Revisor’s notes. —

The provisions of this title were redrafted in 1982 and 1986 to remove personal pronouns pursuant to § 4, ch. 58, SLA 1982 and in 1982, 1986, 1995, 2008, and 2016 to make other minor word changes under AS 01.05.031 .

Administrative Code. —

For department of corrections, see 22 AAC.

Collateral references. —

Construction and application of state statute providing compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration. 34 ALR4th 648.

Chapter 05. Probation Administration Act.

Sec. 33.05.010. Powers of commissioner.

The commissioner shall administer a probation system and enforce the probation laws in the superior court.

History. (§ 2 ch 105 SLA 1960)

Cross references. —

For provisions concerning the grant and conditions of probation, see AS 12.55.080 12.55.102 .

Notes to Decisions

Judicial supervision of probation held proper. —

Nothing in this section prohibits a trial judge from imposing, on a juvenile defendant who has violated AS 04.16.050 , a requirement for defendant to report back to the judge every other week to provide updates on the status of the probation. Jackson v. State, 127 P.3d 835 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Quoted in

State v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 644 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1982).

Collateral references. —

59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.

24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 2144 et seq.

67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.

Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant’s refraining from political activity, protest, or the like. 45 ALR3d 1022.

State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 ALR3d 932.

What constitutes “good behavior” within statute or judicial order expressly conditioning suspension of sentence thereon. 58 ALR3d 1156.

Ability to pay as necessary condition in conditioning probation or suspended sentence upon reparation or restitution. 73 ALR3d 1240.

Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim. 79 ALR3d 976.

Propriety of conditioning probation upon defendant’s posting of bond guaranteeing compliance with terms of probation. 79 ALR3d 1068.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits. 80 ALR3d 1280.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s not associating with particular person. 99 ALR3d 967.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s serving part of probationary period in jail or prison. 6 ALR4th 446.

Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants. 19 ALR4th 1251.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public welfare payments. 22 ALR4th 534.

Defendant’s right to credit for time spent in halfway house, rehabilitation center, or other restrictive environment as condition of probation. 24 ALR4th 789.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant’s not entering specified geographical area. 28 ALR4th 725.

Right of convicted defendant to refuse probation. 28 ALR4th 736.

Sec. 33.05.020. Duties of commissioner; probation officers and personnel; ignition interlock devices.

  1. The commissioner shall appoint and make available to the superior court, when ordered under AS 12.55.015(a) , a qualified probation officer for the active supervision of a person placed on probation for a felony offense. The commissioner may provide active supervision to a person placed on probation for a misdemeanor offense.
  2. The commissioner shall fix probation officers’ and assistants’ salaries, assign them to the various judicial districts, and shall provide for their necessary expenses including clerical services and travel.  The commissioner may assign to all probation officers and personnel any duties concerning the administration of the parole system as provided in AS 33.16.
  3. The commissioner shall by regulation
    1. establish standards for calibration, certification, maintenance, and monitoring of ignition interlock devices required as a condition of probation or as part of a sentence under AS 12.55.102 or another statute; and
    2. establish a fee to be paid by the manufacturer for the cost of certifying an ignition interlock device.
  4. The regulations in (c) of this section must require that the ignition interlock device operate reliably over the range of automobile environments, otherwise known as automobile manufacturing standards, for the geographic area for which the device is certified.
  5. The commissioner shall notify the manufacturer of the ignition interlock device when the device is certified. The commissioner may not certify an ignition interlock device unless the device prominently displays a label warning that a person circumventing or tampering with the device violates AS 11.76.140 and may be imprisoned and fined.
  6. The commissioner shall establish a program for offenders on probation for a felony offense who have conditions of probation that include not consuming controlled substances or alcoholic beverages and who have been identified as being at moderate to high risk as identified by a risk-needs assessment. The commissioner shall adopt regulations to implement the program. The program shall
    1. include random testing for controlled substances and alcoholic beverage use;
    2. require that the probation officer file a petition with the court seeking appropriate sanctions by the close of the next business day if a probationer
      1. fails to appear for an appointment as directed by the probation officer; or
      2. tests positive for the use of controlled substances, inhalants, or alcoholic beverages; and
    3. include a means to notify the court, by the close of the next business day, that a petition to revoke probation has been filed on a probationer placed in the program by the commissioner so that the court may review the petition, schedule a prompt hearing, address a request for a warrant provided by the probation officer, or take other action the court considers appropriate.
  7. The commissioner shall establish an administrative sanction and incentive program to facilitate a swift and effective response to a probationer’s compliance with or violation of the conditions of probation. The commissioner shall adopt regulations to implement the program. At a minimum, the regulations must include
    1. a decision-making process to guide probation officers in determining the suitable response to positive and negative offender behavior that includes a list of sanctions for the most common types of negative behavior, including technical violations of conditions of probation, and a list of incentives for compliance with conditions and positive behavior that exceeds those conditions;
    2. policies and procedures that ensure
      1. a process for responding to negative behavior that includes a review of previous violations and sanctions;
      2. that enhanced sanctions for certain negative conduct are approved by the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee; and
      3. that appropriate due process protections are included in the process, including notice of negative behavior, an opportunity to dispute the accusation and the sanction, and an opportunity to request a review of the accusation and the sanction.
  8. The commissioner shall establish by regulation a program allowing probationers to earn credits for complying with the conditions of probation. The credits earned reduce the period of probation. Nothing in this subsection prohibits the department from recommending to the court the early discharge of the probationer as provided in AS 33.30. At a minimum, the regulations must
    1. require that a probationer earn a credit of 10 days for each 30-day period served in which the defendant complied with the conditions of probation;
    2. include policies and procedures for
      1. calculating and tracking credits earned by probationers;
      2. reducing the probationer’s period of probation based on credits earned by the probationer; and
      3. notifying a victim under AS 33.30.013 ;
    3. require that a probationer convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in AS 18.66.990 complete all treatment programs required as a condition of probation before discharge based on credits earned under this subsection.
  9. A probationer may not be enrolled in the program established under (h) of this section if the probationer is on probation for
    1. an unclassified felony;
    2. a sex offense as defined in AS 12.63.100 ;
    3. a felony crime against a person under AS 11.41;
    4. a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , that is an offense under AS 11.41.

History. (§ 2 ch 105 SLA 1960; am § 8 ch 57 SLA 1989; am §§ 10, 11 ch 85 SLA 2010; am § 22 ch 20 SLA 2011; am § 28 ch 83 SLA 2014; am § 114 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 43 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am §§ 100, 101 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision authorizing the Department of Corrections to adopt regulations necessary to implement the 2014 changes to (f) of this section, see sec. 39(a), ch. 83, SLA 2014.

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(q), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to applicability of the 2017 amendment to subsection (h), see sec. 75(a)(23), ch. 1, 4SSLA 2017, in the 2017 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For breath alcohol ignition interlock devices program, see 22 AAC 15.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective July 17, 2014, added (f).

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (g) and (h).

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, added (h)(3), and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, in (h), substituted “10 days” for “30 days” in (h)(1), and deleted “a sex offense as defined in AS 12.63.100 or” following “probationer convicted of” in (h)(3); and added (i).

Editor’s notes. —

Section 28(c), ch. 20, SLA 2011, provides that the 2011 amendment to (a) of this section applies “to offenses occurring before, on, or after July 1, 2011.”

Under sec. 36(b), ch. 83, SLA 2014, subsection (f) as amended by sec. 28, ch. 83, SLA 2014, applies to convictions occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014 for offenses occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014.

Section 142(e), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendment to (h) of this section and enactment of (i) of this section applies “to probation ordered before, on, or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Probation officers executive officers. The constitution does not assign probation officers to the exclusive jurisdiction of either the executive or the judicial branch of government, such that placing probation officers in the executive branch does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Smith v. State Dep't of Cors., 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994).

Judicial supervision of probation held proper. —

Nothing in this section prohibits a trial judge from imposing, on a juvenile defendant who has violated AS 04.16.050 , a requirement for defendant to report back to the judge every other week to provide updates on the status of the probation. Jackson v. State, 127 P.3d 835 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Applied in

Granato v. Occhipinti, 602 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1979).

Quoted in

State v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 644 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1982).

Sec. 33.05.030. Probation officers as officers of court.

  1. All probation officers made available to the courts under this chapter shall be officers of the superior court and subject to the authority of the superior court.
  2. The appointment of a probation officer shall be entered on the journal of the court in the judicial district where the probation officer shall be assigned, and one copy of the journal entry sent to the administrative director of the Alaska Court System.

History. (§ 3 ch 105 SLA 1960; am § 34 ch 8 SLA 2011)

Notes to Decisions

Court authority. —

The court may direct individual probation officers to perform appropriate services, but it may not control the details by which those services are accomplished by establishing general policies. State v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 644 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1982).

Judicial supervision of probation held proper. —

Nothing in this section prohibits a trial judge from imposing, on a juvenile defendant who has violated AS 04.16.050 , a requirement for defendant to report back to the judge every other week to provide updates on the status of the probation. Jackson v. State, 127 P.3d 835 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Sec. 33.05.040. Duties of probation officers.

  1. A probation officer shall
    1. furnish to each probationer under the supervision of the officer a written statement of the conditions of probation and shall instruct the probationer regarding the same;
    2. keep informed concerning the conduct and condition of each probationer under the supervision of the officer and shall report on the probationer to the court placing that person on probation;
    3. use all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by the court, to aid probationers and to bring about improvements in their conduct and condition;
    4. keep records of the probation work, including administrative sanctions and incentives the probation officer imposes under AS 33.05.020(g) , keep accurate and complete accounts of all money collected from persons under the supervision of the officer, give receipts for money collected and make at least monthly returns of it, make the reports to the court and the commissioner required by them, and perform other duties the court may direct;
    5. perform duties with respect to persons on parole as the commissioner shall request, and in that service shall be termed a parole officer;
    6. use administrative sanctions and incentives developed under AS 33.05.020(g) to respond to a probationer’s negative and positive behavior in a way that is intended to interrupt negative behavior in a swift, certain, and proportional manner and support progress with a recognition of positive behavior;
    7. upon determining that a probationer under the supervision of the officer meets the requirements of AS 12.55.090(g) , consider recommending to the court that probation be terminated and the probationer be discharged from probation;
    8. for each probationer who owes restitution and who is under the supervision of the officer, create a restitution payment schedule based on the probationer’s income and ability to pay if the court has not already set a restitution payment schedule;
    9. accommodate the diligent efforts of each probationer to secure and maintain steady employment or to participate in educational courses or training programs when prescribing the times at which a probationer shall report;
    10. permit each probationer to travel in the state to make diligent efforts to secure and maintain steady employment or to participate in educational courses or training programs if the travel is not inconsistent with other terms and conditions of probation;
    11. report on the probationer by making a recommendation to the court to revoke probation or to maintain existing probation conditions when a petition to revoke probation is filed.
  2. The caseload of a probation officer supervising probationers or the combined caseload of a probation officer or parole officer supervising probationers and persons on parole as provided for in (a)(5) of this section may not exceed an average of 75 persons, except in temporary or extraordinary circumstances approved by the commissioner.

History. (§ 4 ch 105 SLA 1960; am § 115 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 1 ch 49 SLA 2016; am § 44 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am § 102 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Revisor's notes. —

Paragraphs (9) and (10) were enacted as (6) and (7) and renumbered in 2016.

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the first 2016 amendment to this section, see sec. 185(k)(5), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The first 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (2) and (5), substituted “the” for “such”, or similar, in three places; in (4) inserted “, including administrative sanctions and incentives the probation officer imposes under AS 33.05.020(g) ” preceding “keep accurate”; added (6), (7) and (8).

The second 2016 amendment, effective October 26, 2016, in (2) and (5), substituted “that” for “such” and, in (5), deleted “such”; added (6) and (7).

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, added (b).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, in (a), deleted “, including responses to technical violations of conditions of probation,” following “negative and positive behavior” in (a)(6), substituted “consider recommending to the court that” for “recommend to the court as soon as practicable that” in (a)(7), added (a)(11), and made related stylistic changes.

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(d), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendment to (a)(11) of this section applies “to probation ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Section 142(e), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendment to (a)(6) of this section applies “to probation ordered before, on, or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Scope of probation officer's authority. —

This section gives Alaska probation officers a certain degree of authority to require, restrict, or prohibit particular conduct on the part of probationers — even when those requirements, restrictions, and prohibitions are not expressly included in the conditions of probation imposed by a judge at sentencing. Marunich v. State, 151 P.3d 510 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Superior court erred in revoking defendant's probation because there was insufficient evidence to support his probation violation for failing to provide a urine sample at the request of a probation officer; the State failed to present any evidence that the staff at the correctional center told him that the test had been requested by a probation officer and that refusing to submit to the test would constitute a violation of his probation. Flores v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2019) (memorandum decision).

Applied in

Jackson v. State, 541 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1975).

Quoted in

State v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 644 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1982).

Sec. 33.05.050. Report of probation officer.

When directed by the court, the probation officer shall report to the court with a statement of the conduct of the probationer while on probation. Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may then discharge the probationer from further supervision and may terminate the proceedings against the probationer, or may extend the probation, as shall seem advisable.

History. (§ 5 ch 105 SLA 1960; am § 14 ch 70 SLA 2012)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in the second sentence added “Except as otherwise provided by law,”; made stylistic changes.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

State v. Henry, 240 P.3d 846 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Sec. 33.05.060. Transfer of jurisdiction over probationer.

Whenever during the period of probation, a probationer goes from the judicial district in which the probationer is being supervised to another judicial district, jurisdiction over the probationer may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the court for the district from which the probationer goes to the court for the other district, with the concurrence of the latter court. Thereupon the court for the district to which jurisdiction is transferred shall have all power with respect to the probationer that was previously possessed by the court for the district from which the transfer is made, except that the period of probation may not be changed without the consent of the sentencing court. This process under the same conditions may be repeated whenever during the period of probation the probationer goes from the district in which the probationer is being supervised to another district.

History. (§ 5 ch 105 SLA 1960)

Sec. 33.05.070. Arrest of probationer.

  1. At any time within the probation period, the probation officer may for cause arrest the probationer whenever found, without a warrant. At any time within the probation period, or within the maximum probation period permitted by AS 12.55.080 and 12.55.090 , the court for the district in which the probationer is being supervised or, if the probationer is no longer under supervision, the court for the district in which the probationer was last under supervision may issue a warrant for the probationer’s arrest for violation of probation occurring during the probation period.  The warrant may be executed in any district by the probation officer or any peace officer in the district in which the warrant was issued or of any district in which the probationer is found.  If the probationer is arrested in any district other than that in which the probationer was last supervised, the probationer shall be returned to the district in which the warrant was issued, unless jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred as above provided to the district in which the probationer is found, and in that case the probationer shall be detained pending further proceedings in that district.
  2. As speedily as possible after arrest, the probationer shall be taken before the court for the district having jurisdiction over the probationer. Except as provided in AS 12.55.090(f) , the court may revoke the probation and require the probationer to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence and, if imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence that might originally have been imposed, subject to the limitation specified in AS 12.55.086(c) .
  3. At any time within the probation period, a police officer certified by the Alaska Police Standards Council may detain a probationer if the police officer has reasonable suspicion that the probationer has recently violated or may imminently violate a probation condition relating to one of the topics set out in (d) of this section. The police officer may also arrest the probationer without a warrant if the police officer has probable cause to believe that the probationer has violated a probation condition relating to one of the topics set out in (d) of this section.
  4. The conditions that permit a police officer to detain or arrest a probationer or parolee without a warrant under AS 33.16.240 and (c) of this section are those conditions imposed by the court, or the parole board, relating to
    1. geographic limitations on the probationer’s movements;
    2. possessing or consuming controlled substances under state or federal law;
    3. possessing firearms;
    4. possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages, or being in a place where they are sold or served;
    5. operating or driving a motor vehicle; or
    6. other conduct that creates an imminent public danger or threatens serious harm to persons or property.

History. (§ 5 ch 105 SLA 1960; am § 3 ch 32 SLA 1979; am § 26 ch 2 SLA 2005; am § 15 ch 70 SLA 2012)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2012 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, in (b), in second sentence added “Except as provided in AS 12.55.090(f) ”; and made stylistic changes.

Notes to Decisions

Increased sentence prohibited. —

A probation revocation order which increased the minimum period that a defendant must spend in jail violated his double jeopardy rights as well as the command of subsection (b) of this section that the court upon revocation of probation may order the defendant to serve the sentence originally imposed, or a lesser sentence, but not a greater one. Nelson v. State, 617 P.2d 502 (Alaska 1981).

An increase in the minimum period of incarceration required before becoming eligible for parole is an increase in the sentence. Nelson v. State, 617 P.2d 502 (Alaska 1981).

Sentencing criteria following probation revocation. —

When a sentence is imposed following probation revocation, the sentencing judge must consider the same criteria as those considered initially upon conviction of the underlying offense. Kanipe v. State, 620 P.2d 678 (Alaska 1980).

Imposition of jail time is not necessarily called for simply because the express terms of probation have been violated. Kanipe v. State, 620 P.2d 678 (Alaska 1980).

When probation may be revoked. —

Probation may be revoked for crimes committed prior to the technical commencement of the probationary period. Gant v. State, 654 P.2d 1325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Where a defendant is convicted of an offense and placed on probation for two years and commits a further offense within the two-year period which is not discovered until after the two-year period runs, the trial court may revoke probation, so long as the petition to revoke probation was filed within the five-year maximum probation period authorized by statute. Galaktionoff v. State, 733 P.2d 628 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Stated in

State v. Falealo Manuele Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

Revocation: right to notice and hearing. 29 ALR2d 1074, 44 ALR3d 306.

Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 ALR3d 306.

Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked. 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.

Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of probation on same charge. 76 ALR3d 564.

Propriety of revocation of probation for subsequent criminal conviction which is subject to appeal. 76 ALR3d 588.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. 77 ALR3d 636.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of incriminating statement obtained in violation of Miranda rule. 77 ALR3d 669.

Right of defendant sentenced after revocation of probation to credit for jail time served as condition of probation. 99 ALR3d 781.

Power of court, after expiration of probation term, to revoke or modify probation for violations committed during the probation term. 13 ALR4th 1240.

Power of court to revoke probation for acts committed after imposition of sentence but prior to commencement of probation term. 22 ALR4th 755.

Propriety of increased sentence following revocation of probation. 23 ALR4th 883.

Revocation of probation based on defendant’s misrepresentation or concealment of information from trial court. 36 ALR4th 1182.

Sec. 33.05.080. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,

  1. “administrative sanctions and incentives” means responses by a probation officer to a probationer’s compliance with or violation of the conditions of probation under AS 33.05.020(g) .
  2. “commissioner” means the commissioner of corrections or the designee of the commissioner;
  3. “probation,” except as authorized under AS 12.55.086 , is a procedure under which a defendant, found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the superior court subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject to the supervision of the probation service as provided in this chapter.

History. (§ 1 ch 105 SLA 1960; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am § 4 ch 32 SLA 1979; am E.O. No. 55, § 12 (1984); am § 116 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Reorganized in 1986 to alphabetize the defined terms. In 2016, paragraph (1) was enacted as (3) and renumbered to maintain alphabetical order.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (3) [now (1)].

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Jackson v. State, 541 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1975).

Quoted in

Newsom v. State, 533 P.2d 904 (Alaska 1975).

Stated in

State v. Falealo Manuele Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211 (Alaska 2020).

Sec. 33.05.090. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the Probation Administration Act.

History. (§ 7 ch 105 SLA 1960)

Chapter 07. Pretrial Services Program.

History. (§ 117 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of chapter, see sec. 185(o)(10), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For the effect of this chapter on Rule 41, Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, see sec. 180(e), ch. 36, SLA 2016 in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effective dates. —

Section 192, ch. 36, SLA 2016 makes this chapter effective January 1, 2018.

Sec. 33.07.010. Pretrial services program; establishment.

The commissioner shall establish and administer a pretrial services program that provides a pretrial risk assessment for all defendants detained in custody in a correctional facility following arrest and for any defendant for whom the prosecution requests to have a pretrial risk assessment at the next hearing or arraignment. The pretrial services program shall make recommendations to the court concerning pretrial release decisions and provide supervision of defendants released while awaiting trial as ordered by the court.

History. (§ 117 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 45 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective January 1, 2018, inserted “detained in custody in a correctional facility following arrest and for any defendant for whom the prosecution requests to have a pretrial risk assessment at the next hearing or arraignment” at the end of the first sentence, inserted “The pretrial services program shall make” at the beginning of the second sentence, inserted “provide” preceding “supervision of defendants” in the second sentence, and made stylistic changes.

Cited in

Vaneyck v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2018).

Sec. 33.07.020. Duties of commissioner; pretrial services.

The commissioner shall

  1. appoint and make available to the superior court and district court qualified pretrial services officers;
  2. fix pretrial services officers’ salaries;
  3. assign pretrial services officers to each judicial district;
  4. provide for the necessary supervision, training, expenses, including clerical services, and travel of pretrial services officers;
  5. approve a risk assessment instrument that is objective, standardized, and developed based on analysis of empirical data and risk factors relevant to pretrial failure, that evaluates the likelihood of failure to appear in court and the likelihood of rearrest during the pretrial period, and that is validated on the state’s pretrial population; and
  6. adopt regulations in consultation with the Department of Law, the public defender, the Department of Public Safety, the office of victims’ rights, and the Alaska Court System, consistent with this chapter and as necessary to implement the program; the regulations must include a process for pretrial services officers to make a recommendation to the court concerning a pretrial release decision and guidelines for pretrial diversion recommendations.

History. (§ 117 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 192, ch. 36, SLA 2016 makes this section effective January 1, 2018.

Sec. 33.07.030. Duties of pretrial services officers.

  1. Pretrial services officers shall, in advance of a first appearance before a judicial officer under AS 12.30, conduct a pretrial risk assessment on the defendant using an instrument approved by the commissioner for the purpose of making a recommendation to the court concerning an appropriate pretrial release decision and conditions of release. In conducting a pretrial risk assessment and making a recommendation to the court, the pretrial services officer shall follow the decision-making process established by regulation under this chapter. The pretrial risk assessment shall be completed and presented to the court in a pretrial release report that contains a risk assessment rating of low, moderate, or high and a recommendation regarding release and release conditions, including a recommendation concerning a defendant’s dependency on, abuse of, or addiction to alcohol or controlled substances, to the extent those factors are indicated by the offense or criminal history, before the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer.
  2. A pretrial services officer shall make a recommendation under (a) of this section for pretrial release to the court based on factors that include the results of a pretrial risk assessment, the offense charged, and the least restrictive condition or conditions that will reasonably ensure the appearance of the person in court and the safety of the victim, other persons, and the community. If the offense or criminal history of a defendant identifies that a dependency on, abuse of, or addiction to alcohol or controlled substances is a factor in the defendant’s offense, the pretrial services officer shall include that identified fact in the report to the court and to the attorneys. The recommendation must take into account
    1. the defendant’s risk rating;
    2. the appropriateness for release on the defendant’s own recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond, unsecured performance bond, or both; and
    3. the appropriateness of nonmonetary release conditions permitted under AS 12.30.011 , 12.30.016 , 12.30.021 , and 12.30.027 and supervision of those conditions by a pretrial services officer for defendants who are recommended for release.
  3. A pretrial services officer shall recommend for release on personal recognizance, upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond, or upon execution of an unsecured performance bond, with nonmonetary conditions as appropriate, if a defendant is charged with
    1. a misdemeanor, unless that misdemeanor is
      1. a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in AS 18.66.990 ;
      2. a crime against the person under AS 11.41;
      3. an offense under AS 11.56.730 or 11.56.757 ;
    2. a class C felony, unless that felony is
      1. a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in AS 18.66.990 ;
      2. a crime against the person under AS 11.41;
      3. an offense under AS 11.56.730 ;
    3. an offense under AS 28.35.030 or 28.35.032 , if the defendant has been assessed as being low or moderate risk on the pretrial risk assessment.
  4. A pretrial services officer shall recommend release on personal recognizance, upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond, or upon execution of an unsecured performance bond, with nonmonetary conditions as appropriate, unless the pretrial services officer finds
    1. by substantial evidence that no nonmonetary conditions of release in combination with release on personal recognizance or upon execution of unsecured bond can reasonably ensure public safety and appearance in court; and
    2. the defendant has been charged with
      1. an offense under AS 28.35.030 or 28.35.032 , and the offender has been assessed as high risk under a pretrial risk assessment;
      2. an offense under AS 11.56.730 or 11.56.757 , and the offender has been assessed as low to moderate risk under a pretrial risk assessment; or
      3. any other offense, and the defendant has been assessed as being low risk under a pretrial risk assessment.
  5. A pretrial services officer may recommend release on personal recognizance, upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond, or upon execution of an unsecured performance bond, with nonmonetary conditions as appropriate, for a defendant not otherwise recommended for release under (c) or (d) of this section.
  6. A pretrial services officer may supervise a defendant released while awaiting trial, imposing the least restrictive level of supervision that will reasonably ensure the appearance of the person in court and the safety of the victim, other persons, and the community, and prioritizing higher levels of supervision for a defendant accused of serious charges or assessed as moderate or high risk under a pretrial risk assessment. The commissioner may, in accordance with AS 36.30, procure and enter into agreements or contracts for the supervision of defendants on electronic monitoring during the pretrial period.
  7. A pretrial services officer may
    1. recommend pretrial diversion to the court and parties before adjudication in accordance with the guidelines established by the commissioner under AS 33.07.020 (6);
    2. if the officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has committed an offense under AS 11.56.730 or 11.56.757 or has violated the defendant’s release conditions, file a complaint with the court and
      1. arrest, with or without a warrant, a defendant who has been released while awaiting trial; or
      2. request the court to issue warrants related to any violation of the defendant’s release conditions;
    3. refer interested defendants for substance abuse screening, assessment, and treatment on a voluntary basis and assist any defendant whose offense or criminal history identified a dependency on, abuse of, or addiction to alcohol or controlled substances with accessing and obtaining appropriate treatment in the community to address those needs;
    4. recommend that a defendant charged with an offense involving the use of alcohol or controlled substances comply with a program established under AS 47.38.020 ; and
    5. coordinate with community-based organizations and tribal courts and councils to develop and expand pretrial diversion options.

History. (§ 117 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 18 ch 22 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective June 15, 2018, in the introductory language in (g)(2), deleted “Arrest, without a warrant, a defendant who has been released while awaiting trial” at the beginning, added “, file a complaint with the court and” at the end, added (g)(2)(A) and (B).

Effective dates. —

Section 192, ch. 36, SLA 2016 makes this section effective January 1, 2018.

Sec. 33.07.040. Pretrial services officers as officers of court.

All pretrial services officers shall be available to the superior and district courts and shall be officers of the court.

History. (§ 117 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 192, ch. 36, SLA 2016 makes this section effective January 1, 2018.

Sec. 33.07.090. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. “commissioner” means the commissioner of corrections;
  2. “program” means the pretrial services program.

History. (§ 117 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 192, ch. 36, SLA 2016 makes this section effective January 1, 2018.

Chapter 10. Interstate Compact on Probation and Parole.

[Renumbered as AS 33.36.110 33.36.120 .]

Chapter 15. Parole Administration Act.

[Repealed, § 7 ch 88 SLA 1985.]

Chapter 16. Parole Administration.

Administrative Code. —

For Alaska board of parole, see 22 AAC 20.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Wilson v. State, 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).

Collateral references. —

59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.

67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.

Sec. 33.16.010. Parole.

  1. A prisoner who is serving a term or terms of two years or more is eligible for mandatory parole.
  2. A prisoner who is eligible under  AS 33.16.090 may be granted discretionary parole by the board of parole.
  3. Except as provided in (g) of this section, a prisoner who is not eligible for special medical or discretionary parole, or who is not released on special medical or discretionary parole, shall be released on mandatory parole for the term of good time deductions credited under AS 33.20, if the term or terms of imprisonment are two years or more.
  4. A prisoner released on special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole is subject to the conditions of parole imposed under AS 33.16.150 . Parole may be revoked under AS 33.16.220 .
  5. A prisoner eligible under  AS 33.16.085 may be released on special medical parole by the Parole Board.
  6. [Repealed, § 72 ch 1 4SSLA 2017.]
  7. A prisoner is not eligible for mandatory parole if the prisoner has been convicted of a crime under AS 11.41.100 or 11.41.110 .

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 1, 2 ch 77 SLA 1987; am §§ 2, 3 ch 70 SLA 1995; am §§ 118 — 120 ch 36 SLA 2016; am §§ 46, 47, 72 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am §§ 103, 104 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(d)(7) and (m)(1) and (2), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For eligibility for discretionary parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 1.

For conditions of parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 5.

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (c), inserted “special medical, administrative, or” in two places, following “eligible for” and “not released on”, respectively; in (d), inserted “administrative,” after “special medical,”; added former (f).

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in (c), twice deleted “, administrative,” following “special medical”; in (d), deleted “administrative,” following “special medical,”; repealed (f).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, substituted “Except as provided in (g) of this section, a prisoner” for “A prisoner” at the beginning of (c), and added (g).

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(f), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendments to (c) and (g) of this section apply “to parole ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Mandatory parole, as its name suggests, is required by statute, and a parolee has no right to refuse mandatory release from prison. State v. Staael, 807 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Inmate alleged that he was not aware that after two years of imprisonment he would be released and would serve the remainder of his six year sentence on mandatory parole; the inmate established a prima facie case that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, about the nature of the sentence he would receive if he entered into the plea bargain, and that he would not have entered into the plea bargain had he received accurate advice regarding mandatory parole. Knox v. State, 130 P.3d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Special conditions. —

Alaska Parole Board was authorized to set special conditions of mandatory parole, based on the statutes enacted in 1960, when defendant committed his offenses in 1979 and 1984; the enactment of a new parole statute in 1985 did not increase his punishment and the special conditions imposed were inherent in the criminal judgments imposed by the sentencing courts in 1979 and 1984. James v. State, 244 P.3d 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Parolee was not entitled to in-person hearing before standard conditions of parole could be imposed, and his parole was properly revoked after he violated standard conditions of parole by leaving the state and failing to report. State v. Staael, 807 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Jurisdiction of board over parolee. —

Where defendant was charged with a violation while he was still on mandatory parole under this section and notice of the violation was served and resolved at a parole revocation hearing while the board of parole retained jurisdiction over defendant under AS 33.16.200 , the validity of the board’s action did not hinge on whether defendant was deemed to have been technically on parole at the time of the hearing. Gyles v. State, 901 P.2d 1143 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).

Quoted in

Wilson v. State, 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).

Cited in

State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Morrison v. State, 7 P.3d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 33.16.020. Board of parole.

  1. There is in the Department of Corrections a board of parole consisting of five members appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by a majority of members of the legislature in joint session.
  2. Members of the board serve for staggered terms of five years and until their successors are appointed.
  3. The governor shall choose the presiding officer of the board from among the membership.
  4. The governor shall make appointments to the board with due regard for representation on the board of the ethnic, racial, sexual, and cultural populations of the state.
  5. The governor shall appoint at least one member who resides in the First Judicial District, one member who resides in the Third Judicial District, and one member who resides in either the Second or Fourth Judicial District.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

There is no authority which would sanction expansion of superior court’s jurisdiction to pass sentence into a realm of review and modification which is statutorily vested in either the supreme court or the executive branch of government. Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1975); Szeratics v. State, 572 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977) (decided under former AS 33.15.010).

Cited in

Thomas v. State, 413 P.3d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).

Sec. 33.16.030. Selection criteria for board members.

  1. The governor shall appoint board members on the basis of their qualifications to make decisions that are compatible with the welfare of the community and of individual offenders. The governor shall appoint members who are able to consider the character and background of offenders and the circumstances under which offenses were committed.
  2. At least one person appointed to the board must have experience in the field of criminal justice.
  3. Officers or employees of the state may not be appointed to the board.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Sec. 33.16.040. Compensation and expenses.

A board member is entitled to compensation at an amount to be set by the governor for each day the member is participating in business of the board, and is also entitled to the per diem and travel allowances provided under AS 39.20.180 .

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Sec. 33.16.050. Meetings of the board.

