upon approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign shall slow down as necessary for safety but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign or signal. At other times drivers of authorized emergency vehicles shall stop in obedience to a stop sign or signal.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8148; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Deputy, who stopped at an intersection and, with his blue lights and sirens activated, slowly proceeded across in a stop-and-start fashion, exercised sufficient safety measures to prompt other drivers near the intersection to yield the right-of-way, including the driver traveling in the lane ahead of plaintiffs. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the deputy’s conduct did not demonstrate a conscious indifference to consequences, nor did it rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of persons not engaged in criminal activity, so as subject the county to liability under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c). Rayner v. Pennington, 25 So.3d 305, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 12 (Miss. 2010).

Evidence showed the officer was traveling approximately 37 miles per hour with lights and sirens activated, there was nothing obstructing the view of either the person later injured or the officer, and the greater weight of evidence also proved that the person’s left turn signal was not activated. In addition, the officer had consciously stopped at the previous two intersections because the officer considered both of those to be blind intersections, and therefore, the officer’s behavior supported the finding that the officer appreciated the risk involved in approaching the intersection and did not act with reckless disregard. Davis v. Latch, 873 So. 2d 1059, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 445 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, a driver who had a green light was not negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to an emergency police vehicle pursuant to §63-3-809 because the driver of an emergency vehicle has a duty under §63-3-315 to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching a red traffic light controlling an intersection. Andrews v. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 537 So. 2d 447, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1989).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

§ 63-3-317. Unauthorized signs, signals, markings and devices.

  1. No person shall place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any highway any unauthorized sign, signal, marking or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal. No person shall place or maintain and no public authority shall permit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal bearing thereon any commercial advertising, or any billboard or advertising sign of any kind or description, except that motorist services business signs and supports which are authorized by the state highway commission pursuant to Section 65-1-8 may be placed and maintained within state highway rights-of-way. This shall not be deemed to prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent to highways of signs giving useful directional information and of a type that cannot be mistaken for official signs provided that said signs are not erected closer than fifty (50) feet to the center line of state highways.
  2. Every such prohibited sign, signal or marking is hereby declared to be a public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highway is hereby empowered to remove the same or cause it to be removed after ten (10) days’ notice to the owner thereof by registered letter or otherwise.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8159; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 395, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk. 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like. 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures. 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway. 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

§ 63-3-319. Interference with official traffic-control devices or railroad signs or signals.

No person shall without lawful authority attempt to or in fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal, or any inscription, shield, or insignia thereon, or any other part thereof.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8160; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of private person negligently causing malfunctioning, removal, or extinguishment of traffic signal or sign for subsequent motor vehicle accident. 64 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Automobiles: sudden emergency as exception to rule requiring motorist to maintain ability to stop within assured clear distance ahead. 75 A.L.R.3d 327.

§ 63-3-321. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; offenses.

Any person who wilfully destroys, knocks down, removes, defaces, or alters any letters or figures on a detour or warning sign set upon a highway or road of this state, or who wilfully knocks down, removes, rearranges, destroys, defaces, or alters any letter or figures on a barricade or fence erected on any highway or road of this state, or who drives around or through any barricade or fence on any officially closed highway or road of this state, or who drives around such detour sign or barricade or fence, or who wilfully ignores or disregards a warning sign before such road has been officially opened to the public traffic by the Mississippi State Highway Department, or in appropriate cases by the county or municipal officer responsible for constructing or maintaining such roads, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This shall have no application to peace officers in the performance of their duties, nor to employees of the Mississippi State Highway Department, nor to employees of the contractor, nor to employees of the federal authorities when engaged in inspection of surveys, repairs, maintenance, or construction on or alongside such highways, within the right-of-way, nor to individuals domiciled or making their livelihood within the affected areas, nor to any person or group of persons who shall be authorized by the highway director, or appropriate county or municipal officer.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8160.6; Laws, 1972, ch. 397, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1972).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty of highway construction contract or to provide temporary way or detour around obstruction. 29 A.L.R.2d 876.

§ 63-3-323. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; definitions.

The following words, terms and phrases, when used in Section 63-3-321 shall have the meaning ascribed to them herein:

“Detour sign” means any sign placed across or on a public road of the state, by the state, the county or municipal authorities or by their contractors, indicating that such road is closed or partially closed, which sign also indicates the direction of an alternate route to be followed to give access to certain points.

“Warning sign” means a sign indicating construction work in area.

“Barricade” means a barrier for obstructing the passage of motor vehicle traffic.

“Fence” means a barrier to prevent the intrusion of motor vehicle traffic.

“Officially closed” means a highway or road that has been officially closed by a governmental unit, the Mississippi State Highway Department, a city or a county.

“Officially opened” shall mean any highway that does not have signs or barriers stating that it is closed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8160:5: Laws, 1972, ch. 397, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1972).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation.

§ 63-3-325. Destruction, removal, etc., of detour sign, warning sign, barricade, or fence; penalties.

Every person convicted of a violation of Section 63-3-321 shall be punished by a fine of not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00), or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The conviction of a violation of Section 63-3-321 shall not be competent evidence in any civil action.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8160.7: Laws, 1972, ch. 397, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 27, 1972).

Cross References —

Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see §63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

Article 9. Accidents and Reports.

§ 63-3-401. Duties of driver involved in accident resulting in personal injury or death; offenses and penalties.

  1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 63-3-405.
  2. Every stop under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be made without obstructing traffic or endangering the life of any person more than is necessary.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, if any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that results in injury to any person willfully fails to stop or to comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section, then such person, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year, or by fine of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
  4. If any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident that results in the death of another or the mutilation, disfigurement, permanent disability or the destruction of the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb, organ or member of another willfully fails to stop or to comply with the requirements under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, then such person, upon conviction, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five (5) nor more than twenty (20) years, or by fine of not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
  5. The commissioner shall revoke the driver’s license of any person convicted under this section.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8161; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1996, ch. 461, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 374, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2010.

Amendment Notes —

The 2010 amendment substituted “imprisonment for not less than five (5) nor more than twenty (20) years” for “imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years” in (4).

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Indictment — held sufficient.

2. Double jeopardy.

3. Illustrative cases.

1. Indictment — held sufficient.

That an indictment charging appellant with aggravated assault and leaving the scene of the accident did not state the location of the incident and whether the victims were pedestrians did not entitle him to post-conviction collateral relief, because he demonstrated no uncertainty as to these facts during his testimony at his sentencing hearing, and he waived any non-jurisdictional defects in the indictment when he pled guilty. Fox v. State, 129 So.3d 208, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 223 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 131 So.3d 577, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 2014).

Indictment charging appellant with leaving the scene of the accident was sufficient and not vague; as it included the phrase “wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,” it was apparent that he was charged under the felony, not the misdemeanor, portion of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-401. Fox v. State, 129 So.3d 208, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 223 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 131 So.3d 577, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 78 (Miss. 2014).

Denial of petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief was proper where his indictment was not defective because the indictment clearly charged an offense cognizable under the laws of Mississippi; it tracked the language in Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-401 and was therefore sufficient. Holifield v. State, 852 So. 2d 653, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 67 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 847 So. 2d 866, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 902 (Miss. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 957, 124 S. Ct. 409, 157 L. Ed. 2d 294, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7587 (U.S. 2003).

2. Double jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated because the drunk-driving statute established separate crimes for each of the victims identified and the offense of leaving the scene of an accident contained different elements from the offenses established by the drunk-driving statute. Buckner v. State, 135 So.3d 915, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 682 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 136 So.3d 437, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 2014).

3. Illustrative cases.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior driving under the influence conviction; the trial court found the evidence was clearly probative as to defendant’s motive for leaving the scene of the accident, and any potential prejudice was outweighed by its enormous amount of probative value. Manyfield v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 319 (Miss. Ct. App. May 26, 2020).

Jury could have found that defendant was the driver of the truck when it caused the accident that killed the victim and that defendant left the scene, and thus the evidence supported his convictions; his parents loaned him the truck, his books were found inside, before the accident he was seen at a bar, he had a motive to leave the scene given his recent conviction of driving under the influence and his license suspension, and his DNA also matched the DNA on the truck’s driver’s side airbag. Manyfield v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 319 (Miss. Ct. App. May 26, 2020).

Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for attempting to leave the scene of an accident that resulted in an injury because defendant tried to open the door to a car and get in the car after wrecking a car which defendant had taken in a carjacking. The jury was free to infer that defendant did so with the intent to steal the car and then flee the scene of an auto accident in which another motorist was severely injured, but was frustrated by a locked car door or defendant’s own physical condition, not a voluntary abandonment of purpose. Moffett v. State, 287 So.3d 975, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 549 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

Defendant, an off-duty police officer, was properly convicted of felony leaving the scene of an accident because, while it was later determined that he was not at fault for a fatal accident with a pedestrian, returned to the scene, and admitted to hitting the pedestrian, more than one witness testified to seeing him leave the scene of the accident for as long as 15 minutes. Snyder v. State, 204 So.3d 859, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 261 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 205 So.3d 1085, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 499 (Miss. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the felony of leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in injury or death because, although defendant stated that he assumed that he possibly hit a bird, the jury heard testimony from three witnesses that the victim’s bicycle was equipped with a blinking strobe light and an orange medical flag, which sat atop a five-foot-high plastic pole; defendant’s collision with the victim not only damaged the right fender of defendant’s truck but also broke his passenger-side mirror and tore off the accompanying mirror cover; and defendant called his girlfriend and asked her to call the hospital to see whether any reports had come in regarding someone struck by a vehicle. Brown v. State, 169 So.3d 897, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 85 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.2d 564.

Criminal responsibility of one other than driver at time of accident, under “hit-and-run” statute. 62 A.L.R.2d 1130.

Applicability of criminal “hit-and-run” statute to accidents occurring on private property. 77 A.L.R.2d 1171.

Instructions on sudden emergency in motor vehicle cases. 80 A.L.R.2d 5.

Violation of statute requiring one involved in accident to stop and render aid as affecting civil liability. 80 A.L.R.2d 299.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 287, Identification of Hit-and-Run Vehicle and Driver.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-403. Duties of driver involved in accident resulting in property damage to attended vehicle; offenses and penalties.

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 63-3-405. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

Any person failing to stop or comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8162; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 287, Identification of Hit-and-Run Vehicle and Driver.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Law Reviews.

1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Torts. 50 Miss. L. J. 887, December, 1979.

§ 63-3-405. Duty of driver involved in accident resulting in injury or death or property damage to give information and render aid; liability for rendering assistance.

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall, upon request and if available, exhibit his operator’s or chauffeur’s license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with. Said driver shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person. No such driver who, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care, renders emergency care to any injured person at the scene of an accident or in transporting said injured person to a point where medical assistance can be reasonably expected, shall be liable for any civil damages to said injured person as a result of any acts committed in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care or omission in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care by such driver in rendering the emergency care to said injured person.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8163; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1979, ch. 376, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1979.

Cross References —

“Good Samaritan” statute, see §73-25-37.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Application.

3. Construction.

4. Procedural matters.

1. In general.

A state “hit and run” statute, requiring the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property to stop at the scene and give his name and address, does not violate the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 128 (U.S. 1971).

2. Application.

This section [Code 1942, § 8163], which makes it mandatory for the driver of a vehicle to stop such vehicle at the scene of accident and render reasonable assistance to the person injured, is not limited in its application to persons who have contributed to the accident in the sense that such persons must be shown to have been at fault or to have been guilty of negligence, which was a contributing approximate cause of the accident. Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 1951).

3. Construction.

The duty to “render assistance” to persons injured in the first accident did not relieve the defendant, whose negligence caused the first accident, of the duty of removing or attempting to remove his disabled vehicle from the highway where his vehicle was struck by a second vehicle. Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1496 (Miss. 1971).

One of the main purposes of this section [Code 1942, § 8163] is to enable the persons injured and the officers investigating the accident to determine who is at fault, and to compel the driver of the car involved in the accident to render humanitarian assistance to the persons injured, whether he was guilty of negligence in the operation of his vehicle at the time of the accident or not. Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 1951).

4. Procedural matters.

Since no question of negligence is involved in the failure to comply with this section [Code 1942, § 8163], the trial court properly refused to instruct that the fact that the defendant left the scene of the motor vehicle accident was a strong presumption that he was guilty of negligence by failing to stay at the scene of the accident and rendering first aid to the plaintiff and assisting in calling an ambulance and discharging other duties owed to the plaintiff. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1957).

An indictment under this section [Code 1942, § 8163] was not defective where it did not show the highway on which the accident occurred, or described the scene of accident or show the extent of injuries of the persons involved in the accident. Meadows v. State, 211 Miss. 557, 52 So. 2d 289, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 1951).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of compliance with requirement of criminal “hit and run” statute that motorist identify himself. 48 A.L.R.3d 685.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property. 73 A.L.R.4th 737.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

§ 63-3-407. Duties of driver involved in accident involving unattended vehicle.

The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a conspicuous place in the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and of the owner of the vehicle doing the striking and a statement of the circumstances thereof. However, the provisions herein shall not apply where no material damage is done and where the owner of the unattended vehicle was guilty of negligence in leaving said vehicle parked as same was when so struck.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8164; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

§ 63-3-409. Duties of driver striking fixtures upon or adjacent to highway.

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damages to fixtures legally upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of such fact and of his name and address and of the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator’s or chauffeur’s license and shall make report of such accident when and as required in Section 63-3-411.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8165; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

§ 63-3-411. Duties of drivers involved in accidents involving injury or death or property damage of $500 or more to report accidents; supplemental reports; investigations and reports by law enforcement officers.

  1. The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an apparent extent of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or more shall immediately, by the quickest means of communication, give notice of the collision to the local police department if the collision occurs within an incorporated municipality, or if the collision occurs outside of an incorporated municipality to the nearest sheriff’s office or highway patrol station.
  2. The department may require any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, of which report must be made as provided in this section, to file supplemental reports whenever the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the department. Additionally, the department may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the department.
  3. It shall be the duty of the highway patrol or the sheriff’s office to investigate all accidents required to be reported by this section when the accident occurs outside the corporate limits of a municipality, and it shall be the duty of the police department of each municipality to investigate all accidents required to be reported by this section when the accidents occur within the corporate limits of the municipality.

    Every law enforcement officer who investigates an accident as required by this subsection, whether the investigation is made at the scene of the accident or by subsequent investigation and interviews, shall forward within six (6) days after completing the investigation a written report of the accident to the department if the accident occurred outside the corporate limits of a municipality, or to the police department of the municipality if the accident occurred within the corporate limits of such municipality. Police departments shall forward such reports to the department within six (6) days of the date of the accident.

  4. Whenever an engineer of a railroad locomotive, or other person in charge of a train, is required to show proof of his identity under the provisions of this article, in connection with operation of such locomotive, to any law enforcement officer, such person shall not be required to display his operator’s or chauffeur’s license but shall display his railroad employee number.
  5. In addition to the information required on the “statewide uniform traffic accident report” forms provided by Section 63-3-415, the department shall require the parties involved in an accident and the witnesses of such accident to furnish their phone numbers in order to assist the investigation by law enforcement officers.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8166; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 446, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 441, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 563, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 485, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.

Amendment Notes —

The 2003 amendment deleted former (2) which read: “The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage to an apparent extent of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or more shall forward within ten (10) days after such accident, a written report of such accident to the department” and redesignated former (3) through (6) as present (2) through (5).

Cross References —

Accident report required to be furnished sheriff following boating accident or collision, see §§59-21-51,59-21-53.

Use of statewide uniform traffic accident report forms, see §63-3-415.

Confidentiality of accident reports, see §63-3-417.

Accident report required to be furnished public service commission by proper officer of motor carrier, see §77-7-181.

Accident report required to be furnished public service commission following railway accident, see §77-9-431.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A separate investigative report prepared by an officer on a form other than that required by Section 63-3-411 and Section 63-3-415 would be considered a supplemental report as referenced by section 63-3-417, and would be subject to the confidentiality requirements contained therein. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to comply with statute requiring one involved in automobile accident to stop or report as affecting question as to suspension or tolling statute of limitations. 10 A.L.R.2d 564.

Admissibility of police officer’s testimony at state trial relating to motorist’s admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law. 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

Sufficiency of showing of driver’s involvement in motor vehicle accident to support prosecution for failure to stop, furnish identification, or render aid. 82 A.L.R.4th 232.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

§ 63-3-413. Reporting of accident by occupant of vehicle when driver incapable of reporting.

Whenever the driver of a vehicle is physically incapable of making a required accident report and there was another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of making a report, such occupant shall make or cause to be made said report.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8167; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 38.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

§ 63-3-415. Accident report forms.

  1. The department shall prepare and furnish “statewide uniform traffic accident report” forms to other agencies, municipal police departments, county sheriffs and other suitable law enforcement agencies or individuals. The department may charge an amount not exceeding the actual costs incurred by the department in preparing and furnishing the forms. The Department of Public Safety also may make such forms available in electronic format, which shall be accessible by law enforcement departments and other agencies without charge.
  2. Every accident report required by Section 63-3-411 from a law enforcement officer or individual shall be made on the statewide uniform traffic accident report form provided by the department.
  3. In addition to the information required on the accident report forms provided for herein, the department shall include a place on such report forms for the phone numbers of the parties involved in the accident and any witnesses to such accident.
  4. “Statewide uniform traffic accident report” forms shall not have printed upon them the name of any elected state official.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8168; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1984, ch. 485; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 36; Laws, 1990, ch. 441, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 446, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.

Amendment Notes —

The 2002 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), deleted “without cost to other agencies” following “shall prepare and furnish,” inserted “other agencies” preceding “municipal police departments,” and added the last two sentences; and inserted “traffic” preceding “accident” in (4).

Cross References —

Witnesses to accident to furnish phone numbers in order to assist investigation by law enforcement officers, see §63-3-411.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Traffic accident reports prepared by law enforcement agencies are subject to the confidentiality requirements of Section 63-3-417 and they are not available to the general public pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

A separate investigative report prepared by an officer on a form other than that required by Section 63-3-411 and Section 63-3-415 would be considered a supplemental report as referenced by section 63-3-417, and would be subject to the confidentiality requirements contained therein. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-417. Disclosure of information in accident reports; fraudulently obtaining information contained in report; penalties.

  1. All required accident reports and supplemental reports shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and, except as otherwise provided in this section, shall be for the confidential use of the department; however, the department may, upon written request of any person involved in an accident, the spouse or next of kin of any such person, or any person against whom a claim is made as a result of the accident or upon written request of the representative of his estate, disclose to such requester or his legal counsel or a representative of his insurer any information contained in such report except the parties’ version of the accident as set out in the written report filed by such parties, or may disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when such identity is not otherwise known or when such person denies his presence at such accident. The admissibility of an accident report into evidence in any court shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. However, the department shall furnish, upon demand of any person who has, or claims to have, made such a report or, upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or has not been made to the department solely to prove a compliance or a failure to comply with the requirement that such a report be made to the department.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section or the provisions of any other law to the contrary, the department may supply vehicle-specific accident data to any person or entity, in bulk electronic form, for the purpose of compiling vehicle history reports for use by law enforcement, consumers and businesses. The department may charge and collect fees at a negotiated price established by the department for providing such data; however, the department may not agree to grant to any person or entity an exclusive right to receive information or data under this subsection. A person or entity that requests access to such data must agree, in writing, to use information obtained from such data only for the purpose of identifying vehicles that have been involved in accidents and any damage to those vehicles. A person or entity obtaining such data may not use such information to identify or contact persons or individuals.
    2. The department shall retain and deposit into a special fund that is hereby created in the State Treasury so much of the fees collected as may be necessary to defray the actual costs that the department incurs in retrieving, furnishing and maintaining the records and data requested under this subsection. Monies in the special fund may be expended, upon legislative appropriation, to defray such costs. Unexpended amounts remaining in the special fund at the end of the fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, and any income earned or investment earnings on amounts in the fund shall be deposited to the credit of the fund. That portion of the fees collected in excess of the amount necessary to defray the actual costs that the department incurs in retrieving, furnishing and maintaining the records and data requested under this subsection shall be deposited in the State General Fund as provided under Section 45-1-23.
  2. The report required by Section 63-3-411 may be used in proving uninsured status of the owner and operator of a vehicle in any action to enforce a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile liability policy, but only as provided in Section 13-1-124.
  3. Any person to whom information contained in an accident report is not authorized to be disclosed under this section who fraudulently obtains or fraudulently attempts to obtain a copy of such report or information contained in such report shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and such person, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), or imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8170; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1981, ch. 361, § 2; Laws, 1985, ch. 303; Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 116; Laws, 2005, ch. 313, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 314, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 492, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2007.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Section 1 of ch. 313, Laws of 2005, effective from and after July 1, 2005 (approved March 10, 2005), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 314, Laws of 2005, effective July 1, 2005 (approved March 10, 2005), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 314, Laws of 2005, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 13-1-124, referred to in subsection (2), was repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.

Amendment Notes —

The first 2005 amendment (ch. 313) rewrote the former first sentence of (1); and added (3).

The second 2005 amendment (ch. 314) inserted “except as otherwise provided in this section” following “individual so reporting and” near the beginning of the first sentence of (1); inserted (2); and renumbered former (2) as present (3).

The 2007 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), inserted “the spouse or next of kin of any such person, or any person against whom a claim is made as a result of the accident” and deleted “his surviving spouse or one or more of his surviving next of kin” preceding “disclose to such requester”; and added (4).

Cross References —

Similar provision regarding use of accident report required by the motor vehicle safety-responsibility law as evidence of uninsured status, see §63-15-23.

Action against owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, see §83-11-105.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Reports by law enforcement.

1. In general.

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] applies only to reports required to be filed by parties involved in accidents. Boyd v. Donald, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1964).

2. Reports by law enforcement.

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] does not require the police officer investigating an accident to make a report. Boyd v. Donald, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1964).

This section [Code 1942, § 8170] did not preclude the admission of a report prepared by highway patrolman who had investigated the accident for the purpose of impeaching the officer’s testimony. Boyd v. Donald, 250 Miss. 618, 167 So. 2d 661, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 482 (Miss. 1964).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Accident report or portions of it written by persons involved giving their version of facts are private and are not to be released under our law, including copies in possession of police department; however, police officer’s investigative report, including officer’s report or oral statements of persons involved, is not prohibited from release. Twiford, July 22, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0496.

Municipalities and police departments may adopt reasonable procedures, including release forms, to verify that persons requesting accident report information are eligible, under statute, to receive it. Long, March 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0092.

Traffic accident reports prepared by law enforcement agencies are subject to the confidentiality requirements of Section 63-3-417 and they are not available to the general public pursuant to the Mississippi Public Records Act. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

A separate investigative report prepared by an officer on a form other than that required by Section 63-3-411 and Section 63-3-415 would be considered a supplemental report as referenced by section 63-3-417, and would be subject to the confidentiality requirements contained therein. Nowak, Jan. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 05-0626.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records. 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

Admissibility of police officer’s testimony at state trial relating to motorist’s admissions made in or for automobile accident report required by law. 46 A.L.R.4th 291.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-419. Reporting by hospitals and medical examiners of deaths from motor vehicle accidents.

  1. Every county medical examiner or county medical examiner investigator shall, on or before the tenth day of each month, report in writing to the department the death of any person within his jurisdiction during the preceding calendar month as the result of an accident involving a motor vehicle and the circumstances of such accident.
  2. Every hospital shall notify the county medical examiner or county medical examiner investigator of the county in which the accident occurred of the death within the hospital of any person who dies as a result of injuries apparently sustained in an accident involving a motor vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8169; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 446, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 37, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

Cross References —

Mississippi Medical Examiner Act of 1986, see §§41-61-51 et seq.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-421. Tabulation and analysis of accident reports.

The department shall receive accident reports required by this article, and shall tabulate and may analyze all accident reports and shall publish annually or at more frequent intervals statistical information based thereon as to the number and circumstances of traffic accidents.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8171; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1976, ch. 446, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1976.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

§ 63-3-423. Requirement of accident reports by municipal corporations; confidentiality of reports.

Any incorporated city, town, village, or other municipality, may by ordinance require that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident shall also file with a designated city department a report of such accident or a copy of any report required under this article to be filed with the department. Any such report shall be for the confidential use of the city department and shall be subject to the provisions of Section 63-3-417.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8172; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Validity, construction, and application of statutory provisions relating to public access to police records. 82 A.L.R.3d 19.

Discoverability of traffic accident reports and derivative information. 84 A.L.R.4th 15.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 324, 325 et seq.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 46.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1692 et seq.

Article 11. Restrictions on Speed; Use of Radar.

§ 63-3-501. Maximum speed limits on state, interstate and controlled access highways; maximum speed limit on toll roads.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of the state at a speed greater than sixty-five (65) miles per hour.

The Mississippi Transportation Commission may, in its discretion, by order duly entered on its minutes, increase the speed restrictions on any portion of the Interstate Highway System provided such speed restrictions are not increased to more than seventy (70) miles per hour. The commission may likewise increase the speed limit to seventy (70) miles per hour on controlled access highways with four (4) or more lanes.

A governmental entity that operates and maintains a toll road as authorized under Section 65-43-1, or that contracts with some person or business to operate and maintain a toll road as authorized under Section 65-43-3, may establish the maximum speed for motor vehicles operated on any such toll road; however, the maximum speed so established may not exceed eighty (80) miles per hour.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 318; Laws, 1996, ch 303, § 1; Laws, 2008, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 44, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved June 2, 2008.).

Amendment Notes —

The 2008 amendment (ch. 2, 1st Ex Sess) substituted “Except as otherwise provided in this section, no person” for “No person” at the beginning of the first paragraph; and added the third paragraph.

Cross References —

Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see §65-1-8.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Duty of motorists.

3. Presumption of negligence.

4. Liability.

5. Proximate cause.

6. Comparative negligence.

7. Manslaughter.

8. Evidence.

9. Questions for jury.

10. Instructions.

11. Verdict.

12. Miscellaneous.

13.-20. [Reserved for future use.]

21. Under former law.

1. In general.

The law fixing a permissible speed presupposes a compliance with the duty to keep the car under control and be on the alert for objects on the highway. Robertson v. Welch, 242 Miss. 110, 134 So. 2d 491, 1961 Miss. LEXIS 536 (Miss. 1961).

A motorist about to turn left in front of an approaching car may assume that such car is not exceeding a lawful speed, only until he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the speed is such that the turn cannot be safely made. Cothern v. Brewer, 234 Miss. 676, 107 So. 2d 361, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 538 (Miss. 1958).

This section [Code 1942, § 8176] makes the prohibited speed prima facie evidence of guilt, but does not exclude any valid defense. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Maximum speed allowed is such rate of speed as is reasonable and proper having due regard to the traffic or use of the highway, or such as will not endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

2. Duty of motorists.

The presence of an intersection with which the motorist was fully familiar heightened his duty to exercise reasonable care in operating his car at such speed as would permit him to take the necessary steps to avoid colliding with a pedestrian using the road, and within his length of vision ahead as provided by his headlights. Parkins v. Brown, 241 F.2d 367, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

“Control” of vehicles within statute requiring control of vehicles at all times means that driver shall have ability to stop readily and easily. Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1932).

