Subtitle 1. General Provisions

Cross References. Annual list of eligible banks for deposits by local governments, § 19-8-105.

Emergency temporary location for political subdivisions, § 14-14-308.

Immunity from tort liability, § 16-120-101 et seq.

Chapter 1 General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 1070, § 71, provided: “ARKADELPHIA 2025 COMMISSION.

“(a) There is hereby created the Arkadelphia 2025 Commission to be composed of the Mayor, City Manager, and Chairman of the City Planning Commission of Arkadelphia, the Superintendent of the Arkadelphia Public School District, the member of the Arkansas House of Representatives representing the Arkadelphia area, the member of the Arkansas Senate representing the Arkadelphia area, the County Judge of Clark County, the Presidents of Ouachita Baptist University and Henderson State University, the President and Executive Secretary of the Arkadelphia Chamber of Commerce, and at least an equal number of citizens of the Arkadelphia area to be appointed by the members just named. The Commission shall be as broadly based as possible to represent all the diverse interests and to represent every race, gender, income level, and geographic area.

“(b) The Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

“(1) Determine the immediate needs of Arkadelphia and its surrounding area;

“(2) Determine the long-range needs and opportunities of the Arkadelphia area;

“(3) Seek and expend funds from all sources, both public and private;

“(4) Coordinate the activities of the various federal, state, and local agencies as well as the private sector in providing for the economic, social, and physical needs of the area;

“(5) To serve as the lead agency in the rebuilding and revitalization of the Arkadelphia area;

“(6) Adopt bylaws and establish goals; and

“(7) Perform all other powers and functions necessary to fulfill its duties.

“(c) The Commission shall be subject to audit by the Division of Legislative Audit [Arkansas Legislative Audit].

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Acts 2016, No. 251, § 71, provided: “ARKADELPHIA 2025 COMMISSION.

“(a) There is hereby created the Arkadelphia 2025 Commission to be composed of the Mayor, City Manager, and Chairman of the City Planning Commission of Arkadelphia, the Superintendent of the Arkadelphia Public School District, the member of the Arkansas House of Representatives representing the Arkadelphia area, the member of the Arkansas Senate representing the Arkadelphia area, the County Judge of Clark County, the Presidents of Ouachita Baptist University and Henderson State University, the President and Executive Secretary of the Arkadelphia Chamber of Commerce, and at least an equal number of citizens of the Arkadelphia area to be appointed by the members just named. The Commission shall be as broadly based as possible to represent all the diverse interests and to represent every race, gender, income level, and geographic area.

“(b) The Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

“(1) Determine the immediate needs of Arkadelphia and its surrounding area;

“(2) Determine the long-range needs and opportunities of the Arkadelphia area;

“(3) Seek and expend funds from all sources, both public and private;

“(4) Coordinate the activities of the various federal, state, and local agencies as well as the private sector in providing for the economic, social, and physical needs of the area;

“(5) To serve as the lead agency in the rebuilding and revitalization of the Arkadelphia area;

“(6) Adopt bylaws and establish goals; and

“(7) Perform all other powers and functions necessary to fulfill its duties.

“(c) The Commission shall be subject to audit by the Division of Legislative Audit.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017.”

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2020, No. 2, § 68, provided: “ARKADELPHIA 2025 COMMISSION.

“(a) There is hereby created the Arkadelphia 2025 Commission to be composed of the Mayor, City Manager, and Chairman of the City Planning Commission of Arkadelphia, the Superintendent of the Arkadelphia Public School District, the member of the Arkansas House of Representatives representing the Arkadelphia area, the member of the Arkansas Senate representing the Arkadelphia area, the County Judge of Clark County, the Presidents of Ouachita Baptist University and Henderson State University, the President and Executive Secretary of the Arkadelphia Chamber of Commerce, and at least an equal number of citizens of the Arkadelphia area to be appointed by the members just named. The Commission shall be as broadly based as possible to represent all the diverse interests and to represent every race, gender, income level, and geographic area.

“(b) The Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

“(1) Determine the immediate needs of Arkadelphia and its surrounding area;

“(2) Determine the long-range needs and opportunities of the Arkadelphia area;

“(3) Seek and expend funds from all sources, both public and private;

“(4) Coordinate the activities of the various federal, state, and local agencies as well as the private sector in providing for the economic, social, and physical needs of the area;

“(5) To serve as the lead agency in the rebuilding and revitalization of the Arkadelphia area;

“(6) Adopt bylaws and establish goals; and

“(7) Perform all other powers and functions necessary to fulfill its duties.

“(c) The Commission shall be subject to audit by the Division of Legislative Audit.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021”.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 1076, § 1: effective by its own terms Jan. 1, 2020.

14-1-101. Sport shooting ranges and sports facilities.

  1. A sport shooting range or sports facility that is not in violation of a state law or an ordinance of a local unit of government prior to the enactment of a new ordinance of a local unit of government affecting the range or facility may continue to operate even if, at or after the time of enactment of the new ordinance affecting the range or facility, the operation is not in compliance with the new ordinance.
  2. No new ordinance of a local unit of government shall prohibit a sport shooting range or sports facility that is in existence on August 12, 2005, from doing any of the following within its existing geographic boundaries:
    1. Repairing, remodeling, or reinforcing any building or improvement as may be necessary in the interest of public safety or to secure the continued use of the building or improvement;
      1. Reconstructing, repairing, rebuilding, or resuming the use of a facility or building damaged by fire, collapse, explosion, act of nature, or act of war occurring after August 12, 2005.
      2. The reconstruction, repair, or rebuilding shall be completed within one (1) year following the date of the damage or settlement of any property damage claim. If reconstruction, repair, or rebuilding is not completed within one (1) year, the reconstruction, repair, or rebuilding may be terminated in the discretion of the local unit of government;
    2. Expanding or enhancing its membership or opportunities for public participation; or
    3. Reasonably expanding or increasing facilities or activities.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in this section, this section shall not prohibit a local unit of government from regulating the location and construction of a sport shooting range or sports facility.
  4. As used in this section:
    1. “Local unit of government” means a county, city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town;
    2. “New ordinance” also includes an ordinance or an amendment to an existing ordinance;
    3. “Sport shooting range” means an area designed and operated for the use of rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, trap, black powder, or any other similar sport shooting; and
      1. “Sports facility” means a baseball field, basketball court, gymnasium, golf course, soccer field, swimming pool, tennis court, or other facility for recreational sports.
      2. “Sports facility” does not include a facility for go-carts, motorcycles, motor vehicles, or other motorized conveyances.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1011, § 1.

14-1-102. Noncriminal fingerprinting — Fee.

A local law enforcement agency may charge a reasonable fee for noncriminal fingerprinting services to offset the cost of expenses associated with offering a noncriminal fingerprinting service.

History. Acts 2015, No. 163, § 1.

14-1-103. Sanctuary policies prohibited — Definition. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

    1. A municipality shall not enact or adopt a sanctuary policy.
    2. A municipality that enacts or adopts a sanctuary policy is ineligible for discretionary moneys provided through funds or grants administered by the state until the sanctuary policy is repealed or no longer in effect.
  1. As used in this section, “sanctuary policy” means an order, ordinance, or law enforcement policy, whether formally enacted or informally adopted by custom or practice, that:
    1. Limits or prohibits a municipal official or person employed by the municipality from communicating or cooperating with federal agencies or officials to verify or report the immigration status of a person within the municipality;
    2. Grants to illegal immigrants the right to lawful presence or status within the municipality in violation of federal law;
    3. Violates 8 U.S.C. § 1373, as in effect January 1, 2019;
    4. Restricts or imposes any conditions upon the municipality's cooperation or compliance with detainers or other requests from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to maintain custody of an immigrant or to transfer an immigrant to the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
    5. Requires United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to obtain a warrant or demonstrate more than probable cause before complying with detainers or other legal and valid requests from United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to maintain custody of an immigrant or to transfer an immigrant to the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; or
    6. Prevents law enforcement officers from asking a person about his or her citizenship or immigration status.
    1. Upon receiving a complaint from a resident of the state of a violation of this section by a municipality, the Attorney General shall issue an opinion stating whether the municipality is in violation of this section.
    2. If the Attorney General issues an opinion stating that the municipality has enacted or adopted a sanctuary policy that violates this section, the municipality is ineligible to receive discretionary moneys provided through funds or grants administered by the state until the Attorney General certifies that the sanctuary policy is repealed or no longer in effect.
    1. Before the provision of funds or the award of grants is made to a municipality, a member of the General Assembly may request that the Attorney General issue an opinion stating whether the municipality has current policies in violation of this section.
    2. A municipality deemed ineligible for discretionary moneys under this section is ineligible to receive discretionary moneys provided through funds or grants administered by the state until the Attorney General certifies that the municipality is in full compliance with this section.
  2. A municipality may appeal a decision of the Attorney General under this section to the Pulaski County Circuit Court.
  3. Records created in connection with administrative investigations related to this section are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq.

History. Acts 2019, No. 1076, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 1076, § 1: effective by its own terms Jan. 1, 2020.

Subchapter 2 — Flags

14-1-201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

    1. “Flag of the United States” means the flag of the United States made of fabric, cloth, or paper suitable for display from a pole or staff, or in a window, and with dimensions not larger than ten feet (10') in length or eight feet (8') in width.
    2. “Flag of the United States” does not mean a depiction or emblem of the flag of the United States made in or of lights, paint, roofing, siding, paving materials, flora, balloons, or any other similar building, landscaping, or decorative components;
  1. “Legal right” means the freedom of use and enjoyment generally exercised by the owners and occupiers of land; and
  2. “Local government” means:
    1. A county;
    2. A city of the first class or city of the second class;
    3. An incorporated town; or
    4. Any other district or political subdivision or any board, commission, or agency of these political subdivisions.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1106, § 1.

14-1-202. Local government may not prohibit the flying of the flag of the United States.

  1. A local government shall not adopt any ordinance, regulation, or policy that prohibits or restricts a resident from properly displaying a flag of the United States on the resident's person, property, or motor vehicle unless the flag is used as, or in conjunction with, an advertising display.
    1. This section shall not prevent a local government from imposing reasonable restrictions as to the time, place, and manner of displaying the flag of the United States when necessary for the preservation of the public's health and safety or the public order.
    2. No restrictions solely to promote aesthetic considerations shall be imposed under subdivision (b)(1) of this section.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1106, § 2.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, Flying United States Flag, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 434.

14-1-203. Private entity may not prohibit the flying of the flag of the United States.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person, homeowners' association, property owners' association, or other private entity shall adopt any rule, regulation, or policy or shall enter into any agreement or protective covenant that prevents any person or private entity that would otherwise have the legal right to properly display a flag of the United States on private property from exercising that right.
    1. Display of the flag may be restricted if the flag is used as, or in conjunction with, an advertising display.
    2. This section shall not apply to:
      1. Landlords of private rental property who operate fewer than twelve (12) rental units; and
      2. Property owned by churches or religious organizations.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1106, § 3.

14-1-204. Liability for costs and attorney's fees.

A prevailing party in an action to enforce the legal right to fly a flag of the United States shall be entitled to recover the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1106, § 4.

Subchapter 3 — Adult-Oriented Businesses in Proximity to Locations Frequented by Children

14-1-301. Findings and legislative intent.

  1. The purpose of this subchapter is to establish requirements governing the location of adult-oriented businesses in order to protect the public health, safety, and welfare and to prevent criminal activity.
  2. Based on evidence of the adverse secondary effects of adult-oriented businesses and on findings discussed in cases, including City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), Erie v. PAP's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the General Assembly finds that:
    1. Adult-oriented businesses, as a category of commercial land uses, are associated with a wide variety of adverse secondary effects, including a negative impact on surrounding properties, personal and property crime, illicit drug use and trafficking, lewdness, prostitution, potential spread of disease, and sexual assault;
    2. Adult-oriented businesses should be separated from schools, playgrounds, places of worship, and other places frequented by children to minimize the impact of the secondary effects of the adult-oriented businesses on schools, playgrounds, places of worship, and other places frequented by children; and
      1. There is a substantial government interest in preventing each of the negative secondary effects described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
      2. The substantial government interest exists independently of any comparative analysis between adult-oriented businesses and nonadult-oriented businesses.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-302. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Adult arcade” means any place where the public is permitted or invited and where a still or motion picture machine, projector, or other image-producing device is:
    1. Coin-operated or slug-operated or electronically, electrically, or mechanically controlled; and
    2. Maintained to show an image or images involving a specific sexual activity or a specific anatomical area to a person in a booth or viewing room;
  2. “Adult bookstore or video store” means a commercial establishment that offers for sale or rent any of the following as one (1) of its principal business purposes:
    1. A book, magazine, periodical or other printed matter, photograph, film, motion picture, videocassette, reproduction, slide, or other visual representation that depicts or describes a specific sexual activity; or
    2. An instrument, a device, or paraphernalia that is designed for use in connection with a specific sexual activity;
  3. “Adult cabaret” means any nightclub, bar, restaurant, or other similar commercial establishment that regularly features a:
    1. Person who appears in a state of nudity or who is seminude;
    2. Live performance that is characterized by the exposure of a specific anatomical area or a specific sexual activity; or
    3. Film, motion picture, videocassette, slide, or other photographic reproduction that is characterized by the depiction or description of a specific sexual activity or a specific anatomical area;
  4. “Adult live entertainment establishment” means an establishment that features either a:
    1. Person who appears in a state of nudity; or
    2. Live performance that is characterized by the exposure of a specific anatomical area or a specific sexual activity;
  5. “Adult motion picture theater” means a commercial establishment in which for any form of consideration a film, motion picture, videocassette, slide, or other similar photographic reproduction characterized by the depiction or description of a specific sexual activity or a specific anatomical area is predominantly shown;
  6. “Adult-oriented business” means an adult arcade, an adult bookstore or video store, an adult cabaret, an adult live entertainment establishment, an adult motion picture theater, an adult theater, a massage establishment that offers adult services, an escort agency, or a nude model studio;
  7. “Adult theater” means a theater, a concert hall, an auditorium, or a similar commercial establishment that predominantly features a person who appears in a state of nudity or who engages in a live performance that is characterized by the exposure of a specific anatomical area or a specific sexual activity;
  8. “Child care facility” means a facility that is licensed by the Division of Child Care and Early Childhood Education of the Department of Human Services to provide care or supervision for minor children;
  9. “Escort” means a person who:
    1. For consideration agrees or offers to act as a date for another person; or
    2. Agrees or offers to privately model lingerie or to privately perform a striptease for another person;
  10. “Escort agency” means a person or business association that furnishes, offers to furnish, or advertises the furnishing of an escort as one (1) of its primary business purposes for any fee, tip, or other consideration;
  11. “Local unit of government” means a city of the first class, a city of the second class, an incorporated town, or a county;
  12. “Massage establishment that offers adult services” means an establishment that offers massage services characterized by an emphasis on a specific sexual activity or a specific anatomical area;
  13. “Nude”, “nudity”, or “state of nudity” means any of the following:
    1. The appearance of a human anus, human genitals, or a female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola; or
    2. A state of dress that fails to opaquely cover a human anus, human genitals, or a female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola;
    1. “Nude model studio” means a place where a person who appears in a state of nudity or who displays a specific anatomical area is observed, sketched, drawn, painted, sculptured, photographed, or otherwise depicted by another person for money or other consideration.
    2. “Nude model studio” does not include a proprietary school that is licensed by this state, a college, community college, or university that is supported entirely or in part by taxation, a private college or university that maintains and operates educational programs in which credits are transferable to a college, community college, or university that is supported entirely or in part by taxation, or a structure containing an establishment to which the following apply:
      1. A sign is not visible from the exterior of the structure and no other advertising appears indicating that a nude person is available for viewing;
      2. A person must enroll at least three (3) days in advance of a class in order to participate; and
      3. No more than one (1) nude or seminude model is on the premises at a time;
  14. “Park” means any area primarily intended for recreational use that is dedicated or designated by any federal, state, or local unit of government, local agency or entity, or any private individual, business, or group including any land leased, reserved, or held open to the public for use as a park;
  15. “Place of worship” means a structure where persons regularly assemble for worship, ceremonies, rituals, and education relating to a particular form of religious belief and which a reasonable person would conclude is a place of worship by reason of design, signs, or architectural features;
  16. “Playground” means any:
    1. Public park or outdoor recreational area with play equipment installed and designed to be used by children; and
    2. Outdoor recreational area with play equipment installed that is owned and operated by a charitable organization or a business;
  17. “Public library” means:
    1. A city library established under § 13-2-501 et seq.;
    2. A county library established under § 13-2-401 et seq.;
    3. A joint city-county library established under § 13-2-401 et seq. or § 13-2-501 et seq.; and
    4. Any other library system established under § 13-2-401 et seq., § 13-2-501 et seq., or the Regional Library System Law, § 13-2-901 et seq.;
  18. “Recreational area or facility” means an area or facility open to the public for recreational purposes;
  19. “Residence” means a permanent dwelling place;
  20. “School” means a public or private elementary, secondary, charter, or postsecondary school;
  21. “Seminude” means a state of dress for which clothing covers no more than the genitals, the pubic region, and a female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola, as well as portions of the body that are covered by supporting straps or devices;
  22. “Specific anatomical area” means any of the following:
    1. A human anus, genitals, pubic region, or a female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola that is less than completely and opaquely covered; or
    2. Male genitals in a discernibly turgid state if less than completely and opaquely covered;
  23. “Specific sexual activity” means any of the following:
    1. A sex act, actual or simulated, including an act of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, oral copulation, or sodomy; or
    2. Fondling or other erotic touching of a human genital, a pubic region, a buttock, an anus, or a female breast; and
  24. “Walking trail” means a pedestrian trail or path primarily used for walking but also for cycling or other activities.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-303. Location of adult-oriented businesses.

