Chapter 1. County and Municipal Prisons and Prisoners
§ 47-1-1. Enforcement of sentences.
Every convict sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail, or to such imprisonment and the payment of a fine, or the payment of a fine, shall be committed to jail, and shall remain in close confinement for the full time specified for imprisonment in the sentence of the court, and in like confinement, subject to the provisions of Section 99-19-20.1, until the fine, costs and jail fees be fully paid, unless discharged in due course of law, or as hereinafter provided. Subject to the provisions of Section 99-19-20.1, no convict shall be held in continuous confinement under a conviction for any one (1) offense for failure to pay fine and costs in such case for a period of more than one (1) year.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 775; 1906, § 837; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 4015, 4030; 1930, § 4058; 1942, § 7899; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 2018, ch. 416, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Amendment Notes —
The 2018 amendment inserted “subject to the provisions of Section 99-19-20.1” in the first sentence and at the beginning of the second sentence; substituted “one (1) year” for “two (2) years” at the end of the last sentence; and made a minor stylistic change.
Cross References —
Duty of sheriff relative to prisoners, see §§19-25-63 et seq.
Credit allowed for labor of convicts, see §47-1-47.
Sentence upon conviction for vagrancy, see §97-35-41.
Sentence upon two or more convictions, see §99-19-21.
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Removal of prisoner.
3. Length of confinement.
1. In general.
Code sections associated with section containing provision, stricken by Amendatory Act, that no convict shall be credited with wages while in jail and not at work held to entitle convict to credit of $1 on his fine and costs for each day spent in jail when ready, able, and willing to work, regardless of title of amendatory act, “An Act to amend [such section] so as to credit convicts with time served in jail.” Ex parte Jackson, 177 Miss. 509, 171 So. 545, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1937).
Duplicate detention warrant held sufficient authority for convict’s detention. Ex parte Moody, 121 Miss. 313, 83 So. 529, 1919 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1919).
Court’s failure to comply with statute does not relieve accused from liability for imprisonment on failure to pay fine. Buck v. State, 103 Miss. 276, 60 So. 321, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 170 (Miss. 1912).
This section [Code 1942, § 7899], in providing for imprisonment until payment of the cost of prosecution, does not violate a constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. Ex parte McInnis, 98 Miss. 773, 54 So. 260, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1910).
2. Removal of prisoner.
Sheriff had no authority to remove prisoner sentenced to imprisonment in county jail where offense was committed to jail of nonadjoining county. Ex parte Buck, 104 Miss. 661, 61 So. 651, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1913).
3. Length of confinement.
Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an indigent, convicted in a state court and sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment specified by statute and payment of a fine and court costs, the judgment also directing, pursuant to statute, that if the defendant was in default of the monetary payment at the expiration of his prison term, he should remain in jail to “work off” the fine at the statutory rate, may not be continued in confinement beyond the maximum term specified by statute because of his failure to satisfy the monetary provisions of the sentence, either with regard to the fine or with regard to the costs. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 8 (U.S. 1970).
Although incarceration of indigent for involuntary failure to pay fine and court costs beyond the maximum imprisonment prescribed by state law for the offense was held to be violative of the Federal Constitution, the state can institute methods, other than incarceration, to enforce the collection of unpaid fines. Wade v. Carsley, 433 F.2d 68, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6973 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).
However, it had earlier been held that the imprisonment of an indigent for failure to pay a fine did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, where the indigent after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge was sentenced to a jail term and to pay a fine, and after serving her jail term was unable to pay the fine because she was indigent, in view of Code 1942, § 7899 which limits the time of confinement for failure to pay a fine for any one offense to 2 years. Wade v. Carsley, 221 So. 2d 725, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1506 (Miss. 1969).
That more than two years had elapsed since imposition of fine and sentence, part of which had been unlawfully suspended by county judge, held not to relieve defendant from serving unsatisfied portion on ground that statute provided that no convict should be held in continuous confinement under conviction for any one offense for failure to pay fine and costs in such case for period of more than two years, where defendant was not in continuous confinement under suspended portion of sentence. Cameron v. Thompson, 178 Miss. 434, 173 So. 422, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 222 (Miss. 1937).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
22A Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law §§ 1319, 1320 et seq.
CJS.
24 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1570.
§ 47-1-3. County convicts; duty of board of supervisors.
It is the imperative duty of the board of supervisors in each county in this state to require each convict sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail and the payment of a fine and costs, or to imprisonment and payment of costs, or to payment of fine and costs, to work out the sentence on the county convict farm or on the public roads or other public works of the county, or in a contiguous county, as herein provided. But any convict who is sentenced to the payment of a fine and costs and who pays such fine and costs shall thereby be relieved from working out such fine and costs, but the payment in full of such fine and costs shall not relieve such convict from working out the full time of his imprisonment as adjudged in his sentence. The board of supervisors of any county, however, may by an order spread upon its minutes, giving the reason therefor, and with the approval of the circuit judge of the district, discharge any aged or infirm convict upon his making an affidavit of his insolvency and inability to pay the fine and costs, and filing same with the clerk of the board of supervisors at any time after the expiration of his imprisonment.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 814; 1906, § 870; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4030; 1930, § 4059; 1942, § 7900; Laws, 1900, ch. 100; Laws, 1906, ch. 100; Laws, 1908, ch. 168; Laws, 1936, ch. 269.
Cross References —
Constitutional prohibition against county convicts being hired or leased, see Miss. Const. Art. 10, § 226.
Jurisdiction and powers of boards of supervisors generally, see §19-3-41.
Working roads with convicts, see §65-7-113.
Acquisition of facilities for restitution centers, see §99-37-19.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Convict, sentenced to imprisonment in county jail and payment of fine and costs, being required by statute to work each day that he is able, is entitled to credit of $1 for each day on which he is physically able and willing to work until full payment of fine and costs, though county board of supervisors fails to furnish him work and facilities or means therefor, as required by statute. Ex parte Jackson, 177 Miss. 509, 171 So. 545, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1937).
Code sections associated with section containing provision, stricken by amendatory act, that no convict be credited with wages while in jail and not at work, held to entitle convict to credit of $1 on fine and costs for each day spent in jail when ready, able, and willing to work, regardless of title to amendatory act. Ex parte Jackson, 177 Miss. 509, 171 So. 545, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1937).
Prisoner cannot be released on habeas corpus before expiration of period sufficient to pay fine at maximum statutory allowance. Morris v. Waldrop, 151 Miss. 553, 118 So. 621, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 365 (Miss. 1928).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Miss. Code Section 47-1-3 makes it duty of board of supervisors in each county to require each convict sentenced to imprisonment in county jail and payment of fine and costs, or to imprisonment and payment of costs, or to payment of fine and costs, to work out sentence on county convict farm or on public roads or at other public works of sentencing county or contiguous county. Simmons, Jan. 11, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0988.
Where inmate is physically willing and able to work, inmate is entitled to credit against fine and cost in amount of $10 per day, until such fine and cost are fully paid. Stewart, May 20, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0255.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-5. County convicts; board of supervisors may lease or buy suitable lands.
In order to carry out the provisions of Section 47-1-3, the board of supervisors of each county in this state are authorized and directed, whenever it may be necessary to buy or lease a sufficient number of acres of land within reasonable and convenient distance of the county jail to be used by the county as a county convict farm. They are also authorized to make any necessary improvements thereon, such as erecting necessary and convenient buildings, clearing, terracing and ditching and leveeing, or otherwise repairing and improving such farm, so that it may be suitable to be used as a farm upon which to work the convicts committed to the county jail, and they shall employ a competent and suitable person to be known as foreman of county farm to superintend such convict farm and manage it and to work the convicts sentenced to the county jail thereon. The board of supervisors in each county shall also have full and complete authority to buy, or rent necessary mules or horses, tractors, farming tools and implements and all other necessary things incidental to the successful operation of such convict farm in such numbers and amounts as they may reasonably contemplate will be necessary to successfully operate such farm, having in view, first, the continuous employment of all the convicts able to work thereon at remunerative labor, and second, the operation of said farm in the most economical manner consistent with the continuous working of such convicts.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 814; 1906, § 870; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4030; 1930, § 4060; 1942, § 7901; Laws, 1900, ch. 100; Laws, 1906, ch. 100; Laws, 1908, ch. 168.
Cross References —
Constitutional prohibition against hiring or leasing county convicts, see Miss. Const. Art. 10, § 226.
Taxation of county farm lying within drainage district, see §51-31-103.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The operation of a county convict farm is a governmental rather than a proprietary function and for that reason no tort liability lay against the county or the board of supervisors as an entity where negligence of the farm superintendent resulted in serious injuries to a minor prisoner, even though Code 1942, § 7904 specifically required the board of supervisors to establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, and safekeeping of prisoners. Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10984 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866, 92 S. Ct. 83, 30 L. Ed. 2d 110, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1971).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Section 47-1-5 clearly gives a county board of supervisors sole authority to create, control, and maintain a county convict farm. Best, July 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0343.
§ 47-1-7. Boards of supervisors of contiguous counties may own farm jointly; working prisoners in another county.
In any county where there are not a sufficient number of convicts to make it economically feasible for such county to own and operate a county convict farm as provided for by law, the board of supervisors of any such county may agree with the board of supervisors of any contiguous county to own and operate in common with such contiguous county, a county convict farm upon which prisoners of both such counties may be detained and required to work. In like manner the board of supervisors of any county in which there are not a sufficient number of convicts to make it economically feasible to own and operate a county convict farm, may make similar arrangements with any city, town or village within said county to own and operate said farm in connection with said city, town or village. In any county where there are not a sufficient number of convicts to make it economically feasible for such county to own a farm or to own and operate a farm with a contiguous county or with a city or town, the board of supervisors of such county may contract with the board of supervisors of any contiguous county or with any county in the same circuit or chancery court district, to have its prisoners worked by the contiguous county or counties in the same circuit or chancery court district upon payment made to the board of supervisors of such contiguous county or counties in the same circuit or chancery court district for the purpose of detaining and working such prisoners. The terms of such a contract are to be agreed upon by and between the two contracting boards and the same shall not be in violation of the law. Where the board of supervisors of one county so contracts to work convicts of another county, all the provisions of Sections 47-1-1 through 47-1-37, Sections 47-1-41, 47-1-45, 47-1-47, and 47-1-61, Mississippi Code of 1972, and Section 226 of the Constitution in regard to the working of convicts shall apply to the convicts contracted for as herein provided; and the name of the convict or convicts may be entered on the jail docket of the county contracting to detain and work the convict or convicts, together with all other information required by Section 47-1-21.
HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, § 4038; 1930, § 4062; 1942, § 7903; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 1936, ch. 269; Laws, 1960, ch. 283.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-9. Convicts may be worked on public roads or other county public works.
In any county where it is clearly more advantageous to the county to work the county convicts or some of them on the public roads of the county, or on other works of the county exclusively public in their character, the board of supervisors shall have the authority so to order, and in such cases the board shall establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, safekeeping, clothing, housing and subsistence of convicts while so working, and shall provide all the necessary equipment for such purpose. The board shall establish regulations for the discipline of convicts on said works, and on county farms, when a convict is persistently idle or refractory, and may enforce such regulations by penalties.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 784; 1906, § 843; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4018; 1930, § 4063; 1942, § 7904; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
Cross References —
Constitutional authority to work convicts on public roads, see Miss. Const. Art. 4, § 85.
Constitutional prohibition against hiring county convicts, see Miss. Const. Art. 10, § 226.
Leasing or hiring convicts unlawful, see §47-1-19.
Working of municipal prisoners, see §47-1-41.
Working state prisoners on certain roads, see §§47-5-129,47-5-131.
Use of offenders as servants prohibited, see §47-5-137.
Use of prisoners in county jails to pick up trash, see §§47-5-431 et seq.
Use of prisoners in county jails to maintain certain historic cemeteries and serve food in conjunction with nonprofit organizations, see §47-5-441.
Working public roads with county convicts, see §65-7-113.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The operation of a county convict farm is a governmental rather than a proprietary function and for that reason no tort liability lay against the county or the board of supervisors as an entity where negligence of the farm superintendent resulted in serious injuries to a minor prisoner, even though Code 1942, § 7904 specifically required the board of supervisors to establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, and safekeeping of prisoners. Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10984 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866, 92 S. Ct. 83, 30 L. Ed. 2d 110, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1971).
The superintendent of a county convict farm was negligent and liable in tort for his failure to instruct a trustee guard in the proper and safe handling of firearms, where the shotgun which the guard was carrying accidentally discharged and caused serious injuries to a minor prisoner. Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10984 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866, 92 S. Ct. 83, 30 L. Ed. 2d 110, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 1392 (U.S. 1971).
Convict held entitled to credit of $1 for each day physically able and willing to work, although supervisors failed to furnish him work. Ex parte Jackson, 177 Miss. 509, 171 So. 545, 1937 Miss. LEXIS 138 (Miss. 1937).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Based on Section47-1-9, as a general rule, county inmates may not be worked on private property, even if such work benefits the public. However, the Mississippi Emergency Management Law, codified at §33-15-1, et. seq., is an exception to the general rule if the governing authorities determine that an emergency exists and there is a need to use the services of prisoners to protect life or property. Price, December 13, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0793.
Absent an emergency declaration, the use of county inmates for labor by the sheriff must be effected on projects “exclusively public in nature.” Waggoner, Nov. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0718.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 162 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-11. Convicts physically unable shall not be required to work.
If any convict committed to the county jail is physically unable to do any kind of manual labor, then, upon the certificate of the county health officer or physician designated by the board of supervisors of the county, to this effect, such convict shall not be required, during the period of such physical disability, to perform manual labor on the convict farm. But all convicts shall be required each day to do and perform such work as they are physically able to do and perform and which will not impair the health of such convict, or as is not inhumane to require of him.
HISTORY: Codes, 1930, § 4064; 1942, § 7905; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
A sheriff is only a custodian of his prisoners and he cannot release any prisoner for the purpose of allowing the prisoner to seek treatment in a hospital. Hegwood v. State, 213 Miss. 693, 57 So. 2d 500, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1952).
A prisoner who was convicted of unlawful possession of liquors and who was released by the sheriff to allow the prisoner to seek private hospital care, was an escapee and he was not entitled to credit upon his sentence for fine and costs for the time spent away from jail. Hegwood v. State, 213 Miss. 693, 57 So. 2d 500, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1952).
Declaration against sheriff and surety for maltreatment of prisoner resulting in prisoner’s death, in that sheriff took deceased into custody knowing he was ill and placed him at work on public roads, held insufficient in not sufficiently charging that prevention of deceased’s wife from giving him food and medicine while in jail caused death and in not charging he did not have medical attention and wholesome food. State ex rel. Trigg v. West, 171 Miss. 203, 157 So. 81, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1934).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Rights of prisoners under Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. 163 A.L.R. Fed. 285.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-13. By contract county may work under guard certain prisoners before indictment and conviction.
Any person being held in the county jail in default of bail to await trial, except those held for treason, murder, arson, or rape, and except such as the sheriff may deem it improper to let out, may on application to the sheriff of the county, be allowed to work on the county farm or on the public roads or other county public works as other convicts are worked and at the same wage. The board of supervisors shall settle with prisoners so working at their regular meetings monthly. But if it appears that it is not to the best interest of the county to work such prisoners, the board may decline at any time to employ them.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 808; 1906, § 864; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4040; 1930, § 4068; 1942, § 7909.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Pretrial detainee’s failure to receive compensation for his work on private property, over and above compensation he actually received, did not constitute deprivation of cognizable property right under §§47-1-13 and47-1-21. Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11455 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S. Ct. 359, 136 L. Ed. 2d 251, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 6445 (U.S. 1996).
The inmate showed no property interest or legal right for payment for the work that he performed while incarcerated for civil contempt so as to establish a deprivation of a property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment because Miss. Code Ann. §47-1-13 required payment for work performed by pretrial detainees, and the inmate was not a pretrial detainee; further, Miss. Code Ann. §47-1-47 required credit for assessed fines and penalties based on work performed by those convicted of crimes, and the inmate was not working off an assessed fine or penalty. Carite v. Hinds County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50112 (S.D. Miss. July 21, 2006).
Pretrial detainee’s failure to receive compensation for his work on public private property constituted deprivation of cognizable property right under §§47-1-13 and47-1-21 whereby pretrial detainee who is permitted to work on public property must be paid same wages as other prisoners. Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11455 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S. Ct. 359, 136 L. Ed. 2d 251, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 6445 (U.S. 1996).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 178, 179.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-15. Deductions from sentence for efficient work.
Any convict working under the direction of the board of supervisors who renders efficient services and complies with all necessary rules and regulations may have deducted from the term of his imprisonment one-fourth (1/4) thereof.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 783; 1906, § 842; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4017; 1930, § 4066; 1942, § 7907; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 1932, ch. 199.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Where appellant was sentenced to consecutive four-year sentences for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery in May 2000, the court did not have authority to grant his motion for a reduction of sentence filed in October 2004; there was no question that the term during which the circuit court sentenced appellant expired in that four-year time period, and as such, the circuit court lacked authority to suspend his sentence. Walters v. State, 933 So. 2d 313, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 494 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Former portion of statute which authorized the board of supervisors to commute one half of the term of imprisonment of a prisoner who was crippled or incapacitated was unconstitutional as an infringement upon the pardoning power vested in the governor. Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 73 So. 2d 137, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 568 (Miss. 1954).
A sheriff is only a custodian of his prisoners and he cannot release any prisoner for the purpose of allowing the prisoner to seek treatment in a hospital. Hegwood v. State, 213 Miss. 693, 57 So. 2d 500, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1952).
A prisoner who was convicted of unlawful possession of liquors and who was released by the sheriff to allow the prisoner to seek private hospital care, was an escapee and he was not entitled to credit upon his sentence for fine and costs for the time spent away from jail. Hegwood v. State, 213 Miss. 693, 57 So. 2d 500, 1952 Miss. LEXIS 413 (Miss. 1952).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-221.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-17. When convict not credited with wages.
No convict shall be credited with any wages during the time of his or her escape; and if any convict escapes while being worked on a public road, or works or county farm, he or she may be pursued and retaken by any person, or officer authorized to make arrests, or board, or any one entitled to the custody or services of said convict; and when retaken such convict shall be required to work out the balance of his term of hire, not counting the period of such escape, even if the term of imprisonment and the time for which such convict was first hired had expired before the recapture. Such convict shall be liable to indictment for such escape and liable to the same punishment as for an escape from the custody of the county jail.
HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 873; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4032; 1930, § 4067; 1942, § 7908; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 1932, ch. 246.
Cross References —
Escape and recapture of county convicts, see §97-9-43.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escape § 27.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 149.
§ 47-1-19. Leasing or hiring convicts unlawful; lawful public service work.
- It is unlawful for any county-housed state inmate or county prisoner or prisoners to be leased or hired to any individual or corporation for any purpose whatsoever. Nor shall they be worked under any contractor; but in working them on county farms, or on the public roads or on any other work, which work must be of an exclusively public character, they shall be under exclusive official control and management.
-
- It is lawful for a state, county or municipality to provide prisoners for public service work for nonprofit charitable organizations as defined under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code if that nonprofit charitable organization provides food to charities. In addition, it is lawful for a state, county or municipality to provide prisoners for public service work for churches according to criteria approved by the Department of Corrections.
- The prisoners participating in the public service work under paragraph (a) shall remain under the exclusive control and management of the county or municipality.
- A prisoner performing public service work under this subsection shall be entitled to earned credits as provided under this chapter.
HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 4014, 4016; 1930, § 4057; 1942, § 7898; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 1997, ch. 383, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 377, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 364, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2008.
Amendment Notes —
The 2005 amendment substituted “It is unlawful for any county-housed state inmate” for “It shall be unlawful for any county prisoner or prisoners” in the first sentence of (1); and inserted “state” preceding “county or municipality” in (2)(a).
The 2008 amendment added the last sentence in (2)(a).
Cross References —
Constitutional prohibition against hiring county convicts, see Miss. Const. Art. 10, § 226.
Prisoners permitted to work on public roads or other public works, see §47-1-9.
Working of municipal prisoners, see §47-1-41.
Use of offenders as servants prohibited, see §47-5-431 et seq.
User of prisoners in county jails to pick up trash, see §§47-5-431 et seq.
Use of prisoners in county jails to maintain certain historic cemeteries and serve food in conjunction with nonprofit organizations, see §47-5-441.
Federal Aspects—
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Miss. Code Section 47-1-19 prohibits agreement to hire out prisoners to HUD subcontractor. Best, Feb. 18, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0940.
Prisoners may not generally be worked on private property, except a municipality may provide prisoners for public service work for nonprofit charitable organizations to provide food to charities, and prisoners may be worked on private property during emergency situations pursuant to the Mississippi Emergency Management Law. Pickens, July 3, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0365.
A private corporation may not employ county prisoners to provide food services for the jail in which such prisoners are incarcerated even if such prisoners are compensated for such work. McWilliams, July 25, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0437.
A county prisoner under the supervision and charge of the sheriff, may not, with the sheriff’s approval, wash and clean the private automobile of a constable that is used by the constable in the performance of his official duties. Manning, September 4, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0542.
County inmates may not voluntarily perform work for private individuals on private property, such as personal automobiles or private land. Huffman, September 4, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0547.
County prisoners may not be used to wash and clean vehicles owned by private citizens, even if for a nominal consideration. Griffith, November 25, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0726.
A county board of supervisors is not authorized to include in a request for proposals to pick up and dispose of garbage any language regarding the county providing prisoners to pick up the garbage. Shepard, Feb. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0069.
When a government official leases or hires out inmate labor to a private citizen or company, he is guilty of a violation of the statute. McLeod, March 17, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0142.
Absent an emergency declaration, the use of county inmates for labor by the sheriff must be effected on projects “exclusively public in nature.” Waggoner, Nov. 30, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0718.
County inmates in the custody of the sheriff would not be allowed to work on properties of aa nonprofit charitable organization that does not provide food to charities. Griffith, Sept. 26, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0496.
Whether or not any specific organization is a nonprofit charitable organization that provides food to charities is a factual determination that cannot be made by official opinion. Assuming that a County Community Action Program meets the requirements of this section, then the county inmates in the custody of the sheriff would be allowed to work on such properties. Griffith, Oct. 30, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0567.
County inmates may not be allowed to perform “grass cutting” for any churches and/or nonprofit charitable organizations as defined under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Meadows, Oct. 28, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0422.
If it is determined that an organization that provides shelter for battered women and children has indeed obtained 501(c)(3) status as a nonprofit charitable organization, the sheriff can utilize county inmates for requested construction purposes, provided those inmates are under the exclusive control and management of the sheriff. Lawrence, Dec. 16, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0618.
Section 47-1-19 does not establish work programs, but merely recognizes that inmates will be worked when sentenced to jail. Once sentenced to jail, it is up to the custodian of the jail to determine whether and when to work the inmate in a public service work program. Nowak, July 28, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0268.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-21. Sheriff to keep a jail docket; what to contain.
The sheriff of each county shall keep a well bound alphabetical jail docket. In it he shall promptly enter under the proper initial the name, age, color and sex of each convict, the date of his or her commitment, each day worked on the county farm, time required to be served and amount of fine and costs and the jail fees charged against the prisoner and the date of discharge.
The sheriff shall submit his docket to the board of supervisors at each of their regular meetings, and the same shall be examined carefully by the president of the board, and by any other members who desire to examine the same, in the presence of the board while in session.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 800; 1906, § 858; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4024; 1930, § 4071; 1942, § 7912; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Pretrial detainee’s failure to receive compensation for his work on private property, over and above compensation he actually received, did not constitute deprivation of cognizable property right under §§47-1-13 and47-1-21. Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11455 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S. Ct. 359, 136 L. Ed. 2d 251, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 6445 (U.S. 1996).
Pretrial detainee’s failure to receive compensation for his work on public private property constituted deprivation of cognizable property right under §§47-1-13 and47-1-21 whereby pretrial detainee who is permitted to work on public property must be paid same wages as other prisoners. Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11455 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948, 117 S. Ct. 359, 136 L. Ed. 2d 251, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 6445 (U.S. 1996).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The jail docket may be computerized, but a copy should be printed and kept in a bound volume. Womack, Apr. 18, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0176.
A sheriff’s public “Jail Docket” is for the purpose of maintaining a record of individuals housed on criminal charges. The identity of an individual housed because of a civil commitment due to mental or drug and alcohol proceedings is not required to be entered in the “Jail Docket,” and the sheriff may maintain a separate “Mental Commitment” docket. Maples, March 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00073, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 77.
§ 47-1-23. The sexes to be kept separate.
It shall be unlawful for convicts of different sexes to be confined or worked together.
HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 28, art. 3 (15); 1857, ch. 6, art. 131; 1871, § 237; 1880, § 3152; 1892, § 789; 1906, § 874; Hemingway’s 1917, §§ 4033, 4034; 1930, § 4072; 1942, § 7913; Laws, 1908, chs. 109, 169; Laws, 1968, ch. 552, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 29, 1968).
Cross References —
Constitutional authority for separation of the sexes in prisons, see Miss. Const. Art. 10, § 225.
Duty of sheriffs to provide separate rooms for the sexes, see §19-25-71.
Separation of sexes in municipal prisons, see §47-1-39.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 29, 30.
§ 47-1-25. Officers to have access to convicts.
Each county officer or officers, for any district of a county shall at all times have free access to convicts in the custody of any official for the purpose of investigating their condition and treatment. The sheriff or his deputies shall visit the convict camp or county farms where the convicts of his county are kept or worked at least once in every month and more often if necessary. He shall make a thorough inspection and investigation of the treatment of convicts and report the same in writing to the board of supervisors. For failure to perform duty in this respect the board of supervisors may fine the sheriff Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00).
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 799; 1906, § 857; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4023; 1930, § 4073; 1942, § 7914; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
When a convict has been placed on the county farm or road camp to work out a sentence, such convict comes under the immediate jurisdiction of the foreman or guard appointed by the board for that purpose and subject to the rules and regulations laid down by the board of supervisors. The sheriff loses direct control of the convict, but it is his duty, under the law, to keep up with the prisoners on such farms and in such camps in a supervisory way and see that they are being worked and treated in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the board. This appears to be the only duty imposed upon the sheriff by this section. Ops Atty Gen, 1933-35, p. 48.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 23, 24-28, 85, 87, 91.
24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 467, Proof of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 14, 24, 25, 59, 63-65, 68, 70, 79, 80, 116.
§ 47-1-27. Maltreatment forbidden.
An official, or guard, or other employee, having the custody of any county prisoner, or any official or employee of the county having custody of any county prisoner, who shall maltreat or abuse any such convict, or who shall knowingly permit the same to be done, or who being under duty to provide sufficient and wholesome food, clothing, shelter, bathing facilities, or medical attention to such convict, shall wilfully fail to furnish the same to such convict, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than Ten Dollars ($10.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or shall be imprisoned not less than one (1) month, or shall suffer both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, and it shall be the duty of the judge of the circuit court of such county to so charge the grand jury.
HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 877; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4035; 1930, § 4074; 1942, § 7915; Laws, 1896, ch. 88; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
Cross References —
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
In order to establish a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause based on a claim of excessive use of force by prison officers, a prisoner who shows unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain is not required to show serious injury, given that (a) the absence of serious injury, although relevant to the inquiry as to whether the use of force violated the Eighth Amendment, does not end that inquiry, and (b) contemporary standards of decency are always violated when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, regardless of whether significant injury is evident. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1372 (U.S. 1992).
Blows allegedly directed at the inmate by the security officers were not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes, and the extent of the inmate’s alleged injuries provided no basis for dismissal of the inmate’s claim against the officers under 42 USCS § 1983. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1372 (U.S. 1992).
For purposes of establishing whether prison officials have inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering on a prisoner so as to violate the prisoner’s rights under the cruel and unusual punishment clause, where the officials are accused of using excessive physical force, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied (a) in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or (b) maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1372 (U.S. 1992).
Declaration against sheriff and surety for maltreatment of prisoner resulting in prisoner’s death, in that sheriff took deceased into custody knowing he was ill and placed him at work on public roads, held insufficient in not sufficiently charging that prevention of deceased’s wife from giving him food and medicine while in jail caused death and in not charging he did not have medical attention and wholesome food. State ex rel. Trigg v. West, 171 Miss. 203, 157 So. 81, 1934 Miss. LEXIS 205 (Miss. 1934).
A convict committed to a county convict farm cannot be whipped for discipline in the absence of authority from the board of supervisors for the infliction of such punishment, under Acts 1894 ch 76 §§ 23 and 24. Davis v. State, 81 Miss. 56, 33 So. 286, 1902 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 1902).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Prisoners’ privileges of mail, telephone, visitation, access to law library and recreation are not addressed by state statute. Mullins, March 27, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0159.
A sheriff may provide a meal from the county jail at no cost to the members of the grand jury as part of their inspection of the county jail. Caranna, April 21, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0207.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Reviewability before trial of order denying qualified immunity to defendant sued in state court under 42 USCS § 1983. 49 A.L.R.5th 717.
Attorney’s fees awards under § 803(d) of Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(d). 165 A.L.R. Fed. 551.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 23 et seq.
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Prisoners' Rights Litigation.
24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 467, Proof of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 14, 24, 25, 26, 50, 59, 63-65, 68, 70, 79, 80, 116, 123, 124.
§ 47-1-29. Complaint of convicts investigated.
On complaint by or on behalf of any convict to any county or county district officer, that such convict had been improperly treated in any respect, it shall be the duty of such officer at once to investigate the complaint, and if it is believed to be well founded, to report the facts to the president of the board of supervisors, or to the board in session. Upon such report the board shall cite the person complained of to appear before it, and such action shall be taken by the board as shall be proper.
HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3180; 1892, § 798; 1906, § 856; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4022; 1930, § 4075; 1942, § 7916: Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
Cross References —
Judicial powers of board of supervisors, see §19-3-39.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 23 et seq., 181 et seq.
24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 467, Proof of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 127.
§ 47-1-31. Grand jury to examine records and treatment of prisoners.
Each grand jury which is impaneled shall examine the records of county prisoners and their treatment and condition and report the same to the court.
HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 871; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4031; 1930, § 4076; 1942, § 7917; Laws, 1896, ch. 133; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 1983, ch. 499, § 25, eff from and after July 1, 1983.
Cross References —
Personal inspection of county jail by grand jury, see §13-5-55.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury §§ 25 et seq.
CJS.
38A C.J.S., Grand Juries §§ 88 et seq.
§ 47-1-33. Each convict to have evidence of term of sentence and amount of fine.
The sheriff on receiving each convict shall furnish such convict with a certificate showing the amount of the fine and costs, as far as the costs are then known, the beginning and length of his term of imprisonment. The convict shall be allowed to have and keep such certificate on or about his person, if he so desires.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 806; 1906, § 862; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4027; 1930, § 4077; 1942, § 7918; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Convict manager cannot detain convict without warrant although there has been a conviction and sentence has not expired. Ex parte Moody, 104 Miss. 836, 61 So. 741, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 86 (Miss. 1913).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 23-28.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17-21, 23-25, 128, 129.
§ 47-1-35. County farms operating at loss, disposition of.
- The board of supervisors of any county that now maintains and operates a county penal farm, commonly known as a “county farm,” which farm contains more than five hundred (500) acres and less than six hundred (600) acres of land, which said farm has been continuously operating at a loss to the county for a period of five (5) years or more, and provided said county contains at least four hundred (400) square miles of territory and less than four hundred twenty-five (425) square miles of territory within its boundaries, shall sell, at public sale after receiving bids as required by law for the letting of public contracts, to the highest and best bidder for cash, said county farm; provided, however, that the said board shall retain for the benefit of the county and shall reserve from said sale, at least one-half (1/2) of the mineral rights and interests in said lands, with full right in the said board, in its discretion, to lease said retained and reserved mineral interests and rights, to the highest and best bidder after receiving bids therefor in the same manner, at the same or any other time.
- Any and all amounts received from such sale of said lands and from such lease of said mineral interests or rights, shall be, on receipt by the board, applied to the payment of the bonded indebtedness of said county.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7901-01; Laws, 1946, ch. 312, §§ 1, 2, eff December 31, 1946.
Cross References —
Authority of board of supervisors to buy or lease land for county farm, see §47-1-5.
§ 47-1-37. Board of supervisors may hire additional labor to work on county farm.
In the cultivation of crops and the gathering thereof if it shall appear necessary, from the lack of convict labor, the board of supervisors may employ free labor at current prices to work on a county convict farm until such time as the convict labor may become sufficient to complete and gather the crops started on such a farm, and pay for the same out of the county treasury.
HISTORY: Codes, 1906, § 878; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4036; 1930, § 4061; 1942, § 7902; Laws, 1902, ch. 64; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
§ 47-1-39. Municipal prison and prisoners; municipality to pay expenses of jail officer education courses.
- The governing authorities of municipalities shall have the power to construct and maintain a municipal prison, and to regulate the keeping of the same and the prisoners therein, and to contract with the board of supervisors, which is empowered in the premises, for the use of the county jail by the municipality; and to provide for the working of the streets by municipal prisoners, and to contract with the county for such work by county prisoners or the working of county roads by municipal prisoners, or for working same on the county farms. Municipal prisoners shall be worked on county roads or county farms only in the county in which the municipality is situated. Males and females shall be confined in separate cells or compartments.
- The municipality shall pay the tuition, living and travel expenses incurred by a person attending and participating in the basic and continuing education courses for jail officers.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 2954; 1906, § 3345; Hemingway’s 1917, § 5842; 1930, § 2421; 1942, § 3374-135; Laws, 1950, ch. 491, § 135; Laws, 1964, ch. 543; Laws, 1968, ch. 552, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 319, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 515, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2000.
Cross References —
Separation of sexes, see §47-1-23.
Jail owned jointly by county and municipality, see §§47-1-49 et seq.
Residency of prisoner as affected by incarceration in facility of Department of Corrections, see §47-1-63.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Where defendant pleaded guilty for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors in violation of municipal ordinance and received suspended sentence, the order revoking the suspended sentence of thirty days in county jail and providing that defendant should be committed to sheriff to serve sentence in county jail was not proper. Gage v. State, 219 Miss. 338, 68 So. 2d 417, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 393 (Miss. 1953).
Municipality held not liable for injury to prisoner, because of being forced to work on streets while shackled and chained. Warren v. Booneville, 151 Miss. 457, 118 So. 290, 1928 Miss. LEXIS 322 (Miss. 1928).
Under this section, Code 1942 § 3374-135, a city is not obliged to maintain its own jail, but may dispose of its prisoners in other ways. Marshall v. Mayor, etc., of Meridian, 103 Miss. 206, 60 So. 135, 1912 Miss. LEXIS 153 (Miss. 1912).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
City that arrests persons through its municipal police department must either house them in its own city jail or enter into contract with county board of supervisors to house city prisoners in county jail; sheriff may be required to accept persons sentenced to jail by city court only if city has contract with board of supervisors for such. Brown, July 29, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0561.
City is responsible for paying medical expenses of city prisoners housed in city jail, as long as they remain city prisoners; in felony cases, prisoner remains city prisoner until he waives preliminary hearing or is bound over to grand jury. Brewer, Oct. 7, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0532.
Sheriff may work municipal prisoners on county work crew only if municipality has contract with county which provides that sheriff may work municipal prisoners on county work crew. McGrew, Jan. 12, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0966.
County may refuse to accept municipal prisoners in absence of agreement between county and municipality. Crawford, March 31, 1994, A.G. Op. #94-0187.
A municipality may provide meals for county prisoners working on city streets pursuant to a contract between the city and the county executed pursuant to Section 47-1-39. Gale, March 1, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0053.
A municipality may furnish labor and all equipment necessary to install water/sewer lines and electrical services for a jail under an interlocal agreement as long as the municipality receives adequate consideration under the terms of the agreement. See Sections 17-5-1 and 21-17-1. Doty, December 13, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0834.
The board of supervisors of a county is granted sole authority to contract with a municipality for the housing of municipal prisoners and the sheriff is bound thereby; the sheriff may be required to accept persons sentenced to jail by the city court only if the city has a contract with the board of supervisors for such. Richardson, June 12, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0291.
A city may contract with a county regional correctional facility through the county board of supervisors to house city inmates and provide guard service for inmate work crews for the working of streets and other municipal projects in the city by entering into an interlocal agreement under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1974. Inmate work crews would have to consist of municipal inmates from the city or county inmates if the board of supervisors has authorized such work under Section 47-1-9. Any guard that is employed by the facility to oversee such work crews would have to be deputized by the county sheriff. Putman, Aug. 19, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0410.
A county board of supervisors is, by Section 47-1-39, granted sole authority to contract with a municipality for the housing of municipal prisoners and the sheriff is bound thereby. The sheriff may then accept persons sentenced to jail by the city court only if the city has a contract with the board for such. However, the county jail would not be allowed to house prisoners of a city, located outside of the county, unless an interlocal agreement is formed between the county and city pursuant to Sections 17-13-1 et seq. Kemp, Mar. 17, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0072.
A sheriff is only required to accept municipal prisoners in the county jail if the municipality has a contract with the board of supervisors to house that municipality’s prisoners. In addition, a board of supervisors is not required to enter into a contract with a municipality for the housing of the municipality’s prisoners. Tanner, Oct. 13, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0504.
Where a preliminary hearing is provided to a defendant charged for a felony and held as a municipal prisoner, the defendant should be bound over to a grand jury and thereby become a county prisoner after the hearing, if the judge so determines. Wiggins, March 2, 2007, A.G. Op. #07-00075, 2007 Miss. AG LEXIS 78.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-41. Working of municipal prisoners.
- Any person convicted of violating any ordinance of any city, town or village in this state and sentenced to pay a fine and costs therefor, and failing to do so, may be worked on the streets or other public works of the municipality in the custody of the street commissioner, or other person designated by the mayor and board of aldermen, or councilmen of such municipality and at its expense, and shall receive credit on such fine and costs as provided in Section 99-19-20 for each day so worked, and such municipality shall accord the same treatment to its convicts that is required by this chapter to county convicts. The responsibility of carrying out the provisions of this section shall devolve on the mayor and board of aldermen or board of councilmen of each municipality with reference to its convicts. In the event it is, in the judgment of the ruling authorities of any village in the state or of any small town in the state, unprofitable to work the convicts as above provided, then such village or town may contract with the board of supervisors of the county at the best price and take and work such convicts on the county farm, but the convict shall receive credit at the rate provided in Section 99-19-20 for each day worked.
- If a convict is unable to work or if the city, town or village is unable to provide work for the convict, the convict shall receive the credit provided in Section 99-19-20 for each day of confinement.
HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3185; 1892, § 813; 1906, § 869; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4029; 1930, § 4069; 1942, § 7910; Laws, 1918, ch. 154; Laws, 2010, ch. 492, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 7, 2010.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2010 amendment added the (1) designation, and therein, in the first sentence, substituted “may be worked” for “shall be worked,” substituted “Section 99-19-20” for “Section 47-1-47,” and in the last sentence, substituted “shall receive credit at the rate provided in Section 99-19-20 for each day worked” for “shall receive credit of one dollar ($1.00) per day for each day worked, although the county may not agree to pay so much”; and added (2).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-43. Keeping of county offenders in municipal jails pending trial.
The board of supervisors of any county and the governing authorities of any municipality located within such county are hereby authorized to enter into agreements providing for the keeping of persons arrested for offenses committed within the county in which such municipality is located in the jail facilities of such municipality pending trial of such person. Such agreements may provide for the payment to the municipality by the board of supervisors from any available funds of the county of a sum not to exceed Five Dollars ($5.00) for each day or part thereof during which an offender may be confined in the jail of the municipality.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 3374-135.5; Laws, 1968, ch. 288, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 27, 1968).
Cross References —
Residency of prisoner as affected by incarceration in facility of Department of Corrections, see §47-1-63.
§ 47-1-45. Board of supervisors may agree with municipalities of the county on terms of working municipal convicts.
The board of supervisors of each county is authorized to make contract with any village or small town within the county to work its convicts on the county farm. But in agreeing to take and work such convicts the board of supervisors shall not agree to pay more per day for the labor of any municipal convict than in its judgment the labor of such convict is worth to the county, in order that in the working of such municipal convicts the county shall not do so at a loss to the county.
HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3185; 1892, § 813; 1906, § 869; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4029; 1930, § 4070; 1942, § 7911; Laws, 1918, ch. 154.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-47. Credit allowed for labor of convicts; treatment.
- Every county or municipal convict shall be comfortably clothed at the expense of the county or municipality, but all clothing furnished shall remain the property of the county or municipality, and shall be thoroughly fumigated and disinfected before being allotted to a convict after having been used by another, and every convict shall be sufficiently fed, to maintain his body and induce his good health, with substantial and suitable food to be furnished and prepared and paid for by the county or municipality. Every convict, for each day’s work he is required to do, shall receive credit on his fine and costs assessed against him at the rate provided under Section 99-19-20, until such fine and costs are fully paid. In case the convict is serving a sentence of imprisonment, each day that he works in serving such sentence shall entitle him credit for equal time on his sentence of imprisonment, but in no instance shall a convict receive credit on the fine and costs and on the time sentenced to imprisonment for the same work. No convict shall be allowed to labor more than eight (8) hours per day, but shall be required, when able, to perform eight (8) hours labor each day.
- If a convict is unable to work or if the county or the municipality is unable to provide work for the convict, the convict shall receive the credit provided in Section 99-19-20 for each day of imprisonment.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 786; 1906, § 845; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4020; 1930, § 4065; 1942, § 7906; Laws, 1908, ch. 109; Laws, 1954, ch. 243; Laws, 1979, ch. 501, § 2; Laws, 2010, ch. 492, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 7, 2010.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2010 amendment added the (1) designation, and therein, in the second and third sentences, made minor stylistic changes, and in the second sentence, substituted “costs assessed against him at the rate provided under Section 99-19-20” for “costs assessed against him of ten dollars ($10.00) per day”; and added (2).
Cross References —
Enforcement of sentence, see §47-1-1.
Convicts physically unable not required to work, see §47-1-11.
Medical aid for prisoners, see §47-1-57.
Removal of prisoners in case of infectious disease, see §§47-3-7,47-3-9.
Clothing for persons working on state highway projects, see §65-1-8.
Authority for use of persons convicted of an offense for work on state highway projects, see §65-1-8.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The inmate showed no property interest or legal right for payment for the work that he performed while incarcerated for civil contempt so as to establish a deprivation of a property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment because Miss. Code Ann. §47-1-13 required payment for work performed by pretrial detainees, and the inmate was not a pretrial detainee; further, Miss. Code Ann. §47-1-47 required credit for assessed fines and penalties based on work performed by those convicted of crimes, and the inmate was not working off an assessed fine or penalty. Carite v. Hinds County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50112 (S.D. Miss. July 21, 2006).
Incarceration of indigent for involuntary failure to pay fine and court costs which extend the total term of imprisonment beyond the maximum period prescribed by state law for the offense creates invidious discrimination based on ability to pay and is violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wade v. Carsley, 433 F.2d 68, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6973 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).
Although incarceration beyond the maximum imprisonment prescribed by the state law for a particular offense for involuntary failure to pay a fine and court costs is violative of the Federal Constitution, the state can institute methods, other than incarceration, to enforce the collection of the remaining portion of the fine. Wade v. Carsley, 433 F.2d 68, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 6973 (5th Cir. Miss. 1970).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Miss. Code Section 47-1-47 provides that, for each day’s work convict is required to do, convict shall receive credit of $10 per day, until convict’s fine and costs are fully paid. Simmons, Jan 11, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0988.
Where inmate is physically willing and able to work, inmate is entitled to credit against fine and cost in amount of $10 per day, until such fine and cost are fully paid. Stewart, May 20, 1993, A.G. Op. #93-0255.
Prisoners’ privileges of mail, telephone, visitation, access to law library and recreation are not addressed by state statute. Mullins, March 27, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0159.
Where a defendant owes a $250.00 fine but refuses to pay it, he can be sent to jail under §99-19-20(2); however, that statute limits the jail time to 10 days (one day for each $25.00 of the fine). If the defendant chooses to work during those 10 days, his fine will be reduced by $10.00 a day under this section. At the end of the 10 days, the defendant must be released. However, he will still owe $150.00 in fines. Thornton, May 29, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0306.
A defendant who is jailed for not paying criminal fines is entitled to receive a credit against such fine of ten dollars per day under this section for each day that he works or is willing and able to work; this credit would be applied to both fines and assessments. Note that under Section 99-19-20 jail time may not exceed one day for each twenty-five dollars of the fines owed by the defendant. Strahan, July 7, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0321.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-221.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102 et seq.
Law Reviews.
1979 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Criminal Law and Procedure. 50 Miss. L. J. 763, December 1979.
§ 47-1-49. Control over jails owned jointly by municipalities and counties.
In the case of a jail owned jointly by a county and municipality, under the provisions of Section 17-5-1, the governing authorities of the county and municipality are hereby vested with full and complete authority, jurisdiction and control over such jointly owned jail facility and the governing authority of the municipality may appoint a jailer who shall be responsible for all municipal prisoners lodged in said jail in the same manner in which the sheriff is responsible for state prisoners, and such jailer shall have the same right of access to the jail as the sheriff.
HISTORY: Codes, 1857, ch. 6, art. 136; 1871, § 242; 1880, § 342; 1892, § 4132; 1906, § 4684; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3101; 1930, § 3331; 1942, § 4256; Laws, 1966, ch. 369, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1966).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Since the functions of the sheriff are confined to his own county, except in the case of the pursuit of an escaping offender, there can be no recovery on a sheriff’s bond for the alleged unlawful treatment of one accused of crime apprehended in another state where such treatment and the event complained of occurred in such other state. McLean v. Mississippi, 96 F.2d 741, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 3552 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 623, 59 S. Ct. 84, 83 L. Ed. 399, 1938 U.S. LEXIS 805 (U.S. 1938), disapproved, Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167, 1939 U.S. LEXIS 77 (U.S. 1939).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
70 Am. Jur. 2d, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables §§ 30, 31.
CJS.
80 C.J.S., Sheriffs and Constables §§ 51-53.
§ 47-1-51. Jointly owned jails; jail supplies.
The jailer of a jail jointly owned by a county and a municipality shall, in regard to municipal prisoners, provide daily wholesome and sufficient food and drink, fire and lights when necessary and proper, and sufficient and clean bedding for all such prisoners committed to the jail, either before or after conviction. Any prisoner may, if he thinks fit, supply himself with meat and drink and bedding, but the same shall pass through the hands of the jailer to the prisoner.
HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 28, art. 3 (15); 1857, ch. 6, art. 131; 1871, § 237; 1880, § 343; 1892, § 4136; 1906, § 4687; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3104; 1930, § 3334; 1942, § 4259; Laws, 1896, p. 153; Laws, 1966, ch. 369, § 2; Laws, 1968, ch. 552, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 29, 1968).
Cross References —
Personal inspection of jail by grand jury, see §13-5-55.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 181-185.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 19-21, 23-25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 46-49, 63, 97, 102.
§ 47-1-53. [Reserved].
In the case of a jail jointly owned by a county and a municipality, the circuit judge in the district in which such jail is located, upon the request and recommendation of either the sheriff of the county or the marshal or chief of police of the municipality involved in the joint ownership, may authorize additional jail guards in cases of emergency and the cost thereof shall be paid in equal proportions by the county and municipality involved.
HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinsons’s 1848, ch. 28, art. 6(31); 1857, ch. 6, art. 135; 1871, § 241; 1880, § 344; 1892, § 4138; 1906, § 4689; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3106; 1930, § 3336; 1942, § 4261; Laws, 1966, ch. 369, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1966).
§ 47-1-57. Furnishing of medical aid to prisoners; nurse screening for county prisoner for nonemergency medical complaints.
- When any person confined in jail shall be in need of medical or surgical aid, the sheriff shall immediately examine the condition of such prisoner and, if he is of the opinion that the prisoner needs such aid, he shall call in a nurse or physician to attend him. If the prisoner be unable to pay the cost, the account of the nurse or physician, when allowed and certified as required in respect to accounts of sheriffs for keeping prisoners, shall be paid, in like manner, out of the treasury of the county in which a prisoner is charged with the crime for which he is imprisoned. The board of supervisors may contract with a physician for the jail by the year.
- The board of supervisors of any county may authorize the sheriff to establish a program under which prisoners expressing the need for non-emergency medical attention will have access to a registered nurse who will evaluate their condition and determine the necessity for treatment by a physician. Charges for such a visit with a registered nurse shall be paid by the prisoner by deductions made by the sheriff out of any funds of the prisoner held by the sheriff or in any other manner satisfactory to the sheriff; however, such prisoner shall not be required to pay out of funds of the prisoner held by the sheriff, more than Ten Dollars ($10.00) per visit. If the prisoner is unable to pay the cost, the cost shall be paid out of the county treasury in the same manner as provided for payment of other medical costs in subsection (1) of this section.
HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 28, art. 8; 1857, ch. 6, art. 132; 1871, § 238; 1880, § 345; 1892, § 4139; 1906, § 4690; Hemingway’s 1917, § 3107; 1930, § 3337; 1942, § 4262; Laws, 1940, ch. 262; Laws, 1956, ch. 194; Laws, 1994, ch. 642, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 8, 1994).
Cross References —
Personal inspection of health of prisoners by grand jury, see §13-5-55.
General treatment of prisoners, see §47-1-47.
Removal of prisoners in case of infectious disease, see §§47-3-7,47-3-9.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
A complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a prisoner’s medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. McFadden v. State, 542 So. 2d 871, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1989).
Where neither the sheriff nor the jailer ever examined the prisoner to form an opinion as to whether he did or did not need medical aid, the sheriff was not relieved from liability for death of prisoner who was suffering from ulcers, on the ground that the sheriff was acting in judicial capacity. Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 465 (Miss. 1955).
This section [Code 1942, § 4262], has no application to a case where a prisoner, shot by a deputy sheriff while attempting to escape, is carried to his mother’s house and is there treated by a physician procured by the sheriff at the suggestion of the circuit judge. Gray v. Coahoma County, 72 Miss. 303, 16 So. 903, 1894 Miss. LEXIS 118 (Miss. 1894).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Nothing prohibits the county from submitting a claim to an insurance carrier for the costs incurred by an inmate who has insurance. Fortier, Aug. 30, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0490.
Sheriffs are required to provide reasonable and necessary dental aid to prisoners suffering from illnesses or injuries which dental assistance would alleviate; however, sheriffs are not required to provide routine dental work for prisoners. McLean, May 3, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0298.
Sheriffs are required to provide reasonable medical care for serious pre-existing illnesses and injuries of prisoners and detainees. McLean, May 3, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0298.
Pursuant to Section 47-1-57 the board of supervisors may contract with a physician for the jail and the sheriff must use that physician. The funds used to pay for such a physician should come from the county general fund. However, the cost of the contract should not be borne by the sheriff’s budget unless funds are included in the budget for the contract as for medical expenses covered by the contract. Pope, October 11, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0654.
Municipalities are liable for health care and hospitalization costs of indigent prisoners with preexisting medical conditions. Davies, March 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0095.
The responsibility for medical expenses incurred by a municipal prisoner lies with the prisoner; if the prisoner is determined indigent and unable to pay his medical expenses, then the municipality has the responsibility for those medical costs. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the responsibility for the medical costs of a municipal prisoner housed in the county jail remains with the municipality. Davis, December 18, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0741.
If a prisoner is unable to pay medical costs, the municipality should pay such costs. If the municipality determines that the prisoner is able to pay for the medical treatment, it may seek reimbursement by civil suit. Miller, Aug. 20, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0387.
A governmental entity is not responsible for the medical care of an individual who is no longer in the custody of that entity. As a former inmate is no longer in custody, a governmental entity is not responsible for their medical care. Parker, Sept. 17, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0444.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Right of state prison authorities to administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs to prisoner without his or her consent – state cases. 75 A.L.R.4th 1124.
Malpractice in diagnosis or treatment of meningitis. 51 A.L.R.5th 301.
Provision of Hormone Therapy or Sexual Reassignment Surgery to State Inmates with Gender Identity Disorder (GID). 89 A.L.R.6th 701.
Relief under Federal Civil Rights Acts to state prisoners complaining of denial of medical care. 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279.
Constitutional right of prisoners to abortion services and facilities – federal cases. 90 A.L.R. Fed. 683.
Federal constitutional and statutory claims by HIV-positive inmates as to medical treatment or conditions of confinement. 162 A.L.R. Fed. 181.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 99.
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Prisoners' Rights Litigation.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 78 et seq.
§ 47-1-59. Hospitalization of prisoners; expenses.
- When the sheriff, marshal or any other peace officer of this state has in his lawful custody a prisoner who, through accident, injury or illness, is in need of hospitalization, such officer may take such prisoner to the nearest hospital in the county or if there be no hospital in that county, to the nearest hospital in an adjacent county and if upon arrival at such hospital any physician licensed to practice medicine in this state certifies that in his opinion such prisoner is in need of hospitalization, such prisoner shall be hospitalized in such hospital for as long as in the opinion of such physician it is necessary to so hospitalize such prisoner. If, in the opinion of the sheriff or other peace officer having custody of such prisoner at the time he is delivered to the aforesaid hospital, or in the opinion of the director of the university hospital if the prisoner be brought to that institution, it is necessary that he be placed under guard while a patient at such hospital, the sheriff of the county in which the crime he was placed in custody for committing was alleged to have taken place, shall furnish the aforesaid guard. When the aforesaid physician or other reputable physician shall certify that hospitalization no longer is needed, the prisoner shall be returned to the original place of detention.
- The actual expense of guarding the prisoner in the hospital shall be paid out of the general funds of the county where the prisoner was originally confined or arrested. The expense contracted incident to the hospitalization aforesaid shall be paid by the prisoner; otherwise he may be hospitalized as a state aid patient. However, if the prisoner is ineligible for state aid or the amount available for hospitalization as a state aid patient is inadequate to pay all such hospital expense of a prisoner who is financially unable to pay his own expenses, the board of supervisors of the county where the prisoner was originally confined or arrested shall, upon presentation of the certificate of the physician certifying that said prisoner was in need of hospitalization, pay from the general funds of the county the reasonable and customary charges for such services or as much thereof as is not paid by state aid. Any such payment to a hospital shall be discretionary with the board of supervisors if its county supports the hospital involved by a special tax levy for its operation and maintenance.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4262.5; Laws, 1954, ch. 245, §§ 1, 2; Laws, 1956, ch. 310; Laws, 1964, ch. 369, § 1; Laws, 1966, ch. 370, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 401, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 23, 1971).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
County was not entitled to a dismissal of a health care provider’s reimbursement claim for a prisoner’s medical expenses under Miss. Code Ann. §47-1-59 because such claims were separate and distinct from the state’s law related to sovereign immunity and the claims were not implied contractual claims subject to immunity under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-3. Vuncannon v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 2d 577, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52190 (N.D. Miss. 2009).
In an action to recover on a promissory note, where the plaintiff attempted to convert its cause of action, by way of motion for summary judgment, from a suit on a promissory note to one for relief under §47-1-59, such a change could not be accomplished in this manner and the proper procedure was for the plaintiff to amend its bill of complaint to allege that a cause of action existed under §47-1-59. Pearl River County Bd. of Supervisors v. South East Collections Agency, Inc., 459 So. 2d 785, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1977 (Miss. 1984).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Based on Section 47-1-59, a suspect who is in the custody of a law enforcement agency and needs medical attention has the responsibility for paying for his own medical bills. If the suspect is indigent and cannot pay his own medical bills, then he should be treated as a state aid patient. If the suspect does not qualify for state aid or state aid does not cover the full medical expenses, then the county board of supervisors is responsible for such medical expenses. Jones, November 22, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0785.
Municipalities are liable for health care and hospitalization costs of indigent prisoners with preexisting medical conditions. Davies, March 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0095.
The responsibility for medical expenses incurred by a municipal prisoner lies with the prisoner; if the prisoner is determined indigent and unable to pay his medical expenses, then the municipality has the responsibility for those medical costs. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the responsibility for the medical costs of a municipal prisoner housed in the county jail remains with the municipality. Davis, December 18, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0741.
A governmental entity is not responsible for the medical care of an individual who is no longer in the custody of that entity. As a former inmate is no longer in custody, a governmental entity is not responsible for their medical care. Parker, Sept. 17, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0444.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Right of state prison authorities to administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs to prisoner without his or her consent – state cases. 75 A.L.R.4th 1124.
Provision of Hormone Therapy or Sexual Reassignment Surgery to State Inmates with Gender Identity Disorder (GID). 89 A.L.R.6th 701.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 99, 217.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 78 et seq., 136, 140.
§ 47-1-61. Penalty for failure to discharge convict.
Any sheriff or other person having lawful custody of any convict who shall fail to discharge such convict when he shall have served the full time of his sentence and fully paid his fine and the costs charged against him, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished accordingly.
HISTORY: Codes, 1892, § 807; 1906, § 863; Hemingway’s 1917, § 4028; 1930, § 4078; 1942, § 7919; Laws, 1908, ch. 109.
Cross References —
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 19-21.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 153.
§ 47-1-63. Residency of prisoner as affected by incarceration in facility of Department of Corrections.
No person shall be deemed to be a resident of a county solely because of being incarcerated in a facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections that is located in such county.
HISTORY: Laws, 1991, ch. 440, § 3, eff from and after May 1, 1992 (the date the United States Attorney General interposed no objection to the addition of this section).
Editor’s Notes —
The United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the addition of this section by Laws of 1991, ch. 440, § 3, on May 1, 1992.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
An inmate housed in a jail or other local detention facility may not use that facility or jail as his residence for voter registration purposes; an inmate who has not been convicted of a crime that disqualifies him from voting, may register by mail in the county in which he resided immediately prior to his incarceration. Scott, Oct. 27, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0644.
Inmates under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Department of Corrections should not be used in determining the population of county supervisor districts for redistricting purposes by virtue of their temporary presence in a detention facility or jail in the county, unless their actual place of residence is also in the county. Johnson, Feb. 22, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0060.
§ 47-1-55. Jointly owned jails; guards.
Chapter 3. Removal of Prisoners
§ 47-3-1. Removal to jail of another county.
When the accused is not entitled to bail, or where he fails to give bail, and there is no county jail or the jail of the county in which the offense is committed, or where the case stands for trial is, in the opinion of the committing officer or of the court having jurisdiction of the case or of the presiding judge, insufficient for the accommodation of the prisoners, or where the judge having jurisdiction of the case shall think it expedient, on grounds of public policy, so to do, it shall be the duty of the officer of the court, or circuit judge, to make an order for the removal of the accused to a convenient and safe jail of some convenient county, there to be kept until the court shall sit for the trial of the accused. It shall be the duty of the sheriff of the county to which the prisoner is so removed, to receive and safely keep him, according to the order of the court or officer having jurisdiction thereof; and it shall further be the duty of said sheriff to have the body of the accused, without further order, before the proper court of the proper county, at its next term thereafter, on the first day of the term, unless he shall have been discharged by due course of law. The county in which the offense is committed, or where the case stands for trial, shall pay all the expenses of such removal and safekeeping and return of the accused for trial.
HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 65, art. 2(76); 1857, ch. 64, art. 290; 1871, § 2790; 1880, § 3052; 1892, § 1403; 1906, § 1476; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1234; 1930, § 1256; 1942, § 2499; Laws, 1964, ch. 355; Laws, 1973, ch. 319, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 14, 1973).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
An inmate housed in a city jail pursuant to a detainer filed by a county, which city and county were under federal court order to relieve overcrowding and had entered into an interlocal agreement pursuant to which the city housed a certain number of county inmates, was in the custody of the county. Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1992 (5th Cir. Miss. 2000).
The circuit court of one county erred in holding that it had no authority to give a defendant credit for time served in another county while awaiting trial in a second county, where the first county retained the defendant on a detainer when it allowed him to be transferred to the second county, which, under §47-3-1, did not release him from the jurisdiction of the first county. Lee v. State, 437 So. 2d 1208, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2881 (Miss. 1983).
In prosecution for murder where the accused was confined in a jail in Louisville, instead of Vaiden where the accused was tried, it was no error, where Vaiden had no jail. Goldsby v. State, 226 Miss. 1, 226 Miss. 20, 86 So. 2d 27, 1955 Miss. LEXIS 604 (Miss. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 944, 77 S. Ct. 266, 1 L. Ed. 2d 239, 1956 U.S. LEXIS 61 (U.S. 1956).
This section [Code 1942, § 2499] does not authorize the removal of a prisoner to another county for any purpose not named in the statute. Ex parte Buck, 104 Miss. 661, 61 So. 651, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1913).
The statute [Code 1942, § 2499] does not warrant the removal of a person sentenced to imprisonment in the jail of the county where his offense was committed, to the jail of another county, to prevent him from directing, from the jail, the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor. Ex parte Buck, 104 Miss. 661, 61 So. 651, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1913).
Order for removal of prisoner from one jail to another for safekeeping does not exhaust court’s power to make another order of removal that he should be taken to another jail for safekeeping. Wray v. Kelly, 98 Miss. 172, 53 So. 492, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1910).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 163-166.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 18, 128, 129.
§ 47-3-3. No removal after commitment.
A person committed or in custody on a criminal charge shall not be removed from the place of his confinement into the custody of any other officer, unless it be by habeas corpus or some other legal writ, except for trial, or in case of fire or infection, or other necessity, or in accordance with express provision of law. If any person, after such commitment, shall make out or issue any warrant or process for such removal except as authorized, it shall be void.
HISTORY: Codes, Hutchinson’s 1848, ch. 65, art. 1(17); 1857, ch. 48, art. 9; 1871, § 1408; 1880, § 3053; 1892, § 1404; 1906, § 1477; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1235; 1930, § 1257; 1942, § 2500.
Cross References —
Removal of prisoners in case of infectious or contagious disease, see §§47-3-7,47-3-9.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Code 1942, § 2499, does not authorize the removal of a prisoner to another county for any purpose not named in the statute. Ex parte Buck, 104 Miss. 661, 61 So. 651, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1913).
The statute [Code 1942, § 2499] does not warrant the removal of a person sentenced to imprisonment in the jail of the county where his offense was committed, to the jail of another county, to prevent him from directing, from the jail, the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor. Ex parte Buck, 104 Miss. 661, 61 So. 651, 1913 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. 1913).
Order for removal of prisoner from one jail to another for safekeeping does not exhaust court’s power to make another order of removal that he should be taken to another jail for safekeeping. Wray v. Kelly, 98 Miss. 172, 53 So. 492, 1910 Miss. LEXIS 49 (Miss. 1910).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 163-166.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 18, 128, 129.
§ 47-3-5. Removal to place where convicts may be worked.
It shall be unlawful for any officer, convict manager, or other person to remove any convict to the state farm, county farm, road or other place where convicts may be worked before the expiration of five (5) days from the date of conviction, unless said convict may express himself so ready to go at an earlier date and such consent be entered on the minutes by order of the court. Any officer or other person violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) or more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty (30) days or more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment.
HISTORY: Codes, Hemingway’s 1921 Supp, §§ 1142g, 1142h; 1930, § 1258; 1942, § 2501; Laws, 1918, ch. 245; Laws, 1920, ch. 328.
Cross References —
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 163-166.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 18, 128, 129.
§ 47-3-7. Removal in case of infectious or contagious disease.
If any infectious or contagious disease shall appear in the vicinity of any jail, or if the appearance of such disease be apprehended, the board of supervisors of the county, or, if it should not meet in time, the sheriff of the county, with the concurrence of two (2) members of such board, or of a circuit judge or chancellor, expressed in writing, may cause the prisoners confined in such jail to be removed to some suitable place of security, for safekeeping, until the threatened danger shall be over, when they shall be returned to the jail.
HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3054; 1892, § 1405; 1906, § 1478; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1236; 1930, § 1259; 1942, § 2502.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 99 et seq., 163-166, 203.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 83, 84, 128, 129.
§ 47-3-9. Removal in case of infectious or contagious disease; place where prisoners may be taken.
Removal of prisoners pursuant to Section 47-3-7 may be to some place in the county, or to the jail of another county. The jailer of such other county shall receive the prisoners and keep them safely, and surrender them when called for by the authority of the sheriff of the county from which they were removed. All the expenses of any such removal of prisoners and their imprisonment anywhere else, shall be borne by the county chargeable with the expense of imprisonment and trial of prisoners.
HISTORY: Codes, 1880, § 3055; 1892, § 1406; 1906, § 1479; Hemingway’s 1917, § 1237; 1930, § 1260; 1942, § 2503.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 99 et seq., 163-166, 203.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 83, 84, 128, 129.
§ 47-3-11. Transfer of convicted foreign national to country of citizenship.
When a treaty is in effect between the United States of America and a foreign country providing for the transfer of convicted offenders to the country of which they are citizens or nationals, the Governor, on behalf of the State of Mississippi, is authorized, subject to the terms of the treaty, to consent to the transfer of the convicted offender. The Governor is authorized to develop any policies and procedures which may be necessary to carry out the mandates of this section.
HISTORY: Laws, 2001, ch. 442, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
Chapter 4. Privately Operated Correctional Facilities
§ 47-4-1. Privately operated correctional facilities authorized for federal and other states’ inmates.
- It is lawful for there to be located within Wilkinson County and Leflore County a correctional facility operated entirely by a private entity pursuant to a contractual agreement between such private entity and the federal government, any state, or a political subdivision of any state to provide correctional services to any such public entity for the confinement of inmates subject to the jurisdiction of such public entity. Any person confined in such a facility pursuant to the laws of the jurisdiction from which he is sent shall be considered lawfully confined within this state. The private entity shall assume complete responsibility for the inmates and shall be liable to the State of Mississippi for any illegal or tortious actions of such inmates.
- The Department of Corrections shall contract with the Board of Supervisors of Leflore County for the private incarceration of not more than one thousand (1,000) state inmates at a facility in Leflore County. Any contract must comply with the requirements of Section 47-5-1211 through Section 47-5-1227.
- It is lawful for any county to contract with a private entity for the purpose of providing correctional services for the confinement of federal inmates subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Any person confined in such a facility pursuant to the laws of the United States shall be considered lawfully confined within this state. The private entity shall assume complete responsibility for the inmates and shall be liable to the county or the State of Mississippi, as the case may be, for any illegal or tortious actions of the inmates.
-
It is lawful for there to be located within any county a correctional facility operated entirely by a private entity and the federal government to provide correctional services to the United States for the confinement of federal inmates subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Any person confined in a facility pursuant to the laws of the United States shall be considered lawfully confined within this state. The private entity shall assume complete responsibility for the inmates and shall be liable to the State of Mississippi for any illegal or tortious actions of the inmates.
A person convicted of simple assault on an employee of a private correctional facility while such employee is acting within the scope of his or her duty or employment shall be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.
A person convicted of aggravated assault on an employee of a private correctional facility while such employee is acting within the scope of his or her duty or employment shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than thirty (30) years, or both.
- The Department of Corrections may contract with the Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility authorized in Chapter 904, Local and Private Laws of 1999, for the private incarceration of not more than one thousand (1,000) state inmates at a facility in Tallahatchie County. Any contract must comply with the requirements of Section 47-5-1211 through Section 47-5-1227. No state inmate shall be assigned to the Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility unless the inmate cost per day is at least ten percent (10%) less than the inmate cost per day for housing a state inmate at a state correctional facility.
- If a private entity houses state inmates, the private entity shall not displace state inmate beds with federal inmate beds unless the private entity has obtained prior written approval from the Commissioner of Corrections.
-
It is lawful for there to be located within Leflore County a correctional facility operated entirely by a private entity pursuant to a contractual agreement between such private entity and the federal government, the State of Mississippi, or Leflore County for the incarceration of federal inmates. Such correctional facility may include a separate Leflore County jail which may be located on or adjacent to the correctional facility site. To further the provisions of this subsection:
- Any private entity, the State of Mississippi, or Leflore County may enter into any agreement regarding real property or property, including, but not limited to, a lease, a ground lease and leaseback arrangement, a sublease or any other lease agreement or arrangement, as lessor or lessee. Such agreements shall not exceed forty (40) years. The Department of Corrections may enter such agreements or arrangements on behalf of the State of Mississippi;
- The powers conferred under this subsection shall be additional and supplemental to the powers conferred by any other law. Where the provisions of this subsection conflict with other law, this subsection shall control; and
- The private entity shall assume complete responsibility for the inmates and shall be liable to the State of Mississippi for any illegal or tortious actions of the inmates.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 537, § 1; Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 5; Laws, 1997, ch. 486, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 540, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 480, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 1, 2013.).
Editor’s Notes —
The United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the addition of this section by Laws of 1992, ch. 537, § 1, on August 12, 1992.
Amendment Notes —
The 2004 amendment substituted “Board of Supervisors of Leflore County” for “‘Delta Correctional Facility Authority’ a public body authorized in Chapter 852 Local and Private Laws of 1992” near the beginning of (2); and added (5).
The 2013 amendment added (7).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Validity of indictment.
Defendant’s conviction for simple assault of an employee of a private correctional facility was appropriate because the nature and cause of the charge against defendant were clear and the indictment properly informed him of the possible defenses to the charged offense. The trial court was within its discretion in finding that the jury properly weighed the evidence and determined that the State showed that the victim suffered an injury as a result of defendant’s striking her with his fist. Moten v. State, 20 So.3d 757, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 763 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Although counties may contract with private entities to house federal inmates, such entities are not authorized by this section to house inmates from other states that are not federal inmates. Puckett, July 3, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0388.
The board of alderman of the Town of Woodville may contract with Corrections Corporation of America to incarcerate Town of Woodville prisoners at the private facility in Wilkinson County. Wilkerson, January 16, 1998, #97-0790.
Subsection (1) of this section is sufficient authority for a contract between Leflore County and Correctional Corporation of America, and for a contract between the City of Greenwood and Correctional Corporation of America, for the private incarceration of their inmates. Perkins, April 9, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0154.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-4-3. Prerequisites to establishment of privately operated correctional facilities; petition and election.
- Before a private correctional facility may be located in the county, the board of supervisors shall by resolution duly adopted and entered on its minutes specify the location of the facility, the nature and size of the facility, the type of inmates to be incarcerated and the identity of the private entity which will operate the facility. The board shall publish a notice as hereinafter set forth in a newspaper having general circulation in such county. Such notice shall include location of the facility, the nature and size of the facility, the type of inmates to be incarcerated and the identity of the entity which will operate the facility. Such notice shall include a brief summary of the provisions of this section pertaining to the petition for an election on the question of the location of the private correctional facility in such county. Such notice shall be published not less than one (1) time each week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in at least one (1) newspaper having general circulation in the county.
- If a petition signed by twenty percent (20%), or fifteen hundred (1500), whichever is less, of the qualified electors of the county is filed within sixty (60) days of the date of the last publication of the notice with the board of supervisors requesting that an election be called on the question of locating such facility, then the board of supervisors shall adopt a resolution calling an election to be held within such county upon the question of the location of such facility. Such election shall be held, as far as practicable, in the same manner as other elections are held in counties. At such election, all qualified electors of the county may vote, and the ballots used at such election shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the facility to be constructed and the words “For the construction of the private correctional facility in (here insert county name) County” and “Against the construction of the private correctional facility in (here insert county name) County.” The voter shall vote by placing a cross (x) or check mark (Π) opposite his choice on the proposition. When the results of the election on the question of the construction of the facility shall have been canvassed by the election commissioners of the county and certified by them to the board of supervisors, it shall be the duty of the board of supervisors to determine and adjudicate whether or not a majority of the qualified electors who voted thereon in such election voted in favor of the construction of the facility in such county. If a majority of the qualified electors who voted in such election vote against the construction of the facility, then the facility shall not be constructed in the county.
- If no petition as prescribed in subsection (2) of this section is filed with the board of supervisors within sixty (60) days of the date of the last publication of the notice, the board of supervisors shall by a resolution duly adopted and entered on its minutes, state that no petition was timely filed and the board may give final approval to the location of the facility.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 537, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 14, 1992).
Editor’s Notes —
The United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the addition of this section by Laws of 1992, ch. 537, § 2, on August 12, 1992.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-4-5. Agreements with private sources to operate juvenile detention centers.
Any local unit of government, or any local unit of government in cooperation with other local units of government, may enter into agreements with private sources for the operation and supervision of juvenile detention centers.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 537, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 14, 1992).
Editor’s Notes —
The United States Attorney General interposed no objection under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended and extended, to the addition of this section by Laws of 1992, ch. 537, § 3, on August 12, 1992.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Private jail facilities are generally not authorized, but any governmental unit or units together may contract with private sources for operation and supervision of juvenile detention centers. Barrett, Oct. 21, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0718.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-4-7. Authority, power and jurisdiction of private guards and jailers; escapees; penalties; pursuit and capture.
- All private guards and jailers at private or public facilities shall have the same authority, power and jurisdiction as contractor’s employees under the Special Needs Prison Program of 1994, if they meet the minimum training requirements for state employees performing similar duties at public correctional and detention facilities.
- Any inmate or person confined in a facility as provided for under subsection (1) of this section who escapes or attempts to escape from any such facility, and any person who aids or assists in such escape or attempted escape, shall be subject to the penalties as prescribed in Sections 97-9-25 through 97-9-49. Any guard or jailer at any such facility shall be authorized to pursue and assist in the capture of any such escapee.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 581, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).
Cross References —
Possession of prohibited items by employees or officers of Department of Corrections or others allowed on premises, see §47-5-192.
General prohibitions regarding employees or officers of Department of Corrections, sheriff’s department, private correctional facility or other persons or offenders, see §47-5-193.
Special Needs Prison Program of 1994, see §§47-5-1101 et seq.
§ 47-4-9. County may contract with private entity for operation of county jail.
The board of supervisors of any county, with the approval of the sheriff, may contract with a private entity for the management, operation and maintenance of a county jail.
HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 540, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved May 13, 2004.).
§ 47-4-11. Amendment, extension and/or renewal of certain agreements in connection with private correctional facilities.
In order for the Mississippi Department of Corrections to manage funds budgeted and allocated in its Contractual Services budget category, the commissioner of the department shall have the authority to amend, extend and/or renew the term of any lease agreement or any inmate housing agreement in connection with a private correctional facility. Notwithstanding any statutory limits to the contrary, such amendment, extension and/or renewal may be for a length of time up to and including ten (10) years as is necessary for the continued operations of such facilities and implementation of the department’s duties and responsibilities in accordance with Title 47 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended.
HISTORY: Laws, 2010, ch. 490, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 7, 2010.).
Chapter 5. Correctional System
Operation, Management and Personnel
§ 47-5-1. Policy of state in operation and management of correctional system; independent internal examinations.
It shall be the policy of this state, in the operation and management of the correctional system, to so manage and conduct the same in that manner as will be consistent with the operation of a modern correctional system and with the view of making the system self-sustaining. Those convicted of violating the law and sentenced to a term in the state correctional system shall have humane treatment, and be given opportunity, encouragement and training in the manner of reformation.
It shall be the policy of this state that the correctional system shall be operated and managed in the most efficient and economical manner possible. The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall so manage and operate the correctional system in that manner in order to make the system self-sustaining and to conserve state general fund revenues. The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall provide leadership to bring about the earliest possible construction of satisfactory prison inmate facilities, and shall utilize existing state resources, including inmates for prison construction labor, when and wherever practicable, in order to minimize the need for state general funds for prison construction.
It shall be the policy of this state that periodic independent internal investigations of the department shall be conducted to ensure the implementation of state correctional policies.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7921; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 416, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1995).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 1, provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Mississippi Corrections Act of 1976.’ ”
Laws of 1981, ch. 465, § 118, which provided for the automatic repeal of provisions reenacting the Department of Corrections and the State Parole Board on June 30, 1984, was repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 126. In turn, Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for the automatic repeal of these provisions from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986), repealed Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, thereby removing the repeal date.
Laws of 1988, ch. 503, § 1, provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Mississippi Board of Corrections is hereby abolished and all power, authority, duties and functions of such board shall hereafter vest in and be performed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The terms ‘Mississippi Board of Corrections’, ‘Board of Corrections’ and ‘board’ appearing in the laws in connection with the performance of the board’s functions transferred to the Mississippi Department of Corrections shall be the Department of Corrections, and more particularly such words or terms shall mean the Mississippi Department of Corrections whenever they appear.”
Laws of 2013, ch. 524, § 1 provides:
“SECTION 1. (1) There is hereby created the Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force to undertake a comprehensive review of the state’s corrections system and criminal justice system. The task force shall be comprised of twenty-one (21) members, as follows:
“(a) The Chairpersons of the Corrections Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives or their designees;
“(b) The Chairpersons of the Judiciary ‘B‘ Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives or their designees;
“(c) The Lieutenant Governor or a designee;
“(d) The Speaker of the House of Representatives or a designee;
“(e) The Commissioner of Corrections or a designee;
“(f) The Attorney General or a designee;
“(g) A state Supreme Court justice or Court of Appeals judge, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(h) A state circuit court judge who presides over a certified drug court, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(i) A state justice court judge, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(j) A state county court judge, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(k) A county public defender, appointed by the Governor;
“( l ) The Director of the Capital Defense Counsel within the Office of the State Public Defender or a designee;
“(m) A member of the Mississippi Sheriffs’ Association appointed by its executive director;
“(n) A district attorney or an assistant district attorney, appointed by the Attorney General;
“(o) A member of the Mississippi Association of Supervisors, chosen by the Executive Director of the Mississippi Association of Supervisors;
“(p) A member representing the Southern Poverty Law Center appointed by the Managing Attorney for Mississippi;
“(q) A member of the Mississippi Association for Justice appointed by its executive committee president;
“(r) A member of the Mississippi Association of Chiefs of Police appointed by its executive board president; and
“(s) The President of the Mississippi Prosecutors Association or a designee.
“(2) The appointed members of the task force must be appointed within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this act. The members shall be a part of the task force for the life of the task force. Any vacancy in the task force shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner prescribed above. The task force shall hold its first meeting within sixty (60) days of the effective date of this act, on the call of the Commissioner of Corrections. At the first meeting, the task force shall elect from among its membership a permanent chairperson and any other officers, if any, determined to be necessary. A majority of the membership of the task force shall constitute a quorum, and shall meet at the call of the chairperson, or upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the task force. All members must be notified in writing of all meetings at least five (5) days before the date on which a meeting of the task force is scheduled.
“(3) The task force shall study and make recommendations for improving the relationship between the corrections system and the criminal justice system in Mississippi. In making those recommendations, the task force shall:
“(a) Undertake a comprehensive review of all areas of the state’s corrections system, including state, local and tribal governments’ corrections practices and policies regarding sentencing guidelines;
“(b) Review the total number of offender populations in Mississippi correctional facilities to determine which offenders receive or serve differing sentences for the same crimes, enumerating any discrepancies in sentencing for conviction of the same crimes and documenting the percentage of offenders whose sentence was a result of mandatory minimum sentencing;
“(c) Make findings regarding such review and recommendations for changes in oversight, policies, practices and laws designed to prevent, deter and reduce crime and violence, reduce recidivism, improve cost-effectiveness and ensure the interests of justice at every step of the criminal justice system;
“(d) Identify critical problems in the criminal justice system and assess the cost-effectiveness of the use of state and local funds in the criminal justice system;
“(e) Consult with state, local and tribal government and nongovernmental leaders, including law enforcement officials, legislators, judges, court administrators, prosecutors, defense counsel, probation and parole officials, criminal justice planners, criminologists, civil rights and liberties organizations, formerly incarcerated individuals and corrections officials; and
“(f) Conduct a comprehensive review of the drug court programs, intensive supervision programs and any other alternative incarceration programs utilized in the state and provide detailed recommendations regarding the appropriate funding to support those programs.
“The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall provide appropriate staff support to assist the task force in carrying out its duties. The Commissioner of Corrections shall designate an appropriate employee to act as a point of contact for the provision of staff support to the task force. In addition, the task force may consult with employees of any state agency or department necessary to accomplish the task force’s responsibilities under this section.
“(4) The task force shall prepare and submit a final report that contains a detailed statement of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the task force to the Legislature, the Governor and to local and tribal governments by December 31, 2013. It is the intention of the Legislature that, given the importance of the matters before the task force, the task force should work toward unanimously supported findings and recommendations and the task force shall state the vote total for each recommendation contained in its report to the Legislature. The report submitted under this subsection shall be made available to the public.
“The recommendations for improving the relationship between the corrections system and the criminal justice system in Mississippi may include proposals for specific statutory changes for improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and methods to foster cooperation among state agencies and between the state and local governments. The task force shall be abolished upon submission of the report to the Governor and the Legislature.”
Cross References —
Regulations relating to penitentiary-made goods, see §§47-5-301 et seq.
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
Power of court to suspend sentence and place defendant on probation, see §47-7-33.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Sovereign immunity.
1. In general.
Section99-19-39, which governs the detention of a convict pending appeal, confers no right in a convicted felon to be incarcerated in county jail pending an appeal to the Supreme Court; construing §99-19-39 to create such a right would place that statutory section in conflict with the provisions of §47-5-1 et seq. which create a comprehensive correctional system to deal with the incarceration of all felony offenders; under the comprehensive legislative scheme setting up the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the circuit court sentences to the Department and not to any particular facility, and neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court can order the Department to return a prisoner duly committed to its custody to county jail as a matter of right. Nicolaou v. State, 596 So. 2d 863, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1992).
There is a constitutional requirement for state defendants, in a suit by prison inmates for certain prison reforms, to establish certain time-tables for and proceed to implement (a) adequate medical facilities and services, and (b) the reduction of overcrowding of prison inmates at residential camps as well as the elimination of those residential camps unfit for human habitation. Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 965, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 13465 (5th Cir. 1976).
An opinion in a class action brought by inmates of the state penitentiary against the superintendent of the penitentiary, members of the Mississippi Penitentiary Board, and the governor (joined in by the United States as plaintiff intervenor) describes in some detail the undesirable and unconstitutional conditions existing at the penitentiary. The trial court granted both prohibitory and affirmative relief and retained jurisdiction to ensure that the court orders are complied with. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12007 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6790 (5th Cir. Miss. 1974), amended, 390 F. Supp. 482, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
2. Sovereign immunity.
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) was considered an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity because state statute, Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-1 et. seq., considered the MDOC an arm of the state; additionally, the MDOC was funded by the state. The department was responsible for the confinement of prisoners throughout the state; it apparently had the authority to sue and be sued in its own name, and, finally, it was authorized by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-5 to hold and use property. Morgan v. Mississippi, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74001 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 12, 2008), amended, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55347 (S.D. Miss. June 16, 2009).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “legal” mail. 47 A.L.R.3d 1150.
Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “nonlegal” mail. 47 A.L.R.3d 1192.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 72, 83, 90, 99, 107, 111.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4, 5, 7.
15A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Public Works and Contracts §§ 216:228 (use of materials produced in penal or correctional institutions).
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 15, 16 et seq.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 3.
§ 47-5-2. Corrections Investigative Taskforce created.
- There is hereby created the Corrections Investigative Taskforce which shall consist of the following members: the Attorney General; State Auditor; the Chief Executive Officer of the Bureau of Narcotics, or his designee; the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Public Safety, or his designee; the Chairman of the Senate Corrections Committee and the Chairman of the House Penitentiary Committee.
-
The taskforce shall:
- Conduct or cause to be conducted periodic investigation of the Department of Corrections;
-
Study and make recommendations on correctional policies, including, but not limited to:
- Drug trafficking;
- Inmate gang activity;
- Internal accounting and control procedures; and
- Correction services and programs.
- Request assistance from the Department of Audit, Office of the Attorney General, Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Narcotics and any other state agency. Any state agency shall comply with a request for assistance to the fullest extent possible.
- The taskforce shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature no later than January 15 of each year.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 416, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1995).
§ 47-5-3. Facilities of the correctional system; their purposes and locations.
The plantation known as Parchman owned by the state in Sunflower and Quitman Counties, and in such other places as are now or may be hereafter owned or operated by the state for correctional purposes shall constitute the facilities of the correctional system for the custody, punishment, confinement at hard labor and reformation of all persons convicted of felony in the courts of the state and sentenced to the custody of the department, and whenever the term “penitentiary” or “state penitentiary” appears in the laws of the State of Mississippi, it shall mean any facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections which is used for the purposes described herein.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7922; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 2 1976, ch. 440, § 19; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 2; Laws, 1984, ch. 397; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1986, ch. 491, § 1, effective from and after passage (approved April 15, 1986), provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Mississippi Board of Corrections is hereby authorized to convey the right-of-way on the grounds of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, as is hereinafter described, exclusive of gas, water, mineral and subsurface rights, to Sunflower County, Mississippi, for the purpose of completing the Federal Aid Public Road Project No. RS-2847(2)B- Lombardy Road. Said specific right-of-way is described as follows:
“4.794 acres, more or less, located in Section 15, Township 24 North, Range 4 West, Sunflower County, Mississippi, and more particularly described as follows:
“Begin at a point on the centerline of the Lombardy Road at Station 512+ 89.14, with said point being the Southwest corner of Section 15; thence North 00 degrees 33´ 36/” East 410.86 feet to Station 517+ 00 along the said centerline; thence around a 00 degrees 24´ 30/” curve to the left a distance 399.97 feet to Station 520+ 99.97 along the said centerline; thence around a 00 degrees 24´ 30/” curve to the right a distance 399.97 feet to Station 524+ 99.94 along the said centerline; thence North 00 degrees 33´ 36/” East 2,672.71 feet to Station 551+ 72.65 along the said centerline; thence around a 00 degrees 30´ 00/” curve to the left at a distance 248.67 feet to Station 554+ 21.32 along the said centerline; thence North 00 degrees 41´ 00/” West 578.68 feet to Station 560+ 00 along the said centerline; thence West 10 feet to Station 560+ 00 thence North 00 degrees 41´ 00/” West 100 feet to Station 561+ 00; thence East 10 feet to Station 561+ 00, thence North 00 degrees 41´ 00/” West 410 feet to Station 565+ 10 along the said centerline; thence West 80 feet to Station 565+ 10; thence South 00 degrees 41´ 00/” East 1,688.68 feet to Station 554+ 21.32; thence around a 00 degrees 30´ 00/” curve to the right a distance 248.67 feet to Station 551+ 72.65; thence South 00 degrees 33´ 36’´ West 2,672.71 feet to Station 524+ 99.94; thence around a 00 degrees 24´ 30/” curve to the left at a distance 399.97 feet to Station 520+ 99.97; thence around a 00 degrees 24´ 30/” curve to the right at a distance 399.97 feet to Station 517+ 00.00; thence South 00 degrees 33´ 36/” West 410.86 feet to Station 512+ 89.14; thence West 40.00 feet to Station 512+ 89.14 to the said centerline and the Point of Beginning.
“Less and Except: 2.996 acres, more or less, existing road right-of-way.
“The Attorney General shall assist in the preparation of legal documents necessary to transfer said right-of-way under the terms specified herein.”
Laws of 1993, ch. 320, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 11, 1993) provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Governor’s Office of General Services, Department of Finance and Administration, is authorized in its discretion to sell to the Department of Corrections real property described as follows:
“Certain property forming a portion of the right-of-way of the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company’s abandoned Sunflower District (‘LD’ Line), said property situated in the East half of the Northwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of Section 27; West half of the West half of Section 34; and the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 33, Township 24 North, Range 3 West, and in the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 3, Township 23 North, Range 3 West, Choctaw Meridian, Sunflower County, Mississippi, is described as all of the Grantor’s original 100´ wide right-of-way lying 50´ on either side of the centerline of Grantor’s main tract as originally located and extending southwesterly from the North line of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 27 approximately 3629´ as measured along said main tract centerline to a right-of-way width change in Grant Street, Parchman, Mississippi; thence continuing southwesterly of said parcel 200´ wide lying 50´ to the Southeast and 150´ to the Northwest of said main tract centerline 2000´ as measured along said main tract centerline to a right-of-way width change; thence continuing southwesterly of said parcel 100´ wide lying 50´ on either side of said main tract centerline approximately 5213´ as measured along said main tract centerline to the South line of the aforesaid Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 33 and to the West line of the aforesaid Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 3.”
Laws of 1993, ch. 339, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1993, provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Mississippi Department of Corrections is authorized to convey to the United States of America 34.88 acres of state-owned property situated in the NE 1/4 of Section 4, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Hinds County, Mississippi, more particularly described as follows:
“BEGINNING at the NE corner of Section 4, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Hinds County, Mississippi; run thence with the east boundary of said Section of 4 S 01 degree 06´ 20/” E, 1481.38 feet; thence N 53 degrees 37´ W, 223.1 feet; thence N 56 degrees 28´ 30/” W, 300.0 feet; thence N 59 degrees 20´ W, 300.4 feet; thence N 56 degrees 28´ 39/” W, 200.0 feet; thence N 52 degrees 40´ W, 601.3 feet; thence N 54 degrees 11´ W, 500.4 feet; thence N 56 degrees 28´ 30/” W, 434.2 feet to the north boundary of said Section 4; thence with said north boundary N 89 degrees 28´ 30/” E, 2072.21 feet to the point of beginning, containing 34.88 acres, more or less. Subject to a 27.08 acre easement for Interstate Highway 20. Subject to a 0.29 acre easement for pipelines. This is the same parcel of land conveyed to the United States of America by the City of Jackson, Mississippi, by deed dated November 18, 1983, on record in the Hinds County Real Property Public Records in Book 2954, beginning on page 567.”
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Without waiving the procedural bar to the inmate’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutional, the court held that the inmate was properly charged under Miss. Code Ann. §97-9-45 and entered a plea of guilty to the escape; the sentence of three years was well within the maximum prescribed by the statute, which referred to prisoners sentenced to the Mississippi Department of Corrections and allowed a maximum sentence of five years, and thus the inmate was not entitled to post-conviction relief; although the inmate was in custody and on a work program for a county at the time of the escape, the inmate was considered under the Department’s jurisdiction for purposes of §97-9-45 because (1) the inmate’s original burglary sentence required imprisonment in the “penitentiary” under Miss. Code Ann. §97-17-23, which term meant any facility under the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-3, (2) commitment to any institution within the jurisdiction of the Department was to the Department, not a particular institution pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-110, and (3) under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-541, the Department recommended rules concerning the participation of inmates in work programs. Gardner v. State, 848 So. 2d 900, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 570 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Section99-19-39, which governs the detention of a convict pending appeal, confers no right in a convicted felon to be incarcerated in county jail pending an appeal to the Supreme Court; construing §99-19-39 to create such a right would place that statutory section in conflict with the provisions of §47-5-1 et seq. which create a comprehensive correctional system to deal with the incarceration of all felony offenders; under the comprehensive legislative scheme setting up the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the circuit court sentences to the Department and not to any particular facility, and neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court can order the Department to return a prisoner duly committed to its custody to county jail as a matter of right. Nicolaou v. State, 596 So. 2d 863, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1992).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 50-55, 58, 59, 60, 62.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 45-50, 54, 55.
§ 47-5-4. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter, the following words shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context shall otherwise require:
“Adult” shall mean a person who is eighteen (18) years of age or older, or any person convicted of any crime not subject to the provisions of the Youth Court Law, or any person “certified” to be tried as an adult by any youth court in the state.
“Juvenile,” “minor” or “youthful” shall mean a person less than eighteen (18) years of age.
“Offender” shall mean any person convicted of a crime or offense under the laws and ordinances of the state and its political subdivisions.
“Facility or institution” shall mean any facility for the custody, care, treatment and study of offenders which is under the supervision and control of the Department of Corrections, including but not limited to the State Penitentiary property located in Sunflower and Quitman Counties.
“Detention” shall mean the temporary care of juveniles and adults who require secure custody for their own or the community’s protection in a physically restricting facility prior to adjudication, or retention in a physically restricting facility upon being taken into custody after an alleged parole or probation violation.
“Unit of local government” shall mean a county, city, town, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of the state.
“Department” shall mean the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
“Commissioner” shall mean the Commissioner of Corrections.
“Correctional system” shall mean the facilities, institutions, programs and personnel of the Department of Corrections utilized for adult offenders who are committed to the custody of the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 3; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
§ 47-5-5. Limited centralization of facilities.
The commissioner, as soon as possible after passage of this section, shall prepare a plan to bring about the limited centralization of facilities within the state correctional system grounds at Parchman, Mississippi. The commissioner is authorized and empowered to use any state funds appropriated for such purposes, together with any available federal funds appropriated by the United States Congress for improvement of correctional institutions to construct modern security facilities for housing of offenders to the end that the state correctional system achieves the greatest degree of security for said offenders. Provided, however, that no new facility to house offenders shall be constructed within two-fifths (Cr) of a mile of any other offender camp. The commissioner shall bring about centralization of food facilities, recreational activities, utility services and other related facilities and correctional services that are presently decentralized within the correctional system.
It is the intent of the Mississippi Legislature that the commissioner shall fully utilize existing knowledge, architectural plans and expertise currently available with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to the end that the State of Mississippi shall have an efficient, modern, and properly secure state correctional system.
The commissioner is authorized to receive and disburse private and public grants, gifts and bequests which may be available to this state for correctional facilities, offender rehabilitation purposes and related purposes, which said sum so received shall be subject to all of the laws applicable to the State Fiscal Management Board.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7926.5; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 11; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 20; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 4; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.
Laws of 1973, ch. 472, §§ 1-4, eff from and after passage (approved April 12, 1973), provide as follows:
“SECTION 1. The purpose of this legislation is to outline and structure a long-range proposal in addition to certain immediate objectives for improvements at the state penitentiary so as to implement provisions of state law and provide modern and efficient penal facilities.
“The more specific purposes of this legislation are to:
“(a) Provide a time schedule for the orderly, efficient and deliberate construction of new capital facilities and for the renovation of certain existing facilities at the state penitentiary.
“(b) Implement the provisions of section 47-5-5 as enacted by the 1971 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature.
“(c) Provide for the maximum internal security of inmates at the state penitentiary by creating a unit of security facilities to aid in phasing out the trusty inmate guard system.
“(d) Unitize supportive functions so as to minimize the basic cost for such facilities and to create an efficient, effective security system in addition to other operations.
“SECTION 2. The intent of the legislature in enacting the provisions of this act is that such provisions, including all construction and renovation, shall be completed and that each of the phases of the development provided in this act shall be accomplished adequately and expeditiously to implement the provisions of this act. New facilities whose construction is authorized by this act shall be constructed on penitentiary lands owned by the state in Sunflower County and implement the provisions of section 47-5-5, as enacted by the 1971 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature. It being the intent of the legislature that the state building commission develop and present to the legislature a long-range capital improvements construction plan for the Mississippi State Penitentiary providing for the construction of all facilities in an orderly, contiguous pattern so that all of the vital facilities constructed and utilized will be constructed in the most economical and efficient manner. All facilities located on these tracts shall, where possible, be placed at least one (1) mile apart, but in no event shall they be closer than two-fifths (Cr) of a mile, as provided in section 47-5-5. The facilities which will house security, administrative and supportive systems shall be designated the central complex.
“SECTION 3. The state building commission shall, using funds appropriated by the legislature, federal matching or other federal funds, federal grants, or other available funds from whatever source provided, construct, renovate and make the following improvements at the state penitentiary, provided, however, that the grouping of improvements into phases shall not be construed so as to require the completion of all improvements within a phase before improvements in a subsequent phase may be initiated, except that construction and renovation of the projects in the Phase I shall receive priority over the projects authorized for preplanning in Phase II.
PHASE I “(1) Training Facilities $45,000.00 “(2) Classification and Filing 55,000.00 “(3) Camp Renovation 250,000.00 “(4) Security Building 125,000.00 “(5) Construction of a first offenders camp 700,000.00 “(6) Complete renovation and additional construction to penitentiary hospital at present location 500,000.00 “(7) Central food and service facility to be constructed in connection with central complex 350,000.00 “(8) Security Fencing 100,000.00 “(9) One (1) Maximum security unit 875,000.00 “Total Expenditure for Implementation of Phase I. $3,000,000.00
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“All of the above to be constructed in accordance with Section 2.
PHASE II-PREPLANNED PROJECTS. “(1) Construction of two (2) medium security inmate facilities. “(2) Development of a new water system and sewerage treatment facility to be used in connection with central complex. “(3) Construction of security fence surrounding entire complex of facilities. “(4) Central laundry facility for prison system. “The projects authorized in Phase II shall be preplanned prior to any construction or renovation. All of the above to be constructed in accordance with section 2. “Provided, however, the state building commission, with the concurrence of the Mississippi Penitentiary Board, or its successor, is hereby authorized to delete line items provided as set out above, and authorized to use the funds released by said deletion to allow construction of facilities at the Mississippi State Penitentiary based on priority, design and identifiable needs. (Amended Laws, 1974, ch. 528, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 4, 1974)). “SECTION 4. The Building Commission and the governing authorities of the State Penitentiary shall initiate and complete construction of the limited unitizing facilities at the penitentiary as hereinabove provided, and shall initiate and complete an orderly phaseout of agricultural camps or units for inmate housing so that only those units which may be satisfactorily renovated, as determined by competent engineers and architects, shall be retained. It is the intent of the Legislature that all available materials, equipment, supplies and other facilities, including prison labor, shall be fully utilized in the capital improvements and construction herein authorized.” Laws of 1983, ch. 464, §§ 1-3, effective from and after passage (approved April 5, 1983), provide as follows: “SECTION 1. The State Building Commission or its successor, using any available funds from whatever source, shall: “(a) Construct and equip a 500-man Minimum Housing Unit; “The Minimum Housing Unit location shall be at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi, or at a site selected by the State Building Commission or its successor in Yalobusha County on land which is hereafter donated to the state specifically for the location of such facility .00 9,400,000 “(b) Construct and equip twelve (12) 75-man Community Work Centers as designated by the State Building Commission or its successor .00 6,230,000 “(c) Construct and equip a 505-Capacity Unit that includes the following facilities: “(i) A 130-man and woman Reception and Classification Unit; “(ii) A 250-woman Women’s Housing Unit; “(iii) A 125-man Minimum Housing Unit; “(iv) Necessary support facilities for the entire 505-Capacity Unit; “The facility location shall be at a site selected by the State Building Commission or its successor in any county on land presently owned by the state or on land which is hereafter donated to the state specifically for the location of such a facility .00 25,250,000 “(d) Construct and equip a 172-man Medium Housing Facility and an Alcohol and Drug Education Facility, both located at the existing Unit 26, at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi .00 2,200,000 “(e) Renovate, construct additions and equip existing Units 4, 16, 22 and 23 at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi .00 2,000,000 “(f) Construct improvements to the entire Utility System including wastewater, water, electrical and natural gas at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi .00 2,000,000 “(g) Construct and equip a new administration facility at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman .00 2,000,000 “(h) Renovate and equip old hospital at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi, for use as a minimum housing unit to house approximately 85 inmates .00 1,400,000 “(i) Have as a contingency for project construction and all necessary administrative, legal and other expenses incidental and related to the issuance of any bonds 520,.00 000 “TOTAL $51,000,000.00
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“If there are excess funds available with respect to any project listed in this section after the contract for such project has been let, such excess funds shall be paid into the Correctional Facilities Construction Fund as created by Section 6, Chapter 542, Laws of 1983, to be expended for the construction of inmate housing facilities as provided in Senate Bill No. 2786, 1986 Regular Session, if such bill is enacted into law; provided, however, if such bill is not enacted into law, then such excess funds shall be transferred to the General Fund in the State Treasury. (Amended by Laws, 1986, ch. 475, eff from and after passage, approved April 14, 1986).
“SECTION 2. (1) The State Building Commission shall not designate the site of a new community work center unless the commission has notified, by certified mail, return receipt requested, each member of the board of supervisors of the county or the governing authorities of the municipality in which the center is to be located. Said board of supervisors or governing authority shall have the opportunity within thirty (30) days after the date of such mailing, but not thereafter, to disapprove the designated site.
“(2) If the Building Commission decides to locate the facilities described in paragraphs (a) or (c) of Section 1 of this act on land which is hereafter donated to the state specifically for the location of such a facility then, prior to the commencement of the construction of such facilities, the board of supervisors of the county in which such land is located shall adopt a resolution calling for an election on the question of constructing the facilities in such county. Such resolution shall be published once a week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in at least one (1) newspaper published in such county. The first publication of such resolution shall be made not less than twenty-one (21) days prior to the date fixed in the resolution for the election and the last publication shall be made not more than seven (7) days prior to such date. Such election shall be held, as far as practicable, in the same manner as other elections are held in counties. At such election, all qualified electors of the county may vote, and the ballots used at such election shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the facilities to be constructed and the words “For the construction of the facilities in (here insert county name) County” and “Against the construction of the facilities in (here insert county name) County.” The voter shall vote by placing a cross (x) or check mark (v) opposite his choice on the proposition. When the results of the election on the question of the construction of the facilities shall have been canvassed by the election commissioners of the county and certified by them to the board of supervisors, it shall be the duty of the board of supervisors to determine and adjudicate whether or not a majority of the qualified electors who voted thereon in such election voted in favor of the construction of the facilities in such county. Unless a majority of the qualified electors who voted in such election shall have voted in favor of the construction of the facilities in such county, then such facilities shall not be constructed in such county.
“(3) It is the intent of the Legislature, in cases in which the State Building Commission selects a site for a facility as described in paragraphs (a) or (c) of Section 1 of this act, that no notice to the board of supervisors of the county or the governing authorities of the municipality in which such facility is to be located shall be required other than such notice as may be required pursuant to subsection (2) of this section in regard to lands donated to the state, and there shall be no authority for such board or governing authorities to either approve or disapprove designated sites and/or construction of those facilities described in paragraphs (a) or (c) of Section 1 of this act.
“SECTION 3. No state funds from any source whatsoever shall be expended to purchase land for the location of any of the facilities the construction of which is authorized in this act; but such facilities shall be located upon land which is already owned by the state or upon land which is donated to the state or leased to the state for a nominal consideration for a period of not less than twenty-five (25) years specifically for the location of such facilities.”
