NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. County Sheriff.

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff's Office, did not violate the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County because the sheriff had authority under the Charter to perform the duties enumerated in the MOA; while Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., City Charter § 16.05 made the police chief the principal conservator of the peace, it did not expressly prohibit the sheriff from engaging in all activities that could conceivably be considered law enforcement, and the language of the Charter clearly contemplated that the principal conservator of the peace was not the only conservator of the peace. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov't, 382 S.W.3d 318, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2012).

Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff's Office, did not violate T.C.A. § 50-1-101(b) because the Charter did not prohibit the sheriff from engaging in all law enforcement functions. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov't, 382 S.W.3d 318, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2012).

50-1-201. Denial of employment because of affiliation or nonaffiliation with labor union or employee organization.

It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind to deny or attempt to deny employment to any person by reason of the person's membership in, affiliation with, resignation from, or refusal to join or affiliate with any labor union or employee organization of any kind.

Acts 1947, ch. 36, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 11366.2 (Williams, § 11412.8); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 50-208.

Cross-References. Discharge for refusal to engage in or remain silent about illegal activities, or for legal use of agricultural product, § 50-1-304.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Labor, § 4.

Law Reviews.

Employee Investigations: Representation Rights Expanded to Nonunion Employees (Mark H. Floyd), 36 No. 10 Tenn. B.J. 13 (2000).

UAW-GM Saturn Contract: “Sweetheart Deal” or Novel Labor-Management Agreement? (Jeffrey L. Hall), 17 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 69 (1986).

Union Organizing of Temporary Employees Subject to New Standards (Mark H. Floyd), 37 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 23 (2001).

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability, OAG 94-043 (4/4/94).

Proposed Electricians' Licensing Act of 1998 does not require union membership, OAG 98-050 (2/23/98).

Right to work law, union rules and fines, conflicts of interest, remedies, OAG 99-231 (12/15/99).

50-1-202. Contracting for exclusion from employment because of affiliation or nonaffiliation with labor union or employee organization.

It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind to enter into any contract, combination or agreement, written or oral, providing for exclusion from employment of any person because of membership in, affiliation with, resignation from, or refusal to join or affiliate with any labor union or employee organization of any kind.

Acts 1947, ch. 36, § 2; C. Supp. 1950, § 11366.3 (Williams, § 11412.9); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 50-209.

Law Reviews.

Procuring Breach of Contract — The Tennessee Treble Damage Statute (Telford E. Forgety), 5 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 599 (1975).

50-1-203. Exclusion from employment for payment of or failure to pay union or employee organization dues.

It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind to exclude from employment any person by reason of the person's payment of or failure to pay dues, fees, assessments or other charges to any labor union or employee organization of any kind.

Acts 1947, ch. 36, § 3; C. Supp. 1950, § 11366.4 (Williams, § 11412.10); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 50-210.

Cross-References. Discharge for refusal to engage in or remain silent about illegal activities, or for legal use of agricultural product, § 50-1-304.

Law Reviews.

Rights and Remedies of Members in Internal Union Controversies in the Southern Jurisdictions, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 888 (1959).

Attorney General Opinions. Fair share legislation and the right to work law, OAG 93-36 (4/14/93).

50-1-204. Prohibition against execution of an agreement with union or employee organization that includes maintenance of membership clause.

It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind operating in this state to execute an agreement with a union or employee organization of any kind that includes a maintenance of membership clause prohibiting employees from withdrawing from a union or employee organization prior to the agreement's expiration. This section shall not apply to a city, town, municipality or county, including a county having a metropolitan form of government.

Acts 2011, ch. 178, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 50-1-204 (Acts 1947, ch. 36, § 5; C. Supp. 1950, § 11366.6 (Williams, § 11412.12); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 50-212; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 111), concerning penalties for violations of this part, was transferred to § 50-1-205 by Acts 2011, ch. 178, § 1, effective May 5, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 178, § 3, provided that the act, which enacted this section, shall apply to agreements entered into on or after May 5, 2011.

For the preamble to the act concerning the state of Tennessee being a right to work state, please refer to Acts 2011, ch. 178.

50-1-205. Penalty.

1. Any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind violating any of the provisions of this part commits a Class A misdemeanor.
2. Each day that any person, firm, corporation or association of any kind remains in violation of this part is deemed to be a separate and distinct offense, punishable in accordance with this section.

Acts 1947, ch. 36, § 5; C. Supp. 1950, § 11366.6 (Williams, § 11412.12); T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 50-212; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 111; T.C.A. § 50-1-204; Acts 2011, ch. 178, §§ 1, 2.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 50-1-204 was transferred to this section by Acts 2011, ch. 178, § 1, effective May 5, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 178, § 3, provided that the act, which transferred former § 50-1-204 to this section, shall apply to agreements entered into on or after May 5, 2011.

For the preamble to the act concerning the state of Tennessee being a right to work state, please refer to Acts 2011, ch. 178.

Cross-References. Penalty for a Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

Law Reviews.

Labor Law — 1961 Tennessee Survey (Paul H. Sanders), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1317 (1961).

50-1-206. Right to work.

1. It is the public policy of this state that employees of this state have the right to:
   1. Employment without regard to any person’s refusal to join or affiliate with, or decision to withdraw from or cease membership in, any labor union or employee organization of any kind;
   2. Be employed free from the restraints of any contract, combination or agreement, written or oral, that provides for exclusion from employment of any person due to their refusal to join or affiliate with, or decision to withdraw from or cease membership in, any labor union or employee organization of any kind;
   3. Be employed without regard to any person’s refusal to pay dues, fees, assessments or other charges to any labor union or employee organization of any kind; and
   4. Decertify a union or other bargaining representative upon compliance with the applicable federal law.
2. Private employers may physically post notice of the rights described in this section, at locations where notices are normally posted, informing employees about their rights under this section, or may physically disseminate such notice to employees if no such normal location for posting exists.
3. To assist private employers in informing workers of their rights as described in this section, the commissioner of labor and workforce development shall create model notice language reiterating the public policies of this state espoused in this part, which may be used by private employers accordingly.
4. The commissioner shall designate those persons in the department responsible for carrying out the commissioner’s power, duties and responsibilities under this part.

Acts 2012, ch. 826, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning an employee’s right to forfeit a union or employee membership, please refer to Acts 2012, ch. 826.

50-1-207. Prohibition against requiring any employer or employee to waive their rights under the National Labor Relations Act or requiring acceptance or agreement to any provisions that are mandatory or non-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under federal labor laws.

1. For purposes of this section:
   1. “Employee” means a natural person who performs services for an employer for valuable consideration, and does not include a self-employed independent contractor;
   2. “Employer” means a person, association, or legal or commercial entity receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving compensation of any kind to such employee;
   3. “Federal labor laws” means the National Labor Relations Act, compiled in 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Labor Management Relations Act, compiled in 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., as amended, presidential executive orders, and federal administrative regulations relating to labor and management or employee and employer issues, and the United States Constitution as amended;
   4. “Multi-employer association” means a bargaining unit composed of independent employers who associate together to negotiate jointly with one (1) or more labor organizations representing the employees of the independent employers within the bargaining unit;
   5. “Political subdivision” means any local governmental entity, including, but not limited to, any municipality, metropolitan government, county, utility district, school district, public building authority, and development district created and existing pursuant to the laws of this state, or any instrumentality of government created by any one (1) or more of the named local governmental entities; and
   6. “State” means the state of Tennessee and its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
2. No law, ordinance, or regulation shall impose any contractual, zoning, permitting, licensing, or other condition that requires any employer or employee to waive their rights under the National Labor Relations Act.
3. No law, regulation, or ordinance shall require, in whole or in part, an employer or multi-employer association to accept or otherwise agree to any provisions that are mandatory or non-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under federal labor laws, including but not limited to, any limitations on an employer or multi-employer association's rights to engage in collective bargaining with a labor organization, to lock out employees, or to operate during a work stoppage; provided, that this subsection (c) shall not invalidate or otherwise restrict the state from requiring the use of project labor agreements to the extent permissible under federal labor laws.
4. This section shall be interpreted and enforced consistent with the National Labor Relations Act.
5. 1. Any agreement, contract, understanding, or practice, written or oral, implied or expressed, between any employer and any labor organization required in violation of this section is declared to be unlawful, null, and void, and of no legal effect.
   2. An employer or employee may seek injunctive relief in the chancery court of Davidson county to prevent the state from violating this section.

Acts 2013, ch. 277, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. For the Preamble to the act concerning the regulation of labor neutrality agreements, please refer to Acts 2013, ch. 277.

Law Reviews.

Does “Why” or “What” Matter: Should Section 302 Apply to Card Check Neutrality Agreements? 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 249 (2014).

50-1-208. Relationship between franchisee and franchisor.

1. Notwithstanding any voluntary agreement entered into between the United States department of labor and a franchisee, neither a franchisee nor a franchisee's employee shall be deemed to be an employee of the franchisor for any purpose.
2. For purposes of this section “franchisee” and “franchisor” have the same definitions as set out in 16 CFR 436.1.

Acts 2015, ch. 114, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, ch. 114, § 2. April 10, 2015.

Part 3
Working Conditions Generally

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Amendment to provide for agency enforcement of the wage laws was a clarification that the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action, rather than a substantive change to the statute, and thus could be applied retroactively to preclude pending private claims. Abadeer v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 890, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145918 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2013).

Dismissal of inmate's claims under the Tennessee Wage Regulation Act, specifically T.C.A. § 50-2-101 et seq., was appropriate because the inmates failed to state a claim arising under the Act for which relief could have been granted. As a matter of law, the inmates were not employees because they could not enter into a contract of hire as employees Harris v. Tenn. Rehabilitative Initiative in Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2014).

T.C.A. § 50-2-107 permitted a private cause of action notwithstanding the 2013 amendment to this section providing for enforcement of that section by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, because the court's holding in Owens that § 50-2-107 provided a private cause of action had not been overruled, the General Assembly did not amend § 50-2-107 when it amended this section in 2013, and when the General Assembly amended § 50-2-107 in 2012 it did not overrule Owens. Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 427, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. May 25, 2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Rest Break or Meal Period.

Retaliatory discharge was an available claim where an employee was allegedly discharged for taking a rest break as a consequence of the employer's violation of a clearly expressed statutory policy that required employees be given a 30-minute rest period if the scheduled shift was six hours or longer. Yates v. Hertz Corp., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17832 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).

T.C.A. § 50-2-103(h) requires a thirty-minute meal break; however, T.C.A. § 50-2-103 makes no provision for private enforcement, but instead provides for enforcement by the department of labor and workforce development under T.C.A. § 50-2-103(j). Johnson v. Koch Foods, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 657, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106058 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2009).

2. Duress Not Found.

Denial of vacation pay to the employee under T.C.A. § 50-2-103(a)(3) was proper because the conclusion that the 2004 contract was not signed under duress undermined much of the employee's argument that he was entitled to his 2005 vacation pay due to the employer's breach of contract. There was no caselaw supporting the employee's assertion that the trial court was permitted to award him vacation pay based on equitable principles. Cummings Inc. v. Dorgan, 320 S.W.3d 316, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2009), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2009), appeal denied, 320 S.W.3d 316, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 576 (Tenn. 2010).

Collateral References.

Time for payment of wages, constitutionality of statute regulating. 12 A.L.R. 612, 26 A.L.R. 1396.

Validity, construction, and effect of state laws requiring payment of wages on discharge of employee immediately or within specified period. 18 A.L.R.5th 577.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Dismissal of inmate's claims under the Tennessee Wage Regulation Act, T.C.A. § 50-2-101 et seq., was appropriate because the inmates failed to state a claim arising under the Act for which relief could have been granted. As a matter of law, the inmates were not employees because they could not enter into a contract of hire as employees Harris v. Tenn. Rehabilitative Initiative in Corr., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2014).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section is not invalid as impairing the obligation of contracts, within the prohibition of Tenn. Const., art. I, § 20, for it deals solely with contracts to be made in the future. West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills, 147 Tenn. 100, 245 S.W. 542, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1922).

This section is not unconstitutional as violative of the law of the land or due process of law clause of Tenn. Const., art. I, § 8. West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills, 147 Tenn. 100, 245 S.W. 542, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1922).

2. Purpose.

The manifest of this section was to protect the laborer and wage earner. Fox v. Miller, 173 Tenn. 453, 121 S.W.2d 527, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1938).

3. Employees Covered.

This section was intended to protect those who work for a fixed sum per day, per week, or per month, whether it be denominated “wages” or “salaries,” for such terms are interchangeable. West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills, 147 Tenn. 100, 245 S.W. 542, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1922).

This section does not authorize assignments by public officials of their future official salaries. Fox v. Miller, 173 Tenn. 453, 121 S.W.2d 527, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1938).

4. Unauthorized Assignment — Garnishment.

Assignment of unearned wages by employee to a third party without consent of the employer was void as to the employer, and being void as to the employer such assignment was void as to a garnisheeing creditor of the employee, as the employer, notwithstanding the assignment, owed the wages after being earned by the employee and such wages were subject to garnishment in his hands. Ellison v. Long, 170 Tenn. 582, 98 S.W.2d 96, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1936).

5. Union Dues.

Authorizations by union members permitting company to deduct union dues from wages were not invalid under the provisions of this section. Murtha v. Pet Dairy Products Co., 44 Tenn. App. 460, 314 S.W.2d 185, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

Collateral References.

Law governing assignment of wages or salary. 1 A.L.R. 3d 927.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Private Cause of Action.

This section permitted a private cause of action notwithstanding the 2013 amendment to T.C.A. § 50-2-101 providing for enforcement of that section by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, because the court's holding in Owens that this section provided a private cause of action had not been overruled, the General Assembly did not amend this section when it amended § 50-2-101 in 2013, and when the General Assembly amended this section in 2012 it did not overrule Owens. Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 2015), rev'd, 513 S.W.3d 427, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. May 25, 2016).

Employee had no private right of action under the Tennessee Tip Statute because, while the employee was an intended beneficiary, (1) the statute did not expressly provide such a right, and (2) no such right was implied, as the doctrine of legislative inaction did not apply to show legislative acquiescence in a judicial decision implying the right, since that decision was inconsistent with subsequent jurisprudence on implication of a private right of action, as the decision reflected a willingness to imply a private remedy so long as doing so was not inconsistent with either the purpose of the statute or any criminal or administrative remedies expressly provided therein, but courts had retreated from that approach in favor of one presuming a legislature would expressly provide for a private remedy if it intended there to be one. Hardy v. Tournament Players Club at Southwind, Inc., 513 S.W.3d 427, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 985 (Tenn. May 25, 2016).

50-2-201. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of labor and workforce development;
2. “Employ” includes to suffer or permit to work;
3. “Employee” means any individual employed by any employer within the state, including individuals employed by the state but not by its political subdivisions, but does not include any individual who is entitled to the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, compiled in 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.;
4. “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of any employer, directly or indirectly, and includes the state but not its political subdivisions; and
5. “Wage rate” means all compensation for employment, including payments in kind and amounts paid by employers for employee benefits as defined by the commissioner in regulations issued under this part.

Acts 1974, ch. 757, § 1; T.C.A., § 50-320; Acts 1999, ch. 520, § 41.

Law Reviews.

Government Contractors Beware: Recent Changes to Federal Affirmative Action Requirements (James Francis Barna), 37 No. 9 Tenn. B.J. 14 (2001).

It's No Revolution: Long Standing Legal Principles Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Anna Wermuth and Jeremy Glenn), 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 839 (2010).

50-2-202. Prohibited acts.

1. No employer shall discriminate between employees in the same establishment on the basis of sex by paying any employee salary or wage rates less than the rates the employer pays to any employee of the opposite sex for comparable work on jobs the performance of which require comparable skill, effort and responsibility, and that are performed under similar working conditions; however, nothing in this part shall prohibit wage differentials based on a seniority system, a merit system, a system that measures earnings by quality or quantity of production, or any other reasonable differential that is based on a factor other than sex.
2. An employer who is paying a wage differential in violation of this part shall not, in order to comply with this part, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
3. No employer may discharge or discriminate against any employee by reason of any action taken by the employee to invoke or assist in any manner the enforcement of this part.

Acts 1974, ch. 757, § 2; T.C.A., § 50-321.

Cross-References. Discharge for refusal to engage in or remain silent about illegal activities, or for legal use of agricultural product, § 50-1-304.

Collateral References.

Availability and scope of punitive damages under state employment discrimination law. 81 A.L.R.5th 367.

50-2-203. Commissioner to administer law.

1. The commissioner has the power and duty to carry out and administer this part, including the power to issue regulations, not inconsistent with the purpose of this part, that the commissioner considers necessary or appropriate to carry out this part.
2. The commissioner is authorized to endeavor to eliminate pay practices unlawful under this part by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion, and to supervise the payment of wages owing to any employee under this part.

Acts 1974, ch. 757, § 3; T.C.A., § 50-322.

50-2-204. Employee remedies.

1. 1. Any employer who violates § 50-2-202 shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, and in instances of an employer knowingly violating § 50-2-202 in employee suits under subsection (b), up to an additional equal amount of unpaid wages as liquidated damages.
   2. For the second established violation of this part in a separate judicial proceeding distinct from the first, any employer who violates § 50-2-202 shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, and instances of an employer knowingly violating § 50-2-202 in employee suits under subsection (b), up to an additional two (2) times the amount of unpaid wages as liquidated damages.
   3. For the third established violation of this part in a separate judicial proceeding distinct from the first and second, any employer who violates § 50-2-202 shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, and instances of an employer knowingly violating § 50-2-202 in employee suits under subsection (b), up to an additional three (3) times the amount of unpaid wages as liquidated damages.
2. Action to recover wages may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one (1) or more employees. The court shall, in cases of violation, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee and cost of the action to be paid by the defendant.
3. No agreement by any employee to work for less than the wages to which the employee is entitled under this part shall be a bar to an action to recover wages, or to a voluntary wage restitution of the full amount due under this part.
4. At the written request of any employee claiming to have been paid less than the wage to which the employee is entitled under this part, the commissioner may bring any legal action necessary on behalf of the employee to collect the claim for unpaid wages. The commissioner shall not be required to pay any filing fee, or other cost in connection with the action. The commissioner shall have the power to join various claims against the employer in one (1) cause of action.

Acts 1974, ch. 757, § 4; T.C.A., § 50-323; Acts 2004, ch. 822, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2004, ch. 822, § 1 provided that the act may be cited as the “Equal Pay Remedies and Enforcement Act.”

Collateral References.

Availability and scope of punitive damages under state employment discrimination law. 81 A.L.R.5th 367.

50-2-205. Limitation of actions.

Court action under this part may be commenced no later than two (2) years after the cause of action occurs.

Acts 1974, ch. 757, § 5; T.C.A., § 50-324.

50-2-206. Penalty.

Any employer who violates this part, or who discharges or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because the employee has made a complaint to that employee's employer, the commissioner, or any other person, or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings under or related to this part, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, commits a Class A misdemeanor.

Acts 1974, ch. 757, § 6; T.C.A., § 50-325; Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 111.

Cross-References. Penalty for Class A misdemeanor, § 40-35-111.

50-2-207. [Repealed.]

Acts 2004, ch. 822, § 3; repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 326, § 4, effective July 1, 2017.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 50-2-207 concerned research on wage disparities.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Independent Contractors.

Company owed no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from obvious and apparent dangers on its property, even though the employee was engaged in inherently dangerous work when the fall from the transmission tower occurred. Ellis v. Chase Communications, 63 F.3d 473, 1995 FED App. 263P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24105, 153 A.L.R. Fed. 693 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1995).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Negligence Per Se.

The violation of T.C.A. § 50-3-102 by a contractor is negligence per se, and it was error to allow issues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk by injured construction worker to go to the jury. Wren v. Sullivan Electric, Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27611 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1986).

2. Tennessee Public Protection Act.

It was error to dismiss an employee's complaint under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA), alleging the employee was terminated for refusing to remain silent about an employer's failure to enact workplace violence policies, because the employee alleged a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act's general duty clause which implicated important public policy concerns in Tennessee, which satisfied the TPPA's “illegal act” requirement. Davis v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Employer.

Occupational Safety and Health Act claims against a city and the city manager were properly dismissed because decedents were employees of a general contract and were working on a building that was privately owned; the decedents'  workplace safety was the contractor's responsibility, and the city and manager were not required to prepare the engineering survey, brace the walls and floors, or to ensure that the contractor did. Kemper v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2012).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Railroad Employees.

Railroad employees are not covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1972. Fowinkle v. Southern R. Co., 533 S.W.2d 728, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. 1976).

2. Domestic Workers.

The domestic worker exception applies to household workers and has no relevance to relatives of the employer when they assist in his business. Acuff v. Commissioner of Tennessee Dep't of Labor, 554 S.W.2d 627, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. 1977).

3. Subcontractors.

Safety regulations adopted under authority of T.C.A. §§ 50-3-104, 50-3-201 and 50-3-917 and safety rules incorporated by reference in T.C.A. § 68-16-104 (now T.C.A. § 68-101-104) do not impose a nondelegable duty upon a municipal electric system to furnish a safe work place for employees of a subcontractor. Dempsey v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 755 S.W.2d 798, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

4. —Individual Employees of Governmental Entity.

Employees of a county hospital authority were immune as individuals from a claim for retaliatory discharge. Coffey v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 932 F. Supp. 1023, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10508 (E.D. Tenn. 1996), aff'd, Coffey v. Chattanooga Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22509 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 1998).

Collateral References.

Preemptive effect of federal railroad safety act, exclusive of “essentially local safety or security hazard” savings clause. 44 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 261.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Dangerous Working Conditions.

Allegations that defendant knowingly permitted dangerous working conditions to exist and violated safety regulations is not sufficient to subject defendant to common law liability. The Workers' Compensation Law, compiled in title 50, chapter 6, provides the exclusive remedy for the entire injury and all of its damages. Mize v. Conagra, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 334, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2513 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

Occupational Safety and Health Act claims against a city and the city manager were properly dismissed because decedents were employees of a general contract and were working on a building that was privately owned; the decedents'  workplace safety was the contractor's responsibility, and the city and manager were not required to prepare the engineering survey, brace the walls and floors, or to ensure that the contractor did. Kemper v. Baker, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2012).

Collateral References.

Secondary smoke as battery. 46 A.L.R.5th 813.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Since the federal and state statutes concerning occupational safety and health are very broad and general, they do not create such a specially protected class of persons as to obviate contributory negligence as a defense. These statutes impose duties and obligations upon employees as well as employers. Bellamy v. Federal Express Corp., 749 S.W.2d 31, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. 1988).

2. Remedies.

Tennessee courts have the equitable remedy of reinstatement available to them when an employee is discharged for seeking workers' compensation benefits. Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

50-3-201. Regulations authorized.

1. It is the responsibility of the commissioner of labor and workforce development to develop and promulgate regulations that adopt occupational safety and health standards.
2. The commissioner may adopt as an occupational safety or health standard the federal standard relating to the same issue.
3. The commissioner may, by regulation, promulgate, modify or revoke any occupational safety and health standard in the manner provided in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5.
4. The decision of an individual, corporation, business entity or local, state or federal government entity, or agent thereof, not to post property pursuant to § 39-17-1359, thereby allowing persons with handgun permits to carry a handgun on such property, does not constitute an occupational safety and health hazard within the jurisdiction of this chapter.

Acts 1972, ch. 561, § 6; 1977, ch. 111, § 5; T.C.A., § 50-507; Acts 1999, ch. 520, § 41; 2011, ch. 33, § 1.

Attorney General Opinions. Confidential HIV and hepatitis testing waivers, OAG 93-35 (4/7/93).

50-3-202. Criteria for standards.

1. Regulations issued under § 50-3-201 shall provide, insofar as possible, the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee; other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standard and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws.
2. Whenever practical, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired.
3. In promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents, the commissioner shall set a standard that most adequately assures, to the extent possible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if the employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by the standard for the period of the employee's working life.

Acts 1972, ch. 561, § 6; 1977, ch. 111, § 6; T.C.A., § 50-517.

50-3-203. Protective measures.