  1. An adult-oriented business shall not be located within one thousand feet (1,000') of a child care facility, park, place of worship, playground, public library, recreational area or facility, residence, school, or walking trail.
  2. For the purposes of this section, the measurement required in subsection (a) of this section shall be made in a straight line in all directions, without regard to intervening structures or objects, from the nearest point on the property line of a parcel containing an adult-oriented business to the nearest point on the property line of a parcel containing a child care facility, park, place of worship, playground, public library, recreational area or facility, residence, school, or walking trail.
  3. An adult-oriented business lawfully operating in conformity with this section is not in violation of this section if a child care facility, park, place of worship, playground, public library, recreational area or facility, residence, school, or walking trail subsequently locates within one thousand feet (1,000') of the adult-oriented business.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-304. County and municipal ordinances.

This subchapter does not prohibit a local unit of government from enacting and enforcing ordinances that regulate the location of adult-oriented businesses in a manner that is at least as restrictive as § 14-1-303.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-305. Civil action.

If there is reason to believe that a violation of this subchapter is being committed in any local unit of government:

  1. The county attorney of the county where the adult-oriented business is located shall maintain an action to abate and prevent the violation and to enjoin perpetually any person who is committing the violation and the owner, lessee, or agent of the building or place in or where the violation is occurring from directly or indirectly committing or permitting the violation; or
  2. A citizen of this state who resides in the county, city, or town where the adult-oriented business is located may in the citizen's own name maintain an action to abate and prevent the violation and to enjoin perpetually any person who is committing the violation and the owner, lessee, or agent of the building or place in or where the violation is occurring from directly or indirectly committing or permitting the violation.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-306. Criminal penalties.

    1. A violation of § 14-1-303 is a Class A misdemeanor.
    2. Each day of violation constitutes a separate offense.
  1. A person violating § 14-1-303 is subject to a fine under § 5-4-201 et seq. and a sentence of imprisonment under § 5-4-401 et seq.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-307. Exceptions.

This subchapter shall not apply to an adult-oriented business that is lawfully operating on or before July 31, 2007.

History. Acts 2007, No. 387, § 1.

14-1-308. Posting information about National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline.

An entity governed by this subchapter shall post information about the National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline as required under § 12-19-102.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1157, § 6.

Subchapter 4 — Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 137, § 2: Emergency clause failed to pass. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are seventy-five (75) counties and five hundred (500) cities and towns in the state; that each county, city, and town can create its own local system for dealing with discrimination; and that this act is immediately necessary to create uniformity regarding discrimination laws across the state. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-1-401. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act”.

History. Acts 2015, No. 137, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2015, No. 137 became law without the Governor's signature.

14-1-402. Purpose — Finding.

  1. The purpose of this subchapter is to improve intrastate commerce by ensuring that businesses, organizations, and employers doing business in the state are subject to uniform nondiscrimination laws and obligations, regardless of the counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions in which the businesses, organizations, and employers are located or engage in business or commercial activity.
  2. The General Assembly finds that uniformity of law benefits the businesses, organizations, and employers seeking to do business in the state and attracts new businesses, organizations, and employers to the state.

History. Acts 2015, No. 137, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2015, No. 137 became law without the Governor's signature.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

John M. A. DiPippa, Bias in Disguise: The Constitutional Problems of Arkansas’s Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 469 (2015).

Case Notes

Ordinance Invalid.

City of Fayetteville Ordinance 5781 violated the Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, § 14-1-401 et seq., by extending the city's discrimination laws to include two classifications not previously included under state law, i.e., sexual orientation and gender identity, thereby creating a nonuniform nondiscrimination law. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2017 Ark. 49, 510 S.W.3d 258 (2017).

Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 4, states that “[n]o municipal corporation shall be authorized to pass any laws contrary to the general laws of the state”, and case law has held that municipal corporations have only the power bestowed on them by statute or the state constitution; therefore, city ordinances that conflict with state statutes are void under the Arkansas Constitution. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2019 Ark. 30, 565 S.W.3d 477 (2019).

Supreme Court's prior opinion and mandate operated as a binding adjudication that a Fayetteville ordinance violated Acts 2015, No. 137, codified as § 14-1-401 et seq., which prohibits a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state from adopting or enforcing an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law. Because the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction on remand in denying appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance, its actions following remand were void. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2019 Ark. 30, 565 S.W.3d 477 (2019).

14-1-403. Prohibited conduct.

  1. A county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.
  2. This section does not apply to a rule or policy that pertains only to the employees of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision.

History. Acts 2015, No. 137, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2015, No. 137 became law without the Governor's signature.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

John M. A. DiPippa, Essay: Bias in Disguise: The Constitutional Problems of Arkansas’s Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 469 (2015).

Case Notes

Ordinance Invalid.

City of Fayetteville Ordinance 5781 violated the Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, § 14-1-401 et seq., by extending the city's discrimination laws to include two classifications not previously included under state law, i.e., sexual orientation and gender identity, thereby creating a nonuniform nondiscrimination law. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2017 Ark. 49, 510 S.W.3d 258 (2017).

Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 4, states that “[n]o municipal corporation shall be authorized to pass any laws contrary to the general laws of the state”, and case law has held that municipal corporations have only the power bestowed on them by statute or the state constitution; therefore, city ordinances that conflict with state statutes are void under the Arkansas Constitution. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2019 Ark. 30, 565 S.W.3d 477 (2019).

Supreme Court's prior opinion and mandate operated as a binding adjudication that a Fayetteville ordinance violated Acts 2015, No. 137, codified as § 14-1-401 et seq., which prohibits a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state from adopting or enforcing an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law. Because the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction on remand in denying appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance, its actions following remand were void. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2019 Ark. 30, 565 S.W.3d 477 (2019).

Chapter 2 Public Records Generally

Research References

Am. Jur. 37A Am. Jur. 2d, F.O.I. Acts, § 14.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 277, § 2: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “The legislature having found that this act is necessary for the benefit of the people of the State of Arkansas, and in order to save them much trouble and expense, it is further found that an emergency exists, and this act being necessary for the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall become in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1943, No. 147, § 4: approved Mar. 4, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 2003, No. 275, § 3: Feb. 28, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that for many years, veterans were advised to file their military service discharge records or DD Form 214 with the court recorder; that these forms contain sensitive information that can be used by identity thieves to obtain credit in the veteran's name or otherwise defraud the veteran or his or her family; in recent years, the incident of identity theft has increased; that incidents of identity thieves using the military service discharge records or DD Form 214 to obtain credit in the veteran's name or otherwise defraud the veteran or his or her family has occurred; that the effects on the veteran and the veteran's family are devastating; and that this act is immediately necessary to protect veterans and their families from identity theft by making military service discharge records or DD Form 214 filed with the county recorder confidential and not subject to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 788, § 2: July 1, 2018.

14-2-101. Recording personalty in only one district.

  1. In counties within the State of Arkansas which have two (2) or more districts with two (2) or more county sites, where it is necessary to record certain written instruments affecting personal property as provided by law, the recording shall be necessary in only one (1) district of the county.
  2. The written instruments affecting personal property shall be recorded or filed for record in the district where the person executing the instrument resides, and it shall not be necessary to make any additional record thereof in the same county.

History. Acts 1941, No. 277, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-304.

Cross References. Recorders, § 14-15-401 et seq.

Records in multiple judicial districts, § 14-15-901.

Case Notes

Sebastian County.

The two districts of Sebastian County are, in effect, separate counties, so far as the recording requirements of § 18-50-103 are involved. Henson v. Fleet Mtg. Co., 319 Ark. 491, 892 S.W.2d 250 (1995).

14-2-102. Records of military discharges.

  1. It shall be the duty of the quorum court in each county of the State of Arkansas to appropriate from any moneys in the general fund any sum as may be necessary, not exceeding in any county the sum of one hundred dollars ($100), for providing a suitable record book for the purpose of recording military certificates of discharge.
  2. The record shall contain a complete copy of discharges and shall contain an index of the names of the discharged soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, members of the United States Coast Guard, merchant marines, members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, Women's Reserve of the United States Naval Reserve, nurses, and members of all other branches of the United States Armed Forces with reference to page, alphabetically arranged.
    1. A military service discharge record or DD Form 214, the Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty of the United States Department of Defense, filed with the county recorder for a veteran discharged from service less than seventy (70) years from the current date shall be confidential, kept in a secure location, and may be viewed or reproduced only by:
      1. The veteran;
      2. The veteran's spouse or child;
      3. A person with a signed and notarized authorization from the veteran;
      4. A funeral director who:
        1. Is licensed and regulated by the State Board of Embalmers, Funeral Directors, Cemeteries, and Burial Services under § 23-61-1101 et seq.;
        2. Is assisting with the veteran's funeral arrangements; and
        3. Presents a signed and notarized authorization from the veteran's spouse, child, or next of kin;
      5. A county or state veterans' service officer who is assisting the veteran or the veteran's family with a veteran's benefit application; or
      6. A person authorized by a court to view or copy the military service discharge record or DD Form 214 upon presentation of a court order.
    2. The county recorder shall record the names and addresses of all persons viewing or copying a military service discharge record or DD Form 214 under this subsection.
    3. No fee shall be charged for reproduction costs under this subsection.
    4. Upon petition by a veteran or other requestor eligible to view the records who has a notarized authorization from the veteran, the court may order the removal of the records from the county recorder's record book.
    1. A military service discharge record for a veteran discharged from service more than seventy (70) years from the current date and filed with the county recorder shall be a public record.
    2. No fee shall be charged for reproduction cost under this subsection.
    1. The county recorder may maintain a record book that contains any of the following information about veterans for public record:
      1. Name;
      2. Rank;
      3. Unit of military service;
      4. Dates of military service;
      5. Medals conferred upon veterans; and
      6. Awards conferred upon veterans.
    2. If the county recorder does not maintain a record book, then upon specific request for the information, the county recorder shall review a military service discharge record or DD Form 214 and provide only the information in subdivision (e)(1) of this section to the requestor, without allowing the requestor to review the military service discharge record or DD Form 214.

History. Acts 1943, No. 147, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 11-1707; Acts 2003, No. 275, § 1; 2005, No. 2208, § 1; 2005, No. 2249, § 1; 2017, No. 788, § 4.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “State Board of Embalmers, Funeral Directors, Cemeteries, and Burial Services under § 23-61-1101 et seq.” for “State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors under § 17-29-201 et seq.” in (c)(1)(D)(i).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 788, § 2: July 1, 2018.

Cross References. Recording certificate of discharge, § 12-62-411.

Military discharge records exempted from the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-105(b)(15).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, Protection for Veterans, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 433.

14-2-103. Book defined.

In all county offices, unless the context or definition requires otherwise, “book” means either paper, electronic files, or information maintained in a computer, computer system or network, or other electronic information storage and retrieval system.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1239, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Reproduction of Records

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1947, No. 218, is also codified as § 25-18-101.

Effective Dates. Acts 1947, No. 218, § 6: Mar. 18, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “There being no provision of law whereby photostatic microfilm or photographic reproductions of writings, documents, or records may be admissible in evidence, and because facilities for storage of public records are now taxed to capacity; and because space must be provided for such public records and because it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the inhabitants of the state; an emergency exists within the meaning of the Constitution and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-2-201. Authority — Requirements.

  1. The head of any county or municipal department, commission, bureau, or board may cause any or all records kept by the official, department, commission, or board to be photographed, microfilmed, photostated, or reproduced on or by film, microcard, miniature photographic recording, optical disc, digital compact disc, electronic imaging, or other process that accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for reproducing the original when provided with equipment necessary for such method of recording.
  2. At the time of reproduction, the agency head shall attach his or her certificate to the record certifying that it is the original record, and the certificate shall be reproduced with the original.
  3. The device used to reproduce the records shall be such as to accurately reproduce and perpetuate the original records in all details.

History. Acts 1947, No. 218, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-501; Acts 2001, No. 1630, § 1.

Cross References. Photographic recording authorized, § 16-46-101.

14-2-202. Copy of record — Admissibility.

  1. The reproduction made in accordance with § 14-2-201, when satisfactorily identified, shall be admissible into evidence as provided in § 16-46-101 or any other provision of law or court rules governing the admission of evidence.
  2. For all purposes recited in this section, a facsimile, exemplification, or certified copy thereof shall be deemed to be a transcript, exemplification, or certified copy of the original.

History. Acts 1947, No. 218, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-502; Acts 2001, No. 1630, § 2.

14-2-203. Disposal, etc., of copied records.

  1. Whenever reproductions of public records have been made in accordance with § 14-2-201 and have been placed in conveniently accessible files or other suitable format and provision has been made for preserving, examining, and using them, the head of a county office or department or city office or department may certify those facts to the county court or to the mayor of a municipality, respectively, who shall have the power to authorize the disposal, archival storage, or destruction of the records.
  2. Cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns may by ordinance declare a policy of record retention and disposal, provided that:
    1. The city or town complies with any specific statute regarding municipal records; and
    2. The following records are maintained permanently in either the original or electronic format as required by law:
      1. Ordinances;
      2. City council minutes;
      3. Resolutions;
      4. Annual financial audits; and
      5. Year-end financial statements.

History. Acts 1947, No. 218, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-504; Acts 2001, No. 1630, § 3; 2005, No. 1252, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 373.

14-2-204. Municipal police department records.

  1. All municipalities of the State of Arkansas shall maintain records for the city or town police department or marshal's office, if the records are currently being maintained, as follows:
    1. Maintain for seven (7) years after closure of the case file or permanently, as the municipality shall determine, provided that §§ 12-12-104 and 14-2-203(b)(1) are complied with and that records related to crimes of violence as defined by § 5-42-203 are maintained permanently:
      1. Closed municipal police case files for felony and Class A misdemeanor offenses; and
      2. Expungement orders of municipal police cases; and
    2. Maintain for three (3) years:
      1. Accident reports;
      2. Incident reports;
      3. Offense reports;
      4. Fine and bond records;
      5. Parking meter records;
      6. Radio logs and complaint cards; and
      7. Employment records, payroll sheets, time cards, and leave requests.
    1. If maintained for more than ten (10) years after the date the record was created, records under subdivision (a)(1) of this section may be copied and maintained in accordance with § 14-2-203.
    2. Records under subdivision (a)(2) of this section may be copied in accordance with § 14-2-203 or are subject to disposal after the specified time period has passed.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1187, § 1; 2005, No. 1252, § 2.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 373.

Subchapter 3 — Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act

Effective Dates. Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 2 and 3, § 129: May 23, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the membership and duties of certain agencies, task forces, committees, and commissions and repeals other governmental entities; that these revisions and repeals of governmental entities impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the provisions of this act should become effective as soon as possible to allow for implementation of the new provisions in advance of the upcoming fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-2-301. Short title.

This subchapter may be cited as the “Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act”.

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1.

14-2-302. Definitions.

In this subchapter:

  1. “Document” means information that is:
    1. inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form; and
    2. eligible to be recorded in the land records maintained by the county recorder.
  2. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  3. “Electronic document” means a document that is received by the county recorder in an electronic form.
  4. “Electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a document and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the document.
  5. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  6. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1.

14-2-303. Validity of electronic documents.

  1. If a law requires, as a condition for recording, that a document be an original, be on paper or another tangible medium, or be in writing, the requirement is satisfied by an electronic document satisfying this subchapter.
  2. If a law requires, as a condition for recording, that a document be signed, the requirement is satisfied by an electronic signature.
  3. A requirement that a document or a signature associated with a document be notarized, acknowledged, verified, witnessed, or made under oath is satisfied if the electronic signature of the person authorized to perform that act, and all other information required to be included, is attached to or logically associated with the document or signature. A physical or electronic image of a stamp, impression, or seal need not accompany an electronic signature.

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1.

14-2-304. Recording of documents.

  1. In this section, “paper document” means a document that is received by the county recorder in a form that is not electronic.
  2. A county recorder:
    1. who implements any of the functions listed in this section shall do so in compliance with standards established by the Electronic Recording Commission.
    2. may receive, index, store, archive, and transmit electronic documents.
    3. may provide for access to, and for search and retrieval of, documents and information by electronic means.
    4. who accepts electronic documents for recording shall continue to accept paper documents as authorized by state law and shall place entries for both types of documents in the same index.
    5. may convert paper documents accepted for recording into electronic form.
    6. may convert into electronic form information recorded before the county recorder began to record electronic documents.
    7. may accept electronically any fee, tax, or revenue stamp that the county recorder is authorized to collect.
    8. may agree with other officials of a state or a political subdivision thereof, or of the United States, on procedures or processes to facilitate the electronic satisfaction of prior approvals and conditions precedent to recording and the electronic payment of fees, taxes, or revenue stamps.
      1. may enter into an agreement with a private entity to perform the duties under this section, including without limitation receiving, reviewing, scanning, and transmitting documents for electronic recording.
      2. An agreement under subdivision (b)(9)(A) of this section shall be a uniform agreement reviewed and formally approved by the commission.