Laws of 1983, ch. 542, § 6, provides as follows:
“SECTION 6. There is hereby created in the State Treasury a special fund to be designated as the ‘Correctional Facilities Construction Fund’ into which shall be deposited Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00) each month beginning August 15, 1983, through July 15, 1984, and One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) each month beginning August 15, 1984, through November 15, 1986, from sales tax collections. Any monies as may be appropriated by the Legislature shall be deposited by the State Treasurer into the ‘Correctional Facilities Construction Fund.’ The proceeds of the sale of bonds under Senate Bill No. 3038 [Chapter 456], 1987 Regular Session, shall be transferred by the State Bond Commission into the ‘Correctional Facilities Construction Fund.’ Such funds shall be used by the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management of the Office of General Services to defray the costs of the construction, equipping, improvement and renovation of prison facilities pursuant to Senate Bill 2698 [Chapter 464], Regular Session of 1983, Senate Bill No. 2786 [Chapter 502], 1986 Regular Session, and Senate Bill No. 3038 [Chapter 456], 1987 Regular Session. The expenditure of monies out of the Correctional Facilities Construction Fund shall be under the direction of the Office of General Services as spread on its minutes, and such funds shall be paid by the State Treasurer upon warrants issued by the State Fiscal Management Board, which warrants shall be issued upon requisitions signed by the Executive Director of the Office of General Services. Any unencumbered funds in the Correctional Facilities Construction Fund on July 1, 1987, shall be transferred to the State General Fund.” (Amended by Laws, 1986, ch. 502, § 4; 1987, ch. 456, § 17).
Laws of 1986, ch. 502, §§ 1-3, provide as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Office of General Services, using the funds in the ‘Correctional Facilities Construction Fund’ as created in Section 6, Chapter 542, Laws of 1983, shall provide for, by construction, lease, lease-purchase agreement or otherwise and shall equip:
“(a) Housing and necessary support facilities for the number of medium security male inmates as deemed necessary by the Mississippi Board of Corrections, not to exceed five hundred (500) medium security male inmates committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections, at a site selected by the Office of General Services on lands in Greene County, Mississippi;
“(b) Housing and necessary support facilities for the number of maximum security inmates as deemed necessary by the Mississippi Board of Corrections, not to exceed one thousand (1,000) maximum security inmates at the State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi;
“(c) Laundry and kitchen facilities and associated access roads at the State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi;
“(d) Renovation/upgrading of existing security facilities at the State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi;
“(e) Upgrading of existing support systems at the State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi, including wastewater system improvements, water system improvements, fire protection water system improvements, dry storage, telephone system improvements and renovation of the old administration building; and
“(f) Building materials and supplies for inmate construction program projects.”
(Amended by Laws, 1987, ch. 456, § 4).
“SECTION 2. (1) Upon the selection of a proposed site for the inmate housing facilities described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 1 of this act, the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management of the Office of General Services shall notify the board of supervisors of the county or counties in which such facility is proposed to be located and shall publish a notice as hereinafter set forth in a newspaper having general circulation in such county. Such notice shall include a description of the tract of land in the county whereon the facility is proposed to be located, the nature and size of the facility and the date on which the determination of the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management shall be final as to the location of such facility, which date shall not be less than forty-five (45) days following the first publication of such notice. Such notice shall include a brief summary of the provisions of this section pertaining to the petition for an election on the question of the location of the inmate housing facility in such county. Such notice shall be published not less than one (1) time each week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in at least one (1) newspaper published in such county.
“If no petition requesting an election is filed prior to the date of final determination stated in such notice, then the bureau shall give final approval to the location of such facilities.
“If at any time prior to the aforesaid date a petition signed by twenty percent (20%), or fifteen hundred (1500), whichever is less, of the qualified electors of the county involved shall be filed with the board of supervisors requesting that an election be called on the question of locating such facilities, then the board of supervisors shall adopt a resolution calling an election to be held within such county upon the question of the location of such facilities. Such election shall be held, as far as practicable, in the same manner as other elections are held in counties. At such election, all qualified electors of the county may vote, and the ballots used at such election shall have printed thereon a brief statement of the facilities to be constructed and the words “For the construction of the facilities in (here insert county name) County” and “Against the construction of the facilities in (here insert county name) County.” The voter shall vote by placing a cross (x) or check mark (v) opposite his choice on the proposition. When the results of the election on the question of the construction of the facilities shall have been canvassed by the election commissioners of the county and certified by them to the board of supervisors, it shall be the duty of the board of supervisors to determine and adjudicate whether or not a majority of the qualified electors who voted thereon in such election voted in favor of the construction of the facilities in such county. Unless a majority of the qualified electors who voted in such election shall have voted in favor of the construction of the facilities in such county, then such facilities shall not be constructed in such county. The provisions of this subsection shall stand repealed from and after June 30, 1988.
“(2) Before any funds shall be expended under Section 1 for the construction of such correctional facilities, the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management, with cooperation of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, shall utilize inmates for construction to the extent such labor is available. The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall determine and provide to the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management, the name, the number and construction skills of inmates, and shall also provide security officers to be in attendance during all hours when inmates are involved in construction. When necessary construction skills are not available from the inmate population, the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management may contract with private contractors or mechanics to perform necessary construction work.”
[SECTION 3. Repealed by its own terms from and after June 30, 1988.].
Laws of 1987, ch. 456, §§ 1-3, 5-16, provide as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares that:
“(a) The overcrowding of state prisoners in county jails has plagued the sheriffs, the Mississippi Department of Corrections and the Legislature for a decade.
“(b) In 1987, for the first time in history, the Mississippi Department of Corrections has over 7,000 inmates in its custody, with over 1,200 state inmates in local jails.
“(c) During the past decade, the Legislature has appropriated over $31,000,000.00 in payments to the sheriffs for housing state prisoners, while over 1,000 new prison beds could have been constructed with such funds.
“(d) The most pressing physical facility need at this time is for a substantial increase in the number of maximum security housing at Parchman, inasmuch as Mississippi’s percentage of maximum security inmate beds is less than the national average; and
“(e) The Mississippi Department of Corrections is in need of a comprehensive, long-term construction program.
“SECTION 2. As used in this act, the following words shall have the meanings ascribed herein unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
“(a) ‘General obligation bonds’ shall mean bonds of the State of Mississippi, to the repayment of which, both as to principal and interest, the full faith, credit and taxing power of the State of Mississippi are irrevocably pledged until the principal and interest is paid in full.
“(b) ‘Office of General Services’ or ‘office’ shall mean the Governor’s Office of General Services, acting through its Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management.
“(c) ‘State Fiscal Management Board’ shall mean the membership of the State Fiscal Management Board acting in their capacity as the state’s Public Procurement Review Board, as provided in Section 27-104-7, Mississippi Code of 1972.
“SECTION 3. The Office of General Services shall have the power and is hereby authorized, at one time or from time to time, with the approval of the State Fiscal Management Board spread upon its minutes, to declare the necessity for issuance of negotiable general obligation bonds of the State of Mississippi in an aggregate amount not to exceed Fifty-six Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($56,650,000.00) to provide funds for the purpose of paying all or any part of the cost of constructing and equipping the correctional facilities authorized under Section 1, Chapter 502, Laws of 1986, (supra, this note) as amended by this act.
“SECTION 5. (1) In the construction of the correctional facilities described in Section 4 of this act, the Office of General Services, in conjunction with the Mississippi Department of Corrections, shall utilize inmates for construction to the extent such labor is available. The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall: establish, maintain and implement a program for training and utilizing inmates in construction projects; determine and provide to the Office of General Services the name, the number and construction skills of inmates; and provide security officers to be in attendance during all hours when inmates are involved in construction. When necessary construction skills are not available from the inmate population, the Office of General Services may contract with private contractors or mechanics to perform necessary construction work.
“(2) In the planning, design, procurement and construction of the facilities described in Section 4 of this act, the Office of General Services shall make maximum utilization of plans and specifications prepared for, and processes employed in, completed or on-going construction projects for the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
“SECTION 6. Upon the adoption of a resolution by the Office of General Services and the State Fiscal Management Board declaring the necessity for the issuance of any part or all of the general obligation bonds authorized by this act, the office shall deliver a certified copy of such resolution or resolutions to the State Bond Commission. Upon the receipt of same, the State Bond Commission shall act as the issuing agent, prescribe the form of the bonds, advertise for and accept bids, issue and sell the bonds so authorized to be sold, pay all fees and costs incurred in such issuance and sale, and do any and all other things necessary and advisable in connection with the issuance and sale of such bonds. For the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon, the full faith, credit and taxing power of the State of Mississippi are hereby irrevocably pledged. If the Legislature shall find that there are funds available in the General Fund of the Treasury of the State of Mississippi in amounts sufficient to pay maturity, principal and accruing interest of such general obligation bonds and if the Legislature shall appropriate such available funds for the purpose of paying such maturity, principal and accruing interest, then the principal, maturity and accruing interest of such bonds shall be paid from appropriations made from the General Fund of the Treasury of the State of Mississippi by the Legislature thereof; but if there are not available sufficient funds in the General Fund of the Treasury of the State of Mississippi to pay the maturity, principal and accruing interest of such bonds, or if such funds are available and the Legislature should fail to appropriate a sufficient amount thereof to pay such principal and accruing interest as the same becomes due, then, and in that event, there shall annually be levied upon all taxable property within the State of Mississippi an ad valorem tax at a rate sufficient to provide the funds required to pay the bonds at maturity and the interest thereon as the same accrues. Such bonds shall bear such date or dates, be in such denomination or denominations, bear interest at such rate or rates, be payable at such place or places within or without the State of Mississippi, shall mature absolutely at such time or times, be redeemable prior to maturity at such time or times and upon such terms, with or without premium, shall bear such registration privileges, and shall be substantially in such form, all as shall be determined by resolution of the State Bond Commission. Such bonds shall be signed by the Chairman of the State Bond Commission or by his facsimile signature, and the official seal of the State Bond Commission shall be affixed thereto, attested by the Secretary of the State Bond Commission. The interest coupons to be attached to such bonds may be executed by the facsimile signatures of such officers. Whenever any such bonds shall have been signed by the officials herein designated to sign the bonds who were in office at the time of such signing but who may have ceased to be such officers prior to the sale and delivery of such bonds, or who may not have been in office on the date such bonds may bear, the signatures of such officers upon such bonds and coupons shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes and have the same effect as if the person so officially signing such bonds had remained in office until the delivery of the same to the purchaser or had been in office on the date such bonds may bear.
“SECTION 7. All general obligation bonds of the State of Mississippi and interest coupons issued under the provisions of this act shall have and are hereby declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the negotiable instruments law of the State of Mississippi. Such bonds and the income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxation within the State of Mississippi.
“SECTION 8. The State Bond Commission may sell such bonds in such manner and for such price as it may determine to be for the best interest of the State of Mississippi, but no such sale shall be made at a price less than par plus accrued interest to date of delivery of the bonds to the purchaser. Notice of the sale of any such bonds shall be published at least one time not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of sale and shall be so published in one or more newspapers having a general circulation in the City of Jackson and in one or more other newspapers or financial journals as may be directed by the State Bond Commission.
“SECTION 9. Upon the issuance and sale of such bonds, the State Bond Commission shall transfer the proceeds of any such sale or sales to the special fund in the State Treasury known as the ‘Correctional Facilities Construction Fund.’ The proceeds of such bonds shall be used solely for the payment of the cost of the project or combined projects described in Section 4 of this act, which shall include costs incident to the issuance and sale of such bonds, and shall be disbursed solely (as provided in Section 17 of this act) under such restrictions, if any, as may be contained in the resolution providing for the issuance of the bonds, except that the fees and costs incident to the issuance and sale of such bonds shall be disbursed by warrant upon requisition of the State Bond Commission, signed by the Governor.
“SECTION 10. Any holder of bonds issued under the provisions of this act or of any of the interest coupons pertaining thereto may, either at law or in equity, by suit, action, mandamus or other proceeding, protect and enforce any and all rights granted hereunder, or under such resolution, and may enforce and compel performance of all duties required by this act to be performed, in order to provide for the payment of bonds and interest thereon.
“SECTION 11. Such general obligation bonds may be issued without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions and things which are specified or required by this act. Any resolution providing for the issuance of general obligation bonds under the provisions of this act shall become effective immediately upon its adoption by the State Bond Commission, and any such resolution may be adopted at any regular, special or adjourned meeting of the State Bond Commission by a majority of its members.
“The bonds authorized under the authority of this act may, in the discretion of the State Bond Commission, be validated in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, in the manner and with the force and effect provided now or hereafter by Chapter 13, Title 31, Mississippi Code of 1972, for the validation of county, municipal, school district and other bonds. The necessary papers for such validation proceedings shall be transmitted to the State Bond Commission, and the required notice shall be published in a newspaper published in the City of Jackson, Mississippi.
“SECTION 12. All bonds issued under the provisions of this act shall be legal investments for trustees and other fiduciaries, and for savings banks, trust companies and insurance companies organized under the laws of the State of Mississippi, and such bonds shall be legal securities which may be deposited with and shall be received by all public officers and bodies of this state and all municipalities and political subdivisions for the purpose of securing the deposit of public funds.
“SECTION 13. This act shall be deemed to be full and complete authority for the exercise of the powers herein granted, but this act shall not be deemed to repeal or to be in derogation of any existing law of this state whereunder projects of the character herein defined may be constructed or financed.
“SECTION 14. The funds which are transferred from the sale of bonds under this act to the special fund in the State Treasury known as the ‘Correctional Facilities Construction Fund’ may be withdrawn only in the manner provided in Section 17 of this act; provided, however, that warrants for the payment of costs incident to the issuance and sale of bonds shall be issued upon requisition by the State Bond Commission, signed by the Governor. The office shall submit a full report of its work and all the transactions carried on by it, and a complete statement of all its expenditures at the next regular session of the Legislature.
“SECTION 15. The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall represent the State Bond Commission in issuing, selling and validating bonds herein provided for, and the State Bond Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to expend such sums as may be necessary and appropriate from the proceeds derived from the sale of the bonds authorized hereunder to pay for the cost of approving attorney’s fees, validating, printing and cost of delivery of bonds authorized under this act.
“SECTION 16. Pending the issuance of bonds of the state as authorized under this act, when funds are insufficient to cover expenditures for construction, equipping, improvement and renovation authorized in Section 4 of this act, the State Bond Commission, upon receipt of a resolution from the Executive Director of the Office of General Services, approved by the State Fiscal Management Board, declaring the necessity for the borrowing of money to cover such expenditures, is authorized and empowered to borrow funds from banks located in the State of Mississippi, or from special funds in the State Treasury, by the issuance of notes, which shall include other certificates of indebtedness, of the State of Mississippi in an amount sufficient to cover such expenditures; however, the principal amount of such notes shall not exceed Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00) in the aggregate. Such notes shall mature not longer than ten (10) years from the date issued and shall not bear a greater overall maximum interest rate to maturity than that allowed for general obligation bonds under Section 75-17-101, Mississippi Code of 1972. The State Bond Commission shall pay all expenses, premiums and commissions which may be necessary or advantageous in connection with the issuance of such notes, but solely from the proceeds of such notes, by warrant issued upon requisition of the State Bond Commission signed by the Governor. The proceeds of such notes shall be deposited in the Correctional Facilities Construction Fund and disbursed therefrom as provided in Section 17 of this act. Payment of the principal of and interest on the notes shall be made from any revenues made available therefor by the Legislature and shall be secured additionally by the full faith and credit of the State of Mississippi.”
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Sovereign immunity.
1. In general.
There is a constitutional requirement for state defendants, in a suit by prison inmates for certain prison reforms, to establish certain timetables for and proceed to implement (a) adequate medical facilities and services, and (b) the reduction of overcrowding of prison inmates at residential camps as well as the elimination of those residential camps unfit for human habitation. Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 965, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 13465 (5th Cir. 1976).
An opinion in a class action brought by inmates of the state penitentiary against the superintendent of the penitentiary, members of the Mississippi Penitentiary Board, and the governor (joined in by the United States as plaintiff intervenor) describes in some detail the undesirable and unconstitutional conditions existing at the penitentiary. The trial court granted both prohibitory and affirmative relief to ensure compliance with the court’s orders. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12007 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6790 (5th Cir. Miss. 1974), amended, 390 F. Supp. 482, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
2. Sovereign immunity.
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) was considered an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity because state statute, Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1 et. seq., considered the MDOC an arm of the state; additionally, the MDOC was funded by the state. The department was responsible for the confinement of prisoners throughout the state; it apparently had the authority to sue and be sued in its own name, and, finally, it was authorized by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-5 to hold and use property. Morgan v. Mississippi, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74001 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 12, 2008), amended, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55347 (S.D. Miss. June 16, 2009).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4, 5, 7.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 10.
§ 47-5-6. Oversight Task Force established; composition; powers and duties.
- There is hereby established a committee to be known as the Corrections and Criminal Justice Oversight Task Force, hereinafter called the Oversight Task Force, which must exercise the powers and fulfill the duties described in this chapter.
-
The Oversight Task Force shall be composed of the following members:
- The Lieutenant Governor shall appoint two (2) members;
- The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall appoint two (2) members;
- The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, or his designee;
- The Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court shall appoint one (1) member of the circuit court;
- The Governor shall appoint one (1) member from the Parole Board;
- The Director of the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review, or his designee;
- The Attorney General shall appoint one (1) member representing the victims’ community;
- The Mississippi Association of Supervisors shall appoint one (1) person to represent the association;
- The President of the Mississippi Prosecutors’ Association;
- The President of the Mississippi Sheriffs’ Association, or his designee; and
- The Office of the State Public Defender shall appoint one (1) person to represent the public defender’s office.
- The task force shall meet on or before July 15, 2015, at the call of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and organize itself by electing one (1) of its members as chair and such other officers as the task force may consider necessary. Thereafter, the task force shall meet at least biannually and at the call of the chair or by a majority of the members. A quorum consists of seven (7) members.
-
The task force shall have the following powers and duties:
- Track and assess outcomes from the recommendations in the Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force report of December 2013;
- Prepare and submit an annual report no later than the first day of the second full week of each regular session of the Legislature on the outcome and performance measures to the Legislature, Governor and Chief Justice. The report shall include recommendations for improvements, recommendations on transfers of funding based on the success or failure of implementation of the recommendations, and a summary of savings. The report may also present additional recommendations to the Legislature on future legislation and policy options to enhance public safety and control corrections costs;
- Monitor compliance with sentencing standards, assess their impact on the correctional resources of the state and determine if the standards advance the adopted sentencing policy goals of the state;
- Review the classifications of crimes and sentences and make recommendations for change when supported by information that change is advisable to further the adopted sentencing policy goals of the state;
- Develop a research and analysis system to determine the feasibility, impact on resources, and budget consequences of any proposed or existing legislation affecting sentence length;
- Request, review, and receive data and reports on performance outcome measures as related to Chapter 457, Laws of 2014;
- To undertake such additional studies or evaluations as the Oversight Task Force considers necessary to provide sentencing reform information and analysis;
- Prepare and conduct annual continuing legal education seminars regarding the sentencing guidelines to be presented to judges, prosecuting attorneys and their deputies, and public defenders and their deputies, as so required;
- The Oversight Task Force shall use clerical and professional employees of the Department of Corrections for its staff;
- The Oversight Task Force may employ or retain other professional staff, upon the determination of the necessity for other staff;
- The Oversight Task Force may employ consultants to assist in the evaluations and, when necessary, the implementation of the recommendations of the Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force report of December 2013;
- The Oversight Task Force is encouraged to apply for and may expend grants, gifts, or federal funds it receives from other sources to carry out its duties and responsibilities.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 68, effective from and after July 1, 2014.
§ 47-5-7. Seal.
The department shall procure a United States lock-seal, to be styled “Mississippi Department of Corrections” of which the commissioner shall be the custodian. Such seal shall be used to authenticate all the written official acts, orders and process executed and issued from the department, and especially on all orders dispatched to the county jails for offenders who have been sentenced to the custody of the department.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7973; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 53; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 21; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 5; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
§ 47-5-8. Department of Corrections; creation; divisions; succession to interests of State Penitentiary and State Probation and Parole Board.
- There is created the Mississippi Department of Corrections, which shall be under the policy direction of the Governor. The chief administrative officer of the department shall be the Commissioner of Corrections.
-
- There shall be a Division of Administration and Finance within the department, which shall have as its chief administrative officer a Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance who shall be appointed by the commissioner, and shall be directly responsible to the commissioner.
- There shall be a Division of Community Corrections within the department, which shall have as its chief administrative officer a Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections, who shall be appointed by the commissioner, and shall be directly responsible to the commissioner. The Probation and Parole Board shall continue to exercise the authority as provided by law, but after July 1, 1976, the Division of Community Corrections shall serve as the administrative agency for the Probation and Parole Board.
- The department shall succeed to the exclusive control of all records, books, papers, equipment and supplies, and all lands, buildings and other real and personal property now or hereafter belonging to or assigned to the use and benefit or under the control of the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the Mississippi Probation and Parole Board, except the records of parole process and revocation and legal matters related thereto, and shall have the exercise and control of the use, distribution and disbursement of all funds, appropriations and taxes now or hereafter in possession, levied, collected or received or appropriated for the use, benefit, support and maintenance of these two (2) agencies except as otherwise provided by law, and the department shall have general supervision of all the affairs of the two (2) agencies herein named except as otherwise provided by law, and the care and conduct of all buildings and grounds, business methods and arrangements of accounts and records, the organization of the administrative plans of each institution, and all other matters incident to the proper functioning of the two (2) agencies.
- The commissioner may lease the lands for oil, gas, mineral exploration and other purposes, and contract with other state agencies for the proper management of lands under such leases or for the provision of other services, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid into the General Fund of the state.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, §§ 10, 11; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 6; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 6; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 216; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 6; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 5; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2002.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment deleted “hereby” preceding “created” at the beginning of (1); in (2)(b), substituted “Corrections” for “Services” following “Community” thrice; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.
Cross References —
Effect of any member of a board, commission, council or authority changing domicile after appointment, see §7-13-9.
Supervision by staff personnel of division of community services of offenders granted probation, parole or executive clemency, see §47-7-5.
Duties of field supervisors and presentence investigators within division of community services, see §47-7-9.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The Department of Corrections has no duty to provide the Parole Board with information and has no control over parole decisions. Thus, the department had no duty to a victim assaulted by a paroled prisoner. Grantham v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 522 So. 2d 219, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1988).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4, 5, 7.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 2 et seq.
§ 47-5-9. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 60]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-9 required the Legislature at each session to appropriate funds for the yearly maintenance of the penitentiary and prisoners.
§ 47-5-10. Department of Corrections; general powers and duties.
The department shall have the following powers and duties:
To accept adult offenders committed to it by the courts of this state for incarceration, care, custody, treatment and rehabilitation;
To provide for the care, custody, study, training, supervision and treatment of adult offenders committed to the department;
To maintain, administer and exercise executive and administrative supervision over all state correctional institutions and facilities used for the custody, training, care, treatment and after-care supervision of adult offenders committed to the department; provided, however, that such supervision shall not extend to any institution or facility for which executive and administrative supervision has been provided by law through another agency;
To plan, develop and coordinate a statewide, comprehensive correctional program designed to train and rehabilitate offenders in order to prevent, control and retard recidivism;
To maintain records of persons committed to it, and to establish programs of research, statistics and planning:
An offender’s records shall include a single cover sheet that contains the following information about the offender: name, including any aliases; department inmate number; social security number; photograph; court of conviction; cause number; date of conviction; date of sentence; total number of days in the department’s custody or number of days creditable toward time served on each charge; date of actual custody; and date of any revocation of a suspended sentence;
The department shall maintain an offender’s cover sheet in the course of its regularly conducted business activities and shall include an offender’s cover sheet in each request from a court, prosecutor or law enforcement agency for a summary of an offender’s records with the department, also known as a “pen-pack.” The cover sheet shall conform to Rules 803(6) and 803(8) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence for admission as an exception to the hearsay rule and may be admissible when properly authenticated according to evidentiary rules and when offered for the purpose of enhanced sentencing under Section 41-29-147, 99-19-81 or 99-19-83 or other similar purposes; and
This subsection is not intended to conflict with an offender’s right of confrontation in criminal proceedings under the state or federal constitution;
To investigate the grievances of any person committed to the department, and to inquire into any alleged misconduct by employees; and for this purpose it may issue subpoenas and compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of writings and papers, and may examine under oath any witnesses who may appear before it;
To administer programs of training and development of personnel of the department;
To develop and implement diversified programs and facilities to promote, enhance, provide and assure the opportunities for the successful custody, training and treatment of adult offenders properly committed to the department or confined in any facility under its control. Such programs and facilities may include, but not be limited to, institutions, group homes, halfway houses, diagnostic centers, work and educational release centers, technical violation centers, restitution centers, counseling and supervision of probation, parole, suspension and compact cases, presentence investigating and other state and local community-based programs and facilities;
To receive, hold and use, as a corporate body, any real, personal and mixed property donated to the department, and any other corporate authority as shall be necessary for the operation of any facility at present or hereafter;
To provide those personnel, facilities, programs and services the department shall find necessary in the operation of a modern correctional system for the custody, care, study and treatment of adult offenders placed under its jurisdiction by the courts and other agencies in accordance with law;
To develop the capacity and administrative network necessary to deliver advisory consultation and technical assistance to units of local government for the purpose of assisting them in developing model local correctional programs for adult offenders;
To cooperate with other departments and agencies and with local communities for the development of standards and programs for better correctional services in this state;
To administer all monies and properties of the department;
To report annually to the Legislature and the Governor on the committed persons, institutions and programs of the department;
To cooperate with the courts and with public and private agencies and officials to assist in attaining the purposes of this chapter and Chapter 7 of this title. The department may enter into agreements and contracts with other departments of federal, state or local government and with private agencies concerning the discharge of its responsibilities or theirs. The department shall have the authority to accept and expend or use gifts, grants and subsidies from public and private sources;
To make all rules and regulations and exercise all powers and duties vested by law in the department;
The department may require a search of all persons entering the grounds and facilities at the correctional system;
To submit, in a timely manner, to the Oversight Task Force established in Section 47-5-6 any reports required by law or regulation or requested by the task force.
To discharge any other power or duty imposed or established by law.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 7; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 217; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 7; Laws, 2012, ch. 305, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 62, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Editor's Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Laws of 2013, ch. 524, § 1 provides:
“SECTION 1. (1) There is hereby created the Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force to undertake a comprehensive review of the state's corrections system and criminal justice system. The task force shall be comprised of twenty-one (21) members, as follows:
“(a) The Chairpersons of the Corrections Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives or their designees;
“(b) The Chairpersons of the Judiciary 'B' Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives or their designees;
“(c) The Lieutenant Governor or a designee;
“(d) The Speaker of the House of Representatives or a designee;
“(e) The Commissioner of Corrections or a designee;
“(f) The Attorney General or a designee;
“(g) A state Supreme Court justice or Court of Appeals judge, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(h) A state circuit court judge who presides over a certified drug court, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(i) A state justice court judge, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(j) A state county court judge, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi;
“(k) A county public defender, appointed by the Governor;
“( l ) The Director of the Capital Defense Counsel within the Office of the State Public Defender or a designee;
“(m) A member of the Mississippi Sheriffs' Association appointed by its executive director;
“(n) A district attorney or an assistant district attorney, appointed by the Attorney General;
“(o) A member of the Mississippi Association of Supervisors, chosen by the Executive Director of the Mississippi Association of Supervisors;
“(p) A member representing the Southern Poverty Law Center appointed by the Managing Attorney for Mississippi;
“(q) A member of the Mississippi Association for Justice appointed by its executive committee president;
“(r) A member of the Mississippi Association of Chiefs of Police appointed by its executive board president; and
“(s) The President of the Mississippi Prosecutors Association or a designee.
“(2) The appointed members of the task force must be appointed within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this act. The members shall be a part of the task force for the life of the task force. Any vacancy in the task force shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner prescribed above. The task force shall hold its first meeting within sixty (60) days of the effective date of this act, on the call of the Commissioner of Corrections. At the first meeting, the task force shall elect from among its membership a permanent chairperson and any other officers, if any, determined to be necessary. A majority of the membership of the task force shall constitute a quorum, and shall meet at the call of the chairperson, or upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the task force. All members must be notified in writing of all meetings at least five (5) days before the date on which a meeting of the task force is scheduled.
“(3) The task force shall study and make recommendations for improving the relationship between the corrections system and the criminal justice system in Mississippi. In making those recommendations, the task force shall:
“(a) Undertake a comprehensive review of all areas of the state's corrections system, including state, local and tribal governments' corrections practices and policies regarding sentencing guidelines;
“(b) Review the total number of offender populations in Mississippi correctional facilities to determine which offenders receive or serve differing sentences for the same crimes, enumerating any discrepancies in sentencing for conviction of the same crimes and documenting the percentage of offenders whose sentence was a result of mandatory minimum sentencing;
“(c) Make findings regarding such review and recommendations for changes in oversight, policies, practices and laws designed to prevent, deter and reduce crime and violence, reduce recidivism, improve cost-effectiveness and ensure the interests of justice at every step of the criminal justice system;
“(d) Identify critical problems in the criminal justice system and assess the cost-effectiveness of the use of state and local funds in the criminal justice system;
“(e) Consult with state, local and tribal government and nongovernmental leaders, including law enforcement officials, legislators, judges, court administrators, prosecutors, defense counsel, probation and parole officials, criminal justice planners, criminologists, civil rights and liberties organizations, formerly incarcerated individuals and corrections officials; and
“(f) Conduct a comprehensive review of the drug court programs, intensive supervision programs and any other alternative incarceration programs utilized in the state and provide detailed recommendations regarding the appropriate funding to support those programs.
“The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall provide appropriate staff support to assist the task force in carrying out its duties. The Commissioner of Corrections shall designate an appropriate employee to act as a point of contact for the provision of staff support to the task force. In addition, the task force may consult with employees of any state agency or department necessary to accomplish the task force's responsibilities under this section.
“(4) The task force shall prepare and submit a final report that contains a detailed statement of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the task force to the Legislature, the Governor and to local and tribal governments by December 31, 2013. It is the intention of the Legislature that, given the importance of the matters before the task force, the task force should work toward unanimously supported findings and recommendations and the task force shall state the vote total for each recommendation contained in its report to the Legislature. The report submitted under this subsection shall be made available to the public.
“The recommendations for improving the relationship between the corrections system and the criminal justice system in Mississippi may include proposals for specific statutory changes for improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and methods to foster cooperation among state agencies and between the state and local governments. The task force shall be abolished upon submission of the report to the Governor and the Legislature.”
Laws of 2015, ch. 474, § 1, effective April 22, 2015, provides:
“SECTION 1. (1) The Mississippi Department of Finance and Administration is authorized to convey and transfer without compensation all of the rights, title and interest in certain state-owned real property and improvements located at 421 West Pascagoula Street in the City of Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi, to the Mississippi Department of Corrections, subject to the requirements of Section 29-1-1(1).”
“(2) The state-owned real property to be conveyed and transferred under the provisions of this act is the same as was acquired by the State of Mississippi for the use and benefit of” the Department of Finance and Administration as authorized under Section 16 of Chapter 87, Laws of 2003, Section 27-104-107, and as authorized by resolution of the State Bond Commission on June 21, 2004, resolution of the Department of Finance and Administration on June 18, 2004, and Resolution of the Mississippi Public Procurement Board at a special meeting on June 15, 2004. The real property herein described lying and being situated in the City of Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi, and recorded in Deed Book 6071 at Page 430 in the Chancery Clerk's Office of Hinds County, Mississippi, is more particularly described as:
“Tract 1
“A certain parcel of land lying and being situated in Lot 28, Miscellaneous Lots in West Jackson of H.C. Daniels Map of 1875 and being more particularly described as follows:
“Commencing at the intersection of the South line of Pascagoula Street with the West right-of-way of Gallatin Street; thence run Southerly along the said West right-of-way line for 46.2 feet being the Point of Beginning; run thence Southerly along said right-of-way of Gallatin Street for 96.4 feet; thence turn right 90° 11´ and run Westerly for 342.96 feet; thence turn right 89° 48´ and run Northerly 94.5 feet; thence turn right 89° 43´ and run Easterly 342.2 feet to the Point of Beginning; being all of said Lot 28 except formerly given for right-of-way widening of Gallatin Street.
“TRACT 2
“A certain lot or parcel of land in Lot 27 of H.C. Daniels Map of 1875 of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, and more particularly described by metes and bounds as follows, to-wit: .
“Beginning at a point on the West line of Gallatin Street and South Line of Pascagoula Street, thence run South for 46.2 feet; thence West 342.2 feet; thence North 45.5 feet; thence East 342.2 feet to the Point of Beginning which is a part of Lot 27 Miscellaneous Numbers of West Jackson. LESS AND EXCEPT:
“Begin at a point that is 305.4 feet West of the West right-of-way of Gallatin Street and the South right-of-way of Pascagoula Street as now laid out and presently in use, thence run South for 45.57 feet; thence West for 36.5 feet; thence run North for 45.5 feet; thence run East for 36.5 feet to the Point of Beginning, said parcel containing 0.038 acres more or less and being a part of Lot 27 Miscellaneous Numbers of West Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi.
“AND, LESS AND EXCEPT:
“The following described land and property being situated in the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of Section 3, Township 5 North Range 1 East, Hinds County, Mississippi, and being part of Miscellaneous Lot 27, West Jackson, According to the Daniels Map of 1875 to wit:
“Beginning at the Northeast Corner of the property described in Deed Book 3486 at Page 518, said corner being the intersection of the West right-of-way line of Gallatin Street and the South right-of-way line of Pascagoula Street; thence run Southward along the West right-of-way line of Gallatin Street for 32 feet; thence run Northwesterly for 41 feet to a point on the South right-of-way line of Pascagoula Street; thence run Easterly along the South right-of-way line of Pascagoula Street for 25 feet back to the Point of Beginning, said parcel containing 400 square feet more or less.”
Laws of 2016, ch. 444, § 1, provides:
“SECTION 1. (1) The Department of Finance and Administration, acting on behalf of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, is authorized to convey and transfer certain real property to the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen of the Town of Walnut Grove, Mississippi. The property is located in Leake County, Mississippi, and more particularly described as follows:
[For a complete description of the property, see Chapter 444, Laws of 2016.]
“(2) The Department of Finance and Administration may correct any discrepancies in the legal description of the property provided in this section.
“(3) The State of Mississippi shall retain all mineral rights to the real property conveyed and transferred under this section.”
Laws of 2018, ch. 449, § 2, effective July 1, 2018, provides:
“SECTION 2.(1) The Department of Finance and Administration, acting on behalf of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, is authorized to convey and transfer certain real property to the governing authorities of the City of Corinth, Mississippi, and Alcorn County, Mississippi. The property is located in Alcorn County, Mississippi, and more particularly described as follows:
“[For complete property description, see Section 2 of Chapter 449, Laws of 2018.]
“(2) The Department of Finance and Administration may correct any discrepancies in the legal description of the property provided in this section.
“(3) The State of Mississippi shall retain all mineral rights to the real property conveyed and transferred under this section.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2012 amendment added (e)(i) through (e)(iii).
The 2014 amendment inserted “technical violation centers,” in the middle of the last sentence in (h); added (r) and redesignated remaining subsection accordingly; and made minor punctuation changes.
Cross References —
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
Administration of community service restitution program by department of corrections, see §§99-20-1 et seq.
Technical violation centers, see §47-7-38.1.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The Department of Corrections has no duty to provide the Parole Board with information and has no control over parole decisions. Thus, the department had no duty to a victim assaulted by a paroled prisoner. Grantham v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 522 So. 2d 219, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1988).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4, 5, 7.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 2 et seq.
§ 47-5-11. Department to collect certain prison, probation and post-release supervision data; report to Oversight Task Force.
-
The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall collect the following information:
-
Prison data shall include:
1. Recidivism rates by offense type;
2. Recidivism rates by risk level;
- The number of offenders entering prison on a new offense;
- The number of offenders entering prison as a revocation of supervision;
- The average sentence length for new prison sentences by offense type;
- The average sentence length for offenders entering prison for a probation revocation;
- The average sentence length for offenders entering prison for a parole revocation;
- The average percentage of prison sentence served in prison by offense type;
- The average length of stay by offense type;
- Recidivism rates. For the purposes of this report, “recidivism” means conviction of a new felony offense within three (3) years of release from prison;
- Total prison population;
1. By offense type;
2. By type of admission into prison.
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Probation data shall include:
- The number of offenders supervised on probation;
- The number of offenders placed on probation;
- The number of probationers revoked for a technical violation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a technical violation center;
- The number of probationers revoked for a technical violation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in another type of department of correction;
- The number of probationers who are convicted of a new felony offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment;
- The number of probationers held on a violation in a county jail awaiting a revocation hearing; and
- The average length of stay in a county jail for probationers awaiting a revocation hearing.
-
Post-release supervision data shall include:
- The number of offenders supervised on post-release supervision;
- The number of offenders placed on post-release supervision;
- The number of post-release probationers revoked for a technical violation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a technical violation center;
- The number of post-release probationers revoked for a technical violation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in another type of department of correction facility;
- The number of post-release probationers who are convicted of a new felony offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment;
- The number of post-release probationers held on a violation in a county jail awaiting a revocation hearing; and
- The average length of stay in a county jail for post-release probationers awaiting a revocation hearing.
-
Prison data shall include:
- The Department of Corrections shall semiannually report information required in subsection (1) of this section to the Oversight Task Force, and upon request, shall report the information to the PEER Committee.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 66, effective from and after July 1, 2014.
Editor’s Notes —
A former §47-5-11 related to the appointment, terms of office and qualifications of members of the Mississippi Penitentiary Board.
A former §47-5-11. (Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 4; Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976).
Cross References —
Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.
§ 47-5-12. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1988, ch. 504, § 60, eff from and after May 6, 1988.
[Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 8; Am Laws, 1983, ch. 351; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 8; Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 8]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-12 created the board of corrections.
Laws of 1988, ch. 504, § 1, provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Mississippi Board of Corrections is hereby abolished and all power, authority, duties and functions of such board shall hereafter vest in and be performed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The terms ‘Mississippi Board of Corrections,’ ‘Board of Corrections’ and ‘board’ appearing in the laws in connection with the performance of the board’s functions transferred to the Mississippi Department of Corrections shall be the Department of Corrections, and more particularly such words or terms shall mean the Mississippi Department of Corrections whenever they appear.”
§ 47-5-13. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 5; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 2; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 401]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-13 related to the compensation and bond of members of The Mississippi Penitentiary Board.
§ 47-5-14. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1988, ch. 504, § 60, eff from and after May 6, 1988.
[Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 5; Laws, 1980, ch. 560, § 20; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 9; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 9; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 9]
§ 47-5-15. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 6]
§ 47-5-16. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1988, ch. 504, § 60, eff from and after May 6, 1988.
[Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 6; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 10; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 10; Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 10]
§ 47-5-17. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 7]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-17 related to the organization of the penitentiary board, board officers, and clerical assistance for the board.
§§ 47-5-18 and 47-5-19. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1988, ch. 504, § 60, eff from and after May 6, 1988.
§47-5-18. [Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 11; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 11; Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 11]
§47-5-19. [Codes, 1942, § 7951; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 31; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 8; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 12; Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 12]
§ 47-5-20. Powers and duties of commissioner.
The commissioner shall have the following powers and duties:
To establish the general policy of the department;
To approve proposals for the location of new facilities, for major renovation activities, and for the creation of new programs and divisions within the department as well as for the abolition of the same; provided, however, that the commissioner shall approve the location of no new facility unless the board of supervisors of the county or the governing authorities of the municipality in which the new facility is to be located shall have had the opportunity with at least sixty (60) days’ prior notice to disapprove the location of the proposed facility. If either the board of supervisors or the governing authorities shall disapprove the facility, it shall not be located in that county or municipality. Said notice shall be made by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the members of the board or governing authorities and to the clerk thereof;
Except as otherwise provided or required by law, to open bids and approve the sale of any products or manufactured goods by the department according to applicable provisions of law regarding bidding and sale of state property, and according to rules and regulations established by the State Fiscal Management Board; and
To adopt administrative rules and regulations including, but not limited to, offender transfer procedures, award of administrative earned time, personnel procedures, employment practices.
To make personnel actions for a period of one (1) year beginning July 1, 2016, that are exempt from State Personnel Board rules, regulations and procedures in order to give the commissioner flexibility in making an orderly, effective and timely reorganization and realignment of the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 9; Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 13; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 13; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 218; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 13; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 6; Laws, 2016, ch. 495, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Laws of 1986, ch. 491, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 15, 1986), provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. The Mississippi Board of Corrections is hereby authorized to convey the right-of-way on the grounds of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, as is hereinafter described, exclusive of gas, water, mineral and subsurface rights, to Sunflower County, Mississippi, for the purpose of completing the Federal Aid Public Road Project No. RS-2847(2)B- Lombardy Road. Said specific right-of-way is described as follows:
“4.794 acres, more or less, located in Section 15, Township 24 North, Range 4 West, Sunflower County, Mississippi, and more particularly described as follows:
“Begin at a point on the centerline of the Lombardy Road at Station 512+89.14, with said point being the Southwest corner of Section 15; thence North 00 degrees 33´36/” East 410.86 feet to Station 517+ 00 along the said centerline; thence around a 00 degrees 24´30/” curve to the left a distance 399.97 feet to Station 520+ 99.97 along the said centerline; thence around a 00 degrees 24´30/” curve to the right a distance 399.97 feet to Station 524+99.94 along the said centerline; thence North 00 degrees 33´36/” East 2,672.71 feet to Station 551+72.65 along the said centerline; thence around a 00 degrees 30´00/” curve to the left at a distance 248.67 feet to Station 554+21.32 along the said centerline; thence North 00 degrees 41´00/” West 578.68 feet to Station 560+ 00 along the said centerline; thence West 10 feet to Station 560+00 thence North 00 degrees 41´00/” West 100 feet to Station 561+ 00; thence East 10 feet to Station 561+00, thence North 00 degrees 41´00/” West 410 feet to Station 565+10 along the said centerline; thence West 80 feet to Station 565+10; thence South 00 degrees 41’00” East 1,688.68 feet to Station 554+21.32; thence around a 00 degrees 30´00/” curve to the right a distance 248.67 feet to Station 551+72.65; thence South 00 degrees 33´36/” West 2,672.71 feet to Station 524+99.94; thence around a 00 degrees 24´30/” curve to the left a distance 399.97 feet to Station 520+99.97; thence around a 00 degrees 24´30/” curve to the right at a distance 399.97 feet to Station 517+00.00; thence South 00 degrees 33´36/” West 410.86 feet to Station 512+89.14; thence West 40.00 feet to Station 512+89.14 to the said centerline and the Point of Beginning.
“Less and Except: 2.996 acres, more or less, existing road right-of-way.
“The Attorney General shall assist in the preparation of legal documents necessary to transfer said right-of-way under the terms specified herein.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2016 amendment added (e).
Cross References —
Provisions providing that the state fiscal management board, acting through the bureau of budget and fiscal management, shall be the department of public accounts formerly in the office of the state auditor of public accounts, see §§7-7-2 et seq.
State fiscal management board, see §§27-104-1 et seq.
Further powers and duties of the commissioner, see §47-5-28.
Agreements to transfer state offenders to federal facilities, see §47-5-175.
Powers of board relating to penitentiary-made goods program, see §§47-5-301 et seq.
State board of corrections recommending rules and regulations concerning participation of state inmates in public service work programs, see §47-5-401.
State board’s approval required of rules governing participation of state inmates in joint state-county public service work programs, see §47-5-405.
Authority of state board of corrections to delegate functions relative to joint state-county public service work programs, see §47-5-419.
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4, 5, 7.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 2 et seq.
§ 47-5-21. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1988, ch. 504, § 60, eff from and after May 6, 1988.
[Codes, 1942, § 7928; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 8; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 14; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 14; Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 14]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-21 authorized the removal of members of the board of corrections for cause.
§ 47-5-23. Management and control of correctional system to be vested in Department of Corrections.
The department shall be vested with the exclusive responsibility for management and control of the correctional system, and all properties belonging thereto, subject only to the limitations of this chapter, and shall be responsible for the management of affairs of the correctional system and for the proper care, treatment, feeding, clothing and management of the offenders confined therein. The commissioner shall have final authority to employ and discharge all employees of the correctional system, except as otherwise provided by law.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7930; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 10; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 22; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 15; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 15; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
I. Under Current Law.
1. In general.
2.-5. [Reserved for future use].
II. Under Former Law.
6. In general.
I. Under Current Law.
1. In general.
In damages action brought by former inmate alleging, inter alia, breach of duty imposed by this section and by §§47-5-1 and47-5-45 [repealed], the court’s recognition of an immunity defense for the superintendents and the assistant superintendent, raised with regard to a cause of action brought under 42 USCS § 1983, was dispositive of this claim as well; simple negligence in the performance of the superintendents’ duties was not sufficient to support their liability for money damages for injuries suffered in prison by the plaintiff. Bogard v. Cook, 405 F. Supp. 1202, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15354 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 586 F.2d 399, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 6984 (5th Cir. Miss. 1978).
The district court’s findings that conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary denied inmates proper care, treatment, and feeding as required by statute, and the relief therein ordered, were affirmed. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6790 (5th Cir. Miss. 1974).
There is a constitutional requirement for state defendants, in a suit by prison inmates for certain prison reforms, to establish certain time-tables for and proceed to implement (a) adequate medical facilities and services, and (b) the reduction of overcrowding of prison inmates at residential camps as well as the elimination of those residential camps unfit for human habitation. Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 965, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 13465 (5th Cir. 1976).
Mississippi recognizes that its prisoners must be afforded civilized treatment, imposing on the penitentiary superintendent the general common law duty of the custodian of a prisoner to take proper care of him, and civil rights protestors, who were detained in the Mississippi penitentiary merely for the purpose of holding them for trial, with male prisoners required to strip naked and remain in such state for up to 32 hours and detained in cells with inadequate hygienic facilities and no bedding, and with female prisoners required to strip to their undergarments and permitted to have no personal belongings including medicine or sanitary napkins and given quantities of laxatives, and who brought an action against state and municipal authorities, were subjected to inhuman treatment in violation of this statute. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11905 (5th Cir. Miss. 1971), modified, 456 F.2d 835, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10947 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972).
The superintendent of a state prison farm, vested with exclusive management and control thereof by virtue of Code 1942, § 7930, who inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon civil rights demonstrators charged with parading without a permit who had not been arraigned or tried for the offense charged, violated 42 USCS § 1983. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11905 (5th Cir. Miss. 1971), modified, 456 F.2d 835, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10947 (5th Cir. Miss. 1972).
2.-5. [Reserved for future use].
II. Under Former Law.
6. In general.
The superintendent of the state penitentiary is granted by statute exclusive management and control of the prison system. Morgan v. Cook, 236 So. 2d 749, 1970 Miss. LEXIS 1501 (Miss. 1970).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Wrongful discharge based on public policy derived from professional ethics codes. 52 A.L.R.5th 405.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4, 5, 7, 18.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 6 et seq.
§ 47-5-24. Commissioner of Corrections; appointment; compensation; qualifications; bond.
- The Governor shall appoint a Commissioner of Corrections, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Such commissioner may be removed by the Governor. The commissioner shall be the chief executive, administrative and fiscal officer of the department.
- The commissioner shall receive an annual salary fixed by the Governor, not to exceed the maximum authorized by law, in addition to all actual, necessary expenses incurred in the discharge of official duties, including mileage as authorized by law.
-
The commissioner shall possess the following minimum qualifications:
- A master’s degree in corrections, criminal justice, guidance, social work, or some related field, and at least six (6) years full-time experience in corrections, including at least three (3) years of correctional management experience; or
- A bachelor’s degree in a field described in subparagraph (a) of this subsection and at least ten (10) years full-time work in corrections, five (5) years of which shall have been in correctional management; or
- Shall possess at least a bachelor’s degree and relevant experience in fiscal management in the private or public sector.
- The commissioner shall be required, upon assuming the duties of his office, to execute a good and sufficient bond payable to the State of Mississippi in the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00), conditioned upon an accurate accounting for all monies and property coming into his hands. The commissioner, upon approval by the Governor, may require of other officers, employees and agents of the department a good and sufficient bond in such sum as he may determine, subject to the minimum requirements set forth herein, payable to the State of Mississippi upon like condition. The bonds shall be approved by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State, and shall be executed by a surety company authorized to do business under the laws of this state. The premium on any such bond shall be paid by the state out of the support and maintenance fund of the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 13; Laws, 1978, ch. 520, § 11; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 16; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 16; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 16; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Cross References —
Bond of public officers generally, see §§25-1-13 et seq.
Bond of auditor for correctional system, see §47-5-35.
Commissioner as director of nonprofit corporation formed to manage prison industries, see §47-5-541.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Section 47-5-24, provides for the appointment of a Commissioner of Corrections by the Governor at any time in the normal course of events. Smith, February 16, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0067.
No provision in Section 7-1-35 or in Section 47-5-24 provides for an interim appointment of a Commissioner of Corrections. The statutes make no distinction between an interim appointment and a permanent appointment and, in fact, do not contemplate two different types of appointment. Smith, February 16, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0067.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 18.
63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees §§ 487, 488.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 13, 15-16, 115.
§ 47-5-25. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 12; Laws, 1966, ch. 445, § 29; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 3; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 9]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-25 related to the qualifications, compensation and authority of the superintendent of the prison system and to the classification of prisoners.
§ 47-5-26. Commissioner of Corrections; employment of deputy commissioners, administrative assistant for parole matters, and prison superintendents.
-
The commissioner shall employ the following personnel:
-
A Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance, who shall supervise and implement all fiscal policies and programs within the department, supervise and implement all hiring and personnel matters within the department, supervise the department’s personnel director, supervise and implement all purchasing within the department and supervise and implement all data processing activities within the department, and who shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Division of Administration and Finance. He shall possess either:
- A master’s degree from an accredited four-year college or university in public or business administration, accounting, economics or a directly related field, and four (4) years of experience in work related to the above-described duties, one (1) year of which must have included line or functional supervision; or
- A bachelor’s degree from an accredited four-year college or university in public or business administration, accounting, economics or a directly related field, and six (6) years of experience in work related to the above-described duties, one (1) year of which must have included line or functional supervision. Certification by the State of Mississippi as a certified public accountant may be substituted for one (1) year of the required experience.
- A Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections, who shall initiate and administer programs, including, but not limited to, supervision of probationers, parolees and suspensioners, counseling, community-based treatment, interstate compact administration and enforcement, prevention programs, halfway houses and group homes, technical violation centers, restitution centers, presentence investigations, and work and educational releases, and shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Division of Community Services. The Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections is charged with full and complete cooperation with the State Parole Board and shall make monthly reports to the Chairman of the Parole Board in the form and type required by the chairman, in his discretion, for the proper performance of the probation and parole functions. After a plea or verdict of guilty to a felony is entered against a person and before he is sentenced, the Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections shall procure from any available source and shall file in the presentence records any information regarding any criminal history of the person such as fingerprints, dates of arrests, complaints, civil and criminal charges, investigative reports of arresting and prosecuting agencies, reports of the National Crime Information Center, the nature and character of each offense, noting all particular circumstances thereof and any similar data about the person. The Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections shall keep an accurate and complete duplicate record of this file and shall furnish the duplicate to the department. This file shall be placed in and shall constitute a part of the inmate’s master file. The Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections shall furnish this file to the State Parole Board when the file is needed in the course of its official duties. He shall possess either: (i) a master’s degree in counseling, corrections psychology, guidance, social work, criminal justice or some related field and at least four (4) years’ full-time experience in such field, including at least one (1) year of supervisory experience; or (ii) a bachelor’s degree in a field described in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph and at least six (6) years’ full-time work in corrections, one (1) year of which shall have been at the supervisory level.
- A Deputy Commissioner for Institutions, who shall administer institutions, reception and diagnostic centers, prerelease centers and other facilities and programs provided therein, and shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Division of Institutions. He shall possess either: (i) a master’s degree in counseling, criminal justice, psychology, guidance, social work, business or some related field, and at least four (4) years’ full-time experience in corrections, including at least one (1) year of correctional management experience; or (ii) a bachelor’s degree in a field described in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph and at least six (6) years’ full-time work in corrections, four (4) years of which shall have been at the correctional management level.
-
A Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance, who shall supervise and implement all fiscal policies and programs within the department, supervise and implement all hiring and personnel matters within the department, supervise the department’s personnel director, supervise and implement all purchasing within the department and supervise and implement all data processing activities within the department, and who shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Division of Administration and Finance. He shall possess either:
- The commissioner shall employ an administrative assistant for parole matters, who shall be an employee of the department assigned to the State Parole Board and who shall work under the guidance and supervision of the board.
- The administrative assistant for parole matters shall receive an annual salary to be established by the Legislature. The salaries of department employees not established by the Legislature shall receive an annual salary established by the State Personnel Board.
-
The commissioner shall employ a superintendent for the Parchman facility, Central Mississippi Correctional Facility and South Mississippi Correctional Institution of the Department of Corrections. The Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary shall reside on the grounds of the Parchman facility. Each superintendent shall appoint an officer in charge when he is absent.
Each superintendent shall develop and implement a plan for the prevention and control of an inmate riot and shall file a report with the Chairman of the Senate Corrections Committee and the Chairman of the House Penitentiary Committee on the first day of each regular session of the Legislature regarding the status of the plan.
In order that the grievances and complaints of inmates, employees and visitors at each facility may be heard in a timely and orderly manner, each superintendent shall appoint or designate an employee at the facility to hear grievances and complaints and to report grievances and complaints to the superintendent. Each superintendent shall institute procedures as are necessary to provide confidentiality to those who file grievances and complaints.
- For a one-year period beginning July 1, 2016, any person authorized for employment under this section shall not be subject to the rules, regulations and procedures of the State Personnel Board, except as otherwise provided under Section 25-9-127(5).
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 14; Laws, 1978, ch. 520, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 17; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 17; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 17; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 8; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 9; Laws, 1992, ch. 368 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 577, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch 419, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 63; Laws, 2016, ch. 495, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment inserted “who” preceding “shall” near the end of the first sentence in (1)(a); in (b), substituted “Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections” for “deputy commissioner for community services,” at the beginning of the first sentence, and substituted “shall” for “to” preceding “serve” near the end of the first sentence, substituted “Corrections” for “Services” following “Community” in the second, third, fourth, and sixth sentences, and inserted “some” preceding “related” in clause (i) of the seventh sentence; substituted “shall” for “to” preceding “serve” in the first sentence of (c); and made minor stylistic changes throughout.
The 2014 amendment inserted “technical violation centers,” in the first sentence of (1)(b).
The 2016 amendment added (5).
Cross References —
State Parole Board, see §47-7-5.
Technical violation centers, see §47-7-38.1.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 18 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 12.
§ 47-5-27. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 19; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 6; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 4; Laws, 1975, ch. 403]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-27 related to the surety bond of superintendent and other officers and employees of the prison system.
§ 47-5-28. Additional powers and duties of commissioner.
The commissioner shall have the following powers and duties:
To implement and administer laws and policy relating to corrections and coordinate the efforts of the department with those of the federal government and other state departments and agencies, county governments, municipal governments, and private agencies concerned with providing offender services;
To establish standards, in cooperation with other state agencies having responsibility as provided by law, provide technical assistance, and exercise the requisite supervision as it relates to correctional programs over all state-supported adult correctional facilities and community-based programs;
To promulgate and publish such rules, regulations and policies of the department as are needed for the efficient government and maintenance of all facilities and programs in accord insofar as possible with currently accepted standards of adult offender care and treatment;
To provide the Parole Board with suitable and sufficient office space and support resources and staff necessary to conducting Parole Board business under the guidance of the Chairman of the Parole Board;
To contract for transitional reentry center beds that will be used as noncorrections housing for offenders released from the department on parole, probation or post-release supervision but do not have appropriate housing available upon release. At least one hundred (100) transitional reentry center beds contracted by the department and chosen by the Parole Board shall be available for the Parole Board to place parolees without appropriate housing;
To make an annual report to the Governor and the Legislature reflecting the activities of the department and make recommendations for improvement of the services to be performed by the department;
To cooperate fully with periodic independent internal investigations of the department and to file the report with the Governor and the Legislature;
To make personnel actions for a period of one (1) year beginning July 1, 2016, that are exempt from State Personnel Board rules, regulations and procedures in order to give the commissioner flexibility in making an orderly, effective and timely reorganization and realignment of the department; and
To perform such other duties necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the purposes of the department as may be directed by the Governor.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 15; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 18; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 18; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 18; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 9; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 10; Laws, 1995, ch. 416, § 2; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 49; Laws, 2016, ch. 495, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment added (e) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and made minor punctuation changes in (c) and (h).
The 2016 amendment added (h), and redesignated former (h) and (i).
Cross References —
Further powers and duties of the commissioner, see §47-5-20.
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 18 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 14.
§ 47-5-29. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 13; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 4; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 5]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-29 related to the removal of the superintendent by the penitentiary board.
§ 47-5-30. Commissioner of Corrections; development of five-year strategic plan for operation of state correctional system.
-
The Commissioner of Corrections shall develop a strategic plan for its operation of the state correctional system. The strategic plan shall cover a five-year period. The plan shall include, at a minimum, the following:
- A clearly defined comprehensive statement of the mission, goals and objectives of the agency;
- Performance effectiveness objectives for each facility under the jurisdiction of the department;
- A description of the department’s internal management system used to evaluate its performance in relation to projected levels;
- Detailed plans and strategies for meeting current and future needs and achieving goals and objectives established for the state correctional system;
- A detailed analysis of the use of current agency resources in meeting current needs and expected future needs, and additional resources that may be necessary to meet future needs;
- An analysis of factors affecting projected prison populations including impact of juveniles on prison populations and how populations are expected to change within the period of the plan;
- A plan to remove inmates from county jails.
- The department shall revise the plan annually.
- Upon completion of the initial plan and each revision, the department shall provide copies to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chairman of the Senate Corrections Committee, the Chairman of the House Penitentiary Committee, the Legislative Budget Office, the Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review Committee, the Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration and the Legislative Reference Bureau.
- The commissioner shall develop the strategic plan before September 23, 1994.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 27; Laws, 2009, ch. 546, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 15, 2009.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2009 amendment deleted “the State Auditor” following “House Penitentiary Committee” in (3).
§ 47-5-31. Reports by commissioner; inventory.
The commissioner shall monthly make to the Governor and to the State Fiscal Management Board and to the Chairmen of the Corrections Committee of the Senate and Penitentiary Committee of the House of Representatives full and complete reports of the fiscal affairs of such correctional system and of the general conditions with relation thereto. Not more than thirty (30) days after the end of each fiscal year said commissioner shall give a full and complete inventory of all property of every description belonging to the correctional system, and there shall be set opposite each item the book value of same. Such inventory shall further include a statement of the fiscal affairs of such system as of the last day of the fiscal year; and a sufficient number of copies of such inventory and report shall be printed to give general publicity thereto.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7931; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 11; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 6; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 23; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 19; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 388; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 19; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 19; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration.”
§ 47-5-33. Commissioner authorized to administer oaths, and to summon and examine witnesses.
The commissioner, in the discharge of his duties, is authorized to administer oaths, to summon and examine witnesses, and take such other steps as may be necessary to ascertain the truth of any matter about which he may have the right to inquire.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7941; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 21; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 24; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 20; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 20; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 20; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Cross References —
Requirement that probationer submit to a chemical analysis test to detect presence of alcohol or controlled substance as condition of probation, see §47-7-35.
§ 47-5-35. Auditor for correctional system.
The Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review (PEER) shall appoint an auditor to audit the correctional system, and provide sufficient office facilities in the Jackson office, who shall be a certified public accountant or an experienced accountant, whose duty shall be to audit all accounts of the state correctional system for the purpose of reporting to the Legislative Budget Office. He shall report whether supplies and products bought and sold are handled in accordance with law and when bought on samples and specifications whether they measure up to such samples and specifications when the goods are received. The auditor shall report on the letting of bids and shall make a determination that all bids are advertised and let in accordance with law and shall render a report on same. The auditor shall be responsible to make a periodic inventory on all goods, machinery, livestock, farm produce or any other property of the correctional system and make a report thereon to the Legislative Budget Office on such terms and conditions and as often as required by the committee. The salaries and expenses of such auditor or his employees shall be paid from funds appropriated for support of the Legislature or its committees.
Such auditor shall make, at least, a monthly report to the Legislative Budget Office and the Chairman of the Corrections Committee of the Senate and the Chairman of the Penitentiary Committee in the House of Representatives.
The auditor shall attend all the meetings of the board and shall be notified by the board of all meetings or specially called meetings. The Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review shall provide the auditor with a secretary and such personnel as it deems necessary.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7952; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 32; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 7; Laws, 1974, ch. 539 § 7; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 25; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 21; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 21; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 219; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 21, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Bonds of public officers generally, see §§25-1-13 et seq.
Joint Legislative Budget Committee and Legislative Budget Office, generally, see §§27-103-101 et seq.
Public purchasing practices, see §31-7-11.
Bidding requirements for public purchases, see §31-7-13.
Bond of Commissioner of Corrections, see §47-5-24.
Remission to State Treasurer of funds belonging to correctional system, and payment of bills and accounts of correctional system, see §47-5-77.
How purchases are to be made, see §47-5-79.
Prohibition on sale of oil or gasoline, see §47-5-87.
Entry of bids, bills, and invoices in minutes before award or payment, see §47-5-105.
Cancellation of contracts upon finding of fact of auditor for the correctional system, see §47-5-107.
Audit of penitentiary-made goods, see §47-5-319.
Penalty for offering or receiving kickbacks, see §97-11-53.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Public officer’s bond as subject to forfeiture for malfeasance in office. 4 A.L.R.2d 1348.
Differences in character or quality of materials, articles, or work as affecting acceptance of bid for public contract. 27 A.L.R.2d 917.
Right of public authorities to reject all bids for public work or contract. 31 A.L.R.2d 469.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 9.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 5.
§ 47-5-37. Fiscal comptroller, bookkeepers, and assistants; maintenance of modern accounting system; commissioner to sign warrants.
The commissioner shall employ a qualified fiscal comptroller who shall be a certified public accountant and who shall be charged with the responsibility of maintaining a modern accounting system which shall accurately reflect all fiscal transactions in such manner and in such form as shall be recommended by the State Fiscal Management Board. The commissioner shall employ such qualified bookkeepers and other clerical personnel as required to maintain the accounting system who shall devote their full time to their duties as employees of the correctional system. The fiscal comptroller shall make a monthly report to the Governor and Chairmen of Corrections Committee of the Senate and the Penitentiary Committee of the House of Representatives. The fiscal comptroller shall countersign all checks. The fiscal comptroller shall have sole responsibility for all purchases and the signing of all purchase orders issued by the correctional system. Such fiscal comptroller shall execute a good and sufficient bond payable to the State of Mississippi in the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), conditioned for the satisfactory performance of the duties of his office, and the accurate accounting of any moneys and properties coming into his hands.
The commissioner or his designee shall sign all requisitions for issuance of warrant authorizing any disbursement of any sum or sums on account of the correctional system, and no money shall be paid out on any account of the correctional system except on a requisition for issuance of warrant signed by him or his designee.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7934; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 14; Laws, 1966, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 5; Laws, 1974, ch. 539 § 8; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 26; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 22; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 22; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 22; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.
Cross References —
Oath of employees of correctional system, see §47-5-41.
§ 47-5-39. Fiscal impact notes.
- As used in this section, “fiscal note” means the estimated dollar cost to the state for the first year and the annual cost thereafter. The term “ten-year fiscal note” means the estimated dollar cost to the state over the ten-year period following passage or adoption of the subject of the fiscal note.
- Whenever legislation is introduced in the Legislature, which would establish a new criminal offense or would amend the sentencing provisions of an existing criminal offense, the Department of Corrections shall provide a fiscal note and a ten-year fiscal note on the proposed legislation upon the request of any member of the Legislature. The fiscal note shall be published in electronic form on the Mississippi Legislature website as provided in Section 5-1-85.
- State agencies and political subdivisions shall cooperate with the department in preparing fiscal notes and the ten-year fiscal notes. Such agencies and political subdivisions shall submit requested information to the department in a timely fashion.
- In preparing fiscal notes and the ten-year fiscal notes, the department must accurately report to the Legislature information provided to the department by state agencies and political subdivisions.
- The department may request information from nongovernmental agencies and organizations to assist in preparing the fiscal note and the ten-year fiscal note.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 64, effective from and after July 1, 2014.
Editor’s Notes —
A former §47-5-39 provided for the employment of a prison physician, a dentist, a psychiatrist and nurses, their compensation and residences, and provided that prison employees and dependents are entitled to free medical and dental care.
A former §47-5-39 [Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 41; Laws, 1966, ch. 380, § 1; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 9; Laws, 1973, ch. 320, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 9; Laws, 1975, ch. 425; Repealed by Laws, of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976] provided for the employment of a prison physician, a dentist, a psychiatrist and nurses, their compensation and residences, and provided that prison employees and dependents are entitled to free medical and dental care.
§ 47-5-41. Employees’ oath of office.
All employees, before entering upon their duties, shall take and subscribe the following oath to be filed and preserved by the commissioner:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and diligently perform all the duties required of me as_______________of the correctional system, and will observe and execute the laws, rules and regulations passed and prescribed for the government thereof so far as the same concerns or pertains to any employment, and that I will not ill-treat or abuse any offender under my care contrary to the law and the rules and regulations prescribed by legal authority. So help me God.”
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7962; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 42; Laws, 1966, ch. 445, § 30; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 10; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 27; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 23; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 23; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 23, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees §§ 124 et seq.
CJS.
67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees § 46.
§ 47-5-43. Workers’ compensation coverage.
The commissioner shall purchase workers’ compensation insurance with coverage for all personnel employed by the department as authorized by law, and all personnel shall be entitled to the benefits prescribed by the operation of law, Sections 71-3-1 through 71-3-111, as the same is now or may hereafter be amended, cited as the “Workers’ Compensation Law.”
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7962.5; Laws, 1971, ch. 439, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 28; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 24; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 24; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 24, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-45. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 67]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-45 related to qualifications of sergeants, guards and drivers, applications for employment, and uniforms.
§ 47-5-47. Nepotism prohibited; employees not to be interested in contracts.
It shall be unlawful for any person related by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree computed according to the rules of the civil law to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor or commissioner to accept any employment in the state correctional system, neither shall the commissioner or other officer or employee of the state correctional system be directly or indirectly interested in any contract, purchase or sale for or in behalf of or on account of the state correctional system.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7952; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 32; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 7; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 29; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 25; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 25; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 25; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 13, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Validity, construction, and effect of state constitutional or statutory provision regarding nepotism in the public service. 11 A.L.R.4th 826.
§ 47-5-49. Employees not to engage in other business.
Neither the commissioner nor any other employee, save physicians and chaplains not employed for all their time, shall have or engage in any other business during his normal hours of employment that may require his personal attention or time. The Governor, in the case of the commissioner, and the commissioner in the case of any other employee shall receive prior notification and approve outside employment and the respective parties named herein shall punish a violation of this provision by the dismissal of the employee if the offense justifies such dismissal.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7953; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 33; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 8; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 30; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 26; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 26; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 26; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Prohibited conduct.
Trial court erred in overturning the denial of unemployment benefits to a corrections employee who was terminated where the employee admitted to distributing bootleg copies of DVDs to coworkers while at work, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-49; employee also admitted knowing that distributing bootleg copies of DVDs was illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §97-23-87(3)(a)(i) and Miss. Code Ann. §97-23-89(2). Miss. Dep't of Corr. v. Scott, 929 So. 2d 975, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 376 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
§ 47-5-51. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1983, ch. 469, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1983.
[Codes, 1942, § 7954; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 34; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 31; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 27]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-51 prohibited prison employees from having an interest in prison contracts.
§ 47-5-53. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 37]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-53 prohibited prison officers or employees from owning, renting, leasing or working land within fifteen (15) miles of the state farm, and provided for a fine and dismissal.
§ 47-5-54. Status of employees as peace officers; promulgation and enforcement of speed limits upon grounds of correctional facilities.
Employees assigned to the canine unit of the department may, upon request, assist law enforcement agencies by using specially trained dogs in any matter relating to the tracking, discovery or capture of any person in the enforcement of criminal statutes pertaining to the possession, sale or use of narcotics or other dangerous drugs, or in the pursuit of suspected felons and, while so doing, shall have the status of peace officers anywhere in the state and shall have the status of law enforcement officers and peace officers as contemplated by Sections 45-6-3, 97-3-7 and 97-3-19.
Employees of the department while performing their officially assigned duties relating to the custody, control, transportation, recapture or arrest of any offender within the jurisdiction of the department or any offender of any jail, penitentiary, public workhouse or overnight lockup of the state or any political subdivision thereof not within the jurisdiction of the department, shall have the status of peace officers anywhere in the state in any matter relating to the custody, control, transportation or recapture of such offender, and shall have the status of law enforcement officers and peace officers as contemplated by Sections 45-6-3, 97-3-7 and 97-3-19.
The commissioner may appoint investigators with the Corrections Investigation Division who have been certified by the Board on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Training and who shall be empowered to investigate and enforce all applicable regulations of the department, which are related to the functions and missions of the department, and all laws of the State of Mississippi and who shall be empowered to investigate and enforce all laws of the State of Mississippi in private correctional facilities and regional county correctional facilities. These employees shall have the status of law enforcement officers and peace officers as contemplated by Sections 45-6-3, 97-3-7 and 97-3-19.
These officers shall be under the supervision of the commissioner. These officers may perform any service of process required to be performed at any facility owned by the Department of Corrections, at any private correctional facility or at any regional county correctional facility.
The commissioner may promulgate rules regulating the speed of motor vehicles on roads within the grounds of any correctional facility and such restrictions may be enforced by employees of the department by citation or as otherwise prescribed by law.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 18; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 28; Laws, 1983, ch. 345; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch 471, § 27; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 27; Laws, 1986, ch. 485, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 333, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 422, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 390, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 361, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 454, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 23, 2006.).
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 454, Laws of 2006, effective from and after passage (approved March 13, 2006), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 361, Laws of 2006, effective from and after passage (approved March 23, 2006), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 361, Laws of 2006, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The first 2006 amendment (ch. 361), substituted “Corrections Investigation” for “internal audit” and substituted “Board on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Training” for “law enforcement academy” near the beginning of the first sentence of the third paragraph.
The second 2006 amendment (ch. 454), substituted “investigators with the Corrections Investigation Division who have been certified by the Board on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Training” for “investigators with the internal audit division who have been certified by the law enforcement academy” in the first sentence of the third paragraph.
Cross References —
Mississippi Law Enforcement Officers’ Training Academy, see §§45-5-1 et seq.
Definition of “law enforcement officer,” see §45-6-3.
Provision that the Commissioner of Corrections may set speed limits on roads of correctional facilities, which speed limits become effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected, see §63-3-511.
Sexual penetration of incarcerated offenders by law enforcement officers or employees, see §97-3-104.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Correctional officers may be eighteen years of age unless they are designated with the status of “peace officer”. Stringer, March 20, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0125.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 14, 17, 19-21, 23-25.
§ 47-5-55. Exemption from jury service.
The officers and employees of the state correctional system are exempt from jury service.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7974; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 54; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 32; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 29; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 28; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-56. Lease of property; operating funds; disposal of income; transfer of property.
The department shall lease to the Mississippi Commission on Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks for a period of twenty (20) years all timberlands in Quitman County for an annual rental of One Dollar ($1.00). The lands so leased to the Mississippi Commission on Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall be used and maintained as a public game and fish management area. Proceeds from the sale of the timber or from any forest management practice shall be deposited into the Lambert State Forest Revolving Fund created in Section 47-5-78. All costs associated with the management of timber shall be paid from the fund. The remaining funds shall then be deposited in the Prison Agricultural Enterprises Fund, as created in Section 47-5-66. Any timber needed in the building operations carried on by the department may be purchased by the department at a cost not to exceed the cost of the management of that timber. Upon the transfer of the real property described in Section 1 of Chapter 517, Laws of 2001, to the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, the department and the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks may terminate or modify as appropriate any lease entered into under this section regarding such property.
HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 18; Laws, 1978, ch. 301, § 3; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 30; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 421, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 29; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 29; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 15; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 11; Laws, 1996, ch. 337, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 362, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 517, § 2, eff from and after Mar. 30, 2001.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 2001, ch. 517, § 1, provides as follows:
“Section 1. (1) The Department of Corrections shall transfer and convey to the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks for the consideration of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) certain real property located in Quitman County, Mississippi, also known as the “O’Keefe Division Lands”, described more specifically as follows:
“All Mississippi Department of Corrections lands that lie in Township 26, Range 1 West, Section 2 less the NW 1/4 and the N 1/2 of the SW 1/4, Section 3, Section 10, Section 11, Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, Section 15, Section 22, Section 23, Section 24, Section 25, Section 26, Section 27 of Quitman County, Mississippi.
“(2) The Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks is authorized to acquire the property described in subsection (1) and to pay the consideration therefor out of any funds available. Upon completion of the conveyance, the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks shall assume all supervision, management, maintenance and control of the property described in subsection (1) of this section and shall receive all revenue derived from such property.
“(3) Any funds received from the sale of the property described in subsection (1) of this section shall be deposited into a special fund in the State Treasury to be used by the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the general support of the department. Unexpended amounts remaining in the special fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund. Any interest earned or investment earnings on amounts in the fund shall be deposited into the special fund.”
Cross References —
Agricultural extension services of Mississippi State University of Agriculture and Applied Science, see §37-113-19.
Agricultural leases of prison lands to private entities, generally, see §47-5-64.
Publication requirements and submission of bids relating to agricultural leases of prison lands to private entities, see §47-5-66.
Establishment, regulation, and purchase of lands for game and fish management areas, see §§49-5-11 through49-5-15.
Powers and duties of State Game and Fish Commission, see §49-1-29.
Management by State Forestry Commission of growing and cutting of timber, see §49-19-3.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 5.
73B C.J.S., Public Lands § 287-295.
§ 47-5-57. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 2001, ch. 517, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 30, 2001).
[Laws, 1997, ch. 412, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 24, 1997).]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-57 required a public hearing to be held before timber was cleared by the Department of Corrections on the O’Keefe Division Lands.
§ 47-5-58. Sales by commissary to persons or agencies.
The commissary located at any facility of the correctional system shall not sell to any person or agency, any food or other commodities, whether produced by the correctional system or not, for any amount less than the wholesale price of such food or other commodities in the area of the facility.
HISTORY: Laws, 1973, ch. 380, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 34; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 32; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 30; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 30, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-59. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 398, eff from and after July 1, 1984.
[Codes, 1942, § 7970; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 50; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 12; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 35; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 33]
§ 47-5-60. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1992, ch. 506, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).
[Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 20; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 36; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 34; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 31; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 220; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 31]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-60 required the commissioner to transfer the title to all farm equipment, livestock, farm buildings and dwellings to the lessee of any lands leased from the Department of Corrections.
§ 47-5-61. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 38; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 13]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-61 authorized the penitentiary board to insure the cotton and cottonseed raised on the state farms.
§ 47-5-62. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 420, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1984.
[Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 22; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 37; Laws, 1978, ch. 301, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 35]
§ 47-5-63. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 51; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 14]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-63 dealt with the sale or other disposition of cotton, cottonseed, or other goods advertised for sale where no bids are received or bids are rejected.
§ 47-5-64. Agricultural leases of prison lands to private entities; reservation of additional land for agricultural or nonagricultural projects of Department of Corrections; lease of prison land for power generation or other commercial or industrial projects.
- The commissioner is hereby directed to determine the number of acres and location of land under the department’s jurisdiction that are needed for security purposes, for Prison Agricultural Enterprises and for nonagricultural purposes. The commissioner shall designate and reserve such additional land for agricultural or nonagricultural enterprise projects of the department, as he deems necessary. The commissioner shall then recommend to the Department of Finance and Administration the number of acres of department land that should be leased to private entities and the term of the leases.
- The Department of Finance and Administration is authorized to lease for agricultural purposes that Penitentiary land so recommended for not less than three (3) nor more than eight (8) years, with the approval of the Public Procurement Review Board.
-
The Department of Finance and Administration, with the approval of the Governor, the Secretary of State and the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, is authorized to lease Penitentiary land for power generation projects or other commercial or industrial projects at the same time that it leases the land as prescribed in subsection (2) of this section. The Department of Finance and Administration is authorized to negotiate all aspects of leases or related agreements executed under this subsection consistent with the following:
- The period of the lease term combined with the term of renewal shall not exceed forty (40) years.
-
Any lease or renewal lease shall:
- Provide for periodic rent adjustments throughout the term of the lease; and
- Require the lessee to provide a decommissioning and restoration bond or other security securing the lessee’s obligation to remove all aboveground and underground facilities to a depth of at least three (3) feet underground and to restore the surface to a condition similar to its condition before the commencement of the lease.
- Any lease or renewal lease may provide for any combination of the following: base rent, bonuses, percentage of income payments, royalty payments or other terms and conditions that the Department of Finance and Administration deems necessary to maintain a fair and equitable return to the state and to protect the leased land throughout the term of the lease or renewal lease.
- Oil, gas and mineral rights in the leased land shall be reserved to the State of Mississippi.
- This subsection does not authorize the sale or transfer of title to any state lands.
- The Department of Finance and Administration may charge fees and expenses, not to exceed costs, incurred in administering this subsection.
- Any monies derived from leasing lands under this subsection shall be deposited to the Prison Agricultural Enterprise Fund as provided in Section 47-5-66.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 301, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 36; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 32; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 221; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 32; Laws, 1986, ch. 425, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 16; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 12; Laws, 2007, ch. 351, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 538, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2012.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment substituted “commissioner” for “Mississippi Commissioner of Corrections” and “Department of Finance and Administration” for “Governor’s Office of General Services” throughout; and in the last sentence, substituted “three (3)” for “one (1)” and “eight (8)” for “three (3)” respectively.
The 2012 amendment designated the first three sentences of the former section as (1), and therein, added “and for nonagricultural” in the first sentence, inserted “or nonagricultural” in the second sentence, and made minor stylistic changes; designated the last sentence of the former section as (2), and therein, substituted “is authorized” for “shall have the authority”; and added (3).
Cross References —
Creation of the office of general services, see §7-1-451.
Department of Finance and Administration generally, see §§27-104-101 et seq.
Leasing of sixteenth section lands, see §§29-3-51 et seq.
Publication requirements and submission of bids relating to agricultural leases of prison lands to private entities, see §47-5-66.
Duties of the Public Procurement Review Board with respect to the leasing of prison agricultural lands, see §47-5-66.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Lands § 67.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 5.
§ 47-5-65. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 52; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 15]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-65 authorized the penitentiary board to engage the services of an agent for the sale of cotton.
§ 47-5-66. Agricultural leases of prison lands to private entities; procedures; methods of payment of rents; disposal of income; fee per acre in lieu of ad valorem taxes.
- Except as provided in Section 47-5-64(3), it shall be the duty of the Department of Finance and Administration, with the approval of the Public Procurement Review Board, to lease lands at public contract upon the submission of two (2) or more sealed bids to the Department of Finance and Administration after having advertised the land for rent in newspapers of general circulation published in Jackson, Mississippi; Memphis, Tennessee; the county in which the land is located; and contiguous counties for a period of not less than two (2) successive weeks. The first publication shall be made not less than ten (10) days before the date of the public contract, and the last publication shall be made not more than seven (7) days before that date. The Department of Finance and Administration may reject any and all bids. If all bids on a tract or parcel of land are rejected, the Department of Finance and Administration may then advertise for new bids on that tract or parcel of land. Successful bidders shall take possession of their leaseholds at the time authorized by the Department of Finance and Administration. However, rent shall be due no later than the day upon which the lessee shall assume possession of the leasehold, and shall be due on the anniversary date for each following year of the lease. The Department of Finance and Administration may provide in any lease that rent shall be paid in full in advance or paid in installments, as may be necessary or appropriate. In addition, the Department of Finance and Administration may accept, and the lease may provide for, assignments of federal, state or other agricultural support payments, growing crops or the proceeds from the sale thereof, promissory notes, or any other good and valuable consideration offered by any lessee to meet the rent requirements of the lease. If a promissory note is offered by a lessee, it shall be secured by a first lien on the crop of the lessee, or the proceeds from the sale thereof. The lien shall be filed pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985, as enacted or amended. If the note is not paid at maturity, it shall bear interest at the rate provided for judgments and decrees in Section 75-17-7 from its maturity date until the note is paid. The note shall provide for the payment of all costs of collection and reasonable attorney’s fees if default is made in the payment of the note. The payment of rent by promissory note or any means other than cash in advance shall be subject to the approval of the Public Procurement Review Board, which shall place the approval of record in the minutes of the board.
- There is created a special fund to be designated as the “Prison Agricultural Enterprises Fund” and to be used for the purpose of conducting, operating and managing the agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises of the department. Any monies derived from the leasing of Penitentiary lands, from the sales of timber as provided in Section 47-5-56, from the prison’s agricultural enterprises or earmarked for the Prison Industries Fund shall be deposited to the special fund. However, fifteen percent (15%) of the monies derived from the leasing of Penitentiary lands under Section 47-5-64(3) shall be deposited to a special fund to be distributed annually on a student pro rata basis to the public schools located in Sunflower County by the Department of Finance and Administration.
- All profits derived from prison industries shall be placed in a special fund in the State Treasury to be known as the “Prison Industries Fund,” to be appropriated each year by the Legislature to the nonprofit corporation, which is required to be organized under the provisions of Section 47-5-535, for the purpose of operating and managing the prison industries.
- The state shall have the rights and remedies for the security and collection of the rents given by law to landlords.
- Lands leased for agricultural purposes under Section 47-5-64(2) shall be subject to a fee-in-lieu of ad valorem taxes, including taxes levied for school purposes. The fee-in-lieu shall be Nine Dollars ($9.00) per acre. Upon the execution of the agricultural leases to private entities as authorized by Section 47-5-64(2), the Department of Finance and Administration shall collect the in lieu fee and shall forward the fees to the tax collector in which the land is located. The tax collector shall disburse the fees to the appropriate county or municipal governing authority on a pro rata basis. The sum apportioned to a school district shall not be less than the school district’s pro rata share based upon the proportion that the millage imposed for the school district by the appropriate levying authority bears to the millage imposed by the levying authority for all other county or municipal purposes. Any funds obtained by the corporation as a result of sale of goods and services manufactured and provided by it shall be accounted for separate and apart from any funds received by the corporation through appropriation from the State Legislature. All nonappropriated funds generated by the corporation shall not be subject to appropriation by the State Legislature.
- Any land leased, as provided under Section 47-5-64(2), shall not be leased for an amount less than would be received if such land were to be leased under any federal loan program. In addition, all leases shall be subject to the final approval of the Public Procurement Review Board before such leases are to become effective.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 301, § 2; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 37; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 33; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 222; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 33; Laws, 1987, ch. 463; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 17; Laws, 1989, ch. 308, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 24; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 13; Laws, 1994, ch. 369, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 388, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1997, ch. 367, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1998, ch. 420, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 536, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 362, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 363, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 334, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 483, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2006, ch. 396, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 576, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 321, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 420, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 538, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2012.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 363 Laws, 2001, effective from and after passage (approved March 11, 2001), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 407, Laws, 2001, effective from and after July 1, 2001 also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 407, Laws, 2001, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, the amendment with the latest effective date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section taking effect earlier.
Editor’s Notes —
Section 7-1-451 provides that wherever the term “Office of General Services” appears in any law the same shall mean the Department of Finance and Administration.
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Laws of 1987, ch. 463, § 2, provided for the repeal of this section effective July 1, 1991. Subsequently, Laws of 1989, ch. 308, § 2, amended Laws of 1987, ch. 463, § 2, so as to remove the provision for the repeal of this section.
Laws of 1994, ch. 369, § 2, provides as follows:
“SECTION 2. The Department of Corrections and the State Forestry Commission shall study and prepare a reforestation plan for prison lands. The Department of Corrections and the State Forestry Commission shall submit the plan and any other recommendations to the Senate Forestry Committee, the Senate Corrections Committee and the House Penitentiary Committee no later than September 2, 1994.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (2) from “July 1, 2002” until “July 1, 2004.”
The 2004 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (2) from “July 1, 2004” until “July 1, 2005”.
The 2006 amendment reenacted and amended the section by making a minor stylistic change in (1); and extended the date of the repealer in (2) from “July 1, 2005” until “July 1, 2007.”
The 2007 amendment, in the first paragraph of (1), deleted “State” preceding “Department of Finance” throughout, deleted “Mississippi” preceding “Uniform Commercial Code,” added “Lands leased for . . . ($9.00) per acre,” substituted “Department of Finance and Administration . . . all other county or municipal purposes” for “authorized by Section 47-5-64, the leased land shall be liable to be taxed as other lands are taxed during the continuance of the lease, but in case of sale thereon for taxes, only the title of the leaseholder or his heirs or assigns shall pass by the sale,‘ and made a minor stylistic change; added the second paragraph of (1); and substituted “July 1, 2008” for “July 1, 2007” in (2).
The 2008 amendment extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “July 1, 2009” for “July 1, 2008.”
The 2009 amendment added (2).
The 2012 amendment subdivided the first paragraph of (1) into (1) through (5); added the exception at the beginning of (1); rewrote present (2), which read: “There is created a special fund to be designated as the ‘Prison Agricultural Enterprises Fund.’ Any monies in hand or due from the leasing of Penitentiary lands and the sales of timber as provided in Section 47-5-56 and earmarked for the Prison Industries Fund shall be deposited to the special fund for prison agricultural enterprises. All monies in each fiscal year derived from the leasing of the Penitentiary lands and the sales of timber as provided in Section 47-5-56 shall be deposited into the special fund for the purpose of conducting, operating and managing the prison agricultural enterprises of the department”; updated the section references in present (5); designated the former second paragraph of the section as (6), and therein, substituted “provided under Section 47-5-64(2)” for “provided in this section”; and deleted the former last paragraph of the section, which read: “This section shall be repealed from and after July 1, 2014.”
Cross References —
Creation of the office of general services, see §7-1-451.
Creation of tax lien by this section and time that such lien attaches, see §27-35-1.
Sale by state forestry commission of timber from leased timberlands, see §47-5-56.
Agricultural leases of prison lands to private entities, generally, see §47-5-64.
Expenditures from and deposits to prison industries fund, see §47-5-323.
Payment of per diem and expenses of members of the prison industries advisory council from the prison industries fund, see §47-5-329.
Article 9 of the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, see §§75-9-101 et seq.
Federal Aspects—
Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985, see 7 USCS § 1631.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Lands § 67.
15A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Public Lands § 212:16 (notice – to potential bidders – for lease of public lands).
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 5.
§ 47-5-67. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1968, ch. 379; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 16]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-67 authorized the penitentiary board to engage the services of an agent for the sale of rice.
§ 47-5-69. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 395, eff from and after July 1, 1984.
[Codes, 1942, § 7986; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 66; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 17; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 38; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 38]
§ 47-5-70. “Board” and “lessee” defined.
As used in this chapter, “board” shall include the Mississippi Board of Corrections or its successor, and “lessee” shall mean the Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service.
HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 538, § 19; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 39; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 39; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 34; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 34, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-71. Construction or pavement of roads.
The State Highway Commission and the Mississippi Department of Corrections are hereby authorized to enter into and perform agreements to contract together for the construction or the pavement of roads by the State Highway Department in and adjoining to any facility of the correctional system.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7966; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 46; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 40; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 40; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 35; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 35; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 18, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation.
Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation, and whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.
Cross References —
Use of inmates of a correctional institution to work on projects of the Mississippi Department of Transportation, see §§47-5-133 and65-1-8.
Composition of Mississippi Commission, see §65-1-3.
§ 47-5-72. Establishment of regional recycling centers at regional correctional facilities; participation of inmates in recycling center work program.
The Department of Corrections, counties and municipalities are authorized to develop regional recycling centers at regional correctional facilities.The department may establish a work program for inmates to participate in the recycling program. Inmates that are ineligible to participate in joint state-county programs and public service programs are also ineligible to participate in the program established for regional recycling centers.
HISTORY: Laws, 2010, ch. 318, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2010.
§ 47-5-73. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 69]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-73 authorized the superintendent and penitentiary board to request any other state agencies to perform services in connection with prison programs.
§ 47-5-75. Suits by or against board of corrections; tort liability insurance.
The department is authorized to bring and maintain suits for the collection and enforcement of all demands and debts owing to the correctional system. No bond for costs, appeal bond, supersedeas bond or other security shall at any time be required of the department in any civil suit of any kind brought by or against it or its employees in their official capacity, except such suits as may be brought against it or them by the State of Mississippi. The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi is hereby directed to assist the department in the filing and prosecution of any suits filed herein.
The department shall have the further power and authority, in its discretion, to take adequate liability insurance on the operation of said correctional system, including liability insurance to protect the commissioner and other regular employees of the correctional system from tort actions in any state or federal court.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7929; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 9; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 13; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 41; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 41; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 36; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 495, § 21; Laws, 1985, ch. 474, § 51; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 36; Laws, 1986, ch. 438, § 32; Laws, 1987, ch. 483, § 33; Laws, 1988, ch. 442, § 30; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 19; Laws, 1989, ch. 537, § 29; Laws, 1990, ch. 518, § 30; Laws, 1991, ch. 618, § 29; Laws, 1992, ch. 491, § 31, approved May 12, 1992, eff from and after July 1, 1993.
Cross References —
Immunity of state and political subdivisions from liability and suit for torts and torts of its employees, see §§11-46-1 et seq.
Participation in a comprehensive plan of one or more policies of liability insurance, see §11-46-17.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The members of the Board of Corrections act in a general policy-making and supervisory capacity with respect to the various correctional institutions of the state. In cases involving the day-to-day operations of a corrections facility, normally the board members will have no potential liability. McFadden v. State, 542 So. 2d 871, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1989).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 127.
§ 47-5-76. Payment of court costs for inmate’s civil action against Department employee pertaining to condition of confinement.
-
Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, if an inmate plaintiff files a pauper’s affidavit in a civil action and the defendant is an employee of the department and the civil action pertains to the inmate’s condition of confinement, the department shall pay, out of any funds available for such purpose, all costs of court assessed against the inmate in the civil action. However, the department shall not pay the costs of court if the inmate has on three (3) or more prior occasions, while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
An inmate shall not bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding in forma pauperis if the prisoner has, on three (3) or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court that was dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
- An inmate who proceeds in forma pauperis in a civil action shall pay twenty percent (20%) per month of the funds in his or her inmate account to the Department of Corrections until all filing fees and costs of his or her litigation are paid to the department. The department may withdraw such funds automatically from the account of any inmate permitted a civil filing as a pauper. If an inmate is allowed an appeal in forma pauperis of a civil action, the inmate shall reimburse all costs and fees to the department by automatic withdrawal each month in the amount of twenty percent (20%) of his or her funds until all state funds are reimbursed.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 378, § 2; Laws, 1993, ch. 402, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 387, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 392, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 16, 2005.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2005 amendment rewrote (2) to require an inmate who proceeds in forma pauperis to pay certain litigation expenses to the Department of Corrections in increments of 20% from his or her inmate account, and to remove the requirement that in order for an inmate to pay certain litigation expenses related to the in forma pauperis proceedings, the inmate must have had funds in his or her accounts during the preceding six months.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Because an inmate’s complaint—regarding the alleged confiscation of the inmate’s personal property during the inmate’s confinement in lock-down—was frivolous and because the inmate should not have been allowed to file the complaint as an in forma pauperis litigant due to the inmate’s prior frivolous filings, it was appropriate to assess costs of the inmate’s appeal to the inmate to be withdrawn from the inmate’s prison account. Duncan v. Bonner, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 315 (Miss. Ct. App. May 26, 2020).
Inmate may be granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status on appeal under the statute; the language referencing appeals in the 1998 and 2005 amendments allows a trial court to grant an inmate IFP status on appeal. Willis v. Westley, 287 So.3d 1050, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 611 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Statute’s language provided the trial court with authority to allow an inmate to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal because the inmate filed his action against Mississippi Department of Corrections employees under §47-5-76(1), challenging a condition of confinement. Willis v. Westley, 287 So.3d 1050, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 611 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
It was appropriate to assess costs of an appeal to an inmate, despite his in forma pauperis status, as the Mississippi Department of Corrections was entitled to withdraw funds from the inmate’s account until all fees and costs of his appeal were repaid. Willis v. Westley, 287 So.3d 1050, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 611 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-76(1), under limited circumstances the Mississippi department of corrections must pay court costs for an inmate who brings a civil action against a department employee; however, that civil action must pertain to the inmate’s condition of confinement, and the inmate’s lawsuit did not pertain to a condition of his confinement, and as such the inmate was not eligible to proceed in forma pauperis. Bessent v. Clark, 974 So. 2d 928, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 633 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Statute requiring Department of Corrections to pay for inmate suits pertaining to conditions of confinement applies at trial level and not at appellate level. Carson v. Hargett, 689 So. 2d 753, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 716 (Miss. 1996).
Section 47-5-76, which requires the Department of Corrections to pay court costs for an inmate plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis in a civil action against a Department employee pertaining to conditions of confinement, applies only at the trial level and not at the appellate level. Moreno v. State, 637 So. 2d 200, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 265 (Miss. 1994).
§ 47-5-77. Remission to State Treasurer of funds belonging to correctional system; payment of bills and accounts of correctional system.
The commissioner shall remit to the State Treasurer all moneys belonging to the correctional system received by him in accordance with the provisions of Section 7-9-21. All bills and accounts of said correctional system shall be paid from appropriations made by the Legislature upon sworn accounts and warrants drawn by the State Fiscal Management Board on the State Treasurer in the same manner as provided by general law. Each account shall be approved by the commissioner or, in the commissioner’s absence, by his designee.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7935; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 15; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 23; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 42; reenacted Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 42; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 37; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 223; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 37; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 20, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.
Cross References —
Duty of prison auditor with respect to bids, purchases, and sales, see §47-5-35.
§ 47-5-78. Creation of the “Lambert State Forest Revolving Fund.”
There is established within the State Treasury a revolving fundto fund forest management costs provided under Sections 47-5-56 and 47-5-66 for the Lambert State Forest in Quitman County and shall be disbursed as provided in those sections. The fund shall be called the “Lambert State Forest Revolving Fund,” and moneys for the fund shall accrue from any revenues derived from the Lambert State Forest including, but not limited to, timber sales and any other revenue derived from forest management practices. The State Treasurer shall invest all monies in the fund, and interest earned on the investments shall be paid back into the fund and not into the General Fund. The fund shall be audited annually by the State Auditor.
HISTORY: Laws, 1996, ch. 337, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 362, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 17, 2000.).
§ 47-5-79. How purchases to be made.
All contracts for the purchase of materials, supplies, equipment and sustenance for the offenders of the correctional system shall be made under the provisions of the state purchasing law, same being Sections 31-7-1 through 31-7-55.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7937; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 17; Laws, 1966, ch. 378, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 43; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 43; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 38; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 38, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§§ 47-5-81, 47-5-83. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, §§ 63, 39]
§ 47-5-85. Chapel for religious worship; chaplain.
There shall be provided an area at each facility of the correctional system for religious worship to be conducted by the chaplain’s office of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The chaplains will have ingress and egress to all facilities of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the purpose of providing religious services to the offenders incarcerated therein.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7975; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 55; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 44; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 44; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 385; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 39; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 39, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
State prison regulations effectively preventing Muslim inmates from attending weekly congregational service do not violate First Amendment’s free exercise of religion clause. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2604 (U.S. 1987).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 33, 34, 37-43, 45, 46.
Lawyers’ Edition.
Supreme Court’s views as to prisoner’s right to free exercise of religion under Federal Constitution’s First Amendment.96 L. Ed. 2d 736.
§ 47-5-87. No gasoline or motor oil to be sold.
No gasoline or motor oil shall be sold for personal use by the state correctional system to any of its employees. Gasoline shall be delivered only in tank truck or tank car lots in such quantities as the commissioner may deem necessary, and motor oil in such quantities as may be needed.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7982; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 62; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 45; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 45; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 40; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 40, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Duty of auditor for the correctional system with respect to bids, purchases, and sales, see §47-5-35.
§ 47-5-89. No solicitation nor contribution for political purposes.
If any officer or employee of the state or county government, or any employee of the state correctional system, or any other person shall solicit or accept from any employee of the state correctional system, or from any offender therein, any contribution of money or other property for political or election purposes he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or imprisoned in the county jail not less than sixty (60) days nor longer than one hundred twenty (120) days, or both, and if an employee of the state correctional system he shall be immediately and permanently removed from further employment with the state correctional system.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7984; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 64; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 46; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 46; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 41; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 41, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
§ 47-5-91. Transportation of children of employees to school; payment of tuition.
The commissioner is authorized and directed to provide for transportation of children of employees of the Mississippi State Penitentiary both in Sunflower County and Quitman County to a public elementary or secondary school located in those counties and to pay for such transportation out of the support and maintenance fund of the department of correction. The commissioner shall further pay to any public elementary or secondary school located in said counties which said children are sent, an amount not to exceed Sixty Dollars ($60.00) per student per month as tuition, which also shall be paid out of the support and maintenance fund of the department of correction. Any student who receives benefits under this section shall not be eligible for any other educational financial state grant or loan.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7967; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 47; Ex Sess, 1969, ch. 36, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 404; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 63; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 47; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 42; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 42, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-93. Governor to make inspections.
It shall be the duty of the Governor to make personal inspection of the central facilities of the state correctional system and offenders twice during each and every year at such times as may suit his convenience, and without previous notice to the commissioner, and the commissioner, when required so to do, shall afford all necessary facilities for making such inspection.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7969; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 49; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 47; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 48; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 43; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 43, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The governor’s duties under §§47-5-93 and7-1-5(c) and (d) are discretionary and, as such, the governor enjoys a qualified immunity to a civil suit for damages based on the governor’s alleged failure to perform his duties under those statutes. McFadden v. State, 542 So. 2d 871, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 65 (Miss. 1989).
§ 47-5-94. Annual structural and environmental inspections; report of findings.
The Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management of the Department of Finance and Administration and the State Board of Health are hereby authorized and directed, upon the passage of this section, to institute permanent annual structural and environmental inspections of institutional housing and service facilities at the State Penitentiary, such inspections to include but not be limited to, structural soundness, repairs and maintenance of buildings; food service; fire and safety hazards; fresh water supply; wastewater system; sewage collection and treatment; solid waste collection, storage and disposal; rodent and pest control and general institutional housekeeping.
All other state agencies, authorities, boards, commissions and departments are hereby directed, upon the request of the Commissioner of Corrections, the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management of the Department of Finance and Administration or the State Board of Health, to assist in such inspections with the fullest degree of reasonable cooperation.
Within thirty (30) days of the completion of the inspections provided for herein, the participants shall compile a written report of their findings which shall be submitted to the Governor, the Commissioner of Corrections and the Warden or Superintendent of the State Penitentiary at Parchman.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 447, § 2; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 49; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 44; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 44; Laws, 1994, ch. 480, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Only insofar as Section 47-5-94 is applicable, Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real Property Management of Governor’s Office of General Services and State Board of Health are required to inspect State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi and not other correctional facilities. Cobb, July 15, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0494.
§ 47-5-95. Officials to be admitted to places where offenders kept and worked; visitors to correctional system facilities.
The members of the executive department, except the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and judicial departments of the state and members of the Legislature, shall with advance notice to the commissioner be admitted into the correctional system or any facility thereof, and other places where offenders are kept and worked, at all proper hours, for the purpose of observing the conduct thereof, and may hold conversations with the offenders apart from all correctional system officials. Other persons may visit a correctional system facility under such rules and regulations as may be established by the commissioner who shall be liable to the state on his bond for negligence in security and in an amount to be determined by the courts.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7950; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 30; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 24; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 48; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 50; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 45; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 45, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 85, 87, 91.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 100-102.
§ 47-5-97. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 68]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-97 dealt with periodic investigations of prison security measures and reports thereon, and authorized the penitentiary board to require persons entering the penitentiary to be searched.
§ 47-5-99. Creation of classification hearing officers and disciplinary hearing officers.
There are hereby created classification hearing officers and disciplinary hearing officers of the correctional system to be appointed by the commissioner.
HISTORY: Laws, 1973, ch. 309, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 49; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 51; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 46; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 46; Laws, 1991, ch. 360 § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Construction.
Miss Code Ann. §§47-5-99 to47-5-103 (1972) do not create an expectation of any particular classification. McLemore v. Greer, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25365 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 18, 2005).
§ 47-5-101. Meetings and minutes of classification and disciplinary hearing officers.
The classification and disciplinary hearing officers shall maintain a record of all actions and orders by minutes. The hearing officers shall meet on a regular basis.
HISTORY: Laws, 1973, ch. 309, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 52; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 47; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 47; Laws, 1991, ch. 360, § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
§ 47-5-103. Powers and duties of classification hearing officer and classification board as to classification of offenders.
- The classification hearing officer shall be responsible for assigning a classification to each offender within forty (40) days after the offender’s commitment to the custody of the department. The classification shall determine the offender’s work duties, living quarters, educational, vocational or other rehabilitation programs, and privileges to be accorded the offender while in custody of the department. The classification hearing officer, in assigning classifications, shall consider the offender’s age, offense and surrounding circumstances, the complete record of the offender’s criminal history including records of law enforcement agencies or of a youth court regarding that offender’s juvenile criminal history, family background, education, practical or employment experience, interests and abilities as evidenced by mental and psychological examination and knowledge obtained by the classification hearing officer in personal interview with the offender. The classification hearing officer shall use the above criteria to assign each offender a classification which will serve and enhance the best interests and general welfare of the offender. The designee or designees of the commissioner shall approve or disapprove each classification. The classification hearing officer shall provide the State Parole Board with a copy of the classification assigned to each offender in the custody of the department who is eligible for parole.
- The classification board, consisting of the commissioner, or his designee, deputy commissioner of institutions and the director of offender services may change an action of the classification or disciplinary hearing officer if the board makes a determination that the action of the hearing officer was not supported by sufficient factual information. The commissioner, in emergency situations, may suspend the classification of an offender or offenders for a period of not exceeding fifteen (15) days to relieve the emergency situation. The classification of each offender may be reviewed by a classification hearing officer at least once each year. In no case shall an offender serve as a servant in the home of any employee other than authorized by the commissioner.
- The classification board shall establish substantive and procedural rules and regulations governing the assignment and alteration of inmate classifications, and shall make such rules and regulations available to any offender upon request.
HISTORY: Laws, 1973, ch. 309, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 50; Laws, 1981, ch. 381, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 53; Laws, 1983, ch. 375, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 48; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 48; Laws, 1986, ch. 422, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 360, § 3; Laws, 1995, ch. 417, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 3; Laws, 2004, ch. 338, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.
Amendment Notes —
The 2004 amendment substituted “designee or designees of the commissioner” for “director or assistant director of offender services” in the next-to-last sentence of (1).
Cross References —
Disclosure of youth court records, see §43-21-261.