Motorist must drive at rate of speed enabling him to avoid injury to persons who should come under his observation. Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1930).

Driver must keep automobile under control and be on alert for pedestrians. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

Driver or owner of motor vehicle must show due care and observance of the statute. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

Automobile driver must keep his machine constantly under control and be on the alert for and anticipate the presence of pedestrians and others using the streets. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

3. Presumption of negligence.

In an action arising out of intersection motor vehicle collision, the court’s instruction that if the driver of a truck which was not a “pick-up” truck, was violating the law in driving the truck at a speed of more than 45 miles per hour, such fact did not raise any presumptions of negligence on the part of the driver, was error in view of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream & Creamery Co., 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1957).

Motorist approaching and entering intersection at unabated speed of approximately 30 miles per hour is prima facie negligent. Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

Statutory presumption of negligence on part of party shown to have violated motor vehicle law disappears when all facts and circumstances on issue of liability are in evidence. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

One driving automobile at more than ten miles an hour at night without lights was prima facie negligent. McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 365 (Miss. 1933), overruled, Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 1988).

Prima facie case of negligence arising from violation of statute governing speed of automobile is rebuttable. Rhodes v. Fullilove, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 840, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1931).

Automobile driver, killing mule while driving at excessive speed, was prima facie negligent. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

4. Liability.

Driving an automobile on a highway under the influence of intoxicants, or at a high and unlawful rate of speed, is not only dangerous but is negligence per se, and if such negligence contributes to an injury the defendant is liable in damages. Freeze v. Taylor, 257 So. 2d 509, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1459 (Miss. 1972).

Motorist prevented by bright lights of truck standing on highway from seeing beyond such lights, held negligent in failing to reduce speed and to proceed with caution, rendering him liable for striking person standing on highway. Kettle v. Musser's Potato Chips, Inc., 249 Miss. 212, 162 So. 2d 243, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 388 (Miss. 1964).

Motorist failing to slow down on being blinded by lights of approaching car held liable for death of pedestrian struck while walking on side of road. Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 293 (Miss. 1964).

Motorist who, while traveling at unlawful rate of speed, struck pedestrian after seeing him on highway, held liable for injuries to pedestrian, even though pedestrian was contributorily negligent, since damages recoverable would be reduced in proportion to pedestrian’s negligence. Hadad v. Lockeby, 176 Miss. 660, 169 So. 691, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1936).

Presence of ditched car on right-hand side of road and another automobile backed near it to render aid, held not independent intervening cause of passenger’s injury when bus, claimed to have been operated at excessive speed and without proper lookout on approaching curve, ran into ditch to avoid collision. Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1935).

Employer held liable for wilful and wanton acts resulting in injury to boy whom driver of truck had invited to ride thereon. Trico Coffee Co. v. Clemens, 168 Miss. 748, 151 So. 175, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 210 (Miss. 1933).

Motorist exceeding legal speed limit, and as a result inflicting injury on another, is liable therefor. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Bateman, 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1932), overruled in part, Twin County Elec. Power Ass'n v. McKenzie, 823 So. 2d 464, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 2002).

Driving automobile at night at speed not permitting driver to avoid injury to persons coming within range of lights is negligence. Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1930).

Pedestrian’s negligence does not relieve automobile driver from exercising reasonable care. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

Pedestrian’s recovery for injuries by automobile should be reduced in proportion to negligence in crossing street. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

Driving automobile at dangerous rate of speed upon a populous and frequently used street is negligence per se. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522, 1917 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1917).

5. Proximate cause.

Presence of ditched car on right-hand side of road and another automobile backed near it to render aid, held not independent intervening cause of passenger’s injury when bus, claimed to have been operated at excessive speed and without proper lookout on approaching curve, ran into ditch to avoid collision. Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1935).

Court may, notwithstanding all facts regarding automobile collision are in evidence, instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by defendant is negligence and entitles plaintiff to recover where it is proximate cause of injury, or that violation of statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff’s recovery. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

Bus company was liable for injury to automobile occupant if proximately caused by gravel thrown by bus because of its reckless negligence and excessive speed. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Bateman, 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1932), overruled in part, Twin County Elec. Power Ass'n v. McKenzie, 823 So. 2d 464, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 175 (Miss. 2002).

Undisputed testimony held to establish that automobile driver’s violation of state statute regulating speed, constituting negligence, was proximate cause of collision. Terry v. Smylie, 161 Miss. 31, 133 So. 662, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 241 (Miss. 1931).

Unlawful speed of automobile must be proximate contributing cause of injury to make unlawful speed an element of liability. Pounders v. Day, 151 Miss. 436, 118 So. 298, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 324 (Miss. 1928); Rowlands v. Morphis, 158 Miss. 662, 130 So. 906, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 92 (Miss. 1930).

6. Comparative negligence.

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff’s coal truck struck defendant’s pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. Cobb v. Williams, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1956).

Where defendant’s driver was grossly negligent in entering intersection at 50 miles per hour without stopping as required by Code 1942, § 8213, and collided with plaintiff’s driver who, in entering the intersection on a through street at unabated speed of 30 miles per hour, was prima facie negligent under this section [Code 1942, § 8176], the negligence of plaintiff’s driver was a contributing factor to the accident and warranted application of the comparative negligence statute (Code 1942, § 1454). Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

7. Manslaughter.

Motorist exceeding speed fixed by law fails to exercise legal measure of due care prescribed by state, and speed so much above legal rate as to leave no doubt that excess was intentional and wilful constitutes culpable want of due care as respects injuries proximately resulting therefrom, so that homicide proximately caused by such wilfully excessive speed is manslaughter. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1935).

Motorists’ habitual violation of statute, limiting speed in closely built-up territory to twenty miles an hour, and disregard of pedestrians’ rights by many motorists, furnish no excuse for courts to refuse to enforce law or depart therefrom in case wherein facts justify conviction of motorist for manslaughter in causing pedestrian’s death by wilful violation of speed law. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1935).

8. Evidence.

Where the speed of a vehicle is a factor in determining the proximate cause of a collision, evidence as to speed should be limited to the time of, or immediately before, the collision, and the court should exclude, evidence of speed prior to and remote from the collision in question; but evidence of prior speed may be admitted if the evidence shows that the vehicle continued to be operated at approximately the same speed until collision occurs, or where the circumstances are such that prior speed has substantial evidential values as to the speed of the vehicle at the time of, or immediately before, the collision. Barrett v. Shirley, 231 Miss. 364, 95 So. 2d 471, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 521 (Miss. 1957).

Error in personal injury case in admitting evidence of a municipal speed ordinance because it was not pleaded in the declaration could not be complained of where the pertinent provision of the ordinance as to the applicable speed limit was identical with that of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] and it was alleged in the declaration that defendant was running at a reckless speed in violation of the law. Howell v. George, 201 Miss. 783, 30 So. 2d 603, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1947).

Defendant could not complain of conviction for violating city ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] on ground that the summons or notice to appear and defend contained no specification of speed at which defendant was charged to have driven, where defendant appeared and defended without making such point in the trial court. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Evidence that defendant was driving at greater speed than that prescribed by this section [Code 1942, § 8176], or by city ordinance adopting provisions thereof, establishes defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, where defendant fails to offer any evidence in justification thereof. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

In an action by an automobile owner to recover for personal injuries sustained by him when he attempted to avoid an anticipated collision with the defendant’s truck which was entering the intersection from a side road, evidence of the physical condition at the scene of the accident and that the truck stopped either before entering the paved part of the intersection or when it reached the center thereof, disproved any contention that the truck was driving at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable and proper when it approached the intersection in question or that the driver in any manner violated the provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Hand, 186 Miss. 893, 191 So. 674, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. 1939).

Evidence as to bus driver’s violation of speed statute and sharp curve statute and of failure to keep proper lookout held sufficient to make issue for jury of driver’s negligence in action for passenger’s injuries when bus ran into ditch as result of driver’s effort to avoid striking automobile on side of road. Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 56 (Miss. 1935).

Evidence of motorists’ wilful and intentional operation of automobile at speed grossly exceeding statutory limit across pedestrians’ path alongside railroad track at street crossing and death of pedestrian as proximate or concurrently proximate result of such law violation held to sustain conviction of manslaughter. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744, 1935 Miss. LEXIS 231 (Miss. 1935).

Privilege tax statute defining trucks as motor vehicles used in business of transporting property not applying to statute restricting speed of trucks to thirty miles per hour, plaintiff in personal injury action held not required to show that defendant’s automobile exceeding speed limit for trucks was engaged in business of transporting property. Pollard v. Stansell, 169 Miss. 136, 152 So. 646, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1934).

In prosecution against automobile driver for failure to reasonably turn to right, evidence showing defendant exceeded speed limit was inadmissible. Naylor v. State, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1930).

Under evidence jury could not find defendant motorist’s negligent speed did not contribute to injury of plaintiff struck when replacing tools in automobile on highway at night. Frazier v. Hull, 157 Miss. 303, 127 So. 775, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1930).

9. Questions for jury.

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant’s driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

In an action for the death of eight-year-old child killed when struck by a large diesel trailer truck, not equipped with service brakes, it was for the jury to determine whether the truck driver was negligent in driving at a speed in excess of 45 miles an hour, in failing to maintain a proper lookout for persons on the highway, and failing to observe the movements of a child crossing the highway in time to avoid injuring her; in failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle after he saw, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have seen the child on the highway, and whether the driver’s negligence, if any, was the approximate or contributing cause of the death of the child. Reed v. Eubanks, 232 Miss. 27, 98 So. 2d 132, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1957).

In an action by occupant of a truck against driver to recover for injuries sustained when the truck went off highway on curve, where evidence was conflicting to some extent, there was no prejudicial error in submitting issue of negligence for determination of jury. Shearron v. Shearron, 219 Miss. 27, 68 So. 2d 71, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 369 (Miss. 1953), modified, 219 Miss. 27, 69 So. 2d 801, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 341 (Miss. 1954).

Whether bus driver could have reasonably foreseen possibility of injury, held for jury. Wheat v. Teche Lines, Inc., 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1938).

Under evidence, question whether bus driver was traveling at reasonable rate of speed, and whether bus was in such close proximity to plaintiff as to endanger life or limb, held for jury. Wheat v. Teche Lines, Inc., 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1938).

Automobile chauffeur’s negligence in permitting owner’s son to drive automobile while intoxicated, resulting in injury to child, held for jury. Slaughter v. Holsomback, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318, 1933 Miss. LEXIS 368 (Miss. 1933).

Whether motorist in rear had automobile under control and whether truck driver ahead, stopping on bridge, exercised ordinary care at and immediately before collision held for jury. Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1932).

Whether excessive speed of truck, or plaintiff’s act in placing himself at rear of stalled automobile, was proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, held for jury under evidence. Rhodes v. Fullilove, 161 Miss. 41, 134 So. 840, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 250 (Miss. 1931).

Whether automobile driver was exceeding fifteen miles per hour at time of striking mule held for jury. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

Negligence in driving automobile fifteen miles per hour at time of striking pedestrian crossing the street held for jury. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

10. Instructions.

In a suit for the death of a child pedestrian struck by an automobile, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by reason of the driver’s alleged failure to decrease the speed of his automobile as he approached the intersection, where the evidence as to the automobile’s speed was in conflict. Young v. Schwarz, 230 So. 2d 583, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1560 (Miss. 1970).

The admission of a defendant motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to reduce her speed on approaching the intersection would only entitle the plaintiff to an instruction that the defendant’s failure to reduce her speed was negligence and that if such negligence caused or contributed to the accident then he was entitled to a verdict against her. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

Where there was evidence that defendant’s truck was traveling at about 60 miles an hour as it approached and entered the intersection, the lower court properly instructed the jury that if the truck was being operated at a greater rate of speed than 50 miles per hour immediately before the collision such speed would constitute negligence, and if such negligence proximately contributed to the collision then the verdict should be for the plaintiffs. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of the plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit, instructions, which when read together, focused the attention of the jury on the real issue of whether the plaintiff’s truck was overtaken from behind, run into and damaged by the negligence of the defendant’s driver in operating his truck without proper control, without keeping a proper lookout, and at a negligent rate of speed, or whether plaintiff’s driver negligently stopped his truck on the half-moon curve in the right lane of the pavement when it was unnecessary and impractical to do so, and, if so, whether such negligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision, were not reversibly erroneous, even though some imperfections could be found therein. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

In an action against an automobile driver for injuries sustained by a bicyclist, where in instructions the jury was told that the plaintiff failed to keep his bicycle under control and to keep a proper lookout for others on the highway and to use due care not to place himself in a place of danger and not to create emergency he could not recover, the instruction failed to take into account the provisions of comparative negligence statutes which provide that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, if the proof showed that the defendant was negligent and the defendant’s negligence was the proximate contributing cause to the plaintiff’s injuries. Rivers v. Turner, 223 Miss. 673, 78 So. 2d 903, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 422 (Miss. 1955).

An instruction that if driver of plaintiff’s bus was operating it at night over public streets at such speed as not to permit driver to avoid striking vehicles coming within range of his lights, which was sole proximate cause of collision with defendant, jury should return verdict for defendant, announced sound law. Jackson City Lines v. Harkins, 204 Miss. 707, 38 So. 2d 102, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 399 (Miss. 1948).

Instruction authorizing jury to find defendant guilty of violating city ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176], if jury believed from the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully drove automobile on city street more than 55 miles per hour, was proper, where defendant made no attempt to overcome prima facie case. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

In action for injuries sustained in collision between trucks in municipality, instructions which did not refer to regulatory statutes which were allegedly violated by defendant’s truck driver, or declare that violation of statutes must contribute proximately to the collision, but which left jury to guess at what constituted negligence, were insufficient. McDonough Motor Express v. Spiers, 180 Miss. 88, 177 So. 655 (Miss. 1937).

Instruction that it was truck driver’s duty to operate truck at safe rate of speed held properly refused; law requiring only reasonably safe rate. Robinson v. Haydel, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1936).

In action for injuries sustained when automobile in which plaintiff was riding was struck by truck, instruction which invoked for plaintiff aid of statute regarding excessive speed and prima facie rule of evidence held erroneous, where declaration was merely sufficient to state case of common-law liability for negligence. Gulf Research Dev. Co. v. Linder, 177 Miss. 123, 170 So. 646, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1936).

In prosecution for manslaughter by automobile, instruction that, if defendant was exceeding twenty miles per hour and exceeding speed at which reasonable or prudent man would have driven, he was guilty of culpable negligence, and authorizing conviction if death was proximate result of such culpable negligence, held reversible error. Bailey v. State, 176 Miss. 579, 169 So. 765, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Miss. 1936).

Instruction that it is violation of state law to drive automobile on public highway at greater speed than reasonable and proper, having due regard to traffic and use of highway, and that motorist must anticipate presence of other persons and vehicles on highway and drive at such rate of speed as to enable him to avoid injury to such persons, held proper. Hadad v. Lockeby, 176 Miss. 660, 169 So. 691, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 140 (Miss. 1936).

In action arising out of collision between automobile and truck on bridge, deficiency in instruction relating to precautions truck driver should have taken in approaching bridge held cured by instruction setting out statutory provisions defining duty of operator of automobile approaching bridge. Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Screws, 175 Miss. 383, 166 So. 754, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 37 (Miss. 1936).

Court may, notwithstanding all facts regarding automobile collision are in evidence, instruct jury that violation of motor vehicle statute by defendant is negligence and entitles plaintiff to recover where it is proximate cause of injury, or that violation of statute by plaintiff which is sole proximate cause of injury defeats plaintiff’s recovery. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

Instruction that plaintiff, if exceeding speed permitted by statute, was prima facie negligent, held erroneous, where all facts and circumstances of collision were in evidence, since violation of statute would not prevent recovery unless it was sole proximate cause of collision. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 152 So. 484, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1934).

Instruction on rate of speed on highway where territory contiguous thereto was closely built up held erroneous under evidence. Bradford v. State, 158 Miss. 210, 127 So. 277, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 2 (Miss. 1930).

11. Verdict.

A verdict of $25,000 for the loss of an arm was excessive where the evidence showed that the negligence of the plaintiff to a very large extent contributed proximately to the injury, in that he was driving a truck without any brakes with knowledge thereof, and was violating the 30-mile speed limit for trucks prescribed by previous enactment of similar section (Code 1930, § 5569 [repealed]), during the nighttime and while he was crossing three bridges in a creek bottom one of which was very narrow. E. L. Bruce Co. v. Bramlett, 188 So. 532 (Miss. 1939).

12. Miscellaneous.

A declaration in an action seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident which charged special hazards, excessive rate of speed, and that the defendant negligently and in complete disregard of the rights and safety of others attempted to drive his truck between two vehicles, one stalled on the left hand lane and the other traveling in the right hand lane, was sufficient to state a cause of action. Bullock v. Sim Ramsey, Jr. Trucking Co., 207 So. 2d 628, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1621 (Miss. 1968).

In an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, where the evidence as to whether at the time defendant entered the intersection the plaintiff’s vehicle was approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard was in sharp conflict, and the plaintiff admitted that he did not reduce his speed as he approached the intersection, the trial court did not err in refusing plaintiff’s request for directed verdict. Junakin v. Kuykendall, 237 Miss. 255, 114 So. 2d 661, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 1959).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes a misdemeanor and fine of $100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Affidavit that defendant wilfully and unlawfully drove automobile over public street or highway in city at rate of more than fifty-five miles per hour, contrary to laws and ordinances of city, sufficiently charges offense of violating ordinance adopting provisions of this section [Code 1942, § 8176]. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

Recovery could not be sustained for death of truck driver occurring at night when he drove his truck into an unlighted railroad car on a railroad crossing, where if the decedent had been observing the requirements of this section [Code 1942, § 8176], and of the law with respect to lights on motor vehicles, the accident would not have occurred. Mississippi E. R. Co. v. Summers, 194 Miss. 179, 11 So. 2d 429, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 21 (Miss. 1943).

13.-20. [Reserved for future use.]

21. Under former law.

Ford coupe, equipped with pick-up body and capable of carrying half ton of freight, was “truck” within statute prohibiting driving of truck on highway at speed exceeding thirty miles per hour. Pollard v. Stansell, 169 Miss. 136, 152 So. 646, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 1934).

Highway running through unincorporated village, with railroad depot and several buildings, was public highway where territory contiguous thereto is closely built up within statute. Lucedale Auto. Co. v. Daughdrill, 154 Miss. 707, 123 So. 871, 1929 Miss. LEXIS 186 (Miss. 1929).

Ordinance regulating pedestrian’s use of the street held reasonable. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Where State Highway Commission has acted in response to federal laws, speed limit on county roads is automatically reduced to 55 miles per hour, regardless of whether board of supervisors has passed ordinance or resolution setting limit. Clark, Dec. 9, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0908.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert’s testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 263 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 760 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 201-210.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 887.1 (speed contest), 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 671 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1641 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-502. Penalties for conviction of driving motor vehicle or motorcycle on street or highway in a race.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Motor vehicle” has the meaning ascribed in Section 27-19-3.
    2. “Motorcycle” has the meaning ascribed in Section 27-19-3.
    3. “Street” or “highway” means the entire width between property lines of every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.
  2. Any person driving a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon a street or highway in a race, upon conviction, shall be punished as follows:
    1. A person convicted for the first offense of violating this subsection shall be fined not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), imprisoned for not more than forty-eight (48) hours, or both.
    2. For a second conviction of any person violating this subsection, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, the person shall be fined not less than Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) nor more than One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), shall be imprisoned not less than five (5) days nor more than one (1) year, and shall be sentenced to community service work for not less than ten (10) days nor more than one (1) year.
      1. For a third or subsequent conviction of any person violating this subsection, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, the person shall be guilty of a felony and fined not less than Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), and shall serve not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections; however, for any such offense that does not result in serious injury or death to any person, the sentence of incarceration may be served in the county jail at the discretion of the circuit court judge.
      2. After a conviction under this subsection and upon receipt of the court abstract, the Commissioner of Public Safety shall suspend the driver’s license and driving privileges of the person for not less than five (5) years.
  3. A conviction and imposition of a sentence under this section does not prevent a conviction and imposition of a sentence under Section 63-7-103.

HISTORY: Laws, 2010, ch. 457, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2010.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor or felony violation, see §99-19-73.

§ 63-3-503. Modification of maximum speed limits by state highway commission; maximum penalties for violations.

Whenever the state highway commission shall determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that any speed set forth in Section 63-3-501 is greater than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of a highway, said commission shall determine and declare a reasonable and safe speed limit thereat which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection or other place or part of highway.

Whenever the state highway commission determines that speed limits set forth in Section 63-3-501 are different from those speeds set forth in applicable laws of the Federal Government, then said commission may declare a speed limit which is consistent with such laws and which shall be effective immediately upon adoption by the commission. Appropriate signs giving notice of the adopted speed limits shall be erected upon order of the commission.

The maximum fine and sentence to be imposed for a violation of excessive speed above the maximum limits set by the state highway commission pursuant to the authority granted by this section shall be one-half (1/2) the fine and sentence imposed by Section 63-9-11 if the excessive speed does not exceed the maximum limits imposed by Section 63-3-501.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 314, eff from and after passage (approved Feb. 28, 1974).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes misdemeanor and fine of $100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert’s testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 265.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 887.1 (speed contest).

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 671 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1641 et seq.

§ 63-3-505. Conditions under which speed must be decreased.

The driver or operator of any motor vehicle must decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic. All trucks, or truck-trailer combinations and passenger buses shall be required to reduce speed to forty-five miles per hour during inclement weather when visibility is bad.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1 eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

Cross References —

Powers and duties of the highway commission, generally, see §65-1-8.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Criminal sanctions.

3. Jury instructions.

4. Jury issues.

5. Directed verdict.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

Mother was required under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505 to decrease the speed of her vehicle when she approached the intersection; the mother failed to keep a proper lookout as she approached the intersection, where a reasonable person would have recognized the need to slow the vehicle down when approaching the intersection. Clark v. Clark, 863 So. 2d 1027, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 38 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In an action arising from an accident at an intersection between a bus with the right-of-way and an automobile which failed to stop at a stop sign, the statute was properly applied to require the bus driver to slow down as he approached the intersection and to brake when it became apparent that the automobile was not going to stop. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 202 (Miss. 2000).

A truckdriver, in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, should have reduced the speed of his truck so as to enable him to keep his truck under control and avoid striking the decedent when decedent came within the range of truck’s headlights; the fact that the decedent was at or near the center of the road, under the influence of intoxicating liquor and a black man dressed in black clothing does not in and of itself absolve the truckdriver of his liability. Hornburger v. Baird, 508 F. Supp. 84, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16076 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

A motorist driving approximately 85 miles per hour who failed to reduce his speed while approaching an intersection was liable for injuries sustained by a passenger during a collision where the motorist’s speed was a proximate contributing cause of the collision. Youngblood v. Monteith, 340 So. 2d 4, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1702 (Miss. 1976).

Notwithstanding that it was raining hard on the morning of an accident, neither the owner nor the operator of a tractor-semi-trailer were guilty of negligence per se for failing to reduce speed from 50 to 45 miles per hour, where the operator testified that visibility was approximately one-quarter of a mile, and other witnesses for the plaintiff testified to the fact that it was raining but that they had no trouble seeing the highway and automobiles in front of them. Harpole v. Harrison, 279 So. 2d 150, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1458 (Miss. 1973).

Motorist who, in violation of ¶ 2 of subd (b) of Code 1942, § 8185, attempted to pass another car on the left within 100 feet of a dangerous intersection, and at the same time failed to decrease his speed as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8176] was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision at the intersection. McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 253 Miss. 169, 175 So. 2d 480, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 979 (Miss. 1965).

Motorist approaching and entering intersection at unabated speed of approximately 30 miles per hour is prima facie negligent. Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

2. Criminal sanctions.

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] constitutes misdemeanor and fine of $100 may be imposed therefor, by virtue of Code 1942, § 8275. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

3. Jury instructions.

In a suit brought by a widow against a company, alleging that her decedent was struck and killed by a truck negligently driven by one of the company’s employees, the trial court did not err in refusing a peremptory instruction, to the effect that the employee was negligent in failing to decrease his speed as he approached the intersection where the decedent’s vehicle was, as, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505 (Rev. 2004), the employee, who was already traveling 10 to 25 miles per hour below the speed limit, was not required to reduce his speed further upon approaching the intersection. Martin v. B&B Concrete Co., 71 So.3d 611, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 210 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 71 So.3d 1207, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 487 (Miss. 2011).

Where a driver turned left in front of another vehicle, causing an accident, there was no error in the trial court’s refusal to give a special hazard instruction, as there were no stalled or wrecked vehicles obstructing the highway, no emergency vehicles, and no emergency lights; the Supreme Court of Mississippi has never held, and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505 did not provide, that a momentarily inattentive driver was a special hazard for which another driver had to reduce speed. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So. 2d 1051, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 473 (Miss. 2003).

In an action arising from a one-car accident that occurred when the 16-year-old driver lost control of her car when she hit some loose asphalt or gravel as she entered a curve, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury either that it was their sworn duty to return a verdict for the plaintiff or that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of her motor vehicle as a matter of law where (1) the defendant estimated her speed at around 35 to 40 mph, but contended that she did not believe she was speeding, and (2) her response to the question of whether she slowed down before entering the curve was, “I do not recall applying my brakes before I entered the curve,” but slowing down can also be accomplished by letting off the gas, as opposed to braking. Jones v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 86 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2001), aff'd, 822 So. 2d 946, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 224 (Miss. 2002).

The court properly instructed the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff to reduce her speed when approaching and going around a curve and that if the jury believed from the evidence that the plaintiff failed to reduce the speed of her automobile on approaching and going around a curve and, in the exercise of reasonable care, she should have reduced her speed while traveling on a wet highway, then she was guilty of negligence. Fielder v. Magnolia Bev. Co., 757 So. 2d 925, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1999).

A jury instruction in a negligence action arising from an automobile accident that required the defendant to “decrease her speed as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on the highway in compliance with legal requirements” was erroneous because it placed a higher burden on the defendant than that of reasonable care. Similarly, an instruction that required the defendant to be “vigilant and to anticipate the presence of vehicles at all times and under all circumstances” was erroneous for the same reason, and also warranted reversal and remand of the case. Turner v. Turner, 524 So. 2d 942, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1988).

In a suit for the death of a child pedestrian struck by an automobile, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by reason of the driver’s alleged failure to decrease the speed of his automobile as he approached the intersection, where the evidence as to the automobile’s speed was in conflict. Young v. Schwarz, 230 So. 2d 583, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1560 (Miss. 1970).

The admission of a defendant motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to reduce her speed on approaching the intersection would only entitle the plaintiff to an instruction that the defendant’s failure to reduce her speed was negligence and that if such negligence caused or contributed to the accident then he was entitled to a verdict against her. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

4. Jury issues.

In a motorist’s suit to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained in a car accident with a construction worker, the construction company and the worker’s motions for summary judgment were denied because even though it was undisputed that the motorist did not slow down when he approached the intersection at which the accident occurred, thereby violating Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-505, whether this was negligence per se was for a jury to decide. Moran v. Callahan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94573 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007).