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1; 2017, No. 140, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The 2017 amendment to this section was not based upon an official revision of the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (b)(9).

14-2-305. Administration and standards.

    1. An Electronic Recording Commission consisting of eleven (11) members appointed by the Governor is created to adopt standards to implement this subchapter.
    2. A majority of the members of the commission must be county recorders.
    3. A member of the commission must be an active state legislator.
    4. A member of the commission shall serve a term of two (2) years.
    5. The terms of the current commission members on July 31, 2009, shall expire on September 1, 2009.
    6. Each member of the commission may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.
  1. To keep the standards and practices of county recorders in this state in harmony with the standards and practices of recording offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this subchapter and to keep the technology used by county recorders in this state compatible with technology used by recording offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this subchapter, the Electronic Recording Commission, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies, and provisions of this subchapter, in adopting, amending, and repealing standards shall consider:
    1. Standards and practices of other jurisdictions;
    2. The most recent standards promulgated by national standard-setting bodies, such as the Property Records Industry Association;
    3. The views of interested persons and governmental officials and entities;
    4. The needs of counties of varying size, population, and resources; and
    5. Standards requiring adequate information security protection to ensure that electronic documents are accurate, authentic, adequately preserved, and resistant to tampering.
    1. A staff member of the Association of Arkansas Counties shall be assigned to assist the Electronic Recording Commission.
    2. The staff member shall coordinate meetings, accumulate information, and provide general support to the commission.

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1; 2009, No. 725, § 1; 2011, No. 1157, §§ 1, 2; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 27; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 27.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The 2009, 2011, and 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendments to this section were not based upon an official revision of the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 2 and 3, § 1, provided:

“(a) The General Assembly finds:

“(1) State government provides vital functions that impact the lives of Arkansas citizens on a daily basis;

“(2) While these functions are important, it is equally important to ensure that state government operates efficiently and effectively to eliminate unnecessary spending of tax dollars and provide timely and quality services to Arkansas citizens; and

“(3) Issues such as the administrative organization of a governmental entity, the appointment structure of a governmental entity's governing board, and extraneous duties assigned to governmental entities hamper the operation of state government and result in unnecessary expenses and delays in the provision of state services.

“(b) It is the intent of this act to amend provisions of law applicable to certain agencies, task forces, committees, and commission to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of state government as a whole.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (a)(2) through (a)(5) and redesignated the remaining text of (a) accordingly.

The 2011 amendment substituted “eleven (11) members” for “nine (9) members” in (a)(1); inserted present (a)(3) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and added (c).

The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 2 and 3 redesignated former (c) as (c)(1) and (2); substituted “Association of Arkansas Counties” for “Bureau of Legislative Research” in (c)(1); substituted “shall” for “will” in (c)(1) and (2); and made stylistic changes.

14-2-306. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this Uniform Act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1.

14-2-307. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This subchapter modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001(c) or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in 15 U.S.C.S. § 7003(b).

History. Acts 2007, No. 734, § 1.

14-2-308. [Reserved.]

Publisher's Notes. Section 8 of the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, the effective date clause, was not adopted in Arkansas.

Chapters 3-12 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 2. County Government

Chapter 13 General Provisions

[Reserved]

Chapter 14 County Government Code

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp. & Coun., § 1 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

The enabling legislation for Ark. Const. Amend. 55 was Acts 1977, No. 742, now codified as this chapter. Venhaus v. Adams, 295 Ark. 606, 752 S.W.2d 20 (1988).

Elections.

The amount allowed for voting machine preparation is not fixed by state law, and there is nothing in Ark. Const. Amend. 55, the revision of county government amendment, and nothing in this chapter, to prohibit or curtail the power of the quorum court from exercising its discretion on the amount to be allowed, so long as it is reasonable. Union County v. Union County Election Comm'n, 274 Ark. 286, 623 S.W.2d 827 (1981).

Cited: Kreutzer v. Clark, 271 Ark. 243, 607 S.W.2d 670 (1980).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 569, § 2: Mar. 24, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that some counties and county officials that have public records stored in an electronic record may not have complete access and control of the records and that this act is necessary because the lack of control has led or will lead to lawsuits of which the basis is the county officeholder's inability to access the county's own records. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 751, § 9: Mar. 30, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that several uncodified acts involving the allocation of revenue within counties composed of dual judicial districts have been subject to misinterpretation by the courts; that to prevent litigation arising from varying interpretations of the uncodified acts, certain sections of these uncodified acts need to be repealed; and that this act is immediately necessary to ensure that the standard operating procedures of the affected counties and the Department of Finance and Administration are lawful. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-14-101. Title.

This chapter constitutes the Arkansas “County Government Code”.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3101.

Case Notes

Cited: Ark. County v. Burris, 308 Ark. 490, 825 S.W.2d 590 (1992).

14-14-102. County defined.

A county is a political subdivision of the state for the more convenient administration of justice and the exercise of local legislative authority related to county affairs and is defined as a body politic and corporate operating within specified geographic limitations established by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3201.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Cited: Mosier v. Robinson, 722 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

14-14-103. Construction.

  1. Except when a specific definition is given or a technical interpretation is required, words and phrases used in this chapter shall be construed according to their ordinary usage in the English language.
  2. Words in the present tense include the future tense.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3102.

14-14-104. Publication requirements.

  1. Unless otherwise specifically provided, when a county government is required to publish, publication shall be by a one-time insertion in a newspaper of general circulation in the county.
  2. Where no newspaper of general circulation exists in a county, publication may be made by posting in three (3) public places which have been designated by ordinance.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3103.

14-14-105. Notice by publication.

Unless otherwise specifically provided, when notice of a hearing or other official act is required by a county government, the following provisions shall apply:

  1. The notice shall be published two (2) times with at least six (6) days separating each publication. The first publication shall be no more than thirty (30) days prior to the action, and the last publication shall be no less than three (3) days prior to the action;
  2. The published notice shall contain:
    1. The date, time, and place at which the hearing or other action will occur;
    2. A brief statement of the action to be taken; and
    3. Any other information which may be required by the specific provision of law requiring notice.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3104.

14-14-106. Notice by mailing.

    1. Notice by mailing shall be as provided by law or the ordinance of the county quorum court providing for notice by mailing.
    2. In those instances where a county government requires that notice of hearing or other official act be given by mail and the procedures therefor are not set forth by law or ordinance, the notice by mailing shall be made not less than seven (7) days nor more than thirty (30) days prior to the action to be taken, and the requirements of the notice shall be met by:
      1. Deposit of the notice properly addressed in the United States mail, with postage paid at the first-class rate;
      2. Sending the notice by registered or certified mail rather than first class; or
      3. Mailing the notice at the bulk rate instead of first class when notice is to be given by mail to all electors or residents of a county government.
  1. All notices by mailing shall contain:
    1. The date, time, and place at which the hearing or other action will be taken;
    2. A brief statement of the action to be taken; and
    3. Any other information required by the specific section requiring mail notice.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 5; 1979, No. 413, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3105.

14-14-107. Petitions.

  1. Requirements. Whenever a petition is authorized in the conduct of county affairs, except initiative and referendum petitions as provided in §§ 14-14-914 — 14-14-918, unless the statute authorizing the petition establishes different criteria, the petition shall be valid if it is signed by fifteen percent (15%) of the qualified electors of the county or portion of the county affected by the petition, with the number of electors of the county or portion of the county to be determined in the manner set forth in subdivision (a)(6) of this section, and if the petition meets the following requirements:
    1. Qualified Electors. Petitions shall be signed only by qualified electors of the county in which the measure of local application is sought by petition. A qualified elector shall be defined as any person duly registered and qualified to vote pursuant to the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 51;
    2. Signatures.
      1. The signatures on all petitions shall be the signatures evidenced by voter registration. A signature which is in substantial compliance with these requirements and which is readily identifiable from the additional information required from the signer on the petition shall be counted as sufficient.
      2. Penalty for Fraudulent Signature. Any person who shall sign any name other than his or her own to a petition, who shall knowingly sign his or her name more than once for the same measure, or who shall sign the petition when he or she is not a legal voter of the county when the measure is of local application to the county only shall be guilty of a felony and may be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years;
    3. Statement of Purpose. The petition shall contain a statement of the purpose for which it is circulated sufficient to meet the specific criteria set out in the statute authorizing the petition;
    4. Filing of Petitions. All petitions relating to county affairs shall be directed to the judge of the county court and filed with the county clerk. All petitions, upon verification of sufficiency by the county clerk, shall be referred to the county quorum court during the next regular meeting of that body for consideration and disposition. However, a special meeting of the quorum court may be called as provided by law for the consideration and disposition of petitions;
    5. Verification of Petitions.
      1. Only legal voters shall be counted upon petitions.
        1. Petitions may be circulated and presented in parts, but each part of any petition shall have attached to it the affidavit of the persons circulating the petition affirming that:
          1. All signatures on the petition were made in the presence of the affiant; and
          2. To the best of the affiant's knowledge and belief, each signature is genuine and the person signing is a legal voter.
        2. No other affidavit or verification shall be required to establish the genuineness of signatures under subdivision (a)(5)(B)(i) of this section;
    6. Sufficiency of Petitions. The sufficiency of all county petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the county clerk, subject to review by the circuit court. The number of signatures required in a county petition shall be based on the total number of votes cast in the last general election for the office of circuit clerk, or the Office of Governor in cases where the office of circuit clerk may have been abolished;
    7. Challenge of Petition. If the sufficiency of any petition is challenged, that cause shall be a preference cause and shall be tried at once. However, the failure of the courts to reach a decision prior to the election, if an election is required, as to the sufficiency of any petition shall not prevent the question from being placed upon the ballot at the election named in the petition, nor militate against the validity of the measure if it shall have been approved by a vote of the people; and
    8. Amendment of Petitions. If the county clerk shall decide any petition to be insufficient, without delay he or she shall notify the sponsors of the petition and permit at least thirty (30) days from the date of the notification for correction. In the event of legal proceedings to prevent giving legal effect to any petition upon any grounds, the burden of proof shall be upon the person attacking the validity of the petition.
  2. Unwarranted Restrictions Prohibited.
    1. No law shall be passed to prohibit any person from giving or receiving compensation for circulating petitions, nor to prohibit the circulation of petitions, nor in any manner to interfere with the freedom of the people in procuring petitions.
    2. Laws shall be enacted prohibiting and penalizing perjury, forgery, and all other felonies or other fraudulent practices in the securing of signatures or filing of petitions.
  3. Declaration of Sufficiency. Within ten (10) calendar days from the date a petition was filed with the county clerk, the clerk shall determine the adequacy of the petition.
  4. Withdrawal of Signatures. Any person may in writing withdraw his or her signature from a petition at any time prior to the time of filing the petition with the county clerk. Unless otherwise specifically provided by law, no elector shall be permitted to withdraw his or her signature from a petition after it has been filed.
  5. Publication — Costs. All petitions under the provisions of this section shall be published as provided by law. All costs of any petition shall be borne by the petitioners.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 6; 1979, No. 413, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3106; Acts 2019, No. 383, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a)(5)(A) through (a)(5)(B) designations; in (a)(5)(B)(i), substituted “to it” for “thereto” and substituted “the petition” for “them”; substituted “on the petition” for “thereon” in (a)(5)(B)(i) (a) ; and added “under subdivision (a)(5)(B)(i) of this section” in (a)(5)(B)(ii).

14-14-108. Public hearings.

Unless otherwise specifically provided, when a county court or county quorum court is required to conduct a public hearing for the purpose of providing reasonable opportunity for citizen participation prior to any final decision by either court, the hearing shall meet the following requirements:

  1. At a minimum, a public hearing shall provide for submission of both oral and written testimony for and against the action or matter at issue. If the hearing is not held before the ultimate decisionmakers, provision shall be made for the transmittal of a summary or transcript of the testimony received to the ultimate decisionmakers prior to their determination;
  2. Public hearings may be held at regular or special meetings of each of the courts;
  3. The person or authority holding the public hearing may include in the notice calling the hearing any special procedures or guidelines to be followed at the hearing;
  4. Petitions and letters received by the respective body conducting a public hearing prior to the hearing shall be entered into the minutes of the hearing and considered as other testimony received at the hearing; and
  5. Except for budget and appropriation hearings, the quorum court may designate a subcommittee to conduct any public hearings on county legislative affairs.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 7; 1979, No. 413, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3107.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-109. Public meetings.

    1. All meetings of a county government governing body, board, committee, or any other entity created by, or subordinate to, a county government shall be open to the public except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section.
    2. A meeting, or part of a meeting, which involves or affects the employment, appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplining, dismissal, or resignation of a county government official or employee need not be open to the public unless the local government officer or employee requests a public meeting.
  1. In any meeting required to be open to the public, the county quorum court, committee, board, or other entity shall adopt rules for conducting the meeting which afford citizens a reasonable opportunity to participate prior to the final decision.
  2. Appropriate minutes shall be kept of all public meetings and shall be made available to the public for inspection and copying.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 8, 9; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-3108, 17-3109.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Case Notes

Cited: Baxter County Newspapers, Inc. v. Medical Staff of Baxter Gen. Hosp., 273 Ark. 511, 622 S.W.2d 495 (1981).

14-14-110. Public records.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, all records and other written materials in the possession of a local government shall be available for inspection and copying by any person during normal office hours.
  2. Personal records, medical records, and other records which relate to matters in which the right to individual privacy exceeds the merits of public disclosure shall not be available to the public unless the person they concern requests they be made public.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3110.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-111. Electronic records.

    1. County governments in Arkansas are the repository for vast numbers of public records necessary for the regulation of commerce and vital to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state.
    2. These records are routinely kept in electronic format by the county officials who are the custodians of the records.
    3. It is the intent of this section to:
      1. Ensure that all public records kept by county officials are under the complete care, custody, and control of the county officials responsible for the records; and
      2. Prevent a computer or software provider doing business with a county from obtaining complete care and control of county records and from becoming the de facto custodian of the records.
  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Administrative rights” means permissions and powers, including without limitation the permissions and powers to access, alter, copy, download, read, record, upload, write, or otherwise manipulate and maintain records kept by a county official;
    2. “Electronic record” means a record created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means; and
        1. “Public records” means writings, recorded sounds, films, tapes, electronic or computer-based information, or data compilations in any medium required by law to be kept or otherwise kept and that constitute a record of the performance or lack of performance of official functions that are or should be carried out by a public official or employee, a governmental agency, or other agency wholly or partially supported by public funds or expending public funds.
        2. All records maintained in county offices or by county employees within the scope of employment are public records.
      1. “Public records” does not mean software acquired by purchase, lease, or license.
    1. A county official required by law to maintain public records and who in the normal performance of official duties chooses to keep and maintain the records in an electronic record retains administrative rights and complete access to all the records.
    2. A contract between a county and an electronic record provider shall include the information under subdivision (c)(1) of this section.

History. Acts 2009, No. 569, § 1.

Case Notes

Freedom of Information Act.

Circuit court abused its discretion in issuing a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff competitor under the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq., because the plaintiff failed to sue an entity covered under FOIA; the competitor could not sue a private corporation alone under FOIA and direct it to produce public records it possessed by virtue of its contracts with counties because the private corporation was not the custodian of the public records. The circuit court's conclusion that county officials were unnecessary parties to a dispute over access to their public records was clearly erroneous. Apprentice Info. Sys. v. DataScout, LLC, 2018 Ark. 146, 544 S.W.3d 39 (2018).

14-14-112. Bulk copying of public records.

  1. In the absence of an existing agreement or county ordinance, a county official may negotiate with a commercial, nonpress entity regarding a reasonable fee for mass duplication, copying, or bulk electronic access of public records.
  2. A negotiated agreement authorized by this section is not to the exclusion of any right to a public record a person has under this subchapter or § 25-19-109.
  3. As used in this section, “existing agreement” means a contract, custom, practice, or dealings that were in use as of January 1, 2011.

History. Acts 2011, No. 870, § 1.

14-14-113. Review of audit report by quorum court.

  1. Audit reports and accompanying comments and recommendations under § 10-4-418 relating to a county shall be reviewed by the quorum court.
    1. The audit report and accompanying comments and recommendations shall be reviewed at the first regularly scheduled meeting following receipt of the audit report if the audit report is received by the quorum court at least ten (10) days before the regularly scheduled meeting.
    2. If the audit report is received by the quorum court less than ten (10) days before a regularly scheduled meeting, the audit report shall be reviewed at the regularly scheduled meeting falling within the ten-day period or the next regularly scheduled meeting subsequent to the ten-day period.
  2. The appropriate official shall advise the quorum court concerning each finding and recommendation contained in the audit report.
  3. The minutes of the quorum court shall document the review of the findings and recommendations of the appropriate official.

History. Acts 2011, No. 837, § 2.

14-14-114. Allocation of revenue.