Authority of classification committee regarding commutation of time for good conduct, see §47-5-139.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Inmate’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was enough to have him removed from the Community Work Center and placed at a state prison; inmates had no property or liberty interest as to their housing assignment. Hamilton v. Ruffin, 875 So. 2d 1125, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 587 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Under Mississippi law, classification of inmates is the responsibility of Department of Corrections, and inmate has no right to particular classification; thus, prison inmate whose custody status was reduced to “close custody” classification has no liberty interest in classification under Due Process Clause, and where prison officials did not abuse discretion in changing custody status, prisoner is not entitled to preliminary injunctions against physical restraints to which he was subjected as result of change in status. Tubwell v. Griffith, 742 F.2d 250, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 18287 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984).
§ 47-5-104. Demotion of offender or forfeiture of earned time.
The commissioner shall designate a disciplinary hearing officer to hear evidence and to make decisions in all cases when an offender has been issued a rule violation report and is subject to be demoted or having earned time taken from him. All proceedings of a disciplinary hearing officer shall be taped and retained for at least three (3) years. The commissioner shall not attend any hearings whereby an offender is subject to be demoted or having earned time taken away.
HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 485, § 3; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 51; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 54; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 49; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 49; Laws, 1991, ch. 360 § 4; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
§ 47-5-105. Entry of bids, bills, and invoices in minutes before award or payment; copies to be sent.
The award of all contracts within the purview of the Department of Finance and Administration under Section 27-104-7 in excess of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) entered into by the commissioner shall be approved by the Public Procurement Review Board and shall be entered on the minutes of such board before any funds shall be expended therefor. Provided further, that the entrance of the award of contracts on the minutes of the Public Procurement Review Board shall contain a detailed accounting of all bids entered showing clearly the lowest bid and best bid that was awarded in each and every case and, if the bid accepted is not the lowest, then the reasons and justification for not accepting the lowest bid shall be spread on the minutes. A true copy of the minutes of each meeting of the Public Procurement Review Board shall be sent monthly to the Governor, members of the Legislative Budget Office and Chairmen of the Corrections Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 27; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 52; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 55; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 50; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 224; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 50; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 21; Laws, 2012, ch. 388, § 1; Laws, 2016, ch. 355, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Amendment Notes —
The 2012 amendment substituted “Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00)” for “One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00)” in the first sentence, and in the last sentence substituted “Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives” for “Committee of the Senate and Penitentiary Committee of the House of Representatives.”
The 2016 amendment inserted “within the purview of the Department of Finance and Administration under Section 27-104-7” in the first sentence; and made a minor stylistic change in the last sentence.
Cross References —
Creation of the Office of General Services, see §7-1-451.
Duty of auditor for the correctional system with respect to bids, purchases, and sales, see §47-5-35.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 5.
§ 47-5-107. Cancellation of contracts.
Any contract entered into by any person, firm or corporation with the department can be cancelled, in the discretion of the commissioner, upon a finding of fact by the correctional system auditor provided for in Section 47-5-35, and entered on the minutes of the Public Procurement Review Board, that the person, firm or corporation doing business with the correctional system has violated either the published regulations of the correctional system or the laws of the State of Mississippi.
HISTORY: Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 28; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 53; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 56; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 51; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 51; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 22, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Cross References —
Duty of auditor for the correctional system with respect to bids, purchases, and sales, see §47-5-35.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Differences in character or quality of materials, articles, or work as affecting acceptance of bid for public contract. 27 A.L.R.2d 917.
Right of public authorities to reject all bids for public work or contract. 31 A.L.R.2d 469.
Am. Jur.
64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts § 70.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 5.
§ 47-5-108. Self-sustaining food facilities established at certain penitentiary and correctional facilities; Employee Cafeteria Funds.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections is hereby authorized to provide self-sustaining facilities for the preparation and serving of food for employees and visitors of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility, and the South Mississippi Correctional Institution. The commissioner shall promulgate policies and procedures for the operation of such facilities. In addition, the funds derived from these operations shall remain in separate accounts, hereafter known as the “Employee Cafeteria Funds.” The profits, if any, shall be distributed at the direction of the Commissioner of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 354; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 52; Laws, 1986, ch. 358, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 52; Laws, 1989, ch. 305, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 326, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1992.
§ 47-5-109. Operation of inmate canteen facilities; Canteen Fund.
- The State Department of Corrections is hereby authorized to operate a facility or facilities to be known as an inmate canteen facility or facilities, the purpose of which is to make available certain goods and other items of value for purchase by offenders confined at the State Penitentiary at Parchman, offenders confined at any other facility of the department, certain employees of the department and certain persons visiting offenders or employees. The commissioner shall promulgate rules and regulations for the operation of such a facility.
- Any funds which may be derived from the operation of an inmate canteen facility or facilities shall be deposited into an account to be known as the Canteen Fund. For accounting purposes, certain allocated costs attributable to the operation of such a facility, and as prescribed by the rules and regulations of the board, shall be chargeable as operating costs against profits earned. These costs of operation which are chargeable shall include, but shall not be limited to, rent allocation, utility allocation and employee wages. Any net profits which may accrue from the operation of such a facility and any interest earned thereon shall be deposited into the Inmate Welfare Fund.
HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 358, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 23, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
There is no statutory authority that would require a jail canteen to operate on a cash basis system; therefore, a sheriff may operate a jail canteen on a cashless system under the statute. Weissinger, June 26, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0333.
This section is not authority for a county board of supervisors to directly commit the profits from an inmate canteen fund to a contract for the provision of various programs and treatment services at a jail facility, such as inmate records system, substance abuse treatment program, GED program, chaplaincy and religious services, law library services, recreation program, etc. Webb, June 4, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0245.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 4-14, 22.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 2-4.
§ 47-5-109.1. Contract for administration of inmate canteen services.
-
The Department of Corrections shall contract for the administration of inmate canteen services to a third party. Such contract shall comply with the procedures set forth in this section:
-
The Department of Corrections shall cause to be prepared a request for proposals. This request for proposals shall be prepared for distribution to any interested third party. Notice of the department’s intention to seek proposals shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation at least one time per week for three (3) weeks before closing the period for interested parties to respond. Additional forms of notice may also be used. The newspaper notice shall inform the interested parties of the service to be contracted, existence of a request for proposals, how it can be obtained, when a proposal must be submitted, and to whom the proposal must be submitted. All requests for proposals shall describe clearly what service is to be contracted, and shall fully explain the criteria upon which an evaluation of proposals shall be based. The criteria to be used for evaluations shall, at a minimum, include:
- Require interested third parties to describe their qualifications to provide inmate canteen services to correctional facilities in widely dispersed geographical regions; and
- Describe the department’s expectations with regard to commissions, pricing and quality assurance for inmate canteen services.
- All proposals submitted by interested parties shall be evaluated by the Inmate Welfare Fund Committee, as established in Section 47-5-158, which shall apply the same criteria to all proposals when conducting an evaluation. The results and recommendations of the evaluation shall be presented to the Department of Corrections for review. All evaluations presented to the department shall be retained by the department for at least three (3) years. The department may accept or reject any recommendation of the committee, or it may conduct further inquiry into the proposals. Any further inquiry shall be clearly documented and all methods and recommendations shall be retained by the department and shall spread upon its minutes its choice of the administrator for inmate canteen services and its reasons for making the choice.
-
- The department shall be responsible for preparing a contract that shall be in accordance with all provisions of this section and all other provisions of law. The contract shall also include a requirement that the contractor shall consent to an evaluation of its performance. Such evaluation shall occur after the first six (6) months of the contract, and shall be reviewed at times the department determines to be necessary. The contract shall clearly describe the standards upon which the contractor shall be evaluated.
- The PEER Committee, at the request of the House or Senate Corrections Committee and with funds specifically appropriated by the Legislature for such purpose, shall contract with an accounting firm or with other professionals to conduct a compliance audit of the services provided by the contractor. Such audit shall review the compliance with the performance standards required for inclusion in the administrator’s contract. Such audit shall be delivered to the Legislature no later than January 1.
-
The Department of Corrections shall cause to be prepared a request for proposals. This request for proposals shall be prepared for distribution to any interested third party. Notice of the department’s intention to seek proposals shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation at least one time per week for three (3) weeks before closing the period for interested parties to respond. Additional forms of notice may also be used. The newspaper notice shall inform the interested parties of the service to be contracted, existence of a request for proposals, how it can be obtained, when a proposal must be submitted, and to whom the proposal must be submitted. All requests for proposals shall describe clearly what service is to be contracted, and shall fully explain the criteria upon which an evaluation of proposals shall be based. The criteria to be used for evaluations shall, at a minimum, include:
- Contracts for the administration of inmate canteen services shall commence at the beginning of the calendar year and shall end on the last day of a calendar year. This shall not apply to contracts provided for in subsection (3) of this section.
- If the Department of Corrections determines that it is necessary to not renew the contract of an administrator, or finds it necessary to terminate a contract with or without cause as provided for in the contract of the administrator of inmate canteen services, the department is authorized to select an administrator for inmate canteen services without complying with the bid requirements in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Such contracts shall be for the balance of the calendar year in which the nonrenewal or termination occurred, and may be for an additional calendar year if the department determines that the best interests of the inmates are served by such. Any contract negotiated on an interim basis shall include a detailed transition plan which shall ensure the orderly transfer of responsibilities between contractors.
- Except for contracts executed under the authority of subsection (3) of this section, the department shall select administrators of inmate canteen services at least six (6) months before the expiration of the current administrator’s contract. The period between the selection of the new administrator of inmate canteen services and the effective date of the new contract shall be known as the transition period. The Department of Corrections shall furnish the Legislature and Governor with copies of all transition plans and keep them informed of progression on such plans.
HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 432, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2015.
Offenders
§ 47-5-110. Commitments to be to department and not to particular institutions or facilities; transfers of offenders; community prerelease program; conditions; immunity for commissioner of corrections; evidence-based programs for benefit of inmates.
- Commitment to any institution or facility within the jurisdiction of the department shall be to the department, not to a particular institution or facility. The commissioner shall assign a newly committed offender to an appropriate facility consistent with public safety; provided, however, that any offender who, in the opinion of the sentencing judge, requires confinement in a maximum security unit shall be assigned, upon initial commitment, to the Parchman facility. The commissioner may extend the place of confinement of eligible offenders as provided under subsection (2) of this section. He may transfer an offender from one (1) institution to another, consistent with the commitment and in accordance with treatment, training and security needs. The commissioner shall have the authority to transfer inmates from the various correctional facilities of the department to restitution centers if such inmates meet the qualifications prescribed in Section 99-37-19. The commissioner shall prepare appropriate standards of eligibility for such transfers of offenders from one (1) institution to another institution and transfers of offenders who meet the qualifications for placement in restitution centers. The commissioner shall have the authority to remove the offenders from restitution centers and to transfer them to other facilities of the department. The commissioner shall obtain the approval of the sentencing court before transferring an offender committed to the department to a restitution center. On the request of the chief executive officer of the affected unit of local government, the commissioner may transfer a person detained in a local facility to a state facility. The commissioner shall determine the cost of care for that person to be borne by the unit of local government. The commissioner may assign to a community work center, any offender who is convicted under the Mississippi Implied Consent Law and who is sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections, except that if a death or a serious maiming has occurred during the commission of the violation of the Mississippi Implied Consent Law, then the offender so convicted may not be assigned to a community work center.
-
The department may establish by rule or policy and procedure a community prerelease program which shall be subject to the following requirements:
- The commissioner may extend the limits of confinement of offenders serving sentences for violent or nonviolent crimes who have six (6) months or less remaining before release on parole, conditional release or discharge to participate in the program. Parole violators may be allowed to participate in the program.
- Any offender who is referred to the program shall remain an offender of the department and shall be subject to rules and regulations of the department pertaining to offenders of the department until discharged or released on parole or conditional release by the State Parole Board.
- The department shall require the offender to participate in work or educational or vocational programs and other activities that may be necessary for the supervision and treatment of the offender.
- An offender assigned to the program shall be authorized to leave a community prerelease center only for the purpose and time necessary to participate in the program and activities authorized in paragraph (c) of this subsection.
- The commissioner shall have absolute immunity from liability for any injury resulting from a determination by the commissioner that an offender shall be allowed to participate in the community prerelease program.
-
- The department may by rule or policy and procedure provide evidence-based programs for the benefit of inmates, with emphasis on those that are targeted at reducing inmate recidivism and prerelease service for offenders at each of its major correctional facilities: Mississippi State Penitentiary, Central Mississippi Correctional Institution and South Mississippi Correctional Institution and other facilities where the department confines state inmates.
- The commissioner may establish prerelease programs at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution. The prerelease program may be located on the grounds of this facility or another facility designated by the commissioner.
- For purposes of this subsection, the term “evidence-based programs” shall have ascribed to it the meaning in Section 27-103-159.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 16; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 57; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 53; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 53; Laws, 1986, ch. 428, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 578, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 371, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 552, § 2; Laws, 2005, ch. 505, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 353, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 391, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 463, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2015.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment rewrote the fifth and sixth sentences of (1); and added (5) containing a repealer of July 1, 2005.
The 2005 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (5) from “July 1, 2005” until “July 1, 2007.”
The 2007 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (5) from “July 1, 2007” to “July 1, 2011.”
The 2012 amendment deleted former (5), which read: “This section shall stand repealed on July 1, 2011.”
The 2015 amendment in (4)(a), substituted “evidence-based programs for the benefit of inmates, with emphasis on those that are targeted at reducing inmate recidivism” for “the regimented inmate discipline program” near the beginning, and added “and other facilities where the department confines state inmates” at the end; in (b), deleted “regimented inmate discipline and” preceding “prerelease programs at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution” in the first sentence, and deleted the former second sentence, which read: “Offenders assigned to this facility may receive the services provided by the regimented inmate discipline program”; and added (c).
Cross References —
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
Mississippi Implied Consent Law, see §§63-11-1 et seq.
Restitution centers generally, see §99-37-19.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Without waiving the procedural bar to the inmate’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutional, the court held that the inmate was properly charged under Miss. Code Ann. §97-9-45 and entered a plea of guilty to the escape; the sentence of three years was well within the maximum prescribed by the statute, which referred to prisoners sentenced to the Mississippi Department of Corrections and allowed a maximum sentence of five years, and thus the inmate was not entitled to post-conviction relief; although the inmate was in custody and on a work program for a county at the time of the escape, the inmate was considered under the Department’s jurisdiction for purposes of §97-9-45 because (1) the inmate’s original burglary sentence required imprisonment in the “penitentiary” under Miss. Code Ann. §97-17-23, which term meant any facility under the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-3, (2) commitment to any institution within the jurisdiction of the Department was to the Department, not a particular institution pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-110, and (3) under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-541, the Department recommended rules concerning the participation of inmates in work programs. Gardner v. State, 848 So. 2d 900, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 570 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Section99-19-39, which governs the detention of a convict pending appeal, confers no right in a convicted felon to be incarcerated in county jail pending an appeal to the Supreme Court; construing §99-19-39 to create such a right would place that statutory section in conflict with the provisions of §47-5-1 et seq. which create a comprehensive correctional system to deal with the incarceration of all felony offenders; under the comprehensive legislative scheme setting up the Mississippi Department of Corrections, the circuit court sentences to the Department and not to any particular facility, and neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court can order the Department to return a prisoner duly committed to its custody to county jail as a mater of right. Nicolaou v. State, 596 So. 2d 863, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 133 (Miss. 1992).
A prisoner did not have a protected liberty interest in being transferred from a county correctional facility to a state prison, absent a state law or regulation or prison policy or procedure conditioning such a transfer on proof of misbehavior or some other event. McFadden v. State, 580 So. 2d 1210, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1991).
An imprisoned offender was improperly transferred from one institution to another institution within the same Department of Corrections, since such transfer was pursuant to an order of a Circuit Judge, and, pursuant to §47-5-110, only the Commissioner of Corrections has the authority to assign or transfer offenders to particular institutions. Lewis v. State, 414 So. 2d 435, 1982 Miss. LEXIS 2028 (Miss. 1982).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 18 et seq, 163 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 2, 17-20, 128, 129 et seq.
§ 47-5-110.1. Offenders to pay costs of requested transfers between facilities.
Whenever an offender in the custody of the Department of Corrections is transferred, upon request, from one (1) facility to another, the offender must pay to the department an amount equal to Forty Cents ($.40) per mile for each mile traveled from the transferor facility to the transferee facility or Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00), whichever is greater, to cover the costs of the transfer. An offender may not be required to pay for the costs of any transfer that is initiated by the Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 12; Laws, 2005, ch. 370, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 15, 2005.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2005 amendment substituted “Forty Cents ($.40)” for “Thirty-five Cents ($.35)” in the first sentence.
§ 47-5-110.2. Persons sentenced to custody of department after January 1, 2017, can no longer be sentenced to regimented inmate discipline program.
From and after January 1, 2017, no person to be sentenced to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections shall be ordered to a Regimented Inmate Discipline (RID) program by any court of this state. The Department of Corrections shall either operate RID programs for inmates sentenced to such a program prior to January 1, 2017, or devise and implement suitable alternatives for any such inmates.
HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 463, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015.
§ 47-5-111. Transportation of offenders to correctional system facilities; processing of offenders at receiving stations.
The commissioner shall make suitable provision and regulations for the safe and speedy transportation of offenders from counties of their confinement to the appropriate facility of the correctional system by the sheriffs of such respective counties if such sheriffs are willing to perform such services as cheaply as the correctional system can have it done otherwise. Such transportation shall be on state account. In no instance shall the offenders be carried direct from the county jails to a correctional facility, but shall be carried to the appropriate receiving station as designated by the commissioner where the character of labor which each offender may reasonably perform shall be determined. Upon the arrival of each offender at such receiving station, the commissioner shall cause a statement to be made by the offender, giving a brief history of his life, and showing where he has resided, the names and post office addresses of his immediate relatives, and such other facts as will tend to show his past habits and character. The commissioner shall, by correspondence or otherwise, verify or disprove such statements, if practicable, and shall preserve the record and information so obtained for future reference. The commissioner shall have authority to designate such vehicles as are necessary to transport offenders.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7940; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 20; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 54; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 58; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 54; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 54; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 24, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Cross References —
“Biddle guard” to be installed on vehicle transporting prisoner, §47-5-116.
Procedure for commitment of convict sentenced to penitentiary, see §§99-19-43 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 18, 163 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 20, 22, 130 et seq.
§ 47-5-112. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1989, ch. 488, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1991.
[Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 8; Laws, 1978, ch. 447, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 372, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1980, ch. 310; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 59; am, Laws, 1982, ch. 386; 1983, ch. 390; Laws, 1984, ch. 392; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 225; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1985, ch. 507; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1987, ch. 336; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 25; Laws, 1989, ch. 488, § 81]
§ 47-5-113. Offenders of the United States courts.
The offenders of the courts of the United States sentenced to confinement in the state correctional system shall on delivery to the correctional system be confined in the correctional system according to their several sentences and be treated as other offenders, the United States supporting such offenders and paying the expenses of executing their sentences.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7977; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 57; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 55; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 60; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 55; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 55, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-115. Offenders whose capital sentences are commuted.
Any offender who has been sentenced to suffer death, and whose sentence has been commuted by the Governor to imprisonment in the state correctional system, shall be confined in the state correctional system on order of the Governor and treated as are other offenders.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7976; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 56; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 56; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 61; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 56; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 56, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Constitutional authority for governor to grant reprieves, see Miss. Const. Art. 5, § 124.
Procedure upon violation of pardon, see §99-19-29.
§ 47-5-116. Installation of “Biddle guard” on vehicle transporting prisoner.
- The term “Biddle guard” means a device or partition installed in a vehicle operated by a law enforcement officer which separates the front and rear passenger compartments.
- It is unlawful to transport a prisoner who is committed to the Department of Corrections in a vehicle which is not equipped with a secure Biddle guard. Each prisoner shall be restrained and a state, county, municipal or private correctional facility shall not release a prisoner into the custody of a law enforcement officer unless the prisoner is being transported in a vehicle equipped in accordance with this section.
- The Commissioner of Corrections, sheriff or chief law enforcement officer who is responsible for a vehicle in which any transportation in violation of this section occurs shall be assessed a civil penalty of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) which shall be collected by the Attorney General and paid into the State Treasury.
- The Commissioner of Corrections, sheriff or chief law enforcement officer who is responsible for a vehicle in which a prisoner is transported in violation of this section shall not be liable personally for any damages arising from injuries to persons or property caused by a prisoner who has escaped while being transported in violation of this section.
- This section does not apply to any vehicle used by a correctional officer for transporting prisoners on the grounds of a correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the department, to any vehicle used by a field officer of the Department of Corrections when taking a prisoner into the custody of the Department of Corrections or to any vehicle used to transport prisoners in work release programs.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 380, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 525, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Any prisoner committed to the Department of Corrections must be transported in a vehicle equipped with a Biddle guard; this section does not apply to prisoners who have not been committed to the Department of Corrections. Hunter, August 13, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0395.
This section applies to the transportation of a prisoner for any reason with the exception of transporting prisoners on the grounds of a correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the department, to any vehicle used by a field officer of the Department of Corrections when taking a prisoner into the custody of the Department of Corrections or to any vehicle used to transport prisoners in work release programs. Hunter, August 13, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0395.
§ 47-5-117. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 59]
§ 47-5-119. Initial search of offender; disposition of money found thereon; misappropriation of offender’s money.
Offenders, when received into a facility of the correctional system, shall be carefully searched. If money be found on the person of the offender, or received by him at any time, it shall be taken in charge by the commissioner and placed to the offender’s credit and expended for the offender’s benefit on his written order and under such restrictions as may be prescribed by law or the rules. If an offender with money charged to his credit shall die from any cause while in a facility of the correctional system or be discharged without claiming such money, the commissioner shall make every effort to give notice of such fact to the discharged offender or to the beneficiary or nearest-known relative, if any, of the deceased or discharged offender, and upon a valid claim presented shall pay out such money to such discharged offender, beneficiary or nearest relative. After two (2) years from the date of giving such notice, or a valid attempt to give such notice, or two (2) years after the death of such offender, if the beneficiary or nearest relative is unknown, if such money has not been validly claimed, the commissioner shall make an affidavit of such fact, which sums shall escheat to the correctional system special vocational training program fund to help in offender rehabilitation. Any officer or employee having charge of the offenders’ money who misappropriates the same, or any part thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be confined in the correctional system for a term of not more than five (5) years. All sums credited to the account of an offender who shall escape shall immediately, upon the offender’s escape, escheat to the special vocational training program fund to help in offender rehabilitation.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7947; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 27; Laws, 1968, ch. 378, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 57; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 62; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 57; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 57, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Fourth Amendment as protecting prisoner against unreasonable searches or seizures. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 601.
§ 47-5-120. Transfer of offender for observation, diagnosis and treatment; board of examiners established to examine condition of certain offenders.
- Except as otherwise provided by law, the commissioner may transfer an offender for observation, diagnosis and treatment to another appropriate state department or institution, provided that he has given prior written notice to the administrator of the agency.
- The department of corrections shall create a board of examiners, hereinafter referred to as the “board,” who shall examine and evaluate the condition of offenders who are apparently suffering from psychosis, other mental illness, or dependency or addiction to drugs. The commissioner shall refer such offenders to the board which shall make a written report of its findings pertaining to each such offender. If all members of the board determine that an offender is in need of mental treatment or can obtain benefit from the programs of treatment for drug dependency or addiction at a facility of the department of mental health, then the board may authorize his transfer for observation, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation after prior written notice to the administrator of the facility of the department of mental health that is to receive the offender.
-
The board shall be composed of the following:
- A physician on the staff of the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield, Mississippi, or the East Mississippi State Hospital at Meridian, Mississippi;
- A physician on the staff of the Mississippi Department of Corrections; and
- A physician to be selected by the commissioner of corrections who is not an employee of the department of corrections or the department of mental health.
- The board shall meet once each month at the correctional facility located at Parchman, Mississippi. All fees, compensation and expenses of the board shall be paid from funds appropriated to or otherwise available to the state department of corrections. The board is authorized to establish such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
- While the offender is in another institution, his sentence shall continue to run. When the director of the institution to which an offender has been transferred determines that the offender is not in need of treatment or has recovered from the condition which occasioned the transfer or has received the maximum benefit of treatment and rehabilitation, the commissioner shall provide for his return to the department, unless his sentence has expired, in which case he shall be issued a discharge in accordance with law.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 17; Laws, 1977, ch. 495, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 63; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 58; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 58, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-121. Separation of sexes.
All female offenders shall be kept separate and apart from male offenders. Where practicable, the commissioner shall keep the female offenders within a separate facility from the male offenders, and shall provide reasonable rules and regulations for the government of same.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7943; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 23; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 58; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 64; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 59; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 59, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Constitutional authority for separation of sexes, see Miss. Const. Art. 10, § 225.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 31.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 53.
§ 47-5-122. Agricultural production as part of disciplinary or other programs; contracts for federal subsidies.
The Commissioner of Corrections may provide for agricultural production in connection with disciplinary programs, rehabilitation, inmate work projects, prison agricultural enterprise programs or any similar activity of the department; however, agricultural activities shall be conducted in a manner which are labor intensive and a minimum amount of mechanized or power-driven equipment shall be utilized to the extent practical and economically feasible.
The Department of Corrections is authorized to enter into contracts or agreements with the federal government with respect to agricultural subsidies or payments.
HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 425, § 2; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).
§ 47-5-123. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, §§ 25, 22]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-123 dealt with the clothing to be furnished as required outerwear for prisoners.
§ 47-5-124. Uniform designations for offenders; restrictions on possession of radios, televisions and similar electronic devices; restrictions on weight lifting programs.
-
Beginning January 1, 1995, the Department of Corrections shall phase in the following uniform designations for all offenders housed by the Department of Corrections:
- Maximum security offenders – Red and white horizontal stripes which are three (3) inches wide;
- Medium security offenders – Black and white horizontal stripes which are three (3) inches wide; and
-
Minimum security offenders – Green and white horizontal stripes which are three (3) inches wide.
No offender may wear any article of clothing that is not issued to the offender by the Department of Corrections. The word “convict” must be written on the back of the shirt or other upper outer garment of clothing.
- No convict incarcerated in a state correctional facility or a private correctional facility may be authorized or permitted to operate, use or have in his possession during the term of his incarceration any radio, television, record player, tape player, recorder, compact disc player, stereo or computer, except when such devices are used in a work incentive program authorized and administered by the Department of Corrections. The department shall develop and implement a plan to return such devices owned by inmates to the families of such inmates.
- No state correctional facility existing on August 23, 1994, and no correctional facility, public or private, constructed or contracted for under the provisions of this chapter shall include weight lifting equipment, except when such equipment is used in a work incentive program.
- An inmate is prohibited from possessing individual air conditioners. However, the Department of Finance and Administration and Department of Corrections shall determine the feasibility and cost effectiveness of heating and refrigerated air conditioning equipment for the cooling and heating of a correctional facility constructed after August 23, 1994.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 28; Laws, 2015, ch. 463, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2015.
Amendment Notes —
The 2015 amendment deleted “or Regimented Inmate Discipline Program” preceding “authorized and administered by the Department of Corrections” in the next-to last sentence of (2); and deleted “or a Regimented Inmate Discipline program authorized and administered by the Department of Corrections” from the end of (3).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 113, 117, 118.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners § 68.
§ 47-5-125. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, §§ 25, 22]
§ 47-5-126. Working of inmates.
All inmates, unless physically unable, shall be required to perform such work as may be set out in the policy-making board of the institution.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 91; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 65; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 60; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 60, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Prohibition against use of offenders as servants, see §47-5-137.
Regulations relating to penitentiary-made goods, see §§47-5-301 et seq.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
A prison inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in a particular job assignment under the due process clause. However, a liberty interest may be created by state law or prison regulation. McFadden v. State, 580 So. 2d 1210, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 306 (Miss. 1991).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-127. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 26; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 25; Laws, 1975, ch. 485, § 1]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-127 related to the working of prisoners, the deduction of overtime and Sunday work from their sentences, and the forfeiture of such deductions for misconduct.
§ 47-5-128. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 420, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1984.
[Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 21; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 59; Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 2; Laws, 1978, ch. 301, § 5; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 66]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-128 pertained to assignment of offenders to farming operations and the employment of other labor.
§ 47-5-129. Offenders to work certain roads; Sunflower County.
Sunflower County shall have the use of not over thirty-five (35) offenders six (6) workdays of each week for the purpose of working the roads of Sunflower County. The board of supervisors of Sunflower County shall lay out and designate the roads to be worked by the offenders, and the board of supervisors shall furnish transportation to and from the Parchman facility for the offenders. The supervision and handling of offenders while working on the roads shall be under the road sergeant, it being understood that all offenders so worked on the road shall be returned to the Parchman facility at night.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7955; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 35; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 60; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 67; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 61; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 61, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-131. Offenders to work certain roads; Quitman County.
Quitman County, Mississippi, shall have the use of not over twenty (20) offenders from the Parchman facility for five (5) workdays of each week for the purpose of working the roads of Quitman County. The board of supervisors of Quitman County shall lay out and designate roads to be worked by the offenders, and the board of supervisors shall furnish transportation to and from the Parchman facility for offenders.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7956; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 36; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 61; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 68; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 62; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 62, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-132. Housing of prisoners; “hot racking,” tents and “double bunking.”
- In addition to any other powers and duties of the Commissioner of Corrections, the commissioner is authorized to study and develop a plan for rotating bed space, known in military terms as “hot racking,” for adult offenders committed to the Department of Corrections. The plan, as determined by the commissioner, may include rotating shifts of labor, training and sleep.
-
In addition, the commissioner may:
- In his discretion as he deems necessary to address emergency overcrowding situations, utilize military-style temporary housing facilities and infrastructure, for the incarceration of adult offenders committed to the department. Such facilities shall include tents or other temporary structures, any necessary ditches for drainage purposes, any temporary infrastructure and any other improvement or accompaniment to such structures. All such facilities shall be constructed as much as possible by adult offenders in the custody of the Department of Corrections, possessing the minimum constructions skills necessary.
- In his discretion, require that any bed in the state correctional system shall be converted to a bunk bed, in order that a space occupied by a bed will consist of a bed on top of a bed, which shall be known as “double-bunking.”
HISTORY: Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 29, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
§ 47-5-133. Drainage of correctional system property; restriction on working of offenders off correctional system property.
The commissioner is authorized and empowered to use the offenders on or off the property of the correctional system to drain or improve the drainage of any property belonging to the correctional system. Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, no offenders at any time are to work off property of the correctional system except: (a) when some dire calamity or disaster exists or threatens, or (b) those offenders assigned to duty at the Governor’s Mansion (eight (8)). The Governor may order offenders to work to avert or control such calamity or disaster.
Provided, however, that the commissioner may authorize the working of offenders in support of any road construction, repair or other project of the State Highway Department upon proper request therefor by the State Highway Commission. In such cases the department shall establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, safekeeping, clothing, housing and subsistence of offenders while so working.
Provided further, that the commissioner may authorize the working and housing of offenders in support of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics upon proper request therefor by the bureau. In such cases the department shall establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, safekeeping, clothing, housing and subsistence of offenders while so working.
The commissioner may authorize the working of offenders in support of any aspect of Mississippi state government where such work would be appropriate and useful.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7964; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 44; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 62; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 69; Laws, 1984, ch. 305, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 63; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 63; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 26; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation.
Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “Mississippi State Highway Department,” or the term “department” meaning the Mississippi State Highway Department, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Department of Transportation, and whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.
Cross References —
Bureau of Narcotics, see §41-29-107 et seq.
Bureau of Narcotics work program, see §41-29-110.
Use of inmates of correctional institutions on highway projects, see §65-1-8.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Although §47-5-133 appears to prohibit working prison inmate on private property, making inmate do such work and not paying inmate for such work does not violate inmate’s constitutional or civil rights. Murray v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16467 (5th Cir. Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1050, 111 S. Ct. 760, 112 L. Ed. 2d 779, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 406 (U.S. 1991).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Application of Section 1 of 13th Amendment to United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. XIII, 1, Prohibiting Slavery and Involuntary Servitude – Labor Required as Punishment for Crime. 87 A.L.R.6th 109.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-134. Offenders to work for Habitat for Humanity or the Fuller Center for Housing, Inc.
The Commissioner of Corrections may authorize the working of offenders, on a voluntary basis, in support of Habitat for Humanity, Inc., or the Fuller Center for Housing, Inc., which are nonprofit organizations. However, offenders shall only be used to work on construction projects. The Department of Corrections shall establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, safekeeping, clothing, housing and subsistence of offenders when they are working.
HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 365, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 428, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2009.
Amendment Notes —
The 2009 amendment in the first sentence, inserted “or the Fuller Center for Housing, Inc., which are” following “Habitat for Humanity, Inc.,” and substituted “organizations” for “organization” at the end.
§§ 47-5-135 and 47-5-136. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1983, ch. 391, § 2, eff from and after March 24, 1983.
§47-5-135. [Codes, 1942, § 7981; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 64; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 64; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 70]
§47-5-136. [Codes, 1942, § 7922(b-d); Laws, 1972, ch. 468, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 65; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 71]
§ 47-5-137. Use of offenders as servants prohibited; exception.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the use of offenders as servants, gardeners, chauffeurs, cooks, baby-sitters or domestic workers of any nature by an employee of the correctional system or by any other person in an individual household is hereby prohibited; provided, however, that the commissioner may use offenders for such work on the grounds of a facility of the correctional system.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7960; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 40; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 26; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 66; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 72; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 64; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 64; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Prisoners permitted to work on public roads or other public works, see §47-1-9.
County prisoners may provide certain public service work, see §47-1-19.
Working of municipal prisoners, see §47-1-41.
Working of inmates, see §47-5-126.
Use of prisoners in county jails to pick up trash, see §§47-5-43 et seq.
Use of prisoners in county jails to maintain certain historic cemeteries and serve food in conjunction with nonprofit organizations, see §47-5-441.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
A judge’s use of county prisoners to carry out personal labors on his own behalf justified removal of the judge from office. In re Collins, 524 So. 2d 553, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2932 (Miss. 1987).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Liability of public officer or body for harm done by prisoner permitted to escape. 44 A.L.R.3d 899.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-138. Earned time allowances; earned-release supervision; promulgations of rules and regulations; forfeiture generally; release of offender; phase-out of earned time release.
- The department may promulgate rules and regulations to carry out an earned time allowance program based on the good conduct and performance of an inmate. An inmate is eligible to receive an earned time allowance of one-half (1/2) of the period of confinement imposed by the court except those inmates excluded by law. When an inmate is committed to the custody of the department, the department shall determine a conditional earned time release date by subtracting the earned time allowance from an inmate’s term of sentence. This subsection does not apply to any sentence imposed after June 30, 1995.
- An inmate may forfeit all or part of his earned time allowance for a serious violation of rules. No forfeiture of the earned time allowance shall be effective except upon approval of the commissioner, or his designee, and forfeited earned time may not be restored.
-
- For the purposes of this subsection, “final order” means an order of a state or federal court that dismisses a lawsuit brought by an inmate while the inmate was in the custody of the Department of Corrections as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
-
On receipt of a final order, the department shall forfeit:
- Sixty (60) days of an inmate’s accrued earned time if the department has received one (1) final order as defined herein;
- One hundred twenty (120) days of an inmate’s accrued earned time if the department has received two (2) final orders as defined herein;
- One hundred eighty (180) days of an inmate’s accrued earned time if the department has received three (3) or more final orders as defined herein.
- The department may not restore earned time forfeited under this subsection.
- An inmate who meets the good conduct and performance requirements of the earned time allowance program may be released on his conditional earned time release date.
- For any sentence imposed after June 30, 1995, an inmate may receive an earned time allowance of four and one-half (4-1/2) days for each thirty (30) days served if the department determines that the inmate has complied with the good conduct and performance requirements of the earned time allowance program. The earned time allowance under this subsection shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of an inmate’s term of sentence; however, beginning July 1, 2006, no person under the age of twenty-one (21) who has committed a nonviolent offense, and who is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, shall be subject to the fifteen percent (15%) limitation for earned time allowances as described in this subsection (5).
- Any inmate, who is released before the expiration of his term of sentence under this section, shall be placed under earned-release supervision until the expiration of the term of sentence. The inmate shall retain inmate status and remain under the jurisdiction of the department. The period of earned-release supervision shall be conducted in the same manner as a period of supervised parole. The department shall develop rules, terms and conditions for the earned-release supervision program. The commissioner shall designate the appropriate hearing officer within the department to conduct revocation hearings for inmates violating the conditions of earned-release supervision.
- If the earned-release supervision is revoked, the inmate shall serve the remainder of the sentence, but the time the inmate served on earned-release supervision before revocation, shall be applied to reduce his sentence.
HISTORY: Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 6; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 73; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 386; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 65; Laws, 1985, ch. 531, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 65; Laws, 1992, ch. 520, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 403, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 4; Laws, 1996, ch. 350, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 418, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 402, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 5; Laws, 2005, ch. 471, § 9; Laws, 2012, ch. 486, § 1; brought forward and amended, Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 72, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2005 amendment added “however, beginning July 1, 2006, no person under the age of twenty-one (21) who has committed a nonviolent offense, and who is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, shall be subject to the fifteen percent (15%) limitation for earned time allowances as described in this subsection (5)” at the end of (5).
The 2012 amendment substituted “served on earned-release supervision before revocation, shall be applied to reduce his sentence” for “was on earned-release supervision, shall not be applied to and shall not reduce his sentence” at the end of (7).
The 2014 amendment brought the section forward and amended it with a minor stylistic change in (2).
Cross References —
Handbook explaining earned time procedure, see §47-5-140.
Meritorious earned time, see §47-5-142.
Provision for notice to the sheriff of the county in which an offender was convicted prior to release of the offender from the custody of the Department of Corrections, see §47-5-177.
Eligibility for earned time credit for inmates participating in joint state-county public service work programs, see §47-5-413.
Earned time credit for inmates participating in joint state-county work program, see §47-5-461.
Participation in a drug identification program by a person on probation or parole, see §§47-5-601 et seq.
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
Utilization of powers which tend to reduce prison system population, including earned time allowances, prior to declaration of a prison system overcrowding state of emergency, see §47-5-705.
Procedures for revocation of conditional advancement of parole eligibility date during period of prison overcrowding, see §47-5-723.
Relationship between earned time allowances and advancement of parole eligibility dates during periods of prison overcrowding, see §47-5-727.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Constitutionality.
3. Final order.
4. Early release.
5. Revocation.
1. In general.
As the allegations in an inmate’s motion for postconviction relief were contradicted by his prior sworn statements, and his claims had no arguable basis in law or in fact and had no realistic chance for success, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion frivolous and ordering the forfeiture of 60 days of his earned time under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138. Bell v. State, 102 So.3d 297, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 489 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 119 So.3d 328, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 446 (Miss. 2013).
Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in deeming appellant’s second post-conviction (PCR) motion frivolous and ordering the forfeiture of sixty days of his earned-time credit under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(3)(b)(i) because appellant entered a voluntary guilty plea, which waived his right to challenge the search warrant; the PCR motion offered nothing more than conclusory allegations framed as newly discovered evidence, and it had no realistic chance of success, was not premised upon an arguably sound basis in fact and law, and set forth no facts that would warrant relief. Russell v. State, 73 So.3d 542, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 327 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138 limits the maximum amount of earned time and meritorious earned time an offender could receive to one-half of his total sentence, but there is nothing in the statute that automatically entitles an offender to serve only fifty percent of his sentence. Hearron v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 22 So.3d 1238, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 827 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Where defendant pled guilty to statutory rape, the trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to participate in the Mississippi Regimented Inmate Discipline Program program under its own discretion, and not under the earned-time allowance program administered by the Mississippi DOC. Gatlin v. State, 18 So.3d 290, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 199 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Despite the fact that an inmate was entitled to an earned-time allowance of one-half of his total sentence, including mandatory time because he was convicted before the effective date of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e), the earned-time allowance did not reduce the mandatory portions of his sentences or accelerate his parole eligibility date under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1) or his tentative discharge date. Adams v. Gibbs, 988 So. 2d 395, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 409 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Trial judge unquestionably could consider both the civil file in defendant’s post-conviction-relief proceedings and the entire record in the criminal proceedings, including the transcript of the guilty-plea hearing, in determining not only the issue of the merits of defendant’s post-conviction-relief petition, but also the issue of whether the petition was frivolous for the purpose of considering sanctions; the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in sanctioning defendant via a forfeiture of sixty days of accrued earned time. Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 326 (Miss. 2008).
Trial court did not err in ordering the Department of Corrections to forfeit 60 days of defendant’s accrued earned time pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(3)(a) for filing a frivolous motion because defendant presented no argument that would enable him to prevail upon appeal. Waddell v. State, 999 So. 2d 375, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 93 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Inmate’s appeal was frivolous where the complaint never had a realistic chance of success, it failed to present an arguably sound basis in fact or law, and the inmate could not prove any set of facts that would warrant relief; the Mississippi department of corrections had to apply the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(3)(b)(i) regarding forfeiture of 60 days of the inmate’s earned time release, if the inmate had any. Bessent v. Clark, 974 So. 2d 928, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 633 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
In a case involving a motion for post-conviction relief, there was no error in finding that the motion was frivolous since there was no newly discovered evidence in a case arising from a guilty plea in 2004, as defendant had claimed; therefore, the loss of earned time was appropriate. Coleman v. State, 971 So. 2d 637, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 681 (Miss. Dec. 6, 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 684 (Miss. Dec. 6, 2007), cert. denied, 973 So. 2d 244, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 686 (Miss. 2007).
Notwithstanding a time bar, a post-conviction claim failed on the merits because earned time and trusty time were not allowed for an escape conviction under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(3) since certain conditions were not met, and defendant was erroneously allowed to keep the time that was credited to his non-mandatory sentences; because defendant was convicted of violating a state statutory provision instead of a prison rule, he was not entitled to receive an administrative hearing and have the forfeiture of earned time approved. Golden v. Epps, 958 So. 2d 271, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 392 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 610 (Miss. 2007).
Defendant was not prejudiced by the imposition of a forfeiture of good time based on a meritless motion for post-conviction relief because he was not eligible for such as a habitual offender. Adams v. State, 962 So. 2d 640, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 38 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Defendant’s discontentment concerning the loss of good time credits was without merit; under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138, the court may order forfeiture of good time credits upon a finding that the lawsuit was frivolous; the trial court ruled that the present suit was frivolous, and the appellate court would not disturb that finding as defendant’s motion was procedurally barred. Smith v. State, 922 So. 2d 43, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 126 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Order summarily dismissing petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief was upheld where, contrary to his allegations, there was no requirement in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138 that there be an evidentiary hearing before a classification board prior to the loss of earned time; in his brief, petitioner did not address any of the specific instances in which his earned time was forfeited or show that any evidentiary hearing would have been beneficial. Stewart v. State, 938 So. 2d 344, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 694 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
As an inmate was sentenced after June 30, 1995, and was subject to the earned release supervision (ERS) that was present in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(5), the inmate’s arguments that inmate’s fifteen percent earned time allowance should not be spent on ERS was without merit and his complaint was properly dismissed. Peters v. State, 935 So. 2d 1064, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 11 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 936 So. 2d 367, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 2006).
Trial court did not err in applying the earned time forfeiture statute after the inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief was denied as the present petition addressed issues that had previously been raised and resolved on appeal. Moore v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 936 So. 2d 941, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 973 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 560 (Miss. Aug. 24, 2006).
Appellate court affirmed the denial of an inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief and his claim that he should have been released after serving seven and one-half years of his 15-year sentence, as it was clear that the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) had authority to revoke the inmate’s earned time under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138 for violating the internal rules of the MDOC. Sanders v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 912 So. 2d 189, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 713 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Trial court properly denied defendant’s “motion to correct sentence” because applying Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138 to him was clearly impermissible under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3, as he was an offender over 19 years of age and clearly ineligible for parole. Smith v. State, 914 So. 2d 330, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Because the record did not support any finding of ineffectiveness of counsel, the claim upon which defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief was based, but rather indicated that defendant understood all matters to which he pled and was satisfied with the performance of his attorney, it was within the trial court’s discretion to order that defendant forfeit 60 days of earned time. Stanley v. State, 904 So. 2d 1127, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 973 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
There was no merit to petitioner’s contention that, since he was not eligible to accrue earned time at the time of his attempted escape, during the mandatory portion of his sentence, he had no earned time to be forfeited; the escape attempt resulted in a forfeiture of all of petitioner’s earned time credit. Boler v. Bailey, 840 So. 2d 734, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
In determining whether a case brought in forma pauperis should be dismissed as frivolous, the courts had a three-part test; did the complaint have a realistic chance of success, did it present an arguably sound basis in fact and law, and could the complainant prove any set of facts that would warrant relief. Dock v. State, 802 So. 2d 1051, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 272 (Miss. 2001).
An inmate could not accrue earned-time allowance in excess of 15 percent of his sentence, all prisoners were required to serve, at a minimum, 85 percent of their term of confinement. Hall v. State, 800 So. 2d 1202, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 347 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
Nothing in the earned time forfeiture provision prevents pro se inmates from seeking relief; the purpose of the statute is to reduce frivolous filings on the part of all incarcerated individuals, whether literate or illiterate, pro se or represented by counsel. Holt v. State, 757 So. 2d 1088, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 211 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
The trial court acted within appropriate boundaries when ordering that a certified copy of the final order dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief as frivolous be forwarded to the Mississippi Department of Corrections for action under subsection (3)(b), where the petitioner had previously petitioned the trial court for relief from sentence and other relief, and the same was deemed frivolous in a prior order, and he then filed his second petition with knowledge that his first petition had been deemed frivolous. Holt v. State, 757 So. 2d 1088, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 211 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
While forfeiture of time has become an additional option that a trial judge may exercise in imposing sanctions for frivolous motions, the trial judge may also impose monetary sanctions. Retherford v. State, 749 So. 2d 269, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 550 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
Statutory amendment that required that 85% of sentence be served and that eliminated opportunities for parole that had previously existed was an ex post facto law as applied to defendants who had been charged with crimes before effective date of statute and whose charges were not to be disposed of until after effective date. Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 636 (Miss. 1996).
A prisoner serving a 20-year sentence was not entitled to a deduction of earned time from his parole eligibility date since he did not become eligible for earned time until after the Attorney General issued an opinion discontinuing the practice of allowing earned time to shorten parole eligibility. McFadden v. State, 523 So. 2d 77, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 87 (Miss. 1988).
The actions of corrections officials in designating a prisoner eligible for earned time, due to an administrative or clerical error, and then in withdrawing that designation, did not amount to a forfeiture of earned time without due process since no earned time was accumulated by the prisoner. Doctor v. State, 522 So. 2d 229, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 81 (Miss. 1988).
Reasonable and harmonious construction of §§47-5-138,47-5-139, and47-7-3 is that legislature intended them to maintain enhanced penalty that §99-19-81 imposes on habitual offenders, which penalty includes denial of certain privileges available to other prisoners. Perkins v. Cabana, 794 F.2d 168, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27510 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936, 107 S. Ct. 414, 93 L. Ed. 2d 366, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4575 (U.S. 1986).
Defendant sentenced as habitual offender has no entitlement to credit for “good time.” Hardy v. State, 473 So. 2d 941, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2166 (Miss. 1985).
2. Constitutionality.
This section is not unconstitutional, and does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since neither prison inmates nor indigents constitute a suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So. 2d 654, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 2000).
The statute is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law, notwithstanding that it deprived the defendant of good time credits which he earned prior to the effective date of the statute, as the punitive measures required by the statute were applied to actions taken by the defendant after the effective date of the statute. Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So. 2d 654, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 2000).
The defendant was not deprived of due process in connection with his forfeiture of good time credits as it was apparent that this section provides much greater procedural protections than those which are typically found in extra-judicial prison revocation proceedings in that it only provides for a revocation of good time credits in the event that a “final order” is issued dismissing the prisoner’s lawsuit. Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So. 2d 654, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 2000).
This section is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that it does not contain a provision granting inmates a right to counsel in appealing a revocation of good time credits under the statute as there is no right of counsel for appeals from inmate lawsuits which have been dismissed as frivolous. Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So. 2d 654, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 2000).
The statute is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that it does not contain a provision for an inmate to file an in forma pauperis appeal from a ruling ordering the forfeiture of a prisoner’s earned good time credits since there is no constitutional right to appeal in forma pauperis from inmate lawsuits which have been dismissed as frivolous. Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So. 2d 654, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 2000).
3. Final order.
The orders dismissing an inmate’s lawsuits were final orders within the meaning of the statute where, in each of the orders, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit and expressly found that the suit was frivolous. Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So. 2d 654, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 189 (Miss. 2000).
Based on the supreme court’s previous stern admonition to defendant and pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(3)(a), the appellate court’s mandate was a “final order” that dismissed a lawsuit brought by an inmate while the inmate was in the custody of the Department of Corrections as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Mississippi Department of Corrections was directed and ordered that an additional 60, for a total of 120 days of accrued earned time would be forfeited by defendant. Roland v. State, 939 So. 2d 810, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 671 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
4. Early release.
Defendant’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum because the order only sent her to a restitution center if she was released on Earned Release Supervision or some other form of early release, and if she were released on Earned Release Supervision, any remaining time she served in a restitution center cannot exceed her statutory maximum sentence under state law. Stevens v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 128 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2020).
Where appellant served 1,077 days in prison on his four-year sentence for the sale of cocaine, he was released on earned-release supervision under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138. The discharge certificate from the Mississippi Department of Corrections reflected that appellant had served his four-year sentence. Branch v. State, 996 So. 2d 829, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 782 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
5. Revocation.
Although an inmate was a candidate for sanctions under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(3)(a) and (b) for filing successive, frivolous motions for post-conviction relief, such sanctions would have no effect because he had been sentenced as a habitual offender under Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-81, and thus had no earned time to forfeit. Clay v. State, 168 So.3d 987, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 147 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. dismissed, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 651 (Miss. Dec. 12, 2013).
Denial of defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief, in which defendant challenged the revocation of his earned-release supervision (ERS), pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(2), was clearly erroneous because defendant was never indicted for the conduct upon which the revocation was based, and at the revocation hearing, the State did not present evidence to prove defendant had violated an ERS rule and did not dispute any evidence that defendant had acted in self-defense. Morris v. State, 66 So.3d 716, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 399 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Earned time may only be forfeited if an inmate commits a violation felonious in nature or in the event of escape. Lucas, June 22, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0443.
The Department of Corrections does not have the authority to award earned time to a defendant for time that was served in a municipal or county jail while awaiting trial. Anderson, July 10, 1998, A.G. Op. #98-0350.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of good-time allowance to prisoner. 95 A.L.R.2d 1265.
Defendant’s Right to Credit for Time Spent in Halfway House, Rehabilitation Center, or Similar Restrictive Environment as Condition of Pretrial Release. 46 A.L.R.6th 63.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-231.
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Prisoners' Rights Litigation.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 142-144, 146, 152.
§ 47-5-138.1. Trusties authorized to accumulate additional earned time; certain offenders in trusty status ineligible for time allowance.
- In addition to any other administrative reduction of sentence, an offender in trusty status as defined by the classification board of the Department of Corrections may be awarded a trusty-time allowance of thirty (30) days’ reduction of sentence for each thirty (30) days of participation during any calendar month in an approved program while in trusty status, including satisfactory participation in education or instructional programs, satisfactory participation in work projects and satisfactory participation in any special incentive program.
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An offender in trusty status shall not be eligible for a reduction of sentence under this section if:
- The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment;
- The offender was convicted as an habitual offender under Sections 99-19-81 through 99-19-87;
- The offender was convicted of a sex crime;
- The offender has not served the mandatory time required for parole eligibility, as prescribed under Section 47-7-3, for a conviction of robbery or attempted robbery through the display of a deadly weapon, carjacking through the display of a deadly weapon or a drive-by shooting; or
- The offender was convicted of trafficking in controlled substances under Section 41-29-139.
HISTORY: Laws, 1999, ch. 515, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 6; Laws, 2001, ch. 478, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 456, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 470, § 2; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 41, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 6 of ch. 393 Laws of 2001, effective from and after July 1, 2001 (approved March 12, 2001), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 478, Laws of 2001, effective July 1, 2001 (approved March 23, 2001), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 478, Laws of 2001, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The 2004 amendment in (1), substituted “thirty (30)” for “ten (10)” and inserted “during any calendar month” following “thirty (30) days of participation”; and added (2).
The 2010 amendment rewrote (2)(e), which formerly read: “The offender was convicted of violating Section 41-29-139(a) and sentenced under Section 41-29-139(b) or 41-29-139(f).”
The 2014 amendment deleted former (2)(e) which read: “The offender was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver or sell a controlled substance under Section 41-29-139; or”; and redesigned the remaining subsection accordingly; and made minor stylistic changes throughout.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general; construction.
2. Constitutionality.
1. In general; construction.
Circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief because his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made as result of the erroneous advice given to him by his appointed trial counsel—that a sentence for second-degree murder would be eligible for trusty-earned time—the judge did not discuss or mention defendant’s eligibility of trusty-earned time or that any term of incarceration would be served day for day during the plea colloquy, and the plea petition did not contradict in any shape or form defendant’s erroneous expectation about trusty-earned time, parole, or early release. Ulmer v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 85 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2020).
Because appellant’s argument that his sentence should be reduced or his probation modified under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138.1 was raised for the first time on appeal, it was procedurally barred, and appellant failed to implicate a fundamental constitutional right to except his argument from the procedural bar, therefore the trial court properly dismissed appellant’s motion for postconviction relief. Monroe v. State, 203 So.3d 1140, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 675 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Inmate’s trusty-time credit was properly revoked because (1) anyone convicted of a sex offense was not eligible for such time, and (2) the inmate had been convicted of sexual battery, conspiracy to commit sexual battery, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor who was sexually abused. King v. McCarty, 196 So.3d 175, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 405 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Notwithstanding a time bar, a post-conviction claim failed on the merits because earned time and trusty time were not allowed for an escape conviction under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(3) since certain conditions were not met, and defendant was erroneously allowed to keep the time that was credited to his non-mandatory sentences; because defendant was convicted of violating a state statutory provision instead of a prison rule, he was not entitled to receive an administrative hearing and have the forfeiture of earned time approved. Golden v. Epps, 958 So. 2d 271, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 392 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 610 (Miss. 2007).
Defendant, who was convicted of armed robbery, was not allowed to accrue earned-time credits because the sentence for armed robbery was a mandatory day for day sentence, and defendant was not eligible for parole. Wells v. State, 936 So. 2d 479, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 596 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Because the inmate began serving his mandatory sentences as an habitual offender, totaling six years, on September 29, 2000, he would be serving them until September 29, 2006; and therefore, he remained ineligible for trusty status. Snow v. Johnson, 913 So. 2d 334, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 257 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Both defendant and the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office agreed that defendant’s parole and release dates were incorrectly calculated as to the date his sentence began and credits and trusty time. Thus, the appellate court reversed the determination that defendant was not entitled to a hearing and remanded the matter to the Mississippi Parole Board to allow the Board to make the exact calculations of defendant’s parole and release dates; however, on remand, the Board was free to grant or deny defendant’s petition for parole and the circuit court had no authority to determine defendant’s parole eligibility. Lizana v. Scott, 910 So. 2d 31, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
There was no merit to petitioner’s contention that, since he was not eligible to accrue earned time at the time of his attempted escape during the mandatory portion of his sentence, he had no earned time to be forfeited; the escape attempt resulted in a forfeiture of all of petitioner’s earned time credit. Boler v. Bailey, 840 So. 2d 734, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Proper interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-138.1,47-5-139, was that the prisoner was ineligible for earned time allowance on the habitual and mandatory portion of the prisoner’s sentences. Hill v. State, 838 So. 2d 994, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
2. Constitutionality.
Trial court erred in summarily dismissing an inmate’s petition seeking trusty status; since the record lacked sufficient factual findings to determine whether the application of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138.1 to the inmate constituted an ex post facto violation, resolution of this issue required an evidentiary hearing. Horton v. Epps, 20 So.3d 24, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 210 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Trial court erred in summarily dismissing a prisoner’s motion for postconviction relief; an evidentiary hearing was necessary to decide whether application of the amended version of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138.1 to the prisoner, who had pleaded guilty to the crime of sale and transfer of cocaine, constituted an ex post facto violation. Gray v. State, 13 So.3d 283, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 611 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 344 (Miss. July 23, 2009).
The amendment to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138.1 was not an ex post facto law; even though the amended statute held that an offender was not eligible for trusty status if the offender was convicted of trafficking in controlled substances, defendant continued to receive the 10 days for 30 days time benefit under the prior statute. Ross v. Epps, 922 So. 2d 847, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 141 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
§ 47-5-139. Certain inmates ineligible for earned time allowance; commutation to be based on total term of sentences; forfeiture of earned time in event of escape.
-
An inmate shall not be eligible for the earned time allowance if:
- The inmate was sentenced to life imprisonment; but an inmate, except an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment for capital murder, who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) or older and who has served at least fifteen (15) years may petition the sentencing court for conditional release;
- The inmate was convicted as a habitual offender under Sections 99-19-81 through 99-19-87;
- The inmate has forfeited his earned time allowance by order of the commissioner;
- The inmate was convicted of a sex crime; or
- The inmate has not served the mandatory time required for parole eligibility for a conviction of robbery or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon.
- An offender under two (2) or more consecutive sentences shall be allowed commutation based upon the total term of the sentences.
- All earned time shall be forfeited by the inmate in the event of escape and/or aiding and abetting an escape. The commissioner may restore all or part of the earned time if the escapee returns to the institution voluntarily, without expense to the state, and without act of violence while a fugitive from the facility.
- Any officer or employee who shall willfully violate the provisions of this section and be convicted therefor shall be removed from office or employment.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7944; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 24; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 12; Laws, 1973, ch. 357, § 1; Laws, 1974, ch. 539, § 29; Laws, 1975, ch. 485, §§ 2, 5; Laws, 1976, ch. 389; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 67; Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 74; Laws, 1981, ch. 502, § 10; Laws, 1982, ch. 431, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 66; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 66; Laws, 1992, ch. 520, § 2; Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 6; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 5, eff from and after June 30, 1995.
Cross References —
Penalty of life imprisonment without parole for sale of specified quantities of certain drugs, see §41-29-139.
Classification committee, see §§47-5-99 et seq.
Proceedings before classification committee on demotion of offenders or forfeiture of earned time, see §47-5-104.
Handbook explaining earned time procedure, see §47-5-140.
Meritorious earned time, see §47-5-142.
Eligibility for earned time credit for inmates participating in joint state-county public service work programs, see §47-5-413.
Earned time credit for inmates participating in joint state-county work program, see §47-5-461.
Utilization of powers which tend to reduce prison system population, including earned time allowances, prior to declaration of a prison system overcrowding state of emergency, see §47-5-705.
Procedures for revocation of conditional advancement of parole eligibility date during period of prison overcrowding, see §47-5-723.
Relationship between earned time allowances and advancement of parole eligibility dates during periods of prison overcrowding, see §47-5-727.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general; construction.
2. Constitutional issues.
3. Multiple sentences.
4. Eligibility for release.
5. Changes in regulation or in interpretation of regulation.
6. Conditional release.
7. Miscellaneous.
1. In general; construction.
Notwithstanding a time bar, a post-conviction claim failed on the merits because earned time and trusty time were not allowed for an escape conviction under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(3) since certain conditions were not met, and defendant was erroneously allowed to keep the time that was credited to his non-mandatory sentences; because defendant was convicted of violating a state statutory provision instead of a prison rule, he was not entitled to receive an administrative hearing and have the forfeiture of earned time approved. Golden v. Epps, 958 So. 2d 271, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 392 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 968 So. 2d 948, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 610 (Miss. 2007).
Defendant was not entitled to parole consideration on a rape conviction based on the fact that defendant was 19 when the offense was committed because the former Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 allowed parole consideration only in cases where the defendant was convicted of statutory rape; former Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139 precluded good time credit for any sex offense. Braziel v. Bailey, 835 So. 2d 962, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 223 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
There was no merit to petitioner’s contention that, since he was not eligible to accrue earned time at the time of his attempted escape during the mandatory portion of his sentence, he had no earned time to be forfeited; the escape attempt resulted in a forfeiture of all of petitioner’s earned time credit. Boler v. Bailey, 840 So. 2d 734, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Proper interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-138.1,47-5-139, was that the prisoner was ineligible for earned time allowance on the habitual and mandatory portion of the prisoner’s sentences. Hill v. State, 838 So. 2d 994, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
A prisoner may not earn good time during service of a mandatory portion of his period of confinement and later use that good time earned upon expiration of the mandatory portion of his sentence. Wilson v. Puckett, 721 So. 2d 1110, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 1998).
A defendant convicted of armed robbery was not eligible to reduce his sentence with the grant of administrative good time, pursuant to §47-5-139, since earned time for good conduct and performance only applies to inmates who are eligible for parole, and defendant was not entitled to parole under §47-7-3, which required him to serve his full 10-year sentence. Cooper v. State, 439 So. 2d 1277, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2983 (Miss. 1983).
2. Constitutional issues.
Where a juvenile convicted of murder receives a life sentence, conditional release does not satisfy the mandate of Miller v. Alabama, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4873, because conditional release is more akin to clemency, which is different from parole despite some surface similarities, and conditional release would not be determined by the sentencing authority at the time of sentencing based on age and other characteristics, as Miller mandates. Parker v. State, 119 So.3d 987, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 2013).
Defendant, convicted of murder, argued that because of his age, under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a) he was subjected to greater punishment for his crime than others sentenced to life imprisonment at age 50 or older; the appellate court rejected his argument that the age distinction in the statute subjected a younger individual to a longer punishment that was cruel and unusual, since his life sentence fell within the statutory limits designated by the Mississippi Legislature. Knox v. State, 912 So. 2d 1004, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 207 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 344, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 686 (Miss. 2005).
Inmate’s petition arguing that the Mississippi Department of Corrections illegally took his earned time allowance away from him was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The inmate claims of due process/ex post facto violations were fatally flawed as had not legally acquired any earned time allowances because he was not eligible for earn time allowances on the mandatory portion of his sentences for armed robbery, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e). Adams v. Epps, 900 So. 2d 1210, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 145 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 901 So. 2d 1273, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 2005).
Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment for murder conviction was upheld because Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a) was not violative of defendant’s due process and equal protection rights by specifying criteria to consider in determining which inmates could or could not be considered for earned time allowance. Martin v. State, 871 So. 2d 693, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 416 (Miss. 2004).
Denial of credit for time served in jail and of “good time” to person convicted of felony who appeals judgment of conviction and who remains in jail pending disposition of appeal due to inability to make bond, while allowing credit for time served in jail and award of “good time” to convicted felons serving sentence in county jail without appealing conviction is denial of equal protection, contrary to Fourteenth Amendment. Lacy v. State, 468 So. 2d 63, 1985 Miss. LEXIS 2040 (Miss. 1985).
A defendant convicted of armed robbery after 1977 and sentenced to serve less than 10 years in the penitentiary, and who was therefore not eligible for parole pursuant to §47-7-3, was not subjected to enforcement of an ex post facto law by a policy of the Department of Corrections administratively barring him from earning good time after January, 1981, although good time earned prior to that date was not taken away, notwithstanding the provisions of §47-5-139, since the statutory provisions regarding good time remained unchanged, and since administrative interpretation of a clearly worded statute is not a “law” within the scope and contemplation of the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Tiller v. State, 440 So. 2d 1001, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2981 (Miss. 1983).
3. Multiple sentences.
A defendant who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for armed robbery and 15 years imprisonment for manslaughter to run consecutively, would be eligible for parole on March 30, 1993, where he began the service of his 10-year armed robbery sentence on the date of his initial arrest pursuant to §99-19-23, he was legally released from that sentence 10 years later on February 5, 1990 but remained held under the 15-year manslaughter sentence, and he earned substantial meritorious earned time; although he would ordinarily have been required to serve at least 1/4 of the manslaughter sentence-3 years and 9 months-before he became eligible for parole, his earned time advanced his earliest parole eligibility date by approximately 7 months. Milam v. State, 578 So. 2d 272, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1991).
Reasonable and harmonious construction of §§47-5-138,47-5-139, and47-7-3 is that legislature intended them to maintain enhanced penalty that §99-19-81 imposes on habitual offenders, which penalty includes denial of certain privileges available to other prisoners. Perkins v. Cabana, 794 F.2d 168, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27510 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936, 107 S. Ct. 414, 93 L. Ed. 2d 366, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4575 (U.S. 1986).
Under the requirement of §47-7-3 that a person under a life sentence becomes eligible for parole after ten years, a prisoner serving three consecutive life terms would not be eligible for parole until he had served at least ten years of each life sentence less 30 percent of earned good time, since §47-5-139(3) mandates the mathematical process of multiplying the number of life sentences imposed upon the prisoner by ten years to determine the date upon which the prisoner would become eligible for parole. Davis v. State, 429 So. 2d 262, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2555 (Miss. 1983).
4. Eligibility for release.
Inmate did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as: (1) the plea petition, the guilty-plea colloquy, and the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, taken together, reflected that defense counsel correctly advised the inmate of the life sentence for murder, his potential for release at age 65, and the correct sentencing statutory provision, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f), which prohibited parole eligibility because the inmate pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment; (2) the inmate had the potential for release Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a) at age 65 after serving 15 years by petitioning for early release at or after age 65; (3) the inmate was 36 years old at the time of his guilty plea and sentence; (4) upon reaching age 65, the inmate would have served substantially more than 15 years; and (5) the inmate admitted being advised of his eligibility to be released at age 65. Higginbotham v. State, 114 So.3d 9, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 595 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 116 So.3d 1072, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 2013).
5. Changes in regulation or in interpretation of regulation.
Defendant who enters plea of guilty to charge of armed robbery pursuant to plea bargain agreement in reliance upon erroneous advice of attorney that defendant will be eligible for earned good time and will be subject to release after serving 7 years of sentence is entitled to vacation of guilty plea and reinstatement of innocent plea when Mississippi Department of Corrections changes administrative policy to comply with §§47-5-139,47-7-3, thereby requiring that defendant serve minimum of 10 years. Coleman v. State, 483 So. 2d 680, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2336 (Miss. 1986).
A petitioner who enters a guilty plea to armed robbery pursuant to plea bargain agreement upon erroneous advice of counsel that petitioner will be eligible for earned good time and will be subject to release after serving 7 years of sentence is not subjected to ex post facto law when Mississippi Department of Corrections changes administrative policy to comply with §§47-5-139 and47-7-3, causing petitioner to serve minimum of 10 years. Coleman v. State, 483 So. 2d 680, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2336 (Miss. 1986).
A defendant convicted of armed robbery after 1977 and sentenced to serve less than 10 years in the penitentiary, and who was therefore not eligible for parole pursuant to §47-7-3, was not subjected to enforcement of an ex post facto law by a policy of the Department of Corrections administratively barring him from earning good time after January, 1981, although good time earned prior to that date was not taken away, notwithstanding the provisions of §47-5-139, since the statutory provisions regarding good time remained unchanged, and since administrative interpretation of a clearly worded statute is not a “law” within the scope and contemplation of the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Tiller v. State, 440 So. 2d 1001, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2981 (Miss. 1983).
6. Conditional release.
Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-21 was not unconstitutionally vague and did not apply to the inmate where the inmate confused parole with conditional release as: (1) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f) prohibited parole for an inmate sentenced to life under Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101 for capital offenses; (2) since the inmate pled guilty to murder, carrying a life sentence, he was convicted of an other capital offense under Miss. Code Ann. §1-3-4; and (3) the inmate was eligible to petition for conditional release at age 65 under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a). Higginbotham v. State, 114 So.3d 9, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 595 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 116 So.3d 1072, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 2013).
Defendant’s guilty plea to murder under Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-19(1)(a) was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as defense counsel correctly advised the inmate that when he reached the 65, he could petition to be released from custody under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a); while counsel might have used the term “parole eligibility” rather than the correct term “conditional release,” he correctly advised the inmate that he would be eligible for release at age 65. Higginbotham v. State, 114 So.3d 9, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 595 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 116 So.3d 1072, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 2013).
7. Miscellaneous.
Inmate’s claim of ineffective assistance lacked merit, as the inmate’s claims that he would not have entered his guilty plea for fondling if his attorney had not misrepresented his eligibility for parole was contradicted by the fact that, at the plea hearing, he indicated he had not been promised anything in order to make him enter his guilty plea and was aware of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed. Brown v. State, 187 So.3d 667, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 132 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Trial court did not err in dismissing an inmate’s petition alleging that the Mississippi Department of Corrections improperly computed his discharge date and that he had to be released from prison because the inmate was not entitled to any earned-time credit, and his time had been properly computed; because Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-81 clearly stated that a habitual offender’s sentence would not be reduced, the inmate was required to serve the maximum term of imprisonment for his crime of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, which was thirty years’ imprisonment, Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-7(2), and was the sentence that the inmate received. Lee v. Kelly, 34 So.3d 1203, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 75 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
In a post-conviction relief case in which a pro se inmate had pled guilty to armed robbery, he argued unsuccessfully that constitutional rights were violated because he was sentenced to serve a mandatory 10-year sentence without the benefit of earned time. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e), an inmate was not eligible for earned-time credit when the inmate had not served the mandatory time required for parole eligibility for a conviction of robbery or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, and, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)), he was not eligible for parole since he had been convicted of armed robbery after October 1, 1994. Diggs v. State, 46 So.3d 361, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 55 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 49 So.3d 636, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 561 (Miss. 2010).
Despite the fact that an inmate was entitled to an earned-time allowance of one-half of his total sentence, including mandatory time because he was convicted before the effective date of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e), the earned-time allowance did not reduce the mandatory portions of his sentences or accelerate his parole eligibility date under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1) or his tentative discharge date. Adams v. Gibbs, 988 So. 2d 395, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 409 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Although appellant argued that the trial court failed to inform him that he would be eligible for earned time pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1) only after serving 10 years of his sentence, because appellant was convicted after October 1, 1994, appellant was not eligible for parole pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(d)(ii) (now47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)). Since appellant was not eligible for parole, appellant was precluded from accumulating earned time pursuant to §47-5-139(1)(e). Robinson v. State, 4 So.3d 361, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 399 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 2009).
Post-conviction relief was properly denied in an armed robbery case because a trial court correctly stated that, due to the nature of the charges, defendant was not eligible for parole, and he had to serve his entire 30-year sentence; defendant was not eligible under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139 until the mandatory portion of his sentence had been served. Robinson v. State, 964 So. 2d 609, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 607 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Appellant was not entitled to earned time credit under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e) where appellant had not served the mandatory time required for parole eligibility for a conviction of armed robbery; appellant had to serve the entire sentence under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii). Sykes v. Epps, 963 So. 2d 31, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 518 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e), an inmate was not entitled to receive earned time until he had served the mandatory portion of sentence; the inmate was not entitled to receive eighteen-and-one-half years earned time, and any calculation that the Mississippi Department of Correction (MDOC) mistakenly gave did not change that fact; the incorrect sentence computation given to the inmate did not operate to increase his earned time, which had been properly calculated by MDOC as thirteen-and-one-half years. Guy v. Box, 925 So. 2d 139, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 202 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Defendant, who was convicted of armed robbery, was not allowed to accrue earned-time credits because the sentence for armed robbery was a mandatory day for day sentence, and defendant was not eligible for parole. Wells v. State, 936 So. 2d 479, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 596 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Although the inmate argued that Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139 should be interpreted to allow his non-mandatory sentences to run concurrently with his mandatory sentences, thus entitling him to be released from prison; the appellate court was unable to grant such relief where the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) had to be allowed to interpret its statutes in a manner that allowed the Mississippi Parole Board to impose an enhanced penalty for habitual offenders, and MDOC’s interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-21 as it applied to subsequent mandatory sentences was correct. Snow v. Johnson, 913 So. 2d 334, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 257 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
A prisoner was not permitted to earn good time credit during service of the mandatory portion of his period of confinement and then use that good time earned upon expiration of the mandatory portion of the sentence. Williams v. Puckett, 624 So. 2d 496, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 420 (Miss. 1993).
The district court’s findings as to the illegality of the disciplinary procedures at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, and the relief therein granted, were affirmed. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6790 (5th Cir. Miss. 1974).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of good-time allowance to prisoner. 95 A.L.R.2d 1265.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-231.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 142-144, 146, 152.
§ 47-5-140. Earned time handbook.
Each county attorney, district attorney, each member of the Parole Board and circuit judge shall be provided a copy of a handbook prepared by the commissioner which shall include a copy of Section 47-5-138 and Section 47-5-139, and shall clearly show how such sections would apply to an offender sentenced to terms of various lengths. Each offender shall be provided a copy of the handbook upon arrival at the correctional system and have it explained to him as a part of his initial orientation.
HISTORY: Laws, 1975, ch. 485, § 4; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 68; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 75; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 67; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 67; Laws, 1992, ch. 520, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 14, 1992).
Cross References —
Earned time for good conduct, see §§47-5-138,47-5-139.
Trusties authorized to accumulate additional earned time, see §47-5-138.1.
§ 47-5-141. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1983, ch. 391, § 2, eff from and after March 24, 1983.
[Codes, 1942, § 7985; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 65; Laws, 1966, ch. 543, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 327, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 69; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 76; en, Laws, 1982, ch. 431, § 3]
§ 47-5-142. Meritorious earned time.
- In order to provide incentive for offenders to achieve positive and worthwhile accomplishments for their personal benefit or the benefit of others, and in addition to any other administrative reductions of the length of an offender’s sentence, any offender shall be eligible, subject to the provisions of this section, to receive meritorious earned time as distinguished from earned time for good conduct and performance.
- Subject to approval by the commissioner of the terms and conditions of the program or project, meritorious earned time may be awarded for the following: (a) successful completion of educational or instructional programs; (b) satisfactory participation in work projects; and (c) satisfactory participation in any special incentive program.
- The programs and activities through which meritorious earned time may be received shall be published in writing and posted in conspicuous places at all facilities of the department and such publication shall be made available to all offenders in the custody of the department.
- The commissioner shall make a determination of the number of days of reduction of sentence which may be awarded an offender as meritorious earned time for participation in approved programs or projects; the number of days shall be determined by the commissioner on the basis of each particular program or project.
- No offender shall be awarded any meritorious earned time while assigned to the maximum security facilities for disciplinary purposes.
- All meritorious earned time shall be forfeited by the offender in the event of escape and/or aiding and abetting an escape.
- Any officer or employee of the department who shall willfully violate the provisions of this section and be convicted therefor shall be removed from office or employment.
- An offender may forfeit all or any part of his meritorious earned time allowance for just cause upon the written order of the commissioner or his designee. Any meritorious earned time allowance forfeited under this section shall not be restored nor shall it be re-earned by the offender.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 531, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 520, § 4; Laws, 2009, ch. 316, § 1; brought forward without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 73, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2009 amendment deleted the former last 3 sentences from the end of (4), which placed a cap on the number of days that could be awarded under the meritorious earned time program.
The 2014 amendment brought the section forward without change.
Cross References —
Earned time, generally, see §§47-5-138,47-5-139.
Earned time credit for inmates participating in joint state-county public service work programs, see §§47-5-413.
Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
Effect of meritorious earned time upon parole eligibility, see §47-7-3.
Penalties for state and county prisoners who escape from custody, see §§97-9-43 et seq.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
The meritorious earned time provision in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-142 clearly referred to a “reduction of sentence,” and was not subject to the earned release supervision in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138(5). Peters v. State, 935 So. 2d 1064, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 11 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 936 So. 2d 367, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 400 (Miss. 2006).
Both defendant and the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office agreed that defendant’s parole and release dates were incorrectly calculated in regard to the date his sentence began, and as to credits and trusty time. Thus, the appellate court reversed the determination that defendant was not entitled to a hearing and remanded the matter to the Mississippi Parole Board to allow the Board to make the exact calculations of defendant’s parole and release dates; however, on remand, the Board was free to grant or deny defendant’s petition for parole and the circuit court had no authority to determine defendant’s parole eligibility. Lizana v. Scott, 910 So. 2d 31, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Inmate’s suit against prison officials seeking 180 days of meritorious earned time was properly dismissed where awarding the credit was within the discretion of the officials pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-142, the inmate failed to resolve the matter by contacting his work supervisor, and he received no injury resulting from the denial of his meritorious earned time award. Green v. Sparkman, 829 So. 2d 1290, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 588 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 840 So. 2d 716, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 173 (Miss. 2003).
The unexplained failure to award an inmate meritorious earned time did not amount to a violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, since an inmate’s earning of “time” is a matter of grace or privilege under §47-5-142, which provides that “meritorious earned time may be awarded.” Since correctional officials are vested with discretionary power to award time under certain conditions, inmates are not entitled to it. Ross v. State, 584 So. 2d 777, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 483 (Miss. 1991).
A defendant who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for armed robbery and 15 years imprisonment for manslaughter to run consecutively, would be eligible for parole on March 30, 1993, where he began the service of his 10-year armed robbery sentence on the date of his initial arrest pursuant to §99-19-23, he was legally released from that sentence 10 years later on February 5, 1990 but remained held under the 15-year manslaughter sentence, and he earned substantial meritorious earned time; although he would ordinarily have been required to serve at least 1/4 of the manslaughter sentence-3 years and 9 months-before he became eligible for parole, his earned time advanced his earliest parole eligibility date by approximately 7 months. Milam v. State, 578 So. 2d 272, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1991).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of good-time allowance to prisoner. 95 A.L.R.2d 1265.
Denial of state prisoner’s application for, or revocation of, participation in work or study release program or furlough program as actionable under Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS § 1983). 55 A.L.R. Fed. 208.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-231.
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Prisoners' Rights Litigation.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 144-146, 148, 154.
§§ 47-5-143 and 47-5-145. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
§47-5-143. [Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 45; Laws, 1971, ch. 524, § 10]
§47-5-145. [Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 48]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-143 prohibited the use of trusty guards from and after July 1, 1974, and authorized the employment of civilian guards.
Former §47-5-145 regulated the discipline to be administered for prisoner infractions and made it a felony for any prison employee to violate the section, punishable by dismissal and imprisonment for 1-5 years.
§ 47-5-147. Governor may authorize payment of reward for apprehension of escaped offender.
When an offender escapes from the custody of the department, the commissioner shall immediately notify the Governor who shall have exclusive power to authorize the payment of a reward, in his discretion, not exceeding Fifty Dollars ($50.00), out of any money available in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the arrest and delivery of such offender to the proper authorities.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7963; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 43; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 70; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 77; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 68; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 68, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escape §§ 1 et seq.
§ 47-5-149. United States offenders subject to the laws of the state.
If any offender of the United States courts who has been delivered to the custody of the department shall escape or attempt to escape, or shall commit any other crime while in the state correctional system, he shall be liable to the like punishment as if he had been convicted by the courts of the state.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7978; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 58; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 71; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 78; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 69; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 69, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-5-151. Death of prisoner; investigations, inquests, and autopsies; fees; penalties.
The superintendent (warden) or other person in charge of prisoners, upon the death of any prisoner under his care and control, shall at once notify the county medical examiner or county medical examiner investigator (hereinafter “medical examiner”) of the county in which said prisoner died, of the death of the prisoner, and it shall be the duty of such medical examiner, when so notified of the death of such person, to obtain a court order and notify the State Medical Examiner of the death of such prisoner. It shall be mandatory that the State Medical Examiner cause an autopsy to be performed upon the body of the deceased prisoner. Furthermore, the State Medical Examiner shall investigate any case where a person is found dead on the premises of the correctional system, in accordance with Sections 41-61-51 through 41-61-79. The State Medical Examiner shall make a written report of his investigation, and shall furnish a copy of the same, including the autopsy report, to the superintendent (warden) and a copy of the same to the district attorney of the county in which said prisoner died. The copy so furnished to the district attorney shall be turned over by the district attorney to the grand jury, and it shall be the duty of the grand jury, if there be any suspicion of wrongdoing shown by the inquest papers, to thoroughly investigate the cause of such death.
It shall be the duty of the medical examiner of the county in which said prisoner died to arrange for the remains to be transported to the State Medical Examiner for said autopsy, and accompanying the remains shall be the court order for autopsy and any documents or records pertaining to the deceased prisoner, institutional health records or other information relating to the circumstances surrounding the prisoner’s death. The State Medical Examiner shall arrange for the remains to be transported to the county in which said prisoner died following completion of the autopsy. If the remains are not claimed for burial within forty-eight (48) hours after autopsy, then said remains may be delivered to the University of Mississippi Medical Center for use in medical research or anatomical study.
The provisions herein set forth in the first paragraph shall likewise apply to any case in which any person is found dead on the premises of the Mississippi State Penitentiary except that the autopsy to be performed on the body of such a person shall not be mandatory upon a person who is not a prisoner unless the medical examiner determines that the death resulted from circumstances raising questions as to the cause of death, in which case the medical examiner may cause an autopsy to be performed upon the body of such deceased person in the same manner as authorized to be performed upon the body of a deceased prisoner.
Provided further, that the provisions herein shall apply with respect to any deceased prisoner who at the time of death is being detained by duly constituted state authority such as the Oakley Youth Development Center, Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield, East Mississippi State Hospital, or any other state institution.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to a prisoner who was lawfully executed as provided in Sections 99-19-49 through 99-19-55.
Any officer or employee of the prison system or any other officer, employee or person having charge of any prisoner who shall fail to immediately notify the medical examiner of the death of such prisoner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) and by confinement in the county jail for not more than one (1) year.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7948; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 28; Laws, 1971, ch. 432, § 1; Laws, 1972, ch. 515, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 79; Laws, 1983, ch. 391, § 1, ch. 499, § 26; Laws, 1984, ch. 448, § 8; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 70; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 70; Laws, 1986, ch. 459, § 33; Laws, 2010, ch. 554, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2011.
Editor’s Notes —
Section 99-19-49 referred to in this section, was repealed by Laws of 2000, ch. 569, § 18, eff from and after July 1, 2000.
Amendment Notes —
The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, substituted “Oakley Youth Development Center” for “Columbia Training School, Oakley Training School” in the fourth paragraph.
Cross References —
Duty of district attorney, see §§25-31-1 et seq.
Disposition of bodies of executed prisoners, see §99-19-55.
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
§ 47-5-153. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 92, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 70]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-153 authorized the penitentiary board to establish a program of vocational rehabilitation training.
§ 47-5-155. Discharged offenders revolving fund.
There is hereby created a special fund to be known as the “Discharged Offenders Revolving Fund” to be maintained in a bank to be selected by the commissioner. It shall be the duty of the bank, so long as it retains such deposits, to make monthly reports to the State Treasurer of the State of Mississippi as to the condition of the funds on deposit in the depository. Such funds shall be used for the prompt payment in cash to all discharged, pardoned or paroled offenders such amounts as are provided by Section 47-5-157. Upon the passage of this chapter, the Treasurer of the State of Mississippi shall transfer any funds in the State Treasury to the credit of the correctional system an amount which shall not exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to the Discharged Offenders Revolving Fund. The fund shall be replenished from time to time by the State Treasurer upon requisitions drawn by the commissioner which requisitions shall be supported by statements reflecting the names of the discharged offenders to whom payments have been made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Upon receipt of adequately supported requisitions, the State Auditor shall draw his warrants made payable to the Discharged Offenders Revolving Fund against any funds in the State Treasury to the credit of the correctional system.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7936; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 16; Laws, 1966, ch. 378, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 72; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 80; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 71; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 71, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor,” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.
Section 27-104-6 provides that whenever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration”.
Cross References —
Qualifications for depositories for state funds, see §§27-105-1 et seq.
Portion of the Inmate Welfare Fund to be deposited in Discharted Offenders Revolving Fund created in this section, see §47-5-158.
Transfer of payments from community service revolving fund to discharged offenders’ revolving fund, see §47-7-49.
§ 47-5-157. Written discharge or release, clothing, Mississippi driver’s license or state identification card, money and bus ticket furnished to discharged or released offender.
When an offender is entitled to a discharge from the custody of the department, or is released therefrom on parole, pardon, or otherwise, the commissioner or his designee shall prepare and deliver to him a written discharge or release, as the case may be, dated and signed by him with seal annexed, giving the offender’s name, the name of the offense or offenses for which he was convicted, the term of sentence imposed and the date thereof, the county in which he was sentenced, the amount of commutation received, if any, the trade he has learned, if any, his proficiency in same, and such description of the offender as may be practicable and the discharge plan developed as required by law. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the release of an offender as described herein, the director of records of the department shall give the written notice which is required pursuant to Section 47-5-177. The offender shall be furnished, if needed, suitable civilian clothes, a Mississippi driver’s license, or a state identification card that is not a department-issued identification card and all money held to his credit by any official of the correctional system shall be delivered to him.
The amount of money which an offender is entitled to receive from the State of Mississippi when he is discharged from the state correctional system shall be determined as follows:
If he has continuously served his sentence in one (1) year or less flat time, he shall be given Fifteen Dollars ($15.00).
If he has served his sentence in more than one (1) year flat time and in less than ten (10) years flat time, he shall be given Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00).
If he has continuously served his sentence in ten (10) or more years flat time, he shall be given Seventy-five Dollars ($75.00).
If he has continuously served his sentence in twenty (20) or more years flat time, he shall be given One Hundred Dollars ($100.00).
There shall be given in addition to the above specified monies in subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d), a bus ticket to the county of conviction or to a state line of Mississippi.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 7949; Laws, 1964, ch. 378, § 29; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 73; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 81; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 72; Laws, 1985, ch. 444, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 72; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 46, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment, in the first undesignated paragraph, added “and the discharge plan developed as required by law” to the end of the first sentence; substituted “At least fifteen (15) days” for “Within forty-eight (48) hours” at the beginning of the second sentence; and in the last sentence, at the beginning, substituted “The offender” for “He”, and inserted “a Mississippi driver’s license, or a state identification card that is not a department-issued identification card and.”
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 21, 170.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 152, 153.
§ 47-5-158. Inmate Welfare Fund.
- The department is authorized to maintain a bank account which shall be designated as the Inmate Welfare Fund. All monies now held in a similar fund or in a bank account or accounts for the benefit and welfare of inmates shall be deposited into the Inmate Welfare Fund. This fund shall be used for the benefit and welfare of inmates in the custody of the department and shall be expended in accordance with any provisions or restrictions in the regulations promulgated under subsection (7) of this section.
- There shall be deposited into the Inmate Welfare Fund interest previously earned on inmate deposits, all net profits from the operation of inmate canteens, performances of the Penitentiary band, interest earned on the Inmate Welfare Fund and other revenues designated by the commissioner. All money shall be deposited into the Inmate Welfare Fund as provided in Section 7-9-21.
-
All inmate telephone call commissions shall be paid to the department. Monies in the fund may be expended by the department, upon requisition by the commissioner or his designee, only for the purposes established in this subsection.
- Twenty-five percent (25%) of the inmate telephone call commissions shall be used to purchase and maintain telecommunication equipment to be used by the department.
- Until July 1, 2008, twenty-five percent (25%) of the inmate telephone call commissions shall be deposited into the Prison Agricultural Enterprise Fund. Beginning on July 1, 2008, thirty-five percent (35%) of the inmate telephone call commissions shall be deposited into the Prison Agricultural Enterprise Fund. The department may use these funds to supplement the Prison Agricultural Enterprise Fund created in Section 47-5-66.
- Forty percent (40%) of the inmate telephone call commissions shall be deposited into the Inmate Welfare Fund.
- The commissioner may invest in the manner authorized by law any money in the Inmate Welfare Fund that is not necessary for immediate use, and the interest earned shall be deposited in the Inmate Welfare Fund.
- The Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance shall establish and implement internal accounting controls for the Inmate Welfare Fund that comply with generally accepted accounting principles and regulations of the Department of Finance and Administration. The Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance shall prepare and issue quarterly consolidated and individual facility financial statements to the prison auditor of the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review. The deputy commissioner shall prepare an annual report which shall include a summary of expenditures from the fund by major categories and by individual facility. This annual report shall be sent to the prison auditor, the Legislative Budget Office, the Chairman of the Corrections Committee of the Senate, and the Chairman of the Corrections Committee of the House of Representatives.
- A portion of the Inmate Welfare Fund shall be deposited in the Discharged Offenders Revolving Fund, as created under Section 47-5-155, in amounts necessary to provide a balance not to exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in the Discharged Offenders Revolving Fund, and shall be used to supplement those amounts paid to discharged, paroled or pardoned offenders from the department. The superintendent of the Parchman facility shall establish equitable criteria for the making of supplemental payments which shall not exceed Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) for any offender. The supplemental payments shall be subject to the approval of the commissioner. The State Treasurer shall not be required to replenish the Discharged Offenders Revolving Fund for the supplemental payments made to discharged, paroled or pardoned offenders.
-
- The Inmate Welfare Fund Committee is hereby created and shall be composed of nine (9) members: The Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections, the Deputy Commissioner of Institutions, the Superintendent of the Parchman facility, the Superintendent of the Rankin County facility, the Superintendent of the Greene County facility, the State Treasurer, the State Auditor, and two (2) members to be appointed by the Commissioner of Corrections, one (1) of whom must have a relative incarcerated by the department at the time of appointment and shall be a representative of inmate families. The commissioner shall appoint the chairman of the committee. The committee shall administer and supervise the operations and expenditures from the Inmate Welfare Fund and shall maintain an official minute book upon which shall be spread its authorization and approval for all such expenditures. The committee shall promulgate regulations governing the use and expenditures of the fund.
- Regulations adopted shall set out what types of items shall be allowable purchases, and in all cases, the minutes of the committee shall explain which regulation permits any purchase it approves. Additionally, regulations of the committee shall prescribe the number of members necessary to constitute a quorum, minimum attendance requirements for a member to retain a seat on the committee, and a mission statement for the committee.
- The committee shall conduct an annual needs assessment to determine what types of items should be purchased for the benefit of inmates. The needs assessments shall be conducted with the assistance of the department personnel, inmates and the families of inmates.
- The committee shall evaluate the proposals of interested third parties for the administration of inmate canteen services as provided in Section 47-5-109.1.
- The Department of Audit shall conduct an annual comprehensive special audit of the committee’s use of the Inmate Welfare Fund. The department shall incorporate in its special audit report any recommendations it has concerning the financial and management control practices of the committee. The department shall report its findings and recommendations to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Corrections Committees.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 307, § 1; Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 25; Laws, 1995, ch. 621, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 379, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 474, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 459, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 3; Laws, 2007, ch. 555, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 329, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 432, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2015.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 379, Laws of 1996, effective from and after passage (approved March 18, 1996), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 474, Laws of 1996, effective from and after passage (approved April 8, 1996), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 474, Laws of 1996, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Section 1 of ch. 459, Laws of 2002, eff from and after July 1, 2002 (approved March 20, 2002), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 624, Laws of 2002, eff from and after July 1, 2002 (approved April 25, 2002), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 624, Laws of 2002, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The first 2002 amendment (ch. 459) rewrote (3); and in (7), substituted “composed of seven (7) members” for “composed of five (5) members,” inserted “the Deputy Commissioner of Institutions,” and substituted “two (2) members” for “one (1) member” in the first sentence, and rewrote the second sentence.
The second 2002 amendment (ch. 624) rewrote (3); and in (7), substituted “The Deputy Commissioner for Community Corrections” for “The Deputy Commissioner for Community Services” in the first sentence.
The 2007 amendment, in (3), deleted “of Corrections” following “department” in the second sentence of the introductory paragraph, substituted “July 1, 2008” for “July 1, 2007” in (b) and (d), and substituted “The department may use” for The Mississippi Department of Corrections may use” in (b).
The 2008 amendment, in (3), substituted “thirty-five percent (35%)” for “fifty percent (50%)” in (b) and “Forty percent (40%)” for “Twenty-five percent (25%)” in (c), and deleted former (d), which read: “Until July 1, 2008, twenty-five percent (25%) shall be deposited in a fund called the Inmate Technology Fund to purchase an Inmate Information Technology System. This paragraph (d) shall repeal on July 1, 2008.”
The 2015 amendment, in (1), inserted “or in a bank account or accounts” in the first sentence, and added “and shall be expended…under subsection (7) of this section” at the end; in (2), deleted “the annual prison rodeo” following “inmate canteens” in the first sentence, and “Mississippi Code of 1972” at the end of the last sentence; in (5), combined the former first and second sentences into the present first sentence by deleting “be the custodian of the Inmate Welfare Fund. He shall” preceding “establish and implement,” and in the first sentence, inserted “for the Inmate Welfare Fund” and “and regulations of the Department of Finance and Administration,” and substituted “Chairman of the Corrections Committee” for “Chairman of the Penitentiary Committee”; in (7), in (a), substituted “nine (9) members” for “seven (7) members,” inserted “the State Treasurer, the State Auditor,” and added “one (1) of whom…inmate families” at the end of the first sentence, and substituted “shall promulgate” for “may promulgate” in the last sentence, and added (b) through (d); and in (8), inserted “special” and “committee’s use of the” in the first sentence, and added the last two sentences.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Inmate Welfare Fund money may be used to purchase inmate law library books. Lucas, Oct. 14, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0733.
The approval of the Inmate Welfare Fund Committee is required prior to any expenditure, and whether the construction of a roof over an exercise yard is a proper use of the Fund is a factual determination to be made by the Committee in conformity with the rules and regulations governing such expenditures. Lindsey, May 30, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0256.
§§ 47-5-159 through 47-5-171. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1982, ch. 431, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 1982.
§47-5-159. [Laws, 1973, ch. 483, § 1; Laws, 1975, ch. 382, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 74; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 82]
§47-5-161. [Laws, 1973, ch. 483, § 2; Laws, 1975, ch. 382, § 2; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 75; Laws, 1978, ch. 400, § 9; Laws, 1979, ch. 462, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 83]
§47-5-163. [Laws, 1973, ch. 483, § 3; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 76; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 84]
§47-5-165. [Laws, 1973, ch. 483, § 4; Laws, 1975, ch. 382, § 3; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 77; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 85]
§47-5-167. [Laws, 1973, ch. 483, § 5; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 78; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 86]
§47-5-169. [Laws, 1973, ch. 483, § 6; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 87]
§47-5-171. [Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 4; Laws, 1978, ch. 493, § 1; Laws, 1979, ch. 372, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1980, ch. 309; reenacted and amended Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 88; Laws, 1981, ch. 502, § 11]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-159 pertained to work release program and the duties of board of corrections with respect to such program.
Former §47-5-161 pertained to work release program ane the extension of limits of offender’s confinement and the payment of offender’s wages escape.
Former §47-5-163 pertained to work release program and the conditions on offender’s participation.
Former §47-5-165 pertained to work release program and the consent of certain officials.
Former §47-5-167 pertained to work release program and cooperation with private industry.
Former §47-5-169 pertained to work release program and the application to prisoners presently working off penitentiary property.
Former §45-5-171 pertained to the supervised earned release program.
§ 47-5-173. Granting of leave for personal reasons.
The commissioner, or his designees, may grant leave to an offender and may take into consideration sickness or death in the offender’s family or the seeking of employment by the offender in connection with application for parole, for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) days. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the release of an offender on leave, the director of records of the department shall give the written notice required pursuant to Section 47-5-177. However, if an offender is granted leave because of sickness or death in the offender’s family, written notice shall not be required but the inmate shall be accompanied by a correctional officer or a law enforcement officer. In all other cases the commissioner, or his designees, shall provide required security when deemed necessary. The commissioner, or his designees, in granting leave, shall take into consideration the conduct and work performance of the offender.
HISTORY: Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 7; Laws, 1978, ch. 338, § 1 brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 89; Laws, 1982, ch. 431, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 73; Laws, 1985, ch. 444, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 73; Laws, 1996, ch. 373, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 50, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment substituted “At least fifteen (15) days” for “Within forty-eight (48) hours” at the beginning of the second sentence.
Cross References —
Leave to inmates participating in joint state-county public service work programs, see §47-5-415.
Passes and leaves under joint county-state work program, see §47-5-463.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Under Sections 47-5-173 and 47-5-177 only the Commissioner of Corrections may authorize leave of prisoners. A sheriff is only notified of the release of the prisoners under section 47-5-177. Trowbridge, Nov. 14, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0472.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.
Grant or denial of furlough or work release to federal prisoner under 18 USCS § 4082(c). 64 A.L.R. Fed. 807.
§ 47-5-175. Agreements to transfer state offenders to federal facilities.
The Commissioner of Corrections, with the concurrence of the Governor, is hereby authorized to enter into agreements with appropriate federal agencies to provide housing and incarceration of persons convicted by the courts of Mississippi and sentenced to the Mississippi Department of Corrections by such courts under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed if a determination is made that the best interest of the State of Mississippi would be served by making such transfer.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 412; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 74; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 74; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for the automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed Laws, 1984 of ch. 471, § 128, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Provisions relative to prison system overcrowding and the exercise of powers which tend to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity during states of emergency, see §§47-5-701 et seq.
§ 47-5-177. Notice requirements prior to release of offenders.
At least fifteen (15) days prior to the release of an offender from the custody of the department because of discharge, parole, pardon, temporary personal leave or pass, or otherwise, except for sickness or death in the offender’s family, the director of records of the department shall give written or electronic notice of such release to the sheriff of the county and to the chief of police of the municipality where the offender was convicted. If the offender is paroled to a county other than the county of conviction, the director of records shall give written or electronic notice of the release to the sheriff, district attorney and circuit judge of the county and to the chief of police of the municipality where the offender is paroled and to the sheriff of the county and to the chief of police of the municipality where the offender was convicted. The department shall notify the parole officer of the county where the offender is paroled or discharged to probation of any chronic mental disorder incurred by the offender, of any type of infectious disease for which the offender has been examined and treated, and of any medications provided to the offender for such conditions.
The commissioner shall require the director of records to clearly identify the notice of release of an offender who has been convicted of arson at any time. The fact that the offender to be released had been convicted of arson at any time shall appear prominently on the notice of release and the sheriff shall notify all officials who are responsible for investigation of arson within the county of such offender’s release and the chief of police shall notify all such officials within the municipality of such offender’s release.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 444, § 1; Laws, 1987, ch. 388; Laws, 1990, ch. 399, § 1; Laws, 1991, ch. 427, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 365, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 51, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment, in the first paragraph, deleted “of Corrections” following “department” throughout, in the first sentence, deleted “which shall include a copy of the ‘Release Offense Investigation’ and the ‘Social Admission Report’ ” preceding “to the sheriff of the county,” inserted “or electronic” following “shall give written” twice, and deleted “State” preceding “department” in the last sentence; in the first sentence of the last paragraph, deleted “of Corrections” following “The commissioner,” and deleted “written” following “to clearly identify the.”
The 2014 amendment substituted “At least fifteen (15) days” for “Within forty-eight (48) hours” at the beginning of the first sentence in the first undesignated paragraph.
Cross References —
Procedures relative to written discharge or release, publication of notice pursuant to this section, and provision to offender of clothing, money, and bus ticket, see §47-5-157.
Procedures relative to granting of leaves for personal reasons, see §47-5-173.
Requirements for parole, including notice requirements, see §47-7-17.
Arson, generally, see §§97-17-1 through97-17-14.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Under Sections 47-5-173 and 47-5-177 only the Commissioner of Corrections may authorize leave of prisoners. A sheriff is only notified of the release of the prisoners under section 47-5-177. Trowbridge, Nov. 14, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0472.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 5 A.L.R.4th 773.
Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 6 A.L.R.4th 1155.
Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 72, 74, 79, 83, 84, 90, 93, 94, 99, 109, 111, 117, 122.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon & Parole § 65.
§ 47-5-179. Department of Corrections to deduct nonemergency medical expenses from inmate accounts.
- The responsibility for paying the expenses of nonemergency medical care, treatment and medicine of an inmate is the responsibility of the inmate receiving the care, treatment and medicine.
- The Department of Corrections is authorized to deduct the payment for nonemergency medical care, treatment and medicine from an inmate’s account and accept payment from other reimbursement programs.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 601, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1995.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Constitutionality.
Inmate’s complaint was procedurally barred as the inmate did not provide authority for the inmate’s claim that Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-179, under which the inmate was charged $ 6 for medical care, deprived the inmate of the inmate’s property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V; further, the facility’s personnel abided by MDOC Policy 25-02-A, and complied with statutory authority, and did not deny the inmate non-emergency medical care due to a lack of funds. Clincy v. Atwood, 65 So.3d 327, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 345 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
§ 47-5-180. Appointment of commissioner to make health-care decisions for offender who lacks capacity and does not have relative available; procedure; applicability of Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.
- The following words and phrases that are used in this section are defined in Section 41-41-203:advance health-care directive, agent, capacity, guardian, health-care decision, individual instruction, person, power of attorney for health care and surrogate.
- For an offender who is a resident of Mississippi, the department may petition the chancery court of the county of residence of the offender to appoint the commissioner as guardian for an offender who lacks the capacity to make a health-care decision and who does not have a relative or other person available to make the decision.
- The department may, consistent with Sections 41-41-201 through 41-41-229, provide an offender with the forms necessary to execute an advance health-care directive.
- The department shall place an original or copy of the directive in the offender’s medical record, attach the directive to the offender’s commitment report and provide a copy of the directive to case management.
- If a department physician determines that an offender’s life expectancy is less than one (1) year or that the offender is to undergo certain medical procedures to be determined by the department medical director, the department shall provide the offender with the opportunity to alter or execute a written advance health-care directive.
-
When the department provides an offender with the forms necessary to execute an advance health-care directive, Sections 41-41-201 through 41-41-229 and the following provisions apply:
- Absent a court order to the contrary, an offender in the department’s custody shall not act as the agent, guardian or surrogate for the offender executing an advance health-care directive. But the principal offender may designate another offender as the agent, guardian or surrogate without judicial approval if the offenders are related by blood, marriage or adoption.
- Absent a court order to the contrary, a department employee shall not act as the agent, guardian or surrogate for the offender executing an advance health-care directive. But the principal offender may designate a department employee as the agent, guardian or surrogate without judicial approval if the offender and the employee are related by blood, marriage or adoption.
- In addition to the restrictions in Section 41-41-205, neither an offender in the department’s custody nor a department employee shall be used as a witness for a power of attorney for health care that an offender executes while in the department’s custody.
HISTORY: Laws, 2012, ch. 529, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2012.
§ 47-5-181. Conversion of community work centers to pre-release centers.
- The Department of Corrections is authorized to convert four (4) community work centers to pre-release centers. The department shall convert the community work centers as follows: one (1) center in the northern part of the state, two (2) centers in the central part of the state, and one (1) center in the southern part of the state.