  1. The board may meet as often as it considers necessary to carry out its responsibilities, but shall meet at least four times a year.
  2. Three members of the board constitute a quorum for the conduct of business.
  3. Except when a member of the board imposes special conditions of mandatory parole for the board under AS 33.16.150 and except as provided in (e) of this section, decisions and orders of the board require the affirmative votes of a majority of the members present.
  4. The board may conduct meetings by the use of teleconferencing facilities.
  5. A meeting of the board is not required for a decision or order setting special conditions of mandatory parole by a single member of the board under AS 33.16.150(b) and (e). If a prisoner or parolee who is aggrieved by the board member’s decision or order applies to the full board under AS 33.16.150(e) and 33.16.160 for a change in parole conditions, the board shall meet to act on the application.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 9, 10 ch 43 SLA 1994; am § 2 ch 44 SLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

Sec. 33.16.060. Duties of the board.

  1. The board shall
    1. serve as the parole authority for the state;
    2. consider the suitability for parole of a prisoner who is eligible for discretionary parole or special medical parole if
      1. the prisoner had no disciplinary action imposed during incarceration; or
      2. the prisoner had disciplinary action imposed during incarceration and the prisoner filed an application with the board for discretionary or special medical parole;
    3. impose parole conditions on all prisoners released under special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole;
    4. under AS 33.16.210 , discharge a person from parole when custody is no longer required;
    5. maintain records of the meetings and proceedings of the board;
    6. recommend to the governor and the legislature changes in the law administered by the board;
    7. recommend to the governor or the commissioner changes in the practices of the department and of other departments of the executive branch necessary to facilitate the purposes and practices of parole;
    8. upon request of the governor, review and recommend applicants for executive clemency; and
    9. execute other responsibilities prescribed by law.
  2. The board shall adopt regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62)
    1. establishing standards under which the suitability of a prisoner for special medical or discretionary parole shall be determined;
    2. providing for the supervision of parolees and for recommitment of parolees; and
    3. governing procedures of the board.
  3. The board shall establish a program for a parolee who has conditions of parole that include not consuming controlled substances or alcoholic beverages and who has been identified as being at moderate to high risk as identified by a risk-needs assessment. The program must
    1. include random testing for controlled substance and alcoholic beverage use;
    2. require that a parole officer file a parole violation report by the close of the next business day if a parolee
      1. fails to appear for an appointment as directed by the parole officer; or
      2. tests positive for the use of controlled substances or alcoholic beverages; and
    3. include a means to notify the board by the close of the next business day that a parole violation report has been filed on a parolee placed in the program by the board.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 4 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 29 ch 83 SLA 2014; am § 121 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 48 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am § 105 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For regulations relating to parole, see generally 22 AAC 20.

For provision authorizing the board of parole to adopt regulations necessary to implement (c) of this section, see sec. 39(b), ch. 83, SLA 2014.

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to subsection (a), see sec. 185(d)(8), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For eligibility for discretionary parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 1.

For attendance and appearance at parole board adjudicatory hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 2.

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For conditions of parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 5.

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

For discharge from parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 8.

For parole rescission hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 9.

For hearing officers, see 22 AAC 20, art. 10.

For recording of hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 11.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

For disclosure of information by board member, see 22 AAC 20, art. 13.

For disqualification of board member or hearing officer, see 22 AAC 20, art. 14.

For special medical parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 15.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective July 17, 2014, added (c).

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a)(2), deleted “upon receipt of an application,” at the beginning of the paragraph; inserted “for discretionary parole at least 90 days before the prisoner's first date of eligibility and upon receipt of the prisoner's application” following “who is eligible”; deleted “or discretionary” after “special medical”; in (a)(3), inserted “special medical, administrative,” preceding “discretionary”; and made stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in (a)(3), deleted “administrative,” following “special medical,”.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, rewrote (a)(2), which read, “consider the suitability for parole of a prisoner who is eligible for discretionary parole at least 90 days before the prisoner’s first date of eligibility and upon receipt of the prisoner’s application for special medical parole;”.

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 36(b), ch. 83, SLA 2014, subsection (c) as amended by sec. 29, ch. 83, SLA 2014, applies to convictions occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014 for offenses occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014.

Section 142(f), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendment to (a) of this section applies “to parole ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Rules should be adopted as soon as practicable. —

Concerning sentencing, sentence appeals, and parole matters in general, the supreme court believed it would be of benefit to all concerned if, as soon as practicable, the parole board adopted rules regarding eligibility of prisoners for parole, the conduct of parole hearings, and conditions of release to be imposed on parolees. Robinson v. State, 484 P.2d 686 (Alaska 1971).

Due process requirements. —

There is no difference between parole and probation revocations as regards due process requirements. Avery v. State, 616 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1980).

It was not error for parole board to apply preponderance of evidence standard in a parole revocation hearing. Avery v. State, 616 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1980).

Stated in

Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sec. 33.16.070. Process.

The board or a member of the board may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum in the performance of board duties under AS 33.16.060(a) . Subpoenas issued under this section are enforceable in Superior Court.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Administrative Code. —

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Sec. 33.16.080. Executive director.

The board shall hire an executive director to serve the board in the discharge of its duties. The executive director must have had training and experience in the field of criminal justice. The executive director may employ additional staff to assist the board.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Sec. 33.16.085. Special medical parole.

  1. Notwithstanding a presumptive, mandatory, or mandatory minimum term or sentence a prisoner may be serving or any restriction on parole eligibility under AS 12.55, a prisoner who is serving a term of at least 181 days may, upon application by the prisoner or the commissioner, be released by the board on special medical parole if the board determines that
    1. the prisoner has not been convicted of an offense under AS 11.41.410 11.41.425 or 11.41.434 11.41.438 and the prisoner is severely medically or cognitively disabled as certified in writing by a physician licensed under AS 08.64;
    2. a reasonable probability exists that
      1. the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating any laws or conditions imposed by the board;
      2. because of the prisoner’s severe medical or cognitive disability, the prisoner will not pose a threat of harm to the public if released on parole; and
      3. release of the prisoner on parole would not diminish the seriousness of the crime;
    3. the prisoner
      1. was not suffering from the severe medical or cognitive disability at the time the prisoner committed the offense or parole or probation violation for which the prisoner is presently incarcerated; or
      2. was suffering from the severe medical or cognitive disability at the time the prisoner committed the offense or parole or probation violation for which the prisoner is presently incarcerated and the medical or cognitive disability has progressed so that the likelihood of the prisoner’s committing the same or a similar offense is low;
    4. the care and supervision that the prisoner requires can be provided in a more medically appropriate or cost-effective manner than by the department;
    5. the prisoner is incapacitated to an extent that incarceration does not impose significant additional restrictions on the prisoner;
    6. the prisoner is likely to remain subject to the severe medical or cognitive disability throughout the entire period of parole or to die and there is no reasonable expectation that the prisoner’s medical or cognitive disability will improve noticeably; and
    7. an appropriate discharge plan has been formulated that addresses basic life domains of the prisoner, including care coordination, housing, eligibility for public benefits, and health care, including necessary medication.
  2. If the board finds a change in circumstances or discovers new information concerning a prisoner who has been granted a special medical parole release date, the board may rescind or revise the previously granted parole release date.
  3. The board shall issue its decision to grant or deny special medical parole, or to rescind or revise the release date of a prisoner granted special medical parole, in writing and provide a basis for the decision. A copy of the decision shall be provided to the prisoner.

History. (§ 5 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 3 ch 25 SLA 2003; am § 27 ch 2 SLA 2005)

Administrative Code. —

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For special medical parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 15.

Notes to Decisions

Ex post facto claim.—

In an appeal that involved an ex post facto challenge to the special medical parole statute, the appellate court concluded that the expansion of the statutory exclusion in 2003 simply returned appellant to the position he was in at the time he committed his 1984 offense, before special medical parole was enacted. Because the exclusion did not constitute additional punishment for appellant's underlying crime, the appellate court rejected appellant's ex post facto claim. Whittlesey v. State, 626 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1980) (memorandum decision).

Sec. 33.16.087. Rights of victims in connection with special medical parole.

  1. If the victim of a crime requests notice of a scheduled hearing to review or consider special medical parole for a prisoner convicted of that crime, the board shall send notice of the hearing to the victim at least 30 days before the hearing. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the prisoner’s or commissioner’s application for parole submitted under AS 33.16.085 . The copy of the application sent to the victim must include the prisoner’s proposed residence and employment addresses.
  2. A victim who requests notice under this section shall maintain a current, valid mailing address on file with the board. The board shall send the notice required by this section to the last known address of the victim. The victim’s address may not be disclosed to the prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney.
  3. The victim has a right to attend meetings of the parole board in which the status of the prisoner convicted of the crime against that victim is officially considered and to comment, in writing or in person, on the proposed action of the board. Copies of any written comments shall be provided to the prisoner and the prisoner’s attorney before action by the board.
  4. The board shall consider the comments presented under (c) of this section in deciding whether to release the prisoner on special medical parole.
  5. If the victim requests, the board shall make every reasonable effort to notify the victim as soon as practicable in writing of its decision to grant or deny special medical parole. The notice under this subsection must include the expected date of the prisoner’s release, the geographic area in which the prisoner is required to reside, and other pertinent information concerning the prisoner’s conditions of parole that may affect the victim.

History. (§ 5 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 4 ch 25 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For special medical parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 15.

Sec. 33.16.089. Eligibility for administrative parole.

History. [Repealed, § 72 ch 1 4SSLA 2017.]

Sec. 33.16.090. Eligibility for discretionary parole and minimum terms to be served.

  1. A prisoner sentenced to an active term of imprisonment of at least 181 days may, in the discretion of the board, be released on discretionary parole if the prisoner
    1. has served the amount of time specified under (b) of this section, except that
      1. a prisoner sentenced to one or more mandatory 99-year terms under AS 12.55.125(a) or one or more definite terms under AS 12.55.125(l) is not eligible for consideration for discretionary parole;
      2. a prisoner is not eligible for consideration of discretionary parole if made ineligible by order of a court under AS 12.55.115 ;
      3. a prisoner imprisoned under AS 12.55.086 is not eligible for discretionary parole unless the actual term of imprisonment is more than one year;
      4. a prisoner sentenced to a single sentence within or below a presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125(c) , (d)(2) — (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i) who has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release is not eligible for consideration of discretionary parole;
      5. a prisoner sentenced to a single sentence, including a consecutive or partially consecutive sentence, that is not eligible for a good time deduction under AS 33.20.010(a)(3) and that has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release is not eligible for consideration of discretionary parole; or
    2. is at least 60 years of age, has served at least 10 years of a sentence for one or more crimes in a single judgment, and has not been convicted of an unclassified felony or a sexual felony as defined in AS 12.55.185 .
  2. A prisoner eligible under (a)(1) of this section who is sentenced
    1. to a single sentence under AS 12.55.125(a) or (b) may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the mandatory minimum term under AS 12.55.125(a) or (b),
      1. two-thirds of the active term of imprisonment imposed, or any term set under AS 12.55.115 , whichever is greatest, for a conviction under AS 11.41.100 or 11.41.110 ;
      2. one-half of the active term of imprisonment imposed, or any term set under AS 12.55.115 , whichever is greatest, for a conviction for an offense not listed in (A) of this paragraph;
    2. to a single sentence under AS 12.55.125(c) , (d)(2) — (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i), and has been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release during the second half of the sentence, may not be released on discretionary parole until
      1. the prisoner has served that portion of the active term of imprisonment required by the three-judge panel; and
      2. in addition to the factors set out in AS 33.16.100(a) , the board determines that
        1. the prisoner has successfully completed all rehabilitation programs ordered by the three-judge panel that were made available to the prisoner; and
        2. the prisoner would not constitute a danger to the public if released on parole;
    3. to a single enhanced sentence under AS 12.55.155(a) that is above the applicable presumptive range may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the greater of the following:
      1. an amount of time, less good time earned under AS 33.20.010 , equal to the upper end of the presumptive range plus one-fourth of the amount of time above the presumptive range; or
      2. any term set under AS 12.55.115;
    4. to a single sentence under any other provision of law may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served at least one-fourth of the active term of imprisonment, any mandatory minimum sentence imposed under any provision of law, or any term set under AS 12.55.115, whichever is greatest;
    5. to concurrent sentences may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the greatest of
      1. any mandatory minimum sentence or sentences imposed under any provision of law;
      2. any term set under AS 12.55.115; or
      3. the amount of time that is required to be served under (1) — (4) or (7) of this subsection for the sentence imposed for the primary crime, had that been the only sentence imposed;
    6. to consecutive or partially consecutive sentences may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the greatest of
      1. the composite total of any mandatory minimum sentence or sentences imposed under any provision of law, including AS 12.55.127 ;
      2. any term set under AS 12.55.115; or
      3. the amount of time that is required to be served under (1) — (4) or (7) of this subsection for the sentence imposed for the primary crime, had that been the only sentence imposed, plus one-quarter of the composite total of the active term of imprisonment imposed as consecutive or partially consecutive sentences imposed for all crimes other than the primary crime;
    7. to a single sentence under AS 12.55.125(d) for an offense under AS 11.71.030(a)(2) or (9), and has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release, may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served one-half of the active term of imprisonment imposed.
  3. As used in this section,
    1. “active term of imprisonment” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.127 ;
    2. “primary crime” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.127 .

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 30 — 32 ch 79 SLA 1992; am § 14 ch 7 SLA 1996; am §§ 5, 6 ch 125 SLA 2004; am § 28 ch 2 SLA 2005; am § 47 ch 41 SLA 2009; am §§ 123, 124 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 49 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am §§ 106, 107 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(d)(10) and (m)(3), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For eligibility for discretionary parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 1.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in (c)(1), substituted “AS 12.55.127 ” for “AS 12.55.185 ”.

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), in the introductory language, inserted “and who has not been released on administrative parole as provided in AS 33.16.089 ” following “181 days”; designated a portion of (a) as (1) and redesignated (a)(1), (2) and (3) as (a)(1)(A), (B) and (C); added (a)(2); in the introductory language of of (b), substituted “(a)(1)” for “(a)”; in (b)(2), substituted “AS 12.55.125(i)(1) and (2)” for “AS 12.55.125(c) , (d)(2) – (4), (e)(3) and (4) or (i)”; in (b)(3), substituted “AS 12.55.125(i) ” for “AS 12.55.125(c) , (d)(2) – (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i)”; added (b)(8); effective July 12, 2016, repealed (c)(2)(B), (d)(2)(B) and (o); and made related and stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in the introductory language in (a), deleted “and who has not been released on administrative parole as provided in AS 33.16.089 ” following “at least 181 days”.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, added (a)(1)(D) and (a)(1)(E), and made a related stylistic change; in (b), added (b)(1)(A), added the (b)(1)(B) designation, substituted “one-half” for “one-third” at the beginning of (b)(1)(B), and added “, for a conviction for an offense not listed in (A) of this paragraph” at the end, deleted former (b)(2), which read, “to a single sentence within or below a presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125(i) (1) and (2), and has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release, may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the term imposed, less good time earned under AS 33.20.010 ;”, redesignated the following paragraphs accordingly, in present (b)(2), substituted “AS 12.55.125(c) , (d)(2) – (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i)” for “AS 12.55.125(i) ”, in present (b)(5)(C) and (b)(6)(C), substituted “under (1) – (4) or (7)” for “under (1) – (5)”, and in present (b)(7), substituted “AS 12.55.125(d) for an offense under AS 11.71.030(a)(2) or (9)” for “AS 12.55.125(i)(3) and (4)” and deleted “, after a deduction for good time earned under AS 33.20.010 ,” following “prisoner has served.”

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(b), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendments to (a) and (b) of this section apply “to sentences imposed on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Wording of order. —

The wording, “an order suspending the imposition of sentence for a given length of time, and requiring, as a special condition of probation, a definite term of imprisonment to be served periodically,” is necessary to ensure that a prisoner given periodic time receives appropriate “good time” credit, so that his parole eligibility is properly computed. Whittlesey v. State, 626 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1980).

Eligibility. —

Superior court properly sentenced defendant to 30 years to serve for first-degree sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter because he had a criminal history—he had physically and sexually abused his biological sister—he was not eligible for good time deductions where he was sentenced for an unclassified sexual felony, and he was not eligible for discretionary parole. Evans v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Challenge to legislative policy. —

Judge failed to provide any case-specific reasons for his conclusion that a restriction on discretionary parole was required or for his generalized assumptions about when criminal defendants typically "age out," instead improperly voicing his disagreement with the legislative policy decisions underlying the provisions of this section. Thomas v. State, 413 P.3d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).

“Presumptive” term and parole. —

Judge’s decision to label defendant’s term of imprisonment “presumptive” had no effect on his eligibility for discretionary parole, where parole eligibility was set by statute. Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).

As negotiated, defendant received an eight-year sentence for second-degree assault and kidnapping; trial court erred in labeling a portion of defendant’s sentence as “presumptive” because this was both legally incorrect and, potentially, a cause of future confusion. Different provisions of this section govern the parole eligibility of prisoners who are subject to presumptive sentencing. Heavyrunner v. State, 172 P.3d 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

There is no direct relationship between whether a defendant’s sentence is a “presumptive sentence” and whether he is eligible to apply for discretionary parole while serving the sentence. Luckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).

Statewide three-judge panel has the authority to grant enhanced parole eligibility to defendants who are subject to presumptive sentencing, but sentencing judges have no discretion when it comes to categorizing a defendant’s sentence as “presumptive” or “non-presumptive”; rather, this classification of sentences is governed by statute. Luckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).

Trial court erred in failing to consider whether the prohibition on discretionary parole would result in manifest injustice after it imposed a sentenced of 15 years with 9 years suspended for second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and the three-judge sentencing panel had statutory authority to grant enhanced parole eligibility to defendants who were subject to presumptive sentencing. Lochridge v. State (Alaska Ct. App. June 8, 2016) (memorandum decision).

Release of presumptively sentenced prisoner. —

A presumptively sentenced prison who is mandatorily released with 180 days or less remaining on his sentence cannot be released unconditionally. State v. Frazier, 719 P.2d 261 (Alaska 1986).

Fifty year parole restriction improper. —

Trial court’s order that defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole be restricted until he had served at least 50 years of his sentence was reversed as excessive because defendant was ineligible for parole for 33 years, when he would be 67 years old. The trial court’s decision to additionally restrict defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole was based on predictions that defendant would be dangerous to the public and might constitute a danger to his then middle-aged children and their children which was a speculative possibility at best. Korkow v. State, 258 P.3d 932 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011), rev'd, 314 P.3d 560 (Alaska 2013).

Cruel and unusual punishment.—

In a case in which defendant received a sentence of 70 years' imprisonment (with normal eligibility for parole) for a murder that he committed when he was a juvenile, the appellate court concluded that defendant's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because defendant failed to prove that he would inevitably spend his entire life in prison. Walker v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. July 19, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Calculation of good time credit. —

Although amendments to AS 33.20.010(a) were meant to preclude a defendant from accruing good time credits where substantial physical torture was inflicted upon a murder victim, where those amendments were enacted after defendant’s sentencing, the amendments were not applicable to defendant. Malloy v. State, 153 P.3d 1003 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

Jurisdiction to decide challenges and constitutionality. —

District court lacked jurisdiction to decide challenges to the state parole board’s interpretation of this section and to the constitutionality of parole statutes, as interpreted. Such challenges had to be brought in the superior court. Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 685 P.2d 103 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), decided under former AS 33.15.180.

Anticipatory revocation of mandatory parole release authorized. —

Parole board had the authority to anticipatorily revoke scheduled mandatory parole release on account of prisoner’s failure to complete the sex offender treatment ordered by the sentencing court. Gwalthney v. State, 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Applied in

Ridgley v. State, 739 P.2d 1299 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Colocho v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2020).

Quoted in

Merry v. State, 752 P.2d 475 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Sikeo v. State, 258 P.3d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Cited in

Kirby v. State, 748 P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Charles v. State, 780 P.2d 377 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); George v. State, 836 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Morrison v. State, 7 P.3d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); State v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2002); Beaudoin v. State, 57 P.3d 703 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Harapat v. State, 174 P.3d 249 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008); Phillips v. State, 211 P.3d 1148 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009); Bates v. State, 258 P.3d 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011); Gray v. State, 267 P.3d 667 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011); Byford v. State, 352 P.3d 898 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015); Olmstead v. State, 477 P.3d 656 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).

Sec. 33.16.100. Granting of discretionary parole.

  1. The board may authorize the release of a prisoner who is otherwise eligible under AS 12.55.115 and AS 33.16.090(a)(1) on discretionary parole if it determines a reasonable probability exists that
    1. the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating any laws or conditions imposed by the board;
    2. the prisoner’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society will be furthered by release on parole;
    3. the prisoner will not pose a threat of harm to the public if released on parole; and
    4. release of the prisoner on parole would not diminish the seriousness of the crime.
  2. If the board finds a change in circumstances in a prisoner’s preparole reports listed in AS 33.16.110(a) , or discovers new information concerning a prisoner who has been granted a parole release date, the board may rescind or revise the previously granted parole release date. In reconsidering the release date, the procedures set out in AS 33.16.130 shall be followed.
  3. [Repealed, § 32 ch 2 SLA 2005.]
  4. [Repealed, § 32 ch 2 SLA 2005.]
  5. [Repealed, § 179 ch 36 SLA 2016.]
  6. [Repealed, § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019.]
  7. When considering a prisoner for release on discretionary parole under AS 33.16.090(a)(2) , the board may release a prisoner if, taking into consideration the prisoner’s likelihood of recidivism given the prisoner’s age, criminal history, behavior in prison, participation in treatment, and plans for reentering the community, a reasonable probability exists that
    1. the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating any laws or conditions imposed by the board;
    2. the prisoner’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society will be furthered by release on parole;
    3. the prisoner will not pose a threat of harm to the public if released on parole; and
    4. release of the prisoner on parole would not diminish the seriousness of the crime.
  8. If the board considers an application for discretionary parole and denies parole because the prisoner does not meet the standards in (a) or (g) of this section, the board may make the prisoner ineligible for further consideration of discretionary parole or require that additional time be served before the prisoner is again eligible for consideration for discretionary parole.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 3 ch 77 SLA 1987; am §§ 29, 32 ch 2 SLA 2005; am §§ 125 — 127, 179 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 50 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am §§ 108, 109, 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Administrative Code. —

For eligibility for discretionary parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 1.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

For parole rescission hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 9.

Cross references. —

For provision relating to applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(m)(4) — (6), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), inserted “convicted of an unclassified felony who is otherwise eligible under AS 12.55.115 and AS 33.16.090(a)(1) ” following “release of a prisoner”; in (b), substituted “preparole reports listed in AS 33.16.110(a) ” for “parole release plan submitted under AS 33.16.130 (a)” and “AS 33.16.130 ” for “AS 33.16.130(b) and (c)”; repealed (e); added (f) and (g).

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in (f), deleted “and has not been released on administrative parole under AS 33.16.089 ,” preceding “unless the board”, and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, in (a), deleted “convicted of an unclassified felony” following “release of a prisoner” in the introductory paragraph; repealed (f); and added (h).

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(h), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendment of (a) of this section applies “to parole granted on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Section 142(f), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 enactment of (h) of this section applies “to parole ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

“Presumptive” term and parole. —

Judge’s decision to label defendant’s term of imprisonment “presumptive” had no effect on his eligibility for discretionary parole, where parole eligibility was set by statute. Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).

Restricting parole eligibility. —

Twenty-year parole restriction, applied to the entire period of a twenty-year sentence, was clearly mistaken, since such an implied distrust of the parole board’s ability to do its job was unwarranted in the absence of express findings, supported by specific evidence, establishing a need to restrict parole eligibility. Newell v. State, 771 P.2d 873 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Restrictions on parole eligibility must rest on a finding that normal parole eligibility would be insufficient to protect the public and insure the defendant’s reformation. Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).

Parole board did not abuse its discretion when it refused to remove the precondition for parole on defendant's completion of a substance abuse evaluation and any recommended treatment because there was nothing in the record to suggest that the parole board was aware that the precondition could not be met at the time it was imposed, and nothing to suggest that the precondition could not be met in the future once defendant was released from protective custody. Starkey v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Applicability of good-time deduction. —

Deduction of good time under this section was inapplicable in calculating whether a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment had been served for purposes of determining discretionary parole eligibility. Hampel v. State, 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).

Trial court is not required to advise of parole minimums, or of its authority to fix parole eligibility, under the terms of Cr. R. 11; but it is preferable for the court to inform the defendant. Morgan v. State, 582 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1978) (Decided under former AS 33.15.080)

Increase in minimum period of incarceration required before becoming eligible for parole is an increase in the sentence. Nelson v. State, 617 P.2d 502 (Alaska 1981).

Applied in

Ridgley v. State, 739 P.2d 1299 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Gilbert M. v. State, 139 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2006).

Quoted in

Merry v. State, 752 P.2d 475 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Frank v. State, 97 P.3d 86 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004); State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560 (Alaska 2013).

Stated in

Malloy v. State, 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); Thomas v. State, 413 P.3d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).

Cited in

Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Charles v. State, 780 P.2d 377 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Weitz v. State, 794 P.2d 952 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); George v. State, 836 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Morrison v. State, 7 P.3d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); Beaudoin v. State, 57 P.3d 703 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Malloy v. State, 153 P.3d 1003 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008); Bates v. State, 258 P.3d 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Sec. 33.16.110. Preparole reports.

  1. In determining whether a prisoner is suitable for discretionary parole, the board shall consider the preparole reports including
    1. the presentence report made to the sentencing court;
    2. the recommendations made by the sentencing court, by the prosecuting attorney, and by the defense attorney, and any statements made by the victim or the prisoner at sentencing;
    3. the prisoner’s institutional conduct history while incarcerated;
    4. recommendations made by the staff of the correctional facilities in which the prisoner was incarcerated;
    5. reports of prior crimes, juvenile histories, and previous experiences of the prisoner on parole or probation;
    6. physical, mental, and psychiatric examinations of the prisoner;
    7. information submitted by the prisoner, the sentencing court, the victim of the crime, the prosecutor, or other persons having knowledge of the prisoner or the crime;
    8. information concerning an unjustified disparity in the sentence imposed on a prisoner in relation to other sentences imposed under similar circumstances;
    9. the case plan created under AS 33.30.011(a)(8) for the prisoner, including a compliance report on the case plan;
    10. a reentry plan created under AS 33.30.011(a)(9) ; and
    11. other relevant information that may be reasonably available.
  2. The board shall provide information available under (a)(3) and (a)(6) of this section when requesting comments on the discretionary parole of a prisoner from the sentencing court.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 128 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), added (9), (10), and (11); and made a stylistic change.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Frank v. State, 97 P.3d 86 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).

Sec. 33.16.120. Rights of certain victims in connection with parole.

  1. If the victim of a crime against a person or arson in the first degree requests notice of a scheduled hearing to review or consider discretionary parole for a prisoner convicted of that crime, the board shall send notice of the hearing to the victim at least 30 days before the hearing. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the prisoner’s parole plan submitted to the board. However, the copy of the parole plan sent to the victim may not include the prisoner’s confidential health information, information protected under  AS 33.16.170 , proposed residence, or employment addresses.
  2. A victim who requests notice under this section shall maintain a current, valid mailing address on file with the board. The board shall send the notice required by this section to the last known address of the victim. The victim’s address may not be disclosed to the prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney.
  3. The victim has a right to attend meetings of the parole board in which the status of the prisoner convicted of the crime against that victim is officially considered and to comment, in writing or in person, on the proposed action of the board. Copies of any written comments shall be provided to the prisoner and the prisoner’s attorney before action by the board.
  4. The board shall consider the comments presented under (c) of this section in deciding whether to release the prisoner on parole.
  5. If the victim requests, the board shall make every reasonable effort to notify the victim as soon as practicable in writing of its decision to grant or deny discretionary parole or to release the prisoner under  AS 33.16.010(c) . The notice under this subsection must include the expected date of the prisoner’s release, the geographic area in which the prisoner is required to reside, and other pertinent information concerning the prisoner’s conditions of parole that may affect the victim.
  6. Upon request of the victim, if a prisoner is released under  AS 33.16.010(c) or 33.16.090 , the board shall make every reasonable effort to notify the victim before the prisoner’s release date. Notification under this subsection must include the expected date of the prisoner’s release, the geographic area in which the prisoner is required to reside, and other pertinent information concerning the prisoner’s conditions of parole that may affect the victim.
  7. A victim of a crime involving domestic violence or of a sexual assault under  AS 11.41.410 - 11.41.427 shall be informed by the board at least 30 days in advance of a scheduled hearing to review or consider parole for a prisoner. The board shall inform the victim of any decision to grant or deny parole or to release the prisoner under  AS 33.16.010(c) . If the prisoner is to be released, the victim shall be notified of the expected date of the release, the geographic area in which the prisoner will reside, and any other information concerning conditions of parole that may affect the victim. The victim shall also be informed of any changes in the conditions of parole that may affect the victim. The board shall send the notice required to the last known address of the victim. A person may not bring a civil action for damages for a failure to comply with the provisions of this subsection.
  8. [Repealed, § 27 ch 13 SLA 2017.]

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 12 — 15 ch 59 SLA 1989; am § 51 ch 64 SLA 1996; am §§ 129 — 132 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 27 ch 13 SLA 2017; am § 51 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Cross references. —

For rights of victims generally, see AS 12.61.

Administrative Code. —

For attendance and appearance at parole board adjudicatory hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 2.

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), substituted “parole plan submitted to the board” for “application for parole submitted under AS 33.16.130(a) ” and “parole plan” for “application”; inserted “confidential health information, information protected under AS 33.16.170 ,” following “prisoner’s”; in (f), inserted “33.16.089, or 33.16.090 ” preceding “the board shall”; in (g), inserted “or of a sexual assault under AS 11.41.410 11.41.427 ” following “domestic violence”; deleted “discretionary” in two places – following “review or consider” and “grant or deny”, respectively; added (h); and made a minor stylistic change.

The first 2017 amendment, effective June 20, 2017, repealed (h).

The second 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in (f), deleted “, 33.16.089,” in the list of statutory citations.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Under this section, all family members who meet the statutory definition of “victim” in this chapter are entitled to be present during all parole board hearings concerning the perpetrator and to comment on the proposed board action. May 24, 1996, Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 33.16.130. Parole procedures.

  1. A prisoner eligible for discretionary parole may apply to the board for discretionary parole. As part of the application for parole, the prisoner shall submit to the board a parole release plan that includes information concerning the prisoner’s plan for employment, residence, and rehabilitation if released on parole.
  2. Before the board determines a prisoner’s suitability for discretionary parole, the prisoner is entitled to a hearing before the board. The commissioner or the commissioner’s designee shall furnish to the prisoner a copy of the preparole reports listed in AS 33.16.110(a) , and the prisoner shall be permitted access to all records that the board will consider in making its decision except those that are made confidential by law. The prisoner may also respond in writing to all materials the board considers, be present at the hearing, and present evidence to the board.
  3. If the board denies parole, the board shall state the reasons for the denial, identify all of the factors considered relevant to the denial, and provide a written plan for addressing all of the factors relevant to the denial. The board may schedule a subsequent parole hearing at the time of the denial or at a later date.
  4. The board shall issue its decision in writing and provide a copy of the decision to the prisoner.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; § 133 ch 36 SLA 2016; am §§ 52, 53 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am §§ 110, 111 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(d)(11), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to applicability of the 2017 amendment to subsection (c), see sec. 75(d), ch. 1, 4SSLA 2017, in the 2017 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For attendance and appearance at parole board adjudicatory hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 2.

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For parole rescission hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 9.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, rewrote the section.

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in the introductory language in (a), deleted the second sentence, which read, “The board shall also hold a hearing if requested by a victim under procedures established for the request for a prisoner eligible for administrative parole.”, and in (a)(1), deleted “, unless the prisoner is eligible for administrative parole” at the end; deleted (c)(1) and (2), setting specific time frames for scheduling of subsequent parole hearings.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, repealed and reenacted (a); and added the first sentence in (b).

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(f), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the repeal and reenactment of (a) of this section and the amendment of (b) of this section apply “to parole ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Section inapplicable to mandatory parolee. Mandatory parolees are not denied equal protection of the laws because they are not permitted to appear before the parole board prior to their release while discretionary parolees are granted the right of an in-person appearance; the purpose of the parole hearing under this section is to allow the discretionary parolee an opportunity to persuade the board for release on parole whereas the mandatory parolee must be released on parole at the end of the parolee’s sentence less time deducted for good conduct. Accordingly, there is nothing for the board to consider with regard to whether a mandatory parolee should be released. Smith v. State Dep't of Cors., 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994).

Board's duty to specify reasons for denial. —

22 AAC 20.170(d), stating that the parole board doesn't have to make findings of fact or conclusions of law, does not exempt the Alaska Parole Board from the duty imposed by subsection (c) to specify its reasons for denying an application for discretionary parole. Frank v. State, 97 P.3d 86 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).