Revenues received by a county that contains within its boundary a circuit court composed of more than one (1) judicial district that was created by an uncodified act shall be allocated as determined by the quorum court and shall not be divided by the judicial district in which the revenues were collected.

History. Acts 2011, No. 1171, § 3; 2017, No. 751, § 8.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 1171, § 5, provided: “The provisions of this act are not severable, and if any provision of this act is declared invalid for any reason, then all provisions of this act shall also be invalid.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Revenues received by a” for “A” at the beginning and substituted “more than one (1) judicial district that was created by an uncodified act shall be allocated as determined by the quorum court” for “both an east and a west judicial district that were created in 1883 shall enact an ordinance to establish that revenues received by the county shall be allocated for the entire county”.

14-14-115. Civil office-holding — Definition.

    1. A person elected or appointed to any of the following county offices shall not be elected or appointed to another civil office during the term for which he or she has been elected:
      1. County judge;
      2. Justice of the peace;
      3. Sheriff;
      4. Circuit clerk;
      5. County clerk;
      6. Assessor;
      7. Coroner;
      8. Treasurer;
      9. County surveyor; or
      10. Collector.
    2. An elected county official under subdivision (a)(1) of this section may run for a civil office during the term for which he or she has been elected.
    1. As used in this section, “civil office” means any one (1) of the following elected or appointed positions, including without limitation:
      1. County election commissioner;
      2. Member of the Parole Board;
      3. Member of a school board;
      4. Prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney;
      5. Constable;
      6. Sheriff or deputy sheriff;
      7. Chief of police or city police officer;
      8. City attorney;
      9. City council member;
      10. Member of a drainage improvement district board;
      11. Member of a public facilities board;
      12. Member of a soil conservation district board;
      13. Member of a county library board;
      14. Member of a rural development authority;
      15. Member of a rural waterworks facilities board or regional water distribution board;
      16. Member of an airport commission;
      17. Member of a county or district board of health;
      18. Member of a levee board or levee improvement district board; and
      19. Member of the Career Education and Workforce Development Board.
    2. As used in this section, “civil office” does not include a position that a county official may be appointed to on an advisory board or task force established to assist:
      1. The Governor;
      2. The General Assembly;
      3. A state agency;
      4. A state department;
      5. A county office;
      6. A county department; or
      7. A subordinate service district.
    3. As used in this section, “civil office” does not include a position in which a county official is required to serve by law and that is related to the county official's duties, including without limitation:
      1. A member of an intergovernmental cooperation council;
      2. A member of a county equalization board;
      3. A member of a regional solid waste management district board;
      4. A member of a planning and development district board;
      5. A member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training;
      6. A member of the Electronic Recording Commission;
      7. A member of a county hospital board;
      8. A member of the Arkansas Workforce Development Board;
      9. A member of the State Board of Election Commissioners;
      10. A member of the Criminal Justice Institute Advisory Board for Law Enforcement Management Training and Education;
      11. A member of the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System;
      12. A special judge appointment under Arkansas Constitution, Article 7, § 36;
      13. A member of the Arkansas 911 Board or any successor board; and
      14. A member of the Professional Bail Bond Company and Professional Bail Bondsman Licensing Board.
  1. This section does not prevent a person:
    1. From being elected or appointed to an office under subdivision (a)(1) of this section if he or she held a civil office before January 1, 2017; or
    2. From continuing to hold a civil office the person held before appointment or election to an office under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.

History. Acts 2019, No. 639, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Boundaries

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1067, § 1, provided:

“Legislative findings.

“The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas finds that:

“(1) Areas of Boone County and Carroll County are cut off from public and emergency services by the waters of Table Rock Lake;

“(2) The areas are commonly known as the Backbone Bluff and the Cricket Creek Public Use Area;

“(3) Problems associated with the provision of services in these areas have existed for several years, but the number of calls for service were minimal due to the sparse population of the areas; and

“(4) Changing the boundaries of Boone County and Carroll County will address these problems.”

Acts 2013, No. 1067, § 2, provided:

“The boundaries of Carroll County and Boone County are changed as follows:

“(a) Effective January 1, 2014, the western boundary of Boone County, Arkansas, is identified as follows: Beginning at the intersection center of channel of Table Rock Lake in the North East Quarter of Section 15, Township 21 North Range 22 West with the Eastern boundary of said Section; thence meandering West following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 15 Township 21 North Range 22 West past the Cricket Creek Public Use Area, thence meandering northeasterly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 10 Township 21 North Range 22 West, thence meandering northerly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 11 Township 21 North Range 22 West, thence meandering northwesterly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 10 Township 21 North Range 22 West to a point due south of the center of channel of the strait between Backbone Bluff and the island lying to the west, thence north through the strait to a point in the center of channel of Table Rock Lake, thence meandering easterly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 11 Township 21 North Range 22 West to the point of intersection with the Arkansas state and Missouri state boundary.

“(b) Effective January 1, 2014, the eastern boundary of Carroll County, Arkansas, is identified as follows: Beginning at the intersection center of channel of Table Rock Lake in the North East Quarter of Section 15, Township 21 North Range 22 West with the Eastern boundary of said Section; thence meandering West following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 15 Township 21 North Range 22 West past the Cricket Creek Public Use Area, thence meandering northeasterly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 10 Township 21 North Range 22 West, thence meandering northerly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 11 Township 21 North Range 22 West, thence meandering northwesterly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 10 Township 21 North Range 22 West to a point due south of the center of channel of the strait between Backbone Bluff and the island lying to the west, thence north through the strait to a point in the center of channel of the Table Rock Lake, thence meandering easterly following the center of channel of Table Rock Lake through Section 11 Township 21 North Range 22 West to the point of intersection with the Arkansas state and Missouri state boundary.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 39 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 14 et seq.

14-14-201. Power to change.

  1. The power to change county boundaries is inherent in the General Assembly, subject to express constitutional restrictions.
    1. No county now established shall be reduced to an area of less than six hundred square miles (600 sq. mi.) nor to less than five thousand (5,000) inhabitants; nor shall any new county be established with less than six hundred square miles (600 sq. mi.) and five thousand (5,000) inhabitants.
    2. This section shall not apply to the counties of Lafayette, Pope, and Johnson nor be so construed as to prevent the General Assembly from changing the line between the counties of Pope and Johnson.
  2. No part of a county shall be taken off to form a new county, or a part thereof, without the consent of a majority of voters in the part to be taken off.
  3. In the formation of new counties, no line thereof shall run within ten (10) miles of the county seat of the county proposed to be divided, except the county seat of Lafayette County.
    1. Sebastian County may have two (2) districts and two (2) county seats, at which county and circuit courts shall be held as may be provided by law, each district paying its own expenses.
    2. However, nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring Sebastian County to maintain two (2) districts or two (2) county seats, nor construed as authorizing the establishment of two (2) county quorum courts and two (2) county courts.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 12-16; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3202.

Case Notes

In General.

The power to change county lines is inherent in the General Assembly, subject to express constitutional restrictions and the essential requisites of the state that are implied in our form of government. Reynolds v. Holland, 35 Ark. 56 (1879); Pulaski County v. County Judge, 37 Ark. 339 (1881) (decisions under prior law).

Area.

An act of the General Assembly reducing a county below 600 square miles is unconstitutional. Bittle v. Stuart, 34 Ark. 224 (1879) (decision under prior law).

New Counties.

Consent of a majority of voters in part taken off is only required in the case of new counties to be formed out of portions of old ones. Reynolds v. Holland, 35 Ark. 56 (1879); Pulaski County v. County Judge, 37 Ark. 339 (1881) (decisions under prior law).

Sebastian County.

The two districts of Sebastian County are, in effect, separate counties, so far as the recording requirements of § 18-50-103 are involved. Henson v. Fleet Mtg. Co., 319 Ark. 491, 892 S.W.2d 250 (1995).

Cited: In re Wallace, 61 B.R. 54 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986); In re Henson, 157 B.R. 867 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993).

14-14-202. Initiation of alteration.

Alteration of county boundaries may be initiated by the General Assembly or by a petition to the General Assembly by persons whose rights and interests would be affected by the boundary change.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3203.

Case Notes

Boundary Disputes.

Disputes as to county line boundaries may be decided by a court in suit between individuals, though counties are not parties to the action. Pruitt v. Sebastian County Coal & Mining Co., 215 Ark. 673, 222 S.W.2d 50 (1949) (decision under prior law).

14-14-203. Petition to General Assembly.

      1. A petition signed by not less than fifteen percent (15%) of the legal voters residing in the areas to be affected by a proposed county boundary change may be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration.
      2. A petition to form a new county shall be preceded by an election on the issue and consent by the majority of the voters in the part proposed to be taken off.
    1. The number of signatures required upon any petition shall be computed pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section as a percentage of the total vote cast for the Office of Governor at the preceding general election in the various townships affected by the petition.
  1. All petitions under the provisions of this section shall be published as provided by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 18, 19; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-3204, 17-3205.

14-14-204. Accompanying documentation.

Petitions for the alteration of county boundaries shall be accompanied by the following documentation:

    1. A survey of the proposed boundary alterations, except where common boundaries are being dissolved.
    2. The survey shall be performed by a professional surveyor as defined in § 17-48-101; and
  1. A map drawn to scale of the area affected by the petition.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3206; Acts 2005, No. 1178, § 1; 2011, No. 898, § 7.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “a professional surveyor as defined in § 17-48-101” for “a registered professional surveyor of the State of Arkansas” in (1)(B).

14-14-205. Costs.

All costs of petitions, surveys, and mapping shall be borne by the petitioners.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3207.

14-14-206. Apportionment of property and indebtedness.

All property, bonded indebtedness, and outstanding indebtedness of counties affected by a change in boundaries shall be apportioned by the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 22; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3208.

Case Notes

In General.

When a county was divided, the old county would, without statutory provision, retain the property and remain liable for the debts of the county, and the severed part or new county would be released; however, it was competent for the General Assembly to apportion the property and the burden between the old and the new counties, as it deemed proper, and compel taxation for that purpose. Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497 (1878); Lee County v. State ex rel. Phillips County, 36 Ark. 276 (1880); Pulaski County v. County Judge, 37 Ark. 339 (1881) (decisions under prior law).

Apportionment may be done by a subsequent General Assembly. Perry County v. Conway County, 52 Ark. 430, 12 S.W. 877 (1890) (decision under prior law).

Bonded Indebtedness.

In apportioning the bonded indebtedness between a new county and an old county, under the act creating the former, the date of the negotiation of the bonds was held to be the time of the creation of the county's debt, and the new county was held to be only liable for its proportion of the bonds negotiated before its formation, although all may have been issued. Hempstead County v. Howard County, 51 Ark. 344, 11 S.W. 478 (1888) (decision under prior law).

The apportionment of interest goes with the bond. Hempstead County v. Howard County, 51 Ark. 344, 11 S.W. 478 (1888) (decision under prior law).

Outstanding Indebtedness.

Claims of a county for proportioned indebtedness under a special act do not have to be authenticated and presented to a county court as others claim. Perry County v. Conway County, 52 Ark. 430, 12 S.W. 877 (1890) (decision under prior law).

Judgment against parent county, rendered subsequent to division on obligations existing prior to division, is proportionately binding on new county. Garland County v. Hot Spring County, 68 Ark. 83, 56 S.W. 636 (1900) (decision under prior law).

Subchapter 3 — County Seats

Cross References. Change of county seat, Ark. Const., Art. 13, § 3.

County buildings, § 14-19-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 86, § 13, p. 201: in force from and after its passage. Approved March 2, 1875.

Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 193, § 2: Feb. 26, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are meeting places of governing bodies across the state that are in disrepair; that often a meeting place needs to be closed and relocated temporarily; and that this act is immediately necessary because under current law a meeting place cannot be set up temporarily unless an emergency arises due to an enemy attack. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 44 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 53 et seq.

14-14-301. Definition.

  1. A “county seat” shall be defined as the principal site for the conducting of county affairs and maintaining records of the various courts.
  2. Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as a limitation on a county to maintain several sites throughout the county for the conducting of county affairs.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3301.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-302. Establishment or change.

  1. Unless for the purpose of the temporary location of county seats in the formation of new counties, it shall be unlawful to establish or change any county seat in this state without the consent of a majority of the qualified voters of the county to be affected by the change; nor will a county seat be located until the place at which it is proposed to establish or change any county seat shall be fully designated, with the designation embracing a complete and intelligible description of the proposed locations, together with an abstract of the title thereto, and the terms and conditions upon which it can be purchased or donated by or to the county.
  2. The county court shall not order the election provided in this subchapter unless it shall be satisfied that a good and valid title can and will be made to the proposed new locations or one (1) of them.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 24; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3302.

Case Notes

Change.

Since the judgment of a county court directing the removal of the county seat is self-executing, and therefore cannot be stayed by a supersedeas bond, a circuit court, or the judge thereof in vacation, has power, upon proper showing, to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal therefrom. Reese v. Steel, 73 Ark. 66, 83 S.W. 335 (1904) (decision under prior law).

Former similar statute referred to removal of county seat from one town to another, and not from one lot to another in the same town. Graham v. Nix, 102 Ark. 277, 144 S.W. 214 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Where, in an action to stay an election on removal of a county seat, a question of law was raised whether the election petition had been brought under the proper statutory method and a question of fact was raised whether the petition was signed by the required number of qualified voters of the county, the contestants were entitled to trial on the merits prior to the election. Bruce v. Nicholas, 226 Ark. 890, 294 S.W.2d 772 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Title.

A county court has jurisdiction to pass upon the sufficiency of the abstract of title. Walsh v. Hampton, 96 Ark. 427, 132 S.W. 214 (1910) (decision under prior law).

14-14-303. Petition for change.

  1. Whenever fifteen percent (15%) of the legal voters of any county in this state shall join in a petition to the county court of the county for the change or removal of the county seat, the county court shall order an election to be held at the voting places in the county directing that the proposition of the petitioners for the change or removal shall be submitted to the qualified electors.
  2. The number of signatures required upon a petition for change of a county seat shall be computed upon the total vote cast for the Office of Governor at the preceding general election in the county affected by the petition.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 26; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3304.

Case Notes

Change of Courthouse.

When a county seat has been removed, until the courthouse has been erected, the court can lawfully sit in a building on other property than that to be used as a court when the courthouse is erected. Hudspeth v. State, 55 Ark. 323, 18 S.W. 183 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Where voters elected to abolish two districts and establish county seat at one new location, but nothing was done to facilitate the new county seat at the location, courts had jurisdiction to sit in old districts until new courthouse was certified as ready for use. Warren v. State, 241 Ark. 264, 407 S.W.2d 724 (1966) (decision under prior law).

Elections.

An offer, by interested persons, to build a courthouse and jail and donate them to the county, in case the county seat is changed to the desired point, is not an offer to bribe electors and will not invalidate an election at which such a change is made. Neal v. Shinn, 49 Ark. 227, 4 S.W. 771 (1887) (decision under prior law).

The general election law applies to a county seat election. Walsh v. Hampton, 96 Ark. 427, 132 S.W. 214 (1910) (decision under prior law).

In an election regarding the removal of a county seat, the canvassing board should not go behind the returns and purge the returns of illegal votes, as the board has no discretionary power. Pitts v. Stuckert, 111 Ark. 388, 163 S.W. 1173 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Where, in a given precinct, it was shown that fraud was promiscuously committed by the election officials that affected the result to an extent, the exact limits of which it was impossible to ascertain from the testimony and which fairly drew into question the integrity of the whole return, the same should have been thrown out entirely and omitted from the count, leaving each party the opportunity to prove, by other evidence, the number of legal ballots actually cast. Sailor v. Rankin, 125 Ark. 557, 189 S.W. 357 (1916) (decision under prior law).

14-14-304. Form of ballots.

The ballots of the voters shall have written or printed upon them the words “FOR CHANGE”, or “AGAINST CHANGE”, meaning for or against change from the existing county seat location, and the words “FOR ….” (one of the localities allowed by the act to be voted for, naming and describing the place to which the change or removal is proposed).

History. Acts 1875, No. 86, § 5, p. 201; C. & M. Dig., § 1874; Pope's Dig., § 2393; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-205.

14-14-305. Designation of new site.

  1. Where a majority of the qualified voters of the county have voted in favor of the change from the existing location and are in a majority agreement as to the location in cases where more than one (1) location is proposed, the county court shall proceed to carry into effect the will of the majority.
  2. Where a majority agreement is rendered in favor of a change but is not rendered on a specific location, where more than one (1) location is proposed, the court shall immediately order an election to decide which of the two (2) locations receiving the highest number of votes in the initial election on the issue shall be designated as the new site for the county seat.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 28; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3306.

Case Notes

Authority of County Courts.

The removal of a county seat is a matter of local concern over which the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction; the circuit court has no authority to determine the result of an election for removal in the first instance and before the county court has acted in the premises, and where it assumes to do so, a writ of prohibition will lie from the Supreme Court. Russell v. Jacoway, 33 Ark. 191 (1878) (decision under prior law).

As the power of a county court over the location of public buildings is a continuing one, the court, after ordering a courthouse to be built on a certain lot, may, at a subsequent term, order the courthouse to be built on another lot in the same town. Graham v. Nix, 102 Ark. 277, 144 S.W. 214 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Proceedings and Appeals.