- The department may place any inmate in a pre-release center if: (a) the inmate is within one (1) year of his or her earliest release date, and (b) the inmate is approved for placement by the classification hearing officer and the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee.
- The department shall notify, by certified mail, each member of the board of supervisors of the county in which the center is located of the department’s intent to convert the community work center to a pre-release center. The board of supervisors shall have thirty (30) days after the date of the mailing to disapprove the conversion of the center. If the board of supervisors disapproves of the pre-release center, the department shall not convert the community work center.
HISTORY: Laws, 1996, ch. 349, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 7; Laws, 2007, ch. 414, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2007.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment, in (2), inserted “or her earliest” and added “or the commissioner’s designee.”
§ 47-5-183. Department of Corrections may create a postconviction DNA database.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections is authorized, subject to the availability of funds, to secure a biological sample for purposes of DNA identification analysis from every individual convicted of a felony or in its custody before release from or transfer to a state correctional facility or county jail or other detention facility.
HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 459, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2003.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing. 72 A.L.R.6th 227.
Alcoholic Beverages, Controlled Substances, Narcotic Drugs, Weapons, and Other Contraband
§ 47-5-191. Definitions.
As used in Sections 47-5-191 through 47-5-195, “alcoholic beverage” shall have the meaning defined in Section 67-1-5 of the Local Option Alcoholic Beverage Control Law of the State of Mississippi; “controlled substance” means any substance defined as a controlled substance by the Uniform Controlled Substances Law of the State of Mississippi; “narcotic drug” means any substance defined as a narcotic drug by Section 41-29-105; “weapon or deadly weapon” shall mean any weapon or firearm mentioned in Section 97-37-1, and any rifle or shotgun regardless of barrel length; and “contraband” means coin or currency, money orders, traveler’s checks, promissory notes, credit cards, personal checks or other negotiable instruments, knives, sharpened instruments, tools, explosives, ammunition and drug paraphernalia as defined in Section 41-29-105(v).
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 394, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 341, § 2; Laws, 1986, ch. 423, § 3; Laws, 1995, ch. 420, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved March 15, 1995).
§ 47-5-192. Possession of prohibited items by persons other than offenders.
- The Commissioner of Corrections may prohibit the possession by employees or officers of the Department of Corrections or any person allowed upon the premises of a correctional facility under his jurisdiction of any item, the possession of which by offenders is prohibited or regulated.
- The commissioner may distinguish between classes of employees and visitors and may establish zones or designate areas or facilities where such regulations apply in his discretion and as necessary for security and orderly operation of prison facilities.
- The commissioner shall promulgate rules authorized by this section in accordance with the Mississippi Administrative Procedures Act.
- Any person who violates a duly enacted rule authorized by this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both.
HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 423, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 1, 1986).
Cross References —
Provisions of the Mississippi Administrative Procedures Act, see §§25-43-1.101 et seq.
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
§ 47-5-193. Prohibitions generally; circuit court authorized to order disabling of contraband cell phone service from carrier.
- It is unlawful for any officer or employee of the department, of any county sheriff’s department, of any private correctional facility in this state in which offenders are confined, of any municipal or other correctional facility in this state, or for any other person or offender to possess, furnish, attempt to furnish, or assist in furnishing to any offender confined in this state any weapon, deadly weapon, unauthorized electronic device, contraband item, or cell phone or any of its components or accessories to include, but not limited to, Subscriber Information Module (SIM) cards or chargers. It is unlawful for any person or offender to take, attempt to take, or assist in taking any weapon, deadly weapon, unauthorized electronic device, contraband item, cell phone or any of its components or accessories to include, but not limited to, Subscriber Information Module (SIM) cards or chargers on property within the state belonging to the department, a county, a municipality, or other entity that is occupied or used by offenders, except as authorized by law.
- The circuit court is authorized to issue an order to disable the contraband cell phone service from the carrier.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 394, § 1; Laws, 1986, ch. 423, § 4; Laws, 1996, ch. 420, § ; Laws, 1998, ch. 391, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 429, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 439, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 415, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 325, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 5, 2012.); Laws, 2019, ch. 449, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 3, 2019).
Amendment Notes —
The 2004 amendment inserted “unauthorized electronic device” twice following “deadly weapon”.
The 2006 amendment inserted “or offender‘ following “any other person” in the first sentence and following ‘ any person‘ near the beginning of the second sentence; inserted “possess” following ‘or offender to” in the first sentence; and inserted “cell phone” following “unauthorized electronic device” twice.
The 2008 amendment inserted “or any of its components or accessories to include, but not limited to, Subscriber Information Module (SIM) cards, chargers, etc.,” twice, following “cell phone” near the end of the first and second sentences of the section.
The 2012 amendment inserted “of any municipal or other correctional facility in this state,” twice inserted “contraband item” preceding “cell phone,” and twice substituted “(SIM) cards or chargers” for “(SIM) cards, chargers, etc., or contraband items,” inserted “within the state” and “a county, a municipality, or other entity” near the end and made stylistic changes.
The 2019 amendment, effective April 3, 2019, added (2).
Cross References —
Additional prohibited items, see §47-5-194.
Penalties for violations of this section and §47-5-194, see §47-5-195.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Evidence.
2. — Sufficient.
3. Limiting instruction.
3.5. Presumptive instructions.
4. Recusal.
5. In general.
6. Constitutionality.
7. Applicability.
8. Burden of proof.
1. Evidence.
2. — Sufficient.
Assuming that the State of Mississippi was required to prove that defendant was an inmate of a county jail, the evidence supported defendant’s conviction for unauthorized possession of a cell phone in a county jail because, although the booking process had not been completed, defendant was in a locked area, dressed in a jail uniform, and was not free to leave. When defendant put defendant’s belongings on a counter, the cell phone, among other items, fell out of a rolled up mat that the jail had provided to defendant. Smith v. State, 275 So.3d 100, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 238 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Overwhelming weight of the evidence supported jury’s conviction of defendant for possession of a cell phone within a correctional facility. The evidence established that during a search of defendant, a cell phone fell out of his pants and that a twenty-two minute call had been made on the phone to one of defendant’s family members. Pruitt v. State, 122 So.3d 806, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 612 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
There was sufficient testimony to support a jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of bringing contraband into a prison in violation of Miss. Code §47-5-193, as a corrections officer testified that the officer found money in defendant’s bra. Weems v. State, 63 So.3d 579, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 224 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), cert. dismissed, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 302 (Miss. June 16, 2011).
Defendant’s conviction for possession of cellular phones while confined in a correctional facility, in violation of Miss. Code. Ann. §47-5-193, was proper because there was ample evidence for the jury to find that defendant knowingly possessed the contraband phones, which were hidden in the crotch area of his thermal long underwear under four pairs of boxer shorts. Lynch v. State, 24 So.3d 1043, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Defendant’s argument that his conviction for bringing contraband into a jail facility must be reversed and rendered because the record lacked proof that the jacket in which the marijuana was found belonged to him lacked merit because (1) defendant’s testimony was the complete opposite of the testimony of three witnesses; (2) defendant’s testimony on cross-examination contradicted his direct testimony because it was not until cross-examination that defendant mentioned taking a jacket from a locker that he once shared with another inmate, and, on direct, defendant had stated that the jacket had come from another locker; (3) a witness testified that the marijuana was found in the sleeve of the jacket that defendant was wearing when he returned to the jail; and (4) a jury considered all of the testimony presented at trial and concluded that defendant was guilty as charged. Weeks v. State, 971 So. 2d 645, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 843 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
3. Limiting instruction.
In a case in which defendant was convicted of violating Miss. Code Ann, §47-5-193, he unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts where there was no foundation for their admissibility and no showing that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. Defense counsel failed to request a limiting instruction, and the trial judge was not required to issue the limiting instruction sua sponte after defense counsel objected; Rule 105 clearly placed the burden of requesting a Miss. R. Evid. Rule 404(b) limiting instruction upon counsel. Lindsey v. State, 29 So.3d 121, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 89 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
3.5. Presumptive instructions.
Trial court erred in convicting defendant of possessing a cell phone in a correctional facility because the jury was wrongly instructed that they could convict defendant if the state proved defendant took the cell phone into the correctional facility; transporting contraband and possessing contraband are distinctly different. Instructing the jury as to persons taking cell phones into correctional facilities did not track the language of the applicable statute and improperly shifted the burden of proving the defendant was not in constructive possession of the cell phone to the defendant. Moody v. State, 202 So.3d 1235, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 447 (Miss. 2016).
4. Recusal.
In a case in which defendant was convicted of violating Miss. Code Ann, §47-5-193, his argument that the trial judge should have recused himself after speaking to the potential jurors was procedurally barred on appeal since he failed to object or file a motion seeking the trial judge to recuse himself. Lindsey v. State, 29 So.3d 121, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 89 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
5. In general.
Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-193 turns on possession of cellular phones, not ownership. Lynch v. State, 24 So.3d 1043, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
6. Constitutionality.
In a prosecution of defendant for possession of contraband in a correctional facility under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-193, defendant’s argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague was without merit. Houston v. State, 150 So.3d 157, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 636 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
7. Applicability.
In a prosecution of defendant for possession of contraband in a correctional facility under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-193, defendant’s argument that the statute’s designation of “offender” did include him was meritless. Houston v. State, 150 So.3d 157, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 636 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
8. Burden of proof.
Defendant was indicted and convicted under the first sentence of the statute, for possession of a cell phone in a correctional facility. Therefore, the State of Mississippi was not required to prove that the county jail was property belonging to the county and that the property was occupied or used by offenders because these elements were not essential to the possession of a cell phone crime charged under the first sentence. Smith v. State, 275 So.3d 100, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 238 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
State of Mississippi was not required to prove that defendant was an inmate at the county jail because this factual allegation did not change the crime charged as all that the statute required was that defendant be either a person or offender in possession of a cell phone at a correctional facility. Smith v. State, 275 So.3d 100, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 238 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Nature and elements of offense of conveying contraband to state prisoner. 64 A.L.R.4th 902.
Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.
§ 47-5-194. Prohibition against possession of cash or negotiable instruments; limitations upon prohibition; confiscation of money found in excess of allowable amounts; disposition of moneys confiscated.
-
It is unlawful for any offender committed to the department to possess:
- Coin or currency on his person or in premises assigned to him or under his control;
- A money order, traveler’s check, promissory note, credit card, personal check or other negotiable instrument.
- Subsection (1) does not apply to offenders who are granted a parole; placed on work release, supervised earned release, earned probation or probation; or granted leave for the duration of such leave; however, these offenders may be restricted by the parole or probation order or by order of the commissioner with respect to amounts or form of money possessed or controlled by the offenders.
- A violation of subsection (1) shall be considered a rules violation or a violation of the conditions of parole or probation as the case may be and shall be processed in the manner of similar violations.
- Any money possessed by an offender may be confiscated by the corrections officer who discovers the possession. The department shall establish a policy and procedure for the collection and accounting of all confiscated funds. All confiscated coin or currency shall be deposited in a special fund which is created in the State Treasury. The money in this special fund may be appropriated by the Legislature to enhance the security of the department’s facilities. Unexpended amounts remaining in the special fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, but funds may be expended only by appropriation approved by the Legislature. Any interest earned on amounts in the special fund shall be deposited to the credit of the special fund.
- The possession of coin, currency, money order, traveler’s check or other negotiable instrument on the grounds of a facility is prohibited.
- The department shall establish a cashless system for facilities no later than July 1, 1996. The department shall provide lockers for visitors to place prohibited items when on grounds of a facility. The department is authorized to charge visitors an hourly rental fee for use of the lockers. Community work centers and restitution centers are exempt unless designated by the commissioner as being included in the cashless system.
HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 423, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 319, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 420, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 372, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 421, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1996.
§ 47-5-195. Penalties for violations.
Any person who violates any provision of Section 47-5-193 or 47-5-194 shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by confinement in the Penitentiary for not less than three (3) years nor more than fifteen (15) years, and may be fined not more than Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), or both.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 394, § 3; Laws, 1998, ch. 391, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1998.
Cross References —
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any felony violation, see §99-19-73.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
In a prosecution of defendant for possession of contraband in a correctional facility, the trial court properly sentenced defendant to serve fifteen years with five years suspended pursuant to this section. Houston v. State, 150 So.3d 157, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 636 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Nature and elements of offense of conveying contraband to state prisoner. 64 A.L.R.4th 902.
Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.
§ 47-5-196. Mandatory drug testing of employees of Department of Corrections.
The Department of Corrections shall develop and implement a drug testing program for its employees no later than July 1, 1997. The department shall develop a written policy for alcohol and drug testing of employees to deter the use of alcohol and drugs at its facilities and to ensure an alcohol and drug free environment at correctional facilities. Participation by employees is mandatory and the tests may be conducted in a random manner.
HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 400, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 18, 1997).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Validity, construction, and application of state statute criminalizing possession of contraband by individual in penal or correctional institution. 45 A.L.R.5th 767.
Validity, under federal constitution, of regulations, rules or statutes requiring random or mass drug testing of public employees or persons whose employment is regulated by state, local or federal government. 86 A.L.R. Fed. 420.
§ 47-5-198. Sale, possession, or use of controlled substances or narcotic drugs within facilities; knowledge by employees; punishment for violations.
- It is unlawful for any person to sell within, bring to, or be in possession of, in any correctional facility or convict camp within the state or any county, municipal or other jail within the state, except as authorized by law, any controlled substance or narcotic drug.
- It is unlawful for any person who is the keeper or officer in charge of the facility, camp or jail, or who is employed in or about the facility, camp or jail to knowingly permit any controlled substance or narcotic drug to be sold, possessed or used therein contrary to law.
- Any person who violates the provisions of this section and is convicted shall be fined up to Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) and be punished by imprisonment for not less than three (3) years nor more than seven (7) years; and the person is not eligible for probation, parole, suspension of sentence, earned time allowance or any other reduction of sentence.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 391, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1998.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Conviction proper.
2. Attorney disbarment.
3. Sufficient evidence.
4. Indictment.
1. Conviction proper.
Defendant’s conviction for the sale of marijuana within a correctional facility in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-198(1) was proper because the trial judge did not need to recuse himself from the trial since nothing in the judge’s response gave rise to overcome the presumption of impartiality. Jackson v. State, 962 So. 2d 649, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 104 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 962 So. 2d 38, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 2007).
2. Attorney disbarment.
Where the attorney was charged with selling marijuana to his client while he was incarcerated at the county jail, the attorney was convicted of the sale of marijuana within a correctional facility in a violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-198 and disbarred from the practice of law. Miss. Bar v. Jackson, 987 So. 2d 930, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 84 (Miss. 2008).
3. Sufficient evidence.
Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motions for a directed verdict, JNOV, or a new trial, as the evidence showed that defendant told the warden that the pills hidden inside the waistband of her pants were controlled substances. Warren v. State, 187 So.3d 616, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 2016).
Evidence supported defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance inside a correctional facility because (1) an officer observed defendant and another inmate stand by the exterior door to a jail’s yard, bend down, and retrieve items from underneath the door; [2] an officer found a small opening that could allow someone to slip an item through the door; and (3) officers found marijuana in envelopes in a blanket that defendant tried to pass to the other inmate when the inmates were searched as they reentered the jail. Graham v. State, 204 So.3d 329, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 113 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance within a correctional facility after jailers found marijuana, aluminum foil, and a blunt cigar inside of a deodorant container she left for her incarcerated husband; defendant claimed it would have been impossible for her to hide the drugs in the deodorant container during the three to five minutes it took to get from the store where she purchased the deodorant to the jail. However, defendant’s appeal was based on a factual dispute that the jury resolved in the state’s favor, and the jury obviously rejected defendant’s impossibility defense. Woods v. State, 19 So.3d 817, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 721 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Where the State presented testimony from an inmate and correction officers that defendant attempted to plant a brown paper bag containing marijuana on another inmate, the evidence was sufficient to convict him for possession of marijuana in a correctional facility in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-198. The trial court did not err by denying his motion for directed verdict. Stewart v. State, 986 So. 2d 304, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 348 (Miss. 2008).
4. Indictment.
Indictment, which tracked the language of this section, was sufficient, and, because neither the crime nor the penalty depended upon the identity of the controlled substance, the indictment for possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility did not need to identify the substance allegedly possessed. Warren v. State, 187 So.3d 616, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 2016).
Although defendant asserted that the indictment was fatally defective for failure to specify the contraband that defendant conspired to possess in a correctional facility, the two count indictment included the essential statutory elements of the charges against defendant and provided sufficient notice so that defendant suffered no prejudice in preparing a defense. Furthermore, defendant was procedurally barred from arguing an objection to a multi-count indictment on appeal because defendant failed to raise the objection at trial. Graham v. State, 204 So.3d 329, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 113 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss due to a defective indictment where the indictment failed to specify the nature of the controlled substance that defendant was alleged to have possessed in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-198, and the State’s failure to include the identity of the controlled substance prevented defendant from preparing a defense that her possession of the controlled substance was lawful. Warren v. State, 187 So.3d 631, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 40 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), rev'd, 187 So.3d 616, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 2016).
Although Mississippi caselaw on the issue of whether an indictment sufficiently specifies the nature of the controlled substance primarily addresses possession and trafficking of controlled substances pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139 (Supp. 2014), the Court of Appeals of Mississippi sees no reason why this same reasoning should not extend to possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-198. Warren v. State, 187 So.3d 631, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 40 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), rev'd, 187 So.3d 616, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 137 (Miss. 2016).
Mississippi Offenders and Volunteer Effort [Repealed]
§§ 47-5-201 through 47-5-209. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1981, ch. 386, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1981.
[Laws, 1978, ch. 334, §§ 1-5]
Penitentiary-Made Goods
§ 47-5-301. Short title.
Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 may be cited as the “Penitentiary-Made Goods Law of 1978.”
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 75; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 75, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, thereby removing the repeal date.
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Cross References —
Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990, see §47-5-531.
Authorization to transfer and expend monies from Prison Industries Fund to carry out purposes of sections47-5-301 et seq., and47-5-501 et seq., see §47-5-565.
Entities to whom prison-made goods or services produced by corporation from prison industries may be sold, see §47-5-549.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 180.
§ 47-5-303. Declaration of purpose.
The aims and purposes of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 are:
To utilize the labor of offenders for self-maintenance and for reimbursing this state for expenses incurred by reason of their crimes and imprisonment; and
To effect the requisitioning and disbursement of penitentiary products directly through established state authorities and to permit the sale of such products to the public.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 2; Laws, 1981, ch. 516, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 76; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 76, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed, Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Working of prisoners in penitentiary, see §47-5-126.
§ 47-5-305. Authorization to purchase materials and engage supervisory personnel; sale of products to public; contracts with private enterprise.
- The State Department of Corrections is authorized to purchase, in the manner prescribed by law, equipment, raw materials and supplies, and to engage the supervisory personnel necessary to establish and maintain for this state at the penitentiary or any penal farm or institution now or hereafter under the control of such department industries for the utilization of services of offenders in the manufacture or production of such articles or products as may be needed for the construction, operation, maintenance or use of any commission, department, institution or other agency supported in whole or in part by this state and the political subdivisions thereof. The State Department of Corrections is further authorized to sell such products to the public.
- The Department of Corrections is authorized to contract for work projects from outside sources, including private enterprise, for processing, fabrication or repair; however, preference shall be given to the performance of such work projects for any commission, department, institution or other agency of the state.
- The Department of Corrections is further authorized to contract with private or public industrial and business enterprises regarding the location of operations or projects upon any property utilized by the state prison correctional system in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 3; Laws, 1981, ch. 412, § 1; Laws, 1981, ch. 516, § 3; Laws, 1983, ch. 409, § 8; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 77; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 77; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Leasing or hiring of county prisoner, see §47-1-19.
Correctional industries work programs, see §§47-5-501 et seq.
Entities to whom prison-made goods or services produced by corporation from prison industries may be sold, see §47-5-549.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 180.
CJS.
18 C.J.S., Convicts §§ 23 et seq.
§ 47-5-307. Purchase of penitentiary-made goods by other state agencies; state and commercial specifications.
- On and after the establishment of the industries provided for in Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327, all commissions, departments, institutions and other agencies of this state, which are supported in whole or in part by this state, may purchase from the State Department of Corrections all articles or products required by such commissions, departments, institutions or agencies which are produced or manufactured by the State Department of Corrections with the use of penitentiary labor as provided for by Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327. All purchases made by state agencies shall be made through the State Fiscal Management Board upon requisition by the proper authority of the commission, department, institution or agency. Political subdivisions of this state may purchase directly from the State Department of Corrections.
- Any article or product manufactured by the State Department of Corrections for sale through the State Fiscal Management Board to any commission, department, institution or agency of the state or to any political subdivision thereof, shall be manufactured and/or produced only upon state specifications developed by and through the State Fiscal Management Board. However, if such specifications have not been developed by the State Fiscal Management Board, then production may be based upon commercial specifications in current use by industry for the manufacture of such articles and products for sale to the state and political subdivisions thereof which have first been approved by the State Fiscal Management Board. For purposes of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327, state specifications and commercial specifications approved by the State Fiscal Management Board shall mean the latest complete version of any specification including amendments thereto.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 4; Laws, 1981, ch. 516, § 5; brought forward without change, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 78; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 226; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 78, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Entities to whom prison-made goods or services produced by corporation from prison industries may be sold, see §47-5-549.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 180.
CJS.
18 C.J.S., Convicts § 24.
§ 47-5-309. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1981, ch. 516, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1981.
[Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 5]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-309 set forth exceptions to the mandatory purchase provisions of the Penitentiary-Made Goods Law.
§ 47-5-311. Catalogues.
The State Department of Corrections shall cause to be prepared, at such times as it may determine, catalogues containing an accurate and complete description of all articles and products manufactured or produced by it pursuant to the provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327. Copies of such catalogues shall be sent to all commissions, departments, institutions and agencies of this state and made accessible to all political subdivisions of this state referred to in the preceding sections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 6(1); brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 79; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 79, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Entities to whom prison-made goods or services produced by corporation from prison industries may be sold, see §47-5-549.
§ 47-5-313. Summary reports of goods purchased by other state agencies.
At least thirty (30) days before the beginning of each fiscal year, the State Fiscal Management Board shall provide to the State Department of Corrections, summary reports of the kind and amount of articles and products purchased for state commissions, departments, institutions, agencies and political subdivisions based upon the previous nine (9) months’ experience. Not more than one hundred (100) days following the close of each fiscal year, the State Fiscal Management Board shall submit to the State Department of Corrections a report showing the kinds and amounts of such penitentiary-manufactured articles purchased by all state commissions, departments, institutions, agencies and political subdivisions based upon the purchase experience of the entire previous fiscal year. All such reports shall refer, insofar as possible, to the items or products contained in the catalogue as issued by the State Department of Corrections. The State Fiscal Management Board may at any time request the State Department of Corrections to manufacture or produce additional articles or products.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 6(2); brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 80; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 227; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 80, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 27-104-1 provides that the term “Fiscal Management Board” shall mean the “Department of Finance and Administration”.
Cross References —
Entities to whom prison-made goods or services produced by corporation from prison industries may be sold, see §47-5-549.
§ 47-5-315. Priority of production requirements.
The articles or products manufactured or produced by penitentiary labor in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 shall be devoted first, to fulfilling the requirements of the commissions, departments, institutions and agencies of this state which are supported in whole or in part by this state; and secondly, to supplying the political subdivisions of this state with such articles and products; and lastly to producing articles and products for sale to the public.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 7; Laws, 1981, ch. 516, § 6; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 81; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 81, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Sale of penitentiary made products to the public, see §47-5-305.
Entities to whom prison-made goods or services produced by corporation from prison industries may be sold, see §47-5-549.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 180.
CJS.
18 C.J.S., Convicts § 24.
§ 47-5-317. Determination of prices.
The Industries Division of the State Department of Corrections shall fix and determine the prices at which all articles or products manufactured or produced shall be furnished.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 8; Laws, 1984, ch. 387; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 82; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 82, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
§ 47-5-319. Annual audit reports.
In addition to the information ordinarily required by law in the annual audits of expenditures and operations of the State Department of Corrections made by the state auditor, after March 23, 1978, audit reports shall also include a detailed statement of all materials, machinery or other property procured, and the cost thereof, and the expenditures made during the audited year for manufacturing purposes, together with a statement of all materials on hand to be manufactured, or in process of manufacture, or manufactured, and the values of all machinery, fixtures or other appurtenances for the purpose of utilizing the productive labor of offenders, and the earnings realized therefrom during the year.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 9; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 83; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 83, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor,” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.
Section 27-104-6 provides that whenever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration”.
Cross References —
Auditor of correctional system, generally, §47-5-35.
§ 47-5-321. Promulgation of policies.
The State Board of Corrections shall have the power and authority to prepare and promulgate policies which are necessary to give effect to the provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 with respect to matters of administration respecting the same which if made shall be in writing, entered on their minutes, and available to the general public for inspection during the regular office hours of the department. Before taking effect, said policies, as well as subsequent amendments thereto, shall be placed on file by the department in the office of the secretary of state in a well-bound book designated by the secretary for that purpose.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 10; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 84; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 84, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
§ 47-5-323. Expenditure of appropriations; deposit of collected monies in prison industries fund.
- In order to carry out the provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327, the department is authorized to expend such monies out of appropriations from the Prison Industries Fund, as established by Section 47-5-66, as may be necessary to erect buildings, to improve existing facilities, to purchase equipment, to procure tools, supplies and materials, to purchase, install or replace equipment and otherwise to defray the necessary expenses incident to the employment of offenders as herein provided.
- All monies collected by the State Department of Corrections from the sale or disposition of articles and products manufactured or produced by penitentiary labor in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 shall be forthwith deposited into the Prison Industries Fund authorized by subsection (1) of this section. The money so collected and deposited shall be used solely for the purchase of raw materials, manufacturing supplies, equipment, machinery and buildings used to carry out the purposes of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327, to otherwise defray the necessary expenses incident thereto, including the employment of such necessary supervisory personnel as is unavailable in the inmate population. All expenditures from such fund shall be subject to the approval of the commissioner; provided, however, that such Prison Industries Fund shall never be maintained in excess of the amount necessary to carry out efficiently and properly the intentions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 11; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 85; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 228; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 85; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 29, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Cross References —
Establishment of prison industries fund, see §47-5-66.
§ 47-5-325. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1981, ch. 516, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 1981.
[Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 12]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-325 prescribed penalties for selling penitentiary-made products on the open market.
§ 47-5-327. Construction of provisions.
The provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 shall be liberally construed to achieve the primary objective of vocational training and rehabilitation of offenders through work in industrial types of activities which also will best serve the economical and efficient operation of state agencies. The provisions of Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-327 shall be considered as supplementary, or in addition to, other existing provisions of law relative to the employment of offenders.
HISTORY: Laws, 1978, ch. 408, § 13; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 86; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 86, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
§ 47-5-329. Prison industries advisory council; members; compensation.
- The Commissioner of Corrections shall appoint a Prison Industries Advisory Council. The council shall advise the commissioner and the Governor on all aspects of the prison industry program at the State Penitentiary, including, but not limited to, the types and quantity of products to be manufactured and their manner of production.
- The council shall consist of the commissioner, who shall be chairman of the council, and six (6) citizens appointed by the commissioner. The members appointed by the commissioner shall be active leaders of business and industry in this state, and one (1) of the members shall be a representative of organized labor. The members shall be familiar, insofar as possible, with the various types of prison industries in operation or contemplated for operation at the State Penitentiary. Of the initial members of the council, one (1) shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year; one (1) for a term of two (2) years; one (1) for a term of three (3) years; one (1) for a term of four (4) years; one (1) for a term of five (5) years; and one (1) for a term of six (6) years. Thereafter, each member shall serve a term of four (4) years. Vacancies shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term and members may be reappointed. Members shall receive such per diem as provided by law for each day actually spent in the performance of their duties, in addition to the actual and necessary expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties. The per diem and expenses shall be paid from the Prison Industries Fund as created in Section 47-5-66.
- The council shall meet quarterly and at such other times deemed necessary by the commissioner.
HISTORY: Laws, 1981, ch. 516, § 2; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 87; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 87; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 30, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
§ 47-5-331. Lease of buildings at Parchman facility; provisions of lease.
- Upon request of the Board of Corrections the Governor’s Office of General Services is authorized to lease one or more existing buildings or portions thereof on the grounds of the Parchman facility of the Department of Corrections (a) to a private individual, firm or corporation for the purpose of establishing and operating a factory for the manufacture and processing of products, or (b) to any other commercial enterprise deemed consistent with the aims and purposes of the Penitentiary-Made Goods Law. The leased premises shall include any real estate needed for reasonable access to and access from the leased buildings. The term of the lease shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Money derived from the lease of such buildings and real estate shall be placed in the Prison Industries Fund in the State Treasury.
-
Each lease negotiated and concluded under subsection (1) of this section shall include and shall be valid only so long as the lessee adheres to the following provisions:
- All persons employed in the factory or other commercial enterprise operated in the leased property, except for lessee’s supervisory employees and necessary training personnel approved by the warden, shall be inmates of the State Penitentiary and approved for such employment by the warden and the lessee.
- The factory or other commercial enterprise operated in the leased property shall observe at all times such practices and procedures regarding security as the lease may specify, or as the warden may temporarily stipulate during periods of emergency.
- The factory or other commercial enterprise operated in the leased property shall be deemed a private enterprise and subject to all the laws and lawfully adopted rules of this state governing the operation of similar business enterprises elsewhere.
HISTORY: Laws, 1981, ch. 516, § 4; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 88; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 229; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 88, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 7-1-451 provides that wherever the term “Office of General Services” appears in any law the same shall mean the Department of Finance and Administration.
Cross References —
Establishment of prison industries fund, see §47-5-66.
Provisions of the Penitentiary-Made Goods Law, see §§47-5-301 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 180.
CJS.
18 C.J.S., Convicts §§ 23 et seq.
Prison Agricultural Enterprises
§ 47-5-351. State policy; legislative intent; mission.
- It is the policy of the State of Mississippi that the Department of Corrections, to the extent practical, make maximum utilization of the farm lands of the various correctional institutions for the purpose of feeding inmates.
- It is the intent of the Legislature that the department grow, harvest and process those agricultural products that will directly assist in reducing the reliance of the department upon external sources of supply and that will facilitate the self-sufficiency of the inmates and the department.
- The Department of Corrections shall establish, implement and manage prison agricultural enterprises in a manner and form deemed appropriate to ensure a profitable farming operation and self-sufficiency in the feeding of the inmates.
-
The Legislature finds that the mission of the prison agricultural enterprises is:
- To reduce the cost of state government by producing and processing food for use by inmates;
- To operate the program primarily with inmate labor;
- To serve the security goals of the department through the reduction of idleness of inmates;
- To produce and market agricultural products that will aid in maintaining a profitable agricultural operation to the extent possible.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 506 § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).
§ 47-5-353. Definitions.
For the purpose of Sections 47-5-351 through 47-5-357, the following terms shall have the following meanings unless the context shall provide otherwise:
“Agricultural commodities” means crops, vegetables, fruits, livestock, domesticated fish, fowl, seafood, animal husbandry, wood and the various processes that any of these commodities may go through subsequent to their removal from the soil or water.
“Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Corrections;
“Department” means the Department of Corrections;
“Director” means the director of the prison agricultural enterprises;
“Prison agricultural enterprises” means any program operated by the Department of Corrections including, but not limited to, the growing, harvesting, processing and marketing of crops, vegetables, fruits, livestock, domesticated fish, fowl and any product of agriculture, animal husbandry or aquaculture that may be used for the feeding of prisoners for the general welfare of the prisoners or profitably grown on department lands. This term includes any proper method of canning, freezing or preserving such products;
“Products” means any item produced by prison agricultural enterprises.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 506 § 2; Laws, 2001, ch. 339, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 11, 2001.).
Cross References —
Definition of “prison agricultural enterprises” for purposes of Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990, see §47-5-539.
§ 47-5-355. Director of prison agricultural enterprises; duties and powers; records; annual report; joint ventures.
-
The Commissioner of Corrections shall employ a director of the prison agricultural enterprises, who shall be directly responsible to the commissioner. The director shall have the following duties and powers:
- To implement and manage the prison agricultural enterprises;
- To determine, with the advice of the Director of Planning, the type of agricultural, animal husbandry and aquaculture products needed to feed inmates and which may be grown profitably on department lands;
- To use inmate labor to meet the labor needs of the programs, subject to the requirements of subsection (2);
- To recommend rules and regulations and employ personnel necessary for the operation of the programs;
- To determine the proper methods of canning, freezing or preserving that may be used to the best advantage of the programs;
- With approval of the commissioner, to do those things necessary and proper to accomplish the purposes of the programs;
- To determine and establish priorities on the most appropriate and profitable products to be grown and which department lands should be farmed, taking into consideration the available prison labor, existing equipment and funds available therefor, markets for the products, and other matters consistent with prudent agricultural practices;
- To manage the food services of the department at the discretion of the commissioner.
- The director shall have the right to use inmate labor to the exclusion of prison industries. The superintendents shall provide the prison agricultural enterprises with sufficient inmate labor. If a superintendent refuses to provide inmate labor because of security concerns, the commissioner shall decide if security requirements preclude use of inmate labor. Upon the request of the director, the superintendents shall provide security for prison agricultural enterprises.
- The director shall maintain accurate and complete financial records of all receipts and expenditures of the prison agricultural enterprise programs.
- The director shall file a full and complete report with the Legislature before January 1 of each year detailing the costs, inventory and receipts of each program. The report shall also provide the cost or cost savings of such programs.
- The department may enter into joint ventures with private businesses related to prison agricultural enterprises.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 506 § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).
§ 47-5-357. Purchasing policy; items exempted from bid requirements.
- Due to the unique and time sensitive requirements of growing and harvesting products produced by the prison agricultural enterprises, the Department of Finance and Administration and the department shall establish a prudent purchasing policy which may exempt from bid requirements those commodities, items or services which are needed for the efficient and effective management of the prison agricultural enterprises.
- The Department of Finance and Administration shall, by order entered on its minutes, list those commodities, items and services exempted from bid requirements as provided in Section 31-7-12, Mississippi Code of 1972.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved May 15, 1992).
Public Service Work Programs
§ 47-5-401. Public service work programs; eligibility; limitation.
- There is hereby authorized, in each county of the state, a public service work program for state inmates in custody of the county. Such a program may be established at the option of the county in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421. The department shall also recommend rules and regulations concerning the participation of state inmates in the program.
- An inmate shall not be eligible to participate in a work program established in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 if he has been convicted of any crime of violence, including but not limited to murder, aggravated assault, rape, robbery or armed robbery.
- The inmates participating in the work program established in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 are restricted to the performance of public service work for counties, municipalities, the state or nonprofit charitable organizations, as defined by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, except that the Department of Corrections must approve all requests by nonprofit charitable organizations to use offenders to perform any public service work. Upon request of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, or the board of trustees of a county school district, municipal school district or junior college district, the inmates may be permitted to perform work for such boards.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 2; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 89; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 89; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 31; Laws, 1992, ch. 317, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 4; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
Federal Aspects—
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Under Section 47-5-401, the board of supervisors has no authority to control the placement of state inmates in the county jail. Welch, October 4, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0656.
As long as the provisions Sections 21-19-11 and 47-5-401 are followed, a municipality may contract with the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the use of state inmates housed at community work centers to perform public service work such as the type authorized by Section 21-19-11 on private property. Trice, August 30, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0467.
A state inmate who is in the custody of a county may be worked in a public service work program; however, such work program is restricted to the performance of public service work for counties, municipalities, the state, or nonprofit charitable organizations, as defined by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Johnson, Jan. 7, 2000, A.G. Op. #99-0707.
A county board of supervisors is authorized to use community work release center prisoners to pick up county garbage and deposit it in county-operated garbage trucks for disposal. Shepard, Feb. 18, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0069.
Assuming that inmates are not performing their duties for a private contractor, a county school district may use inmates to clean and remove garbage at a school cafeteria. Mayfield, Apr. 27, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0251.
A board of supervisors, by appropriate resolution, may establish joint work programs to be operated under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sheriff, and inmates participating in such a program may be housed in work camps in lieu of confinement in jail, which need not be within the corporate limits of the county seat. DeLaughter, Mar. 8, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0042.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections is under no obligation to pay counties for the costs associated with the care of inmates participating in a joint state/county work program under Section 47-5-401(1). Epps, Feb. 28, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0764.
County inmates in the custody of the sheriff would not be allowed to work on properties of a nonprofit charitable organization that does not provide food to charities. Griffith, Sept. 26, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0496.
A court may authorize participants in a Community Service, Restitution and Work Program to perform work service for qualified nonprofit charitable organizations as defined by Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Weathers, Dec. 27, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0549.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Computation of incarceration time under work-release or “hardship” sentences. 28 A.L.R.4th 1265.
Defendant’s right to credit for time spent in halfway house, rehabilitation center, or similar restrictive environment as a condition of pretrial release. 29 A.L.R.4th 240.
Denial of state prisoner’s application for, or revocation of, participation in work or study release program or furlough program as actionable under Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS § 1983). 55 A.L.R. Fed. 208.
§ 47-5-403. Definitions.
As used in Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421, the following words and terms have the meanings hereby ascribed to them:
“County inmate” means a person convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of confinement of one (1) year’s duration or less.
“State inmate” means a person convicted of a crime and sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term of confinement of more than one (1) year’s duration.
“Department” means the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 90; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 90; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 32, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provides for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
State Department of Corrections, generally, see §§47-5-8 et seq.
Commitment of offenders to custody of department of corrections, see §47-5-110.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
§ 47-5-405. Joint state-county work programs; sheriff to adopt regulations.
Each county electing to establish a work program under Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 is authorized through its sheriff to adopt regulations and policies for joint state-county work programs, including extending the limits of the place of confinement of an eligible inmate as to whom there is reasonable cause to believe he will know his trust.
Any rules, regulations or policies promulgated by the sheriff shall be filed with the board of supervisors, and shall be left on file for a minimum of thirty (30) days before any such rules, regulations or policies can be implemented or utilized for any inmate pursuant to the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421. Provided further, such rules as they pertain to state inmates shall also be submitted to the Department of Corrections for approval which shall be granted or rejected within thirty (30) days of submission. If said rules are rejected the reasons therefor shall be stated in writing.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 3; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 91; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 91; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 33, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Duties of sheriff with regard to jail prisoners, generally, see §19-25-69.
Powers and duties of state board of corrections, generally, see §47-5-20.
Work camps for participating inmates, see §47-5-407.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 162 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-407. Work camps.
Any county establishing a work program pursuant to Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 may also establish a work camp to be used in carrying out the program, wherein inmates participating in the program may be housed in lieu of confinement in the county jail.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 4; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 92; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 92, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Extending limits of place of confinement of eligible inmate, see §47-5-405.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Sections 47-5-401 et. seq. particularly Section 47-5-407 allows any county with a work program to establish a work camp wherein inmates participating in the program may be housed in lieu of confinement in the jail. Such a camp need not be within the corporate limits of the county seat. Bradley, July 8, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0335.
A board of supervisors, by appropriate resolution, may establish joint work programs to be operated under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sheriff, and inmates participating in such a program may be housed in work camps in lieu of confinement in jail, which need not be within the corporate limits of the county seat. DeLaughter, Mar. 8, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0042.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-409. Escapes.
The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of his confinement or to return to the place of confinement within the time prescribed shall be deemed an escape from a state penal institution in the case of a state inmate, and an escape from the custody of the sheriff in the case of a county inmate, and shall be punishable accordingly.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 5; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 93; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 93, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Forfeiture of earned time in event of escape from state penal institution, see §47-5-139.
Reward for apprehension of escaped state prisoner, see §47-5-147.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
Penalties for state and county prisoners who escape from custody, see §§97-9-43 through97-9-49.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Failure of prisoner to return at expiration of work furlough or other permissive release period as crime of escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 658.
Temporary unauthorized absence of prisoner as escape or attempted escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 695.
Am. Jur.
27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escape §§ 1 et seq.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 229.
§ 47-5-411. Criteria for public service work.
The Department of Corrections and the county shall endeavor to secure public service work for eligible inmates under Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421, subject to the following criteria:
Such work shall not result in the displacement of employed workers.
Inmates eligible for work shall not be employed to impair any existing contracts.
Exploitation of eligible inmates, in any form, is prohibited either as it might affect the community, the inmates, the Department of Corrections or the county.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 6; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 94; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 94; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 34, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Prohibition against using state prisoners as servants, see §47-5-137.
§ 47-5-413. Earned time credit.
County inmates performing public service work under Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 shall be eligible for earned time credit in the same manner as other inmates confined or detained in the county jail or other county correctional facility. State inmates performing public service work shall be eligible for earned time credit in the same manner as other inmates confined or detained in state prisons or other state correctional facilities.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 7; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 95; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 95, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Earned time allowances for state inmates, see §§47-5-138,47-5-139.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1.-5. [Reserved for future use].
6. Under former §47-5-171.
1.-5. [Reserved for future use].
6. Under former § 47-5-171.
In the absence of a clear statement of legislative intent to the contrary, a prisoner who has been released under a supervised earned release program and later apprehended for violation of the rules promulgated thereunder, is entitled to credit on his sentence for the period of time he was released under such program. Ivory v. State, 403 So. 2d 1284, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2196 (Miss. 1981).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Computation of incarceration time under work-release or “hardship” sentences. 28 A.L.R.4th 1265.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-231.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 142-144, 146, 152.
§ 47-5-415. Passes and leaves.
The sheriff, in the case of county inmates and state inmates incarcerated in county jails, and the Commissioner of Corrections, in the case of state inmates incarcerated in a Mississippi Department of Corrections facility, may institute a procedure for granting passes and leaves to inmates participating under Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421, and may grant such passes or leaves in deserving cases, not to exceed three (3) days or seventy-two (72) hours.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 8; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 96; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 96; Laws, 1986, ch. 427; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 35, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Leave for personal reasons for state inmates, see §47-5-173.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
§ 47-5-417. Status of participating inmate.
No inmate granted privileges under the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 shall be deemed to be an agent, employee or involuntary servant of the Department of Corrections, the state or any political subdivision thereof, while involved in the free community or while going to and from work or other specified areas or while on furlough pass.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 9; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 97; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 97; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 36, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 5 A.L.R.4th 773.
Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 6 A.L.R.4th 1155.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq., 211-213.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 26, 50, 123, 124.
§ 47-5-419. Delegation of functions.
The sheriff may designate any officer or employee of the county to do and perform for the county any act or function Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 empower the county to do or perform; provided, however, no elected official of the county shall be designated to do or perform any act or function for the county unless such elected officer is agreeable to being so designated.
The Commissioner of Corrections may designate any employee of the State Department of Corrections to do and perform for the department any act or function Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 empower the department to do or perform.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 10; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 98; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 98; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 37, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
State Department and Board of Corrections, generally, see §§47-5-8 et seq.
Joint state-county work program, see §§47-5-451 et seq.
§ 47-5-421. Provisions cumulative.
The provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 are cumulative and shall not be construed to repeal or supersede any laws directly inconsistent herewith; and it is specifically provided herein that any work program in operation or functioning pursuant to any local law when Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421 become law may be continued pursuant to such local law and shall not be affected in any way by Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421. The county conducting such program may, however, at its option convert the program to a program to be governed by Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421.
HISTORY: Laws, 1982, ch. 456, § 11; brought forward, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 99; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 99, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for an automatic repeal of this section from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986) repealed § 128 of ch. 471, Laws of 1984, thereby removing the repeal date.
Use of Prisoners in County Jails to Pick up Trash
§ 47-5-431. Use of prisoners in county jails to pick up trash; earned time credit; escapes.
- The sheriff may, in his discretion, use any person who has been convicted of a nonviolent felony and who is serving all or any part of his sentence in the county jail to pick up trash along public roads and state highways within the county.
- County inmates performing work under this section shall be eligible for earned time credit in the same manner as state inmates. State inmates shall be eligible for earned time credit in the same manner as other inmates confined or detained in state prisons or other state correctional facilities.
- Any inmate escaping while participating in the work described herein shall receive an additional five-year sentence.
HISTORY: Laws, 1988, ch. 343, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1988.
Cross References —
Prisoners permitted to work on public roads or other public works, see §47-1-9.
County prisoners may provide certain public service work, see §47-1-41.
Use of offenders as servants prohibited, see §47-5-137.
Use of prisoners in county jails to maintain certain historic cemeteries and serve food in conjunction with nonprofit organizations, see §47-5-441.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Failure of prisoner to return at expiration of work furlough or other permissive release period as crime of escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 658.
Sex discrimination in treatment of jail or prison inmates. 12 A.L.R.4th 1219.
Computation of incarceration time under work-release or “hardship” sentences. 28 A.L.R.4th 1265.
Denial of state prisoner’s application for, or revocation of, participation in work or study release program or furlough program as actionable under Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS sec. 1983). 55 A.L.R. Fed. 208.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq., 222 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq., 142 et seq.
§ 47-5-433. Use of State Highway vehicles to pick up trash bagged by inmates.
The State Highway Commission may furnish vehicles along state highways to pick up trash bagged by inmates.
HISTORY: Laws, 1988, ch. 343, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1988.
Editor’s Notes —
Section 65-1-1 provides that whenever the term “State Highway Commission,” or the term “commission” meaning the State Highway Commission, appears in the laws of this state, it shall mean the Mississippi Transportation Commission.
Use of Prisoners in County Jails to Maintain Certain Historic Cemeteries and Serve Food in Conjunction With Nonprofit Organizations
§ 47-5-441. Use of county prisoners to preserve and maintain certain historic cemeteries and use of county prison labor to prepare and serve food in county or public facilities in conjunction with certain nonprofit organizations.
- Any sheriff, or his designee, may use any person who has been convicted of a nonviolent offense and who is serving all or any part of his sentence in the county jail to clear, clean, stabilize, preserve, maintain and restore historic cemeteries in the county. For the purposes of this section the term “historic cemeteries” means cemeteries that are at least one hundred (100) years old.
- Before undertaking work on an historic cemetery, the sheriff, or his designee, shall contact the Department of Archives and History to obtain information on the appropriate procedures for the preservation and restoration of an historical cemetery.
- Any sheriff, or his designee, may use any person who has been convicted of a crime and is serving all or part of his sentence in the county jail, who volunteers his time, to prepare or serve food in county or public facilities in conjunction with a nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
HISTORY: Laws, 2003, ch. 532, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 20, 2003.).
Cross References —
Prisoners permitted to work on public roads or other public works, see §47-1-9.
County prisoners may provide certain public service work, see §47-1-41.
Use of offenders as servants prohibited, see §47-5-137.
Use of prisoners in county jails to pick up trash, see §§47-5-431 et seq.
Federal Aspects—
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Pursuant to this section the sheriff may use county inmate labor to clear, clean, stabilize, preserve, maintain and restore historic cemeteries in the county, public or private. The board of supervisors may authorize the sheriff to use county equipment and property to repair and maintain historic cemeteries pursuant to G.S. 39-5-19. Brown, July 7, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0284.
Joint State-County Work Program
§ 47-5-451. Joint state-county work programs; eligibility; limitations.
- There is hereby authorized, in each county of the state, a public service work program for state inmates in custody of the county. Such a program may be established at the option of the county in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421. The department shall also recommend rules and regulations concerning the participation of state inmates in the program.
- An inmate shall not be eligible to participate in a work program established in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421, if he has been convicted of any crime of violence, including, but not limited to, murder, aggravated assault, rape, robbery or armed robbery.
- The inmates participating in the work program established in accordance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421, are restricted to the performance of public service work for counties, municipalities, the state, nonprofit charitable organizations or churches, as defined by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, except that the Department of Corrections must approve all requests by nonprofit charitable organizations or churches to use offenders to perform any public service work. Upon request of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning, or the board of trustees of a county school district, municipal school district or junior college district, the inmates may be permitted to perform work for such boards.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 38; Laws, 1992, ch. 317, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 5; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 9; Laws, 2008, ch. 364, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2008.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1985, ch. 489, § 11, provided for the repeal of the Joint State-County Work Program (§§47-5-451 through47-5-469). Subsequently, Laws of 1987, ch. 384, § 11, amended Laws of 1985, ch. 489, § 11, by removing the repeal provision.
Amendment Notes —
The 2008 amendment added “or churches” following “nonprofit charitable organizations” twice in the first sentence of (3); and made minor stylistic changes throughout.
Cross References —
Department of Corrections, see §47-5-8.
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
Noxubee County Work Program established pursuant to the authority of §§47-5-451 through §§47-5-469, see §47-5-1209.
Federal Aspects—
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Work programs.
Without waiving the procedural bar to the inmate’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutional, the court held that the inmate was properly charged under Miss. Code Ann. §97-9-45 and entered a plea of guilty to the escape; the sentence of three years was well within the maximum prescribed by the statute, which referred to prisoners sentenced to the Mississippi Department of Corrections and allowed a maximum sentence of five years, and thus the inmate was not entitled to post-conviction relief; although the inmate was in custody and on a work program for a county at the time of the escape, the inmate was considered under the Department’s jurisdiction for purposes of §97-9-45 because (1) the inmate’s original burglary sentence required imprisonment in the “penitentiary” under Miss. Code Ann. §97-17-23, which term meant any facility under the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-3, (2) commitment to any institution within the jurisdiction of the Department was to the Department, not a particular institution pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-110, and (3) under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-451, the Department recommended rules concerning the participation of inmates in work programs. Gardner v. State, 848 So. 2d 900, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 570 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The creation of Christmas ornaments for display on public streets and city property constitutes public service work but the creation of Christmas ornaments for advertisement and sale by cities to other cities or anyone in the private sector does not constitute public service work. Shepard, Dec. 18, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0943.
Legislature intended that eligibility provision of Miss. Code §47-5-451(2) exclude inmates who previously had been convicted of violent crimes, as well as those who were presently serving time for such convictions; further, this exclusion would apply to juveniles, only if they were tried and convicted as adults, but would not apply to juvenile delinquency adjudications. Lucas, Jan. 6, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0977.
It was intended that eligibility provision of Miss. Code Section 47-5-45(2) [repealed] apply only to those work programs that are authorized and created under provisions of Miss. Code Section 47-5-451. Lucas, Jan. 6, 1993, A.G. Op. #92-0977.
A board of supervisors, by appropriate resolution, may establish joint work programs to be operated under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sheriff, and inmates participating in such a program may be housed in work camps in lieu of confinement in jail, which need not be within the corporate limits of the county seat. DeLaughter, Mar. 8, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0042.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Computation of incarceration time under work-release or “hardship” sentences. 28 A.L.R.4th 1265.
Defendant’s right to credit for time spent in halfway house, rehabilitation center, or similar restrictive environment as condition of pretrial release. 29 A.L.R.4th 240.
Denial of state prisoner’s application for, or revocation of, participation in work or study release program or furlough program as actionable under Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS § 1983). 55 A.L.R. Fed. 208.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 162 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-452. Offenders to clean up abandoned or neglected cemeteries and public roads of the county.
Upon written request by a majority of the board of supervisors of any county, the Commissioner of Corrections may authorize offenders committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections to clean abandoned or neglected cemeteries of the county or clean public roads of the county. The offenders shall be under the supervision of the department and the department shall establish all proper regulations for the working, guarding, safekeeping, clothing, housing and subsistence of offenders while working.
HISTORY: Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 35, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-453. Adoption of regulations and policies.
Each county board of supervisors electing to establish a work program under Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 shall adopt regulations and policies as authorized by the Department of Corrections for joint state-county work programs, including extending the limits of the place of confinement of an eligible inmate as to whom there is reasonable cause to believe he will know his trust. Extending the limits of the place of confinement may include confinement at the residence of the subject inmate wherein the primary maintenance and care of the inmate shall take place, subject to approval by the department and county.
Violations by inmates participating in such programs of any such rules, regulations or policies shall result in the ineligibility of the inmates to participate in such programs, and shall result in the inmate’s immediate incarceration.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 39, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Cross References —
Duties of sheriff with regard to jail prisoners, generally, see §19-25-69.
Powers and duties of state board of corrections, generally, see §47-5-20.
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
Work camps for participating inmates, see §47-5-455.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-455. Establishment of work camps.
Any county board of supervisors establishing a work program pursuant to Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 may also establish a work camp to be used in carrying out the program, wherein inmates participating in the program may be housed.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1987.
Cross References —
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
Extending limits of place of confinement of eligible inmate, see §47-5-453.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-457. Escapes.
The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of his confinement or to return to the place of confinement within the time prescribed shall be deemed an escape from a state penal institution and shall be punishable accordingly.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1987.
Cross References —
Forfeiture of earned time in event of escape from state penal institution, see §47-5-139.
Reward for apprehension of escaped state prisoner, see §47-5-147.
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
Penalties for state and county prisoners who escape from custody, see §§97-9-43 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Failure of prisoner to return at expiration of work furlough or other permissive release period as crime of escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 658.
Temporary unauthorized absence of prisoner as escape or attempted escape. 76 A.L.R.3d 695.
Am. Jur.
27A Am. Jur. 2d, Escape §§ 1 et seq.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 229.
§ 47-5-459. Criteria for public service and private sector work.
-
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the State Department of Corrections and the county board of supervisors shall endeavor to secure public service work or private paid employment for eligible inmates under Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469, subject to the following criteria:
- Such work shall not result in the displacement of employed workers.
- Inmates eligible for work shall not be employed to impair any existing contracts.
- Exploitation of eligible inmates, in any form, is prohibited either as it might affect the community, the inmates, the department or the county.
-
In those cases in which inmates have been authorized to engage in paid employment in the private sector which has been approved by the Department of Corrections and a county board of supervisors electing to establish a work program under Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469, the disposition of funds received by such inmates shall be allocated by the Department of Corrections and the county board of supervisors. The guidelines to be used in the allocation of such funds shall include consideration of the following:
- The cost of maintenance of the inmate in his place of confinement and reimbursement for same to the appropriate person or entity;
- The operating expenses and costs incurred by the county or Department of Corrections in operating such a work program and reimbursement to such county or to the department; and
- Restitution to any victim of the offense for which the inmate was convicted in such amounts and under such conditions as the sentencing court may have imposed.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 5; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 40; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Prohibition against using state prisoners as servants, see §47-5-137.
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
A board of supervisors, by appropriate resolution, may establish joint work programs to be operated under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sheriff, and inmates participating in such a program may be housed in work camps in lieu of confinement in jail, which need not be within the corporate limits of the county seat. DeLaughter, Mar. 8, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0042.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-461. Earned time credit.
State inmates performing public service work or private paid employment under Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 shall be eligible for earned time credit allowances in the same manner as other inmates confined or detained in state prisons or other state correctional facilities.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 6; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1987.
Cross References —
Earned time allowances for state inmates, see §§47-5-138,47-5-139.
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
I. Under Current Law.
1. In general.
2.-5. [Reserved for future use].
II. Under Former §47-5-171.
6. In general.
I. Under Current Law.
1. In general.
A habeas corpus petitioner who had been a death row inmate, and as such had not been eligible for earned time credit, was entitled to full earned time credit for the years of incarceration on death row where (1) his conviction and sentence were found to be illegal, (2) he subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter, and (3) he received a 20-year sentence. Voyles v. State, 520 So. 2d 501, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 166 (Miss. 1988).
2.-5. [Reserved for future use].
II. Under Former § 47-5-171.
6. In general.
In the absence of a clear statement of legislative intent to the contrary, a prisoner who has been released under a supervised earned release program and later apprehended for violation of the rules promulgated thereunder, is entitled to credit on his sentence for the period of time he was released under such program. Ivory v. State, 403 So. 2d 1284, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2196 (Miss. 1981).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Computation of incarceration time under work-release or “hardship” sentences. 28 A.L.R.4th 1265.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 218-231.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 142-144, 146, 152.
§ 47-5-463. Passes and leaves.
The Commissioner of Corrections may institute a procedure for granting passes and leaves to inmates participating under Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469, and may grant such passes or leaves in deserving cases, not to exceed three (3) days or seventy-two (72) hours.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 7; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 41, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
§ 47-5-465. Status of participating inmate.
No inmate granted privileges under Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 shall be deemed to be an agent, employee or involuntary servant of the Department of Corrections, any county board of supervisors, the state or any political subdivision thereof, while involved in the free community or while going to and from work or other specified areas or while on furlough pass.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 8; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 8; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 42, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 5 A.L.R.4th 773.
Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 6 A.L.R.4th 1155.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 162, 211-213.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 26, 50, 123, 124.
§ 47-5-467. Delegation of functions.
The Commissioner of Corrections may designate any employee of the department to do and perform for the department any act or function which Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 empower the department to do or perform.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 9; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 9; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 43, eff from and after passage (approved May 6, 1988).
Cross References —
State department and board of corrections, generally, see §§47-5-8 et seq.
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-469. Provisions cumulative.
The provisions of Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 of this chapter are cumulative and shall not be construed to repeal or supersede any laws directly inconsistent herewith; and it is specifically provided herein that any work program in operation or functioning pursuant to any local law when Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 of this chapter become law may be continued pursuant to such local law and shall not be affected in any way by Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 of this chapter. The county board of supervisors conducting such program may, however, at its option, convert the program to a program to be governed by Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 489, § 10; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 384, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 1987.
Cross References —
Public service work program, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 176 et seq.
CJS.
72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners §§ 17, 21 et seq.
§ 47-5-471 Department of Corrections to make available to requesting counties eligible inmates for participation in state-county work program; counties responsible for transportation and expenses related to housing and caring for inmates.
Upon the request of any county for eligible inmates, the Department of Corrections shall make available for participation in the state-county work program in the requesting county any eligible inmates. Upon request and approval of such request by the Department of Corrections, the requesting county shall arrange for transportation of such inmates from the Department of Corrections to such county. Upon receiving any inmates, the county shall be responsible for all expenses related to housing and caring for such inmates. The Department of Corrections shall not be obligated to pay the county for any costs associated with housing or caring for such inmates, while the inmates are in the custody of the county for the purposes of the state-county work program. Regardless of any eligibility criteria established by the Department of Corrections, no inmate convicted of a sex crime, a crime of violence as defined by Section 97-3-2, or any other crime which specifically prohibits parole shall be eligible for participation in the program. The requesting county may, in its sole discretion, refuse any inmate deemed to present an undue risk to such county.
HISTORY: Laws, 2018, ch. 416, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Correctional Industries Work Programs
§ 47-5-501. Legislative intent.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the Legislature to provide vocational education and training for offenders in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and simultaneously reimburse the state for the expenses of incarcerating such offenders. To implement this goal, the Legislature intends for the Department of Corrections to work in conjunction with private industry to locate viable industries and businesses on property utilized by the State Prison Correctional System and utilize offenders in the custody of the Department of Corrections as the labor force necessary to conduct their operations.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 409, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990, see §47-5-531.
Authorization to transfer and expend monies from Prison Industries Fund to carry out purposes of sections47-5-301 et seq., and47-5-501 et seq., see §47-5-565.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
So long as the provision of this section and Section 21-19-11 are followed, a municipality may contract with the Mississippi Department of Corrections to use inmate labor for public service work such as the cleaning of private property under Section 21-19-11. Pierce, Dec. 19, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0676.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Computation of incarceration time under work-release or “hardship” sentences. 28 A.L.R.4th 1265.
Defendant’s right to credit for time spent in halfway house, rehabilitation center, or similar restrictive environment as a condition of pretrial release. 29 A.L.R.4th 240.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 22, 176-180.
§ 47-5-503. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 534, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved April 4, 1990).
[Laws, 1983, 409, § 2; Laws, 1988, ch. 518, § 23]
§ 47-5-505. Selection and evaluation of suitable industries; negotiation of leases and other agreements; ratification.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the Department of Economic Development, and the Mississippi State University Cooperative Extension Service shall collaborate with the Department of Corrections in an initial evaluation of viable industries and businesses readily found in the present economy and a determination of which of these would effectively function within the correctional industries work program. Special consideration shall be given to those industries and businesses which will provide vocational education and training for offenders so as to assist offenders in functioning more successfully following their release from custody.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, in conjunction with the initial evaluation and determination described in subsection (1) of this section, the Department of Economic Development shall have the primary responsibility of identifying and evaluating acceptable industries and businesses and of acting as an agent of the Department of Corrections by communicating with such concerns and aggressively soliciting their participation in the correctional industries work program.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, after an acceptable industry or business has expressed an interest in participating in the correctional industries work program, the Department of Corrections shall negotiate any necessary contractual agreements and arrangements between the concern and the Department of Corrections, including (a) leases of up to twenty-five (25) years, renewable at the option of the lessee for an additional ten-year period at the end of each lease term, of any property utilized by the state prison correctional system, and (b) authorization for such industry or business to develop leased property in a manner necessary to conduct the operation or project.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, any contracts concerning the leasing of real property by the Board of Corrections, any rules and regulations promulgated by the board and the making of any contract by the Department of Corrections with any private business shall be ratified and approved by the Governor’s Office of General Services.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 409, §§ 3, 10; Laws, 1984, ch. 488, § 230; Laws, 1988, ch. 518, § 24; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 57-1-2 provides that the term “Board of Economic Development” shall mean the “Mississippi Development Authority”.
Laws of 1984, ch. 488, § 341, provides as follows:
“SECTION 341. Nothing in this act shall affect or defeat any claim, assessment, appeal, suit, right or cause of action which accrued prior to the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective, whether such assessments, appeals, suits, claims or actions shall have been begun before the date on which the applicable sections of this act become effective or shall thereafter be begun.”
Cross References —
Creation of the office of general services, see §7-1-451.
Duty of Department of Community and Economic Development to assist Department of Corrections in selection and evaluation of suitable industries, see §57-1-55.
§ 47-5-507. Vocational training of offenders; employment subsequent to release.
The participating industry or business shall be responsible for providing the offenders with any vocational education or training necessary for employment. Upon an offender’s release from custody, the participating industry or business may offer such offender a similar employment opportunity at a free-world location or facility operated by the industry or business.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 409, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1983.
§ 47-5-509. Security for facilities; employment status of offenders.
The department of corrections shall at all times be responsible for the security of the facility being used for the operation or project. No offender granted privileges under the provisions of Section 47-5-501 et seq. shall be deemed to be an agent, employee, or involuntary servant of the participating industry or business while working in the correctional industries work program, or while going to and from employment or other specified areas.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 409, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 1983.
§ 47-5-511. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 534, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved April 4, 1990).
[Laws, 1983, ch. 409, § 6]
Editor’s Notes —
Former section 47-5-511 provided for the selection of offenders eligible to participate in the program.
§ 47-5-513. Disposition of funds received.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, proceeds of funds paid by industries or businesses participating in the correctional industries work program shall be paid into the special fund in the State Treasury to the credit of the Department of Corrections for the operating expenses of the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 409, § 7; Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Reporting requirements and disposition of funds received by state officials, see §7-9-21.
§ 47-5-515. Work training programs for offenders in trades for which there is a shortage of workers; cooperation with private industry.
- The Department of Corrections shall establish work training programs in conjunction with private industry to provide training to offenders in those trades in which there is a shortage of workers.
- The commissioner may cooperate with private industry for the establishment of work training programs.
- Private industry shall provide the training at state correctional facilities.
HISTORY: Laws, 1999, ch. 567, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1999.
§ 47-5-517. Work program for data processing entry at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility.
The Department of Corrections shall contract with the Department of Economic and Community Development for a training and work program for inmates to perform data processing entry at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility.
HISTORY: Laws, 1999, ch. 586, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 22, 1999.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in the section’s subsection designators. The subsection number “(1)” at the beginning of the section was deleted. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its August 5, 2008, meeting.
Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990
§ 47-5-531. Short title of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575.
Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575 shall be known as the “Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990.”
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-533. Legislative findings.
- It is the finding of the Legislature that prison industry programs of the State Department of Corrections are uniquely different from other programs operated or conducted by other departments in that it is essential to the state that the prison industry programs provide inmates with useful activities that can lead to meaningful employment after release in order to assist in reducing the return of inmates to the system.
-
It is further the finding of the Legislature that the mission of a prison industry program is:
- To reduce the cost of state government by operating prison industries primarily with inmate labor, which industries do not seek to unreasonably compete with private enterprise;
- To serve the rehabilitative goals of the state by duplicating as nearly as possible, the operating activities of a free-enterprise type of profit-making enterprise; and
- To serve the security goals of the state by reducing the idleness of inmates and by providing an incentive for good behavior while in prison.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Department of Corrections, see §47-5-8.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 22, 176-180.
§ 47-5-535. Legislative intent.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, it is the intent of the Legislature that a nonprofit corporation be organized and formed, within sixty (60) days from April 4, 1990, to lease and manage the prison industry programs of the Mississippi Correctional Industries. The corporation created and established shall be a body politic and corporate, may acquire and hold real and personal property, may receive, hold and dispense monies appropriated to it by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi received from the federal government, received from the sale of products, goods, and services which it produces, and received from any other sources whatsoever.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, it is the further intent of the Legislature that the nonprofit corporation shall create any additional prison industry program as it deems fit, and any such program shall be created in compliance with the provisions of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, it is the further intent of the Legislature that such nonprofit corporation shall have exclusive rights to operate any prison industry program and when such corporation is lawfully formed, no other public or private entity shall be allowed to carry out the provisions of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575.
- It is the further intent of the Legislature, that the nonprofit corporation which is required to be organized and formed under Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575 shall locate and operate prison industries at any state correctional facility with the approval of the Commissioner of Corrections. It is the intent of the Legislature that the nonprofit corporation locate and operate such industries in an orderly and expeditious manner. Such corporation may locate and operate prison industries at other prison satellites, at community work centers in the state, at any private correctional facility which houses state inmates and at any regional correctional facility as authorized under Section 47-5-931. No industrial prison program shall be located at a site other than state prison facilities approved by the commissioner.
- It is the further intent of the Legislature that the nonprofit corporation shall not have any rights to operate a program under the prison agricultural enterprises and shall not create a prison industry program that duplicates a prison agricultural enterprises program or product.
- It is the further intent of the Legislature that the department retain exclusive rights to conduct all prison agricultural and related enterprises.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 3; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 7; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 12; Laws, 1997, ch. 530, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1997).
§ 47-5-537. Formation of nonprofit corporation; programs of Division of Vocational Rehabilitation not to be prison industries.
The Secretary of State, or his designee, shall assist the Department of Corrections and the Department of Finance and Administration in the formation of the nonprofit corporation, and within sixty (60) days after the formation of the corporation, the corporation shall apply for exemption from federal tax under the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Any program of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation of the State Department of Human Services shall not be classified as prison industries under the provisions of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 13, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Secretary of State, see §7-3-5.
Department of Finance and Administration, see §27-104-1.
Rehabilitation services of State Department of Rehabilitation Services, see §37-33-157.
Department of Corrections, see §47-5-8.
Federal Aspects—
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Participants of the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) program are employees not of the Mississippi Prison Industries Corporation, but may be considered employees of the private employers with which the Mississippi Department of Corrections contracts for workers’ compensation purposes and, therefore, the Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers’ Compensation Trust cannot extend workers’ compensation coverage to those inmates participating in the PIE program. Self, May 5, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0189.
§ 47-5-539. Definitions.
For the purposes of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575, the following terms shall have the following meanings unless the context shall provide otherwise:
“Corporation” means the private nonprofit corporation which is required to be organized and formed to carry out the provisions of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575 regarding prison industries.
“Department” means the State Department of Corrections.
“Inmate” means any person incarcerated within any state correctional facility.
“Prison industry program” means any program which is considered to be a part of any prison industry in this state.
“Prison agricultural enterprises” means all agricultural endeavors as defined in Section 47-5-353.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 5; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-541. Board of directors of corporation; chief executive officer; industry advisory board; compensation of directors; rules and regulations; duties of chief executive officer.
- The corporation shall be governed by a board of directors. The board of directors of the nonprofit corporation shall be composed of the following eleven (11) members who shall be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate: one (1) representative of the manufacturing industry, one (1) representative of the agriculture industry, one (1) representative of the banking and finance industry, one (1) representative of the labor industry, one (1) representative from the marketing industry and six (6) members from the state at large. In addition, the State Commissioner of Corrections and the President of Mississippi Delta Community College shall be ex officio members of the board of directors with full voting privileges. In making initial appointments, three (3) members shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years; four (4) members shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years; and four (4) members shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years; to be designated by the Governor at the time of appointment; and all succeeding terms shall be for four (4) years from the expiration date of the previous term. Initial appointments shall be made within thirty (30) days after passage of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575. Any vacancy shall be filled by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The officers of the corporation shall consist of a chairman, vice chairman and a secretary-treasurer. The officers shall be selected by the members of the board. However, the Commissioner of Corrections and the President of Mississippi Delta Community College shall not be eligible to serve as an officer of the corporation.
- The board of directors shall select and employ a chief executive officer of the corporation who shall serve at the pleasure of the board. The board shall set the compensation of the chief executive officer. The chief executive officer shall be responsible for the general business and entire operations of the corporation, and shall be responsible for operating the corporation in compliance with the bylaws of the corporation and in compliance with any provision of law. The board shall be authorized and empowered to do only those acts provided by law and by the bylaws of the corporation. Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, such board shall have the authority to establish prison industries, to cease the operation of any industry which it deems unsuitable or unprofitable, to enter into any lease or contract for the corporation and it shall have the full authority to establish prices for any industry good.
- No member of the board of directors shall vote on any matter that comes before the board that could result in pecuniary benefit for himself or for any entity in which such member has an interest.
- In addition to the board of directors, an advisory board may be set up for the benefit of each industry which is established pursuant to the provisions of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575. Such boards shall be advisory only, and may be set up in the discretion of the board of directors of the corporation.
- Each member of the board of directors of the corporation shall receive per diem as provided in Section 25-3-69 for each day or fraction thereof spent in actual discharge of his official duties and shall be reimbursed for mileage and actual expenses incurred in the performance of his official duties in accordance with the requirements of Section 25-3-41, Mississippi Code of 1972.
- The board of directors shall make and publish policies, rules and regulations governing all business functions, including but not limited to accounting, marketing, purchasing and personnel, not inconsistent with the terms of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575, as may be necessary for the efficient administration and operation of the corporation.
-
The chief executive officer of the corporation shall:
- Employ all necessary employees of the corporation and dismiss them as is necessary;
- Administer the daily operations of the corporation;
- Upon approval of the board of directors, execute any contracts on behalf of the corporation; and
- Take any further actions which are necessary and proper toward the achievement of the corporation purposes.
- A member of the board of directors of the corporation shall not be liable for any civil damages for any personal injury or property damage caused to a person as a result of any acts or omissions committed in good faith in the exercise of their duties as members of the board of directors of the corporation, except where a member of the board engages in acts or omissions which are intentional, willful, wanton, reckless or grossly negligent.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 6; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 15; Laws, 2007, ch. 415, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2007.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment deleted the former last two sentences of (1), which read: “The superintendent for the Parchman facility of the Department of Corrections shall attend all meetings of the board of directors. In addition, the superintendents of the Rankin County and Greene County facilities of the Department of Corrections shall attend any meeting of the board of directors wherein the business relates to their respective facilities.”
Cross References —
State Commissioner of Corrections, see §47-5-24.
§ 47-5-543. Lease of existing prison industries to corporation; exception for agricultural enterprises land, equipment, etc.
- Within sixty (60) days after the formation of the corporation pursuant to the provisions of Section 47-5-535, the State Department of Corrections shall lease to the corporation all existing prison industries including the buildings, land, furnishings, equipment and other chattel used in the operation of such industries. Such lease shall be agreed upon by the State Department of Corrections, State Department of Finance and Administration and the corporation. The initial term of such lease shall not exceed six (6) years, provided that such lease may be renewed for additional successive terms of years not to exceed six (6) years in any one (1) renewal. No sublease to the corporation shall be in excess of that amount for which the department is obligated to pay under any lease agreement with any other state agency. Any receivable and remaining funds shall be transferred to the corporation after the payment of any existing liabilities. No operating loss of any type shall be transferred to the corporation. The State Department of Corrections shall continue to manage and operate the prison industries until such industries are leased to the corporation. When leasing any prison industry program to the corporation, the corporation shall exercise a reasonable effort to employ any personnel of the State Department of Corrections who are currently involved in any prison industry program being leased to the corporation. Before the leasing of the prison industries, buildings, lands and other items mentioned herein to the corporation, the State Auditor of Public Accounts shall perform a comprehensive audit of all the items and things mentioned herein which are to be leased by the department to the corporation. The corporation may expand, eliminate, suspend or alter any of its industries as it sees fit.
- Any lands, buildings, equipment, furnishings, livestock, supplies and vehicles used in the department’s farming operations which were leased or transferred to the nonprofit corporation under subsection (1) shall be transferred to the department. Any personnel in the department’s farming operations employed by the nonprofit corporation who desire to be reassigned to the department and who are under state service may be reassigned to the department.
- The department is not required to lease land, buildings, equipment, furnishings or other chattel used in its prison agricultural enterprises.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 7; Laws, 1992, ch. 506 § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 16; Laws, 2001, ch. 434, § 1, eff from and after Mar. 14, 2001.
Editor’s Notes —
Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor,” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.
Section 27-104-6 provides that whenever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration”.
Cross References —
Department of Finance and Administration, see §27-104-1.
Department of Corrections, see §47-5-8.
Prison agricultural enterprises, see §§47-5-351 et seq.
§ 47-5-545. Procedures for establishing new prison industries.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, after the commissioning and implementation of a marketing feasibility study for any proposed new prison industry, the corporation may establish such prison industry. Before any new industry is established, the corporation shall hold a hearing to determine the impact such industry may have on the private sector market. The corporation shall provide adequate and advance notice regarding the nature, time, date and place of such hearing. After the hearing which is required under this section, the corporation may commence negotiations with the State Department of Corrections, with the Secretary of State, or his designee, serving as a mediator, regarding the leasing of land and other chattels for the purpose of establishing any new industry.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 8; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 17, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-547. Training programs or auxiliary programs associated with prison industries.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, any training program or auxiliary program associated with any existing prison industry shall be transferred to the corporation. The corporation is empowered and authorized to establish in participation with the Mississippi Delta Community College, any training or auxiliary program for existing prison industries or for any industries which the corporation might create. Mississippi Delta Community College shall provide assistance in business planning, marketing and analysis of existing or projected industries. These industrial services shall be contracted with appropriate community colleges when these industries are developed at other correction sites.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 9; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 18, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-549. Entities to whom prison made goods or services may be sold; purchases of raw materials; prices of goods or services.
Any service or item manufactured, processed, grown or produced by the corporation from its prison industries may be furnished or sold to any legislative, executive or judicial branch of the state, any political subdivision or any governing authority of the state, any other state, any school, college or university of the state, any foreign government, any agency of the federal government or to any private entity. The corporation shall make reasonable efforts to purchase raw materials from in-state vendors. The prices for industry-made products shall be established by the board of directors of the corporation or its designee.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 19, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-551. Property of prison industry program reverts to department upon dissolution or expiration of lease.
In the event the corporation is dissolved or its lease of any prison industry program expires or is otherwise terminated, all property relating to such prison industry program which ceases to function because of such termination or dissolution, including all funds, buildings, land, furnishings, equipment and other chattels subsequently purchased or otherwise acquired by the corporation in connection with its continued operation of that program, automatically reverts to full ownership by the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 20, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-553. Chief executive officer of corporation to communicate with Commissioner of Corrections regarding security at facility; communication as to needed improvements.
Before any prison industry may commence operations, the chief executive officer of the corporation must communicate with the Commissioner of Corrections regarding the proper security for the facility. If at anytime the Commissioner of Corrections recognizes a need for improvement in the security at any facility, then he or she shall communicate to the corporation regarding what improvements are needed for the facility to be properly secured. The corporation shall furnish its own security within the parameters of any prison industry work area.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 21; Laws, 2007, ch. 421, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2007.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment rewrote the section.
§ 47-5-555. Use of inmate labor.
The department shall, subject to the necessary security requirements and the needs of the corporation, provide to the corporation sufficient inmate labor for the various prison industry programs. The department may adopt rules and regulations as may be necessary to govern the use of inmates by the corporation. The corporation shall establish policies and procedures, subject to the approval of the department, relating to the use of inmates in the prison industry programs.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 22, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 22, 176-180.
§ 47-5-557. Inmate not agent, employee or involuntary servant of corporation; exception.
Any inmate who performs work for the corporation, except those inmates employed by the corporation in the Prison Industry Enhancement Program under Section 47-5-1251, shall not be deemed an agent, employee or involuntary servant of the corporation while performing such work or while going to and from work or other specified areas.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 23; Laws, 2001, ch. 434, § 2, eff from and after Mar. 14, 2001.
Editor’s Notes —
This section was reenacted without change by Laws of 1995, ch. 547, § 23, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Cross References —
Employment of offenders within the custody of the department or prison industries through the Prison Industry Enhancement Program, see §47-5-1251.
§ 47-5-559. Annual report on status of correctional work programs; financial statements; audit of corporation.
The corporation shall submit to the Governor and the Legislature, on or before January 1 of each year, a report on the status of the correctional work programs, including but not limited to the programs and funds which have been transferred to the corporation, the programs and funds to be taken over within the next year and the proposed use of the profits from such programs, a breakdown of the amount of non-inmate labor used, work subcontracted to other vendors, use of consultants, finished goods purchased for resale, and the number of inmates working in the correctional work programs at the time of the report. In addition, the corporation shall submit to the department, the Governor and the Legislature an annual independently audited financial statement and such other information as may be requested by the Legislature together with recommendations from the corporation relating to provisions for reasonable tax incentives to private enterprises that employ inmates, parolees or former inmates who have participated in correctional work programs. The department shall include, as a portion of its annual report, a report on post-release job placement and the rate of subsequent contact with the correctional system for those inmates who have participated in the correctional work programs operated by the corporation and by the department. Beginning January 1, 1991, the State Auditor shall conduct an annual financial audit of the corporation in conjunction with an independent audit conducted by the corporation’s auditors. The State Auditor and the legislative PEER committee shall also conduct a biennial performance audit of the corporation for the period beginning January 1, 1991, through January 1, 1993, and thereafter upon the joint request of the Senate Corrections Committee, House Penitentiary Committee, Senate Finance Committee, and House Ways and Means Committee.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 24, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 7-7-2 provides that the words “State Auditor of Public Accounts,” “State Auditor,” and “Auditor” appearing in the laws of this state in connection with the performance of Auditor’s functions shall mean the State Fiscal Officer.
Section 27-104-6 provides that whenever the term “State Fiscal Officer” appears in any law it shall mean “Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration”.
§ 47-5-561. Authority of corporation to request appropriations from general fund; repayment of funds; funds to be maintained in interest-bearing accounts.
- In addition to its other powers, the corporation shall have the power to request, through the department, an appropriation of general revenue funds for the purposes of operation of, addition to or renovation of facilities or correctional work programs at the various correctional institutions; however, upon receipt of such appropriation, the rental paid by the corporation for the operation of or such new remodeled or renovated facilities or the operation of a correctional work program shall be sufficient to amortize its cost over a period of five (5) years.
- The corporation shall maintain those prison industries funds in excess of that amount necessary for sustaining quarterly or monthly operations of the corporation in an interest-bearing account best serving the proper management of corporation funds and earning the maximum amount of interest allowed by law. The corporation shall cause monies from the interest-bearing account to be deposited quarterly or monthly into the corporation’s checking account in order to pay the legal debts of the corporation, approved for payment by the corporation.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 16; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 25, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-563. Department may adopt rules governing use of inmates by corporation; corporation to establish policies relating to use of inmates; filing of rules and policies.
- The department may adopt such rules as may be necessary to govern the use of inmates by the corporation; however, such rules shall be related only to the need for security, inmate protections, and efficient operation of each institution.
- The corporation, with the input of the department, shall establish policies and procedures subject to the approval of the department’s legal counsel relating to the use of inmates in the correctional work programs.
- All such policies and procedures adopted by the department and the corporation shall be placed on file in the office of the Secretary of State.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 17; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 26, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-565. Corporation to authorize expenditures from Prison Industries Fund.
To carry out the provisions of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575, the provisions of Sections 47-5-301 et seq., and 47-5-501 et seq., Mississippi Code of 1972, the corporation shall authorize the transfer and expending of monies from the Prison Industries Fund.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 18; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 27, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-567. Inmates ineligible for unemployment compensation or worker’s compensation.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, no inmate shall be eligible for unemployment compensation or workmen’s compensation whether employed by the corporation or by any other private enterprise operating on the grounds of a correctional institution or elsewhere where such employment shall be a part of a correctional work program or work release program of either the corporation or the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 19; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 28, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 71-3-1 provides that the words “workmen’s compensation” shall mean “workers’ compensation” wherever they appear in the code.
§ 47-5-569. Department to lease all or none of work programs at any one correctional institution; disposition of rent paid by corporation; approval of leases.
- Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, if the department leases a single correctional work program at any correctional institution to the corporation, the corporation shall lease all such correctional work programs at that institution. Any rent paid by the corporation to the department shall be deposited in a correctional programs trust fund for enhancement of education and training, post-release job placement, and other correctional purposes related to the purposes of Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575.
- All leases of department-owned land for the funding or operations of the corporation shall be subject to the approval of the corporation, the Mississippi Department of Corrections and the Public Procurement Review Board.
- This section shall not apply to any program within the prison agricultural enterprises operated by the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 20; Laws, 1992, ch. 506, § 10; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 29, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-571. Unauthorized sales of prison-made goods or services prohibited.
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, no goods, wares, services or merchandise manufactured, mined or offered in whole or in part by prisoners shall be sold or offered by any person or other authority except by the corporation, as authorized by Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 21; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 30, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-572. Repealed.
Repealed by its own terms, effective July 1, 2011.
§47-5-572. [Laws, 2004, ch. 502, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 352, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 15, 2007.)]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-572 prohibited private correctional facilities from importing goods made by inmates in another state.
§ 47-5-573. Master plan for correctional work programs; needs of corporation considered in assigning and transferring prisoners.
- In adopting or modifying master plans for correctional work programs, and in the administration of the Department of Corrections, it shall be the objective of the department to develop a logical sequence of vocational training, employment by correctional work programs, and post-release job placement for inmates participating in correctional work programs.
- The Department of Corrections shall establish guidelines for the development of correctional work programs.
-
The needs of the corporation shall be considered by the department when assigning and transferring prisoners to correctional institutions. The following criteria shall be used when assigning and transferring inmates:
- Skills of the inmate relevant to the corporation’s industries;
- Security classification of the inmate relevant to the type of corporation’s industry;
- Duration of availability of the inmate for employment by the corporation;
- Establishment of a concept of potentially rehabilitative inmate.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 22; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 31, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
§ 47-5-575. Records of corporation subject to public records act.
Any records or reports which relate to the financial aspect or operations of the corporation, with the exception of any trade secrets, shall be considered as public records and shall be subject to the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act of 1983.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 534, § 23; reenacted without change, Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 32, eff from and after passage (approved April 13, 1996).
Drug Identification Program
§ 47-5-601. Establishment of program by Department of Corrections.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections is authorized to establish a drug identification program and shall have the power and duty to adopt rules not inconsistent with law as it may deem proper and necessary with respect to the establishment, administration and operation of the program.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved March 30, 1983).
Cross References —
Applicability of this section to a child placed on probation, see §43-21-159.
Parole eligibility conditioned on submitting to chemical analysis test to detect presence of alcohol or controlled substance, see §47-7-17.
Power of department of corrections to make rules requiring a parolee to submit to a chemical analysis test to detect presence of alcohol or controlled substance, see §47-7-17.
Probation on earned probation eligibility conditioned on probationer submitting to chemical analysis test to detect presence of alcohol or controlled substance, see §§47-7-35,47-7-47.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Admissibility under state law of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient. 80 A.L.R.3d 456.
Driving while intoxicated: duty of law enforcement officer to offer suspect chemical sobriety test under implied consent law. 95 A.L.R.3d 710.
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.
Request before submitting to chemical sobriety test to communicate with counsel as refusal to take test. 97 A.L.R.3d 852.
Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants. 19 A.L.R.4th 1251.
Propriety, as condition of probation granted pursuant to 18 USCS § 3651, of requiring that probationer refrain from consumption of alcoholic beverages. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 843.
Propriety of imposing special parole term as part of sentence, under 21 USCS § 846, for a conspiracy to violate Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 48 A.L.R. Fed. 767.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 66, 67 et seq.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 38-43, 59, 60, 62.
§ 47-5-603. Participation in program; submission to chemical analysis test.
Any offender on probation or released from a facility of the Department of Corrections on parole or earned probation who remains under the supervision of the Department of Corrections or any offender who is incarcerated in a state correctional facility may be required to participate in the Mississippi Department of Corrections drug identification program. Participation by an offender would consist of submission by the offender, from time to time and upon the request of a parole or probation supervisor, or authorized personnel of the department to any type of breath, saliva or urine chemical analysis test, the purpose of which is to detect the possible presence of alcohol or a substance prohibited or controlled by any law of the State of Mississippi or the United States.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 2; Laws, 1991, ch. 437 § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 314, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1998.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Admissibility under state law of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient. 80 A.L.R.3d 456.
Driving while intoxicated: duty of law enforcement officer to offer suspect chemical sobriety test under implied consent law. 95 A.L.R.3d 710.
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.
Request before submitting to chemical sobriety test to communicate with counsel as refusal to take test. 97 A.L.R.3d 852.
Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants. 19 A.L.R.4th 1251.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, technician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical specialist in substance analysis. 74 A.L.R.4th 388.
Propriety, as condition of probation granted pursuant to 18 USCS § 3651, of requiring that probationer refrain from consumption of alcoholic beverages. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 843.
Propriety of imposing special parole term as part of sentence, under 21 USCS § 846, for a conspiracy to violate Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 48 A.L.R. Fed. 767.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 64 et seq.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 38-43, 59, 60, 62.
§ 47-5-605. Fees and costs for administering chemical analysis test.
Each time the results of such a chemical analysis test indicate the unauthorized presence of alcohol or a controlled substance in the parolee or probationer, he or she shall be required to pay a fee of Ten Dollars ($10.00) to the Mississippi Department of Corrections drug identification program, which fee shall be used to pay for the cost of administering that particular test. All other costs of the program, including the costs of administering such tests in cases in which the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance is not found, will be paid by expenditures from the community service revolving fund as described in Section 47-7-49.
HISTORY: Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved March 30, 1983).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Admissibility under state law of hospital record relating to intoxication or sobriety of patient. 80 A.L.R.3d 456.
Driving while intoxicated: duty of law enforcement officer to offer suspect chemical sobriety test under implied consent law. 95 A.L.R.3d 710.
Necessity and sufficiency of proof that tests of blood alcohol concentration were conducted in conformance with prescribed methods. 96 A.L.R.3d 745.
Request before submitting to chemical sobriety test to communicate with counsel as refusal to take test. 97 A.L.R.3d 852.
Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants. 19 A.L.R.4th 1251.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, technician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical specialist in substance analysis. 74 A.L.R.4th 388.
Propriety, as condition of probation granted pursuant to 18 USCS § 3651, of requiring that probationer refrain from consumption of alcoholic beverages. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 843.
Propriety of imposing special parole term as part of sentence, under 21 USCS § 846, for a conspiracy to violate Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 48 A.L.R. Fed. 767.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 66, 67 et seq.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 38-43, 59, 60, 62.
Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act
§ 47-5-701. Short title [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729 shall be known and may be cited as the “Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act.”
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 127; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 44; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
This section was reenacted without change by Laws of 2018, ch. 406, § 1, effective from and after July 1, 2018. Since the language of the section as it appears in the main volume is unaffected by the reenactment, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Conditions relating to placement of more than one prisoner per cell as violation of inmates’ federal constitutional rights. 85 A.L.R. Fed. 308.
Propriety and construction of “totality of conditions” analysis in federal court’s consideration of Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions. 85 A.L.R. Fed. 750.
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 44.5.
§ 47-5-703. Definitions [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
For the purposes of Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729 the following words shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context shall otherwise require:
“Inmate” means every person who at the time of the declaration of a prison system overcrowding state of emergency, or at any time during the continuation of a state of emergency, is incarcerated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections as a result of a commitment to the department, including persons committed to the department and incarcerated in local or county jails or other facilities authorized to house state inmates.
“Operating capacity” means the total number of state inmates which can be safely and reasonably housed in facilities operated by the Department of Corrections and in local or county jails or other facilities authorized to house state inmates as certified by the department, subject to applicable federal and state laws and rules and regulations.
“Parole eligibility date” means the date on which an inmate becomes eligible for release by parole under the provisions of Section 47-7-3, Mississippi Code of 1972. For the purposes of Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729, an inmate with a sentence of one (1) year shall be deemed to have a parole eligibility date which shall be the last day of his sentence.
“Prison” means any correctional facility operated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
“Prison system” means the prisons operated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections and those local or county jails or other facilities authorized to house state inmates.
“Prison system population” means the total number of state inmates housed in the prisons operated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections and in those local or county jails or other facilities authorized to house state inmates.
“Qualified inmate” means inmates who are not incarcerated for convictions of murder, kidnapping, arson, armed robbery, rape, sexual offenses or any offense involving the use of a deadly weapon and who are within that number of days of their parole eligibility date at the time of the declaration of the state of emergency as is specified to be conditionally advanced under the declaration of the state of emergency. An inmate sentenced as an habitual offender shall not be considered a “qualified inmate.”
“State of emergency” means a prison system overcrowding state of emergency as provided in Section 47-5-711.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 128; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 2; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 45; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-705. Requirements for declaration of state of emergency [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
The requirements for the declaration of a prison system overcrowding state of emergency are as follows:
Prison system population in excess of ninety-five percent (95%) of the prison system operating capacity for at least thirty (30) consecutive days immediately preceding the declaration of a state of emergency;
Full appropriate utilization by the Mississippi Department of Corrections of powers which tend either to reduce prison system population or expand operating capacity. Such powers include, but are not limited to, earned time allowances as specified in Sections 47-5-138 and 47-5-139, Mississippi Code of 1972, review of offenders for purposes of reclassification, reevaluation of persons eligible for consideration for work release, supervised earned release or other release programs authorized by law and arrangements for housing inmates of the Department of Corrections in local or county jails or other facilities authorized to house state inmates; and
Full appropriate utilization by the State Parole Board of those powers which tend to reduce the prison system population. Such powers include, but are not limited to, parole as provided in Section 47-7-3, Mississippi Code of 1972, the review of inmates who have had their parole revoked and the reevaluation of inmates previously denied parole.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 129; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 46; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 3; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted and amended the section by making minor stylistic changes throughout.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
30-day report by State Parole Board, including evaluation of utilization of powers which tend to reduce the prison system population, see §47-5-709.
Determination by Governor as to existence of conditions for declaration of state of emergency, see §47-5-711.
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 467, Proof of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions.
§ 47-5-707. Notice of overcrowded prison conditions; thirty-day report of overcrowded prison conditions [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Whenever the prison system population exceeds ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity, the Commissioner of Corrections shall immediately notify the Governor and the State Parole Board of this fact. The notice shall include the current prison system population and the prison system operating capacity. A report must be made within ten (10) days after the thirtieth day of operating in excess of ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity. The report shall include the prison system operating capacity, the prison system population during the relevant time period, and may include a recommended specific term of advancement of the parole eligibility dates.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 130; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 4; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 47; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 4, from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Termination of action if the Governor has not exercised his powers within 14 days after receipt of the reports specified in this section and §47-5-709, see §47-5-711.
60-day report of overcrowded prison conditions, see §47-5-717.
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-709. Thirty-day report by State Parole Board [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
If the prison system population exceeds ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity for thirty (30) consecutive days, the State Parole Board shall meet to determine whether there has been full appropriate exercise of the powers of the State Parole Board which tend to reduce the prison system population. The State Parole Board shall report its findings to the Governor within ten (10) days after the thirtieth day of operating in excess of ninety-five percent (95%) of prison operating capacity. The report shall include the determination of the State Parole Board regarding its utilization of powers described in paragraph (c) of Section 47-5-705.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 131; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 48; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Termination of action if the Governor has not exercised his powers within 14 days after receipt of the reports specified in this section and §47-5-707, see §47-5-711.
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-711. Powers of Governor upon receipt of reports [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Upon receipt of the report from the Commissioner of Corrections and the report of the State Parole Board, the Governor has the power to:
Determine to be in error the determination that there had been full appropriate exercise of powers which tends to reduce prison population, in which case no state of emergency shall commence;
Determine that commencement of a state of emergency would be injurious to the public good, or raises the potential of threatening the safety of the public in the state as a whole or in a particular community, in which case no state of emergency shall commence; or
Determine that the reports establish the existence of the conditions for a declaration of a prison system overcrowding state of emergency as described in Section 47-5-705 and declare a state of emergency, specifying an amount of advancement of parole eligibility dates from thirty (30) to ninety (90) days.
If fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the reports to the Governor pursuant to Sections 47-5-707 and 47-5-709 the Governor has not exercised any of the powers specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this section, action under Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729 is considered terminated.
If the Governor exercises a power under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, he shall state the reasons for the exercise of such power in the notification of his action to the Commissioner of Corrections and the State Parole Board.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 6; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 132; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 6; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 49; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 6; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 6; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2018; reenacted without change, Laws 2018, ch. 406 § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted and amended the section by substituting “paragraph (a) or (b)” for “paragraphs (a) or (b)” in the last paragraph.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-713. Advancement of parole eligibility dates during state of emergency [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Upon the declaration of a state of emergency, the parole eligibility dates of qualified inmates shall be conditionally advanced. The amount of advancement of parole eligibility dates must be specified in the declaration by the Governor. When the state of emergency has been terminated, the parole eligibility dates which were conditionally advanced shall be reset to the parole eligibility date set prior to the emergency for those inmates who were not released on parole under the provisions of Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 133; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 50; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-715. Weekly certification of population figures during state of emergency; termination of state of emergency [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
During the continuation of a state of emergency, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections shall weekly certify to the Governor the prison system population for each day of the preceding week. The Governor shall declare the state of emergency terminated upon notification that the prison system population has been at or below ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity for seven (7) consecutive days.
If no declaration of termination is issued within seven (7) days after the certification of conditions for termination of the state of emergency, the state of emergency is considered terminated as of the seventh day after the certification.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 8; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 134; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 8; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 51; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 8; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-717. Sixty-day report of overcrowded prison conditions [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
If sixty (60) days after the declaration of a prison system overcrowding state of emergency or of an additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates the prison system population continues to be in excess of ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity, the Commissioner of Corrections shall report to the Governor indicating whether an additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates is necessary in order to reduce the prison system population to ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity and indicating the amount of any recommended additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates. The recommended amount must be no less than thirty (30) days nor more than ninety (90) days. The report shall include those factors which would tend to indicate that the prison system population is likely to increase above operating capacity within ninety (90) days. The report shall discuss the availability of field supervisors, the currently existing supervision case loads, and the measures that could be taken and the resources that would be needed to provide appropriate supervision of persons released early as a result of an additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 9; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 135; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 9; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 52; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 9; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
30-day report of overcrowded prison conditions, see §47-5-707.
Options of the Governor upon receipt of the report specified in this section, see §47-5-719.
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-719. Powers of Governor upon receipt of report [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Upon receipt of the report from the Commissioner of Corrections as provided in Section 47-5-717, the Governor has the power to:
Determine to be in error any conclusion of the Commissioner of Corrections that an additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates is necessary in order for the prison system population to be reduced to ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity, in which case no additional advancements of the parole eligibility dates shall occur;
Determine that the ordering of additional advancements of the parole eligibility dates would be injurious to the public good or raises the potential of threatening the safety of the public in the state as a whole or in a particular community, in which case no additional advancement of parole eligibility dates shall occur; or
Determine that an additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates is necessary in order for the prison system population to be reduced to ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity and order additional advancements specifying the amount of additional advancements, which shall be at least thirty (30) and not more than ninety (90) days.
If fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the report to the Governor pursuant to Section 47-5-717 including a determination of the Commissioner of Corrections that an additional advancement of the parole eligibility dates is not necessary in order for the prison system population to be reduced to ninety-five percent (95%) of operating capacity the Governor has not exercised the power provided in paragraph (c) of this section, action initiated under Section 47-5-717 is considered terminated.
If the Governor exercises a power provided under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, he shall state the reasons for the exercise of such power in the notification of his action to the Commissioner of Corrections and the State Parole Board.
If the Governor orders additional advancements of the parole eligibility dates under this section, the amount of advancement of the parole eligibility dates must be as ordered by the Governor.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 10; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 136; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 10; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 53; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 10; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 10; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 10; reenacted without change Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted and amended the section by substituting “paragraph (a) or (b)” for “paragraphs (a) or (b)” and making a minor stylistic change in the next-to-last paragraph.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-721. Termination of state of emergency by order of Governor [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
If at any time during a state of emergency the Governor determines that the continuation of the state of emergency is injurious to the public good or raises the potential of threatening the safety of the public in the state as a whole or in a particular community, he may order the state of emergency terminated.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 11; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 137; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 11; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 54; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 11; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-731 were repealed by operation of law on July 1, 2004.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-723. Revocation of conditional advancement of parole eligibility date [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Revocation of the conditional advancement of the parole eligibility date is a permissible prison disciplinary action according to the same procedures governing the forfeiture of earned time allowances as a prison disciplinary action.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 138; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 55; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 12; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 12; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-725. Conditions of advancement of parole eligibility date [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
The State Parole Board shall prescribe conditions of advancement of the parole eligibility date applicable prior to an inmate’s release. The State Parole Board shall prescribe conditions of supervision consistent with existing regulations applicable after release on parole. When an inmate is released under the provisions of Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729 he shall be considered to be in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 13; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 139; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 13; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 56; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 13; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 13; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 13, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
The propriety of conditioning parole on defendant’s not entering specified geographical area. 54 A.L.R.5th 743.
§ 47-5-727. Advancement of parole eligibility date to be independent of other adjustments [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
Advancement of parole eligibility dates under Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729 shall occur independently of all other adjustments of the parole eligibility dates, such as advancing the parole eligibility dates as a result of receiving earned time allowances.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 14; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 140; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 14; reenacted, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 57; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 14; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 14; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 14; reenacted without change Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 14; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Section 47-5-731, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 336, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to July 1, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted and amended the section by substituting “eligibility dates” for “eligibility date” preceding “such as advancing.”
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-729. Establishment and quarterly certification or alteration of operating capacities [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
The Commissioner of Corrections shall within thirty (30) days after April 10, 1985, establish the operating capacities of the prison system, and shall at least quarterly certify existing operating capacities or establish changed or new operating capacities.
HISTORY: Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 15; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 141; reenacted, Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 15; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 58; reenacted, Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 15; reenacted, Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 615, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 15; reenacted without change Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 15; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014.); reenacted without change Laws, 2018, ch. 406, §15, eff from and after July 1, 2018; reenacted without change Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-731.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Applicability of general conditions of parole to advancement of parole eligibility dates under Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §47-7-3.
§ 47-5-731. Repeal of Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729.
Sections 47-5-701 through 47-5-729, Mississippi Code of 1972, which create the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, shall stand repealed from and after July 1, 2022.
HISTORY: Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 142; Laws, 1987, ch. 335, § 16; Laws, 1988, ch. 504, § 59; Laws, 1990, ch. 315, § 16; Laws, 1991, ch. 378 § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 419, § 16; Laws, 1994, ch. 312, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 389, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 537, § 16; Laws, 2001, ch. 411, § 16; Laws, 2002, ch. 615 , § 16; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2005, ch. 519, § 16; Laws, 2006, ch. 395, § 16; Laws, 2008, ch. 322, § 16; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2012, ch. 322, § 16; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2014, ch. 316, § 16, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); Laws, 2018, ch. 327, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018; Laws, 2018, ch. 406, § 16, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of Chapter 327, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 7, 2018), amended this section. Section 16 of Chapter 406, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 21, 2018), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 16 of Chapter 406, Laws of 2018, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-701 through47-5-729 from July 1, 2002 until July 1, 2004.
The 2005 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the date of the repealer for §§47-5-701 through47-5-729 from “July 1, 2004” until “July 1, 2006.”
The 2006 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-701 through47-5-729 from “July 1, 2006” until “July 1, 2008.”
The 2008 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-701 through47-5-729 by substituting “July 1, 2012” for “July 1, 2008.”
The 2012 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the repealer provision from “July 1, 2012” to “July 1, 2014.”
The 2014 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the repealer provision from “July 1, 2014” to “July 1, 2018.”
The first 2018 amendment (ch. 327) extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-701 through47-5-729 by substituting “July 1, 2020” for “July 1, 2018.”
The second 2018 amendment (ch. 406) extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-701 through47-5-729 by substituting “July 1, 2022” for “July 1, 2018.”
Administrative Review Procedure
§ 47-5-801. Authority to adopt administrative review procedure.
The Department of Corrections is hereby authorized to adopt an administrative review procedure at each of its correctional facilities in compliance with 42 USCS Section 1997, the “Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,” or CRIPA, and Part 40 of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 563, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1989.
Federal Aspects—
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, see 42 USCS §§ 1997 et seq.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Administrative review procedures.
Inmate’s statutory due-process rights were not violated because the inmate did not present any evidence to refute the finding of the Mississippi Department of Corrections that he made a threatening statement to another inmate, and the inmate was present at the hearing, acknowledged the allegations, and admitted the rule violation; the inmate did not request the presence of witnesses or ask to present evidence prior to his disciplinary hearing. State v. Stafford, 237 So.3d 1280, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 74 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Remanding to the circuit court for further review would serve no purpose and would be judicially inefficient since an inmate’s claim that he was denied statutory due process had no realistic chance of success; the inmate did not request or retain counsel, nor did he request that witnesses or evidence be presented at his disciplinary hearing, and the inmate admitted that he made a threatening statement to another inmate. State v. Stafford, 237 So.3d 1280, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 74 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Appellant’s motion for post-conviction collateral relief was properly dismissed because it was barred as a successive motion Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-23(6) (Supp. 2011), and he did not meet an exception. Rather, appellant raised issues of inmate classification that were within the administrative purview of the department of corrections under Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-801 –47-5-807 (Rev. 2004) and not an issue properly brought in a post-conviction collateral relief motion. Cosner v. State, 111 So.3d 111, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 97 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
Inmate’s appeal of a judgment denying his motion to mandate parole eligibility on his life sentence pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act was dismissed under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2) because the inmate did not exhaust his administrative remedies; the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) had determined that the inmate was ineligible for parole consideration by the parole board, but the record was completely bare as to any proof that the inmate ever exhausted his administrative remedies or even voiced his grievance through the MDOC’s administrative-review procedure. Keys v. State, 67 So.3d 783, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 565 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), rev'd, 67 So.3d 758, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 2011).