1. Where appropriate, any standard promulgated under § 50-3-201 may prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of warning to the extent necessary to ensure that employees are informed of any significant hazards to which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and proper conditions for safe use or exposure.
2. Where appropriate, the standards may also prescribe suitable protective equipment, but not as a substitute for appropriate control techniques, as well as control or technological procedures to be used in connection with the hazards.
3. 1. Where appropriate, the administrator shall require the monitoring or measuring of employee exposure at the locations and intervals, and in the manner, necessary for the protection of the employees.
   2. Any employee who has been or is being exposed in a biologically significant manner to harmful agents or materials in excess of the applicable standard shall be promptly notified by the employee's employer, and informed of corrective action being taken.
4. In addition, where appropriate, the standard shall prescribe the type and frequency of medical examinations or other tests that shall be made available, by the employer or at the employer's cost, to employees exposed to the hazards, in order to most effectively determine whether the health of the employees is adversely affected by the exposure.
5. 1. Where appropriate, the standards shall reduce the transmission of bloodborne pathogens through needles. The commissioners of labor and workforce development and health shall jointly review sharps injury prevention technology to include needleless systems and needles with engineered sharps injury protection.
   2. The commissioners shall jointly determine those environments where standards require that sharps injury prevention technology be employed. Sharps injury prevention technology shall not be required wherever the employer or other appropriate party demonstrates that the technology is medically contraindicated or is not more effective than alternative measures used by an employer to prevent exposure incidents.
   3. The standard shall require written exposure control plans be adopted by employers. Written exposure control plans shall be revised to reflect improvements in sharps injury prevention technology. Written exposure control plans shall include the type and brand of device used in an incident of exposure.
   4. The departments of labor and workforce development and health shall jointly compile and maintain a list of existing needleless systems and sharps with engineered sharps injury protection, that shall be available to assist employers in complying with the requirements of the bloodborne pathogen standards promulgated pursuant to this section. The list may be developed from existing sources of information, including, but not limited to, the federal food and drug administration, the federal centers for disease control, the national institute for occupational safety and health, and the United States department of veterans affairs.

Acts 1972, ch. 561, § 6; 1977, ch. 111, § 7; T.C.A., § 50-518; Acts 1999, ch. 37, § 1; 1999, ch. 520, § 41.

Collateral References.

Recovery of damages for expense of medical monitoring to detect or prevent future disease or condition. 17 A.L.R.5th 327.

50-3-204. Advisory committee.

1. The commissioner may appoint an advisory committee to assist the commissioner in the development and review of regulations prescribing standards under § 50-3-201.
2. 1. The committee shall consist of an uneven number of persons, not to exceed seven (7), appointed by the commissioner, engaged in the development of the regulation.
   2. Membership on the committee shall include representatives qualified by experience and affiliation to present the diverse viewpoint of persons and groups most likely to be affected by the standards, and may include representatives of employers, employees, the insurance industry, the health professions and the safety professions.
   3. In the selection of members, the commissioner shall consider such criteria as special expertise in the health and safety fields, geographical distribution of members within the three (3) grand divisions of the state, the interests of state and local government and the interests of the public.
3. Members of the advisory committee shall be reimbursed for their expenses and shall be paid on a per diem basis for days actually and necessarily employed in the discharge of official duties of the committee at a rate to be determined by the commissioner and approved by the department of finance and administration.
4. 1. Administrative and technical assistance reasonably required by the advisory committee shall be provided by the commissioner.
   2. The committee may seek advice and information from interested and knowledgeable parties and governmental agencies to assist it in the determination of its recommended standards.

Acts 1972, ch. 561, § 7; 1977, ch. 111, § 8; impl. am. Acts 1977, ch. 111, § 44; T.C.A., § 50-519.

Cross-References. Grand divisions, title 4, ch. 1, part 2.

Part 3
Inspections

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Records Request.

Tennessee Department of Labor and Workplace Development should not have assessed penalties against an employer for violations of T.C.A. § 50-5-111(1), (4), based on the employer's failure to provide records within an hour. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 402 S.W.3d 218, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Records Request.

Tennessee Department of Labor and Workplace Development should not have assessed penalties against an employer for violations of T.C.A. § 50-5-111(1), (4), based on the employer's failure to provide records within an hour. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 402 S.W.3d 218, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013).

Child Labor Act provides authority to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development to immediately request the records that are required to be maintained by the Child Labor Act be produced for inspection, however, if the employer refuses an immediate inspection of the records, the appropriate recourse is for the Department to seek an administrative warrant pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-4-101, and the Department may not threaten an employer with a penalty for asserting its Fourth Amendment right. Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 402 S.W.3d 218, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013).

50-5-201. Short title.

This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Tennessee Protection of Minor Performers Act.”

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Stand by Me: The Tennessee Protection of Minor Performers Act (Dorothy Kathryn Campbell), 40 No. 11 Tenn. B.J. 12 (2004).

50-5-202. Power to amend or repeal.

The general assembly shall have power to amend or repeal all or part of this part at any time and all persons subject to this part shall be governed by the amendment or repeal.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-203. Part definitions.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. “Artistic or creative services” means, but is not limited to, services as an actor, actress, dancer, musician, comedian, vocalist, including demonstration recordings, stunt-person, voice-over artist, model, or other performer or entertainer, or as a songwriter, musical producer or arranger, writer, director, producer, production executive, choreographer, composer, conductor, or designer, or other performing artist; and
2. “Minor” means any person who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age and has not had the disability of minority removed so as to make this part inapplicable.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

Cross-References. Removal of disability of minors, title 29, chapter 31.

50-5-204. Construction.

This part does not repeal or affect the rights or powers under title 29, chapter 31, regarding the removal of disability of minors, and all provisions of that chapter shall remain in force and effect and applicable to the appropriate circumstances addressed in that chapter.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-205. Approval not exemption from other law — Disability of non-age not removed generally.

Approval of a contract pursuant to this part shall not:

1. Exempt any person from any other law with respect to licenses, consents, or authorizations required for any conduct, employment, use, or exhibition of the minor in this state, nor limit in any manner the discretion of the licensing authority or other persons charged with the administration of the requirements, nor dispense with any other requirement of law relating to the minor;
2. Unless specifically so provided in the order, remove the disability of non-age for any other contract with the same minor that is not approved by the court pursuant to this section, nor, unless specifically so provided in the order, is the disability of non-age of the minor removed generally for the minor, nor is the minor emancipated for any other purpose or contract other than the performance of contracts approved pursuant to this section; and
3. Be granted for a contract that provides for an employment, use, or exhibition of the minor, within or without the state, that is prohibited by law and in particular by any federal or state minor labor law, and could not be licensed to take place in this state.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

Cross-References. Removal of disability of minors, title 29, chapter 31.

50-5-206. Applicability.

The chapters of this title shall apply to every minor person who desires to perform artistic or creative services in the state, including minor persons who reside in the state and minor persons not residing in the state, as long as some or all of the services are to be provided or delivered in the state, or at least one (1) of the other parties are doing business in the state.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-207. Disaffirmance of approved contract on ground of minority.

If a contract is approved by the appropriate court pursuant to this part, then the minor may not, either during minority or after reaching majority, disaffirm the contract on the ground of minority, nor may the minor assert that the minor's parent or guardian lacked the authority to make the contract personally as an adult.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-208. Who may apply for court order.

Application for an order pursuant to this part may be made by the minor, or the minor's parent, or legal guardian, or guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to this part. For the purposes of any proceeding under this part, a parent or legal guardian, as the case may be, entitled to the physical custody, care, and control of the minor at the time of the proceeding shall be considered the minor's guardian ad litem for the proceeding, unless the court determines that appointment of a different individual as guardian ad litem is required in the best interests of the minor.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-209. Approval for contract that is executed, in existence or being performed — Effective date — Earnings.

1. Approval under this part may be sought for a contract or agreement that is fully executed, is already in existence or under which the parties are currently performing. Approval may be effective as of the date upon which the contract has been executed, or the date when services were first performed by the minor, if specifically so ordered by the court. The parties may petition the court for approval to be effective within one (1) year of the contract's ratification by the court. The parties may also petition the court for approval of a contract effective date more than one (1) year after the ratification of the contract by the court, if good cause for the delayed effective date is shown by the petitioners.
2. If a contract is approved pursuant to this part, all earnings, royalties, or other compensation earned or received by the minor pursuant to the approved contract shall become the sole property of the minor who will be authorized to execute any contracts relating to administration or investments of the earnings.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-210. Where to file petition.

Petition for contract approval under this part shall be filed with and, when granted, approved by the court handling probate matters for the county in which the minor resides, where the minor is employed or where the minor performs or renders the minor's services, or intends to do so; or the county in this state where performance of the contract shall be conducted, if the minor is not a resident of the state where the majority of the services are performed and the non-minor party to the contract is either a resident of this state or has been qualified or licensed to do business in the state.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-211. Notice and hearing.

After a petition is filed pursuant to § 50-5-208, and following reasonable notice to all parties to the contract as is fixed by the court, the court will provide all parties to the contract with the opportunity to appear and be heard. The court may approve the contract following the hearing.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-212. Effect of court approval — Revocation of approval.

Court approval of a valid contract shall serve to bind the minor as if the minor executed the contract personally as an adult; and the minor shall be bound to all provisions including the permanent sale of intellectual property rights; provided, however, that the revocation of approval of the contract by the court shall not include the transfer back to the minor of intellectual property rights unless there has been a showing of fraud or misrepresentation by the employer; and, further, that the court approving the contract shall retain the authority to revoke approval of the contract, or modify its terms if assented to by both parties, if the court finds that the well being of the minor requires the disapproval.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-213. Scope.

Contracts eligible for approval under this part shall include contracts pursuant to which a minor person is employed, employs, or agrees to perform or render artistic or creative services, either directly or through a third party including, without limitation, a personal services corporation, manager, booking agent, or producer. For purposes of this part, when a minor renders services as an extra, background performer, or in a similar capacity, through an agency or service that provides one (1) or more performers for a fee, the agency or service shall be considered the minor's employer.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-214. Effect of modifications, amendments, or assignments of contracts.

1. Modifications, amendments, or assignments of contracts previously approved by the court are deemed a new contract and require separate approval under this part.
2. Notwithstanding subsection (a), this section does not require court approval if the employing company assigns its rights in the contract to a successor or affiliate entity.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-215. Appointment of guardian ad litem — Court discretion — Criteria — Compensation.

1. At any time after the filing of the petition, the court in its discretion may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the minor or to oversee the minor's earnings related to the contract approved under this part. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem as to any contract where the parent or guardian will receive remuneration or financial gain from the performance of the contract or if the court deems that the persons have any other conflict of interest with the minor. The court, in determining whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed, may consider the following criteria:
   1. The length of time the exclusive services of the minor are required;
   2. Whether the gross earnings of the minor under the contract are either contingent or unknown;
   3. The amount of gross earnings of the minor under the contract; and
   4. The age of the minor.
2. The guardian ad litem shall be entitled to reasonable compensation. The court shall have the power to determine which party shall be responsible for the fee, whether the fee and any required bond shall be paid from the earnings of the minor pursuant to the contract sought to be approved, or may apportion the fee between the parties to the proceedings.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-216. Custody of minor — Contents of petition.

1. A parent, guardian, or legal custodian entitled to the physical custody, care, and control of a minor who enters into a contract of a type described in this part shall provide a certified copy of the minor's birth certificate indicating the minor's minority to the other party or parties to the contract.
2. A guardian or a person with temporary legal custody must provide a certified copy of the court document appointing the person as the minor's legal guardian.
3. A complete copy of the contract or proposed contract shall be attached to the petition. The petition shall also include the following information:
   1. The full name, residence, and date of birth of the minor;
   2. The name and residence of any living parent of the minor, the name and residence of the person who has care and custody of the minor, and the name and residence of the person with whom the minor resides;
   3. A statement that the minor is a resident of the state. If the minor is not a Tennessee resident, a statement that the petition is for approval of a contract for performance or rendering of services by the minor in the state, specifying the place in the state where the services are to be performed or rendered;
   4. A brief description of the minor's employment and compensation under the contract, including where services of the minor are to be performed, accompanied by a plan for the protection of the minor's earnings under the contract;
   5. The full name and residence of the petitioner, and the interest of the petitioner in the contract or proposed contract or in the minor's performance under the contract; and
   6. Other facts known by the petitioner regarding the minor and the minor's family and property that will show that the contract is reasonable, prudent, and in the best interests of the minor. The information shall include whether the minor has had at any time a guardian ad litem appointed by a court of any jurisdiction and an explanation of the facts regarding the previous appointment. Information regarding whether relief similar to the current petition has been sought on behalf of the minor, including whether a guardian ad litem was appointed for the previous application for court approval.
4. Upon application by any party or by order of the court, the petition or any portion of the petition, including attachments, may be filed under seal.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-217. Persons to be served with petition.

The following persons, other than one who is the petitioner or who joins in the petition, shall be served with the petition by formal notice, as prescribed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure:

1. The minor;
2. The minor's legal custodian or guardian ad litem, if any, whether or not appointed or qualified in this state;
3. Each party to the contract;
4. The parent or parents of the minor;
5. Any person having the care and custody of the minor;
6. The person with whom the minor resides, if other than a parent or guardian; and
7. If it appears that the minor is married, the minor's spouse.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-218. Court's discretion for hearing in chambers or courtroom — Of record — Sealed.

At the court's discretion, the hearing may be held in the court's chambers or courtroom. The proceeding shall be of record and may be sealed, if the court determines that sealing the record will be in the best interests of the minor.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-219. Minor's personal appearance.

The minor, unless excused by the court for good cause shown, shall attend personally before the court upon the hearing of the petition.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-220. Options of the court.

1. The court at the hearing or on an adjournment of the hearing, may by its order do any of the following:
   1. Approve or disapprove the contract or proposed contract;
   2. Approve the contract upon such conditions, with respect to modification of the terms of the contract or otherwise, as it shall determine;
   3. Appoint a guardian ad litem as provided by § 50-5-215;
   4. Appoint a trustee to administer the trust for earnings as provided by § 50-5-222; or
   5. Award reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses paid or to be paid by or on behalf of the minor in connection with the proceeding, approval of the contract, and its performance.
2. The court shall consider the following factors in making its final determination:
   1. The best interest of the minor;
   2. Whether the minor is represented by a lawyer;
   3. The length of the contract;
   4. The age of the minor; and
   5. Any other matter that the court deems appropriate.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-221. Court's review of contract — Protection of earnings.

1. The court shall ensure that any contract it approves contains all the requirements for the rendering of services of the minor and that the petition includes a plan for the protection of earnings under the contract.
2. The court shall consider the following when determining the protection of earnings:
   1. The interest of the petitioner in the contract or proposed contract or in the minor's performance under the contract;
   2. The parties who are entitled to the minor's earnings, and, if the minor is not so entitled, facts regarding the property and financial circumstances of the parent or parents, or legal custodian or guardian ad litem, or other third party;
   3. A bank or trust account used expressly for the deposit of fees generated under the contract and the relationship of any proposed trustee of the minor's funds;
   4. The percentage of fees generated that are intended for deposit; and
   5. The minor's financial advisor or other third party who will render investment advice and administer the bank or trust account.
3. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the creditors of any person, other than the minor, shall not be entitled to the earnings of the minor.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

50-5-222. Requirement that portion of earnings be set aside in trust.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, in an order approving a minor's contract as described in this part, the court shall require that fifteen percent (15%) of the minor's gross earnings pursuant to the contract be set aside by the minor's employer in trust and shall be paid to the trustee appointed by the court so that it may be invested in an account or other savings plan, and preserved for the benefit of the minor until the minor reaches the age of majority. The court may also require that more than fifteen percent (15%) of the minor's gross earnings be set aside in trust, in an account or other savings plan, and preserved for the benefit of the minor, upon request of the minor's parent or legal guardian, or the minor, through the minor's guardian ad litem. Gross earnings for the purpose of this section refers to those funds earned and received by the minor pursuant to the terms of the contract and does not include those funds applied towards recoupment pursuant to the contract.

Acts 2003, ch. 168, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This statute does not violate Tenn. Const., art. I, § 8, providing that no man shall be taken or disseized of his freehold, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

Constitutional prohibition against express repeal of laws without reciting in title or body substance of laws repealed does not render this statute invalid since it only repeals by implication. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

This statute does not violate the provision of Tenn. Const., art. I, § 21 that no man's particular services or property shall be taken or applied to public use, without just compensation. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

This statute is not violative of Tenn. Const., art. I, § 6, upon the ground that it denies trial by jury, because the parties by accepting the act waive the right of trial by jury, and hence are not deprived of that right, for the statute is elective and if its provisions are accepted, it thereby becomes a part of the contract of employment. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

This statute does not deprive the employee of his property without due process of law in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 14. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

This statute is not unconstitutional in that it undertakes to make an election for, and a binding contract upon, a minor employee, since the statute endows a minor, for its purpose, with power to elect. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

Constitutional prohibition against act containing two subjects was not contravened because both the original act and its title provided a system of workers' compensation and also a system of liability or accident insurance. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

Original act and title were not contrary to constitutional requirements that act and title contain only one subject, in that they provided revenue for the state and compensation to employees by providing for fines after conviction upon violation of certain of its provisions and by appropriating from state revenues sums necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

This statute is elective, and therefore cannot be declared to be discriminative. Vantrease v. Smith, 143 Tenn. 254, 227 S.W. 1023, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1920).

This act is not invalid as contrary to Tenn. Const., art. II, § 17 or art. XI, § 8. Mitchell v. Usilton, 146 Tenn. 419, 242 S.W. 648, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1921).

No action for punitive damages is allowable in a workers' compensation case. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 212 Tenn. 178, 368 S.W.2d 760, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (1963).

2. —Invalid Provision — Elision.

This statute was not unconstitutional as a whole by reason of the invalidity of the provision allowing fees to county judges or chairmen of county courts, because such provision may be elided. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

3. Nature and Effect of Statute.

This statute deprived the employee coming under its provisions of the ordinary remedy for negligence resulting in injury, and substituted compensation for injury by accident arising out of and in course of employment, without reference to negligence, actual or imputed, on the part of the employer. Partee v. Memphis Concrete Pipe Co., 155 Tenn. 441, 295 S.W. 68, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1927).

Negligence of employer is not taken into account in cases arising under this statute. Morrison v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 162 Tenn. 523, 39 S.W.2d 272, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1931).

The compensation law is both elective and contractual. Hammett v. Vogue, Inc., 179 Tenn. 284, 165 S.W.2d 577, 1942 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1942).

The Workers' Compensation Act constitutes a complete substitute for the previous remedies in tort on the part of the employee. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 212 Tenn. 178, 368 S.W.2d 760, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (1963).

The statute is not a social welfare law. Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Industries, Inc., 212 Tenn. 291, 369 S.W.2d 721, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 423 (1963).

Workers' Compensation Law is a creature of the general assembly, and any change in its structure must come from the general assembly and not from the courts. Lindsey v. Hunt, 215 Tenn. 406, 384 S.W.2d 441, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (1964), rehearing denied, Lindsey v. Hunt, 215 Tenn. 406, 387 S.W.2d 344, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 505 (1964), overruled, Betts v. Tom Wade Gin, 810 S.W.2d 140, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. 1991); Cordell v. Sky Rides of Am., Inc., 218 Tenn. 485, 404 S.W.2d 488, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 647 (1966), overruled, Betts v. Tom Wade Gin, 810 S.W.2d 140, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 174 (Tenn. 1991); Aerosol Corp. of South v. Johnson, 222 Tenn. 339, 435 S.W.2d 832, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 435 (1968).

Although Workers' Compensation Law is to be liberally construed to accomplish its intended purposes, it is not a social welfare statute. Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Industries, Inc., 212 Tenn. 291, 369 S.W.2d 721, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 423 (1963); Bishop Baking Co. v. Forgey, 538 S.W.2d 602, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 493 (Tenn. 1976).

4. Application and Scope.

Employees hired in another state could maintain an action in Tennessee for benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act where they incurred accidental injury while in the scope and course of their employment in Tennessee. Millican v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224 Tenn. 604, 460 S.W.2d 842, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 362 (1970).

The workers' compensation laws should be rationally but liberally construed to promote and adhere to the act's purposes of securing benefits to those workers who fall within its coverage. Lindsey v. Smith & Johnson, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 923, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. 1980).

Supreme Court of Tennessee thinks that a physician discharging a patient to home, knowing that the patient will be confined to a bed and unable to ambulate or perform other functions without assistance, and knowing that the patient will require care such as changing wound dressings or requiring other such attention, must certainly contemplate that nursing services will be required. The statute requires only that a physician “order” the services, not that the order be reduced to writing. Long v. Mid-Tennessee Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 504, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 225 (Tenn. 2005), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2005).

5. Election of Remedies.

Employee's execution of agreement that compensation would be payable until terminated in accordance with Indiana workers' compensation law and his acceptance of benefits thereunder constituted a valid and binding election to receive benefits under Indiana law, thus precluding him from the awarding of benefits under Tennessee law. Clevinger v. Burlington Motor Carriers, 925 S.W.2d 518, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 462 (Tenn. Special Workers' Comp. App. Panel 1996).

6. Purpose.

The general purpose of compensation laws is to provide compensation for loss of earning power or capacity sustained by workers through injuries in industry. Mathis v. J. L. Forrest & Sons, 188 Tenn. 128, 216 S.W.2d 967, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (1949).

The Workers' Compensation Law was enacted simply to compensate for disability of the employee occurring under certain specified conditions while such employee is working for the employer, and the purpose of the Occupational Disease Statute is the same. Norton v. Standard Coosa-Thatcher Co., 203 Tenn. 649, 315 S.W.2d 245, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (1958); Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Industries, Inc., 212 Tenn. 291, 369 S.W.2d 721, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 423 (1963).

The policy of the law is for a speedy trial on the issues of liability. Stovall v. General Shoe Corp., 204 Tenn. 358, 321 S.W.2d 559, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 288 (1959).

One of the purposes of the statute is to increase the right of employees to be compensated for injuries growing out of their employment. W. S. Dickey Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 208 Tenn. 576, 347 S.W.2d 493, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (1961).

7. What Constitutes Accident.

When a condition has developed gradually over a period of time resulting in a definite work-connected, unexpected, fortuitous injury, it is an “accident” within the Workers' Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq., and is compensable. Conroy v. Carter Automotive Products Corp., 640 S.W.2d 831, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. 1982).

Mental disability incurred when plaintiff, a driver's license examiner, was assaulted on the premises of her employer's driver's license testing center, was a sufficiently acute, sudden or unexpected emotional stress to support the finding of “injury by accident” which arose out of plaintiff's employment. Beck v. State, 779 S.W.2d 367, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. 1989).

8. Statute as Part of Employment Contracts.

The provisions of this law are written into every contract of employment covered thereby. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919); Kennedy v. Columbian Casualty Co., 163 Tenn. 312, 43 S.W.2d 201, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1931); Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 163 Tenn. 420, 43 S.W.2d 221, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 131 (1931), rehearing denied, 163 Tenn. 648, 45 S.W.2d 528, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 162 (1931).

A widow, claiming the benefits of the act, is bound by all the terms which the law wrote into her husband's contract of employment. Battle Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Martin, 155 Tenn. 34, 290 S.W. 18, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1927).

Under this law the relation of employer and employee is contractual, and the terms of the law are to be read as a part of every contract of service between those subject to its terms. Basham v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 184 Tenn. 532, 201 S.W.2d 678, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 407 (1947).

The Workers' Compensation Act of Tennessee imposes its terms upon all contracts of employment that it covers. Hudnall v. S & W Constr. Co. of Tennessee, Inc., 60 Tenn. App. 743, 451 S.W.2d 858, 1969 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

9. Nature of Employment Contracts.

The agreement between an employer and an employee under this law is in the nature of an insurance contract. Hughes v. Elliott, 162 Tenn. 188, 35 S.W.2d 387, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1931).

10. Disavowing Contractual Obligations.

An employee cannot be allowed to claim benefits paid by his employer under a contract providing for health care and at the same time be allowed to disavow key provisions of the contract. If the employee were permitted to do so, the logical result would be for the employer to delay any and all disability payments until it could be judicially determined whether its liability to the employee was under the disability plan contract or under the Workers' Compensation Act. There would be no other way for the employer to avoid the possibility of having to pay twice for the same disability. This procedure would result in a hardship to the employee, and thus defeat the purpose of both the Workers' Compensation Act and the disability plan, as it would inevitably delay payments and thus deprive the employee of sustenance at the time of his greatest need. Allen v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 688 S.W.2d 64, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. 1985).

11. Federal Courts.

Federal court cannot give the Workers' Compensation Law a construction which conflicts with holdings of the Tennessee supreme court. Anderson v. Royal Indem. Co., 169 F. Supp. 122, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3287 (D. Tenn. 1958).

12. Evidence.

Since negligence is not involved in workers' compensation proceedings, evidence of negligence of employer or employer's staff nurse in treating employee in clinic was irrelevant and inadmissible in compensation proceeding to recover for death of employee. Poe v. E. I. Dupont Denemours & Co., 224 Tenn. 683, 462 S.W.2d 480, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 392 (1970).

Plaintiff introduced insufficient evidence for a jury to have concluded that she was discharged for asserting her rights under the workers' compensation law. Thomason v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prods., Inc., 831 S.W.2d 291, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

13. False Statement in Employment Application.

The following factors must be present before a false statement in an employment application will bar benefits: (1) the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition; (2) the employer must have relied upon the false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring; and (3) there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Federal Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1973); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 590 S.W.2d 920, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 523 (Tenn. 1979).

The Workers' Compensation Law contains no explicit provisions relative to making of false statements by an applicant for employment, but an employee who has willfully misrepresented or failed to disclose material information regarding his physical condition should not be permitted recovery merely because the general assembly failed to anticipate the problem. Federal Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (Tenn. 1973).

14. Working Conditions.

Any recourse against employer for failure to furnish employee a safe place to work or to protect employee from third party assaults on parking lot was under Workers' Compensation Act. Thomas v. General Electric Co., 494 S.W.2d 493, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (Tenn. 1973).