Where the contest is heard in the circuit court on appeal from an order of the county court and it is adjudged there that a majority of the votes were for removal, but not for either place proposed, the circuit court has jurisdiction to order an election to determine the place to which the removal shall be made. Neal v. Shinn, 49 Ark. 227, 4 S.W. 771 (1887); Sailor v. Rankin, 125 Ark. 557, 189 S.W. 357 (1916) (decisions under prior law).

Voters have a right to make themselves parties to designation proceedings and appeal from an order of the county court. Rucks v. Renfrow, 54 Ark. 409, 16 S.W. 6 (1891); Butler v. Mills, 61 Ark. 477, 33 S.W. 632 (1896) (decisions under prior law).

14-14-306. Deed to county required.

Before proceeding to carry into effect the will of a majority voting on the issue of changing a county seat, the county court shall require the vendor or donor of the new location to deliver a good and sufficient deed, conveying to the county the land or location so sold or donated in fee simple, without reservation or condition, and also an abstract of the title, papers, deeds, and conveyances, and assurances by or through which the title thereof is derived, who shall file the deed for record in the recorder's office of the county, to be recorded as other title deeds and papers. The place so deeded shall then be the permanent county seat, and the title shall be vested in the county.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 27; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3305.

Case Notes

Deeds.

Where a person, knowing that a contest over the location of the county seat was pending, conveyed certain property to the county to be used for courthouse purposes and the county seat was finally located elsewhere, the deed to the county was not executed under a mistake and would not be canceled. Schuman v. George, 110 Ark. 486, 161 S.W. 1039 (1913) (decision under prior law).

14-14-307. Temporary location of county seat for new county.

  1. The temporary location for the county seat of any new county shall be fixed by the act of the General Assembly authorizing the formation and organization of the new county.
  2. The temporary location shall be considered the permanent and established location unless changed as provided in this subchapter for the change of county seats.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 25; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3303.

14-14-308. Emergency temporary location for political subdivision — Definition.

      1. Whenever, due to an emergency, it becomes imprudent, inexpedient, or impossible to conduct the affairs of local government at the regular or usual place, the governing body of each political subdivision of this state may meet at any place in the county whether within or without the territorial limits of the political subdivisions on the call of the presiding officer or any two (2) members of the governing body.
      2. The governing body shall proceed to establish and designate by ordinance, resolution, or other manner alternate or substitute sites or places as the emergency temporary location of government where all or any part of the public business may be transacted and conducted during the emergency situation.
    1. The sites or places may be in the county whether within or without the territorial limits of the political subdivisions.
    1. During the period when the public business is being conducted at an emergency temporary location, the governing body and other officers of a political subdivision of this state shall have and possess and shall exercise at the location all of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers and functions conferred upon the governing body and officers by or under the laws of this state.
    2. All acts of the governing body and officers shall be as valid and binding as if performed within the territorial limits of their political subdivision.
  1. As used in this section, “political subdivisions” means all duly formed and constituted governing bodies created and established under authority of the Arkansas Constitution and laws of this state.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 29-31; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-3307 — 17-3309; Acts 2019, No. 193, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (a)(1)(A), deleted “resulting from the effects of enemy attack, or the anticipated effects of a threatened enemy attack” following “emergency”, and deleted “thereof” following “usual place”; inserted “in the county whether” in (a)(1)(A) and in (a)(2); deleted “and may be within or without this state” from the end of (a)(2); inserted the second occurrence of “governing” in (b)(1); in (b)(2), deleted the former first sentence, and inserted “governing”; added “As used in this section” in (c); and made stylistic changes.

Subchapter 4 — Quorum Court Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-14-401. Establishment — Townships continued.

  1. Each county of the state shall divide its land area into convenient county quorum court districts in a manner and at times prescribed by the General Assembly.
  2. The county court of each county in this state shall have the authority to divide the county into convenient townships, subdivide those already established, and alter township lines.
  3. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the county court to enter on the minutes of the court a description of each township established by the court containing the name and boundaries of the township and the place appointed for holding elections and shall also note in the minutes every alteration that is made in any township lines.
  4. The clerk of the county court shall within thirty (30) days after establishing any new township or altering any existing township line, provide the Secretary of State a certified copy of the record made.
  5. If any county clerk in this state has not furnished the Secretary of State with a description of the several townships in the county, it shall be the duty of the county court to direct the clerk of that court to provide the Secretary of State with the description.
  6. Whenever the county court of any county in this state orders the formation of one (1) or more new townships or changes the boundary lines of any of the townships in the county, which formation or change shall require additional township officers, the additional township officer or officers shall be filled in accordance with Arkansas Constitution, Article 7, § 50 [repealed].

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 32; 1979, No. 413, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3401; Acts 1997, No. 1090, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Sections 1 and 4 of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution set forth specific powers assigned to the quorum court. One of these, as provided in Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 4, is the power to fill vacancies in elective county offices. Arkansas Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 7 provides that §§ 1 and 4 of the amendment shall be effective on January 1, 1977. Arkansas Ark. Const. Amend. 55 was adopted at the general election on November 5, 1974.

Cross References. Elective offices, Ark. Const., Amend. 29, § 1.

Case Notes

Appeals.

On appeal from the action of the circuit court in considering action of county court in alteration of townships (now quorum court districts), Supreme Court would not consider the preponderance of the evidence, but only the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. Caldwell v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 236 Ark. 719, 368 S.W.2d 85 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Power of County Courts.

It was unnecessary to determine whether board of election commissioners had power to file petition in county court for change of township (now quorum court districts) boundaries, since county court would have had such power on its own initiative. Garland County Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Ennis, 227 Ark. 880, 302 S.W.2d 76 (1957) (decision under prior law).

County courts have full power over the formation of townships (now quorum court districts) in their respective counties, including the power to abolish townships already formed. Caldwell v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 236 Ark. 719, 368 S.W.2d 85 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Farnsworth v. White County, 39 Ark. App. 98, 839 S.W.2d 229 (1992); Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992); Gravett v. Villines, 314 Ark. 320, 862 S.W.2d 260 (1993).

14-14-402. Number of districts.

The number of convenient quorum court districts to be established in each county shall be determined according to the following population categories:

Quorum Court Districts Population 9 0 to 19,999 11 20,000 to 49,999 13 50,000 to 199,999 15 200,000 and above

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 33; 1979, No. 413, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3402.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Cited: Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

14-14-403. Apportionment of districts.

  1. The county board of election commissioners in each county shall be responsible for the apportionment of the county into quorum court districts. Until otherwise changed in the method set forth in this subchapter, the districts of each county shall consist of the territory of the township established by the county board of election commissioners on or before November 3, 1975, pursuant to the provisions of Acts 1975, No. 128 [repealed]. Thereafter, districts shall be apportioned on or before the first Monday after January 1, 1982, and each ten (10) years thereafter.
  2. All apportionments shall be based on the population of the county as of the last federal decennial census, and the number of districts apportioned shall be equal to the number to which the county is entitled by law.
  3. The provisions of this subchapter shall not be construed to affect the composition of the county committees of the political parties, and the county committee of each political party shall designate the geographic area within the county from which county committee members shall be selected.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 34; 1979, No. 413, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3403.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1975, No. 128, was repealed by Acts 1977, No. 742, § 117.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Unit voting systems which contain varying populations are unconstitutional per se because they deny residents equal representation ensured by U.S. Const. Amend. 14. Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

Purpose.

The overriding objective of apportionment must be substantial equality of population among the various districts. Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

The primary consideration of reapportionment is the numerical equality of the districts, or fair and effective representation for all citizens. Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

Burden of Proof.

Population variation among districts greater than 10% is a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause, and after such a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to justify the variances. Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

Trial court did not err in finding that county election commission overcame prima facie case of discrimination, where 10.149% variance in quorum court districts was only slightly over the acceptable 10% variation, and the systematic approach taken by the commission revealed a rational policy of redistricting which justified the end result that two of 11 districts were over the 10% acceptable variance by four and three voters, respectively. Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

14-14-404. Federal decennial census data.

The Board of Apportionment shall provide each of the respective county boards of election commissioners with the appropriate and necessary federal decennial census information, not less than ninety (90) days prior to the date established for apportionment of county quorum court districts.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 35; 1979, No. 413, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3404.

Case Notes

Cited: Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

14-14-405. Filing and publishing of plan.

  1. Not later than the date set for the apportionment of county quorum court districts, the county board of election commissioners shall file its report with the clerk of the county court, setting forth the district boundaries and the number of inhabitants within them.
  2. Within fifteen (15) days of the filing of an apportionment plan, the clerk of the county court shall cause to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county the district boundaries apportioned and the number of inhabitants within them.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 36; 1979, No. 413, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3405.

Case Notes

Cited: Goldsby v. Brick, 281 Ark. 58, 661 S.W.2d 368 (1983); Riley v. Baxter County Election Comm'n, 311 Ark. 273, 843 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

14-14-406. Contest of apportionment.

Original jurisdiction of any suit to contest the apportionment made for county quorum court districts by a county board of election commissioners is vested in the circuit court of the affected county. Any such contest shall be filed with the circuit court within thirty (30) days following the date publication appears in a newspaper of general circulation.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 37; 1979, No. 413, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3406.

Case Notes

Suits to Contest.

To seek to set aside an apportionment plan filed and published in accordance with statutorily approved procedures is a contest in the sense contemplated by this section, which imposes a 30-day time limit on such suits. Goldsby v. Brick, 281 Ark. 58, 661 S.W.2d 368 (1983).

14-14-407. Certification of plan.

The clerk of the county court, within seven (7) calendar days following the expiration of the time period provided for the filing of contest of an apportionment plan, shall transmit to the Secretary of State a certified copy of the record made of an apportionment plan.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 38; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3407.

Subchapter 5 — Organization Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2001, No. 997, § 2: July 1, 2001.

Acts 2001, No. 997, § 3: Mar. 21, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that portions of Amendment 80 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas which merge courts of law and equity become effective July 1, 2001, and it is unclear what effect that will have on the county clerks' role as probate clerk; that this act should be effective July 1, 2001 to coincide with the related provisions of Amendment 80. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 42 et seq.

14-14-501. Body politic and corporate.

A county government is a body politic and corporate created by the General Assembly and subject to its exercise of power. However, county governments shall possess legislative powers not denied by the Arkansas Constitution or by law. As a corporate body, county governments shall have corporate and governmental powers, a corporate name, and perpetual succession subject to limitations imposed by the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 39; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3501.

14-14-502. Distribution of powers.

  1. Division. The powers of the county governments of the State of Arkansas shall be divided into three (3) distinct departments, each of them to be confined to a separate body, to wit: Those that are legislative to one, those that are executive to a second, and those that are judicial to a third.
    1. Legislative. All legislative powers of the county governments are vested in the quorum court. The people reserve to themselves the power to propose county legislative measures and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the quorum court. The people also reserve to themselves the power, at their option, to approve or reject at the polls any entire ordinance enacted by a quorum court.
    2. Executive.
      1. The executive divisions of a county government shall consist of:
        1. The county judge, who shall perform the duties of the chief executive officer of the county as provided in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 3, and as implemented in this chapter and who shall preside over the quorum court without a vote but with the power of veto;
        2. One (1) sheriff, who shall be ex officio collector of taxes unless otherwise provided by law;
        3. One (1) assessor;
        4. One (1) coroner;
        5. One (1) treasurer, who shall be ex officio treasurer of the common school fund of the county;
        6. One (1) surveyor; and
        7. One (1) clerk of the circuit court, who shall be clerk of the probate division of circuit court and ex officio clerk of the county court and recorder.
      2. There may be elected a county clerk in like manner as a circuit clerk, and in such cases, the county clerk may be ex officio clerk of the probate division of circuit court, if such division exists, of the county until otherwise provided by the General Assembly.
    3. Judicial. The judicial divisions of a county government are vested in the county court, except with respect to those powers formerly vested in the county court which, by the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, are to be performed by the county judge, and in the respective courts of this state as provided by law.
  2. Limitations. No person or collection of persons being one of these departments, legislative, executive, or judicial, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances expressly directed or permitted.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 40; 1979, No. 413, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3502; Acts 2001, No. 997, § 1.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

In General.

The clear division and separation of powers among the branches of county government provided by subsections (a) and (b) of this section makes it apparent that the government is no longer controlled and operated by only a single entity. Pulaski County v. Jacuzzi Bros., 317 Ark. 10, 875 S.W.2d 496 (1994).

Because terminated county employee's actions of reporting alleged misdeeds to quorum court members, sitting as a grievance committee, was reporting to the “appropriate authorities,” under § 21-1-602(2)(A)(ii), evidence supporting terminated employee's claim under the Whistle-Blower Act created a question of fact and it was thus an error for the trial court to have granted the county's motion for a directed verdict. Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 232 S.W.3d 433 (2006).

Cited: Walker v. County of Washington, 263 Ark. 317, 564 S.W.2d 513 (1978); Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

Subchapter 6 — Alternative Organizations

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 42 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Authority Generally.

No county is authorized to pass an ordinance reorganizing its government in a manner contrary to the general law of the state. Clark County v. Miller, 291 Ark. 203, 723 S.W.2d 820 (1987).

14-14-601. Legislative determination — Purpose.

  1. It is determined by the General Assembly that:
    1. The present structure of county government does not meet the needs of every county in the state;
    2. County government can be made more responsive to the wishes of the people through selected structural changes and consolidation; and
    3. Greater economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in providing governmental services can be achieved through modernization of county government.
  2. It is the purpose of this subchapter to:
    1. Establish the basic procedures for the adoption and implementation of alternative county government organization pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 2(b), which provides: “The Quorum Court may create, consolidate, separate, revise, or abandon any elective county office or offices except during the term thereof; provided, however, that a majority of those voting on the question at a general election have approved said action.”; and
    2. Provide the citizens of each county the opportunity to select the form of county government organization which best serves their needs and desires.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 54, 55; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-3701, 17-3702.

Case Notes

Cited: Clark County v. Miller, 291 Ark. 203, 723 S.W.2d 820 (1987).

14-14-602. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Abandon” means to desert, surrender, forsake, or to give up absolutely;
  2. “Consolidate” means to unite offices into one (1) office;
  3. “Create” means to bring into being, to cause to exist, to produce;
  4. “Revise” means to review, reexamine for correction or for the purpose of amending, correcting, rearranging, or otherwise improving; and
  5. “Separate” means to disunite, divide, disconnect, or sever.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 58; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3705.

14-14-603. Offices included.

  1. Within the purposes of this chapter, the term “elective county office” shall mean any office created under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution Article 7, § 19, as amended by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 24, § 3, and Arkansas Constitution, Article 7, § 46.
  2. The elective county offices established by these constitutional provisions are:
    1. One (1) sheriff, who shall be ex officio collector of taxes, unless otherwise provided by law;
    2. One (1) collector of taxes, where established by law;
    3. One (1) assessor;
    4. One (1) coroner;
    5. One (1) treasurer, who shall be ex officio treasurer of the common school fund;
    6. One (1) surveyor;
    7. One (1) clerk of the circuit court, who shall be clerk of the probate division of circuit court and ex officio clerk of the county court and recorder, unless otherwise provided by law; and
    8. One (1) county clerk, where established by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 56; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3703.

14-14-604. Offices excluded.

Offices expressly excluded from the provisions of this subchapter are:

  1. The judge of the county court created pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Article 7, § 28, such office being an “elective county office” but not deemed separable from the county court which serves as a principal element of county government and constitutional organization;
  2. Justices of the peace who are deemed district offices; and
  3. Constables who are deemed township offices and who are not within the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 2(b).

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 57; 1979, No. 413, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3704.

Case Notes

Constables.

While the plain language of § 14-14-1207 authorized reimbursement for district officials, a constable was not a district official, but a township officer under constitutional and statutory law, and thus, the statute did not authorize the reimbursement of expenses for constables, and the circuit court did not err in denying the constable's claim for expenses. Graves v. Greene County, 2013 Ark. 493, 430 S.W.3d 722 (2013).

Limitation on Powers.

County ordinance failed because of the power it granted to the county judge to prepare payroll warrants. This section provides expressly that the offices of county judge, justice of the peace, and constable are excluded from the provisions of this subchapter, and those offices may not be revised pursuant to Ark. Const. Amend. 55. Clark County v. Miller, 291 Ark. 203, 723 S.W.2d 820 (1987).

14-14-605. Authority to adopt alternative provisions — Options.

  1. Each county quorum court may adopt, by ordinance, any one (1) or more of the alternative county government organizational provisions established in this subchapter if the electors have approved the adoption of the proposed provisions by majority vote at a general election.
  2. Alternative organizational proposals may include any one (1) or all of the following options. The principal officer of the office to be affected by the alternate organizational proposal shall be:
    1. Elected;
    2. Appointed in a manner prescribed by ordinance;
    3. Appointed by a county government board in a manner prescribed by ordinance;
    4. Selected as provided by ordinance; or
    5. Not included in the proposed alternative county organization as a separate office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 59; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3706.

14-14-606. Analysis of each office required.