Because Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(3) provided that reclassifying an inmate from house arrest was within the Department of Corrections’ exclusive jurisdiction, and because an inmate had not exhausted the inmate’s administrative remedies in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-801,47-5-803(2), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the inmate’s postconviction motion. Hollingsworth v. State, 66 So.3d 1254, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 438 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Inmate who is uncertain about the operation of his sentence and desires clarity should pursue administrative review procedures before turning to court. Burns v. State, 933 So. 2d 329, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 495 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
§ 47-5-803. Procedure constitutes administrative remedies available to offenders for purpose of preserving cause of action against state.
- Upon approval of the administrative review procedure by a federal court as authorized and required by the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, and the implementation of the procedure within the department, this procedure shall constitute the administrative remedies available to offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of action such offenders may claim to have against the State of Mississippi, the Department of Corrections or its officials or employees.
- No state court shall entertain an offender’s grievance or complaint which falls under the purview of the administrative review procedure unless and until such offender shall have exhausted the remedies as provided in such procedure. If at the time the petition is filed the administrative review process has not yet been completed, the court shall stay the proceedings for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days to allow for completion of the procedure and exhaustion of the remedies thereunder.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 563, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1989.
Federal Aspects—
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, see 42 USCS §§ 1997 et seq.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Stay of proceedings.
3. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
1. In general.
Circuit court erred in dismissing an inmate’s complaint for judicial review of a loss of privileges due to a rule violation report because the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies and sought judicial review within thirty days of receipt of the final decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections; although the circuit court was presented with an incomplete record due to the inmate’s failure to file certain documentation, such failure did not preclude reversal. Willis v. Westley, 243 So.3d 805, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 171 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), overruled in part, Jobe v. State, 288 So.3d 403, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 612 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Parole eligibility did not clearly fall under the purview of administrative-review procedure. Therefore, the appellate court, in determining whether the Mississippi Department of Corrections correctly computed the date of an inmate’s parole eligibility, followed the rule that inmates could, but were not required to, use the administrative-review procedure as a way of challenging parole eligibility. Brown v. State, 230 So.3d 1069, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 156 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
Inmate’s disciplinary complaint should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because he made a timely filing after exhausting his administrative remedies, as required by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807; the circuit court did not perform its full review function when it determined the inmate’s constitutional rights were not violated. Siggers v. Epps, 962 So. 2d 78, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 464 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Inmate’s argument that other prisoners were transferred from his custody status back to a less restrictive custody status, while he was not reclassified, was an issue which arose after reclassification, with no indication that it was properly presented for administrative relief; it was therefore not properly presented before the appellate court. Hurns v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 878 So. 2d 223, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 162 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 67, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 918 (Miss. 2004).
A defendant who wishes to challenge the revocation of his probation need not pursue the administrative remedies set out in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803, as only a court can continue or revoke a defendant’s probation. Rodriguez v. State, 839 So. 2d 561, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
The statute prohibits the state courts from hearing inmate complaints unless and until the prisoner exhausts the administrative review procedure. If a prisoner prematurely petitions the circuit court, the statute requires the court to stay the complaint for 90 days to allow completion of the administrative review procedure. Clary v. Lee, 763 So. 2d 921, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 335 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
2. Stay of proceedings.
Inmate could not seek judicial relief on his claim that the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) improperly calculated his earned time credit on his sentence because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2). The judicial proceedings were to be stayed for 90 days until the inmate filed a complaint with the Administrative Remedies Program of the MDOC and the Administrative Remedies Program adjudicated the complaint. Guy v. State, 915 So. 2d 508, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 898 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where an inmate had completed the administrative review procedure, there was no reason for the trial court to stay his complaint for 90 days. Clary v. Lee, 763 So. 2d 921, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 335 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
3. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Inmate’s appeal of a judgment denying his motion to mandate parole eligibility on his life sentence pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act was dismissed under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2) because the inmate did not exhaust his administrative remedies; the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) had determined that the inmate was ineligible for parole consideration by the parole board, but the record was completely bare as to any proof that the inmate ever exhausted his administrative remedies or even voiced his grievance through the MDOC’s administrative-review procedure. Keys v. State, 67 So.3d 783, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 565 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), rev'd, 67 So.3d 758, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 2011).
Because Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(3) provided that reclassifying an inmate from house arrest was within the Department of Corrections’ exclusive jurisdiction, and because an inmate had not exhausted the inmate’s administrative remedies in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-801,47-5-803(2), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the inmate’s postconviction motion. Hollingsworth v. State, 66 So.3d 1254, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 438 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Court of appeals was without jurisdiction to consider an inmate’s claims that a trial court erred in dismissing his petitions to show cause and clarify his sentence because there was no indication in the record that the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies on those claims; pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. ’ 47-5-803, the petitions had to be handled initially under administrative-review procedures, rather than in the courts. Walker v. State, 35 So.3d 555, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Because there was clearly no evidence in the record showing that an inmate exhausted his administrative remedies through the Administrative Remedy Program of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2), the trial court should have stayed the proceedings for ninety days to allow time for the inmate to exhaust his administrative remedies; however, a reversal of the case would be futile because the trial court record was thorough, and the MDOC clearly provided the trial court with sufficient information to determine whether the inmate’s sentence had been properly computed. Lee v. Kelly, 34 So.3d 1203, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 75 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Although an inmate was incarcerated outside of the state, the inmate was subject to imprisonment in Mississippi by virtue of a detainer, and therefore the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the inmate’s request for habeas corpus relief to compute the amount of time inmate had to serve on his Mississippi sentence; nevertheless, the inmate was procedurally barred from proceeding with his post-conviction relief claim until he exhausted available administrative remedies. Putnam v. Epps, 963 So. 2d 1232, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 421 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 964 So. 2d 508, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 503 (Miss. 2007).
Trial court erred in denying and dismissing a habeas corpus petition on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies because under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2), the trial court should have stayed the petition for 90 days so that the Mississippi DOC Administrative Remedies Program could consider and rule on petitioner’s complaint. Henley v. Epps, 958 So. 2d 1265, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 414 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Regardless of the fact that the trial court had jurisdiction, the inmate was procedurally barred from proceeding with his post-conviction relief claim until he exhausted the administrative remedies available through the Mississippi Department of Corrections, Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2). Putnam v. Epps, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 36 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2007), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 963 So. 2d 1232, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 421 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Appellate court affirmed the denial of an inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief and his claim that he should have been released after serving seven and one-half years of his 15 year sentence; neither the appellate court nor the trial court had jurisdiction to review his sentence because the inmate had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies as required by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2). Sanders v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 912 So. 2d 189, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 713 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Inmate’s amended petition claiming that the points classification system of the Mississippi Department of Corrections was racially discriminatory in violation of equal protection was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. There was no indication that the inmate went through the Administrative Remedy Program before filing suit on his equal protection/racial discrimination claim as required by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2). Adams v. Epps, 900 So. 2d 1210, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 145 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 901 So. 2d 1273, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 291 (Miss. 2005).
§ 47-5-805. Application of procedures to pending lawsuits.
Any offender who, on July 1, 1994, is a plaintiff in a lawsuit naming the state, the Department of Corrections or an official or an employee of the Department of Corrections as a defendant or defendants shall be furnished notice by certified mail of Sections 47-5-801 through 47-5-807 and the fact and date of the enactment of the administrative review procedure, and proof of notice of service of the offender plaintiff shall be filed in the offender’s court record where such lawsuit is pending. Any offender so notified by certified mail shall, within thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice, commence administrative review, under the administrative review procedure, of the complaint which is the subject matter of his lawsuit. Any such pending lawsuit, on July 1, 1994, shall be stayed by the court for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days in order to require exhaustion of the remedies as provided under the administrative review procedure. If an offender fails to completely utilize the administrative review procedure during the period of the stay, then the court may consider this as a factor in deciding whether the case may proceed.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 563, § 3; Laws, 1994, ch. 444, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1994.
§ 47-5-807. Judicial review of agency decision.
Any offender who is aggrieved by an adverse decision rendered pursuant to any administrative review procedure under Sections 47-5-801 through 47-5-807 may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the agency’s final decision, seek judicial review of the decision.
HISTORY: Laws, 1989, ch. 563, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 1989.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Construction and applicability.
2. Time for filing.
3. Right to judicial review.
4. Mailbox rule.
5. Appeal dismissed.
6. Service of process.
1. Construction and applicability.
Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807 does not prescribe that the 30-day time limit to appeal from a final agency decision applies only to actions for damages, but rather to any action appealed from an administrative proceeding. Boler v. Bailey, 840 So. 2d 734, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
2. Time for filing.
When an inmate contested the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ (MDOC) revocation of most of inmate’s accrued trusty-time credit, the inmate’s complaint was properly dismissed because (1) the complaint had to be filed within 30 days of MDOC’s decision, and, (2) while MDOC did not prove it was filed more than 30 days after receiving MDOC’s decision dismissing the inmate’s administrative complaint contesting revocation of trusty-time credit, the record showed the inmate did not contest the original decision revoking trusty-time credit within 30 days. King v. McCarty, 196 So.3d 175, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 405 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Prisoner’s failure to file his motion for judicial review of a decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections denying his request for earned-time credit within the thirty days allowed by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807 barred his appeal. Hill v. State, 165 So.3d 495, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 267 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
Motion for judicial review under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807 was properly dismissed by the trial court because an inmate’s underlying claims arising out of a 17-year-old conviction were untimely filed. Hearron v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 22 So.3d 1238, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 827 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Prisoner’s circuit court appeal of a jail-time credit grievance was untimely since it was not filed within thirty days after receipt of the final decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ Administrative Remedy Program. Stokes v. State, 984 So. 2d 1089, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 374 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Appellate court affirmed the denial of an inmate’s petition for writ of habeas corpus relief, which was treated as a petition for post-conviction relief, as under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807, the inmate only had 30 days to appeal the denial of his grievance with the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and the inmate did not seek review until more than two months later. Moore v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 936 So. 2d 941, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 973 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 560 (Miss. Aug. 24, 2006).
Appellate court affirmed the denial of an inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief and his claim that he should have been released after serving seven and one-half years of his 15 year sentence; neither the appellate court nor the trial court had jurisdiction to review his sentence because the inmate had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies as required by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2) as the violations that caused him to lose earned time occurred between 1994 and 2000 and his motion for relief was not filed until 2003. Thus, the inmate did not comply with the 30-day time requirement in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807. Sanders v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 912 So. 2d 189, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 713 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Trial court determined that defendant, having failed to seek judicial review within 30 days after receipt of the appropriate final decision, did not complete the final step required for judicial review; therefore, it properly determined that the trial court lacked authority to hear defendant’s grievances on the merits. Taylor v. State, 919 So. 2d 209, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition for postconviction relief was properly denied because he had until January 31, 1999 to appeal an administrative judgment, but did not do so until September 19, 2000. Moore v. State, 897 So. 2d 997, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 945 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 898 So. 2d 679, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 243 (Miss. 2005).
Appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief where the inmate failed to timely file his appeal within 30 days from the final adverse decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections Administrative Remedy Program as required by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807. Simmons v. Sparkman, 829 So. 2d 1289, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 589 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Inmate’s motion to show cause was properly dismissed by the trial court where to failed to seek timely judicial review of a department of corrections’ administrative remedies program decision concerning prisoner privacy rights. The inmate failed to seek judicial review of the agency’s final decision within the 30-day time limit of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807. Edmond v. Anderson, 820 So. 2d 1, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 10 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 959, 123 S. Ct. 383, 154 L. Ed. 2d 311, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 7760 (U.S. 2002).
Defendant’s original petition was not filed until well past the allowable 30-day period; filing within the statutorily-mandated time was jurisdictional. Stanley v. Turner, 846 So. 2d 279, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 836 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 846 So. 2d 229, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 536 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Defendant’s right to assert his claim through a motion for post conviction relief claiming denial of his right to due process of law because he was not afforded a hearing before being terminated from the Regimented Inmate Discipline (RID) Program was time barred under this section. Brown v. State, 752 So. 2d 464, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 686 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
3. Right to judicial review.
Circuit court erred in dismissing an inmate’s complaint for judicial review of a loss of privileges due to a rule violation report because the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies and sought judicial review within thirty days of receipt of the final decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections; although the circuit court was presented with an incomplete record due to the inmate’s failure to file certain documentation, such failure did not preclude reversal. Willis v. Westley, 243 So.3d 805, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 171 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), overruled in part, Jobe v. State, 288 So.3d 403, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 612 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Inmate’s appeal of a judgment denying his motion to mandate parole eligibility on his life sentence pursuant to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act was dismissed under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2) because the inmate did not exhaust his administrative remedies; the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) had determined that the inmate was ineligible for parole consideration by the parole board, but the record was completely bare as to any proof that the inmate ever exhausted his administrative remedies or even voiced his grievance through the MDOC’s administrative-review procedure. Keys v. State, 67 So.3d 783, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 565 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), rev'd, 67 So.3d 758, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 389 (Miss. 2011).
Because there was clearly no evidence in the record showing that an inmate exhausted his administrative remedies through the Administrative Remedy Program of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803(2), the trial court should have stayed the proceedings for ninety days to allow time for the inmate to exhaust his administrative remedies; however, a reversal of the case would be futile because the trial court record was thorough, and the MDOC clearly provided the trial court with sufficient information to determine whether the inmate’s sentence had been properly computed. Lee v. Kelly, 34 So.3d 1203, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 75 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Inmate’s disciplinary complaint should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because he made a timely filing after exhausting his administrative remedies, as required by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807; the circuit court did not perform its full review function when it determined the inmate’s constitutional rights were not violated. Siggers v. Epps, 962 So. 2d 78, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 464 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Although the inmate argued that he was placed in administrative segregation without review by a Mississippi Department of Corrections classification committee and administrative review in excess of 180 days, his assertion was not raised in an administrative review, nor brought before the circuit court, and as such was not reviewable by the appellate court. Hurns v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 878 So. 2d 223, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 162 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 67, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 918 (Miss. 2004).
A prisoner’s right to judicial review for administrative discipline under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807 is limited by a preceding section, Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803, which provides that no state court shall entertain an offender’s grievance unless and until such offender shall have exhausted the remedies as provided in such procedure. Boler v. Bailey, 840 So. 2d 734, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
There was jurisdiction for a court to consider claims regarding the denial of various credits to sentences. Hill v. State, 838 So. 2d 994, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
While an inmate had no liberty interest in his prison classification, the right to review of final decisions of the classification committee was conferred by statute; thus, the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections which removed the inmate from a house arrest program and placed him in the general prison population for a rule violation. Edwards v. Booker, 796 So. 2d 991, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 185 (Miss. 2001).
4. Mailbox rule.
Inmate sought his judicial review within the thirty days required by the statute, and the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider it, because the inmate dropped his motion for judicial review in the prison mailbox within the thirty-day appeal deadline. Jobe v. State, 288 So.3d 403, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 612 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Inmate’s complaint alleging that the prison officials failed to protect him from an assault by another inmate was timely filed under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807 where the inmate acknowledged receipt of the denial of his claim on March 24, the prison mail log indicated the inmate mailed “legal mail” to the circuit court clerk’s office on April 20, and that was the only mailing the inmate sent to the circuit court clerk. Clay v. Epps, 953 So. 2d 264, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 27 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Trial court erred in dismissing inmate’s complaint as untimely as under the “prison mailbox rule,” the date on which a pro se document was deemed filed was the date the prisoner placed it in the mail, not the date it was received by a court clerk; as the prisoner’s proof of service had the document mailed as timely, but it was not received by the county clerk in a timely manner, and the prison mail log had no record of the mailing, the dismissal of the inmate’s complaint was reversed. Easley v. Roach, 879 So. 2d 1041, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1014 (Miss. 2004).
Dismissal of the inmate’s complaint against the Mississippi Department of Corrections was improper where the mailbox rule applied to his complaint timely signed on July 5, 2001, two days prior to the 30-day deadline, Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-807. Maze v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 854 So. 2d 1090, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 874 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
5. Appeal dismissed.
Because an inmate had been released on parole since the filing of his appeal of an order requiring Rule Violation Reports (RVRs) be expunged from his prison record, the issues were moot, and his appeal was dismissed; review of the circuit court’s finding on whether substantial evidence existed to support the inmate’s two individual RVRs, which only subjected the inmate to reclassification and loss of privileges, was not a matter of “public interest.”State v. Runnels, 281 So.3d 148, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Because an inmate had been released on parole since the filing of his appeal of an order requiring Rule Violation Reports (RVRs) be expunged from his prison record, the issues were moot, and his appeal was dismissed; the inmate completed his punishment and fully litigated the issuance of the RVRs, and thus, there was no reasonable expectation that he could be subject to the same action RVR in the future. State v. Runnels, 281 So.3d 148, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
6. Service of process.
Inmate’s petition for review was governed by Miss. Unif. Cir. & Cty. R. 5.04 and not Miss. R. Civ. P. 4 because the petition for Administrative Remedy Program review was not a “regular civil filing” that required service of process under the rules of civil procedure; no service of process was required, and thus, the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over the Mississippi Department of Corrections to hear the inmate’s petition for review of his request for treatment. Jobe v. State, 288 So.3d 403, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 612 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
State Offenders Serving Sentences in County Jails
§ 47-5-901. Service of sentence in county jail if space unavailable in state facility; reimbursement of costs; governmental liability [Repealed effective July 1, 2020].
- Any person committed, sentenced or otherwise placed under the custody of the Department of Corrections, on order of the sentencing court and subject to the other conditions of this subsection, may serve all or any part of his sentence in the county jail of the county wherein such person was convicted if the Commissioner of Corrections determines that physical space is not available for confinement of such person in the state correctional institutions. Such determination shall be promptly made by the Department of Corrections upon receipt of notice of the conviction of such person. The commissioner shall certify in writing that space is not available to the sheriff or other officer having custody of the person. Any person serving his sentence in a county jail shall be classified in accordance with Section 47-5-905.
- If state prisoners are housed in county jails due to a lack of capacity at state correctional institutions, the Department of Corrections shall determine the cost for food and medical attention for such prisoners. The cost of feeding and housing offenders confined in such county jails shall be based on actual costs or contract price per prisoner. In order to maximize the potential use of county jail space, the Department of Corrections is encouraged to negotiate a reasonable per day cost per prisoner, which in no event may exceed Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per day per offender.
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- Upon vouchers submitted by the board of supervisors of any county housing persons due to lack of space at state institutions, the Department of Corrections shall pay to such county, out of any available funds, the actual cost of food, or contract price per prisoner, not to exceed Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per day per offender, as determined under subsection (2) of this section for each day an offender is so confined beginning the day that the Department of Corrections receives a certified copy of the sentencing order and will terminate on the date on which the offender is released or otherwise removed from the custody of the county jail. The department, or its contracted medical provider, will pay to a provider of a medical service for any and all incarcerated persons from a correctional or detention facility an amount based upon negotiated fees as agreed to by the medical care service providers and the department and/or its contracted medical provider. In the absence of negotiated discounted fee schedule, medical care service providers will be paid by the department, or its contracted medical service provider, an amount no greater than the reimbursement rate applicable based on the Mississippi Medicaid reimbursement rate. The board of supervisors of any county shall not be liable for any cost associated with medical attention for prisoners who are pretrial detainees or for prisoners who have been convicted that exceeds the Mississippi Medicaid reimbursement rate or the reimbursement provided by the Department of Corrections, whichever is greater. This limitation applies to all medical care services, durable and nondurable goods, prescription drugs and medications. Such payment shall be placed in the county general fund and shall be expended only for food and medical attention for such persons.
- Upon vouchers submitted by the board of supervisors of any county housing offenders in county jails pending a probation or parole revocation hearing, the department shall pay the reimbursement costs provided in paragraph (a).
- If the probation or parole of an offender is revoked, the additional cost of housing the offender pending the revocation hearing shall be assessed as part of the offender’s court cost and shall be remitted to the department.
- A person, on order of the sentencing court, may serve not more than twenty-four (24) months of his sentence in a county jail if the person is classified in accordance with Section 47-5-905 and the county jail is an approved county jail for housing state inmates under federal court order. The sheriff of the county shall have the right to petition the Commissioner of Corrections to remove the inmate from the county jail. The county shall be reimbursed in accordance with subsection (2) of this section.
- The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall defend the employees of the Department of Corrections and officials and employees of political subdivisions against any action brought by any person who was committed to a county jail under the provisions of this section.
- This section does not create in the Department of Corrections, or its employees or agents, any new liability, express or implied, nor shall it create in the Department of Corrections any administrative authority or responsibility for the construction, funding, administration or operation of county or other local jails or other places of confinement which are not staffed and operated on a full-time basis by the Department of Corrections. The correctional system under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections shall include only those facilities fully staffed by the Department of Corrections and operated by it on a full-time basis.
- An offender returned to a county for post-conviction proceedings shall be subject to the provisions of Section 99-19-42 and the county shall not receive the per-day allotment for such offender after the time prescribed for returning the offender to the Department of Corrections as provided in Section 99-19-42.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 547, § 1; Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 16; Laws, 1995, ch. 566, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1997, ch. 408, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 419, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 426, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 421, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 395, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2007, ch. 603, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 323, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 490, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 317, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 59; reenacted without change, Laws, 2016, ch. 408, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 426, Laws of 2002, eff from and after July 1, 2002 (approved March 20, 2002), amended this section. Section 4 of ch. 624, Laws of 2002, effective from and after July 1, 2002 (approved April 25, 2002), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 4 of ch. 624, Laws of 2002, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Editor’s Notes —
For the repeal date of this section, see §47-5-911.
Laws of 2004, ch. 537, § 8 provides:
“SECTION 8. The Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review Committee shall conduct a study to determine the actual per day cost of housing state inmates in county jails. The PEER Committee shall complete such determination and shall report with the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House and Chairmen of the Senate and House Corrections Committees no later than December 1, 2004.”
Amendment Notes —
The first 2002 amendment (ch. 426) reenacted the section without change.
The second 2002 amendment (ch. 624) rewrote the last sentence in (2); and rewrote (3).
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted and amended the section by, in (3), rewriting the second sentence and adding the fourth sentence.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2007 amendment, which reenacted and amended the section, in (3), added (b) and (c), redesignated the former first paragraph as present (a), and deleted the former last sentence of (a), which read: “The Department of Corrections shall not pay a county for offenders housed in county jails pending a probation or parole revocation hearing.”
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2010 amendment, in (3)(a), rewrote the second sentence, which formerly read: “The department shall pay the cost for medical attention for prisoners at an amount no greater than the reimbursement rate based on the Mississippi Medicaid reimbursement rate,” and added the third and fourth sentences.
The 2012 amendment was reenacted without change.
The 2014 amendment, in (3)(b), deleted “out of any available funds,” following “the department shall pay”; and in (4), added “of this section” to the end.
The 2016 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Department of Corrections may create a postconviction DNA database see §47-5-183.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Certification as to whether there is space available within a Department of Corrections facility should be in writing on individual basis. Lucas, Oct. 12, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0734.
If prisoner is sentenced by circuit judge to department of corrections and committed to county jail, then sheriff can not simply refuse to take prisoner because of overcrowding. Barrett, Jan. 12, 1994, A.G. Op. #93-0832.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections is under no obligation to pay counties for the costs associated with the care of inmates participating in a joint state/county work program under Section 47-5-401(1). Epps, Feb. 28, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0764.
The state’s responsibility for housing costs of prisoners commences the day the Department of Corrections receives a certified copy of the sentencing order regardless of when MDOC finishes the paperwork to induct an inmate into the system. Robinson, Mar. 4, 2005, A.G. Op. 04-0626.
§ 47-5-903. Other conditions under which sentence may be served in county jail; governmental liability [Repealed effective July 1, 2020].
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A person committed, sentenced or otherwise placed under the custody of the Department of Corrections, on order of the sentencing court, may serve his sentence in the county jail of the county where convicted if all of the following conditions are complied with:
- The person must be classified in accordance with Section 47-5-905;
- The person must not be classified as in need of close supervision;
- The sheriff of the county where the person will serve his sentence must request in writing that the person be allowed to serve his sentence in that county jail;
- After the person is classified and returned to the county, the county shall assume the full and complete responsibility for the care and expenses of housing such person; and
- The county jail must be an approved county jail for housing state inmates under federal court order.
- This section does not apply to inmates housed in county jails due to lack of space at state correctional facilities. The department shall not reimburse the county for the expense of housing an inmate under this section.
- The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi shall defend the employees of the Department of Corrections and officials and employees of political subdivisions against any action brought by any person who was committed to a county jail under the provisions of this section.
- The state, the Department of Corrections, and its employees or agents, shall not be liable to any person or entity for an inmate held in a county jail under this section.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 547, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1997, ch. 408, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 419, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 538, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 426, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 421, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 395, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2007, ch. 603, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 323, § 2; reenacted without change Laws, 2012, ch. 317, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2016, ch. 408, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Editor’s Notes —
For the repeal date of this section, see §47-5-911.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2007 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2016 amendment reenacted the section without change.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Mississippi Department of Corrections is under no obligation to pay counties for the costs associated with the care of inmates participating in a joint state/county work program under Section 47-5-401(1). Epps, Feb. 28, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0764.
§ 47-5-905. Processing and classification of inmates [Repealed effective July 1, 2020].
- All persons placed under the custody of the Department of Corrections shall be processed at a reception and diagnostic center of the Department of Corrections and then be assigned to an appropriate correctional facility for a complete and thorough classification, not to exceed ninety (90) days, unless the department determines that a person can be properly processed and classified at the county jail in accordance with the department’s classification plan.
- The Department of Corrections shall develop a plan for the processing and classification of inmates in county jails and shall implement the plan by January 1, 1993.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 547, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1997, ch. 408, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 419, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 538, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 426, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 421, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 395, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2007, ch. 603, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 323, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 317, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2016, ch. 408, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Editor’s Notes —
For the repeal date of this section, see §47-5-911.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2007 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2016 amendment reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Person serving sentence in county jail to be classified in accordance with this section, see §§47-5-901,47-5-903.
§ 47-5-907. Removal of state inmate from county jail; petition; grounds; immunity from liability [Repealed effective July 1, 2020].
The sheriff of any county in this state shall have the right to petition the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections to remove a state inmate from the county jail in such county to the State Penitentiary. The commissioner shall remove such inmate from such county jail if the sheriff of such county sets forth just cause in his petition indicating why an inmate should be removed from such county jail to the State Penitentiary.
Just cause is established if such sheriff can sufficiently prove that such inmate has a dangerous behavior or sufficiently prove that there is no available or suitable medical facility where such inmate can be provided suitable medical services. The commissioner shall respond in writing to the petition no later than thirty (30) days after the receipt of such petition. If the petition to remove such inmate is denied by the commissioner, such sheriff and his agents shall have from the date of denial absolute immunity from liability for any injury resulting from subsequent behavior or from medical consequences regarding such inmate, provided that such injury resulted from conditions which were set forth in such petition.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 547, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1997, ch. 408, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 419, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 538, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 426, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 421, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 395, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2007, ch. 603, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 323, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 317, § 4; Laws, 2016, ch. 408, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Editor’s Notes —
For the repeal date of this section, see §47-5-911.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2007 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2016 amendment reenacted the section without change.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
If sheriff asks that inmate be removed from his or her jail, agency is authorized to start reimbursing county at that point. Lucas, Oct. 12, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0734.
§ 47-5-909. Incarceration in county jails as temporary measure only [Repealed effective July 1, 2020].
It is the policy of the Legislature that all inmates be removed from county jails as early as practicable. Sections 47-5-901 through 47-5-907 are temporary measures to help alleviate the immediate operating capacity limitations at correctional facilities and are not permanent measures to be included in the long-term operating capacity of the correctional system.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 547, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1997, ch. 408, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1998, ch. 419, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 538, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 426, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 421, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 395, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2007, ch. 603, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 323, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 317, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2016, ch. 408, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Editor’s Notes —
For the repeal date of this section, see §47-5-911.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2007 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2016 amendment reenacted the section without change.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Notification to be given sheriff when space becomes available in Department of Corrections Facility for particular inmate is left to sound discretion of Commissioner of Department of Corrections. Lucas, Oct. 12, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0734.
§ 47-5-911. Repeal of Sections 47-5-901 through 47-5-911 [Repealed effective July 1, 2020].
Sections 47-5-901 through 47-5-911 shall stand repealed on July 1, 2020.
HISTORY: Laws, 1992, ch. 547, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 311, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 418, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 408, § 6; Laws, 1998, ch. 419, § 6; Laws, 1999, ch. 538, § 6; Laws, 2001, ch. 364, § 1; Laws, 2003, ch. 421, § 6; Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 6; Laws, 2005, ch. 395, § 6; Laws, 2007, ch. 354, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 603, § 6; Laws, 2008, ch. 323, § 6; reenacted and amended Laws, 2012, ch. 317, § 6; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 60; Laws, 2016, ch. 408, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2016.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 354, Laws of 2007, effective upon passage (approved March 15, 2007), amended this section. Section 6 of ch. 603, Laws of 2007, effective upon passage (approved April 21, 2007), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 6 of ch. 603, Laws of 2007, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment, reenacted the section and extended the repealer date from “July 1, 2002” for “July 1, 2003.”
The 2003 amendment extended the repealer from “July 1, 2003” to “July 1, 2004” for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911.
The 2004 amendment extended the the date of the repealer for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911 from “July 1, 2004” to “July 1, 2005.”
The 2005 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911 from “July 1, 2005” until “July 1, 2007.”
The first 2007 amendment (ch. 354), extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911 from “July 1, 2007” until “July 1, 2008.”
The second 2007 amendment (ch. 603) extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911 from “July 1, 2007” until “July 1, 2008.”
The 2008 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911 by substituting “July 1, 2012” for “July 1, 2008.”
The 2012 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the repealer provision from “July 1, 2012” to “July 1, 2014.”
The 2014 amendment extended the repealer provision from “July 1, 2014” to “July 1, 2016.”
The 2016 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-901 through47-5-911 by substituting “July 1, 2020” for “July 1, 2016.”
Incarceration of State Offenders in County Owned or Leased Correctional Facilities
§ 47-5-931. Authorization for incarceration of state offenders at county or regional correctional facility.
- The Department of Corrections, in its discretion, may contract with the board of supervisors of one or more counties and/or with a regional facility operated by one or more counties, to provide for housing, care and control of offenders who are in the custody of the State of Mississippi. Any facility owned or leased by a county or counties for this purpose shall be designed, constructed, operated and maintained in accordance with American Correctional Association standards, and shall comply with all constitutional standards of the United States and the State of Mississippi, and with all court orders that may now or hereinafter be applicable to the facility. If the Department of Corrections contracts with more than one (1) county to house state offenders in county correctional facilities, excluding a regional facility, then the first of such facilities shall be constructed in Sharkey County and the second of such facilities shall be constructed in Jefferson County.
- The Department of Corrections shall contract with the board of supervisors of the following counties to house state inmates in regional facilities: (a) Marion and Walthall Counties; (b) Carroll and Montgomery Counties; (c) Stone and Pearl River Counties; (d) Winston and Choctaw Counties; (e) Kemper and Neshoba Counties; (f) Holmes County and any contiguous county in which there is located an unapproved jail; and (g) Bolivar County and any contiguous county in which there is located an unapproved jail. The Department of Corrections may contract with the board of supervisors of the following counties to house state inmates in regional facilities: (a) Yazoo County, (b) Chickasaw County, (c) George and Greene Counties, (d) Washington County, (e) Hinds County, and (f) Alcorn County. The Department of Corrections shall decide the order of priority of the counties listed in this subsection with which it will contract for the housing of state inmates. For the purposes of this subsection, the term “unapproved jail” means any jail that the local grand jury determines should be condemned or has found to be of substandard condition or in need of substantial repair or reconstruction.
- In addition to the offenders authorized to be housed under subsection (1) of this section, the Department of Corrections may contract with the Kemper and Neshoba regional facility to provide for housing, care and control of not more than seventy-five (75) additional offenders who are in the custody of the State of Mississippi.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 585, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 457, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 526, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 472, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 539, § 1; Laws, 2013, ch. 422, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 321, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 25, 2014.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2004 amendment substituted “three hundred (300)” for “two hundred fifty (250)” in (1).
The 2007 amendment, in the first sentence of (1), deleted “jointly” following “regional facility” and substituted “one (1) or more counties” for “two (2) or three (3) counties”; in (2), deleted “and any contiguous county” following “Yazoo County” and added “(d) Washington County, (e) Hinds County, and (f) Alcorn County”; and added (3).
The 2013 amendment substituted “board of supervisors” for “boards of supervisors” in the first and second sentences in (2); and substituted “(75) additional offenders” for “(75) female offenders” in (3).
The 2014 amendment, in (1), deleted “not more than three hundred (300)” following “, to provide for housing, care and control of”; and in (3), deleted “number of” following “In addition to the.”
Cross References —
Department of Corrections may create a postconviction DNA database see §47-5-183.
§ 47-5-933. Contracts for incarceration of state offenders in county facilities; medical care.
The Department of Corrections may contract for the purposes set out in Section 47-5-931 for a period of not more than twenty (20) years. The contract may provide that the Department of Corrections pay a fee of up to Twenty-nine Dollars and Seventy-four Cents ($29.74) per day for each offender that is housed in the facility. The Department of Corrections may include in the contract, as an inflation factor, a three percent (3%) annual increase in the contract price. The state shall retain responsibility for medical care for state offenders to the extent that is required by law.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 585, § 2; Laws, 2007, ch. 539, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2007.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment substituted “Twenty-nine Dollars and Seventy-four Cents ($29.74)” for “Twenty-four Dollars and Ninety Cents ($24.90).”
§ 47-5-934. Extension of contracts for incarceration in event of disruption due to natural disaster.
If a regional facility authorized under Section 47-5-931 experiences a disruption in the housing of state inmates due to a natural disaster in which the Governor has declared a disaster emergency under the laws of this state or the President of the United States has declared an emergency or major disaster to exist in this state, notwithstanding the limitation prescribed in Section 47-5-933, the term of the contract entered into by the Department of Corrections and the board of supervisors of the involved county or counties may be extended for a period not to exceed five (5) years.
HISTORY: Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 14, eff from and after July 1, 2002.
§ 47-5-935. Sheriff of county designated Chief Corrections Officer for facility; responsibilities; additional compensation.
Concurrent with the execution of a contract for housing of state offenders as authorized by Sections 47-5-931 through 47-5-941, the sheriff of a county where the facility is located is designated as the Chief Corrections Officer for the facility housing state offenders, and in that capacity, shall assume responsibility for management of the corrections facility and for the provision of the care and control of the state offenders housed therein. The sheriff shall be subject to the direction of the department for management of the correctional facility. In addition to the compensation provided by Section 25-3-25, the sheriff shall receive Fifteen Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($15,600.00) as compensation for the duties specified in Sections 47-5-931 through 47-5-941.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 585, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 7, 1995).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The sheriff has responsibility for management of a regional correctional facility and such a facility is exempt from the requirements of law otherwise applicable to a county; however, after the budget for the facility has been approved by the county board of supervisors, the sheriff cannot unilaterally increase the salary of the warden. Burgoon, Jr., Nov. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0671.
§ 47-5-937. Exercise of power and authority regarding facility; exemption from certain requirements or restrictions.
Sections 47-5-931 through 47-5-941 shall be full and complete authority for the exercise of all powers and authority granted herein and no requirements or restrictions of law which would otherwise be applicable to acts of the county or sheriff or the Department of Corrections shall be applicable except as expressly provided herein. The sheriff is expressly authorized to employ counsel to represent the facility to be paid a salary within the range allowed for a legal assistant to a district attorney with the employment to continue for a period of time not to exceed the duration of the indebtedness incurred for construction of the facility. The county or counties shall pay this cost and other costs incurred in the operation of the facility from the proceeds of the funds derived from the financing of the project and the housing of offenders.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 585, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved April 7, 1995).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The statute creates a position for counsel to last as long as the indebtedness incurred for construction of a facility and gives the sheriff discretionary authority to employ an attorney to fill that position on an at-will basis; however, this does not authorize a sheriff to bind his successors in office and a subsequent sheriff may exercise the same discretion and, therefore, any employment contract entered into by a prior sheriff under the statute is voidable by a subsequent sheriff. Ballard, Nov. 20, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0617.
The statute contemplates that an attorney hired pursuant to the statute will be a full-time rather than a part-time employee, and that he will be paid a certain salary. Ballard, Nov. 20, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0617.
The sheriff has responsibility for management of a regional correctional facility and such a facility is exempt from the requirements of law otherwise applicable to a county; however, after the budget for the facility has been approved by the county board of supervisors, the sheriff cannot unilaterally increase the salary of the warden. Burgoon, Jr., Nov. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0671.
§ 47-5-938. Offenders in counties to participate in work programs; implementation; reimbursement of costs incurred due to utilization of offenders; offender’s compensation fund; canteen operations fund.
-
Offenders are encouraged to participate in work programs. The chief corrections officer as created in Section 47-5-935, with ratification of the board of supervisors of the county in which a correctional facility established pursuant to Sections 47-5-931 through 47-5-941, is located, may enter into agreements to provide work for any state offender housed in the facility, with the approval of the Commissioner of Corrections, to perform any work:
- Authorized in the Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990 as provided in Sections 47-5-531 through 47-5-575;
- Authorized in the Prison Agricultural Enterprises Act as provided in Sections 47-5-351 through 47-5-357;
- Authorized in the Penitentiary-Made Goods Law of 1978 as provided in Sections 47-5-301 through 47-5-331;
- Authorized in the Public Service Work Programs Act as provided in Sections 47-5-401 through 47-5-421;
- Authorized in Section 47-5-431, which authorizes the sheriff to use county or state offenders to pick up trash along public roads and state highways.
- The chief corrections officer shall promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to govern the work performance of the offenders for the parties to the agreements. Political subdivisions of the State of Mississippi including but not limited to counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage districts, water management districts and joint county-municipal endeavors are to have free use of the offender’s labor but are responsible for reimbursing the facility for costs of transportation, guards, meals and other necessary costs when the inmates are providing work for that political body. Offenders may be compensated for work performed if the agreement so provides.
- There is created a special fund in the county treasury to be known as the “offender’s compensation fund.” All compensation paid to offenders shall be placed in the special fund for use by the offenders to purchase certain goods and other items of value as authorized in Section 47-5-109, for offenders housed in state correctional facilities. As provided in Section 47-5-194, no cash is to be paid to offenders. The agreement shall provide that a certain portion of the compensation shall be used for the welfare of the offenders. All money collected from the regional jail canteen operations shall be placed in a county special fund. Expenditures from that fund can be made by the chief corrections officer for any lawful purpose that is in the best interest and welfare of the offenders. The chief corrections officer, his employees and the county or counties owning the facility are given the authority necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
- The provisions of this section shall be supplemental to any other provisions of law regarding offender labor and work programs.
HISTORY: Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 34; Laws, 2001, ch. 398, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
§ 47-5-939. Housing pretrial detainees, county offenders and other persons.
In addition to housing offenders for the Department of Corrections, the Chief Corrections Officer may house pretrial detainees, county offenders and other persons legally subject to incarceration by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. All offenders are to be housed in accordance with American Corrections Association standards.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 585, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 7, 1995).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
A “court of competent jurisdiction” as referred to in Miss. Code Section 47-5-939 means a court within the Mississippi State Judicial System, and a Regional Correctional Facility is not allowed to contract with another State or with the United States for the housing of inmates. Weissinger, July 18, 1997, A.G. Op. #97-0386.
§ 47-5-940. Authorization for drug and alcohol treatment pilot program at Bolivar County Regional Facility [Repealed effective July 3, 2022].
-
- The Department of Corrections may contract with the Bolivar County Regional Facility for a five-year pilot program dedicated to an intensive and comprehensive alcohol and other drug treatment program for not more than two hundred fifty (250) inmates. The Bolivar County Regional Facility shall have the option of canceling the contract for the drug treatment program after giving the Department of Corrections thirty (30) days’ notice of its intent to cancel. The program shall be a prison-based treatment program designed to reduce substance abuse by inmates, correct dysfunctional thinking and behavioral patterns, and prepare inmates to make a successful and crime-free readjustment to the community.
- The Department of Corrections shall reimburse the Bolivar County Regional Facility at the per diem rate allowed under Section 47-5-933.
-
- An inmate who is within eighteen (18) months of his earned release date or parole date may be placed in the program.
- The Department of Corrections shall remove any inmate within seventy-two (72) hours after being notified by the Bolivar County Regional Facility that the inmate is violent or refuses to participate in the drug treatment program.
-
The program shall consist, but is not limited to, the following components:
- An assessment and placement component using a recidivism needs assessment of the inmates.
- An intensive and comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation component which addresses the specific drug or alcohol problem of the inmate. This component shall include relapse prevention strategies and anger management strategies.
- An aftercare post-release component that has a specific transition plan for each inmate. The transition plan must address specific post-release needs such as employment, housing, medical care, relapse prevention and treatment. The plan shall require personnel to assist the inmate with these needs and to assist in finding community-based programs for the inmate. The plan shall require the inmate to be tracked in at least thirty-day intervals to measure compliance with his established transition plan.
- A monitoring assessment of recidivism containing post-release history of substance abuse, breaches of trust, arrests, convictions, employment, community functioning, and marital and family interaction.
- The department shall file a report annually on the program with specific data on recidivism of inmates including the data required in subsection (3)(d).
- The program authorized under this section may be renewed if it meets performance requirements as may be determined by the Legislature.
- This section shall be repealed on July 3, 2022.
HISTORY: Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 13; Laws, 2007, ch. 534, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 504, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2012, ch. 393, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 318, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 463, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2015; Laws, 2018, ch. 318, § 1, eff from and after July 1 2018; Laws, 2018, ch. 409, § 1, eff from and after July 1 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 318, Laws of 2015, effective from and after passage (approved March 13, 2015), amended this section. Section 3 of ch. 463, Laws of 2015, effective from and after July 1, 2015 (approved April 20, 2015), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 3 of ch. 463, Laws of 2015, pursuant to Section 1-3-79, which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, the amendment with the latest effective date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section effective on an earlier date.
Section 1 of Chapter 318, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 7, 2018), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 409, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 21, 2018), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of Chapter 409, Laws of 2018, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment extended the date of the repealer for the section from “January 1, 2008” until “July 3, 2009.”
The 2009 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (6) by substituting “July 3, 2010” for “July 3, 2009”; and made a minor stylistic change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the repealer from “July 3, 2010” to “July 3, 2015” at the end of (6).
The first 2015 amendment (ch. 318), extended the repealer provision from “July 3, 2015” to “July 3, 2018” at the end of (6).
The second 2015 amendment (ch. 463), deleted “and regimented discipline strategies” from the end of (3)(b), and made related stylistic changes; and extended the repealer provision in (6), from “July 3, 2015” to “July 3, 2018.”
The first 2018 amendment (ch. 318) extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “July 1, 2019” for “July 3, 2018” in (6).
The second 2018 amendment (ch. 409) extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “July 3, 2022” for “July 3, 2018” in (6).
§ 47-5-941. Authorization to contract with certain Wilkinson County authorities for private incarceration of state inmates.
In addition to any other authority granted by law, the Department of Corrections may contract with the Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of not more than one thousand (1,000) state inmates at a facility in Wilkinson County. Any such contract must comply with Sections 47-5-1211 through 47-5-1227.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 585, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 7, 1995).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The board of alderman of the Town of Woodville may contract with Corrections Corporation of America to incarcerate Town of Woodville prisoners at the private facility in Wilkinson County. Wilkerson, January 16, 1998, #97-0790.
§ 47-5-942. Authorization to contract with a county to be determined by Department of Corrections for maximum security regional correctional facility.
- The Department of Corrections, in its discretion, may contract with the board of supervisors of a county to be determined by the department, to house not more than five hundred (500) adult male maximum security state inmates in a maximum security regional correctional facility constructed only with local, federal or private funds.
- The Department of Corrections may contract for a period of not more than twenty-five (25) years. The contract shall comply with the cost-savings requirements provided in Section 47-5-1211. The state shall retain responsibility for medical care for state offenders to the extent that is required by law.
HISTORY: Laws, 2008, ch. 536, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2008.
§ 47-5-943. Contracts for incarceration; compliance with standards and statutes.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections may contract with the Walnut Grove Correctional Authority or the governing authorities of the Municipality of Walnut Grove, Leake County, Mississippi, to provide for the private housing, care and control of not more than one thousand five hundred (1,500) offenders who are in the custody of the Department of Corrections at a maximum security facility in Walnut Grove. A county or circuit judge shall not order any offender to be housed in the correctional facility authorized in Sections 47-5-943 through 47-5-953. Commitment of offenders shall not be to this facility, but shall be to the jurisdiction of the department. The commissioner shall assign newly sentenced offenders to an appropriate facility consistent with public safety. Any facility owned or leased by the Walnut Grove Correctional Authority or the Municipality of Walnut Grove for this purpose shall be designed, constructed, operated and maintained in accordance with American Correctional Association standards, and shall comply with all constitutional standards of the United States and the State of Mississippi and with all court orders that may now or hereinafter be applicable to the facility. The contract must comply with Sections 47-5-1211 through 47-5-1227.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 562, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 579, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 537, § 7; Laws, 2005, ch. 517, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 417, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 489, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 26, 2012.).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 2004, ch. 537, § 8 provides:
“SECTION 8. The Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review Committee shall conduct a study to determine the actual per day cost of housing state inmates in county jails. The PEER Committee shall complete such determination and shall report with the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House and Chairmen of the Senate and House Corrections Committees no later than December 1, 2004.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment inserted “of” between “control” and “five,” added “the department also . . . department’s custody” at the end of the first sentence, and substituted “twenty (20) years” for “nineteen (19) years”.
The 2004 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “may contract” for “shall contract” near the beginning of the section; substituted “not more than one thousand (1,000)” for “five hundred (500)” preceding “juvenile offenders,” and deleted “the department also may contract with such authority or governing authorities for the housing at the Walnut Grove facility of an additional two hundred fifty (250) juvenile offenders in the department’s custody” at the end; and rewrote the second sentence.
The 2005 amendment substituted “twenty-two (22) years” for “twenty-one (21) years” and “twenty-second birthday” for “twenty-first birthday” in the second sentence.
The 2007 amendment substituted “one thousand five hundred (1,500) juvenile offenders” for “one thousand (1,000) juvenile offenders.”
The 2012 amendment deleted “juvenile” preceding “offenders who are in the custody of” in the first sentence; deleted the former second sentence which read: “The maximum age of any offender housed in this facility shall be twenty-two (22) years of age, and upon reaching his or her twenty-second birthday, the offender must be removed from the facility speedily and within a reasonable amount of time”; substituted “offender for “juvenile” in the second sentence; and deleted “juvenile” preceding “offenders shall not be to this facility” in the third sentence.
Cross References —
Contract restrictions, see §47-5-945.
Continuing education leading to high school diploma or GED and vocational education to be provided juvenile offenders, see §47-5-949.
Provision of alcohol and drug counseling and treatment, see §47-5-951.
§ 47-5-945. Contract restrictions; time; terms; medical care of offenders.
The Department of Corrections shall contract for the purposes set out in Section 47-5-943 for a period of not more than twenty (20) years. The Department of Corrections may include in the contract, as an inflation factor, a three percent (3%) annual increase in the contract price. The state shall retain responsibility for medical care for state offenders to the extent that is required by law.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 562, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).
§ 47-5-947. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 2012, ch. 395, § 1, effective July 1, 2012.
§47-5-947. [Laws, 1998, ch. 562, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-947 provided for the implementation of the regimented inmate discipline program at the Walnut Grove Correctional Facility.
§ 47-5-949. Continuing education; high school level degree; vocational education.
The correctional facility authorized in Section 47-5-943 shall provide any juvenile offender housed in the facility with continuing education throughout his incarceration which leads to the presentation of a high school diploma or High School Equivalency Diploma equivalent. The facility also shall provide a program of vocational education, which is to be included in the continuing education program for a high school diploma or High School Equivalency Diploma equivalent.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 562, § 4; Laws, 2014, ch. 398, § 15, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment substituted “High School Equivalency Diploma” for “General Education Development (GED)” in the first and second sentences.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Even though this section does require that the Walnut Grove Correctional Authority must provide any juvenile offender incarcerated therein with continuing education and vocational education which leads to a high school diploma or General Education Development equivalent, no authority is given for it to act in the capacity of a school board. Webb, Dec. 5, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0498.
§ 47-5-951. Alcohol and drug counseling and treatment.
The correctional facility authorized in Section 47-5-943 shall provide each juvenile offender housed in the facility alcohol and drug counseling and treatment throughout his incarceration.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 562, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).
§ 47-5-953. Construction of subsequent facilities; locations; requirements and standards.
- If a second public or private correctional facility for juvenile offenders is constructed, then the facility shall be located in Kemper County. The facility shall comply with the requirements and standards established in Sections 47-5-943 through 47-5-951.
- If a third public or private correctional facility for juveniles is constructed, a site in North Mississippi and a site in South Mississippi shall be considered. If a site is chosen in North Mississippi, then preference shall be given to Quitman County. The facility shall comply with the requirements and standards established in Sections 47-5-943 through 47-5-951.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 562, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).
Intensive Supervision Program; Electronic Home Detention
§ 47-5-1001. Definitions [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
For purposes of Sections 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015, the following words shall have the meaning ascribed herein unless the context shall otherwise require:
“Approved electronic monitoring device” means a device approved by the department which is primarily intended to record and transmit information regarding the offender’s presence or nonpresence in the home.
“Correctional field officer” means the supervising probation and parole officer in charge of supervising the offender.
“Court” means a circuit court having jurisdiction to place an offender into the intensive supervision program.
“Department” means the Department of Corrections.
“House arrest” means the confinement of a person convicted or charged with a crime to his place of residence under the terms and conditions established by the department or court.
“Operating capacity” means the total number of state offenders which can be safely and reasonably housed in facilities operated by the department and in local or county jails or other facilities authorized to house state offenders as certified by the department, subject to applicable federal and state laws and rules and regulations.
“Participant” means an offender placed into an intensive supervision program.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 606, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 539, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, §1, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected a typographical error in (c) by substituting “a court having jurisdiction to place an offender into the intensive” for “a court having jurisdiction to place an offender to the intensive.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 24, 2014, meeting.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Laws of 2005, ch. 485, § 11 provides as follows:
“SECTION 11. The intensive supervision program established in Laws of 2005, Chapter 485 is a continuation of the intensive supervision program that existed on June 30, 2004. All actions taken by the Department of Corrections from July 1, 2004, to April 6, 2005, which would have been authorized under the prior intensive supervision program are ratified, confirmed and validated.”
This section was reenacted without change by Laws of 2012, ch. 316, effective from and after passage (approved April 5, 2012). Since the language of the section as it appears in the main volume is unaffected by the reenactment, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1003. Intensive supervision program; eligibility; procedure; time limits; program violations; notice to Department of Corrections; participation in program during term of probation; provision of certain data to Oversight Task Force [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
- An intensive supervision program may be used as an alternative to incarceration for offenders who are not convicted of a crime of violence pursuant to Section 97-3-2 as selected by the court and for juvenile offenders as provided in Section 43-21-605. Any offender convicted of a sex crime shall not be placed in the program.
- The court may place the defendant on intensive supervision, except when a death sentence or life imprisonment is the maximum penalty which may be imposed by a court or judge.
- To protect and to ensure the safety of the state’s citizens, any offender who violates an order or condition of the intensive supervision program may be arrested by the correctional field officer and placed in the actual custody of the Department of Corrections. Such offender is under the full and complete jurisdiction of the department and subject to removal from the program by the classification hearing officer.
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When any circuit or county court places an offender in an intensive supervision program, the court shall give notice to the Mississippi Department of Corrections within fifteen (15) days of the court’s decision to place the offender in an intensive supervision program. Notice shall be delivered to the central office of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and to the regional office of the department which will be providing supervision to the offender in an intensive supervision program.
The courts may not require an offender to participate in the intensive supervision program during a term of probation or post-release supervision.
- The Department of Corrections shall provide to the Oversight Task Force all relevant data regarding the offenders participating in the intensive supervision program including the number of offenders admitted to the program annually, the number of offenders who leave the program annually and why they leave, the number of offenders who are arrested or convicted annually and the circumstances of the arrest and any other information requested.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 2; Laws, 1994, ch. 606, § 3; Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 26; Laws, 1995, ch. 399, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 397, § 2; Laws, 1998, ch. 461, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 622, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 10; Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 2; Laws, 2008, ch. 313, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 2; Laws, 2009, ch. 502, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 459, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 2; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2014; reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 2, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 10 of ch. 393 Laws of 2001, effective from and after July 1, 2001 (approved March 12, 2001), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 482, Laws of 2001, effective July 1, 2001 (approved March 23, 2001), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of both amendments pursuant to Section 1-1-109, which gives the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication authority to integrate amendments so that all versions of the same code section enacted within the same legislative session may become effective. The Joint Committee on Compilation, Revision, and Publication ratified the integration of these amendments as consistent with the legislative intent at the April 26, 2001, meeting of the Committee.
Section 1 of ch. 313, Laws of 2008, effective upon passage (approved March 24, 2008), amended this section. Section 2 of ch. 479, Laws of 2008, effective upon passage (approved April 10, 2008), reenacted the section, as amended by ch. 313, Laws of 2008, without change. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 2 of ch. 479, Laws of 2008, which contains language that specifically provides that it supersedes §47-5-1003 as amended by Laws of 2008, ch. 313.
Section 2 of Chapter 317, Laws of 2014, effective from and after passage (approved March 12, 2014), amended this section. Section 11 of Chapter 457, Laws of 2014, effective from and after July 1, 2014 (approved March 31, 2014), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 11 of Chapter 457, Laws of 2014, pursuant to Section 1-3-79, which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, the amendment with the latest effective date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section taking effect on an earlier date.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Section 47-5-1015, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 325, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to June 30, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The first 2008 amendment (ch. 313) inserted “convicted of a felony committed after having been” in (2).
The second 2008 amendment (ch. 479) reenacted the section, as amended by ch. 313, without change.
The 2009 amendment deleted “or a felony violation of Section 41-29-139(a)(1)” following “convicted of a sex crime” in (1); substituted “The court or the department may place the defendant” for “The court placing an offender in the intensive supervision program may, acting upon the advice and consent of the commissioner and not later than one (1) year after the defendant has been delivered to the custody of the department, suspend the further execution of the sentence and place the defendant” in (2); in the last paragraph of (4), substituted “participate in” for “complete” and “during a term” for “as a condition”; and added (5).
The 2011 amendment added “and for juvenile offenders as provided in Section 43-21-605” to the end of the first sentence of (1).
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The first 2014 amendment (ch. 317), reenacted the section without change.
The second 2014 amendment (ch. 457), in (1), substituted “not convicted of a crime of violence pursuant to Section 97-3-2” for “low risk and nonviolent,” and deleted “department or” preceding “court and for juvenile offenders”; in (2), deleted “or the department” following “The court” and substituted “by a court of judge” for “or if the defendant has been convicted of a felony committed after having been confined for the conviction of a felony on a previous occasion in any court or courts of the United States and of any state or territories thereof or has been convicted of a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon”; in (5), substituted “provide to the Oversight . . . other information requested” for “or if the defendant has been convicted of a felony committed after effectiveness of the intensive supervision program before January 1, 2010.”
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
Cross References —
Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Jurisdiction.
3. Post-conviction relief.
4. Removal from house arrest.
1. In general.
Where defendant agreed to plead guilty to a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(1) in exchange for the district attorney’s recommendation of house arrest but where house arrest was not a permissible punishment for that offense, the district attorney’s promise was illusory. Because no valid contract was formed, the agreement was an improper inducement to plead guilty in violation of Miss. Unif. Cir. & County Ct. Prac. R. 8.04(A)(3), and defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Littleton v. State, 3 So.3d 760, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 431 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 102 (Miss. 2009).
Defendant’s sentence after being convicted of the sale of marijuana within a correctional facility was appropriate because the maximum fine and the minimum sentence that he received were both within the statutory limits of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-198(3); it was clear that the circuit court was more than lenient in imposing house arrest against defendant because he benefited through what appeared to have been legislative oversight as well as significant judicial restraint because, if he had been convicted of merely selling controlled substances, he could not have been sentenced to house arrest. Jackson v. State, 962 So. 2d 649, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 104 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 962 So. 2d 38, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 434 (Miss. 2007).
Trial court properly did not make a finding that defendant was a violent offender under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003 when defendant was convicted of driving under the influence under Miss. Code Ann. §63-11-30(5) because §47-5-1003 does not require the trial court to make an on the record determination that the accused is a violent offender, and further, aggravated DUI does not fall within either of the excluded categories of § 47-5-1003. Smith v. State, 942 So. 2d 308, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 850 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Making the suspension of part of a defendant’s sentence contingent upon successful completion of an intensive supervision program is not prohibited by statute. Jenkins v. State, 910 So. 2d 23, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 4 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), overruled in part, Graham v. State, 85 So.3d 860, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Had the inmate successfully completed the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP), and then been given a suspended sentence, the inmate would have had a right to a hearing prior to the revocation of ISP status, but the inmate did not make it to that point because the inmate failed the urine test four months short of completing the one year in ISP, and there was no denial of due process or equal protection. McBride v. Sparkman, 860 So. 2d 1237, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1070 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Pursuant to the statute, a circuit court does not have the authority to disregard a disciplinary committee’s finding that a defendant was not guilty of a violation of the program and, then, to reinstate his sentence. Babbitt v. State, 755 So. 2d 406, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 2000).
2. Jurisdiction.
Because Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(3) provided that reclassifying an inmate from house arrest was within the Department of Corrections’ exclusive jurisdiction, and because an inmate had not exhausted the inmate’s administrative remedies in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §§47-5-801,47-5-803(2), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the inmate’s postconviction motion. Hollingsworth v. State, 66 So.3d 1254, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 438 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Circuit court conditioned future suspension of fifteen years of the inmate’s sentence on her successful completion of the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP); the circuit court’s sentence was not prohibited by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(4) where suspension of fifteen years of the inmate’s sentence was contingent upon her completion of the ISP, and successful completion of post-release supervision was conditioned upon obedience to the terms and conditions of post-release supervision spelled out in her court order, none of which required completion of the ISP; the inmate was not subject to removal from the ISP by the circuit court, but only by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Ivory v. State, 999 So. 2d 420, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 735 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 852, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 2009).
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to remove the defendant from an intensive supervision program as the statute vested such jurisdiction in the Department of Corrections. Jensen v. State, 798 So. 2d 383, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 41 (Miss. 2001).
Subsection (3) confers full and complete jurisdiction on the Department of Corrections classification committee to remove a prisoner from house arrest and place him into the general prison population to complete his sentence. Smith v. State, 766 So. 2d 50, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 334 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
3. Post-conviction relief.
Although appellant’s sentence was a violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(1), this did not constitute reversible error; appellant did not suffer any prejudice by the imposition of house arrest and where a defendant is given an illegal sentence that is more favorable than what the legal sentence would have been then he/she is not later entitled to relief through a post-conviction action. Graham v. State, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 116 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2010), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 85 So.3d 860, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Inmate’s due process rights were not violated in a revocation hearing of his post-release supervision; he signed a waiver to a revocation hearing, admitted to the charges, and consented to immediate revocation of his post-release supervision. The inmate was given notice and an opportunity to be heard and was, therefore, not denied his due process rights. Williams v. State, 4 So.3d 388, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 128 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Circuit court was correct in stating that incarceration in a Mississippi Department of Corrections facility was the only legal sentence available for an inmate after he violated his post-release supervision. His sentence to house arrest was clearly more lenient and favorable than incarceration and was a benefit to the inmate; therefore, such was harmless error, and the inmate was not prejudiced by the sentence and could not now attack its legality or complain of prejudice. Williams v. State, 4 So.3d 388, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 128 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Where appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent and possession of cocaine, the offenses were not included on the list of offenses not eligible for the intensive supervision and house arrest program under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003; the trial court’s imposition of a 25-year sentence in intensive supervision was not an illegal sentence. Moore v. State, 976 So. 2d 930, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 486 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. dismissed, 977 So. 2d 343, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 114 (Miss. 2008).
Motion for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed based on an allegation that an illegal sentence of house arrest was imposed under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003 due to defendant’s prior convictions because defendant had benefitted from any error. Jefferson v. State, 958 So. 2d 1276, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 440 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003 prevented successful completion of house arrest from being made a condition of post-release supervision; if the 2005 sentence did state such a condition, the condition was ineffective, but since the trial judge said on post-conviction relief that there was no such condition, there was also no continuing issue. Burns v. State, 933 So. 2d 329, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 495 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Inmate claimed that his probation should not have been revoked as the arrest violated Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003 because the officer who found the drugs did not arrest him. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the inmate’s petition because the fact that the officer did not immediately arrest the inmate, but waited for an agent from the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics to arrive, did not violate §47-5-1003 because the officer who found the drugs was with the inmate the entire time, and the inmate was arrested the same day. Johnson v. State, 909 So. 2d 122, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 559 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief was properly denied because his sentence was not illegal at the time it was entered and did not become illegal upon the passage of the 2000 amendment to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003. The revision to §47-5-1003 relied upon by defendant did not become effective until over a year and a half after his sentencing; while the legislature could have required resentencing under the new provision, it did not do so. McBride v. State, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 314 (Miss. Ct. App. May 10, 2005), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 914 So. 2d 260, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 524 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Denial of the inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief was proper where the revision to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003 relied upon by him did not become effective until over a year and a half after his sentencing. Thus, his sentence was not illegal at the time it was entered and did not become illegal upon the passage of the revision. McBride v. State, 914 So. 2d 260, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 524 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 344, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 720 (Miss. 2005).
House arrest is not a form of probationary release and a prisoner under house arrest is confined as a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections in the normally-understood sense of that term; thus, post-conviction relief is an inappropriate remedy for a prisoner to pursue after he is removed from house arrest and returned to the general prison population. Lewis v. State, 761 So. 2d 922, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
4. Removal from house arrest.
Appellant’s guilty plea was not rendered ineffective by the trial court failing to explain to her that she could be incarcerated if she did not comply with the conditions of her house arrest as those conditions were imposed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Smith v. State, 919 So. 2d 989, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 426 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where the prisoner was removed from house arrest, the circuit court properly denied the prisoner’s motion for postconviction relief, because the prisoner had not received a suspended sentence and therefore a hearing prior to revocation was not necessary, and he was entitled to no further procedure as there was a rescission of the possibility of probation caused by his failure in the house arrest program. Moore v. State, 830 So. 2d 1274, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 640 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief because the Mississippi Department of Corrections revoked defendant’s participation in an in-house arrest program under the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(3), and the circuit court did not amend its original sentencing order. Reeder v. State, 822 So. 2d 1043, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 161 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 830 So. 2d 1251, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 719 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Department of Corrections had the authority to remove a defendant from an Intensive Supervision Program and place him directly in their custody without a hearing. Perry v. State, 798 So. 2d 643, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 443 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
There was no violation of the statute where the appellant was removed from the house arrest program and placed into the general prison population to complete his original sentence by the Department of Corrections disciplinary committee since the disciplinary committee is not a separate entity, but is instead a part of the Department of Corrections classification committee. Smith v. State, 766 So. 2d 50, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 334 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Department of Corrections has authority to place an inmate, without the knowledge or permission of the court, in the Intensive Supervision Program when the court has sentenced the inmate to incarceration and the inmate is serving his court-imposed sentence. Bailey & Roberts, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0335.
Although this section is silent as to the length of time an offender may remain on house arrest, he may not be kept on house arrest past the date of the completion of his sentence. Bailey & Roberts, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0335.
An offender can be placed on house arrest if he is determined to be “low risk and nonviolent; ” an offender may not be placed on house arrest if he has been convicted of a sex crime, a felony for the sale or manufacture of a controlled substance or a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, or if he has received a death sentence or been convicted of a crime for which life imprisonment is the maximum penalty, or if he has previously been confined for the conviction of a felony in any court or courts of the United States or of any state or territories thereof. Bailey & Roberts, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0335.
Once an offender is picked up and returned to the actual custody of the Department of Corrections for violating the conditions of house arrest, the decision whether to remove him from the program is left to the classification committee; there is nothing in this section forbidding the classification committee from setting conditions that would allow the offender to return to house arrest. Bailey & Roberts, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0335.
An offender in the intensive supervision program is to be considered an inmate and not a probationer or parolee and, therefore, the assumption is that the time served on house arrest is applied as time served on the offender’s sentence, even if he violates house arrest before serving the complete sentence; thus, an offender whose house arrest is revoked after successfully serving 11 months of a 12 month sentence would only have one month left to serve in the actual custody of the department. Bailey & Roberts, July 23, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0335.
Among offenders convicted under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, only those persons convicted specifically of the sale or manufacture of a controlled substance are excluded from being placed in an intensive supervision program. Johnson, Oct. 20, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0629.
The amendment to subsection (1), denying certain offenders eligibility for the Intensive Supervision Program has no effect on the length of incarceration and consequently does not violate the ex post facto clause when applied to those convicted prior to its passage. Eads, Nov. 16, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0673.
A circuit judge does not have the jurisdiction to modify a sentence of a defendant placed on house arrest after the expiration of the sentencing term. Cotten, Jan. 23, 2004, A.G. Op. 03-0692.
§ 47-5-1005. Rules and guidelines for operation of intensive supervision program; approval and leasing of electronic monitoring devices [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
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The department shall promulgate rules that prescribe reasonable guidelines under which an intensive supervision program shall operate. These rules shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
- The participant shall remain within the interior premises or within the property boundaries of his or her residence at all times during the hours designated by the correctional field officer.
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Approved absences from the home may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Working or employment approved by the court or department and traveling to or from approved employment;
- Unemployed and seeking employment approved for the participant by the court or department;
- Undergoing medical, psychiatric, mental health treatment, counseling or other treatment programs approved for the participant by the court or department;
- Attending an educational institution or a program approved for the participant by the court or department;
- Participating in community work release or a community service program approved for the participant by the court or department; or
- For another compelling reason consistent with the public interest, as approved by the court or department.
- Except in case of a medical emergency and approval by the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, or his designee, or by circuit court order for medical purposes, no participant in the intensive supervision program may leave the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi.
- The department shall select and approve all electronic monitoring devices used under Sections 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015.
- The department may lease the equipment necessary to implement the intensive supervision program and to contract for the monitoring of such devices. The department is authorized to select the lowest price and best source in contracting for these services.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 3; Laws, 2007, ch. 598, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 3, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Section 47-5-1015, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 325, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to June 30, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2007 amendment, in (1), inserted “a” preceding “community service program” in (b)(v), and added (c).
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1007. Payment of monthly fee by participant who is employed; payment of monthly fee by juvenile offender; special fund; responsibilities of participant; notice regarding violation of detention [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
- Any participant in the intensive supervision program who engages in employment shall pay a monthly fee to the department for each month such person is enrolled in the program. The department may waive the monthly fee if the offender is a full-time student or is engaged in vocational training. Juvenile offenders shall pay a monthly fee of not less than Ten Dollars ($10.00) but not more than Fifty Dollars ($50.00) based on a sliding scale using the standard of need for each family that is used to calculate TANF benefits. Money received by the department from participants in the program shall be deposited into a special fund which is hereby created in the State Treasury. It shall be used, upon appropriation by the Legislature, for the purpose of helping to defray the costs involved in administering and supervising such program. Unexpended amounts remaining in such special fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, and any interest earned on amounts in such special fund shall be deposited to the credit of the special fund.
- The participant shall admit any correctional officer into his residence at any time for purposes of verifying the participant’s compliance with the conditions of his detention.
- The participant shall make the necessary arrangements to allow for correctional officers to visit the participant’s place of education or employment at any time, based upon the approval of the educational institution or employer, for the purpose of verifying the participant’s compliance with the conditions of his detention.
- The participant shall acknowledge and participate with the approved electronic monitoring device as designated by the department at any time for the purpose of verifying the participant’s compliance with the conditions of his detention.
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The participant shall be responsible for and shall maintain the following:
- A working telephone line in the participant’s home;
- A monitoring device in the participant’s home, or on the participant’s person, or both; and
- A monitoring device in the participant’s home and on the participant’s person in the absence of a telephone.
- The participant shall obtain approval from the correctional field officer before the participant changes residence.
- The participant shall not commit another crime during the period of home detention ordered by the court or department.
- Notice shall be given to the participant that violation of the order of home detention shall subject the participant to prosecution for the crime of escape as a felony.
- The participant shall abide by other conditions as set by the court or the department.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 539, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 4; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 4; Laws, 2011, ch. 459, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 4; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2014; reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 4, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 4 of Chapter 317, Laws of 2014, effective from and after passage (approved March 12, 2014), reenacted this section without change. Section 12 of Chapter 457, Laws of 2014, effective from and after July 1, 2014 (approved March 31, 2014), amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 12 of Chapter 457, Laws of 2014, pursuant to Section 1-3-79, which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, the amendment with the latest effective date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section taking effect on an earlier date.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted and amended the section by making a minor stylistic change.
The 2011 amendment added the third sentence in (1).
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The first 2014 amendment (ch. 317), reenacted the section without change.
The second 2014 amendment (ch. 457), inserted “court or the” near the end of (9).
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Escape.
Defendant was properly convicted of escape because the Legislature made clear that an escape from house arrest was a felony escape and defendant was on “house arrest” under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Department of Corrections in the Intensive Supervision Program when he cut his monitoring device off his ankle and fled. Smith v. State, 270 So.3d 1052, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 502 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
§ 47-5-1009. Immunity of department; audit [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
- The department shall have absolute immunity from liability for any injury resulting from a determination by a judge or correctional officer that an offender shall be allowed to participate in the electronic home detention program.
- The Department of Audit shall annually audit the records of the department to ensure compliance with Sections 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 539, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 5, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 5, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Section 47-5-1015, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 325, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to June 30, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted without change.
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1011. Prior notification of participant and co-residents regarding nature and extent of electronic monitoring devices; damage to equipment; noncriminal environment to be maintained [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
-
Before entering an order for commitment for electronic house arrest, the department shall inform the participant and other persons residing in the home of the nature and extent of the approved electronic monitoring devices by doing the following:
- Securing the written consent of the participant in the program to comply with the rules and regulations of the program.
- Advising adult persons residing in the home of the participant at the time an order or commitment for electronic house arrest is entered and asking such persons to acknowledge the nature and extent of approved electronic monitoring devices.
- Insuring that the approved electronic devices are minimally intrusive upon the privacy of other persons residing in the home while remaining in compliance with Sections 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015.
- The participant shall be responsible for the cost of equipment and any damage to such equipment. Any intentional damage, any attempt to defeat monitoring, any committing of a criminal offense or any associating with felons or known criminals, shall constitute a violation of the program.
- Any person whose residence is utilized in the program shall agree to keep the home drug and alcohol free and to exclude known felons and criminals in order to provide a noncriminal environment.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 6; Laws, 1994, ch. 606, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 539, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without changed, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 6, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1013. Conditions for participation in intensive supervision program [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
Participants enrolled in an intensive supervision program shall be required to:
Maintain employment if physically able, or full-time student status at an approved school or vocational trade, and make progress deemed satisfactory to the correctional field officer, or both, or be involved in supervised job searches.
Pay restitution and program fees as directed by the department. Program fees shall not be less than Eighty-eight Dollars ($88.00) per month. The sentencing judge may charge a program fee of less than Eighty-eight Dollars ($88.00) per month in cases of extreme financial hardship, when such judge determines that the offender’s participation in the program would provide a benefit to his community. Juvenile offenders shall not pay a program fee but shall pay a monthly fee as provided in Section 47-5-1007. Program fees shall be deposited in the special fund created in Section 47-5-1007.
Establish a place of residence at a place approved by the correctional field officer, and not change his residence without the officer’s approval. The correctional officer shall be allowed to inspect the place of residence for alcoholic beverages, controlled substances and drug paraphernalia.
Remain at his place of residence at all times except to go to work, to attend school, to perform community service and as specifically allowed in each instance by the correctional field officer.
Allow administration of drug and alcohol tests as requested by the field officer.
Perform not less than ten (10) hours of community service each month.
Meet any other conditions imposed by the court to meet the needs of the offender and limit the risks to the community.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 539, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 7; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 7; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 7; Laws, 2010, ch. 492, § 1; Laws, 2011, ch. 459, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 7, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 7, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal date of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Section 47-5-1015, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 325, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to June 30, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2005 amendment reenacted and amended the section by substituting “Seventy-five Dollars ($75.00) per month” for “Fifty Dollars ($50.00)” in the second and third sentences of (b).
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2008 amendment reenacted and amended the section by substituting “Eighty Dollars ($80.00)” for “Seventy-five Dollars ($75.00)” twice in (b).
The 2010 amendment twice substituted “Eighty-eight Dollars ($88.00)” for “Eighty Dollars ($80.00)” in (b).
The 2011 amendment added the next-to-last sentence in (b).
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1014. Monthly supervision fee for those participating in program since July 1, 2004 [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
- Participants who have been in the intensive supervision program since July 1, 2004, whether placed into the program before or after July 1, 2004, shall pay a Fifty Dollar ($50.00) monthly supervision fee to the Mississippi Department of Corrections for their supervision from July 1, 2004, or from the date the participant entered the program after July 1, 2004, until completion of the program, or April 6, 2005, or whichever occurs first. From and after April 6, 2005, all participants of the intensive supervision program shall pay the fee as established in Section 47-5-1013.
- The Department of Corrections shall use its best effort to collect the monthly supervision fees in arrearage under this section.
- A participant’s failure to pay the monthly fees in arrearage shall not be deemed a violation of a condition of the program, and the participant shall not be removed from the program for failure to pay the monthly fees in arrearage.
- This section shall not apply to any fees incurred after April 6, 2005.
- Any arrearage remaining under this section at the end of the offender’s participation in the program shall automatically be reduced to a civil judgment and upon notice by the Department of Corrections shall be recorded with the circuit court clerk in the county wherein the participant resides. The Department of Corrections and/or the district attorney shall use best efforts to collect the judgment.
HISTORY: Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); reenacted without change, Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 8, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
For repeal of this section, see §47-5-1015.
Laws of 2005, ch. 485, § 11, provides as follows:
“SECTION 11. The intensive supervision program established in this act is a continuation of the intensive supervision program that existed on June 30, 2004. All actions taken by the Department of Corrections from July 1, 2004, to April 6, 2005, which would have been authorized under the prior intensive supervision program are ratified, confirmed and validated.”
Section 47-5-1015, which is the repealer for this section, was amended by § 1, Chapter 325, Laws of 2018, to extend the date of the repealer to June 30, 2020. The section heading is set out above to reflect the amended postponed repeal date. Since the section text as it appears in the bound volume is unaffected by the amendment of the repeal date, it is not reprinted in this supplement.
Amendment Notes —
The 2008 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2012 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2014 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2018 amendment, effective June 30, 2018, reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1015. Repeal of §§ 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015 [Repealed effective after June 30, 2022].
Sections 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015 shall stand repealed after June 30, 2022.
HISTORY: Laws, 1993, ch. 576, § 8; Laws, 1995, ch. 399, § 2; Laws, 1999, ch. 539, § 8; Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 8; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2003, ch. 418, § 8; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 9; Laws, 2006, ch. 392, § 8; Laws, 2008, ch. 479, § 9; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2012, ch. 316, § 9; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2014, ch. 317, § 9, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 12, 2014); Laws, 2018, ch. 325, § 1, eff from and after June 30, 2018; Laws, 2018, ch. 408, § 9, eff from and after June 30, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of Chapter 325, Laws of 2018, effective from and after June 30, 2018 (approved March 7, 2018), amended this section. Section 9 of Chapter 408, Laws of 2018, effective from and after June 30, 2018 (approved March 21, 2018), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 9 of Chapter 408, Laws of 2018, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Amendment Notes —
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section and extended the repealer for §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1015 from “June 30, 2003” to “June 30, 2004. ”
The 2005 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the date of the repealer for §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1015 from “June 30, 2004” until “June 30, 2006.”
The 2006 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1015 from “June 30, 2006” until “June 30, 2008.”
The 2008 amendment extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1015 by substituting “June 30, 2012” for “June 30, 2008.”
The 2012 amendment reenacted and amended the section by extending the repealer provision from “June 30, 2012” to “June 30, 2014.”
The 2014 amendment extended the repealer provision from “June 30, 2014” to “June 30, 2018.”
The first 2018 amendment (ch. 325), effective June 30, 2018, extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1015 by substituting “June 30, 2020” for “June 30, 2018.”
The second 2018 amendment (ch. 408), effective June 30, 2018, extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1014 by substituting “June 30, 2022” for “June 30, 2018.”
Special Needs Prison Program of 1994
§ 47-5-1101. Short title.
Sections 47-5-1101 through 47-5-1123 shall be cited as the “Special Needs Prison Program of 1994.”
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 1; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Editor’s Notes —
Section47-5-1123, which provided for the repeal of §§47-5-1101 through47-5-1121 and is referred to in this section, was repealed by § 1 of Chapter 582, Laws of 2006, effective from and after July 2, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 11.
§ 47-5-1103. Definitions.
As used in Sections 47-5-1101 through 47-5-1123, unless the context otherwise requires:
“Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Corrections.
“Contractor” means any private entity entering into a contractual agreement with the commissioner to provide special needs facilities or correctional services to inmates under the custody of the department.
“Department” means the Department of Corrections.
“Special needs” means an inmate with diminished mental or physical health requiring specialized health care facilities or services. This does not include HIV positive inmates.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 2; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Editor’s Notes —
Section47-5-1123, which provided for the repeal of §§47-5-1101 through47-5-1121 and is referred to in this section, was repealed by § 1 of Chapter 582, Laws of 2006, effective from and after July 2, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1105. Contracts for special needs facilities and services; eligibility of inmate for special needs facility; rates and benefits standards.
- The commissioner is authorized to enter into contracts for a special needs correctional facility and services only as provided in Sections 47-5-1101 through 47-5-1123.
- No contract shall be entered into unless it offers cost savings of at least ten percent (10%) to the department.
- Any inmate sentenced to the custody of the department identified as having a special need may be eligible to be incarcerated in a special needs correctional facility in which a contractor is providing correctional services.
- The rates and benefits for correctional services shall be negotiated by the commissioner based upon American Correction Association Standards, state law and court orders.
- The special needs facility or the site for a proposed facility must comply with all local zoning ordinances and regulations.
- The department may contract for the construction or leasing of a special needs facility. Any facility operated by a private contractor must house medium or maximum security inmates.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 3; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Editor’s Notes —
Section47-5-1123, which provided for the repeal of §§47-5-1101 through47-5-1121 and is referred to in this section, was repealed by § 1 of Chapter 582, Laws of 2006, effective from and after July 2, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1107. Standards for design, construction, maintenance, and operation of facilities.
All facilities that are governed by this chapter shall be designed, constructed, and at all times maintained and operated in accordance with the American Correctional Association Standards in force at the time of contracting, as well as with subsequent ACA Standards to the extent that they are approved by the contracting agency. The facility shall meet the percentage of standards required for accreditation by the American Correctional Association.
In addition, all facilities shall at all times comply with all federal and state constitutional standards, federal, state and local laws, and all court orders.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 4; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 4, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1109. Term limits on contracts for operation and construction of facilities.
The initial contract for the operation of a facility or for incarceration of prisoners or inmates therein shall be for a period of not more than five (5) years with an option to renew for an additional period of two (2) years. Contracts for construction, purchase, or lease of a facility shall not exceed a term of fifteen (15) years. Any contract for housing beyond the initial five (5) years shall be subject to annual appropriation by the Legislature if public funds are used to finance the construction.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 5; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1111. Private “correctional officers” of contractors; use of force and firearms restricted; training.
- A contractor’s employees serving as “correctional officers” shall be allowed to use force only while on the grounds of a facility, while transporting inmates, and while pursuing escapees from a facility.
- A contractor shall be authorized to use only such nondeadly force as the circumstances require in the following situations: to prevent the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, including escape; to defend oneself or others against physical assault; to prevent serious damage to property; to enforce institutional regulations and orders; and to prevent or quell a riot.
- A contractor’s employees, while performing their officially assigned duties relating to the custody, control, transportation, recapture or arrest of any escaped offender assigned to a contract prison, shall be authorized to use force and firearms as necessary to pursue and recapture escapees.
- Private correctional officers who have been appropriately certified as determined by the contracting agency and trained pursuant to the provisions of subsection (5) shall have the right to carry and use firearms and shall exercise such authority and use deadly force only as a last resort, and then only to prevent an act that could result in death or serious bodily injury to oneself or to another person.
- Private correctional officers shall be trained in the use of force and the use of firearms, in accordance with ACA Standards and shall be trained, at the contractor’s expense, for at least the minimum number of hours that public personnel are currently trained.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 6; Laws, 1998, ch. 581, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 6; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1113. Employee training.
All employees of a facility operated pursuant to Sections 47-5-1101 through 47-5-1123 must receive, at a minimum, the same quality and quantity of training as that required by the state, for employees of public correctional and detention facilities. All training expenses shall be the responsibility of the contractor.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 7; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Editor’s Notes —
Section47-5-1123, which provided for the repeal of §§47-5-1101 through47-5-1121 and is referred to in this section, was repealed by § 1 of Chapter 582, Laws of 2006, effective from and after July 2, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1115. Prerequisites for contracting for correctional services.
A contract for correctional services shall not be entered into unless the following requirements are met:
The contractor provides an adequate plan of insurance, specifically including insurance for civil rights claims, as determined by an independent risk management/actuarial firm with demonstrated experience in public liability for state governments. In determining the adequacy of the plan, such firm shall determine whether:
The insurance is adequate to protect the state from any and all actions by a third party against the contractor or the state as a result of the contract;
The insurance is adequate to protect the state against any and all claims arising as a result of any occurrence during the term of the contract; that is, the insurance is adequate on an occurrence basis, not on a claims-made basis;
The insurance is adequate to assure the contractor’s ability to fulfill its contract with the state in all respects, and to assure that the contractor is not limited in this ability because of financial liability which results from judgments; and
The insurance is adequate to satisfy such other requirements specified by the independent risk management/actuarial firm.
The sovereign immunity of the state shall not apply to the contractor. Neither the contractor nor the insurer of the contractor may plead the defense of sovereign immunity in any action arising out of the performance of the contract.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 8; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 8, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1117. Plan for resumption of state control of facility upon termination of contract.
A plan shall be developed and certified by the commissioner which demonstrates the method by which the state would resume control of the prison upon contract termination. Such plan shall be submitted for review and comment to law enforcement agencies, the district attorney and circuit judges in the county in which the prison is located.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 9; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1119. Monitoring of contracts and facilities by commissioner and medical director.
- The commissioner shall monitor any contracts with prison contractors providing correctional services and shall report at least annually, or as requested, to the Senate Committee on Corrections and the House Penitentiary Committee on the performance of the contractor.
- The medical director of the department shall be responsible for monitoring all aspects of the facility. The medical director may designate a person to assist in monitoring at the facility, as the medical director determines to be necessary. The medical director shall be provided an on-site work area, shall be on-site on a daily basis, and shall have access to all areas of the facility and to inmates and staff at all times. The contractor shall provide any and all data, reports and other materials that the medical director determines are necessary to carry out monitoring responsibilities under this section.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 10; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
§ 47-5-1121. Nondelegable responsibilities.
No contract for private correctional facilities or services shall authorize, allow, or imply a delegation of the authority or responsibility of the state to a prison contractor to:
Classify inmates or place inmates in less restrictive custody or more restrictive custody;
Transfer an inmate, although the contractor may recommend in writing that the department transfer a particular inmate;
Grant, deny, or revoke sentence credits;
Recommend that the parole board either deny or grant parole, although the contractor may submit written reports that have been prepared in the ordinary course of business;
Develop and implement procedures for calculating sentence credits or inmate release and parole eligibility dates;
Require an inmate to work, except on department-approved projects; approve the type of work that inmates may perform; or award or withhold wages or sentence credits based on the manner in which individual inmates perform such work; or
Determine inmate eligibility for furlough and work release.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2003, ch. 372, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 11; reenacted without change, Laws, 2006, ch. 385, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2006.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2003 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2004 amendment reenacted the section without change.
The 2006 amendment reenacted the section without change.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 7.
§ 47-5-1123. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 2006, ch. 582, § 1 effective from and after July 2, 2006.
§47-5-1123. [Laws, 1994, ch. 450, § 12; Laws, 1999, ch. 540, § 12; Laws, 2001, ch. 397, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 480, § 12; Laws, 2002, ch. 617, § 12; Laws, 2003, ch. 372; Laws, 2004, ch. 471, § 12, eff from and after July 1, 2004].
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 12 of ch. 385, Laws of 2006, effective from and after July 1, 2006 (approved March 13, 2006), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 582, Laws of 2006, effective from and after July 2, 2006 (approved April 24, 2006), repealed this section. As set out above, this section reflects the repeal in Section 1 of ch. 582, Laws of 2006, pursuant to the terms of Section 2 of ch. 582, Laws, 2006.
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-1123 was entitled: “Repeal of Sections47-5-1101 through47-5-1121.”
Laws of 2006, ch. 582, § 2 provides as follows:
“SECTION 2. It is the intent of the Legislature that the repeal of Section 47-5-1123, Mississippi Code of 1972, contained in this Senate Bill No. 2585, 2006 Regular Session [Chapter 582], shall supersede the amendment to this section contained in House Bill No. 552, 2006 Regular Session [§ 12, ch. 385, Laws of 2006].”
Amendment Notes —
The 2006 amendment (ch. 385) extended the date of the repealer for §§47-5-1101 through47-5-1121 from “July 1, 2006” until “July 1, 2008.”
State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board
§ 47-5-1201. Legislative intent and purpose.
The purpose of this legislation is to alleviate the immediate and the projected operating capacity needs of the state correctional system by providing for the immediate and long-term addition of correctional facilities. It is the intent of the Legislature that agencies expedite the procurement of facilities to alleviate the short-term emergency capacity needs of the correctional system.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
§ 47-5-1203. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws, 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 26, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1996.
[Laws, 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 26, § 2]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-5-1203 related to the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board.
This section, as enacted by Laws, 1994, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 26, § 2, contained a self-executing repealer, effective from and after July 1, 1996.
§ 47-5-1205. Board to provide for construction and equipping of additional housing and support facilities.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board shall provide for the construction and shall equip additional housing and necessary support facilities for one thousand two hundred sixteen (1,216) medium security male offenders and for two hundred (200) male offenders sentenced to evidence-based programs for the benefit of inmates at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution. The department may house offenders not sentenced to such programs in the two hundred (200) beds reserved for the program as it deems appropriate.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board shall provide for the construction and shall equip additional housing and support facilities for seven hundred (700) medium security male offenders at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board shall use funds from the “Corrections Facilities Emergency Construction Fund.”
- The Department of Finance and Administration shall use its emergency powers to expedite the construction of these facilities. In the planning, design, procurement and construction of these facilities, the board shall make maximum utilization of plans, specifications and processes used in, completed or on-going construction projects for the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 3; Laws, 2007, ch. 474, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 463, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2015.
Amendment Notes —
The 2007 amendment added the last sentence in (1).
The 2015 amendment, in (1), substituted “evidence-based programs for the benefit of inmates” for “the Regimented Inmate Discipline Program” in the next-to-last sentence, and substituted “such programs” for “Regimented Inmate Discipline Program” in the last sentence.
§ 47-5-1207. Board to select suitable sites for various public and private facilities.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board shall select a suitable site or sites for a public or private facility not to exceed one thousand (1,000) beds in any of the following counties: Lauderdale, Quitman, Perry and Sharkey.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board may contract for the construction, lease, acquisition, improvement, operation and management of a private correctional facility in Marshall County or Wilkinson County for the private incarceration of not more than one thousand (1,000) state inmates at the facility.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board may contract with any county industrial or economic development authority or district for the construction, lease, acquisition, improvement, operation and management of a private correctional facility to be sited or constructed under Chapter 26, Laws of 1994 First Extraordinary Session.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board may contract for the construction, lease, acquisition, improvement and operation of two (2) private restitution centers, one of which may be in Bolivar County. The capacity of each restitution center shall not exceed seventy-five (75) state inmates.
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- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board may contract for the special needs facility and services authorized in Sections 47-5-1101 through 47-5-1123.
- No later than September 15, 1994, the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review shall determine the state medical cost per inmate day to use as a basis for measuring the validity of ten percent (10%) savings of the contractor cost.
- Each private contractor and private facility housing state inmates must meet the requirements of Section 47-5-1211 through Section 47-5-1227.
- No additional emergency prisons shall be located in any city and/or county, except upon the submission to the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board, of a resolution signed by a majority of the governing authorities of the city and/or county, wherein the proposed prison site is to be located, approving and/or requesting that a prison facility be located at the proposed site.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 4, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 47-5-1123, referred to in (5)(a), was repealed by Laws of 2006, ch. 582, § 1, effective from and after July 2, 2006.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
An economic development district, not being an economic development authority, is subject to the purchase laws of the State of Mississippi; trustees of a development district control funds collected for support of the district and may upon a majority vote approve properly submitted bills for payment; funds must be placed in the county depository at which the development district may have its own separate account; and there is no authority for a development district to provide meals for its appointed trustees at their meetings. Munn, January 9, 1998, A.G. Op. #97-0816.
§ 47-5-1209. Noxubee County Prison Work Program.
- There is created the Noxubee County Prison Work Program, to be located at the Industrial Park in Macon, Mississippi. The Noxubee County Prison Work Program shall be established pursuant to the authority granted in Sections 47-5-451 through 47-5-469 that provide for the joint state-county work programs, in order to achieve the legislative intent as set out in Section 47-5-351, making maximum utilization of the farmlands for the purpose of feeding offenders.
- The State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board, subject to such funding as the Legislature may make available, may modify any existing facility or construct and equip one (1) seventy-five-bed correctional work camp in accordance with Section 47-5-455, on the site of the Industrial Park in Macon, Mississippi. The purpose of constructing this work camp is to provide housing and necessary support in order that the offenders may be available to work for the municipalities and counties in the surrounding areas in addition to working at the Industrial Park.
- In the construction and renovation of a work camp, the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board, in conjunction with the Mississippi Department of Corrections, shall utilize offenders in the custody of the Department of Corrections for construction to the extent such labor is available. The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall: establish, maintain and implement a program for training and utilizing offenders in construction projects; determine and provide to the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board the name, the number and construction skills of offenders; and provide security officers to be in attendance during all hours when offenders are involved in construction. When necessary construction skills are not available from the offender population, the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board may contract with private contractors or mechanics to perform necessary construction work.
- In the planning, design, procurement and construction of a work camp, the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board shall make maximum utilization of plans and specifications prepared for, and processes employed in, completed or ongoing construction projects for the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 6, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
§ 47-5-1211. Contracts for private correctional facilities or services; experience of contractor; rates and benefits standards.
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A contract for private correctional facilities or services shall not be entered into unless the contractor has demonstrated that it has:
- The qualifications, experience and management personnel necessary to carry out the terms of the contract.
- The ability to expedite the siting, design and construction of correctional facilities.
- The ability to comply with applicable laws, court orders and national correctional standards.
- Demonstrated history of successful operation and management of other correctional facilities.
- A facility shall at all times comply with all federal and state laws, and all applicable court orders.
-
- No contract for private incarceration shall be entered into unless the cost of the private operation, including the state’s cost for monitoring the private operation, offers a cost savings of at least ten percent (10%) to the Department of Corrections for at least the same level and quality of service offered by the Department of Corrections.
- Beginning in 2012, and every two (2) years thereafter, the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review (PEER) shall contract with a certified public accounting firm to establish a state inmate cost per day using financial information of the Department of Corrections for the most recently completed fiscal year. The state inmate cost per day shall be certified as required by this section. The certified cost shall be used as the basis for measuring the validity of the ten percent (10%) savings of the contractor costs.
- Prior to engaging a certified public accountant, the PEER Committee, in conjunction with the Department of Corrections, shall develop a current cost-based model that will serve as a basis for the report produced as authorized by this section.
- The rates and benefits for correctional services shall be negotiated based upon American Correction Association standards, state law and court orders.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 7; Laws, 2012, ch. 399, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2012.
Amendment Notes —
The 2012 amendment rewrote (3)(b) and added (c).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
Contract with a county to house certain adult male maximum security state inmates to comply with cost-savings requirements provided in this section, see §47-5-942.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Private correctional facilities and services contracted for pursuant to the provisions of Sections 47-5-1211 et seq. are not subject to the construction and purchasing laws requiring public bids. This statutory scheme constitutes a separate authority for this type of contract in addition to and outside the regular statutes. Puckett, May 31, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0361.
Donations become a part of the cost calculation of the private prison is a factual question to be determined by the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review through its contract with the certified public accounting firm pursuant to Section 47-5-1211. Reeves, December 6, 1996, A.G. Op. #96-0769.
A contract between Mississippi Department of Corrections and a private medical provider for healthcare services at a private prison is not subject to the state’s public bid law. Johnson, Oct. 26, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0652.
§ 47-5-1213. Term limits on contracts for operation and construction of facilities; conveyance of facilities to state.
The initial contract for the operation of a facility or for incarceration of inmates therein shall be for a period of not more than five (5) years with an option to renew for an additional period of two (2) years. Contracts for construction, purchase, or lease of a facility shall not exceed a term of twenty (20) years. Such contracts shall provide that the contractor shall convey the facility to the state, at the option of the state, for a total consideration of One Dollar ($1.00). Any contract for housing shall be subject to annual appropriation by the Legislature.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 8, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1215. Private “correctional officers” of contractors; use of force and firearms restricted; training.
- A contractor’s employees serving as “correctional officers” shall be allowed to use force only while on the grounds of a facility, while transporting inmates, and while pursuing escapees from a facility.
- Private correctional officers shall be authorized to use only such non-deadly force as the circumstances require in the following situations: to prevent the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, including escape; to defend oneself or others against physical assault; to prevent serious damage to property; to enforce institutional regulations and orders; and to prevent or quell a riot.
- A contractor’s employees, while performing their officially assigned duties relating to the custody, control, transportation, recapture or arrest of any escaped offender assigned to a contract prison, shall be authorized to use force and firearms as necessary to pursue and recapture escapees.
- Private correctional officers who have been appropriately certified as determined by the contracting agency and trained pursuant to the provisions of subsection (5) shall have the right to carry and use firearms and shall exercise such authority and may use deadly force to prevent an act that could result in death or serious bodily injury to oneself or to another person.
- Private correctional officers shall be trained in the use of force and the use of firearms, in accordance with ACA Standards and shall be trained, at the private contractor’s expense, for at least the minimum number of hours that public personnel are currently trained.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 9; Laws, 1998, ch. 581, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1217. Employee training.
All employees of a facility operated pursuant to Sections 47-5-1201 through 47-5-1229 must receive, at a minimum, the same quality and quantity of training as that required by the state, for employees of public correctional and detention facilities. All training expenses shall be the responsibility of the contractor.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 10, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1219. Prerequisites for contracting for correctional services; defense of suits or claims.
A contract for correctional services shall not be entered into unless the following requirements are met:
In addition to fire and casualty insurance, the contractor provides at least Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) of liability insurance, specifically including insurance for civil rights claims. The liability insurance shall be issued by an insurance company with a rating of at least an A- according to A.M. Best standards. In determining the adequacy of such insurance, the Department of Finance and Administration shall determine whether:
The insurance is adequate to protect the state from any and all actions by a third party against the contractor or the state as a result of the contract;
The insurance is adequate to protect the state against any and all claims arising as a result of any occurrence during the term of the contract;
The insurance is adequate to assure the contractor’s ability to fulfill its contract with the state in all respects, and to assure that the contractor is not limited in this ability because of financial liability which results from judgments; and
The insurance is adequate to satisfy such other requirements specified by the independent risk management/actuarial firm.
The sovereign immunity of the state shall not apply to the contractor. Neither the contractor nor the insurer of the contractor may plead the defense of sovereign immunity in any action arising out of the performance of the contract.
The contractor shall post a performance bond to assure the contractor’s faithful performance of the specifications and conditions of the contract. The bond is required throughout the term of the contract. The terms and conditions must be approved by the Department of Corrections and the Department of Finance and Administration and such approval is a condition precedent to the contract taking effect.
The contractor shall defend any suit or claim brought against the State of Mississippi arising out of any act or omission in the operation of a private facility, and shall hold the State of Mississippi harmless from such claim or suit. The contractor shall be solely responsible for the payment of any legal or other costs relative to any such claim or suit. The contractor shall reimburse the State of Mississippi for any costs that it may incur as a result of such claim or suit immediately upon being submitted a statement therefor by the Attorney General.
The duties and obligations of the contractor pursuant to this subsection shall include, but not be limited to, any claim or suit brought under any federal or state civil rights or prisoners rights statutes or pursuant to any such rights recognized by common law or case law, or federal or state constitutions.
Any suit brought or claim made arising out of any act or omission in the operation of a private facility shall be made or brought against the contractor and not the State of Mississippi.
The Attorney General retains all rights and emoluments of his office which include direction and control over any litigation or claim involving the State of Mississippi.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 11, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1221. Plan for resumption of state control of facility upon termination of contract.
A plan shall be developed and certified by the commissioner which demonstrates the method by which the state would resume control of the prison upon contract termination. Such plan shall be submitted for review and comment to law enforcement agencies, the district attorney and circuit judges in the county in which the prison is located.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 12, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1223. Contract compliance officer; reimbursement of contract compliance officer’s salary and expenses by private entity.
- The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections shall designate an existing employee of the Department of Corrections as a contract compliance officer within the department which shall monitor any contracts between the state and private entities for the operation and management of correctional facilities, and shall assure contractor compliance with its performance work statement and assure the provision of prisoner care requirements.
- The contract compliance officer shall be responsible for monitoring all aspects of each privatized correctional facility.The officer shall be provided an on-site work area, shall be on-site on a daily basis, and shall have access to all areas of the facilities and to offenders and staff at all times.The private contractor or contractors shall provide any and all data, reports and other materials that the contract compliance officer determines are necessary to carry out monitoring responsibilities under this section.
- The contract compliance officer shall report at least annually, or as requested, to the Governor, the Senate Committee on Corrections, the House Penitentiary Committee and the Joint Legislative Committee on Performance Evaluation and Expenditure Review on the performance of the private contractor or contractors.
- The salary and expenses of the contract compliance officer shall be reimbursed to the Department of Corrections by the private entity that has contracted to operate or manage a correctional facility.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 13; Laws, 2010, ch. 403, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2010.
Amendment Notes —
The 2010 amendment added (4).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1225. Nondelegable responsibilities.
No contract for private correctional facilities or services shall authorize, allow, or imply a delegation of the authority or responsibility of the state to a prison contractor to:
Classify inmates or place inmates in less restrictive custody or more restrictive custody;
Transfer an inmate, although the contractor may recommend in writing that the department transfer a particular inmate;
Grant, deny, or revoke sentence credits;
Recommend that the parole board either deny or grant parole, although the contractor may submit written reports that have been prepared in the ordinary course of business;
Develop and implement procedures for calculating sentence credits or inmate release and parole eligibility dates;
Require an inmate to work, except on department-approved projects; approve the type of work that inmates may perform; or award or withhold wages or sentence credits based on the manner in which individual inmates perform such work; or
Determine inmate eligibility for furlough and work release.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 14, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
§ 47-5-1227. Restrictions on employment of public officials and employees by private entities.
- No public official or an employee of a state agency who has duties or responsibilities related to the contracting, constructing, leasing, acquiring or operating a private correctional facility may become an employee, consultant or contract vendor to a private entity providing such facility or services to the state within one (1) year after the termination of his service or employment.
- Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not less than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) but not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 15, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Cross References —
Contracts with Wilkinson County industrial development or economic development authority for the private incarceration of state inmates to comply with this section, see §47-5-941.
Contracts for provision of private housing, care and control of juvenile offenders to comply with this section, see §47-5-943.
Imposition of standard state assessment in addition to all court imposed fines or other penalties for any misdemeanor violation, see §99-19-73.
§ 47-5-1229. Correctional Facilities Emergency Construction Fund.
There is hereby created a special fund to be designated as the “Correctional Facilities Emergency Construction Fund.” Any monies as may be appropriated by the Legislature shall be deposited into the fund. The expenditure of monies out of the fund shall be under the direction of the State Prison Emergency Construction and Management Board as spread on its minutes and such funds shall be paid by the State Treasurer upon warrants issued by the Executive Director of the Department of Finance and Administration.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 17, eff from and after passage (approved August 23, 1994).
Prison Industry Enhancement Program
§ 47-5-1251. Prison Industry Enhancement Program; creation.
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There is created the “Prison Industry Enhancement Program,” through which the Department of Corrections may contract with the nonprofit corporation organized and formed under the “Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990” to employ offenders within the custody of the department or prison industries. The offenders must be under the supervision of the department at all times while working. The offenders shall be paid, by the entity or entities, wages at a rate which is not less than that paid for similar work in the locality in which the work is performed. The wages may be subject to deductions which shall not, in the aggregate, exceed eighty percent (80%) of gross wages. The deductions shall be limited to the following:
- To pay federal, state and local taxes;
- To pay reasonable charges for room and board as determined by regulations issued by the Commissioner of Corrections;
- To support the offender’s family pursuant to state statute, court order or agreement by the offender; and
- To pay contributions equaling not less than five percent (5%) but not more than twenty percent (20%) of the offender’s gross wages into the Crime Victims’ Compensation Fund as created in Section 99-41-29.
- Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, the offenders shall not be qualified to receive any payments for unemployment compensation while incarcerated. However, the offenders shall not solely by their status as offenders be deprived of the right to participate in benefits made available by the federal or state government to other individuals on the basis of their employment, such as workers’ compensation.
- Offenders who participate in the employment must do so voluntarily and must agree in advance to the specific deductions made from gross wages pursuant to this section and to all other financial arrangements or benefits resulting from participation in the employment.
- The Department of Corrections shall develop rules and regulations to meet the criteria established by the Bureau of Justice Assistance under the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program.
HISTORY: Laws, 1996, ch. 547, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 434, § 3, eff from and after Mar. 14, 2001.
Cross References —
Mississippi Prison Industries Act of 1990, see §§47-5-531 et seq.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Participants of the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) program are employees not of the Mississippi Prison Industries Corporation, but may be considered employees of the private employers with which the Mississippi Department of Corrections contracts for workers’ compensation purposes and, therefore, the Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers’ Compensation Trust cannot extend workers’ compensation coverage to those inmates participating in the PIE program. Self, May 5, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0189.