Superior court did not err in denying petitioner's application for postconviction relief where the Board's explanation for denying parole was specific enough both to allow for meaningful judicial review and to allow petitioner to prepare more satisfactory future applications for parole. Walker v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Sec. 33.16.140. Order for parole.

An order for parole issued by the board, setting out the conditions imposed under AS 33.16.150(a) and (b) and the date parole custody ends, shall be furnished to each prisoner released on special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 6 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 134 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 54 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(m)(7), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, inserted “administrative,” following “special medical,".

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, deleted “administrative,” following “special medical,”.

Sec. 33.16.150. Conditions of parole.

  1. As a condition of parole, a prisoner released on special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole
    1. shall obey all state, federal, or local laws or ordinances, and any court orders applicable to the parolee;
    2. shall make diligent efforts to maintain steady employment or meet family obligations;
    3. shall, if involved in education, counseling, training, or treatment, continue in the program unless granted permission from the parole officer assigned to the parolee to discontinue the program;
    4. shall report
      1. upon release to the parole officer assigned to the parolee;
      2. at other times, and in the manner, prescribed by the board or the parole officer assigned to the parolee that accommodate the diligent efforts of the parolee to secure and maintain steady employment or to participate in educational courses or training programs;
    5. shall reside at a stated place and not change that residence without notifying, and receiving permission from, the parole officer assigned to the parolee;
    6. shall remain within stated geographic limits unless written permission to depart from the stated limits is granted the parolee;
    7. may not use, possess, handle, purchase, give, distribute, or administer a controlled substance as defined in AS 11.71.900 or under federal law or a drug for which a prescription is required under state or federal law without a prescription from a licensed medical professional to the parolee;
    8. may not possess or control a firearm; in this paragraph, “firearm” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900 ;
    9. may not enter into an agreement or other arrangement with a law enforcement agency or officer that will place the parolee in the position of violating a law or parole condition without the prior approval of the board;
    10. may not contact or correspond with anyone confined in a correctional facility of any type serving any term of imprisonment or a felon without the permission of the parole officer assigned to a parolee;
    11. shall agree to waive extradition from any state or territory of the United States and to not contest efforts to return the parolee to the state;
    12. shall provide a blood sample, an oral sample, or both, when requested by a health care professional acting on behalf of the state to provide the sample or samples, or an oral sample when requested by a juvenile or adult correctional, probation, or parole officer, or a peace officer, if the prisoner is being released after a conviction of an offense requiring the state to collect the sample or samples for the deoxyribonucleic acid identification registration system under AS 41.41.035;
    13. from a conviction for a sex offense shall submit to regular periodic polygraph examinations; in this paragraph, “sex offense” has the meaning given in AS 12.63.100 .
  2. The board may require as a condition of special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole, or a member of the board acting for the board under (e) of this section may require as a condition of mandatory parole, that a prisoner released on parole
    1. not possess or control a defensive weapon, a deadly weapon other than an ordinary pocket knife with a blade three inches or less in length, or ammunition for a firearm, or reside in a residence where there is a firearm capable of being concealed on one’s person or a prohibited weapon; in this paragraph, “deadly weapon,” “defensive weapon,” and “firearm” have the meanings given in AS 11.81.900 , and “prohibited weapon” has the meaning given in AS 11.61.200 ;
    2. refrain from possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages;
    3. submit to reasonable searches and seizures by a parole officer, or a peace officer acting under the direction of a parole officer;
    4. submit to appropriate medical, mental health, or controlled substance or alcohol examination, treatment, or counseling;
    5. submit to periodic examinations designed to detect the use of alcohol or controlled substances; the periodic examinations may include testing under the program established under AS 33.16.060(c) ;
    6. make restitution ordered by the court according to a schedule established by the board;
    7. refrain from opening, maintaining, or using a checking account or charge account;
    8. refrain from entering into a contract other than a prenuptial contract or a marriage contract;
    9. refrain from operating a motor vehicle;
    10. refrain from entering an establishment where alcoholic beverages are served, sold, or otherwise dispensed;
    11. refrain from participating in any other activity or conduct reasonably related to the parolee’s offense, prior record, behavior or prior behavior, current circumstances, or perceived risk to the community, or from associating with any other person that the board determines is reasonably likely to diminish the rehabilitative goals of parole, or that may endanger the public; in the case of special medical parole, for a prisoner diagnosed with a communicable disease, comply with conditions set by the board designed to prevent the transmission of the disease;
    12. refrain from traveling in the state to make diligent efforts to secure or maintain steady employment or to participate in educational courses or training programs only if the travel violates other conditions of parole.
  3. Except for a condition imposed under (b)(1) and (3) — (6) of this section, the board, or a member of the board acting for the board under (e) of this section, may generally delegate imposition of special conditions under (b) of this section to the discretion of the parole officer.
  4. The board, or a member of the board acting for the board under (e) of this section, may require a prisoner released on parole to comply with special conditions imposed under (b) of this section for any period up to the maximum term under which the prisoner is subject to the custody and jurisdiction of the board.
  5. The board may designate a member of the board to act on behalf of the board in imposing conditions of mandatory parole under (a) and (b) of this section, in delegating imposition of conditions of mandatory parole under (c) of this section, and in setting the period of compliance with the conditions of mandatory parole under (d) of this section. The decision of a member of the board under this section is the decision of the board. A prisoner or parolee aggrieved by a decision of a member of the board acting for the board under this subsection may apply to the board under AS 33.16.160 for a change in the conditions of mandatory parole.
  6. In addition to other conditions of parole imposed under this section, the board may impose as a condition of special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole for a prisoner serving a term for a crime involving domestic violence (1) any of the terms of protective orders under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) — (7); (2) a requirement that, at the prisoner’s expense, the prisoner participate in and complete, to the satisfaction of the board, a program for the rehabilitation of perpetrators of domestic violence that meets the standards set by, and that is approved by, the department under AS 44.28.020(b) ; and (3) any other condition necessary to rehabilitate the prisoner. The board shall establish procedures for the exchange of information concerning the parolee with the victim and for responding to reports of nonattendance or noncompliance by the parolee with conditions imposed under this subsection. The board may not under this subsection require a prisoner to participate in and complete a program for the rehabilitation of perpetrators of domestic violence unless the program meets the standards set by, and is approved by, the department under AS 44.28.020(b) .
  7. In addition to other conditions of parole imposed under this section for a prisoner serving a sentence for an offense where the aggravating factor provided in AS 12.55.155(c)(29) has been proven or admitted, the board shall impose as a condition of special medical, discretionary, and mandatory parole a requirement that the prisoner submit to electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring under this subsection must comply with AS 33.30.011(a)(10) and provide for monitoring of the prisoner’s location and movements by Global Positioning System technology. The board shall require a prisoner serving a period of parole with electronic monitoring as provided under this subsection to pay all or a portion of the costs of the electronic monitoring, but only if the prisoner has sufficient financial resources to pay the costs or a portion of the costs. A prisoner subject to electronic monitoring under this subsection is not entitled to a credit for time served in a correctional facility while the defendant is on parole. In this subsection, “correctional facility” has the meaning given in AS 33.30.901 .
  8. In addition to other conditions of parole imposed under this section, for a prisoner serving a sentence for an offense involving the use of alcohol or controlled substances, the board may impose, as a condition of special medical, discretionary, or mandatory parole, a requirement that the prisoner comply with a program established under AS 33.16.060(c) or AS 47.38.020 . The board may require a prisoner serving a period of parole and complying with a program established under AS 33.16.060(c) or AS 47.38.020 to pay all or a portion of the costs associated with the program.
  9. In addition to other conditions of parole imposed under this section, for a prisoner who is serving a sentence for an offense involving the use of alcohol and whom the board has ordered to refrain from possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages, the board shall require the surrender of the person’s driver’s license or identification card, forward the license or identification card to the department, and impose as a condition of parole that, if the parolee is eligible for a driver’s license or identification card, the parolee shall apply to the department for a new license or identification card with a restriction imposed on the person under AS 04.16.160 . The board shall notify the department of the board’s order under this subsection by providing a copy of the board’s order. Upon discharge from parole, the board shall notify the department of the parolee’s discharge. In this subsection, “department” means the Department of Administration.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 16 ch 59 SLA 1989; am §§ 3, 4 ch 44 SLA 1994; am §§ 7, 8 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 52 ch 64 SLA 1996; am § 15 ch 86 SLA 1998; am § 7 ch 95 SLA 1998; am § 4 ch 44 SLA 2000; am § 10 ch 14 SLA 2006; am § 2 ch 27 SLA 2007; am § 30 ch 83 SLA 2014; am §§ 135 — 140 ch 36 SLA 2016; am §§ 2, 3 ch 49 SLA 2016; am §§ 55 — 60 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 11, ch. 43, SLA 1994 added a new subsection (e) for this section, which was superseded by the enactment of a substantially similar provision in § 4, ch. 44, SLA 1994, which took effect the day after ch. 43. Under § 14, ch. 43, SLA 1994, the subsection added by ch. 43 was retroactive to January 1, 1986. It read as follows: “(e) The board may delegate its authority under this section to a single member of the board to issue a decision or order on behalf of the board setting special conditions of mandatory parole. A prisoner or parolee aggrieved by a decision or order of a single board member under this section may request a change in mandatory parole conditions by applying to the full board under AS 33.16.160 .”

Cross references. —

For provision authorizing the board of parole to adopt regulations necessary to implement (b) of this section, see sec. 39(b), ch. 83, SLA 2014.

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(m)(8) - (13), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For attendance and appearance at parole board adjudicatory hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 2.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For conditions of parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 5.

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective July 17, 2014, in (b)(5), added “the periodic examinations may include testing under the program established under AS 33.16.060(c) ;” at the end.

The first 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a) inserted “administrative,” following “special medical,”; in (b), inserted “administrative” in two places; in (e), inserted “administrative or” in four places; in (f), inserted “administrative” following “special medical,”; in (g), inserted “administrative” following “special medical,”; inserted “comply with AS 33.30.011(a)(10) and” following “subsection must”; substituted “parole” for “probation”; added (h) and (i).

The second 2016 amendment, effective October 26, 2016, in (a)(4)(B), added “that accommodate the diligent efforts of the parolee to secure and maintain steady employment or to participate in educational courses or training programs” at the end of the sentence; added (b)(12).

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, deleted “administrative,” following “special medical,” in the introductory language in (a) and (b), and in (f), (g), and (h); in the introductory language in (b), and three times in (e), it deleted “administrative or” preceding “mandatory parole”.

Editor’s notes. —

Under sec. 36(b), ch. 83, SLA 2014, subsection (b) as amended by sec. 30, ch. 83, SLA 2014, applies to convictions occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014 for offenses occurring before, on, or after July 17, 2014.

Notes to Decisions

Regulatory mandating of statutory provisions. —

Nothing in this section prohibits the board from mandating by regulation some of the statutory conditions listed in subsection (b). Smith v. State Dep't of Cors., 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994).

Applied in

Reichel v. State, 101 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004); James v. State, 244 P.3d 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Quoted in

State v. Staael, 807 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Cited in

Knowlton v. State, 795 P.2d 1287 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); Dep't of Corr. v. Cowles, 151 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006); Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 33.16.160. Change in parole conditions.

  1. Upon application of the state or the parolee, the board may change a condition of parole previously imposed under AS 33.16.150(b) .
  2. If the proposed change in conditions of parole is more restrictive of a parolee’s liberty, the parolee is entitled to notice of the proposed change, the reasons for the proposed change, a hearing before the board, and an opportunity to respond to the proposed change and to present evidence.
  3. Notwithstanding (a) and (b) of this section, when a parole officer determines that an emergency situation requires an immediate change in a condition of parole, or the imposition of a new condition, the parole officer may impose the change or new condition immediately, without a hearing.  The parole officer shall immediately notify the board of the imposition of the emergency change or new condition and shall provide a written report setting out the basis for the change or new condition and the nature of the emergency.  The effective period of a change in condition or imposition of a new condition under this subsection may not exceed 15 working days.
  4. A condition of parole may be changed, a new condition of parole may be imposed, or a new or changed condition imposed under (c) of this section may be extended by a member of the board or the board’s designee if, after a preliminary hearing, an emergency situation is found that requires a change in condition. The effective period of a change in condition under this subsection, the imposition of a new condition under this subsection, or the extension under this subsection of a new or changed condition imposed under (c) of this section may not exceed 90 days.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Administrative Code. —

For conditions of parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 5.

For hearing officers, see 22 AAC 20, art. 10.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Sec. 33.16.170. Confidentiality of records and information.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, the preparole reports listed in AS 33.16.110 , and other information obtained and used by the board under this chapter, are confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone other than the board, the sentencing judge, the prosecuting and defense attorneys, the prisoner, the prisoner’s attorney, the attorney for the board, the staff of the board, or others granted access to this information under this chapter.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section and AS 33.16.130(b) , in a preparole proceeding under AS 33.16.130 the board may not disclose to the prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney
    1. diagnostic opinions that, if made known to the eligible prisoner, could lead to serious disruption of the prisoner’s institutional program;
    2. portions of a document that reveal sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; or
    3. other information that, if disclosed, may result in physical harm to any other person.
  3. When the board withholds information from a prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney under (b) of this section, the board shall provide the prisoner with an excised copy of the material or summary of the material withheld containing as much specificity as the circumstances allow.
  4. Except for portions containing personal medical, mental health, or substance abuse treatment information or information that is otherwise required to be kept confidential by state or federal law, decisions of the board, orders for parole, and parole conditions imposed by the board are not confidential. The board shall post all decisions, orders of parole, and conditions imposed on a publicly available Internet website with any confidential portions redacted.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 112 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Administrative Code. —

For attendance and appearance at parole board adjudicatory hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 2.

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For recording of hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 11.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, added (d).

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(f), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the enactment of (d) of this section applies “to parole ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Sec. 33.16.180. Duties of the commissioner.

The commissioner shall

  1. conduct investigations of prisoners eligible for discretionary parole, as requested by the board and as provided in this section;
  2. supervise the conduct of parolees;
  3. appoint and assign parole officers and personnel;
  4. notify the board and provide information on a prisoner 120 days before the prisoner’s mandatory release date, if the prisoner is to be released on mandatory parole;
  5. maintain records, files, and accounts as requested by the board;
  6. prepare preparole reports under AS 33.16.110(a) ;
  7. notify the board in writing of a prisoner’s compliance or noncompliance with the prisoner’s case plan created under AS 33.30.011(a)(8) not less than 30 days before the prisoner’s next parole eligibility date or the prisoner’s parole hearing date, whichever is earlier;
  8. establish an administrative sanction and incentive program to facilitate a swift and certain response to a parolee’s compliance with or violation of the conditions of parole and shall adopt regulations to implement the program; at a minimum, the regulations must include
    1. a decision-making process to guide parole officers in determining the suitable response to positive and negative offender behavior that includes a list of sanctions for the most common types of negative behavior, including technical violations of conditions of parole, and a list of incentives for compliance with conditions and positive behavior that exceeds those conditions;
    2. policies and procedures that ensure
      1. a process for responding to negative behavior that includes a review of previous violations and sanctions;
      2. that enhanced sanctions for certain negative conduct are approved by the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee; and
      3. that appropriate due process protections are included in the process, including notice of negative behavior, an opportunity to dispute the accusation and the sanction, and an opportunity to request a review of the accusation and the sanction; and
  9. within 30 days after sentencing of an offender, provide the victim of a crime information on the earliest dates the offender could be released on furlough, probation, or parole, including deductions or reductions for good time or other good conduct incentives, and the process for release, including contact information for the decision-making bodies.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 141 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 61 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(p)(1), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For eligibility for discretionary parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 1.

For attendance and appearance at parole board adjudicatory hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 2.

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (1), inserted “administrative or” following “eligible for”; inserted “and as provided in this section” following “by the board”; in (4), inserted “administrative parole under AS 33.16.089 or” preceding “discretionary parole”; added (7), (8), (9) and (10); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, in (1), deleted “administrative or” preceding “discretionary parole”; deleted (4), relating to information on prisoners eligible for administrative or discretionary parole; made related changes.

Sec. 33.16.190. Authority of parole, pretrial services, and probation officers.

An officer appointed by the commissioner under AS 33.05.020(a) , AS 33.07, or this chapter, may discharge duties under AS 33.05, AS 33.07, or this chapter.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 19 ch 22 SLA 2018)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2018 amendment, effective June 15, 2018, twice inserted “, AS 33.07” and made a stylistic change.

Sec. 33.16.200. Custody of parolee.

Except as provided in AS 33.16.210 , the board retains custody of special medical, discretionary, and mandatory parolees until the expiration of the maximum term or terms of imprisonment to which the parolee is sentenced.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 9 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 142 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 62 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(m)(14), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For discretionary parole release procedures, see 22 AAC 20, art. 6.

For special medical parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 15.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, inserted “administrative,” following “special medical,”.

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, deleted “administrative,” following “special medical,”.

Notes to Decisions

Jurisdiction of board over parolee. —

Where defendant was charged with a violation while he was still on mandatory parole under AS 33.16.010 and notice of the violation was served and resolved at a parole revocation hearing while the board of parole retained jurisdiction over defendant under this section, the validity of the board’s action did not hinge on whether defendant was deemed to have been technically on parole at the time of the hearing. Gyles v. State, 901 P.2d 1143 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).

Cited in

State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Sec. 33.16.210. Discharge of parolee.

  1. The board may unconditionally discharge a parolee from the jurisdiction and custody of the board after the parolee has completed one year of parole. A discretionary parolee with a residual period of probation may, after one year of parole, be discharged by the board to immediately begin serving the residual period of probation.
  2. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the board may unconditionally discharge a mandatory parolee before the parolee has completed one year of parole if the parolee is serving a concurrent period of residual probation under AS 33.20.040(c) , and the period of residual probation and the period of suspended imprisonment each equal or exceed the period of mandatory parole.
  3. At the discretion of a parole officer, a parole officer may recommend to the board early discharge for a parolee who
    1. has completed at least one year on parole;
    2. has completed all treatment programs required as a condition of parole;
    3. is currently in compliance with all conditions of parole for all of the cases for which the person is on parole; and
    4. has not been convicted of
      1. an unclassified felony offense under AS 11;
      2. a sexual felony as defined in AS 12.55.185 ; or
      3. a crime involving domestic violence as defined in AS 18.66.990 .

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 4, 5 ch 77 SLA 1987; am §§ 143, 144 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 113 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(p)(2) and (3), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For discharge from parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 8.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), substituted “one year” for “two years” in two places; in (b) substituted “one year” for “two years”; added (c).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, rewrote the introductory paragraph (c), which read, “A parole officer shall recommend to the board early discharge for a parolee who”, and rewrote (c)(3), which read, “has not been found in violation of conditions of parole by the board for at least one year; and”.

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(f), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the amendment of (c) of this section applies “to parole ordered on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

Jackson v. State, 31 P.3d 105 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sec. 33.16.215. Sanctions for technical violations and other violations of parole.

History. [Repealed, § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019.]

Sec. 33.16.220. Revocation of parole.

  1. The board may revoke parole if the prisoner or parolee (1) engages in conduct in violation of AS 33.16.150(a) , (b), or (f), or (2) has violated an order of the court to participate in or comply with the treatment plan of a rehabilitation program under AS 12.55.015(a)(10) . Mandatory parole may be revoked before a prisoner’s actual release on parole.
  2. Except as provided in (e) of this section, within 15 working days after the arrest and incarceration of a parolee for violation of a condition of parole, the board or its designee shall hold a preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the board or its designee shall determine if there is probable cause to believe that the parolee violated the conditions of parole and, when probable cause exists, whether the parolee should be released pending a final revocation hearing. A finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing in a criminal case is conclusive proof of probable cause that a parole violation occurred.
  3. In determining whether a parole violator should be released pending a final revocation hearing, the board or its designee shall consider
    1. the likelihood of the parolee’s appearance at a final revocation hearing;
    2. the seriousness of the alleged violation;
    3. whether the parolee presents a danger to the community;
    4. whether the parolee is likely to further violate conditions of parole; and
    5. whether the parolee is on parole for a crime involving domestic violence; if the violation of the condition of parole involved an act of domestic violence, the parolee may not be released pending the final revocation hearing.
  4. If the parole violator is released pending a final revocation hearing, the board or its designee may impose additional conditions necessary to ensure the parolee’s appearance at the final revocation hearing, and to prevent further violation of conditions of parole.
  5. A preliminary hearing under (b) of this section is not required if the board holds a final revocation hearing within 20 working days after the parolee’s arrest and incarceration.
  6. If a parolee has had a preliminary hearing under (b) of this section, the board shall hold a final revocation hearing not later than 120 days after a parolee’s arrest, subject to restrictions arising under AS 33.36.110 and (g) of this section.
  7. When the basis for the revocation proceeding is a criminal charge, the parolee may request, or the board upon its own motion may propose, that further proceedings on the revocation be delayed.  In making the determination to delay further proceedings, the board shall consider prejudice that may result to the parolee’s and the state’s interests in the pending criminal case and the parolee’s decision to delay final revocation proceedings.  If good cause to proceed is found, the board shall consult with the attorney general before continuing the final revocation proceeding.
  8. At a final revocation hearing, a violation of a condition of parole must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
  9. If, after the final revocation hearing, the board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole imposed under AS 33.16.150(a) , (b), or (f), or a law or ordinance, the board may revoke all or a portion of the remaining period of parole or change any condition of parole. A parolee’s period of parole is tolled from the date of filing with the parole board of a violation report until the date of the final revocation hearing.
  10. [Repealed, § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019.]

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 10 ch 188 SLA 1990; am §§ 53, 54 ch 64 SLA 1996; am §§ 8, 9 ch 95 SLA 1998; am §§ 146 — 149 ch 36 SLA 2016; am §§ 114, 115, 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(p)(5) - (8), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to the applicability of subsection (i) “to decisions of the Board of Parole issued before January 1, 2017”, see sec. 30(a), ch. 13, SLA 2017, in the 2017 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (b), inserted “, other than a technical violation under AS 33.16.215 ” following “condition of parole”; in (f), substituted “If a parolee has had a preliminary hearing under (b) of this section, the” for “The” at the beginning of the subsection; substituted “not” for “no”; in (i), inserted “remaining period of” following “portion of the”; inserted “subject to the limits set out in AS 33.16.215 ” preceding “or change any”; and added the following two sentences to the end of the subsection: “A parolee's period of parole is tolled from the date of filing with the parole board of a violation report for absconding and the date of the parolee's arrest, if the parole board finds, after a hearing, that the parolee violated parole by absconding, as defined in AS 33.16.215(f). The board may not extend the period of parole beyond the maximum release date calculated by the department on the parolee's original sentence plus any time that has been tolled as described in this section.”; added (j).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, in (b), deleted “, other than a technical violation under AS 33.16. 215” following “condition of parole” in the first sentence; in (i), deleted “subject to the limits set out in AS 33.16.215 ,” following “remaining period of parole” in the first sentence, and substituted “until the date of the final revocation hearing” for “for absconding and the date of the parolee’s arrest, if the parole board finds, after a hearing, that the parolee violated parole by absconding, as defined in AS 33.16.215 (f)”, and deleted the former third sentence, which read, “The board may not extend the period of parole beyond the maximum release date calculated by the department on the parolee’s original sentence plus any time that has been tolled as described in this section.”; and repealed (j).

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(g), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendments to (b) and (i) of this section apply “to parole ordered before, on, or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Notes to Decisions

Right to impartial fact finder in proceedings. —

Due process includes the right to an impartial fact finder in parole revocation proceedings. Newell v. State, 620 P.2d 680 (Alaska 1980).

When a person sitting in or deliberations in a parole revocation hearing was the person who initially recommended revocation and whose reports and testimony form the bulk of the evidence supporting revocation, such a person was part of the prosecution, and his presence violated the parolee’s due process rights to an impartial fact finder. Newell v. State, 620 P.2d 680 (Alaska 1980).

Appellate brief inadequate. —

Superior court properly denied defendant's application for post-conviction relief because he failed to meaningfully brief the claim on appeal, the legislature passed legislation stating that neither of the subject statutes applied retroactively, the record showed that the parole board revoked his parole, not, as defendant claimed, by someone in time accounting, and his equal protection argument was not properly raised in the trial court proceedings. Hartvigsen v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

Use of illegally obtained evidence in revocation proceeding. —

Ordinarily, neither the Alaska Constitution nor the state criminal rules bar the use of illegally obtained evidence in parole revocation proceedings. Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977).

Delay in hearing attributable to parolee. —

Parolee who fought extradition from Tennessee to Alaska could not assert a violation of the 120-day period provided for in this section; the delay in the hearing was caused by the defendant’s efforts to block extradition and, therefore, the delay was attributable to him. Covington v. State, 938 P.2d 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).

Anticipatory revocation of mandatory parole release authorized. —

Parole board had the authority to anticipatorily revoke scheduled mandatory parole release on account of prisoner’s failure to complete the sex offender treatment ordered by the sentencing court. Gwalthney v. State, 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Revocation and good time credit. —

Mandatory parole is lawful and the parole board has the authority to set conditions governing the conduct of prisoners released to mandatory parole; however, a parolee who violates those conditions can lawfully be sent back to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence, that is, the number of days that the parolee was excused from serving earlier because of good time credit. Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Stated in

Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. Alaska 2002).

Cited in

State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Collateral references. —

Right to notice and hearing before revocation of suspension of sentence, parole, conditional pardon, or probation. 29 ALR2d 1074; 44 ALR3d 306.

Right to assistance of counsel at proceedings to revoke probation. 44 ALR3d 306.

Acquittal in criminal proceeding as precluding revocation of parole on same charge. 76 ALR3d 578.

Sec. 33.16.230. Waiver of hearing.

A prisoner or parolee may waive the right to a hearing provided under AS 33.16.130 , 33.16.160 , or 33.16.220 by submitting a written waiver to the board.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am § 37 ch 30 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For conditions of parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 5.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Sec. 33.16.240. Arrest of parole violator.

  1. A parolee may be arrested, with or without a warrant, for a violation of parole.
  2. A warrant for the arrest of a parolee who is charged with a violation of parole may be issued by the board, or a member of the board, based on probable cause that a violation has occurred.
  3. In addition to the powers granted to a police officer under (g) of this section, a parole officer may, without a warrant, arrest a parolee for a violation of parole only if there is danger to the public, if there is a likelihood that the parolee will flee, or if the parolee committed a crime in the presence of the parole officer.
  4. If a parolee is arrested without a warrant, the parole officer shall notify the board no later than the working day immediately following the arrest.  The parole officer shall, within five working days after the arrest, provide the board with a written report setting out the alleged violation and circumstances that required immediate arrest of the parolee.
  5. A parolee arrested for violation of parole is not entitled to bail.
  6. Time spent in custody pending revocation proceedings shall be credited toward the unexpired term of imprisonment of the parolee; however, the time the parolee was at liberty on parole does not alter the time the parolee was sentenced to serve.
  7. At any time within the period of parole supervision, a police officer certified by the Alaska Police Standards Council may detain a parolee if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has recently violated or may imminently violate a parole condition relating to one of the topics set out in AS 33.05.070(d) . The officer may also arrest the parolee without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has violated a parole condition relating to one of the topics set out in AS 33.05.070(d) .
  8. [Repealed, § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019.]
  9. The board or its designee may impose additional conditions necessary to ensure the parolee’s appearance at a hearing held under AS 33.16.220(h) .

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 30, 31 ch 2 SLA 2005; am § 150 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 138 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(p)(9), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

For parole violations, see 22 AAC 20, art. 12.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (h), and (i).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, repealed (h).

Notes to Decisions

Parolee’s liberty should be afforded all protections consistent with his status as one convicted of a crime and under supervision and restrictions, although released from incarceration. Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977).

Warrant ordinarily required. —

This section requires that, absent exigent circumstances, a parole officer must secure a warrant from the parole board or board member. Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977).

Warrant issued only upon probable cause. —

In order for the warrant requirement of this section to be meaningful, the warrant should be issued only upon cause of a violation of the conditions of parole being presented, in writing, to the parole board or a member thereof. Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977).

Parolee subject to arrest for wide variety of causes which do not apply to others. Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977).

Usual arrest requirements not imposed as regards arrest of parolee. —

To impose the same requirements on the arrest of a parolee as are otherwise mandated for an arrest, including an affidavit or sworn complaint, would constitute meaningless additional time and effort on the part of parole officers. Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977).

Purpose of subsection (f). —

Subsection (f) indicates the legislature’s apparent intent to prevent a prisoner from losing credit simply because of the state’s delay in filing formal proceedings against him or because of his inability to make bail. Walters v. State, 798 P.2d 357 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

Subsection (f) of this section and AS 33.20.040(a) are consistent with one another, particularly in light of the principle that conflicting provisions of parole statutes should be reconciled wherever possible. A sensible, common sense reading of these provisions indicates that a prisoner who remains “in custody” for the purpose of maintaining the parole board’s jurisdiction over him may still be deemed “at liberty” for denying credit under subsection (f). Dulier v. State, 789 P.2d 372 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

Credit for time served since arrest for subsequent offenses. —

Where defendant’s sentences were to be served consecutively to a sentence then being served for a parole revocation on an earlier offense, the trial court order, that the defendant receive no credit for time served since his arrest, was proper in view of the court’s action in making the sentences consecutive to the time to be served on the parole revocation, for the time served from defendant’s arrest should properly have been credited toward the parole revocation sentence. Reynolds v. State, 595 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1979).

Escape from detention. —

The second-degree escape statute (AS 11.56.310 ) covers the act of removing oneself from detention based on parole arrest warrant. State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Quoted in

State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Cited in

Knowlton v. State, 795 P.2d 1287 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

Collateral references. —

When is a person in custody of governmental authorities for purpose of exercise of state remedy of habeas corpus — modern cases. 26 ALR4th 455.

Sec. 33.16.250. Execution of warrant for arrest of parolee.

  1. A parole officer, or a peace officer acting at the request of a parole officer, shall execute a warrant issued under AS 33.16.240 by arresting the parolee and confining the parolee in a correctional facility designated by the commissioner.
  2. The parole officer or peace officer shall immediately notify the board or a member of the board of an arrest under (a) of this section.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985)

Notes to Decisions

Second-degree escape statute (AS 11.56.310 ) covers the act of removing oneself from detention based on parole arrest warrant. State v. Stores, 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

Sec. 33.16.260. Designation of victims’ representative.

If more than one person who qualifies as a victim under AS 12.55.185 requests notice under this chapter, the commissioner shall designate one person for purposes of receiving the notice required and exercising the rights granted by this chapter.

History. (§ 17 ch 59 SLA 1989)

Revisor’s notes. —

Former AS 33.16.260 was renumbered as AS 33.16.900 in 1986.

Administrative Code. —

For discretionary parole release hearings, see 22 AAC 20, art. 4.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Under this section, all family members who meet the statutory definition of “victim” in this chapter are entitled to be present during all parole board hearings concerning the perpetrator and to comment on the proposed board action. May 24, 1996, Op. Att’y Gen.

Sec. 33.16.270. Earned compliance credits.

  1. The commissioner shall establish by regulation a program allowing parolees to earn credits for complying with the conditions of parole. The earned compliance credits reduce the period of parole. Nothing in this section prohibits the department from recommending to the board the early discharge of the parolee as provided in this chapter. At a minimum, the regulations must
    1. require that a parolee earn a credit of 10 days for each 30-day period served in which the parolee complied with the conditions of parole;
    2. include policies and procedures for
      1. calculating and tracking credits earned by parolees;
      2. reducing the parolee’s period of parole based on credits earned by the parolee and notifying a victim under AS 33.30.013 ;
    3. require that a parolee convicted of a crime involving domestic violence complete all treatment programs required as a condition of parole before discharge based on credits earned under this section.
  2. A parolee may not earn credits under (a) of this section if the parolee is on parole for
    1. an unclassified felony;
    2. a sex offense as defined in AS 12.63.100 ;
    3. a felony crime against a person under AS 11.41;
    4. a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in AS 18.66.990 , that is an offense under AS 11.41.

History. (§ 151 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 63 ch 1 4SSLA 2017; am §§ 116, 117 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(p)(10), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to the applicability of this section "to credit for time served on parole before January 1, 2017", see sec. 30(b), ch. 13, SLA 2017, in the 2017 Temporary and Special Acts.

For provision relating to applicability of the 2017 amendment to this section, see sec. 75(a)(24), ch. 1, 4SSLA 2017, in the 2017 Temporary and Special Acts.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, added (3), and made a related change.