  1. All proposals for alternative county government organization adopted by a county quorum court through ordinance for referral to the electors, or an initiative petition referring an alternative organization proposal to the electors, shall be based on a comprehensive analysis of each office or department included in the ordinance or proposal.
  2. The analysis of each office or department shall consist of the following requirements:
    1. A comprehensive analysis of the existing office or department organization included in the proposal and the procedures established for providing governmental services;
    2. A comprehensive comparative analysis of the proposed alternative organization with regard to improved efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability to the people;
    3. The preparation of a proposed plan of organization embodying the selected characteristics to be referred to the electors. The plan shall:
      1. Establish the procedures for the election or appointment of any new officers. However, any appointive officer shall be deemed a part of the executive branch and, as such, shall be appointed by, and be responsible to, the county judge;
      2. Provide for the scheduling of any necessary transfer of powers, records, documents, properties, assets, funds, liabilities, and bonding which result from the changes in a proposed county organization;
      3. Provide for the continuity, where necessary, of existing officers and offices, the abolition of offices or their change from elective to appointive status, and the making of interim and temporary appointments; and
      4. Provide that the plan may be prepared in narrative form but shall be finally embodied in a single or series of ordinances styled in a manner provided by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 60; 1979, No. 413, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3707.

14-14-607. Initiation and conduct of analysis.

  1. Initiation. Any justice of the peace of each county may propose the initiation of an analysis for alternative county organization through the introduction and passage of an ordinance, or the initiation may be accomplished by an initiative petition of the electors.
  2. Conduct of Analysis. An ordinance adopted for conduct of an analysis of alternative county organizations shall provide for:
    1. The final date of completion of the analysis;
    2. The employment of any staff or other financial support where deemed necessary;
    3. The conduct of the analysis; and
    4. The selection of any one (1), or any combinations, of the following methods of conduct:
      1. Directly by the county quorum court through the establishment of an office or department;
      2. By interlocal agreement;
      3. By purchasing the analysis services from a private or public vendor; or
      4. By establishing a county board in a manner prescribed by the ordinance.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 61; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3708.

14-14-608. Limitations on adoption of alternatives.

  1. Services to be Maintained. A county government serving as a political subdivision of the state for the more convenient administration of justice is compelled by law to provide certain services relating to judicial administration, law enforcement, and other matters. No county ordinance adopted by the electors for the establishment of alternative county organizations shall serve to repeal or diminish any general law of the state directing or requiring a county government or any officer or employee of a county government to carry out any function or provide any service. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or prevent counties from adopting alternative county organizations nor the reassignment of statutorily delegated functions or services where such alternative organization or reassignment shall not alter the obligation of the county to continue providing the services or functions which are or may be established by state law.
  2. Transfer of Duties. To encourage that a minimum level of consistency shall be maintained in county governments throughout the state, the following organizational limitations may apply where any one (1) or all elective county offices are abolished and consolidated, however, nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the consolidation of any nonelected county office or department by two (2) or more adjoining counties through interlocal agreement:
    1. All duties prescribed by law for the clerk of the circuit court may be assigned to a county department of records and court services;
    2. All duties prescribed by law for a county clerk exclusive of county financial management duties may be assigned to a county department of records and court services;
    3. All duties prescribed by law for a county clerk relating to county financial management may be assigned to a county department of financial management;
    4. All duties prescribed by law for the sheriff serving as an officer of the courts and law enforcement may be assigned to a county department of public safety;
    5. All duties prescribed by law for a sheriff serving as the collector of taxes may be assigned to a county department of financial management;
    6. All duties prescribed by law for a collector of taxes may be assigned to a county department of financial management;
    7. All duties prescribed by law for an assessor may be assigned to a county department of records and court services;
    8. All duties prescribed by law for a surveyor may be assigned to a county department of records and court services;
    9. All duties prescribed by law for a coroner may be assigned to a county department of records and court services; and
    10. All duties prescribed by law for a treasurer may be assigned to a county department of financial management. However, any plan for alternative county organization adopted by the electors which includes the abolishment of the treasurer as an elective office shall provide in that plan for the establishment of financial controls. The plan of financial controls shall not vest sole financial administration in a single elected official or in a department which is administratively controlled by the elected official.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 62; 1979, No. 413, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3709.

Case Notes

Reassignment of Duties.

While the general law of the state requires the office of sheriff to be maintained and includes as a duty of the office of sheriff the running of the county jail, this section allows a county to reassign statutorily imposed duties so long as the reassignment does not “alter the obligation of the county to continue providing the services.” Gravett v. Villines, 314 Ark. 320, 862 S.W.2d 260 (1993).

Sole Financial Administration.

Regarding the provisions of this section prohibiting the placement of “sole financial administration” in a single official or department, the court rejected the contention that “sole financial administration” meant all the subparts of administration including account, budgeting, and auditing, and not just the collecting and accounting revenues. Clark County v. Miller, 291 Ark. 203, 723 S.W.2d 820 (1987).

County ordinance which vested sole financial administration in a newly created office of tax and revenue was in violation of this section. Clark County v. Miller, 291 Ark. 203, 723 S.W.2d 820 (1987).

14-14-609. Referendum on proposed plan.

  1. All questions on alternative county organization as proposed by ordinance of the county quorum court, or as proposed by initiated petitions filed by electors of the county pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, shall be submitted to the electors of a county only at the general election following the adoption of the ordinance or filing of the petitions.
    1. Any ordinance or initiative petition submitting an alternative organization proposal to the voters shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the county no later than the first day of filing for the preferential primary immediately preceding the general election at which the alternative county government proposal shall be decided.
    2. If approved by a majority of those voting on the question, the proposed plan for alternative county organization shall become effective on January 1 following the general election at which the plan was approved by the electors, or two (2) years following the general election at which the plan was approved by the electors.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 63; 1979, No. 413, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3710.

14-14-610. Election results.

  1. An affirmative majority vote by the electors voting on the adoption of an alternative county organization plan shall be deemed the will of the people.
  2. The election of any candidate during the same general election for any office consolidated, abandoned, or established as an appointive office by an adopted plan of alternative county organization shall be considered null and void.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 64; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3711.

14-14-611. Appointment of interim officers.

Where a proposed plan approved by the electors for alternative county organization provides for the creation of any elective office by consolidation of two (2) or more offices, the proposed plan shall establish procedures for the appointment of an interim officer, who shall serve in the office so created from the effective date of the plan and until the next general election, or until a successor is elected and qualified. The appointee shall meet all requirements prescribed by law for appointment to an elective office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 65; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3712.

14-14-612. Abandonment of alternative plan.

  1. A county quorum court may abandon any alternative county organization plan, or any part or section thereof, adopted by the electors pursuant to this subchapter, by referral and adoption of a revised organizational plan at a general election. However, no revised alternative county organization plan shall be considered by the electors until four (4) years have elapsed after the date of the referendum at which the original plan was adopted.
  2. Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as a limitation on a quorum court to submit a proposal to the electors at a general election for multicounty consolidation of an elective office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 66; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3713.

14-14-613. Multicounty consolidations of offices and departments.

  1. Any two (2) or more adjoining counties may consolidate functionally similar county offices or departments, either elective or appointive, pursuant to the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, §§ 1(c) and 2(b).
    1. Consolidation of Elective Offices.
      1. Initiation. Proposals for the consolidation of elective county offices may be initiated by the county quorum courts of each affected county by entering into an interlocal agreement and adoption of an ordinance for referral to the electors of each respective county, or by the filing of an initiative petition signed by not less than fifteen percent (15%) of the qualified voters as provided by law.
      2. Plan of Proposed Alternative Organization Required. All proposals for multicounty consolidation of elective offices referred to the electors shall be prepared in the manner prescribed by law for alternative county government organization proposals affecting a single county. Where applicable and possible, multicounty elective office consolidation proposals should be planned, combined, and referred to the electors jointly with proposals referring alternative single county organizations.
      3. Multicounty Consolidation Agreements Required. All interlocal agreements for consolidation of any elective office shall specify the offices to be consolidated, the duties and responsibilities of the consolidated offices, procedures for the selection and reassignment of personnel, procedures for the transfer of powers, records, documents, properties, assets, funds, and liabilities, and for the possible termination of the agreement. The agreement shall also provide for apportionment of the cost of the consolidated office, based on the equalized taxable valuation or the population, or a combination thereof, of the counties involved. The agreement may contain other provisions pertaining to the consolidated office that the participating counties deem necessary or advisable. Each interlocal agreement shall be adopted through ordinance by the quorum court of each county affected prior to submission to the electors.
      4. Referendum on Elective Office Consolidation. The question of multicounty consolidation of elective county offices shall be submitted to the electors in the affected counties at the next general election following the adoption of the agreements by the quorum courts. If approved by a majority of those voting on the question in each county, the proposed consolidation shall become effective on January 1 following the general election at which the consolidation was approved by the electors.
      5. Appointment of Interim Officer. All proposed multicounty consolidation agreements for a county elective office referred to the electors shall establish procedures for the appointment of an interim officer who shall serve in the consolidated office from the effective date of the agreement until the next general election or until his or her successor is elected and qualified. Such an appointee to an elective office shall meet all requirements prescribed by law for appointment to an office. The appointee to a multicounty elective office shall be deemed to be a district officer and shall be appointed by the Governor.
      6. Precedence of Election. An affirmative majority vote by the electors voting on the issue of multicounty consolidation of elective offices in each respective county shall be deemed the will of the people. The election of a candidate in each respective county for the offices affected by the adopted consolidation proposals shall be considered null and void.
      7. Elections for Multicounty Consolidated Offices. Election for multicounty consolidated offices shall be conducted at the next general election following the establishment of the consolidated office. Elections of persons for consolidated county offices shall be held in the same manner as prescribed for the election of district officers. A candidate for a consolidated county office shall possess the same qualifications for election as required of a candidate for the same office in a single county. The candidate for a consolidated county office receiving a majority of votes cast for the office in the affected counties, taken together, shall be elected. If no candidate receives a majority of votes cast for the office, a runoff election between the two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast shall be held in the same manner as a runoff election for district officers.
      8. Abandonment of a Multicounty Consolidated Elective Office Plan. A quorum court may abandon any multicounty consolidated elective office plan, or any part or section thereof, adopted by the electors in their respective county by referring the revised plan to the electors at a general election. However, no revised plan for multicounty elective office consolidation shall be considered by the electors until four (4) years have elapsed after the date of the referendum at which the original plan for consolidation was adopted.
    2. Consolidation of Nonelective County Offices or Departments.
      1. Authority to Adopt Consolidation Plans. Proposals for multicounty consolidation of nonelective county offices or departments may be introduced and adopted by the quorum court of each respective county by entering into an interlocal agreement by ordinance in each affected county. The consolidation of nonelective county offices or departments need not be referred to the electors for approval. However, any such ordinance shall be subject to the provisions of initiative and referendum in each respective county entering into such agreements.
      2. Multicounty Consolidation Agreements Required. All interlocal agreements for consolidation of nonelective county offices shall conform to the requirements of interlocal agreements prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 67; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3714.

14-14-614. Severability of ballot titles.

  1. Ballot Title.
    1. Upon receipt of an alternative county organization proposal for either a single county or multicounty which is to be referred to the electors, it shall be the duty of the members of the county board of election commissioners to take due cognizance and to certify the results of the vote cast thereon.
    2. Where the proposed measure is referred through more than one (1) or a series of ordinances, the board shall cause the ballot title of each separate ordinance to be placed on the ballot to be used in the election. The ballot shall state plainly and separately the title of each ordinance referred to the electors.
  2. Severability. If a single ordinance relating to a proposal for alternative county organization is rejected by the electors, the rejection shall not affect any other ordinance so adopted by the electors; or if any provision of an ordinance adopted by the electors for alternative county organization or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application. The provisions of any single ordinance and the validity of each voted upon by separate ballot titles are declared to be severable.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 68; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3715.

Subchapter 7 — Service Organizations

Cross References. City-county tourist meeting and entertainment facilities, § 14-171-201 et seq.

County museums, § 13-5-501 et seq.

Fire protection districts outside cities and towns, § 14-284-201 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1981, No. 874 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, Section 106, of Chapter 6 of Act 742 of 1977 authorized the counties of this State to establish county subordinate service districts, providing for the purposes of creating such districts as well as financing, establishment and administrative procedures; and

“Whereas, Act 919 of 1979 repealed Section 106 of Chapter 6 of Act 742 of 1977 but did provide for the establishment of county subordinate service districts created for particular purposes but did not provide for financing, establishment or administrative procedures; and

“Whereas, there presently exists a state of confusion as to the legality of future subordinate service districts; and

“Whereas, this Act is necessary to clarify the present state of confusion;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Aug. 15, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the well being of the residents of the various counties that the county hospitals in the respective counties be under the management, control and operation of a separate Board of Governors selected and functioning in substantially the same manner as was provided for in Act 481 of 1949 and acts amendatory and supplemental thereto; that this Act is designed to substantially reenact the laws relating to County Hospital Boards of Governors which were repealed by Act 742 and to amend Section 107 of Act 742 to exempt County Hospital Boards of Governors from the reorganization provided for therein, and to thereby insure the continued effective and efficient operation of the various county hospitals under the supervision and direction of the respective County Boards of Governors in substantially the same manner as was provided for in the laws repealed by Act 742 and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-701. Legislative determination — Purpose.

  1. It is determined by the General Assembly that:
    1. The present service organization of county government does not meet the needs of every county in this state; and
    2. County governments can be made more responsive to the service needs of the people through the reorganization of county government into departments, boards, and subordinate service districts which are consistent in their organization and assignment of duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
  2. It is therefore the purpose of this subchapter to:
    1. Establish the basic procedures for the establishment of service organizations in county government; and
    2. Establish the authorities and limitations of these service organizations.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 98, 99; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-4101, 17-4102.

Case Notes

Cited: Eaton v. McCuen, 273 Ark. 154, 617 S.W.2d 341 (1981); Freeman v. Curry, 299 Ark. 263, 772 S.W.2d 586 (1989); Gravett v. Villines, 314 Ark. 320, 862 S.W.2d 260 (1993).

14-14-702. Authority to establish — Restrictions.

The county quorum court of each county may prescribe, by ordinance, the department, board structure, and organization of their respective county governments and may prescribe the functions of all offices, departments, and boards. However, no ordinance shall be enacted by a quorum court which:

  1. Divests the county court of any of its original jurisdictions granted by the Arkansas Constitution. However, where any county ordinance establishing a department or board and the assignment of functions thereof interferes with the jurisdictions of the county court, it shall be implied that the functions and acts may be performed on order of the county court or proper order of superior courts on appeal;
  2. Alters the organization of elected county officials established by the Arkansas Constitution, except through the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 2(b). However, any function or duty assigned by statute may be reassigned by ordinance; or
  3. Limits any provision of state law directing or requiring a county government or any officer or employee of a county government to carry out any function or provide any service. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the reassignment of functions or services assigned by statute where Arkansas reassignment does not alter the obligation of the county to continue providing the function or service.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 100; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4103.

Case Notes

Government Reorganization.

Notwithstanding the power of quorum courts under Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 2(b) and subdivision (2) of this section, no county is authorized to pass an ordinance reorganizing its government in a manner contrary to the general law of the state. Gravett v. Villines, 314 Ark. 320, 862 S.W.2d 260 (1993).

Cited: Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

14-14-703. Office organization of county government.

  1. Unless otherwise provided or permitted by the Arkansas Constitution, county governments shall maintain the following organization of elected county offices:
    1. Office of the County Judge. The judge of the county court serves as the principal executive officer of the county and may establish divisions of his or her office to carry out any jurisdiction of the county court or duties assigned by county ordinance. No such delegation of administrative functions among departments of the office shall be construed as limiting or delegating any jurisdiction of the county court. Further, the county court may appoint advisory committees to assist in the formulation of policy for any department of the office. However, confirmation by the county quorum court of advisory committees so appointed or the oath of office is not required; and
    2. Other Executive Offices of the County. As established by the Arkansas Constitution, the organization of county offices shall include:
      1. The office of treasurer;
      2. The office of county clerk, as may be provided by law;
      3. The office of assessor;
      4. The office of clerk of the circuit court;
      5. The office of sheriff;
      6. The office of collector of taxes, as may be provided by law;
      7. The office of surveyor; and
      8. The office of coroner.
  2. Any executive officer of the county may establish divisions of the office to conduct any function or duty assigned by the Arkansas Constitution or by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 101; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4104.

Case Notes

Cited: Gravett v. Villines, 314 Ark. 320, 862 S.W.2d 260 (1993).

14-14-704. Establishment of county departments.