Jurisdiction Over Correctional Facilities and Grounds
§ 47-5-1301. United States jurisdiction over correctional facilities and grounds.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, as a supplementary method for granting concurrent jurisdiction to the United States, the Governor of the State of Mississippi may grant to the United States full civil and criminal jurisdiction concurrent with the State of Mississippi over any correctional facility and the grounds of the facility in which are housed or located inmates committed to the custody of the United States or over any correctional facility and the grounds of the facility which are owned by a private entity that has entered into a contract for the confinement of inmates committed to the custody of the United States.
HISTORY: Laws, 1997, ch. 530, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved April 10, 1997).
Interstate Corrections Compact
§ 47-5-1351. Interstate Corrections Compact; purpose and policy; definitions; contracts; procedures and rights; extradition; federal aid; when compact becomes effective; withdrawal and termination; construction and severability.
The Governor, on behalf of this state may execute the Interstate Corrections Compact, with any and all states legally joining therein, in substantially the following form and the Legislature signifies in advance its approval and ratification of such compact:
HISTORY: Laws, 2005, ch. 362, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2005.
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT
Article I Purpose and Policy
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a basis of cooperation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the mutual development and execution of such programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human and material resources.
Article II Definitions
As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
“State” means a state of the United States, the United States of America, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
“Sending state” means a state party to this compact in which conviction or court commitment was had;
“Receiving state” means a state party to this compact to which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction or court commitment was had;
“Inmate” means a male or female offender who is committed, under sentence to or confined in, a penal or correctional institution; and
“Institution” means any penal or correctional facility, including, but not limited to, a facility for the mentally ill or mentally defective, in which inmates defined in (d) above may lawfully be confined.
Article III Contracts
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Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated within receiving states. Any such contract shall provide for:
- Its duration;
- Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part of normal maintenance.
- Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any; the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof; and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting therefrom;
- Delivery and retaking of inmates; and
- Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states.
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The terms and provisions of this compact entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto, and nothing in any such contract shall be inconsistent therewith.
Article IV Procedures and Rights
- Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release on probation or parole, for discharge or for any other purpose permitted by the laws of the sending state, provided, that the sending state shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III.
- Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this compact including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have official review of his or her record in determining and altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state.
- All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights which said inmate would have had if in an appropriate institution of the sending state.
- Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state if authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of the sending state.
- Any inmate confined pursuant to this compact shall be released within the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory.
- Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations, or have such obligations modified or his status changed on account of any action or proceedings in which he could have participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state located within such state.
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The parent, guardian, trustee or other person or persons entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise or otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of any power in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact.
Article V Acts Not Reviewable in Receiving State: Extradition
Article VI Federal Aid
Any state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state pursuant to this compact may participate in any such federally aided program or activity for which the sending or the receiving state have made contractual provision; provided, that if such program or activity is not part of the customary correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official of the sending state shall be required therefrom.
Article VII Entry into Force
This compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two (2) states. Thereafter, this compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding as to any other of said states upon similar action by such state.
Article VIII Withdrawal and Termination
This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not take effect until one (1) year after the notices provided in said statute have been sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal. Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to the provisions of this compact.
Article IX Other Arrangement Unaffected
Nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a nonparty state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative institutional arrangements.
Article X Construction and Severability
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed and shall be severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate quarters and care or an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any institution in which it has a contractual right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution.
Any decisions of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is pending against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is formally accused of having committed within such state a criminal offense, the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment or detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this compact through any and all states’ party to this compact without interference.
An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is confined pursuant to this compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state and from the state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for institution of extradition or rendition proceedings shall be that of the sending state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an escapee.
Comparable Laws from other States —
Alabama: Code of Ala. §§14-13-1 et seq.
Alaska: Alaska Stat. §§ 33.36.010 et seq.
Arizona: A.R.S. § 31-491 et seq.
Arkansas: A.C.A. §12-49-101 et seq.
California: Cal Pen Code § 11189 et seq.
Colorado: C.R.S. 24-60-1601 et seq.
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-105 et seq.
Delaware: 11 Del. C. § 6570 et seq.
District of Columbia: D.C. Code § 24-1001 et seq.
Florida: Fla. Stat. § 941.55 et seq.
Georgia: O.C.G.A. §§42-11-1 et seq.
Hawaii: HRS §§ 355D-1 et seq.
Idaho: Idaho Code § 20-701 et seq.
Illinois: 730 ILCS 5/3-4-4.
Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. §§11-8-4-1 et seq.
Kansas: K.S.A. §§ 76-3001 et seq.
Kentucky: KRS § 196.610 et seq.
Maine: 34-A M.R.S. §§ 9401 et seq.
Maryland: Md. Correctional Services Code Ann. §§ 8-601 et seq.
Massachusetts: Mass. Spec. Laws ch. S138, § 1.
Michigan: MCLS §§ 3.981 et seq. MCLS § 791.211a.
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 241.28
Missouri: §§ 217.525 et seq.
Montana: Mont. Code Anno., §§46-19-401,46-19-402.
Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. §§ 29-3401, 29-3402.
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 215A.010 et seq.
New Hampshire: 60 RSA 622-B:1
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. § 30:7C-1 et seq.
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-5-17
New York: NY CLS Correc §§ 100 et seq.
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-119 et seq.
Ohio: ORC Ann. 5120.50.
Oklahoma: 57 Okl. St. §§ 601, 602.
Oregon: ORS § 421.245 et seq.
Pennsylvania: 61 Pa. C.S. §§ 7101 et seq.
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§24-11-10 et seq.
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §41-23-101 et seq.
Texas: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.19
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§77-28a-1 et seq.
Vermont: 28 V.S.A. §§ 1601 – 1610, 1621.
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1-216, 53.1-217.
Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §§ 72.74.010 et seq.
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. §§ 302.25, 302.255.
Youthful Offenders
§ 47-5-1401. Establishment of Youthful Offender Unit at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility; age limitations on youth housed in unit.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall establish a Youthful Offender Unit (“YOU”) at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility. All youth ages seventeen (17) years of age and under and who are assigned to a Mississippi Department of Corrections prison shall be housed in the YOU, except that nothing in this section shall prohibit the department from housing a youth who is seventeen (17) years of age and under in a community work center or other environments that are less restrictive than a Mississippi Department of Corrections prison.
Youth ages seventeen (17) and under as prescribed in this section shall be housed in the YOU, separate from adult inmates. No individual who is over the age of nineteen (19) shall be housed in the YOU. The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections shall have discretion to house individuals who are eighteen (18) and nineteen (19) years of age and who have been classified as vulnerable in the YOU.
The Mississippi Department of Corrections shall provide youth housed at the YOU with the opportunity for the appropriate amounts of interactive, structured rehabilitative and/or educational programming, recreational and leisure activities outside of their cells on a daily basis, including weekends and holidays. The programming developed, as prescribed in this subsection shall, to the extent possible, be tailored to the developmental needs of adolescents.
HISTORY: Laws, 2012, ch. 489, § 2, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 26, 2012.).
Chapter 7. Probation and Parole
Probation and Parole Law
§ 47-7-1. Probation and Parole Law.
This chaptershall be known as the “Probation and Parole Law.”
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 1; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 1; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 90; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 100; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 100, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1981 of ch. 465, § 118, which provided for the automatic repeal of provisions reenacting the Department of Corrections and the State Parole Board on June 30, 1984, was repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 126. In turn, Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for the automatic repeal of these provisions from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986), repealed Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Uniform act for out-of-state parolee supervision, see §47-7-71.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Offenses and convictions covered by pardon. 35 A.L.R.2d 1261.
Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 A.L.R.3d 306.
Validity of statutes prohibiting or restricting parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in cases of violent crimes. 100 A.L.R.3d 431.
Right of convicted defendant to refuse probation. 28 A.L.R.4th 736.
§ 47-7-2. Definitions.
For purposesof this chapter, the following words shall have the meaning ascribedherein unless the context shall otherwise require:
“Adult”means a person who is seventeen (17) years of age or older, or anyperson convicted of any crime not subject to the provisions of theyouth court law, or any person “certified” to be triedas an adult by any youth court in the state.
“Board”means the State Parole Board.
“Parolecase plan” means an individualized, written accountabilityand behavior change strategy developed by the department in collaborationwith the parole board to prepare offenders for release on parole atthe parole eligibility date. The case plan shall focus on the offender’scriminal risk factors that, if addressed, reduce the likelihood ofreoffending.
“Commissioner”means the Commissioner of Corrections.
“Correctionalsystem” means the facilities, institutions, programs and personnelof the department utilized for adult offenders who are committed tothe custody of the department.
“Criminalrisk factors” means characteristics that increase a person’slikelihood of reoffending. These characteristics include: antisocialbehavior; antisocial personality; criminal thinking; criminal associates;dysfunctional family; low levels of employment or education; pooruse of leisure and recreation; and substance abuse.
“Department”means the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
“Detention”means the temporary care of juveniles and adults who require securecustody for their own or the community’s protection in a physicallyrestricting facility prior to adjudication, or retention in a physicallyrestricting facility upon being taken into custody after an allegedparole or probation violation.
“Dischargeplan” means an individualized written document that providesinformation to support the offender in meeting the basic needs identifiedin the pre-release assessment. This information shall include, butis not limited to: contact names, phone numbers, and addresses ofreferrals and resources.
“Evidence-basedpractices” means supervision policies, procedures, and practicesthat scientific research demonstrates reduce recidivism.
“Facility”or “institution” means any facility for the custody,care, treatment and study of offenders which is under the supervisionand control of the department.
“Juvenile,”“minor” or “youthful” means a person lessthan seventeen (17) years of age.
“Offender”means any person convicted of a crime or offense under the laws andordinances of the state and its political subdivisions.
“Pre-releaseassessment” means a determination of an offender’s abilityto attend to basic needs, including, but not limited to, transportation,clothing and food, financial resources, personal identification documents,housing, employment, education, and health care, following release.
“Specialmeetings” means those meetings called by the chairman withat least twenty-four (24) hours’ notice or a unanimous waiverof notice.
“Supervisionplan” means a plan developed by the community corrections departmentto manage offenders on probation and parole in a way that reducesthe likelihood they will commit a new criminal offense or violatethe terms of supervision and that increases the likelihood of obtainingstable housing, employment and skills necessary to sustain positiveconduct.
“Technicalviolation” means an act or omission by the probationer thatviolates a condition or conditions of probation placed on the probationerby the court or the probation officer.
“Transitionalreentry center” means a state-operated or state-contractedfacility used to house offenders leaving the physical custody of theDepartment of Corrections on parole, probation or post-release supervisionwho are in need of temporary housing and services that reduce theirrisk to reoffend.
“Unitof local government” means a county, city, town, village orother general purpose political subdivision of the state.
“Riskand needs assessment” means the determination of a person’srisk to reoffend using an actuarial assessment tool validated on Mississippicorrections populations and the needs that, when addressed, reducethe risk to reoffend.
HISTORY: Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 3; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 91; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 101; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 101; Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 2; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 47, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1976, ch. 465, § 118, provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ”Mississippi Corrections Act of 1976.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment added (c), (f), (i), (j), (n), (p), (q), (r), and (t) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Constitutionality.
2. Technical violation.
1. Constitutionality.
In a post-conviction relief case, it was error to determine that this statute, which provided for graduated penalties for technical violations for probation and supervised release, was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine because there was nothing in the amendments to this statute that impinged upon a trial court’s ability to enforce its orders. The trial court retained its authority to determine whether there was a violation of a condition of supervised release, as well as the power to revoke the term of supervision and to impose a period of imprisonment; the Mississippi Legislature merely altered the term and place of imprisonment for certain violations. Atwood v. State, 183 So.3d 843, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 2016).
2. Technical violation.
Circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing appellant’s post-conviction-relief motion because its decision to impose a period of imprisonment greater than ninety days was not clearly erroneous since appellant committed at least three technical violations of his post-release supervision. Edmonson v. State, 238 So.3d 1218, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 101 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Because it was appellant’s first technical violation of his probation, he should have been sentenced to not more than ninety days in a technical-violation center or restitution center, not to the full term of his suspended sentence of five years’ incarceration. Walker v. State, 230 So.3d 709, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 230 So.3d 703, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 2017).
§ 47-7-3. Parole of prisoners; conditions for eligibility; determination of tentative hearing date.
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Every prisonerwho has been convicted of any offense against the State of Mississippi,and is confined in the execution of a judgment of such convictionin the Mississippi Department of Corrections for a definite term orterms of one (1) year or over, or for the term of his or her naturallife, whose record of conduct shows that such prisoner has observedthe rules of the department, and who has served not less than one-fourth(1/4) of the total of such term or terms for which such prisoner wassentenced, or, if sentenced to serve a term or terms of thirty (30)years or more, or, if sentenced for the term of the natural life ofsuch prisoner, has served not less than ten (10) years of such lifesentence, may be released on parole as hereinafter provided, exceptthat:
- No prisoner convictedas a confirmed and habitual criminal under the provisions of Sections 99-19-81 through 99-19-87 shall be eligiblefor parole;
- Any person whoshall have been convicted of a sex crime shall not be released onparole except for a person under the age of nineteen (19) who hasbeen convicted under Section 97-3-67;
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- No person shallbe eligible for parole who shall, on or after January 1, 1977, beconvicted of robbery or attempted robbery through the display of afirearm until he shall have served ten (10) years if sentenced toa term or terms of more than ten (10) years or if sentenced for theterm of the natural life of such person. If such person is sentencedto a term or terms of ten (10) years or less, then such person shallnot be eligible for parole. The provisions of this paragraph (c)(i)shall also apply to any person who shall commit robbery or attemptedrobbery on or after July 1, 1982, through the display of a deadlyweapon. This paragraph (c)(i) shall not apply to persons convictedafter September 30, 1994;
- No person shallbe eligible for parole who shall, on or after October 1, 1994, beconvicted of robbery, attempted robbery or carjacking as providedin Section 97-3-115 et seq.,through the display of a firearm or drive-by shooting as providedin Section 97-3-109. The provisionsof this paragraph (c)(ii) shall also apply to any person who shallcommit robbery, attempted robbery, carjacking or a drive-by shootingon or after October 1, 1994, through the display of a deadly weapon.This paragraph (c)(ii) shall not apply to persons convicted afterJuly 1, 2014;
- No person shallbe eligible for parole who, on or after July 1, 1994, is charged,tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibilityfor parole under the provisions of Section 99-19-101;
- No person shallbe eligible for parole who is charged, tried, convicted and sentencedto life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 99-19-101;
- No person shallbe eligible for parole who is convicted or whose suspended sentenceis revoked after June 30, 1995, except that an offender convictedof only nonviolent crimes after June 30, 1995, may be eligible forparole if the offender meets the requirements in subsection (1) andthis paragraph. In addition to other requirements, if an offenderis convicted of a drug or driving under the influence felony, theoffender must complete a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program priorto parole or the offender may be required to complete a post-releasedrug and alcohol program as a condition of parole. For purposes ofthis paragraph, “nonviolent crime” means a felony otherthan homicide, robbery, manslaughter, sex crimes, arson, burglaryof an occupied dwelling, aggravated assault, kidnapping, feloniousabuse of vulnerable adults, felonies with enhanced penalties, except enhanced penalties for the crime of possessionof a controlled substance under Section 41-29-147, the sale or manufacture of a controlled substance under the UniformControlled Substances Law, felony child abuse, or exploitation orany crime under Section 97-5-33 or Section 97-5-39(2) or 97-5-39(1)(b), 97-5-39(1)(c) or a violationof Section 63-11-30(5). In addition,an offender incarcerated for committing the crime of possession ofa controlled substance under the Uniform Controlled Substances Lawafter July 1, 1995, including an offenderwho receives an enhanced penalty under the provisions of Section 41-29-147 for suchpossession, shall be eligible for parole. An offenderincarcerated for committing the crime of sale or manufacture of acontrolled substance shall be eligible for parole after serving one-fourth(1/4) of the sentence imposed by the trial court. This paragraph (f)shall not apply to persons convicted on or after July 1, 2014;
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1. The inmate issentenced as a habitual offender under Sections 99-19-81 through 99-19-87;
2. The inmate issentenced for a crime of violence under Section 97-3-2;
3. The inmate issentenced for an offense that specifically prohibits parole release;
4. The inmate issentenced for trafficking in controlled substances under Section 41-29-139(f);
5. The inmate issentenced for a sex crime; or
6. The inmate hasnot served one-fourth (1/4) of the sentence imposed by the court.
- No person who,on or after July 1, 2014, is convicted of a crime of violence pursuantto Section 97-3-2, a sex crimeor an offense that specifically prohibits parole release, shall beeligible for parole. All persons convicted of any other offense onor after July 1, 2014, are eligible for parole after they have servedone-fourth (1/4) of the sentence or sentences imposed by the trialcourt.
- Notwithstandingthe provisions in subparagraph (i) of this paragraph (g), a personserving a sentence who has reached the age of sixty (60) or olderand who has served no less than ten (10) years of the sentence orsentences imposed by the trial court shall be eligible for parole.Any person eligible for parole under this subsection shall be requiredto have a parole hearing before the board prior to parole release.No inmate shall be eligible for parole under this paragraph of thissubsection if:
- Notwithstandingthe provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection, any offender who has not committed a crimeof violence under Section 97-3-2 and has servedtwenty-five percent (25%) or more of his sentence may be paroled bythe parole board if, after the sentencing judge or if the sentencingjudge is retired, disabled or incapacitated, the senior circuit judgeauthorizes the offender to be eligible for parole consideration;
- Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw, an inmate who has not been convicted as a habitual offender under Sections 99-19-81 through 99-19-87, has not been convictedof committing a crime of violence, as defined under Section 97-3-2, has not beenconvicted of a sex crime or any other crime that specifically prohibitsparole release, and has not been convicted of drug trafficking under Section 41-29-139 is eligiblefor parole if the inmate has served twenty-five percent (25%) or moreof his or her sentence, but is otherwise ineligible for parole.
- Notwithstandingany other provision of law, an inmate shall not be eligible to receiveearned time, good time or any other administrative reduction of timewhich shall reduce the time necessary to be served for parole eligibilityas provided in subsection (1) of this section.
- The State ParoleBoard shall, by rules and regulations, establish a method of determininga tentative parole hearing date for each eligible offender taken intothe custody of the Department of Corrections. The tentative parolehearing date shall be determined within ninety (90) days after thedepartment has assumed custody of the offender. The parole hearingdate shall occur when the offender is within thirty (30) days of themonth of his parole eligibility date. The parole eligibility dateshall not be earlier than one-fourth (1/4) of the prison sentenceor sentences imposed by the court.
- Any inmate withintwenty-four (24) months of his parole eligibility date and who meetsthe criteria established by the classification board shall receivepriority for placement in any educational development and job trainingprograms that are part of his or her parole case plan. Any inmaterefusing to participate in an educational development or job trainingprogram that is part of the case plan may be in jeopardy of noncompliancewith the case plan and may be denied parole.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-03; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 2; Laws, 1946, ch. 486, § 2; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 4; Laws, 1958, ch. 233, § 2; Laws, 1964, ch. 366; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 79; Laws, 1976, ch. 470, § 5; Laws, 1980, ch. 511; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 92; Laws, 1982, ch. 431, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 102; Laws, 1985, ch. 499, § 16; Laws, 1985, ch. 531, § 3; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 102; Laws, 1986, ch. 435, § 1; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 4; Laws, 1993, ch. 443, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 566, § 2; Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 5; Laws, 1995, ch. 575, § 2; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 3; Laws, 2001, ch. 393, § 11; Laws, 2002, ch. 413, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 407, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 520, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 569, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 503, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 438, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 536, § 4; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 40; Laws, 2015, ch. 448, § 1; Laws, 2016, ch. 506, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 13, 2016); Laws, 2018, ch. 416, § 5, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 407 Laws of 2004, effective from and after passage (approved April 22, 2004), amended this section. Section 1 of ch. 520, Laws of 2004, effective from and after July 1, 2004 (approved May 4, 2004), and Section 1 of ch. 569, Laws of 2004, effective from and after passage (approved May 14, 2004), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of ch. 569, Laws of 2004, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an internal reference in subsection (1)(g)(ii) by substituting “subparagraph (i) of this paragraph (g)” for “paragraph (i) of this subsection.” The Joint Committee ratified the correction at the August 14, 2018, meeting of the Committee.
Editor's Notes —
Laws of 1994, ch. 566, § 5, provides as follows:
“SECTION 5. The provisions of this act shall apply to any case in which pre-trial, trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994.”
Section97-3-67 referred to in (1)(b) was repealed by Laws of 1998, ch. 549, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 1998. For current provisions, see §§97-3-65, 97-3-95, and 97-5-23.
Laws of 2004, ch. 569, § 4 provides:
“SECTION 4. It is the intent that the amendments to Section 47-7-3, Mississippi Code of 1972, contained in this House Bill No. 668, 2004 Regular Session, shall supersede the amendments to Section 47-7-3, contained in Senate Bill No. 2680, 2004 Regular Session, and House Bill No. 669, 2004 Regular Session.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment rewrote former (g), (h), and (i) as present (g).
The first 2004 amendment (ch. 407) inserted “a violation of 63-11-30(5) resulting in death” near the end of (g); added the last sentence in (g); designated the first paragraph of (3) as (3)(a); and added (3)(b).
The second 2004 amendment (ch. 520) in (g), inserted “a violation of Section 63-11-30(5) resulting in death” in the next to last sentence, and added the last sentence.
The third 2004 amendment (ch. 569) in (1)(g), rewrote the next-to-last sentence and added the last sentence; and added (3)(b).
The 2005 amendment, in (1), substituted “Mississippi Department of Corrections” for “Mississippi State Penitentiary” and “department” for “penitentiary” in the introductory paragraph, and in (1)(g), substituted “or any crime under Section 97-5-33 or Section 97-5-39(2) or a violation of Section 63-11-30(5)” for “and a violation of 63-11-30 (5)” following “felony child abuse” in the third sentence and added the last sentence.
The 2008 amendment substituted “paragraph” for “subparagraph” in (1)(d)(i) and (d)(ii); in (1)(g), substituted “an offender convicted of only nonviolent crimes after June 30, 1995” for “a first offender convicted of a nonviolent crime after January 1, 2000” in the first sentence, rewrote the third and last sentences, and substituted the present next-to-last sentence for the former next-to-last sentence, which provided a definition of “first offender”; in (3), deleted the paragraph designations, inserted “whether the offender served in the United States Armed Forces and has an honorable discharge” near the end, and made minor stylistic changes.
The 2010 amendment added (1)(g); and redesignated former (1)(g) as (1)(h).
The 2014 amendment deleted (1)(c) and former (1)(g) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; in present (1)(c)(ii) and (1)(f), added a sentence to the end of each subsection; and added present (1)(g); in (2), deleted “; however, this subsection shall not apply to the advancement of parole eligibility dates pursuant to the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act. Moreover, meritorious earned time allowances may be used to reduce the time necessary to be served for parole eligibility as provided in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section.” from the end of the subsection; in (3), substituted “The parole hearing . . . by the court.” for “Such tentative parole hearing date shall be calculated by a formula taking into account the offender's age upon first commitment, number of prior incarcerations, prior probation or parole failures, the severity and the violence of the offense committed, employment history, whether the offender served in the United States Armed Forces and has an honorable discharge, and other criteria which in the opinion of the board tend to validly and reliably predict the length of incarceration necessary before the offender can be successfully paroled.”; in (4), added “that are part of his or her parole case plan” to the end of the first sentence; inserted “that is part of the case plan” following “and job training program” in the second sentence; and substituted “in jeopardy of noncompliance with the case plan and may be denied parole” for “ineligible for parole” at the end of the second sentence.
The 2015 amendment rewrote (1)(g)(iii), which read: “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1)(a) of this section, any nonviolent offender who has served twenty-five percent (25%) or more of his sentence may be paroled if the sentencing judge or if the sentencing judge is retired, disabled or incapacitated, the senior circuit judge, recommends parole to the Parole Board and the Parole Board approves.”
The 2016 amendment, effective May 13, 2016, in (1)(f), deleted the former fourth sentence, which read: “An offender convicted of a violation under Section 41-29-139(a), not exceeding the amounts specified under Section 41-29-139(b), may be eligible for parole”; and added the next-to-last sentence.
The 2018 amendment, in (1)(f), inserted the exception in the third sentence and inserted “including an offender who receives an enhanced penalty under the provisions of Section 41-29-147 for such possession” in the fourth sentence; substituted “paragraph (a) of this subsection” for “paragraph (1)(a) of this section” in (1)(g)(iii); and added (1)(h).
Cross References —
Uniform Controlled Substances Law, see §§41-29-101 et seq.
Penalty of life imprisonment without parole for sale of specified quantities of certain drugs, see §41-29-139.
Availability of parole to persons convicted under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law or prior law superseded thereby, see §41-29-149.
Good time, see §§47-5-138 et seq.
Advancement of parole eligibility dates during periods of prison overcrowding, see §§47-5-701 through47-5-729.
Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act, see §§47-5-701 through47-5-729.
Exclusivity of State Parole Board’s responsibility for granting or revoking parole, as provided by this section, see §47-7-5.
Condition of probation upon suspended sentence, see §§47-7-33 et seq.
Requirement that persons on parole or probation make payments to community service revolving fund, see §47-7-49.
Authority for use of persons convicted of an offense for work on state highway projects, see §65-1-8.
Person convicted of aggravated domestic violence ineligible for parole under the provisions of this section, see §97-3-7.
Ineligibility for parole of person whose death sentence has been changed to life imprisonment should death penalty be declared unconstitutional, see §99-19-107.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general; construction.
2. Constitutionality.
3. Consecutive sentences.
4. Eligibility for earned good time.
5. Change in law, regulation, or interpretation; ex post factoeffect.
6. Argument to, or consideration by, jury.
7. Jury instructions.
8. Miscellaneous.
9. Ineffective assistance of counsel.
10. Sex offenders.
11. Resentencing.
1. In general; construction.
Defendant was not entitled to relief when a trial court declined to recommend to the Parole Board that defendant be deemed parole eligible because (1) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 gave the trial court discretion to issue such a recommendation, and (2) the denial did not implicate an appealable judgment. Barnett-Phillips v. State, 195 So.3d 226, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 377 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Defendant was not eligible for parole on the sentences for two counts because they carried an enhanced penalty. Ferrell v. State, 158 So.3d 1204, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 65 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
Circuit court did not err in denying a petition for post-conviction relief because although petitioner was given incorrect information regarding his parole eligibility, the error was harmless; the motivating factor for petitioner’s guilty pleas was not his parole eligibility the dismissal of five felony indictments, and any misinformation petitioner received concerning parole eligibility was harmless and did not invalidate his voluntary guilty pleas. Mosley v. State, 150 So.3d 127, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 613 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), cert. dismissed, 158 So.3d 1153, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 155 (Miss. 2015).
Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-21 was not unconstitutionally vague and did not apply to the inmate where the inmate confused parole with conditional release as: (1) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f) prohibited parole for an inmate sentenced to life under Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101 for capital offenses; (2) since the inmate pled guilty to murder, carrying a life sentence, he was convicted of a capital offense as defined in Miss. Code Ann. §1-3-4; and (3) the inmate was eligible to petition for conditional release at age 65 under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a). Higginbotham v. State, 114 So.3d 9, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 595 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 116 So.3d 1072, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 2013).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(g) does not abolish parole. It applies only to the internal operating procedures of the Department of Corrections and the prisons and does not affect a judge’s sentencing prerogative under the criminal statutes. Parker v. State, 30 So.3d 1222, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 161 (Miss. 2010).
Defendant’s postconviction review motion was correctly denied because remarks made by the circuit judge during defendant’s sentencing hearing were merely surplusage, in that they were comments concerning defendant’s eligibility for parole; the parole board, not the circuit court, had exclusive authority for granting parole within the parameters set forth in Miss. Code. Ann. §47-7-3. Chandler v. State, 27 So.3d 1199, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 9 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Dismissal of defendant's motion for post-conviction relief was proper because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(d)(i) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(i)) foreclosed armed robbers convicted after October 1, 1994, from parole eligibility. Defendant had pleaded guilty on March 20, 2002, to one count of armed robbery and five counts of kidnapping. Banks v. State, 37 So.3d 81, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 625 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 36 So.3d 455, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 288 (Miss. 2010).
Inmate's allegation that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced under a revised section of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 was rejected. Under §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)) , armed robbers convicted after October 1, 1994, were foreclosed from parole eligibility; because defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery in 2004, he was not eligible for parole. Poss v. State, 17 So.3d 167, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 570 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Dismissal of an inmate’s petition to show cause was proper as the Mississippi State Parole Board had absolute discretion to confer or deny parole under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3, and the inmate failed to show that his due process rights were violated as there was no constitutionally recognized liberty interest with regard to parole. Hopson v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 976 So. 2d 973, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 139 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Trial court did not err in denying the inmate's petition for a writ of mandamus; Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 did not require the parole board to give the inmate a psychiatric evaluation prior to the inmate's parole hearings; rather §47-7-3 clearly stated that an inmate must be eligible for parole before he was entitled to a psychiatric evaluation. Also, the inmate did not have a liberty interest in a psychiatric examination because Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-17 used the permissive “may” and not the mandatory “shall.” Edmond v. Miller, 942 So. 2d 203, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 942 So. 2d 164, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 718 (Miss. 2006).
Defendant’s capital murder conviction was proper because he did not need to receive a sentencing hearing since, even absent a procedural bar, if the State was not seeking the death penalty, the only possible sentence for conviction of capital murder was life without parole, Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101(1) and47-7-3(1)(f). Thus, a sentencing hearing was not necessary. Davis v. State, 914 So. 2d 200, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 269 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 344, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 746 (Miss. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 856, 127 S. Ct. 133, 166 L. Ed. 2d 98, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 6743 (U.S. 2006).
Trusty time reduces the length of the sentences a defendant is required to serve, which in turn results in an earlier parole eligibility date. Lizana v. Scott, 910 So. 2d 31, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Mississippi Parole Board is not required to place a prisoner on parole after a prisoner completes his sentences described in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3. Lizana v. Scott, 910 So. 2d 31, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where the circuit court sentenced appellant who pled guilty to armed robbery to a fourteen-year sentence, but suspended seven years from that sentence, leaving a seven-year sentence, appellant was not subject to the ten-year minimum service requirement of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(d)(i) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(i)). Edmond v. State, 906 So. 2d 798, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1135 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Phrase “first offender,” when used in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(g), describes those incarcerated for their first and sole offense; later convictions end “first offender” status even if the offenses occurred before the first conviction. McClurg v. State, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 592 (Miss. Ct. App. June 24, 2003), sub. op., 870 So. 2d 681, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 572 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Reading Miss. Code Ann. §§97-3-21,99-19-101(1),47-7-3(1)(f), together indicates that a defendant on trial for capital murder may only be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the eligibility of parole. Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 2003).
Defendant was not entitled to parole consideration on a rape conviction based on the fact that defendant was 19 when the offense was committed because the former Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 allowed parole consideration only in cases where the defendant was convicted of statutory rape; former Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139 precluded good time credit for any sex offense. Braziel v. Bailey, 835 So. 2d 962, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 223 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
According to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f), there is no longer the possibility of life imprisonment; by giving only the sentencing options of death or life imprisonment without parole, the trial judge properly gave the jury all the instructions that were needed. Flowers v. State, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 67 (Miss. Feb. 20, 2003), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 842 So. 2d 531, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 2003).
When read in pari materia, §97-3-21 and this section provide juries with the option of sentencing capital defendants to life without parole as long as any proceeding, from pretrial through resentencing, that follows the actual charge occurs after July 1, 1994; simultaneously, the two statutes preclude the parole board from granting parole to any capital defendant who was charged after July 1, 1994. West v. State, 725 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1998), overruled by Wilson v. State, 194 So.3d 855 (Miss. 2016), to the extent that West improperly changed Section99-19-33 to substitute the word ‘shall‘ for the word ‘may‘ in the first sentence, thereby issuing a holding that would hold trial courts in error for sentencing a defendant under the older of two sentencing statutes.
Parole statutes contain no mandatory language, but instead employ permissive “may” rather than “shall,” and thus prisoners have no constitutionally recognized liberty interest in parole. Vice v. State, 679 So. 2d 205, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 1996).
The Mississippi parole statutes do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the form of an expectation of parole because of the use of the permissive “may” in §47-7-3, which provides that a prisoner “may be released on parole as hereinafter provided,” read in the context of the other provisions of that section and, as well, those of §47-7-17. Thus, Mississippi law did not vest a convicted and incarcerated felon with a liberty interest in parole entitling him to due process of law incident to his application for parole. Harden v. State, 547 So. 2d 1150, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 1989).
Language of statute concerning parole and probation is mandate to Parole Board and not to courts, and is unnecessary and surplusage in sentence. Gardner v. State, 514 So. 2d 292, 1987 Miss. LEXIS 2520 (Miss. 1987).
Absolute discretion conferred on parole board in Mississippi affords prisoner no constitutionally recognized liberty interest in being released on parole. Scales v. Mississippi State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 14969 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987).
Reasonable and harmonious construction of §§47-5-138,47-5-139, and47-7-3 is that legislature intended them to maintain enhanced penalty that §99-19-81 imposes on habitual offenders, which penalty includes denial of certain privileges available to other prisoners. Perkins v. Cabana, 794 F.2d 168, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27510 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936, 107 S. Ct. 414, 93 L. Ed. 2d 366, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4575 (U.S. 1986).
In a prosecution for armed robbery involving a firearm, the defendant was properly convicted under §47-7-3(d) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)) where, although he was not the person who actually robbed the bank, he was an aider and abettor and therefore, under §97-1-3, was considered a principal. Anderson v. State, 397 So. 2d 81, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 1988 (Miss. 1981).
2. Constitutionality.
Inmate had no constitutionally recognized liberty interest in parole because the Mississippi Parole Board had the exclusive responsibility and discretion over whether to grant the inmate parole. Brown v. State, 230 So.3d 1069, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 156 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
Circuit judge’s decision to sentence a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole was neither arbitrary, nor an abuse of discretion because, at the hearing required by the case law, the judge, although the judge did not specifically discuss on the record each and every factor mentioned in the case law for the sentencing of a juvenile offender, expressly stated that the judge had considered each of the factors mentioned in the case law for the sentencing. Jones v. State, 285 So.3d 626, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 684 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. dismissed, — So.3d —, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 2018).
Circuit court properly dismissed an inmate’s petition for writ of habeas corpus because it was without merit; the inmate’s constitutional claim failed as a matter of law because a state’s decision to expand parole eligibility only on a prospective basis was rational and did not discriminate on any purposeful or invidious basis. Fluker v. State, 200 So.3d 1148, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 504 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), cert. denied, 214 So.3d 1058, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 126 (Miss. 2017).
Based on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2445 (2012), Parker v. State, 119 So.3d 987 (Miss. 2013), and Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698 (Miss. 2013), an inmate who was 17 years old at the time he was involved in the robbery that led to his capital murder guilty plea and a sentence of life in prison without eligibility for parole was entitled to a new sentencing hearing to consider a sentence that would allow parole. Thomas v. State, 130 So.3d 157, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 16 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
Trial court properly dismissed appellant’s suit alleging the Mississippi Parole Board’s denial of his parole was racially motivated and biased, as he did not present evidence that established a violation of his equal-protection rights by the Board in its application of the parole statutes based on his suspect classification. Wilde v. Miss. Parole Bd., 144 So.3d 175, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 780 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 145 So.3d 674, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 398 (Miss. 2014).
This section does not violate the Miller mandate so long as the sentencing authority accounts for characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles. Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 372 (Miss. 2013).
As defendant was 15 at the time of the murder and was statutorily ineligible for parole, and as Miller v. Alabama, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4873, was decided while his appeal was pending, his life sentence was vacated and the case was remanded so the trial court could consider the Miller factors before determining sentence. Parker v. State, 119 So.3d 987, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 2013).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(h) (now §47-7-3(1)(f)) can constitutionally be applied to juveniles provided that the sentencing authority considers the factors of Miller v. Alabama, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4873, in imposing the sentence. Parker v. State, 119 So.3d 987, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 321 (Miss. 2013).
Trial court did not err in dismissing an inmate’s complaint against the State seeking an interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-3 and47-7-5 and claiming that the statutes were unconstitutional because he trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the inmate’s claims; the inmate’s concerns failed to state a constitutional claim sufficient for the trial court to assert jurisdiction. Rochell v. State, 36 So.3d 479, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 291 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 is neutral on its face and contains no language separating individuals based on suspect classifications. Hopson v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 976 So. 2d 973, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 139 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Trial court erred in dismissing an inmate’s constitutional challenge to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(g) for lack of standing, as it relied on extra-record information to find that the inmate was not a “first offender” subject to the amendment. McClurg v. State, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 592 (Miss. Ct. App. June 24, 2003), sub. op., 870 So. 2d 681, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 572 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Inmate challenging an amendment to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 should have named the State Parole Board and individuals in their official capacities who could both have defended the statute and provided any ordered relief; however, the trial court should not have dismissed the suit on the merits no matter how faulty the complaint was found to be. McClurg v. State, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 592 (Miss. Ct. App. June 24, 2003), sub. op., 870 So. 2d 681, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 572 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Where an inmate challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3, in considering the question of the ripeness of the inmate’s claim, it was not a requirement that he be on the verge of eligibility for release if his arguments were accepted. McClurg v. State, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 592 (Miss. Ct. App. June 24, 2003), sub. op., 870 So. 2d 681, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 572 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
This section prohibits probation for an activity that common sensibly constitutes “sex crimes” and therefore, is not so vague as to be unconstitutional. Genry v. State, 735 So. 2d 186, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 123 (Miss. 1999).
3. Consecutive sentences.
Inmate argued that he should have been released after ten years, but that was an incorrect application of the law, because he was serving three separate consecutive sentences on drug offenses. Consecutive sentences with statutory minimums could not be combined for parole eligibility purposes, and he was required to serve 10 years of his 30-year sentence, one-fourth of his 7-year sentence, and one-fourth of his 18-year sentence, for a total of 16 years, three months; his parole eligibility date was to be calculated in the same way as his tentative release date. Lizana v. Scott, 910 So. 2d 31, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Parole board’s application and interpretation of former Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3 (1), as applied to the inmate’s sentence, was proper; thus, where the inmate was resentenced to life on the murder conviction, and given a 39-year sentence on the rape charge and a 30-year sentence on the kidnapping charge, the sentences running consecutively, the inmate was not eligible for parole until the inmate had served 30 years. McGhee v. Johnson, 868 So. 2d 1051, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 231 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Where a defendant is convicted of capital murder in a prosecution in which the state does not seek the death penalty, the trial judge may impose life imprisonment without parole without formally returning the matter to the jury for sentencing since that is the only sentence possible in such a situation. Kha Tao Pham v. State, 716 So. 2d 1100, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 326 (Miss. 1998).
A defendant who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for armed robbery and 15 years imprisonment for manslaughter to run consecutively, would be eligible for parole on March 30, 1993, where he began the service of his 10-year armed robbery sentence on the date of his initial arrest pursuant to §99-19-23, he was legally released from that sentence 10 years later on February 5, 1990 but remained held under the 15-year manslaughter sentence, and he earned substantial meritorious earned time; although he would ordinarily have been required to serve at least 1/4 of the manslaughter sentence-3 years and 9 months-before he became eligible for parole, his earned time advanced his earliest parole eligibility date by approximately 7 months. Milam v. State, 578 So. 2d 272, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 225 (Miss. 1991).
Under the requirement of §47-7-3 that a person under a life sentence becomes eligible for parole after ten years, a prisoner serving three consecutive life terms would not be eligible for parole until he had served at least ten years of each life sentence less 30 percent of earned good time, since §47-5-139(3) mandates the mathematical process of multiplying the number of life sentences imposed upon the prisoner by ten years to determine the date upon which the prisoner would become eligible for parole. Davis v. State, 429 So. 2d 262, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2555 (Miss. 1983).
4. Eligibility for earned good time.
Trial court did not err in upholding the decision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) to deny an inmate trusty status because even if the inmate was granted trusty status, he could not use any earned trusty time to reduce the time that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole when the MDOC, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(2), stopped applying trusty time to reduce an offender’s parole eligibility date, and the MDOC’s decision to change its application of the trusty-time policy was not an ex post facto application of the law as to defendant; therefore, the inmate’s placement into trusty status would not reduce the amount of time that he had to serve before becoming eligible for parole on his kidnaping conviction. Rice v. State, 28 So.3d 683, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 61 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
In a post-conviction relief case in which a pro se inmate had pled guilty to armed robbery, he argued unsuccessfully that constitutional rights were violated because he was sentenced to serve a mandatory 10-year sentence without the benefit of earned time. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e), an inmate was not eligible for earned-time credit when the inmate had not served the mandatory time required for parole eligibility for a conviction of robbery or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, and, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)) , he was not eligible for parole since he had been convicted of armed robbery after October 1, 1994. Diggs v. State, 46 So.3d 361, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 55 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 49 So.3d 636, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 561 (Miss. 2010).
Despite the fact that an inmate was entitled to an earned-time allowance of one-half of his total sentence, including mandatory time because he was convicted before the effective date of Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(e), the earned-time allowance did not reduce the mandatory portions of his sentences or accelerate his parole eligibility date under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1) or his tentative discharge date. Adams v. Gibbs, 988 So. 2d 395, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 409 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Although appellant argued that the trial court failed to inform him that he would be eligible for earned time pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1) only after serving 10 years of his sentence, because appellant was convicted after October 1, 1994, appellant was not eligible for parole pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)). Since appellant was not eligible for parole, appellant was precluded from accumulating earned time pursuant to §47-5-139(1)(e). Robinson v. State, 4 So.3d 361, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 399 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 112 (Miss. 2009).
Circuit court properly dismissed a petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief because the time served for armed robbery was mandatory time to be served day for day. Wells v. State, 936 So. 2d 479, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 596 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
A prisoner was not permitted to earn good time credit during service of the mandatory portion of his period of confinement and then use that good time earned upon expiration of the mandatory portion of the sentence. Williams v. Puckett, 624 So. 2d 496, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 420 (Miss. 1993).
A defendant convicted of armed robbery was not eligible to reduce his sentence with the grant of administrative good time, pursuant to §47-5-139, since earned time for good conduct and performance only applies to inmates who are eligible for parole, and defendant was not entitled to parole under §47-7-3, which required him to serve his full 10-year sentence. Cooper v. State, 439 So. 2d 1277, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2983 (Miss. 1983).
5. Change in law, regulation, or interpretation; ex post facto effect.
It was error to hold defendant’s sentence for selling methamphetamine rendered defendant parole ineligible because (1) amendments to Miss. Code Ann. §§41-29-139 and47-7-3(f) extended parole eligibility to persons convicted of selling or manufacturing controlled substances, and, (2) while these amendments occurred after defendant’s claims were dismissed, an appellate court had to apply the law in effect at the time the court rendered the court’s decision. Odom v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 201 So.3d 1114, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 606 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Offenders convicted prior to July 1, 2014, of selling or manufacturing controlled substances not exceeding the amounts specified in controlled substances law may be eligible for parole; therefore, postconviction relief was warranted in a case where an applicant had pled guilty to manufacturing and possessing methamphetamine because, based on the changes to the parole law effective on July 1, 2014 in a house bill, the conviction did not render the applicant ineligible for parole. Offenders similar to the applicant had been deemed eligible for parole prior to July 2014 due to the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ misinterpretation of the law. Sinko v. State, 192 So.3d 1069, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 214 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole after he was convicted of murder was proper because he was convicted of the violent crime of murder after January 1, 2000 and was not eligible for parole according to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(g); nor did the appellate court find that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. Fannings v. State, 997 So. 2d 953, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 790 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Trial court properly found appellant ineligible for parole because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)) applied to the case due to the fact that appellant was convicted of armed robbery after October 1, 1994; hence, appellant's civil action against the Mississippi department of corrections and its commissioner for failing to provide appellant with a parole eligibility date was properly dismissed. Sykes v. Epps, 963 So. 2d 31, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 518 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Where petitioner’s plea counsel was unaware that the law had changed and required convicted armed robbers to serve every day of their sentence, the post-conviction court set aside petitioner’s fifteen-year sentence for armed robbery entered in accordance with the plea agreement. Prior to entering his guilty plea, counsel erred by telling petitioner that he would be eligible for parole after serving ten years of his fifteen year sentence. Hudson v. State, 932 So. 2d 842, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 864 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 933 So. 2d 303, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 509 (Miss. 2006).
Statutory amendment that required that 85% of sentence be served and that eliminated opportunities for parole that had previously existed was an ex post facto law as applied to defendants who had been charged with crimes before effective date of statute and whose charges were not to be disposed of until after effective date. Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 636 (Miss. 1996).
A 7-year sentence for armed robbery committed with a knife in 1980 in violation of §97-3-79 was not an unconstitutional application of an ex post facto law, even though §47-7-3 denied eligibility for parole prior to 1982 only when a robbery was committed with the display of a firearm, where the sentencing order merely established that the defendant serve 7 years and made no mention of “mandatory” or “without parole.” Additionally, the sentencing chapter and the parole chapter are separate and distinct; the granting of parole or denial of parole under §47-7-3 is the exclusive responsibility of the state parole board, which is independent of the circuit court’s sentencing authority. Thus, sentencing authority was provided for under §97-3-79, rather than § 47-7-3, and the defendant was not “sentenced” under the parole statute, which was later amended. Mitchell v. State, 561 So. 2d 1037, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 258 (Miss. 1990).
Defendant who enters plea of guilty to charge of armed robbery pursuant to plea bargain agreement in reliance upon erroneous advice of attorney that defendant will be eligible for earned good time and will be subject to release after serving 7 years of sentence is entitled to vacation of guilty plea and reinstatement of innocent plea when Mississippi Department of Corrections changes administrative policy to comply with §§47-5-139,47-7-3, thereby requiring that defendant serve minimum of 10 years. Coleman v. State, 483 So. 2d 680, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2336 (Miss. 1986).
A petitioner who enters a guilty plea to armed robbery pursuant to plea bargain agreement upon erroneous advice of counsel that petitioner will be eligible for earned good time and will be subject to release after serving 7 years of sentence is not subjected to ex post facto law when Mississippi Department of Corrections changes administrative policy to comply with §§47-5-139 and47-7-3, causing petitioner to serve minimum of 10 years. Coleman v. State, 483 So. 2d 680, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2336 (Miss. 1986).
A defendant convicted of armed robbery after 1977 and sentenced to serve less than 10 years in the penitentiary, and who was therefore not eligible for parole pursuant to §47-7-3, was not subjected to enforcement of an ex post facto law by a policy of the Department of Corrections administratively barring him from earning good time after January, 1981, although good time earned prior to that date was not taken away, notwithstanding the provisions of §47-5-139, since the statutory provisions regarding good time remained unchanged, and since administrative interpretation of a clearly worded statute is not a “law” within the scope and contemplation of the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Tiller v. State, 440 So. 2d 1001, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2981 (Miss. 1983).
An administrative correction of a prior misinterpretation of parole laws is not a change in the law so as to violate the ex post facto clause of the United States or Mississippi Constitutions; even if the correction of a former mistaken interpretation of parole law did reach the level of a change in law, administrative decisions with regard to parole law eligibility are not “laws annexed to the crime when committed.” Taylor v. Mississippi State Probation & Parole Board, 365 So. 2d 621, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2418 (Miss. 1978).
6. Argument to, or consideration by, jury.
Prosecutor’s statement in closing argument at sentencing phase of capital trial to effect that if defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, he would be eligible for parole in 10 years, was accurate, thumbnail statement of Mississippi law, in spite of fact that it was obviously not full explanation of state’s system of parole, and court refused to conclude that such remarks created unacceptable risk that jury would sentence defendant to death arbitrarily or capriciously. Gilliard v. Scroggy, 847 F.2d 1141, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8831 (5th Cir. Miss. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S. Ct. 818, 102 L. Ed. 2d 807, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 61 (U.S. 1989).
It is no more proper for a jury to concern itself with the wisdom of the legislative determination, pursuant to §47-7-3(1), that persons sentenced to life imprisonment may under certain circumstances become eligible for parole, than it is for a jury to consider the legislature’s determination that death in the gas chamber is an authorized punishment for capital murder. Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1578 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117, 105 S. Ct. 803, 83 L. Ed. 2d 795, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 471 (U.S. 1985).
7. Jury instructions.
As defendant, on trial for capital murder, could be sentenced only to death or life imprisonment without the eligibility of parole, by instructing the jury that these were its only sentencing options, the trial judge properly gave the jury all the instructions that were needed. Brown v. State, 890 So. 2d 901, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1104 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 981, 125 S. Ct. 1842, 161 L. Ed. 2d 735, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3424 (U.S. 2005).
In defendant’s capital murder conviction where defendant was sentenced to death, because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f) denied parole eligibility to any person charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101, the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 586 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 907, 125 S. Ct. 1595, 161 L. Ed. 2d 282, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2289 (U.S. 2005).
In a capital murder case, by giving only the sentencing options of death or life imprisonment without parole, the trial judge properly gave the jury all the instructions that were needed, as according to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f), there was no possibility of life imprisonment. Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 149 (Miss. 2003).
8. Miscellaneous.
Appellant failed to state a claim upon which the circuit court could assert jurisdiction because his case was not one of unlawful revocation of parole; appellant was never released on parole because the Mississippi Parole Board changed its decision and denied him parole. Cook v. State, 282 So.3d 760, 2019 Miss. App. LEXIS 404 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
Trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to life without eligibility for parole because he was only 70 days short of his 18th birthday when he shot the victim, prior to the shooting he had already compiled an extensive youth court record, the threats defendant made to the victim prior to the shooting displayed premeditation, the victim was unarmed and attempting to run away when defendant shot him, and his youth court record failed to provide any positive factors or substantial hope of retaliation. Bass v. State, 273 So.3d 768, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 631 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 272 So.3d 130, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 238 (Miss. 2019).
Circuit judge erred in classifying defendant’s offense as a “crime of violence” because the judge’s finding that defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force increased the minimum sentence that he had to serve and indisputably altered the prescribed range of sentences to which he was exposed, it eliminated defendant’s eligibility for parole and made him ineligible for any type of early release until he had served at least half of his sentence, aggravated the punishment based on judicial fact-finding and Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-2(2) violated defendant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the extent that it permitted the circuit judge to find that an unlisted felony was a “crime of violence.” Fogleman v. State, 276 So.3d 1213, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 460 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), rev'd, 283 So.3d 685, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 303 (Miss. 2019).
Relinquishment of the right to seek a conditional release from imprisonment that would emanate from the sentence for conviction of a charge that the defendant could have been convicted of, but was not, is not one of those constitutional rights that he is giving up, as a defendant has no constitutional right to seek a conditional release from any imprisonment, even when the imprisonment stems from a sentence received as a result of a conviction by a jury or by a plea of guilty. Ware v. State, 258 So.3d 315, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
While an inmate was eligible for parole, no constitutionally protected liberty interest was conferred by statute upon the inmate. In addition, the grant or denial of parole was entirely within the Mississippi State Parole Board’s discretion, and the denial of parole was not subject to a statutory right of appeal. Willard v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 212 So.3d 80, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 664 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for a parole recommendation was not an appealable order. Therefore, the appellate court did not address the merits of defendant’s claim that defendant was entitled to be declared parole eligible. Morgan v. State, 193 So.3d 703, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 385 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Circuit court properly denied petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief because the criminal informations were not fatally defective; petitioner was not eligible for parole because he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, with intent to distribute, with a firearm enhancement. Jackson v. State, 192 So.3d 1143, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 370 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's motion for post-conviction relief because no evidence was presented that appellant was misinformed during his sentencing hearing; under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(h) (now §47-7-3(1)(f)) appellant was not eligible for parole, and the trial court stated repeatedly at the sentencing hearing that the only sentence that could be imposed was life imprisonment. Collier v. State, 112 So.3d 1088, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 221 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
Contrary to an inmate's assertions, the 2008 amendment of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(g) (now §47-7-3(1)(f)) did not provide the inmate with the possibility of being eligible for parole; the inmate had been convicted of armed robbery after October 1, 1994, and thus, he was ineligible for parole under §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)) . Brown v. State, 54 So.3d 882, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 79 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Defendant’s argument that it was error for the trial court to sentence him to life in prison without possibility of parole was improper; after the trial court set aside the jury’s sentence of death, it had only one choice, which was the lesser sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Sentences that did not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute are not considered grossly disproportionate and are not disturbed on appeal. Maye v. State, 49 So.3d 1140, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 807 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), vacated, 49 So.3d 1124, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 622 (Miss. 2010).
Denial of appellant inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief was appropriate because his indictment was not faulty for its failure to contain a provision for his eligibility for parole since it was not an essential element of the crime or had no effect on jurisdiction. His attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to a valid indictment. Bowling v. State, 12 So.3d 607, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 395 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Where appellant pled guilty to two counts of capital murder and two counts of armed robbery in 1979, he filed several motions for post-conviction relief; the circuit court did not err by dismissing his 2007 motion for post-conviction relief as a time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-5. Appellant’s claim that double jeopardy barred prosecution of his armed robbery convictions was not good cause for an exception to the time-bar, because appellant delayed thirty years in attacking his armed robbery convictions until he became eligible for parole on his murder convictions in accordance with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1) (1972). Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 545, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 310 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd, 42 So.3d 503, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 386 (Miss. 2010).
Defendant’s life-imprisonment sentence after he was convicted of capital murder was neither cruel nor unusual under Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101(1) and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f) because the only possible sentence for conviction of capital murder committed after July 1, 1994, other than the death penalty, would have been life without parole; defendant’s sentence under his conviction of capital murder not only fell within the prescribed statutory limits, but was the only sentence that could have been imposed. Anderson v. State, 5 So.3d 1088, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 677 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 171 (Miss. 2009), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 184 (Miss. 2009), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 177 (Miss. 2009).
Post-conviction relief was properly denied in an armed robbery case because a trial court correctly stated that, due to the nature of the charges, defendant was not eligible for parole, and he had to serve his entire 30 year sentence; defendant was not eligible under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139 until the mandatory portion of his sentence had been served. Robinson v. State, 964 So. 2d 609, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 607 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Motion for postconviction relief was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing in a case where a guilty plea was entered to the charge of burglary of an occupied dwelling because defendant offered no proof of what advice he was given about parole, other than the assertions made in the motion, and he was not eligible for such due to his conviction; also, defendant was told by a trial court that he was required to serve the full term of his sentence when he entered a guilty plea. Edge v. State, 962 So. 2d 81, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 461 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)) foreclosed armed robbers convicted after October 1, 1994, from parole eligibility, and defendant entered his guilty plea in February 2003, well after the date when Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (now §47-7-3(1)(c)(ii)) became applicable to persons convicted for armed robbery; thus, the trial judge properly informed defendant about his ineligibility for parole or early release. Gladney v. State, 963 So. 2d 1217, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 305 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Due to the fact that defendant had pled guilty to charges relating to the sale of methamphetamine, he was not eligible for parole since that crime was excepted from Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3; therefore, a motion for post-conviction relief was properly denied. Heafner v. State, 947 So. 2d 354, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 17 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Court denied petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief from her conviction for capital murder based on her claim that she was improperly informed of the trial judge’s sentencing options when she was deciding to waive a jury determination of her sentence and to place the decision in the hands of the trial judge because petitioner did not raise the issue on direct appeal and was procedurally barred under Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-21(1), and she failed to show cause and actual prejudice by being informed that the trial judge had “three sentencing options” under the capital sentencing statute, Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101(1), in that it could have sentenced her to death, life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, or life imprisonment. In reality, the trial court had only two sentencing options, death or life imprisonment without parole eligibility, because the parole statute, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f), denies parole eligibility to any person charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101. Byrom v. State, 927 So. 2d 709, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 43 (Miss.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1056, 127 S. Ct. 662, 166 L. Ed. 2d 520, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 9076 (U.S. 2006).
Inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief was denied because the denial of the possibility of parole for an armed robbery conviction came from Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(d)(ii), not from a trial judge. Hinton v. State, 947 So. 2d 979, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 381 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 947 So. 2d 960, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 2007).
Appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief as the record indicated that the trial court advised the inmate that he would be eligible for parole after 10 years, and under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(d)(ii), the inmate would not be eligible. Thus, the inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Garner v. State, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 695 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2005).
Trial court properly denied defendant’s “motion to correct sentence” because applying Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-138 to him was clearly impermissible under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3, as he was an offender over 19 years of age and clearly ineligible for parole. Smith v. State, 914 So. 2d 330, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 793 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(g) provided that no person shall be eligible for parole who was convicted or whose suspended sentence was revoked after June 30, 1995; defendant was convicted of two sales of cocaine on December 3, 1996, such that he was plainly ineligible for parole release from the cocaine sales sentences pursuant to subsection (g), and any advice by counsel that defendant would have been eligible for parole if he pled guilty to the cocaine sales was erroneous. Thomas v. State, 881 So. 2d 912, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 504 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Inmate’s sentence after pleading guilty to a charge of armed robbery was proper where the record constituted sufficient evidence to show that the inmate was properly advised as to the minimum and maximum sentence prior to entering his plea; further, three years was the minimum sentence for armed robbery and a person convicted of armed robbery could not receive a wholly suspended sentence as the inmate alleged that his attorney told him. Mullins v. State, 859 So. 2d 1082, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1078 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Amendment to the parole eligibility statute, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1), created an ambiguity because the usual rule that an inmate must serve one fourth of the sentence before parole eligibility can be modified if the prisoner was sentenced to a term of 30 years or more, or life, but the 10-year minimum appeared to only apply to life sentences; it was clear the Legislature intended the 10-year minimum sentence to apply to sentences of 30 years or more and that defendant was not entitled to a correction to his parole eligibility date. Lattimore v. Sparkman, 858 So. 2d 936, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1032 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Defendant argued that his attorney had erroneously told him he would only have to serve 25 percent of his sentence and that the plea agreement was a good one; however, defendant could not decide which percentage of his sentence he believed he had to serve and defendant’s claim was time barred; once a prisoners’ effective assistance of counsel claims were time barred, they had to fall within one of the enumerated exceptions to remain viable. Austin v. State, 863 So. 2d 59, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 995 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Trial court erred by stating (in its sentencing order that defendant was to serve his sentence “without the benefit of parole or probation” pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3, which prohibited granting parole to persons convicted of a crime after June 30, 1995, since §47-7-3(1)(g) was a mandate to the parole board and not to the courts; inclusion of this language was surplusage, but defendant was not entitled to any relief, since the sentence was not illegal. Norwood v. State, 846 So. 2d 1048, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 472 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Defendant’s supported allegations that his guilty plea to murdering his girlfriend was involuntary and the result of coercion because his attorney refused to investigate an allegedly incorrect criminal record that would have shown defendant to be a habitual criminal could properly be rejected by the trial court considering defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing; trial court could properly impose a life sentence without referring the matter to a jury. Riley v. State, 848 So. 2d 888, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 196 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Other than first-time offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes, defendants were ineligible for parole; defendant was an habitual offender and had committed violent crimes, and whether or not he was an habitual offender was of no importance to the validity of the sentence because habitual offender status was but one route to a prison term without possibility of parole. Booker v. Bailey, 839 So. 2d 611, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 160 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Because defendant was a juvenile and the death penalty was unavailable, the circuit court sentenced him to the only sentence currently available for capital murder, life imprisonment without parole. Horne v. State, 825 So. 2d 627, 2002 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 2002).
Language in sentencing order that defendant was to serve his sentence without hope of parole or probation was stricken as surplusage on appeal since the administration of parole for the defendant was governed by statute. Norwood v. State, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 489 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2001), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 846 So. 2d 1048, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 472 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Whether defendant was classified as an accessory before the fact or an aider and abettor to the gunman was irrelevant where his role was tantamount to that of the principal; therefore, there was no error in the sentence that was given based on his guilty plea for murder. Walton v. State, 752 So. 2d 452, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 692 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
A post-conviction relief petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of his guilty plea where the transcripts of the petitioner’s change of plea hearing and sentencing hearing indicated that the assistant district attorney, the defendant’s attorney, and the trial judge were confused or misinformed as to §47-7-3, under which the defendant was pleading guilty, and consequently the defendant was not properly advised of the mandatory minimum sentence he would have to serve before becoming eligible for parole. Washington v. State, 620 So. 2d 966, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 254 (Miss. 1993).
A defendant who was convicted of armed robbery was entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to §§99-39-13 through99-39-23 on the issue of whether he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process, where the defendant alleged that his attorney erroneously informed him that if he accepted the prosecution’s plea bargain offer of 15 years imprisonment he would be eligible for parole after serving 3 years and 9 months of his sentence, and that he would not have accepted the prosecution’s plea bargain offer had he known that he would be ineligible for parole for 10 years pursuant to §47-7-3(1)(d), which provides that a person convicted of robbery and sentenced to more than 10 years imprisonment shall not be eligible for parole until after serving at least 10 years of the sentence. Alexander v. State, 605 So. 2d 1170, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 573 (Miss. 1992).
Where it appeared that the trial court, in sentencing a 16-year-old defendant convicted of armed robbery to a term of 14 years in state prison, had been under the misapprehension that §§97-3-79 and47-7-3, read together, mandated a sentence of at least 10 years in the state penitentiary, absent a jury verdict of life imprisonment, the case would be remanded to the court for a clarification of the sentencing since there was no way to ascertain whether the trial court had considered the statutory alternative for sentencing minor offenders under the provisions of §43-21-159(3). Bougon v. State, 405 So. 2d 101, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2240 (Miss. 1981).
In a prosecution for armed robbery, a sentence of 12 years in prison, without eligibility of parole for 10 years, imposed upon a 14-year-old mentally retarded defendant did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; however, the case would be remanded to the trial court for consideration of alternative sentencing under §43-21-159 where the trial judge should have placed in the record the sources and facts of his sentence study and should have permitted the defendant’s attorney to introduce evidence of the presence or absence of facilities at the Mississippi State Penitentiary for the care of the defendant, and the availability of other institutions or facilities which could be utilized by the defendant. May v. State, 398 So. 2d 1331, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2021 (Miss. 1981).
In a prosecution for armed robbery, the defendant’s contention that his sentence of 30 years imprisonment without parole was unconstitutional became moot with the passage of §47-7-3(d) which provides that persons who have been convicted of armed robbery would be eligible for parole after serving 10 years. Bankston v. State, 391 So. 2d 1005, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2177 (Miss. 1980).
9. Ineffective assistance of counsel.
Circuit court properly denied appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief because cited no authority to support his argument that it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel to give appellant erroneous advice regarding, or not to inform him of, any potential conditional release he could or could not receive if he were convicted of the greater offense with which he was charged. Ware v. State, 258 So.3d 315, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Circuit court properly denied appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief because he was not affirmatively misinformed regarding his parole eligibility, and thus, his guilty plea was not entered into voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. Ware v. State, 258 So.3d 315, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Since a defendant’s attorney would not be required to advise the defendant of any potential conditional release from imprisonment if the defendant went to trial and was convicted of the charged offense, it seems quite logical that the defense counsel would not be required to give such advice when the defendant pleads guilty not to the offense charged, but to a lesser offense that happens to be included in the charged offense. Ware v. State, 258 So.3d 315, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Only information provided in appellant’s mother’s affidavit regarding what appellant’s attorney said to appellant about his parole eligibility came from appellant himself; thus, the circuit court, which dismissed appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief, did not err in its determination that appellant’s mother had no firsthand knowledge of any statements made by appellant’s attorney concerning the length of time appellant would have to serve. Moore v. State, 248 So.3d 845, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 671 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, 247 So.3d 1264, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 2018).
Inmate’s claim of ineffective assistance lacked merit, as the inmate’s claims that he would not have entered his guilty plea for fondling if his attorney had not misrepresented his eligibility for parole was contradicted by the fact that, at the plea hearing, he indicated he had not been promised anything in order to make him enter his guilty plea and was aware of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed. Brown v. State, 187 So.3d 667, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 132 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Inmate did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as: (1) the plea petition, the guilty-plea colloquy, and the post-conviction relief evidentiary hearing, taken together, reflected that defense counsel correctly advised the inmate of the life sentence for murder, his potential for release at age 65, and the correct sentencing statutory provision, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(f), which prohibited parole eligibility because the inmate pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment; (2) the inmate had the potential for release Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-139(1)(a) at age 65 after serving 15 years by petitioning for early release at or after age 65; (3) the inmate was 36 years old at the time of his guilty plea and sentence; (4) upon reaching age 65, the inmate would have served substantially more than 15 years; and (5) the inmate admitted being advised of his eligibility to be released at age 65. Higginbotham v. State, 114 So.3d 9, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 595 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 116 So.3d 1072, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 317 (Miss. 2013).
10. Sex offenders.
Mississippi Department of Corrections requiring defendant to serve his full, fifteen-year sentence, consistent with the statute, imposed by the circuit court, was not an extension or increase in defendant’s sentence because the denial of any reduction to his sentence was not equivalent the Department “resentencing” him. Thomas v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 248 So.3d 786, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 2018).
Circuit court did not err in affirming the denial of defendant’s claim that he he was being improperly classified as a sex offender and was entitled to trusty time or meritorious earned time because defendant’s conviction for kidnapping a minor under the age of sixteen made him ineligible for parole and ineligible for any reduction in his sentence. Thomas v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 248 So.3d 786, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 129 (Miss. 2018).
Defendant’s sentence of thirty-five years in prison, with thirty years to serve and five years suspended, followed by five years’ supervised probation, without the possibility of parole, was permissible under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-3(1)(b), although Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-101(3) did not expressly authorize day-for-day sentences and parole restrictions. Petty v. State, 118 So.3d 659, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 390 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
11. Resentencing.
It was not an abuse of discretion to resentence defendant, who was a juvenile when committing a homicide, to life without parole because the judge (1) appointed counsel, authorized funds for a mitigation specialist, and ordered a psychological assessment, and, (2) after conducting an evidentiary hearing at which the judge considered the Miller factors, substantial evidence supported the judge’s findings that defendant was not entitled to a lesser sentence. Wells v. State, — So.3d —, 2020 Miss. App. LEXIS 58 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2020).
Juvenile’s sentence of life without parole after a Miller resentencing was not an abuse of discretion because the court considered characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles, as Miller required, and, having satisfied the court’s Miller obligation, did not abuse the court’s discretion in denying relief from a previously imposed sentence of life without parole. Wharton v. State, — So.3d —, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 407 (Miss. Dec. 5, 2019).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Simple assault on a police officer is not excluded for parole eligibility under the statute. Johnson, Sept. 19, 2001, A.G. Op. #01-0545.
An inmate with a pre-1995 parole-eligible sentence retains his parole eligibility on that sentence if he is subsequently convicted of another crime after June 30, 1995. Epps, Mar. 21, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0107.
An offender who has been convicted of a nonviolent offense and who has had a previous felony charge expunged under §41-29-150(d)(2) may qualify as a first offender for parole eligibility purposes under subsection (g) of this section. Epps, Nov. 7, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0589.
If a defendant is convicted of an offense for which he would normally be eligible for parole, but prior to being sentenced for that first offense he is convicted of a separate felony, he is no longer considered a first offender and eligible for parole. Taylor, Aug. 27, 2004, A.G. Op. 04-0393.
Unless required by federal law or federal desegregation order, a school board who orders the superintendent to reassign teachers based upon racial ratios would substantially encroach on the prerogatives clearly delegated by statute to the superintendent. Rhodes, Apr. 28, 2006, A.G. Op. 06-0133.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant’s refraining from political activity, protest, or the like. 45 A.L.R.3d 1022.
State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 A.L.R.3d 932.
Ability to pay as necessary consideration in conditioning probation or suspended sentence upon reparation or restitution. 73 A.L.R.3d 1240.
Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim. 79 A.L.R.3d 976.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs. 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.
Propriety of conditioning probation upon defendant’s posting of bond guaranteeing compliance with terms of probation. 79 A.L.R.3d 1068.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches. 79 A.L.R.3d 1083.
Validity of statutes prohibiting or restricting parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in cases of violent crimes. 100 A.L.R.3d 431.
Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 6 A.L.R.4th 1155.
Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.
Defendant’s Right to Credit for Time Spent in Halfway House, Rehabilitation Center, or Similar Restrictive Environment as Condition of Pretrial Release. 46 A.L.R.6th 63.
Sufficiency, under 18 USCS § 4206(b) or (c), of statement by United States Parole Commission of reasons for denying parole. 58 A.L.R. Fed. 147.
Information consideration by United States Parole Commission in making determinations relating to release on parole under § 2 of Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (18 USCS §§ 4201 et seq). 58 A.L.R. Fed. 911.
Validity, construction, and application of Anti-Car Theft Act (18 USCS § 2119). 140 A.L.R. Fed. 249.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 82, 83, 90, 99, 107, 111.
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Prisoners' Rights Litigation.
Law Reviews.
1989 Mississippi Supreme Court Review: Statutory Interpretation. 59 Miss. L. J. 876, Winter, 1989.
§ 47-7-3.1. Case plan for parole-eligible inmates; purpose; components.
- In consultationwith the Parole Board, the department shall develop a case plan forall parole eligible inmates to guide an inmate’s rehabilitationwhile in the department’s custody and to reduce the likelihoodof recidivism after release.
-
Within ninety(90) days of admission, the department shall complete a case planon all inmates which shall include, but not limited to:
- Programming andtreatment requirements based on the results of a risk and needs assessment;
- Any programmingor treatment requirements contained in the sentencing order; and
- General behaviorrequirements in accordance with the rules and policies of the department.
-
The departmentshall provide the inmate with a written copy of the case plan andthe inmate’s caseworker shall explain the conditions set forthin the case plan.
- Within ninety(90) days of admission, the caseworker shall notify the inmate oftheir parole eligibility date as calculated in accordance with Section 47-7-3(3);
- At the time aparole-eligible inmate receives the case plan, the department shallsend the case plan to the Parole Board for approval.
- The departmentshall ensure that the case plan is achievable prior to inmate’sparole eligibility date.
- The caseworkershall meet with the inmate every eight (8) weeks from the date theoffender received the case plan to review the inmate’s caseplan progress.
- Every four (4)months the department shall electronically submit a progress reporton each parole-eligible inmate’s case plan to the Parole Board.The board may meet to review an inmate’s case plan and mayprovide written input to the caseworker on the inmate’s progresstoward completion of the case plan.
- The Parole Boardshall provide semiannually to the Oversight Task Force the numberof parole hearings held, the number of prisoners released to parolewithout a hearing and the number of parolees released after a hearing.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 43, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Cross References —
Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.
Case plan for parole-eligible inmates, see §47-7-3.1.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Applicability.
It was error to hold the Mississippi Department of Corrections was required to develop a parole case plan for an inmate, under Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-3.1 or47-7-18, because (1) the general rule was that statutes only had prospective operation, absent a clear and positive contrary expression of legislative intent, (2) the statutes contained no such expression, and (3) the inmate was convicted and sentenced before the statutes became effective. Fisher v. Drankus, 204 So.3d 1232, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 505 (Miss. 2016).
Inmate was ineligible for parole because, although the inmate claimed that a constitutionally protected interest in parole was created by statute, compliance with a parole case plan was a statutory prerequisite to parole, but the statutory parole case plan requirements were inapplicable as the inmate’s conviction and sentence predated the effective date of the statutes. Willard v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 212 So.3d 80, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 664 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
§ 47-7-3.2. Minimum time offenders convicted of crime of violence must serve before release; minimum percentage of other sentences offenders must serve before release.
- Notwithstanding Sections 47-5-138, 47-5-139, 47-5-138.1 or 47-5-142, no person convictedof a criminal offense on or after July 1, 2014, shall be releasedby the department until he or she has served no less than fifty percent(50%) of a sentence for a crime of violence pursuant to Section 97-3-2 or twenty-fivepercent (25%) of any other sentence imposed by the court.
-
This sectionshall not apply to:
- Offenders sentencedto life imprisonment;
- Offenders convictedas habitual offenders pursuant to Sections 99-19-81 through 99-19-87;
- Offenders servinga sentence for a sex offense; or
- Offenders servinga sentence for trafficking pursuant to Section 41-29-139(f).
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 42, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
§ 47-7-4. Conditional medical release of prisoners; criteria; supervision; revocation.
The commissionerand the medical director of the department may place an offender whohas served not less than one (1) year of his or her sentence, exceptan offender convicted of a sex crime, on conditional medical release.However, a nonviolent offender who is bedridden may be placed on conditionalmedical release regardless of the time served on his or her sentence.Upon the release of a nonviolent offender who is bedridden, the stateshall not be responsible or liable for any medical costs that maybe incurred if such costs are acquired after the offender is no longerincarcerated due to his or her placement on conditional medical release.The commissioner shall not place an offender on conditional medicalrelease unless the medical director of the department certifies tothe commissioner that (a) the offender is suffering from a significantpermanent physical medical condition with no possibility of recovery;(b) that his or her further incarceration will serve no rehabilitativepurposes; and (c) that the state would incur unreasonable expensesas a result of his or her continued incarceration. Any offender placedon conditional medical release shall be supervised by the Divisionof Community Corrections of the department for the remainder of hisor her sentence. An offender’s conditional medical releasemay be revoked and the offender returned and placed in actual custodyof the department if the offender violates an order or condition ofhis or her conditional medical release. An offender who is no longerbedridden shall be returned and placed in the actual custody of thedepartment.
HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 426, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 365, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 545, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved May 22, 2012.).
Editor’s Notes —
[ Laws, 1994, ch. 606, § 1; Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 26, § 25; Laws, 1996, ch. 509, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 387, § 1]
A former §47-7-4 was repealed by its own terms by Laws of 1997, ch. 387, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 1998.
Former §47-7-4 related to medical release for certain offenders.
Amendment Notes —
The 2008 amendment added the second and third sentences; and added feminine pronouns throughout.
The 2012 amendment, substituted “bedridden” for “terminally ill” in the second and third sentences, and added the last sentence.
§ 47-7-5. State Parole Board created; membership; requirements; vacancies; expenses; immunity; budget; responsibilities to offenders; electronic monitoring program; central registry of paroled inmates; minimum vote required to grant parole to inmate convicted of capital murder or sex crime [Repealed effective July 1, 2022].
- The State ParoleBoard, created under former Section 47-7-5, is herebycreated, continued and reconstituted and shall be composed of five(5) members. The Governor shall appoint the members with the adviceand consent of the Senate. All terms shall be at the will and pleasureof the Governor. Any vacancy shall be filled by the Governor, withthe advice and consent of the Senate. The Governor shall appoint achairman of the board.
- Any person whois appointed to serve on the board shall possess at least a bachelor’sdegree or a high school diploma and four (4) years’ work experience.Each member shall devote his full time to the duties of his officeand shall not engage in any other business or profession or hold anyother public office. A member shall not receive compensation or perdiem in addition to his salary as prohibited under Section 25-3-38. Each membershall keep such hours and workdays as required of full-time stateemployees under Section 25-1-98. Individualsshall be appointed to serve on the board without reference to theirpolitical affiliations. Each board member, including the chairman,may be reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses as authorizedby Section 25-3-41. Each memberof the board shall complete annual training developed based on guidancefrom the National Institute of Corrections, the Association of ParolingAuthorities International, or the American Probation and Parole Association.Each first-time appointee of the board shall, within sixty (60) daysof appointment, or as soon as practical, complete training for first-timeParole Board members developed in consideration of information fromthe National Institute of Corrections, the Association of ParolingAuthorities International, or the American Probation and Parole Association.
- The board shallhave exclusive responsibility for the granting of parole as providedby Sections 47-7-3 and 47-7-17 and shall have exclusiveauthority for revocation of the same. The board shall have exclusiveresponsibility for investigating clemency recommendations upon requestof the Governor.
- The board, itsmembers and staff, shall be immune from civil liability for any officialacts taken in good faith and in exercise of the board’s legitimategovernmental authority.
- The budget ofthe board shall be funded through a separate line item within thegeneral appropriation bill for the support and maintenance of thedepartment. Employees of the department which are employed by or assignedto the board shall work under the guidance and supervision of theboard. There shall be an executive secretary to the board who shallbe responsible for all administrative and general accounting dutiesrelated to the board. The executive secretary shall keep and preserveall records and papers pertaining to the board.
- The board shallhave no authority or responsibility for supervision of offenders granteda release for any reason, including, but not limited to, probation,parole or executive clemency or other offenders requiring the samethrough interstate compact agreements. The supervision shall be providedexclusively by the staff of the Division of Community Correctionsof the department.
-
- The Parole Boardis authorized to select and place offenders in an electronic monitoringprogram under the conditions and criteria imposed by the Parole Board.The conditions, restrictions and requirements of Section 47-7-17 and Sections 47-5-1001 through 47-5-1015 shall apply tothe Parole Board and any offender placed in an electronic monitoringprogram by the Parole Board.
- Any offenderplaced in an electronic monitoring program under this subsection shallpay the program fee provided in Section 47-5-1013. The programfees shall be deposited in the special fund created in Section 47-5-1007.
- The departmentshall have absolute immunity from liability for any injury resultingfrom a determination by the Parole Board that an offender be placedin an electronic monitoring program.
-
- The Parole Boardshall maintain a central registry of paroled inmates. The Parole Boardshall place the following information on the registry: name, address,photograph, crime for which paroled, the date of the end of paroleor flat-time date and other information deemed necessary. The ParoleBoard shall immediately remove information on a parolee at the endof his parole or flat-time date.
- When a personis placed on parole, the Parole Board shall inform the parolee ofthe duty to report to the parole officer any change in address ten(10) days before changing address.
- The Parole Boardshall utilize an Internet website or other electronic means to releaseor publish the information.
- Records maintainedon the registry shall be open to law enforcement agencies and thepublic and shall be available no later than July 1, 2003.
- An affirmativevote of at least four (4) members of the Parole Board shall be requiredto grant parole to an inmate convicted of capital murder or a sexcrime.
- This sectionshall stand repealed on July 1, 2022.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-01; Laws, 1942, ch. 283; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 3; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, §§ 2, 3; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 2; Laws, 1960, ch. 272; Laws, 1968, ch. 362, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 80; Laws, 1978, ch. 520, § 13; Laws, 1980, ch. 560, § 21; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 93; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 103; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 103; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 346, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 575, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1994 Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 1; amended, Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 1; Laws, 1997, ch. 602, § 2; Laws, 2000, ch. 612, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 560, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 569, § 2; Laws, 2005, ch. 485, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 570, § 1; Laws, 2007, ch. 597, § 1; Laws, 2009, ch. 513, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 320, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 52, eff from and after July 1, 2014; Laws, 2018, ch. 326, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018; Laws, 2018, ch. 410, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of Chapter 326, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 7, 2018), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 410, Laws of 2018, effective from and after July 1, 2018 (approved March 21, 2018), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of Chapter 410, Laws of 2018, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Editor's Notes —
Laws of 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 8, provides as follows:
“SECTION 8. The State Parole Board created by Section 1 of this act is a continuation of the State Parole Board that existed on June 30, 1994. Executive Order 754, issued June 24, 1994, shall have no force or effect from and after the effective date of this act, and the State Parole Board created by Section 1 of this act supersedes the entity referred to in Executive Order 754 in all respects after the effective date of this act; however, all actions taken by the entity referred to in Executive Order 754 between June 30, 1994, and the effective date of this act that would have been lawful if they had been taken by the State Parole Board as it existed on June 30, 1994, pursuant to the board's powers or duties as they existed on June 30, 1994, or pursuant to any powers or duties of the board provided for by any state law enacted during the 1994 Regular Session or any federal law or regulation that was in effect between June 30, 1994, and the effective date of this act, are retroactively ratified, confirmed and validated. In addition, all actions taken by the State Fiscal Officer, the State Treasurer and their respective employees between June 30, 1994, and the effective date of this act in connection with the expenditure by the entity referred to in Executive Order 754 of any of the funds appropriated to the Department of Corrections by Senate Bill 3253, 1994 Regular Session, are retroactively ratified, confirmed and validated. Nothing in this section shall be construed as ratifying any authority of the Governor to establish a state agency by Executive Order.”
Laws of 2005, ch. 485, § 11 provides as follows:
“SECTION 11. The intensive supervision program established in Laws of 2005, Chapter 485 is a continuation of the intensive supervision program that existed on June 30, 2004. All actions taken by the Department of Corrections from July 1, 2004, to April 6, 2005, which would have been authorized under the prior intensive supervision program are ratified, confirmed and validated.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment substituted “Division of Community Corrections” for “Division of Community Services” in (6); deleted (7); redesignated former (8) as (7); inserted present (8); substituted the repeal date of “2004” for “2002” in (9); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 2004 amendment deleted former (7) and redesignated remaining subdivisions accordingly; and changed the date of the repealer provision from “July 1, 2004” to “July 1, 2005” in (8).
The 2005 amendment inserted (7); renumbered former (7) and (8) as present (8) and (9); and extended the date of the repealer in (9) from “July 1, 2005” until “July 1, 2006.”
The 2006 amendment deleted “but a member shall not be reimbursed for travel expenses from his residence to the nearest State Penitentiary” at the end of (2); and extended the date of the repealer in (9) from “July 1, 2006” until “July 1, 2007.”
The 2007 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (9) from “July 1, 2007” until “July 1, 2009.”
The 2009 amendment added (9); redesignated former (9) as present (10); and extended the date of the section repealer in (10) by substituting “July 1, 2012” for “July 1, 2009.”
The 2012 amendment extended the repealer provision in (10) from “July 1, 2012” to “July 1 2014.”
The 2014 amendment added two additional sentences at the end of (2); and extended the repealer provision from “July 1, 2014” to “July 1, 2018” in (10).
The first 2018 amendment (ch. 326) extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “July 1, 2020” for “July 1, 2018” in (10).
The second 2018 amendment (ch. 410) extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “July 1, 2022” for “July 1, 2018” in (10).
Cross References —
State agencies and public officials providing information about the agency or office to the public on a website are required to regularly review and update that information, see §25-1-117.
For provision authorizing uniform per diem compensation for officers and employees of state boards, commissions and agencies, see §25-3-69.
Division of community services generally, see §47-5-8.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Trial court did not err in dismissing an inmate’s complaint against the State seeking an interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-3 and47-7-5 and claiming that the statutes were unconstitutional because he trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the inmate’s claims; the inmate’s concerns failed to state a constitutional claim sufficient for the trial court to assert jurisdiction, and the Parole Board was in compliance with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-5, Rochell v. State, 36 So.3d 479, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 291 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Both defendant and the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office agreed that defendant’s parole and release dates were incorrectly calculated in regard to the date his sentence began, and as to credits and trusty time. Thus, the appellate court reversed the determination that defendant was not entitled to a hearing and remanded the matter to the Mississippi Parole Board to allow the Board to make the exact calculations of defendant’s parole and release dates; however, on remand, the Board was free to grant or deny defendant’s petition for parole and the circuit court had no authority to determine defendant’s parole eligibility. Lizana v. Scott, 910 So. 2d 31, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
An agreement between a capital murder defendant and the State for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was void and unenforceable on public policy grounds where the defendant was not an habitual offender, since a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not an option unless the defendant is adjudged an habitual offender; the agreement was an attempt to circumvent §99-19-101, which only authorizes a sentence of life imprisonment or death for capital murder, and its enforcement by the court would bind the parole board, which would effect judicial encroachment on an executive function. Lanier v. State, 635 So. 2d 813, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 165 (Miss. 1994), overruled in part, Twillie v. State, 892 So. 2d 187, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1322 (Miss. 2004).
Parole board members who voted to parole a prisoner to Friends of Alcoholics (FOA) were not liable to a person who was injured by the parolee after he left FOA without leave; the parole board members did not lose their qualified immunity, either by failure to perform their ministerial functions or by acting with reckless disregard in voting to parole the parolee to FOA, where pertinent information regarding the parolee was contained in his parole file and the master file which were reviewed by the parole board when the case was considered. The board members substantially complied with the duties and requirements set forth in the statute for members of the parole board, particularly §47-7-17 and there was no violation of their ministerial duties. Additionally, although the board members were lay persons, untrained, unschooled, and inexperienced in the complex and sensitive problems of probation and parole, and even though judgment and decision was deficient and lacking, they were exercising discretionary authority; their decision was the result of personal deliberation and judgment, and they did not commit willful wrongs or malicious acts. Furthermore, they did not act with reckless disregard and did not exceed and pervert their discretionary authority-theirs was an exercise of poor judgment. As a result of this case, the legislature enacted a law providing for a full time parole board with members who are salaried employees of the State, and providing that the parole board members shall be immune from civil liability for any official acts taken in good faith and in exercise of the board’s legitimate governmental authority. Sykes v. Grantham, 567 So. 2d 200, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 1990).
The Department of Corrections has no duty to provide the Parole Board with information and has no control over parole decisions. Thus, the department had no duty to a victim assaulted by a paroled prisoner. Grantham v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 522 So. 2d 219, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1988).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Actual and necessary expenses do not include travel between one’s home and office where one normally works. Hughes, May 22, 1991, A.G. Op. #91-0375.
A member of the Parole Board may conduct worship service on Sunday mornings and teach bible class on Wednesday nights in addition to his duties as a member of the Parole Board, but may not receive compensation therefore. Naylor, April 16, 1999, A.G. Op. #99-0168.
The State Parole Board has no authority to parole an offender under subsection (8) who is suffering from a terminal illness but has not served sufficient prison time to be eligible for parole. Pope, Feb. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0033.
The State Parole Board has no authority to parole an offender under subsection (8) who is suffering from a terminal illness but is sentenced under a law such as “Truth in Sentencing” which does not provide for a parole. Pope, Feb. 13, 2001, A.G. Op. #2001-0033.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole § 76.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 46-48.
§ 47-7-6. Parole Board to collect certain information and report semiannually to Oversight Task Force.
-
The Parole Board,with the assistance of the Department of Corrections, shall collectthe following information:
- The number ofoffenders supervised on parole;
- The number ofoffenders released on parole;
- The number ofparole hearings held;
- The parole grantrate for parolees released with and without a hearing;
- The average lengthof time offenders spend on parole;
- The number andpercentage of parolees revoked for a technical violation and returnedfor a term of imprisonment in a technical violation center;
- The number andpercentage of parolees revoked for a technical violation and returnedfor a term of imprisonment in another type of Department of Corrections’facility;
- The number andpercentage of parolees who are convicted of a new offense and returnedfor a term of imprisonment on their current crime as well as the newcrime;
- The number ofparolees held on a violation in county jail awaiting a revocationhearing; and
- The average lengthof stay in a county jail for parolees awaiting a revocation hearing.
- The Parole Boardshall semiannually report information required in subsection (1) tothe Oversight Task Force, and upon request, shall report such informationto the PEER Committee.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 67, effective from and after July 1, 2014.
Editor’s Notes —
A former §47-7-6 provided that an individual was ineligible for an appointment by the governor to the State Parole Board if that individual contributed more than a certain amount to the campaign of the appointing governor.
A former §47-7-6. (Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 2, eff from and after May 1, 1989; Repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 438, § 2, effective from and after passage April 7, 2008).
§ 47-7-7. Repealed.
Repealed by Laws of 1976, ch. 440, § 922, eff from and after July 1, 1976.
[Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 12; Laws, 1950, ch. 524; § 6; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 3; Laws, 1958, ch. 239; Laws, 1960, ch. 274; Laws, 1964, ch. 367; Laws, 1968, ch. 363, § 1; Laws, 1973, ch. 377, § 1]
Editor’s Notes —
Former §47-7-7 required the state probation and parole board to appoint an administrative assistant, in turn to appoint, subject to board approval, probation and parole officers and other employees; provided for examinations; and fixed the total number of employees and probation and parole officers.
§ 47-7-9. General powers and duties of personnel of Division of Community Corrections as field supervisors and presentence investigators.
- The circuit judgesand county judges in the districts to which Division of CommunityCorrections personnel have been assigned shall have the power to requestof the department transfer or removal of the division personnel fromtheir court.
-
- Division personnelshall investigate all cases referred to them for investigation bythe board, the division or by any court in which they are authorizedto serve. They shall furnish to each person released under their supervisiona written statement of the conditions of probation, parole, earned-releasesupervision, post-release supervision or suspension and shall instructthe person regarding the same. They shall administer a risk and needsassessment on each person under their supervision to measure criminalrisk factors and individual needs. They shall use the results of therisk and needs assessment to guide supervision responses consistentwith evidence-based practices as to the level of supervision and thepractices used to reduce recidivism. They shall develop a supervisionplan for each person assessed as moderate to high risk to reoffend.They shall keep informed concerning the conduct and conditions ofpersons under their supervision and use all suitable methods thatare consistent with evidence-based practices to aid and encouragethem and to bring about improvements in their conduct and conditionand to reduce the risk of recidivism. They shall keep detailed recordsof their work and shall make such reports in writing as the courtor the board may require.
- Division personnelshall complete annual training on evidence-based practices and criminalrisk factors, as well as instructions on how to target these factorsto reduce recidivism.
- The divisionpersonnel duly assigned to court districts are hereby vested withall the powers of police officers or sheriffs to make arrests or performany other duties required of policemen or sheriffs which may be incidentto the division personnel responsibilities. All probation and paroleofficers hired on or after July 1, 1994, will be placed in the LawEnforcement Officers Training Program and will be required to meetthe standards outlined by that program.
- It is the intentionof the Legislature that insofar as practicable the case load of eachdivision personnel supervising offenders in the community (hereinafterfield supervisor) shall not exceed the number of cases that may beadequately handled.
-
- Division personnelshall be provided to perform investigation for the court as providedin this subsection. Division personnel shall conduct presentence investigationson all persons convicted of a felony in any circuit court of the state,prior to sentencing and at the request of the circuit court judgeof the court of conviction. The presentence evaluation report shallconsist of a complete record of the offender’s criminal history,educational level, employment history, psychological condition andsuch other information as the department or judge may deem necessary.Division personnel shall also prepare written victim impact statementsat the request of the sentencing judge as provided in Section 99-19-157.
- In order thatoffenders in the custody of the department on July 1, 1976, may benefitfrom the kind of evaluations authorized in this section, an evaluationreport to consist of the information required hereinabove, supplementedby an examination of an offender’s record while in custody,shall be compiled by the division upon all offenders in the custodyof the department on July 1, 1976. After a study of such reports bythe State Parole Board those cases which the board believes wouldmerit some type of executive clemency shall be submitted by the boardto the Governor with its recommendation for the appropriate executiveaction.
- The departmentis authorized to accept gifts, grants and subsidies to conduct thisactivity.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-09; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 7; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 10; Laws, 1954, Ex. ch. 23, § 1; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 4; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 81; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 94; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 104; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 104; Laws, 1987, ch. 433, § 7; Laws, 1994, ch. 516, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 6; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 5; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 53, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment substituted “Division of Community Corrections” for “Division of Community Services” in (1).
The 2014 amendment, in (2)(a), substituted “the person” for “him” at the end of the second sentence; added the third, fourth, and fifth sentences; and inserted “that are consistent with evidence-based practices” and “and to reduce the risk of recidivism” to the second from last sentence; added (2)(b) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.
Cross References —
Right of presentence investigators to inspect certain youth court records, see §43-21-261.
Division of community services generally, see §47-5-8.
Condition of probation by order of court upon suspended sentence, see §§47-7-33 et seq.
Out-of-state parolee supervision, see §47-7-71.
Duty of department of corrections, division of community services to support pretrial intervention program (§§99-15-101 through99-15-127), see §99-15-127.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Petition for postconviction relief was denied because there was no error in the mention of the conspiracy charges during sentencing when the state requested their retirement to the file; there was no indication that the conspiracy charges, which were not included in a pre-sentence report, were considered as aggravating factors. Moody v. State, 964 So. 2d 564, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 429 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and arson were proper where the failure to grant a sentencing hearing was not in error because the trial judge was already privy to the facts of the case and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to sentencing, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-9(3)(a). Payton v. State, 897 So. 2d 921, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 2003).
In a prosecution for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the trial court did not err in failing to order a presentence report, thus prohibiting the defendant from offering mitigating circumstances for the court’s consideration prior to imposition of sentence, since presentence investigations and reports are discretionary with the trial judge and not mandatory. Edwards v. State, 615 So. 2d 590, 1993 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 1993).
The use of presentence investigations and reports, as provided in §47-7-9(3)(a), are discretionary with the trial judge and are not mandatory; a defendant does not have a right to a presentence investigation. Roberson v. State, 595 So. 2d 1310, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 95 (Miss. 1992).
Failure to request pre-sentence report is not ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant is not automatically entitled to pre-sentence reports under §47-7-9(3)(a), which clearly states that pre-sentence reports are given only at discretion of circuit judge. Stringer v. Scroggy, 675 F. Supp. 356, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11203 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 1108, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 17949 (5th Cir. Miss. 1988).
A presentence report under §47-7-9(3)(a) is required only when the circuit judge requests it, and there is no reason to order such a report in a capital case in which the jury imposes the sentence and both the state and the defendant are entitled to present evidence. Johnson v. Thigpen, 449 So. 2d 1207, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1713 (Miss. 1984).
In a prosecution for murder while engaged in the offense of kidnapping, the trial court did not commit reversible error by sentencing the defendant to death without a pre-sentence report where the sentencing jury had decided the issue of sentence after a full hearing on the issues of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In re Jordan, 390 So. 2d 584, 1980 Miss. LEXIS 2149 (Miss. 1980).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Probation officer’s liability for negligent supervision of probationer. 44 A.L.R.4th 638.
Right of convicted defendant or prosecution to receive updated presentence report at sentence proceedings. 22 A.L.R.5th 660.
§ 47-7-11. Salaries, per diem and expenses.
All salariesand expenses incurred in the carrying out of this chapter shall bepaid out of funds appropriated by the legislature for the supportand maintenance of the probation and parole board. All accounts, includingsalaries, shall be approved and allowed by the board, and the boardshall keep a complete record thereof.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-19; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 16; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 20; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 9; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 95; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 105; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 105, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-7-13. Voting and recordkeeping requirements; offices, equipment, and supplies.
A majority ofthe board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of all business.A decision to parole an offender convicted of murder or a sex-relatedcrime shall require the affirmative vote of three (3) members. Theboard shall maintain, in minute book form, a copy of each of its officialactions with the reasons therefor. Suitable and sufficient officespace and support resources and staff necessary to conducting ParoleBoard business shall be provided by the Department of Corrections.However, the principal place for conducting parole hearings shallbe the state penitentiary at Parchman.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-06; Laws, 1942, ch. 283; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 4; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 7; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 96; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 106; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 106; Laws, 1986, ch. 435, § 2; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 5, eff from and after May 1, 1989.
Cross References —
Exemption of probation and parole board from provisions of open meetings law, see §25-41-3.
Inapplicability of Mississippi Rules of Evidence in proceedings to grant or revoke probation, see Miss. R. Evid. 1101.
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The provisions of Section 47-7-13 regarding the necessary votes to parole offenders convicted of murder do not apply to offenders convicted of manslaughter. Mosley, July 31, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0504.
Until the Legislature addresses Section 47-7-13, an affirmative unanimous vote is required to parole an offender convicted of murder or a sex-related offense. Mosley, July 31, 1995, A.G. Op. #95-0504.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 A.L.R.3d 932.
§ 47-7-15. Seal of board; records and reports.
The board shalladopt an official seal of which the courts shall take judicial notice.Decisions of the board shall be made by majority vote.
The board shallkeep a record of its acts and shall notify each institution of itsdecisions relating to the persons who are or have been confined therein.At the close of each fiscal year the board shall submit to the Governorand to the Legislature a report with statistical and other data ofits work.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-07; Laws, 1942, ch. 283; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, §§ 5, 18; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 8; brought forward, 1981, ch. 465, § 97; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 107; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 107; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 6, eff from and after May 1, 1989.
§ 47-7-17. Examination of offender’s record; eligibility for parole.
Within one (1)year after his admission and at such intervals thereafter as it maydetermine, the board shall secure and consider all pertinent informationregarding each offender, except any under sentence of death or otherwiseineligible for parole, including the circumstances of his offense,his previous social history, his previous criminal record, includingany records of law enforcement agencies or of a youth court regardingthat offender’s juvenile criminal history, his conduct, employmentand attitude while in the custody of the department, the case plancreated to prepare the offender for parole, and the reports of suchphysical and mental examinations as have been made. The board shallfurnish at least three (3) months’ written notice to each suchoffender of the date on which he is eligible for parole.
Before rulingon the application for parole of any offender, the board may requirea parole-eligible offender to have a hearing as required in this chapterbefore the board and to be interviewed. The hearing shall be heldno later than thirty (30) days prior to the month of eligibility.No application for parole of a person convicted of a capital offenseshall be considered by the board unless and until notice of the filingof such application shall have been published at least once a weekfor two (2) weeks in a newspaper published in or having general circulationin the county in which the crime was committed.The board shall,within thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled hearing, also givenotice of the filing of the application for parole to the victim ofthe offense for which the prisoner is incarcerated and being consideredfor parole or, in case the offense be homicide, a designee of theimmediate family of the victim, provided the victim or designatedfamily member has furnished in writing a current address to the boardfor such purpose. Parole release shall, at the hearing, be orderedonly for the best interest of society, not as an award of clemency;it shall not be considered to be a reduction of sentence or pardon. An offender shall be placed on parole only when arrangements havebeen made for his proper employment or for his maintenance and care,and when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfillthe obligations of a law-abiding citizen.When the board determinesthat the offender will need transitional housing upon release in orderto improve the likelihood of him or her becoming a law-abiding citizen,the board may parole the offender with the condition that the inmatespends no more than six (6) months in a transitional reentry center.At least fifteen (15) days prior to the release of an offender onparole, the director of records of the department shall give the writtennotice which is required pursuant to Section 47-5-177.Everyoffender while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of thedepartment from which he was released and shall be amenable to theorders of the board. Upon determination by the board that an offenderis eligible for release by parole, notice shall also be given withinat least fifteen (15) days before release, by the board to the victimof the offense or the victim’s family member, as indicatedabove, regarding the date when the offender’s release shalloccur, provided a current address of the victim or the victim’sfamily member has been furnished in writing to the board for suchpurpose.
Failure to providenotice to the victim or the victim’s family member of the filingof the application for parole or of any decision made by the boardregarding parole shall not constitute grounds for vacating an otherwiselawful parole determination nor shall it create any right or liability,civilly or criminally, against the board or any member thereof.
A letter of protestagainst granting an offender parole shall not be treated as the conclusiveand only reason for not granting parole.
The board mayadopt such other rules not inconsistent with law as it may deem properor necessary with respect to the eligibility of offenders for parole,the conduct of parole hearings, or conditions to be imposed upon parolees,including a condition that the parolee submit, as provided in Section 47-5-601 to any typeof breath, saliva or urine chemical analysis test, the purpose ofwhich is to detect the possible presence of alcohol or a substanceprohibited or controlled by any law of the State of Mississippi orthe United States. The board shall have the authority to adopt rulesrelated to the placement of certain offenders on unsupervised paroleand for the operation of transitional reentry centers. However, inno case shall an offender be placed on unsupervised parole beforehe has served a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of the period of supervisedparole.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-08; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 9; Laws, 1972, ch. 335, § 1; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 8; Laws, 1981, ch. 382, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 98; Laws, 1983, ch. 375, § 2, ch. 435, § 4; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 108; Laws, 1985, ch. 444, § 2; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 108; Laws, 1986, ch. 422, § 3; Laws, 1986, ch. 424, § 1; Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess ch. 3, § 7; Laws, 1990, ch. 399, § 2; Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 3; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 45, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment, in the first undesignated paragraph, inserted “the case plan created to prepare the offender for parole,” near the end of the first sentence; in the second undesignated paragraph, in the first sentence, substituted “require a parole-eligible” for “have the” and “to have a hearing as required in this chapter before the board and to be interviewed” for “appear before it and interview him”; in the second sentence, deleted “in order for the department to address any special conditions required by the board” from the end, and substituted “no later than thirty (30) days prior” for “two (2) months,” in the fourth sentence, inserted “within thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled hearing,”; in the fifth sentence, deleted “A” at the beginning and inserted “release” following “Parole” and “at the hearing,” preceding “be ordered only for the best”; added a seventh sentence; and at the beginning of the eighth sentence, substituted “At least fifteen (15) days” for “Within forty-eight (48) hours”; deleted the second to last sentence, which read: “The board, upon rejecting the application for parole of any offender, shall within thirty (30) days following such rejection furnish that offender in general terms the reasons therefor in writing”; and inserted “within at least fifteen (15) days before release,” near the beginning of the last sentence; in the last undesignated paragraph, in the second to last sentence, substituted “related to the placement of” for “permitting,” deleted “to be placed” following “certain offenders” and added “and for the operation of transitional reentry centers” to the end; and in the last sentence, substituted “fifty percent (50%) of the period” for “three (3) years.”
Cross References —
Disclosure of youth court records, see §43-21-261.
Requirement that classification committee provide parole board with copies of classifications, see §47-5-103.
Exclusivity of State Parole Board’s responsibility for granting or revoking parole, as provided by this section, see §47-7-5.
Provision that the Department of Corrections shall not make any rules which are inconsistent with those imposed by the State Parole Board pursuant to this section with respect to unsupervised parole, see §47-7-23.
Power of court to suspend sentence and place defendant on probation, see §47-7-33.
Inapplicability of Mississippi Rules of Evidence in proceedings to grant or revoke probation, see Miss. R. Evid. 1101.
Case plan for parole-eligible inmates, see §47-7-3.1.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general; construction.
2. Change in law, regulation or interpretation; ex post factoeffect.
3. Conduct of board members; liability.
4. Presence of prisoner at hearing.
5. Miscellaneous.
6. Discretion.
1. In general; construction.
Denial of the inmate’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was affirmed as (1) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-17 did not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, (2) the inmate waived his right to argue that he was prejudiced by the Parole Board’s failure to publish notice of his parole hearing as it was not raised below, and (3) the inmate did not argue in his petition that he had ever been denied the opportunity to call witnesses or that the Parole Board refused to listen to their testimony. Way v. Miller, 919 So. 2d 1036, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 471 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Inmate’s complaint filed with the circuit court for a review of the parole board’s determinations was properly dismissed because the circuit court did not have the jurisdiction to grant or deny parole. Further, while the inmate had entitled his petition a habeas corpus action, because the parole board had complete discretion to grant or deny parole, the inmate failed to state a claim that would have required an evidentiary hearing. Johnson v. Miller, 919 So. 2d 273, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 430 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Parole statutes contain no mandatory language, but instead employ permissive “may” rather than “shall,” and thus prisoners have no constitutionally recognized liberty interest in parole. Vice v. State, 679 So. 2d 205, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 419 (Miss. 1996).