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, in (a)(1), substituted “10 days” for “30 days”, and in (a)(3), deleted “a sex offense as defined in AS 12.63.100 or” following “parolee convicted of”; and added (b).

Effective dates. —

Section 190, ch. 36, SLA 2016 made this section effective January 1, 2017.

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(g), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendments to this section apply “to parole ordered before, on, or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Brief on appeal. —

Superior court properly denied defendant's application for post-conviction relief because he failed to meaningfully brief the claim on appeal, the legislature passed legislation stating that neither of the subject statutes applied retroactively, the record showed that the parole board revoked his parole, not, as defendant claimed, by someone in time accounting, and his equal protection argument was not properly raised in the trial court proceedings. Hartvigsen v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019).

Sec. 33.16.900. Definitions.

In this chapter,

  1. [Repealed, § 72,ch. 1, 4SSLA 2017.]
  2. “administrative sanctions and incentives” means responses by a parole officer to a parolee’s compliance with or violation of the conditions of parole under AS 33.16.180 .
  3. “board” means the board of parole;
  4. “commissioner” means the commissioner of corrections;
  5. “controlled substance” means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in the schedules set out in AS 11.71.140 11.71.190 ;
  6. “crime against a person” has the meaning given in AS 33.30.901 ;
  7. “crime involving domestic violence” and “domestic violence” have the meanings given in AS 18.66.990 ;
  8. “department” means the Department of Corrections;
  9. “discretionary parole” means the release of a prisoner by the board before the expiration of a term, subject to conditions imposed by the board and subject to its custody and jurisdiction; “discretionary parole” does not include “special medical parole”;
  10. “mandatory parole” means the release of a prisoner who was sentenced to one or more terms of imprisonment of two years or more, for the period of good time credited under AS 33.20, subject to conditions imposed by the board and subject to its custody and jurisdiction;
  11. “parolee” means a prisoner, sentenced to one or more terms of imprisonment exceeding 180 days in the case of discretionary parole and of two years or more in the case of mandatory parole, released by the board or by operation of law before the expiration of the term, subject to the custody and jurisdiction of the board;
  12. “prisoner” means an offender confined for a violation of state law, but does not include a person confined under AS 47;
  13. “severely medically or cognitively disabled” means that a person has a medical condition, or a cognitive condition, that substantially reduces the ability to commit an offense similar to the offense for which the person was convicted or to commit an offense in violation of AS 11.41 that is punishable as a felony, and the person is likely to
    1. remain subject to the severe medical or cognitive condition throughout the entire period of parole; or
    2. die from the medical or cognitive condition;
  14. “special medical parole” means the release by the board before the expiration of a term, subject to conditions imposed by the board and subject to its custody and jurisdiction, of a prisoner who is severely medically or cognitively disabled;
  15. “victim” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 6, 7 ch 77 SLA 1987; am §§ 10, 11 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 55 ch 64 SLA 1996; am § 3 ch 49 SLA 1997; am §§ 5, 6 ch 25 SLA 2003; am § 152 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 72 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 33.16.260 . Renumbered in 1986.

In 1995, paragraphs (13) and (14) were enacted as (11) and (12), in 1996, paragraph (7) was enacted as (13), and in 2016, paragraph (2) was enacted as (15); the paragraphs were renumbered to maintain the alphabetical order of the terms.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (15) [now (2)].

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, repealed (1).

Notes to Decisions

“One or more terms of imprisonment of two years or more.” —

In determining whether a prisoner is released and placed on mandatory parole, or released unconditionally, the phrases “term or terms of imprisonment of two years or more” in AS 33.20.040 and “one or more terms of imprisonment of two years or more” in paragraph (8) of this section indicate that terms of imprisonment are to be aggregated to determine whether the total length of imprisonment exceeds two years. Wilson v. State, 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).

Quoted in

Smith v. State Dep't of Cors., 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994).

Chapter 20. Remission of Sentences; Executive Pardons and Clemency.

Article 1. Remission of Sentences.

Notes to Decisions

Derivation. —

Alaska’s mandatory release scheme is derived from former 18 U.S.C. 4161-66. Morton v. Hammond, 604 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979).

Sec. 33.20.010. Computation of good time.

  1. Notwithstanding AS 12.55.125(f)(3) and 12.55.125(g)(3) , a prisoner convicted of an offense against the state or a political subdivision of the state and sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeds three days is entitled to a deduction of one-third of the term of imprisonment rounded off to the nearest day if the prisoner follows the rules of the correctional facility in which the prisoner is confined. A prisoner is not eligible for a good time deduction if the prisoner has been sentenced
    1. to a mandatory 99-year term of imprisonment under AS 12.55.125(a) after June 27, 1996;
    2. to a definite term under AS 12.55.125(l) ;
    3. for a sexual felony under AS 12.55.125(i)
      1. and has one or more prior sexual felony convictions as determined under AS 12.55.145(a)(4) ; or
      2. that is an unclassified or a class A felony; or
    4. for an unclassified felony under AS 11.41.100 or 11.41.110 .
  2. [Repealed, § 15 ch 7 SLA 1996.]
  3. A prisoner may not be awarded a good time deduction under (a) of this section for any period spent in a treatment program, in a private residence, or on electronic monitoring.

History. (§ 1 ch 107 SLA 1960; am § 17 ch 166 SLA 1978; am § 1 ch 11 SLA 1986; am §§ 15, 18 ch 7 SLA 1996; am § 11 ch 90 SLA 2003; am § 31 ch 24 SLA 2007; am § 33 ch 43 SLA 2013; am §§ 153, 154 ch 36 SLA 2016; am §§ 118, 119 ch 4 FSSLA 2019)

Cross references. —

For governor's transmittal letter for ch. 43, SLA 2013 (SB 22), see 2013 Senate Journal 38 — 39.

For provision relating to the applicability of the 2016 amendments to this section, see sec. 185(d)(12) and (r), ch. 36, SLA 2016, in the 2016 Temporary and Special Acts.

Administrative Code. —

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in (a)(3), added the (A) and (B) designations, added (a)(3)(B), and made related changes.

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, added (a)(4), and made a related change; effective July 12, 2016, rewrote (c).

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, substituted “for an unclassified felony under AS 11.41.100 or 11.41.110 ” for “to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 10 days for a technical violation of AS 12.55.110(c) or AS 33.16.215 ” in (a)(4); and repealed and reenacted (c).

Editor's notes. —

Under sec. 46(a), ch. 43, SLA 2013, the 2013 changes to (a) of this section apply to offenses committed before, on, or after July 1, 2013.

Section 142(b), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendments to this section apply “to sentences imposed on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Opinions of attorney general. —

Authority exists to both award and forfeit statutory good time for pretrial detainees. February 18, 1986 Op. Att’y Gen.

A prisoner incarcerated for failure to complete community work service should receive credit for good time during the subsequent incarceration. October 27, 1986 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Wording of order. —

The wording, “an order suspending the imposition of sentence for a given length of time, and requiring, as a special condition of probation, a definite term of imprisonment to be served periodically,” is necessary to ensure that a prisoner given periodic time receives appropriate “good time” credit, and so that his parole eligibility is properly computed. Whittlesey v. State, 626 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1980).

Applicability of good-time deduction. —

Deduction of good time under this section was inapplicable in calculating whether a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment had been served for purposes of determining discretionary parole eligibility. Hampel v. State, 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).

Although amendments to subsection (a) were added to preclude a defendant from accruing good time credits where substantial physical torture was inflicted upon a murder victim, those amendments were enacted after defendant’s sentencing and, thus, were not applicable to defendant. Malloy v. State, 153 P.3d 1003 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

Defendants were not entitled to good time credit for time spent in a halfway house as a condition of probation because, while parolees were entitled to such credit, probation is an act of grace and clemency, intended as a more lenient alternative to imposition of a statutory penalty for a crime, while mandatory parole is an established variation on imprisonment, so a prisoner released on mandatory parole is still technically a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment. George v. State, 307 P.3d 4 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).

Superior court properly sentenced defendant to 30 years to serve for first-degree sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter because he had a criminal history—he had physically and sexually abused his biological sister—he was not eligible for good time deductions where he was sentenced for an unclassified sexual felony, and he was not eligible for discretionary parole. Evans v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017) (memorandum decision).

Defendants in residential treatment programs not eligible. —

Court concluded that the Alaska legislature validly restricted good time credit to prisoners who are serving their sentences in prison; defendants who are serving their sentences in court-ordered residential treatment programs do not receive good time credit. Valencia v. State, 91 P.3d 983 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).

However, credit allowed in defendant's stay in contractor-run halfway house. —

Post-conviction relief was properly granted in a case where appellee inmate was seeking good time credit based on his stay in a halfway house run by a contractor because the definition of “correctional facility” is not limited to state-run facilities, and there is no discretion to withhold credit unless there is a showing of a violation of the rules of the correctional facility; Valencia v. State, 91 P.3d 983 (Alaska App. 2004), does not apply to prisoners placed by authority of the Alaska Department of Corrections in a correctional facility. State v. Bourdon, 193 P.3d 1209 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

When the Parole Board orders a mandatory parolee to reside at a correctional restitution center, a halfway house, or any other non-prison correctional center, the mandatory parolee is entitled to both credit for time served under AS 12.55.025(c) and good time credit under AS 33.20.010(a) , corresponding to the period of enforced residence at the correctional center, if the Board later revokes parole and imposes some or all of the remaining sentence. State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App.), reaff'd, 246 P.3d 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Halfway house parolee eligible. —

Trial court properly granted defendant’s request for seven days of good-time credit for time served at a halfway house because mandatory parolees who were remanded to custody in a halfway house were entitled to good-time credit corresponding to the period of their confinement if their parole was later revoked. State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Refusal to pay fine is like a contempt of the court, not an “offense against the state” within the meaning of this section. Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1988).

Deduction lost by violating rules. —

A prisoner is entitled to a deduction of one-third of his term of imprisonment if he follows prison rules, but violating prison rules can lead to a loss of this deduction. Dep't of Corr. v. Kraus, 759 P.2d 539 (Alaska 1988).

Proceeding reducing good time is major disciplinary proceeding. —

Prisoners have a right to judicial review of major disciplinary proceedings, and proceedings to reduce statutory good time can be so classified, since reduction of good time is one of the most severe punishments possible at an administrative level of the prison system. Dep't of Corr. v. Kraus, 759 P.2d 539 (Alaska 1988).

Forfeiture of good time authorized. —

The Department of Corrections has the authority to forfeit good time for a prisoner’s misbehavior engaged in before resentencing on the same offense. Briggs v. Donnelly, 828 P.2d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).

Block computation method permissible. —

The Alaska legislature intended to adopt the block computation method when it enacted this section. State v. McCallion, 875 P.2d 93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Computation methods formerly applied. —

Under the block method used from 1960 through 1971, prisoners could receive reductions of up to one-third of their sentences; under the accrual method, administratively adopted for use from 1971 to 1980, prisoners could receive reductions only of up to one-fourth of their sentences. State v. McCallion, 875 P.2d 93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Prospective good time is improper consideration in sentencing. —

Where judge twice stated that defendant’s 300 day sentence would be reduced by good time to 200 days, the case was remanded for judge to clarify whether defendant’s sentence was improperly based on that assumption. Roath v. State, 874 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Time served. —

Trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s application for postconviction relief insofar as it related to defendant’s claim that he did not receive proper credit for the time served before sentencing. Jackson v. State, 31 P.3d 105 (Alaska Ct. App.), sub. op., — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Composite sentence. —

In the case of a defendant serving consecutive sentences, good time is calculated for the composite sentence for all of the defendant’s convictions; and the defendant’s release on mandatory parole is based upon his composite sentence rather than each individual sentence. Callan v. State, 904 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008), reaff'd, 297 P.3d 885 (Alaska 2013).

Applied in

Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).

Quoted in

Braham v. Bierne, 675 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 685 P.2d 103 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Wilson v. State, 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997); Sikeo v. State, 258 P.3d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).

Stated in

State v. Frazier, 719 P.2d 261 (Alaska 1986); Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. Alaska 2002).

Cited in

Bear v. State, 439 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1968); McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1975); Morton v. Hammond, 604 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979); Juneby v. State, 641 P.2d 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Gant v. State, 654 P.2d 1325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Frazier, 698 P.2d 1212 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Kirby v. State, 748 P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Staael, 807 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Webb v. Alaska Dep't of Corr., 963 P.2d 1074 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Morrison v. State, 7 P.3d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).

Collateral references. —

59 Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.

24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 2169, 2229.

67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.

Withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of good-time allowance to prisoner. 95 ALR2d 1265.

Sec. 33.20.020. Good time. [Repealed, § 21 ch 166 SLA 1978.]

Sec. 33.20.030. Discharge.

A prisoner shall be released at the expiration of the term of sentence less the time deducted for good conduct. A certificate of deduction shall be entered on the commitment by the warden, keeper, or the commissioner.

History. (§ 3 ch 107 SLA 1960)

Notes to Decisions

Composite sentence. —

In the case of a defendant serving consecutive sentences, good time is calculated for the composite sentence for all of the defendant’s convictions; and the defendant’s release on mandatory parole is based upon his composite sentence rather than each individual sentence. Callan v. State, 904 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).

Defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief based on an ambiguity in defendant's sentence allegedly establishing defendant's mandatory release date had passed because, (1) when adding the consecutive portions of defendant's five sentences together, the trial court's intention to impose a 65-year sentence was unambiguous, and (2) the sentence was only ambiguous if provisions of the trial court's judgment were read out of sequence. Page v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Release of presumptively sentenced prisoner. —

A presumptively sentenced prisoner who is mandatorily released with 180 days or less remaining on his sentence cannot be released unconditionally. State v. Frazier, 719 P.2d 261 (Alaska 1986).

Defendant waived a claim that defendant's mandatory release date had passed because defendant previously conceded defendant's composite sentence was 65 years, as, during litigation to correct the sentence, counsel agreed to that sentence and sought no review of the trial court's confirmation of that sentence. Page v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Mandatory parole. —

Mandatory parole is lawful and the parole board has the authority to set conditions governing the conduct of prisoners released to mandatory parole; however, a parolee who violates those conditions can lawfully be sent back to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence, that is, the number of days that the parolee was excused from serving earlier because of good time credit. Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Inmate alleged that he was not aware that after two years of imprisonment he would be released and would serve the remainder of his six year sentence on mandatory parole; the inmate established a prima facie case that he received ineffective assistance of counsel about the nature of the sentence he would receive if he entered into the plea bargain, and that he would not have entered into the plea bargain had he received accurate advice regarding mandatory parole. Knox v. State, 130 P.3d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Calculation of good time credit. —

Although amendments to AS 33.20.010(a) were enacted to preclude a defendant from accruing good time credits where substantial physical torture was inflicted upon a murder victim; where these amendments were enacted after defendant’s sentencing, the amendments were not applicable to defendant. Malloy v. State, 153 P.3d 1003 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

Applied in

Morton v. Hammond, 604 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979); Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).

Quoted in

Smith v. State Dep't of Cors., 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994); Wilson v. State, 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997); Jackson v. State, 31 P.3d 105 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Stated in

Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. Alaska 2002).

Cited in

Hampel v. State, 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).

Sec. 33.20.040. Released prisoner.

  1. Except as provided in (c) of this section, a prisoner released under AS 33.20.030 shall be released on mandatory parole to the custody and jurisdiction of the parole board under AS 33.16, until the expiration of the maximum term to which the prisoner was sentenced, if the term or terms of imprisonment are two years or more.  However, a prisoner released on mandatory parole may be discharged under AS 33.16.210 before the expiration of the term. A prisoner who was sentenced to a term or terms of imprisonment of less than two years shall be unconditionally discharged from mandatory parole.
  2. This section does not prevent delivery of a prisoner to the authorities of a state or the United States entitled to the custody of the prisoner.
  3. If a prisoner’s sentence includes a residual period of probation, the probationary period shall run concurrently with a period of mandatory parole for that sentence and the prisoner shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the court and the parole board. Nothing in this section precludes both the court and the parole board from revoking the prisoner’s probation and mandatory parole for the same conduct. A period of imprisonment resulting from the revocation of probation or mandatory parole may be imposed consecutively in the discretion of the court or the parole board.

History. (§ 4 ch 107 SLA 1960; am §§ 3, 4 ch 88 SLA 1985; am §§ 8, 9 ch 77 SLA 1987)

Administrative Code. —

For mandatory parole release and revocation, see 22 AAC 20, art. 7.

Notes to Decisions

Subsection (a) of this section and AS 33.16.240(f) are consistent with one another, particularly in light of the principle that conflicting provisions of parole statutes should be reconciled wherever possible. A sensible, common sense reading of these provisions indicates that a prisoner who remains “in custody” for the purpose of maintaining the parole board’s jurisdiction over him may still be deemed “at liberty” for denying credit under AS 33.16.240(f) . Dulier v. State, 789 P.2d 372 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

“Term or terms of imprisonment are two years or more.” —

In determining whether a prisoner is released and placed on mandatory parole, or released unconditionally, the phrases “term or terms of imprisonment are two years or more” in this section and “one or more terms of imprisonment of two years or more” in AS 33.16.900 (8) indicate that terms of imprisonment are to be aggregated to determine whether the total length of imprisonment exceeds two years. Wilson v. State, 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).

Parole board authority. —

Prisoners who are released mandatorily under the provisions of subsection (a) with greater than 180 days to serve under their sentences are released as if released on parole, which means that the parole board has the authority to set special conditions of release on parole which are the same as the special conditions which the parole board sets for prisoners which it releases by exercising its discretion; and the parole board can revoke the parole of a person on mandatory release who violates these special conditions, even though the violations are not violations of statutory conditions of parole. Braham v. Bierne, 675 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), (Decided prior to 1985 amendment)

Mandatory parole. —

Inmate alleged that he was not aware that after two years of imprisonment he would be released and would serve the remainder of his six year sentence on mandatory parole; the inmate established a prima facie case that he received ineffective assistance of counsel about the nature of the sentence he would receive if he entered into the plea bargain, and that he would not have entered into the plea bargain had he received accurate advice regarding mandatory parole. Knox v. State, 130 P.3d 971 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).

Anticipatory revocation of mandatory parole. —

The parole board has authority to anticipatorily revoke the scheduled release of prisoners who, while still incarcerated, engage in behavior that would warrant revocation of their parole. Webb v. Alaska Dep't of Corr., 963 P.2d 1074 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

Release of presumptively sentenced prisoner. —

A presumptively sentenced prison who is mandatorily released with 180 days or less remaining on his sentence cannot be released unconditionally. State v. Frazier, 719 P.2d 261 (Alaska 1986).

Defendant waived a claim that defendant's mandatory release date had passed because defendant previously conceded defendant's composite sentence was 65 years, as, during litigation to correct the sentence, counsel agreed to that sentence and sought no review of the trial court's confirmation of that sentence. Page v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) (memorandum decision).

Requirement of concurrent probation and parole. —

Court could not have properly revoked particular defendant’s probation under this section, where it was unclear that defendant was given adequate due process notice that he was on probation; hereafter, the most plausible intent of this section is to require concurrent probation and parole for all persons released after its effective date, September 13, 1987. Lipscomb v. State, 869 P.2d 166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Good time credit. —

Revocation of defendant’s parole may result in his having to spend more total time under state supervision, but this possibility is inherent in any criminal sentence that exceeds two years to serve, by virtue of the statutes that create mandatory parole and that authorize the parole board to revoke it. For prisoners sentenced to serve more than 2 years, good time credit does not constitute a complete forgiveness of jail time, rather, good time credit converts time that would otherwise be spent in prison to time that will be spent on parole. Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sentence upon revocation of probation or mandatory parole. —

When a court revokes a defendant’s probation and imposes a sentence, the sentencing court is required to apply the usual sentencing factors. The sentence must be based on the totality of the circumstances, including the original offense, the offender, and the offender’s intervening conduct. Maillelle v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2013) (memorandum decision).

Composite sentence. —

In the case of a defendant serving consecutive sentences, good time is calculated for the composite sentence for all of the defendant’s convictions and the defendant’s release on mandatory parole is based upon his composite sentence rather than each individual sentence. Callan v. State, 904 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).

Defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief based on an ambiguity in defendant's sentence allegedly establishing defendant's mandatory release date had passed because, (1) when adding the consecutive portions of defendant's five sentences together, the trial court's intention to impose a 65-year sentence was unambiguous, and (2) the sentence was only ambiguous if provisions of the trial court's judgment were read out of sequence. Page v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) (memorandum decision).

State has duty to supervise parolees carefully, and this duty extends to anyone foreseeably endangered; this section will not shield the state from the consequences of its breach of that duty. Division of Corrections, Dep't of Health & Social Services v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986), overruled in part, Dep't of Corr. v. Cowles, 151 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006).

Prisoner’s administrative appeal dismissed. —

The superior court correctly ruled that prisoner’s sole procedural mechanism for challenging the Department of Corrections disciplinary decisions revoking accrued good time credit which impeded immediate parole release was an administrative appeal under Alaska common law such that prisoner was not entitled to pursue either a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a petition for post-conviction relief. Higgins v. Briggs, 876 P.2d 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Applied in

Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Quoted in

Smith v. State Dep't of Cors., 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994); Jackson v. State, 31 P.3d 105 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Stated in

Nukapigak v. State, 645 P.2d 215 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Cited in

Gant v. State, 654 P.2d 1325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Staael, 807 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Hampel v. State, 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); State Dep't of Corr. v. Lundy, 188 P.3d 692 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Sec. 33.20.050. Forfeiture for offense.

If during the term of imprisonment a prisoner commits an offense or violates the rules of the correctional facility, all or part of the prisoner’s good time may be forfeited under regulations adopted by the commissioner of corrections. The amount of good time forfeited shall be related to the severity of the offense or rule violation.

History. (§ 5 ch 107 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 11 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For classification, see 22 AAC 5, art. 4.

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

Opinions of attorney general. —

Authority exists to both award and forfeit statutory good time for pretrial detainees. February 18, 1986 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Forfeiture of good time authorized. —

The Department of Corrections has the authority to forfeit good time for a prisoner’s misbehavior engaged in before resentencing on the same offense. Briggs v. Donnelly, 828 P.2d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).

Applied in

Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).

Stated in

Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Collateral references. —

72 C.J.S., Prisons, § 1 et seq.

Withdrawal, forfeiture, modification, or denial of good-time allowance to prisoner. 95 ALR2d 1265.

Sec. 33.20.060. Restoration of forfeited good time.

The commissioner of corrections may restore all or a portion of a prisoner’s forfeited good time, under regulations adopted by the commissioner, if the prisoner demonstrates progress in faithfully observing the rules of the correctional facility in which the prisoner is confined. The amount of forfeited good time restored by the commissioner shall be related to the severity of the offense or rule violation committed by the prisoner and the length of time of good conduct that followed the offense or rule violation.

History. (§ 6 ch 107 SLA 1960; am § 3 ch 11 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

Notes to Decisions

Applied in

Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).

Stated in

Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Cited in

Bear v. State, 439 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1968).

Collateral references. —

72 C.J.S., Prisons, § 1 et seq.

Right to credit for time served under erroneous or void sentence or invalid judgment of conviction necessitating new trial. 35 ALR2d 1283.

Article 2. Power of Governor to Grant Pardons, Commutations, and Reprieves.

Sec. 33.20.070. Governor may grant pardons, commutations, and reprieves.

The governor may grant pardons, commutations of sentence, and reprieves, and suspend and remit fines and forfeitures in whole or part for offenses against the laws of the State of Alaska or the Territory of Alaska.

History. (§ 1 ch 16 SLA 1961)

Cross references. —

For the constitutional provision on this subject, see Alaska Const., art. III, § 21.

Notes to Decisions

There is no authority which would sanction expansion of superior court’s jurisdiction to pass sentence into a realm of review and modification which is statutorily vested in either the supreme court or the executive branch of government. Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1975); Szeratics v. State, 572 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977).

Authority to establish clemency criteria. —

Alaska Department of Corrections did not act outside its authority because the governor had decided to refer all applications to the parole board and the board had established clemency qualification criteria; that authority was inherent in the governor’s executive clemency power. Lewis v. Dep't of Corr., 139 P.3d 1266 (Alaska 2006).

Cited in

Bear v. State, 439 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1968).

Collateral references. —

Pardon as affecting impeachment by proof of conviction of crime. 30 ALR2d 893.

Habitual criminal statute, pardon as affecting consideration of earlier conviction in applying. 31 ALR2d 1186.

Procedure to be followed where jury requests information as to possibility of pardon or parole from sentence imposed. 35 ALR2d 769.

Offenses and convictions covered by pardon. 35 ALR2d 1261.

Prejudicial effect of statement or instruction of court as to possibility of parole or pardon. 12 ALR3d 832.

Prejudicial effect of statement of prosecutor as to possibility of pardon or parole. 16 ALR3d 1137.

Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor. 58 ALR3d 1191.

Pardon as defense to disbarment of attorney. 59 ALR3d 466.

Power of state court, during same term, to increase severity of lawful sentence — modern status. 26 ALR4th 905.

Power of court to increase severity of unlawful sentence — modern status. 28 ALR4th 147.

Revocation of order commuting state criminal sentence. 88 ALR5th 463.

Sec. 33.20.080. Required notices and investigation by the board of parole.

  1. The governor may not grant executive clemency to a person unless the governor has first provided notice of consideration of executive clemency to the board of parole for investigation and at least 120 days have elapsed since the notice required under (b) of this section has been provided. The board shall investigate each case and, not later than 120 days after receipt of the notice of consideration, submit to the governor a report of the investigation, together with all other information the board has regarding the person. When the report is submitted, the board shall also transmit to the governor the comments it has received under (b) of this section.
  2. The board shall send notice of the governor’s consideration of executive clemency to the Department of Law, the office of victims’ rights, and the victim of a crime against a person, a crime involving domestic violence, or arson in the first degree within five business days after receipt of notice of consideration from the governor. The victim may comment in writing to the board on the consideration for executive clemency. The board shall provide notice of any action taken by the governor to the Department of Law, the office of victims’ rights, and the victim.
  3. If the victim’s address is unknown, the board shall make reasonable efforts to locate the victim to provide the notice required under this section. The board shall ensure that the victim’s address is kept confidential.
  4. In this section,
    1. “crime against a person” has the meaning given in AS 33.30.901 ;
    2. “crime involving domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990 ;
    3. “victim” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .

History. (§ 2 ch 16 SLA 1961; am §§ 18, 19 ch 59 SLA 1989; am §§ 56, 57 ch 64 SLA 1996; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 1 SLA 2007)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraph (d)(2) was enacted as (d)(3). Renumbered in 1996, at which time former (d)(2) was renumbered as (d)(3).

Notes to Decisions

Authority to establish clemency criteria. —

Alaska Department of Corrections did not act outside its authority by establishing clemency eligibility criteria because the governor had decided to refer all applications to the parole board and the board had established clemency qualification criteria; that authority was inherent in the governor’s executive clemency power. Lewis v. Dep't of Corr., 139 P.3d 1266 (Alaska 2006).

Collateral references. —

Revocation of order commuting state criminal sentence. 88 ALR5th 463.

Chapter 25. Western Interstate Corrections Compact.

[Renumbered as AS 33.36.060 33.36.100 .]

Chapter 30. Prison Facilities and Prisoners.

Administrative Code. —

For adult facilities, see 22 AAC 05.

Article 1. Establishment, Control, and Management.

Sec. 33.30.010. Commissioner to control and manage state prison facilities. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.011. Duties of commissioner.

  1. The commissioner shall
    1. establish, maintain, operate, and control correctional facilities suitable for the custody, care, and discipline of persons charged or convicted of offenses against the state or held under authority of state law; each correctional facility operated by the state shall be established, maintained, operated, and controlled in a manner that is consistent with AS 33.30.015 ;
    2. classify prisoners;
    3. for persons committed to the custody of the commissioner, establish programs, including furlough programs that are reasonably calculated to
      1. protect the public and the victims of crimes committed by prisoners;
      2. maintain health;
      3. create or improve occupational skills;
      4. enhance educational qualifications;
      5. support court-ordered restitution; and
      6. otherwise provide for the rehabilitation and reformation of prisoners, facilitating their reintegration into society;
    4. provide necessary
      1. medical services for prisoners in correctional facilities or who are committed by a court to the custody of the commissioner, including examinations for communicable and infectious diseases;
      2. psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes that
        1. a prisoner exhibits symptoms of a serious disease or injury that is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and
        2. the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or denial of care is substantial; and
      3. assessment or screening of the risks and needs of offenders who may be vulnerable to harm, exploitation, or recidivism as a result of fetal alcohol syndrome, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, or another brain-based disorder;
    5. establish minimum standards for sex offender treatment programs offered to persons who are committed to the custody of the commissioner;
    6. provide for fingerprinting in correctional facilities in accordance with AS 12.80.060 ;
    7. establish a program to conduct assessments of the risks and needs of offenders sentenced to serve a term of incarceration of 90 days or more; the program must include a requirement for an assessment before a prisoner’s release on parole, furlough, or electronic monitoring from a correctional facility;
    8. establish a procedure that provides for each prisoner required to serve an active term of imprisonment of 90 days or more a written case plan that
      1. takes effect and is provided to the prisoner within 90 days after sentencing;
      2. is based on the results of the assessment of the prisoner’s risks and needs under (7) of this subsection;
      3. includes a requirement to follow the rules of the institution;
      4. is modified when necessary for changes in classification, housing status, medical or mental health, and resource availability;
      5. includes participation in programming that addresses the needs identified in the assessment;
    9. establish a program to begin reentry planning with each prisoner serving an active term of imprisonment of 90 days or more; reentry planning must begin at least 90 days before release on furlough or probation or parole; the reentry program must include
      1. a written reentry plan for each prisoner completed upon release on furlough or probation or parole that includes information on the prisoner’s proposed
        1. residence;
        2. employment or alternative means of support;
        3. treatment options;
        4. counseling services;
        5. education or job training services;
      2. any other requirements for successful transition back to the community, including electronic monitoring or furlough for the period between a scheduled parole hearing and parole eligibility;
      3. coordination with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development to provide access, after release, to job training and employment assistance; and
      4. coordination with community reentry coalitions or other providers of reentry services if available;
    10. for offenders under electronic monitoring, establish
      1. minimum standards for electronic monitoring, which may include the requirement of active, real-time monitoring using global positioning systems; and
      2. procedures for oversight and approving electronic monitoring programs and systems provided by private contractors;
    11. assist a prisoner in obtaining a valid state identification card if the prisoner does not have a valid state identification card before the prisoner’s release; the department shall pay the application fee for the identification card;
    12. provide to the legislature, by electronic means, by January 10 preceding the first regular session of each legislature, a report summarizing the findings and results of the program established under (7) of this subsection; the report must include
      1. the number of prisoners who were provided with written case plans under (8) of this subsection;
      2. the number of written case plans under (8) of this subsection initiated within the preceding year; and
      3. the number of written case plans under (8) of this subsection that were updated in the preceding year; and
    13. enter into an agreement with the Department of Health and Social Services, consistent with the provisions of AS 47.12.105 , for the detention and care of a minor who is waived into adult court under AS 47.12.030 or 47.12.100 .
  2. In this section, "held under authority of state law" includes the confinement of persons under AS 26.05.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 11 ch 188 SLA 1990; am § 2 ch 54 SLA 1994; am § 12 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 4 ch 49 SLA 1997; am § 31 ch 83 SLA 2014; am § 155 ch 36 SLA 2016; am § 5 ch 55 SLA 2016; am § 120 ch 4 FSSLA 2019; am § 14 ch 16 SLA 2021)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, in subparagraph (a)(8)(B), “subsection” was substituted for “section” to harmonize the 2016 amendments.

Administrative Code. —

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

For security, see 22 AAC 5, art. 2.

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

For classification, see 22 AAC 5, art. 4.

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

For segregation, see 22 AAC 5, art. 7.

For communications, see 22 AAC 5, art. 8.

For discharge, see 22 AAC 5, art. 9.

For sex offender treatment providers, see 22 AAC 30.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2014 amendment, effective January 1, 2016, added (4)(C) and (7) [now (a)(4)(c) and (a)(7)], and made related changes.

The first 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (7) [now (a)(7)], inserted “; the program must include a requirement for an assessment before a prisoner's release on parole, furlough, or electronic monitoring from a correctional facility;” at the end; added (8), (9), (10), and (11) [now (a)(8), (a)(9), (a)(10), and (a)(11)].