  1. The county quorum court of each county, by ordinance, may establish any number of departments for the conduct of county affairs and may prescribe the functions and duties of each department. This authority of a quorum court to establish county departments shall be conclusive and shall supersede any department organizations established by any elected county officer.
    1. Direction of Departments. All departments established by ordinance of the quorum court shall be under the direction and supervision of county judge except departments assigned to other elected officers of the county. Departments established and assigned to an elected officer other than the county judge shall be under the direction and supervision of the respective county officer.
    2. Joint Departments. Two (2) or more county governments may provide for the establishment of joint departments for the conduct of county affairs. Joint departments so created shall be established by interlocal agreements. The direction and supervision of joint departments shall be under the combined authorities of the county judge of each respective county in a manner to be prescribed by ordinance.
    3. Employment of Department Administrator. An ordinance establishing a department of county government may provide for the employment of a department administrator. The ordinance may prescribe minimum qualifications for the person so employed as administrator. However, the county judge alone shall employ all county personnel, except employees of other elected county officers. Where a department is established by the quorum court and the responsibility for direction and supervision of the department is assigned to an elected county officer other than the county judge, the elected county officer so designated shall employ all personnel authorized to be employed by the ordinance.
    4. Management Reports. A quorum court may require, by ordinance, reports for any purpose from any elective county office, department, board, or subordinate service district, or any administrator or employee of them.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 102; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4105.

14-14-705. County advisory or administrative boards.

  1. A county quorum court, by ordinance, may establish county advisory or administrative boards for the conduct of county affairs.
    1. Advisory Boards.
      1. An advisory board may be established to assist a county office, department, or subordinate service district. The advisory board may furnish advice, gather information, make recommendations, and perform other activities as may be prescribed by ordinance. A county advisory board shall not have the power to administer programs or set policy.
      2. All advisory board members shall be appointed by the county judge. Confirmation of advisory board members by a quorum court shall not be required.
      3. An advisory board may contain any number of members as may be provided by the ordinance creating the advisory board.
      4. The term of all advisory board members shall not exceed three (3) years.
    2. Administrative Boards.
      1. Administrative boards may be established to exercise administrative powers granted by county ordinance, except that the board may not be authorized to pledge the credit of the county. The administrative board shall be a body politic and corporate, with power to contract and be contracted with and sue and be sued. As to actions of tort, the board shall be considered as an agency of the county government and occupy the same status as a county. No board member shall be liable in court individually for an act performed by him or her as a board member unless the damages caused thereby were the results of the board member's malicious acts.
      2. No member of any administrative board shall be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract made with the administrative board. A violation of subdivision (2)(B) of this section shall be deemed a felony.
      3. An administrative board may be assigned responsibility for a county department or a subordinate service district.
      4. All administrative board members shall be appointed by the county judge. These appointments shall require confirmation by a quorum court.
      5. An administrative board shall contain five (5) members. Provided, a county library board created after August 1, 1997, shall consist of not less than five (5) members nor more than seven (7) members and shall serve until their successors are appointed and qualified.
      6. The term of any administrative board member shall be for a period of five (5) years. However, the initial appointment of any administrative board shall provide for the appointment of one (1) member for a one-year term, one (1) member for a two-year term, one (1) member for a three-year term, one (1) member for a four-year term, and the remaining member or members for a five-year term, thereby providing, except for county library boards with more than five (5) members, for the appointment of one (1) member annually thereafter.
    3. Boards Generally.
      1. No board member, either advisory or administrative, shall be appointed for more than two (2) consecutive terms.
      2. All persons appointed to an advisory or administrative board shall be qualified electors of the county. A quorum court may prescribe by ordinance additional qualifications for appointment to a county administrative board.
      3. All board members appointed to either an advisory or administrative board shall subscribe to the oath of office within ten (10) days from the date of appointment. Evidence of oath of office shall be filed with the county clerk. Failure to do so shall be deemed to constitute rejection of the office, and the county judge shall appoint a board member to fill the vacancy.
      4. No member of a quorum court shall serve as a member of a county advisory or administrative board.
      5. A person may be removed from a county board for cause by the county judge with confirmation by resolution of the quorum court. Written notification stating the causes for removal shall be provided to the board member prior to the date established for quorum court consideration of removal, and the board member shall be afforded the opportunity to meet with the quorum court in their deliberation of removal.
      6. Appeals from removal of a county board member shall be directed to the circuit court of the respective county within thirty (30) days after the removal is confirmed by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 103; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4106; Acts 1997, No. 359, § 1.

14-14-706. Register of board appointment.

The clerk of the county court shall maintain a register of county advisory and administrative board appointments established by a county quorum court, including:

  1. The name of the board;
  2. The ordinance reference number establishing the board;
  3. The name of the board member;
  4. The date of appointment; and
  5. The expiration date of the appointments.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 104; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4107.

14-14-707. Conduct of affairs of county boards.

  1. Initial Meeting. The time and place for the initial meeting of a county board shall be established by the county judge through written notification of each board member.
  2. Meeting Dates and Notification. All boards shall by rule provide for the date, time, and place of regular monthly meetings or other regularly scheduled meetings. This information shall be filed with the county court, and notification of all meetings shall be conducted as established by law for public meetings.
  3. Special Meetings. Special meetings may be called by two (2) or more board members upon written notification of all members not less than two (2) calendar days prior to the calendar day fixed for the time of the meeting.
  4. Quorum. A majority of board members shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of conducting business and exercising powers and responsibilities. Board action may be taken by a majority vote of those present and voting unless the ordinance creating the board requires otherwise.
  5. Organization and Voting. At its initial meeting of a quorum of members, each county board shall elect one (1) of their members to serve as chair of the board for a term of one (1) year. The chair shall thereafter preside over the board throughout his or her term as chair. In the absence of the chair, a quorum of the board may select one (1) of its members to preside and conduct the affairs of the board.
  6. Minutes. All boards shall provide for the keeping of written minutes which include the final vote on all board actions indicating the vote of each individual member on the question.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 105; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4108.

14-14-708. Subordinate service districts generally.

  1. Authority to Establish. Subordinate service districts to provide one (1) or more of the services authorized to be provided by county governments may be established, operated, altered, combined, enlarged, reduced, or abolished by the county quorum court by ordinance.
  2. Area Served. A subordinate service district may include all, or any part, of the jurisdictional areas of county government. Two (2) or more county governments may create a joint subordinate service district by interlocal agreement.
  3. Purposes of District. A subordinate service district is defined as a county service organization established to provide one (1) or more county services or additions to county services and financed from revenues secured from within the designated service area through the levy and collection of service charges. These districts may be created for the following purposes:
    1. Emergency services, including ambulance services, civil defense services, and fire prevention and protection services;
    2. Solid waste services, including recycling services, and solid waste collection and disposal services;
    3. Water, sewer, and other utility services, including sanitary and storm sewers and sewage treatment services, water supply and distribution services, water course, drainage, irrigation, and flood control services; and
    4. Transportation services, including roads, bridges, airports and aviation services, ferries, wharves, docks, and other marine services, parking services, and public transportation services.
  4. Financing. Notwithstanding any provisions of law requiring uniform taxation within a county, a quorum court, by ordinance, may establish subordinate service districts and levy service charges to provide and finance any county service or function which a county is otherwise authorized to undertake.

History. Acts 1981, No. 874, § 1; 1983, No. 233, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4109.

Case Notes

Creation.

As to ordinances creating a subordinate service district under repealed statute, see Eaton v. McCuen, 273 Ark. 154, 617 S.W.2d 341 (1981).

Mandatory Fees.

Before mandatory fees, and tax liens for those mandatory fees, can be imposed, there must be notice and a public hearing. Freeman v. Curry, 299 Ark. 263, 772 S.W.2d 586 (1989).

14-14-709. Establishment of subordinate service districts.

  1. Procedure Generally. A subordinate service district may be established by ordinance of the quorum court in the following manner:
    1. Upon petition to the quorum court by twenty-five percent (25%) of the number of realty owners within the proposed subordinate service district, the owners of twenty-five percent (25%) of the realty in the area of the proposed subordinate service district, and the owners of twenty-five percent (25%) of the assessed value of the realty within the proposed subordinate service district, the quorum court shall set a date for a public hearing and shall give notice of the hearing on the petition to form the proposed subordinate service district. Following the public hearing, the court may either adopt an ordinance creating the subordinate service district or refuse to act further on the matter;
    2. If hearings indicate that a geographic area desires exclusion from the proposed subordinate service district, the quorum court may amend the boundaries of the proposed subordinate service district to exclude the property in that area; and
    3. Where an ordinance is adopted establishing a subordinate service district, the quorum court, in addition to all other requirements, shall publish notice of the adoption of the ordinance. The notice shall include a statement setting out the elector's right to protest. If within thirty (30) days of the notice, twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the number of realty owners within the proposed subordinate service district, the owners of twenty-five percent (25%) of the realty in the area of the proposed subordinate service district, and the owners of twenty-five percent (25%) of the assessed value of the realty within the proposed subordinate service district file a written protest, by individual letter or petition, then the ordinance creating the subordinate service district shall be void.
  2. Ordinance Requirements. An ordinance to establish a subordinate service district shall include:
    1. The name of the proposed district;
    2. A map containing the boundaries of the proposed district;
    3. The convenience or necessity of the proposed district;
    4. The services to be provided by the proposed district;
    5. The estimated cost of services to be provided and methods of financing the proposed services. Service charges adopted by a quorum court shall be equally administered on a per capita, per household, per unit of service, or a combination of these methods. Service charges adopted by the court on a per capita or per household method shall be administered equally without regard to an individual or household availing themselves of the service; and
    6. The method for administering the proposed district.
  3. Initiative and Referendum. All provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, shall apply to the establishment of county subordinate service areas.

History. Acts 1981, No. 874, § 1; 1983, No. 233, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4109; Acts 1993, No. 317, § 1.

Case Notes

Interference with Property Ownership.

The General Assembly intended for taxpayers to have notice and an opportunity for a special referendum before a substantial interference with property ownership, such as a tax lien, is imposed. Freeman v. Curry, 299 Ark. 263, 772 S.W.2d 586 (1989).

14-14-710. Modification or dissolution of subordinate service districts.

  1. Modification. A quorum court may, after adoption of an ordinance, with notice and public hearing:
    1. Increase, decrease, or terminate the type of services that the subordinate service district is authorized to provide unless fifty percent (50%) of the electors residing in the district protest;
    2. Enlarge the district to include adjacent land if fifty percent (50%) or more of the electors residing in the proposed addition do not protest;
    3. Combine the subordinate service district with another subordinate service district unless fifty percent (50%) of the electors in either district protest;
    4. Abolish the subordinate service district unless fifty percent (50%) of the electors in the district protest;
    5. Reduce the area of a district by removing property from the district unless fifty percent (50%) of the electors residing in the territory to be removed from the district protest;
    6. Change the method for administering the subordinate service district unless fifty percent (50%) of the electors in the district protest;
    7. All changes in subordinate service districts may be submitted to the electors of the existing or proposed district, whichever is larger, by initiative or referendum.
  2. Dissolution. As provided in this section, a quorum court may abolish or combine subordinate service districts by ordinance. Dissolution or any combination of service districts shall provide for the following considerations:
    1. The transfer or other disposition of property and other rights, claims, and assets of the district;
    2. The payment of all obligations from the resources of the district;
    3. The payment of all costs of abolishing or combining a district from the resources of the districts involved;
    4. The honoring of any bond, debt, contract, obligation, or cause of action accrued or established under the subordinate district;
    5. The provision for the equitable disposition of the assets of the district, for adequate protection of the legal rights of employees of the district, and for adequate protection of legal rights of creditors; and
    6. The transfer of all property and assets to the jurisdiction of the county court.

History. Acts 1981, No. 874, § 1; 1983, No. 233, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4109.

14-14-711. Administration of subordinate service districts.

  1. Generally. A subordinate service district may be administered directly as a part of the office of the county judge, as a part of a department with or without an advisory or administrative board, or as a separate department with or without an advisory or administrative board.
  2. Budget. The budget for each subordinate service district shall be appropriated as other funds of the county.
  3. Tax Lists. Upon request, the county assessor shall provide the quorum court with the assessed or taxable value of all property in a proposed established subordinate service district and a list of property owners and residential structures based on the last completed assessment roll of the county.
  4. Service Charges.
      1. Service charges for subordinate service districts shall be entered on tax statements by the county sheriff or county collector pursuant to § 26-35-705 and shall be collected with the real and personal property taxes of the county.
      2. No collector of taxes shall accept payment of any property taxes if the taxpayer has been billed for services authorized by a subordinate service district unless the service charge is also receipted.
      3. If a property owner fails to pay the service charge, the service charge shall become a lien on the property.
    1. A subordinate service district may choose to forgo county collection of its annual service charges and instead collect its service charges on a suitable periodic basis if the subordinate service district provides its own billing and collection service.
  5. Use of Funds. Funds raised through service charges for a subordinate service district may be used only for subordinate service district purposes. These public funds shall be maintained in the county treasury and accounted for as an enterprise fund. Disbursements of all subordinate service district funds shall be made only upon voucher or claim presented to and approved by the county judge, acting in his or her capacity as the chief executive officer of the county, unless otherwise provided by ordinance establishing the district.

History. Acts 1981, No. 874, § 1; 1983, No. 233, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4109; Acts 1995, No. 552, § 1; 2013, No. 537, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote (d)(1).

Case Notes

Mandatory Fees.

Before mandatory fees, and tax liens for those mandatory fees, can be imposed, there must be notice and a public hearing. Freeman v. Curry, 299 Ark. 263, 772 S.W.2d 586 (1989).

14-14-712. Reorganization of existing county boards and commissions.

  1. All laws providing for the organization, jurisdiction, and operation of county boards and commissions, except the laws relating to county hospital boards of governors and except laws relating to county nursing home boards, shall be given the status of county ordinance until June 30, 1978. These organizations shall continue to function under those respective laws until reorganized by county ordinance. The organizations subject to reorganization by county ordinance are, but are not limited to, the following:
    1. County library boards;
    2. County planning boards;
    3. County park commissions; and
    4. County welfare boards.
  2. Advisory board members appointed as a result of a reorganizational ordinance shall have a term of appointment as specified in this subchapter.
  3. Ordinances enacted by a county quorum court for the reorganization of county government into county departments, with or without advisory or administrative boards or subordinate service districts, may be adopted in a single reading of the court.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 107; 1977 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 6; 1979, No. 741, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4110.

Cross References. County hospitals board of governors, § 14-263-101 et seq.

Subchapter 8 — Legislative Powers

Cross References. Local government reserve funds, § 14-73-101.

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 193-230, 423-578.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, §§ 49, 50 and § 165 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Derden, Survey of Arkansas Law: Constitutional Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 188.

Goldner, A Call for Reform of Arkansas Municipal Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

14-14-801. Powers generally.

  1. As provided by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 1, Part (a), a county government, acting through its county quorum court, may exercise local legislative authority not expressly prohibited by the Arkansas Constitution or by law for the affairs of the county.
  2. These powers include, but are not limited to, the power to:
    1. Levy taxes in a manner prescribed by law;
    2. Appropriate public funds for the expenses of the county in a manner prescribed by ordinance;
    3. Preserve peace and order and secure freedom from dangerous or noxious activities. However, no act may be declared a felony;
    4. For any public purpose, contract or join with any other county, with any political subdivision, or with the federal government;
    5. Create, consolidate, separate, revise, or abandon any elected office, except during the term thereof, if a majority of those voting on the question at a general election have approved the action;
    6. Fix the number and compensation of deputies and county employees;
    7. Fix the compensation of each county officer within a minimum and maximum to be determined by law;
    8. Fill vacancies in elected county offices;
    9. Have the power to override the veto of the county judge by a vote of three-fifths (3/5) of the total membership of the quorum court;
    10. Provide for any service or performance of any function relating to county affairs;
    11. Impose a special assessment reasonably related to the cost of any special service or special benefit provided by county government or impose a fee for the provisions of a service;
    12. Provide for its own organization and management of its affairs; and
    13. Exercise other powers, not inconsistent with law, necessary for effective administration of authorized services and functions.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 69; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3801.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Jonathan L. Marshfield, Improving Amendment, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 477 (2016).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

County quorum court ordinance that required all county constitutional offices to be open during certain hours related to the performance of person in providing necessary services as a tax collector and, as such, was within the express powers granted the quorum court by Ark. Const. Amend. 55 and this section, and not in violation of the separation of powers provisions of the Arkansas Constitution. Walker v. County of Washington, 263 Ark. 317, 564 S.W.2d 513 (1978).

Compensation.

While it is clear that a county sheriff has the authority to appoint his deputies, it is equally clear that the compensation for these individuals is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the quorum court. Venhaus v. Adams, 295 Ark. 606, 752 S.W.2d 20 (1988).

County Employees.

A county ordinance that expressly required that a county employee be given two weeks notice prior to involuntary termination, that the reasons for such action had to be filed in writing, and that the employee had a right to appeal such action to a grievance board, did not, on its face, or as applied to sheriff's deputies, violate the separation of powers doctrine under Arkansas law by encroaching upon the executive branch of county government. Wilson v. Robinson, 668 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1981).

Elected Officials.

Ordinance by county quorum court prohibiting nepotism by elected county officials is a valid and properly adopted ordinance. Henderson v. Russell, 267 Ark. 140, 589 S.W.2d 565 (1979).

Fees.

Where ordinances of county quorum court levying additional local recording fees on deeds and other instruments were inconsistent and in conflict with § 21-6-306, which established a uniform standard amount of recording fee to be charged throughout the state, such ordinances exceeded the local legislative authority granted to the counties by Ark. Const. Amend. 55 and this section and were, therefore, void, and the moneys collected thereunder had to be refunded. Kollmeyer v. Greer, 267 Ark. 632, 593 S.W.2d 29 (1980).