The Mississippi parole statutes do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the form of an expectation of parole because of the use of the permissive “may” in §47-7-3, which provides that a prisoner “may be released on parole as hereinafter provided,” read in the context of the other provisions of that section and, as well, those of §47-7-17. Thus, Mississippi law did not vest a convicted and incarcerated felon with a liberty interest in parole entitling him to due process of law incident to his application for parole. Harden v. State, 547 So. 2d 1150, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 370 (Miss. 1989).
2. Change in law, regulation or interpretation; ex post facto effect.
An administrative correction of a prior misinterpretation of parole laws is not a change in the law so as to violate the ex post facto clause of the United States or Mississippi Constitutions; even if the correction of a former mistaken interpretation of parole law did reach the level of a change in law, administrative decisions with regard to parole law eligibility are not “laws annexed to the crime when committed.” Taylor v. Mississippi State Probation & Parole Board, 365 So. 2d 621, 1978 Miss. LEXIS 2418 (Miss. 1978).
3. Conduct of board members; liability.
Parole board members who voted to parole prisoner to Friends of Alcoholics (FOA) were not liable to a person injured by the parolee after he left FOA without leave; parole board members did not lose qualified immunity, either by failure to perform ministerial functions or by acting with reckless disregard in voting to parole the parolee to FOA, where pertinent information regarding parolee was contained in his parole file and the master file which were reviewed by board when case was considered. Board members substantially complied with duties and requirements set forth in the statute for members of parole board, particularly §47-7-17, and there was no violation of ministerial duties. Additionally, although board members were lay, untrained, unschooled, and inexperienced in complex and sensitive problems of probation and parole, and even though judgment and decision was deficient and lacking, they were exercising discretionary authority; their decision was the result of personal deliberation and judgment, and they did not commit willful wrongs or malicious acts, or act with reckless disregard or exceed and pervert their discretionary authority. (As a result of case, legislature enacted law providing for full time parole board with members salaried employees of State, immune from civil liability for any official acts taken in good faith and in exercise of board’s legitimate governmental authority.) Sykes v. Grantham, 567 So. 2d 200, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 463 (Miss. 1990).
A complaint which alleged that members of the parole board were guilty of gross neglect of their duties under §47-7-17 in paroling an inmate who subsequently injured a person was sufficient to pierce the shield of the officials’ qualified immunity to suit. Grantham v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 522 So. 2d 219, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 117 (Miss. 1988).
4. Presence of prisoner at hearing.
Court rejected the inmate’s claim that he was entitled to review his parole board file, because under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-17, the board may have the offender appear before it and interview him before ruling on the application for parole of any offender; therefore, if the parole board was under no obligation to have the offender present at his parole hearing, it logically followed that the board was under no obligation to disclose its file to the offender. Edmond v. Miller, 942 So. 2d 203, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 942 So. 2d 164, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 718 (Miss. 2006).
This section vests discretion with the parole board to determine whether an applicant for parole will appear before it for an interview and, therefore, a prisoner has no right to be present at the meeting of the parole board. Justus v. Mississippi State Parole Bd., 750 So. 2d 1277, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 586 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
5. Miscellaneous.
Trial court did not err by denying an inmate’s motion for a preliminary injunction because nothing in the record supported the inmate’s claim that the Mississippi State Parole Board arbitrarily denied him parole in violation of any Fourteenth Amendment right; the Parole Board denied the inmate’s parole based upon the serious nature of the offense, the number of offenses committed, the inmate’s police record, community opposition, and insufficient time served, and because the reasons stated by the Parole Board for denying the inmate’s parole were areas that the Parole Board had authority to consider under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-17, those categories could not be viewed as arbitrary and capricious. Rochell v. State, 36 So.3d 479, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 291 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Inmate’s due process rights were not violated when a district attorney sent a letter to a parole board objecting to parole because there was no breach of a plea agreement; the district attorney kept the promise of making a sentencing recommendation, and eligibility for parole did not affect a voluntariness analysis since there was no right to parole. Garlotte v. State, 915 So. 2d 460, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 280 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 1279, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 769 (Miss. 2005).
A trial court erred in concluding that the State of Florida lost jurisdiction over a petitioner when it released her to the custody of a Mississippi bail bondsman because the effect of Florida’s release of the petitioner to the State of Mississippi was a question to be answered in the first instance by a proper court of the State of Florida. Furthermore, the parole board was without statutory or other authority to condition the petitioner’s parole on her voluntarily submitting herself to the custody of the State of Florida, which the petitioner had refused to do on several occasions, and the trial court compounded this error by removing this condition and ordering the parole board to release the petitioner immediately, which was beyond the court’s authority since determining the eligibility for parole is peculiarly and solely a discretionary function of the parole board. State v. Read, 544 So. 2d 810, 1989 Miss. LEXIS 251 (Miss. 1989).
The decision in Gates v. Collier (CA5 Miss.) 501 F.2d 1291, is not to be applied retroactively to require expungement of records made before the adoption of disciplinary procedures that conform to constitutional requirements. Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation & Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15629 (5th Cir. Miss.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998, 96 S. Ct. 428, 46 L. Ed. 2d 373, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3523 (U.S. 1975).
The state parole board did not have authority to issue a release to detainer only and, under the guise of such an instrument, to transfer custody of a prisoner from the state penitentiary to a federal penitentiary. As prisoner’s transfer to federal authorities was void from the beginning, he had no right to complain of his return to state custody following his posting of appeal bond in the federal case. Jones v. State, 312 So. 2d 717, 1975 Miss. LEXIS 1660 (Miss. 1975).
6. Discretion.
While an inmate was eligible for parole, no constitutionally protected liberty interest was conferred by statute upon the inmate. In addition, the grant or denial of parole was entirely within the Mississippi State Parole Board’s discretion, and the denial of parole was not subject to a statutory right of appeal. Willard v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 212 So.3d 80, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 664 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Clearly, the inmate’s prison conduct record was not identical to the prison conduct records of the other two co-defendants. He committed a violent felony after having been convicted of homicide, the parole board had discretion to grant or deny parole for each individual, and its decision to deny parole to the inmate while granting parole to the co-defendants satisfied the rational basis standard of review. Johnson v. Miller, 919 So. 2d 273, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 430 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Immunity of public officer from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 5 A.L.R.4th 773.
Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.
The propriety of conditioning parole on defendant’s not entering specified geographical area. 54 A.L.R.5th 743.
Right under Federal Constitution of prison inmate eligible for parole consideration to inspect his institutional files. 44 A.L.R. Fed. 390.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 81, 84 et seq., 98, 101 et seq.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 50, 51.
§ 47-7-18. Conditions for release of parole-eligible inmates without hearing; hearing required under certain circumstances.
-
Each inmate eligiblefor parole pursuant to Section 47-7-3, shall bereleased from incarceration to parole supervision on the inmate’sparole eligibility date, without a hearing before the board, if:
- The inmate hasmet the requirements of the parole case plan established pursuantto Section47-7-3.1;
- A victim of theoffense has not requested the board conduct a hearing;
- The inmate hasnot received a serious or major violation report within the past six(6) months;
- The inmate hasagreed to the conditions of supervision; and
- The inmate hasa discharge plan approved by the board.
- At least thirty(30) days prior to an inmate’s parole eligibility date, thedepartment shall notify the board in writing of the inmate’scompliance or noncompliance with the case plan. If an inmate failsto meet a requirement of the case plan, prior to the parole eligibilitydate, he or she shall have a hearing before the board to determineif completion of the case plan can occur while in the community.
- Any inmate forwhom there is insufficient information for the department to determinecompliance with the case plan shall have a hearing with the board.
- A hearing shallbe held with the board if requested by the victim following notificationof the inmate’s parole release date pursuant to Section 47-7-17.
- A hearing shallbe held by the board if a law enforcement official from the communityto which the inmate will return contacts the board or the departmentand requests a hearing to consider information relevant to publicsafety risks posed by the inmate if paroled at the initial paroleeligibility date. The law enforcement official shall submit an explanationdocumenting these concerns for the board to consider.
- If a parole hearingis held, the board may determine the inmate has sufficiently compliedwith the case plan or that the incomplete case plan is not the faultof the inmate and that granting parole is not incompatible with publicsafety, the board may then parole the inmate with appropriate conditions.If the board determines that the inmate has sufficiently compliedwith the case plan but the discharge plan indicates that the inmatedoes not have appropriate housing immediately upon release, the boardmay parole the inmate to a transitional reentry center with the conditionthat the inmate spends no more than six (6) months in the center.If the board determines that the inmate has not substantively compliedwith the requirement(s) of the case plan it may deny parole. If theboard denies parole, the board may schedule a subsequent parole hearingand, if a new date is scheduled, the board shall identify the correctiveaction the inmate will need to take in order to be granted parole.Any inmate not released at the time of the inmate’s initialparole date shall have a parole hearing at least every year.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 44, effective from and after July 1, 2014.
Editor’s Notes —
Former Section 47-7-18 required notification of certain law enforcement agencies and the crime victim or victim’s family of the parole of a prisoner.
Former Section 47-7-18 required notification of certain law enforcement agencies and the crime victim or victim’s family of the parole of a prisoner.
Repealed by Laws of 1990, ch. 399, § 3, eff from and after July 1, 1990. [Laws, 1989, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 3, § 3]
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Eligibility for parole.
2. Parole case plan.
1. Eligibility for parole.
Inmate was ineligible for parole because, although the inmate claimed that a constitutionally protected interest in parole was created by statute, compliance with a parole case plan was a statutory prerequisite to parole, but the statutory parole case plan requirements were inapplicable as the inmate’s conviction and sentence predated the effective date of the statutes. Willard v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 212 So.3d 80, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 664 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
2. Parole case plan.
It was error to hold the Mississippi Department of Corrections was required to develop a parole case plan for an inmate, under Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-3.1 or47-7-18, because (1) the general rule was that statutes only had prospective operation, absent a clear and positive contrary expression of legislative intent, (2) the statutes contained no such expression, and (3) the inmate was convicted and sentenced before the statutes became effective. Fisher v. Drankus, 204 So.3d 1232, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 505 (Miss. 2016).
§ 47-7-19. Correctional system officials to permit access to offenders and to give information to board.
It shall be theduty of all correctional system officials to grant to the membersof the board or its properly accredited representatives, access atall reasonable times to any person over whom the board may have jurisdictionunder this chapter; to provide for the board or such representativesfacilities for communicating with and observing the offender; andto furnish to the board such reports as the board shall require concerningthe conduct and character of any offender in the department of correctionscustody and any other facts deemed by the board pertinent in determiningwhether such offender shall be paroled.
It shall be theduty of any judge, district attorney, county attorney, police officer,or other public official of the state, having information with referenceto any person eligible for parole, to send such information as maybe in his possession or under his control to the board, in writing,upon request of any member or employee thereof.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-10; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 11; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 5; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 83; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 99; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 109; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 109, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-7-21. Privileged information.
All informationobtained in the discharge of official duty by a field officer as anemployee of the Department of Corrections shall be privileged andshall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other thanto (a) the State Parole Board, (b) a judge, or (c) law enforcementagencies when such information is relevant to criminal activity.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-16; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 17; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 100; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 110; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 110; Laws, 1987, ch. 340, eff from and after July 1, 1987.
Cross References —
Inapplicability of Mississippi Rules of Evidence in proceedings to grant or revoke probation, see Miss. R. Evid. 1101.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Communications to social worker as privileged. 50 A.L.R.3d 563.
Bankruptcy discharge of student loan on ground of undue hardship under § 523(a)(8)(B) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 523(a)(8)(B)). 63 A.L.R. Fed. 570.
Rights and obligations of Federal Government, under 20 USCS § 1080, when student borrower defaults on federally insured loan. 73 A.L.R. Fed. 303.
Am. Jur.
15A Am. Jur. 2d, Colleges and Universities § 22.
CJS.
14A C.J.S., Colleges and Universities § 34.
§ 47-7-23. Rules and regulations.
Except as otherwiseprovided by law, the Department of Corrections shall have the powerand duty to make rules for the conduct of persons heretofore or hereafterplaced on parole under the supervision of the Department of Correctionsand for the investigation and supervision of such persons, which supervisionmay include a condition that such persons submit, as provided in Section 47-5-601, to anytype of breath, saliva or urine chemical analysis test, the purposeof which is to detect the possible presence of alcohol or a substanceprohibited or controlled by any law of the State of Mississippi orthe United States. The department shall not make any rules which shallbe inconsistent with the rules imposed by the State Parole Board pursuantto Section 47-7-17 on offenderswho are placed on unsupervised parole.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-12; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 17; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 13; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 84; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 101; Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 5; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 111; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 111; Laws, 1986, ch. 424, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 1986.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants. 19 A.L.R.4th 1251.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 79, 94, 122.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 59, 60, 62.
§ 47-7-25. Gratuities to paroled offender.
When an offenderis placed on parole he shall receive, if needed, from the state, civilianclothing and transportation to the place in which he is to reside.At the discretion of the board the offender may be advanced such sumfor his temporary maintenance as the board may allow. The aforesaidgratuities are to be furnished by the commissioner of correctionswho is authorized to charge the actual cost of same in his accountas commissioner of corrections.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-11; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 13; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 12; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 85; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 102; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 112; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 112, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-7-27. Return of violator of parole or earned release supervision; arrest of offender; hearing; revocation of parole; imprisonment for technical violation to be served in technical violation center.
- The board may,at any time and upon a showing of probable violation of parole, issuea warrant for the return of any paroled offender to the custody ofthe department. The warrant shall authorize all persons named thereinto return the paroled offender to actual custody of the departmentfrom which he was paroled.
- Any field supervisormay arrest an offender without a warrant or may deputize any otherperson with power of arrest by giving him a written statement settingforth that the offender has, in the judgment of that field supervisor,violated the conditions of his parole or earned-release supervision.The written statement delivered with the offender by the arrestingofficer to the official in charge of the department facility fromwhich the offender was released or other place of detention designatedby the department shall be sufficient warrant for the detention ofthe offender.
- The field supervisor,after making an arrest, shall present to the detaining authoritiesa similar statement of the circumstances of violation. The field supervisorshall at once notify the board or department of the arrest and detentionof the offender and shall submit a written report showing in whatmanner the offender has violated the conditions of parole or earned-releasesupervision. An offender for whose return a warrant has been issuedby the board shall, after the issuance of the warrant, be deemed afugitive from justice.
- Whenever an offenderis arrested on a warrant for an alleged violation of parole as hereinprovided, the board shall hold an informal preliminary hearing withinseventy-two (72) hours to determine whether there is reasonable causeto believe the person has violated a condition of parole. A preliminaryhearing shall not be required when the offender is not under arreston a warrant or the offender signed a waiver of a preliminary hearing.The preliminary hearing may be conducted electronically.
- The right ofthe State of Mississippi to extradite persons and return fugitivesfrom justice, from other states to this state, shall not be impairedby this chapter and shall remain in full force and effect. An offenderconvicted of a felony committed while on parole, whether in the Stateof Mississippi or another state, shall immediately have his parolerevoked upon presentment of a certified copy of the commitment orderto the board. If an offender is on parole and the offender is convictedof a felony for a crime committed prior to the offender being placedon parole, whether in the State of Mississippi or another state, theoffender may have his parole revoked upon presentment of a certifiedcopy of the commitment order to the board.
-
- The board shallhold a hearing for any parolee who is detained as a result of a warrantor a violation report within twenty-one (21) days of the parolee’sadmission to detention. The board may, in its discretion, terminatethe parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof. If the boardrevokes parole for one or more technical violations theboard shall impose a period of imprisonment to be served in a technicalviolation center operated by the department not to exceed ninety (90)days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the board may impose a periodof imprisonment to be served in a technical violation center for upto one hundred and eighty (180) days or the board may impose the remainderof the suspended portion of the sentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the board may impose upto the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. The periodof imprisonment in a technical violation center imposed under thissection shall not be reduced in any manner.
- If the boarddoes not hold a hearing or does not take action on the violation withinthe twenty-one-day time frame in paragraph (a) of this subsection,the parolee shall be released from detention and shall return to parolestatus. The board may subsequently hold a hearing and may revoke paroleor may continue parole and modify the terms and conditions of parole.If the board revokes parole for one ormore technical violations the board shall impose a period of imprisonment tobe served in a technical violation center operated by the departmentnot to exceed ninety (90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundred twenty (120)days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the board may impose a period of imprisonment to be served in atechnical violation center for up to one hundred eighty (180) daysor the board may impose the remainder of the suspended portion ofthe sentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the board may impose upto the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. The periodof imprisonment in a technical violation center imposed under thissection shall not be reduced in any manner.
- For a paroleecharged with one or more technical violations whohas not been detained awaiting the revocation hearing, the board mayhold a hearing within a reasonable time. The board may revoke paroleor may continue parole and modify the terms and conditions of parole.If the board revokes parole for one ormore technical violations the board shall impose a period of imprisonment tobe served in a technical violation center operated by the departmentnot to exceed ninety (90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundred twenty (120)days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the board may impose a period of imprisonment to be served in atechnical violation center for up to one hundred eighty (180) daysor the board may impose the remainder of the suspended portion ofthe sentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the board may impose upto the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. The periodof imprisonment in a technical violation center imposed under thissection shall not be reduced in any manner.
- Unless good causefor the delay is established in the record of the proceeding, theparole revocation charge shall be dismissed if the revocation hearingis not held within the thirty (30) days of the issuance of the warrant.
- The chairmanand each member of the board and the designated parole revocationhearing officer may, in the discharge of their duties, administeroaths, summon and examine witnesses, and take other steps as may benecessary to ascertain the truth of any matter about which they havethe right to inquire.
- The board shallprovide semiannually to the Oversight Task Force the number of warrantsissued for an alleged violation of parole, the average time betweendetention on a warrant and preliminary hearing, the average time betweendetention on a warrant and revocation hearing, the number of ninety-daysentences in a technical violation center issued by the board, thenumber of one-hundred-twenty-day sentences in a technical violationcenter issued by the board, the number of one-hundred-eighty-day sentencesissued by the board, and the number and average length of the suspendedsentences imposed by the board in response to a violation.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-13; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 11; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 14; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 6; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 86; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 103; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 113; Laws, 1986, ch. 357, § 1; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 113; Laws, 1989, ch. 306, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 7; Laws, 2010, ch. 470, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 488, § 1; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 56, eff from and after July 1, 2014; Laws, 2018, ch. 416, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Amendment Notes —
The 2010 amendment, in the fourth paragraph, inserted “committed” in the second sentence, and added the last sentence.
The 2012 amendment rewrote (1), (5), and (6); deleted “law now in effect concerning the” preceding “right of the State of Mississippi” at the beginning of the first sentence in (4); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 2014 amendment deleted the last sentence from (1) regarding the offender remaining incarcerated pending hearing; added (4), (6), (7), and (9) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.
The 2018 amendment, in (6), substituted “one or more technical violations” for “a technical violation” near the beginning of the third sentences of (a) and (b) and in the first and third sentences of (c), and substituted “revocation” for “technical violation” everywhere it appears in (a) and (b) and in the third, fourth and fifth sentences of (c).
Cross References —
Procedure following violation of probation granted by court, see §§47-7-33 et seq.
Procedure upon violation of condition of suspended sentence, see §§99-19-27,99-19-29.
Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.
Technical violation centers, see §47-7-38.1.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Discretion of parole board.
2. Grounds for revocation.
3. Constitutional issues.
4. Necessity for hearing.
5. Burden of proof.
6. Credit for time served, for time on parole.
7. Miscellaneous.
1. Discretion of parole board.
Court rejected the inmate’s claim that Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-27 was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous and that it discriminated against him as an inmate sentenced to life in prison, because the language of §47-7-27 was quite clear and an ordinary person of common intelligence upon reading it could understand what was allowed and what was not. Section 47-7-27 applied to offenders who previously had parole revoked, and provided that the inmate’s eligibility for a second parole was subject to the parole board’s discretion, and that the inmate was only entitled to a psychological evaluation if the parole board exercised its discretion to grant him a second parole. Edmond v. Miller, 942 So. 2d 203, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 182 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 942 So. 2d 164, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 718 (Miss. 2006).
Circuit court properly dismissed the prisoner’s civil suit alleging that the failure of the parole board to revoke his parole upon entry of later burglary pleas violated his civil rights. He failed to prove that the parole board had abused its discretion. Marshall v. Ruth, 882 So. 2d 252, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 846 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
2. Grounds for revocation.
On revocation of parole, it must be shown that parolee has violated terms and conditions of parole. Alexander v. State, 667 So. 2d 1, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1145, 116 S. Ct. 1441, 134 L. Ed. 2d 562, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2575 (U.S. 1996).
Commission of felony while on parole is grounds for revocation. Alexander v. State, 667 So. 2d 1, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1145, 116 S. Ct. 1441, 134 L. Ed. 2d 562, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2575 (U.S. 1996).
Evidence that parolee violated terms and conditions of his parole supported revocation of his parole by state Parole Board, even though parolee successfully appealed conviction which initially led to revocation of his parole; Parole Board did not rely solely on parolee’s conviction for simple assault as violation of condition of his parole agreement requiring him to live and remain at liberty without violating law, but also upon parolee’s statements at parole revocation hearing that he was guilty of simple assault and had ceased taking his prescribed medication. Alexander v. State, 667 So. 2d 1, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1145, 116 S. Ct. 1441, 134 L. Ed. 2d 562, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2575 (U.S. 1996).
Before parole of parolee acquitted of a criminal charge may be revoked, state must offer actual proof that he committed an act violating terms and conditions of his parole. Alexander v. State, 667 So. 2d 1, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1145, 116 S. Ct. 1441, 134 L. Ed. 2d 562, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2575 (U.S. 1996).
A trial court properly denied a parolee’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which the parolee claimed that he was not afforded a timely parole revocation hearing, where the admitted evidence showed that the parolee had violated the conditions of his parole by 2 Tennessee felony convictions and failure to waive extradition back to Mississippi; these were reasonable grounds for revoking his parole, and therefore all procedural due process guarantees were met. Godsey v. Houston, 584 So. 2d 389, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1991).
Acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not per se preclude parole revocation predicated upon the same charge. The terms and conditions of parole are broader than a mere directive that the parolee commit no felony. Where a prisoner was acquitted of the crime of rape, with which he had been charged while on parole, the acquittal might have meant that the prisoner was not guilty of any act which constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of his parole and, therefore, the acquittal on the criminal charge meant at the very least that, before his parole could be revoked, the State was required to offer actual proof that he committed an act violating the terms and conditions of his parole, and the mere fact that he was arrested and charged with rape would not suffice. Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 1990).
Conviction of a felony by a parolee is a reasonable ground under Mississippi standards for revocation of parole. Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So. 2d 497, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2680 (Miss. 1986).
Evidence in parole revocation proceeding showed that parolee not only violated the conditions of his parole which required that he “live and remain at liberty without violating the law”, but it showed that the 2 violations, convictions for the crime of burglary in State of Colorado, were reasonable grounds for revocation of his parole under state standards. Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So. 2d 497, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2680 (Miss. 1986).
3. Constitutional issues.
Inmate’s due-process rights were not violated when his parole was revoked because upon receiving a certified copy of the order of the court of appeals, the parole board had authority pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 47-7-27 to immediately revoke the inmate’s parole on his earlier conviction; a preliminary revocation hearing and a parole-revocation hearing were held, and the parole board then sent the inmate a letter, which provided notice of its decision to revoke his parole and afforded an opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. Walker v. State, 35 So.3d 555, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
A trial court properly denied a parolee’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which the parolee claimed that he was not afforded a timely parole revocation hearing, where the admitted evidence showed that the parolee had violated the conditions of his parole by 2 Tennessee felony convictions and failure to waive extradition back to Mississippi; these were reasonable grounds for revoking his parole, and therefore all procedural due process guarantees were met. Godsey v. Houston, 584 So. 2d 389, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1991).
Denying an inmate credit for time served while on parole did not deprive her of rights secured under the double jeopardy clause, deny her due process of law, or subject her to an ex post facto law. Segarra v. State, 430 So. 2d 408, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2578 (Miss. 1983).
4. Necessity for hearing.
Where petitioner knew why deputy administrative assistant to the state probation and parole board had come to the jail in which petitioner was lodged for public drunkenness and he knew the parole violation he was charged with, when petitioner freely admitted that he had become intoxicated there was adequate reason for his detention and return to the state penitentiary without the necessity of a preliminary hearing. Gardner v. Collier, 274 So. 2d 662, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1605 (Miss. 1973).
5. Burden of proof.
There are differing burdens of proof in a criminal prosecution and in a parole revocation proceeding; at a criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt while in parole revocation proceedings, the accused is generally protected by lesser standards of proof. Thus, the failure of a jury to find one guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that, by some lesser standard, the facts and circumstances may not be found to be a violation of the terms and conditions of parole. However, where a prisoner was acquitted of the crime of rape, with which he had been charged while on parole, the acquittal might have meant that the prisoner was not guilty of any act which constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of his parole and, therefore, the acquittal on the criminal charge meant at the very least that, before his parole could be revoked, the State was required to offer actual proof that he committed an act violating the terms and conditions of his parole, and the mere fact that he was arrested and charged with rape would not suffice. Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 1990).
6. Credit for time served, for time on parole.
An inmate was properly denied credit for time served upon her original sentence for time spent out of prison on parole prior to its revocation, even though credit is allowed for time spent on work release, which is functionally similar to parole. Segarra v. State, 430 So. 2d 408, 1983 Miss. LEXIS 2578 (Miss. 1983).
7. Miscellaneous.
Inmate’s claim that his parole was unlawfully revoked was not procedurally barred because his post-conviction relief motion fit within an exception to both the general prohibition against successive writs under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss. Code Ann. ‘ 99-39-23(6), and the three-year statute of limitations under the Act, Miss. Code Ann. ’ 99-39-5(2)(b). Walker v. State, 35 So.3d 555, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Field supervisor, within the meaning of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-27, is someone who supervises parolees, rather than someone who supervises other field officers. In other words, a field supervisor is someone who supervises in the field. Furthermore, the Mississippi Code uses the terms field officer and field supervisor interchangeably. Barlow v. State, 8 So.3d 196, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 471 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss. 2009).
Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-27 (Rev. 2004), the officer had the authority to initiate the roadblock with the sheriff’s department, even though he was a field officer and not a field supervisor, and because he had received tips that a parolee was actively involved in criminal activity, he was not required to wait until he had independent reason to believe that defendant had committed a crime to arrest him. Barlow v. State, 8 So.3d 196, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 471 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 204 (Miss. 2009).
If parolee violates term or condition of parole, parole authorities need not await principal trial before commencing proceedings to have parole revoked. Alexander v. State, 667 So. 2d 1, 1995 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1145, 116 S. Ct. 1441, 134 L. Ed. 2d 562, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2575 (U.S. 1996).
If parolee’s petition for mandamus, which sought to compel the chairman of the Mississippi Parole Board to either return parolee from Colorado to Mississippi for parole revocation hearing or to hold a revocation hearing in his absence, should be treated as a motion under §99-39-5, for relief on grounds his parole was unlawfully revoked, parolee would not be entitled to relief in view of language in §47-7-27. Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So. 2d 497, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2680 (Miss. 1986).
Fourteenth Amendment precludes state court from automatically revoking probation and imposing prison term when probationer is unable to pay fine, without finding that probationer has not made bona fide effort to pay fine or that alternative forms of punishment are adequate. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 39 (U.S. 1983).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Based on specified facts pertaining to an encounter with and rearrest of a probationer, the probationer himself was ultimately responsible for his own medical expenses arising from the encounter; however, assuming he was indigent, the county would be responsible for the medical expenses incurred as the injury occurred and the expenses were incurred prior to the initiation of proceedings for revocation of his probation. Griffith, May 3, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0232.
When a probationer is arrested for an unrelated crime the prisoner is in the custody of the local government and the local government must bear the costs of incarceration; however, upon the issuance of a warrant pursuant to this section or §47-7-37 the prisoner becomes a state inmate and the Mississippi Department of Corrections must bear the cost of incarceration. Pope, Mar. 28, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0137.
Upon issuance of a warrant pursuant to Section 47-7-27, the prisoner becomes a state inmate and the Mississippi Department of Corrections must bear the cost of incarceration. Howard, July 22, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0345.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Right to notice and hearing before revocation of suspension of sentence, parole, conditional pardon, or probation. 29 A.L.R.2d 1074.
Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked. 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.
Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of parole on same charge. 76 A.L.R.3d 578.
Power of court, after expiration of probation term, to revoke or modify probation for violations committed during the probation term. 13 A.L.R.4th 1240.
Propriety of increased sentence following revocation of probation. 23 A.L.R.4th 883.
Construction and application of provision of Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (18 USCS § 4214(c)) requiring that alleged parole violator receive revocation hearing within 90 days of date of retaking. 56 A.L.R. Fed. 601.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 127, 130, 133, 147.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 75 et seq.
§ 47-7-29. Effect of conviction of felony while on parole or earned-release supervision.
Any prisonerwho commits a felony while at large upon parole or earned-releasesupervision and who is convicted and sentenced therefor shall be requiredto serve such sentence after the original sentence has been completed.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-14; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 15; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 104; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 114; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 114; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 8, eff from and after June 30, 1995.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
Defendant cited no authority for his interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-29 that his death sentence should not be imposed until he finished serving his prior life sentence; the record did not indicate that defendant’s parole was ever revoked so as to have his earlier sentence re-imposed, and Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-106 provided that execution should be set on motion of the State after all state and federal remedies had been exhausted. Mitchell v. State, 886 So. 2d 704, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1037 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1022, 125 S. Ct. 1982, 161 L. Ed. 2d 864, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3824 (U.S. 2005).
Defendant’s claim that he could not be executed until he had fully served his two prior terms of incarceration, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-29, was moot because the sentences had been served; further, an inmate sentenced to death may be executed whenever his appeals are exhausted, no matter what additional sentence he may be under. Grayson v. State, 879 So. 2d 1008, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 721 (Miss. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S. Ct. 1301, 161 L. Ed. 2d 122, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1593 (U.S. 2005).
A trial court properly denied a parolee’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which the parolee claimed that he was not afforded a timely parole revocation hearing, where the admitted evidence showed that the parolee had violated the conditions of his parole by 2 Tennessee felony convictions and failure to waive extradition back to Mississippi; these were reasonable grounds for revoking his parole, and therefore all procedural due process guarantees were met. Godsey v. Houston, 584 So. 2d 389, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 438 (Miss. 1991).
Evidence in parole revocation proceeding showed that parolee not only violated the conditions of his parole which required that he “live and remain at liberty without violating the law”, but it showed that the 2 violations, convictions for the crime of burglary in State of Colorado, were reasonable grounds for revocation of his parole under state standards. Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So. 2d 497, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2680 (Miss. 1986).
Conviction of a felony by a parolee is a reasonable ground under Mississippi standards for revocation of parole. Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So. 2d 497, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2680 (Miss. 1986).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked. 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.
Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of parole on same charge. 76 A.L.R.3d 578.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 152-155.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 102-104.
§ 47-7-31. Department of correction to investigate pardon and commutation of sentence cases upon request.
Upon requestof the governor the department of corrections shall investigate andreport to him with respect to any case of pardon, commutation of sentence,reprieve, furlough or remission of fine or forfeiture.
Any attorneyof record in the state of Mississippi representing any person whoserecord is before the department shall have the right to inspect suchrecords on file with the department.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-15; Laws, 1942, ch. 283; Laws, 1944, ch. 334, § 15; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 16; Laws, 1952, ch. 382; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 7; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 87; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 105; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 115; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 115, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
Cross References —
Constitutional authority for governor to grant reprieves and pardons and to remit fines, see Miss. Const. Art. 5, § 124.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Ineffective assistance.
Inmate’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s incorrect advice as to the applicability of the 25 percent law, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-31, to his child endangerment charge was rejected as it was based on affidavits that were attached to the inmate’s appellate brief that were not part of the record. Ivy v. State, 103 So.3d 766, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 800 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. dismissed, 119 So.3d 328, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 2013).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 A.L.R.3d 306.
Revocation of order commuting state criminal sentence. 88 A.L.R.5th 463.
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 15 et seq.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 22, 23.
§ 47-7-33. Power of court to suspend sentence and place defendant on probation; notice to Department of Corrections; support payments.
- When it appearsto the satisfaction of any circuit court or county court in the Stateof Mississippi having original jurisdiction over criminal actions,or to the judge thereof, that the ends of justice and the best interestof the public, as well as the defendant, will be served thereby, suchcourt, in termtime or in vacation, shall have the power, after convictionor a plea of guilty, except in a case where a death sentence or lifeimprisonment is the maximum penalty which may be imposed, to suspendthe imposition or execution of sentence, and place the defendant onprobation as herein provided, except that the court shall not suspendthe execution of a sentence of imprisonment after the defendant shallhave begun to serve such sentence. In placing any defendant on probation,the court, or judge, shall direct that such defendant be under thesupervision of the Department of Corrections.
- When any circuitor county court places an offender on probation, the court shall givenotice to the Mississippi Department of Corrections within fifteen(15) days of the court’s decision to place the offender onprobation. Notice shall be delivered to the central office of theMississippi Department of Corrections and to the regional office ofthe department which will be providing supervision to the offenderon probation.
- When any circuitcourt or county court places a person on probation in accordance withthe provisions of this section and that person is ordered to makeany payments to his family, if any member of his family whom he isordered to support is receiving public assistance through the StateDepartment of Human Services, the court shall order him to make suchpayments to the county welfare officer of the county rendering publicassistance to his family, for the sole use and benefit of said family.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-23; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 10; Laws, 1958, ch. 242; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 88; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 106; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 116; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 116; Laws, 2000, ch. 622, § 2; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2014 amendment, in (1), deleted “or where the defendant has been convicted of a felony on a previous occasion in any court or courts of the United States and of any state of territories thereof” following “is the maximum penalty which may be imposed”; and in (3), substituted “Human Services” for “Public Welfare.”
Cross References —
Penalty of life imprisonment without parole for sale of specified quantities of certain drugs, see §41-29-139.
Placing of offender on earned probation program, see §47-7-47.
Authority for use of persons convicted of an offense for work on state highway projects, see §65-1-8.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Construction.
3. Applicability.
4. Time to suspend or to amend sentence; relation to appeal.
5. Revocation of suspension or probation.
6. Propriety of particular sentences — Timeliness of petitionfor.
7. — Convicted felons.
1. In general.
Because appellant suffered no prejudice from an illegally lenient sentence, he could not reap the benefits of that sentence and claim in his motion for post-conviction relief to have been prejudiced as a result. Gray v. State, 269 So.3d 331, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Trial court exceeded its authority by suspending all but twenty years of defendant’s life sentence for first-degree murder because life imprisonment was the applicable sentence for first-degree murder; therefore, the trial court had no authority to suspend any part of defendant’s life sentence.Shaheed v. State, 205 So.3d 1105, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 806 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Trial court did not err in suspending three years of simple robbery sentences and all 10 years of an armed robbery sentence because the trial court had statutory authority to suspend the sentences in such a manner. Caviness v. State, 1 So.3d 917, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 575 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 151 (Miss. 2009).
Defendant did not receive an illegal sentence where defendant failed to report and when defendant then appeared before the court the court imposed a sentence of 20 years for robbery; the 20-year sentence was one that could have been imposed at the time defendant pled guilty. Adams v. State, 954 So. 2d 1051, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 244 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Where defendant had a prior conviction, the trial judge recognized he had made an error in suspending a portion of defendant’s sentence per Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33, and the judge attempted to correct the error with the amended sentencing order. Based on the transcript of the hearing on the motion to vacate judgment and sentence, it was apparent the trial judge imposed a sentence not of fifteen years with eight years suspended but a sentence of seven years to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and eight years of post-release supervision; therefore, defendant did not receive an illegal sentence and any scrivener’s error as to the sentencing transcript was subject to correction on remand. Willcutt v. State, 910 So. 2d 1189, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 608 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Defendant maintained the circuit court’s sentencing order was illegal because, according to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1), he could not be given a suspended sentence since he was a prior convicted felon. While that was true, he stood mute when he was handed an illegal sentence which was more favorable than what the legal sentence would have been; thus, he was not entitled to relief in his postconviction action. Hughery v. State, 915 So. 2d 457, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 265 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 921 So. 2d 1279, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 779 (Miss. 2005).
Defendant misinterpreted the law in trying to set aside his modified sentence of probation. If that sentence had been determined to be illegal under former Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1), which prohibited a sentencing judge from suspending a sentence or placing a convicted felon on probation, the trial court’s earlier sentencing order in which he was given jail time would have taken effect; defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief where he had pled guilty and later received a more lenient modified sentence, and in any event, his action was time barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-5. Wallace v. State, 906 So. 2d 841, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1156 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Defendant argued that the circuit court gave him an illegal sentence by including a period of suspended time and a period of postrelease probation in his sentence; however, a defendant could not stand mute when he was handed an illegal sentence that was more favorable than what the legal sentence would have been, reap the favorable benefits of that illegal sentence, and later claim to have been prejudiced as a result thereof. Jones v. State, 881 So. 2d 351, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 855 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Defendant benefitted from the leniency of the trial court’s ordering him to serve a 10-year suspended sentence, and because he was not subjected to an undue burden or prejudice but to a significantly lesser sentence, the error by the trial court was harmless, and his 10-year sentence did not constitute an illegal sentence. Alexander v. State, 879 So. 2d 512, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 725 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Under Miss. Code Ann. §99-15-26, if defendant successfully completes certain court-imposed conditions, the cause against defendant is dismissed and the case closed. As a result, a conditional dismissal pursuant to §99-15-26 is different than a suspended sentence pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33; consequently, defendant, who pled guilty and received a suspended sentence was not entitled to have the conviction expunged under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-26. Turner v. State, 876 So. 2d 1056, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 605 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Defendant was sentenced to five years of actual incarceration followed by five years of post-release supervision, with no portion of defendant’s sentence suspended. In defendant’s action for postconviction relief, contesting the requirement for post release supervision, defendant confused Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 (convicted felons ineligible for a suspended sentence), with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34(1), which was the provision for post-release supervision; under §47-7-34(1) convicted felons were eligible to receive post-release supervision. Hunt v. State, 874 So. 2d 448, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 489 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
When the court exercises its authority to suspend the execution of a portion of a defendant’s sentence, the normal course of procedure is to (1) impose a sentence, (2) determine what portion is to be suspended, (3) impose a period of probation, and (4) specify the terms and conditions upon which the probation/suspended sentence is contingent; if at any time during the period of probation it is determined that the probationer violated any of the specified conditions of his or her probation, the court has the authority to revoke any part or all of the probation or any part or all of the suspended sentence, as if the decision to suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation had never been made. Artis v. State, 643 So. 2d 533, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1994).
While §47-7-33 does not expressly authorize the suspension of a sentence in part, the greater power to suspend entirely the execution of a sentence includes the lesser power to suspend in part the execution of a sentence. Moore v. State, 585 So. 2d 738, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 587 (Miss. 1991).
Contention was rejected that §47-7-33 provided exclusive procedure in that suspension of sentence under its term could not be combined with requirement that any part of same sentence be served. Marshall v. Cabana, 835 F.2d 1101, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 540 (5th Cir. Miss. 1988).
Code 1942, § 4004-23 gives circuit and county courts power to (1) suspend the imposition of sentence or (2) suspend the execution of sentence. Leonard v. State, 271 So. 2d 445, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1973).
At the time a defendant is convicted of a crime the court may elect not to impose a sentence but rather to suspend imposition of a sentence and place such defendant on probation under Code 1942, § 4004-23. Leonard v. State, 271 So. 2d 445, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1973).
Where the trial court elects to suspend imposition of a sentence, during the period of probation, Code 1942, § 4004-23 continues to vest in the court power subsequently, in the event of a violation of the terms of defendant’s probation, to impose any sentence which originally could have been imposed. Leonard v. State, 271 So. 2d 445, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1973).
Once a circuit or county court exercises its option to impose a definite sentence it cannot subsequently set that sentence aside and impose a greater sentence. Leonard v. State, 271 So. 2d 445, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1973).
2. Construction.
When a suspended sentence and supervised probation are properly imposed upon a first-offender under the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33, the period of supervision by the Mississippi Department of Corrections is limited to a maximum period of five years. Carroll v. State, 3 So.3d 767, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 469 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 1280, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 2009).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 prohibits the imposition of a suspended sentence and supervised probation on a prior convicted felon; however, this statute does not prohibit the imposition of a suspended sentence, in whole or in part, upon a prior convicted felon, so long as the sentence does not involve a period of supervised probation and does not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily prescribed for the felony offense committed. Carroll v. State, 3 So.3d 767, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 469 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 1280, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 2009).
Sentencing court did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 in suspending part of an inmate’s sentence where case law established that courts had the power to suspend a convicted felon’s sentence under that statute. Duhart v. State, 981 So. 2d 1056, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 268 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
The Supreme Court of Mississippi returns the legislatively intended sentencing discretion to Mississippi’s trial courts by clarifying that (1) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 prohibits the imposition of a suspended sentence and supervised probation on a prior convicted felon; however, this statute does not prohibit the imposition of a suspended sentence, in whole or in part, upon a prior convicted felon, so long as the sentence does not involve a period of supervised probation and does not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily prescribed for the felony offense committed; (2) when a suspended sentence and supervised probation are properly imposed upon a first-offender under the provisions of §47-7-33, the period of supervision by the Mississippi Department of Corrections is limited to a maximum period of five years; (3) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 does not prohibit the imposition of post release supervision upon a prior convicted felon, nor does the statute limit the period of post-release supervision to a period of five years; but instead, the period of post release supervision is limited only to the number of years, which when added to the total period of incarceration, would not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily prescribed for the felony offense committed; and, (4) importantly, the statutory limitation of five years applies only to that maximum period of post-release supervision which may be served under the supervision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. To the extent that the court’s decision in Goss v. State, 721 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1998) is in conflict with its decision, Goss is expressly overruled. Johnson v. State, 925 So. 2d 86, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 2006).
Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-79, a person found guilty of armed robbery had to be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the penalty was so fixed by the jury. Defendant, however, was sentenced by the circuit judge after entering a plea of guilty, and Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-79 did not provide for a maximum sentence of life for armed robbery when the sentence was imposed by a judge rather than a jury; thus, where defendant had no prior felonies, and contrary to the State’s argument that defendant’s sentence was illegal, the circuit judge had the statutory authority, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33, to suspend defendant’s sentence (in the case at bar, 9 years of defendant’s 10-year sentence was suspended, subject to a term of supervised probation), to the extent that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as defendant, would be served thereby. State v. Hayes, 887 So. 2d 184, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 863 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Where a trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year in the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), followed by supervised probation under the supervision of the MDOC for a period of 10 years, a court of appeals erred in reversing the sentence because it was clear that the trial court was placing defendant on probation, only five years of which would be served under the supervision of the MDOC, the remaining five years being in essence “unsupervised probation.” Thus, the sentence did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-33,47-7-34, or47-7-37. Miller v. State, 875 So. 2d 194, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 690 (Miss. 2004).
At least two major differences between Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 are: (1) supervised probation may not be imposed on a convicted felon, while postrelease supervision may; and (2) supervised probation is limited to five years, while postrelease supervision is not. Miller v. State, 875 So. 2d 194, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 690 (Miss. 2004).
Probation under this section is a conditional term that is not a part of the prison sentence and is therefore not subject to the “totality” of sentence concept found in §47-7-34. Carter v. State, 754 So. 2d 1207, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 2000).
The code provisions for suspension of sentence are to be construed as in pari materia with those respecting terms and conditions of probation. Jackson v. Waller, 248 Miss. 166, 156 So. 2d 594, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 388, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 265 (Miss. 1963), modified, 248 Miss. 172, 160 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1964).
3. Applicability.
Where defendant, a prior convicted felon, was sentenced to 30 years and was ordered to serve 26 months in incarceration with the remainder of the sentence suspended and four years of post-release supervision, defendant was not placed on probation, and the trial court lawfully placed conditions on the suspended sentence. Because the combined periods of incarceration and post-release supervision did not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily proscribed for the felony offense committed and the trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory guidelines, the sentence was not illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 or §47-7-34. Goudy v. State, 996 So. 2d 185, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 734 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Movant’s 30-year suspended sentence was not an illegal sentence because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) did prohibit convicted felons from receiving suspension and then being placed on probation, but there was no probibition against receiving a flat suspended sentence. Watts v. State, 1 So.3d 886, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 397 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. dismissed, 999 So. 2d 852, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 33 (Miss. 2009), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 1280, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 16 (Miss. 2009).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to reconsider a 10-year prison sentence for the sale of crack cocaine; under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1), the trial court had no jurisdiction to suspend the execution of defendant’s sentence because defendant had already begun to serve the sentence. McGee v. State, 976 So. 2d 954, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 141 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Inmate argued that he could not be given a suspended sentence and probation for his burglary of a dwelling conviction; however, under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33, trial courts have the authority to suspend, in whole or in part, a convicted felon’s sentence, and thus the inmate’s suspended sentence as ordered by the trial court was not in error and was affirmed. Craft v. State, 955 So. 2d 384, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 813 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Rather than having 32 years of his 40-year sentence suspended, had the trial court been aware of his previous felony, the inmate would have received the entire sentence pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1). The inmate received one-fifth of the sentence that should have been imposed; this could hardly be said to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Black v. State, 902 So. 2d 612, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1076 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 901 So. 2d 1273, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 2005).
Court erred in suspending a portion of defendant’s sentence for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine upon his guilty plea because he was a prior convicted felon and this being so, the court did not have the statutory authority to suspend the imposition or execution of his sentence. Sweat v. State, 910 So. 2d 12, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1110 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 912 So. 2d 458, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 661 (Miss. 2005).
Defendant, as a convicted felon, could not quietly enjoy the benefits of an illegally lenient sentence and later attack the sentence when suddenly it was in his interest to do so; because defendant actually benefited from the illegal sentence, he was not denied his fundamental right from an illegal sentence, and there was no ineffective assistance of counsel or other error. Thomas v. State, 861 So. 2d 371, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1188 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Prisoner pleaded guilty to an indictment for the sale of cocaine and was sentenced to 10 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The judgment of sentence directed that the prisoner serve only the first five years of the sentence and that the final five years be suspended and the prisoner be placed on supervised probation for that period. The prisoner argued that the supervised probation portion of his sentence was illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) because he had been convicted of a prior felony. The court held that the sentence was enforceable because the prisoner had voluntarily accepted it as a result of a plea bargain. Crosby v. State, 858 So. 2d 219, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1002 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Even though Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) prohibited suspension of defendant’s sentence because defendant had a prior felony conviction, it was within the trial court’s discretion to suspend defendant’s sentence as set out in the plea agreement; defendant’s complaint that defendant had received an impermissibly lenient sentence and then, by defendant’s own subsequent action, squandered the benefit of that undeserved lenience, did not warrant postconviction relief. Clark v. State, 858 So. 2d 882, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 718 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Defendant, as a prior convicted felon, was not eligible to receive probation on that prior conviction, but the fact that he received an impermissibly lenient sentence on his prior conviction did not mean he could argue in his petition for postconviction relief that the entry of the invalid sentence entitled him to postconviction relief as defendant’s own conduct in committing a forgery was the reason for the revocation and relief could not be granted based on his own misconduct. Robinson v. State, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 96 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002).
Code 1942, § 4004-23, giving the judges of the circuit and county courts power to suspend sentence and place defendants on probation, is not applicable to the matter of mandatory disbarment of an attorney upon his conviction of a felony. Bennett v. State, 211 So. 2d 520, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1268 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 320, 89 S. Ct. 555, 21 L. Ed. 2d 515, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2866 (U.S. 1969).
The power of a circuit judge to suspend sentence does not empower him to suspend the order of disbarment of an attorney found guilty of a felony, for the disbarment order, though a part of the punishment, is not a part of the sentence. Bennett v. State, 211 So. 2d 520, 1968 Miss. LEXIS 1268 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 320, 89 S. Ct. 555, 21 L. Ed. 2d 515, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2866 (U.S. 1969).
4. Time to suspend or to amend sentence; relation to appeal.
Commission on Judicial Performance had jurisdiction to consider misconduct allegations against judge, based on judge’s alleged release of inmates from department of corrections after judge had lost jurisdiction to do so, notwithstanding rule providing that Commission may not consider claim based on judge’s act of making findings of fact, reaching legal conclusion, or applying law as judge understands it absent fraud, corrupt motive, or bad faith; evidence supported finding that judge acted in bad faith where caselaw at relevant time clearly held that circuit judge had no authority to suspend inmates’ sentences. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1997).
If no appeal from conviction is perfected and defendant begins to serve sentence imposed, time has passed for trial judge to suspend sentence under statute giving court authority to suspend sentence, and, if case is appealed to Supreme Court and is affirmed, there is no authority in circuit court or Supreme Court, following issuance of mandate affirming case, to modify judgment and sentence theretofore imposed. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1997).
When sentencing order contains unequivocal provision that execution of sentence is suspended for 3 years and where time limitation within order goes unchallenged until after 3 year suspension period has expired, court has no authority to correct clerical error in order changing 3 year period of suspension to 5 year period intended by judge at time of sentencing. Sisson v. State, 483 So. 2d 1338, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2390 (Miss. 1986).
Since the court must elect at the time of imposition of sentence to simultaneously suspend imposition or execution of the sentence, a trial court is without authority, in accordance with §47-7-33, to suspend a term of two years after the defendant has begun serving the sentence. Payne v. State, 462 So. 2d 902, 1984 Miss. LEXIS 1986 (Miss. 1984).
A trial court is without authority to suspend the execution of a sentence after it has been affirmed by the Supreme Court; if no appeal is perfected and the defendant begins to serve the sentence imposed, the time has passed for the trial judge to suspend the sentence under §47-7-33. Lambert v. Lambert, 394 So. 2d 895, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2085 (Miss. 1981).
Once a circuit or county court exercises its option to impose a definite sentence it cannot subsequently set that sentence aside and impose a greater sentence. Leonard v. State, 271 So. 2d 445, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1973).
5. Revocation of suspension or probation.
Motion for post-conviction relief, which challenged the revocation of a petitioner’s post-release supervision and suspended sentence, was properly denied; petitioner was not given an illegal suspended sentence because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 provided that a circuit court had the power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place a defendant on probation except when the defendant previously was convicted of a felony. Reese v. State, 21 So.3d 625, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 490 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Defendant was not considered a habitual offender for sentencing purposes, and his sentence could not be considered “mandatory” under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47(2)(c); therefore, defendant was eligible for earned probation, and suspension of a convicted felon’s sentence was proper and under the sound discretion of the trial court due to the passage of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34; circuit and county courts had the power to suspend sentences for prior convicted felons that would have been considered illegal under §47-7-33(1). Campbell v. State, 993 So. 2d 413, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 385 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Appellant’s argument that the circuit court did not have the authority to partially or wholly suspend any portion of his sentence under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 (Rev. 2002), since he had prior felony convictions failed because appellant could not reap the benefits of the illegal sentence, which was lighter than what the legal sentence would have been, and then turn around and attack the legality of the illegal, lighter sentence when it served his interest to do so. Thornhill v. State, 919 So. 2d 238, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 450 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Probation under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 was a conditional term that was not part of the prison sentence and was therefore not subject to the totality of sentence concept found in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34; defendant’s five-year probation period would not be added to her original twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault when calculating time to be served, and reinstating the full original sentence therefore would not violate the statutory maximum for her crime as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-7. Miller v. State, 879 So. 2d 1050, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 546 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 887 So. 2d 183, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1347 (Miss. 2004).
A defendant who wishes to challenge the revocation of his probation need not pursue the administrative remedies set out in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803, as only a court can continue or revoke a defendant’s probation. Rodriguez v. State, 839 So. 2d 561, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Evidence that defendant failed to make restitution payments and engaged in continuing misconduct while on probation for aggravated assault supported trial court’s decision to revoke probation and impose the remaining 11 years of defendant’s 12-year sentence; defendant was not denied due process and the sentence was not excessive. Rodriguez v. State, 839 So. 2d 561, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
A court must base its revocation of a suspended sentence on a violation of the clear terms and conditions of the suspended sentence; due process requires that the trial judge at least orally inform the defendant of the terms and conditions upon which his or her suspended sentence is contingent before it may be properly revoked for the violation of those terms and conditions. Artis v. State, 643 So. 2d 533, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1994).
Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was properly denied following his conviction of forgery upon a guilty plea, the suspension of his sentence and his placement on probation, and the subsequent revocation of the suspension and probation upon the prosecution’s discovery of his prior out of state conviction of a felony, where, though defendant contended the prosecutor was aware of the felony conviction at the time he recommended probation, evidence on the issue was conflicting, where the court had jurisdiction over defendant at the time probation was granted and when it was revoked, and where defendant had misled the court by replying to a question, put to him before acceptance of his guilty plea, that his only prior offense had been a traffic ticket. Hamlin v. Barrett, 335 So. 2d 898, 1976 Miss. LEXIS 1947 (Miss. 1976).
6. Propriety of particular sentences — Timeliness of petition for.
Motion for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed based on an allegation that an illegal sentence of house arrest was imposed under Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003 due to defendant’s prior convictions because defendant had benefitted from any error. Jefferson v. State, 958 So. 2d 1276, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 440 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Defendant’s sentence was valid and non-modifiable where he was ordered to serve 15 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with seven years to be served by actual incarceration, and the remaining eight years to be suspended and served by way of post-release supervision under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, with five of the eight years to be served in accordance with “probation-like” terms under the supervision of the MDOC, under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-35. The appellate court ignored the clear intention of the circuit court to order a 15-year sentence, and this intention was appropriately accomplished under Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34. Johnson v. State, 925 So. 2d 86, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 2006).
Defendant asserted that under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33, a prior convicted felon could not be given a suspended sentence. However, that information did not appear in the indictment or the record, and in fact, he received a very favorable sentence considering the sentencing options available for his offense of the sale of cocaine; thus, where he stood mute at sentencing, he could not later claim prejudice or that plea counsel was ineffective and his petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied. Ruff v. State, 910 So. 2d 1160, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 232 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of sexual battery was properly denied because although defendant had two prior convictions and was not entitled to a suspended sentence as provided in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33, defendant did not plead guilty as a result of an offer of a suspended sentence and he benefited from the illegal sentence since it was more lenient than the one he should have received, therefore he did not suffer any fundamental unfairness from the illegal sentence. Myers v. State, 897 So. 2d 198, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Inmate argued that the sentence imposed by the trial court was improper; it was the inmate’s contention that the trial court was without authority under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 to suspend any portion of his sentence, as he was a priorly convicted felon. However, to hold that the inmate’s sentence was improper would allow him and other criminal defendants the ability to conceal prior convictions, accept the sentence imposed by the trial court, and then have a free pass to overturn that sentence if it did not meet his expectations. Black v. State, 902 So. 2d 612, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1076 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 901 So. 2d 1273, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 333 (Miss. 2005).
Imposition of partially suspended sentence upon defendant being convicted of robbery pursuant to a guilty plea was illegal because defendant had a prior felony conviction which rendered defendant ineligible for such a sentence; defendant was not, however, entitled to out-of time relief from the conviction based upon the illegal sentence because defendant had received the benefit of the illegal sentence and did not challenge the illegal sentence until the conviction was used to enhance defendant’s sentence in a subsequent robbery case. Edwards v. State, 839 So. 2d 578, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 144 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Defendant benefitted from the illegal sentence since it was a more lenient one than he was entitled to receive; therefore defendant suffered no fundamental unfairness from the illegal sentence, and his fundamental rights were not violated. Pruitt v. State, 846 So. 2d 271, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 669 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 846 So. 2d 229, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 538 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 957, 124 S. Ct. 410, 157 L. Ed. 2d 294, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 7592 (U.S. 2003).
Where the defendant had a prior felony conviction, the trial court did not have authority to impose a suspended sentence following the defendant’s guilty plea. Weaver v. State, 785 So. 2d 1085, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 190 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
The defendant’s initial sentence, pursuant to the plea agreement, was illegal because the circuit court ordered a partially suspended sentence even though the defendant had a prior felony conviction. Cooper v. State, 737 So. 2d 1042, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 444 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
A trial court did not have the authority to follow the State’s recommendation and impose a suspended sentence where the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony, and therefore the sentence was invalid, since §47-7-33 does not permit the suspension of a sentence and probation where the defendant has a prior felony conviction. Robinson v. State, 585 So. 2d 757, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 604 (Miss. 1991).
Judge acted within his discretion when he modified defendant’s 25 year sentence to 3 years in prison followed by 5 years probation; contention was rejected that §47-7-33 provided exclusive procedure in that suspension of sentence under its term could not be combined with requirement that any part of same sentence be served. Marshall v. Cabana, 835 F.2d 1101, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 540 (5th Cir. Miss. 1988).
A trial judge was in error when he sentenced a defendant to 14 years in the state penitentiary with 7 years suspended if the appellant paid a $125,000 fine, since such a sentence is “indefinite” and thus violates §47-7-33. Arnett v. State, 532 So. 2d 1003, 1988 Miss. LEXIS 457 (Miss. 1988).
Sentence was neither excessive nor beyond the court’s authority which required the defendant, who was convicted of a violation of §97-3-19, to serve 30 days in the county jail, perform 60 days of community work, pay costs of special election, and pay costs of trial, as conditions for the suspension of a one year sentence and 2 years of probation. Fanning v. State, 497 So. 2d 70, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2645 (Miss. 1986).
7. — Convicted felons.
Defendant’s sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm was not illegal because he was sentenced after the applicable statute was amended to remove the portion that prohibited a convicted felon from being placed on probation, and the five-year-probation period was not part of defendant’s actual prison sentence. Davis v. State, 199 So.3d 701, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 528 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Inmate’s sentence was not illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) because he was a convicted felon and was given a suspended sentence as the state’s highest court had clarified that the circuit and county courts had the power to suspend a convicted felon’s sentence under §47-7-33 inasmuch as the state’s highest court and the Mississippi legislature had empowered them to do so under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 and to the extent that the practice had been historically ingrained in the Mississippi’s criminal courts’ sentencing practices. Ivy v. State, 103 So.3d 766, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 800 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. dismissed, 119 So.3d 328, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 2013).
Although circuit judge apparently believed, based on Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) that he could not suspend any portion of defendant’s sentence, due to a prior felony, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 did not prohibit the imposition of post-release supervision upon a previously convicted felon. Wade v. State, 33 So.3d 498, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 645 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Appellant inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief was properly denied because, inter alia, an argument that the inmate was not given a valid term of post-supervision release based on his status as a convicted felon was rejected; the inmate’s sentence was suspended under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, not under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33. Garner v. State, 21 So.3d 629, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 636 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. dismissed, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 571 (Miss. Nov. 19, 2009).
In a business burglary case, denial of post-conviction relief was proper because, although Although Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 limited the power of the trial court to suspend a sentence and order probation for previously convicted felons, any error in sentencing the petitioner was harmless as he was given a lenient sentence; he was indicted as a habitual offender with two prior felonies, but he was ultimately sentenced as a non-habitual offender. Sago v. State, 978 So. 2d 1285, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 204 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Appellate court affirmed the denial of an inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief; the inmate was not illegally sentenced, because as a prior felon, he was not entitled to a suspended sentence under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1). Berry v. State, 924 So. 2d 624, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 179 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Because defendant did not receive a suspended sentence, his sentence was not illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) (Rev. 2004), and therefore his petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed as untimely, as it was not filed until March 2005; under Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-5(2), defendant only had until June 5, 2003, to file his motion for post-conviction relief, and two years’ incarceration plus one year of supervision did not exceed 15 years, the maximum sentence for uttering a forgery. King v. State, 929 So. 2d 373, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 380 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Appellant entered a guilty plea to armed robbery, the court accepted the State’s recommendation and sentenced him to twenty-five years with three years to serve, twenty-two years suspended. While appellant was not entitled to a suspended sentence as a convicted felon, he benefitted from his illegally lenient sentence, and could not obtain postconviction relief. Weathersby v. State, 919 So. 2d 262, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 427 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
There is no apparent authority to suspend or otherwise alter definite sentence already imposed, even in event of jail overcrowding. Sheffield, Oct. 28, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-0812.
Because it is mandatory that defendant’s probation be under supervision of Department of Corrections, circuit judge may not establish local probation program outside statutory probation system supervised by Department of Corrections. Dyson, Dec. 16, 1992, A.G. Op. #92-875.
Section 47-7-33 does not empower circuit judges to suspend sentences pursuant to Section 97-3-65(2)(c) and Section 97-3-101(3) because the latter sections each provide that a life sentence is the maximum sentence that may be imposed. Caranna, May 5, 2000, A.G. Op. #2000-0239.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Defendant’s right to disclosure of presentence report. 40 A.L.R.3d 681.
State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 A.L.R.3d 932.
Inherent power of court to suspend for indefinite period execution of sentence in whole or in part. 73 A.L.R.3d 474.
Governmental tort liability for injuries caused by negligently released individual. 6 A.L.R.4th 1155.
Liability of governmental officer or entity for failure to warn or notify of release of potentially dangerous individual from custody. 12 A.L.R.4th 722.
Right of convicted defendant to refuse probation. 28 A.L.R.4th 736.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s submission to polygraph or other lie detector testing. 86 A.L.R.4th 709.
Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult Under Statute-Expunction Under Statutes Addressing “First Offenders” and “Innocent Persons,” Where Conviction Was for Minor Drug or Other Offense, Where Indictment Has Not Been Presented Against Accused or Accused Has been Released from Custody, and Where Court Considered Impact of Nolle Prosequi, Partial Dismissal, Pardon, Rehabilitation, and Lesser-Included Offenses. 70 A.L.R.6th 1.
§ 47-7-33.1. Pre-release assessment and written discharge plan.
- The departmentshall create a discharge plan for any offender returning to the community,regardless of whether the person will discharge from the custody ofthe department, or is released on parole, pardon, or otherwise. Atleast ninety (90) days prior to an offender’s earliest releasedate, the commissioner shall conduct a pre-release assessment andcomplete a written discharge plan based on the assessment results.The discharge plan for parole eligible offenders shall be sent tothe parole board at least thirty (30) days prior to the offender’sparole eligibility date for approval. The board may suggest changesto the plan that it deems necessary to ensure a successful transition.
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The pre-releaseassessment shall identify whether an inmate requires assistance obtainingthe following basic needs upon release: transportation, clothing andfood, financial resources, identification documents, housing, employment,education, health care and support systems. The discharge plan shallinclude information necessary to address these needs and the stepsbeing taken by the department to assist in this process. Based onthe findings of the assessment, the commissioner shall:
- Arrange transportationfor inmates from the correctional facility to their release destination;
- Ensure inmateshave clean, seasonally appropriate clothing, and provide inmates witha list of food providers and other basic resources immediately accessibleupon release;
- Ensure inmateshave a driver’s license or a state-issued identification cardthat is not a Department of Corrections identification card;
- Assist inmatesin identifying safe, affordable housing upon release. If accommodationsare not available, determine whether temporary housing is availablefor at least ten (10) days after release. If temporary housing isnot available, the discharge plan shall reflect that satisfactoryhousing has not been established and the person may be a candidatefor transitional reentry center placement;
- Refer inmateswithout secured employment to employment opportunities;
- Provide inmateswith contact information of a health care facility/provider in thecommunity in which they plan to reside;
- Notify familymembers of the release date and release plan, if inmate agrees; and
- Refer inmatesto a community or a faith-based organization that can offer supportwithin the first twenty-four (24) hours of release;
- A written dischargeplan shall be provided to the offender and supervising probation officeror parole officer, if applicable.
- A discharge plancreated for a parole-eligible offender shall also include supervisionconditions and the intensity of supervision based on the assessedrisk to recidivate and whether there is a need for transitional housing.The board shall approve discharge plans before an offender is releasedon parole pursuant to this chapter.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 48, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
§ 47-7-34. Postrelease supervision program.
- When a courtimposes a sentence upon a conviction for any felony committed afterJune 30, 1995, the court, in addition to any other punishment imposedif the other punishment includes a term of incarceration in a stateor local correctional facility, may impose a term of post-releasesupervision. However, the total number of years of incarceration plusthe total number of years of post-release supervision shall not exceedthe maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by law for the felonycommitted. The defendant shall be placed under post-release supervisionupon release from the term of incarceration. The period of supervisionshall be established by the court.
- The period ofpost-release supervision shall be conducted in the same manner asa like period of supervised probation, including a requirement thatthe defendant shall abide by any terms and conditions as the courtmay establish. Failure to successfully abide by the terms and conditionsshall be grounds to terminate the period of post-release supervisionand to recommit the defendant to the correctional facility from whichhe was previously released. Procedures for termination and recommitmentshall be conducted in the same manner as procedures for the revocationof probation and imposition of a suspended sentence as required pursuantto Section 47-7-37.
- Post-releasesupervision programs shall be operated through the probation and paroleunit of the Division of Community Corrections of the department. Themaximum amount of time that the Mississippi Department of Correctionsmay supervise an offender on the post-release supervision programis five (5) years.
HISTORY: Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 9; Laws, 2000, ch. 622, § 4; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 6; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 57, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment substituted “Division of Community Corrections” for “Division of Community Services” in (3).
The 2014 amendment added “as required pursuant to Section 47-7-37” to the end of (2)
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Revocation.
3. Construction.
4. Double jeopardy.
5. Propriety of particular sentences.
1. In general.
Circuit court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief because at the plea/sentencing hearing, the circuit court clearly informed appellant that he faced five additional years in Mississippi Department of Corrections custody if he violated the conditions of his post-release supervision. Stacks v. State, 240 So.3d 516, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 132 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Circuit court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief because it had the authority to sentence appellant to serve five years in Mississippi Department of Corrections custody after he violated multiple conditions of his post-release supervision (PSR); the statute does not require the circuit court to expressly suspend part of the defendant’s sentence when the court imposes a term of PRS. Stacks v. State, 240 So.3d 516, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 132 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Circuit courts are encouraged to follow the customary practice to suspend a portion of the offender’s sentence when imposing a term of post-release supervision (PRS); however, a technical deviation from this customary practice does not limit the circuit court’s authority to terminate an offender’s PRS and order him to be recommitted to Mississippi Department of Corrections custody if the offender violates the conditions of his or her PRS. Stacks v. State, 240 So.3d 516, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 132 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Although circuit judge apparently believed, based on Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) that he could not suspend any portion of defendant’s sentence, due to a prior felony, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 does not prohibit the imposition of post-release supervision upon a previously convicted felon. Wade v. State, 33 So.3d 498, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 645 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Because it was within the trial court’s discretion under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 whether to impose a term of post-release supervision, no error could be found in the court’s failure to impose such supervision in sentencing a defendant for armed robbery. Waddell v. State, 999 So. 2d 375, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 93 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Motion for post-conviction relief was denied in a case where defendant’s suspended sentence for statutory rape was revoked because he waived issues relating to a speedy trial and defects in an evidence sample due to a guilty plea, there was no evidence that an indictment was manufactured, and the revocation of the suspended sentence was permitted under Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-34 and47-7-37 where defendant had already served a portion of a five-year sentence after the guilty plea was entered. Davis v. State, 954 So. 2d 530, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 259 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Appellate court affirmed the denial of the inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief as the inmate acknowledged that recommended post-release supervision would be five years, and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 authorized post-release supervision of up to five years. Elliott v. State, 924 So. 2d 609, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 174 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Defendant’s sentence for armed robbery was proper; 20 years in prison, with 12 years suspended, followed by five years of post-release supervision, was within the sentencing range. The trial court had the authority to impose post-release supervision. Williams v. State, 922 So. 2d 853, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 157 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
In a manslaughter case, the trial court correctly dismissed defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief as time-barred as she was not serving an illegal sentence; the combination of her 4 years of post-release supervision and 16 years incarceration resulted in a 20-year sentence, the permissible maximum sentence as per Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34. Brown v. State, 923 So. 2d 258, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 147 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Inmate’s sentence was not illegal where the sum of his term of imprisonment and term of supervised release did not exceed the maximum sentence allowed by statute for the felony committed. Epps v. State, 926 So. 2d 242, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 991 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where there was a conflict between the sentencing order and the commitment order, the sentencing order that stated that the inmate was to serve three years in prison and two years on supervised release controlled; thus, the five year sentence was valid under Miss. Code Ann. §97-1-5 for his conviction of accessory after the fact to murder as it did not exceed the maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by the law for the felony committed. Fuller v. State, 914 So. 2d 1230, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 858 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where an inmate was sentenced for two counts of grand larceny and could have received a maximum sentence of ten years in the custody of Mississippi Department of Corrections, but instead, the trial court suspended five years of the ten year sentence, leaving five years of incarceration to serve, with two years of post-release supervision, the inmate’s sentence was not illegal. Thus, the trial court properly denied the inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief. Hill v. State, 912 So. 2d 494, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 726 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Sentence was rendered on certiorari where the original sentencing order was incorrect and the inmate was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34. The inmate was a prior convicted felon and the appellate court could resentence him without remanding to the trial court because the sentencing error was caused by a misapplication of a sentencing statute; Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 was inapplicable; the supreme court modified the trial court’s sentence so that following his 8 years of incarceration, the inmate would be released to 12 years of post-release supervision but he was required to report to prison officials for only 5 years and the remaining 7 years would be unsupervised post-release supervision. Sweat v. State, 912 So. 2d 458, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 661 (Miss. 2005).
Where defendant had already served 18 months of his ten- year sentence, the trial court’s order sentencing defendant to serve ten years upon his second violation of the terms of his postrelease supervision did exceed the authority of the court, which was only authorized to reinstate the remainder of defendant’s original sentence. The maximum term remaining on defendant’s sentence that could have been reinstated by the court was eight years and six months. Harvey v. State, 919 So. 2d 282, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 377 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Court did not err in sentencing defendant to eight years in prison and 12 years post-release supervision after he was convicted of selling cocaine because the period of incarceration and post-release supervision did not exceed the maximum period of time allowed for the offense. Avant v. State, 896 So. 2d 379, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 3 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Defendant argued that his sentence was contrary to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 because by failing to comply with the terms and conditions of postrelease supervision he could be required to serve a term exceeding the maximum term allowed under the statute; defendant’s sentence totaling 15 years, specifically 10 years to serve with 5 years of postrelease supervision, was unquestionably in accord with Miss. Code Ann. §97-21-33 as it was at the time of his sentencing, and, therefore, his sentence did not conflict with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34. Kemp v. State, 904 So. 2d 1162, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1009 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Defendant claimed that his sentence for an attempted armed robbery charge (10 years, with 5 suspended and 5 years of postrelease supervision), was in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1), which precluded probation for a convicted felon. From the record it was apparent that what the trial court intended, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, was to sentence defendant to five years of actual confinement, and five years of postrelease supervision, and therefore, a remand for clarification of defendant’s sentence was required. Thomas v. State, 883 So. 2d 1197, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 963 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Incarceration and postrelease supervision up to five years is a permissible sentence for a felony, as long as the entire sentence is within the maximum prison term for the offense. The postrelease supervision period merges with the incarceration to form the total sentence. Johnson v. State, 924 So. 2d 527, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 667 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 925 So. 2d 86, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 2006).
Defendant’s status was one of post-release supervision, a status much like probation; the procedures for terminating such supervision were the same as the procedures for the revocation of probation under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34(2), and because the revocation of post-release supervision followed the same procedure as for revocation of probation, it may not be directly appealed, and since the original revocation order may not be appealed, neither may the denial of a motion to reconsider that revocation. Massingille v. State, 878 So. 2d 252, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 665 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Probation under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 was a conditional term that was not part of the prison sentence and was therefore not subject to the totality of sentence concept found in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34; defendant’s five-year probation period would not be added to her original twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault when calculating time to be served, and reinstating the full original sentence therefore would not violate the statutory maximum for her crime as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-7. Miller v. State, 879 So. 2d 1050, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 546 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 887 So. 2d 183, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1347 (Miss. 2004).
Defendant’s period of supervised release was not counted toward his time served; therefore, defendant’s sentence of three years to serve, seven years suspended, and five years of post release supervision was within the ten years allowable pursuant to the embezzlement statute, Miss. Code Ann. §97-23-19. Brown v. State, 872 So. 2d 96, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 380 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Trial court committed plain error under Miss. R. Evid. 103(d) where it sentenced defendant, in part, to 10 years of post-release supervision, as under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, five years of post-release supervision was the maximum. Stigall v. State, 869 So. 2d 410, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1206 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 878 So. 2d 67, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 864 (Miss. 2004).
Defendant’s sentence of 30 years of supervised probation was clearly in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 because the maximum amount of time that the Mississippi Department of Corrections could supervise an offender on postrelease supervision was 5 years. Brooks v. State, 858 So. 2d 930, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 1038 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
This section applies only to felonies, not misdemeanors. Conner v. State, 750 So. 2d 1258, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 3 (Miss. 2000).
This section creates a post-release supervision program that provides for a term of post-release supervision in addition to any term of incarceration imposed upon those already convicted of a felony; it is a legislative creation separate and distinct from probation as set out in §47-7-33. Carter v. State, 754 So. 2d 1207, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 2000).
2. Revocation.
Appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief was properly denied because the trial court was not request to appoint counsel during the revocation hearing; the revocation hearing was straightforward, and the trial court instructed appellant that he could cross-examine witnesses, testify on his own behalf, and call any witnesses that he wanted. Gray v. State, 269 So.3d 331, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Probationer failed to show that the trial court acted outside its authority in revoking the probationer’s post-release supervision because the evidence showed that the probationer was on post-release supervision, instead of parole, which was under the exclusive authority of the trial court. Boone v. State, 148 So.3d 377, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 100 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 151 So.3d 1017, 2014 Miss. LEXIS 493 (Miss. 2014).
Based on the circuit court’s failure to retain sentencing jurisdiction pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47, its implied attempt to impermissibly delegate its authority to suspend part of the prisoner’s 16-year sentence, and the fact that he did not have a revocation hearing, the circuit court’s sentence was impermissibly indeterminate. Graham v. State, 85 So.3d 860, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), vacated, 85 So.3d 847, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 2012).
Because petitioner admitted in his waiver that he did, in fact, violate the terms of his post-release supervision by committing the offense of domestic violence on two occasions, the court had the authority under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34(2) to revoke his post-release supervision. Williams v. State, 4 So.3d 388, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 128 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Defendant’s post-release supervision was not illegally revoked based on his subsequent arrest and being charged with a felony. Campbell v. State, 993 So. 2d 413, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 385 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
3. Construction.
There is no language in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 that requires a circuit court to order a suspended sentence in addition to post-release supervision. McKinney v. State, 7 So.3d 291, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Motion for post-conviction relief, which challenged the revocation of a petitioner’s post-release supervision and suspended sentence, was properly denied because the petitioner’s argument that his suspended sentence was illegal was without merit; the period of post-release supervision under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 was an alternative to probation that was available for prior convicted felons. Reese v. State, 21 So.3d 625, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 490 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 does not prohibit the imposition of post-release supervision upon a prior convicted felon, nor does this statute limit the period of post-release supervision to a period of five years; instead, the period of post-release supervision is limited only to the number of years, which, when added to the total period of incarceration, would not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily prescribed for the felony offense committed. Importantly, the statutory limitation of five years applies only to that maximum period of post-release supervision that may be served under the supervision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Carroll v. State, 3 So.3d 767, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 469 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 1280, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 97 (Miss. 2009).
The Supreme Court of Mississippi returns the legislatively intended sentencing discretion to Mississippi’s trial courts by clarifying that (1) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 prohibits the imposition of a suspended sentence and supervised probation on a prior convicted felon; however, this statute does not prohibit the imposition of a suspended sentence, in whole or in part, upon a prior convicted felon, so long as the sentence does not involve a period of supervised probation and does not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily prescribed for the felony offense committed; (2) when a suspended sentence and supervised probation are properly imposed upon a first-offender under the provisions of §47-7-33, the period of supervision by the Mississippi Department of Corrections is limited to a maximum period of five years; (3) Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 does not prohibit the imposition of post release supervision upon a prior convicted felon, nor does the statute limit the period of post-release supervision to a period of five years; but instead, the period of post release supervision is limited only to the number of years, which when added to the total period of incarceration, would not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily prescribed for the felony offense committed; and, (4) importantly, the statutory limitation of five years applies only to that maximum period of post-release supervision which may be served under the supervision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. To the extent that the court’s decision in Goss v. State, 721 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1998) is in conflict with its decision, Goss is expressly overruled. Johnson v. State, 925 So. 2d 86, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 2006).
Petitioner was properly denied postconviction relief after he pled guilty to manslaughter by culpable negligence because he wrongfully read the post-release supervision statute. The statute applied to him because he was convicted of a felony committed after June 30, 1995; further, the statute did not distinguish between first time and repeat offenders. Oaks v. State, 912 So. 2d 1075, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 675 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Post-release supervision, a legislative creation under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, was separate and distinct from probation, and a defendant’s period of supervised release was not counted toward his time served. Richardson v. State, 907 So. 2d 404, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 422 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where defendant was sentenced to five years of incarceration, a 10-year suspended sentence, and five years post-release supervision, defendant’s sentence was well within the statutory maximum of Miss. Code Ann. §97-5-23 because a defendant’s period of supervised release was not counted toward the defendant’s time served. Hobson v. State, 910 So. 2d 1139, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 212 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
While Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 limits to a period of five years the Mississippi Department of Corrections’s authority to supervise an offender on post-release supervision, the limitation on the Department’s authority to supervise does not limit to five years the period of post-release supervision which a trial judge may give to a prior-convicted felon. Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear that a trial judge may sentence a prior-convicted felon to more than five years of post-release supervision, provided the period of incarceration and the period of post-release supervision do not exceed the maximum period of time allowed for the offense. Avant v. State, 896 So. 2d 379, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 3 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Defendant was properly denied his motion for postconviction relief based on an allegedly illegal sentence where defendant was not convicted and given probation, but was convicted and given five years of postrelease supervision. Since the sentencing court complied with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 (2003) in ordering his sentence, denial of his motion for postconviction relief based on an illegal sentence was proper. Johnson v. State, 883 So. 2d 607, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 699 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 898 So. 2d 679, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 2005).
Where a trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year in the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), followed by supervised probation under the supervision of the MDOC for a period of 10 years, a court of appeals erred in reversing the sentence because it was clear that the trial court was placing defendant on probation, only five years of which would be served under the supervision of the MDOC, the remaining five years being in essence “unsupervised probation.” Thus, the sentence did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-33,47-7-34, or47-7-37. Miller v. State, 875 So. 2d 194, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 690 (Miss. 2004).
At least two major differences between Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 are: (1) supervised probation may not be imposed on a convicted felon, while postrelease supervision may; and (2) supervised probation is limited to five years, while postrelease supervision is not. Miller v. State, 875 So. 2d 194, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 690 (Miss. 2004).
Defendant was sentenced to five years of actual incarceration followed by five years of post-release supervision, with no portion of defendant’s sentence suspended. In defendant’s action for post-conviction relief, contesting the requirement for post release supervision, defendant confused Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 (convicted felons ineligible for a suspended sentence), with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34(1), which was the provision for post-release supervision; under §47-7-34(1) convicted felons were eligible to receive post-release supervision. Hunt v. State, 874 So. 2d 448, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 489 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Trial court erred in imposing a 15-year post-release supervision term on one drug conviction as the maximum allowed for each crime was five years. Hill v. State, 865 So. 2d 371, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 983 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Trial court properly sentenced defendant to a term of incarceration plus a term of post-release supervision where the term of incarceration and post-release supervision did not exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the felony committed, and the sentence did not offend the double jeopardy clause of the United States or Mississippi Constitutions. Kern v. State, 828 So. 2d 871, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 543 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
There is nothing in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 to support the notion that the five-year limitation is intended to limit post-release supervision to five years, regardless of how many felonies the defendant commits; however, for the crime of aggravated assault the trial court sentenced defendant to 4 years of incarceration and 11 years of post-release supervision, which exceeded the maximum amount of time one could be sentenced by statute to post-release supervision. Burnett v. State, 831 So. 2d 1216, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 698 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Probationary period of defendant’s sentence did not count in the calculation of defendant’s sentence under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34; therefore, defendant’s sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable sentence as a result of the probationary period. Jones v. State, 805 So. 2d 610, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 35 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Probation under §47-7-33 is a conditional term that is not a part of the prison sentence and is therefore not subject to the “totality” of sentence concept found in this section. Miller v. State, 879 So. 2d 1050, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 546 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 887 So. 2d 183, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 1347 (Miss. 2004).
4. Double jeopardy.
Decision to revoke appellant’s, an inmate’s, probation was appropriate, but a remand to the trial court was necessary because the handwritten addendum to the revocation order caused the inmate’s new sentence to exceed the five-year maximum sentence and the State conceded that the handwritten addendum imposing three years’ post-release supervision, instead of two years, was a clerical error. Whitaker v. State, 22 So.3d 326, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 760 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Under the Fifth Amendment and Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 21, a trial court’s imposition of defendant’s original ten-year term after his second parole violation was not an unlawful extension or increase of his sentence in violation of his right against double jeopardy because, although the written sentencing order did not reflect the court’s imposition of the ten-year sentence but merely that all but 18 months of that sentence were suspended, on two occasions defendant was clearly informed in open court that his sentence was for ten years. Harvey v. State, 919 So. 2d 282, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 377 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed because the reinstatement of a suspended sentence after the revocation of probation for drug use did not amount to double jeopardy. Britt v. State, 856 So. 2d 699, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 894 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
5. Propriety of particular sentences.
Inmate’s sentence was not illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) because he was a convicted felon and was given a suspended sentence as the state’s highest court had clarified that the circuit and county courts had the power to suspend a convicted felon’s sentence under §47-7-33 inasmuch as the state’s highest court and the Mississippi legislature had empowered them to do so under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 and to the extent that the practice had been historically ingrained in the Mississippi’s criminal courts’ sentencing practices. Ivy v. State, 103 So.3d 766, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 800 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. dismissed, 119 So.3d 328, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 2013).
Inmate’s sentence did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 where: (1) the inmate was sentenced to the maximum sentence for possession-of-cocaine of 16 years’ under Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139(c)(1)(C); (2) the inmate was sentenced to the maximum sentence for child-endangerment of 10 years’ under Miss. Code Ann. §97-5-39(2)(b)(i); (3) 11 years of the 26-year sentence were suspended, leaving 15 years to serve; and (4) when the 5 years of post-release supervision were added to the 15 years to serve, the total was less than the maximum authorized sentence. Ivy v. State, 103 So.3d 766, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 800 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), cert. dismissed, 119 So.3d 328, 2013 Miss. LEXIS 397 (Miss. 2013).
Denial of post-conviction relief to an inmate was error as under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, the circuit court had lacked jurisdiction to extend the inmate’s term of post-release supervision (PRS) beyond the three-year maximum authorized by Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139(b)(3), and therefore, the inmate’s PRS had expired before the circuit court revoked the inmate’s suspended sentence for violation of the terms of the extended PRS. Allen v. State, 62 So.3d 450, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 87 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Appellant inmate’s sentence did not fail to comply with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, because he was sentenced to twenty years, which was well within the statutory guidelines for possession with intent to distribute, and his term of incarceration plus his post-release supervision did not exceed the maximum sentence of thirty years as prescribed by Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139(b)(1). Burks v. State, 37 So.3d 1219, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 26 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Appellant inmate was not entitled to postconviction relief because, in part, he was not improperly sentenced to probation as he asserted; rather, his twenty-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed under post-release supervision pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34. Burks v. State, 37 So.3d 1219, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 26 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Appellant inmate’s sentence did not fail to comply with Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, because he was sentenced to twenty years, which was well within the statutory guidelines for possession with intent to distribute, and his term of incarceration plus his post-release supervision did not exceed the maximum sentence of thirty years as prescribed by Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139(b)(1). Burks v. State, 37 So.3d 1219, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 26 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Where defendant, a prior convicted felon, was sentenced to 30 years and was ordered to serve 26 months in incarceration with the remainder of the sentence suspended and four years of post-release supervision, defendant was not placed on probation, and the trial court lawfully placed conditions on the suspended sentence. Because the combined periods of incarceration and post-release supervision did not exceed the maximum penalty statutorily proscribed for the felony offense committed and the trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory guidelines, the sentence was not illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33 or §47-7-34. Goudy v. State, 996 So. 2d 185, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 734 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Appellant inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief was properly denied because, inter alia, an argument that the inmate was not given a valid term of post-supervision release based on his status as a convicted felon was rejected; the inmate’s sentence was suspended under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, not under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33. Garner v. State, 21 So.3d 629, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 636 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. dismissed, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 571 (Miss. Nov. 19, 2009).
In a case where defendant was sentenced to eight years in prison with five years of post-release supervision after a guilty plea was entered to the crime of attempted burglary of a dwelling, a post-conviction relief motion was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing under Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-11(2) because there was no ineffective assistance of counsel where jurisdiction was included in an indictment, the charges were not contradictory, an attempt charge was appropriate, and appellant inmate’s other self-serving arguments were wholly unsupported by the record. Moreover, a sentence was not illegal since a suspended sentence was not required in addition to post-release supervision, the sentence imposed was within the range permitted, and the inmate was not misinformed regarding his appellate rights. McKinney v. State, 7 So.3d 291, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Post-conviction relief was denied in a case where appellant inmate’s post-release supervision (PRS) and suspended sentences were revoked because the inmate was on state PRS the moment that he was released from federal custody. Therefore, there was no error in revoking his PRS based on an arrest for drugs shortly after his release from federal custody. Lenoir v. State, 4 So.3d 1056, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 585 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 2009).
Defendant was not considered a habitual offender for sentencing purposes, and his sentence could not be considered “mandatory” under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47(2)(c); therefore, defendant was eligible for earned probation, and suspension of a convicted felon’s sentence was proper and under the sound discretion of the trial court due to the passage of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34; circuit and county courts had the power to suspend sentences for prior convicted felons that would have been considered illegal under §47-7-33(1). Campbell v. State, 993 So. 2d 413, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 385 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Defendant’s sentence was valid and non-modifiable where he was ordered to serve 15 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with seven years to be served by actual incarceration, and the remaining eight years to be suspended and served by way of post-release supervision under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, with five of the eight years to be served in accordance with “probation-like” terms under the supervision of the MDOC, under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-35. The appellate court ignored the clear intention of the circuit court to order a 15-year sentence, and this intention was appropriately accomplished under Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34. Johnson v. State, 925 So. 2d 86, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 2006).
Because defendant did not receive a suspended sentence, his sentence was not illegal under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-33(1) (Rev. 2004), and therefore his petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed as untimely, as it was not filed until March 2005; under Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-5(2), defendant only had until June 5, 2003, to file his motion for post-conviction relief, and two years incarceration plus one year of supervision did not exceed 15 years, the maximum sentence for uttering a forgery. King v. State, 929 So. 2d 373, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 380 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Availability of discovery at probation revocation hearings. 52 A.L.R.5th 559.
§ 47-7-35. Terms and conditions of probation; court to determine; sex offender registry check required prior to placing offender on probation.
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The courts referredto in Section 47-7-33 or 47-7-34 shall determine theterms and conditions of probation or post-release supervision andmay alter or modify, at any time during the period of probation orpost-release supervision, the conditions and may include among themthe following or any other:
That the offendershall:
- Commit no offenseagainst the laws of this or any other state of the United States,or of any federal, territorial or tribal jurisdiction of the UnitedStates;
- Avoid injuriousor vicious habits;
- Avoid personsor places of disreputable or harmful character;
- Report to theprobation and parole officer as directed;
- Permit the probationand parole officer to visit him at home or elsewhere;
- Work faithfullyat suitable employment so far as possible;
- Remain withina specified area;
- Pay his finein one (1) or several sums;
- Support his dependents;
- Submit, as providedin Section 47-5-601, to anytype of breath, saliva or urine chemical analysis test, the purposeof which is to detect the possible presence of alcohol or a substanceprohibited or controlled by any law of the State of Mississippi orthe United States;
- Register as asex offender if so required under Title 45, Chapter 33.
- When any courtplaces a defendant on misdemeanor probation, the court must causeto be conducted a search of the probationer’s name or otheridentifying information against the registration information regardingsex offenders maintained under Title 45, Chapter 33. The search maybe conducted using the Internet site maintained by the Departmentof Public Safety Sex Offender Registry.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-24; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 11; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 107; Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 6; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 117; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 117; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 10; Laws, 2006, ch. 566, § 5; Laws, 2007, ch. 392, § 14; Laws, 2011, ch. 359, § 13, eff from and after July 1, 2011.
Amendment Notes —
The 2006 amendment added (2).
The 2007 amendment added (1)(k); and made minor stylistic changes.
The 2011 amendment inserted “any federal, territorial or tribal jurisdiction of” near the end of (1)(a).
Cross References —
Authority for use of persons convicted of an offense for work on state highway projects, see §65-1-8.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Banishment.
3. Probation properly revoked.
4. Propriety of particular sentences.
1. In general.
When the court exercises its authority to suspend the execution of a portion of a defendant’s sentence, the normal course of procedure is to (1) impose a sentence, (2) determine what portion is to be suspended, (3) impose a period of probation, and (4) specify the terms and conditions upon which the probation/suspended sentence is contingent; if at any time during the period of probation it is determined that the probationer violated any of the specified conditions of his or her probation, the court has the authority to revoke any part or all of the probation or any part or all of the suspended sentence, as if the decision to suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation had never been made. Artis v. State, 643 So. 2d 533, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1994).
A court must base its revocation of a suspended sentence on a violation of the clear terms and conditions of the suspended sentence; due process requires that the trial judge at least orally inform the defendant of the terms and conditions upon which his or her suspended sentence is contingent before it may be properly revoked for the violation of those terms and conditions. Artis v. State, 643 So. 2d 533, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1994).
Policy of denying public benefits to probationers as condition of probation unless and until probationer requests hearing for modification of probation and receives approval from court to apply for public assistance does not violate due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment, does not violate equal protection right of probationer or her dependent children nor are such conditions of probation unduly intrusive or constitutionally impermissible restrictions. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 3680 (5th Cir. Miss. 1987).
Sentence was neither excessive nor beyond the court’s authority which required the defendant, who was convicted of a violation of §97-3-19, to serve 30 days in the county jail, perform 60 days of community work, pay costs of special election, and pay costs of trial, as conditions for the suspension of a one year sentence and 2 years of probation. Fanning v. State, 497 So. 2d 70, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2645 (Miss. 1986).
2. Banishment.
In a challenge to the banishment provision of defendant’s sentence pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-5(1)(a), the substitution of some period of formal probationary supervision in place of a like term of banishment did not constitute an increase in the degree or character of defendant’s punishment that would invoke constitutional concerns of double jeopardy, U.S. Const. Amend. V, and the requirement of supervised probation was essentially rehabilitative in its objectives and not punitive; thus, the change in probation terms was within the circuit court’s authority as contained in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-35. Weaver v. State, 856 So. 2d 407, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 234 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 So. 2d 1017, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 515 (Miss. 2003).
A banishment provision must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of probation, the ends of justice and the best interests of the defendant and the public must be served, the public policy must not be violated, the rehabilitative purpose of the probation must not be defeated, and the defendant’s rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution must not be violated. Hamm v. State, 758 So. 2d 1042, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 101 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
3. Probation properly revoked.
Denial of the inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief was proper where his probation was rightfully revoked because there was sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that he more likely than not failed to avoid persons of harmful character and disreputable places. Hubbard v. State, 919 So. 2d 1022, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
4. Propriety of particular sentences.
Defendant’s sentence was valid and non-modifiable where he was ordered to serve 15 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with seven years to be served by actual incarceration, and the remaining eight years to be suspended and served by way of post-release supervision under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34, with five of the eight years to be served in accordance with “probation-like” terms under the supervision of the MDOC, under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34 and Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-35. The appellate court ignored the clear intention of the circuit court to order a 15-year sentence, and this intention was appropriately accomplished under Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34. Johnson v. State, 925 So. 2d 86, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 116 (Miss. 2006).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant’s refraining from political activity, protest, or the like. 45 A.L.R.3d 1022.
Ability to pay as necessary consideration in conditioning probation or suspended sentence upon reparation or restitution. 73 A.L.R.3d 1240.
Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim. 79 A.L.R.3d 976.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs. 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.
Propriety of conditioning probation upon defendant’s posting of bond guaranteeing compliance with terms of probation. 79 A.L.R.3d 1068.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches. 79 A.L.R.3d 1083.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s remaining childless or having no additional children during probationary period. 94 A.L.R.3d 1218.
Right of defendant sentenced after revocation of probation to credit for jail time served as condition of probation. 99 A.L.R.3d 781.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s not associating with particular person. 99 A.L.R.3d 967.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s serving part of probationary period in jail or prison. 6 A.L.R.4th 446.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s not entering specified geographical area. 28 A.L.R.4th 725.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s submission to polygraph or other lie detector testing. 86 A.L.R.4th 709.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s submission to drug testing. 87 A.L.R.4th 929.
Propriety of Requirement, as Condition of Probation, That Defendant Refrain from Use of Intoxicants. 46 A.L.R.6th 241.
Validity, under Fourth Amendment, of warrantless search of parolee or his property by parole officer. 32 A.L.R. Fed. 155.
Propriety, as condition of probation granted pursuant to 18 USCA sec. 3651, of requiring that probationer refrain from consumption of alcoholic beverages. 37 A.L.R. Fed. 843.
§ 47-7-36 Persons who supervise individuals placed on parole or probation shall set times and locations for required meetings that reasonably accommodate the work schedules of those individuals.
Any person whosupervisesan individual placed on parole by the Parole Board orplaced on probationby the court shall set the times and locationsfor meetings that arerequired for parole or probation at such timesand locations thatare reasonably designed to accommodate the workschedule of an individualon parole or probation who is employedby another person or entity.To effectuate the provisions of thissection, the parole officer orprobation officer may utilize technologyportals such as Skype, FaceTimeor Google video chat, or any othertechnology portal that allows communicationbetween the individualon parole or probation and the parole or probationofficer, as applicable,to occur simultaneously in real time by voiceand video in lieu ofrequiring a face-to-face in person meeting ofsuch individual andthe parole or probation officer, as applicable.For individuals whoare self-employed, the provisions of this sectionshall only applywith the agreement of their supervising parole orprobation officer.
HISTORY: Laws, 2018, ch. 416, § 6, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
§ 47-7-37. Period of probation; arrest, revocation and recommitment for violation of probation or postrelease supervision; hearing; revocation of probation for technical violation; imprisonment in technical violation center; certain restrictions on imposition of bail for persons required to register as sex offender.
- The period ofprobation shall be fixed by the court, and may at any time be extendedor terminated by the court, or judge in vacation. Such period withany extension thereof shall not exceed five (5) years, except thatin cases of desertion and/or failure to support minor children, theperiod of probation may be fixed and/or extended by the court forso long as the duty to support such minor children exists. The timeserved on probation or post-release supervision may be reduced pursuantto Section 47-7-40.
- At any time duringthe period of probation, the court, or judge in vacation, may issuea warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspensionof sentence and cause the probationer to be arrested. Any probationand parole officer may arrest a probationer without a warrant, ormay deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so by givinghim a written statement setting forth that the probationer has, inthe judgment of the probation and parole officer, violated the conditionsof probation. Such written statement delivered with the probationerby the arresting officer to the official in charge of a county jailor other place of detention shall be sufficient warrant for the detentionof the probationer.
- Whenever an offenderis arrested on a warrant for an alleged violation of probation asherein provided, the department shall hold an informal preliminaryhearing within seventy-two (72) hours of the arrest to determine whetherthere is reasonable cause to believe the person has violated a conditionof probation. A preliminary hearing shall not be required when theoffender is not under arrest on a warrant or the offender signed awaiver of a preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing may be conductedelectronically. If reasonable cause is found, the offender may beconfined no more than twenty-one (21) days from the admission to detentionuntil a revocation hearing is held. If the revocation hearing is notheld within twenty-one (21) days, the probationer shall be releasedfrom custody and returned to probation status.
- If a probationeror offender is subject to registration as a sex offender, the courtmust make a finding that the probationer or offender is not a dangerto the public prior to release with or without bail. In determiningthe danger posed by the release of the offender or probationer, thecourt may consider the nature and circumstances of the violation andany new offenses charged; the offender or probationer’s pastand present conduct, including convictions of crimes and any recordof arrests without conviction for crimes involving violence or sexcrimes; any other evidence of allegations of unlawful sexual conductor the use of violence by the offender or probationer; the offenderor probationer’s family ties, length of residence in the community,employment history and mental condition; the offender or probationer’shistory and conduct during the probation or other supervised releaseand any other previous supervisions, including disciplinary recordsof previous incarcerations; the likelihood that the offender or probationerwill engage again in a criminal course of conduct; the weight of theevidence against the offender or probationer; and any other factsthe court considers relevant.
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- The probationand parole officer after making an arrest shall present to the detainingauthorities a similar statement of the circumstances of violation.The probation and parole officer shall at once notify the court ofthe arrest and detention of the probationer and shall submit a reportin writing showing in what manner the probationer has violated theconditions of probation. Within twenty-one (21) days of arrest anddetention by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause theprobationer to be brought before it and may continue or revoke allor any part of the probation or the suspension of sentence. If thecourt revokes probation for one or more technical violations,the court shall impose a period of imprisonment to be served in eithera technical violation center or a restitution center not to exceedninety (90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundred twenty (120) days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the court may impose a periodof imprisonment to be served in either a technical violation centeror a restitution center for up to one hundred eighty (180) days orthe court may impose the remainder of the suspended portion of thesentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the court may impose up to the remainderof the suspended portion of the sentence. The period of imprisonmentin a technical violation center imposed under this section shall notbe reduced in any manner.
- If the offenderis not detained as a result of the warrant, the court shall causethe probationer to be brought before it within a reasonable time andmay continue or revoke all or any part of the probation or the suspensionof sentence, and may cause the sentence imposed to be executed ormay impose any part of the sentence which might have been imposedat the time of conviction. If the court revokes probation for one or more technical violations, the court shall impose a period ofimprisonment to be served in either a technical violation center ora restitution center not to exceed ninety (90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundredtwenty (120) days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the court may impose a period of imprisonment to be served in eithera technical violation center or a restitution center for up to onehundred eighty (180) days or the court may impose the remainder ofthe suspended portion of the sentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the court may impose upto the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. The periodof imprisonment in a technical violation center imposed under thissection shall not be reduced in any manner.
- If the courtdoes not hold a hearing or does not take action on the violation withinthe twenty-one-day period, the offender shall be released from detentionand shall return to probation status. The court may subsequently holda hearing and may revoke probation or may continue probation and modifythe terms and conditions of probation. If the court revokes probationfor one or more technicalviolations, the court shallimpose a period of imprisonment to be served in either a technicalviolation center operated by the department or a restitution centernot to exceed ninety (90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundred twenty (120)days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the court may impose a period of imprisonment to be served in eithera technical violation center or a restitution center for up to onehundred eighty (180) days or the court may impose the remainder ofthe suspended portion of the sentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the court may impose upto the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. The periodof imprisonment in a technical violation center imposed under thissection shall not be reduced in any manner.
- For an offendercharged with a technical violation who has not been detained awaitingthe revocation hearing, the court may hold a hearing within a reasonabletime. The court may revoke probation or may continue probation andmodify the terms and conditions of probation. If the court revokesprobation for one or more technical violations thecourt shall impose a period of imprisonment to be served in eithera technical violation center operated by the department or a restitutioncenter not to exceed ninety (90) days for the first revocation and not to exceed one hundredtwenty (120) days for the second revocation. For the third revocation, the court may impose a period of imprisonment to be served in eithera technical violation center or a restitution center for up to onehundred eighty (180) days or the court may impose the remainder ofthe suspended portion of the sentence. For the fourth and any subsequent revocation, the court may impose upto the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. The periodof imprisonment in a technical violation center imposed under thissection shall not be reduced in any manner.
- If the probationeris arrested in a circuit court district in the State of Mississippiother than that in which he was convicted, the probation and paroleofficer, upon the written request of the sentencing judge, shall furnishto the circuit court or the county court of the county in which thearrest is made, or to the judge of such court, a report concerningthe probationer, and such court or the judge in vacation shall haveauthority, after a hearing, to continue or revoke all or any partof probation or all or any part of the suspension of sentence, andmay in case of revocation proceed to deal with the case as if therehad been no probation. In such case, the clerk of the court in whichthe order of revocation is issued shall forward a transcript of suchorder to the clerk of the court of original jurisdiction, and theclerk of that court shall proceed as if the order of revocation hadbeen issued by the court of original jurisdiction. Upon the revocationof probation or suspension of sentence of any offender, such offendershall be placed in the legal custody of the State Department of Correctionsand shall be subject to the requirements thereof.
- Any probationerwho removes himself from the State of Mississippi without permissionof the court placing him on probation, or the court to which jurisdictionhas been transferred, shall be deemed and considered a fugitive fromjustice and shall be subject to extradition as now provided by law.No part of the time that one is on probation shall be considered asany part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve.
- The arrestingofficer, except when a probation and parole officer, shall be allowedthe same fees as now provided by law for arrest on warrant, and suchfees shall be taxed against the probationer and paid as now providedby law.
- The arrest, revocationand recommitment procedures of this section also apply to personswho are serving a period of post-release supervision imposed by thecourt.
- Unless good causefor the delay is established in the record of the proceeding, theprobation revocation charge shall be dismissed if the revocation hearingis not held within thirty (30) days of the warrant being issued.
- The Departmentof Corrections shall provide semiannually to the Oversight Task Forcethe number of warrants issued for an alleged violation of probationor post-release supervision, the average time between detention ona warrant and preliminary hearing, the average time between detentionon a warrant and revocation hearing, the number of ninety-day sentencesin a technical violation center issued by the court, the number ofone-hundred-twenty-day sentences in a technical violation center issuedby the court, the number of one-hundred-eighty-day sentences issuedby the court, and the number and average length of the suspended sentencesimposed by the court in response to a violation.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-25; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 12; Laws, 1962, ch. 331; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 108; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 118; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 118; Laws, 1990, ch. 331, § 1; Laws, 1992, ch. 395, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 11; Laws, 2006, ch. 566, § 6; Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 58, eff from and after July 1, 2014; Laws, 2018, ch. 416, § 11, eff from and after July 1, 2018.
Editor’s Notes —
This section was set out to correct an error in the 2014 Cumulative Supplement. The reference to “Section 55 of this act” at the end of subsection (1) was changed to “ Section 47-7-40.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2006 amendment added the third paragraph.