The second 2016 amendment, effective August 7, 2016, added (b). Although the 2016 amendment was to have taken effect July 1, 2016, under § 13, ch. 55, SLA 2016, the governor did not sign the bill until August 6, 2016, and so the actual effective date of the 2016 amendment was August 7, 2016, under AS 01.10.070(d) .

The 2019 amendment, effective July 9, 2019, substituted “90 days” for “30 days” in (a)(7) and in the introductory paragraph of (a)(8), in (a)(7), deleted “and provide to the legislature, by electronic means, by January 15, 2017, and thereafter by January 15, preceding the first regular session of each legislature, a report summarizing the findings and results of the program” following “days or more,” inserted “takes effect and” at the beginning of (a)(8)(A), added (a)(9)(D) and (a)(12), and made related stylistic changes.

The 2021 amendment, effective July 9, 2021, added (a)(13) and made a related change.

Editor's notes. —

Section 142(b), ch. 4, FSSLA 2019, provides that the 2019 amendments of (a) of this section apply “to sentences imposed on or after July 9, 2019, for conduct occurring on or after July 9, 2019.”

Section 57(b), ch. 16, SLA 2021, provides that the 2021 amendment of (a) of this section applies to minors subject to AS 47.12.030(a) , as amended by sec. 22, ch. 16, SLA 2021, and AS 47.12.100 “who are held in a facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a facility operated by the Department of Health and Social Services on or after July 9, 2021.”

Legislative history reports. —

For governor’s transmittal letter for ch. 16, SLA 2021 (HB 105), which amended (a) of this section, see 2021 House Journal 181 — 182.

Opinions of attorney general. —

A prisoner has the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs unless a licensed physician or psychiatrist, applying accepted medical standards, determines that the prisoner is suffering from an illness, that the prisoner presents a threat of violence to himself or others, and that the administration of antipsychotic drugs will provide effective treatment for the illness and is necessary to alleviate that threat. January 22, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator's notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Commissioner's control of prison system. —

There are strong indications of a legislative intent to leave the establishment, control, and management of the prison system in the hands of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Welfare whenever practical under the state constitution. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Administration must be neither arbitrary nor vindictive. —

As an extension of the state, the Division of Corrections must administer Alaska’s prisons in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor vindictive. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Monetary sanctions in prison disciplinary proceeding. —

Inmate who pled guilty in a prison disciplinary proceeding to the charge of engaging in mutual combat was properly ordered to pay for 25% of the medical expenses resulting from the infraction under 22 AAC 05.470(a)(4), the regulation allowing for monetary sanctions in prison disciplinary proceedings. The regulation does not conflict with AS 33.30.011 ; allowing the Alaska Department of Corrections, to order restitution for injuries caused by a prisoner is reasonably necessary to control correctional facilities. Smith v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012), limited, Jovanov v. State, 404 P.3d 140 (Alaska 2017) (memorandum decision).

Former AS 33.30.020 implemented Alaska Const., art. I, § 12. —

Former AS 33.30.020 , requiring the commissioner of health and social services to establish programs for the treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation of prisoners, in discharge of his duties to administer all matters affecting prisoners once the court had pronounced sentence, implemented Alas. Const., art. I, § 12, concerning penal administration. Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1978).

Right to medical and psychiatric services. —

Alaska’s legislature has determined that a prisoner has the right to receive necessary medical services, including psychiatric care, while confined. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Pursuant to the provisions of former AS 33.30.020 and former AS 33.30.050 , a prisoner in the custody of the Division of Corrections had the right to receive psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concluded with reasonable medical certainty that the prisoner’s symptoms evidenced a serious disease or injury, that such disease or injury was curable or might be substantially alleviated, and that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or denial of care could be substantial. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

The test of a prisoner’s right to receive treatment for health problems, outlined in Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977), is an appropriate one and the supreme court adopted its criteria in determining questions as to the right of a prisoner to receive psychological or psychiatric care under the provisions of former AS 33.30.020 and former AS 33.30.050 . Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Right to education. —

Barring an inmate's receipt of a computer programming book did not violate a state or federal right because (1) the action was rationally connected to the Department of Corrections' legitimate interest in protecting computer systems, (2) the inmate's right to receive publications was not denied per se, and (3) the inmate was allowed to obtain training on the subject. Antenor v. State, 462 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2020).

Duty to provide post-incarceration rehabilitation. —

Former AS 33.30.020 did not require that the Department of Health and Social Services provide alcoholism rehabilitation to persons released from incarceration; it imposes a duty on the department only with regard to individuals detained or in custody. Goodlataw v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 698 P.2d 1190 (Alaska), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996, 106 S. Ct. 411, 88 L. Ed. 2d 361 (U.S. 1985).

Applied in

City of Kotzebue v. State, 166 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2007).

Collateral references. —

60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 1 et seq.

72 C.J.S., Prisons, § 1 et seq.

Civil liability of sheriff or other officer charged with keeping jail or prison for death or injury of prisoner. 14 A.L.R.2d 353, 41 ALR3d 1021.

Provision of religious facilities for prisoners. 12 ALR3d 1276.

Liability of prison authorities for injury to prisoner directly caused by assault by other prisoner. 41 ALR3d 1021.

Liability of public officer or body for harm done by prisoner permitted to escape. 44 ALR3d 899.

Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “legal” mail. 47 ALR3d 1150.

Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “nonlegal” mail. 47 ALR3d 1192.

Prison conditions as amounting to cruel and unusual punishment. 51 ALR3d 111.

Duress, necessity, or conditions of confinement as justification for escape from prison. 69 ALR3d 678.

Temporary unauthorized absence of prisoner as escape or attempted escape. 76 ALR3d 695.

Civil liability of prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner. 79 A.L.R.3d 1210.

Right of incarcerated mother to retain custody of infant in penal institution. 14 ALR4th 748.

Right of jailed or imprisoned parent to visit from minor child. 15 ALR4th 1234.

State regulation of conjugal or overnight familial visits in penal and correctional institutions. 29 ALR4th 1216.

State prisoner’s right to personally appear at civil trial to which he is a party—state court cases. 82 A.L.R.4th 1063.

Prisoner’s rights as to search and seizure under state law or constitution—post- Hudson cases. 14 ALR5th 913.

Conditions relating to placement of more than one prisoner per cell as violation of inmates federal constitutional rights. 85 ALR Fed. 308.

Propriety and construction of totality of conditions analysis in federal court’s consideration of Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions. 85 ALR Fed. 750.

Constitutional right of prisoners to abortion services and facilities—federal cases. 90 ALR Fed. 683.

Sec. 33.30.012. Notice of release, parole, community placement, work release placement, furlough, or escape of sex offender or child kidnapper.

  1. Within 30 days before release of a sex offender or child kidnapper with a duty to register under AS 12.63, the commissioner shall complete the registration of the sex offender or child kidnapper if the offender or kidnapper has not previously registered. The commissioner shall take the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s photograph, and determine if legible fingerprints of the sex offender or child kidnapper have been previously provided to the Department of Public Safety; if legible fingerprints for the sex offense or child kidnapping have not previously been provided to the Department of Public Safety, the commissioner shall obtain the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s fingerprints in the manner required by the Department of Public Safety and shall immediately forward the fingerprints to the department. When completing the registration or taking the photograph under this subsection, the commissioner shall also send written notice of release, parole, community placement, work release placement, or furlough of a sex offender or child kidnapper to
    1. the chief of police of the community, if any, in which the inmate will reside;
    2. the Alaska state trooper post located nearest to where the inmate will reside;
    3. the village public safety officer of the rural community without a municipal police department or Alaska state trooper post in which the inmate will reside; and
    4. the central registry of sex offenders and child kidnappers.
  2. If an inmate convicted of a sex offense or child kidnapping escapes from a correctional facility, the commissioner shall immediately notify the Department of Public Safety and the chief of police of the community and the Alaska state trooper post located closest to where the inmate resided immediately before the inmate’s arrest and conviction.

History. (§ 7 ch 41 SLA 1994; am § 21 ch 106 SLA 1998)

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

The statutory design of the Registration Act, ch. 41, SLA 1994, which requires “sex offenders” to register with police authorities, displays a purpose to regulate present circumstances, not to punish prior conduct. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (U.S. 2003).

Sec. 33.30.013. Commissioner to notify victims.

  1. The commissioner shall notify the victim if the offender
    1. escapes from custody;
    2. is discharged from parole under AS 33.16; or
    3. is released to the community on a furlough, on an early release program, or for any other reason.
  2. The commissioner is required to give notice of a change in the status of an offender under this section only if the victim has requested notice of the change, except that the commissioner is required to give notice, mailed to the last known address of the victim, in every case of a crime involving domestic violence.
  3. A victim who has requested notice under (b) of this section shall maintain a current, valid mailing address on file with the commissioner. The commissioner shall send the notice from the department required by this section to the victim’s last known address. The victim’s address may not be disclosed to the offender or the offender’s attorney.
  4. The state may not be held liable in damages for the failure of the commissioner to comply with the requirements of this section.
  5. As part of the notice under this section, the commissioner shall send the victim a photograph of the offender if the victim has specifically requested in writing that a photograph be sent. The photograph must have been taken within three weeks of the offender’s release or, if the offender escapes from custody, must be the most recent photograph in the commissioner’s possession. The photograph is for the victim’s personal use, and the victim may not make copies of the photograph for distribution to others. An offender who is released under (a) of this section shall be notified that a photograph has been sent to the victim under this subsection.
  6. The commissioner’s duty under (a) — (c) of this section to notify a victim of a change in the status of an offender is satisfied by the notice provided by an automated victim notification system established under AS 12.61.050 .

History. (§ 20 ch 59 SLA 1989; am §§ 14, 15 ch 57 SLA 1991; am § 58 ch 64 SLA 1996; am § 2 ch 73 SLA 1997; am § 156 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, designated portions of (a) as (a)(1) and (a)(3), added (a)(2).

Sec. 33.30.015. Living conditions for prisoners.

  1. The commissioner may not
    1. make per capita expenditures for food for prisoners in a state correctional facility operated by the state that exceed 90 percent of per capita expenditures for food that is available to enlisted personnel in the United States Army stationed in the state;
    2. provide, in a state correctional facility operated by the state,
      1. living quarters for a prisoner into which the view is obstructed; however, the commissioner is not required to renovate a facility to comply with this subparagraph if the facility is being used as a correctional facility on August 27, 1997, or if the facility was already built before being acquired by the department;
      2. equipment or facilities for publishing or broadcasting material the content of which is not subject to prior approval by the department as consistent with keeping order in the institution and prisoner discipline;
      3. cable television service other than a level of basic cable television service that is available as a substitute for services that are broadcast to the public in the community in which a correctional facility is located;
    3. allow a prisoner held in a state correctional facility operated by the state to
      1. possess in the prisoner’s cell a cassette tape player or recorder, a video cassette recorder (VCR), or a computer or modem of any kind;
      2. view movies rated “R,” “X,” or “NC-17”;
      3. possess printed or photographic material that
        1. is obscene as defined by the commissioner in regulation;
        2. could reasonably be expected to incite racial, ethnic, or religious hatred that is detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or violence;
        3. could reasonably be expected to aid in an escape or in the theft or destruction of property;
        4. describes procedures for brewing alcoholic beverages or for manufacturing controlled substances, weapons, or explosives; or
        5. could reasonably be expected to facilitate criminal activity or a violation of institution rules;
      4. receive instruction in person, or by broadcast medium, or engage in boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, or other martial art or in any activity that, in the commissioner’s discretion, would facilitate violent behavior;
      5. possess or have access to equipment for use in the activities listed in (D) of this paragraph;
      6. possess or have access to free weights;
      7. possess in the prisoner’s cell a coffee pot, hot plate, appliance or heating element for food preparation, or more than three electrical appliances of any kind;
      8. possess or appear in a state of dress, hygiene, grooming, or appearance other than as permitted as uniform or standard in the correctional facility;
      9. use a computer other than those approved by the correctional facility; the use of a computer under this subparagraph may be approved only as part of the prisoner’s employment, education, or vocational training and may not be used for any other purpose;
      10. smoke or use tobacco products of any kind.
  2. The commissioner may determine whether the provisions of (a) of this section shall apply to correctional facilities that are not operated by the state and may negotiate with a provider of services for the detention and confinement of persons held under authority of state law under contract or agreement whether the living conditions set out in (a) of this section shall apply to persons held under authority of state law at a facility operated under contract or agreement.
  3. On and after January 1, 1998, the commissioner may not allow a prisoner to possess a television in the prisoner’s cell if the prisoner is classified as maximum custody under AS 33.30.011(a)(2) .
  4. The commissioner may allow a prisoner who, under AS 33.30.011(a)(2) , has been classified as other than maximum custody to possess a television in the prisoner’s cell only if the prisoner
    1. either is incapable of obtaining or has attained a high school diploma or general education development diploma or the equivalent;
    2. is actively engaged in an educational, vocational training, or employment program;
    3. has satisfied or is on a regular and current payment schedule for all restitution orders entered by the court as part of the prisoner’s sentence and, if applicable, is actively engaged in a treatment plan or counseling, psychiatric, or rehabilitation program ordered by the court or the department as part of the prisoner’s sentence; and
    4. pays for the expense of providing the television and, in addition to the utility service fee required by AS 33.30.017 , pays for the expense of providing any cable television service.
  5. The commissioner shall use
    1. appropriate technology to screen programs received by prisoners under (d) of this section;
    2. Alaska farm products and salmon to the greatest extent practicable for food for prisoners in a state correctional facility operated by the state.

History. (§ 5 ch 49 SLA 1997; am § 48 ch 41 SLA 2009)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, in subsections (c) and (d), "AS 33.30.011(a)(2) " was substituted for "AS 33.30.011 (2)" to reflect the addition of AS 33.30.011(b) .

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective June 21, 2009, in the introductory language of (a), substituted “The” for “On and after August 27, 1999, the”.

Notes to Decisions

No due process violation found. —

Because single hearing officers were not in Alaska case law presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary proceedings, and because defendant offered no specific allegations of bias or an explanation of why a high-moderate infraction of possession of tobacco in violation of this section and 22 AAC 05.400(c)(7) required adjudication by a committee instead of a single hearing officer, he did not show a violation of his Alaska constitutional right to an impartial factfinder under Alaska Const. art. I, § 7 as was required for a reversal under AS 33.30.295 . Brandon v. Dep't of Corrections, 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003).

Sec. 33.30.017. Fees for utilities services for prisoners.

  1. The commissioner shall establish a reasonable utility fee for electrical utilities that are used by prisoners who are confined in a state correctional facility.
  2. The commissioner shall
    1. charge each prisoner who possesses at least one major electrical appliance the utility fee established in (a) of this section; the commissioner may deduct the utility fee monthly from the account established for a prisoner into which money due the prisoner for labor is paid; if a prisoner is indigent, the commissioner shall make the deduction from any amount credited to the indigent inmate’s account;
    2. if available from legislative appropriation, expend money deducted and collected under (1) of this subsection to offset the cost of the department’s utility expenses; the commissioner shall annually report on the amounts that are collected and expended under this paragraph.
  3. The provisions of (b) of this section do not apply to prisoners
    1. who are
      1. developmentally disabled; or
      2. severely medically or cognitively disabled, as that term is defined in AS 33.16.900 ;
    2. who are housed in a mental health unit or psychiatric unit of a state correctional facility; or
    3. while placed in a state correctional facility awaiting classification under classification procedures for the purpose of making the appropriate assignment of the prisoner.

History. (§ 5 ch 49 SLA 1997; am § 7 ch 25 SLA 2003)

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

Sec. 33.30.020. Commissioner to establish and administer prison facilities. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.021. Regulations.

The commissioner shall adopt regulations to implement this chapter.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Cross references. —

For regulations adopted under this section, see generally 22 AAC 05.

Administrative Code. —

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

For security, see 22 AAC 5, art. 2.

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

For classification, see 22 AAC 5, art. 4.

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

For segregation, see 22 AAC 5, art. 7.

For communications, see 22 AAC 5, art. 8.

For discharge, see 22 AAC 5, art. 9.

For sex offender treatment providers, see 22 AAC 30.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Duty to promulgate regulations. —

The commissioner is under a legislative mandate and has the concomitant duty to promulgate appropriate regulations concerning prison facilities and the numerous other matters coming within the ambit of this chapter. McGinnis v. Stevens, 570 P.2d 735 (Alaska 1977).

Sec. 33.30.025. Siting of prison facilities.

The commissioner shall notify each community council established by municipal charter or ordinance of the department’s plans to locate a prison facility or to contract for the operation of a prison facility, community residential facility, or other rehabilitation program if the facility or proposed facility will be within one-half mile of the boundary of the area represented by a community council.

History. (§ 4 ch 100 SLA 1988)

Sec. 33.30.026. Procurement Code applicable to contracts.

Contracting for services under this chapter is governed by AS 36.30 (State Procurement Code).

History. (§ 54 ch 14 SLA 1987)

Sec. 33.30.028. Responsibility for costs of medical care.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the liability for payment of the costs of medical, psychological, and psychiatric care provided or made available to a prisoner committed to the custody of the commissioner is, subject to (b) of this section, the responsibility of the prisoner and the
    1. prisoner’s insurer if the prisoner is insured under existing individual health insurance, group health insurance, or any prepaid medical coverage;
    2. Department of Health and Social Services if the prisoner is eligible for assistance under AS 47.07 or AS 47.25.120 47.25.300 ;
    3. United States Department of Veterans Affairs if the prisoner is eligible for veterans’ benefits that entitle the prisoner to reimbursement for the medical care or medical services;
    4. United States Public Health Service, the Indian Health Service, or any affiliated group or agency if the prisoner is a Native American and is entitled to medical care from those agencies or groups; and
    5. parent or guardian of the prisoner if the prisoner is under the age of 18.
  2. The commissioner shall require prisoners who are without resources under (a) of this section to pay the costs of medical, psychological, and psychiatric care provided to them by the department. At a minimum, the prisoner shall be required to pay a portion of the costs based upon the prisoner’s ability to pay.
  3. The commissioner shall apply for medical assistance under AS 47.07 and for general relief assistance under AS 47.25.120 - 47.25.300 on behalf of a prisoner incarcerated in a correctional facility to establish medical assistance coverage or general relief assistance for the prisoner during a period of hospitalization outside of the correctional facility.
  4. The commissioner may obtain information necessary to determine whether a prisoner incarcerated in a correctional facility is eligible for medical assistance under AS 47.07 or public assistance under AS 47.25. Information obtained under this subsection may be used only for the purpose of applying for medical assistance or public assistance under (c) of this section and may not be disclosed for any other purpose without the permission of the prisoner. An employee of the commissioner who discloses a prisoner’s social security number in an application for medical assistance or public assistance under this section is considered to be acting in the performance of the employee’s duties or responsibilities under AS 45.48.400(b) .

History. (§ 13 ch 70 SLA 1995; am § 38 ch 30 SLA 1996; am § 35 ch 25 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective September 19, 2016, added (c) and (d).

Notes to Decisions

Applicability to former prisoner. —

The State can seek reimbursement for medical care costs from a former prisoner’s estate under this section. He was a “prisoner” for purposes of AS 33.30.028 , even though he was no longer in custody. Dep't of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce, 254 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2011).

Monetary sanctions in prison disciplinary proceeding. —

Inmate who pled guilty in a prison disciplinary proceeding to the charge of engaging in mutual combat was properly ordered to pay for 25% of the medical expenses resulting from the infraction under 22 AAC 05.470(a)(4), the regulation allowing for monetary sanctions in prison disciplinary proceedings. The regulation does not conflict with AS 33.30.011 ; allowing the Alaska Department of Corrections, to order restitution for injuries caused by a prisoner is reasonably necessary to control correctional facilities. Smith v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012), limited, Jovanov v. State, 404 P.3d 140 (Alaska 2017) (memorandum decision).

Sec. 33.30.030. Commissioner to adopt regulations. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.031. Contracts for confinement and care of prisoners.

  1. The commissioner shall determine the availability of state correctional facilities suitable for the detention and confinement of persons held under authority of state law or under agreement entered into under (e) of this section. If the commissioner determines that suitable state correctional facilities are not available, the commissioner may enter into an agreement with a public or private agency to provide necessary facilities. Correctional facilities provided through agreement with a public agency for the detention and confinement of persons held under authority of state law may be in this state or in another state. Correctional facilities provided through agreement with a private agency must be located in this state unless the commissioner finds in writing that (1) there is no other reasonable alternative for detention in the state; and (2) the agreement is necessary because of health or security considerations involving a particular prisoner or class of prisoners, or because an emergency of prisoner overcrowding is imminent. The commissioner may not enter into an agreement with an agency unable to provide a degree of custody, care, and discipline similar to that required by the laws of this state.
  2. [Repealed, § 37 ch 2 FSSLA 1992.]
  3. Notwithstanding AS 36.30.300 , an agreement with a private agency to provide necessary facilities under (a) of this section must be based on competitive bids.
  4. A person employed outside the facility while confined in a privately operated correctional facility established under (a) of this section is subject to the provisions of AS 33.30.131 .
  5. The commissioner may enter into an agreement with the United States, another state, a municipality of this state, or another state agency, to provide a correctional facility for the custody, care, and discipline of a person held under authority of the law of that jurisdiction.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 49 ch 138 SLA 1986; am § 55 ch 14 SLA 1987; am § 14 ch 90 SLA 1991; am §§ 5, 37 ch 2 FSSLA 1992)

Cross references. —

For interstate compacts concerning the confinement of inmates, see AS 33.36.

Administrative Code. —

For classification, see 22 AAC 5, art. 4.

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Opinions of attorney general. —

On September 4, 1986, the commissioner of corrections obtained authority to contract for the placement of prisoners found guilty but not mentally ill into privately operated treatment facilities. July 8, 1986 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Authority granted. —

The legislature has authorized the commissioner of health and welfare to designate an appropriate facility for service of a sentence by an Alaskan prisoner whether or not such facility is in another state, territory, or possession of the United States. Dwyer v. State, 449 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1969).

Alaska’s legislature authorized the commissioner of health and welfare to enter into agreements with the proper United States authorities for the placement of of Alaskan prisoners in federal facilities. Dwyer v. State, 449 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1969).

Incarceration in federal facility. —

Defendant’s incarceration upon a sentence for violation of Alaska’s burglary statute in a federal facility located in the State of California is not unlawful. Dwyer v. State, 449 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1969).

The Congress of the United States has authorized the Attorney General of the United States to contract with proper state officials for the care of state prisoners in federal facilities. Dwyer v. State, 449 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1969).

Incarceration at out-of-state facility. —

Although the settlement agreement between the state of Alaska and a group of state prisoners, that set forth population control measures in prisons to remain in effect until emergency overcrowding legislation was enacted, only regulated conditions in correctional facilities owned or operated by the state and did not directly cover Alaska inmates incarcerated at the Central Arizona Detention Center; the settlement agreement empowered the superior court to require compliance at the Arizona facility as a condition of approving the state’s plan to reduce prison overcrowding. Smith v. Cleary, 24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2001).

The Alaska Department of Corrections retains authority over all significant decisions involving Alaska inmates housed at the Central Arizona Detention Center, and the state did not waive jurisdiction over defendant by sending him to the Arizona facility. Hertz v. State, 22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Ex post facto considerations. —

Although defendant committed his crime before subsection (a) was amended to permit the Department of Corrections to contract with private out-of-state prisons, applying the law to defendant did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, because subsection (a) did not punish defendant for an act previously committed, nor make the punishment for his crime more burdensome, nor deprive him of any defense that was available when he killed his victim. The fact that a statute alters a convicted person’s circumstances to his or her disadvantage does not show an ex post facto violation. Hertz v. State, 22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Quoted in

Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles, 21 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2001).

Cited in

City of Kotzebue v. State, 166 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2007).

Collateral references. —

Liability of private operator of “halfway house” or group home housing convicted prisoners before final release, for injury to third person caused by inmate. 9 ALR5th 969, § 4.

Rights of prisoners in private prisons. 119 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sec. 33.30.035. Notice to sex offenders or child kidnappers of registration and other requirements.

The department shall provide written notice to a sex offender or child kidnapper of the registration, verification, and change of address requirements of AS 12.63.010 and shall obtain a written receipt of notice from the sex offender or child kidnapper (1) at the time of the sex offender’s or child kidnapper’s release from a state correctional facility; (2) immediately after taking supervision of a sex offender or child kidnapper under the Interstate Corrections Compact or AS 33.36.110 . The department shall forward the written receipt to the Department of Public Safety, along with a description of any identifying features of the offender or kidnapper, the anticipated address of the offender or kidnapper, and a statement concerning whether the offender or kidnapper has received treatment for the offender’s or kidnapper’s mental abnormality or personality disorder related to the sex offense or child kidnapping. In this section, “sex offense” and “child kidnapping” have the meanings given in AS 12.63.100 .

History. (§ 8 ch 41 SLA 1994; am § 22 ch 106 SLA 1998)

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

The statutory design of the Registration Act, ch. 41, SLA 1994, which requires “sex offenders” to register with police authorities, displays a purpose to regulate present circumstances, not to punish prior conduct. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (U.S. 2003).

Sec. 33.30.040. Duty of commissioner to provide prison facilities. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.041. Lease of correctional facility to municipality.

  1. If the commissioner determines that it would be in the best interest of the state, the commissioner may enter into an agreement with a municipality of the state for the lease of a state correctional facility or for the use and operation of a state correctional facility for the joint benefit of the municipality and the state.
  2. An agreement executed by the commissioner under (a) of this section must provide that
    1. the state has the right to detain or confine a prisoner held under authority of law in the correctional facility;
    2. the administrator of the correctional facility agrees to implement an order, concerning a prisoner, issued by a court of the state;
    3. the administrator of the correctional facility shall comply with the law, and regulations adopted by the commissioner, relating to the custody, care, and discipline of a prisoner detained or confined in the correctional facility; and
    4. the commissioner may inspect the correctional facility at any time to determine the conditions under which a prisoner is detained or confined.
  3. The agreement executed by the commissioner under (a) of this section may require the administrator of the correctional facility to comply with requirements that the commissioner considers necessary for the protection of the public or for the quality of care and programs for prisoners required by this chapter and regulations adopted by the commissioner.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Article 2. Commitments, Programs, and Furloughs.

Sec. 33.30.050. Commissioner to provide medical services. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.051. Commitment to commissioner.

  1. A person convicted of an offense against the state shall be committed to the custody of the commissioner for the term of imprisonment that the court directs.
  2. A person restrained under AS 26.05.400 or convicted of an offense by court-martial under AS 26.05 and confined under AS 26.05.405 shall be committed to the custody of the commissioner for the period of restraint or confinement as directed by the adjutant general.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 6 ch 55 SLA 2016)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective August 7, 2016, added (b). Although the 2016 amendment was to have taken effect July 1, 2016, under § 13, ch. 55, SLA 2016, the governor did not sign the bill until August 6, 2016, and so the actual effective date of the 2016 amendment was August 7, 2016, under AS 01.10.070(d) .

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Authority to designate specific facility for incarceration. —

The authority to designate a specific prison facility is “plainly vested” in the Commissioner of Health and Social Services. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978). See also Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

The matter of a prisoner’s classification, which encompasses designation of the prison facility to which the prisoner is to be confined, is committed to the administrative discretion of the Division of Corrections, and not to the sentencing courts of Alaska, although it is appropriate that the Division of Corrections give weight to the sentencing court’s recommendations; thus, the sentencing court does not have the authority to designate a particular prison facility in which a prisoner is to be confined. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Resource allocation is executive concern involving many day-to-day decisions which necessitates that court interference be kept to a minimum. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978), on rehearing modified on other grounds, Rust v. State, 584 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1978), decided under former AS 33.30.100 .

Cited in

Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sec. 33.30.055. Contraband articles into or out of prisons prohibited. [Repealed, § 21 ch 166 SLA 1978. For current law, see AS 11.56.375 and 11.56.380.]

Sec. 33.30.060. Commissioner may contract for confinement and care of prisoners. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.061. Commissioner to designate facility.

  1. The commissioner shall designate the correctional facility to which a prisoner is to be committed to serve a term of imprisonment or period of temporary commitment. The commissioner may designate a facility without regard to whether it is maintained by the state, is located within the judicial district in which the prisoner was convicted, or is located in the state.
  2. The commissioner may designate an out-of-state facility under this section only if the commissioner determines that rehabilitation or treatment of the prisoner will not be substantially impaired.
  3. The commissioner may, under AS 33.30.065 , designate a prisoner to serve the prisoner’s term of imprisonment or period of temporary commitment, or a part of the term or period, by electronic monitoring. A prisoner serving a term of imprisonment, or a period of temporary commitment, for a crime involving domestic violence is not eligible for electronic monitoring.
  4. A prisoner serving a term of imprisonment at a private residence as required by statute when electronic monitoring is not available does not have a liberty interest in that status. The commissioner may return the prisoner to a correctional facility if the commissioner finds that the prisoner has violated the terms and conditions of the imprisonment at the private residence.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 4 ch 116 SLA 1998; am § 64 ch 1 4SSLA 2017)

Administrative Code. —

For classification, see 22 AAC 5, art. 4.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2017 amendment, effective November 27, 2017, added (d).

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Authority for administration placed with commissioner. —

Alaska’s statutory provisions leave little doubt that the legislature intended to place authority for administering matters affecting prisoners with the Commissioner of Health and Social Services. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Inmate’s due process rights relating to classification of prisoners. —

Decisions of prison authorities relating to classification of prisoners are completely administrative matters regarding which an inmate has no due process rights beyond the expectation of fair and impartial allocation of the resources of the prison system to its charges. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Superior court’s jurisdiction on appeal. —

A Department of Correction’s classification hearing on the transfer of a prisoner to an out-of-state prison involved the prisoner’s fundamental constitutional right to rehabilitation and was an adjudicative proceeding producing a record adequate for review by the superior court. Brandon v. State, Dep't of Cors., 938 P.2d 1029 (Alaska 1997).

Administration must be neither arbitrary nor vindictive. —

As an extension of the state, the Division of Corrections must administer Alaska’s prisons in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor vindictive. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Authority to designate specific facility for incarceration. —

The authority to designate a specific prison facility is “plainly vested” in the Commissioner of Health and Social Services. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978). See also Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

The matter of a prisoner’s classification, which encompasses designation of the prison facility to which the prisoner is to be confined, is committed to the administrative discretion of the Division of Corrections, and not to the sentencing courts of Alaska, although it is appropriate that the Division of Corrections give weight to the sentencing court’s recommendations; thus, the sentencing court does not have the authority to designate a particular prison facility in which a prisoner is to be confined. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Resource allocation is executive concern involving many day-to-day decisions which necessitates that court interference be kept to a minimum. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978), on rehearing modified on other grounds, Rust v. State, 584 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1978), decided under former AS 33.30.100 .

Recommendations from sentencing judge. —

It is within the sentencing judge’s authority to make a recommendation to the commissioner regarding the appropriate placement of the offender. The commissioner has the power to effectuate such a recommendation by placing the offender in the appropriate facility, and, although the commissioner was not bound by the sentencing court’s recommendation, a demonstrated failure to provide an appropriate rehabilitation program or to further the purposes of the sentence might have justified judicial intervention. Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).

Good time credit for stay in contractor-run facility. —

Post-conviction relief was properly granted in a case where appellee inmate was seeking good time credit under AS 33.20.010 based on his stay in a halfway house run by a contractor because the definition of “correctional facility” is not limited to state-run facilities, and there is no discretion to withhold credit unless there is a showing of a violation of the rules of the correctional facility; Valencia v. State, 91 P.3d 983 (Alaska App. 2004), does not apply to prisoners placed by authority of the Alaska Department of Corrections in a correctional facility. State v. Bourdon, 193 P.3d 1209 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Sentencing court’s authority. —

Where the sentencing court issued a supplemental order barring the department of corrections from housing defendant in the same facility as another named inmate and the prosecutor stated that the State had no opposition to defendant’s request, the supplemental order was reversed because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to order the department of corrections to hold defendant and the other inmate in separate facilities. State v. Combs, 64 P.3d 135 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).

Quoted in

Richard B. v. State, 71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003); Ivie v. State, 179 P.3d 947 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008); Ackerman v. State, 179 P.3d 951 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Sec. 33.30.062. Contracts with privately operated facilities. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.065. Service of sentence by electronic monitoring.