15. Indemnity of Third-Party Tortfeasor by Employer.

An employer who has paid an injured employee benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law is not liable for indemnity to a third-party tortfeasor under the Tennessee active-passive negligence doctrine since, in view of § 50-6-108, the employer could share no common tort liability with the third-party tortfeasor. Dawn v. Essex Conveyors, Inc., 498 F.2d 921, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8036 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1974), cert. denied, Process Equipment Engineering Co. v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 419 U.S. 1040, 95 S. Ct. 528, 42 L. Ed. 2d 317, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3534 (1974).

16. Medical Experts.

Absolute certainty on the part of a medical expert is not necessary to support a workers' compensation award. Stratton-Warren Hardware v. Parker, 557 S.W.2d 494, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. 1977).

17. Common Law Tort Rights.

A worker's common law right to bring a personal tort action against a person other than his employer was neither extinguished nor created by the Tennessee workers' compensation statute. Hodge v. Southern Ry., App. D.C., 415 A.2d 543, 1980 D.C. App. LEXIS 300 (1980).

18. Retaliatory Discharge.

The retaliatory discharge cause of action is intended to prevent employers from relieving themselves of their obligations under the workers' compensation laws. Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Tennessee courts do, in fact, have the equitable remedy of reinstatement available to them when an employee is discharged for seeking workers' compensation benefits. Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Employee did not allege that he was terminated because of his own exercise of a statutory or constitutional right, and he was not an injured employee attempting to exercise his right to see benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act as a result of a work-related accident; his insistence that his termination violated the clear public policy of the Act was at best a conclusory allegation and his allegations were insufficient to state a cause of action for common law retaliatory discharge. Patrick v. Nelson Global Prods., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2014).

19. Black Lung Benefits Act.

The Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq., incorporated by reference both the presumptions and standards created by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (30 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902, 921-925, 931-941 and 951) and the regulations used to determine eligibility for black lung disability payments. Solomon v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 664 S.W.2d 70, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. 1984).

20. Punitive Damages.

Punitive damages are not recoverable in workers' compensation cases. Anderson v. Dean Truck Line, Inc., 682 S.W.2d 900, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Arnold v. Travelers Ins. Co., — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Nov. 26, 1990).

21. Frivolous Appeals.

A factual or legal dispute will preclude an award of damages for frivolous appeals. Anderson v. Dean Truck Line, Inc., 682 S.W.2d 900, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 897 (Tenn. 1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Arnold v. Travelers Ins. Co., — S.W.2d —, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 440 (Tenn. Nov. 26, 1990).

22. Federal Employers' Liability Act.

An employee of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce would not be covered by this chapter if the federal courts' interpretation of the federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) would bring the employee within the coverage of that act. Petty v. Tennken R., Inc., 722 S.W.2d 386, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 851 (Tenn. 1986).

23. Exhaustion of Remedies.

Although the Tennessee Workers'  Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq., was a remedial statute and was to be equitably construed under T.C.A. § 50-6-116, an employee's administrative remedies were not effectively exhausted for T.C.A. §§ 50-6-203(a) and 50-6-225(a)(1) purposes by the Tennessee Department of Labor's long period of inaction on the employee's request for assistance under T.C.A. § 50-6-238. Chapman v. Davita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 643 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2012).

Collateral References.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action — compensability under particular circumstances. 84 A.L.R.5th 249.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence Sufficiency.

Claimant failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that his left-foot condition arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment, where the claimant submitted no medical evidence showing that it was more likely than not that his employment contributed more than 50 percent to his injury. The treating physician's statement that the claimant's workplace accident was at least part of the cause of his foot problems did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's employment contributed more than 50 percent in causing the injury. Payne v. D & D Elec., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 215 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 213 (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2017).

Treating physician's opinion that a claimant's injury was not work-related was entitled to a presumption of correctness, and the claimant did not present sufficient medical evidence to overcome the presumption. Thysavathdy v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

2. Causation.

Workers'  Compensation Appeals Board properly reversed the trial court's order which found that the employee's injury was compensable because, in applying the correct standard to the employee's injury that occurred after July 1, 2014, the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the employment of the employee contributed more than 50% in causing his patellar dislocation as the employee's doctor was unable to state with any reasonable degree of medical certainty that dragging heavy rolls of material at work contributed to the employee's injury in any way; and the doctor stated that the employee had patella alta, a condition that predisposed him to patellar dislocations. Willis v. All Staff, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 455 (Tenn. Aug. 3, 2017).

It was proper to deny an employee's claim for workers'  compensation because the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee failed to sustain his burden of proof that his injury arose primarily out of his employment; a doctor did not testify within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, either directly or indirectly, that the employee's work activity more likely than not contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury. Panzarella v. Amazon.Com, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. May 16, 2018).

Injury that is caused by an employer's failure to provide reasonable medical assistance arises out of and in the course of employment when an employee becomes helpless at work because of illness or other cause unrelated to her employment, the employee needs medical assistance to prevent further injury, the employer knows of the employee's helplessness, and the employer can provide reasonable medical assistance but does not do so. Chaney v. Team Techs., Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2019).

3. Failure to Show Compensable Accident.

Employee's October 2008 shoulder and neck injuries were not compensable because the first doctor testified that the January 2009 MRI of the employee's shoulder showed degenerative changes that had existed for quite some time, and that the cysts appearing in the MRI were evidence of a chronic condition and could not have formed since October 2008; and the second doctor testified that he consulted with a radiologist who interpreted both the employee's 2003 spinal images and his 2012 spinal images and, based on the comparison of those images, the second doctor opined that the employee had only slight progression of his spondylosis over that time and there was no anatomical change due to an acute injury that occurred between 2003 and 2012. T & B Trucking v. Pigue, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 788 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2017), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 789 (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2017).

4. Independent Contractor's Employee.

Material evidence supported the jury's determination that a worker was the employee of a non-party independent contractor, rather than the property owner, where the contractor had been hired by the owner to construct a house and had the right to control the conduct of the work, the right to schedule working hours, the freedom to select and hire helpers, and the right of termination. Helton v. Lawson, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Employer.

Sawmill operator employing 12 workers was subject to the Workers' Compensation Law. Shoaf v. Fitzpatrick, 104 F.2d 290, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 4129 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 620, 60 S. Ct. 295, 84 L. Ed. 518, 1939 U.S. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 1939).

Husband and wife were engaged in building business where they purchased several old houses for building material from which they constructed several new houses, though first house constructed was a house used as a residence for defendants, and were subject to the Workers' Compensation Act. Brady v. Reed, 186 Tenn. 556, 212 S.W.2d 378, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 581 (1948).

Defendant who operated sawmill as his regular business was not liable for compensation to employee of coal mine operated in addition to mill where he never employed over four men at any time at the mine. Threet v. Cox, 189 Tenn. 477, 226 S.W.2d 86, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1949).

Partnership, which operated coal mine under a lease, but which subleased to another without recording sublease and without securing consent of lessor as provided by lease, paid premiums on insurance policy issued in its name, retained entire output of mine, and carried insurance protection for employees of mine, was the employer of a miner killed in accident at the mine. Douglas v. Sharp, 194 Tenn. 11, 249 S.W.2d 999, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 346 (1952).

An employer's business may embrace two occupations, both within the Workers' Compensation Law. Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Lett, 201 Tenn. 171, 297 S.W.2d 93, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 480 (1956).

Where the record showed that Illinois employer brought only two employees to Tennessee to help erect towers, hired only two local men, and at no time had more than four employees in Tennessee, employer was not required to qualify under Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law defining “employer,” as those using not less than five persons for pay. Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., 338 F.2d 127, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4741 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925, 85 S. Ct. 1561, 14 L. Ed. 2d 684, 1965 U.S. LEXIS 1173 (1965).

Where decedent was an employee of a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent corporation, the parent company is an employer for purposes of workers' compensation only where the two corporations are so completely integrated and commingled that neither party can realistically be viewed as a separate economic entity. Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6079 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

Where plaintiff was employee of supplier of temporary manpower and was supplied to defendant who requested some temporary day labor, defendant was a coemployer with employment agency at the time of plaintiff's injury and plaintiff was limited to a cause of action under title 50, chapter 6 and precluded from bringing an action in negligence against defendant. Bennett v. Mid-South Terminals Corp., 660 S.W.2d 799, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

The definition of “employer” under the Workers' Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq., which includes the compensation insurance carrier, also includes the employees of the insurance carrier. Spears v. Morris & Wallace Elevator Co., 684 S.W.2d 620, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3047 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Where a Comprehensive Employment Training Act worker is assigned by an agency to a business for job training and supervision, both the agency and the business are the CETA worker's employer under the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq.Jackson Housing Authority v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 686 S.W.2d 917, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Parent corporation and subsidiary were treated as one employer under T.C.A. § 50-6-101 where the subsidiary functioned as the manufacturing and sales distribution agent of the parent corporation. Stigall v. Wickes Machinery, Div. of Wickes Corp., 801 S.W.2d 507, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (Tenn. 1990).

2. —Basis of Liability.

The basis of liability under the Workers' Compensation Law is the employer-employee relation. Clendening v. London Assurance Co., 206 Tenn. 601, 336 S.W.2d 535, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (1960), rehearing denied, 206 Tenn. 601, 337 S.W.2d 603, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (1960).

Liability under the statute is based on the existence of an employment relationship and there is no imposition of liability where the alleged employee is either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle, 222 Tenn. 633, 439 S.W.2d 598, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1969).

Insured was liable to insurers for workers'  compensation premiums for physical therapists with whom the insured contracted under a risk of loss provision in the parties'  insurance contract because: (1) the clause did not only apply when T.C.A. § 50-6-113 might apply; and (2) the insurers had to defend any suit in which a therapist sought workers'  compensation from the insured, even if only to find the therapist's status as an employee or independent contractor, so the insured was liable for premiums for shifting this litigation risk to the insurers. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Theraco, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 841, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. May 28, 2014).

3. —Employment of Five Persons.

The five persons referred to need not be regularly engaged in work at the place of the injury, and need not work in the same county to make one an employer under act. The contract of employment and not place of accident governs recovery. Vantrease v. Smith, 143 Tenn. 254, 227 S.W. 1023, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1920).

The statute was amended by Acts 1923, ch. 84, § 2, so that its every section applies to employers who employ not less than five persons for pay. Ezell v. Tipton, 150 Tenn. 300, 264 S.W. 355, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1924).

The burden of proof is on petitioner to show that employer had five or more employees. King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 72, 53 A.L.R. 1086 (1927); Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S.W.2d 148, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1930).

Workers' compensation coverage attaches on the first day that five or more persons who may be classified as regular employees work for an employer. Ganus v. Asher, 561 S.W.2d 756, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. 1978); Garner v. Reed, 856 S.W.2d 698, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. 1993), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. June 28, 1993).

Once coverage attaches to an employer of five or more persons it may not be withdrawn solely by the device of reducing the work force to four or fewer regular employees. Ganus v. Asher, 561 S.W.2d 756, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 580 (Tenn. 1978).

The five-employee limitation for workers' compensation liability was not applicable to principle contractor liable because subcontractor failed to secure workers' compensation insurance. Brown v. Canterbury Corp., 844 S.W.2d 134, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. 1992).

4. —Insurer as “Employer.”

In view of the definition of employer herein as including his insurer, notice of employer's insurer of willingness to pay compensation is sufficient to start running of the period of limitation within which suit may be brought, as provided in former § 50-6-224. Oman v. Delius, 162 Tenn. 192, 35 S.W.2d 570, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1931).

Employee had the right to sue the insurance carrier without joining the employer and the mere fact that the statute of limitations barred his right to bring suit against the employer would not prevent his suing and recovering from the carrier where limitations had been tolled as to the carrier. General Acci. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Kirkland, 210 Tenn. 39, 356 S.W.2d 283, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (1962).

The employer and insurer are each principals and are jointly and severally liable to the employee. General Acci. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Kirkland, 210 Tenn. 39, 356 S.W.2d 283, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (1962).

The insurer may be sued directly by the employee for compensation benefits. General Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Scudginton, 213 Tenn. 532, 376 S.W.2d 464, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (1964).

5. Guarantor.

The guarantor of a self-insured employer's obligations is entitled to the same immunity as a workers' compensation insurer. Malkiewicz v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 703 F. Supp. 49, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 290 (M.D. Tenn. 1989), aff'd without opinion, 932 F.2d 968, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 14568 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1991).

There is no principled distinction between the status of a workers' compensation insurer and that of a guarantor who guarantees the employer's financial ability to comply with the workers' compensation statutes. Malkiewicz v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 794 S.W.2d 728, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. 1990).

Inclusion of a guarantor within the definition of “employer” so as to afford it the benefit of exclusive remedy provisions is consistent with the legislative purpose of insuring solvent and responsible sources of recovery under the compensation program. Malkiewicz v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 794 S.W.2d 728, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. 1990).

6. —Insurer's Act as Tolling Statute of Limitations.

Insurer's acts being for and in behalf of the employer under subsection (a), an agreement between an insurer and an employee tolled the statute of limitations, so that action by employee against employer was not barred. Moore v. Hines, 170 Tenn. 456, 95 S.W.2d 928, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1936).

7. —Charities.

An educational institution constructing a reservoir, not necessary for its own water supply but to provide the needs of a municipality for profit, is liable for compensation to a worker thereon. Lincoln Memorial University v. Sutton, 163 Tenn. 298, 43 S.W.2d 195, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1931).

A university which was a charitable educational institution operating under a welfare charter was an employer within the meaning of this section. Smith v. Lincoln Memorial University, 202 Tenn. 238, 304 S.W.2d 70, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1957).

8. —Sufficiency of Evidence.

In suit for workers' compensation, evidence showed that the employers had as many as five employees at time of injury, notwithstanding employer's claim that part of their business had been sold or leased to another. Buck & Simmons Auto & Electric Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1952).

9. —Jury Question.

Submitting to the jury the question of whether the defendant corporation was an employer of decedent where decedent was killed while employed by a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant was not prejudicial where substantial evidence in the record supported the jury's finding that the parent corporation was not an employer and where decedent was not a special employee of defendant corporation. Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6079 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

10. Employees.

The ordinary and usual meaning of the word “employee” is one who is employed by another and works for wages or salary without regard to whether the employment is legal or illegal. American Surety Co. v. Clarksville, 204 Tenn. 67, 315 S.W.2d 509, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (1958).

In defining the term “employee” the general assembly intended to cover contracts for hire the making of which is prohibited (such as employment in certain cases of minors) but not those contracts, even though legal contracts of hire, where the acts required of the employee are themselves a violation of the penal statutes and the employee receives injuries in the performance of the required illegal acts. Bowers v. General Guaranty Ins. Co., 221 Tenn. 719, 430 S.W.2d 871, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (1968).

Employee who as part of his employment knowingly violated penal statutes against illegal sale of intoxicating liquor and who was injured in the course of making such a sale was not an “employee” under the statute and was not entitled to compensation. Bowers v. General Guaranty Ins. Co., 221 Tenn. 719, 430 S.W.2d 871, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (1968).

Whether a workers' compensation claimant was an employee depends upon the nature of the defendant's business, the way it was conducted and the claimant's relationship to the business. Butler v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 366, 426 S.W.2d 515, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1968).

Farmer who brought load of tobacco to warehouse and who was told by owner that if he unloaded the tobacco he would be paid for it was an employee of the warehouse when injured while unloading the tobacco. Butler v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 366, 426 S.W.2d 515, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1968).

The question of whether a claimant is an employee under this section and of whether he is a casual employee under § 50-6-106 are separate and distinct questions. Butler v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 366, 426 S.W.2d 515, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1968).

For one to be an employee of another there must be an express or implied agreement for the alleged employer to remunerate the alleged employee for his services in behalf of the former. Black v. Dance, 643 S.W.2d 654, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 372 (Tenn. 1982).

For comprehensive enumeration of what constitutes employees for hire and volunteer or gratuitous employees, see Hill v. King, 663 S.W.2d 435, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Where volunteer deputy received occasional meal and reimbursement for mileage and expenses, the court might stretch the definition of “hire” if the question was whether or not workers' compensation was due, but would not impute or imply a waiver of the common-law right to recover full compensation or the statutory right to recover within the limits of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (title 29, ch. 20) without real, palpable and substantial consideration; the law will not presume that the deputy sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Hill v. King, 663 S.W.2d 435, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

A Comprehensive Employment Training Act worker was an employee both of the local referring agency and of the business which provided the training. Jackson Housing Authority v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 686 S.W.2d 917, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3363 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

A convict cannot make an employment contract with the authorities who confine him, and is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Howard v. Uselton, 774 S.W.2d 925, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. 1989).

Job applicant does not have a cause of action under the Tennessee Workers'  Compensation Act against a prospective employer for failure to hire if the prospective employer failed to hire the job applicant because that applicant had filed, or is likely to file, a workers'  compensation claim against a previous employer; moreover, the Second Injury Fund does not show a legislative intent to allow job applicants who have been previously injured to sue prospective employers for failure to hire. Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 470 S.W.3d 800, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 630 (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2015).

11. —Independent Contractors and Employees Distinguished.

One employed to do work according to his own methods, free from control of employer, was an independent contractor. Siskin v. Johnson, 151 Tenn. 93, 268 S.W. 630, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1925).

Where the power to direct and supervise the work is reserved, the contractee is a servant and not an independent contractor. Finley v. Keisling, 151 Tenn. 464, 270 S.W. 629, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1924); Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (1950).

The mere fact that the laborer is receiving so much by the piece or job does not control the question as to whether the contractee was an independent contractor or a servant. Finley v. Keisling, 151 Tenn. 464, 270 S.W. 629, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1924); Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S.W.2d 148, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1930).

One employed at certain price per thousand feet “to cut and haul said timber as directed by said first party,” the employer having power to direct and supervise the cutting, was a servant, obliged to do the work strictly according to instructions, and not an independent contractor. Finley v. Keisling, 151 Tenn. 464, 270 S.W. 629, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1924).

Under contract of employment whereby employer simply agreed to pay one for hauling lumber according to the amount hauled, with no relinquishment by the employer of the right to control the means and method by which the hauling was done, or to terminate the employment, the hauler was an employee within meaning of this section and not an independent contractor. Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Corp., 158 Tenn. 18, 11 S.W.2d 860, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (1928).

The relationship of employer and employee arises where the former selects the latter, and may discharge him and may order not only that the work shall be done but also the mode of its performance. Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S.W.2d 148, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1930).

Where petitioner agreed to paint a roof at rate of $50.00 per hour and at a maximum labor cost of $15.00 for himself and helper and where there was no evidence to show any relinquishment by employer of his right to control the means and methods by which the painting was to be done, there was material evidence to support the chancellor's finding that petitioner was an employee and not an independent contractor. Welch v. Reiling, 170 Tenn. 698, 99 S.W.2d 216, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1936).

Where owner of candy company paid social security tax and carried compensation insurance on traveling salesman who was compensated on a basis of five percent of his gross sales and paid his own expenses and at times as a sideline sold goods for other companies with the consent of the candy company but did not so do in the state of Georgia where his death occurred, such salesman was an employee of the candy company and not an independent contractor and was covered by the compensation statute. Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1939).

In ascertaining whether a given contract establishes an employer-employee status or that of an independent contractor, the decisive fact always is whether the party for whom the work was being done had the right of control in the doing of that work. Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (1950).

Individual injured hauling logs in own truck was entitled to compensation as an employee, rather than an independent contractor, where he was hired for an indefinite time and amount of work with some control of the manner of working, even though he is paid by the piece, particularly where indorsement blank on salary checks states the parties are subject to fair labor standards act. Bond Bros., Inc. v. Spence, 198 Tenn. 316, 279 S.W.2d 509, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1955).

There is no absolute formula whereby it can be determined whether a party is an employee or independent contractor but the facts of each particular case have to be taken into consideration and from these facts a determination made. Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (1956); Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959); Smart v. Embry, 208 Tenn. 686, 348 S.W.2d 322, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (1961).

One of the most widely accepted definitions of an independent contractor is: “One who contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of the work, and who has the right to employ and direct the action of the worker independent of his employer, and free from any superior authority in the employer to say how specified work shall be done, or what the laborers shall do as the work progresses; one who undertakes to produce a given result without being in any way controlled as to the methods by which he attains the result.” Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (1956); Smart v. Embry, 208 Tenn. 686, 348 S.W.2d 322, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (1961); Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

In determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor, it is the duty of the court to give the Workers' Compensation Law a liberal construction in favor of the fact that he is an employee, rather than a strict construction. Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (1956).

Where petitioner contracted with coal company to mine coal at stated price per ton with the company to furnish certain equipment and the petitioner to furnish the labor and certain other equipment, and where petitioner paid social security, withheld income tax and paid into miner's pension fund as to his employees but the coal company reserved and exercised full control of where and how the coal was to be mined as well as the quantity of coal and the place at which it was to be delivered and petitioner could have been discharged at any time, evidence supported finding of the trial court that petitioner was an employee rather than an independent contractor. Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (1956).

Where ice cream vendor was furnished with pushcart and products to sell at retail with unsold products being returned to company at close of each day, and company at all times kept control of equipment and products and could seize the products and equipment at any time and terminate contract with vendor, vendor was an employee rather than an independent contractor even though his compensation was the difference between the wholesale and retail prices of the products. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

The right of a company to terminate relationship with claimant at will is strong evidence that claimant is an employee rather than an independent contractor. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959); Owens v. Turner, 211 Tenn. 121, 362 S.W.2d 793, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (1962); Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

Whether claimant is an employee or independent contractor depends upon the nature of business of the alleged employer, the way it is conducted and the claimant's relationship to that business. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

The method of payment for services supposed to be rendered by claimant is not controlling on question of whether he is an employee or independent contractor. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

The mere fact that employee was paid at rate of so much per thousand brick laid would not make him an independent contractor or prevent him from being an employee within the meaning of the Act. Clendening v. London Assurance Co., 206 Tenn. 601, 336 S.W.2d 535, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (1960), rehearing denied, 206 Tenn. 601, 337 S.W.2d 603, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 424 (1960).

In determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the test is whether employer had the right to control the employee in doing his work and not whether that right was exercised. Owens v. Turner, 211 Tenn. 121, 362 S.W.2d 793, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 348 (1962).

Carpenter hired for purpose of repairing garage door by owner of motor company who worked by the hour and intended to submit bill when job was complete was independent contractor and not an employee of the garage owner. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Co. v. Shoemaker, 211 Tenn. 523, 366 S.W.2d 129, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (1963).

For determining whether worker is an employee or an independent contractor in workers' compensation cases, one test is whether employer had a right to control employee in doing the work, and another, the right to terminate the employment at any time, such rights being incompatible with full control of the work usually enjoyed by independent contractor. Armstrong v. Spears, 216 Tenn. 643, 393 S.W.2d 729, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (1965).

Painter was employee rather than independent contractor where he was directed by farm operator to paint trim on house on a particular day and complied, employment could be terminated at any time, regular employees were directed from time to time to paint farm buildings, and painting was an expectable, routine and inherent part of the farming operation. Armstrong v. Spears, 216 Tenn. 643, 393 S.W.2d 729, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (1965).

Factors to be considered in determining whether claimant is an employee or an independent contractor include right or exercise of control by asserted employer, method of payment, furnishing of equipment and right to fire. Fisher v. J. F. G. Coffee Co., 221 Tenn. 333, 426 S.W.2d 502, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (1967).

Where there is a contract of employment either express or implied the burden is on the employer to show that the claimant is an independent contractor rather than an employee. Butler v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 366, 426 S.W.2d 515, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1968).

Plaintiff who was engaged to clean bricks on new buildings by the job or by number of bricks, who was not controlled as to means of accomplishment of end result, furnished major portion of tools and materials and frequently hired and paid his own employees, although on occasion he received help from contractor's employees without charge, was, on the facts of the case, an independent contractor rather than an employee, even though plaintiff and building contractor may have engaged in some occasional consultation and experimentation with reference to cleaning solution to be used. Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle, 222 Tenn. 633, 439 S.W.2d 598, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1969).

Among the tests for determining whether a work relationship is that of employer-employee or of independent contractor are: (1) Right to control conduct of work; (2) Right of termination; (3) Method of payment between alleged employer and employee; (4) Whether or not alleged employee furnishes his own helpers; and (5) whether or not the alleged employee furnishes his own tools, but these tests are not absolute and are not to be applied abstractly. Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle, 222 Tenn. 633, 439 S.W.2d 598, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1969); Carver v. Sparta Electric System, 690 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. 1985); Stratton v. United Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 695 S.W.2d 947, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 591 (Tenn. 1985).

So-called “relative nature of the work” test is of vital significance on the issue of whether an individual is an employee or casual employee but is of less significance where the question is whether the injured person is an employee or independent contractor. Cromwell General Contractor, Inc. v. Lytle, 222 Tenn. 633, 439 S.W.2d 598, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (1969).