The 2014 amendment added present (3), (10), and (11) and redesignated former undesignated paragraphs as (1), (2), and (4) through (9); in present (1), added the last sentence; and rewrote present (5)(a).
The 2018 amendment, in (5), substituted “one or more technical violations” for “a technical violation” in the fourth sentence of (a), second sentence of (b), third sentence of (c) and third sentence of (d), substituted “revocation” for “technical violation” everywhere it appears in (a) through (c) and in the third, fourth and fifth sentences of (d), and made a minor stylistic change in (c).
Cross References —
Oversight Task Force, see §47-5-6.
Technical violation centers, see §47-7-38.1.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general; applicability.
2. Constitutional issues.
3. Jurisdiction.
4. Proceedings; right to counsel.
5. —Evidence.
6. Propriety of particular sentences.
7. Miscellaneous.
1. In general; applicability.
Statute addressing suspended sentences and conditional pardons could not have been used as authority to revoke post-release supervision; the procedures for the revocation of post-release supervision were prescribed exclusively in another statute. Atwood v. State, 183 So.3d 843, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 2016).
Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37, only the court had the authority to revoke probation; accordingly, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant in revoking his post-release supervision. Edwards v. State, 946 So. 2d 822, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 8 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), overruled in part, Sobrado v. State, 168 So.3d 1114, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 98 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
Per Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37, the circuit court had the statutory authority to revoke defendant’s post-release supervision when he sold cocaine to an agent while on release. There was no error where the circuit court reinstated his five year suspended sentence; further, per the bench warrant upon which defendant was arrested, and the summons setting the revocation hearing, hand delivered to defendant, he had notice of the revocation hearing and he was not denied due process or entitled to post-conviction relief. Rucker v. State, 909 So. 2d 137, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 551 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Defendant’s violation of the condition of his suspended sentence occurred within the five-year implied period of probation, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37; defendant understood the simple and clear condition that he was not to violate any laws of any city or state or of the United States. McCaine v. State, 879 So. 2d 1114, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 777 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Defendant was shown to have violated his probation, and pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 the trial judge had the right to reimpose the previously suspended seven year sentence; defendant’s three years incarceration and seven years suspended plus five years of post-release supervision did not equate to fifteen years of time-served, and the sentence was not in violation of the statute. Brown v. State, 872 So. 2d 96, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 380 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
In a capital murder case, defendant’s contention that his identification was the result of an illegal arrest was without merit as his probation officer had the legal authority to sign the warrant under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37, even though he allegedly had no personal knowledge of the circumstances in the warrant. Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 556 (Miss. 2003), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S. 440, 125 S. Ct. 856, 160 L. Ed. 2d 873, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 1371 (U.S. 2005).
Petitioner’s sentence for five years probation was proper where the trial court could impose up to five years’ post-release supervision following time in the custody of the Department of Corrections, and the petitioner failed to establish that he was being held unlawfully in custody. Payton v. State, 845 So. 2d 713, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 398 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 So. 2d 392, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1078, 124 S. Ct. 931, 157 L. Ed. 2d 751, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 9076 (U.S. 2003).
A defendant who wishes to challenge the revocation of his probation need not pursue the administrative remedies set out in Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-803, as only a court can continue or revoke a defendant’s probation. Rodriguez v. State, 839 So. 2d 561, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
The trial court could not properly revoke the defendant’s suspended sentence where (1) a 10-year period of probation was improperly imposed on the defendant as the statute allowed a maximum period of probation of five years, (2) shortly before the end of the fifth year of probation, the defendant’s probation officer filed a violation report and an arrest warrant was issued, but no arrest occurred at that time, and (3) about two years later, the defendant was arrested on an unrelated charge, and a petition to revoke his suspended sentence was then filed. Simpson v. State, 785 So. 2d 1121, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 221 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
Where defendant would maintain his status as a probationer for a total of five years after his release, the maximum permitted, he would only be subjected to supervised probation, with its requirements of periodic reporting and other more restrictive provisions, for the first two years of the five-year probationary period. Hall v. State, 800 So. 2d 1202, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 347 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
Where the period of probation has already expired, it cannot thereafter be revoked, regardless of whether the probationary status terminated prior to the expiration of the term originally set by the sentencing court or by the passage of time. Davis v. State, 844 So. 2d 1142, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 245 (Miss. 2000).
When the county circuit court revoked the defendant’s probation, it lacked the jurisdiction since, at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the five year term of her probation had already expired by several months and, therefore, could not be revoked; a form warrant signed and mailed by an officer of the Department of Corrections did not serve to toll the running of term of probation because it was not issued by the court or a judge in vacation. Ellis v. State, 748 So. 2d 130, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 311 (Miss. 1999).
The combined terms of a sentence of imprisonment and a period of probation may exceed the maximum sentence permitted for a crime. Carter v. State, 726 So. 2d 195, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 1071 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 235 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1999).
When the court exercises its authority to suspend the execution of a portion of a defendant’s sentence, the normal course of procedure is to (1) impose a sentence, (2) determine what portion is to be suspended, (3) impose a period of probation, and (4) specify the terms and conditions upon which the probation/suspended sentence is contingent; if at any time during the period of probation it is determined that the probationer violated any of the specified conditions of his or her probation, the court has the authority to revoke any part or all of the probation or any part or all of the suspended sentence, as if the decision to suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation had never been made. Artis v. State, 643 So. 2d 533, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1994).
Once a circuit or county court exercises its option to impose a definite sentence it cannot subsequently set that sentence aside and impose a greater sentence. Leonard v. State, 271 So. 2d 445, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1512 (Miss. 1973).
This provision does not apply to misdemeanors. Jackson v. Waller, 248 Miss. 166, 156 So. 2d 594, 1963 Miss. LEXIS 388, 1964 Miss. LEXIS 265 (Miss. 1963), modified, 248 Miss. 172, 160 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1964).
2. Constitutional issues.
In a post-conviction relief case, it was error to determine that this statute, which provided for graduated penalties for technical violations for probation and supervised release, was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine because there was nothing in the amendments to this statute that impinged upon a trial court’s ability to enforce its orders. The trial court retained its authority to determine whether there was a violation of a condition of supervised release, as well as the power to revoke the term of supervision and to impose a period of imprisonment; the Mississippi Legislature merely altered the term and place of imprisonment for certain violations. Atwood v. State, 183 So.3d 843, 2016 Miss. LEXIS 18 (Miss. 2016).
In a post-conviction appeal, a state inmate argued unsuccessfully that he was denied due process by the circuit court’s failure to require that he be found guilty of a crime before revoking his probation. The Mississippi Supreme Court had stated that a conviction was not necessary to revoke probation; probation could be revoked upon a showing that the inmate more likely than not violated the terms of probation. Loisel v. State, 995 So. 2d 850, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 693 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
In a post-conviction appeal, a state inmate argued unsuccessfully the circuit court erred in refusing his motion for post-conviction relief and that as a result, he was denied due process. Contrary to the inmate’s assertion, the record showed that the circuit court judge provided a written order in which he found that the inmate admitted at the revocation hearing to violating his probation, and it was that admission that served as the basis for the revocation. Loisel v. State, 995 So. 2d 850, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 693 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
In a post-conviction appeal in which a state inmate argued that during his probation revocation hearing, he was on medication for depression and anxiety, and, as a result, he claimed that he felt extremely uncomfortable at the hearing and was denied due process, that argument failed. Nothing in the record indicated that the subject of his medications or mental state was ever brought up during the initial revocation hearing in relation to that proceeding, and he was represented by counsel and given an opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to examine witnesses. Loisel v. State, 995 So. 2d 850, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 693 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Order dismissing defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-11(2) was upheld where defendant was accorded the minimum due process requirements to which defendant was entitled at a probation revocation hearing; defendant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the State’s witnesses and to call witnesses. Morgan v. State, 995 So. 2d 787, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 248 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 374, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 633 (Miss. 2008).
Petitioner was accorded the minimum due process requirements to which he was entitled at his revocation hearing; he signed the waiver of preliminary hearing, which contained the charges against him, and his revocation hearing was not held until two months later; there the evidence against him was presented and he was given the opportunity to be heard on the matter. Payton v. State, 845 So. 2d 713, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 398 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 859 So. 2d 392, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 436 (Miss. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1078, 124 S. Ct. 931, 157 L. Ed. 2d 751, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 9076 (U.S. 2003).
A defendant who allegedly violated the terms of his probation by committing the crime of sale of cocaine was denied due process of law by having his probation revoked immediately after a mistrial was declared in his trial on the charge of sale of cocaine where the revocation was based upon the trial which had just resulted in a mistrial, the defendant never agreed that the court could summarily revoke his probation in the event the trial resulted in anything other than a conviction, and he was not given advance notice of a revocation hearing. Grayson v. State, 648 So. 2d 1129, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 630 (Miss. 1994).
A defendant was deprived of due process by a trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry as to the reason she was delinquent in paying her probation fines before revoking her probation because of her failure to pay those fines. Berdin v. State, 648 So. 2d 73, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 637 (Miss. 1994), overruled, Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999). But see Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999).
A defendant’s probation revocation violated her due process rights where there was no record of the defendant receiving notice of a probation violation, and the disparity between the court’s statements when probation was revoked, the written and signed order of revocation, and the court’s after-the-fact explanation at the defendant’s post-conviction relief hearing demonstrated a lack of actual notice. Berdin v. State, 648 So. 2d 73, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 637 (Miss. 1994), overruled, Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999). But see Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999).
A probationer was not denied due process due to the lack of a preliminary hearing in his probation revocation proceedings, even though a hearing expressly designated as “preliminary” was not held, where 3 hearings were held in the circuit courts and the first and second hearings were, for all practical purposes, equivalent to a preliminary hearing. Additionally, the probationer was not wrongfully denied the opportunity to call his own witnesses where he made a last-minute request during the third hearing to call witnesses who allegedly would have testified in his behalf, the court concluded that the witnesses would have offered no new evidence, the probationer had already admitted that he committed probation violations, and at most the witnesses would have testified in regard to the probationer’s character and would have had no effect on the outcome of the case. Riely v. State, 562 So. 2d 1206, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1990).
The probation-revocation procedure delineated in §47-7-37 is constitutional; the statute includes the minimum due process requirements applicable to parole and probation revocation procedures set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 71 Ohio Ops 2d 279. Riely v. State, 562 So. 2d 1206, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1990).
3. Jurisdiction.
Appellant’s claim for excessive detention while awaiting a revocation hearing was procedurally barred because appellant should have either filed a habeas petition or a motion for relief pursuant to subsection (3), and his failure to do so resulted in the issue never being presented to the circuit court and, therefore, it was procedurally barred on appeal. Edmonson v. State, 238 So.3d 1218, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 101 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Appellant’s claim that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction or authority to revoke his probation was procedurally barred because appellant cited no law supporting his assertion that he was not on probation at the time of the alleged violation; appellant admitted at his revocation hearing that his probation had started. Walker v. State, 230 So.3d 709, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 230 So.3d 703, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 2017).
Circuit court conditioned future suspension of fifteen years of the inmate’s sentence on her successful completion of the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP); the circuit court’s sentence was not prohibited by Miss. Code Ann. §47-5-1003(4) where suspension of fifteen years of the inmate’s sentence was contingent upon her completion of the ISP, and successful completion of post-release supervision was conditioned upon obedience to the terms and conditions of post-release supervision spelled out in her court order, none of which required completion of the ISP; the inmate was not subject to removal from the ISP by the circuit court, but only by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Ivory v. State, 999 So. 2d 420, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 735 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 852, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 51 (Miss. 2009).
Regardless of whether defendant was under earned- or post-release supervision at the time he initially violated probation, he admitted to violating his probation and when he appeared at his probation revocation hearing, he had not been released from the trial court’s jurisdiction; accordingly, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over him under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 in revoking his probation, so the reduced sentence that he received was unquestionably legal. Grace v. State, 919 So. 2d 987, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 446 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Trial court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation after he pled guilty to two counts of sale of cocaine, because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 did not require that the original sentencing judge be the person who revoked probation. Evans v. State, 846 So. 2d 301, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Where the judge who revoked the inmate’s suspended sentence was not the judge who imposed the sentence, the trial court had authority to revoke the sentence pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37, as the identity of the judge who revoked the suspension was irrelevant. Atwell v. State, 848 So. 2d 190, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 348 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
The trial judge’s expressed retention of jurisdiction during the first 180 days of the defendant’s two year probation did not act as a waiver of jurisdiction beyond the first 180 days yet prior to the expiration of the term of probation. Reaves v. State, 749 So. 2d 295, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 552 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
4. Proceedings; right to counsel.
Appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief was properly denied because the trial court was not request to appoint counsel during the revocation hearing; the revocation hearing was straightforward, and the trial court instructed appellant that he could cross-examine witnesses, testify on his own behalf, and call any witnesses that he wanted. Gray v. State, 269 So.3d 331, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Appellant did not require counsel at the hearing due to his mental illness because no mental illness was ever raised before the circuit court, let alone any reasonable grounds to believe that appellant was not competent; there was no indication anywhere in the entire record of appellant’s alleged mental illness or hospitalization, other than his own brief. Walker v. State, 230 So.3d 709, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 230 So.3d 703, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 2017).
Trial court was entitled to revoke a probationer’s post-release supervision (PRS) based solely on the probationers admission to the violations of the terms and conditions of the probationer’s PRS. Furthermore, because the case was not complex, the probationer would not have been entitled to appointed counsel even if the probationer had been informed that the probationer could request counsel Hall v. State, 189 So.3d 631, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 41 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
Post-conviction relief was denied in a case where a portion of a suspended sentence was revoked under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 because there was no due process violation since the evidence relied upon was listed, there was no double jeopardy violation since the original sentence was reinstated, and counsel was not required since the case was not complex. Pruitt v. State, 953 So. 2d 302, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 203 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Post-conviction relief was properly denied, because petitioner’s probation was properly revoked based on his indictment for burglary, as petitioner was provided with written notice of the charges against him, the evidence against him was presented to the court in the form of an indictment for burglary and failure to pay supervision and court costs fees, and petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard in court and to present evidence that could refute the allegations levied against him. Newsom v. State, 904 So. 2d 1095, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 396 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Postconviction relief was properly denied, because petitioner was not improperly denied a right to counsel at his probation revocation hearing, as the record did not reflect that petitioner obtained or requested counsel during the revocation hearing, and the trial court was under no duty to appoint counsel for petitioner during the revocation proceeding. Newsom v. State, 904 So. 2d 1095, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 396 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Probationers and parolees do not “have, per se, a right to counsel at revocation hearings.” Whether probationers have a right to counsel must be answered “on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system.” Riely v. State, 562 So. 2d 1206, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1990).
A probationer was not deprived of the right to counsel at his probation revocation hearings in violation of his constitutional rights where the circuit court did not actually “disallow” the probationer to have legal representation but merely refused to continue the hearing in response to his belated request for more time to obtain counsel, the case was not “complex or otherwise difficult to develop,” and counsel was provided upon the probationer’s request prior to the fourth hearing before the circuit court and prior to his appeal to the Supreme Court. Riely v. State, 562 So. 2d 1206, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1990).
A probationer was not denied due process due to the lack of a preliminary hearing in his probation revocation proceedings, even though a hearing expressly designated as “preliminary” was not held, where 3 hearings were held in the circuit courts and the first and second hearings were, for all practical purposes, equivalent to a preliminary hearing. Additionally, the probationer was not wrongfully denied the opportunity to call his own witnesses where he made a last-minute request during the third hearing to call witnesses who allegedly would have testified in his behalf, the court concluded that the witnesses would have offered no new evidence, the probationer had already admitted that he committed probation violations, and at most the witnesses would have testified in regard to the probationer’s character and would have had no effect on the outcome of the case. Riely v. State, 562 So. 2d 1206, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 240 (Miss. 1990).
5. —Evidence.
Denial of the inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief was proper where, had the information of his HIV diagnosis been available to the judge, it would not have changed the fact that the inmate violated the terms of his probation; however, the court remanded for proper sentencing, stating that his failure to successfully complete the Regimented Inmate Discipline (RID) Program did not occur because of any misconduct or similar failure on his part. Curry v. State, 855 So. 2d 452, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 564 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Evidence that defendant failed to make restitution payments and engaged in continuing misconduct while on probation for aggravated assault supported trial court’s decision to revoke probation and impose the remaining 11 years of defendant’s 12-year sentence; defendant was not denied due process and the sentence was not excessive. Rodriguez v. State, 839 So. 2d 561, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Since a hearing on a petition to revoke probation is not a criminal proceeding, the evidence for revocation need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is only necessary that the evidence be sufficient to convince the court that probation should be revoked. Ray v. State, 229 So. 2d 579, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1253 (Miss. 1969).
6. Propriety of particular sentences.
Circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing appellant’s post-conviction-relief motion because its decision to impose a period of imprisonment greater than ninety days was not clearly erroneous since appellant committed at least three technical violations of his post-release supervision. Edmonson v. State, 238 So.3d 1218, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 101 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Because it was appellant’s first technical violation of his probation, he should have been sentenced to not more than ninety days in a technical-violation center or restitution center, not to the full term of his suspended sentence of five years’ incarceration. Walker v. State, 230 So.3d 709, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 230 So.3d 703, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 2017).
Circuit court did not err in dismissing defendant’s postconviction-relief motion as he was not subjected to double jeopardy when the circuit court revoked his probation for a second time and reinstated the remaining balance of his originally suspended 10-year sentence because the circuit court was authorized to incarcerate defendant for the remaining balance of his suspended sentence; and the circuit court did not resentence defendant, nor did it lengthen his original sentence upon the second revocation. Smith v. State, 196 So.3d 986, 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 581 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
Based on the circuit court’s failure to retain sentencing jurisdiction pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47, its implied attempt to impermissibly delegate its authority to suspend part of the prisoner’s 16-year sentence, and the fact that he did not have a revocation hearing, the circuit court’s sentence was impermissibly indeterminate. Graham v. State, 85 So.3d 860, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), vacated, 85 So.3d 847, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 2012).
Defendant, who admitted that he had twice violated a specific term of his post-release supervision, was properly required to serve the remainder of his entire sentence because Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 gave the circuit court judge discretion to revoke and impose any portion or all of a suspended sentence, and a conviction was not necessary in order to revoke probation. Yance v. State, 30 So.3d 370, 2010 Miss. App. LEXIS 82 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
There was no error in the circuit court’s dismissal of an inmate’s motion for post-conviction relief. After the inmate violated his post-release supervision, the circuit court revoked his post-release supervision for a period of eight years with the first three years to be served on house arrest and the remaining sentence to be served on post-release supervision; the inmate’s sentence was within the circuit court’s authority according to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37. Williams v. State, 4 So.3d 388, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 128 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Where appellant served four years of his six-year sentence for the sale of cocaine, he was released; upon the revocation of his suspended two-year sentence, the trial court violated Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 and appellant’s protection against double jeopardy by imposing a three-year term of imprisonment. Branch v. State, 996 So. 2d 829, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 782 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
In an appeal from a circuit court’s summary dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-11(2), a pro se inmate argued unsuccessfully that his sentence illegally exceeded the statutory maximum under Miss. Code. Ann. §97-3-73, and therefore, it was illegal for the circuit court to institute and then revoke his post-release supervision. Since the inmate’s sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable sentence as provided for in Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-75, there was no merit to his argument that because his sentence exceeded the time allowed by the statute, his post-release supervision was not illegally instituted and revoked, there was no merit to his argument that he should have received credit for the time he spent on post-release supervision, and, under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37, the circuit court had the right to reimpose the previously suspended 12-year sentence. Fluker v. State, 2 So.3d 717, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 675 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Post-conviction relief was denied in a case where appellant inmate’s post-release supervision and suspended sentences were revoked because the inmate was merely ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37; therefore, he was not entitled to a milder sentence for forgery, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-33. Lenoir v. State, 4 So.3d 1056, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 585 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 11 So.3d 1250, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 122 (Miss. 2009).
Motion for post-conviction relief was denied in a case where defendant’s suspended sentence for statutory rape was revoked because he waived issues relating to a speedy trial and defects in an evidence sample due to a guilty plea, there was no evidence that an indictment was manufactured, and the revocation of the suspended sentence was permitted under Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-34 and47-7-37 where defendant had already served a portion of a five-year sentence after the guilty plea was entered. Davis v. State, 954 So. 2d 530, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 259 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Where defendant had already served 18 months of his ten- year sentence, the trial court’s order sentencing defendant to serve ten years upon his second violation of the terms of his postrelease supervision did exceed the authority of the court, which was only authorized to reinstate the remainder of defendant’s original sentence. The maximum term remaining on defendant’s sentence that could have been reinstated by the court was eight years and six months. Harvey v. State, 919 So. 2d 282, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 377 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where a trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year in the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), followed by supervised probation under the supervision of the MDOC for a period of 10 years, a court of appeals erred in reversing the sentence because it was clear that the trial court was placing defendant on probation, only five years of which would be served under the supervision of the MDOC, the remaining five years being in essence “unsupervised probation.” Thus, the sentence did not violate Miss. Code Ann. §§47-7-33,47-7-34, or47-7-37. Miller v. State, 875 So. 2d 194, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 690 (Miss. 2004).
While Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 (Rev. 2000) gave the trial court the authority to impose less than the full sentence as a sanction for an inmate’s probation violation, since the trial court stated it was sentencing the inmate to “his 2 1/2 years,” the appellate court inferred that the trial court had intended to impose the entire suspended sentence of 4 1/2 years, which was the sentence stated in the written order and which prevailed over the oral sentence. Boutwell v. State, 847 So. 2d 294, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 492 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
After an arson conviction, a trial court erred by sentencing defendant to 10 years of post-release supervision because only five years was permitted under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37. Miller v. State, 856 So. 2d 420, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 243 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 694 (Miss. June 17, 2004).
Twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault, of which eight years were suspended for a period of five years did not exceed the 20-year statutory maximum for the offense because a period of probation is not included in calculating the period of incarceration to which a defendant is sentenced. Ray v. State, 844 So. 2d 483, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 690 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 846 So. 2d 229, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 485 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
After petitioner admitted he breached the terms of his suspended sentence, the trial court was entitled to revoke any or all of the suspended sentence and was also allowed to impose the four years it originally suspended, and thus, the petitioner was not entitled to a credit of 15 months served on supervised release deducted from the four-year suspended sentence that petitioner was ordered to serve after he breached his suspended sentence. Johnson v. State, 802 So. 2d 110, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 505 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
The probationary period imposed on the defendant was improper and in violation of the statute, which allowed a maximum period of probation of five years, where his sentence was suspended and he was placed on 10 years’ probation. Simpson v. State, 785 So. 2d 1121, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 221 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
Upon a defendant’s violation of his probation, it was well within the court’s power to revoke his probation or his suspended sentence and reinstate any or all of the original sentence if it deemed such an action necessary; court could sentence a defendant to the full original sentence if it deemed such an action necessary. Brunson v. State, 796 So. 2d 284, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 387 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
Defendant’s sentence of nineteen and one-half years incarceration and six months suspended plus five years of probation does not equate to twenty-five years of time-served, and the sentence is not in violation of this section or §97-3-25. Carter v. State, 754 So. 2d 1207, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 2000).
Where the defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 10 years, suspended for two years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with such suspension made contingent upon his successful completion of a two year period of house arrest, and where the defendant failed to abide by the terms and conditions of his probation and house arrest, the trial court was authorized to revoke the defendant’s probation and impose any part or all of the 10 year sentence originally imposed. Reaves v. State, 749 So. 2d 295, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 552 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
The defendant was entitled to reversal and remand for resentencing where he was given the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years, but with six months suspended and probation for five years; such sentence exceeded the statutory maximum sentence. Carter v. State, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 235 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1999), rev'd, 754 So. 2d 1207, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 7 (Miss. 2000).
The revocation of a defendant’s suspended sentence 10 years after the date of the original sentence was not improper, where the defendant was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, the execution of 15 years of the 30-year sentence was suspended, the defendant was also ordered to serve a 5-year period of supervised probation, the defendant was released on parole after serving 5 years in the state penitentiary on the 15-year “to serve” portion of his sentence, the defendant was arrested for receiving stolen property approximately 2 years after his release on parole and was reincarcerated, he was released on probation 19 months later, and his 15-year suspended sentence was partially revoked for a period of 6 years for violation of the suspended sentence as a result of a house burglary which occurred approximately one year after he was released on probation. The 5-year probationary period for the 15-year suspended portion of the defendant’s 30-year sentence did not begin to run until the day he was released on probation, and the house burglary which triggered the revocation of the suspended sentence took place well within the 5-year period of probation. Moore v. State, 585 So. 2d 738, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 587 (Miss. 1991).
Where on remand for resentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant, this being his first offense, to 3 1/2 years in the state penitentiary, but included in the resentencing order a proviso that when defendant shall have served one year of the sentence, he should be placed on probation and parole as to the remaining 2 1/2-year-period for a term of 5 years, inasmuch as the period of probation did not exceed the limit set in Code 1942 § 4004-25, the judgment would be affirmed. Pettus v. Alexander, 278 So. 2d 778, 1973 Miss. LEXIS 1453 (Miss. 1973).
7. Miscellaneous.
Appellant’s claim for excessive detention while awaiting a revocation hearing lacked support because the record on appeal was sparse on the details of appellant’s arrest and subsequent pre-hearing detention; the record also was void of any transcript from appellant’s revocation hearing.Edmonson v. State, 238 So.3d 1218, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 101 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
Because appellant violated three other conditions of his post-release supervision in addition to the condition requiring that he not commit any state or federal offense, appellant committed three “technical violations,” and thus, the circuit court was within its authority to impose the remainder of the suspended portion of his sentence. Claverie v. State, 261 So.3d 1120, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 122 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 260 So.3d 797, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 2019).
Appellant was afforded a neutral and detached probation revocation hearing because the circuit court judge did not prosecute for the State when he recited the allegations, asked appellant if he disputed or admitted them, and asked the probation officer if he had anything to add Walker v. State, 230 So.3d 709, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 230 So.3d 703, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 2017).
Revocation of appellant’s probation was proper because appellant did not report to his probation officer and did not pay the requisite fees and restitution; by appellant’s own admission, he did, in fact, violate the conditions of his probation. Walker v. State, 230 So.3d 709, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 666 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 230 So.3d 703, 2017 Miss. LEXIS 387 (Miss. 2017).
Decision to revoke appellant’s, an inmate’s, probation was appropriate pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 because he had testified that he had used marijuana one time since being placed on probation, and, in revoking his probation, the trial judge found that the inmate had used drugs while on probation, had failed to pay supervision fees and court costs, and had resided with his brother, who had an outstanding felony warrant. Whitaker v. State, 22 So.3d 326, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 760 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
State acted on a probation revocation petition within a reasonable amount of time; defendant had fled the jurisdiction to Pennsylvania upon release from prison, and remained there until returning to Mississippi, shortly before being served with the revocation petition and arrested. Leech v. State, 994 So. 2d 850, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 422 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. dismissed, 999 So. 2d 852, 2009 Miss. LEXIS 50 (Miss. 2009).
Revocation of defendant’s probation and reinstatement of an initially suspended sentence was well within a trial judge’s discretion and within the confines of statutory authority where defendant committed another armed robbery while on probation for armed robbery, thereby violating the terms of probation. Deere v. State, 976 So. 2d 977, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 135 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
Denial of the inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief was proper pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §99-39-21(1) where his argument that the judge should not have presided over the revocation hearing was not preserved for review because he did not raise the issue at the revocation proceeding. In addition, it was without merit because the judge was exercising his authority under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37 to issue a warrant for the inmate’s arrest for a probation violation; thus, he was acting within his statutory authority and there was no indication that he was unqualified or biased. Hubbard v. State, 919 So. 2d 1022, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Where petitioner had waived his right to a probation revocation hearing, the court had the right to re-impose petitioner’s suspended sentence for uttering forgery because he had tested positive for marijuana and was terminated from a work program. While petitioner claimed that he did not understand that he would have to serve the remaining balance of his sentence, he was not entitled to postconviction relief. Gates v. State, 919 So. 2d 170, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 375 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-37, probation did not equal time served and could not be credited toward a suspended sentence; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for credit for the time he had served on probation. Simmons v. State, 913 So. 2d 1011, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 299 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Record indicated an order signed by the trial judge extending defendant’s probation for one year; since there was a record of an order extending probation for the trial judge to consider in reviewing defendant’s motion for postconviction relief, the trial judge acted within proper judicial discretion in denying defendant’s requested relief. McDonald v. State, 904 So. 2d 1167, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 1034 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
A two-day delay between probationer’s arrest and presentation of petition to the court was insufficient to run afoul of the statute’s requirement that judicial oversight be brought to this notice and that the probationer be given an opportunity to be heard. Thorn v. State, 815 So. 2d 455, 2002 Miss. App. LEXIS 194 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
When the trial court imposes conditions upon a suspended sentence without stating a probationary period, Mississippi law implies imposition of the maximum probationary period of five years and, therefore, if the defendant violates the conditions of his probation within such period, the court has the authority to revoke the suspended sentence. Shumpert v. State, 764 So. 2d 1250, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 345 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
Before a trial court may revoke a defendant’s probation or suspended sentence, it must afford the defendant the minimum due process requirements, including a preliminary hearing and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Shumpert v. State, 764 So. 2d 1250, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 345 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
Although a probationary period was not described by the court, a probationary period of up to five years was in fact established based on the terms of the defendant’s release where he was ordered to serve ten years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections with the last eight years suspended, pending future good behavior. Wilson v. State, 735 So. 2d 290, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 135 (Miss. 1999).
The trial court did not violate the defendant’s right to due process when it revoked his suspended sentence based upon an offense that occurred prior to the imposition of his probation and when the court’s express condition of probation stated that the defendant “shall hereafter commit no offense against the laws of this . . . state,” where (1) the defendant was served with a copy of the state’s petition to revoke his suspended sentence at least five days before the hearing in open court and was given notice thereof, (2) during the hearing, the defendant, through his attorney, confessed to the petition filed by the state and acknowledged that he violated the terms of his probation, and (3) the trial court judge advised the defendant that he was entitled to a hearing during which the state would be required to sufficiently establish that he violated the terms of his probation, but he informed the court that he did not desire such a hearing. Smith v. State, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 1053 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998), rev'd, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999).
When failure to pay court-imposed fines becomes a possible basis for a probation revocation, the trial court must follow the procedural mandates of §99-19-20(2). Berdin v. State, 648 So. 2d 73, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 637 (Miss. 1994), overruled, Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999). But see Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 1146, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 260 (Miss. 1999).
A court must base its revocation of a suspended sentence on a violation of the clear terms and conditions of the suspended sentence; due process requires that the trial judge at least orally inform the defendant of the terms and conditions upon which his or her suspended sentence is contingent before it may be properly revoked for the violation of those terms and conditions. Artis v. State, 643 So. 2d 533, 1994 Miss. LEXIS 468 (Miss. 1994).
A prisoner will not be permitted to serve his or her period of probation simultaneously with his or her incarceration; “probation” denotes a release of the defendant, under suspension of sentence, into the community under the supervision of a probation officer. Moore v. State, 585 So. 2d 738, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 587 (Miss. 1991).
Petition for revocation of probation filed approximately 11 days prior to expiration of probationary period tolls running of probationary period and court acts within reasonable time by revoking probation 2 days after probationary period would otherwise have expired. Jackson v. State, 483 So. 2d 1353, 1986 Miss. LEXIS 2383 (Miss. 1986).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Based on specified facts pertaining to an encounter with and rearrest of a probationer, the probationer himself was ultimately responsible for his own medical expenses arising from the encounter; however, assuming he was indigent, the county would be responsible for the medical expenses incurred as the injury occurred and the expenses were incurred prior to the initiation of proceedings for revocation of his probation. Griffith, May 3, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0232.
When a probationer is arrested pursuant to Section 47-7-37 and held in the county jail awaiting a probation revocation hearing, the prisoner is a state inmate and the Mississippi Department of Corrections is responsible for the cost of incarcerating such an inmate. Shepard, Mar. 21, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0108.
When a probationer is arrested for an unrelated crime, the prisoner is in the custody of the local government and the local government must bear the costs of incarceration; however, upon the issuance of a warrant pursuant to this section or §47-7-27 the prisoner becomes a state inmate and the Mississippi Department of Corrections must bear the cost of incarceration. Pope, Mar. 28, 2003, A.G. Op. #03-0137.
Based on Section 47-5-901(3), when a probationer is arrested pursuant to this section and held in the county jail awaiting a probation revocation hearing, the Mississippi Department of Corrections is not responsible for the cost of incarcerating such an inmate; therefore, the county must absorb such costs. Note: Shepard (Mar. 21, 2003), A.G. Op. #03-0108, is hereby revoked. Shepard, July 7, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0108.
Upon issuance of a warrant pursuant to Section 47-7-37 the prisoner becomes a state inmate and the Mississippi Department of Corrections must bear the cost of incarceration. Howard, July 22, 2005, A.G. Op. 05-0345.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 A.L.R.3d 306.
Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked. 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.
Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of probation on same charge. 76 A.L.R.3d 564.
Propriety of revocation of probation for subsequent criminal conviction which is subject to appeal. 76 A.L.R.3d 588.
Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. 77 A.L.R.3d 636.
Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda Rule. 77 A.L.R.3d 669.
Right of defendant sentenced after revocation of probation to credit for jail time served as condition of probation. 99 A.L.R.3d 781.
Admissibility of hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings. 11 A.L.R.4th 999.
Power of court, after expiration of probation term, to revoke or modify probation for violations committed during the probation term. 13 A.L.R.4th 1240.
Power of court to revoke probation for acts committed after imposition of sentence but prior to commencement of probation term. 22 A.L.R.4th 755.
Propriety of increased sentence following revocation of probation. 23 A.L.R.4th 883.
Probation revocation: insanity as defense. 56 A.L.R.4th 1178.
Availability of discovery at probation revocation hearings. 52 A.L.R.5th 559.
Right and sufficiency of allocation in probation revocation proceeding. 70 A.L.R.5th 533.
Am. Jur.
19 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 583, Governmental Entity’s Liability for Injuries Caused by Negligently Released Individual.
§ 47-7-37.1. Revocation of probation or post-release supervision.
Notwithstandingany other provision of law to the contrary, if a court finds by apreponderance of the evidence, that a probationer or a person underpost-release supervision has committed a felony or absconded, thecourt may revoke his probation and impose any or all of the sentence.For purposes of this section, “absconding from supervision”means the failure of a probationer to report to his supervising officerfor six (6) or more consecutive months.
HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 448, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved Apr. 20, 2015.).
Editor’s Notes —
Section 4, Chapter 448, Laws of 2015, provides:
“SECTION 4. Sections 1 and 2 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2015. Section 3 of this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage [approved April 20, 2015].”
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. Imposition of remainder of sentence.
There was sufficient record evidence to support the circuit court’s determination that appellant more likely than not violated the condition of his post-release supervision order that required that he not commit any state or federal offense; accordingly, the circuit court was authorized to impose the remaining portion of appellant’s suspended sentence. Claverie v. State, 261 So.3d 1120, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 122 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 260 So.3d 797, 2019 Miss. LEXIS 36 (Miss. 2019).
§ 47-7-38. Graduated sanctions as alternative to judicial modification or revocation of parole, probation or post-release supervision.
- The departmentshall have the authority to impose graduated sanctions as an alternativeto judicial modification or revocation, as provided in Sections 47-7-27 and 47-7-37, for offenders onprobation, parole, or post-release supervision who commit technicalviolations of the conditions of supervision as defined by Section 47-7-2.
- The commissionershall develop a standardized graduated sanctions system, which shallinclude a grid to guide field officers in determining the suitableresponse to a technical violation. The commissioner shall promulgaterules and regulations for the development and application of the systemof sanctions. Field officers shall be required to conform to the sanctiongrid developed.
- The system ofsanctions shall include a list of sanctions for the most common typesof violations. When determining the sanction to impose, the fieldofficer shall take into account the offender’s assessed risklevel, previous violations and sanctions, and severity of the currentand prior violations.
- Field officersshall notify the sentencing court when a probationer has committeda technical violation or the parole board when a parolee has committeda technical violation of the type of violation and the sanction imposed.When the technical violation is an arrest for a new criminal offense,the field officer shall notify the court within forty-eight (48) hoursof becoming aware of the arrest.
-
The graduatedsanctions that the department may impose include, but shall not belimited to:
- Verbal warnings;
- Increased reporting;
- Increased drugand alcohol testing;
- Mandatory substanceabuse treatment;
- Loss of earned-dischargecredits; and
- Incarcerationin a county jail for no more than two (2) days. Incarceration as asanction shall not be used more than two (2) times per month for atotal period incarcerated of no more than four (4) days.
-
The system shallalso define positive reinforcements that offenders will receive forcompliance with conditions of supervision. These positive reinforcementsshall include, but not limited to:
- Verbal recognition;
- Reduced reporting;and
- Credits for earneddischarge which shall be awarded pursuant to Section 47-7-40.
- The Departmentof Corrections shall provide semiannually to the Oversight Task Forcethe number and percentage of offenders who have one or more violationsduring the year, the average number of violations per offender duringthe year and the total and average number of incarceration sanctionsas defined in subsection (5) of this section imposed during the year.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 54, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected an error in an internal reference is Section 54 of H.B. 585 (Chapter 457) codified as this section. The reference to “Section 70 of this act” in (6)(c) was changed to “Section 55 of this act,” which has been codified as new Section 47-7-40. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 24, 2014, meeting.
§ 47-7-38.1. Technical violation centers.
- The Departmentof Corrections shall establish technical violation centers to detainprobation and parole violators revoked by the court or parole board.
- The departmentshall place an offender in a violation center for a technical violationas ordered by the board pursuant to Section 47-7-27 and the sentencingcourt pursuant to Section 47-7-37.
- The violationcenters shall be equipped to address the underlying factors that ledto the offender’s violation as identified based on the resultsof a risk and needs assessment. At a minimum each violation centershall include substance abuse services shown to reduce recidivismand a reduction in the use of illicit substances or alcohol, educationprograms, employment preparation and training programs and behavioralprograms.
- As required by Section 47-5-20(b), the departmentshall notify, by certified mail, each member of the board of supervisorsof the county in which the violation center shall be located of thedepartment’s intent to convert an existing department facilityto a technical violation center.
- The departmentshall establish rules and regulations for the implementation and operationof the technical violation centers.
- The Departmentof Corrections shall provide to the Oversight Task Force semiannuallythe average daily population of the technical violation centers, thenumber of admissions to the technical violation centers, and the averagetime served in the technical violation centers.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 61, eff from and after July 1, 2014.
§ 47-7-39. Change of residence; transfer.
If, for goodand sufficient reasons, a probationer desires to change his residencewithin or without the state, such transfer may be effected by applicationto his field supervisor which transfer shall be subject to the court’sconsent and subject to such regulations as the court, or judge, mayrequire.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-26; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 13; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 89; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 109; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 119; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 119, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-7-40. Earned-discharge program; eligibility; accrual of earned-discharge credits.
- The commissioner shall establish rules and regulations for implementing the earned-discharge program that allows offenders on probation and parole to reduce the period of supervision for complying with conditions of probation. The department shall have the authority to award earned-discharge credits to all offenders placed on probation, parole, or post-release supervision who are in compliance with the terms and conditions of supervision. An offender serving a Mississippi sentence for an eligible offense in any jurisdiction under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision shall be eligible for earned-discharge credits under this section. Offenders shall not be denied earned-discharge credits solely based on nonpayment of fees or fines if a hardship waiver has been granted as provided in Section 47-7-49.
- For each full calendar month of compliance with the conditions of supervision, earned-discharge credits equal to the number of days in that month shall be deducted from the offender’s sentence discharge date. Credits begin to accrue for eligible offenders after the first full calendar month of compliance supervision conditions. For the purposes of this section, an offender is deemed to be in compliance with the conditions of supervision if there was no violation of the conditions of supervision.
- No earned-discharge credits may accrue for a calendar month in which a violation report has been submitted, the offender has absconded from supervision, the offender is serving a term of imprisonment in a technical violation center, or for the months between the submission of the violation report and the final action on the violation report by the court or the board.
- Earned-discharge credits shall be applied to the sentence within thirty (30) days of the end of the month in which the credits were earned. At least every six (6) months, an offender who is serving a sentence eligible for earned-discharge credits shall be notified of the current sentence discharge date.
- Once the combination of time served on probation, parole or post-release supervision, and earned-discharge credits satisfy the term of probation, parole, or post-release supervision, the board or sentencing court shall order final discharge of the offender. No less than sixty (60) days prior to the date of final discharge, the department shall notify the sentencing court and the board of the impending discharge.
- The department shall provide semiannually to the Oversight Task Force the number and percentage of offenders who qualify for earned discharge in one or more months of the year and the average amount of credits earned within the year.
HISTORY: Laws, 2014, ch. 457, § 55, eff from and after July 1, 2014; Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 36, eff from and after July 1, 2019.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Pursuant to Section 1-1-109, the Joint Legislative Committee on Compilation, Revision and Publication of Legislation corrected errors in the first sentence of subsection (2) by substituting “offender’s sentence” for “offenders sentence” and deleting “established in this act” from the end of the sentence. The Joint Committee ratified the correction at its July 24, 2014, meeting.
Editor's Notes —
Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:
“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Justice Reform Act.”
Amendment Notes —
The 2019 amendment added the last sentence of (1).
§ 47-7-41. Discharge from probation.
When a probationershall be discharged from probation by the court of original jurisdiction,the field supervisor, upon receiving a written request from the probationer,shall forward a written report of the record of the probationer tothe Division of Community Corrections of the department, which shallpresent a copy of this report to the Governor. The Governor may, inhis discretion, at any time thereafter by appropriate executive orderrestore any civil rights lost by the probationer by virtue of hisconviction or plea of guilty in the court of original jurisdiction.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-27; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 14; Laws, 1976, ch. 440, § 90; reenacted, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 110; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 120; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 120; Laws, 1992, ch. 511, § 1; Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 7, eff from and after July 1, 2002.
Amendment Notes —
The 2002 amendment substituted “Division of Community Corrections” for “Division of Community Services.”
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Right in absence of express statutory authorization, of one convicted of crime and imprisoned or paroled, to prosecute civil action. 74 A.L.R.3d 680.
Who may institute proceedings to revoke probation. 21 A.L.R.5th 275.
Validity, construction, and application of state criminal disenfranchisement provisions. 10 A.L.R.6th 31.
§ 47-7-43. Application of provisions.
The provisionsof this chapter are hereby extended to all persons who, at the effectivedate thereof, may be on parole, or eligible to be placed on paroleunder existing laws, with the same force and effect as if this chapterhad been in operation at the time such persons were placed on paroleor become eligible to be placed thereon, as the case may be.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-17; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 18; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 111; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 121; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 121, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
§ 47-7-45. Provisions inapplicable to Oakley Youth Development Center.
The provisionsof this chapter shall not apply to probation under the Youth CourtLaw nor to parole from the Oakley Youth Development Center.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004-18; Laws, 1950, ch. 524, § 19; Laws, 1956, ch. 262, § 8; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 112; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 122; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 122; Laws, 2010, ch. 554, § 10, eff from and after July 1, 2011.
Amendment Notes —
The 2010 amendment substituted “Oakley Youth Development Center” for “Columbia Training School and the Oakley Training School.”
§ 47-7-47. Earned probation program; restitution to crime victim.
- The judge ofany circuit court may place an offender on a program of earned probationafter a period of confinement as set out herein and the judge mayseek the advice of the commissioner and shall direct that the defendantbe under the supervision of the department.
-
- Any circuit courtor county court may, upon its own motion, acting upon the advice andconsent of the commissioner not earlier than thirty (30) days norlater than one (1) year after the defendant has been delivered tothe custody of the department, to which he has been sentenced, suspendthe further execution of the sentence and place the defendant on earnedprobation, except when a death sentence or life imprisonment is themaximum penalty which may be imposed or if the defendant has beenconfined two (2) or more times for the conviction of a felony on aprevious occasion in any court or courts of the United States andof any state or territories thereof or has been convicted of a felonyinvolving the use of a deadly weapon.
- The authoritygranted in this subsection shall be exercised by the judge who imposedsentence on the defendant, or his successor.
- The time limitimposed by paragraph (a) of this subsection is not applicable to thosedefendants sentenced to the custody of the department prior to April14, 1977. Persons who are convicted of crimes that carry mandatorysentences shall not be eligible for earned probation.
- When any circuitor county court places an offender on earned probation, the courtshall give notice to the Mississippi Department of Corrections withinfifteen (15) days of the court’s decision to place the offenderon earned probation. Notice shall be delivered to the central officeof the Mississippi Department of Corrections and to the regional officeof the department which will be providing supervision to the offenderon earned probation.
- If the courtplaces any person on probation or earned probation, the court mayorder the person, as a condition of probation, to a period of confinementand treatment at a private or public agency or institution, eitherwithin or without the state, which treats emotional, mental or drug-relatedproblems. Any person who, as a condition of probation, is confinedfor treatment at an out-of-state facility shall be supervised pursuantto Section 47-7-71, and anyperson confined at a private agency shall not be confined at publicexpense. Time served in any such agency or institution may be countedas time required to meet the criteria of subsection (2)(a).
- If the courtplaces any person on probation or earned probation, the court mayorder the person to make appropriate restitution to any victim ofhis crime or to society through the performance of reasonable workfor the benefit of the community.
- If the courtplaces any person on probation or earned probation, the court mayorder the person, as a condition of probation, to submit, as providedin Section 47-5-601, to anytype of breath, saliva or urine chemical analysis test, the purposeof which is to detect the possible presence of alcohol or a substanceprohibited or controlled by any law of the State of Mississippi orthe United States.
HISTORY: Laws, 1977, ch. 479, § 5; Laws, 1978, ch. 400, § 10; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 113; Laws, 1981, ch. 502, § 12; Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 7; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 123; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 123; Laws, 1996, ch. 397, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 622, § 3; Laws, 2001, ch. 482, § 9, eff from and after July 1, 2001.
Cross References —
Applicability of this section to placement of offenders in intensive supervision program, see §47-5-1003.
Requirement that person in earned probation program make payments to community service revolving fund, see §47-7-49.
Restitution to victim, generally, see §99-37-1 et seq.
Conditioning probation on restitution, see §99-37-5.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
2. Applicability.
3. Jurisdiction.
1. In general.
Trial court clearly erred by finding that it did not have jurisdiction to re-sentence defendant under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47, the earned probation program, where he was neither an “inmate” nor “in custody” of the DOC after being released pending re-sentencing. Creel v. State, 944 So. 2d 896, 2005 Miss. App. LEXIS 805 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), vacated, 944 So. 2d 891, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 683 (Miss. 2006).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate any statutory or constitutional rights of the defendant by removing him from the earned probation program without an evidentiary hearing. Bourrage v. State, 785 So. 2d 1096, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 176 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
The defendant was not improperly dismissed from the regimented inmate disciplinary program, notwithstanding her assertion that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to such dismissal. Green v. State, 784 So. 2d 273, 2001 Miss. App. LEXIS 189 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
This section does not inhibit the ability of the trial court to “adjust” a sentence within the limits of this section while an appeal is pending. Jenkins v. State, 733 So. 2d 833, 1999 Miss. LEXIS 94 (Miss. 1999).
The trial court judge acted in excess of his authority and jurisdiction when he released an inmate after the inmate was denied parole and was beyond the statutory deadline for modifying or amending a sentence. In re Moore, 722 So. 2d 465, 1998 Miss. LEXIS 458 (Miss. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1123, 119 S. Ct. 905, 142 L. Ed. 2d 904, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 775 (U.S. 1999).
Judge lacked authority to suspend remainder of defendant’s sentence where defendant was clearly ineligible for release under statute governing earned probation, defendant was taken into custody for parole violation involving weapons and alcohol, and judge acted solely on his own after numerous ex parte communications with others. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1997).
Judge’s use of nunc pro tunc order to suspend defendant’s sentence following ex parte communications with defendant’s daughter, regarding defendant’s age and health, exceeded judge’s authority where judge did not reserve right to judicial review at time of original sentencing. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1997).
Judge’s use of nunc pro tunc order to correct sentencing order to show that judge had reserved judicial review of sentence for 180 days, thus permitting subsequent suspension of defendant’s sentence, exceeded judge’s authority, in that reservation language was not included in original order, defendant was not eligible for earned probation under statute, judge could not suspend sentence imposed by another judge, which defendant was serving at time judge suspended sentence, and judge acted ex parte, without motion by defendant’s attorney. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1997).
State Supreme Court’s Wigginton decision, providing that trial judge who initially committed prisoner to regimented inmate discipline (RID) program could review prisoner’s expulsion from that program in order to ascertain whether there was any basis for removal, did not authorize circuit court judge to use nunc pro tunc orders to suspend sentences and place prisoners on probation after time of original sentencing. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So. 2d 929, 1997 Miss. LEXIS 35 (Miss. 1997).
Circuit judge who sentenced prisoner under statute governing earned probation programs had authority to later make a determination whether to suspend execution of sentence due to removal of prisoner from Regimented Inmate Discipline (RID), or shock probation, program. Wigginton v. State, 668 So. 2d 763, 1996 Miss. LEXIS 69 (Miss. 1996).
Neither the due process clause nor Mississippi law gives rise to a protected liberty interest in the form of an expectation of release on probation. There is no liberty interest in release pursuant to the provisions of §47-7-47, which creates a procedure whereby the courts may place a prisoner on probation, since the language of the statute is permissive rather than mandatory in nature; the statute vests absolute discretion in both the Department of Corrections and the court in determining whether probation should be recommended and granted, and this discretion affords a prisoner no constitutionally recognized liberty interest. Smith v. State, 580 So. 2d 1221, 1991 Miss. LEXIS 326 (Miss. 1991).
2. Applicability.
Where defendant pled guilty to statutory rape, the trial court did not err by sentencing defendant to participate in the Mississippi Regimented Inmate Discipline Program program under its own discretion, and not under the earned-time allowance program administered by the Mississippi DOC. Gatlin v. State, 18 So.3d 290, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 199 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
Defendant was not considered a habitual offender for sentencing purposes, and his sentence could not be considered “mandatory” under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47(2)(c); therefore, defendant was eligible for earned probation, and suspension of a convicted felon’s sentence was proper and under the sound discretion of the trial court due to the passage of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-34; circuit and county courts had the power to suspend sentences for prior convicted felons that would have been considered illegal under §47-7-33(1). Campbell v. State, 993 So. 2d 413, 2008 Miss. App. LEXIS 385 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
To the extent defendant may be correct that Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47 gave the trial judge between thirty days and one year to modify or suspend sentences, the authority to do so was within the sound discretion of the court, and the judge determined not to do so, which was not error. Ducote v. State, 970 So. 2d 1309, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 831 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
Circuit court’s interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47(2)(a) as pertaining to resentencing was erroneous because the statute did not pertain to resentencing, it pertained only to a suspension of the further execution of a sentence and to the placement of the convicted felon on earned probation. Creel v. State, 944 So. 2d 891, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 683 (Miss. 2006).
The statute does not apply to the intensive supervision program provided for in §§47-5-1001 through47-5-1015 and, therefore, the circuit court did not have the authority to disregard a disciplinary committee’s finding that the defendant was not guilty of a violation of the program and to reinstate his sentences. Babbitt v. State, 755 So. 2d 406, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 15 (Miss. 2000).
3. Jurisdiction.
Based on the circuit court’s failure to retain sentencing jurisdiction pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47, its implied attempt to impermissibly delegate its authority to suspend part of the prisoner’s 16-year sentence, and the fact that he did not have a revocation hearing, the circuit court’s sentence was impermissibly indeterminate. Graham v. State, 85 So.3d 860, 2011 Miss. App. LEXIS 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), vacated, 85 So.3d 847, 2012 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 2012).
Dismissal of the inmate’s petition for postconviction relief was proper because the appeal was untimely; further, even assuming that his appeal was an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of the inmate’s motion for reconsideration, the circuit court did not commit clear error not did it abuse its discretion in dismissing that motion because the inmate had been sentenced during a previous term of court that had since ended, and thus the circuit court had lost jurisdiction as to any aspect of the inmate’s sentencing under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-47(2). Doss v. State, 956 So. 2d 1100, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 344 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
While the statute provides for jurisdiction in matters of probation and earned probation, it does not provide for jurisdiction with regard to house arrest. Smith v. State, 766 So. 2d 50, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 334 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Once a court revokes a defendant’s non-adjudicated status, accepts the defendant’s original plea and imposes a sentence, the defendant has then been adjudicated guilty and the court may not return the defendant to a non-adjudicated status, even if the imposed sentence consists of an earned probation program. Terry, June 7, 2002, A.G. Op. #02-0320.
Any alderman may vote to repeal or amend a valid and effective ordinance. Collins, Apr. 7, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0153.
A defendant who has served a single confinement for more than one felony conviction would be eligible for the earned probation program. Thomas, Apr. 25, 2003, A.G. Op. 03-0148.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
Criminal liability in connection with application for, or receipt of, public relief or welfare payments. 92 A.L.R.2d 421.
Construction of Federal Probation Act (18 USCS § 3651) that, in placing defendant on probation upon terms and conditions, defendant may be required to make restitution. 97 A.L.R.2d 798.
Ability to pay as necessary consideration in conditioning probation or suspended sentence upon reparation or restitution. 73 A.L.R.3d 1240.
Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim. 79 A.L.R.3d 976.
Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs. 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.
Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s submission to drug testing. 87 A.L.R.4th 929.
Power of successor judge taking office during term time to vacate, set aside, or annul judgment entered by his or her predecessor. 51 A.L.R.5th 747.
Requirement, as condition of probation, pursuant to 18 USCS § 3651, that defendant make restitution to aggrieved parties. 71 A.L.R. Fed. 789.
Am. Jur.
22A Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law §§ 1242 et seq.
22 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Prisoners' Rights Litigation.
§ 47-7-49. Creation of community service revolving fund; payments by offender on probation, parole, earned-release supervision, post-release supervision, or earned probation; disposition of payments; time limit on payments [Repealed effective June 30, 2022].
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Any offender on probation, parole, earned-release supervision, post-release supervision, earned probation or any other offender under the field supervision of the Community Services Division of the department shall pay to the department the sum of Fifty-five Dollars ($55.00) per month by certified check or money order unless a hardship waiver is granted. An offender shall make the initial payment within sixty (60) days after being released from imprisonment unless a hardship waiver is granted. A hardship waiver may be granted by the sentencing court or the Department of Corrections. A hardship waiver may not be granted for a period of time exceeding ninety (90) days. The commissioner or his designee shall deposit Fifty Dollars ($50.00) of each payment received into a special fund in the State Treasury, which is hereby created, to be known as the Community Service Revolving Fund. Expenditures from this fund shall be made for: (a) the establishment of restitution and satellite centers; and (b) the establishment, administration and operation of the department’s Drug Identification Program and the intensive and field supervision program. The Fifty Dollars ($50.00) may be used for salaries and to purchase equipment, supplies and vehicles to be used by the Community Services Division in the performance of its duties. Expenditures for the purposes established in this section may be made from the fund upon requisition by the commissioner, or his designee.
Of the remaining amount, Three Dollars ($3.00) of each payment shall be deposited into the Crime Victims’ Compensation Fund created in Section 99-41-29, and Two Dollars ($2.00) shall be deposited into the Training Revolving Fund created pursuant to Section 47-7-51. When a person is convicted of a felony in this state, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court may, in its discretion, order the offender to pay a state assessment not to exceed the greater of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or the maximum fine that may be imposed for the offense, into the Crime Victims’ Compensation Fund created pursuant to Section 99-41-29.
Any federal funds made available to the department for training or for training facilities, equipment or services shall be deposited into the Correctional Training Revolving Fund created in Section 47-7-51. The funds deposited in this account shall be used to support an expansion of the department’s training program to include the renovation of facilities for training purposes, purchase of equipment and contracting of training services with community colleges in the state.
No offender shall be required to make this payment for a period of time longer than ten (10) years.
- The offender may be imprisoned until the payments are made if the offender is financially able to make the payments and the court in the county where the offender resides so finds, subject to the limitations hereinafter set out. The offender shall not be imprisoned if the offender is financially unable to make the payments and so states to the court in writing, under oath, and the court so finds.
- This section shall stand repealed from and after June 30, 2022.
HISTORY: Laws, 1979, ch. 462, §§ 1-3; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 114; Laws, 1981, ch. 543, § 1; Laws, 1982, ch. 431, § 5; Laws, 1983, ch. 435, § 8, ch. 545, § 4; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 124; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 124; Laws, 1986, ch. 426; Laws, 1990, ch. 509, § 16; Laws, 1991, ch. 408, § 1; Laws, 1993, ch. 335, § 1; Laws, 1994, ch. 317, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1995, ch. 538, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 12; Laws, 1995, ch. 621, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 376, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 379, § 2; Laws, 1996, ch. 474, § 2; reenacted and amended, Laws, 1997, ch. 366, § 1; Laws, 1998, ch. 463, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 541, § 1; Laws, 2001, ch. 572, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2002, ch. 448, § 1; reenacted and amended, Laws, 2002, ch. 624, § 8; Laws, 2003, ch. 412, § 1; Laws, 2004, ch. 444, § 1; Laws, 2005, ch. 372, § 1; Laws, 2006, ch. 381, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 2010, ch. 404, § 1; Laws, 2012, ch. 385, § 1; Laws, 2015, ch. 328, § 1, eff from and after June 30, 2015; Laws, 2018, ch. 324, § 1, eff from and after June 30, 2018; Laws, 2018, ch. 407, § 1, eff from and after June 30, 2018; Laws, 2019, ch. 466, § 35, eff from and after July 1, 2019.
Joint Legislative Committee Note —
Section 1 of ch. 448, Laws of 2002, eff from and after passage (approved March 20, 2002), amended this section. Section 8 of ch. 624, Laws of 2002, eff from and after July 1, 2002 (approved April 25, 2002), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 8 of ch. 624, Laws of 2002, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Section 1 of Chapter 324, Laws of 2018, effective from and after June 30, 2018 (approved March 7, 2018), amended this section. Section 1 of Chapter 407, Laws of 2018, effective from and after June 30, 2018 (approved March 21, 2018), also amended this section. As set out above, this section reflects the language of Section 1 of Chapter 407, Laws of 2018, pursuant to Section 1-3-79 which provides that whenever the same section of law is amended by different bills during the same legislative session, and the effective dates of the amendments are the same, the amendment with the latest approval date shall supersede all other amendments to the same section approved on an earlier date.
Editor's Notes —
Laws of 2019, ch. 466, § 1 provides:
“SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Criminal Justice Reform Act.’”
Amendment Notes —
The first 2002 amendment (ch. 448) extended the date of the repealer in (3) from “June 30, 2002” until “June 30, 2004.”
The second 2002 amendment (ch. 624) incorporated the amendments made by ch. 448; and twice substituted “Community Services Division ” for “Community Corrections Division” in the first paragraph of (1).
The 2003 amendment, in (1), substituted “Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00)” for “Thirty Dollars ($30.00)” in the first sentence, added the second sentence, substituted “Thirty Dollars ($30.00) of each payment” for “Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) of the payments” in the fifth sentence, and substituted “Thirty Dollars ($30.00)” for “Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00)” in the next-to-last sentence.
The 2004 amendment in (1) substituted “Forty Dollars ($40.00)” for “Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00)” in the first sentence, substituted “Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00)” for “Thirty Dollars ($30.00)” in the fourth sentence, substituted “Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00)” for “Thirty Dollars ($30.00)” in the fifth sentence; extended the date of the repealer in (3) from “June 30, 2004” until “June 30, 2006.”
The 2005 amendment in (1), substituted “Forty-five Dollars ($45.00)” for “Forty Dollars ($40.00)” in the first sentence and “Forty Dollars ($40.00)” for “Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00)” in the fourth and fifth sentences.
The 2006 amendment extended the date of the repealer in (3) from “June 30, 2006” until “June 30, 2008.”
The 2008 amendment, in (1), substituted “Fifty Dollars ($50.00)” for “Forty-five Dollars ($45.00)” and “Forty-five Dollars ($45.00)” for “Forty Dollars ($40.00)” twice; and in (3), extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “June 30, 2012” for “June 30, 2008.”
The 2010 amendment, in (1), substituted “Fifty-five Dollars ($55.00)” for “Fifty Dollars ($50.00)” in the first sentence, and substituted “Fifty Dollars ($50.00)” for “Forty-five Dollars ($45.00)” in the fifth and seventh sentences.
The 2012 amendment substituted “into” for “in” following “deposited” in the first sentence of the second and third paragraphs of (1); and extended the repealer provision from “June 30, 2012” to “June 30, 2015” at the end of (3).
The 2015 amendment extended the repealer provision from “June 30, 2015” to “June 30, 2018” at the end of (3).
The first 2018 amendment (ch. 324) extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “June 30, 2020” for “June 30, 2018” in (3).
The second 2018 amendment (ch. 407), effective June 30, 2018, extended the date of the repealer for the section by substituting “June 30, 2022” for “June 30, 2018” in (3).
The 2019 amendment substituted “sixty (60) days” for “thirty (30) days” in (1).
Cross References —
Public service work programs, see §§47-5-401 et seq.
Correctional industries work program, see §47-5-501 et seq.
Use of community service revolving funds for costs in conjunction with the drug identification program, see §47-5-605.
Probation and parole, generally, see §§47-7-1 et seq.
Earned probation program, see §47-7-47.
Authority for use of persons convicted of an offense for work on state highway projects, see §65-1-8.
Restitution to victims of crime, see §§99-37-1 et seq.
Revocation of probation, suspension of sentence, or other form of release as alternative to contempt proceeding, see §§99-37-5 and99-37-15.
Restitution centers, see §99-37-19.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
In viewing Miss. Code Ann. §§97-3-25,99-19-32(1), and §47-7-49 in pari materia, the trial court was within its discretion to order defendant, convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, to pay not only a $10,000 fine, but also a $ 10,000 assessment to the Mississippi Crime Victims’ Compensation Fund. Felder v. State, 876 So. 2d 372, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 776 (Miss. 2004).
§ 47-7-51. Correctional Training Revolving Fund.
- There is herebycreated in the State Treasury a special fund, which shall be knownas the Correctional Training Revolving Fund. This fund shall be usedto develop and implement the comprehensive correction training programauthorized in Chapter 509, Laws of 1990. These funds may be used toconstruct and renovate training facilities, purchase training equipmentfor the hiring of instructors, and to pay operating expenses to accomplishand fulfill the purposes of the training program.
- The Commissionerof Corrections shall establish guidelines for the use and accountabilityof such funds.
HISTORY: Laws, 1990, ch. 509, § 17, eff from and after July 1, 1990.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1990, ch. 509, enacted Sections 99-41-1 through 99-41-29, amended Section 47-7-49, and enacted Section 47-7-51.
Cross References —
Deposit of federal funds into Correctional Training Revolving Fund, see §47-7-49.
Portion of payments by offender on probation, parole, or earned probation to be paid into Training Revolving Fund, see §47-7-49.
§ 47-7-53. Department of Corrections to assume duties, powers and responsibilities of Parole Board.
If the ParoleBoard is abolished, the Department of Corrections shall assume andexercise all the duties, powers and responsibilities of the StateParole Board. The Commissioner of Corrections may assign to the appropriateofficers and divisions any powers and duties deemed appropriate tocarry out the duties and powers of the Parole Board. Wherever theterms “State Parole Board” or “Parole Board”appear in any state law, they shall mean the Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 4; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 2; Laws, 2004, ch. 569, § 3, eff from and after passage (approved May 14, 2004.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2004 amendment substituted “If the Parole Board is abolished” for “On July 1, 2000.”
§ 47-7-55. Parole Commission; creation; purpose; membership; compensation.
- There is herebycreated a joint committee of the Senate and House of Representativesto be known as the Parole Commission, hereinafter referred to as the“commission.” The commission shall study and make recommendationsto the Legislature related to the abolition of parole, the completeand thorough classification of inmates prior to sentencing and sentencingstandards.
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The commissionshall consist of the following members:
- Three (3) membersof the House Judiciary “B” Committee and three (3) membersof the House Penitentiary Committee appointed by the Speaker.
- Three (3) membersof the Senate Corrections Committee and three (3) members of the SenateJudiciary Committee appointed by the Lieutenant Governor.
- The Chairmanof the Senate Corrections Committee and the Chairman of the HousePenitentiary Committee shall serve as co-chair of the commission.
- The commissionshall submit its findings and recommendations to the Legislature nolater than January 2, 1996.
- For attendingmeetings of the commission, members of the commission shall receiveper diem as provided by Section 25-3-69, and reimbursementof expenses as provided by Section 5-1-47. The membersof the commission shall obtain the approval of the Management Committeeof the House of Representatives and the Contingent Expense Committeeof the Senate for per diem and travel expense expenditures of thecommission. The members of the commission shall not receive per diemor expenses while the Legislature is in session. All expenses incurredby and on behalf of the commission shall be paid from the contingencyfunds of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
- In conductingits activities pursuant to this section, the commission may elicitthe support of and participation by federal, state and local agenciesand interested associations, organizations and individuals. The commissionmay appoint an advisory committee whose members shall serve withoutcompensation. The advisory committee may consist of judges, prosecutingattorneys, defense attorneys, medical professionals, correctionalpersonnel and any other individual or groups that the commission desiresto place on the advisory committee.
HISTORY: Laws, 1994, 1st Ex Sess, ch. 25, § 7; Laws, 1995, ch. 596, § 13, eff from and after June 30, 1995.
Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision
§ 47-7-71. Uniform act for out-of-state parolee supervision.
HISTORY: Codes, 1942, § 4004.5; Laws, 1948, ch. 436, §§ 1, 3; brought forward, Laws, 1981, ch. 465, § 115; reenacted, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 125; reenacted, Laws, 1986, ch. 413, § 125, eff from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986).
I. The governor of this state is hereby authorized and directed to execute a compact on behalf of the state of Mississippi with any of the United States legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
A Compact
Entered into by and among the contracting states, signatories hereto, with the consent of the congress of the United States of America, granted by an act entitled “An act granting the consent of Congress to any two (2) or more states to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and for other purposes.”
The contracting states solemnly agree:
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That it shall be competent for the duly constituted judicial and administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (herein called “sending state”), to permit any person convicted of an offense within such state and placed on probation or released on parole to reside in any other state party to this compact (herein called “receiving state”), while on probation or parole, if
- Such person is in fact a resident of or has his family residing within the receiving state and can obtain employment there;
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Though not a resident of the receiving state and not having his family residing there, the receiving state consents to such person being sent there.
Before granting such permission, opportunity shall be granted to the receiving state to investigate the home and prospective employment of such person.
A resident of the receiving state, within the meaning of this section, is one who has been an actual inhabitant of such state continuously for more than one (1) year prior to his coming to the sending state and has not resided within the sending state more than six (6) continuous months immediately preceding the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted.
- That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of and supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards that prevail for its own probationers and parolees.
- That duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any person on probation or parole. For that purpose no formalities will be required other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the person to be retaken. All legal requirements to obtain extradition of fugitives from justice are hereby expressly waived on the part of states party hereto, as to such persons. The decision of the sending state to retake a person on probation or parole shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state: Provided, however, that if at the time when a state seeks to retake a probationer or parolee there should be pending against him within the receiving state any criminal charge, or he should be suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense, he shall not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or from imprisonment for such offense.
- That the duly accredited officers of the sending state will be permitted to transport prisoners being retaken through any and all states parties to this compact, without interference.
- That the governor of each state may designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other contracting states, if and when appointed, shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to more effectively carry out the terms of this compact.
- That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its execution by any state as between it and any other state or states so executing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of law within such state, the form of execution to be in accordance with the laws of the executing state.
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That this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each executing state until renounced by it. The duties and obligations hereunder of a renouncing state shall continue as to parolees or probationers residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally discharged by the sending state. Renunciation of this compact shall be by the same authority which executed it, by sending six (6) months’ notice in writing of its intention to withdraw from the compact to the other state party hereto.
II. This section may be cited as the uniform act for out-of-state parolee supervision.
1. In general.
2. No private right of action.
3. Construction.
Editor’s Notes —
Laws of 1981, ch. 465, § 118, which provided for the automatic repeal of provisions reenacting the Department of Corrections and the State Parole Board on June 30, 1984, was repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 126. In turn, Laws, 1984, ch. 471, § 128, provided for the automatic repeal of these provisions from and after July 1, 1986. Subsequently, Laws of 1986, ch. 413, § 126, effective from and after passage (approved March 28, 1986), repealed Laws of 1984, ch. 471, § 128, thereby removing the repeal date.
Cross References —
Application of this compact to supervision of probationer confined for treatment in an out-of-state facility, see §47-7-47.
Procedure upon violation of parole, see §§99-19-27,99-19-29.
Comparable Laws from other States —
California: California Pen C §§ 11175 to 11179.
Colorado: C.R.S. §§24-60-301 to24-60-309.
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. §§ 2A:168-14 to 2A:168-17.
Oregon: ORS § 144.610 et seq.
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws §§13-9-1 to13-9-5.
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§24-16-1 et seq.
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §77-27-24.
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1-166 et seq.
Washington: Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 9.95.270.
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 304.13.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
1. In general.
When a victim was raped by a parolee accepted from another state for supervision, summary judgment was correctly granted to the State in the victim’s action against it for negligently accepting supervision of the parolee and negligently supervising him because acceptance of the parolee’s supervision was mandatory under the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71, as he had family and a job in Mississippi, and decisions made by the parolee’s supervising parole officer in the course of the parolee’s supervision were discretionary, so the State could not be held liable under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-1 et seq. Doe v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).
2. No private right of action.
When a victim was raped by a parolee accepted from another state for supervision, the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71, did not imply a private right of action on the victim’s behalf against the State for accepting supervision of the parolee. Doe v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).
Where the inmate, while on probation, left Mississippi and went to Tennessee, the suspension of the inmate’s sentence was properly revoked despite the fact that the suspended sentence order permitted the inmate’s supervision to be transferred to Tennessee; the transfer was not automatic, there was no evidence that the inmate complied with the procedures necessary to transfer, and as a result, a transfer did not occur pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71(1). Atwell v. State, 848 So. 2d 190, 2003 Miss. App. LEXIS 348 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Parolee fell under Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71(1) of the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision because the parolee’s parents lived in the state and the parolee indicated that parolee had a job in the state, and thus the State’s acceptance of the parolee under the Act was proper and mandatory; because there was nothing in the Act or the state corrections department regulations that required a field officer to revoke one’s parole, the officer’s decision not to revoke the parole after the parolee failed to timely report was an exercise of discretion, and because (1) there was no evidence of a gross, reckless, or wanton failure in the State’s supervision of the parolee, and (2) there was no sufficient causal connection or element of foreseeability between the alleged violated statutory duty and the injuries sustained by the victim when raped by a parolee, the State maintained the benefit of immunity under Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-9(1) of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§11-46-1 to11-46-23, and the State was properly granted summary judgment in the victim’s action for damages. Connell v. State, 841 So. 2d 1127, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 2003), op. withdrawn, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 625 (Miss. Nov. 6, 2003), sub. op., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).
Where a parolee was arrested in Mississippi by agreement between Mississippi and sending state, pending his being retaken by authorities of the sending state under the statute which provides that a parolee who is in receiving state by agreement between receiving and sending state may be retaken, this did not violate the parolee’s constitutional right. Stone v. Robinson, 219 Miss. 456, 69 So. 2d 206, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 352 (Miss. 1954).
A certificate of parole issued by authorities of Louisiana was sufficient for parolee’s arrest, and communications from authorities of Louisiana were sufficient to justify the chairman of Mississippi Parole Board in issuing a warrant for parolee’s arrest pending his being retaken by authorities from Louisiana. Stone v. Robinson, 219 Miss. 456, 69 So. 2d 206, 1954 Miss. LEXIS 352 (Miss. 1954).
The Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71, known as the “Compact,” does not create a private right of action. Connell v. State, 841 So. 2d 1127, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 2003), op. withdrawn, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 625 (Miss. Nov. 6, 2003), sub. op., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).
3. Construction.
Use of the conjunction “or” in Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71(1)(a) of the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision allows a parolee to be sent to the receiving state if such person is a resident or the person has family in the receiving state. Connell v. State, 841 So. 2d 1127, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 147 (Miss. 2003), op. withdrawn, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 625 (Miss. Nov. 6, 2003), sub. op., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).
When deciding whether to accept supervision of a parolee or probationer from another state, under the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, Miss. Code Ann. §47-7-71, it mattered not whether the probationer or parolee was actually a resident of the receiving state because the use of the conjunction “or” in §47-7-71(1)(a) allowed a parolee to be sent to the receiving state if such person was a resident or had family in the receiving state. Doe v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 859 So. 2d 350, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 603 (Miss. 2003).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole § 75.
CJS.
67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole §§ 69, 71, 72 et seq.
§ 47-7-73. Notification to county and municipal officials; probation or parole of out-of-state parolee.
The Department of Corrections shall notify the sheriff of the county and the police chief of each municipality in the county when a person is placed on probation or released on parole to reside in the county under the Uniform Act for Out-of-state Parolee Supervision.
HISTORY: Laws, 1998, ch. 532, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved April 17, 1998).
Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision
§ 47-7-81. Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision.
The Governor, on behalf of this state, may execute a compact, in substantially the following form, and the Governor, on behalf of this state, may execute a compact, in substantially the following form, and the Legislature signifies in advance its approval and ratification of such compact:
HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 457, § 1, eff from and after July 1, 2004.
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION
ARTICLE I PURPOSE
The compacting states to this interstate compact recognize that each state is responsible for the supervision of adult offenders in the community who are authorized, pursuant to the bylaws and rules of this compact, to travel across state lines both to and from each compacting state in such a manner as to: track the location of offenders; transfer supervision authority in an orderly and efficient manner; and when necessary, return offenders to the originating jurisdictions.
The compacting states also recognize that Congress, by enacting the Crime Control Act, 4 USCS Section 112 (1965), has authorized and encouraged compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime.
It is the purpose of this compact and the interstate commission created under this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states: to provide the framework for the promotion of public safety and to protect the rights of victims through the control and regulation of the interstate movement of offenders in the community; to provide for the effective tracking, supervision and rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending and receiving states; and to equitably distribute the costs, benefits and obligations of the compact among the compacting states.
In addition, this compact will: create an interstate commission that will establish uniform procedures to manage the movement between states of adults placed under community supervision and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections or other criminal justice agencies that will promulgate rules to achieve the purpose of this compact; ensure an opportunity for input and timely notice to victims and to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or to relocate across state lines; establish a system of uniform data collection, access to information on active cases by authorized criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of compact activities to heads of state councils, state executive, judicial and legislative branches and criminal justice administrators; monitor compliance with rules governing interstate movement of offenders and initiate interventions to address and correct noncompliance; and coordinate training and education regarding regulations of interstate movement of offenders for officials involved in such activity.
The compacting states recognize that there is no “right” of any offender to live in another state and that duly accredited officers of a sending state may enter a receiving state and apprehend and retake any offender under supervision subject to the provisions of this compact and bylaws and rules promulgated under the compact.
It is the policy of the compacting states that the activities conducted by the interstate commission created in this compact are the formation of public policies and are therefore public business.
ARTICLE II DEFINITIONS
As used in this compact, the following words and terms have the following meanings, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context:
“Adult” means individuals legally classified as adults and juveniles treated as adults by court order, statute or operation of law
“Bylaws” mean those bylaws established by the interstate commission for its governance or for directing or controlling the interstate commission’s actions or conduct.
“Compact administrator” means the individual in each compacting state appointed under this compact who is responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of offenders subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the interstate commission and policies adopted by the state council under this compact.
“Compacting state” means any state that has enacted the enabling legislation for this compact.
“Commissioner” means the voting representative of each compacting state appointed under Article III of this compact.
“Interstate commission” means the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision established by this compact.
“Member” means the commissioner of a compacting state or the commissioner’s designee, who shall be a person officially connected with the commissioner.
“Noncompacting state” means any state that has not enacted the enabling legislation for this compact.
“Offender” means an adult placed under, or subject to, supervision as the result of the commission of a criminal offense and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections or other criminal justice agencies.
“Person” means any individual, corporation, business enterprise or other legal entity, either public or private.
“Rules” mean acts of the interstate commission, duly promulgated pursuant to Article VII of this compact, substantially affecting interested parties in addition to the interstate commission, which shall have the force and effect of law in the compacting states.
“State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia and any other territorial possessions of the United States.
“State council” means the resident members of the respective state council for interstate adult offender supervision created by each state under Article III of this compact.
ARTICLE III THE COMPACT COMMISSION
The compacting states create the “Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision.” The interstate commission shall be a body corporate and joint agency of the compacting states. The interstate commission shall have all the responsibilities, powers and duties set forth in this compact, including the power to sue and be sued, and such additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the respective legislatures of the compacting states in accordance with the terms of this compact.
The interstate commission shall consist of commissioners selected and appointed by resident members of a state council for interstate adult offender supervision or the Governor for each state. While each member state may determine the membership of its own state council, its membership must include at least one (1) representative from the legislative, judicial and executive branches of government, victims groups and compact administrators. The Mississippi state council will be appointed by the compact administrator. The compact administrator also may appoint additional representatives to the state council when he deems such appointments necessary. The commissioner of corrections or his designee shall serve as the compact administrator and as the state’s commissioner on the interstate commission in such capacity pursuant to applicable law of the member state. Each compacting state retains the right to determine the qualifications of the compact administrator who shall be appointed by the Governor.
The commissioner of corrections shall serve as compact administrator and chairperson of the state council for interstate adult offender supervision. If the commissioner of corrections appoints a designee, the designee must be a deputy commissioner of corrections or the division director in the office of community corrections that has operational authority over the interstate compact division.
The term of office for state council members shall be four (4) years. The state council shall meet at least twice a year. The state council may advise the compact administrator on participation in the interstate commission activities and administration of the compact. Members of the council are entitled to reimbursement for travel and expenses related to the interstate commission as provided by state law.
In addition to appointment of its commissioner to the National Interstate Commission, each state council shall exercise oversight and advocacy concerning its participation in interstate commission activities and other duties as may be determined by each member state, including, but not limited to, development of policy concerning operations and procedures of the compact within that state.
In addition to the commissioners who are the voting representatives of each state, the interstate commission shall include individuals who are not commissioners, but who are members of interested organizations; the noncommissioner members must include a member of the national organizations of governors, legislators, state chief justices, attorneys general and crime victims. All noncommissioner members of the interstate commission shall be ex officio (nonvoting) members. The interstate commission may provide in its bylaws for such additional, ex officio (nonvoting) members as it deems necessary.
Each compacting state represented at any meeting of the interstate commission is entitled to one (1) vote. A majority of the compacting states constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the bylaws of the interstate commission.
The interstate commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of twenty-seven (27) or more compacting states, shall call additional meetings. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and meetings shall be open to the public.
The interstate commission shall establish an executive committee that shall include commission officers, members and others as determined by the bylaws. The executive committee has the power to act on behalf of the interstate commission during periods when the interstate commission is not in session, with the exception of rule-making or amendment to the compact, or both. The executive committee: oversees the day-to-day activities managed by the executive director and interstate commission staff; administers enforcement and compliance with the provisions of the compact, its bylaws and as directed by the interstate commission; and performs other duties as directed by the commission or set forth in the bylaws.
ARTICLE IV POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION
The interstate commission shall have the following powers:
- To adopt a seal and suitable bylaws governing the management and operation of the interstate commission.
- To promulgate rules that have the force and effect of statutory law and are binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact.
- To oversee, supervise and coordinate the interstate movement of offenders subject to the terms of this compact and any bylaws adopted and rules promulgated by the compact commission.
- To enforce compliance with compact provisions, interstate commission rules and bylaws, using all necessary and proper means, including, but not limited to, the use of judicial process.
- To establish and maintain offices.
- To purchase and maintain insurance and bonds.
- To borrow, accept or contract for services of personnel, including, but not limited to, members and their staffs.
- To establish and appoint committees and hire staff that it deems necessary for the carrying out of its functions including, but not limited to, an executive committee as required by Article III, which shall have the power to act on behalf of the interstate commission in carrying out its powers and duties hereunder.
- To elect or appoint such officers, attorneys, employees, agents or consultants and to fix their compensation, define their duties and determine their qualifications; and to establish the interstate commission’s personnel policies and programs relating to, among other things, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation and qualifications of personnel.
- To accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials and services, and to receive, utilize and dispose of same.
- To lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve or use any property, real, personal or mixed.
- To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal or mixed.
- To establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in Article IX of this compact.
- To sue and be sued.
- To provide for dispute resolution among compacting states.
- To perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact.
- To report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary and state councils of the compacting states concerning the activities of the interstate commission during the preceding year. These reports shall include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the interstate commission.
- To coordinate education, training and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of offenders for officials involved in that activity.
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To establish uniform standards for the reporting, collecting and exchanging of data.
ARTICLE V ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION
Section A. Bylaws
The interstate commission, by a majority of the members within twelve (12) months of the first interstate commission meeting, shall adopt such bylaws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the compact, including, but not limited to:
- Establishing the fiscal year of the interstate commission;
- Establishing an executive committee and such other committees as may be necessary;
- Providing reasonable standards and procedures: (i) for the establishment of committees; and (ii) governing any general or specific delegation of any authority or function of the interstate commission;
- Providing reasonable procedures for calling and conducting meetings of the interstate commission, and ensuring reasonable notice of each commission meeting;
- Establishing the titles and responsibilities of the officers of the interstate commission;
- Providing reasonable standards and procedures for the establishment of the personnel policies and programs of the interstate commission. Notwithstanding any civil service or other similar laws of any compacting state, the bylaws shall govern exclusively the personnel policies and programs of the interstate commission;
- Providing a mechanism for concluding the operations of the interstate commission and the equitable return of any surplus funds that may exist upon the termination of the compact after the payment or reserving, or both, of all of its debts and obligations;
- Providing transition rules for the “start up” administration of the compact; and
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Establishing standards and procedures for compliance and technical assistance in carrying out the compact.
Section B. Officers and Staff
The interstate commission shall elect from among its members, by a majority of the members, a chairperson and a vice chairperson, each of whom shall have such authorities and duties as may be specified in the bylaws. The chairperson or, in the chairperson’s absence or disability, the vice chairperson, shall preside at all meetings of the interstate commission. The officers so elected shall serve without compensation or remuneration from the interstate commission; however, subject to the availability of budgeted funds, the officers shall be reimbursed for any actual and necessary costs and expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the interstate commission.
The interstate commission, through its executive committee, shall appoint or retain an executive director for such period, upon such terms and conditions and for such compensation as the interstate commission may deem appropriate. The executive director shall serve as secretary to the interstate commission, and hire and supervise such other staff as may be authorized by the interstate commission, but the executive director shall not be a member of the interstate commission.
Section C. Corporate Records of the Interstate Commission
If the interstate commission determines that any compacting state has at any time defaulted (“defaulting state”) in the performance of any of its obligations or responsibilities under this compact, the bylaws or any duly promulgated rules, the interstate commission may impose any or all of the following penalties:
Reinstatement following withdrawal of any compacting state shall occur upon the withdrawing state reenacting the compact or upon such later date as determined by the interstate commission.
The withdrawing state is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal, including any obligations, the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal.
The interstate commission shall notify the other compacting states of the withdrawing state’s intent to withdraw within sixty (60) days of its receipt of the notification.
The withdrawing state shall notify immediately the chairperson of the interstate commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this compact in the withdrawing state.
The effective date of withdrawal is the effective date of the repeal.
Once effective, the compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon every compacting state; however, a compacting state may withdraw from the compact (“withdrawing state”) by enacting a statute specifically repealing the statute that enacted the compact into law.
Amendments to the compact may be proposed by the interstate commission for enactment by the compacting states. No amendment shall become effective and binding upon the interstate commission and the compacting states unless it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the compacting states.
The compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than thirty-five (35) of the states. The initial effective date shall be the later of July 1, 2004, or upon enactment into law by the thirty-fifth jurisdiction. Thereafter, it shall become effective and binding, as to any other compacting state, upon enactment of the compact into law by that state. The governors of nonmember states or their designees will be invited to participate in interstate commission activities on a nonvoting basis before adoption of the compact by all states and territories of the United States.
Any state, as defined in Article II of this compact, is eligible to become a compacting state.
The interstate commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the interstate commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its bylaws. However, all receipts and disbursements of funds handled by the interstate commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant, and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the interstate commission.
The interstate commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind before securing the funds adequate to meet the obligations. The interstate commission may not pledge the credit of any of the compacting states, except by and with the authority of the compacting state.
The interstate commission shall levy on and collect an annual assessment from each compacting state to cover the cost of the internal operations and activities of the interstate commission and its staff, which levy must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the interstate commission’s annual budget as approved each year. The aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the interstate commission, taking into consideration the population of the state and the volume of interstate movement of offenders in each compacting state. The interstate commission shall promulgate a rule binding upon all compacting states which governs the assessment.
The interstate commission shall pay or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization and ongoing activities.
The interstate commission shall enact a bylaw or promulgate a rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among the compacting states.
The interstate commission shall attempt to resolve any disputes or other issues that are subject to the compact and which may arise among compacting states and noncompacting states.
The compacting states shall report to the interstate commission on issues or activities of concern to them and shall cooperate with and support the interstate commission in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities.
The courts and executive agencies in each compacting state shall enforce this compact and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate the compact’s purposes and intent. In any judicial or administrative proceeding in a compacting state pertaining to the subject matter of this compact which may affect the powers, responsibilities or actions of the interstate commission, the interstate commission shall be entitled to receive all service of process in any such proceeding and shall have standing to intervene in the proceeding for all purposes.
The interstate commission shall oversee the interstate movement of adult offenders in the compacting states and shall monitor such activities being administered in noncompacting states which significantly may affect compacting states.
Upon determination by the interstate commission that an emergency exists, the interstate commission may promulgate an emergency rule that shall become effective immediately upon adoption; however, the usual rule-making procedures provided under this compact shall be applied retroactively to that rule as soon as reasonably possible, and in no event, later than ninety (90) days after the effective date of the rule.
Subjects to be addressed within twelve (12) months after the first meeting must include, at a minimum: (a) notice to victims and opportunity to be heard; (b) offender registration and compliance; (c) violations and returns; (d) transfer procedures and forms; (e) eligibility for transfer; (f) collection of restitution and fees from offenders; (g) data collection and reporting; (h) the level of supervision to be provided by the receiving state; (i) transition rules governing the operation of the compact and the interstate commission during all or part of the period between the effective date of the compact and the date on which the last eligible state adopts the compact; and (j) mediation, arbitration and dispute resolution.
Not later than sixty (60) days after a rule is promulgated, any interested person may file a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the federal district court where the interstate commission’s principal office is located for judicial review of the rule. If the court finds that the interstate commission’s action is not supported by substantial evidence (as defined in the APA) in the rule-making record, the court shall hold the rule unlawful and set it aside.
When promulgating a rule, the interstate commission shall: (a) publish the proposed rule stating with particularity the text of the rule that is proposed and the reason for the proposed rule; (b) allow persons to submit written data, facts, opinions and arguments, which information shall be publicly available; (c) provide an opportunity for an informal hearing; and (d) promulgate a final rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on the rule-making record.
If a majority of the legislatures of the compacting states rejects a rule, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt the compact, then that rule shall have no further force and effect in any compacting state.
All rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified in each rule or amendment.
Rule-making shall occur pursuant to the criteria set forth in this article and the bylaws and rules adopted pursuant thereto. Such rule-making shall substantially conform to the principles of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USCS Section 551 et seq., and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 USCS App. 2, Section 1 et seq., as may be amended (hereinafter “APA”).
The interstate commission shall promulgate rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of the compact, including transition rules governing administration of the compact during the period in which it is being considered and enacted by the states.
The interstate commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of offenders as directed through its bylaws and rules, which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange and reporting requirements.
For every meeting closed pursuant to this provision, the interstate commission’s chief legal officer shall certify publicly that, in the legal officer’s opinion, the meeting may be closed to the public and shall reference each relevant exemptive provision. The interstate commission shall keep minutes that shall describe fully and clearly, all matters discussed in any meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of any actions taken and the reasons therefor, including, a description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll call vote (reflected in the vote of each member on the question). All documents considered in connection with any action shall be identified in such minutes.
Public notice shall be given of all meetings and all meetings shall be open to the public, except as set forth in the rules or as otherwise provided in the compact. The interstate commission shall promulgate rules consistent with the principles contained in the “Government in Sunshine Act,” 5 USCS Section 552(b), as may be amended. The interstate commission and any of its committees may close a meeting to the public where it determines, by two-thirds (2/3) vote, that an open meeting would be likely to: (a) relate solely to the interstate commission’s internal personnel practices and procedures; (b) disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (c) disclosure trade secrets or commercial or financial information which is privileged or confidential; (d) involve accusing any person of a crime or formally censuring any person; (e) disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (f) disclose investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes; (g) disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of or for the use of, the interstate commission with respect to a regulated entity for the purpose of regulation or supervision of such entity; (h) disclose information, the premature disclosure of which would significantly endanger the life of a person or the stability of a regulated entity; (i) specifically relate to the interstate commission’s issuance of a subpoena, or its participation in a civil action or proceeding.
The interstate commission’s bylaws shall establish conditions and procedures under which the interstate commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The interstate commission may exempt from disclosure any information or official records to the extent that they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests. In promulgating such rules, the interstate commission may make available to law enforcement agencies records and information otherwise exempt from disclosure, and may enter into agreements with law enforcement agencies to receive or exchange information or records subject to nondisclosure and confidentiality provisions.
The interstate commission shall meet at least once during each calendar year. The chairperson of the interstate commission may call additional meetings at any time and, upon the request of a majority of the members, shall call additional meetings.
Each member of the interstate commission has the right and power to cast a vote to which that compacting state is entitled and to participate in the business and affairs of the interstate commission. Amember shall vote in person on behalf of the state and may not delegate a vote to another member state. However, the compact administrator shall appoint another authorized representative, in the absence of the commissioner from that state, to cast a vote on behalf of the member state at a specified meeting. The bylaws may provide for members’ participation in meetings by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication. Any voting conducted by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication shall be subject to the same quorum requirements of meetings where members are present in person.
Except as otherwise provided in this compact and unless a greater percentage is required by the bylaws, in order to constitute an act of the interstate commission, the act must be taken at a meeting of the interstate commission and must receive an affirmative vote of a majority of the members present.
The interstate commission shall meet and take such actions as are consistent with this compact.
The interstate commission shall indemnify and hold the commissioner of a compacting state, the appointed designee or employees, or the interstate commission’s representatives or employees, harmless in the amount of any settlement or judgment obtained against such persons arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties or responsibilities, or which such persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties or responsibilities if the actual or alleged act, error or omission did not result from gross negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of such person.
The interstate commission shall defend the commissioner of a compacting state, or the commissioner’s representatives or employees, or the interstate commission’s representatives or employees, in any civil action seeking to impose liability, arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties or responsibilities, or which the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties or responsibilities if the actual or alleged act, error or omission did not result from intentional wrongdoing on the part of such person.
The members, officers, executive director and employees of the interstate commission shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of any actual or alleged act, error or omission that occurred within the scope of interstate commission employment, duties or responsibilities; however, nothing in this paragraph may be construed to protect any such person from suit or liability, or both, for any damage, loss, injury or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person.
The interstate commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the bylaws.
Section D. Qualified Immunity, Defense and Indemnification
ARTICLE VI ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION
ARTICLE VII RULE-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION
The existing rules governing the operation of the previous compact superceded by this compact shall be null and void twelve (12) months after the first meeting of the interstate commission created under this compact.
ARTICLE VIII OVERSIGHT, ENFORCEMENT, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION
Section A. Oversight
Section B. Dispute Resolution
Section C. Enforcement
The interstate commission, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, shall enforce the provisions of this compact using any or all means set forth in Article XI, Section B, of this compact.
Section D. Retaking Cases From Another Jurisdiction
The duly accredited officers of a sending state may enter a receiving state and apprehend and retake any person on probation or parole according to the laws of the United States. For that purpose, the sending state must establish the authority of the officer and the identity of the person or persons to be retaken. The person or persons must be afforded a preliminary hearing consistent with due process requirements under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. All legal requirements to extradition of fugitives from justice are waived expressly on the part of states that are parties to this compact as to such persons. The decision of the sending state to retake a person on probation or parole is conclusive and not reviewable within the receiving state; however, if, at the time a state seeks to retake a probationer or parolee, there is pending against him within the receiving state a criminal charge or if he is suspected of having committed within that state a criminal offense, the probationer or parolee may not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state until the probationer or parolee is discharged from prosecution or from imprisonment for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state may transport prisoners being retaken through any state that is a party to this compact without interference.
ARTICLE IX FINANCE
ARTICLE X COMPACTING STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT
ARTICLE XI WITHDRAWAL, DEFAULT, TERMINATION, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
Section A. Withdrawal
Section B. Default
- Fines, fees and costs in such amounts as are deemed to be reasonable, as fixed by the interstate commission;
- Remedial training and technical assistance as directed by the interstate commission;
- Suspension and termination of membership in the compact. Suspension shall be imposed only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance under the bylaws and rules have been exhausted. Immediate notice of suspension shall be given by the interstate commission: to the Governor, the Chief Justice or chief judicial officer of the state; the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s Legislature; and the state council. The grounds for default include, but are not limited to, failure of a compacting state to perform such obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this compact, interstate commission bylaws or duly promulgated rules. The interstate commission shall immediately notify the defaulting state in writing of the penalty imposed by the interstate commission on the defaulting state pending a cure of the default. The interstate commission shall stipulate the conditions and the time period within which the defaulting state must cure its default. If the defaulting state fails to cure the default within the time period specified by the interstate commission, in addition to any other penalties imposed, the defaulting state may be terminated from the compact upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the compacting states and all rights, privileges and benefits conferred by this compact shall be terminated from the effective date of suspension.
Section C. Judicial Enforcement
The interstate commission by majority vote of the members, may initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the interstate commission, in the federal district where the interstate commission has its offices to enforce compliance with the compact, its duly promulgated rules and bylaws against any compacting state in default. If judicial enforcement is necessary, the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of the litigation, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
Section D. Dissolution of Compact
ARTICLE XII SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION
ARTICLE XIII BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS
Section A. Other Laws
Section B. Binding Effect of the Compact
Within sixty (60) days of the effective date of termination of a defaulting state, the interstate commission shall notify the governor, the chief justice or chief judicial officer and the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature and the state council of such termination.
The defaulting state is responsible for all assessments, obligations and liabilities incurred through the effective date of termination including any obligations, the performance of which extends beyond the effective date of termination.
The interstate commission shall not bear any costs relating to the defaulting state unless otherwise mutually agreed upon between the interstate commission and the defaulting state.
Reinstatement following termination of any compacting state requires both a reenactment of the compact by the defaulting state and the approval of the interstate commission pursuant to the rules.
The compact dissolves effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the compacting state which reduces membership in the compact to one (1) compacting state.
Upon the dissolution of this compact, the compact becomes null and void and shall be of no further force or effect, and the business and affairs of the interstate commission shall be concluded and any surplus funds shall be distributed in accordance with the bylaws.
The provisions of this compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of the compact shall be enforceable.
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.
Nothing in this compact prevents the enforcement of any other law of a compacting state which is not inconsistent with this compact.
All compacting states’ laws conflicting with this compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.
All lawful actions of the interstate commission, including all rules and bylaws promulgated by the interstate commission, are binding upon the compacting states.
All agreements between the interstate commission and the compacting states are binding in accordance with their terms.
Upon the request of a party to a conflict over the meaning or interpretation of interstate commission actions, and upon a majority vote of the compacting states, the interstate commission may issue advisory opinions regarding such meaning or interpretation.
If any provision of this compact exceeds the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any compacting state, the obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the interstate commission shall be ineffective, and such obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction shall remain in the compacting state and shall be exercised by the agency of that state to which the obligations, duties, powers or jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the time this compact becomes effective.
Comparable Laws from other States —
Alabama: Code of Ala. §15-22-1.1.
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 33.36.110.
Arizona: A.R.S. §§ 31-467 et seq.
Arkansas: A.C.A. §§12-51-101 et seq.
California: California Pen C § 11180.
Colorado: C.R.S. §§24-60-2801 et seq.
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-133 et seq.
Delaware: 11 Del. C. §§ 4358 et seq.
District of Columbia: D.C. Stat. § 24-133.
Florida: Fla. Stat. § 949.07.
Georgia: O.C.G.A. §§42-9-80 et seq.
Hawaii: H.R.S. §§ 353B-1 et seq.
Idaho: Idaho Code §§ 20-301 et seq.
Illinois: § 45 I.L.C.S. 170/1 et seq.
Indiana: Burns Ind. Code Ann. §§11-13-4.5-1 et seq.
Iowa: Iowa Code §§ 907B.1 et seq.
Kansas: K.S.A. §§ 22-4110 et seq.
Kentucky: K.R.S. §§ 439.561 et seq.
Louisiana: La. R.S. §§ 15:574.31 et seq.
Maine: 34-A M.R.S. §§ 9871 et seq.
Maryland: Md. CORRECTIONAL SERVICES Code Ann. §§ 6-201 et seq.
Massachusetts: ALM GL ch. 127, §§ 151A et seq.
Michigan: M.C.L.S. §§ 3.1011 et seq.
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 243.1605 et seq.
Missouri: §§ 589.500 et seq. R.S. Mo.
Montana: M.C.A. §§46-23-1101 et seq.
Nebraska: R.R.S. Neb. §§ 29-2639 et seq.
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 213.215 et seq.
New Hampshire: R.S.A. §§ 651-A:26 et seq.
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. §§ 2A:168-26 et seq.
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§31-5-20 et seq.
New York: NY CLS Exec § 259-mm.
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-65.4 et seq.
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code §§12-65-01 et seq.
Ohio: ORC Ann. §§ 5149.21 et seq.
Oklahoma: 22 Okl. St. §§ 1091 et seq.
Oregon: O.R.S. §§ 144.600 et seq.
Pennsylvania: 61 Pa. C.S. § 7112.
Puerto Rico: 4 L.P.R.A. §§ 1433 et seq.
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-9.1-1.3.
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§24-21-1100 et seq.
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§24-16A-1 et seq.
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§40-28-401 et seq.
Texas: Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 510.001 et seq.
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§77-28c-101 et seq.
Vermont: 28 V.S.A. §§ 1351 et seq.
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1-176.1 et seq.
Virgin Islands: 5 V.I.C. §§ 4631 et seq.
Washington: Rev. Code Wash. §§ 9.94A.745 et seq.
West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§28-7-1 et seq.
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 304.16.
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §7-13-422 et seq.
§ 47-7-83. Supervision of offenders from participating states.
Pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, the Department of Corrections may assume the duties of supervision over offenders of any sending state who were convicted of misdemeanors. The Department of Corrections may not supervise offenders convicted of misdemeanors of states that are not participating in the compact.
HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 457, § 2, eff from and after July 1, 2004.
Editor’s Notes —
For a list of other Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision signatory state provisions, see the Editor’s note under §47-7-81.
§ 47-7-85. Application fee for out-of-state transfer; funds received to defray compact expenses.
Pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, the Department of Corrections may charge a one-time application fee in the amount of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) to each offender applying for out-of-state transfer under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. Payments received under this section shall be deposited into a special fund which is created in the State Treasury. Monies in the fund shall be expended by the Department of Corrections, upon appropriation by the Legislature, to defray costs incurred by the department under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. Unexpended amounts remaining in the special fund at the end of a fiscal year shall not lapse into the State General Fund, and any interest earned or investment earnings on amounts in the special fund shall be deposited to the credit of the special fund.
HISTORY: Laws, 2004, ch. 457, § 3; Laws, 2006, ch. 359, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 13, 2006.).
Amendment Notes —
The 2006 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “Fifty Dollars ($50.00)” for “Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00)” near the middle, and deleted “Adult” preceding “Supervision” near the end.
Mississippi Re-Entry Council
§ 47-7-101. Mississippi Re-Entry Council; purpose; steering committee membership and duties.
- There is created the Mississippi Re-Entry Council. The purpose of the council is to create effective strategies to assist former inmates in their return to the general population, to reduce the recidivism rates of inmates, to increase public safety, and to reduce budgetary constraints presently created by prison-related costs. The Re-Entry Council shall be led by a steering committee.
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The Re-Entry Council Steering Committee shall be composed of the following twelve (12) members, who shall serve for two-year terms:
- A Mississippi United States Attorney, or a designee appointed by the Governor;
- The Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, or a designee;
- The Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, or a designee;
- The director of a faith-based organization involved in re-entry programs, or a designee appointed by the Lieutenant Governor;
- The Chief Probation Officer of the United States District Courts of Mississippi, or a designee;
- A Mississippi United States District Judge, or a designee appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
- The Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, or a designee;
- The Executive Director for the Mississippi Department of Mental Health, or a designee;
- The Executive Director for the Mississippi Division of Medicaid, or a designee;
- The Chairman of the Parole Board, or a designee;
- A person who is a former offender appointed by the Chairman of the Parole Board; and
- The Director of the Mississippi Department of Employment Security, or a designee.
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The Re-Entry Council Steering Committee shall have the following duties:
- To consider development of a statewide approach to assist re-entry of former inmates into the general population of this state;
- To provide recommendations regarding evidence-based approaches that equip inmates with the requisite, individualized resources to promote their successful return to the general population of this state;
- To review reports, studies, and materials as it deems appropriate;
- To appoint such subcommittees as it finds proper;
- To study proposed legislation that seeks to resolve recidivism;
- To submit recommendations from its findings to the Legislature, the Governor and the Mississippi Supreme Court. In making such recommendations, the Re-entry Council Steering Committee will seek input from all branches of state and local government, governmental agencies, businesses and nonprofit organizations throughout this state;
- To seek and receive grants;
- To hire contract personnel and/or staff using any grants received; and
- To collaborate with the coordinator of the transitional re-entry center, under the supervision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, which shall provide administrative support to the council.
- The Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court shall call the first meeting of the steering committee. At its first meeting, the steering committee shall elect a chairman and vice chairman from its membership and adopt rules for transacting its business and keeping records. Officers shall serve one-year terms or until such time as a successor is elected.
HISTORY: Laws, 2015, ch. 424, § 1, eff from and after passage (approved Mar. 29, 2015.).