  1. If the commissioner designates a prisoner to serve the prisoner’s term of imprisonment or period of temporary commitment, or a part of the term or period, by electronic monitoring, the commissioner shall direct the prisoner to serve the term or period at the prisoner’s residence or other place selected by the commissioner. The electronic monitoring shall be administered by the department or by a private contractor approved by the department under AS 33.30.011(a)(10)(B) and shall be designed so that any attempt to remove, tamper with, or disable the monitoring equipment or to leave the place selected for the service of the term or period will result in a report or notice to the department.
  2. In determining whether to designate a prisoner to serve a term of imprisonment or period of temporary commitment by electronic monitoring, the commissioner shall consider
    1. safeguards to the public;
    2. the prospects for the prisoner’s rehabilitation;
    3. the availability of program and facility space;
    4. the nature and circumstances of the offense for which the prisoner was sentenced or for which the prisoner is serving a period of temporary commitment;
    5. the needs of the prisoner as determined by a classification committee and any recommendations made by the sentencing court;
    6. the record of convictions of the prisoner, with particular emphasis on crimes specified in AS 11.41 or crimes involving domestic violence;
    7. the use of drugs or alcohol by the prisoner; and
    8. other criteria considered appropriate by the commissioner.
  3. A decision by the commissioner to designate a prisoner to serve a term of imprisonment or a period of temporary confinement, or a part of the term or period, by electronic monitoring does not create a liberty interest in that status for the prisoner. The prisoner may be returned to a correctional facility at the discretion of the commissioner.
  4. The commissioner may require a prisoner designated to serve a term of imprisonment or a period of temporary confinement by electronic monitoring to pay all or a portion of the costs of the electronic monitoring, but only if the prisoner has sufficient financial resources to pay the costs or a portion of the costs.

History. (§ 5 ch 116 SLA 1998; am § 157 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective January 1, 2017, in (a), inserted “or by a private contractor approved by the department under AS 33.30.011(a)(10)(B) ” preceding “and shall be designed”.

Notes to Decisions

Application to credit for time served. —

Although the commissioner of the Alaska Department of Corrections had the authority to designate relatively unstructured ways in which a prisoner could serve a sentence, a defendant, who was subject to those unstructured conditions as a component of pre-custody release by a superior court, was not required to receive credit for time served. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

Cited in

Ackerman v. State, 179 P.3d 951 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Sec. 33.30.070. Contracts with privately operated facilities. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.071. Responsibility for prisoners pending commitment.

  1. The commissioner is not responsible for providing custody, care, and discipline for a person detained under AS 47.30.705 or AS 47.37.170 unless the person is admitted into a state correctional facility.
  2. The responsibility of the commissioner under AS 33.30.011 begins when a prisoner is accepted into the commissioner’s custody or admitted into a correctional facility.
  3. Medical services for a prisoner who is unconscious or in immediate need of medical attention before admission to a correctional facility or commitment by a court to the custody of the commissioner of corrections shall be provided by the law enforcement agency having custody of the prisoner. The law enforcement agency may require the prisoner to compensate the agency for the cost or for a portion of the cost of medical services provided for any preexisting medical condition.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 14 ch 70 SLA 1995; am §§ 1, 2 ch 92 SLA 1995; am § 6 ch 49 SLA 1997)

Revisor’s notes. —

Section 14, ch. 70, SLA 1995, effective September 3, 1995, added a cross-reference to AS 33.30.028 to the former second sentence of subsection (a). However, since § 1, ch. 92, SLA 1995, had deleted that second sentence, effective July 1, 1995, the amendment made by § 14, ch. 70, SLA 1995 was not given effect.

Administrative Code. —

For emergency guards, see 13 AAC 62.

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Physical examination shortly after arrest held proper. —

A physical examination by a clinical psychologist shortly after defendant was arrested and taken into custody, because the police feared defendant was suicidal, was properly authorized under former AS 33.30.130(a) and did not violate former AS 12.45.087(a), providing for a psychiatric examination of a defendant under certain conditions; the evidence resulting from the examination was, therefore, legally obtained. Loveless v. State, 592 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1979).

Reimbursement of housing costs. —

City was entitled to reimbursement of housing costs it incurred prior to the date it received formal notice that the department of corrections had withdrawn the city jail’s designation as a correctional facility; until the department provided that formal notice, no steps had been taken to end the jail’s use as a suitable holding place for persons arrested by the city police. City of Kotzebue v. State, 166 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2007).

Sec. 33.30.080. Commissioner may lease state prison facility to political subdivision. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.081. Transportation of prisoners.

  1. The commissioner of public safety is responsible for transporting a prisoner to and from the court having jurisdiction over the prisoner and for delivering a prisoner to a correctional facility upon temporary or final commitment by a court or upon transfer of a prisoner from one correctional facility to another either inside or outside the state.
  2. The commissioner of corrections shall make available return transportation to the place of arrest for a prisoner who is released from custody in a state correctional facility.
  3. The commissioner of public safety shall make available return transportation to the place of arrest for a prisoner who is released from custody before admission to a state correctional facility.
  4. The commissioner of corrections shall adopt regulations governing the furnishing of transportation, discharge payments, and clothing to prisoners upon release from a state correctional facility at any stage of a criminal proceeding.
  5. Except as provided in (f) of this section or as necessary in a criminal action pending against the prisoner, a court may not order the transportation of a prisoner.
  6. A court may order a prisoner who is a party or witness to a civil action or a witness to a criminal action to appear at a place other than within a correctional facility only if the court determines, after providing a reasonable opportunity for the commissioner to comment, that the prisoner’s personal appearance is essential to the just disposition of the action. In making its determination, the court shall consider available alternatives to the prisoner’s personal appearance including deposition and telephone testimony.
  7. Except as provided in (h) of this section, the expenses associated with the transportation of a prisoner ordered under (f) of this section, including the costs of travel for the prisoner and escorting officers, and the salary and per diem costs of the escorting officers, shall be borne by the party who has requested the prisoner’s appearance, and shall be paid to the commissioner of public safety before the prisoner is transported.
  8. A prisoner who is a party to a civil action is not required to bear the full costs of a prisoner’s own transportation under (g) of this section if the court determines that the prisoner is indigent. In these cases, the court may require the prisoner to bear a portion of the costs, and the commissioner of public safety shall bear the remaining costs of transporting the prisoner. If an indigent prisoner recovers a money judgment, the court may require the prisoner to bear all or part of the expenses required under (g) of this section.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For discharge, see 22 AAC 5, art. 9.

Notes to Decisions

Proceedings to terminate parental rights. —

Where imprisoned father’s credibility was not central to the trial court’s decision-making process in termination proceeding, and the burden on the state’s interests of a rule requiring prisoner transports in all termination proceedings would be substantial, this section did not require an incarcerated father to be transported to proceeding to determine the termination of parental rights. Financial costs to the state were high, the administrative burden on the Department of Corrections increased by the frequent need to transfer prisoners out to make room for incoming prisoners or face legal action for overcrowding, and significant planning and coordination will often be necessary to accomplish such transfers, and in this case the father gave little notice to the Department of Corrections of his request to attend the trial in person. Richard B. v. State, 71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003).

In making a determination to grant a prisoner’s request to testify in person in a civil trial in which the prisoner is a party, Alaska trial court’s may take into account the costs and inconvenience of transporting a prisoner from his place of incarceration to the courtroom, any potential danger or security risk which the presence of a particular inmate would pose to the court, the substantiality of the matter at issue, the need for an early determination of the matter, the possibility of delaying trial until the prisoner is released, the probability of success on the merits, the integrity of the correctional system, and the interests of the inmate in presenting his testimony in person rather than by deposition. These factors are among those a trial court should consider in deciding whether to grant an incarcerated parent’s request to be transported to a termination trial under subsection (f). Richard B. v. State, 71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003).

There was no deprivation of due process when the trial court denied an incarcerated father’s motion for transport so the father could attend his parental rights termination trial where the father participated telephonically the first four days of trial, personally attended the last two days, and testified in person. Any possible error in applying this section was harmless. Seth D. v. State, 175 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2008).

Superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying a prisoner's request for transport to attend in person the prisoner's parental rights termination trial because the court considered all relevant factors that the parties presented to the court, because it was not obvious that considering additional factors in the case law would have changed the court's statutory analysis, and because the prisoner's due process rights were not violated. Alex H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017).

Incarcerated husband’s pretrial request to participate in divorce proceeding in person was properly denied where there was no specific offer of credibility-dependent evidence, the trial judge had ample opportunity to observe the husband’s demeanor in a recent criminal trial, and the main points in contention, i.e., the husband’s separate ownership of the marital home and his request for rehabilitative alimony, turned largely on evidence concerning past conduct of the parties that might have manifested their intentions concerning the status of their marital home and evidence concerning their current financial status. Carr v. Carr, 152 P.3d 450 (Alaska 2007).

Transportation at request of defense counsel. —

Superior court erred in directing the Department of Public Safety to transport defendant from the correctional center where he was currently housed to another correctional center to facilitate a psychological evaluation by a psychologist retained by defendant's attorneys because the court had no authority to do so without violating the doctrine of separation of powers and the defense attorneys' claim of "cost-effectiveness" was purely a relative one inasmuch as they made no attempt to show that it would be objectively more cost-effective for all involved and they did not even provide any estimate of the relative costs. State v. Superior Court, 411 P.3d 648 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).

Postconviction proceedings. —

Trial court erred in not ordering the Alaska Department of Corrections to transport defendant to a postconviction evidentiary hearing so that defendant could present his testimony in person because resolution of two issues hinged to some degree on defendant’s credibility as a witness. Jones v. State, 284 P.3d 853 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).

“Place of arrest” not defined. —

“Place of arrest” is not defined in this section or in 22 AAC 05.585(a); definitions supporting the interpretation of “place” as meaning “community” include a portion of space, encompassing an area with definite or indefinite boundaries, such as a particular region or center of population. Wilson v. State, 127 P.3d 826 (Alaska 2006).

Return to place of arrest. —

Appellant was arrested at his home in Columbia Cove, 3.5 miles from Tenakee Springs, Alaska; upon his release from prison, the state complied with subsection (b) and 22 AAC 05.585(a) by offering to transport appellant to Tenakee Springs. Wilson v. State, 127 P.3d 826 (Alaska 2006).

Sec. 33.30.090. Commitment to commissioner. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.091. Designation of programs.

Except as provided in AS 33.30.111 and 33.30.161 , the commissioner may assign a prisoner committed to the commissioner’s custody to a program established under AS 33.30.011(a)(3) considering

  1. safeguards to the public;
  2. the prospects for the prisoner’s rehabilitation;
  3. the availability of program and facility space;
  4. the prospect of future judicial proceedings requiring the presence of the prisoner;
  5. the nature and circumstances of the offense for which the prisoner was sentenced;
  6. the needs of the prisoner as determined by a classification committee and any recommendations made by the sentencing court;
  7. the record of convictions of the prisoner with particular emphasis on crimes specified in AS 11.41;
  8. the use of drugs or alcohol by the prisoner;
  9. the length of the prisoner’s sentence; and
  10. other criteria considered appropriate by the commissioner, including experimental evaluation of correctional programs that are consistent with protection of the public and reformation of the prisoner.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Revisor's notes. —

In 2016, “AS 33.30.011 (a)(3)” was substituted for “AS 33.30.011 (3)” to reflect the addition of AS 33.30.011(b) .

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Sec. 33.30.095. Duties of commissioner before release of prisoner.

  1. The commissioner shall establish a program to prepare a prisoner who is serving a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year for the prisoner’s discharge, release on parole or probation, or prerelease furlough under AS 33.30.111 that begins 90 days before the date of the prisoner’s discharge, release, or furlough.
  2. The program established under (a) of this section must include
    1. instruction on
      1. obtaining state identification;
      2. community resources available for housing, employment, and treatment;
    2. an individualized reentry plan under AS 33.30.011(a)(9) for the prisoner;
    3. probation and parole orientation, if appropriate; and
    4. a partnership with one or more nonprofit organizations to allow access to a prisoner before the prisoner’s discharge, release, or furlough to assist the prisoner with the prisoner’s application for Medicaid, social security benefits, public assistance under AS 47.25, and a state identification card or driver’s license and provide other programs to assist the prisoner’s transition into the community, promote rehabilitation, and reduce recidivism.

History. (§ 158 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Effective dates. —

Section 190, ch. 36, SLA 2016 made this section effective January 1, 2017.

Sec. 33.30.100. Commissioner to designate facility. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.101. Furloughs.

  1. The commissioner shall adopt regulations governing the granting of prerelease and short-duration furloughs to prisoners
    1. to obtain counseling and treatment for alcohol or drug abuse;
    2. to secure or attend vocational training;
    3. to obtain medical or psychiatric treatment;
    4. to secure or engage in employment;
    5. to attend educational institutions;
    6. to secure a residence or make other preparations for release;
    7. to appear before a group whose purpose is a better understanding of crime or corrections; or
    8. for any other rehabilitative purpose the commissioner determines to be in the interests of the prisoner and the public.
  2. If the commissioner determines with reasonable probability that a prisoner can live under reduced supervision without violating the law or the conditions established for the conduct of the prisoner, the commissioner may grant a furlough after considering
    1. the factors in AS 33.30.091 ;
    2. violations, if any, by the prisoner of a condition of a prior furlough;
    3. the history, if any, of institutional misconduct by the prisoner; and
    4. the best interests of the prisoner and the public.
  3. The regulations adopted under (a) of this section may not provide for the granting of a furlough of any type to a prisoner sentenced to a mandatory 99-year term of imprisonment under AS 12.55.125(a) or a definite term of imprisonment under AS 12.55.125(l) unless the prisoner is at all times in the direct custody of a correctional officer while the prisoner is away from the correctional facility.
  4. The commissioner may release on furlough a prisoner convicted of a crime involving domestic violence only under conditions that would protect the victim of domestic violence or other household member.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 16 ch 7 SLA 1996; am § 59 ch 64 SLA 1996)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsection (d) was enacted as (c). Relettered in 1996. In 2008, in subsection (a), “to” was moved from the end of the introductory language to follow each of paragraphs (a)(1) — (7) to maintain the grammatical structure.

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Annotator’s notes. —

The Department of Corrections was created from the Division of Corrections of the Department of Health and Social Services by E.O. No. 55 (1984). Earlier cases refer to the executive administration then in effect.

Furlough conditions properly imposed. —

When conditions on an inmate’s request for a furlough were not part of, or in effect at the time of, inmate’s original sentence, his constitutional rights were not violated. AS 33.30.101(a) , AS 33.30.111(c) and 22 AAC §§ 05.316 and 05.321 mandate the conditions without regard to the sentence. Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

No due process violation. —

Alaska furlough condition laws do not facially violate an inmate’s right to due process under the Alaska Constitution. Here there was no claim that the the inmate was denied fair consideration or that the conditions were imposed for an improper purpose. Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

Right to receive psychiatric care. —

The test of a prisoner’s right to receive treatment for health problems outlined in Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977), is an appropriate one. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

A prisoner in the custody of the Division [now Department] of Corrections had the right to receive psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concluded with reasonable medical certainty that the prisoner’s symptoms evidenced a serious disease or injury, that such disease or injury was curable or might be substantially alleviated, and that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or denial of care could be substantial. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).

Amended sentence construed to have replaced initial term of imprisonment by employment as fire fighter would have been, in effect, similar to a work release. Thus, the amended sentence would have meant that each day spent working would be considered the equivalent of a day spent in jail. Chase v. State, 479 P.2d 337 (Alaska 1971).

Quoted in

State v. Crosby, 770 P.2d 1154 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Stated in

State v. Felix, 50 P.3d 807 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).

Cited in

LeFever v. State, 877 P.2d 1298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).

Collateral references. —

Failure of prisoner to return at expiration of work furlough or other permissive release period as crime of escape. 76 ALR3d 658.

Sec. 33.30.110. Commissioner may designate facility for service of temporary commitments or sentences of one year or less. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.111. Prerelease furloughs.

  1. Furlough programs established under AS 33.30.101 must include prerelease furloughs designed to facilitate the reintegration of a prisoner into society.
  2. A facility that is specifically adapted to provide a residence outside prison, including a halfway house, group home, or other placement that provides varying levels of restriction and supervision, may be used for a prisoner on a prerelease furlough.
  3. The restrictions and supervision required for a prerelease furlough shall provide safeguards that minimize risk to the public and include, as a minimum,
    1. frequent contact with the prisoner by persons supervising the prisoner;
    2. knowledge by supervisory staff of the location of the prisoner;
    3. periodic reports by supervisory staff to the commissioner on the performance of the prisoner while on furlough; and
    4. a residential setting in which persons supervising a prisoner are obliged to immediately report to the commissioner any violation of a condition set for the prisoner’s conduct.
  4. Notwithstanding AS 33.30.101(b) , and other eligibility criteria established by the commissioner that relate to risks to the public posed by the proposed furlough of a prisoner,
    1. a prisoner sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of more than one year but less than five years is not eligible for a prerelease furlough until the prisoner has served at least one-third of the sentence; and
    2. a prisoner sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of five years or more is not eligible for a prerelease furlough until the prisoner has served at least one-third of the sentence or is within three years of the release date, whichever is later.
  5. A prisoner may request a prerelease furlough under procedures adopted by the commissioner. If the commissioner denies a request for a prerelease furlough, the commissioner shall provide the prisoner with a written explanation of the reasons for the denial.
  6. Except as provided in (g) of this section, if the commissioner considers a prisoner convicted of a crime against a person or arson in the first degree for a prerelease furlough and the victim has requested notice under AS 33.30.013 , the commissioner shall send notice of intent to consider the prisoner for a prerelease furlough to the victim. The victim may comment in writing on the commissioner’s intent to release the prisoner on a prerelease furlough status. The commissioner shall consider the victim’s comments before making a final decision to release a prisoner on a prerelease furlough status. The commissioner shall make a reasonable effort to notify the victim of an intent to release the prisoner on a prerelease furlough. The notice must contain the expected date of the prisoner’s release, the geographic area in which the prisoner will reside, and other pertinent information concerning the prisoner’s release that may affect the victim.
  7. If the commissioner considers a prisoner convicted of a crime involving domestic violence for a prerelease furlough, the commissioner shall send notice of intent to consider the prisoner for prerelease furlough to the last known address of the victim. The victim may comment in writing on the commissioner’s intention to release the prisoner on a prerelease furlough. The commissioner shall consider the victim’s comments, if any, before making a final decision to release the prisoner on a prerelease furlough. The commissioner shall make a reasonable effort to notify the victim of any decision to release the prisoner on the prerelease furlough. The notice must include the expected date of the furlough and any other information concerning the furlough that may affect the victim. A person may not bring a civil action for damages for a failure to comply with the provisions of this subsection.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 21 ch 59 SLA 1989; am §§ 60, 61 ch 64 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Due process. —

Alaska prerelease furlough laws providing for imposition of conditions for granting furloughs do not facially violate an inmate’s right to due process under the Alaska Constitution. There was no showing that the inmate was denied fair consideration or that the conditions were imposed for an improper purpose. Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

Not ex post facto. —

Furlough condition laws were not ex post facto punishment, nor did the laws trigger double jeopardy, because enacting the furlough statute after an inmate was sentenced was more favorable to the inmate than prior law, and a furlough is not punishment. Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

Furlough conditions properly imposed. —

Although conditions on an inmate’s request for a furlough were not contained in the inmate’s original sentence, his constitutional rights were not violated; AS 33.30.101(a) , AS 33.30.111(c) , and 22 AAC §§ 05.316 and 05.321 mandate the conditions without regard to the sentence. Hertz v. Macomber, 297 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2013).

Sec. 33.30.120. Transfer of prisoners. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.121. Short-duration furloughs.

  1. A short-duration furlough is an authorized leave of absence from a correctional facility for a period not to exceed 12 hours at any one time, except for
    1. family visitations, that may not exceed one week or occur more frequently than once in each four-month period; or
    2. medical treatment, for which the furlough may not last longer than necessary for the treatment.
  2. A short-duration furlough may be granted to a prisoner at any time under regulations adopted by the commissioner.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Opinions of attorney general. —

On September 4, 1986, the commissioner of corrections obtained authority to contract for the placement of prisoners found guilty but not mentally ill into privately operated treatment facilities. July 8, 1986 Op. Att’y Gen.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

State v. Ambrose, 758 P.2d 639 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

Sec. 33.30.130. Duty of the commissioner of public safety to provide for persons pending commitment. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.131. Prerelease or short duration furlough or correctional restitution center placement involving employment.

  1. The commissioner may grant a prerelease or short-duration furlough to permit a prisoner to participate in suitable employment under conditions and at wages that represent the prevailing standard for the area. A prisoner may not participate in employment where an organized labor dispute is in progress.
  2. Unless alternative arrangements are expressly approved by the commissioner, when a prisoner is employed outside a correctional facility as part of a prerelease or short-duration furlough program, or as part of serving time in a correctional restitution center under AS 33.30.151 33.30.181 , the earnings of the prisoner shall be delivered to the commissioner. If an employer transmits the earnings to the commissioner, the employer has no liability to the prisoner for the earnings. The commissioner shall disburse the earnings of the prisoner, in an order determined appropriate, under procedures adopted by the commissioner to
    1. pay for the room, board, and personal expenses of the prisoner in an amount or at a rate determined by the commissioner;
    2. pay any restitution or fine ordered by the sentencing court;
    3. reimburse the state for an award made for violent crimes compensation under AS 18.67 arising out of the criminal conduct of the prisoner;
    4. pay a civil judgment arising out of the criminal conduct of the prisoner; and
    5. support the dependents of the prisoner, and to provide child support payments as required by AS 25.27.
  3. After making the disbursements authorized under (b) of this section, the commissioner shall retain the balance remaining in the account of the prisoner and give it to the prisoner upon release. The commissioner may permit the prisoner to draw upon a portion of this money for other purposes that the commissioner considers appropriate.
  4. Only the earnings retained by the commissioner under (c) of this section are subject to lien, attachment, garnishment, execution, or other proceedings to encumber money or property.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 32 ch 7 FSSLA 1994)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Sec. 33.30.140. Place of service of sentence by prisoner. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.141. Effect of violation of furlough conditions or failure to return.

  1. If, after a hearing, a prisoner on a furlough is found to have violated the conditions established for the prisoner’s conduct, the commissioner may immediately require the return of the prisoner to actual confinement for a period not to exceed the balance of the term of imprisonment or initiate disciplinary proceedings authorized by regulations adopted by the commissioner or both.
  2. The failure of a prisoner on a furlough to return to the place of confinement or residence within the time specified by those having direct supervision over the prisoner is an unlawful evasion under AS 11.56.335 or 11.56.340 .

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 5 ch 51 SLA 1995; am § 7 ch 57 SLA 2006)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Notes to Decisions

Quoted in

State v. Crosby, 770 P.2d 1154 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Sec. 33.30.150. Visitation privileges. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.151. Correctional restitution centers.

  1. The commissioner shall establish correctional restitution centers in the state. The purpose of the centers is to provide certain offenders with rehabilitation through comprehensive treatment for substance abuse, cognitive behavioral disorders, and other criminal risk factors, including aftercare support, community service, and employment, while protecting the community through partial incarceration of the offender, and to create a means to provide restitution to victims of crimes.
  2. The commissioner shall adopt regulations setting standards for the operation of the centers including
    1. requirements that the centers be secure and in compliance with state and local safety laws;
    2. standards for disciplinary rules to be imposed on prisoners confined to the centers;
    3. standards for the granting of emergency absence to prisoners confined to the centers;
    4. standards for classifying prisoners to centers;
    5. standards for mandatory employment and participation in community service programs in each center;
    6. standards for periodic review of the performance of prisoners confined to the centers and quality assurance measures to ensure centers are meeting state standards and contractual obligations;
    7. standards for the provision of treatment, including substance abuse treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, and aftercare designed to address an offender’s individual criminogenic needs; and
    8. standards and a process to assess an offender’s risk of recidivating and the criminal risk factors and needs that reduce the risk of recidivating and ensure that
      1. high risk offenders with moderate to high needs are a priority for acceptance into a correctional restitution center; and
      2. centers establish internal procedures to limit the mixing of low and high risk prisoners.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 1 ch 82 SLA 1988; am § 159 ch 36 SLA 2016)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, in (a), in the introductory language, inserted “comprehensive treatment for substance abuse, cognitive behavioral disorders, and other criminal risk factors, including aftercare support,” following “rehabilitation through”, added “and quality assurance measures to ensure centers are meeting state standards and contractual obligations;” to the end of (b)(6); added (b)(7) and (8); and made a related change.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Sec. 33.30.160. Transportation of prisoners. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.161. Eligibility to serve time in a correctional restitution center.

  1. The commissioner may not allow a prisoner to serve time in a correctional restitution center unless the commissioner specifically finds that the prisoner meets the eligibility requirements of this section.
  2. To be eligible to serve time in a correctional restitution center, the prisoner
    1. must be employable or eligible to work on community service projects approved by the commissioner and agree to secure employment or participate in community service projects and obey the rules of the center;
    2. may not be serving a sentence for conviction of an offense
      1. involving violence or the use of force;
      2. under AS 11.41.320 , 11.41.330 , or AS 11.56.740 ;
    3. may not have been convicted of a felony offense, in the state or another jurisdiction, involving violence or the use of force;
    4. may not have been convicted of an offense under AS 11.41.410 11.41.470 or an offense in the state or another jurisdiction having elements substantially identical to an offense under AS 11.41.410 11.41.470 ; and
    5. may not have been sentenced to a
      1. mandatory 99-year term of imprisonment under AS 12.55.125(a) ; or
      2. definite term of imprisonment under AS 12.55.125(l) .
  3. Unless the commissioner determines otherwise for good cause shown, a person sentenced to less than five days who is serving time in a correctional restitution center shall participate in a community service project when available.
  4. In (b) of this section,
    1. “force” has the meaning given in AS 11.81.900(b) ;
    2. “violence or the use of force” includes possession of a firearm, as defined in AS 11.81.900(b) , in the commission of an offense, whether or not the firearm was actually used.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am §§ 2, 3 ch 82 SLA 1988; am § 13 ch 64 SLA 1991; am § 17 ch 7 SLA 1996)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Sec. 33.30.170. Expenses of prisoners to be paid by the department. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.171. Community advisory committees.

The commissioner shall appoint a community advisory committee for each center, to consist of five members of the community in which the center is located. The committee shall act as a liaison between the community and the department regarding community concerns with the center.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Sec. 33.30.180. Copy of commitment. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.181. Confinement to the center.

  1. A prisoner shall be confined to the center at all times except while
    1. at work and traveling to and from work;
    2. at and traveling to and from a community service project approved by the commissioner;
    3. on emergency absence;
    4. at and traveling to and from a job interview; or
    5. on a furlough approved by the commissioner.
  2. Except for an emergency absence or furlough, a prisoner may not be absent from a center under this section for more than 12 hours in a 24-hour period.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For programs, see 22 AAC 5, art. 5.

Secs. 33.30.185 — 33.30.190. Transmission of criminal records and data to place of imprisonment. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Article 3. Miscellaneous Provisions.

Sec. 33.30.191. Employment of prison inmates.

  1. It is the policy of the state that prisoners be productively employed for as many hours each day as feasible.
  2. The commissioner may enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with any public agency for the performance of conservation projects. After June 14, 2006, the commissioner may enter into a contract with an individual or private organization or public agency for the employment of prisoners if the commissioner consults with local union organizations before contracting and ensures that the contract will not result in the displacement of employed workers, be applied in skills, crafts, or trades in which there is a surplus of available gainful labor in the locality, or impair existing contracts for services. A contract with an individual or private organization must require payment to the commissioner of at least the minimum wage required by AS 23.10.065 for each hour worked by a prisoner. The wage required under the contract, multiplied by the total hours worked by inmates, must be paid weekly, or for another period as required by the contract.
  3. The commissioner may direct a prisoner to participate in a type of productive employment listed in (g)(1) and (3) — (5) of this section while the prisoner is confined in a correctional facility. A prisoner who refuses to participate in productive employment inside a correctional facility when directed under this section is subject to disciplinary sanctions imposed in accordance with regulations adopted by the commissioner.
  4. In employing prison inmates, the department shall comply with federal and state health and safety regulations, except for providing workers’ compensation under AS 23.30.
  5. The provisions of AS 23 do not apply to the employment of prison inmates.
  6. Prison inmates productively employed under this section are not state employees nor do they have the rights or privileges given to state employees, including the right to participate in collective bargaining.
  7. In this section, “productively employed” includes the following kinds of employment:
    1. routine maintenance and support services essential to the operation of a correctional facility;
    2. education, including both academic and vocational;
    3. public conservation projects, including wildland fire prevention and control, forest and watershed enhancement, recreational area development, construction and maintenance of trails and campsites, fish and game enhancement, soil conservation, and forest watershed revegetation;
    4. renovation, repair, or alteration of existing correctional facilities as permitted by law; and
    5. other work performed inside or outside of a correctional facility under (b) of this section.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 7 ch 49 SLA 1997; am §§ 2 — 5 ch 58 SLA 2006; am § 2 ch 22 SLA 2008)

Revisor’s notes. —

Subsections (d)-(f) were enacted as (e)-(g), respectively. Relettered in 2006, at which time existing subsection (d) was relettered as subsection (g) and an internal reference to the subsection was changed accordingly.

Cross references. —

For authority to use prisoners for work on trails and campsites, see AS 41.21.858(b) .

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

Notes to Decisions

Shoveling snow. —

A paid employment position shoveling snow is within the definition of productive employment. Hays v. State, 830 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1992).

Assignment to different position without hearing. —

As a practical matter, the Department of Corrections must have the discretion to assign inmates to different prison employment positions, as staffing needs require, without conducting a hearing as to each contemplated transfer. Hays v. State, 830 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1992).

Sec. 33.30.193. Standard applicable to allowing prisoners access to and use of legal reference materials and legal assistance.

If the commissioner imposes a restriction on access to and use of legal reference materials by or legal assistance of a prisoner in a state correctional facility, a court may not enter an order giving relief to the prisoner unless the court first finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that enforcement or application of the restriction hinders the prisoner from having access to and use of the legal reference materials or legal assistance

  1. in order to gain meaningful access to a court for the purpose of challenging
    1. the prisoner’s conviction or sentence; or
    2. the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement; or
  2. in circumstances in which a state court has specifically determined that a provision of the state constitution necessarily requires a prisoner to have access to and use of the legal reference materials or legal assistance.

History. (§ 8 ch 49 SLA 1997)

Sec. 33.30.201. Compensation of prison inmates; deductions; disbursement; liens.

  1. Each prisoner who is productively employed, as defined in AS 33.30.191(g)(1) or (3) — (5), may receive for that work compensation at a rate determined by the commissioner under this section if the money is available from legislative appropriations. Compensation established by the commissioner under this section may not exceed 50 percent of the minimum wage established in AS 23.10.065 ; however, if required to comply with a federal statute or regulation, a higher compensation may be established by the commissioner.
  2. If compensation established under (a) of this section is 50 percent or more of the minimum wage established in AS 23.10.065 , the commissioner may deduct the cost of confinement of the prisoner up to the statewide average cost of confinement before disbursements are made under (c) of this section.
  3. The commissioner shall disburse compensation received under (a) of this section, after any deduction required by (b) of this section, in the following order of priority:
    1. for support of the prisoner’s dependents, if any;
    2. to reimburse the state for compensation awarded under AS 18.67 resulting from the prisoner’s criminal conduct;
    3. to pay a civil judgment resulting from the prisoner’s criminal conduct;
    4. to pay a restitution or fine of the prisoner ordered by a sentencing court;
    5. for the payment of fees for the prisoner’s utilities services under AS 33.30.017 ;
    6. for the purchase of clothing and commissary items for the prisoner’s personal use.
  4. A prisoner’s compensation remaining after any deductions under (b) of this section and disbursements under (c) of this section is to be credited to the prisoner and, except as provided in (e) of this section, must be retained by the department for the primary purpose of being available to the prisoner at the time of release. The commissioner shall maintain individual prisoner accounts for those earnings. The commissioner may, however, permit the prisoner to draw on a portion of that money for other purposes that the commissioner considers appropriate.
  5. If a prisoner escapes, a portion of the retained compensation of the prisoner, as determined by the commissioner, is to be forfeited. The commissioner shall deposit forfeited compensation in the general fund.
  6. Except for execution by the state under AS 09.38.030(f) , only the prisoner compensation retained by the commissioner under (d) of this section is subject to lien, attachment, garnishment, execution, or similar procedures to encumber money or property.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am §§ 6, 7 ch 58 SLA 2006)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2006, in (a) of this section, “AS 33.30.191 (g)(1) or (3) — (5)” was substituted for “AS 33.30.191 (d)(1) or (3) — (5)” to reflect the 2006 relettering in AS 33.30.191.