In order to be in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] a motorist must fail to reduce his speed from a maximum provided when one of the conditions set out in this section is present, and the question of whether the plaintiff motorist involved in an intersectional accident when travelling at a speed less than the maximum failed further to reduce his speed under the prevailing circumstances constituted negligence was one for the jury to determine. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

Evidence that motorist approached intersection without reducing speed in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] was sufficient to submit to the jury the question of whether he was guilty of any negligence which proximately caused or contributed to the accident. Shaw v. Phillips, 193 So. 2d 717, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1559 (Miss. 1967).

5. Directed verdict.

The admission by a motorist involved in an intersectional accident that she failed to decrease her speed upon approaching the intersection is not sufficient ground to support a directed verdict for the plaintiff on the basis of the contention that the defendant motorist was in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8176] and therefore negligent as a matter of law. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

6. Miscellaneous.

The trial court did not err in finding in favor of a driver in her action against a city and a police officer stemming from a vehicular accident in which the driver was struck by the officer, because the city’s argument that the driver was contributorily negligent under Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-805 and63-3-505 contained no evidentiary basis. The driver’s view was blocked by a truck and therefore, she was unable to see the officer approach; the driver had a green light at the intersection and she was not speeding or violating any other rule of the road. City of Jackson v. Presley, 40 So.3d 578, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd, 40 So.3d 520, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 2010).

In an action for injury sustained when plaintiff’s coal truck struck defendant’s pick-up truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, even if plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving at an excessive speed while visibility was poor, and failing to blow his horn, and in failing to slow down as he approached the intersection, under Code 1942, § 1454, he was not barred from recovery, although the amount of damages which he might otherwise have been entitled to recover would be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to him. Cobb v. Williams, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1956).

Duty of drivers of motor vehicles in approaching curves defined. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle leaves road. 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle turns over on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Competency of nonexpert’s testimony, based on sound alone, as to speed of motor vehicle involved in accident. 33 A.L.R.3d 1405.

Am. Jur.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 201-210.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

5 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 191, Meteorological Conditions at a Particular Time and Place.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 675.

§ 63-3-507. Details of complaint and summons or notice to appear alleging speeding violation.

In every charge of violation of Sections 63-3-501 through 63-3-505, and subsection (2) of Section 63-3-509 the complaint as well as the summons or notice to appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven as well as the speed applicable within the district or at the location.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8176; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

Cross References —

Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law –Traffic Violations Procedure, see Chapter 9 of this title.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Evidence.

1. In general.

Defendant could not complain of conviction for violating city ordinance adopting provisions of Code 1942, § 8176, on ground that the summons or notice to appear and defend contained no specification of speed at which defendant was charged to have driven, where defendant appeared and defended without making such point in the trial court. White v. Philadelphia, 197 Miss. 166, 19 So. 2d 493, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 287 (Miss. 1944).

2. Evidence.

Error in personal injury case in admitting evidence of a municipal speed ordinance because it was not pleaded in the declaration could not be complained of where the pertinent provision of the ordinance as to the applicable speed limit was identical with that of Code 1942, § 8176, and it was alleged in the declaration that defendant was running at a reckless speed in violation of the law. Howell v. George, 201 Miss. 783, 30 So. 2d 603, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 1947).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Miss. Code Section 63-3-507 requires that speed alleged to have been traveled needs to be on ticket. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

Miss. Code Section 63-3-507 deals specifically with speeding; although helpful, it is not mandated that exact speed be alleged when driving in excess of speed limit is part of reckless driving charge. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1649.

§ 63-3-509. Minimum speed limits.

  1. No motor vehicle shall be driven at a speed less than thirty miles per hour on federal designated highways where no hazard exists. An exception to this requirement shall be recognized when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation, or when a vehicle or combination of vehicles is necessarily, or in compliance with law or police direction, proceeding at a reduced speed.

    Police officers are hereby authorized to enforce this provision by directions to drivers. In the event of apparent wilful disobedience to this provision and refusal to comply with the direction of an officer in accordance herewith the continued slow operation by a driver shall be a misdemeanor.

  2. In the event a speed limit of seventy miles per hour is established on any portion of the Interstate Highway System or on four-laned U.S. designated highways as is provided in Section 63-3-501, a minimum speed of forty miles per hour shall be established for those vehicles having a maximum speed restriction of seventy miles per hour. Notice of said minimum speed shall be posted on such roads.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, §§ 8176, 8178; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, §§ 1, 3; Laws, 1962, ch. 524; Laws, 1966, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1970, ch. 442, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1970).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. In general.

In an action for personal injuries and property damages resulting when plaintiff’s automobile ran into defendant’s truck which was going in the same direction on a U. S. highway, where it appeared that the speed of defendant’s truck at the time of the accident was from 10 to 20 miles per hour, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge that the jury should find for plaintiff if the defendant was driving his vehicle on a federal designated highway at the time and place of the accident at a speed of less than 30 miles per hour where no fact existed justifying such slow speed under this section [Code 1942, § 8178], and the reduced speed was the proximate, or a contributory cause of the accident. Netterville v. Crawford, 233 Miss. 562, 103 So. 2d 1, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 418 (Miss. 1958).

2.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Truckdriver traveling less than 30 miles per hour on highway is not negligent if reduced speed is out of necessity; physical limitation on rate of acceleration of tractor trailer which is traveling at reduced speed due to just having entered highway falls within “necessary” exception to minimum speed. Byrd v. F-S Prestress, 464 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1899 (Miss. 1985).

Operation of motor vehicle at less than fixed maximum rate of speed may be negligence. Wheat v. Teche Lines, Inc., 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 83 (Miss. 1938).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Mississippi Department of Transportation has the duty to post signs indicating the minimum speed limit on any portion of the Interstate Highway System or on four-laned U.S. designated highways wherein the Mississippi Transportation Commission has established the maximum speed limit to be 70 miles per hour. Brown, Apr. 16, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0162.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity. 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 263 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 766.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 69 et seq.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 674.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1641.

§ 63-3-511. Modification of speed limits by local authorities; establishment of speed limits upon roads of correctional facilities; modification of local limits to conform to lower limits established by state highway commission.

Whenever local authorities, including boards of supervisors, within their respective jurisdictions, determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the speed permitted under this article on any street, or any county road or any portion thereof, or at any intersection is greater than is reasonable or safe under conditions found to exist upon such street, or any county road or any portion thereof, or at such intersection, such local authorities shall determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit, which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected on such street, or any county road or any portion thereof, or at such intersection, or upon the approaches thereto. However, no speed limit shall be fixed by any such local authorities at less than fifteen (15) miles per hour.

The Commissioner of Corrections is authorized to establish by regulation reasonable and safe speed limits upon the roads of the correctional facilities under his jurisdiction which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected. Speed limits may be based upon road or traffic conditions or upon security considerations.

Provided, however, that whenever the State Highway Commission shall, pursuant to Section 63-3-503, lower the maximum speed limit in response to federal laws, regulations or guidelines for purposes of energy conservation, local authorities, including boards of supervisors, shall immediately lower maximum speed limits on local highways, not to exceed a maximum speed of fifty-five (55) miles per hour.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8177; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 2; Laws, 1956, ch. 397; Laws, 1960, ch. 208; Laws, 1974, ch. 321; Laws, 1986, ch. 485, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1986).

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Cross References —

Provision that speed limits within the grounds of correctional facilities may be enforced by employees of the Department of Corrections by citation or otherwise, see §47-5-54.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Burden of proof.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1. In general.

In cases involving injuries arising out of vehicular traffic on municipal streets or county roads where special municipal or county speed restrictions have been placed in effect, the party expecting to rely upon a violation of such restrictions should plead the existence of the special speed limit established by local authority, and its violation. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

2. Burden of proof.

If the existence of a special county or municipal speed restriction is alleged and denied, or if its legality is put in issue by a responsive pleading, proof should then be required, the burden resting upon the party having the affirmative, as in other cases of disputed fact; but where the existence of the speed zone and rate of speed are properly alleged and not denied, proof that speed signs were in fact posted is sufficient to create a presumption that they reflect appropriate action by competent authority in restricting speeds. Niles v. Sanders, 218 So. 2d 428, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1599 (Miss. 1969).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

In action for injuries sustained in collision alleged to have resulted from defendant’s negligence in driving truck in excess of thirty miles per hour on left side of highway through municipality, in absence of showing city ordinance limiting speed of motor vehicles within its limits, statutes limiting maximum speed of thirty miles per hour would apply. McDonough Motor Express v. Spiers, 180 Miss. 88, 177 So. 655 (Miss. 1937).

City ordinance, fixing automobile speed limit outside business district, not statute fixing lower limit on highways in closely built-up territory, controls speed in city outside such district. Robinson v. Haydel, 177 Miss. 233, 171 So. 7, 1936 Miss. LEXIS 266 (Miss. 1936).

Former statute, since repealed [Code 1930, § 5569] delegated, with certain limitations, to governing authorities of municipalities power to fix their own traffic rules within corporate limits within bounds fixed. Meridian Coca-Cola Co. v. Watson, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1931).

Where city had regulated traffic within its limits, state regulation of eight miles an hour in passing pedestrians held inapplicable. Meridian Coca-Cola Co. v. Watson, 161 Miss. 108, 134 So. 824, 1931 Miss. LEXIS 246 (Miss. 1931).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 264, 266.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 71-73.

§ 63-3-513. Special speed limitation on bridges and elevated structures; proof of violations.

The state highway commission upon request from any local authority shall, or upon its own initiative may, conduct an investigation of any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway, and if it shall thereupon find that such structure cannot with safety to itself withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this article, the commission shall determine and declare the maximum speed of vehicles which such structure can withstand, and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating such maximum speed to be erected and maintained at a distance of one hundred feet before each end of such structure.

No person shall drive a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge or structure, when such structure is signposted as provided in this section.

Upon the trial of any person, charged with a violation of this section, proof of said determination of the maximum speed by said commission and the existence of said signs shall constitute conclusive evidence of the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge or structure.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8179; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

§ 63-3-515. Speed limits near schools and churches, upon levees and causeways, and in other designated special zones.

The boards of supervisors of counties and the governing authorities of municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt by order or resolution and to enforce within their respective territorial boundaries the maximum legal rate of speed at which a motor vehicle may be run or operated along any public street, road, highway (except state-maintained highways), or portion thereof in the vicinity of schools and churches, upon levees and causeways and in other special zones which the board or governing authorities may designate. The rate of speed so established shall be determined upon the basis of an engineering and traffic study. The order or resolution setting such speed limits may provide that such limits are only effective during specified times of the day, days of the week and months of the year.

HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 5776; 1930, § 5570; 1942, § 8060; Laws, 1916, ch. 116; Laws, 1986, ch. 353, eff from and after July 1, 1986.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The statute prohibiting drivers from passing a school during regular school hours faster than ten miles per hour was not repealed by implication by a subsequent statute prohibiting a motorist from driving faster than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances where the two statutes could be harmonized and expressed a clear legislative intent. Brown v. McCoy, 362 So. 2d 186, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2080 (Miss. 1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Meaning of “residence district,” “business district,” “school area,” and the like, in statutes and ordinances regulating speed of motor vehicles. 50 A.L.R.2d 343.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 276-278.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

§ 63-3-516. Speed limits within highway work zones; penalties for violations.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle within a highway work zone at a speed in excess of the maximum speed limit specifically established for the zone whenever workers are present and whenever the zone is indicated by appropriately placed signs displaying the reduced maximum speed limit. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished, upon conviction, for a first offense by a fine of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00); and for second, third and subsequent offenses by a fine of double the maximum fine imposed for second, third or subsequent offenses under Section 63-9-11.
  2. For the purposes of this section the term “highway work zone” means a construction or maintenance area that is located on or along any public highway, road or street within this state that is marked:
    1. By appropriate warning signs or other traffic control devices indicating that work is in progress; and
    2. By signs of a design approved by the Department of Transportation indicating that any person who operates a motor vehicle within a highway work zone at a speed in excess of the reduced maximum speed limit may be punished by a fine of double the maximum amount otherwise authorized by law.
  3. Nothing in this section shall preclude the prosecution or conviction for careless or reckless driving of any motor vehicle operator whose operation of a motor vehicle in a highway work zone, apart from speed, demonstrates the operation of the same in a careless or imprudent manner in violation of Section 63-3-1213 or in a reckless manner in violation of Section 63-3-1201.
  4. Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of this section and who causes property damage to road construction equipment or a motor vehicle in an amount of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or greater within a highway work zone shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a separate misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) nor more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, and the court shall, as a condition of any sentence imposed determine the extent of the property damage caused by the violator and require the violator to make restitution to the injured party upon such terms and conditions determined by the court. Nothing herein however shall prevent the injured party from pursuing any other civil remedies against the violators as allowed by law.
  5. Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of this section and who causes the death of another within a highway work zone or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb, organ or member of another within a highway work zone shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a separate felony for each victim who suffers death, mutilation, disfigurement or other injury and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time of not less than three (3) years and not to exceed fifteen (15) years for each death, mutilation, disfigurement or other injury, and the imprisonment for the second or each subsequent conviction, in the discretion of the court, shall commence either at the termination of the imprisonment for the preceding conviction or run concurrently with the preceding conviction.

HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 326, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 324, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004; Laws, 2019, ch. 356, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Joint Legislative Committee Note— Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected errors in this section by deleting the paragraph designator “a” following the subsection (4) and (5) designators. Section 2 of Chapter 356, Laws of 2019, amended this section by adding paragraphs designated (a) in subsections (4) and (5) but did not add any other designated paragraphs in the subsections. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 12, 2019, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment, in (1), inserted “for a first offense” preceding “by a fine of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00)” and added “and for second, third and subsequent offenses by a fine of double the maximum fine imposed for second third or subsequent offenses under Section 63-9-11”; and rewrote (2).

The 2019 amendment rewrote (3), which read: “Nothing in this section shall preclude the prosecution or conviction for reckless driving of any motor vehicle operator whose operation of a motor vehicle in a highway work zone, apart from speed, demonstrates a reckless disregard for life, limb or property”; and added (4) and (5).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Controlling Statute.

1. In general.

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §63-3-313 as he did not obey an official traffic-control device. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §65-1-71 as he did not obey a sign that was erected to control the use of the road during construction. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

Although there was no violation of §63-3-516 when the defendant drove 67 miles per hour in a construction zone which was posted at 60 miles per hour because it was nighttime and no workers were present, there was a violation of §65-1-8, which allows the Transportation Commission to adopt rules, regulations and ordinances for the control of and the policing of the traffic on the state highways. Harrison v. State, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 44 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000), aff'd, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

2. Controlling Statute.

Specific provision of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-516 prevails over the general speeding statutes. Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 223 (Miss. 2001).

§ 63-3-517. Applicability of speed restrictions to emergency vehicles; duties of drivers of emergency vehicles.

The speed limitations set forth in this article shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency calls and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle. This section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street, nor shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8180; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1948, ch. 328, § 4.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Law enforcement immunity.

1. In general.

In an action arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by a constable in pursuit of a reckless driver and one operated by plaintiff, where the evidence was in conflict as to such matters as to whether the siren on constable’s car was sounded, speed, and position of vehicles at time of accident, the issue was properly submitted to a jury. Johnson v. Richardson, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1959).

2. Law enforcement immunity.

Police officer’s decision to answer a burglary call without lights or sirens was not a discretionary decision entitling him and his employer to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§11-46-1 through11-46-23, because the officer had no element of choice or judgment in how to respond to an emergency dispatch, pursuant to the terms of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-517. City of Jackson v. Lipsey, 834 So. 2d 687, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 8 (Miss. 2003).

Directed verdict in favor of the sheriff and county in the family’s action alleging reckless disregard by an auxiliary deputy sheriff concerning an accident involving the deputy and their son was appropriate under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c) because the deputy’s actions, at the most, amounted to negligence; the deputy was traveling no more than five miles over the speed limit and Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-517 permitted him to do so because he was responding to an accident. Peebles v. Winston County, 929 So. 2d 385, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 373 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Municipal law enforcement officers of a municipality with a population of 2,000 or more may operate radar speed-detection equipment upon a state-designated highway projecting through its corporate limits as well as on other public streets; however, officers of a municipality having a population of less than 15,000 cannot lawfully operate such equipment on any federally designated highway within the corporate limits of the municipality; this is true even if the federally designated highway is also designated a city street. Levingston, Feb. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0062.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damages to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 4 A.L.R.4th 865.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 945, 946.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 881-887, 1341-1524, 1911-1928.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

§ 63-3-519. Use of radar speed detection equipment; authorization and limitations.

It shall be unlawful for any person or peace officer or law enforcement agency, except the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol, to purchase or use or allow to be used any type of radar speed detection equipment upon any public street, road or highway of this state. However, such equipment may be used:

1. By municipal law enforcement officers within a municipality having a population of two thousand (2,000) or more upon the public streets of the municipality;

2. By any college or university campus police force within the confines of any campus wherein more than two thousand (2,000) students are enrolled;

3. By municipal law enforcement officers in any municipality having a population in excess of fifteen thousand (15,000) according to the latest federal census on federally designated highways lying within the corporate limits.

The Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol will not set up radar on highways within municipalities with a population in excess of fifteen thousand (15,000) according to the latest federal census.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8176.5; Laws, 1966, ch. 383, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 542, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1968).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

The court would reject the contention that a state highway running through a municipality is not a “public street” within the meaning of the exception stated in subparagraph (1). Moore v. City of Louisville, 716 So. 2d 1136, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 513 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The federal census requirement applies to the provisions of Section 63-3-519(1). Rogers, April 10, 1991, [no A.G. opinion number in the original], 1991 Miss. AG LEXIS 323; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §65-7-95, a municipality having a population of 2,000 or more may purchase and operate radar on its public streets. The most authentic proof of population is the census, but the municipality may use another official count. Any speeding conviction resulting from radar evidence would have to be based on both proof of the offense and proof of the town’s population. Adams, June 13, 1974, [no A.G. opinion number in original] 1974 Miss. AG LEXIS 8.

In order to come within the exception to the rule that only the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol can use radar speed detection equipment, a municipality must have, according to the latest federal census, a population of 2,000 or more. Hickman, June 24, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0441, 1992 Miss. AG LEXIS 339; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

Intent of Miss. Code Section 63-3-519 is to prohibit use of all devices for detection of speed of automobiles, not just those which use emission of electronic waves; system of using table to calculate speed of car, which is timed between two points falls, within statutory prohibition of use of radar speed-detection equipment. Ewing, Feb. 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0002.

Municipality with population of over 2,000 but under 15,000 may use radar on state highways within municipal corporate limits. Gentry, Feb. 16, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0067.

VASCAR, time and motion device, is within prohibition of radar speed detection equipment in Section 63-3-519; intent of statute is to prohibit use of all devices for detection of speed of automobiles, not just those which use emission of electronic waves. Chism, March 9, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0013.

Laser speed detection device falls within prohibition of radar speed detection equipment in Section 63-3-519. Schwing, March 31, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0176.

The only census that can be used to establish the minimum population necessary for the use of radar is the latest federal census. Shows, April 20, 1994, A.G. Op. # 94-0160, 1994 Miss. AG LEXIS 235; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

This section requires a municipality to have a population of two thousand or more according to the latest federal census in order to operate radar upon the public streets of the municipality. Davis, July 19, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0473, 1996 Miss. AG LEXIS 324; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

A town may not use electronic timing devices to calculate the speed of an automobile since the statute prohibits the use of all devices for the detection of the speed of automobiles except for the use of radar as limited by statute. Moore, August 10, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0461.

Since the statute only allows the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol to use radar speed detection equipment on federally designated highways located within the corporate limits of a municipality having a population of 15,000 or less according to the latest federal census, a city could not use a radar-based traffic monitoring device on federally designated highways within the corporate limits, although it could be used on other public streets of the municipality. Johnson, November 6, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0688 (superseded by Payne, Jan. 18, 2000, A.G. op. #99-0709).

Municipal law enforcement officers of a municipality with a population of 2,000 or more may operate radar speed detection equipment upon a state designated highway, however, such officers of a municipality having a population of less than 15,000 cannot lawfully operate such equipment on any federally designated highway. Scruggs, December 11, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0752.

The legislative intent of the statute does not prohibit the purchase and use of a radar-based device that will be used for driver safety awareness and not for enforcement purposes. Payne, Jr., Jan. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #1999-0709.

A city is entitled to use radar speed detection equipment on any portion of a federally designated highway lying within its corporate limits which is removed from the state maintained system and, if the population of the city exceeds 15,000, radar may be used regardless of whether the street is a public street of the municipality. Lawrence, Apr. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0164.

A radar unit can be located on private property, including church and bank parking lots, as long as the vehicle being timed is located on a public street, and the radar unit can be operated safely and accurately. The private property owner may allow or disallow such use of its property. Russell, Jan. 14, 2005, A.G. Op. 04-0642.

City police department cannot use radar speed detection equipment on a federal within the corporate limits of the city. Fazente, May 13, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0231.

In order to operate radar, a municipality must have a population of 2,000 according to the latest federal census. May, Oct. 7, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0465, 2005 Miss. AG LEXIS 254; opinion withdrawn as to application of federal census requirement in 63-3-519(3) to municipalities with population of 2,000 or more by Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

The use of all devices for the detection of the speed of automobiles is prohibited under the terms of Section 63-3-519 and this would include VASCAR. Magee, Oct. 21, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0496.

The legislature clearly intended municipal radar on a highway designated both federal and state to be used only in municipalities of a population of 15,000 or more. Walker, Apr. 28, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0137.

There is no reason in the law to imply that the census requirement found in 63-3-519(3) applies to 63-3-519(1). A town my use some other official population count to prove its current population. Pennington, February 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00054, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 6.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Proof, by radar or other mechanical or electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations. 47 A.L.R.3d 822.

Possession or operation of device for detecting or avoiding traffic radar as criminal offense. 17 A.L.R.4th 1334.

Am. Jur.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Speed.

§ 63-3-521. Use of radar speed detection equipment; penalties for violations.

Any person who violates section 63-3-519 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8176.5; Laws, 1966, ch. 383, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 542, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1968).

Cross References —

Payment of traffic fines by personal check, see §63-9-12.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

Article 13. Driving on Right Side of Roadway: Overtaking and Passing; Following.

§ 63-3-601. Vehicles to be driven on right half of roadway; exceptions.

Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows:

1. When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement;

2. When the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair;

3. Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon; or

4. Upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8181; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Particular circumstances as negligence.

3. Exception in emergency.

4. Jury instructions.

1. In general.

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop because driving in the left-hand lane of a four-lane highway did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 or Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 should be read in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611, which addresses the exceptions to §63-3-601’s requirement that traffic remain on the right side of the roadway. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop for driving in the left-hand lane because Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601(4) exempted roadways designated and signposted for one-way traffic. Hence, the traffic stop was not valid. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

When a motor vehicle is driven upon the wrong side of the highway at a time not within the exception set out in this section [Code 1942, § 8181], such an operation of the vehicle is negligence, and if the driver’s negligence is the sole cause of the accident, damages cannot be recovered for his injury caused by his own act. Lum v. Jackson Industrial Uniform Service, Inc., 253 Miss. 342, 175 So. 2d 501, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 992 (Miss. 1965).

2. Particular circumstances as negligence.

Driver of automobile who, in attempt to avoid hitting dead possum on road, loses control of automobile causing it to go off to right side and hit tree is liable for resulting injury to passenger; passenger who advises driver to avoid hitting possum is not contributorily negligent. Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Patrick, 469 So. 2d 92, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2087 (Miss. 1985).

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child’s parents’ home, the driver was not negligent per se for driving on the “wrong” side of the street where the infant was not within the protected class of pedestrians or drivers who act in reliance upon the orderly flow of traffic dictated by the statute and where the driver’s admitted violation of this section was not the proximate cause of the injuries since the accident would have been no less likely to occur if the automobile had been facing in the opposite direction. Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1980).

The fact that driver of pulpwood truck, in which plaintiff was riding, was violating this section [Code 1942, § 8181] by having a portion of the truck on the left side of the highway at the time of colliding with a pickup truck which was coming out of a driveway, would only constitute contributory negligence which, under the comparative negligence statute, would cause damages to be reduced, and a mere violation of the law in the operation of a motor vehicle would not entitle the opposite party to a peremptory instruction. Winfield v. Magee, 232 Miss. 57, 98 So. 2d 130, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 443 (Miss. 1957).

3. Exception in emergency.

This section [Code 1942, § 8181] would not prevent a motorist turning to the left hand in an emergency, upon giving the proper and timely signal, to avoid striking a pedestrian. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

4. Jury instructions.

Instructions granted under this section [Code 1942, § 8181] were not applicable to a city street with two traffic lanes and one parking lane. Critelli v. Blair, 203 So. 2d 604, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1389 (Miss. 1967).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Driving in the left lane of a four lane highway does not violate this section or §63-3-611. Blakney, Oct. 11, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0566.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Rights, duties, and liability with respect to narrow bridge or passage as between motor vehicle approaching from opposite directions. 47 A.L.R.2d 142.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobile and Highway Traffic, Forms 291 et seq., 311-326, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 812-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1659.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-603. Driving on roadways laned for traffic.

  1. Whenever any roadway has been divided into three (3) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, except through or bypassing a municipality, the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply:
    1. A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
    2. A vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane upon a roadway which is divided into three (3) lanes except when:
      1. Overtaking and passing another vehicle where the roadway is clearly visible and such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance;
      2. Such vehicle is in preparation for a left turn; or
      3. Such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the direction such vehicle is proceeding and is signposted to give notice of such allocation.
    3. Official signs may be erected directing slow-moving traffic to use a designated lane or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving in the same direction, and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such sign.
    4. Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway.
    5. Persons riding bicycles upon a roadway shall not ride more than two (2) abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two (2) abreast shall not impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall ride within a single lane.
    1. A vehicle shall not be driven in the outermost left lane of any roadway with two (2) or more lanes allowing for movement of traffic in the same direction except when:
      1. Overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement;
      2. The right lane(s) of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair;
      3. The right lane(s) of the roadway is in disrepair or in an otherwise impassable or unsafe condition; or
      4. A vehicle is preparing to exit the roadway on the left.
    2. A vehicle shall not be driven continuously in the outermost left lane of a multi-lane roadway whenever it impedes the flow of other traffic.
    3. A violation of this subsection (2) is punishable by a fine of not less than Five Dollars ($5.00) nor more than Fifty Dollars ($50.00).

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8187; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1977, ch. 321, § 1; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1983; Laws, 2018, ch. 360, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment added (2), and designated the previously undesignated first paragraph (1).

The 2018 amendment, in the first sentence of (7), inserted “the unit prices contained within the procurement contracts” and “overall.”

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Liability for negligence.

3. —Particular circumstances.

4. Proximate cause.

5. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop because there was no evidence that defendant violated Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-603 in moving from the right-hand lane to the left-hand lane. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Liability for collision resulting when automobile proceeding east on 4 lane highway collides with truck which is blocking eastbound lanes while preparing to turn left onto westbound lanes is determined under statute governing right of way at intersection (§63-3-805), not under change of lane statute (§63-3-603). Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2017 (Miss. 1985).