Where only practical difference between truck drivers delivering manufacturer's products as employees and as “contract haulers” was that contract haulers stood to make more money and both types of drivers worked same hours, performed same duties and contracts of contract haulers could be terminated at any time, action of trial judge in finding that “contract hauler” was employee would be sustained. Curtis v. Hamilton Block Co., 225 Tenn. 275, 466 S.W.2d 220, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 300 (1971).

Where worker had leased a tractor from corporation to be used by worker in delivering gasoline and petroleum products for corporation, and where the lease agreement had provided that the leased equipment would be operated by the corporation's exclusive direction and control and that corporation would have the right to terminate the services of any driver, the worker was an employee of the corporation rather than an independent contractor for workers' compensation purposes. Wooten Transports, Inc. v. Hunter, 535 S.W.2d 858, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. 1976).

Where defendant held a franchise to operate a taxicab company, and where a taxicab driver was seriously injured while answering one of defendant's radio dispatches, the fact that the name of the company and other business information was painted on the vehicles, that all of the cabs were radio dispatched, that gasoline purchases were made by the drivers from defendant, that defendant supplied oil for each vehicle, and that defendant's supervisors checked cabs for cleanliness, constituted sufficient evidence of an employer-employee relationship rather than of independent contractors, and defendant was required to compensate plaintiff under § 50-6-112. Nesbit v. Powell, 558 S.W.2d 436, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 1977).

Where man and his wife worked on painting and papering homes for mortgage company and painting was sometimes paid for by the hour and sometimes on square foot basis and papering was paid for by the roll, and he could set his own working hours, provide his own tools and hire additional helpers if he wished, he was an independent contractor and not an employee. Barnes v. National Mortg. Co., 581 S.W.2d 957, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. 1979).

Where: (1) Injured person was a member of a partnership and was working on the construction of a house for a general contractor; (2) The general contractor inspected the work to the extent necessary to see that the end result would be according to plan but did not control the methods and details of the work; (3) Payment was negotiated on the square foot of completion basis; and (4) Such injured person hired and paid his own helpers and did not use the workers of the general contractor, such injured person was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the general contractor. Lindsey v. Smith & Johnson, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 923, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 472 (Tenn. 1980).

Where defendant supplied all his own tools and workers, and plaintiff had no right to termination and did not deduct social security or income taxes from defendant's paychecks, defendant was an independent contractor. Jackson Sawmill, Inc. v. West, 619 S.W.2d 105, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. 1981).

The fact that a company did not deduct social security or income taxes was not controlling in deciding whether an employer-employee or independent contractor relationship existed. Carver v. Sparta Electric System, 690 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. 1985).

The following are to be considered as means of analysis, not as absolutes, in the determination of an independent contractor or employee relationship: (1) The right to control the conduct of the work; (2) The right of termination; (3) The method of payment; (4) The freedom to select and hire helpers; (5) The furnishing of tools and equipment; (6) Self scheduling of work hours; and (7) Being free to render services to other entities. German v. Whaley, 760 S.W.2d 627, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 1988).

The method of payment, the freedom to select and hire helpers, the furnishing of tools and equipment, and the freedom to render services to other entities unequivocally established defendant as an independent contractor, and evidence on issues of termination and control did not persuasively indicate an employer-employee relationship. German v. Whaley, 760 S.W.2d 627, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. 1988); Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

A party to a contract can exercise direction and control over the results of the work without destroying the independence of the contract or creating an employer-employee relationship. Wright v. Knox Vinyl & Aluminum Co., 779 S.W.2d 371, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 465 (Tenn. 1989).

While no single factor is determinative, the supreme court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the right to control when distinguishing employees and independent contractors, the relevant inquiry being whether the right existed, not whether it was exercised. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

Method of payment does weigh toward finding an independent contractor relationship, but it is one factor among many to be considered. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

Where truck leasing company required driver to sign contract emphasizing driver's status as “independent contractor” rather than “employee,” but could effectively terminate its relationship with driver at will, retained the responsibility for selecting the routes to be driven, required driver to take the most commercially reasonable route and offset any equipment operating costs due to a deviation in route against driver's earnings, penalized driver if he failed to meet pickup or delivery times, required driver to report daily, and required driver to obtain company approval before taking time off from work, evidence supported chancellor's findings that relationship was that of employer-employee. Boruff v. CNA Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 125, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (Tenn. 1990).

Independent contractor status did not place the defendant outside the purview of T.C.A. § 50-6-102 as the defendant was performing a non-delegable duty of the workers' compensation carrier when it failed to pay plaintiff's claim. Davis v. Alexsis, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 228, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 1999).

Courier, who was denied insurance benefits for an injury sustained while making a delivery, was an employee under T.C.A. § 50-6-102, rather than an independent contractor as designated in his employment contract, where the employer controlled the method of payment, the courier was required to pay for an insurance program that he did not want to participate in, the courier did not have control of his vacation schedule, the employer set the courier's work schedule, the courier did not have time or permission to offer his services to other entities, and the employer had the right to terminate the courier. Dillon v. NICA, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2011).

When physical therapists were required to supervise the therapists'  assistance, such requirement did not make the physical therapists the employees of an insured with whom the therapists contracted, for purposes of making the insured liable to insurers for workers'  compensation premiums for the therapists, because this was a requirement imposed by law that did not show whether the insured could exercise the requisite control over the therapists. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Theraco, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 841, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. May 28, 2014).

Insured was not liable to insurers for workers'  compensation premiums for physical therapists with whom the insured contracted on the theory that the therapists were the insured's employees because the therapists were independent contractors, as there was insufficient evidence that the insured had the right to control how the therapists provided therapy. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Theraco, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 841, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. May 28, 2014).

12. —Status of Claimant — Nature of Question.

If facts surrounding oral contract of employment are undisputed the question of determining whether claimant is an employee or an independent contractor is one of law. Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (1950).

If facts are undisputed question of whether claimant is an employee or an independent contractor is one of law. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

A convict performing work for the county during his imprisonment was not under any contract, express or implied, and was therefore not an employee for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Laws. Abrams v. Madison County Highway Dep't, 495 S.W.2d 539, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. 1973).

Where the new hire was injured in an automobile accident while traveling to a training facility, she was an employee for purposes of T.C.A. § 50-6-102. The new hire was being paid for her time at orientation; as soon as the orientation was over, she was to report to the nursing home to begin her work as a hostess at that facility. Hubble v. Dyer Nursing Home, 188 S.W.3d 525, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. 2006).

13. —Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof is on the employer to show that status of alleged employee was that of an independent contractor. Sledge v. Hunt, 157 Tenn. 606, 12 S.W.2d 529, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 227 (1928).

Any doubt as to whether an injured worker is an employee or an independent contractor must be resolved in favor of the former. Kamarad v. Parkes, 201 Tenn. 566, 300 S.W.2d 922, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (1957); Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

Where a business relation or contract of employment, either express or implied, is shown, the burden is on the employer to show that claimant is an independent contractor rather than an employee. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959); Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

Because the Workers' Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq., must be rationally but liberally construed to promote and adhere to the purpose of securing benefits to those workers who fall within its coverage, the supreme court will resolve doubts in favor of a finding that a worker is an employee rather than an independent contractor. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W.2d 584, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1991).

Burden of proof is upon the employee to establish that the employer “had the requisite number of employees to bring it within the application of Tennessee's compensation statute.” Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., 338 F.2d 127, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4741 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925, 85 S. Ct. 1561, 14 L. Ed. 2d 684, 1965 U.S. LEXIS 1173 (1965).

14. —Presumption.

There is a rebuttable presumption that one performing work for another is his employee. Sledge v. Hunt, 157 Tenn. 606, 12 S.W.2d 529, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 227 (1928); Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S.W.2d 148, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1930); Phillips v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 160 Tenn. 538, 26 S.W.2d 1051, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1929).

Where employment appears, the presumption is that one doing work is an employee and the burden is on the employer who seeks to be relieved from the liability arising from such relationship to establish an independent contractual relationship and to show that he has relinquished his right to control the other and that the other did not have to take orders and instructions from him. Welch v. Reiling, 170 Tenn. 698, 99 S.W.2d 216, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1936); Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1939).

15. —Necessity of Contract.

No action will lie unless the parties are bound by contract, express or implied. Cornett v. Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1933); Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

Recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act, whether by an adult or a minor, is recovery as under a contract. Moore v. Nashville Union Stock Yards, Inc., 169 Tenn. 638, 90 S.W.2d 524, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1936).

16. —Regular Employee.

The amount of compensation paid and the length of time one is employed are not determinative of whether he is a regular or a casual employee, nor is it material that an alleged employee is related to his employer. Brady v. Reed, 186 Tenn. 556, 212 S.W.2d 378, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 581 (1948); American Surety Co. v. Clarksville, 204 Tenn. 67, 315 S.W.2d 509, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (1958).

The mere fact that some of the persons who were in the defendants' service were minors and were “picked up” from day to day and not used for a specified time does not exclude them from the class of regular employees as defined by state statutes. So long as they were members of the class who were doing some work that was necessary in carrying on the particular business, they fall within the classification of those “regularly employed.” Brady v. Reed, 186 Tenn. 556, 212 S.W.2d 378, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 581 (1948).

The nature of the employment rather than its frequency or infrequency or its duration determines whether the employment is casual or regular. American Surety Co. v. Clarksville, 204 Tenn. 67, 315 S.W.2d 509, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (1958).

So long as compensation claimant was a member of a class doing some work necessary in carrying on defendant's business he fell within the classification of those regularly employed. Butler v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 366, 426 S.W.2d 515, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (1968).

17. —Part-time.

Evidence was sufficient to show that claimant was a part-time employee. Jones v. Crenshaw, 645 S.W.2d 238, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 604 (Tenn. 1983).

18. —Temporary Work for Another Employer.

Where employer authorized its employee to execute trucking “trip lease” with another trucking company, employer remained liable for employee's injuries even though trip lease worked to sole benefit of other company. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Vanatta, 539 S.W.2d 35, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 571 (Tenn. 1976).

19. —Last Date Worked Rule.

The “last date worked” rule was adopted to prevent workers with gradual and repetitive injuries from losing the opportunity to bring claims due to the statute of limitations; thus, where evidence supported a causal connection between plaintiff's injury and her employment, her failure to miss work was not fatal to her claim. Story v. Legion Ins. Co., 3 S.W.3d 450, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 1999).

Last day worked rule does not apply when determining an employee's compensation rate if the employee gives the employer actual notice of a gradually occurring injury prior to missing time from work on account of the injury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was modified to reflect an award based on a weekly compensation rate calculated as of the date the employee reported her gradually occurring injury to her employer, rather than on the date of her surgery, the latter date being the date she finally stopped working. Bone v. Saturn Corp., 148 S.W.3d 69, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 907 (Tenn. 2004), overruled in part, Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Britt, 211 S.W.3d 706, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. 2007), overruled, Shoulders v. TRW Commer. Steering Div., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. Apr. 3, 2007), overruled, Brown v. Erachem Comilog, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 918, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Aug. 30, 2007), overruled in part, Mathenia v. Milan Seating Sys., 254 S.W.3d 313, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 896 (Tenn. 2007), overruled, Buckingham v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 910 (Tenn. Oct. 25, 2007), overruled, Pickens v. Delta Faucet, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 914 (Tenn. Oct. 29, 2007), overruled, Aerospace Testing Alliance v. Anderson, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. May 23, 2008), overruled in part, Edwards v. Saturn Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 617 (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2008).

20. —Loaned Employees.

Although during the year immediately preceding an employee's death, he was loaned to another company by his employer, and worked for the other company three weeks, he should be treated as a regular employee of his employer during the year, and comes under subdivision (a)(1), in determining the amount of compensation. Wilmoth v. Phoenix Utility Co., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1934).

Where truck owner loaned drivers to contractor for hauling of material to state highway and contractor supervised hauling and paid wages though deducting amount of wages from amount due truck owner, the contractor was a special employer and was liable to injured truck driver for compensation. Wardrep v. Houston, 168 Tenn. 170, 76 S.W.2d 328, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1934).

In determining whether an employee in a particular instance should be regarded as a loaned employee in the service of a special employer or whether he should be regarded as remaining in the service of his general employer the question of whose work the employee was engaged in at the time of the injury is a test to be considered. Owen v. St. Louis Spring Co., 175 Tenn. 543, 136 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1940).

Where it was the duty of the seller of a machine to furnish a man to install the machine and to instruct the buyer's employees in the use of it and where the buyer could instruct such person what to do but not how to do it, a worker who was injured while engaged in such operations was not a loaned employee even though he was at the time on the payroll of the buyer but was in the employ of the general employer. Owen v. St. Louis Spring Co., 175 Tenn. 543, 136 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1940).

Employee loaned by employer to foreman for personal use outside of working hours, where employer continues to pay wages, is not injured in course of employment where accidental death occurred in employer's truck, even though employee had finished job, delivered helper home, and was returning truck to employer. Kempkau v. Cathey, 198 Tenn. 17, 277 S.W.2d 392, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 339 (1955).

The rule was adopted in Tennessee that where a general employer lends an employee to a special employer the special employer becomes liable for workers' compensation only if: (1) The employee has made a contract of hire express or implied with the special employer; (2) The work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and (3) The special employer has the right to control the details of the work. Winchester v. Seay, 219 Tenn. 321, 409 S.W.2d 378, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (1966).

Where worker was injured while cutting metal strip to fit under air conditioner over door of restaurant, such employee was engaged in maintenance and repair work so as to be entitled to compensation from restaurant owner rather than from his regular employer even though he was regularly employed at nearby hotel where at time of injury he was working under direction of owner of restaurant and not of his regular employer. Winchester v. Seay, 219 Tenn. 321, 409 S.W.2d 378, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 531 (1966).

Where four separate equipment rental corporations had common president, vice president and general manager who supervised all operations and exercised control over all employees who at different times performed work for all corporations, employee of one corporation who was injured while performing work for a second of the corporations was engaged in dual employment and his remedy was against second corporation under the Workers' Compensation Law rather than by common law tort action. Potts v. Knox-Tenn Rental, Inc., 62 Tenn. App. 699, 467 S.W.2d 796, 1971 Tenn. App. LEXIS 205 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

Decedent was not a loaned employee where she was employed by the wholly owned subsidiary of a parent corporation, although at the time of her death in an industrial explosion she was doing work for the parent company which controlled the details of her work, due to fact that decedent was not transferred to a new payroll and that the evidence at trial failed to show that decedent expressly or impliedly consented to a change of employers. Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6079 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

Where plaintiff was injured while he was working on a crew which had been requested by defendant from plaintiff's regular employer, and where this crew was working under the direction of one of defendant's supervisors, plaintiff was a “loaned servant” and defendant was consequently plaintiff's employer for the purposes of recovery. Carpenter v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp., 553 S.W.2d 356, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

Employee found to be “loaned servant.” Catlett v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 813 S.W.2d 411, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. 1991).

21. —Employee of Independent Contractor.

Plaintiff who worked for general contractor was employee of general contractor where latter constructed a home for third party on a flat fee of five percent of cost, though plaintiff was paid directly by third party. Edwards v. Harvey, 194 Tenn. 603, 253 S.W.2d 766, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 428 (1952).

Evidence that contractor had actual knowledge and notice of accident, and that claimant was contractor's employee, was sufficient to uphold award of compensation. Rote v. Walls, 197 Tenn. 463, 274 S.W.2d 1, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 508 (1954).

Where contractor was engaged on a cost plus basis to make certain changes in manufacturing plant and such contractor employed and supervised its own workers and acted in its own discretion as to the manner of accomplishing the alterations provided for in the contract, worker injured on the construction project was an employee of the contractor and not of the manufacturing corporation and was entitled to maintain common law action against manufacturing corporation as third party tort feasor. Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. Brown, 253 F.2d 631, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 5205 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1958).

Where evidence showed that deceased was killed more than three months after his employment was terminated by defendant manufacturing company and that at the time of the accident he was driving a truck owned and operated by and under the instructions of a third party, he was not an employee of defendant manufacturing company even though at the time of the accident the truck was carrying property of defendant manufacturing company. Gluck Bros., Inc. v. Turner, 205 Tenn. 691, 330 S.W.2d 311, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (1959).

22. —Minors.

Every injured employee must give notice of injury as prescribed by statute even though he is a minor, unless there is a reasonable excuse for not doing so. Moore v. Nashville Union Stock Yards, Inc., 169 Tenn. 638, 90 S.W.2d 524, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1936).

23. — —Validity of Provisions as to.

This statute is not invalid as undertaking to make an election for and a binding contract upon a minor employee when, by reason of such minority, he is unable to make such election or contract, since the act makes him sui juris as to power of election for purpose of the act. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W. 844, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1919).

24. — —Illegal Employment — Effect.

Prior to the 1961 amendment, subdivision (a)(2) (now (a)(3)(A)) did not include the words “whether lawfully or unlawfully employed” following the word “minor.” Under the law prior to such amendment it was held that a minor unlawfully employed was not covered by the Workers' Compensation Law and therefore could maintain an action at common law for damages in the cases of Manning v. American Clothing Co., 147 Tenn. 274, 247 S.W. 103, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ausbrooks, 148 Tenn. 615, 257 S.W. 858, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 47, 33 A.L.R. 330 (1924); Knoxville News Co. v. Spitzer, 152 Tenn. 614, 279 S.W. 1043, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1926). It was held otherwise, however, with respect to employment in violation of municipal ordinance in Walsh v. Myer Hotel Co., 161 Tenn. 355, 30 S.W.2d 225, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1930).

It was also indicated that a minor unlawfully employed could elect whether to seek recovery under the act or sue for damages at common law in the cases of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ausbrooks, 148 Tenn. 615, 257 S.W. 858, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 47, 33 A.L.R. 330 (1924); American Surety Co. v. Clarksville, 204 Tenn. 67, 315 S.W.2d 509, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 247 (1958).

Where death of minor occurred prior to effective date of 1961 amendment extending definition of employee to a minor whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, administrator of minor's estate was entitled to maintain suit against employer of minor for wrongful death and amendment had no retroactive effect so as to preclude actions at law arising prior to the time the amendment became effective. Pigg v. Stacey, 210 Tenn. 144, 356 S.W.2d 593, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 414 (1962); Mills v. Pigg, 54 Tenn. App. 612, 393 S.W.2d 28, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

In common law action for wrongful death arising prior to 1961 amendment to this section making compensation law applicable to minors whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, exclusion of evidence offered by defendants to show that decedent minor was lawfully employed at time of death and that common law action was thereby precluded was improper. Mills v. Pigg, 54 Tenn. App. 612, 393 S.W.2d 28, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

25. Leased Operators.

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the alleged employer was proper pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-6-106(1)(A) where it was not, as a matter of law, the alleged employees' employer so as to subject it to liability under the Workers' Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq.; in a service agreement executed by the alleged employer and company, the company agreed to provide drivers to the alleged employer and the agreement stated that the personnel supplied to the alleged employer would be employees of the company only. Honsa v. Tombigbee Transp. Corp., 141 S.W.3d 540, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 632 (Tenn. 2004), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 826 (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2004).

26. — —Limitations.

Since subdivision (a)(2) (now (a)(3)(A)) expressly includes a minor within the definition of an employee and § 50-6-224(4) (now 50-6-224(a)(4)), expressly excludes minors from those entitled to extension of the statute of limitations for reasons of physical or mental incapacity to assert their rights, a minor is subject to the one year statute of limitations with reference to making his claim under the Workers' Compensation Law. Franse v. Knox Porcelain Corp., 171 Tenn. 49, 100 S.W.2d 647, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1937).

27. —Associations — Status of Members.

Where incorporated rural education association paid plaintiff hourly wages before she signed paper stating that she was a member of the association and that thereafter she was to be paid “merely for the purpose of subsistence,” that she was not an employee and that any sums she received were not to constitute wages, but where she was continually paid a wage thereafter until the time of her injury, plaintiff was an employee of the association and the association was not relieved from liability under the compensation statute. Schroader v. Rural Educational Ass'n, 33 Tenn. App. 36, 228 S.W.2d 491, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

28. —Corporate Officers.

Prior to the 1963 amendment subdivision (a)(2) (now (a)(3)(A)) did not include the words “the president, any vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other executive officer of a corporate employer” in the definition of “employee.” Cases decided prior to such amendment and determining whether the specific duties of such officials would constitute them employees are Alsup v. Murfreesboro Bread & Ice Cream Co., 165 Tenn. 591, 56 S.W.2d 746, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1933); Alperin v. Eagle Indem. Co., 169 Tenn. 215, 84 S.W.2d 101, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1935).

29. —Municipal Officers and Employees.

A policeman of a city is a civil officer and not “under any contract of hire” so as to be an employee. Cornett v. Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1933); Woods v. La Follette, 185 Tenn. 655, 207 S.W.2d 572, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (1947). However, see insurance company would cover a police officer when the provisions of the contract clearly provided for such coverage.

Where the injured employee seeking compensation was employed and paid by the federal emergency relief administration, and received the injury to his eye when engaged in emergency work, in the extension of a street, under a foreman furnished by the city, he is not entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act as against the city, since the work was being prosecuted by the federal emergency relief administration. Shelton v. Greeneville, 169 Tenn. 366, 87 S.W.2d 1016, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1935).

Where there was material evidence to sustain the finding of the trial judge that the primary duties of municipal employee suing the municipality under the Workers' Compensation Law were those of a street superintendent or foreman and that he was acting in that capacity at the time of the accidental injury such finding was upheld even though there was some evidence in the record to show that petitioner served as an arresting officer or policeman. Shelbyville v. Hamilton, 170 Tenn. 297, 95 S.W.2d 43, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1936).

30. —Stockholder of Employer.

The fact that an employee was a stockholder in the employer corporation is immaterial on question of his right to compensation. Alsup v. Murfreesboro Bread & Ice Cream Co., 165 Tenn. 591, 56 S.W.2d 746, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1933).

31. —Partners.

A member of a partnership who receives wages is not an employee. An employee must be under the control of the employer. Gebers v. Murfreesboro Laundry Co., 159 Tenn. 51, 15 S.W.2d 737, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1929).

Where decedent mined coal under an agreement of mutual understanding of partnership or joint venture, and each controlled his own work, and after the expenses were determined and deducted from the proceeds of the coal, the balance was divided up between the members in accordance with the amount of time each worked, deceased was not an employee. Tidwell v. Walden, 205 Tenn. 705, 330 S.W.2d 317, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 411 (1959).

32. —Payment of Social Security Tax — Effect.

The payment by the employer of social security tax on the earnings of a traveling salesman was a recognition of the fact that such person was an employee so that the employer was in no position to deny the fact of employment. Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1939).

Lumber company which provided plans and specifications for house, guaranteed owner that house would be erected to FHA or GI specifications, paid for labor on house, withheld social security and withholding taxes for all laborers except injured worker, relied on mechanics' and materialmen's statute, made statements at various times that it was the builder and furnisher and supervised job from beginning to end was employer of injured workman where proof showed that there was no difference between such worker and the other employees working on construction of the house except for fact that social security and withholding taxes were not withheld as to him. Kamarad v. Parkes, 201 Tenn. 566, 300 S.W.2d 922, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (1957).

The fact that neither social security taxes nor withholding taxes are deducted is not controlling on question of whether or not claimant is an employee. Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1959).

33. —Carrying Compensation Insurance — Effect.

Where an employer carries workers' compensation insurance and the earnings of the employee are included in computing the premiums paid for such insurance, neither the employer nor the insurer is in a position to question the relationship of the parties under the compensation law. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Warren, 172 Tenn. 403, 112 S.W.2d 837, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1938) (decision under Kentucky statute); Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1939).

Fact that building corporation included window washer in social security list which insurance company used to determine premium on policy covering employees of corporation was a factor to be considered in determining whether window washer was an employee or an independent contractor. Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 474 (1950).

Independent contractor was not covered by workers' compensation although deductions for workers' compensation insurance were deducted from checks paid to independent contractor. Barnes v. National Mortg. Co., 581 S.W.2d 957, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 442 (Tenn. 1979).

34. —Admissibility of Evidence.

Testimony of municipal officers and others tending to show the character of work required of petitioner and petitioner's contract of employment with town was admissible in suit by municipal employee against town under the Workers' Compensation Law as showing that petitioner was an employee subject to the statute rather than a policeman with the weight of such testimony being for the trial judge. Shelbyville v. Hamilton, 170 Tenn. 297, 95 S.W.2d 43, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1936).

35. Maximum Total Benefit.

The 1985 amendment to T.C.A. § 50-6-208(b)(2) does not authorize an exception to the maximum total benefit limitation of T.C.A. § 50-6-102 so that an employee who has been awarded temporary total disability benefits and permanent total disability benefits can recover more than the statutory maximum. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 762 S.W.2d 883, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 266 (Tenn. 1988).

When an injury is confined to a scheduled member, ordinarily only the statutory benefits for that particular member can be awarded. Onley v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 785 S.W.2d 348, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. 1990).

Award of permanent total disability benefits under T.C.A. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) are payable to age 65 without regard to the monetary cap imposed by the maximum total benefit provisions of T.C.A. § 50-6-102. Love v. American Olean Tile Co., 970 S.W.2d 440, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (Tenn. 1998).

Awards of permanent and total disability are not subject to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of T.C.A. § 50-6-102. Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. 1998).