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

Notes to Decisions

Compelled use of inmate’s prison work earnings for child support does not violate his constitutional right of access to rehabilitation programs under Alaska Const., art. 1, § 12. Smith v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 790 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1990).

Construction with other law. —

In a case where an inmate was ordered to pay interest and attorney’s fees after an unsuccessful civil rights action, there was no need to decide whether former AS 33.32.050 and 33.32.060 conflicted with subsection (f); since this section is identical to the repealed statutes; therefore, the inmate’s rights were the same under either the repealed or current statutes. Hertz v. Carothers, 174 P.3d 243 (Alaska), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 843, 129 S. Ct. 84, 172 L. Ed. 2d 73 (U.S. 2008).

Child Support Enforcement Division properly considered inmate’s earnings under a prison work program in establishing his child support obligation, and it was not improper for the division to attach earnings which had been credited to his prisoner account. Smith v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 790 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1990).

Applied in

Baker v. State, 158 P.3d 836 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).

Quoted in

Barber v. State, Dep't of Corr., 314 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2013).

Collateral references. —

Validity, construction, and application of state statute requiring inmate to reimburse government for expense of incarceration. 13 ALR5th 872.

Sec. 33.30.211. Transmission of documents.

  1. When a prisoner is admitted to a correctional facility, a copy of the commitment shall be delivered with the prisoner as evidence of the authority of the correctional facility to hold the prisoner.
  2. When a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, copies of the pre-sentence report, sentencing report prepared under AS 12.55.025 , and any other information of the probation office or of the court that may affect the person’s rehabilitation shall be transmitted to the superintendent of the correctional facility in which the prisoner will be confined.
  3. The commissioner shall adopt regulations providing for the security, confidentiality, and use of documents transmitted under (b) of this section.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For operations, see 22 AAC 5, art. 3.

Collateral references. —

Rights of prisoners in private prisons. 119 A.L.R.5th 1.

Sec. 33.30.216. Copies of records for child support purposes.

If a copy of a record prepared or maintained by or on behalf of the commissioner for a person in the custody of the commissioner is requested by the child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 , or the child support enforcement agency of another state, the official custodian of the record shall provide the requesting agency with a certified copy of the record. If the record is prepared or maintained in an electronic data base, the official custodian of the record may provide the requesting agency with a copy of the electronic record and a statement certifying its contents. The agency receiving information under this section may use the information only for child support purposes authorized under law.

History. (§ 142 ch 87 SLA 1997)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2004, “child support enforcement agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” was changed to “child support services agency created in AS 25.27.010 ” in this section in accordance with § 12(a), ch. 107, SLA 2004.

Editor’s notes. —

The delayed repeal of this section by § 148(c), ch. 87, SLA 1997, as amended by § 53, ch. 132, SLA 1998, which was to take effect July 1, 2001, was repealed by § 15, ch. 54, SLA 2001.

Sec. 33.30.221. Superintendent of correctional facility may administer oaths and acknowledgments.

The superintendent of a correctional facility or the superintendent’s assistant may administer oaths to and take acknowledgments from a prisoner, but may not request or accept compensation from a prisoner for acts performed under this section.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For communications, see 22 AAC 5, art. 8.

Secs. 33.30.225 — 33.30.227. Employment of prison inmates. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.231. Telephone access and monitoring inside correctional institutions.

  1. A prisoner shall have reasonable access to a telephone except when access is suspended as punishment for conviction of a rule infraction or pending a hearing for a rule infraction involving telephone abuse.  A suspension under this subsection must be reasonable in length and may not prohibit telephone communication between the prisoner and an attorney or between the prisoner and the office of the ombudsman.
  2. [Repealed, § 3 ch 56 SLA 1990.]
  3. Notwithstanding  AS 42.20.300 and 42.20.310 , in order to preserve the security and orderly administration of the correctional facility and to protect the public, the commissioner shall monitor or record the telephone conversations of prisoners. The commissioner shall post a warning by each telephone informing prisoners that calls may be monitored or recorded. The monitoring or recording may be conducted on all calls or selectively or in some other limited manner as determined by the commissioner to be appropriate. A recording of a telephone call made under this subsection shall be kept confidential, and access to the recording and its contents is limited to persons who are acting within the scope of their official duties and whose access to specific recordings has been authorized by the facility superintendent. A telephone call between an attorney and a prisoner or between the office of the ombudsman and a prisoner may not be monitored or recorded except when authorized by a court.
  4. Notwithstanding (a) of this section, the department may contract under  AS 36.30 for telephone services for use by a prisoner.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am §§ 1 — 3 ch 56 SLA 1990; am § 6 ch 2 FSSLA 1992; am § 9 ch 49 SLA 1997)

Administrative Code. —

For communications, see 22 AAC 5, art. 8.

Notes to Decisions

Liberty interest. —

Pretrial detainees do not have a state-created liberty interest in using a telephone during their pretrial confinements. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. Alaska 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1047, 123 S. Ct. 2110, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1087 (U.S. 2003).

No reasonable expectation of privacy. —

State did not violate defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment or Alaska Const. art. I, § 14 when it recorded his telephone conversations to his wife from jail without a warrant; defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone calls from jail. Signs were posted above the prisoner telephones, warning inmates that their telephone calls could be monitored and recorded; the monitoring was authorized by this section. State v. Avery, 211 P.3d 1154 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).

Record was insufficient to determine if rates charged inmates for local telephone calls violated a settlement agreement, inmates' constitutional right to rehabilitation, or inmates' statutory right to telephone calls, because (1) no party presented supporting evidence, and (2) the trial court made no findings. Antenor v. State, 462 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2020).

Collateral references. —

Propriety of telephone testimony or hearings in prison proceedings. 9 ALR5th 451.

Sec. 33.30.241. Effect of judgment of conviction on civil rights.

  1. A person who is convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude as defined in AS 15.80.010 is disqualified from voting in a state or municipal election until the person’s unconditional discharge.
  2. A person who is convicted of a felony is disqualified from serving as a juror until the person’s unconditional discharge.
  3. In this section “unconditional discharge” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Revisor’s notes. —

In 2010, in subsection (a), “AS 15.80.010 ” was substituted for “AS 15.60.010” to reflect the 2010 renumbering of AS 15.60.010.

Cross references. —

For loss and restoration of voting rights after certain felony convictions, see AS 15.05.030 .

Sec. 33.30.250. Work furlough. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.251. Disposal of abandoned personal property.

  1. Except as provided in (b) of this section, it is the obligation of each person committed to the custody of the commissioner to provide for the appropriate disposition of all of the person’s property remaining at a correctional facility within 90 days of the date of the person’s release or transfer from the correction facility.
  2. The commissioner shall provide for the shipment to the receiving facility of a reasonable amount of the prisoner’s property, as determined by the commissioner, when the prisoner is transferred from one correctional facility to another.
  3. A prisoner’s personal property that remains at a correctional facility after 90 days from the date of the prisoner’s release or transfer is considered abandoned, and shall be delivered to the Department of Administration for disposal under AS 44.68.110 .
  4. The state is not liable for any loss or damage to personal property properly determined to be abandoned under (c) of this section.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For admission to adult correctional facilities, see 22 AAC 5, art. 1.

Sec. 33.30.260. Rehabilitation furloughs. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.261. Excess money as contraband.

  1. A prisoner who possesses money in an amount greater than that permitted by the commissioner is subject to disciplinary sanctions under regulations adopted by the commissioner.
  2. Money in the possession of a prisoner in an amount greater than that permitted by the commissioner is contraband. If, after a hearing under regulations adopted by the commissioner, a prisoner is found to have been in possession of contraband under this section, the contraband shall be forfeited and deposited into the general fund.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Administrative Code. —

For discipline, see 22 AAC 5, art. 6.

Sec. 33.30.270. Employment of imprisoned persons. [Repealed, § 6 ch 53 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 33.30.271. Forfeiture of property.

A conviction of a person for a crime does not work a forfeiture of property, except in cases where a forfeiture is expressly provided by law.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Sec. 33.30.280. Credit for labor while imprisoned. [Repealed, § 6 ch 53 SLA 1982.]

Sec. 33.30.281. Crime against sentenced prisoner.

A person who commits a crime against a sentenced prisoner is punishable as if the prisoner was not sentenced and incarcerated.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Secs. 33.30.282 — 33.30.290. Correctional restitution centers. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Sec. 33.30.291. Treaties.

If a treaty in effect between the United States and a foreign country provides for the transfer or exchange of prisoners sentenced to serve a term of incarceration to the country where they are citizens or nationals, the commissioner may, on behalf of the state and subject to the terms of the treaty, consent to the transfer or exchange of prisoners and take any other action necessary to initiate the participation of the state in the treaty.

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986)

Sec. 33.30.292. Designation of victims’ representative.

If more than one person who qualifies as a victim under AS 12.55.185 requests notice under this chapter, the commissioner shall designate one person for purposes of receiving the notice required and of exercising the rights granted by this chapter.

History. (§ 22 ch 59 SLA 1989)

Sec. 33.30.295. Review of prisoner disciplinary decisions.

  1. A prisoner may obtain judicial review by the superior court of a final disciplinary decision by the department only if the prisoner alleges specific facts establishing a violation of the prisoner’s fundamental constitutional rights that prejudiced the prisoner’s right to a fair adjudication. An appeal shall be commenced by the prisoner filing a notice of appeal and other required documents in accordance with AS 09.19 and the applicable rules of court governing administrative appeals that do not conflict with AS 09.19. Unless the appeal is not accepted for filing under AS 09.19.010 or is dismissed under AS 09.19.020 , a record of the proceedings shall be prepared by the department, consisting of the original papers and exhibits submitted in the disciplinary process and a cassette tape of the disciplinary hearing. The record shall be prepared and transmitted in accordance with the applicable rules of court governing administrative appeals.
  2. A disciplinary decision may not be reversed
    1. unless the court finds that the prisoner’s fundamental constitutional rights were violated in the course of the disciplinary process, and that the violation prejudiced the prisoner’s right to a fair adjudication;
    2. because the department failed to follow hearing requirements set out in state statutes and regulations, unless the prisoner was prejudiced by the denial of a right guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution or United States Constitution; if such prejudice is found, the court shall enter judgment as provided in (c) of this section and remand the case to the department; or
    3. because of insufficient evidence if the record described in (a) of this section shows that the disciplinary decision was based on some evidence that could support the decision reached.
  3. The court shall enter judgment setting aside or affirming the disciplinary decision without limiting or controlling the discretion vested in the department to allocate resources within the department and to control security and administration within the prison system.

History. (§ 14 ch 79 SLA 1995)

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality. —

AS 33.30.295 was not unconstitutional as interpreted and applied as the legislature had complied with the judicial requirements by stating its purpose to amend Alaska R. App. P. 602. Parks v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 10, 2018) (memorandum decision).

No due process violation found. —

Because single hearing officers were not in Alaska case law presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary proceedings, and because defendant offered no specific allegations of bias or an explanation of why a high-moderate infraction of possession of tobacco in violation of AS 33.30.015 and 22 AAC 05.400(c)(7) required adjudication by a committee instead of a single hearing officer, he did not show a violation of his Alaska constitutional right to an impartial factfinder under Alaska Const. art. I, § 7 as was required for a reversal under this section. Brandon v. Dep't of Corrections, 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003).

Prisoner had not shown a violation of his due process rights where even if he had not waived the issues, he failed to address whether his disciplinary proceedings were major, and thus, due process did not require advance written notice of the charge. Parks v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Jan. 10, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Audio recording of a prison disciplinary hearing met the U.S. Supreme Court's requirement for a written statement, as the verbatim record served the same purposes as a written statement and only provided a more protective standard. Pease-Madore v. Dep't of Corr., 414 P.3d 671 (Alaska 2018).

Failure to call inmate's requested witnesses. —

In a case in which the Department of Corrections found an inmate guilty of making a false statement to a staff member about work he was supposed to be doing and ordered the inmate to pay in restitution half the amount of his wages for that work, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing officer's failure to call the inmate's requested witnesses was a prejudicial violation of the inmate's constitutional rights, and that the error was not harmless. Walker v. State, 421 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2018).

Constitutionality of department of corrections disciplinary proceedings. —

Inmate who pled guilty in a prison disciplinary proceeding to the charge of engaging in mutual combat was properly ordered to pay for 25% of the medical expenses resulting from the infraction under 22 AAC 05.470(a)(4), the regulation allowing for monetary sanctions in prison disciplinary proceedings. The regulation does not conflict with AS 33.30.011 ; allowing the Alaska Department of Corrections to order restitution for injuries caused by a prisoner is reasonably necessary to control correctional facilities. Smith v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Sept. 5, 2012), limited, Jovanov v. State, 404 P.3d 140 (Alaska 2017) (memorandum decision).

Prisoner’s interest was in accessing the courts for appellate review of alleged constitutional infirmities in the department of corrections disciplinary proceedings, and this interest is recognized in both precedent and statute. Barber v. State, Dep't of Corr., 314 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2013).

Failure to raise due process claim. —

In a case in which the Department of Corrections found an inmate guilty of making a false statement to a staff member about work he was supposed to be doing and ordered the inmate to pay in restitution half the amount of his wages for that work, the inmate did not forfeit his due process claim by failing to raise it during the administrative appeal process. Walker v. State, 421 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2018).

Prisoners who fail to raise their constitutional claims during the administrative appeal process do not necessarily forfeit those claims. James v. State, Department of Corrections, 260 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2011), is overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent. Walker v. State, 421 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2018).

No prejudice shown. —

Any procedural error in an inmate's disciplinary proceedings did not warrant reversal because the inmate did not demonstrate prejudice. Pease-Madore v. Dep't of Corr., 414 P.3d 671 (Alaska 2018).

Right to fair adjudication prejudiced. —

Absence of a written statement prejudiced a prisoner's right to a fair adjudication because in the absence of any statement of reasons for a disciplinary decision or any indication of the evidence supporting it, the prisoner could not know which evidence formed the basis of the hearing officer's guilty finding or whether the hearing officer correctly applied the regulation at issue; that precluded meaningful review of the hearing officer's decision. Huber v. State, 426 P.3d 969 (Alaska 2018).

Appeal dismissed. —

Inmate’s appeal of a finding of possessing contraband was properly dismissed be- cause the inmate’s statement of points on appeal was insufficient, as (1) a statement that the State violated the inmate’s fundamental constitutional rights to due process and thereby prejudiced the inmate’s right to a fair adjudication alleged no supporting facts, and (2) a claim that alleged violations were ascertainable from the record and decisional documents attached to a notice of appeal shifted to the trial judge the burden of identifying appealable issues, contrary to the statute. Johnson v. State, 380 P.3d 653 (Alaska 2016).

Inmate entitled to new hearing. —

It was necessary to hold a new disciplinary hearing where an inmate’s due process right was violated during a prior disciplinary proceeding; the inmate had a due process right to have the disciplinary hearing recorded. James v. State, 260 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2011), overruled in part, Walker v. State, 421 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2018).

Noncompliant points on appeal.

Inmate's appeal of a finding of possessing contraband was properly dismissed because the inmate's statement of points on appeal was insufficient, as (1) a statement that the State violated the inmate's fundamental constitutional rights to due process and thereby prejudiced the inmate's right to a fair adjudication alleged no supporting facts, and (2) a claim that alleged violations were ascertainable from the record and decisional documents attached to a notice of appeal shifted to the trial judge the burden of identifying appealable issues, contrary to the statute. Johnson v. State, 380 P.3d 653 (Alaska 2016).

Quoted in

DeRemer v. State, 307 P.3d 975 (Alaska 2013).

Cited in

Hertz v. State, 22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Secs. 33.30.300 — 33.30.900. Crime against convict in penitentiary. [Repealed, § 12 ch 88 SLA 1986.]

Article 4. General Provisions.

Sec. 33.30.901. Definitions.

In this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise,

  1. “center” means a correctional restitution center;
  2. “commissioner” means the commissioner of corrections;
  3. “community service” means work on projects designed to reduce or eliminate environmental damage, protect the public health, or improve public services, lands, forests, parks, roads, highways, facilities, or education; community service may not confer a private benefit on a person except as may be incidental to the public benefit;
  4. “correctional facility” or “facility” means a prison, jail, camp, farm, half-way house, group home, or other placement designated by the commissioner for the custody, care, and discipline of prisoners; a “state correctional facility” means a correctional facility owned or run by the state;
  5. “court” means the supreme court, the court of appeals, the superior court, the district or magistrate court, or a justice or judge of a court;
  6. “crime against a person” means a crime as set out in AS 11.41, or a crime against a person in this or another jurisdiction having elements substantially identical to those of a crime as set out in AS 11.41;
  7. “crime involving domestic violence” has the meaning given in AS 18.66.990 ;
  8. “department” means the Department of Corrections;
  9. “furlough” means an authorized leave of absence from actual confinement for a designated purpose and period of time;
  10. “health care provider” means
    1. a physician assistant licensed to practice in the state and working under the direct supervision of a licensed physician or psychiatrist;
    2. a mental health professional as defined in AS 47.30.915 ; or
    3. an advanced practice registered nurse as defined in AS 08.68.850 ;
  11. “municipality” means a municipality authorized by law to establish a correctional facility;
  12. “prisoner”
    1. means a person held under authority of state law in official detention as defined in AS 11.81.900(b) ;
    2. includes a minor committed to the custody of the commissioner when,
      1. under AS 47.12.030 , 47.12.065 , or 47.12.100 , the minor has been charged, prosecuted, or convicted as an adult; or
      2. under AS 47.12.160(e) , the minor has been ordered transferred to the custody of the commissioner;
  13. “sex offender or child kidnapper,” “sex offense,” and “child kidnapping” have the meanings given in AS 12.63.100 ;
  14. “temporary commitment” means detention of a person for any period under authority of state law, but does not include confinement upon conviction and judgment of a court of this state;
  15. “victim” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.185 .

History. (§ 6 ch 88 SLA 1986; am § 23 ch 59 SLA 1989; am § 9 ch 41 SLA 1994; am § 4 ch 113 SLA 1994; am § 62 ch 64 SLA 1996; am § 23 ch 106 SLA 1998; am § 5 ch 107 SLA 1998; am § 47 ch 33 SLA 2016)

Revisor’s notes. —

Paragraph (13) was enacted as (14). Renumbered as (12) in 1994, at which time former (12) and (13) were renumbered as (13) and (14) respectively. Paragraph (7) was enacted as (15). Renumbered in 1996, at which time former paragraphs (7) — (14) were renumbered as (8) — (15).

In 2001, in the definition of “health care provider,” “physician assistant” was substituted for “physician’s assistant” to correct a manifest error.

Effect of amendments. —

The 2016 amendment, effective July 7, 2016, in (10)(A), deleted “or nurse practitioner” following “a physician assistant”; added (10)(C); and made related changes.

Notes to Decisions

“Correctional facility.” —

City was entitled to reimbursement of housing costs it incurred prior to the date it received formal notice that the department of corrections had withdrawn the city jail’s designation as a correctional facility; until the department provided that formal notice, no steps had been taken to end the jail’s use as a suitable holding place for persons arrested by the city police. City of Kotzebue v. State, 166 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2007).

Post-conviction relief was properly granted in a case where appellee inmate was seeking good time credit under AS 33.20.010 based on his stay in a halfway house run by a contractor because the definition of “correctional facility” is not limited to state-run facilities, and there is no discretion to withhold credit unless there is a showing of a violation of the rules of the correctional facility; Valencia v. State, 91 P.3d 983 (Alaska App. 2004), does not apply to prisoners placed by authority of the Alaska Department of Corrections in a correctional facility. State v. Bourdon, 193 P.3d 1209 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).

Operation of correctional facility by contractor. —

The good time credit statute applies to all prisoners “confined” in a “correctional facility”, and the statutory definition of “correctional facility” (AS 33.30.901 (4)) encompasses all facilities for housing prisoners, regardless of whether they are operated by the State or by others under contract with the State. State v. Shetters, 246 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App.), reaff'd, 246 P.3d 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).

Collateral references. —

Rights of prisoners in private prisons. 119 A.L.R.5th 1.

Chapter 32. Correctional Industries.

[Repealed, § 7 ch 53 SLA 1982, as amended by § 1 ch 25 SLA 1987, § 4 ch 77 SLA 1991, § 10 ch 93 SLA 1995, and § 14 ch 49 SLA 1997. For current law, see AS 33.30.191 and 33.30.201 .]

Chapter 35. Agreement on Detainers.

Sec. 33.35.010. Agreement enacted.

The Agreement on Detainers is enacted into law and entered into by the State of Alaska with all other jurisdictions legally joining in it in a form substantially as follows:

THE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS. Article I

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of those charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide those cooperative procedures.

Article II

As used in this agreement, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “state” means a state of the United States, the United States of America, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
  2. “sending state” means a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that the prisoner initiates a request for final disposition under Article III of this agreement or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated under Article IV of this agreement;
  3. “receiving state” means the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint under Article III or Article IV of this agreement.

Article III

  1. When a person is serving a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and when during the term of imprisonment there is pending in another party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, the prisoner shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner has had delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint. However, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or counsel for the prisoner being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.  The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
  2. The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) of this article shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
  3. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer against the prisoner, and shall also inform the prisoner of the right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.
  4. Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner under paragraph (a) of this article shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.  The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner’s request for final disposition is being sent of the proceedings being initiated by the prisoner.  Any notification sent under this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner’s written notice, request, and the certificate.  If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated by this article before the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, that indictment, information or complaint is of no further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing it with prejudice.
  5. A request for final disposition made by a prisoner under paragraph (a) of this article shall also be considered a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated or included by reason of paragraph (d) of this article, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence imposed upon the prisoner there, after completion of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment in the sending state.  The request for final disposition also constitutes a consent by the prisoner to the production of the prisoner’s body in any court where the prisoner’s presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph prevents the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
  6. Escape from custody by the prisoner after the execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) of this article shall void the request.

Article IV

  1. The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending is entitled to have a prisoner, against whom the officer has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state, made available in accordance with Article V(a) of this agreement upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of an indictment, information or complaint must have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request is honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon the governor’s own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
  2. Upon receipt of the officer’s written request as provided in paragraph (a) of this article, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.  Those authorities shall at the same time furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons for the request.
  3. In any proceeding under this article, trial shall begin within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state.  However, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or counsel for the prisoner being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
  4. Nothing contained in this article may be construed to deprive a prisoner of any right that the prisoner may have to contest the legality of the prisoner’s delivery as provided in paragraph (a) of this article, but the prisoner’s delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state had not affirmatively consented to or ordered the delivery.
  5. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated by this agreement before the prisoner’s return to the prisoner’s original place of imprisonment under Article V(e) of this agreement, the indictment, information or complaint is not of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing it with prejudice.

Article V

  1. In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV of this agreement, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of a prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where the indictment, information or complaint is pending against the prisoner in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had.  If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state is entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner’s presence in federal custody at the place of trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
  2. The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
    1. proper identification and evidence of the authority of the officer or other representative to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given; and
    2. a certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
  3. If the appropriate authority refuses or fails to accept temporary custody of the prisoner, or if an action on the indictment, information or complaint, on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged, is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV of this agreement, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing it with prejudice, and any detainer based on it shall cease to be of any force or effect.
  4. The temporary custody referred to in this agreement is only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or for prosecution on any other charge arising out of the same transaction.  Except for the prisoner’s attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which the prisoner’s presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
  5. At the earliest practicable time consistent with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
  6. During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
  7. For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be considered to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state.  Any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
  8. From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner under this agreement until the prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph govern unless the states concerned have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities between themselves.  Nothing in this agreement may be considered to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of or the responsibility for costs.

Article VI

  1. In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of those time periods shall be tolled when and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
  2. No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, apply to a person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

Article VII

Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall adopt regulations to carry out the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, inside and outside the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.

Article VIII

This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when that state has enacted it into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw from it by enacting a statute repealing it. However, the withdrawal of any state does not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time the withdrawal takes effect, nor does it affect their rights in respect to those proceedings.

Article IX

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability of a provision to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability of it to any government, agency, person or circumstance is not affected. If this agreement is held to be contrary to the constitution of any party state, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

History. (§ 1 ch 39 SLA 1981; am § 90 ch 6 SLA 1984; am E.O. No. 55, §§ 30 — 32 (1984))

Notes to Decisions

Primary function of agreement. —

A defendant was not denied due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Alaska Constitution because the state did not supplement its extradition proceedings with a specific request for return of the defendant under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, for the primary function of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is to give the defendant a means, if he wishes to exercise it, of compelling the state to return him for retrial. Conway v. State, 707 P.2d 930 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).

Filing detainer without first seeking extradition. —

Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(d)(6) requires the state to exercise diligence and to make reasonable efforts to obtain the presence of the defendant for trial in order to avoid dismissal, but there is nothing in the language of Rule 45 that would preclude the state from initially relying on the interstate Agreement on Detainers as a means of exercising diligence and reasonable efforts; the agreement fully protects the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, and a requirement that the state first seek extradition before filing a detainer would serve no useful purpose. Miller v. State, 739 P.2d 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).

Prisoner’s burden regarding filing of request. —

A prisoner need only transmit the written notice and request for final disposition to the appropriate custodial officials in order to fulfill completely his responsibility under the agreement. However, while the filing of a request with the proper custodial authorities is sufficient to fulfill the prisoner’s responsibility, the defendant has the burden of proving that such a proper request was filed. Newcomb v. State, 779 P.2d 1240 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).

Effect of dismissed escape charges on extradition request. —

That Virginia filed a detainer pursuant to this section, but later dismissed the charge of escape against defendant, did not affect the validity of Virginia’s later extradition request which included a copy of the sentence imposed for the defendant’s Virginia felony charges, a statement that he failed to complete the sentences because he escaped, and a copy of the arrest warrant based on the escape charge. Kelly v. State, 803 P.2d 876 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).

Violation of Agreement. —

Although defendant argued that a trial judge should have granted his motion to dismiss because the State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers by filing an untimely detainer, defendant did not demonstrate that the judge erred when she decided that the State had not violated the Agreement. Gage v. State, — P.3d — (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2012) (memorandum decision).

Collateral references. —

Construction and application of article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) — issues related to “speedy trial” requirement, and construction of essential terms, 70 ALR6th 361.

Construction and application of article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) — issues related to custody, duties of prison officials, waiver of extradition, escape, assistance of counsel, and necessity of hearing, 72 ALR6th 141.

Sec. 33.35.020. “Appropriate court” defined.

The phrase “appropriate court” in AS 33.35.010 , with reference to the courts of this state, means the superior court.

History. (§ 1 ch 39 SLA 1981)

Sec. 33.35.030. Enforcement.

All courts, departments, agencies, officers, and employees of the state and its political subdivisions shall enforce the Agreement on Detainers under AS 33.35.010 and cooperate with one another and with other party states in enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose.

History. (§ 1 ch 39 SLA 1981)

Sec. 33.35.040. Central administrator and information agent.

The commissioner of corrections or the designee of the commissioner of corrections is the central administrator of and information agent for the Agreement on Detainers under AS 33.35.010 .

History. (§ 1 ch 39 SLA 1981; am E.O. No. 55, § 33 (1984))

Chapter 36. Interstate Corrections Compacts.

Article 1. Interstate Corrections Compact.

Sec. 33.36.010. Compact enacted.

The Interstate Corrections Compact as contained in this section is enacted into law and entered into on behalf of the State of Alaska with any other states legally joining in it in a form substantially as follows. It is the policy of the State of Alaska not to transfer a resident inmate outside of the state under this compact if that inmate’s continued confinement in Alaska will better facilitate rehabilitation or treatment:

History. (§ 1 ch 127 SLA 1982)

INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT

Article I Purpose and Policy

The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each of the party states to provide those facilities and programs on a basis of cooperation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of the offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the mutual development and execution of programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human and material resources.

Article II Definitions

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “state” means a state of the United States, the United States of America, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
  2. “sending state” means a state party to this compact in which conviction or court commitment was had;
  3. “receiving state” means a state party to this compact to which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction or court commitment was had;
  4. “inmate” means a male or female offender who is committed, under sentence to, or confined in a penal or correctional institution;
  5. “institution” means any penal or correctional facility, including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or mentally defective, in which inmates, as defined in (d) of this article, may lawfully be confined.

Article III Contracts

  1. Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated within receiving states.  Such a contract shall provide for:
    1. its duration;
    2. payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and the participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part of normal maintenance;
    3. participation in programs of inmate employment, if any; the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account of their employment; and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting from their employment;
    4. delivery and retaking of inmates;
    5. other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states.
  2. The terms and provisions of this compact shall be a part of a contract entered into under this compact, and nothing in such a contract may be inconsistent with this compact.

Article IV Procedures and Rights

  1. Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this compact, which state has entered into a contract under Article III, decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate quarters and care or an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, those authorities may direct that the confinement be in an institution within the territory of the other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
  2. The appropriate officials of a state party to this compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to an institution in which it has a contractual right to confine inmates, for the purpose of inspecting the facilities of the institution and visiting those of its inmates who may be confined in the institution.
  3. Inmates confined in an institution under this compact are at all times subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be removed from the institution for transfer to a prison or other institution in the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose permitted by the laws of the sending state; however, the sending state continues to be obligated to make any payments that may be required under a contract entered into the terms of Article III of this compact.
  4. A receiving state shall provide regular reports to a sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions under this compact, including a conduct record of each inmate, and certify that record to the official designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have official review of the inmate’s record in determining and altering the disposition of that inmate in accordance with the law in the sending state and in order that the record may be a source of information for the sending state.
  5. All inmates who may be confined in an institution under the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be treated equally with similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution.
  6. Any hearing to which an inmate, confined under this compact, may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending state or of the receiving state if authorized by the sending state.  The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for those hearings which may be conducted by the appropriate officials of a sending state.  If a hearing is had before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and a record of the hearing as prescribed by the sending state shall be made.  That record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be transmitted immediately to the officials before whom the hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In a proceeding had under the provisions of this subsection, the officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination may be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of the sending state.
  7. An inmate confined under this compact shall be released within the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and receiving states, agree upon release in some other place.  The sending state shall bear the cost of the return of an inmate to its territory.
  8. An inmate confined under the terms of this compact has all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have those obligations modified or the inmate’s status changed on account of an action or proceeding in which the inmate could have participated if confined in an appropriate institution of the sending state located in that state.
  9. The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for or otherwise function with respect to an inmate may not be deprived of or restricted in the exercise of any power in respect to an inmate confined under the terms of this compact.

Article V Acts Not Reviewable in Receiving State: Extradition

  1. A decision of the sending state in respect to a matter over which it retains jurisdiction under this compact is conclusive upon and not reviewable in the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is pending against the inmate in that state any criminal charge or if the inmate is formally accused of having committed in that state a criminal offense, the inmate may not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment or detention for the offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport inmates under this compact through any state party to this compact without interference.
  2. An inmate who escapes from an institution in which the inmate is confined under this compact is considered a fugitive from the sending state and from the state in which the institution is situated.  In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for institution of extradition or rendition proceedings is that of the sending state, but nothing contained in this compact may be construed to prevent or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an escapee.

Article VI Federal Aid

A state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this compact or a contract under it and an inmate in a receiving state under this compact may participate in a federally aided program or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual provision; however, if the program or activity is not part of the customary correctional regimen, the express consent of the appropriate official of the sending state shall be required.

Article VII Becoming Effective

When this compact has been enacted into law by any two states, it becomes effective and binding upon them. Thereafter, this compact becomes effective and binding as to any other state upon similar action by that state.

Article VIII Withdrawal and Termination

This compact continues in force and remains binding upon a party state until the state enacts a statute repealing the compact and providing for sending formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal does not take effect until one year after the notices provided in the statute have been sent. A withdrawal does not relieve the withdrawing state from its obligations assumed under this compact before the effective date of withdrawal. Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, those inmates it may have confined under the provisions of this compact.

Article IX Other Arrangements Unaffected

Nothing contained in this compact may be construed to abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a nonparty state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative institutional arrangements.

Article X Construction and Severability

The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed and are severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of a participating state or of the United States, or the applicability of it to a government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability of it to a government, agency, person or circumstance is not affected by that holding. If this compact is held contrary to the constitution of a state participating in it, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 33.24.010. Renumbered in 1982.

Administrative Code. —

For parole progress reports, see 22 AAC 20, art. 3.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Hertz v. State, 22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sec. 33.36.020. Commitment or transfer of inmates under compact.