2. Liability for negligence.

A violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8187], when neither explained nor excused, constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Vicksburg Concrete Co. v. Poindexter, 198 So. 2d 245, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1257 (Miss. 1967).

A motorist who drives his vehicle into the lane of opposing traffic without first ascertaining that it is free of oncoming vehicles or other obstructions is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Vicksburg Concrete Co. v. Poindexter, 198 So. 2d 245, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1257 (Miss. 1967).

3. —Particular circumstances.

Automobile driver making a left turn at an intersection, who stopped his vehicle 3 or 4 feet across the center line into the lane of an oncoming police motorcycle, violated Mississippi Code 63-3-603, and was guilty of negligence, and, if such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, motorist would be liable for injuries sustained by police officer when his motorcycle struck the stopped car. McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2617 (Miss. 1986).

Motorist held negligent in turning into another lane to avoid stalled car without first ascertaining the position of a following car. Cipriani v. Miller, 248 Miss. 672, 160 So. 2d 87, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 1964).

4. Proximate cause.

The alleged negligence, in driving contrary to part one of this section, by a truck driver who collided head-on with a station wagon was not, even if it occurred, the proximate cause of the accident where evidence indicated that the accident was inevitable because of the negligence of the station wagon’s driver, who was going in the wrong direction on a four lane divided highway. Ward v. Valley Steel Products Co., 339 So. 2d 1361, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1695 (Miss. 1976).

5. Directed verdict.

Under this section, a violation of which constitutes negligence as a matter of law, a municipality was entitled to a directed verdict, where the evidence showed that plaintiff-motorist moved into the adjoining left lane of southbound traffic to pass a vehicle at night and ran through a barricade before falling into a shallow excavation dug earlier in the day to repair a water line leak, and where the barricade was lit by smudge pots; plaintiff failed to ascertain that the adjoining lane was clear before she proceeded to pass the vehicle in front of her. City of Jackson v. Sullivan, 349 So. 2d 527, 1977 Miss. LEXIS 2157 (Miss. 1977).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 245.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 311-326, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Negligence of Motorist in Accident Involving Bicyclist.

11 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 503, Motor Vehicle Accident – Contributory Negligence by Bicyclist.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1659.

§ 63-3-605. Driving upon one-way roadways and around rotary traffic islands.

  1. Upon a roadway designated and signposted for one-way traffic a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated.
  2. A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only to the right of such island.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8186; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 236.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861 et seq., 872, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 51.

§ 63-3-607. Passing by vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.

Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right. Upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic in each direction each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8182: Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury issues.

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former laws.

1. In general.

Instructions granted under this section [Code 1942, § 8182] were not applicable to a city street with two traffic lanes and one parking lane. Critelli v. Blair, 203 So. 2d 604, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1389 (Miss. 1967).

In action arising out of collision of two trucks on highway, plaintiff insurer is entitled to peremptory instruction on whole question of liability of defendants when it is shown without any dispute that defendants’ truck came approximately thirty inches across center line and onto wrong side of highway and ran into left rear wheel of insured truck at time when two trucks were meeting each other and at time when insured truck was wholly upon its side of highway, and peremptory instruction on behalf of defendants is properly refused. West v. Aetna Ins. Co., 208 Miss. 776, 45 So. 2d 585, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1950).

2. Jury issues.

Where evidence showed that defendant’s vehicle, encountering an icy patch of pavement, slid over into its left lane in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8182] and struck plaintiff’s automobile proceeding in the opposite direction, the question of negligence was one for the jury. Kight v. Murdock, 253 Miss. 572, 176 So. 2d 320, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1014 (Miss. 1965).

3.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former laws.

In prosecution against automobile driver for failure to seasonably turn to right, evidence showing defendant exceeded speed limit was inadmissible. Naylor v. State, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1930).

Affidavit in prosecution of automobile driver for failure to seasonably turn to right held sufficient, if defective, for purposes of res judicata. Naylor v. State, 158 Miss. 99, 130 So. 102, 1930 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss. 1930).

Instruction authorizing recovery for damages in automobile collision, in case defendant undertook to pass plaintiff at more than 8 miles per hour, held erroneous. Gardner v. Comer, 151 Miss. 443, 118 So. 300, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 325 (Miss. 1928).

Affidavit in prosecution for failing to turn motor truck to right of center of highway on meeting another held sufficient. Sullivan v. State, 150 Miss. 542, 117 So. 374, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 1928).

Defendant held entitled to instruction on theory that automobile driver turned left to avoid collision. Priestley v. Hays, 147 Miss. 843, 112 So. 788, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1927).

Instruction making it absolute duty of automobile driver to turn right held erroneous, where defense was defendant turned left to avoid collision. Priestley v. Hays, 147 Miss. 843, 112 So. 788, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 310 (Miss. 1927).

Automobile held required to turn to right of center of highway on meeting automobile. Crystal v. State, 147 Miss. 40, 112 So. 687, 1927 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 1927).

Failure to look for motor vehicle on wrong side of street held not contributory negligence. Clarke v. Hughes, 134 Miss. 377, 99 So. 6, 1924 Miss. LEXIS 276 (Miss. 1924).

Driver of motor vehicle not turning to right is liable for colliding with other vehicle on proper side of highway. Flynt v. Fondren, 122 Miss. 248, 84 So. 188, 1920 Miss. LEXIS 433 (Miss. 1920).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for collision due to swaying or swinging of motor vehicle or trailer. 1 A.L.R.2d 167.

Liability for accident arising from failure of motorist to give signal for left turn at intersection, as against oncoming or intersecting motor vehicle. 39 A.L.R.2d 65.

Rights, duties, and liability with respect to narrow bridge or passage as between motor vehicle approaching from opposite directions. 47 A.L.R.2d 142.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the right. 48 A.L.R.2d 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 252, 253.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic §§ 816 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 291-304, 311-326, 331-336, 421-427.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 861-873, 1341-1524, 1891-1898, 1981-1984.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 707 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1750.

§ 63-3-609. Overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in same direction.

The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, exceptions and special rules otherwise provided in this article:

The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle.

Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8183; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

3. Jury issues.

1. In general.

Motorist overtaking and passing bicycle is required to do so at safe distance; motorist’s admission that he did not entirely clear bicyclist’s lane of traffic as he passed bicyclist but was only straddling center line and was unaware of location of vehicle in relation to bicycle as he passed it is sufficient basis upon which jury may find that collision between motorist’s vehicle and bicycle was caused by motorist’s negligence. Rideout v. Knight, 463 So. 2d 1042, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1866 (Miss. 1985).

2. Instructions.

The trial court in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident properly granted plaintiff’s peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, where defendant driver testified that on the day of the accident it was raining and the road was wet, where he admitted knowing that oil rises to the surface of wet asphalt and admitted seeing a roadsign that said “slippery when wet,” and where he further stated that, while passing plaintiff, he had lost control of his truck, in that §§63-3-609 and63-3-611 imposed upon defendant a duty of care in passing plaintiff, a duty he failed to exercise in ignoring the danger he knew lay ahead, which resulted in the loss of control of his truck. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So. 2d 416, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1693 (Miss. 1984).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant’s driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

3. Jury issues.

Where defendant driver of overtaken truck permitted his vehicle to drift across the centerline and speeded up when plaintiff attempted to pass on the left, the evidence was sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of the truckdriver’s negligence. Lewis Grocery Co. v. Blackwell, 209 So. 2d 639, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1465 (Miss. 1968).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty and liability of overtaken driver with respect to adjusting speed to that of passing vehicle. 91 A.L.R.2d 1260.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 247-251.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 843, 850 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 231-239, 411.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 911-924, 1341-1524, 1971-1973.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 723 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1750.

§ 63-3-611. Overtaking and passing vehicles on left side of roadway.

  1. No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within one hundred (100) feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.
  2. No vehicle shall, in overtaking and passing another vehicle or at any other time, be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
    1. When approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the highway where the driver’s view along the highway is obstructed;
    2. When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of any marked or readily distinguishable bridge, viaduct or tunnel on any roadway other than a four-lane roadway;
    3. When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of or traversing any marked or readily distinguishable intersection or railroad grade crossing;
    4. When official signs are in place directing that traffic keep to the right, or a distinctive center line is marked, which distinctive line also so directs traffic as declared in the sign manual adopted by the State Transportation Commission.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8185; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1991, ch. 402, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 447, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 25, 1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

3. Negligence.

4. Contributory negligence.

5. Proximate cause.

6. Instructions.

1. In general.

Code 1972 §63-3-611(2)(a) is concerned not only with oncoming traffic but also with traffic to the rear, and if a driver cannot see to the rear, he cannot comply with the requirements of Code 1972 §63-3-707. Gates v. Murphree, 286 So. 2d 291, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1316 (Miss. 1973).

In enacting this section [Code 1942, § 8185] it was the intention of the legislature to prohibit a car from being on the left hand side of the road undertaking to pass another car going in the same direction while within 100 feet of any hazards, and the entire statute puts emphasis upon prohibiting overtaking and passing another car headed in the same direction except at a safe distance from places where hazards and dangers might be anticipated. Rayborn v. Freeman, 209 So. 2d 193, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1446, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1447 (Miss. 1968).

An intersection not marked by signs and not observable by reasonably careful motorist is not an intersection within the meaning of the statute. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

Violation of this provision is negligence. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

2. Applicability.

Court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of steroids found in a search of his vehicle during a traffic stop because driving in the left-hand lane of a four-lane highway did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 or Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-601 should be read in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-611, which addresses the exceptions to §63-3-601’s requirement that traffic remain on the right side of the roadway. Couldery v. State, 890 So. 2d 959, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1155 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Where a statute provided that no vehicle shall in overtaking and passing other vehicle be driven on the left side of the roadway when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection, this statute was not applicable to overtaking automobile which attempted to pass truck as the truck driver attempted to make a left turn into a driveway leading to a store, where there was no showing that the driveway was a highway within the meaning of the statute. Frizell v. Guthrie, 222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 671 (Miss. 1954).

3. Negligence.

Where the driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle on a curve testified that he looked in his rear view mirror and did not see a third vehicle which was overtaking him, even accepting his testimony as true, this did not absolve him from negligence, since he was violating Code 1972 §63-3-611 intended to prevent passing when a driver cannot see a vehicle behind him because of a curve. Gates v. Murphree, 286 So. 2d 291, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1316 (Miss. 1973).

In attempting to pass three motor vehicles within 100 feet of an intersection, the existence of which was well known to him, the defendant was clearly negligent. Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1496 (Miss. 1971).

A truck driver who drove on the left side of a highway while attempting to pass an automobile while both vehicles were approaching an unmarked T intersection which was difficult to see, was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law on the theory that he violated the statute prohibiting driving on the left side of the highway when approaching within 100 feet of any intersection, since it would be unreasonable to require a motorist to observe this statute with respect to intersections which are not marked by signs or observable by the operator of a vehicle in the exercise of reasonable care. Coleman v. Ward, 232 So. 2d 731, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1642 (Miss. 1970).

Motorist who, in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8185], attempted to pass another car on the left within 100 feet of a dangerous intersection, and at the same time failed to decrease his speed as required by subd (b) of Code 1942, § 8176 was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision at the intersection. McCorkle v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 253 Miss. 169, 175 So. 2d 480, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 979 (Miss. 1965).

A bus driver did not have the right under the law to overtake and pass a preceding vehicle, regardless of the fact that the vision of the driver of the preceding vehicle was lessened or obscured, when the bus driver observed conditions that would cause a reasonably prudent driver to proceed with caution. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

To cross a yellow line marking center of a highway in making a left turn into an intersecting road or a driveway is not negligence per se. Edwards v. Murphree, 249 Miss. 78, 160 So. 2d 689, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 377 (Miss. 1964).

Violation of this provision is negligence. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

4. Contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s truck, in violating this section [Code 1942, § 8185] and failing to observe other requirements of the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law when it collided with defendant’s car, negligently stopped on the traveled highway at the entrance to bridge, warranted reduction of verdict for plaintiff by 50 per cent. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

5. Proximate cause.

Even if a railroad company were negligent for placing its guard rail too close to the paved portion of a highway, the acts of the host driver and of an overtaken motorist in attempting to pass a pickup truck within 100 feet of a railroad crossing, were the efficient, independent intervening proximate causes of the fatal accident resulting in decedent’s death when the host driver’s automobile smashed into the guard rail. Milam v. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co., 284 So. 2d 309, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1258 (Miss. 1973).

6. Instructions.

Trial court did not in err when it refused to give a motor vehicle accident victim’s peremptory instruction on negligence per se because the question of whether the intersection where the accident occurred as the victim was making a left turn when hit by a passing vehicle was marked or readily distinguishable was left for the jury to determine. McLaughlin v. North Drew Freight, Inc., 249 So.3d 1081, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 291 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

A trial court in a personal injury action did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that an automobile accident occurred within an “intersection” so that the defendant was in violation of law, pursuant to §63-3-611(2), by attempting to pass within 100 feet of the intersection, since the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute an “intersection” within the meaning of §63-3-129. An “intersection” requires the conjunction of “2 highways,” and one of the roads which formed the conjunction where the accident took place did not constitute a “highway” where the only evidence as to whether the road was public was the existence of a “Plant Entrance” sign and testimony regarding usage by employees of the electric plant; this evidence did not indicate that the road was public, but instead was consistent with permissive use of a private driveway. Stewart v. Davis, 571 So. 2d 926, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 697 (Miss. 1990).

Instruction to jury that it would constitute negligence per se if tractor-trailer was attempting to pass another vehicle and crossed double-yellow no passing line going up hill with 79,000 pound load would be proper. Blackmon v. Payne, 510 So. 2d 483, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2522 (Miss. 1987).

The trial court in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident properly granted plaintiff’s peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, where defendant driver testified that on the day of the accident it was raining and the road was wet, where he admitted knowing that oil rises to the surface of wet asphalt and admitted seeing a roadsign that said “slippery when wet,” and where he further stated that, while passing plaintiff, he had lost control of his truck, in that §§63-3-609 and63-3-611 imposed upon defendant a duty of care in passing plaintiff, a duty he failed to exercise in ignoring the danger he knew lay ahead, which resulted in the loss of control of his truck. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So. 2d 416, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1693 (Miss. 1984).

In a personal injury suit, instructions which required the defendant overtaking motorist under all circumstances to be diligent and to anticipate the presence of others, and placing an absolute duty to pass safely and to avoid injury to others on such defendant, who collided with an oncoming motorist, were erroneous in placing a higher standard of care on the defendant than required by law and providing no factual guide for determining his negligence, since the standard of the law is reasonable care. Acord v. Moore, 243 So. 2d 55, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1501 (Miss. 1971).

It was erroneous to grant the “emergency instruction” where it raised an inference that if the driver of a truck had suddenly turned his vehicle across the center line into the left lane of the highway at the time when the defendant’s bus was about to pass, that then the defendant was not guilty of contributory negligence in driving at an unlawful speed and approaching the truck at an unreasonable rate in an unreasonable manner. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

It was erroneous to instruct the jury that a bus driver could pass a preceding truck regardless of the surrounding circumstances if he did not know of the iced-over condition of the rear and side windows of the truck, because these instructions told the jury the defendant bus driver was not guilty of contributory negligence, regardless of the known surrounding circumstances and his duty to foresee the changes and to proceed with caution at a speed at which he could control the operation of the bus. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

An instruction is erroneous which tells the jury for the defendant bus driver that the defendant cannot be held for negligence if, while exercising ordinary care to see, he did not see or know the condition of the glass on the rear and sides of the preceding pickup truck, when the evidence showed in fact that before attempting to pass the truck the bus driver was aware of the iced-over condition of the rear and side windows of the truck. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1148 (Miss. 1965).

In a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle collision, an instruction that if the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding negligently attempted to pass the defendant’s vehicle within 100 feet of an intersection, and such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the jury could find for the defendant, was correct, where the defendant’s proof showed that the attempt to pass was made within 50 or 60 feet of the intersection, and the intersection involved was one coming within the contemplation of the statute. Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 467, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 445 (Miss. 1957).

Peremptory instruction to jury, that plaintiff violated Mississippi statute providing that a person riding a bicycle is prohibited from passing another vehicle going in the same direction on the right hand side of said vehicle and is also prohibited from passing another vehicle under any circumstances when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection, was proper in an action for injuries where plaintiff bicyclist, approaching defendant’s truck from rear, tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Driving in the left lane of a four lane highway does not violate this section or §63-3-601. Blakney, Oct. 11, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0566.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence of motorist colliding with vehicle approaching in wrong lane. 47 A.L.R.2d 6.

Negligence of motorist as to injury or damage occasioned in avoiding collision with vehicle approaching in wrong lane. 47 A.L.R.2d 119.

Construction, applicability, and effect of traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from passing one another at street or highway intersection. 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 247-251.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 843, 850 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 231-239, 411.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 911-924, 1341-1524, 1971-1973.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 723 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1750.

§ 63-3-613. Overtaking and passing upon right of another vehicle.

  1. The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.
  2. The driver of a vehicle may overtake and, allowing sufficient clearance, pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction either upon the left or upon the right on a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for four (4) or more lines of moving traffic when such movement can be made in safety. The left lane shall be the preferred passing lane. No person shall drive off the pavement or upon the shoulder of the roadway overtaking or passing on the right.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8184; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1977, ch. 321, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 4, 1977).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Where a driver of an oil truck in order to make a right turn first swung to the left, the driver of following pole truck ought not to have attempted to pass on the right unless the vehicle in front of him was making or about to make a left turn. American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros., Inc., 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1951).

Evidence in prosecution for manslaughter by culpable negligence in the operation of a motor truck supported defense that defendant had right to pass to the right of an overtaken wagon which was making or about to make a turn to the left. Goudy v. State, 203 Miss. 366, 35 So. 2d 308, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 280 (Miss. 1948).

2. Instructions.

Peremptory instruction to jury, that plaintiff violated Mississippi statute providing that a person riding a bicycle is prohibited from passing another vehicle going in the same direction on the right hand side of said vehicle and is also prohibited from passing another vehicle under any circumstances when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection, was proper in an action for injuries where plaintiff bicyclist approaching defendant’s truck from rear tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass on right of other motor vehicle proceeding in same direction. 38 A.L.R.2d 114.

Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities where motor vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the right. 48 A.L.R.2d 232.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 251.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 847 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 921-923, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 707, Passing.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 744.

§ 63-3-615. Meeting or overtaking school bus.

    1. The driver of a vehicle upon a street or highway upon meeting or overtaking any school bus that has stopped on the street or highway for the purpose of receiving or discharging any school children shall come to a complete stop at least ten (10) feet from the school bus before reaching the school bus when there is in operation on the school bus the flashing red lights provided in Section 63-7-23, or when a retractable, hand-operated stop sign is extended; the driver shall not proceed until the children have crossed the street or highway and the school bus has resumed motion or the flashing red lights are no longer actuated and the hand-operated stop sign is retracted.
    2. The driver of a vehicle upon a divided highway that has four (4) lanes or more and permits at least two (2) lanes of traffic to travel in opposite directions need not stop upon meeting or passing a school bus that is stopped in the opposing roadway, or if the school bus is stopped in a loading zone that is a part of or adjacent to the highway and where pedestrians are not permitted to cross the roadway.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b), any person violating the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon a first conviction thereof shall be fined not less than Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) nor more than Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00), or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or both. For a second or subsequent offense, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, the person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) nor more than One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00), or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or both. In addition, the Commissioner of Public Safety or his duly authorized designee, after conviction for a second or subsequent offense and upon receipt of the court abstract, shall suspend the driver’s license and driving privileges of the person for a period of ninety (90) days.
    2. A conviction under this section for a violation resulting in any injury to a child who is in the process of boarding or exiting a school bus shall be a violation of Section 97-3-7, and a violator shall be punished under subsection (2) of that section.
  1. This section shall be applicable only in the event the school bus shall bear upon the front and rear thereon a plainly visible sign containing the words “school bus” in letters not less than four (4) inches in height.
  2. If any person witnesses the driver of any vehicle violating the provisions of this section and the identity of the driver of the vehicle is not otherwise apparent, it shall be a rebuttable inference that the person in whose name the vehicle is registered committed the violation. If charges are filed against multiple owners of a motor vehicle, only one (1) of the owners may be convicted and court costs may be assessed against only one (1) of the owners. If the vehicle that is involved in the violation is registered in the name of a rental or leasing company and the vehicle is rented or leased to another person at the time of the violation, the rental or leasing company may rebut the inference of guilt by providing the law enforcement officer or prosecuting authority with a copy of the rental or lease agreement in effect at the time of the violation.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8226; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1946, ch. 341; Laws, 1946, ch. 420, § 10; Laws, 1974, ch. 304; Laws, 1986, ch. 368; Laws, 2011, ch. 481, § 1; Laws, 2016, ch. 340, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2016; Laws, 2019, ch. 352, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

Editor’s Notes —

Chapter 481, Laws of 2011, which amended this section, is known as “Nathan’s Law.”

Amendment Notes —

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2016 amendment rewrote (1)(b), which read: “The driver of a vehicle upon a highway that has four (4) lanes or more, whether or not there is a median or turn lane, need not stop upon meeting or passing a school bus that is on a different roadway or when upon a controlled-access highway if the school bus is stopped in a loading zone that is a part of or adjacent to the highway and where pedestrians are not permitted to cross the roadway.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “If any person witnesses the driver of any vehicle violating the provisions of this section” for “If the driver of any vehicle is witnessed by a law enforcement officer or the driver of a school bus to have violated this section” in (4).

Cross References —

Transportation of school children generally, see §37-41-1 et seq.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 280.

§ 63-3-616. Blocking certain lanes of traffic by school bus driver permitted for the purpose of preventing being overtaken when receiving or discharging passengers.

A school bus driver, for the purpose of preventing being overtaken when receiving or discharging any school children, may stop on a street or highway blocking the two (2) outermost right lanes, regardless of the number of lanes on the street or highway. For a two-lane street or highway, this provision allows for blocking both lanes. Such school bus driver may only block both of these lanes during the time that the school bus is receiving or discharging any school children.

HISTORY: Laws, 2019, ch. 352, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2019.

§ 63-3-617. Driving in center of highway; refusal to turn to right to allow overtaking vehicle to pass.

It shall be unlawful for the driver of any truck or other vehicle to drive in or near the center of any highway for a distance of more than two hundred yards, or at any time to refuse to turn to the right in order that any driver desiring to pass said truck or other vehicle, may drive at a higher legal rate of speed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8188; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1962, ch. 525, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1962).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. No violation of statute.

State failed to prove the elements of the offense of driving in or near the center of any highway for a distance of more than 200 yards because there was no proof that defendant drove more than 200 yards in or near the center line of any highway in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-617; although a highway patrolman testified that defendant’s vehicle was behind two other cars and that it was traveling close to the center line, there was no mention or indication that the patrolman observed defendant following too close to the center line of any highway, and there was no evidence to suggest that he observed defendant driving in such a manner as to impede a driver of any truck or vehicle from overtaking and passing him. Fluker v. State, 44 So.3d 1029, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 95 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), cert. denied, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 509 (Miss. Sept. 30, 2010), cert. denied, 49 So.3d 106, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 522 (Miss. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 847, 852, 853.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 924, 1341-1524, 1972.

10 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Divider Line Automobile Accident Cases.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 738-740.

§ 63-3-619. Distances to be maintained between traveling vehicles; inapplicability to operators of nonlead vehicles in a platoon under certain circumstances; requirement for operation of platoon.

  1. The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
  2. The driver of any motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district shall not follow within three hundred (300) feet of another motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to prevent overtaking and passing nor shall the same apply upon any lane specially designated for use by motor trucks.
    1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subsection, subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall not apply to the operator of a nonlead vehicle in a platoon, as defined in Section 63-3-103(k), as long as the platoon is operating on a limited access divided highway with more than one (1) lane in each direction and the platoon consists of not more than two (2) motor vehicles.
    2. A platoon may be operated in this state only after an operator files a plan for approval of general platoon operations with the Department of Transportation. If that department approves the submission, it shall forward the plan to the Department of Public Safety for approval. The plan shall be reviewed and either approved or disapproved by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Public Safety within thirty (30) days after it is filed. If approved by both departments, the operator shall be allowed to operate the platoon five (5) working days after plan approval. The Motor Carrier Division of the Department of Public Safety shall develop the acceptable standards required for each portion of the plan.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8188; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1962, ch. 525, eff from and after passage (approved April 25, 1962); Laws, 2018, ch. 445, § 2, eff from and after January 1, 2019.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, added (3), and inserted “(300)” in (2).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

1.5. Constitutionality.

2. Negligence.

3. —Proximate cause.

4. —Sudden emergency.

5. Instructions.

6. Directed verdict.

7. Sufficiency of evidence.

1. In general.

Minimum following distances specified in §63-3-619 are applicable to vehicle approaching slow moving truck which has just turned into left-easternmost lane of southbound lanes of 4 lane highway. Byrd v. F-S Prestress, 464 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1899 (Miss. 1985).

One truck should not follow another truck more closely than is reasonable and prudent. American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros., Inc., 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1951).

1.5. Constitutionality.

Tailgating statute is not impermissibly vague and does not fail to give a driver notice of the prohibited conduct; the statute, coupled with the rules of the road, is sufficiently definite such that an ordinary person can understand the prohibited conduct and that law enforcement can avoid arbitrary enforcement. The statute is sufficiently specific to pass constitutional scrutiny. Nolan v. State, 182 So.3d 484, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

2. Negligence.

Trial court did not err in failing to find that a police officer committed a traffic violation by tailgating a driver’s vehicle because the driver had to show more than mere negligence to establish reckless disregard and remove a city’s immunity; the statute applies to traffic regulations but does not address governmental immunity. Carothers v. City of Water Valley, 242 So.3d 138, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 281 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, 246 So.3d 67, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 206 (Miss. 2018).

Driver of motor vehicle was entitled to peremptory instruction or directed verdict on liability, although there is no per se rule that driver of following car is negligent if he collides with rear of preceding vehicle, where driver of following car did not know her approximate speed, was driving approximately one car length behind preceding vehicle when she saw truck turn off in front of preceding vehicle, and saw preceding vehicle’s brake lights come on; there was no way any rational jury could reach any conclusion but that following driver failed in either one or more of her duties to keep proper lookout ahead, keep her car under proper control, and drive at speed and sufficient distance behind preceding vehicle to stop without colliding into its rear end when that vehicle stopped to allow truck to turn off street. White v. Miller, 513 So. 2d 600, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2833 (Miss. 1987).

One who on attempting to pass a car ahead of him was prevented by an approaching car and on returning to his proper lane was obliged to apply his brakes to avoid striking the car ahead, resulting in a skid, held negligent toward a passenger. Gregory v. Thompson, 248 Miss. 431, 160 So. 2d 195, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 271 (Miss. 1964).

Evidence held to show negligence in following another’s car too closely on a highway made slippery by hail. Klumok v. Young, 239 Miss. 393, 123 So. 2d 535, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 297 (Miss. 1960).