Because the statutory definition of maximum total benefit exempts permanent total disability awards from the 400 week limitation, such benefits are to be paid until age 65 under T.C.A. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) without regard to the monetary cap imposed by the maximum total benefit provision of T.C.A. § 50-6-102. Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (Tenn. 1998).

As awards of permanent total disability under T.C.A. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) are not subject to the monetary cap imposed by the definition contained in T.C.A. § 50-6-102, once the employee was reclassified as being “100 percent permanently and totally disabled,” the employer and the workers' compensation insurer were liable for the total disability award without any credit for temporary total disability benefits previously paid to the employee. Vinson v. UPS, 92 S.W.3d 380, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 706 (Tenn. 2002).

The 400-week statutory limitation applied to temporary total disability benefits as the statutory definition of maximum total benefit was clear; the only category of disability benefits exempted from this 400-week limitation was permanent total disability benefits and the maximum total benefit 400-week limitation applied to temporary total disability benefits. Thus, trial court erred in ordering the insurer to pay temporary total disability benefits in excess of the statutory 400-week limitation. Wausau Ins. Co. v. Dorsett, 172 S.W.3d 538, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 660 (Tenn. 2005).

36. Maximum Weekly Benefit.

In the case of an employee who died with dependents in February 1993, the “maximum weekly benefit” was determined based upon the employee's average weekly wage; not until 662/3% of the employee's average weekly wage equals or exceeds 78% of the state's average weekly wage would that figure be used to determine the amount of compensation benefits payable to the dependents. Spencer v. Towson Moving & Storage, 922 S.W.2d 508, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (Tenn. 1996).

In a workers'  compensation case where the employee alleged she sustained injuries to her ankle and knee while lifting a patient, the trial court awarded 291 weeks of temporary disability benefits and a 65% permanent partial disability to the leg which resulted in a total award of 421 weeks of benefits. The trial court erred by awarding benefits in excess of the statutory maximum set out in T.C.A. § 50-6-102 because the employee's recovery of permanent and temporary disability benefits was subject to the 400-week maximum. Collier v. Life Care Ctrs. of Collegedale, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2012), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2012).

37. Average Weekly Wages.

The court must ascertain the average weekly wages of petitioner by past earnings and not by what he may earn in the future. White v. Pinkerton Co., 155 Tenn. 229, 291 S.W. 448, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1927); Armstrong v. Spears, 216 Tenn. 643, 393 S.W.2d 729, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (1965).

The three methods of ascertaining the average weekly wage discussed. White v. Pinkerton Co., 155 Tenn. 229, 291 S.W. 448, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1927); Bragg's Quarry v. Smith, 161 Tenn. 682, 33 S.W.2d 87, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1930).

Ascertainment of average weekly wages as a basis of workers' compensation where employed over a year prior to the injury is constitutional under equal protection and due process clauses of U.S. Const., amend. 14 and Tenn. Const., art. I, § 8, where total wages for year are divided by 52, less weeks involuntarily laid off but not less weeks voluntarily laid off such as strike for employee's benefit. Hartley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Tenn. 504, 276 S.W.2d 1, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 519 (1954).

The average weekly wage of a claimant in workers' compensation must be ascertained by past earnings and not by what he may earn in the future. Armstrong v. Spears, 216 Tenn. 643, 393 S.W.2d 729, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 610 (1965).

Where employee was injured while engaged in part time work of unloading truck for carrier as loaned employee, award would be based on employee's part time earnings rather than on basis of standard hourly wage. Johnson v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 221 Tenn. 219, 425 S.W.2d 757, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (1968).

The compensation award is determined by the amount of wages the employee earns and not by the rate of the wage. Johnson v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 221 Tenn. 219, 425 S.W.2d 757, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (1968).

A computation of the “average weekly wage” of a part-time employee, such as the plaintiff, must be based upon his actual part-time earnings rather than upon the basis of the standard hourly wage or the standard work week of 40 hours. McKinney v. Feldspar Corp., 612 S.W.2d 157, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. 1981).

Except in those cases where the claimant earns a given sum for a normal week, actual wages should be used in computing the claimant's average weekly wages. Russell v. Genesco, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 206, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. 1983).

In computing an injured employee's average weekly wage, the court considers only the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which he was working when injured. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (Tenn. 1990).

The value of fringe benefits is not included in the calculation of an employee's average weekly wage. Pollard v. Knox County, 886 S.W.2d 759, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 295 (Tenn. 1994).

Trial court erred in ruling that weeks an injured employee spent on strike should be excluded from the employee's average weekly wage because time spent away from work due to a strike was a voluntary absence. Goodman v. HBD Indus., 208 S.W.3d 373, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 991 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 918, 127 S. Ct. 2130, 167 L. Ed. 2d 863, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4558 (2007).

38. —What Constitutes Earnings.

The earnings of an employee include anything received by him under the terms of his employment contract from which he realizes economic gain. P & L Constr. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. 1978).

Where an employee-shareholder foregoes any direct monetary compensation for his labors, a measure of his earnings would be the compensation paid by the same company to another employee performing the same or similar duties. P & L Constr. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. 1978).

In certain situations involving closely held corporations, an employee-shareholder's earnings may include the implicit increase in the value of the stock held by such employee-shareholder which occurs when he foregoes any direct monetary compensation for his labors. P & L Constr. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. 1978).

Gifts are not “earnings” within the meaning of of T.C.A. § 50-6-102. Jones v. Crenshaw, 645 S.W.2d 238, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 604 (Tenn. 1983).

39. —Wages for Year as Basis of Computation.

It is only when the employment has been regular and continuous for a year or longer that the average weekly wage is determined by dividing the total wages received during the year by 52. Bragg's Quarry v. Smith, 161 Tenn. 682, 33 S.W.2d 87, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1930).

In a compensation proceeding, where the chancellor found that the injured employee's total earnings for 52 weeks were $1,030.74, and during the year preceding the injury decedent lost six and 5/7 weeks of work, his average weekly wage was $22.76, on which compensation was properly based. Wilmoth v. Phoenix Utility Co., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1934).

40. —Time Lost as Incident to Employment.

Where worker had been employed regularly and continuously for several years, and such employment varied from week to week as to the number of hours per day and days per week, but since variation in weekly wages and amount of time worked per week was a normal and recognized incident of the employment and not due to chance happenings or uncontemplated circumstances, the proper test for determining worker's weekly wage was a division of the total annual amount earned by 52. Carter v. Victor Chemical Works, 171 Tenn. 141, 101 S.W.2d 462, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1937).

Time lost by chance or accident is deducted, but time lost because of incidental events common and natural to the type or kind of employment, is not deducted. Strikes and “mine creep” are natural incidents of coal mining, and injured employee's average weekly wage was computed by dividing wages for the 52 weeks immediately preceding injury by 52, without deductions for 10 weeks lost because of a strike and “mine creep.” New Jellico Coal Co. v. Kenner, 172 Tenn. 185, 110 S.W.2d 476, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1937).

41. —Loaned Employee.

Deceased was an employee for 52 week period prior to death though he was loaned to another company for three weeks during that period. Wilmoth v. Phoenix Utility Co., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1934).

42. —Wages Divided by Weeks Employed.

Average weekly wage of grocery store clerk who worked during holidays and Saturday afternoons and nights for 10 weeks was properly computed by dividing the total wages received by number of weeks employed. White v. Pinkerton Co., 155 Tenn. 229, 291 S.W. 448, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1927).

Average wage determined by dividing wages received by number of weeks worked. Mayberry v. Bon Air Chemical Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S.W.2d 148, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (1930).

Where employment covered a period of several years but the employee did not work regularly and continuously, compensation will be based on average weekly wages actually earned during time of actual employment, the statute not specifically covering such a case. Bragg's Quarry v. Smith, 161 Tenn. 682, 33 S.W.2d 87, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1930).

Where deceased lost six and 5/7 weeks out of 52 week period prior to death, proper method of determining average weekly wage was to divide total amount earned by 45 and 2/7 weeks. Wilmoth v. Phoenix Utility Co., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1934).

Where injured employee worked intermittently for a total of 14 weeks during the year preceding his injury, with the time worked being dependent on the amount of work his employer had available, such employee was not regularly employed within the meaning of this section and his average weekly wages should have been determined by dividing the total amount earned during the year by the number of weeks worked. Toler v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 173 Tenn. 378, 117 S.W.2d 751, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1938).

Where time lost from work was not because of the fault of employee but because of shortage of material or lack of orders, average weekly wage would be determined on the basis of the number of weeks actually worked. Bryant v. McAllister, 202 Tenn. 654, 308 S.W.2d 412, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1957).

Where injured employee was only employed part-time, the correct method of computing his average weekly wage was to divide the total wages received during the year by the number of weeks during which the employee received wages. Gaw v. Raymer, 553 S.W.2d 576, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 584 (Tenn. 1977).

The average weekly wage of a part-time employee is found by dividing the total wages received during the year by the number of weeks during which the employee received wages. McKinney v. Feldspar Corp., 612 S.W.2d 157, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (Tenn. 1981).

The proper method of computing the average wages of a regular employee is to total his earnings and divide by 52, and in deciding which “lost” days can be deducted from the 52 weeks, only sickness, other disabilities and fortuitous events can be considered. Russell v. Genesco, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 206, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 653 (Tenn. 1983).

43. —Wages of Person of Same Grade in Same Work.

A finding by the trial court that, because of the short duration of employment, it was impracticable to calculate compensation otherwise than by having regard to the available wages received by a person of the same grade, employed at the same work by the same employer, is one of fact binding on the supreme court when not appealed from. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McBride, 165 Tenn. 580, 56 S.W.2d 736, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1933).

Where employee worked only a few weeks before injury, finding as to amount of compensation due such employee based on wages of employee during such period including overtime and Sunday work was improper, and such finding should have been based on the average weekly wages of other employees in the same grade of work and class of employment. United States Rubber Products Co. v. Cannon, 172 Tenn. 665, 113 S.W.2d 1184, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 1938).

Where deceased railroad switchman who worked only a day and a half during the preceding year was working under the “extra board” system when killed and evidence showed that switchmen working under such system averaged 20 days per month, the average weekly wage of other switchmen working under the system was to be used in determining compensation under the statute. A. G. S. R. Co. v. Wright, 175 Tenn. 138, 133 S.W.2d 457, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1939).

44. —Evidence of Average Weekly Wage.

Where injured employee testified that his earnings had been $16.50 per week, agreement of employer and employee upon payment of $8.25 per week as compensation and payment thereof for 13 weeks afforded some evidence of employee's average weekly earnings for 52 weeks preceding injury. Cambria Coal Mining Co. v. Wilson, 156 Tenn. 64, 299 S.W. 811, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1927).

Where plaintiff was paid a gross salary out of which he had to deduct his expenses, it was impossible to use any of the methods described in this section to determine his average weekly wage, and therefore resort to the average weekly amount being earned by a person in the same grade employed in the same class of employment in the same district was proper. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 568 S.W.2d 97, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 608 (Tenn. 1978).

Where the eight weeks during which the workers'  compensation claimant was on a leave of absence constituted lost days due to sickness or disability, those days and the disability benefits received, those days were properly excluded by the trial court from the computation of the claimant's average weekly wage under T.C.A. § 50-6-102. Cantrell v. Carrier Corp., 193 S.W.3d 467, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. May 30, 2006).

45. —Bonuses and Allowances.

Bonus received by refiner of aluminum ore for doing a certain amount of work and working a certain number of days each week was a part of his compensation to be included in the computation of his average weekly pay. Otherwise the employer might escape his burdens by paying small wages and large bonuses. Moss v. Aluminum Co. of America, 152 Tenn. 249, 276 S.W. 1052, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1925).

Provision that “wherever allowances of any character made to an employee in lieu of wages are specified as part of the wage contract, they shall be deemed a part of his earnings” is inapplicable where bonuses are not claimed to have been made in lieu of wages, the only question being whether the bonus was a part of the wages. Moss v. Aluminum Co. of America, 152 Tenn. 249, 276 S.W. 1052, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1925).

“Meals” and “tips” are not part of the wage contract unless specifically made a part by the contract of employment. Crane Co. v. Jamieson, 192 Tenn. 41, 237 S.W.2d 546, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (1951).

When it is within the contemplation of the parties that tips received by an employee should be retained by him as part of his compensation such tips should be taken into account in determining average weekly wages. Bryson v. Benton, 217 Tenn. 116, 395 S.W.2d 794, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 523 (1965).

Where employer and waitress in restaurant both treated tips as part of wages, such tips were “in lieu of wages” and within meaning of this section and were to be taken into account in computing average weekly wages. Bryson v. Benton, 217 Tenn. 116, 395 S.W.2d 794, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 523 (1965).

46. Injury by Accident.

The word “accident” implies that the injury must partake of the unusual, casual, or fortuitous. Meade Fiber Corp. v. Starnes, 147 Tenn. 362, 247 S.W. 989, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1923).

An injury need not be traumatic, it may be accidental whether occasioned by heat, germs or more abrupt or perceptible physical force. Whether an infection is an accidental injury must be determined on the facts of the case. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Hay, 159 Tenn. 202, 17 S.W.2d 904, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1929); Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. Starnes, 160 Tenn. 504, 26 S.W.2d 128, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1930).

The statute is only applicable to cases of accidental injury, which is one unforeseen, unexpected and fortuitous. An element of unexpected casualty must be present. Other injuries are for common law action. Morrison v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 162 Tenn. 523, 39 S.W.2d 272, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1931).

An award is sustainable if death has been the result of, or shall at least have been substantially contributed to by, a compensable injury. Lenoir Car Works v. Hill, 163 Tenn. 578, 44 S.W.2d 321, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 151 (1931).

The word “injury” as used in this chapter is synonymous with the word “accident” as used herein. Franse v. Knox Porcelain Corp., 171 Tenn. 49, 100 S.W.2d 647, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Employee who for 18 months was required to stand over a melting pot in connection with his duties, and on specified date became sick, was not entitled to recover compensation for alleged ailment, since ailment was the gradual result of breathing fumes for a period of 18 months, and not the result of a single occurrence. Gabbard v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp., 184 Tenn. 464, 201 S.W.2d 651, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (1947).

An accident is an event or happening in the nature of a misfortune, casual or fortuitous. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1949); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Clark, 194 F.2d 29, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2725 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

Employee was not entitled to recover for loss of vision due to removal of eye after rock struck the eye where medical evidence showed that removal of eye was due to diseased blood vessel. Craig v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 190 Tenn. 234, 229 S.W.2d 148, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1950).

Neurosis due to being struck on neck by employer's truck while engaged in moving barricade was compensable. Buck & Simmons Auto & Electric Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1952).

Stroke sustained at home by employee in failing health after doing normal work during day was not compensable though he had headache on the job. McMahan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 286, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3960 (D. Tenn. 1953).

Where deceased suffered a heart attack and died while unloading plumbing fixtures, his death was attributable to an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and was compensable under this act. Patterson Transf. Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 417 (1953).

Under Tennessee law, a heart attack brought about or aggravated by the exertion of work of an employee is an accident within the meaning of this statute. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Johnson, 278 F.2d 200, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4678 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1960).

An accident is generally an unlooked for mishap, an untoward event, which is not expected or designed. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (1961).

Gradually occurring traumatic injury to ulnar nerve as a result of repeated movement of such nerve in and out of groove it normally occupied while employee was operating machine as required by his employment was an accidental injury and not an occupational disease. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (1961).

“Injury” as applied to a personal injury to a human being includes whatever lesion or change to any part of the system produces harm or lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or capability. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (1961).

If ordinary exertion or usual strain produces an unusual result, the resulting injury is by accident and is compensable. Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 210 Tenn. 170, 357 S.W.2d 50, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (1962); Central Motor Express, Inc. v. Burney, 214 Tenn. 118, 377 S.W.2d 947, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (1964).

When a condition has developed gradually over a period of time resulting in a definite work-connected, unexpected, fortuitous injury, it is an “accident” within the terms of the statute. Central Motor Express, Inc. v. Burney, 214 Tenn. 118, 377 S.W.2d 947, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (1964).

Where employee gradually developed a protruded or herniated disc as a result of strain or exertion involved in lifting heavy freight, such injury was compensable. Central Motor Express, Inc. v. Burney, 214 Tenn. 118, 377 S.W.2d 947, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (1964).

An accidental injury is an unusual, fortuitous or unexpected happening causing an injury which is accidental in character. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 397 S.W.2d 368, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (1965); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Evans, 221 Tenn. 199, 425 S.W.2d 611, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (1968); Electro--Voice, Inc. v. O'Dell, 519 S.W.2d 395, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 705 (Tenn. 1975).

Where handling of heavy hides in tanning operation resulted in disability from pressure on nerve of hand of employee, such disability constituted injury by accident. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Britt, 220 Tenn. 444, 414 S.W.2d 830, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 425 (1967), rehearing denied, 220 Tenn. 457, 418 S.W.2d 660, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 426 (1967).

The courts will not attempt to lay down an exclusive definition of the word “accident” although they will observe certain boundaries including the requirement that the injury must be unexpected. Kroger Co. v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 649, 430 S.W.2d 130, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1967).

Severe cramping and pain in feet and legs which resulted from standing and lifting were conditions which would normally be expected to develop in person having flat feet and such cramping and pain would not be considered as result of injury by accident to employee having such foot condition even though standing and lifting was part of his employment. Kroger Co. v. Johnson, 221 Tenn. 649, 430 S.W.2d 130, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (1967).

The mere manifestation of a heart condition without proof of any strain or over-exertion at work does not show an accidental injury even though the development of the heart disease may have been hastened by the employee's usual and ordinary work. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Evans, 221 Tenn. 199, 425 S.W.2d 611, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (1968); Chapman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 221 Tenn. 376, 426 S.W.2d 760, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1968).

When an employee's work exposes him to an elemental force and requires him to continue to work under the risk of the hazard which the elemental force creates, the employee is to be compensated for injuries which result therefrom. Globe Co. Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Tenn. 37, 442 S.W.2d 253, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1969).

An employee who was required to assume a certain posture by her employment which increased the pain of a previously suffered injury which was not related to her employment, did not sustain an “accident” within the meaning of this section. Boling v. Raytheon Co., 223 Tenn. 528, 448 S.W.2d 405, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (1969).

An accidental injury is one which cannot be reasonably anticipated, is unexpected and is precipitated by unusual combinations of fortuitous circumstances. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Loveday, 224 Tenn. 317, 455 S.W.2d 141, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (1970).

If the usual strain or exertion of work produces an unusual result, the resulting injury is by accident. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Loveday, 224 Tenn. 317, 455 S.W.2d 141, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (1970).

Where employee was required to assume an unusual position in digging a ditch and such strain resulted in back injury, employee suffered injury by accident. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Loveday, 224 Tenn. 317, 455 S.W.2d 141, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (1970).

Compensation is allowable for conditions which do not occur instantaneously as the result of one accident but develop gradually over varying periods of time resulting from repeated work related incidents. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Waller, 524 S.W.2d 478, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. 1975).

Where the usual strain or exertion of work causes an unusual result, such an injury is “by accident” under this section. Continental Ins. Co. v. Dowdy, 560 S.W.2d 619, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 1978).

“Injury by accident” does not embrace every stress or strain of daily living or every undesirable experience encountered in carrying out the duties of a contract of employment. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979).

Workers' compensation coverage is not as broad as general, comprehensive health and accident insurance. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979).

A very liberal interpretation has been given in this state to the statutory requirement of “injury by accident.” Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979); Mays v. United States Fed. & Guar. Co., 672 S.W.2d 773, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. 1981).

47. —Failure to Show Compensable Accident.

Where plaintiff claimed that long hours and work stress of a general nature exacerbated his heart condition, he failed to show that he suffered a compensable “accident” within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-6-101 et seq.Sexton v. Scott County, 785 S.W.2d 814, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 122 (Tenn. 1990).

48. —False Medical Information.

False medical information will bar recovery under the workers' compensation statute if employer shows: (1) That the employee knowingly and willfully made a false representation of his physical condition; (2) That the employer relied on the false representation and that this reliance was a substantial factor in the decision to hire; and (3) That there is a causal connection between the false representation and the injury subsequently suffered by the employee. Bane v. Daniel Constr. Co., 793 S.W.2d 256, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (Tenn. 1990).

49. —Causal Connection — Meaning.

The burden rests upon the employee to show a causal connection between his injury and his employment, but by “causal connection” is meant not proximate cause as used in the law of negligence, but cause in the sense that the accident had its origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee while doing his work. Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S.W.2d 977, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1951).

There must be a causal connection between a worker's accidental injury and his death and the nature of his employment. McCann Steel Co. v. Carney, 192 Tenn. 94, 237 S.W.2d 942, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1951).

Where doctor testified that employee complained of increasing pain in abdomen following a fall, a ruptured appendix was causally related to the fall, even though there was no direct evidence that fall actually caused the ruptured appendix, since absolute certainty was not required to support award. Great American Indem. Co. v. Friddell, 198 Tenn. 360, 280 S.W.2d 908, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1955).

Question of whether accident suffered by workman initiated gall bladder and liver trouble of worker or merely aggravated it was immaterial where there was a causal relation between the initiating accident and the resultant disability and the inception of plaintiff's disability was assignable to the accident. Kitts v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp. 937, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2971 (D. Tenn. 1955).

Where medical evidence did not establish causal connection between injury to truck driver's hip and side, award for total and permanent disability caused by lung cancer was not justified. American Casualty Co. v. Ball, 211 Tenn. 608, 366 S.W.2d 773, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1963).

Question of causal connection between injury and employment is one of fact. Cas Walker's Cash Stores, Inc. v. Livesay, 215 Tenn. 306, 385 S.W.2d 745, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 618 (1965).

There must be a causal connection between the worker's accidental injury or death and the nature of his employment. Armstrong v. Liles Constr. Co., 215 Tenn. 678, 389 S.W.2d 261, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 641 (1965); Globe Co. Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Tenn. 37, 442 S.W.2d 253, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1969).

Causal connection is cause in the sense the accident had its origins in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee while doing his work. Lawrenceburg v. Nelson, 219 Tenn. 177, 407 S.W.2d 674, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 516 (1966).

The question of causal connection is one of fact and review of trial court on this point will only be for sole purpose of determining if there is material evidence to support findings. Poe v. E. I. Dupont Denemours & Co., 224 Tenn. 683, 462 S.W.2d 480, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 392 (1970).

Where employee fainted and was nauseous while being treated for an on the job injury to her ankle and shortly after she felt stiffness of the neck, the evidence was sufficient to establish a causal connection between stress during treatment of the ankle injury and the rupture of a pre-existent aneurism. Elmore's Variety Store v. White, 553 S.W.2d 350, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 581 (Tenn. 1977).

Where employee had recently assumed a new job involving heavier work, and experienced a sudden pain in her shoulder while flinging a pair of overalls onto a rack, which was a usual action required in her new job, there was sufficient evidence of a causal connection between her injury and her work. Continental Ins. Co. v. Dowdy, 560 S.W.2d 619, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. 1978).

Where the cause of a fall is due to some condition personal to the employee, and is not causally related to some hazard incident to the conditions of the employment, injury resulting therefrom is not compensable under workers' compensation statutes. Dickerson v. Trousdale Mfg. Co., 569 S.W.2d 803, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 628 (Tenn. 1978).

In many of the cases where recovery has been allowed for myocardial infarctions, although not in all, some unusual or sudden event involving emotional stress, fright or shock could be pointed to as the precipitating event. In others, the statutory provisions did not include a requirement of injury by accident. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979).

When emotional stress that accompanies the performance of the employment contract is “within the bounds of the ups and downs of emotional normal human experience”, courts frequently decline to impose liability upon employers for conditions resulting from “cumulated” strain. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979).

Absent either physical exertion or some acute, sudden or unexpected emotional stress directly attributable to employment, an industrial accident should not be deemed to have occurred, even though worry, anxiety or emotional stress of a general nature may have preceded the onset of a myocardial infarction. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979).

Mental stimulus, such as fright, shock or excessive unexpected anxiety resulting in injury might justify a compensation award. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Wells, 578 S.W.2d 369, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 409 (Tenn. 1979).

In determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment, the relation of the employment to the injury is the essential point of inquiry, liability for workers' compensation is not based upon any act or omission of the employer. Thus, the law of tort causation, wherein liability is predicated upon fault and nullified by contributory fault, is not applicable in workers' compensation cases. Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. 1980).

The court was unwilling to find that the shift of hours that an employer has available for an employee can be considered to provide a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and an employee's inability to discipline his personal life. Henley v. Roadway Express, 699 S.W.2d 150, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. 1985).

There was no causal connection between the conditions under which work was required to be performed and the resulting injury where the claimant suffered a severe and unusual reaction from ingesting a substance to enhance his work performance where the substance was not found in the workplace, was not supplied by the employer, nor was the use of the substances explicitly or implicitly required by the employment. Arden v. Hutch Mfg. Co., 771 S.W.2d 406, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 188 (Tenn. 1989).