An agency or officer of the State of Alaska having power to commit or transfer an inmate to an institution for confinement may commit or transfer the inmate to an institution inside or outside the State of Alaska, if the State of Alaska has entered into a contract for the confinement of inmates in the institution under Article III of the Interstate Corrections Compact.

History. (§ 1 ch 127 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 33.24.020. Renumbered in 1982.

Sec. 33.36.030. Enforcement of compact.

The courts, departments, agencies, and officers of the State of Alaska and its subdivisions shall enforce the Interstate Corrections Compact and shall do all things appropriate to carry out its purposes and intent which may be within their respective jurisdictions but not limited to making and submitting required reports.

History. (§ 1 ch 127 SLA 1982)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 33.24.030. Renumbered in 1982.

Sec. 33.36.040. Implementation.

The commissioner of corrections or the commissioner’s designee shall do all things necessary or incidental to the carrying out of the Interstate Corrections Compact. However, no contract is of any force or effect until approved by the commissioner of administration.

History. (§ 1 ch 127 SLA 1982; am E.O. No. 55, § 34 (1984))

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as AS 33.24.040. Renumbered in 1982.

Article 2. Western Interstate Corrections Compact.

Sec. 33.36.060. Compact enacted.

The Western Interstate Corrections Compact as contained in this section is enacted into law and entered into on behalf of the State of Alaska with any and all other states legally joining in it in a form substantially as follows:

History. (§ 1 ch 18 SLA 1961)

WESTERN INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT

Article I Purpose and Policy

The party states, desiring by common action to improve their institution facilities and provide programs of sufficiently high quality for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a basis of cooperation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such offenders and of society. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the development and execution of such programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders.

Article II Definitions

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “state” means a state of the United States, or, subject to the limitation contained in Article VII, Guam;
  2. “sending state” means a state party to this compact in which conviction was had;
  3. “receiving state” means a state party to this compact to which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction was had;
  4. “inmate” means a male or female offender who is under sentence to or confined in a prison or other correctional institution;
  5. “institution” means any prison, reformatory or other correctional facility (including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or mentally defective) in which inmates may lawfully be confined.

Article III Contracts

  1. Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated within receiving states. Any such contract shall provide for:
    1. its duration;
    2. payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part of normal maintenance;
    3. participation in programs of inmate employment, if any; the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof; and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting therefrom;
    4. delivery and retaking of inmates;
    5. such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states.
  2. Prior to the construction or completion of construction of any institution of addition thereto by a party state, any other party state or states may contract therewith for the enlargement of the planned capacity of the institution or addition thereto, or for the inclusion therein of particular equipment or structures, and for the reservation of a specific percentum of the capacity of the institution to be kept available for use by inmates of the sending state or states so contracting. Any sending state so contracting may, to the extent that moneys are legally available therefor, pay to the receiving state, a reasonable sum as consideration for such enlargement of capacity, or provision of equipment or structures, and reservation of capacity. Such payment may be in a lump sum or in installments as provided in the contract.
  3. The terms and provisions of this compact shall be a part of any contract entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto, and nothing in any such contract shall be inconsistent therewith.

Article IV Procedures and Rights

  1. Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party state is necessary in order to provide adequate quarters and care or desirable in order to provide an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
  2. The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any institution in which it has a contractual right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution.
  3. Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided that the sending state shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III.
  4. Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this compact including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have the benefit of the inmate’s record in determining and altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state.
  5. All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be cared for and treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of the sending state.
  6. Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state if authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of the sending state. Costs of records made pursuant to this subdivision shall be borne by the sending state.
  7. Any inmate confined pursuant to this compact shall be released within the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory.
  8. Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or the inmate’s status changed on account of any action or proceeding in which the inmate could have participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state located within such state.
  9. The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in the exercise of any power in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact.

Article V Acts Not Reviewable in Receiving State; Extradition

  1. Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is pending against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense, the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment or detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this compact through any and all states party to this compact without interference.
  2. An inmate who escapes from an institution in which the inmate is confined pursuant to this compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state and from the state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for institution of extradition proceedings shall be that of the sending state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an escapee.

Article VI Federal Aid

Any state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state pursuant to this compact may participate in any such federally aided program or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual provision provided that if such program or activity is not part of the customary correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official of the sending state shall be required therefor.

Article VII Entry into Force

This compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon the state so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two contiguous states from among the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. For the purposes of this article, Alaska and Hawaii shall be deemed contiguous to each other; to any and all of the states of California, Oregon and Washington; and to Guam. Thereafter, this compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding as to any other of said states, or any other state contiguous to at least one party state upon similar action by such state. Guam may become party to this compact by taking action similar to that provided for joinder by any other eligible party state and upon the consent of Congress to such joinder. For the purposes of this article, Guam shall be deemed contiguous to Alaska, Hawaii, California, Oregon and Washington.

Article VIII Withdrawal and Termination

This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not take effect until two years after the notices provided in said statute have been sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal. Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to the provisions of this compact.

Article IX Other Arrangements Unaffected

Nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a nonparty state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative institutional arrangements.

Article X Construction and Severability

The provisions of this compact and act shall be liberally construed and shall be severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 33.25.010. Renumbered in 1982.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Hertz v. State, 22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sec. 33.36.070. Commitment or transfer of inmates under compact.

An agency or officer of the State of Alaska having power to commit or transfer an inmate (as defined in art. II(d) of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact) to any institution for confinement may commit or transfer the inmate to an institution within or without the State of Alaska if the State of Alaska has entered into a contract or contracts for the confinement of inmates in the institution under art. III of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact.

History. (§ 2 ch 18 SLA 1961)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 33.25.020. Renumbered in 1982.

Sec. 33.36.080. Enforcement of compact.

The courts, departments, agencies and officers of the State of Alaska and its subdivisions shall enforce this compact and shall do all things appropriate to carry out its purposes and intent which may be within their respective jurisdictions including but not limited to the making and submission of reports required by the compact.

History. (§ 3 ch 18 SLA 1961)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 33.36.030 . Renumbered in 1982.

Sec. 33.36.090. Board of parole to hold hearings under compact.

The Alaska board of parole shall hold such hearings as may be requested by another party state under art. IV(f) of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact.

History. (§ 4 ch 18 SLA 1961)

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 33.36.040 . Renumbered in 1982.

Sec. 33.36.100. Implementation of compact.

The commissioner of corrections may enter into such contracts on behalf of the State of Alaska as may be appropriate to implement the participation of this state in the Western Interstate Corrections Compact under art. III of the compact. No contract is of any force or effect until approved by the commissioner of administration.

History. (§ 5 ch 18 SLA 1961; am § 6 ch 104 SLA 1971; am E.O. No. 55, § 35 (1984))

Revisor’s notes. —

Formerly AS 33.25.050. Renumbered in 1982.

Article 3. Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision.

Sec. 33.36.110. Authorizing governor to execute interstate compact.

The governor of this state is authorized and directed to execute a compact on behalf of this state with any of the United States legally joining in the compact in the form substantially as follows:

History. (§ 2 ch 138 SLA 1957; am § 1 ch 106 SLA 1960; am § 2 ch 61 SLA 2002)

INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION

ARTICLE I PURPOSE AND POLICY

The compacting states to this Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision recognize that each state is responsible for the supervision of adult offenders in the community who are authorized in accordance with the by-laws and rules of this compact to travel across state lines both to and from each compacting state in such a manner as to track the location of offenders, transfer supervision authority in an orderly and efficient manner, and when necessary return offenders to the originating jurisdictions.

The compacting states also recognize that Congress, by enacting the Crime Control Act, 4 U.S.C. 112 (1965), has authorized and encouraged compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime.

It is the purpose of this compact and the Interstate Commission created under this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states, to provide the framework for the promotion of public safety and protect the rights of victims through the control and regulation of the interstate movement of offenders in the community; to provide for the effective tracking, supervision, and rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending and receiving states; and to equitably distribute the costs, benefits, and obligations of the compact among the compacting states.

In addition, this compact will create an Interstate Commission that will establish uniform procedures to manage the movement between states of adults placed under community supervision and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections, or other criminal justice agencies that will adopt rules to achieve the purpose of this compact; ensure an opportunity for input and timely notice to victims and to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or to relocate across state lines; establish a system of uniform data collection, access to information on active cases by authorized criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of compact activities to heads of state councils, state executive, judicial, and legislative branches and criminal justice administrators; monitor compliance with rules governing interstate movement of offenders and initiate interventions to address and correct non-compliance; and coordinate training and education regarding regulations of interstate movement of offenders for officials involved in that activity.

The compacting states recognize that there is no right of any offender to live in another state and that duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any offender under supervision subject to the provisions of this compact and by-laws and rules adopted under the compact.

It is the policy of the compacting states that the activities conducted by the Interstate Commission created in this compact are the formation of public policies and are, as a result, public business.

ARTICLE II DEFINITIONS

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction,

  1. “adult” means both individuals legally classified as adults and juveniles treated as adults by court order, statute, or operation of law;
  2. “by-laws” means the by-laws established by the Interstate Commission for its governance, or for directing or controlling the Interstate Commission’s actions or conduct;
  3. “compact” means the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision;
  4. “compact administrator” means the individual in each compacting state, appointed in accordance with the terms of this compact, who is responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of offenders subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the Interstate Commission, and policies adopted by the state council under this compact;
  5. “compacting state” means any state that has enacted the enabling legislation for this compact;
  6. “commissioner” means the voting representative of each compacting state appointed in accordance with art. III of this compact;
  7. “Interstate Commission” means the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision established by this compact;
  8. “member” means the commissioner of a compacting state or a designee, who shall be a person officially connected with the commissioner;
  9. “non-compacting state” means any state that has not enacted the enabling legislation for this compact;
  10. “offender” means an adult placed under, or subject to, supervision as the result of the commission of a criminal offense and released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, paroling authorities, corrections, or other criminal justice agencies;
  11. “person” means any individual, corporation, business enterprise, or other legal entity, either public or private;
  12. “rules” means acts of the Interstate Commission, duly adopted in accordance with art. VII of this compact, substantially affecting interested parties in addition to the Interstate Commission; the rules shall have the force and effect of law in the compacting states;
  13. “state” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia and any other territorial possessions of the United States;
  14. “state council” means the resident members of the State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision created by each state under art. III of this compact.

ARTICLE III THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE COMPACT

  1. The compacting states create the “Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision.” The Interstate Commission shall be a body corporate and joint agency of the compacting states. The Interstate Commission shall have all the responsibilities, powers, and duties set out in this compact, including the power to sue and be sued, and the additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the respective legislatures of the compacting states in accordance with the terms of this compact.
  2. The Interstate Commission consists of commissioners selected and appointed by resident members of a State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision for each state. While each member state may determine the membership of its own state council, its membership must include at least one representative from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government, victims groups, and compact administrators. Each state council shall appoint as its commissioner the compact administrator from that state, to serve on the Interstate Commission in that capacity under or in accordance with applicable law of the member state. Each compacting state retains the right to determine the qualifications of the compact administrator, who shall be appointed by the state council or by the governor in consultation with the legislature and the judiciary. In addition to appointment of its commissioner to the national Interstate Commission, each state council shall exercise oversight and advocacy concerning its participation in Interstate Commission activities and other duties as may be determined by each member state, including development of policy concerning operations and procedures of this compact within that state.
  3. In addition to the commissioners who are the voting representatives of each state, the Interstate Commission shall include individuals who are not commissioners but who are members of interested organizations; non-commissioner members must include a member of the national organizations of governors, legislators, state chief justices, attorneys general, and crime victims. All non-commissioner members of the Interstate Commission shall be ex-officio, nonvoting members. The Interstate Commission may provide in its by-laws for such additional, ex officio, nonvoting members as it deems necessary.
  4. Each compacting state represented at any meeting of the Interstate Commission is entitled to one vote. A majority of the compacting states shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the by-laws of the Interstate Commission.
  5. The Interstate Commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of 27 or more compacting states, shall call additional meetings. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and meetings shall be open to the public.
  6. The Interstate Commission shall establish an executive committee that shall include commission officers, members, and others as shall be determined by the by-laws. The executive committee shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission during periods when the Interstate Commission is not in session, with the exception of rulemaking or amendment to the compact, or both. The executive committee oversees the day-to-day activities managed by the executive director and Interstate Commission staff, administers enforcement and compliance with the provisions of this compact, its by-laws, and as directed by the Interstate Commission, and performs other duties as directed by commission or set out in the by-laws.

ARTICLE IV POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

The Interstate Commission shall have the following powers:

  1. to adopt a seal and suitable by-laws governing the management and operation of the Interstate Commission;
  2. to adopt rules that shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact;
  3. to oversee, supervise, and coordinate the interstate movement of offenders subject to the terms of this compact and any by-laws and rules adopted by the Interstate Commission;
  4. to enforce compliance with compact provisions and Interstate Commission rules and by-laws, using all necessary and proper means, including the use of judicial process;
  5. to establish and maintain offices;
  6. to purchase and maintain insurance and bonds;
  7. to borrow, accept, or contract for services of personnel, including members and their staffs;
  8. to establish and appoint committees and hire staff that it deems necessary for the carrying out of its functions, including an executive committee as required by art. III of this compact that shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission in carrying out its powers and duties under this compact;
  9. to elect or appoint officers, attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants, and to fix their compensation, define their duties, and determine their qualifications, and to establish the Interstate Commission’s personnel policies and programs relating to, among other things, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation, and qualifications of personnel;
  10. to accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose of them;
  11. to lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve, or use any property, real, personal, or mixed;
  12. to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal, or mixed;
  13. to establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in art. IX of this compact;
  14. to sue and be sued;
  15. to provide for dispute resolution among the compacting states;
  16. to perform the functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact;
  17. to report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary, and state councils of the compacting states concerning the activities of the Interstate Commission during the preceding year; the reports also shall include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the Interstate Commission;
  18. to coordinate education, training, and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of offenders for officials involved in that activity;
  19. to establish uniform standards for the reporting, collecting, and exchanging of data.

ARTICLE V ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of its members, within 12 months of the first Interstate Commission meeting, adopt by-laws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this compact, including
    1. establishing the fiscal year of the Interstate Commission;
    2. establishing an executive committee and such other committees as may be necessary;
    3. providing reasonable standards and procedures
      1. for the establishment of committees; and
      2. governing any general or specific delegation of any authority or function of the Interstate Commission;
    4. providing reasonable procedures for calling and conducting meetings of the Interstate Commission, and ensuring reasonable notice of each meeting;
    5. establishing the titles and responsibilities of the officers of the Interstate Commission;
    6. providing reasonable standards and procedures for the establishment of the personnel policies and programs of the Interstate Commission; notwithstanding any civil service or other similar laws of any compacting state, the by-laws shall exclusively govern the personnel policies and programs of the Interstate Commission;
    7. providing a mechanism for winding up the operations of the Interstate Commission and the equitable return of any surplus money that may exist upon the termination of this compact after the payment or reserving, or both, of all of its debts and obligations;
    8. providing transition rules for start-up administration of the compact;
    9. establishing standards and procedures for compliance and technical assistance in carrying out this compact.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the members, elect from among its members a chairperson and a vice chairperson, each of whom shall have the authorities and duties as may be specified in the by-laws. The chairperson or, in the chairperson’s absence or disability, the vice chairperson, shall preside at all meetings of the Interstate Commission. The officers so elected shall serve without compensation or remuneration from the Interstate Commission except that, subject to the availability of budgeted money, the officers shall be reimbursed for any actual and necessary costs and expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the Interstate Commission. The Interstate Commission shall, through its executive committee, appoint or retain an executive director for the period, upon the terms and conditions, and for the compensation as the Interstate Commission may deem appropriate. The executive director shall serve as secretary to the Interstate Commission, and hire and supervise other staff as may be authorized by the Interstate Commission, but is not a member.
  3. The Interstate Commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the by-laws.
  4. The members, officers, executive director, and employees of the Interstate Commission shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused by or arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities; however, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to protect any such person from suit or liability, or both, for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional, or wilful and wanton, misconduct of any such person. The Interstate Commission shall defend the commissioner of a compacting state, or the commissioner’s representatives or employees, or the Interstate Commission’s representatives or employees, in any civil action seeking to impose liability, arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, as long as the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional wrongdoing on the part of that person. The Interstate Commission shall indemnify and hold the commissioner of a compacting state, the appointed designee or employees, or the Interstate Commission’s representatives or employees, harmless in the amount of any settlement or judgment obtained against those persons arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that those persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, as long as the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from gross negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person.

ARTICLE VI ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. The Interstate Commission shall meet and take such actions as are consistent with the provisions of this compact.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this compact and unless a greater percentage is required by the by-laws, in order to constitute an act of the Interstate Commission, the act shall have been taken at a meeting of the Interstate Commission and shall have received an affirmative vote of a majority of the members present.
  3. Each member of the Interstate Commission shall have the right and power to cast a vote to which that compacting state is entitled and to participate in the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission. A member shall vote in person on behalf of the state and shall not delegate a vote to another member state. However, a state council shall appoint another authorized representative, in the absence of the commissioner from that state, to cast a vote on behalf of the member state at a specified meeting. The by-laws may provide for members’ participation in meetings by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication. Any voting conducted by telephone, or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication shall be subject to the same quorum requirements of meetings where members are present in person.
  4. The Interstate Commission shall meet at least once during each calendar year. The chairperson of the Interstate Commission may call additional meetings at any time and, upon the request of a majority of the members, shall call additional meetings.
  5. The Interstate Commission’s by-laws shall establish conditions and procedures under which the Interstate Commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The Interstate Commission may exempt from disclosure any information or official records to the extent they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests. In adopting such rules, the Interstate Commission may make available to law enforcement agencies records and information otherwise exempt from disclosure, and may enter into agreements with law enforcement agencies to receive or exchange information or records subject to non-disclosure and confidentiality provisions.
  6. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and all meetings shall be open to the public, except as set out in the rules or as otherwise provided in this compact. The Interstate Commission shall adopt rules consistent with the principles contained in the Government in Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b), as may be amended. The Interstate Commission and any of its committees may close a meeting to the public if it determines by two-thirds vote that an open meeting would be likely to
    1. relate solely to the Interstate Commission’s internal personnel practices and procedures;
    2. disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
    3. disclose trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential;
    4. involve accusing any person of a crime, or formally censuring any person;
    5. disclose information of a personal nature when disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
    6. disclose investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes;
    7. disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of or for the use of, the Interstate Commission with respect to a regulated entity for the purpose of regulation or supervision of the entity;
    8. disclose information, the premature disclosure of which would significantly endanger the life of a person or the stability of a regulated entity; or
    9. specifically relate to the Interstate Commission’s issuance of a subpoena or its participation in a civil action or proceeding.
  7. For every meeting closed under (f) of this provision, the Interstate Commission’s chief legal officer shall publicly certify that, in the legal officer’s opinion, the meeting may be closed to the public, and shall reference each relevant exemptive provision. The Interstate Commission shall keep minutes that shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed in any meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of any actions taken, and the reasons for the action, including a description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll call vote as reflected in the vote of each member on the question. All documents considered in connection with any action shall be identified in the minutes.
  8. The Interstate Commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of offenders as directed through its by-laws and rules, which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection and data exchange, and reporting requirements.

ARTICLE VII RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. The Interstate Commission shall adopt rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of this compact, including transition rules governing administration of this compact during the period in which it is being considered and enacted by the states.
  2. Rulemaking shall occur in accordance with the criteria set out in this article and the by-laws and rules adopted under it. The rulemaking shall substantially conform to the principles of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. 551 et seq., and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.S. app.2, sec. 1 et seq., as may be amended (APA).
  3. All rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified in each rule or amendment.
  4. If a majority of the legislatures of the compacting states rejects a rule, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt this compact, then the rule shall have no further force and effect in any compacting state.
  5. When adopting a rule, the Interstate Commission shall
    1. publish the proposed rule, stating with particularity the text of the rule that is proposed and the reason for the proposed rule;
    2. allow persons to submit written data, facts, opinions, and arguments, which shall be publicly available;
    3. provide an opportunity for an informal hearing; and
    4. adopt a final rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on the rulemaking record.
  6. Not later than 60 days after a rule is adopted, any interested person may file a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the federal District Court where the Interstate Commission’s principal office is located for judicial review of the rule. If the court finds that the Interstate Commission’s action is not supported by substantial evidence, as defined in the APA, in the rulemaking record, the court shall hold the rule unlawful and set it aside.
  7. Subjects to be addressed within 12 months after the first meeting must at a minimum include the following:
    1. notice to victims and opportunity to be heard;
    2. offender registration and compliance;
    3. violations or returns, or both;
    4. transfer procedures and forms;
    5. eligibility for transfer;
    6. collection of restitution and fees from offenders;
    7. data collection and reporting;
    8. the level of supervision to be provided by the receiving state;
    9. transition rules governing the operation of this compact and the Interstate Commission during all or part of the period between the effective date of this compact and the date on which the last eligible state adopts this compact;
    10. mediation, arbitration, and dispute resolution.
  8. The existing rules governing the operation of the previous compact superseded by this Act shall be void 12 months after the first meeting of the Interstate Commission created under this compact.
  9. Upon determination by the Interstate Commission that an emergency exists, the Interstate Commission may adopt an emergency rule, which becomes effective immediately upon adoption; however, the usual rulemaking procedures provided in this compact shall be retroactively applied to the rule as soon as is reasonably possible, but in no event later than 90 days after the effective date of the rule.

ARTICLE VIII OVERSIGHT, ENFORCEMENT, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION

  1. The Interstate Commission shall conduct oversight as follows:
    1. the Interstate Commission shall oversee the interstate movement of adult offenders in the compacting states and shall monitor such activities being administered in non-compacting states that may significantly affect compacting states;
    2. the courts and executive agencies in each compacting state shall enforce this compact and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate this compact’s purposes and intent; in any judicial or administrative proceeding in a compacting state that pertains to the subject matter of this compact and that may affect the powers, responsibilities, or actions of the Interstate Commission, the Interstate Commission shall be entitled to receive all service of process in the proceeding, and shall have standing to intervene in the proceeding for all purposes.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall conduct dispute resolution as follows:
    1. the compacting states shall report to the Interstate Commission on issues or activities of concern to them, and cooperate with and support the Interstate Commission in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities;
    2. the Interstate Commission shall attempt to resolve any disputes or other issues that are subject to this compact and that may arise among compacting states and non-compacting states;
    3. the Interstate Commission shall enact a by-law or adopt a rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among the compacting states.
  3. The Interstate Commission, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, shall enforce the provisions of this compact using any or all means set out in (b) of art. XI of this compact.

ARTICLE IX FINANCE

  1. The Interstate Commission shall pay or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization, and ongoing activities.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall levy on and collect an annual assessment from each compacting state to cover the cost of the internal operations and activities of the Interstate Commission and its staff; the assessment must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the Interstate Commission’s annual budget as approved each year. The aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the Interstate Commission, taking into consideration the population of the state and the volume of interstate movement of offenders in each compacting state, and shall adopt a rule binding upon all compacting states that governs the assessment.
  3. The Interstate Commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind before securing money adequate to meet the obligations; nor shall the Interstate Commission pledge the credit of any of the compacting states, except by and with the authority of the compacting state.
  4. The Interstate Commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the Interstate Commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its by-laws. However, all receipts and disbursements of money handled by the Interstate Commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the Interstate Commission.

ARTICLE X COMPACTING STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE, AND AMENDMENT

  1. Any state, as defined in art. II of this compact, is eligible to become a compacting state.
  2. This compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of this compact into law by no less than 35 of the states. The initial effective date shall be the later of July 1, 2001, or upon enactment into law by the 35th jurisdiction. Thereafter it shall become effective and binding, as to any other compacting state, upon enactment of this compact into law by that state. The governors of non-member states or their designees will be invited to participate in Interstate Commission activities on a non-voting basis before adoption of this compact by all states and territories of the United States.
  3. Amendments to this compact may be proposed by the Interstate Commission for enactment by the compacting states. No amendment shall become effective and binding upon the Interstate Commission and the compacting states unless and until it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the compacting states.

ARTICLE XI WITHDRAWAL, DEFAULT, TERMINATION, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT

  1. The withdrawal of a compacting state from this compact is governed by the following:
    1. once effective, this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each and every compacting state except that a compacting state may withdraw from the compact by enacting a statute specifically repealing the statute that enacted this compact into law;
    2. the effective date of withdrawal is the effective date of the repeal of the statute;
    3. the withdrawing state shall immediately notify the chairperson of the Interstate Commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this compact in the withdrawing state;
    4. the Interstate Commission shall notify the other compacting states of the withdrawing state’s intent to withdraw within 60 days of its receipt of the notification under (3) of this subsection;
    5. the withdrawing state is responsible for all assessments, obligations, and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal, including any obligations the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal;
    6. reinstatement following withdrawal of any compacting state shall occur upon the withdrawing state reenacting this compact or upon a later date as determined by the Interstate Commission.
  2. A default of a compacting state is governed by the following:
    1. if the Interstate Commission determines that any compacting state has at any time defaulted in the performance of any of its obligations or responsibilities under this compact, the by-laws, or any duly adopted rules, the Interstate Commission may impose any or all of the following penalties:
      1. fines, fees, and costs in the amounts as are deemed to be reasonable as fixed by the Interstate Commission;
      2. remedial training and technical assistance as directed by the Interstate Commission;
      3. suspension and termination of membership in this compact; suspension shall be imposed only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance under the by-laws and rules have been exhausted; immediate notice of suspension shall be given by the Interstate Commission to the governor, the chief justice or chief judicial officer of the state, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council; the grounds for default include failure of a compacting state to perform the obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this compact, Interstate Commission by-laws, or duly adopted rules; the Interstate Commission shall immediately notify the defaulting state in writing of the penalty imposed by the Interstate Commission on the defaulting state pending a cure of the default; the Interstate Commission shall stipulate the conditions and the time period within which the defaulting state must cure its default; if the defaulting state fails to cure the default within the time period specified by the Interstate Commission, in addition to any other penalties imposed in this compact the defaulting state may be terminated from this compact upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the compacting states and all rights, privileges, and benefits conferred by this compact shall be terminated from the effective date of suspension;
    2. within 60 days of the effective date of termination of a defaulting state, the Interstate Commission shall notify the governor, the chief justice or chief judicial officer, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council of the termination;
    3. the defaulting state is responsible for all assessments, obligations, and liabilities incurred through the effective date of termination, including any obligations the performance of which extends beyond the effective date of termination;
    4. the Interstate Commission shall not bear any costs relating to the defaulting state unless otherwise mutually agreed upon between the Interstate Commission and the defaulting state;
    5. reinstatement following termination of any compacting state requires both a reenactment of this compact by the defaulting state and the approval of the Interstate Commission in accordance with the rules.
  3. The Interstate Commission may, by majority vote of the members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the federal district where the Interstate Commission has its offices to enforce compliance with the provisions of this compact and its duly adopted rules and by-laws against any compacting state in default. If judicial enforcement is necessary, the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of the litigation, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
  4. Dissolution of this compact is governed by the following:
    1. this compact dissolves effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the compacting state that reduces membership in this compact to one compacting state;
    2. upon the dissolution of this compact, it becomes void and shall be of no further force or effect, the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission shall be wound up, and any surplus money shall be distributed in accordance with the by-laws.

ARTICLE XII SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION

  1. The provisions of this compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this compact shall be enforceable.
  2. The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

ARTICLE XIII BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS

  1. Other laws’ effects on this compact are as follows:
    1. nothing in this compact prevents the enforcement of any other law of a compacting state that is not inconsistent with this compact;
    2. all compacting states’ laws conflicting with this compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.
  2. Binding effect of this compact is as follows:
    1. all lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, including all rules and by-laws adopted by the Interstate Commission, are binding upon the compacting states;
    2. all agreements between the Interstate Commission and the compacting states are binding in accordance with their terms;
    3. upon the request of a party to a conflict over meaning or interpretation of Interstate Commission actions, and upon a majority vote of the compacting states, the Interstate Commission may issue advisory opinions regarding the meaning or interpretation;
    4. if any provision of this compact exceeds the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any compacting state, the obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by the provision upon the Interstate Commission shall be ineffective and the obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction shall remain in the compacting state and shall be exercised by the agency of the compacting states to which the obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the time this compact becomes effective.

Revisor's notes. —

Formerly AS 33.10.010. Renumbered in 1985.

Administrative Code. —

For conditions of parole, see 22 AAC 20, art. 5.

Editor's notes.-

Article VI(f) of this section with regard to meetings of the Interstate Commission contains a citation to 5 U.S.C. 552(b). It appears that the correct citation may actually be 5 U.S.C. 552b.

Notes to Decisions

Cited in

Gonzales v. State, 586 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1978); Nunley v. State, 26 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).

Sec. 33.36.120. Definition. [Repealed, § 5 ch 61 SLA 2002.]

Sec. 33.36.130. Compact administrator.

  1. The governor shall appoint the administrator for the compact set out in AS 33.36.110 in consultation with the legislature and judiciary. The compact administrator must have a background in criminal justice.
  2. The compact administrator is responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of offenders under AS 33.36.110 , and shall report to the state council under AS 33.36.140 .
  3. The compact administrator shall work within the Department of Corrections under the direction of the commissioner of corrections. The compact administrator serves at the pleasure of the governor.

History. (§ 3 ch 61 SLA 2002)

Sec. 33.36.135. Review of rules.

The compact administrator shall annually, not later than January 31, provide a report on any rules that have been adopted by the Interstate Commission during the previous calendar year to the legislature. The legislature shall review the rules to determine if the compact should be repealed, amended, or permitted to continue. In this section, “compact,” “compact administrator,” and “Interstate Commission,” have the meanings given in AS 33.36.110 .

History. (§ 8 ch 61 SLA 2002)

Revisor’s notes. —

Enacted as uncodified law in § 8, ch. 61, SLA 2002. Codified in 2002.

Sec. 33.36.140. State council.

  1. There is created the State Council for Interstate Adult and Juvenile Offender Supervision to implement the provisions of the compact set out in AS 33.36.110 as the State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision and the compact set out in AS 47.15.010 as the State Council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision. The state council shall meet as frequently as necessary to carry out its responsibilities.
  2. The state council consists of nine members as follows:
    1. the commissioner of corrections; the commissioner of corrections may name a designee to serve in this capacity;
    2. the compact administrator appointed under AS 33.36.130 ;
    3. an attorney employed in the Department of Law, appointed by the governor;
    4. two members appointed by the governor from among the citizens of the state, at least one of whom must be a representative from victims’ groups;
    5. one ex officio nonvoting member from the legislative branch selected by the legislature and one ex officio nonvoting member from the judicial branch selected by the judiciary;
    6. the commissioner of health and social services; the commissioner of health and social services may name a designee to serve in this capacity;
    7. the compact administrator appointed under AS 47.15.020 .
  3. The commissioner of corrections or the commissioner’s designee shall serve as chair of the state council.
  4. The term of office of a member of the state council appointed under (b)(4) of this section is three years. The members of the state council appointed under (b)(3) and (4) of this section serve at the pleasure of the governor.
  5. Voting members of the state council who are not state employees receive no salary for their work on the council, but are entitled to per diem and travel expenses authorized for other boards and commissions.
  6. The state council shall
    1. designate the compact administrator, appointed under AS 33.36.130 , as its commissioner to the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision set out in AS 33.36.110 ; if the compact administrator is unavailable to serve as commissioner at a meeting of the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision, the council shall designate another person to serve in place of the compact administrator;
    2. exercise oversight and advocacy concerning the state’s participation in the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision;
    3. subject to available appropriations and other legal obligations, recommend policy development concerning the operations and procedures of the compact within the state; and
    4. make recommendations to the legislature to facilitate the implementation of the compact and the rules and bylaws adopted by the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision.

History. (§ 3 ch 61 SLA 2002; am §§ 1, 2 ch 37 SLA 2009)

Effect of amendments. —

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in (a), added “and Juvenile” following “Interstate Adult”, and added “as the State Council for Interstate Adult Offender Supervision and the compact set out in AS 47.15.010 as the State Council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision” at the end of the first sentence; in (b), substituted “nine” for “seven” in the introductory language, added (b)(6) and (b)(7), and made a related stylistic change.

Sec. 33.36.145. Application fee.

A person under probation or parole supervision by the Department of Corrections who applies for a transfer of supervision to another state under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision shall pay to the Department of Corrections a nonrefundable application fee of $100.

History. (§ 2 ch 88 SLA 2004)