Where, under either plaintiff’s or defendant’s evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the collision and death. Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1957).

3. —Proximate cause.

Where the driver of a cattle truck suddenly pulled his truck across the wrong lane of traffic in order to avoid the danger created by the action of a bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop which was stopped suddenly, partially on traveled portion of a highway, the action of the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop partly on the paved and main portion of the highway was a proximate cause of the collision. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

4. —Sudden emergency.

In an action for injuries sustained in a three vehicle collision, it was error to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine with respect to the defendant motorist, where it was shown that just before striking the plaintiff’s vehicle, the defendant had been following behind at a distance of only 36 feet while traveling 45 miles per hour in violation of Code 1942, § 8188. Dailey v. Acme Finance Corp., 234 So. 2d 902, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1423 (Miss. 1970).

Where, under either plaintiff’s or defendant’s evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the collision and death; and the defendant could not invoke the sudden emergency rule because his own testimony showed that the emergency was proximately caused by his own fault. Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1957).

Where the death of a driver of an automobile resulted from collision from an oncoming truck which entered the wrong lane when a truck before it stopped to avoid hitting a bus which suddenly stopped partially on a highway, and the driver of the truck was found to be following too closely, the driver of the truck was not entitled to invoke the doctrine of sudden emergency in order to show that the sole proximate cause of the collision was negligence of the bus driver, since the emergency was caused by truck driver. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

5. Instructions.

Jury was clearly instructed on Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-809(1),63-3-619(2), and as they fairly announced the applicable law in this wrongful death case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s proposed instruction. Rushing v. Mobile Forest Prods., 282 So.3d 708, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 370 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

In an action for injuries sustained in a three vehicle collision, it was error to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine with respect to the defendant motorist, where it was shown that just before striking the plaintiff’s vehicle, the defendant had been following behind at a distance of only 36 feet while traveling 45 miles per hour in violation of Code 1942, § 8188. Dailey v. Acme Finance Corp., 234 So. 2d 902, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1423 (Miss. 1970).

Court’s instruction for plaintiff that it was the duty of the driver of defendant’s truck at all times to maintain a reasonably safe and proper distance between his vehicle and any vehicle proceeding in front of his truck, that it was his duty to anticipate that preceding vehicles would slow or would stop on the highway, and that it was his duty to keep the truck under reasonable control at all times and to take reasonable precautions commensurate with the type of vehicle and load thereon, imposed no absolute liability on the truckdriver for the consequences of his actions. Bill Hunter Truck Lines, Inc. v. Jernigan, 384 F.2d 361, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4789 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit, instructions, which when read together, focused the attention of the jury on the real issue of whether the plaintiff’s truck was overtaken from behind, run into and damaged by the negligence of the defendant’s driver in operating his truck without proper control, without keeping a proper lookout, and at a negligent rate of speed, or whether plaintiff’s driver negligently stopped his truck on the half-moon curve in the right lane of the pavement when it was unnecessary and impractical to do so, and, if so, whether such negligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision, were not reversibly erroneous, even though some imperfections could be found therein. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

In an action for damages resulting when defendant’s truck-trailer unit ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck-trailer unit on the curved portion of the highway, the court did not err in refusing to charge the defendant’s driver with negligence in respect to speeding, overtaking on the right, and following too closely, particularly in view of Code 1942, § 1455. Green Truck Lines, Inc. v. Hooper, 233 Miss. 794, 103 So. 2d 443, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1958).

Where, under either plaintiff’s or defendant’s evidence, the defendant, at the speed he was traveling, was following too closely to the car preceding him, which stopped, causing defendant to enter into the opposite lane of traffic and collide head-on with a truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction, since the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the collision and death. Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss. 504, 95 So. 2d 791, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 535 (Miss. 1957).

Since Code 1942, § 8149, provides that this section [Code 1942, § 8188] is applicable to a person riding a bicycle, an instruction to the jury, that if they believe that the plaintiff violated this section [Code 1942, § 8188] and such violation was proximate cause of accident they should find for the defendants, was proper in an action for injuries to the plaintiff bicyclist who, approaching the defendant’s truck from the rear, tried to pass it at an intersection, was hit by the truck as it also started to turn right, and was catapulted into pathway of another car. Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. 2d 806, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1950).

In action for damages to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, it was error for court to refuse plaintiff instruction that failure of any person to perform duty imposed by statute is negligence in itself, and that should jury find that defendant in his truck immediately prior to and at time of collision followed vehicle of plaintiff more closely than was reasonable and prudent, having due regard to speed of such vehicles and traffic upon and condition of highway, and that such failure was proximate cause of collision, his conduct constituted actionable negligence, and refusal to grant this instruction is not cured by granting of instruction which also includes another point. Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1950).

6. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

7. Sufficiency of evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support a tailgating conviction under this statute because an officer was able to articulate an objective basis for the stop by stating that defendant’s vehicle was following another vehicle more closely than was reasonable and prudent, and defendant admitted that he was following a business associate’s car too closely to a hotel because he was unfamiliar with the area and did not want to get separated. The conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence either. Nolan v. State, 182 So.3d 484, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for following too closely where the officer testified that defendant was traveling at about 50 miles per hour, there was only one car length between her and the car in front of her, she was tapping her brakes, and she was operating her vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Robinette v. State, 189 So.3d 675, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 593 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of tailgating, under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-619(1), because a police officer made it clear from the start that appellant’s following a sport-utility vehicle so closely was what drew his attention to appellant, and appellant offered no evidence to contradict the officer’s testimony. Barrow v. State, 121 So.3d 935, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 170 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Driver’s failure to maintain proper distance from motor vehicle ahead. 85 A.L.R.2d 613.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 246.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 829, 838 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 266-277, 412.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 933-935, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

19 Am. Jur. Trials 567, Handling a Rear-End Collision Case.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 43, Tailgating.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 121, Negligence of Driver During Overtaking and Passing Maneuver.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 736, 737.

§ 63-3-621. Distance to be maintained between vehicle and traveling or parked fire apparatus or traveling or parked ambulance on emergency call.

The driver of any vehicle other than one on official business shall not follow any fire apparatus traveling in response to a fire alarm closer than five hundred (500) feet or drive into or park such vehicle within the block where fire apparatus has stopped in answer to a fire alarm. The driver of any vehicle other than an official emergency vehicle shall not follow any moving ambulance that is engaged in an emergency medical call closer than five hundred (500) feet, or park the vehicle within two hundred (200) feet of where the ambulance has stopped to pick up or deliver a patient or otherwise render care at the scene of an ambulance call.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8223; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 425, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment added the second sentence.

Article 15. Starting and Turning; Signaling.

§ 63-3-701. Starting of stopped, standing, or parked vehicle.

No person shall start a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8191; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-2. [Reserved for future use].

3. Instructions.

1.-2. [Reserved for future use].

3. Instructions.

Finding in favor of a trucking company and truck driver in a wrongful-death action brought by the decedent’s widow was proper because the trial court did not err in refusing the widow’s requested jury instructions under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-701. There was no evidence to support the instruction that the tractor-trailer could not be operated or moved safely at the time that it left the trucking company’s lot. Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., 32 So.3d 450, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 200 (Miss. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 16 A.L.R.2d 979.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 309.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 927.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 805, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 693, 694.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-703. Turning at intersections.

The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows:

Both the approach for a right turn and the turn itself shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.

The approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered.

The approach for a left turn from a two-way street into a one-way street shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and by passing to the right of such center line where it enters the intersection. A left turn from a one-way street into a two-way street shall be made by passing to the right of the center line of the street being entered upon leaving the intersection.

Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause markers, buttons, or signs to be placed within or adjacent to intersections and thereby require and direct that a different course from that specified in this section be traveled by vehicles turning at an intersection. When markers, buttons, or signs are so placed no driver of a vehicle shall turn a vehicle at an intersection other than as directed and required by such markers, buttons, or signs.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8189; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence.

3. Evidence.

4. Instructions.

1. In general.

Officer had probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle based on his observation of an improper turn and a missing headlight, notwithstanding the fact that the officer had received word from dispatch to be on the lookout for a vehicle matching that description. Scott v. City of Booneville, 962 So. 2d 698, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 637 (Miss. 2007).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8189] may warrant a jury in finding that an automobile was being negligently operated. West v. Armstrong, 248 Miss. 617, 159 So. 2d 805, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1964).

2. Negligence.

Motorist who turns into left hand-easternmost lane of southbound lane of 4 lane highway is not negligent as matter of law. Byrd v. F-S Prestress, 464 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1899 (Miss. 1985).

In an action by a motorcyclist against a motorist for injuries resulting from an intersectional collision which occurred when the automobile driver made a left turn in front of the motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction immediately prior to the collision, evidence that the motorcycle struck the front bumper of the car to the left of center, together with the motorist’s admission that his vehicle was at an angle with the direction of the highway from which he was turning, at the time of the collision, clearly established that the automobile driver made his left turn by “cutting the corner” before reaching the center of the intersection, in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8189]. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

3. Evidence.

Testimony of accident reconstruction expert is admissible to prove the relative speed of vehicles, the angle of impact of vehicles, and what diverted their course. Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1942 (Miss. 1985).

Allowing an investigating officer not an eyewitness to an accident, to give his opinion, in an action for injuries resulting from the collision, as to the place of impact and to depict this point on a map, was harmless error where the negligence of the defendant motorist was clearly established by other evidence. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

In an action for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision, it was proper for the investigating officer to testify as to the location of the vehicles at the time of his investigation, the location of the injured plaintiff, and the location of debris created by the impact, and equally proper for him to mark the location of these things on the map of the intersection. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

4. Instructions.

In an action for injuries sustained by a 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to this section [Code 1942, § 8189], and a city ordinance, “cut the corner” in making a left turn, the court properly instructed that the truck driver was guilty of negligence which was a proximate, contributing cause of the collision. City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1958).

In action by wife for damages for injuries sustained in automobile collision when husband’s and defendant’s cars, both going east, attempted to make left turn from different traffic lanes, refusal of defendant’s instruction predicated upon theory that plaintiff’s husband had no right to drive car in north lane of south half of highway and granting to plaintiff of instruction on facts of case under which jury found plaintiff’s husband was in proper lane for left turn and defendant in wrong lane, was proper. Kouvarakis v. Hawver, 208 Miss. 697, 45 So. 2d 278, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1950).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for accident arising from failure of motorist to give signal for left turn between intersections. 39 A.L.R.2d 103.

Automobiles: liability for U-turn collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 241-244.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 864 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 181-186.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 961-967, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 709, Turning and Jackknifing of Commercial Vehicles.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Motorcycle Accidents.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 405, Negligent Left Turn of Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 863 et seq.

§ 63-3-705. Turning on curves or crests of grades.

No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon any curve, or upon the approach to or near the crest of the grade, where such vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle approaching from either direction within five hundred feet.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8190; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Automobiles: liability for U-turn collisions. 53 A.L.R.4th 849.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 241-244.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 872-874.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 405, Negligent Left Turn of Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 706.

§ 63-3-707. Requirements as to signalling of turns or stops.

No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement or after giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this article in the event any other vehicle may be affected by such movement.

A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously for a reasonable distance before turning.

No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this article to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8192; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence.

3. Contributory negligence.

4. Instructions.

5. Searches and seizures.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

A motorist is not only under a duty to keep a proper lookout and be on the alert for other vehicles using the highway, but is also under duty not to turn his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal by hand, arm or other signal device, in the event that any other vehicle might be affected by such movement. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1957).

Where a driver of an oil truck turned to the left on a highway before making a right turn and he was hit by a truck attempting to pass, the driver of the oil truck was under a duty to give the proper sign for stopping, or turning right or left. American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Rose Bros., Inc., 211 Miss. 173, 51 So. 2d 220, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 345 (Miss. 1951).

2. Negligence.

Jury verdict defied all logic, as the evidence presented at trial established that the driver was negligent as a matter of law for failing to maintain a proper lookout and to yield the right-of-way by executing a turn across the insured’s lane of travel. A verdict should have been returned in favor of the insured because the violation of said statutory duties by the driver was the unequivocal proximate cause of the insured’s injury; even if the driver was not negligent per se, the facts presented at trial unconditionally demonstrated that the collision was the result of her negligence and the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply Miss. R. Civ. P. 50, and by denying the insured’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. State Farm Auto Ins. Cos. v. Davis, 887 So. 2d 192, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1065 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

That a motorist actuated a stop signal on the automobile by applying the brake does not necessarily exonerate the motorist from a charge of negligence toward a following car. Box v. Swindle, 306 F.2d 882, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4242 (5th Cir. Miss. 1962).

A motorist who signaled an intention to stop may be found negligent if there was insufficient time and distance to bring a following car to a halt. Box v. Swindle, 306 F.2d 882, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 4242 (5th Cir. Miss. 1962).

Code 1972 §63-3-611(2)(a) is concerned not only with oncoming traffic but also with traffic to the rear, and if a driver cannot see to the rear, he cannot comply with the requirements of Code 1972 §63-3-707. Gates v. Murphree, 286 So. 2d 291, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1316 (Miss. 1973).

The fact that a motorist, who had previously given a lawful notice that she was reducing the speed of her vehicle, failed to signal of her ultimate intention to make a right turn, this was not a proximate contributing cause of the collision which resulted when she was struck in the rear by the plaintiff’s automobile which was following too closely, being driven at a high, excessive and unlawful rate of speed, at a time when its driver was not maintaining a proper lookout ahead, and did not have the vehicle under control. Callender v. Cockrell, 217 So. 2d 643, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1580 (Miss. 1969).

3. Contributory negligence.

Plaintiff’s testimony that he observed defendant’s approaching vehicle until it was about 150 feet behind him and although he realized it was traveling at a faster speed and overtaking him, he drove about 15 seconds from the time he last looked before he made his left turn, that by merely glancing in his rear view mirror he could have ascertained the location of the defendant’s car before he began his left turn, and that he relied completely on his blinker signal to keep traffic behind him from coming around him, established that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Stockton v. Lamberth, 278 So. 2d 423, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1440 (Miss. 1973).

Failure to give a signal at a reasonable distance of intention to make a left turn is contributory negligence. Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 497 (Miss. 1963).

A motorist was guilty of contributory negligence who, without giving any warning signal of any kind to indicate her intention, had turned from her right lane of traffic and was proceeding across the left or oncoming traffic lane of the highway to enter a driveway when she was struck by defendant’s automobile, which, at the time of the motorist’s turn, had been approaching some 40 to 60 feet away. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1957).

4. Instructions.

A plaintiff motorist was entitled to an instruction that a preceding motorist was negligent as a matter of law under §63-3-707, which provides that a driver should not turn a vehicle from a highway unless the turn can be made with reasonable safety, where the preceding driver admitted that he turned his vehicle to the left out of his lane of traffic without first looking to see whether the plaintiff was following him, and the court’s refusal to give this requested instruction was reversible error. Conner v. Harris, 624 So. 2d 482, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 304 (Miss. 1993).

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2232 (Miss. 1982).

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident at an intersection in which the defendant was struck by the plaintiff’s automobile as he made a left turn across the plaintiff’s traffic lane, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed that the accident had been proximately caused by the negligence of a truck driver who had allegedly indicated to the defendant that he could safely cross the plaintiff’s traffic lane; the defendant did not have the legal right to rely on the truck driver and had a duty to ascertain whether he could cross the traffic lane with reasonable safety. Boyd v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 994, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2155 (Miss. 1980).

Where the evidence made a jury issue as to whether defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to give a signal indicating his intention to turn left for a reasonable distance before turning, and in turning his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway when such movement could not be made with reasonable safety, the trial court should not have granted defendant’s motion for a peremptory instruction. Cronier v. Denson, 198 So. 2d 252, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1260 (Miss. 1967).

In a wrongful death action arising out of a collision of defendant’s automobile with a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon a highway, the trial court did not err in instructing that the rider of a bicycle or other vehicle along a public highway should not turn from a direct course unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving an appropriate signal, and the signal for a left turn should be given by extending the hand and arm horizontally. Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 376 (Miss. 1957).

The trial court properly refused defendant a peremptory instruction where, in an action for a personal injury sustained when the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger was struck by defendant’s automobile while undertaking to turn from the right lane of traffic across the oncoming traffic lane to enter a driveway, the jury was warranted in finding that the truck driver’s movements were consistent with reasonable safety as required by this section. [Code 1942, § 8192], and that, in view of defendant’s admission that although she saw the truck slowing down for one-half mile and thought he was going to turn in to the driveway, she did not slow down, but continued to operate her automobile at 50 miles per hour, the contributing, if not the sole, cause of accident was defendant’s negligence. Hamilton v. McCry, 229 Miss. 481, 91 So. 2d 564, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 629 (Miss. 1956).

In action for damages to automobile arising out of ramming by truck from rear, there being no controversy in record that car was equipped with signal light in rear in good order, instruction for defendant that person driving upon highway is required by law, before stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of his automobile, to give proper signal of such intention, and if jury believe from evidence in case that plaintiff so stopped or decreased his speed without giving such proper signal, then jury must find plaintiff was negligent is reversibly erroneous and cannot be cured by other instructions in conflict with it. Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844, 1950 Miss. LEXIS 359 (Miss. 1950).

5. Searches and seizures.

In a felony fleeing case, an argument that an officer lacked probable cause to make a traffic stop was rejected because the officer testified that he personally observed defendant make a right turn onto a state highway without signaling while traffic was present. Moreover, defendant admitted to committing the offense. Johnson v. State, 228 So.3d 933, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 112 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 120, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2017).

Defendant was legally stopped under the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. IV, and Miss. Const. Art. III, § 23 as: (1) he failed to use his turn signal and violated Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-707, even though there was no imminent threat of a collision between his vehicle and an officer’s vehicle that was traveling at a safe distance behind defendant’s vehicle; (2) the subsequent searches of defendant and his vehicle were lawful; (3) defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license; (4) the glass pipes were found in a search incident to defendant’s arrest; and (5) the inventory search of defendant’s vehicle, during which the methamphetamine was discovered, was conducted according to police department policy and was limited to the areas of the vehicle where defendant’s property could reasonably be expected to be found.. Melton v. State, 118 So.3d 605, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 618 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 117 So.3d 330, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 375 (Miss. 2013).

6. Miscellaneous.

In an action by a passenger for injuries sustained when the taxicab, which was stopped upon a highway, was struck from behind by a motorist, in view of the uncontradicted testimony that when the motorist first saw the taxicab it had already stopped and its headlights and taillights were burning, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of the alleged negligence of the taxicab driver in stopping upon the highway without giving any warning by hand signals, arm signals, blinker lights or other signals. Snowden v. Skipper, 230 Miss. 684, 93 So. 2d 834, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for accident arising from motorist’s failure to give signal for right turn. 38 A.L.R.2d 143.

Duty and liability as to signaling following driver to pass or giving him warning of approaching danger. 48 A.L.R.2d 252.

Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle in public street or highway. 63 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability for injury occasioned by backing of motor vehicle from private premises into public street or highway. 63 A.L.R.2d 108.

Liability for injury or damage occasioned by backing of motor vehicle within private premises. 63 A.L.R.2d 184.

Automobiles: duty and liability with respect to giving audible signal at intersection. 21 A.L.R.3d 268.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 227, 242, 279, 280.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 830, 875 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 961-963, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 697, U-Turn Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 701, 702, 743.

§ 63-3-709. Manner of signalling generally.

The signals required in this article shall be given either by means of the hand and arm or by a signal lamp or signal device of a type approved by the department. When a vehicle is so constructed or loaded that a hand and arm signal would not be visible both to the front and rear of such vehicle, then said signals must be given by such a lamp or device.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8193; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

A motorist is not only under a duty to keep a proper lookout and be on the alert for other vehicles using the highway, but is also under duty not to turn his vehicle from a direct course upon the highway unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal by hand, arm or other signal device, in the event that any other vehicle might be affected by such movement. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231 Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 490 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am. Jur.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 559, Right Turns.

§ 63-3-711. Hand and arm signals.

All signals given by hand and arm shall be given from the left side of the vehicle in the following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows:

1. Left turn-hand and arm extended horizontally.

2. Right turn-hand and arm extended upward or moved with a sweeping motion from the rear to the front.

3. Stop or decrease speed-hand and arm extended downward.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8194; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2232 (Miss. 1982).

2. Instructions.

In a wrongful death action arising out of a collision between defendant’s automobile and a bicycle ridden by a nine-year-old child upon the highway, the trial court properly instructed that the rider of a bicycle along a public highway should not turn from a direct course unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving the appropriate signal, and the signal for a left turn should be given by extending the hand and arm horizontally. Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So. 2d 845, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 376 (Miss. 1957).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duty and liability as to signaling following driver to pass or giving him warning of approaching danger. 48 A.L.R.2d 252.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Article 17. Right-of-Way.

§ 63-3-801. Vehicle approaching intersection; vehicles entering intersection at same time.

  1. Except as may otherwise be provided in this article, the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway.
  2. Except as may otherwise be provided in this article, when two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at the same time the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8195; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Right of way, generally.

3. Instructions.

4. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. Gates v. Green, 214 So. 2d 828, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1337 (Miss. 1968).

The statutory rule announced in subsection (2) of this section [Code 1942, § 8195] is inapplicable to the intersection of an existing public road and a new highway under construction which is not yet open for general vehicular traffic. Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Constr. Co., 238 Miss. 681, 119 So. 2d 918, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1960).

Right-of-way statutes have no legal application to traffic on private property. Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 1959).

Violation of statutory rules of the road is negligence per se. Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 1959).

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1942).

2. Right of way, generally.

Unless priority is otherwise given, the vehicle first entering an intersection has the right of way. Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 378 (Miss. 1959).

If two vehicles arrive at an intersection at the same time, it is the duty of the driver to yield to the other driver who is on the right. Herring v. Hart, 225 Miss. 115, 82 So. 2d 710, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 564 (Miss. 1955).

Where an automobile was first to reach an intersection, a driver of a truck approaching from the other street had the duty to yield the right of way to the first automobile and if necessary, to stop so as to permit him to pass through the intersection without interference. Jefferson v. Pinson, 219 Miss. 427, 69 So. 2d 234, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 350 (Miss. 1954).

3. Instructions.

Finding in favor of a trucking company and truck driver in a wrongful-death action brought by the decedent’s widow was proper because the trial court did not err in refusing the widow’s requested jury instructions under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-801 since the record contained no evidence to show that the truck driver or decedent were in close proximity to each other at an intersection when the truck driver entered the highway. The accident occurred two and one-half miles after the truck driver had entered the highway from the trucking company’s lot and had been traveling in the right-hand lane. Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., 32 So.3d 450, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 200 (Miss. 2010).

A party is not entitled to an instruction that one should yield to the car first entering an intersection where the statute requires stopping before entering the intersection in response to a red signal light, and Code 1942, § 8195 merely prescribes the general rule as to an ordinary intersection and is inapplicable to one with traffic lights and signals. Gates v. Green, 214 So. 2d 828, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1337 (Miss. 1968).

Since common-law principles of negligence applied to an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision at an intersection of an existing public road, and a new highway under construction which was not open to general vehicular traffic, the court committed reversible error in giving the favored driver instruction which is solely statutory in origin. Carlisle v. Cobb Bros. Constr. Co., 238 Miss. 681, 119 So. 2d 918, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1960).

A motorist who approached an intersection with the signal light flashing red in her direction, and failed to stop before entering the intersection, was not entitled to an instruction under this section [Code 1942, § 8195], providing that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. Bates v. Walker, 232 Miss. 804, 100 So. 2d 611, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1958).

The action of the trial court in a manslaughter prosecution in instructing the jury in reference to the so-called “rules of the road” as contained in previous repealed section (Code 1930, § 5574) was not error as against the contention that such rules had no application in a criminal case, since the jury was entitled to know the relative rights and duties of the driver of the truck and of the driver of the automobile in order to be able to determine who was at fault when the driver of the automobile was killed in a collision. Turner v. State, 183 Miss. 658, 183 So. 522, 1938 Miss. LEXIS 279 (Miss. 1938).

4. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Right of motorist on through, favored, or arterial street or highway to proceed where lateral view at intersection is obstructed by physical obstacle. 59 A.L.R.2d 1202.

Duty and liability of vehicle drivers approaching intersection of one-way street with other street. 62 A.L.R.2d 275.

Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highway as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to collisions between motor vehicles crossing at intersection. 20 A.L.R.3d 124.

Applicability of last clear chance doctrine to intersectional collision between motor vehicles meeting from opposite directions. 20 A.L.R.3d 287.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 281 et seq.

Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 865 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 141 et seq.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898, 899, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 843 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1755.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-803. Vehicle turning left at intersection.

The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver, having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by Article 15, may make such left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection from said opposite direction shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle making the left turn.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8196; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Negligence.

3. Evidence.

4. Questions for jury.

5. Instructions.

6. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

One who had turned left at an intersection while the traffic signal was red, pursuant to a green arrow signal, and who had traversed almost the entire distance of the intersection before another car, when the signal turned from red to green, had entered the intersection, is not required to yield the right of way. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So. 2d 674, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 441 (Miss. 1963).

2. Negligence.

Jury verdict defied all logic, as the evidence presented at trial established that the driver was negligent as a matter of law for failing to maintain a proper lookout and to yield the right-of-way by executing a turn across the insured’s lane of travel. A verdict should have been returned in favor of the insured because the violation of said statutory duties by the driver was the unequivocal proximate cause of the insured’s injury; even if the driver was not negligent per se, the facts presented at trial unconditionally demonstrated that the collision was the result of her negligence and the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply Miss. R. Civ. P. 50, and by denying the insured’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. State Farm Auto Ins. Cos. v. Davis, 887 So. 2d 192, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1065 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In an action by a police officer for personal injuries sustained when his motorcycle struck a left turning automobile which had come to a stop 3 or 4 feet across the center line into the officer’s lane, §63-3-803 was a more appropriate basis, than §63-3-603, for an instruction that violation thereof constituted negligence. McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2617 (Miss. 1986).

In an action by a motorcyclist against a motorist for injuries resulting from an intersectional collision, testimony of the automobile driver that he did not see the motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction until the instant of collision which occurred when the automobile turned left in front of the motorcycle, together with the acknowledged fact that the intersection was well lighted, indicated that the motorist was negligent in making a left turn without making sure that he could do so in safety, and failing to keep a proper lookout for approaching traffic. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

3. Evidence.

Testimony of accident reconstruction expert is admissible to prove the relative speed of vehicles, the angle of impact of vehicles, and what diverted their course. Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 1942 (Miss. 1985).

Allowing an investigating officer, not an eyewitness to an accident, to give his opinion, in an action for injuries resulting from the collision, as to the place of impact and to depict this point on a map, was harmless error where the negligence of the defendant motorist was clearly established by other evidence. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

In an action for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision, it was proper for the investigating officer to testify as to the location of the vehicles at the time of his investigation, the location of the injured plaintiff, and the location of debris created by the impact, and equally proper for him to mark the location of these things on the map of the intersection. Lynch v. Suthoff, 220 So. 2d 593, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1464 (Miss. 1969).