Refusal to award medical expenses to employee in a workers'  compensation action was appropriate pursuant to T.C.A. § 50-6-102 because he failed to exercise due care and was negligent in placing his hand on the hot burner of the stove in his kitchen which operated to relieve the employer of liability for medical expenses incurred in treating the injuries from his negligent act; when employee disregarded his disabled condition and placed his fingers on the hot stove, responsibility for the accident and its consequences could no longer fairly be ascribed to his original compensable injury. Anderson v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2008).

Workers'  compensation award based on a claimant's workplace smoke inhalation was error because the claimant suffered from bulla emphysema from his cigarette smoking, and the evidence preponderated against a finding that the workplace smoke inhalation advanced the claimant's preexisting bulla emphysema; there was no evidence that the claimant's breathing limits were the direct result of damage to his remaining lung tissue caused by smoke he inhaled at the workplace and the plain meaning of the expert testimony was that the surgery was performed to treat the bullous emphysema and not the smoke inhalation. Although one doctor stated that the smoke inhalation contributed to and aggravated the claimant's emphysema, he did not state that the smoke inhalation itself advanced the severity of the claimant's preexisting condition or cause a new distinct injury. McGowan v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012), review denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012).

Finding that an employee established causation for his injury arising from a spinal infection was proper based on the expert medical testimony; the claimant's treating surgeon stated that trauma could have been a “participating” or “contributing” factor in the development of infection and that the claimant's medical history made him more vulnerable to an infection. A second doctor testified unequivocally that the claimant's injury at work led to a hematoma, which then served as a “breeding ground” for his spinal infection, and, although the second doctor's testimony was more equivocal as to causation, he testified that the work-related injury “more likely” aggravated an ongoing infection. Stewart v. Westfield Ins. Co., — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2012), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2012).

Appellate court declined to apply the causation standard of an amended statute retroactively to an employee's injury in a workers'  compensation case. Marvel v. Roane Transp. Servs., LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 587 (Tenn. July 23, 2015), aff'd, Marvel v. Roane Transp. Servs., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. July 23, 2015).

50. —Employment as Means of Accident.

The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to afford protection against accidental results, and, broadly speaking, under such statute, the employment itself is the means of the accident, and the employment, of course, is never accidental. Scott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Tenn. 351, 87 S.W.2d 1011, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1935).

Where employee, after becoming ill with pains in chest and arms, was sent to company infirmary where he rested for approximately two hours and was then sent back to work, and later that day died from a heart attack while working, his death arose out of and in the course of his employment although he was doing nothing but his ordinary work. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 174 F. Supp. 308, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3037 (D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 200, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4678 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1960).

Where worker would have completely recovered from an attack of edema occurring on the job except for an operation performed for correction of heart disease having no connection with his employment, evidence was not sufficient to establish causal connection between employment and disability. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kessler, 208 Tenn. 224, 345 S.W.2d 663, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 414 (1961).

Recovery of benefits is proper for death due to a heart attack immediately precipitated by acute or sudden emotional stress as opposed to physical exertion, where the necessary causal connection is properly established by the proof. Cabe v. Union Carbide Corp., 644 S.W.2d 397, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 601 (Tenn. 1983).

51. —Two or More Accidents Causing Injury.

A disability is nonetheless an injury by accident when it results from a series of accidents, each specific and ascertainable, although its exclusive influence in the resulting disability cannot be fixed precisely. Burton v. Miller Bros. Co., 166 Tenn. 622, 64 S.W.2d 195, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (1933).

While an accidental injury must be assignable to a particular time and place, the rule is satisfied if each of several accidents, assigned as the combined or alternative causes of a disability, can be thus localized and identified. Burton v. Miller Bros. Co., 166 Tenn. 622, 64 S.W.2d 195, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (1933).

It is not necessary that the happening of the accident be a single occurrence identified in space or time. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1949).

Where there are two equally probable causes of death, one which would impose liability and the other which would not, the plaintiff must fail since the burden of proof to establish accidental death rests upon him. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Clark, 194 F.2d 29, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2725 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

Where permanent and total loss of use of eye was the result of two accidents occurring while employee was in employ of different employers and under testimony it was impossible to allocate any particular part of the loss to any particular employer, chancellor's finding of joint and several liability on part of both employers was correct. J. E. Greene Co. v. Bennett, 207 Tenn. 635, 341 S.W.2d 751, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 503 (1960), overruled in part, Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ray, 596 S.W.2d 816, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 1980).

The last employer or insurance carrier will be liable in full for any permanent disability resulting from the last of successive injuries under different employers or insurance carriers. Globe Co. Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Tenn. 37, 442 S.W.2d 253, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1969).

52. —Prima Facie Case of Accident — Effect.

Where the claimant had made out a prima facie case, the employer is required to go forward and negative this prima facie case. This may either be done by showing the cause of death or by showing other causes equally probable. Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (1948).

Where an employee is found dead at his post of labor, without direct evidence as to the manner of his death, an inference may arise of an accident springing out of and in the course of his employment. In other words a prima facie case for the claimant is thus supported. When such a prima facie case is thus made out the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence to overthrow it. Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (1948).

The defendant is not called upon to introduce any proof or make any explanation as to the death of the employee except where the facts alleged make a prima facie case. Farris v. Yellow Cab Co., 189 Tenn. 46, 222 S.W.2d 187, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 397 (1949).

Where there was substantial evidence that the decedent was in good health prior to his death and upon the very morning of his death, that he had sustained a serious fall after propelling a handtruck and handling several crates which weighed between 25 and 35 pounds and that immediately after the fall there was a bruise on his head which might have been the cause of his death, the evidence was sufficient to create a prima facie case of accident, and the trial court's finding that death was due to an accident was not clearly erroneous, notwithstanding the employer's contention that the medical evidence established the cause of death as heart seizure. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Clark, 194 F.2d 29, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2725 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

Prima facie case of compensable death was shown where miner found dead in mine had shoveled 18 tons of coal from kneeling position. Phillips v. Eureka Casualty Co., 133 F. Supp. 630, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2930 (D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 743, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 3202 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1956).

Where an employee is found dead at his post of labor without direct evidence as to the manner of his death an inference may arise of an accident springing out of and in the course of his employment and when a prima facie case is thus made out the burden shifts to the employer to overturn such prima facie case. Eureka Casualty Co. v. Phillips, 233 F.2d 743, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 3202 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1956).

53. —Disease or Condition Contributing to Injury.

A cook, becoming faint from overheated kitchen, stepped into an alley for fresh air and falling was injured by a passing truck. He was entitled to recover. Patten Hotel Co. v. Milner, 145 Tenn. 632, 238 S.W. 75, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1921).

Where epilepsy, or other physical disturbances, suddenly and without expectation occur and contribute to cause an injury to an employee while at work the same should be held compensable, provided there is present another hazard, incident to the employment, which is generally known to exist and which is shown to be the immediate cause of the accident. Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S.W.2d 977, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1951).

Sickness, or any idiopathic condition, is considered as a “remote cause;” if another cause, incident to the employment, is present and is the immediate cause of the injury and death it is an injury “arising out of,” the employment. McCann Steel Co. v. Carney, 192 Tenn. 94, 237 S.W.2d 942, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1951).

A predisposition toward an injury will not bar a claimant from workers' compensation. Bush Bros. & Co. v. Williams, 197 Tenn. 334, 273 S.W.2d 137, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (1954).

Where tension or fatigue of work accelerated or triggered a cerebral thrombosis, causing the employee to faint, striking his head upon the floor, resulting in a fractured skull, which caused his death, the employee's death was caused by an accident while in the performance of his duties and was compensable. Whitehead v. Aluminum Co., 239 F. Supp. 415, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aff'd, Whitehead v. Aluminum Co. of America, 361 F.2d 620, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5862 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1966).

The death of a worker who was caused to fall by a cerebral thrombosis, fracturing his skull, was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Whitehead v. Aluminum Co. of America, 361 F.2d 620, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5862 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1966).

54. —Aggravation of Preexisting Condition.

Compensation may be properly awarded for disability resulting from aggravation of a preexisting heart disorder by an accidental injury. Sanders v. Blue Ridge Glass Corp., 161 Tenn. 535, 33 S.W.2d 84, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1930); Anderson v. Volz Const. Co., 183 Tenn. 169, 191 S.W.2d 436, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1946); Lucey Boiler & Mfg. Corp. v. Hicks, 188 Tenn. 700, 222 S.W.2d 19, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 393 (1949).

Preexisting weakness or disease will not prevent injury from being result of accident, and acceleration or aggravation of preexisting ailment may be compensable injury. Cambria Coal Co. v. Ault, 166 Tenn. 567, 64 S.W.2d 18, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1933).

Dependents of an injured employee were entitled to compensation, where the injury either caused his death or accelerated an existing cancer or other malady, thereby causing his death. Tullahoma v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91, 114 S.W.2d 804, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1938).

Evidence to the effect that worker suffered from diseased blood vessels prior to his death but prior to the time of his death had performed his work and was apparently undisturbed by his condition supported the finding of the trial judge that his death was the result of a fall while on the job which induced the rupture of the blood vessels. Riverside Mill Co. v. Parsons, 176 Tenn. 381, 141 S.W.2d 895, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1940).

Death of employee which occurred without warning while making manholes on a hot day was not compensable where medical evidence showed that cause of death was the sudden cutting off of blood supply as result of diseased heart. Anderson v. Volz Const. Co., 183 Tenn. 169, 191 S.W.2d 436, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1946).

Injured back from lifting side of beef, though due to a congenital weak back, is compensable. Swift & Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S.W.2d 388, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (1948).

When an employer employs a worker he takes him as he is and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of the disability and excites and aggravates a previous weakened condition, then the employer is liable. Swift & Co. v. Howard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212 S.W.2d 388, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (1948).

Ruptured aneurism of aorta 55 minutes after accidental injury to finger and 10 minutes after amputation of finger was compensable, though walls of aorta had been weakened by disease of syphilis, where there was testimony by expert witnesses that ruptured aneurism could have been due to excitement from accident. Lucey Boiler & Mfg. Corp. v. Hicks, 188 Tenn. 700, 222 S.W.2d 19, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 393 (1949).

Disability resulting from an untoward event, which we commonly refer to as an accident, that hastens the onset of an affliction or aggravates a preexisting disease, is compensable. Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266 (D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 333, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2625 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

In an action to recover death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law, the stronger inference was that the injury of decedent and the inseparable consequences of ceaseless pain and worry and nervous tension aggravated a preexisting coronary sclerosis and hastened his death, and the death was held compensable. Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266 (D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 333, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2625 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

Where the evidence showed that the employee died of blood poisoning resulting from a cut received in the course of his employment, the death arose out of and in the course of the employment, in spite of the fact that the employee was suffering from leukemia, and would eventually have died from that disease. McCann Steel Co. v. Carney, 192 Tenn. 94, 237 S.W.2d 942, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1951).

Where an accident can be fairly considered to be a contributing cause of death, it is compensable under the statute, even though the injured employee was suffering from some prior disability of a serious nature. Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 354, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (1951).

Where it is doubtless true that sooner or later an employee would have died from a cancer, with which he was afflicted, the case is still compensable if an accident in the course of his employment so accelerated or aggravated the cancer that the accident was a contributing cause to the shortening of his life. Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 354, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (1951).

If a blow inflicted upon the leg injures that leg by aggravating a preexisting disease it is no less an injury received from the blow, within the meaning of the statute, than it would have been if there had been no preexisting disease. Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 194 Tenn. 467, 253 S.W.2d 552, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (1952).

Death of employee from coronary occlusion as result of overworking on a hot day was compensable since exertion aggravated diseased heart condition and hastened his death. Jenkins v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 113 F. Supp. 250, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2558 (D. Tenn. 1953).

Employer takes employee in the condition in which he is employed and assumes risk of having any weakened condition aggravated or accelerated by employment, therefore even though employee dies of predisposed disease, if it is shown by expert testimony that physical exertion on the job was a contributing and accelerating factor, a compensable case is made which is not speculative. Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (1955).

Employee may be compensated where peptic ulcer was caused to rupture by strain of work. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. Starcher, 202 Tenn. 278, 304 S.W.2d 87, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 389 (1957).

Recovery may be had for aggravation of preexisting condition where such issue is raised by the evidence, even though the employee does not allege such ground in his pleading or seek at the outset to recover on this theory. Norton v. Standard Coosa-Thatcher Co., 203 Tenn. 649, 315 S.W.2d 245, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (1958).

Evidence that heat stroke occurring in course of employment aggravated a preexisting arteriosclerosis condition was sufficient to make out a compensable injury. Eslinger v. Miller Bros. Co., 203 Tenn. 688, 315 S.W.2d 261, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (1958).

If the physical activity and exertion of an employee's work aggravates a preexisting heart condition, precipitates a fatal heart attack and thus hastens his death, such death is the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Rychen, 204 Tenn. 575, 322 S.W.2d 432, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (1958); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (1959); Sweat v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 169 F. Supp. 155, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3816 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd, 272 F.2d 943, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 2913 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1959); Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 210 Tenn. 170, 357 S.W.2d 50, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (1962).

Where an employer employs a worker, he takes him as he is and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not affect a normal person. Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 283 (1959); Combustion Engineering Co. v. Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 357 S.W.2d 625, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 428 (1962); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Treadwell, 212 Tenn. 1, 367 S.W.2d 470, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 393 (1963); American Surety Co. v. Kizer, 212 Tenn. 328, 369 S.W.2d 736, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 426 (1963); Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 1993).

Where evidence sustained finding of trial court that employee's fall from bakery truck in the course of his employment aggravated preexisting cirrhosis of the liver and resulted in permanent partial disability of 75 percent of the whole body, causal connection was established between the employment and the injury so that employee was entitled to compensation. Martha White Bakeries, Inc. v. Vance, 204 Tenn. 491, 322 S.W.2d 206, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 302 (1959).

Where evidence sustained the finding that worker who had preexisting condition of berry aneurysm died from the rupture of a blood vessel while using a power saw in the course of his employment, such death was compensable. Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 210 Tenn. 170, 357 S.W.2d 50, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 420 (1962).

Traumatic aggravation of otherwise noncompensable disease as result of employment was compensable. Combustion Engineering Co. v. Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 357 S.W.2d 625, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 428 (1962).

Where last injury resulted from the aggravation of a prior injury received while working for another employer and in proceeding for compensation from the last employer it was determined that the disability was attributable to the injury received while working for such employer, such employer could not bring action for contribution against the first employer. Baxter v. Smith, 211 Tenn. 347, 364 S.W.2d 936, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 360 (1962).

Disability resulting from aggravation of a preexisting disease or condition is compensable. American Surety Co. v. Kizer, 212 Tenn. 328, 369 S.W.2d 736, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 426 (1963).

Where worker reported to work in apparent good health and about an hour later suffered a rupture of a hemangioma or vascular tumor located on the left cerebral hemisphere while working as a ripsaw operator and there was medical testimony that such physical exertion could produce the rupture, evidence sustained finding of trial judge that death of employee resulted from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Morristown Chest Co. v. Morgan, 212 Tenn. 441, 370 S.W.2d 513, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 439 (1963).

Although driving a tractor-trailer rig may have aggravated claimant's diseased heart condition, under Tennessee law it was not enough to establish that his death was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; in addition, preponderance of evidence must show driving the truck aggravated plaintiff's diseased condition and that his death was accelerated as a proximate result of such aggravation. Kirby v. Dance Freight Lines, 226 F. Supp. 947, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6452 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).

Proof failed to show that death of plaintiff's intestate, which followed driving tractor-trailer rigs for employer, was caused by an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment or that his heart trouble was aggravated to the extent that it shortened his life or accelerated his death. Kirby v. Dance Freight Lines, 226 F. Supp. 947, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6452 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).

Where, due to cerebral thrombosis, which was aggravated, accelerated or triggered by his work, employee became dizzy and immediately fell to the floor, sustaining skull fracture which was the primary cause of death, employee met with an accident while in performance of his duties, for purposes of workers' compensation. Whitehead v. Aluminum Co., 239 F. Supp. 415, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aff'd, Whitehead v. Aluminum Co. of America, 361 F.2d 620, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5862 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1966).

Where decedent, driver of tractor-trailer rig, died at his home after returning from a long and strenuous trip which placed unusual stress on his preexisting diseased heart, the widow was entitled to recover, as her husband's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. Treadway v. Associated Transport, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 301, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9847 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).

An employer takes an employee as he finds him so that employer is liable for disabilities resulting from injuries sustained by employee arising out of and in the course of his employment even though it aggravates a previous condition with resulting disability far greater than otherwise would have been the case. Globe Co. Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Tenn. 37, 442 S.W.2d 253, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1969); Newport v. Webb, 223 Tenn. 445, 446 S.W.2d 683, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 430 (1969); Blalock v. Williams, 483 S.W.2d 578, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1972).

Where, while securing chicken coops on truck in course of his employment, employee suffered attack of angina pectoris which aggravated and accelerated preexisting arteriosclerotic heart disease and contributed to coronary occlusion, employee suffered injury by accident in course of employment. R. E. Butts Co. v. Powell, 225 Tenn. 119, 463 S.W.2d 707, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 284 (1971).

When an employer employs a worker he takes him as he is and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a normal, healthy person, but such injury must be the proximate cause of the workers' disability to be compensable. Blalock v. Williams, 483 S.W.2d 578, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. 1972).

Unrebutted statement in death certificate filled out by company doctor that cause of death of employee was “acute coronary thrombosis” due to “coronary atherosclerosis”, together with testimony of physician that if employee had preexisting condition of atherosclerosis then the work he was performing could contribute to accelerate his fatal heart attack was sufficient to support finding of chancellor that there was a causal connection between work employee was performing and his death by heart attack suffered on job. Boles v. Aluminum Co. of America, 483 S.W.2d 582, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 368 (Tenn. 1972).

The exertion of unloading heavy boxes from a truck aggravated a preexisting condition of arteriosclerosis causing a heart attack which was an injury arising out of and in the course of employment and there was a causal connection therein. Palmer v. Pruitt, 498 S.W.2d 89, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (Tenn. 1973).

In an action for compensation for permanent partial disability as a result of a ruptured disc, evidence of rheumatoid arthritis in the joints of the arms and legs did not support an award for aggravation of the preexisting condition of rheumatoid arthritis. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co. v. Vines, 498 S.W.2d 897, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. 1973).

Where employee suffered a myocardial infarction while at work, his subsequent death was covered by the act even though exertion at work only aggravated a preexistent condition, and even though the exertion was no more than the job ordinarily required. Kingsport Press, Inc. v. Van Huss, 547 S.W.2d 572, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 566 (Tenn. 1977).

Where the employee's arthritic condition was aggravated and made symptomatic by the bending, stooping, lifting, reaching and twisting motions required by the job assignment he was given, his injury was included within the definition of an accident. Laminite Plastics Mfg. Co. v. Greene, 561 S.W.2d 458, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 583 (Tenn. 1978).

Although there was no evidence in record that the last act performed before the onset of pain was the cause of the injury, it is reasonable to conclude that a back injury sustained shortly after doing heavy work was caused by the work, as the injured person suffered from a degenerative disorder which can be aggravated by such work. American Precision, Inc. v. Ottinger, 562 S.W.2d 818, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. 1978).

Where an employer employs a worker, he takes him as he is and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not affect a normal person. See Harlan v. McClellan, 572 S.W.2d 641, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 1978).

Employee's previous back injury, for which he received compensation for approximately seven to eight percent permanent disability, did not preclude an award for disability resulting from the current injury to his back. Harlan v. McClellan, 572 S.W.2d 641, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 1978).

Defendant employer which employed plaintiff with a preexisting weakened condition (diabetes), which generally made him more susceptible to infections, was not liable for aggravation of an infection that plaintiff contracted from some source other than work and which has not been shown to be employment-related even though aggravation may have been caused by working conditions. Bowers v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 787, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. 1979).

If a work related accident aggravates an idiopathic condition, causing injury or death, or if it is a contributing cause, compensation is available. Hall v. Auburntown Industries, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 614, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. 1985).

The last successive employer or insurance carrier, taking the employee as he is found at the time of the accident, will be liable for the entire resulting disability, including all medical expenses arising from the disability and regardless of any preexisting condition. Bennett v. Howard Johnsons Motor Lodge, 714 S.W.2d 273, 1986 Tenn. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. 1986).

The aggravation of a preexisting nervous condition by a physical injury is compensable. Thomas v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 246 (Tenn. 1991).

Physical or mental injuries caused by worry, anxiety or emotional stress of a general nature or ordinary stress associated with the worker's occupation are not compensable; the injury must have resulted from an incident of abnormal and unusual stressful proportions, rather than the day to day mental stresses and tensions to which workers in that field are occasionally subjected. Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., 46 S.W.3d 131, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc. , — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. 2001).

55. —Alcoholics.

Where an employee, with a five-year history of alcoholism and related diseases, including pancreatitis and cirrhosis of the liver, while on duty as a policeman, fell on an icy street, which aggravated degenerative arthritis in his back and neck causing extreme pain and preventing him from working, and he then began drinking more heavily until six months later, after acute delirium tremens, a marked enlargement of the liver and a collapse, he was admitted to the hospital in a comatose state and died of acute necrotizing pancreatitis contributed to by bilateral lobular pneumonia and cirrhosis, the court held that his fall which occurred in the course of his employment was the proximate cause of his death, that he was not guilty of willful misconduct or intentional self-inflicted injury as defined by § 50-6-110, and that his survivor was entitled to recover full compensation for his injury and death. Wheeler v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 179, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. 1974).

56. —Subsequent Disease or Condition Resulting from Injury.

Injury resulting from an infection following the formation of a callous upon claimant's fingertip, occasioned by operation of listing machine, was accidental. Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. Starnes, 160 Tenn. 504, 26 S.W.2d 128, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1930).

Where an employee, in the course of his employment, accidentally fell and struck his head against a radiator, and soon afterwards symptoms of epilepsy developed without any other apparent cause, and expert medical testimony shows that such an injury often gives rise to epilepsy, it was sufficient to support finding that the condition was brought about by the fall and injury. Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. Finney, 169 Tenn. 547, 89 S.W.2d 749, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1936).

Evidence to the effect that the death of a policeman 40 days after being struck by a car was caused by an internal condition which was either brought about by such accident or aggravated thereby was sufficient to support an award for death of the policeman on grounds that such death was either proximately caused or appreciably accelerated by such injury. Tullahoma v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91, 114 S.W.2d 804, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1938).

Where three medical witnesses introduced by defendant testified that the cause of cancer was purely speculative, that the idea that a blow might cause cancer had been advanced but never proven true and where medical witness for petitioner testified that medical science did not know that cancer will result from certain conditions or that it results from traumatic conditions, finding of the trial judge that the proof did not establish that cancer from which deceased worker died was caused by a blow sustained in the course of employment was proper. McBrayer v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 178 Tenn. 135, 156 S.W.2d 408, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1941).

Evidence held sufficient to justify the finding of the trial court that pericarditis with effusion, by which disease the employee was disabled, was directly attributable to repeated sharp blows upon the chest suffered by the employee in the course of his employment. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1949).

Coronary occlusion three months and one week after injury to foot as result of fall was compensable where employee had suffered pain and shock to nervous system so as to aggravate heart condition. Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266 (D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 333, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2625 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

Where petitioner made out a prima facie case that death of deceased employee from cerebro vascular accident was contributed to or aggravated by a sun or heat stroke, and there was no autopsy or any evidence contrary to prima facie case established by petitioner, an award for compensation was justified. Cunningham v. Hembree, 195 Tenn. 107, 257 S.W.2d 12, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 307 (1953).

Where employee employed as a miner, in apparent good health, sustained a ruptured artery after crawling on his hands and knees a distance of 500 to 800 feet, and 30 days thereafter, following two operations for the purpose of tying off some of the blood flow to the artery, died of thrombosis of the artery, widow was entitled to compensation since exertion in reaching his work was the cause of the ruptured artery. Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 406 (1953).

It was immaterial that the initial injury may have been small in contrast to the grave consequences which resulted where there was a causal relation between the initiating accident and the resultant disability. Kitts v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp. 937, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2971 (D. Tenn. 1955).

Testimony of claimant's attendant doctor that first heart attack in course of employment could have so impaired the heart to make it incapable of standing later attack, without stating direct causal relationship, was sufficient to justify award upon holding that the first attack substantially contributed to the second. Powers v. Beasley, 197 Tenn. 549, 276 S.W.2d 720, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (1955).

Where decedent carrying heavy loads in work suffered a brain hemorrhage and, after several months' treatment, suffered another hemorrhage causing death, his death arose out of original employment since it contributed to his death. Parrott v. Parrott, 198 Tenn. 96, 278 S.W.2d 83, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 350 (1955).

Where workers' compensation claimant suffered electric shock which doctors testify could “possibly” have caused later brain injury seven years after shock, with no symptoms in meantime, decision of trial judge refusing award on basis of one of two reasonable conflicting inferences as to cause will be sustained. Lynch v. La Rue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (1955).

Where employee was hospitalized as result of compensable injury, aggravation of injury as result of negligence of hospital orderly while bathing employee during course of treatment was compensable. Mallette v. Mercury Outboard Supply Co., 204 Tenn. 438, 321 S.W.2d 816, 1959 Tenn. LEXIS 298 (1959), overruled in part, Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 38, 4 A.L.R.5th 1086 (Tenn. 1989).