4. Questions for jury.

In action for injuries sustained by a 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to Code 1942, § 8189(a), and a city ordinance, “cut the corner” in making a left turn, the question of whether the truck driver’s negligence was a proximate, contributing cause of the collision was for the jury. City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1958).

5. Instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident at an intersection in which the defendant was struck by the plaintiff’s automobile as he made a left turn across the plaintiff’s traffic lane, the trial court erred in giving an instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed that the accident had been proximately caused by the negligence of a truck driver who had allegedly indicated to the defendant that he could safely cross the plaintiff’s traffic lane; the defendant did not have the legal right to rely on the truck driver and had a duty to ascertain whether he could cross the traffic lane with reasonable safety. Boyd v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 994, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2155 (Miss. 1980).

An instruction that the operator of a vehicle continuing its course is bound to have his vehicle under such control that another vehicle, entering the intersection first, can safely make the left turn, is improper as making such operator the insurer of the other’s safety without regard to whether such other had at the time a right to turn across the traffic lane, and without regard to whether or not he was in such close proximity to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard. Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Brown, 236 Miss. 253, 109 So. 2d 858, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1959).

An instruction that the driver of an oncoming truck who saw a car signalling at a controlled-traffic intersection for a left turn but continued on a green light was bound to know that the car’s driver contemplated turning, is objectionable as ignoring whatever right the truck driver had to assume that the car would wait until the traffic lane was clear. Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. Brown, 236 Miss. 253, 109 So. 2d 858, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 315 (Miss. 1959).

In an action for injuries sustained by 16-year-old motorcyclist in an intersectional collision with a truck, the driver of which had, contrary to Code 1942, § 8189(a), and a city ordinance, “cut the corner” in making a left turn, instructions permitting the jury to find that the motorcycle had already entered the intersection at the time of the left turn, and was readily visible to the truck driver, was not reversible error, where, under conflicting evidence, the jury could, and evidently did, reject the version of defendant’s witnesses. City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So. 2d 342, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 559 (Miss. 1958).

6. Miscellaneous.

The action of a truckdriver, whose view of the road ahead was admittedly obstructed by a preceding pulpwood truck, who pulled into the left lane of traffic in order to make a turn into a county road was guilty of violating this section [Code 1942, § 8196] and should have stopped or slowed down until the pulpwood truck ceased to obstruct his view. Necaise v. Blalock, 210 So. 2d 637, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1499 (Miss. 1968).

In an action for injuries sustained when plaintiff’s truck was struck by defendant’s truck which was making a left turn in front of plaintiff’s vehicle to enter an intersecting county road, where the defendant’s own testimony showed that he had failed to maintain a proper lookout, and was negligent in failing to comply with this section [Code 1942, § 8196], the jury’s verdict for defendant was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Cobb v. Williams, 228 Miss. 807, 90 So. 2d 17, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1956).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 285, 286.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 144, 145, 182-186.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898, 899, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 81, Left Turns.

7 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 333, Lookout.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 639, Bicycle Accidents.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 865-868.

§ 63-3-805. Vehicle entering through highway.

The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this chapter at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through highway.

The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required by this chapter at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8197; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

3. Construction.

4. What constitutes immediate hazard.

5. Negligence — In general.

6. —Contributory negligence.

7. —Comparative negligence.

8. Questions for jury.

9. Instructions.

10. Negligence not found.

1. In general.

Record showed substantial evidence that a jury could reasonably base their verdict on in favor of the truck driver in a car accident; the jury found that the car driver had time to react at the intersection. Phan v. Denley, 915 So. 2d 504, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 901 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

As the driver failed to reduce his speed and keep a lookout as he approached an intersection that he knew was dangerous, the trial court did not err in assessing 54 percent liability against him. Classic Coach, Inc. v. Johnson, 823 So. 2d 517, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 2002), amended, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. Feb. 20, 2003).

Although this section places a burden on a driver to yield the right-of-way before entering a through highway, and further provides that when a STOP sign is present the driver is to observe the sign, it does not mandate that the state or a county place a STOP sign at an intersection. Jones v. Mississippi DOT, 744 So. 2d 256, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 201 (Miss. 1999).

The general rule is that a vehicle which first enters and occupies the intersection has the right of way. Tant v. Fairchild, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1956).

The general rule that the first vehicle in intersection has the right of way does not relieve a truck owner from the duty of having a flagman present to direct and stop traffic at busy intersection where the truck carried a huge cargo and was very slow in going through the intersection. Tant v. Fairchild, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1956).

2. Applicability.

Employee was required to obey the stop sign and then proceed onto the highway intersection only after yielding to automobiles that were approaching and were close enough to be considered an immediate hazard; however, the mother failed to keep a proper lookout when approaching the intersection, and a reasonable person would have recognized the need to slow the vehicle when approaching the intersection, and the employee was unable to avoid an accident. Clark v. Clark, 863 So. 2d 1027, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 38 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Liability for collision resulting when automobile proceeding east on 4 lane highway collides with truck which is blocking eastbound lanes while preparing to turn left onto westbound lanes is determined under statute governing right of way at intersection (§63-3-805), not under change of lane statute (§63-3-603). Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2017 (Miss. 1985).

3. Construction.

Injured party’s interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-805, was incorrect because the injured party seemed to contend that the uncontradicted proof that the injured party was traveling on the through highway at the time of the accident necessarily establishes the driver’s negligence for the accident, but because the driver testified that the injured party’s vehicle was not in sight just moments before the collision and the driver made reference to the degree of damage inflicted on the driver’s truck as evidence tending to show that the injured party’s vehicle was speeding, there was evidence that the injured party was speeding, which supported an inference that the injured party’s speeding was the cause of the collision; thus, the jury verdict in favor of the driver and against the injured party was not against the weight of the evidence. Redmond v. Breakfield, 840 So. 2d 828, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 235 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

A motorist either at, or when entering, an intersection to cross a through highway has no right of way, and must yield to another car farther from the intersection but yet so close as to present a hazardous situation. Walton v. Owens, 244 F.2d 383, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

The standard of care required of a motorist backing a vehicle into a public street is defined in this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Ramage v. Kelly, 253 Miss. 582, 176 So. 2d 324, 1965 Miss. LEXIS 1016 (Miss. 1965).

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1942).

The statute requires that motorists must stop and look at the intersection of a highway with a through highway. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

No driver of an automobile is absolved from exercising care and diligence when proceeding upon a crossing which is much traveled and at which people are known to travel at a high rate of speed, notwithstanding such driver may have stopped at a stop sign before entering into the intersection. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

4. What constitutes immediate hazard.

Where plaintiff’s automobile which was approaching intersection in highway was only sixty to one hundred feet away, at a time defendant’s truck entered intersection, plaintiff’s automobile constituted an immediate hazard within this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Meo v. Miller, 227 Miss. 11, 85 So. 2d 568, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 651 (Miss. 1956).

5. Negligence — In general.

Expert witness testified that a driver was at fault for pulling out in front of a truck, and the driver’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident; substantial evidence supported the verdict that the driver was negligent for disregarding an immediate hazard. Etheridge v. Harold Case & Co., 960 So. 2d 474, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 623 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 959 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 383 (Miss. 2007).

Failure of motorist on unfavored street to continue to look for approaching vehicles after having stopped at stop sign and looked at intersection of highway with through highway constitutes negligence; motorist who claims to have looked and failed to see vehicles in intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute immediate hazard is guilty of negligence as matter of law. Dogan v. Hardy, 587 F. Supp. 967, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15383 (N.D. Miss. 1984).

Defendant motorist who drove to within a car’s length of a highway stop sign located 40 feet from paved portion of intersecting road, looked to her right and left and did not see any traffic approaching, remained motionless quite a while and then proceeded upon the highway without again looking to her right or left was guilty of negligence. Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So. 2d 87, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1436 (Miss. 1967).

6. —Contributory negligence.

There was sufficient evidence to find that a driver was contributorily negligent including driver’s duty of common sense under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-805, the fact that a good portion of the bus was past the center line before colliding with the car, and the disputed testimony with regard to the amount of time between when the bus pulled into the road and when the bus arrived at the point of collision. Callahan v. Ledbetter, 992 So. 2d 1220, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 547 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

Court’s finding of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff was proper where defendant bus driver testified that he came to a complete stop at the stop sign, he looked both ways for oncoming traffic before entering the intersection, both parties had a clear unobstructed view of the intersection as they approached from their respective directions, and defendant’s bus was hit by plaintiff’s truck, thus indicating a lack of evasive action on the part of plaintiff. Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Lee County Sch. Dist., 925 So. 2d 57, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 2006).

Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence where it appeared that while traveling on his side of a city street, without excessive speed, he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, who, upon entering the intersection, had seen the plaintiff’s automobile approaching at such a distance as to constitute an immediate hazard, but, without looking again, continued across the intersection. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

Since defendant’s own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff’s approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

The doctrine of contributory negligence applies to a suit brought against a driver who allegedly violated this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Baird v. Harrington, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1947).

7. —Comparative negligence.

Circuit court did not err, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§85-5-7(5) and63-3-805, in refusing an apportionment-of-fault jury instruction because the uncontested evidence presented at trial demonstrated that it was one motorist’s negligence that was the sole proximate cause of the accident at an intersection and the injuries sustained by the other motorist and the other motorist’s spouse. Dunnam v. Abney, 137 So.3d 876, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 770 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 139 So.3d 74, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 242 (Miss. 2014).

Since defendant’s own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff’s approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

In action for injuries resulting from automobile collision at intersection of cross road with through traffic lane, failure to give a comparative negligence instruction on behalf of plaintiff is not erroneous when instruction was not requested and plaintiff predicated liability on finding that defendant was negligent and defendant’s negligence was the sole, proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Davidian v. Wendell, 37 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1948).

8. Questions for jury.

When ultimate issue in intersection collision negligence case is relative position and speed of parties in moments prior to collision and evidence offered by witnesses is sharply conflicting, it is proper for jury to resolve conflict. Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2017 (Miss. 1985).

In an action for personal injuries arising out of a multiple vehicle collision, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant where a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant had been negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff’s vehicle. Marshall v. Conley, 391 So. 2d 656, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2183 (Miss. 1980).

What is a “through highway” may be answered categorically and absolutely, but the question who has the “right of way” cannot, since the answer to that question is variable, changing as the circumstances and facts of each situation change, so that it must be for the jury to decide under the facts of a particular case. Shivel v. Ferguson, 259 So. 2d 123, 1972 Miss. LEXIS 1524 (Miss. 1972).

Although the driver of the automobile in which the infant decedent was riding was guilty of negligence in entering the intersection, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict in an action for the wrongful death of the child, where the evidence raised a jury question as to whether defendant’s driver was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the collision. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8197] may warrant a jury in finding that an automobile was being negligently operated. West v. Armstrong, 248 Miss. 617, 159 So. 2d 805, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 285 (Miss. 1964).

Evidence, although conflicting, was sufficient to present question for jury as to whether truck driven from private road onto highway in front of an approaching car at nighttime constituted an immediate hazard. Miller Petroleum Transporters, Ltd. v. Price, 237 Miss. 284, 114 So. 2d 756, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 466 (Miss. 1959).

Whether one entering a through highway intersection after stopping should have yielded a right of way to an approaching car as presenting an immediate hazard, held for the jury where there was evidence that when he started, 15 to 20 feet from the edge of the highway, the approaching car was still several hundred feet distant and that its driver did not reduce speed after he saw or should have seen the other car entering the intersection. Junakin v. Kuykendall, 237 Miss. 255, 114 So. 2d 661, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 1959).

In an action for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and that of the defendant when defendant allegedly drove, without stopping, from a private driveway into the highway upon which plaintiff was proceeding in such manner that plaintiff could not avoid striking him, conflicting evidence raised jury questions as to defendant’s negligence, and whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Stewart v. Madden, 233 Miss. 206, 101 So. 2d 353, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1958).

Since defendant’s own admission showed that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding into a through street without continuing to look for the hazard of plaintiff’s approaching automobile, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the issue of liability, and the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury, and, after finding plaintiff guilty, the jury would only diminish the amount of damages to be awarded. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

It was for the jury to say whether the defendants, in an action for death of a motorist resulting from an automobile collision, were negligent in entering an intersection without looking in the direction from which another motorist was coming, after making a stop at a stop sign some distance from the intersection. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

The fact that the defendants stopped at a stop sign a short distance from the intersection before proceeding into the intersection of a through highway would not discharge them of their duty to exercise ordinary care and diligence in proceeding upon the crossing and whether their failure to look to the south in entering the intersection was negligence proximately causing or contributing to the injury or death of a motorist approaching from that direction was for the jury. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 28 (Miss. 1940).

9. Instructions.

In an action for damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s motorcycle and defendant’s automobile in an intersection with a flashing red light and stop sign facing plaintiff and a flashing yellow light and warning sign facing defendant, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant plaintiff’s standard of care instruction which included the language, “the defendant had no lawful right to go forward. . . under the assumption that it would be open and clear,” where a granted instruction detailed the crucial point that the yellow light facing defendant demanded caution, and that a finding of negligence would flow from her failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff if, as he claimed, he had lawfully entered the intersection and stalled unexpectedly. The trial court also properly refused to grant an instruction which stated in part, “the driver of a motor vehicle has a lawful duty to decrease his speed upon approaching an intersection,” since §63-3-311(2) merely states that a driver “may proceed. . . only with caution” and caution is a relative concept not necessarily entailing decrease in speed since the current speed may already be a cautious speed. Allen v. Blanks, 384 So. 2d 63, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2000 (Miss. 1980).

An instruction to the effect that it is the duty of a motorist approaching a through highway to anticipate the presence of other persons and vehicles thereon and keep a reasonable lookout for them, and to stop for the stop sign at the intersection and yield the right of way to traffic on the through highway, and to see if she could enter the intersection with safety to herself and the traveling public, and that if she failed in any one of those particulars or respects such failure was the sole proximate cause of an intersectional accident then it was the jury’s duty to find against her, is erroneous in the absence of a further statement that after complying with these stated conditions the motorist had a right to enter the intersection and that vehicles on the through highway must yield the right of way to her. Richardson v. Adams, 223 So. 2d 536, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1275 (Miss. 1969).

An instruction was properly refused where it would have told the jury that when the operator of an automobile is confronted with a stop sign at an intersection, he, before entering the intersection, is under a duty to appraise traffic on the intersecting highway and to make certain that the way is clear for him to make a safe passage across the highway. Such an instruction would make the person entering the intersection an insurer of his own safety, regardless of the negligence of others. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

Although the defendant was entitled to an instruction under this section [Code 1942, § 8197], the trial court properly refused to give an instruction which was calculated to confuse the jury and did not properly present the issues. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So. 2d 900, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 469 (Miss. 1964).

Trial court did not err in refusing an instruction that would have required a holding that defendant, who was traveling along a through highway, was guilty of negligence as a matter of law even though the jury could have found that, when plaintiff had entered the intersection, defendant was so close at hand that he could not possibly have stopped or averted a collision. Walton v. Owens, 244 F.2d 383, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3100 (5th Cir. Miss. 1957).

In cross actions for damages and personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle intersectional collision, the trial court erred in instructing that the defendant who had been traveling along a road upon which a stop sign was located, not only had the duty to stop his automobile at the intersection but “to wait until he could safely proceed,” since that duty is not required by this section [Code 1942, § 8197]. Hill v. Columbus Ice Cream & Creamery Co., 230 Miss. 634, 93 So. 2d 634, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. 1957).

Where the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which he was riding both testified that before entering the intersection of a through highway they had looked to the north and the south, the trial court committed reversible error in instructing that the driver of the car was guilty of negligence in driving his car into the intersection without looking to the north immediately before doing so. Moore v. Herman Guy Auto Parts, Inc., 230 Miss. 189, 92 So. 2d 373, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 358 (Miss. 1957).

Where defendant testified that at the time he had stopped before entering a through street he had seen plaintiff’s car approaching thereon from a distance of about 100 yards and traveling at about 40 miles per hour, but that he did not look any further before driving slowly into the through street where the collision occurred, plaintiff was entitled to a peremptory instruction in his action for personal injuries sustained as the result of the collision. Wells v. Bennett, 229 Miss. 135, 90 So. 2d 199, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 594 (Miss. 1956).

In action for injuries resulting from automobile collision at intersection of cross road with through traffic lane, failure to give a comparative negligence instruction on behalf of plaintiff is not erroneous when instruction was not requested and plaintiff predicated liability on finding that defendant was negligent and defendant’s negligence was the sole, proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Davidian v. Wendell, 37 So. 2d 570 (Miss. 1948).

10. Negligence not found.

In a widow’s wrongful-death action, the trial court properly entered a directed verdict in favor of an employer and an employee because the employee had the right of way to proceed onto the highway unless the decedent’s pickup truck was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and the employee testified that the truck was approximately three-fourths of a mile away. Moreno v. TLSL, Inc., 187 So.3d 127, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 124 (Miss. 2016).

The trial court did not err in finding in favor of a driver in her action against a city and a police officer stemming from a vehicular accident in which the driver was struck by the officer, because he city’s argument that the driver was contributorily negligent under Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-805 and63-3-505 contained no evidentiary basis. The driver’s view was blocked by a truck and therefore, she was unable to see the officer approach; the driver had a green light at the intersection and she was not speeding or violating any other rule of the road. City of Jackson v. Presley, 40 So.3d 578, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd, 40 So.3d 520, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 385 (Miss. 2010).

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at a prudent speed, keeping a proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 66, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 858 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Motorist’s liability for collision at intersection of ordinary and arterial highways as affected by absence, displacement, or malfunctioning of stop sign or other traffic signal. 74 A.L.R.2d 242.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Automobiles: accidents arising from merger of traffic on limited access highway with that from service road or ramp. 40 A.L.R.3d 1429.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 239, 240, 281 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 141-148.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 898-904, 1341-1524, 1954.

§ 63-3-807. Vehicle entering or crossing highway from private road or driveway.

The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on said highway.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8198; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Jury questions.

1. In general.

The statute does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, and this is likewise true as to a vehicle about to enter or cross a through highway from a private road or driveway. Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So. 2d 519, 1942 Miss. LEXIS 55 (Miss. 1942).

2. Jury questions.

In an action for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and that of defendant when defendant allegedly drove, without stopping, from a private driveway into the highway upon which plaintiff was proceeding in such a manner that plaintiff could not avoid striking him, conflicting evidence raised jury questions as to defendant’s negligence, and whether his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Stewart v. Madden, 233 Miss. 206, 101 So. 2d 353, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Comment Note. – What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules. 7 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 287.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 939.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 221-223, 570.1 (complaint in collision between bicyclists when minor bicyclist enters roadway from private driveway).

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 900, 901, 1341-1524, 1955.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 792 et seq.

§ 63-3-809. Procedure upon approach of authorized emergency vehicles; procedure upon approaching certain stationary vehicles using authorized flashing lights; duty of driver of authorized emergency, recovery or utility service vehicle.

  1. Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the roadway clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a law enforcement officer.
  2. Upon approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle, when such vehicle is giving a signal by use of flashing, blinking, oscillating or rotating lights, as authorized under Section 63-7-19, a person who drives an approaching vehicle shall:
    1. Proceeding with due caution, yield the right-of-way by making a lane change into a lane not adjacent to that of the authorized emergency vehicle, if possible with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, if on a roadway having at least four (4) lanes with not less than two (2) lanes proceeding in the same direction as the approaching vehicle; or
    2. Proceeding with due caution, reduce the speed of the vehicle, maintaining a safe speed for road conditions and being prepared to stop, if changing lanes would be impossible or unsafe.
  3. Upon approaching a stationary recovery vehicle, utility service vehicle, sanitation vehicle, or highway maintenance vehicle, when the stationary vehicle is giving a signal by use of authorized flashing lights, a person who drives an approaching vehicle shall:
    1. Proceeding with due caution, yield the right-of-way by making a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the stationary vehicle, if possible, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, if on a roadway having at least four (4) lanes with not less than two (2) lanes proceeding in the same direction as the approaching vehicle; or
    2. Proceeding with due caution, reduce the speed of the vehicle, maintaining a safe speed for road conditions and being prepared to stop, if changing lanes would be impossible or unsafe.
  4. For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise clearly requires:
    1. “Highway maintenance vehicle” means a vehicle used for the maintenance of highways and roadways in this state and is:
      1. Owned or operated by the Department of Transportation, a county, a municipality or other political subdivision of this state; or
      2. Owned or operated by a contractor under contract with the Department of Transportation, a county, a municipality or other political subdivision of this state.
    2. “Recovery vehicle” means a truck that is specifically designed for towing a disabled vehicle or a combination of vehicles.
    3. “Utility service vehicle” means a vehicle used by any person, municipality, county, electric cooperative, corporation, board, commission, district or any entity created or authorized by public act, private act or general law to provide electricity, natural gas, water, wastewater services, telecommunications services or any combination thereof, for sale to consumers in any particular service area, or by any contractor under contract with any such entity.
    4. “Sanitation vehicle” means a vehicle used to collect solid waste, refuse or recyclable material that is:
      1. Owned or operated by a county, a municipality or other political subdivision of this state; or
      2. Owned or operated by a contractor under contract with a county, a municipality or other political subdivision of this state.
  5. Upon approaching a vehicle that is marked with some combination of white flashing strobe or amber and red lights, as provided in Section 63-7-19, that is operated by a United States rural mail carrier for the purpose of delivering United States mail, and that is stationary, including when the vehicle is signaling the intention to enter the roadway, a person who drives an approaching vehicle shall:
    1. Proceeding with due caution, yield the right-of-way by making a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the stationary vehicle, if possible, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, if on a roadway having at least four (4) lanes with not less than two (2) lanes proceeding in the same direction as the approaching vehicle; or
    2. Proceeding with due caution, reduce the speed of the vehicle, maintaining a safe speed for road conditions and being prepared to stop, if changing lanes would be impossible or unsafe.
  6. A violation of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine:
    1. Of not more than Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00); or
    2. Of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) if violation of this section results in:
      1. Property damage to the emergency vehicle, sanitation vehicle, highway maintenance vehicle, utility service vehicle, recovery vehicle or rural mail carrier vehicle; or
      2. Bodily injury to the driver or a passenger of any such vehicle.
  7. This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, a sanitation vehicle, a recovery vehicle, a utility service vehicle, a highway maintenance vehicle or a rural mail carrier vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the roadway.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8199; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2007, ch. 315, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 412, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 314, § 1; Laws, 2017, ch. 355, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2017.

Joint Legislative Committee Note —

Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the subsection designations. Laws of 2007, ch. 315, § 1, inserted new subsections (2) through (5) but failed to renumber the original subsection (2) as present subsection (6). The Joint Committee ratified the correction, renumbering former (2) as present (6), at its June 26, 2007, meeting.

Amendment Notes —

The 2007 amendment substituted “roadway” for “highway” throughout; substituted “law enforcement officer” for “police officer” at the end of (1); added (2) through (5); redesignated former (2) as present (6); and inserted “a recovery vehicle or a highway maintenance vehicle” in (6).

The 2012 amendment added (3)(c); and added “a utility service vehicle” and/or “the utitlity service vehicle” following “stationery recovery vehicle” throughout the section.

The 2014 amendment in (3), substituted “sanitation vehicle, or” for “or a” preceding “highway maintenance vehicle, when” and substituted “the stationary” for “such” thereafter; deleted “recovery vehicle, the utility service vehicle or the highway maintenance” following “lane change into a lane not adjacent to the stationary” in (3)(a); added (4)(d); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2017 amendment added (5) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and in (6)(i) and (7), inserted references to “sanitation vehicle” and “rural mail carrier vehicle” and made related stylistic changes.

Cross References —

Warning lights used on authorized emergency vehicles, see §63-7-19.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for misdemeanors and felonies, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Illustrative Cases.

1. In general.

Evidence showed the officer was traveling approximately 37 miles per hour with lights and sirens activated, there was nothing obstructing the view of either the person later injured or the officer, and the greater weight of evidence also proved that the person’s left turn signal was not activated. In addition, the officer had consciously stopped at the previous two intersections because the officer considered both of those to be blind intersections, and therefore, the officer’s behavior supported the finding that the officer appreciated the risk involved in approaching the intersection and did not act with reckless disregard. Davis v. Latch, 873 So. 2d 1059, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 445 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

In a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident, a driver who had a green light was not negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to an emergency police vehicle pursuant to §63-3-809 because the driver of an emergency vehicle has a duty under §63-3-315 to slow down as necessary for safety upon approaching a red traffic light controlling an intersection. Andrews v. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 537 So. 2d 447, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 9 (Miss. 1989).

Even though engaged on an emergency call, the driver of a vehicle is subject to the doctrine of contributory negligence. Baird v. Harrington, 202 Miss. 112, 30 So. 2d 82, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 247 (Miss. 1947).

2. Illustrative Cases.

Jury was clearly instructed on Miss. Code Ann. §§63-3-809(1),63-3-619(2), and as they fairly announced the applicable law in this wrongful death case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s proposed instruction. Rushing v. Mobile Forest Prods., 282 So.3d 708, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 370 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

Deputy, who stopped at an intersection and, with his blue lights and sirens activated, slowly proceeded across in a stop-and-start fashion, exercised sufficient safety measures to prompt other drivers near the intersection to yield the right-of-way, including the driver traveling in the lane ahead of plaintiffs. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the deputy’s conduct did not demonstrate a conscious indifference to consequences, nor did it rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of persons not engaged in criminal activity, so as subject the county to liability under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c). Rayner v. Pennington, 25 So.3d 305, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 12 (Miss. 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability of operator of ambulance service for personal injuries to person being transported. 68 A.L.R.4th 14.

Construction and Application of Statutory Provision Requiring Motorists to Yield Right-of-Way to Emergency Vehicle. 87 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 296-298.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 815.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 591-601, 1341-1524, 1941-1961.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 79, Negligent Vehicular Police Chase.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Negligent Operation of Emergency Vehicle.

Article 19. Stopping, Standing and Parking.

§ 63-3-901. Stopping, standing or parking prohibited in specified places.

  1. No person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or traffic control device, in any of the following places:

    a. On a sidewalk;

    b. In front of a public or private driveway;

    c. Within an intersection;

    d. Within ten feet of a fire hydrant;

    e. On a crosswalk;

    f. Within twenty feet of a crosswalk at an intersection;

    g. Within thirty feet upon the approach to any flashing beacon, stop sign, or traffic-control signal located at the side of a roadway;

    h. Between a safety zone and the adjacent curb or within thirty feet of points on the curb immediately opposite the ends of a safety zone, unless the traffic authority indicates a different length by signs or markings;

    i. Within fifteen feet of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing;

    j. Within twenty feet of the driveway entrance to any fire station and on the side of a street opposite the entrance of any fire station within seventy-five feet of said entrance when properly signposted;

    k. Alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when such stopping, standing, or parking would obstruct traffic;

    m. Upon any bridge or other elevated structure upon a highway or within a highway tunnel;

    n. At any place where official signs prohibit stopping.

  2. No person shall move a vehicle not owned by such person into any such prohibited area or away from a curb such distance as is unlawful.