Chancellor was justified in finding causal connection between employee's back injury and his death from hepatitis where employee used drugs and whiskey to relieve continued and excruciating pain resulting from such injury without knowing that they were dangerous to his life when he was suffering from malnutrition. Fennell v. Maryland Casualty Co., 208 Tenn. 116, 344 S.W.2d 352, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 402 (1961).

Death of worker resulting from operation of tractor was not compensable as arising out of his former employment on ground that necessity of operation of tractor resulting from his inability to perform former work. Jones v. Huey, 210 Tenn. 162, 357 S.W.2d 47, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1962).

Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, every natural consequence that flows from such injury likewise arises out of the employment unless the subsequent injury is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to the employee's own negligence or misconduct. Jones v. Huey, 210 Tenn. 162, 357 S.W.2d 47, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 419 (1962).

Where, in compensation suit involving successive hospitalizations, chancellor found that disability resulted from injury occurring at time of first hospitalization, such finding was binding in suit between the insurance carriers as of the two dates who, although not named, had entered appearances in the original suit. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 52 Tenn. App. 43, 371 S.W.2d 801, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Where an employee was injured about the hips, pelvis and legs in a cave-in and an embolism developed during his convalescence causing either a pulmonary embolism or a coronary thrombosis, causing the employee to fall out of a chair and die, his death was caused by the injuries received in his employment. Manis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 239 F. Supp. 439, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7062 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

Nurse's claim for workers' compensation benefits, based upon the nurse's claim that the nurse had contracted tuberculosis when the nurse's hand came into contact with the blood of a patient who was subsequently diagnosed with tuberculosis, was dismissed because the nurse failed to present competent medical evidence that the nurse had contracted tuberculosis as a result of the nurse's employment. Wheetley v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. June 25, 2014), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. June 25, 2014).

57. —Subsequent Injuries Following Rehabilitation.

The policy allowing compensation in spite of a previous determination of permanent disability to the same member encourages rehabilitation and reemployment. Harlan v. McClellan, 572 S.W.2d 641, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 1978).

An employee who rehabilitates himself and returns to work rather than relying on public relief should not be penalized for his rehabilitation or discouraged from re-entry into the work force by the denial of benefits for subsequent injuries. Harlan v. McClellan, 572 S.W.2d 641, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 656 (Tenn. 1978).

58. —Elemental Forces.

When an employee's work exposes him to an elemental force and requires him to continue to work under the risk of the hazard which the elemental force creates, the employee is to be compensated for injuries which result therefrom. Hodge v. Diamond Container General, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 659, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. 1988).

It is foreseeable that when exposed to the hot sun or the freezing cold an employee suffers an injury therefrom. When the nature of the work requires exposure to the risk of this hazard, any injury resulting therefrom arises out of and in the course of the employment. Hodge v. Diamond Container General, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 659, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (Tenn. 1988).

59. —Heat Prostration, Sunstroke and Heat Exhaustion.

Heat prostration of a fireman in boiler room on an extremely hot day is compensable. King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 72, 53 A.L.R. 1086 (1927).

Where it was shown without dispute that the employee while at his work in loading timber on a very hot July day fell and after a few minutes died, and that the employee was a strong, healthy, able-bodied man, the evidence made out a prima facie case of death from heat exhaustion, heat prostration or sunstroke. Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (1948).

Death caused by heat prostration, sunstroke or heat exhaustion is compensable in this state. Anderson v. Volz Const. Co., 183 Tenn. 169, 191 S.W.2d 436, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1946); Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (1948); T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235 S.W.2d 585, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (1951).

Death of employee was compensable where he died suddenly while engaged in loading crossties on a hot day where medical testimony established that cause of death was sunstroke. T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235 S.W.2d 585, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (1951).

60. —Frostbite and Freezing.

Where employee's work exposed him to the elemental force of freezing for long hours, frostbite resulting therefrom was compensable. Globe Co. Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Tenn. 37, 442 S.W.2d 253, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 387 (1969).

61. —Back Injuries.

Back injury claims are recognized as appropriate situations for applying gradual injury guidelines; however, while in some cases an employee's back injury has been found to have occurred gradually and not as the result of a specific incident, the court has never held that back injuries are always gradual injuries. Each case must be decided on its facts based upon the proof relating to causation. Mynatt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Cos., 699 S.W.2d 799, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. 1985).

62. —Hernia.

If, as result of a strain in lifting some heavy article for his employer, an employee dislocates his vertebrae, or breaks his wrist, or ruptures a blood vessel, it could not be seriously insisted that such unexpected injury was not accidental. If the strain or “stretching,” as petitioner terms his act, instead of causing one of the injuries just enumerated, produces a hernia, the occurrence is nonetheless accidental. Webster v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 177 Tenn. 122, 146 S.W.2d 946, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1941).

Where uncontradicted evidence was to the effect that deceased, a strong healthy man without previous evidence of hernia, engaged in very heavy work subjecting himself to strain in lifting heavy bars of iron, left his place of employment, walked one block to his home and there complained of pain in his side, went to bed and remained there for two days and that on the morning of the third day his employer's physician found him suffering from hernia, the inference was irresistible that deceased had received this injury while lifting the heavy bars and the trial court erred in holding that there was no evidence to show that deceased received an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Riley v. Knoxville Iron Co., 178 Tenn. 107, 156 S.W.2d 398, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1941).

63. —Mental Ailments and Nervous Conditions.

The word “injury” in the Workers' Compensation Law is broader than the mere reference to some objective physical break or wound to the body and includes the consequences therefrom such as mental ailments or nervous conditions. Buck & Simmons Auto & Electric Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1952).

An employee disabled by “traumatic or post-traumatic neurosis” precipitated by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment is entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law. Buck & Simmons Auto & Electric Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1952).

Testimony of doctors and neighbors of muscle spasms and inability to walk or work is such substantial evidence of causation and permanent disability as to allow trial judge to award compensation where claimant alleges back injury. Bush Bros. & Co. v. Williams, 197 Tenn. 334, 273 S.W.2d 137, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 491 (1954).

Traumatic or post-traumatic neurosis is an “injury” within the meaning of the act. McKenzie v. Campbell & Dann Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 475, 354 S.W.2d 440, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (1962).

Where the medical testimony gave no opinion as to the permanence of a present aggravated nervous condition, there was no evidence before the trial court from which a permanent impairment could be inferred. Minton v. Leonard, 219 Tenn. 642, 412 S.W.2d 886, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (1967).

Where there was testimony in the record by psychiatrist that employee suffered from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and that such condition disabled him from work, supreme court would not disturb trial court's finding to that effect even though on the basis of the entire record it might have reached a different conclusion. Gluck Bros., Inc. v. Pollard, 221 Tenn. 383, 426 S.W.2d 763, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 471 (1968).

Mental or nervous illnesses are compensable when shown to be caused by an industrial, work-related accident. Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. 1977).

Where defendant's claim for workers' compensation benefits alleged that he sustained a “severe psychiatric illness” as a result of being placed under a tremendous amount of pressure and tension in order to meet his obligations to his employer, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim due to its general, conclusory nature and lack of specificity. Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (Tenn. 1977).

Trial court erred in awarding workers' compensation benefits for a mental injury to a worker who had been exposed to the blood of a co-worker whom she believed was HIV positive where she had not shown actual exposure to the virus through a medically recognized channel of transmission and five HIV tests had been performed on her and all were negative. The Supreme Court of Tennessee is unwilling to award workers' compensation disability benefits to a claimant who suffers from an irrational fear of exposure to HIV when there is no proof of actual exposure via a medically recognized channel of transmission. Guess v. Sharp Mfg. Co. of Am., 114 S.W.3d 480, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 722 (Tenn. 2003).

Trial court had not erred in concluding that a claimant had not suffered a cognitive impairment due to a work related accident because she had not asserted that she had sustained a closed head injury until her attorney referred her for psychological testing almost three years after the accident. And, the court found “a huge void” in the medical evidence between the time that she received treatment from the neurologist and the time that she was referred for psychological testing. Layman v. Vanguard Contrs., 183 S.W.3d 310, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. 2006).

64. —Emotional Stress.

Worry, anxiety or emotional stress of a general nature are not in and of themselves sufficient to establish an accident. Emotional stress, to some degree, accompanies the performance of any contract of employment; when this is within the bounds of the ups and downs of emotional normal human experience, courts frequently decline to impose liability upon employers for conditions resulting from cumulated strain. Henley v. Roadway Express, 699 S.W.2d 150, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 561 (Tenn. 1985).

For a mental injury by accident or occupational disease to arise out of employment, it must be caused by an identifiable stressful, work-related event producing a sudden mental stimulus such as fright, shock or excessive unexpected anxiety, and therefore it may not be gradual employment stress building up over a period of time. In addition, the stress produced may not be usual stress, but must be extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the stress ordinarily experienced by an employee in the same type duty. Gatlin v. Knoxville, 822 S.W.2d 587, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. 1991).

Where plaintiff suffered an acute, sudden, or unexpected emotional stress, there was an injury by accident. Jones v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 811 S.W.2d 516, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. 1991).

Even if incident where employee was informed by her supervisor that she was probably going to be fired caused employee's mental breakdown, the employee's mental injury was not compensable. Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. 2001).

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can, in some circumstances, be a compensable workers' compensation injury. Guess v. Sharp Mfg. Co. of Am., 114 S.W.3d 480, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 722 (Tenn. 2003).

65. —Poisoning.

Death of person employed to remove trolley lines and steel rails from coal mines as result of arsenic poisoning was not compensable where expert evidence showed that amount of arsenic from copper wiring handled by deceased in mines was not in sufficient quantity to have caused arsenic poisoning. Smith v. Fentress Coal & Coke Co., 188 Tenn. 656, 222 S.W.2d 3, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1949).

66. —Diseases.

Disease caused by breathing dust in work of moving sacks containing chemicals was not compensable. Meade Fiber Corp. v. Starnes, 147 Tenn. 362, 247 S.W. 989, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1923). But see part 3 of this chapter.

Despite conflict in testimony of medical experts, pyelitis held to have been caused by injury to employee's back seven weeks previously. Vester Gas Range & Mfg. Co. v. Leonard, 148 Tenn. 665, 257 S.W. 395, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1923).

Pneumonia from which employee died four days after heat prostration, which was the moving, exciting or contributing cause of the pneumonia, held to have naturally resulted from such injury. King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 72, 53 A.L.R. 1086 (1927).

Whenever an injury by accident can be said to have been the moving, exciting or contributing cause of a resulting disease, such disease “naturally resulted” from the injury; and it is wholly immaterial whether such disease often or usually results from similar injuries. King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 72, 53 A.L.R. 1086 (1927).

An accidental injury may be occasioned by squeezing a pimple resulting in infection with a disease communicated by a horse, cared for by the employee, to his fingers. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Hay, 159 Tenn. 202, 17 S.W.2d 904, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1929).

In order for a disease to be referable to an accidental injury, its inception must be assignable to a determinate, single occurrence, identified in time and space. Morrison v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 162 Tenn. 523, 39 S.W.2d 272, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1931); Gabbard v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp., 184 Tenn. 464, 201 S.W.2d 651, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (1947). But see part 3 of this chapter.

If an employee suffers from a disease at all, occupational or otherwise, he has no recourse under this act unless the disease naturally results from an accidental injury. Morrison v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 162 Tenn. 523, 39 S.W.2d 272, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (1931); Gabbard v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp., 184 Tenn. 464, 201 S.W.2d 651, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 398 (1947). But see part 3 of this chapter.

Since the cause of cancer is purely speculative, it could not be said that deceased employee died of cancer caused by a blow on the breast while working. McBrayer v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 178 Tenn. 135, 156 S.W.2d 408, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1941).

Loss of eye held to be result of disease and not accident. Craig v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 190 Tenn. 234, 229 S.W.2d 148, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1950).

Acts 1947, ch. 139, compiled in this section and in parts 2 and 3 of this chapter, did not limit compensation to specified occupational diseases if the disability from the disease is the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Buck & Simmons Auto & Electric Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1952).

Death by apoplexy while carrying light rope was not compensable since sudden death was not due to exertion but to progress of disease. Wilhart v. L. A. Warlick Const. Co., 195 Tenn. 344, 259 S.W.2d 655, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (1953).

Spondylolisthesis is a disability capable of supporting an award under the Workers' Compensation Act since such disability, in addition to being congenital, may result from trauma. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Friar, 218 Tenn. 554, 404 S.W.2d 518, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 588 (1966).

Occupational diseases are embraced within the terms “injury” and “personal injury.” Wittenbarger v. Carr Co., 557 S.W.2d 65, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 670 (Tenn. 1977).

The death of an employee who dies in the course of his employment by reason of a heart attack, although suffering from a previous heart disease, is covered under the Workers' Compensation Act even if the result was produced only by ordinary exertion and usual strain of the work. Cortrim Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 570 S.W.2d 854, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. 1978).

An injury by accident is not separate from an occupational disease in terms of legal analysis because they both fall within the statutory definition of injury. Gatlin v. Knoxville, 822 S.W.2d 587, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. 1991).

Where police officer's heart attack was not immediately precipitated by a specific acute or sudden stressful event, the trial court's finding of compensability was reversed. Benton v. City of Springfield, 973 S.W.2d 936, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (Tenn. 1998).

Employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits because the employee developed a lung condition as a consequence of the employee's exposure at work to grain dust that was produced by a grain facility adjacent to the employer's workplace. Plotner v. Metal Prep, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 677 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014), aff'd, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 679 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014).

67. —Permanent Disfigurement.

Permanent disfigurement is an injury covered by workers' compensation, even if it is not disabling. Clayton v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 144, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 820 (Tenn. 1984).

68. —Scarring.

Claimant did suffer a compensable injury which arose out of the employment, occurred in the course of employment and caused disablement despite her employer's assertion that her claim should be denied because it was the result of a mere episode of pain resulting from scar tissue which had accumulated as a result of two previous surgeries, did not constitute a new injury and did not advance the severity of her preexisting condition. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 1993).

69. —Averment of Employee — Effect.

An employee is bound by his own averment that his employer's physician was of the opinion that his injury was only a back strain that would readily yield to treatment. Netherland v. Mead Corp., 170 Tenn. 520, 98 S.W.2d 76, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1936).

70. —Statements in Employment Application.

Three factors must be present before a false statement in an employment application will bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits. First, the employee must have knowingly and willfully made a false representation as to his physical condition. Second, the employer must have relied upon a false representation and this reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. Third, there must have been a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. The causal connection required is a factual showing that the injury upon which the workers' compensation claim is based is causally related to the employee's prior injuries or physical condition which were wrongfully concealed from the employer. Except in the most obvious cases, such causation must be established by expert medical testimony. Quaker Oats Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 45, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. 1978).

Although the employer insisted that the employee misrepresented her physical condition in making application for employment, and, consequently, could not recover workers' compensation benefits, where evidence that the employee had not had any “back trouble” for several years before her employment supported a finding that the employee did not knowingly or willfully misrepresent her physical condition in making application for employment, and evidence that the employee was required to undergo a pre-employment physical examination by the employer, which revealed no “back trouble,” supported a finding that the employer did not rely solely on the medical history given by the employee in making application for employment, but relied on the medical examination, there was support for the chancellor's finding that the employee was entitled to receive benefits. Quaker Oats Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 45, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. 1978).

71. —Evidence.

Where employee was found dead in badly ventilated mine where he had been doing heavy manual labor, and doctor testified in workers' compensation trial for death benefits that such air and labor would be contributing causes of death from predisposed heart trouble, although laymen testified he looked healthy, there was sufficient substantial evidence to uphold trial judge's award of compensation. Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (1955).

Medical testimony that it “is possible” or “could be responsible” is not alone sufficient on which to predicate a finding of a causal connection between the accident and the injury for which compensation is sought. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Gregory, 206 Tenn. 525, 334 S.W.2d 939, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (1959).

Where preponderance of proof showed plaintiff's intestate's death resulted from deterioration of the body caused by multiple diseases, the fact that driving a tractor-trailer rig may have been a strain on the body was not sufficient to make out a case or liability under Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Act. Kirby v. Dance Freight Lines, 226 F. Supp. 947, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6452 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).

Lay testimony is competent to establish simple but important matters such as the existence of pain, its location, inability to work and the like, but it may not be received and relied on to prove matters requiring scientific knowledge. American Enka Corp. v. Sutton, 216 Tenn. 228, 391 S.W.2d 643, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (1965).

Evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the employee was disabled as a result of coal worker's pneumoconiosis rather than the heart disease from which the employee also suffered. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bray, 570 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 1978).

In a workers' compensation proceeding for total permanent disability benefits for coal worker's pneumoconiosis, the trial court properly excluded from evidence an application and supporting data submitted by the employee, a coal miner, to the United States department of labor in an effort to obtain black lung benefits under federal statutes where the evidence was offered, not for the purpose of impeaching the employee's testimony or to show a prior inconsistent statement on his part or that of any other witness, but as substantive evidence that the employee had not sustained total disability as a result of pneumoconiosis. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bray, 570 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 1978).

Where the employee's testimony describing his symptoms and complaints, in general, was admissible, although he was not qualified to testify as to the medical reasons or cause of these, any error of the trial court in not formally striking portions of his testimony from the record was harmless and did not affect the outcome of the case, since the hearing was nonjury and before an experienced chancellor, who was clearly able to eliminate any incompetent evidence from consideration in reaching his decision. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bray, 570 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 1978).

A state court, although applying federal standards and criteria, such as are set forth in federal regulations, should make an independent determination of the employee's entitlement to compensation, and it may consider any competent evidence presented on that issue by either party. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bray, 570 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 634 (Tenn. 1978).

The trial court did not err in overruling an objection to a hypothetical question as to whether, assuming that the employee was setting up machinery, which involved a tremendous amount of bending, stooping, stretching and reaching, such exertion could have contributed to the employee's fatal heart attack, where the record indicated that adjusting wood-working machines, which is what the employee was engaged in, did consist of such activity and, moreover, the employer had the opportunity to restate the hypothetical question on cross-examination or frame other questions of his own to point out deficiencies in the question posed by the claimant. Cortrim Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 570 S.W.2d 854, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. 1978).

Where there was direct evidence that prior to his fatal heart attack a part-time high school custodian had moved desks and swept one aisle in the room where his body was found, and there was medical testimony that the exertion required of the custodian could be enough to produce a heart attack, the finding of the chancellor that there was a causal connection between the custodian's activities at work and his fatal heart attack was supported by the evidence, and the supreme court was bound by it. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 574 S.W.2d 43, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 674 (Tenn. 1978).

In “causal connection” cases, facts and circumstances revealed by lay testimony may often have relevancy upon the ultimate determination of that issue, and therefore it is not exclusively within the realm of medical science. Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lane, 576 S.W.2d 348, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. 1978).

The trial judge is not bound to accept physicians' opinions of the extent of the employee's disability, but is entitled to determine the extent of disability from all of the evidence, both expert and nonexpert. Hinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 675, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 690 (Tenn. 1983).

The preponderance of the evidence established that plaintiff did not injure his chest while at work and that his pulmonary problems for which he was hospitalized were caused by his sickle-cell disease. Sheffield v. Schneider Services Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 174, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. 1990).

Where the employee testified that she was injured while flipping a piece of wood and the medical records reflected her doctor's opinion that her back condition was work-related, the evidence was sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the employee's work activities and her back injury. Glisson v. Mohon Int'l, Inc., 185 S.W.3d 348, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (Tenn. 2006).

72. —Burden of Proof.

The plaintiff in a workers' compensation suit, and all civil actions generally, has the burden of proving his case “in all its parts” by a preponderance of the evidence. Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lane, 576 S.W.2d 348, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. 1978).

73. — —Circumstantial Evidence.

Accidental death within the Workers' Compensation Law is provable by circumstantial evidence just as any other fact may be proven. Riley v. Knoxville Iron Co., 178 Tenn. 107, 156 S.W.2d 398, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1941); Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (1955).

Compensable injury may be shown by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstances relied on must be sufficient to make out a prima facie case and at least take it out of the realm of speculation. Smith v. Fentress Coal & Coke Co., 188 Tenn. 656, 222 S.W.2d 3, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 386 (1949).

An expert is not required to testify that trauma is the cause of employee's disability but it is sufficient if the expert testifies that trauma could or might be the cause of the disability in determining issue whether trauma or disease is the cause of the disability sustained. Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 394 (1949).

The fact of accident may be established not only by direct evidence but as well by circumstances reasonably leading to an inference that an accident occurred. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Clark, 194 F.2d 29, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2725 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

Complaint for compensation which alleged that plaintiff was injured as result of fall did not bar expert testimony that fall aggravated a preexisting disease, hence exclusion of expert testimony by trial court was prejudicial error. Ledford v. Miller Bros. Co., 194 Tenn. 467, 253 S.W.2d 552, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 405 (1952).

Finding a person dead at his post of duty does not alone raise a prima facie case for compensation, but where physical exertion is also proven a prima facie case may, depending on circumstances, be made out that death was due to an accident arising out of, and in the course of employment. Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 277 S.W.2d 402, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 341 (1955).

74. — —Expert Testimony.

Where the cause of an existing condition or injury is in dispute, an expert's opinion may be admitted to the effect that a certain cause could or might produce the condition, but to permit him to testify as to what in his opinion probably did produce it would be error. Sanders v. Blue Ridge Glass Corp., 161 Tenn. 535, 33 S.W.2d 84, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1930).

Where previously healthy claimant suffered heart attack while engaged in hot, heavy work, and attendant doctor testified that there was a causal relationship, there was sufficient evidence that the injury arose out of employment. Powers v. Beasley, 197 Tenn. 549, 276 S.W.2d 720, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (1955).

Optometrist's testimony that prior to accidental splashing of acid into his right eye claimant had 20-20 vision, and after the accident had 20-400 vision therein, was valuable in measuring the sight before and after the accident; however, since his training was not in diseases of the eye, his testimony could not be considered material evidence to support award to claimant for loss of eyesight. American Enka Corp. v. Sutton, 216 Tenn. 228, 391 S.W.2d 643, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (1965).

Where both an optometrist and workers' compensation claimant testified that splashing of acid in claimant's right eye caused loss of vision, but a specialist in ophthalmology testified that there was no possible connection between the accident and optic neuritis which caused the loss of vision, the evidence failed to support award for loss of use of the eye. American Enka Corp. v. Sutton, 216 Tenn. 228, 391 S.W.2d 643, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (1965).

Where expert witness testified that employee's work could have been a contributing factor to employee's stroke, there was sufficient evidence to establish a connection between the work and the stroke, and to support a claim for compensation, even though employee was suffering from arteriosclerosis. Forest Products v. Parvin, 532 S.W.2d 908, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. 1975).

Where the physician who testified on the issue of permanence of disability performed several physical examinations, some of which revealed objective signs of injury and treated plaintiff for several months, the fact that he noted no objective signs of back injury on several examinations of plaintiff did not per se destroy the probative value of his testimony. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Flatford, 551 S.W.2d 695, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. 1977).

Where the physician who testified on the issue of permanence of disability was not sure whether the back injury was to a disc or was an acute lumbar strain and the only way to resolve the doubt was to perform an operation which might increase the injury to plaintiff, the court found his testimony sufficient to support a finding for plaintiff. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Flatford, 551 S.W.2d 695, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 532 (Tenn. 1977).

A trial judge may properly predicate an award on medical testimony to the effect that a given incident “could be” the cause of the plaintiff's injury, when he also has before him lay testimony from which it may reasonably be inferred that the incident was in fact the cause of the injury. P & L Constr. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 702 (Tenn. 1978); Cortrim Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 570 S.W.2d 854, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. 1978).

Although the greater number of witnesses were of the opinion that there was no causal connection between the accident and the subsequent optic neuritis, it was within the discretion of the trial judge to conclude that the opinion of one expert should be accepted over those of the other experts and that it contained the most probable explanation. Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Kennedy, 562 S.W.2d 202, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 585 (Tenn. 1978).

Testimony of employee and other lay witnesses who first establish a proper factual foundation is admissible on issue of employee's inability to work and may be sufficient to establish that fact without expert medical testimony. Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. 1978).

No expert medical testimony is required to show the causal connection between an employee's injury and his inability to work where the nature of the injury and the result produced thereby, as testified to by lay witnesses, makes evident to the lay mind, based upon the common knowledge and experience of mankind, that the causal connection exists. Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. 1978).

When causal connection and permanency of the injury have been established by expert medical testimony, the trial judge is not bound to accept the doctors' opinions of the extent of the employee's disability. Trane Co. v. Morrison, 566 S.W.2d 849, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 557 (Tenn. 1978).

A plaintiff must establish the permanency of his disability by a preponderance of the evidence which must be accomplished through expert medical testimony. A fortiori, any expert medical witness presented must give testimony that preponderates in favor of permanency to qualify as having probative value on that issue. Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lane, 576 S.W.2d 348, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. 1978).