On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street;

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8217; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Parking vehicle.

2. Slowing vehicle down.

3. Standing or stopping.

1. Parking vehicle.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile intersectional collision allegedly caused by defendant’s bus being parked in such a manner as to obscure a stop sign, any negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which he was riding, as well as the driver of the other automobile, did not supersede defendant’s negligence. Meridian Hatcheries, Inc. v. Troutman, 230 Miss. 493, 93 So. 2d 472, 1957 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1957).

In an action to recover for the death of a child who was fatally injured when thrown from an automobile fender on which she was riding when the automobile struck an unattended parked automobile on a bridge, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the parking of the automobile upon the bridge and leaving it there unattended for a period of eleven hours was not a proximate contributing cause of the death of the child. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

When the legislature has said that there shall be a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of the main traveled portion of the highway for the free passage of vehicles, and that an automobile shall not be parked upon a bridge, it cannot be reasonably contended that the parking of an automobile upon a bridge nineteen feet three inches in width and leaving the car unattended for a period of eleven hours did not constitute an act of negligence. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

2. Slowing vehicle down.

Since this statute does not require that a motorist drive his vehicle off the pavement while slowing down but only requires him to do so before coming to a stop, it was not violated by a truck driver who, after his airbrakes failed, slowed down but was still moving toward the shoulder of the highway when the truck was struck by an automobile. Sprayberry v. Blount, 336 So. 2d 1289, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1546 (Miss. 1976).

The general rule that the first vehicle in intersection has the right of way does not relieve a truck owner from the duty of having a flagman present to direct and stop traffic at busy intersection where the truck carried a huge cargo and was very slow in going through the intersection. Tant v. Fairchild, 228 Miss. 126, 87 So. 2d 78, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 495 (Miss. 1956).

3. Standing or stopping.

Where defendant stopped his car, to aid a pedestrian, on the traveled portion of the highway with part of his car extending on a highway bridge, so as to leave less than 20 feet clearance, although shoulders of the road were such that defendant could have parked entirely off highway, and plaintiff’s truck struck the rear of defendant’s car causing the damage complained of, defendant was guilty of violation of paragraph m of subsection (1) of this section [Code 1942, § 8217]. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s truck, in colliding with defendant’s car, stopped on the traveled highway and at the entrance to a highway bridge in violation of law, was more responsible for the damages sued for than negligence of defendant and warranted reduction of recovery by 50 per cent. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A private contractor hired by a municipality to operate public parking may not issue traffic tickets or citations. A city could authorize the contractor to immobilize or tow illegally parked vehicles if requested by law enforcement. Kohnke, May 27, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0186.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 811 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 341-363, 431-434.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 971-980, 1341-1524, 1531-2060.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 575, Feasibility of Stopping or Parking Vehicle off Roadway.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 727 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753-1754.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-903. Stopping, standing or parking upon highway outside of business or residence districts.

  1. No person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of any highway outside of a business or residence district when it is practical to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway. In every event, however, a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty (20) feet of such part of the highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle be available from a distance of two hundred (200) feet in each direction upon such highway.
  2. This section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of a highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position.
  3. Any vehicle used solely for the purpose of collecting solid waste, under a contract with any county, municipality, resident or business for the collection of solid waste may stop or stand on the road, street or highway for the sole purpose of collecting solid waste. Such solid waste collection vehicle shall maintain hazard lights on the vehicle at all times that it is engaged in stopping or standing for the purpose of solid waste collection.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8215; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1992, ch. 583 § 16, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Applicability.

3. Construction in general.

4. Impossibility of leaving highway unobstructed.

5. Leaving disabled vehicle on highway.

6. Parked vehicle.

7. Slow moving vehicle.

8. Standing or stopped vehicle.

9. Turning.

10. Questions for jury.

1. In general.

Minor who enters upon an adult activity such as the operation of a motor vehicle must exercise a commensurate degree of responsibility, and will be held to adult standard in determining whether their conduct while engaging in such adult activity is negligent. Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2232 (Miss. 1982).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] will not support an action for injury unless it is the proximate cause thereof. Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1943).

2. Applicability.

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] applies only to highways outside of a business or residence district. Filgo v. Crider, 251 Miss. 234, 168 So. 2d 805, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 343 (Miss. 1964).

3. Construction in general.

The two paragraphs of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] should be construed together so as to give effect to their true meaning. Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1964).

The constitutionality of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] can be sustained by giving the word “practical” in subsection (1) an operation throughout the entire section, and by preserving as referable to the words, “in any event,” the provision that, when possible, a clear view for 200 feet shall be available. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

4. Impossibility of leaving highway unobstructed.

The word “impossible” as used in subsection (2) should be construed as “not reasonably practical”. Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 160 So. 2d 63, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 1964).

Where the driver of a motor vehicle was actually negligent in bringing his motor vehicle to a stop partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, the fact that he may have pulled his motor vehicle as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, and that there may have been a clear view of this stopped vehicle for a distance of 200 feet in each direction, does not relieve him from the liability for injuries proximately caused by his negligence. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] is to be construed to the effect that when 20 feet of clearance is impossible, the vehicle shall turn as far to the right as practical including sound and safe shoulders, but must not stop upon any part of the traveled highway unless and until at least 200 feet clear view is available in each direction from the point where the stop is made, save when the vehicle is disabled, as provided for under subsection (2); and save further, when on account of obstructions or equivalent conditions ahead, it is impossible to proceed so as to leave the 200 feet of clear view; and that all this is for the determination of the jury. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

In construing this section [Code 1942, § 8215] the court will take judicial notice that at least 85 per cent of the public highways in the state are of such width that it is only occasionally possible, and that at distant intervals, to stop a vehicle so as to leave as much as 20 feet of unobstructed highway. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

Statutes regulatory of highway traffic must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

5. Leaving disabled vehicle on highway.

Truck driver negligently violated this section where, though he made several attempts to start his truck after it became disabled and stopped on the highway, he did not look under the hood and thus did not discover that a recently installed battery cable had become unfastened and was the cause of the problem. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Condict, 417 F. Supp. 63, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15305 (S.D. Miss. 1976).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] does not relieve the driver of negligence in leaving his disabled vehicle on the highway where it was disabled as a result of an earlier accident caused by his negligence. Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1496 (Miss. 1971).

Motorist who, without negligence on his part, struck a car making a left turn ahead of him, disabling it, is under no duty to other motorists to remove it from traveled portion of highway. Brent v. Heath, 235 Miss. 324, 109 So. 2d 314, 1959 Miss. LEXIS 432 (Miss. 1959).

6. Parked vehicle.

Parking of a tractor and trailers at least two feet on the paved portion of the road, although there was room to park them entirely off, on a dark, foggy night, without rear lights, reflectors, or flares, is a violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215]. Jester v. Bailey, 239 Miss. 384, 123 So. 2d 442, 1960 Miss. LEXIS 296 (Miss. 1960).

When the legislature has said that there shall be a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet of the main traveled portion of the highway for the free passage of vehicles, and that an automobile shall not be parked upon a bridge, it cannot be reasonably contended that the parking of an automobile upon a bridge nineteen feet three inches in width and leaving the car unattended for a period of eleven hours did not constitute an act of negligence. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

In an action for personal injuries where the plaintiff’s car ran into defendant’s truck parked on a highway the court did not err in giving an instruction based on this section [Code 1942, § 8215] which requires any vehicle parking upon a highway to leave a width of at least twenty feet of the highway opposite such standing vehicle for the passage of other cars, where the parked truck could have been moved back from seven to ten feet. Planters Wholesale Grocery v. Kincade, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So. 2d 578, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 309 (Miss. 1951).

7. Slow moving vehicle.

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

Where defendant’s truck became partially disabled because of water damage to engine and was proceeding slowly ahead of plaintiff’s automobile, which was struck in the rear by an overtaking truck, and at the time of the collision the driver of defendant’s truck was attempting to move it to place where he could get off the highway and the forward movement of defendant’s truck was halted for very brief intervals, the driver of the defendant’s truck did not violate the parking statute. Fant v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 210 Miss. 474, 49 So. 2d 887, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 284 (Miss. 1951).

8. Standing or stopped vehicle.

Where an injured motorist, who was experiencing chest discomfort, pulled his vehicle partly off the highway, but partly obstructed the right-hand lane of travel in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-903, the motorist’s act was a proximate and contributing cause an accident, and the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to apportion fault. Meka v. Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Co., 67 So.3d 18, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 402 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

Although a county was not liable for an individual’s injuries after a third party hit the individual and forced her into a county garbage truck because weather conditions were determined to be the sole cause of the accident, the county also would have been immune under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-903, as there was no evidence that any negligence was attributed to the driver of the garbage truck. Hayes v. Greene County, 932 So. 2d 831, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 774 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 933 So. 2d 303, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 521 (Miss. 2006).

Where a truck driver stopped his rig on an interstate highway to aid a disabled motorist, §63-3-903 required him to pull off the road to the extent practicable. Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc., 456 So. 2d 698, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1812 (Miss. 1984).

Where the driver of a tractor-trailer, while attempting to turn the rig around, had stopped the vehicle in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] in such a fashion that it was blocking both lanes of a two way highway, the fact that there was no time later in which he could extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had deliberately placed himself cannot excuse his original act of negligence. Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 81, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10685 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

Where the exigencies of the traffic situation require, a motorist can stop momentarily in the highway without being guilty of negligence and is not required to drive the vehicle off the main portion of the highway prior to stopping. Burt v. Duckworth, 206 So. 2d 850, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1592 (Miss. 1968).

This section [Code 1942, § 8215] should be construed in a practical manner, and it does not mean that a motorist forced to stop momentarily upon the paved portion of a highway because the vehicle in front of him stopped and oncoming traffic prevented him from passing is guilty of negligence in not immediately driving from the highway onto the shoulder. Whitten v. Land, 188 So. 2d 246, 1966 Miss. LEXIS 1375 (Miss. 1966).

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

The driver of a passenger bus, like the operator of any other motor vehicle on the public highway, must not only observe the statutory requirements of bringing his vehicle to a stop, but he must also exercise due care not to endanger the safety of other persons using the highway and this duty to exercise due care exists independently of any statutory regulation. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

Contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s truck, in colliding with defendant’s car, stopped on the traveled highway and at the entrance to a highway bridge in violation of law, was more responsible for the damages sued for than negligence of defendant and warranted reduction of recovery by 50 per cent. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

Where defendant stopped his car, to aid pedestrian, on traveled portion of highway at entrance to bridge so as to leave less than 20 feet clearance, although the shoulders of the road were in such condition that defendant could have parked entirely off the highway, and plaintiff’s truck struck the rear of defendant’s car causing the damage complained of, trial judge was warranted in finding that the stopping of defendant’s car at the particular place shown by the evidence was in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215], and constituted actionable negligence. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 1944).

Violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] by stopping a bus with the rear end thereof out into the highway was not the proximate cause of injury to a passenger, who after alighting from the bus passed around the rear end of the bus into traffic and was struck by an automobile. Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. 1943).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

The right to travel being the right to go from one place to another includes the right to stop on the way, temporarily, for a legitimate or necessary purpose when that purpose is an immediate incident to travel; and such rights, being fundamental, are constitutional rights which the legislature may regulate in pursuance of the police power but may not arbitrarily or unreasonably restrict. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

9. Turning.

Where the driver of a tractor-trailer, while attempting to turn the rig around, had stopped the vehicle in violation of this section [Code 1942, § 8215] in such a fashion that it was blocking both lanes of a two way highway, the fact that there was no time later in which he could extricate himself from the dangerous position in which he had deliberately placed himself cannot excuse his original act of negligence. Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 81, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10685 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).

The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his car, in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians and this duty exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and where the driver of an automobile is actually not negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of that liability. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 496 (Miss. 1953).

10. Questions for jury.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when pickup truck in which he was riding collided with a passenger bus where the bus driver stopped his bus to discharge passengers at nighttime in the rain with approximately one-half of the bus on paved portion of the highway whether the bus driver was negligent in not parking entirely off the paved portion of the highway was a question for the jury. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 226 Miss. 624, 85 So. 2d 179, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 440 (Miss. 1956).

In an action to recover for the death of a child who was fatally injured when thrown from an automobile fender on which she was riding when the automobile struck an unattended parked automobile on a bridge, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the parking of the automobile upon the bridge and leaving it there unattended for a period of eleven hours was not a proximate contributing cause of the death of the child. Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d 461, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 405 (Miss. 1952).

In an action to recover for the death of a motorist who had run into the rear of a bus which had stopped on the traveled highway to discharge a passenger at a point where it was impossible to leave 20 feet clearance opposite the bus, an instruction that if the bus was stopped upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway, not in an emergency, at a place and time and in such a way as not to leave a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet opposite such bus, was a violation of the law and negligence, was erroneous, since the question whether there had been a compliance with this section [Code 1942, § 8215], under the circumstances existing, was for the jury. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784, 1943 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 1943).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Duties and liabilities between owners or drivers of parked or parking vehicles. 25 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Sudden or unsignalled stop or slowing of motor vehicle as negligence. 29 A.L.R.2d 5.

Liability for injury or damage growing out of pulling out of parked motor vehicle. 29 A.L.R.2d 107.

Negligence of driver of motor vehicle as respects manner of timely application of proper brakes. 72 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where motor vehicle stops on highway. 79 A.L.R.2d 153.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 884 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Accidents, Forms 341-363, 431-434.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 971-979, 1341-1524, 2002.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 575, Feasibility of Stopping or Parking Vehicle off Roadway.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 727 et seq.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

§ 63-3-905. Authority of police officers to remove or provide for removal of illegally stopped vehicles.

  1. Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle standing upon a highway in violation of Section 63-3-903, such officer is hereby authorized to move such vehicle, or require the driver or other person in charge of the vehicle to move the same, to a position off the paved or improved or main traveled part of such highway.
  2. Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle unattended upon any bridge or causeway or in any tunnel where such vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traffic, such officer is hereby authorized to provide for the removal of such vehicle to the nearest garage or other place of safety.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8216; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

In view of the statute requiring police officers to remove a vehicle from the highway when it is a danger to the traveling public, the partial unloading of a rental truck, which was so heavily loaded that it could not be moved without being partially unloaded, and the removal of the truck to the courthouse, was not an illegal search, where at the time the officers moved the truck, they did not search it or seize any of its contents, and did not know that a crime had been committed. Williamson v. State, 248 So. 2d 634, 1971 Miss. LEXIS 1476 (Miss. 1971).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 311.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

§ 63-3-907. Parking parallel with right-hand curb.

Except where angle parking is permitted by local ordinance or usage, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a roadway where there is an adjacent curb shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels of such vehicle parallel with and within twelve inches of the right-hand curb.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8218; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles Municipal police officers may issue citations for violations of this section within the corporate limits. In addition, municipal governing authorities may adopt ordinances regulating parking of vehicles and setting forth penalties for parking violations. Hamilton, April 12, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0210.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 312.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 887.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 761, 762-766.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

§ 63-3-909. Parking of unattended motor vehicles.

No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8219; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Estoppel by acquiescence.

1. In general.

Owner, who parked his automobile and left it unattended, without removing the ignition key, was not liable for injuries caused when his automobile, driven by a thief, ran through a red traffic light at a reckless rate of speed and crashed into the car in which the plaintiff was riding. Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So. 2d 243, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 618 (Miss. 1956).

2. Estoppel by acquiescence.

In an action based on the negligence of defendant car dealer in placing plaintiff’s car on its parking lot with the key in the ignition, which resulted in its theft, the county judge was in error in sustaining the affirmative defense of estoppel by acquiescence, because the custom and usage of the defendant in parking the cars of its customers on its parking lot with the keys in the ignition was against public policy. Gates v. Owen Chevrolet Co., 294 So. 2d 179, 1974 Miss. LEXIS 1818 (Miss. 1974).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Liability for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 16 A.L.R.2d 979.

Liability for damage or injury by stranger starting motor vehicle left parked on street. 51 A.L.R.2d 633.

Failure of motorist to cramp wheels against curb or turn them away from traffic, or to shut off engine, as causing accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 42 A.L.R.3d 1283.

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Liability of motorist who left key in ignition for damage or injury caused by stranger operating the vehicle. 45 A.L.R.3d 787.

Presumption of negligence and application of Res ipsa loquitur Doctrine in action for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of a parked motor vehicle. 55 A.L.R.3d 1260.

Liability for personal injury or property damage caused by unauthorized use of automobile which has been parked with keys removed from ignition. 70 A.L.R.4th 276.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 303 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 922-925.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 363.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1341-1524, 2001.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 767-771.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1753, 1754.

§ 63-3-911. Opening door of stopped motor vehicle.

No person shall open any door on a motor vehicle unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so and can be done without interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a door open on a side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.

HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

§ 63-3-913. Designation of areas of private property as restricted for emergency vehicle access; parking in or blocking restricted access areas.

  1. The designation of areas on private property which are clearly marked to restrict access thereto to emergency vehicles shall be considered permission by the owner of such property that law enforcement officers may enter such private property to enforce such restricted access; and all municipal, county and state law enforcement officers are authorized to enforce such restriction.
  2. It is unlawful to park a motor vehicle, other than an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency, in an area which has been marked as provided in subsection (1) of this section; and any person who unlawfully parks a motor vehicle in such an area or who blocks access thereto is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) for each violation. For the third and any subsequent offense under this section, the offender’s driver’s license shall be suspended for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 63-1-53, Mississippi Code of 1972, in addition to any fine imposed.
  3. For the purpose of this section “emergency vehicle” means fire department vehicles, law enforcement vehicles, ambulances and any other vehicle designated as an emergency vehicle by the governing authority of the county or municipality within which the private property is located.

HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 461, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1995.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. “Clearly marked.”

The area in which the defendant parked was clearly marked to restrict access to emergency vehicles, notwithstanding that there were no signs posted to indicate that the area was restricted, where there was evidence presented that the area was marked with yellow and black stripes. Langston v. City of Iuka, 792 So. 2d 1013, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 171 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 303.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 762, 763, 765 et seq.

§ 63-3-915. Who may authorize towing of vehicle located on private property.

A motor vehicle that is located upon private property may not be towed except when authorized by the owner of the motor vehicle, the lienholder of the motor vehicle, the owner of the property upon which the motor vehicle is located or the towing is authorized by other local, state or federal law.

HISTORY: Laws, 2011, ch. 451, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Article 21. Required Stops.

§ 63-3-1001. Designation of stop intersections; design and placement of stop signs.

  1. The state highway commission with reference to state highways, and local authorities with reference to other highways under their jurisdiction, may designate through highways and erect stop signs at specified entrances thereto or may designate any intersection signs at specified entrances thereto or may designate any intersection as a stop intersection and erect like signs at one or more entrances to such intersection.
  2. Every said sign shall bear the word “Stop” in letters not less than 8“ in height which sign shall be self-illuminated at night or if not shall be reflectorized. Every stop sign shall be located as near as practical at the property line of the highway at the entrance to which the stop must be made, or at the nearest line of the crosswalk thereat, or, if none, at the nearest line of the roadway.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8213; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 325.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Directed verdict.

1. In general.

Where defendant’s driver was grossly negligent in entering intersection at 50 miles per hour without stopping as required by this section [Code 1942, § 8213], and collided with plaintiff’s driver who, in entering the intersection on a through street at unabated speed of 30 miles per hour, was prima facie negligent under Code 1942, § 8176, the negligence of plaintiff’s driver was a contributing factor to the accident and warranted application of the comparative negligence statute (Code 1942, § 1454). Moore v. Abdalla, 197 Miss. 125, 19 So. 2d 502, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 281 (Miss. 1944).

2. Directed verdict.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff when his automobile was struck from the rear by the defendant’s automobile, where the evidence presented jury questions as to whether the defendant was negligent in driving at an excessive speed, or following another vehicle too closely, or in failing to have his vehicle under proper control, or whether the sole proximate cause of the collision was the manner in which the plaintiff’s vehicle was driven into the intersection, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability. Buntyn v. Robinson, 233 Miss. 360, 102 So. 2d 126, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 391 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 239, 240.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic §§ 804-810.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 166-170.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 895, 896, 1341-1524, 1876.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 837.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 1756.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-1003. Designation of yield right-of-way entrances; conduct of driver at yield-right-of-way intersection; proof of failure to yield right-of-way.

  1. The state highway commission with reference to state highways under its jurisdiction and local authorities with reference to other highways under their jurisdiction may, when traffic conditions warrant such action, give preference to traffic through any intersection on any highway and designate specified entrances to said intersections as yield right-of-way entrances by erecting yield-right-of-way signs in lieu of stop signs as required or permitted in Section 63-3-1001.
  2. The driver of a vehicle in obedience to a yield-right-of-way sign shall reduce the speed of his vehicle to not more than twenty miles per hour and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersecting highway either from the right or left or which are approaching so closely on said intersecting highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver having so yielded may proceed at such time as a safe interval occurs.
  3. If a driver is involved in a collision at an intersection or interferes with the movement of other vehicles after driving past a yield-right-of-way sign, such collision or interference shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the driver’s failure to yield right-of-way.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8213; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1956, ch. 325.

Editor’s Notes —

Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Negligence per se.

Just as one seeking relief for any other cause of action needs not refer to the case establishing the particular tort at the center of his case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not demand that a plaintiff claiming negligence per se include within his complaint an explicit citation to authority simply for the sake of doing so; so long as the complaint alleges particular conduct that clearly violates a statute or regulation, it pleads negligence per se with sufficient particularity. Therefore, summary judgment was denied in a negligence per se case where there was no citation to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1003 since a complaint was sufficient where it alleged that a truck driver failed to adhere to the proper standard of care when he did not yield the right of way. Welch v. Loftus, 776 F. Supp. 2d 222, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17963 (S.D. Miss. 2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 810.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 842.

§ 63-3-1005. Stops before emerging from alley, driveway or building.

The driver of a vehicle within a business or residence district emerging from an alley, driveway, or building shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or into the sidewalk area extending across any alley way or private driveway.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8214; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

The failure of a motorist, who was backing his automobile out of his driveway onto the street in a thickly populated neighborhood, to stop his automobile upon the rear of the driveway before reaching the sidewalk was prima facie negligence. Hatten v. Brame, 233 Miss. 509, 103 So. 2d 4, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1958).

2. Instructions.

In an action for personal injuries sustained when a blind pedestrian was struck when defendant backed his automobile from his driveway to a public street in a thickly populated neighborhood, where the evidence established that the defendant failed to stop his automobile upon the rear of the driveway before entering the sidewalk area, the trial court properly granted the pedestrian a peremptory instruction on liability. Hatten v. Brame, 233 Miss. 509, 103 So. 2d 4, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 410 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 287.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 939 et seq.

3 Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 221-223.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 941-949, 1341-1524, 1991, 1992.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 792-803.

§ 63-3-1007. Stops at railroad grade crossings in obedience to signal indicating approach of train or other on-track equipment; effect of noncompliance upon right of recovery in civil action.

  1. Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing and a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a train or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so safely.
  2. The driver of a vehicle shall stop and remain standing and not traverse such a grade crossing when a crossing gate is lowered or when a human flagman gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment. The violation of this section shall not of itself defeat recovery and the question of negligence or the violation aforesaid, shall be left to the jury and the comparative negligence statute and prima facie statute of this state shall apply in these cases as in other cases of negligence.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8209; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2004; Laws, 2018, ch. 303, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in (1); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2018 amendment inserted “or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment” in (1) and (2).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Proof of violation of statute is not necessary in order to prove negligence, and injured party established prima facie case of negligence by proving that driver violated statute by not stopping at crossing even though approaching train was plainly visible and in dangerous proximity to crossing, and by proving that driver was negligent in that he failed to keep proper lookout by looking back as he approached railroad crossing, rejecting contention of driver that because there was no evidence crossing was marked by signal or stop sign injured party had failed to prove driver had violated statute and therefore had failed to prove negligence. Dale v. Bridges, 507 So. 2d 375, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2525 (Miss. 1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 439, Inadequacy of Warning Device at Railroad Crossing.

§ 63-3-1009. Stops at designated particularly dangerous railroad grade crossings.

The Mississippi Transportation Commission is hereby authorized to designate particularly dangerous highway grade crossings of railroads and to erect stop signs thereat. When such stop signs are erected the driver of any vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest track of such grade crossing and shall proceed only upon exercise of due care.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8210; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2004.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “Mississippi Transportation Commission” for “state highway commission” in the first sentence; substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in the second sentence; and made a minor stylistic change.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-2. [Reserved for future use.]

3. Negligence.

1.-2. [Reserved for future use.]

3. Negligence.

Federal district court did not err in rejecting an injured contract worker’s contention that a railroad was negligent per se for failing to install a flagman near a crossing 20-30 feet from where the worker was removing obstructions from the right-of-way; although the worker’s truck was hit by a train while crossing the tracks, the evidence showed that the location of the work zone did not force the worker to “foul the tracks” while maneuvering his truck and that he had violated three separate laws when he crossed the tracks: not stopping after hearing the locomotive’s whistle in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §77-9-249(1), failing to stop at a crossbuck in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §77-9-249(4), and failing to stop at a stop sign in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1009, any of which could have been the proximate cause of the accident. Baker v. Canadian National/Illinois Cent. R.R., 536 F.3d 357, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15178 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1171, 129 S. Ct. 1317, 173 L. Ed. 2d 585, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1320 (U.S. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

§ 63-3-1011. Stops at railroad grade crossings by vehicles carrying passengers for hire or explosive substances and school buses.

  1. The driver of any motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire or of any vehicle carrying explosive substances of flammable liquids as a cargo or part of a cargo, before crossing at grade any track or tracks of a railroad, shall stop the vehicle within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) feet from the nearest rail of the railroad. While stopped, the driver shall listen and look in both directions along the track for:
    1. Any approaching train or any other vehicle operated upon the rails for the purpose of maintenance of railroads, including, but not limited to, all hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance machines; and
    2. Signals indicating the approach of a train or any other vehicle or machine operated upon the rails. The driver shall not proceed until he can do so safely.
  2. No stop need be made at any crossing where a police officer or a traffic control signal directs traffic to proceed.
  3. The driver of every school transportation vehicle used to transport pupils, upon approaching any railroad crossing, shall comply with the provisions of Section 37-41-55.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8211; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 5; Laws, 2011, ch. 327, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2011.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in (1); and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2011 amendment rewrote the section.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

Violation of this requirement held to establish negligence of driver of truck struck by train at crossing. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Nelson, 245 Miss. 395, 146 So. 2d 69, 1962 Miss. LEXIS 560, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 527, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss. 1962).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure of occupants of motor vehicle stalled on railroad crossing to get out and move to place of safety as contributory negligence. 21 A.L.R.2d 742.

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

§ 63-3-1013. Moving heavy equipment at railroad grade crossing.

No person shall operate or move any caterpillar tractor, steam shovel, derrick, roller, or any equipment or structure having a normal operating speed of six (6) or less miles per hour or a vertical body or load clearance of less than nine (9) inches above the level surface of a roadway upon or across any tracks at a railroad grade crossing without notice of any such intended crossing first being given to a superintendent of such railroad and a reasonable time being given to such railroad to provide proper protection at such crossing.