The determination of the issue of permanency of all but the most obvious injuries, such as loss of a member, is peculiarly within the realm of scientific knowledge. Thus, an award of permanent partial disability for an injury must be supported by expert medical testimony that the resulting condition is permanent. Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lane, 576 S.W.2d 348, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. 1978).

Where employee sought compensation for permanent partial disability to his foot, the doctor's testimony that permanent disability was “just a possibility” and that chances were 40 percent for and 60 percent against permanency clearly failed to preponderate in favor of permanency. Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lane, 576 S.W.2d 348, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 695 (Tenn. 1978).

75. — —“Rule of Reasonable Inference.”

Under the “rule of reasonable inference,” where from the medical testimony, two inferences could be drawn and the medical testimony more strongly supports one of them, as a matter of law the court is authorized to adopt the stronger inference. Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266 (D. Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 333, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2625 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1952).

No prima facie case that workers' compensation claimant was killed in course of employment is made out, where night clerk of flop house was found during working hours murdered by persons and for reasons unknown; since where employee is found at post during customary hours and there is no direct evidence of manner of his death, inference may arise that it was in course of employment, but if facts indicate more than one reasonable inference as to cause of death, the rule does not apply. Reed v. Langford, 197 Tenn. 587, 276 S.W.2d 735, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 322 (1955).

76. — —Statement in Death Certificate — Effect.

A statement in a death certificate that death was “due to probable heart attack” was insufficient, in an action for workers' compensation, to overcome the inference that the employee, an able-bodied, healthy man who collapsed and died while loading timber on a very hot day, died of heat prostration. Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (1948).

77. —Presumptions Resolved in Favor of Employee.

Where, in the course of and arising out of his employment, an employee in good health and of strong physique suffers physical injury which is followed by serious disabilities, and competent physicians differ as to whether the disabilities are attributable to the injury, but only probable or conjectural reasons or causes are assigned by the physicians in an effort to explain the disabilities on grounds other than the injury, the presumptions should be resolved in favor of the employee rather than against him. Milstead v. Kaylor, 186 Tenn. 642, 212 S.W.2d 610, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 592 (1948).

Award cannot be based solely on medical experts' testimony that accident possibly could cause injury, but it may be if there is other evidence to reasonably infer such result. Lynch v. La Rue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 351 (1955).

78. —Previous Recovery from Another Employer — Effect.

For law on subsequent injuries, see § 50-6-208.

Recovery from a former employer for permanent loss of an eye does not preclude recovery for the loss of that member against a subsequent employer eight years later. Claimant may show that he and the former employer were mistaken as to such loss, as demonstrated by the event. Loss of an eye not wholly useless is within the schedule of award for loss of an eye. Williams v. S. & W. Const. Co., 167 Tenn. 84, 66 S.W.2d 992, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1934).

That the claimant had received compensation for permanent and total loss of the same eye from a previous employer eight years before accident relied upon is competent as tending to show whether the claimant has such an eye to lose. Williams v. S. & W. Const. Co., 167 Tenn. 84, 66 S.W.2d 992, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1934).

79. Arising out of and in Course of Employment.

The test of compensable injury is one of contract and not conduct. If the employee is doing that which by his contract, either expressly or by implication is made his duty, he is in the course of his employment, however negligent his conduct may be. Leonard v. Cranberry Furnace Co., 150 Tenn. 346, 265 S.W. 543, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1924).

An accident arises “in course of employment” if it occurs while employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do in the time during which he is reasonably employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time. Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 158 Tenn. 148, 11 S.W.2d 900, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1928).

An accident arises in course of employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be done and the resultant injury. Chamber of Commerce v. Turner, 158 Tenn. 323, 13 S.W.2d 318, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (1929); Porter v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 163 Tenn. 526, 43 S.W.2d 1066, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1931); Jellico Grocery Co. v. Hendrickson, 172 Tenn. 148, 110 S.W.2d 333, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1937); Whaley v. Patent Button Co., 184 Tenn. 700, 202 S.W.2d 649, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 291 (1947); Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 316 (1947); Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S.W.2d 977, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 374 (1951); Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 1993).

In order for an injury to arise out of the course of employment within the meaning of the statute there must exist a causal connection between the conditions of employment and the resulting injury so that it will appear that such injury resulted from a peculiar condition or danger to which the employment exposed the worker. Scott v. Shinn, 171 Tenn. 478, 105 S.W.2d 103, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 127 (1937); Toombs v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Tenn. 38, 114 S.W.2d 785, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1938).

An injury arises out of the employment where there is a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Hendrickson, 172 Tenn. 148, 110 S.W.2d 333, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1937); Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Warren, 172 Tenn. 403, 112 S.W.2d 837, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1938); Toombs v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Tenn. 38, 114 S.W.2d 785, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1938).

The term “in the course of employment” refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Tullahoma v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91, 114 S.W.2d 804, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1938).

If the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises “out of” the employment. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 316 (1947).

Mere presence at a place where injury takes place is not sufficient to make injury compensable unless injury is related to the employment. Thornton v. RCA Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1949).

An injury arises out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be performed and the resulting injury. T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235 S.W.2d 585, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (1951); Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. 1980).

Injury, in order to be considered as arising out of employment under Workers' Compensation Law, must result from a danger peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood and an injury purely coincidental, or contemporaneous, or collateral, with the employment will not cause the injury to be considered as arising out of the employment. Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d 389, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1954).

In order to be compensable the injury suffered by the employee must arise out of and in the course of his employment. Armstrong v. Liles Constr. Co., 215 Tenn. 678, 389 S.W.2d 261, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 641 (1965).

Where deceased had left his place of employment and had gone to his apartment on the same premises for rest or association with his family and had retired when fatal heart attack occurred, relationship of master and servant was suspended and injury did not arise out of or in course of his employment where there was no proof of an injury or accident connected with his work to which heart attack could be related. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 397 S.W.2d 368, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (1965); Bowman v. Smith-Built Homes, Inc., 221 Tenn. 102, 424 S.W.2d 801, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 358 (1967).

An injury by accident to an employee is “in the course of” employment if it occurred while he was performing a duty he was employed to do and it is an injury “arising out of” employment if caused by a hazard incident to such employment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 397 S.W.2d 368, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (1965); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Evans, 221 Tenn. 199, 425 S.W.2d 611, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (1968); Williams v. Preferred Development Corp., 224 Tenn. 174, 452 S.W.2d 344, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 310 (1970).

Mere presence of an employee at the place of injury because of employment will not alone result in the injury being considered as arising out of employment and if the injury or death resulted from an exposure which is no more or different from that of any other member of the public similarly situated in place and time it is not compensable. Knox v. Batson, 217 Tenn. 620, 399 S.W.2d 765, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 617, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 618 (1966), overruled in part, Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 38, 4 A.L.R.5th 1086 (Tenn. 1989).

An employer is not liable for workers' compensation benefits to an employee who is injured in an attempt to rescue a stranger, under circumstances in which the employer has no pecuniary or proprietary interest in the rescue as such and no responsibility for creating the danger out of which the rescue attempt arose. Lennon Co. v. Ridge, 219 Tenn. 623, 412 S.W.2d 638, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 453 (1967).

The mere presence of an employee at the place of injury because of employment will not result in the injury being considered as arising out of the employment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Evans, 221 Tenn. 199, 425 S.W.2d 611, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 457 (1968).

The fact that employee was on job site at time of death by heart attack was not in and of itself determinative of the question of whether death arose out of and in the course of his employment. Chapman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 221 Tenn. 376, 426 S.W.2d 760, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1968).

Where an employee becomes helpless in the course of employment due to illness or other cause not related to his employment, is in dire need of medical attention or other assistance in order to prevent further injury and the employer has the ability to make such medical attention or other assistance available but does not do so, the disability which results from this failure of the employer is to be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment; however, an employer is not required to force medical treatment upon an unwilling employee who is conscious and rational at the time. Vanderbilt University v. Russell, 556 S.W.2d 230, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 612 (Tenn. 1977).

In determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, each case must be decided with respect to its own attendant circumstances and not by resort to some formula. Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. 1980).

Accident and injury were found to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment of the employee. Wellington v. John Morrell & Co., 619 S.W.2d 116, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 461 (Tenn. 1981).

An injury arises out of and in the course of employment if it has a rational causal connection to the work and occurs while the employee is engaged in the duties of his employment, and any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury arose out of the employment or not is to be resolved in favor of the employee. Hall v. Auburntown Industries, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 614, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. 1985).

If, because of the nature of the work, there is a special risk of exposure, beyond that incurred by the general public, to criminal attacks or to the violence of the elements, the injury is one arising out of the employment. Hall v. Auburntown Industries, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 614, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. 1985).

The mere presence of an employee at the place of injury because of his employment will not alone result in the injury being considered as arising out of the employment; the injury must be occasioned by and must “arise out of” the employment as well as “in the course of” employment. Jordan v. United Methodist Urban Ministries, Inc., 740 S.W.2d 411, 1987 Tenn. LEXIS 1012 (Tenn. 1987).

Plaintiff's medical problems did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. La-Z-Boy Chair Co. v. Reed, 778 F. Supp. 954, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19446 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 936 F.2d 573, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19988 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1991).

“In the course of employment,” for plant employees having a fixed time to clock in, embraces a reasonable interval before and after actual working hours while the employee is on the premises engaged in preparatory or incidental acts. Carter v. Volunteer Apparel, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 492, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. 1992).

Employee security guard's death did not arise from generalized employment condition but rather from something beyond the norm even for a security guard, where individuals whom security guard chased from the property not only regularly confronted the guard verbally, but also threatened to return and kill him. Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., 46 S.W.3d 131, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc. , — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. 2001).

The mere presence of an employee at the place of injury because of employment is not sufficient to establish entitlement to worker's compensation, as the injury must result from a danger or hazard peculiar to the work or be caused by a risk inherent in the nature of the work. Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., 46 S.W.3d 131, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc. , — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. 2001).

Trial court properly denied an employee workers' compensation benefits under T.C.A. § 50-6-102 as her injury did not result from a danger or hazard peculiar to her work; rather, it occurred while she was undertaking a voluntary test as part of the application process for a job she did not have and may not have gotten even if she passed the test. This case fell within the rule that an injury which is merely coincidental, contemporaneous, or collateral with the employment is not compensable. Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance Sys., LLC, 164 S.W.3d 350, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. 2005).

Where the employee of a nursing home was injured in an automobile accident while traveling to a training facility, the accident arose out of and was in the course of her employment within the meaning of T.C.A. § 50-6-102. This trip fell within the “special errand or mission” exception because it was a special assignment at the direction of the employer. Hubble v. Dyer Nursing Home, 188 S.W.3d 525, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. 2006).

80. —Evidence.

Where there was evidence that petitioner was struck across his lower back by a plank knocking him to the ground and doctor testified that the injury caused the herniated disc, evidence was sufficient to support finding of trial court that employee's herniated disc was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Atlas Powder Co. v. Grimes, 200 Tenn. 206, 292 S.W.2d 13, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 397 (1956).

If there is any conflict in the evidence as to whether an accident arose out of and within the course of employment or in the inferences to be drawn therefrom, or if the evidence is undisputed but the minds of reasonable men may draw different conclusions from the same, it cannot be stated that a pure question of law is presented but rather a question of fact. Volz v. Southerland, 200 Tenn. 344, 292 S.W.2d 385, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 416 (1956).

The burden rests upon the employee to show a causal connection between his injury and his employment but by causal connection is meant not proximate cause as used in the law of negligence but cause in the sense that the accident had its origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee in doing the work. Volz v. Southerland, 200 Tenn. 344, 292 S.W.2d 385, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 416 (1956); White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, Inc., 210 Tenn. 449, 360 S.W.2d 12, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 306 (1962).

Evidence sustained finding of trial court that construction employee whose death resulted from burns suffered when he overturned bucket containing waste and diesel oil which he had lighted to keep warm in ditch where he was working died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Volz v. Southerland, 200 Tenn. 344, 292 S.W.2d 385, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 416 (1956).

Where traveling salesman operated under rule by which the salesman remained in the territory in which they were operating until the job was completed unless it would be less expensive for them to return to headquarters and in the particular instance such salesman was more than a hundred miles from the headquarters and he was not told to return home, death of such salesman resulting from automobile accident which occurred while traveling to his home over the weekend did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Timmerman v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Co., 203 Tenn. 543, 314 S.W.2d 31, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (1958).

Evidence sustained trial court's finding that work which decedent had done on the day of his death following his period of rest at the dispensary contributed to onset of fatal heart attack and thus his death arose out of his employment. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Johnson, 278 F.2d 200, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4678 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1960).

Burden is on the claimant to establish that the injury or death arose out of and in the course of the employment. Gridley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Tenn. 124, 344 S.W.2d 356, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (1961).

Evidence to the effect that employee left his automobile and deliberately ran 30 feet and placed his body beneath a moving train sustained the finding of the trial judge that employee's death resulted from suicide and did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as sales manager. Gridley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Tenn. 124, 344 S.W.2d 356, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 403 (1961).

Injury to policeman during off-duty hours occurring as a result of an offense committed in his presence was compensable where policemen were obligated to make such arrests. Gallatin v. Anderson, 209 Tenn. 392, 354 S.W.2d 84, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 369 (1962).

From evidence which established that a pot attendant for an aluminum company had a diseased heart when he began work on the day of his heart attack, the court found as a fact that exertion of his work either aggravated the heart condition or his physical disability, or caused the attack which resulted in his death; therefore, the deceased sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Blair v. Aluminum Co. of America, 217 F. Supp. 471, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3077 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).

If there was a causal connection between deceased's heart attack and his work, then his disability and death resulted from an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment. Blair v. Aluminum Co. of America, 217 F. Supp. 471, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3077 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).

“Arising out of” and “in the course of” are but facets of the single question of whether the injury was accidental and work-connected. Central Motor Express, Inc. v. Burney, 214 Tenn. 118, 377 S.W.2d 947, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (1964).

Evidence that employee suffered heart attack shortly after he returned from lunch hour during which he had mowed lawn on hot day and became ill shortly after return would not support finding of causal connection between injury and employment. Cas Walker's Cash Stores, Inc. v. Livesay, 215 Tenn. 306, 385 S.W.2d 745, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 618 (1965).

If, upon undisputed proof, it is conjectural whether disability resulted from a cause operating within petitioner's employment, or a cause operating without his employment, there can be no award. Tibbals Flooring Co. v. Stanfill, 219 Tenn. 498, 410 S.W.2d 892, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 369 (1967).

Where the employer construction company frequently performed work in localities away from its principal office, and the employees were required to provide their own transportation and were not paid for any time up until they actually went to work on the job site, the plaintiff employee was simply a commuter, and the accident which occurred on the 115 mile trip back to his home from the job site did not arise out of his employment. Smith v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 679, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. 1977).

Where the death certificate stated that the cause of death in an automobile accident was “an apparent heart attack,” and although there was a stipulation that death occurred in the course of deceased's employment, and testimony that deceased was a hard worker and frequent traveler, this was not sufficient to raise presumption that death arose out of employment. Collins v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 561 S.W.2d 456, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. 1978).

The medical proof that the injury was caused in the course of the employee's work must not be speculative or so uncertain regarding the cause of injury that attributing it to the plaintiff's employment would be an arbitrary determination or a mere possibility. Bolton v. CNA Ins. Co., 821 S.W.2d 932, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. 1991).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that conditions of employment — stress associated with driving a truck through an ice storm — precipitated the employee's stroke. Reeser v. Yellow Freight Sys., 938 S.W.2d 690, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. 1997).

Where an employee suffered a fatal heart attack while driving the employer's vehicle home from work, the employee's widow and son were entitled to death benefits, funeral expenses, and medical expenses; the trial court was permitted to believe his doctor's testimony that the employee's heart attack could have resulted from the physical exertion of his job. Clark v. Nashville Mach. Elevator Co., 129 S.W.3d 42, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. 2004).

Evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee's death arose out of his employment where the shooting was related to the employee's employment as he was outside the employer's office waiting to get paid in accordance with the employer's payment procedure when the shooting occurred; the shooting occurred while the employee was within the time and place of his employment and while he was following the employer's procedures for collecting his paycheck. Hurst v. Ready, 197 S.W.3d 756, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. July 7, 2006).

81. —“Arising out of” and “In Course of” Distinguished.

“Arising out of employment” refers to the origin of the injury, while “in course of employment” refers to time, place and circumstance. Hendrix v. Franklin State Bank, 154 Tenn. 287, 290 S.W. 30, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 125 (1926); Early Stratton Co. v. Rollison, 156 Tenn. 256, 300 S.W. 569, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1927); McConnell v. Lancaster Bros., 163 Tenn. 194, 42 S.W.2d 206, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1931); McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1956); Shubert v. Steelman, 214 Tenn. 102, 377 S.W.2d 940, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (1964).

The injury must arise “out of” the employment as well as “in the course of” employment. Thornton v. RCA Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 384 (1949); McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1956).

The qualifying terms of this section are connected by the conjunction and both conditions must obtain before compensation for the injury can be claimed. It is not sufficient that the injury resulted from an accident received in the course of employment. Smith v. Camel Mfg. Co., 192 Tenn. 670, 241 S.W.2d 771, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 314 (1951), overruled in part, Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 38, 4 A.L.R.5th 1086 (Tenn. 1989).

The terms “arising out of employment” and “in the course of employment” are not synonymous, and if an employee suffers an accident in the course of employment it does not necessarily follow that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Sandlin v. Gentry, 201 Tenn. 509, 300 S.W.2d 897, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1957).

The phrases “arising out of” and “in the course of” are not synonymous, but, rather, embody distinct concepts which are primarily basic to liability under the Workers' Compensation Law. Knox v. Batson, 217 Tenn. 620, 399 S.W.2d 765, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 617, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 618 (1966), overruled in part, Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 38, 4 A.L.R.5th 1086 (Tenn. 1989).

The phrase “in the course of” refers to time and place and “arising out of” to cause or origin. Chapman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 221 Tenn. 376, 426 S.W.2d 760, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 470 (1968).

The phrase, “in the course of,” refers to time and place, and “arising out of,” to cause or origin; an injury by accident to an employee is “in the course of” employment if it occurred while he was performing a duty he was employed to do, and it is an injury “arising out of” employment if caused by a hazard incident to such employment, citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 397 S.W.2d 368, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (1965); Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. 1980).

The terms “arising out of employment” and “in the course of employment” are not synonymous; an injury occurs “in the course of employment” if it takes place while the employee was performing a duty he was employed to perform; in contrast, “arising out of” employment refers to cause or origin. Houser v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. 2001).

An injury occurs “in the course of” employment if it takes place while the employee was performing a duty he was employed to perform, whereas an injury arises out of employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be done and the resultant injury. Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., 46 S.W.3d 131, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. 2001), rehearing denied, Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc. , — S.W.3d —, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. 2001).

Statutory requirements that the injury arise out of and occur in the course of the employment are not synonymous; an injury occurs in the course of employment if it takes place while the employee was performing a duty he or she was employed to perform, and therefore the course of employment requirement focuses on the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Clark v. Nashville Mach. Elevator Co., 129 S.W.3d 42, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 173 (Tenn. 2004).

82. —“Employment”.

83. — —Construction and Application of Term.

The word “employment” as used in this statute will be given a liberal rather than a restricted meaning. McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1956).

Employee may not recover workers' compensation benefits for emotional injuries resulting from sexual harassment by a supervisor because the employee's injuries did not arise out of her employment where supervisor's motive for harassment was purely personal in nature, was not related to furthering the business of the employer and there is no indication that the nature of the employer's business was such that the risk of harassment was a reasonable hazard of or normal component of the employee's working relationship. Anderson v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. 1999), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Mar. 1, 1999).

84. —Injury within Contemplation — Requirement.

The injury, to be compensable, must be one that by the exercise of foresight the employer might have contemplated as a result of engaging in the business and contracting with his workmen. Leonard v. Cranberry Furnace Co., 150 Tenn. 346, 265 S.W. 543, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1924); Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 316 (1947); Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 447 (Tenn. 1980).

Recovery will be denied when the employee voluntarily engages in work not only outside of his employment but involving an added element of peril which could not reasonably have been anticipated as applicable to the work for which he had been employed. Leonard v. Cranberry Furnace Co., 150 Tenn. 346, 265 S.W. 543, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1924).

In order to be compensable, an injury need not to have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence, and reasonably have been, if thought of at the time of employment, considered a risk. Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d 389, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1954).

If the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work of the employee and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment it arises out of the employment. Volz v. Southerland, 200 Tenn. 344, 292 S.W.2d 385, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 416 (1956).

An accident arises out of employment when it is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances that there is a causal connection between work required to be done and the resultant injury. Sandlin v. Gentry, 201 Tenn. 509, 300 S.W.2d 897, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (1957).

Ordinary and usual exertion at work resulting in injury is compensable. Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Rychen, 204 Tenn. 575, 322 S.W.2d 432, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 277 (1958).

In order to be compensable, an injury need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence and reasonably have been, if thought of at the time of employment, considered a risk. West Tennessee Nix-A-Mite Systems, Inc. v. Funderburk, 208 Tenn. 381, 346 S.W.2d 250, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (1961); Central Motor Express, Inc. v. Burney, 214 Tenn. 118, 377 S.W.2d 947, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 456 (1964); Ward v. Ward, 213 Tenn. 657, 378 S.W.2d 754, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (1964).

There must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury, but if the injury is one which after the event may seem to have had its origin in the employment, it need not be shown that it is one that ought to have been foreseen or expected. W. S. Dickey Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 208 Tenn. 576, 347 S.W.2d 493, 1961 Tenn. LEXIS 323 (1961).

The question of whether a death resulting from a heart attack in the course of employment can be compensable as arising out of the employment is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court on the basis of whether or not there was a causal connection between the heart attack and the employment. Ward v. Commercial Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 100, 372 S.W.2d 292, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 473 (1963); Cas Walker's Cash Stores, Inc. v. Livesay, 215 Tenn. 306, 385 S.W.2d 745, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 618 (1965).

85. —Acts for Employer's Benefit.

Acts for the employer's benefit are usually held to arise out of the employment, if expressly, impliedly or reasonably authorized. Tallent v. M. C. Lyle & Son, 187 Tenn. 482, 216 S.W.2d 7, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (1948); McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1956); Sharp v. Jenkins, 211 Tenn. 691, 367 S.W.2d 464, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 392 (1963).

Where duties of employee employed by sole employer were many and varied and include driving employer's automobile both for business purposes and for purposes purely personal to the employer, and where employee was injured while driving employer on a trip which was purely personal to the employer but which was not personal to employee and which employee was making solely because directed to do so by employer, employee's injury arose out of and was in the course of employment and was compensable under statute. McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (1956).

Where it was undisputed that the usual lunch time procedures, which were known and participated in by employer, regularly involved one of the employees leaving the premises and obtaining lunch for the others who remained at their work stations; that on the date of the accident, plaintiff had brought his own lunch to work with him that morning and therefore had no reason to leave work at lunch time except to obtain lunch for his coworkers; and that plaintiff's journey, although arguably unknown to his employer on February 15, 1980, not only benefitted his employer by allowing the other employees to keep on working while plaintiff was obtaining their lunch, but also subjected plaintiff to a definite risk or hazard on the road, chancellor's finding that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment when he was involved in an accident during the trip would be upheld. McCammon v. Neubert, 651 S.W.2d 702, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 663 (Tenn. 1983).

86. —Recreation or Social Activities.

Employee injured while playing basketball on break from work at home of customer was not injured as an incident of his employment and was not entitled to workers' compensation. Ward v. Mid-South Home Service, 769 S.W.2d 486, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. 1989).

Neither mere encouragement nor the offer of a nominal cash prize is enough to transform what would otherwise be a voluntary activity into one within the course of employment. Phyllis A. Young v. Taylor-white, LLC., 181 S.W.3d 324, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2005).

Where an employee injured her shoulder while participating in races during an employer-sponsored company picnic, the injury did not occur in the course of her employment; the picnic was held on a Saturday, outside of work hours, at a public park off of the company's premises. Phyllis A. Young v. Taylor-white, LLC., 181 S.W.3d 324, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 853 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2005).

87. —Nonbeneficial Acts.

It is not essential that the employee be engaged in an act directly beneficial to his employer in order that the resulting injury may be said to have arisen out of the employment. Chamber of Commerce v. Turner, 158 Tenn. 323, 13 S.W.2d 318, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (1929).

88. —Emergency.

A timekeeper, a part of whose duties it was to supervise conditions in the yard adjoining his office, when there was a degree of emergency calling for his physical effort in moving a concrete mixer that obstructed the office entrance, was not so far a volunteer as to deprive him of compensation for an injury that resulted. Roehl v. Graw, 161 Tenn. 461, 32 S.W.2d 1049, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1930).

An employee performing an act made necessary by an emergency in his employer's business does not thereby lose the protection of the statute. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 180 Tenn. 191, 173 S.W.2d 142 (1943).

89. —Acts of God.

Injuries resulting from acts of God are compensable when the employee, by reason of his employment, is subjected to a hazard from such act of God not common to the general public, but peculiar to the nature of the employment and to the conditions under which that employment is required to be performed. Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d 389, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1954).

Where employee was killed by