Before making any such crossing the person operating or moving any such vehicle or equipment shall first stop the same not less than fifteen (15) feet nor more than fifty (50) feet from the nearest rail of such railway and while so stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track for any approaching train or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment and for signals indicating the approach of a train or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment, and shall not proceed until the crossing can be made safely.

No such crossing shall be made when warning is given by automatic signal or crossing gates or a flagman or otherwise of the immediate approach of a railroad train or car or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8212; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 2004, ch. 448, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2004; Laws, 2018, ch. 303, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2004 amendment substituted “fifteen (15) feet” for “ten feet” in the second paragraph; and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2018 amendment inserted “or other on-track equipment, including, but not limited to, hi-rail vehicles and on-track maintenance equipment” twice in the second paragraph and once in the last paragraph.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 1885-1887.

23 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Railroad Crossing Accident Litigation.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 1, Railroads.

Article 23. Pedestrians’ Rights and Duties.

§ 63-3-1101. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control signals at intersections; privileges and restrictions at other locations.

Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic control signals at intersections as heretofore declared in this chapter. At all other places pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and shall be subject to the restrictions stated in this article.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8200; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

1.-10. [Reserved for future use.]

11. Under former law.

Ordinance regulating pedestrian’s use of streets held reasonable because of automobile traffic. Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678, 1926 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 1926).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Application of “assured clear distance ahead” or “radius of lights” doctrine to accident involving pedestrian crossing street or highway. 31 A.L.R.2d 1424.

Contributory negligence of one standing in highway to attempt to warn approaching motorists of dangerous situation. 53 A.L.R.2d 1002.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 320.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 464, 465, 468 et seq.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 895, 896.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-1103. Pedestrians’ right-of-way at crosswalks lacking traffic control signals; duty of vehicle approaching vehicle stopped for pedestrian.

Where traffic control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise provided in this article.

Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8201; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. Instructions.

1. In general.

Motorist’s duty is to drive upon a highway at no greater speed than is reasonable, having regard to traffic, and to keep his car under control and to be on the alert for other persons and vehicles, and to anticipate their presence. Williams v. Moses, 234 Miss. 453, 106 So. 2d 45, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1958).

2. Instructions.

An instruction as to the liability of a motorist to a pedestrian who unexpectedly walks in front of his car is not proper in a case in which the pedestrian had almost completed the crossing of a three-lane highway and was within 3 feet of the curb. Williams v. Moses, 234 Miss. 453, 106 So. 2d 45, 1958 Miss. LEXIS 517 (Miss. 1958).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 299, 302, 320 et seq.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 453, 467.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 481-505, 903, 904, 1341-1524, 1784-1789, 1985.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 895, 896.

§ 63-3-1105. Pedestrians crossing roadways at locations other than crosswalks.

  1. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
  2. Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
  3. Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8202; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Duty of motorists-In general.

2. —To sound horn.

3. Duty of pedestrians.

4. Jury instructions.

5. Questions for jury.

6. Negligence not found.

7.-15. [Reserved for future use.]

16. Under former laws.

1. Duty of motorists-In general.

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child’s parents’ home, the trial court properly declined to give a peremptory instruction on liability favorable to the parents where the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, portrayed circumstances from which reasonable minds could find that the driver had afforded the infant all of the care which was due under the circumstances, including the presence of her parents in the immediate vicinity, and where the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the driver had violated the duty imposed by statute to “exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.” Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1980).

The absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal; The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. Smith v. Walton, 271 So. 2d 409, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1507 (Miss. 1973).

If a pedestrian, standing stationary at the edge of a paved portion of a highway is a child of tender years, or communicates by appearance or action that he is intoxicated, ill, or otherwise not in possession of his faculties, the approaching driver may be bound to anticipate that he will, or that there is sufficient risk that he might, leave his place of safety and come on to the traveled highway. Wendelken v. McMurray, 388 F.2d 553, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4167 (5th Cir. Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 952, 88 S. Ct. 1850, 20 L. Ed. 2d 864, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1581 (U.S. 1968).

2. —To sound horn.

In an action for death of pedestrian who was struck by a motorist as she was crossing a highway, it was an error to peremptorily instruct the jury that it was the duty of a driver of the truck to sound his horn. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

It is unnecessary for a motorist to blow his horn at a pedestrian who knows that the car is overtaking or meeting him or her on the highway, and the purpose of the blowing of horn is to give notice of approach of the automobile. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

3. Duty of pedestrians.

Where the collision which resulted in the decedent’s death occurred at a point in the roadway where there was not a marked crosswalk or an intersection, the decedent owed a duty to yield the right-of-way to the defendant’s truck and his failure to do so was negligent. Hornburger v. Baird, 508 F. Supp. 84, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16076 (N.D. Miss. 1980).

The absence of a statute to the contrary, a pedestrian has the right to use and travel upon any portion of a public highway at any time of the day or night, his rights and the rights of one operating a vehicle thereupon are mutual, reciprocal, and equal; The operator of a motor vehicle owes to pedestrians walking along the highway the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to avoid injuring them. Smith v. Walton, 271 So. 2d 409, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1507 (Miss. 1973).

4. Jury instructions.

In a personal injury action arising out of an accident in which a pedestrian was struck by an automobile, an instruction which conformed to the first part of §63-3-1105, dealing with the duty of a pedestrian to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles operating on the road, but which failed to incorporate the last portion of §63-3-1105, dealing with the duty of a driver to pedestrians already within a roadway, was incomplete; the instruction as worded was virtually peremptory for defendant, and thus plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. Ross v. Miller, 441 So. 2d 541, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 3025 (Miss. 1983).

In an action on behalf of an infant by her parents for injuries sustained by the child when the driver of an automobile drove over her while leaving a parking space in front of the child’s parents’ home, the trial court properly declined to give a peremptory instruction on liability favorable to the parents where the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, portrayed circumstances from which reasonable minds could find that the driver had afforded the infant all of the care which was due under the circumstances, including the presence of her parents in the immediate vicinity, and where the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the driver had violated the duty imposed by statute to “exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.” Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2018 (Miss. 1980).

In an action for death of pedestrian who was struck by a motorist as she was crossing a highway, it was an error to peremptorily instruct the jury that it was the duty of a driver of the truck to sound his horn. Robinson v. Sims, 227 Miss. 375, 86 So. 2d 318, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 701 (Miss. 1956).

5. Questions for jury.

In a personal injury action, a truck driver who struck a pedestrian was not negligent as a matter of law by virtue of the fact that he did not see the pedestrian in the highway in time to avoid striking him; the issue of the driver’s negligence was for the jury to decide. Hood v. Oakley, 519 So. 2d 1236, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 158 (Miss. 1988).

6. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at a prudent speed, keeping a proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 66, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 858 (Miss. 2004).

7.-15. [Reserved for future use.]

16. Under former laws.

Negligence of pedestrian, under the circumstances, was very slight, consisting of being on the right-hand side of the highway instead of the left side, but off the traveled part of the highway where it was unlikely that any injury would be inflicted by automobiles passing along the same side of the highway in the same direction, because the paved part of the highway was ample for the passage of the vehicles, without leaving the pavement. Evans Motor Freight Lines v. Fleming, 184 Miss. 808, 185 So. 821, 1939 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1939).

Issue of injured pedestrian’s contributory negligence in walking on right side of highway was properly submitted to jury, under statute requiring pedestrians to walk on left side. Basque v. Anticich, 177 Miss. 855, 172 So. 141, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 163 (Miss. 1937).

Motorist had duty upon observing pedestrian walking on right side of highway with back to automobile to sound horn until pedestrian became aware of approach, and, if pedestrian continued unaware, to slow down and come to stop, if necessary. Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695, 158 So. 552, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1934).

Motorist who, although observing that boy walking on right side of road with back to approaching automobile was unaware of automobile, failed to slacken speed, and drove on left side to pass boy, who suddenly, becoming aware of automobile, jumped to left into its path, held liable for death of boy. Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695, 158 So. 552, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1934).

Instruction that automobile driver was under no duty to sound horn to warn pedestrian, walking along left side of street, if he saw him so close to automobile that he had no time to do so, held erroneous. Reid v. McDevitt, 163 Miss. 226, 140 So. 722, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1932).

It was duty of automobile driver on left side of street to give signals of his approach to pedestrian walking ahead of him on such side. Reid v. McDevitt, 163 Miss. 226, 140 So. 722, 1932 Miss. LEXIS 32 (Miss. 1932).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Failure to comply with statute regulating travel by pedestrian along highway as affecting right to recovery for injuries or death resulting from collision with automobile. 45 A.L.R.3d 658.

Who is “pedestrian” entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated. 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 301, 320.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 457-459.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 481-505, 1341-1524, 1784-1789, 1959.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 427, Child-Pedestrian Accident Cases.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 595, Motorist’s Negligence in Striking Person Lying in Road.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 895, 897.

§ 63-3-1107. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks.

Pedestrians shall move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8203; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1109. Solicitation of rides by pedestrians.

No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting a ride from the driver of any private vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8204; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Anti-hitchhiking laws: their construction and effect in action for injury to hitchhiker. 46 A.L.R.3d 964.

§ 63-3-1111. Rights of blind and otherwise incapacitated pedestrians crossing at or near intersections or crosswalks; effect of failure to employ cane or guide dog; regulation of use of canes.

  1. Whenever a pedestrian is crossing or attempting to cross a public street or highway, at or near an intersection or crosswalk, guided by a guide dog or carrying in a raised or extended position a cane or walking stick which is metallic or white in color, or white tipped with red, the driver of every vehicle approaching in said intersection or crosswalk shall take such precautions as may be necessary to avoid injuring or endangering such pedestrian, and if injury or danger to such pedestrian can be avoided only by bringing his vehicle to a full stop, he shall bring his said vehicle to a full stop. The word “vehicle,” when used in this section, does not include a train operated on railroad tracks.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to deprive any totally or partially blind or otherwise incapacitated person, not carrying such a cane or walking stick or not being guided by a dog, of the rights and privileges conferred by law upon pedestrians crossing streets or highways. The failure of such totally or partially blind or otherwise incapacitated person to carry a cane or walking stick or to be guided by a guide dog upon the streets, highways or sidewalks of this state, shall not be held to constitute or be evidence of contributory negligence.
  3. It shall be unlawful for any person, unless totally or partially blind or otherwise incapacitated, while on any public street or highway, to carry in a raised or extended position a cane or walking stick which is metallic or white in color, or white tipped with red.
  4. The violation of any provision of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more than Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ten (10) days.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8203.5; Laws, 1950, ch. 330, §§ 1-4; brought forward without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 341, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2018.

Amendment Notes —

The 2018 amendment brought the section forward without change.

Cross References —

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 506.

42 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Negligence of Pedestrian Struck by Motor Vehicle.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 885.

§ 63-3-1112. Duty of driver to avoid collision with pedestrian or person propelling human-powered vehicle; warning signal.

Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter or the provisions of any local ordinance, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle and shall give an audible signal when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person.

HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 350, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1983.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Negligence not found.

Trial court properly found that defendant driver breached no duty to a pedestrian he struck and killed as she was walking near an entrance ramp; he was traveling at prudent speed, keeping proper lookout for traffic while preparing to merge, and the pedestrian was in his lane of travel when she was hit. Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 876 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 66, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 858 (Miss. 2004).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Motorist’s liability for striking person lying in road. 41 A.L.R.4th 303.

§ 63-3-1113. Driving through safety zone.

No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8208; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 230.

Article 25. Reckless or Careless Driving and Miscellaneous Rules.

§ 63-3-1201. Reckless driving.

Any person who drives any vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a wilful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. Reckless driving shall be considered a greater offense than careless driving.

Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon a first conviction by a fine of not less than Five Dollars ($5.00) nor more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), and on a second or subsequent conviction he may be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days or by a fine of not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or by both.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8175; Laws, 1938, ch. 200; Laws, 1993, ch. 317, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1993 (became law without Governor’s signature on March 16, 1993).

Cross References —

Careless driving, see §63-3-1213.

Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any violation of Title 63, see §99-19-73.

Imposition of standard state assessmen in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for speeding, reckless and careless driving violations, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. In general.

2. What constitutes reckless driving, in general.

3. Reckless driving under particular circumstances.

4. —Weaving.

5. Miscellaneous.

1. In general.

The evident purpose of this section [Code 1942, § 8175] is not to punish as criminal acts of simple negligence, or even where gross negligence is shown, in traffic accidents, unless it is of such character as to evince a wilful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property on the highways. Sanford v. State, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1944).

2. What constitutes reckless driving, in general.

Conviction for reckless driving did not require that defendant pose a danger to another person, but to himself and his property; therefore, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction due to the fact that defendant posed a danger to himself and an officer where he was proceeding at a high rate of speed on the wrong side of the road. Ouzts v. State, 947 So. 2d 1005, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 698 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

Reckless driving means the commission of conscious acts or omissions which the driver knows or should know create an unreasonable risk of injury or damage either to the driver and his property, or to the person or property of others. Barnes v. State, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1964).

A motorist is not guilty of reckless driving where there are no persons or vehicles on the highway ahead of and in view of the motorist or where the driving allegedly reckless did not occur on the highway. Gause v. State, 203 Miss. 377, 34 So. 2d 729, 1948 Miss. LEXIS 282 (Miss. 1948).

3. Reckless driving under particular circumstances.

Evidence was sufficient to establish reckless driving by the defendant where (1) a police officer observed the defendant driving at an excessively high rate of speed while weaving in and out of traffic in a 45 mile per hour speed zone and passing other vehicles at an excessive rate of speed, and (2) the officer testified that after questioning the defendant about his speed, the defendant responded and admitted to driving at a speed of 135 miles per hour (although a passenger in his car stated that the defendant drove at 60 to 65 miles per hour) and that he drove at that rate because “I wanted to.” Nix v. State, 763 So. 2d 896, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 175 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

Where defendant drives through a village and he is committing no crime and violating no law, and where two men without possession of any authority undertake to stop him he continues wherein two men shoot at him or at his vehicle and where one of the men jumps into automobile and pursues him and during that pursuit he drives motor vehicle faster than legal speed limit, all as a result of then being pursued by one who had tried to shoot him or the vehicle in which he was riding, the defendant is not guilty of the crime of reckless driving of an automobile. Brown v. State, 227 Miss. 823, 87 So. 2d 84, 1956 Miss. LEXIS 758 (Miss. 1956).

Evidence that state witness approached intersection at a speed of 15 or 20 miles per hour and that accused was approaching intersection from another direction at about the same speed and that accused neglected to be on a constant lookout to see the other vehicle in time to stop his car before striking it, did not establish reckless driving which would subject accused to conviction under this section [Code 1942, § 8175]. Sanford v. State, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1944).

In the absence of proof that accused was driving in a reckless manner or at a rate of speed such as to indicate a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, it is to be assumed that the presence of passengers for hire in his own car would indicate a contrary state of mind. Sanford v. State, 195 Miss. 896, 16 So. 2d 628, 1944 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 1944).

4. —Weaving.

Where police officers observed the defendant motorist’s vehicle weaving from side to side from one traffic lane to the other they were justified in arresting him on a charge of reckless driving. Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79, 1967 Miss. LEXIS 1475 (Miss. 1967).

The driving of a vehicle so as to weave back and forth across the line separating two traffic lanes is such reckless driving as to warrant a constable in stopping it, although there was no traffic. Barnes v. State, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 409 (Miss. 1964).

5. Miscellaneous.

There was no error in failing to give a lesser included offense instruction because reckless driving was not a lesser included offense of the crime of failing to yield to a law enforcement officer; no element of the crime of reckless driving was included in the crime of fleeing a law-enforcement officer. Johnson v. State, 228 So.3d 933, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 112 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 120, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2017).

Circuit court improperly ruled for a family in their action against the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks (MDWFP) because it erroneously applied the legal standard for reckless disregard under the Mississippi Torts Claim Act; MDWFP officers possessed the discretion to request that boaters pull out of the hazardous and high-traffic area of a river, and the MDWFP possessed the authority to regulate the boating traffic on the river and the discretion to do so in a safe manner. Miss. Dep't of Wildlife, Fisheries, & Parks v. Webb, 248 So.3d 823, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), rev'd, 248 So.3d 772, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 127 (Miss. 2018).

There was no error in failing to give a lesser included offense instruction because reckless driving was not a lesser included offense of the crime of failing to yield to a law enforcement officer; no element of the crime of reckless driving was included in the crime of fleeing a law-enforcement officer. Johnson v. State, 228 So.3d 933, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 112 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 229 So.3d 120, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 379 (Miss. 2017).

Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser non-included offense of reckless driving at his trial for aggravated assault, Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-7 (Rev. 2006), where he requested the charge because a conviction for aggravated assault required proof of intent, the crimes had different elements, and there was conflicting evidence as to whether defendant intended to injure police officers when he failed to stop and engaged them in a multiple-vehicle chase. Brooks v. State, 18 So.3d 833, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 471 (Miss. 2009).

City police officers, who, while pursuing motorists for reckless driving and breach of peace, shot at and deflated the rear tires of the automobile, were not liable for property damages or personal injuries sustained by the motorists in view of the jury’s adoption of the testimony of officers that they did not shoot at the motorist or automobile generally but aimed at the rear tires. State use of Holmes v. Pope, 212 Miss. 446, 54 So. 2d 658, 1951 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1951).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a county constable under Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 in a personal injury suit because the constable had immunity, under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1)(c), for injuries to a father, which occurred when the constable’s car collided with his four-wheeler, because there was significant evidence that the father was engaged in criminal activity that had a causal nexus to the accident; the father was driving on a suspended license and pled guilty to reckless driving, however summary judgment against the father’s sons was improper because genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the sons were engaged in criminal activity, whether any criminal activity on the part of the sons had a “causal nexus” to the accident, and whether the constable acted with reckless disregard in his pursuit of appellants. Giles v. Brown, 962 So. 2d 612, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 930 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 962 So. 2d 38, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 477 (Miss. 2007).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Under Miss. Code Section 63-3-1201, speeding in and of itself is not reckless; however, other circumstances may exist which would cause speeding to be considered reckless driving; such circumstances must appear on ticket. Thomas, June 10, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0267.

For charges to be considered reckless driving there must be a “wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Gordon, Sept. 21, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0574.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Statute prohibiting reckless driving: Definiteness and certainty. 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 337 et seq.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 647, Driver’s Negligence in Backing Up.

CJS.

61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 1547 et seq.

Practice References.

Mississippi Criminal and Traffic Law Manual (Michie).

Kenworthy, Transportation Safety and Insurance Law, Second Edition (Michie).

Eades, Jury Instructions in Automobile Actions (Michie).

Limpert, Motor Vehicle Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis, Fifth Edition (Michie).

Bohan and Damask, Forensic Accident Investigation: Motor Vehicles (Michie).

Barzelay, Lacy et al., Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction (Matthew Bender).

Campbell, Fisher, and Mansfield, Defense of Speeding, Reckless Driving and Vehicular Homicide (Matthew Bender).

Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal – Civil (Matthew Bender).

Reiff, Drunk Driving and Related Vehicular Offenses, Third Edition (Michie).

§ 63-3-1203. Operation of vehicle under circumstances which interfere with driver’s view or control over driving mechanism; interference with driver’s view or control by passenger.

  1. No person shall drive a vehicle when it is so loaded or when there are in the front seat such number of persons, exceeding three, as to obstruct the view of the driver to the front or sides of the vehicle or as to interfere with the driver’s control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.
  2. No passenger in a vehicle shall ride in such position as to interfere with the driver’s view ahead or to the sides, or to interfere with his control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8220; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

3A Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Form 1802.

46 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 647, Driver’s Negligence in Backing Up.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 389, Premises Liability: Obstruction of Visibility at Intersection.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 677, Liability of Motor Vehicle Passenger for Accident.

§ 63-3-1205. Driving through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways.

The driver of a motor vehicle traveling through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways shall hold such motor vehicle under control and as near the right-hand edge of the highway as reasonably possible and, upon approaching any curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of 200 feet along the highway, shall give audible warning with the horn of such motor vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8221; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1207. Coasting upon down grade.

The driver of any motor vehicle when traveling upon a down grade shall not coast with the gears of such vehicle in neutral.

The driver of a commercial motor vehicle when traveling upon a down grade shall not coast with the clutch disengaged.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8222; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur.

8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 733.

CJS.

60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 678.

§ 63-3-1209. Crossing unprotected fire hose.

No vehicle shall be driven over any unprotected hose of a fire department when laid down on any street or private driveway, to be used at any fire or alarm of fire, without the consent of the fire department official in command.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8224; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1211. Throwing, etc., of glass or other injurious material on highway; removal of glass or other injurious material by person removing wrecked or damaged vehicle from highway.

No person shall throw or deposit upon any highway any glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, wire, cans, or any other substance likely to injure any person, animal, or vehicle upon such highway.

Any person who drops, or permits to be dropped or thrown, upon any highway any destructive or injurious material shall immediately remove the same or cause it to be removed.

Any person removing a wrecked or damaged vehicle from a highway shall remove any glass or other injurious substance dropped upon the highway from such vehicle.

HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 8225; Laws, 1938, ch. 200.

§ 63-3-1213. Careless driving.

Any person who drives any vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner, without due regard for the width, grade, curves, corner, traffic and use of the streets and highways and all other attendant circumstances is guilty of careless driving. Careless driving shall be considered a lesser offense than reckless driving.

Every person convicted of careless driving shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five Dollars ($5.00) nor more than Fifty Dollars ($50.00).

HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 317, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993 (became law without Governor’s signature on March 16, 1993).

Cross References —

Reckless driving, see §63-3-1201.

Imposition of standard state assessmen in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for speeding, reckless and careless driving violations, see §99-19-73.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

2. Instructions.

3. Probable cause.

4. Preservation for review.

5. Evidence sufficient.

1. Constitutionality.

The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as, although the language of the statute was broad, ordinary people could understand its meaning. United States v. Escalante, 239 F.3d 678, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 614 (5th Cir. Miss. 2001).

This section is not unconstitutionally vague, notwithstanding the contention that the phrase “careless or imprudent manner” is vague and subjective and provides no objective criteria by which an individual is put on notice of what conduct the statute proscribes. Leuer v. City of Flowood, 744 So. 2d 266, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 216 (Miss. 1999).

2. Instructions.

The court properly instructed the jury with regard to careless, rather than reckless, driving where the defendant was cited for careless driving after he was stopped after an officer observed him driving 20 to 25 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone and weaving between 2 northbound lanes. Varvaris v. City of Pearl, 723 So. 2d 1215, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 986 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).

3. Probable cause.

Because a police officer observed defendant’s vehicle cross the right lane fog line once, and then again approach or “bump” the fog line, and the video evidence from the officer’s car camera, while unclear, did not directly contradict the officer’s testimony, there was sufficient evidence that the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had driven in a careless or imprudent manner, without due regard for the width and use of the streets and highways, and to stop defendant’s vehicle. Martin v. State, 240 So.3d 1047, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 424 (Miss. 2017), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2592, 201 L. Ed. 2d 307, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3234 (U.S. 2018).

Testimony from the arresting officer that he observed defendant’s truck pass so close to a deputy that the outside mirror could have struck the officer and that the truck then ran off the road provided sufficient probable cause for a traffic stop based on careless driving. Ludwig v. State, 122 So.3d 1229, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Defendants’ convictions for possession of more than five kilograms of marijuana were appropriate because, under Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213, defendants’ vehicle was seen driving in a careless or imprudent manner and the deputy had the authority to stop them. When defendants acted nervous, the deputy’s retrieval of a drug-detecting dog was appropriate and the drug-detecting dog’s positive alerts created probable cause for the deputy to search the trunk of the rental car. Shelton v. State, 45 So.3d 1203, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 141 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 49 So.3d 636, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 548 (Miss. 2010), cert. denied, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 553 (Miss. Oct. 21, 2010).

Court could not say that it was clear that a police officer’s observation of a driver driving in the middle of two lanes did not or could not constitute a violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213, nor could it say that there was no objective basis for the stop of the driver’s vehicle; thus the case was not one in which the officer acted without any objective reason or on the basis of a purely subjective feeling or “hunch.” On the contrary, the officer did have an objective, reasonable suspicion that the driver had committed the traffic violation of careless driving, even though he was ultimately acquitted of the careless driving charge. Adams v. City of Booneville, 910 So. 2d 720, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

There was probable cause for the stop of a driver’s vehicle because the time of night was very late (2:30 a.m.), the particular night, New Year’s Eve, was one on which persons were widely known to celebrate and often consume alcohol, and in the officer’s observation, the vehicle was traveling without due regard for the width and use of the highway by traveling in the middle of two lanes of traffic, and the reserve officer accompanying the officer saw the vehicle swerve. All of these circumstances served to bolster the conclusion that the driver appeared to the officer to be driving in violation of the careless driving statute, Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213. Adams v. City of Booneville, 910 So. 2d 720, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 217 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine found during a strip search conducted after defendant’s arrest for driving under the influence. There was probable cause for the traffic stop where a police officer witnessed the vehicle defendant was driving approach the curb twice; the presence or absence of traffic is not controlling to a determination of carelessness. Henderson v. State, 878 So. 2d 246, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 657 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence, first offense, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §63-11-30(1)(a), was proper where there was probable cause for the stop because she had repeatedly crossed over the center line and that constituted careless driving pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §63-3-1213; thus, there was probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had been committed and defendant was properly stopped for further police action. Saucier v. City of Poplarville, 858 So. 2d 933, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1025 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

4. Preservation for review.

Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, careless driving, and driving without a seatbelt were appropriate because defendant failed to raise any of the issues he complained of on appeal in his motion for a directed verdict or new trial and because the facts of the case provided sufficient evidence to convict. Jones v. State, 958 So. 2d 840, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 423 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

5. Evidence sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of running a red light and careless driving where a police officer testified that she observed defendant drive his entire vehicle over a concrete median and saw him run a red light. Lobo v. City of Ridgeland, 135 So.3d 148, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 300 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for careless driving because a police sergeant, who responded to two independent calls from drivers who reported that defendant was driving carelessly, testified that defendant was kind of drifting from right to left, that it was pretty obvious that defendant could not maintain control of defendant’s vehicle to keep it in defendant’s direct lane, and that defendant did not stop when the sergeant turned on the police car’s blue lights and did not come to a complete stop at a stop sign. McMurtry v. State, 105 So.3d 395, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 531 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Speeding does not in and of itself constitute careless driving; speeding with other attendant circumstances would constitute careless driving. Mixon, March 10, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0883.

A violation of the statute for careless driving is not based solely on whether traffic is present but should be based on all the combined factors listed in the statute. Gordon, Sept. 21, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0574.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

What amounts to reckless driving of motor vehicle within statute making such a criminal offense. 52 A.L.R.2d 1337.

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated or similar charge. 10 A.L.R.4th 1252.

Statute prohibiting reckless driving: definiteness and certainty. 52 A.L.R.4th 1161.

Negligence or contributory negligence of motorist in failing to proceed in accordance with turn signal given. 84 A.L.R.4th 124.

Am. Jur.

7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 358.

CJS.