Medical Services.

Section 14-14-801 et seq. and § 20-13-301 et seq. were not intended to provide alternative procedures for the establishment of emergency medical services by a county, since to hold that these provisions were intended to provide alternative methods would effectively render § 20-13-301 et seq. a nullity, as there would be no reason for a quorum court to choose the more arduous route required by § 20-13-301 et seq. when it could accomplish the same result more easily under § 14-14-801 et seq.Vandiver v. Washington County, 274 Ark. 561, 628 S.W.2d 1 (1982).

Section 14-14-801 et seq. gives the quorum court of any county the authority to provide for emergency medical services; however, the authority created under these provisions is governed and limited by the procedural requirements of § 20-13-301 et seq.Vandiver v. Washington County, 274 Ark. 561, 628 S.W.2d 1 (1982).

The general county powers law found in this section is circumscribed by § 20-13-303 when the method of financing a county emergency medical service is by service charge. West Wash. County Emergency Medical Servs. v. Washington County, 313 Ark. 76, 852 S.W.2d 137 (1993).

The term “as provided by law” in this section does not refer to § 20-13-303 in cases in which a service charge is to be imposed. West Wash. County Emergency Medical Servs. v. Washington County, 313 Ark. 76, 852 S.W.2d 137 (1993).

14-14-802. Providing of services generally.

  1. A county government, acting through the county quorum court, shall provide, through ordinance, for the following necessary services for its citizens:
    1. The administration of justice through the several courts of record of the county;
    2. Law enforcement protection services and the custody of persons accused or convicted of crimes;
    3. Real and personal property tax administration, including assessments, collection, and custody of tax proceeds;
    4. Court and public records management, as provided by law, including registration, recording, and custody of public records; and
    5. All other services prescribed by state law for performance by each of the elected county officers or departments of county government.
    1. A county government, acting through the quorum court, may provide through ordinance for the establishment of any service or performance of any function not expressly prohibited by the Arkansas Constitution or by law.
    2. These legislative services and functions include, but are not limited to, the following services and facilities:
      1. Agricultural services, including:
        1. Extension services, including agricultural, home economic, and community development;
        2. Fairs and livestock shows and sales services;
        3. Livestock inspection and protection services;
        4. Market and marketing services;
        5. Rodent, predator, and vertebrate control services; and
        6. Weed and insect control services;
      2. Community and rural development services, including:
        1. Economic development services;
        2. Housing services;
        3. Open spaces;
        4. Planning, zoning, and subdivision control services;
        5. Urban and rural development, rehabilitation, and redevelopment services; and
        6. Watercourse, drainage, irrigation, and flood control services;
      3. Community services, including:
        1. Animal control services;
        2. Cemetery, burial, and memorial services;
        3. Consumer education and protection services;
        4. Exhibition and show services;
        5. Libraries, museums, civic center auditoriums, and historical, cultural, or natural site services;
        6. Park and recreation services; and
        7. Public camping services;
      4. Emergency services, including:
        1. Ambulance services;
        2. Civil defense services;
        3. Fire prevention and protection services; and
        4. Juvenile attention services;
      5. Human services, including:
        1. Air and water pollution control services;
        2. Child care, youth, and senior citizen services;
        3. Public health and hospital services;
        4. Public nursing and extended care services; and
        5. Social and rehabilitative services;
      6. Solid waste services, including:
        1. Recycling services; and
        2. Solid waste collection and disposal services;
      7. Transportation services, including:
        1. Roads, bridges, airports, and aviation services;
        2. Ferries, wharves, docks, and other marine services;
        3. Parking services; and
        4. Public transportation services;
      8. Water, sewer, and other utility services, including:
        1. Sanitary and storm sewers and sewage treatment services; and
        2. Water supply and distribution services;
      9. Job training services and facilities; and
      10. Other services related to county affairs.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 70; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3802; Acts 2017, No. 452, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (b)(2)(J) [now (b)(2)(I)].

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Constitutionality of this section was upheld. Thruston v. Little River County, 310 Ark. 188, 832 S.W.2d 851 (1992).

This section does not violate the uniformity requirement of Ark. Const. Amend. 14. Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

This statute is not unconstitutional and in contravention Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 1(a). Villines v. Tucker, 324 Ark. 13, 918 S.W.2d 153 (1996).

Construction.

Providing for the administration of justice under subdivision (a)(1) is a mandatory service; providing a museum under subdivision (b)(2)(C)(v) is a discretionary service the county is authorized to offer. Haynes v. Faulkner County, 326 Ark. 557, 932 S.W.2d 328 (1996).

Designation of county building as a museum was not an illegal exaction since § 14-14-1102(b)(3) and Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 3, provide that the County Judge is the custodian of county property and is therefore authorized to determine how county property shall be used; moreover, subdivision (b)(2)(C)(v) of this section and § 13-5-501 et seq. authorize the County to provide for a county museum. Haynes v. Faulkner County, 326 Ark. 557, 932 S.W.2d 328 (1996).

Emergency Services.

Section 14-14-801 et seq. and § 20-13-301 et seq. were not intended to provide alternative procedures for the establishment of emergency medical services by a county, since to hold that these provisions were intended to provide alternative methods would effectively render § 20-13-301 et seq. a nullity, as there would be no reason for a quorum court to choose the more arduous route required by § 20-13-301 et seq. when it could accomplish the same result more easily under § 14-14-801 et seq.Vandiver v. Washington County, 274 Ark. 561, 628 S.W.2d 1 (1982).

Section 14-14-801 et seq. gives the quorum court of any county the authority to provide for emergency medical services; however, the authority created under these provisions is governed and limited by the procedural requirements of § 20-13-301 et seq.Vandiver v. Washington County, 274 Ark. 561, 628 S.W.2d 1 (1982).

Gravedigging.

Although gravedigging services can be provided when this section is complied with, where there was no indication from the record that the quorum court knew of the county's free gravedigging services other than testimony from a county judge, and even if the quorum court had known of the gravedigging services, it took no action by ordinance or otherwise to authorize such services; the provision of these services was invalid. Dudley v. Little River County, 305 Ark. 102, 805 S.W.2d 645 (1991).

Cited: Kollmeyer v. Greer, 267 Ark. 632, 593 S.W.2d 29 (1980); Wilson v. Robinson, 506 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Hall v. Fisher, 285 Ark. 222, 685 S.W.2d 803 (1985); Venhaus v. Adams, 295 Ark. 606, 752 S.W.2d 20 (1988); West Wash. County Emergency Medical Servs. v. Washington County, 313 Ark. 76, 852 S.W.2d 137 (1993).

14-14-803. Providing of facilities.

The power of county government to provide services includes the power to provide necessary and convenient facilities to support the services.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 71; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3803.

Case Notes

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

14-14-804. Regulatory powers.

The power of a county government to provide services includes the power to exercise regulatory powers in conjunction with the services.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 72; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3804.

14-14-805. Powers denied.

Each county quorum court in the State of Arkansas exercising local legislative authority is prohibited the exercise of the following:

  1. Any legislative act that applies to or affects any private or civil relationship, except as an incident to the exercise of local legislative authority;
  2. Any legislative act that applies to or affects the provision of collective bargaining, retirement, workers' compensation, or unemployment compensation. However, subject to the limitations imposed by the Arkansas Constitution and state law regarding these subject areas, a quorum court may exercise any legislative authority with regard to employee policy and practices of a general nature, including, but not limited to, establishment of general vacation and sick leave policies, general office hour policies, general policies with reference to nepotism, or general policies to be applicable in the hiring of county employees. Legislation promulgated by a quorum court dealing with matters of employee policy and practices shall be applicable only to employees of the county and shall not apply to the elected county officers of the county. Legislation applying to employee policy practices shall be only of a general nature and shall be uniform in application to all employees of the county. The day-to-day administrative responsibility of each county office shall continue to rest within the discretion of the elected county officials;
  3. Any legislative act that applies to or affects the public school system, except that a county government may impose an assessment, where established by the General Assembly, reasonably related to the cost of any service or specific benefit provided by county government and shall exercise any legislative authority which it is required by law to exercise regarding the public school system;
  4. Any legislative act which prohibits the grant or denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity;
  5. Any legislative act that establishes a rate or price otherwise determined by a state agency;
  6. Any legislative act that defines as an offense conduct made criminal by state law, that defines an offense as a felony, or that fixes the penalty or sentence for a misdemeanor in excess of a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) for any one (1) specified offense or violation, or double that sum for repetition of the offense or violation. If an act prohibited or rendered unlawful is, in its nature, continuous in respect to time, the fine or penalty for allowing the continuance of the prohibited or unlawful act, in violation of the ordinance, shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each day that it is unlawfully continued;
  7. Any legislative act that applies to or affects the standards of professional or occupational competence as prerequisites to the carrying on of a profession or occupation;
  8. Any legislative act of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contract shall not be enacted, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate;
  9. Any legislative act which grants to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the terms shall not equally belong to all citizens;
  10. Any legislative act which denies the individual right of property without just compensation;
  11. Any legislative act which lends the credit of the county for any purpose whatsoever or upon any interest-bearing evidence of indebtedness, except bonds as may be provided for by the Arkansas Constitution. This subdivision (11) does not apply to revenue bonds which are deemed not to be a general obligation of the county;
  12. Any legislative act that conflicts with the exercise by municipalities of any expressed, implied, or essential powers of municipal government; and
  13. Any legislative act contrary to the general laws of the state.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 73; 1979, No. 413, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3805; Acts 2013, No. 127, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (6), substituted “fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000)” for “fine of five hundred dollars ($500)” in the first sentence, and substituted “of the prohibited or unlawful act” for “thereof,” “five hundred dollars ($500)” for “two hundred fifty dollars ($250),” and ”is unlawfully” for “may be unlawfully” in the last sentence.

Cross References. Ordinances declaring agricultural operations nuisances void, § 2-4-105.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and State Constitutional Provisions Proscribing State Bills of Attainder. 63 A.L.R.6th 1.

Case Notes

Acts of Attainder.

All regulations, zoning or otherwise, which affect landowners are not acts of attainder. Johnson v. Sunray Servs., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 816 S.W.2d 582 (1991).

County Employees.

A county ordinance that provided a comprehensive scheme of employment policies for county employees including procedural steps to be followed in terminating their employment was clearly authorized by subdivision (2), and where a sheriff failed to establish the existence of any state decisional or positive law that contradicted the presumption that the ordinance and statute were constitutionally valid, the sheriff was required to comply with the ordinance's notice and grievance procedures in order to terminate the employment of his deputy sheriffs. Wilson v. Robinson, 668 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1981).

A county ordinance that expressly required that a county employee be given two weeks notice prior to involuntary termination, that the reasons for such action had to be filed in writing, and that the employee had a right to appeal such action to a grievance board, did not, on its face, or as applied to sheriff's deputies, violate the separation of powers doctrine under Arkansas law by encroaching upon the executive branch of county government. Wilson v. Robinson, 668 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1981).

Defendants did not violate this section as the county quorum court did not pass any ordinance that prohibited the practice of collective bargaining, nor did it prescribe the manner in which collective bargaining should be utilized; the quorum court merely expressed its intent not to renew the collective bargaining agreement with the union and the county employees. AFSCME, Local 380 v. Hot Spring County, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (W.D. Ark. 2004).

Former deputy's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 official capacity claim against a sheriff failed because the sheriff did not act as the final policymaker in terminating the deputy, as the sheriff's employment decisions were subject to review by the quorum court under this section. Thompson v. Shock, 852 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2017).

Public School Systems.

Where the General Assembly has not otherwise provided, the interest earned on school taxes collected belongs to the schools; therefore, a county quorum court ordinance that authorized the county collector to deposit into the county general fund all interest earned on school tax moneys held by the collector prior to transfer of those funds to the county treasurer was invalid, since the ordinance permitted the county to use the school tax money to earn money for the county without passing on any of the interest earned to the school districts, and also since the county was prohibited from passing any legislation “affecting public school systems,” which this ordinance surely did affect. Mears v. Little Rock School Dist., 268 Ark. 30, 593 S.W.2d 42 (1980).

Where the General Assembly had not passed any legislation establishing an “assessment” reasonably related to the cost of any service or specific benefit provided by the county government, the county quorum court was without the authority to order the school districts to pay a pro rata share of the salaries and expenses incurred in the collection of taxes by the county officers, other than the assessor's office. Mears v. Little Rock School Dist., 268 Ark. 30, 593 S.W.2d 42 (1980).

Cited: Wilson v. Robinson, 506 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

14-14-806. Powers requiring state delegation.

Each county quorum court in the State of Arkansas exercising local legislative authority is prohibited the exercise of the following powers, unless the power is specifically delegated by the General Assembly:

  1. The legislative power to authorize a tax on income or the sale of goods or services. This subdivision (1) shall not be construed to limit the authority of county government to levy any other tax or establish the rate of any other tax which is not inconsistent with the Arkansas Constitution or law;
  2. The legislative power to regulate private activities beyond its geographic limits;
  3. The legislative power to impose a duty on or regulate another unit of local government. However, nothing in this limitation shall affect the right of a county to enter into and enforce an agreement of intergovernmental cooperation; and
  4. The legislative power to regulate any form of gambling, lotteries, or gift enterprises.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 74; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3806.

Cross References. County gross receipts tax on hotels, motels and resturants, § 14-20-112.

Rural community projects, § 14-270-101 et seq.

Taxation generally, § 26-73-101 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 889.

14-14-807. Restrictive provisions.

A county exercising local legislative power is subject to the following provisions. These provisions are a prohibition on the legislative power of a county acting other than as provided:

  1. All state laws providing for the:
    1. Corporation or disincorporation of cities and towns;
    2. Annexation, disannexation, or exclusion of territory from a city or town; and
    3. Creation, abandonment, or boundary alteration of counties;
  2. All state laws establishing legislative procedures or requirements for county government;
  3. All laws requiring elections;
  4. All laws which regulate planning or zoning. However, a county quorum court, in the exercise of its local legislative power, may either accept, modify, or reject recommendations of the county planning board. Modifications of the recommendations shall be made by the procedures provided in § 14-17-201 et seq. The quorum court is empowered to initiate its own planning and zoning laws;
  5. All laws directing or requiring a county government, or any officer or employee of a county government, to carry out any function or provide any service. However, nothing in this subdivision (5) shall be construed to prevent counties from abolishing or consolidating an office under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 2(b), nor the reassignment of statutory delegated functions or services which the reassignment is permitted by law if the abolition, consolidation, or reassignment shall not alter the obligation of the county to continue providing the services previously provided by the abolished or consolidated office;
  6. All laws regulating finance or borrowing procedures and powers of local government;
  7. All laws governing eminent domain;
  8. All laws governing public information and open meetings; and
  9. All laws governing the vacation of roads, streets, or alleys.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 75; 1981, No. 278, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3807.

Cross References. County planning boards, § 14-17-201 et seq.

Case Notes

Elections.

An election commissioner is not given the sole authority under subdivision (3) to determine the amount of money necessary to conduct an election, since it is not intended by the General Assembly that the quorum courts be deprived of their fiscal authority over the funding of elections. Union County v. Union County Election Comm'n, 274 Ark. 286, 623 S.W.2d 827 (1981).

Cited: Walker v. County of Washington, 263 Ark. 317, 564 S.W.2d 513 (1978).

14-14-808. Consistency with state rules or regulations required.

  1. A county government exercising local legislative authority is prohibited the exercise of any power in any manner inconsistent with state law or administrative rule or regulation in any area affirmatively subjected by law to state regulation or control.
  2. The exercise of legislative authority is inconsistent with state law, rule, or regulation if it establishes standards or requirements which are lower or less stringent than those imposed by state law, rule, or regulation.
  3. An area is affirmatively subjected to state control if a state agency or officer is directed to establish administrative rules governing the matter or if enforcement of standards or requirements established by statute is vested in a state officer or agency.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 76; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3808; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 984.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules or regulations” for “regulation” in the section heading; inserted “rule or” and made similar changes in (a) and twice in (b); and deleted “and regulations” following “rules” in (c).

Case Notes

Cited: Kollmeyer v. Greer, 267 Ark. 632, 593 S.W.2d 29 (1980).

14-14-809. Concurrent powers.

  1. If a county government is authorized to regulate an area which the state by statute or administrative rule also regulates, the local government may regulate the area only by enacting ordinances which are consistent with state law or administrative rule.
  2. If a state statute or administrative rule prescribes a single standard of conduct, an ordinance is consistent if it is identical to the state statute or administrative rule.
  3. If a state statute or administrative rule prescribes a minimal standard of conduct, an ordinance is consistent if it establishes a standard which is the same as, or higher or more stringent than, the state standard.
  4. A county government may adopt ordinances which incorporate by reference state statutes and administrative rules in areas in which a local government is authorized to act.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 77; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3809; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 985.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rule” for “regulation” and “rules” for “regulations” throughout the section.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Johnson v. Sunray Services, Inc.: Possible Solutions to the NIMBY Syndrome, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 657.

Case Notes

Cited: Johnson v. Sunray Servs., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 816 S.W.2d 582 (1991).

14-14-810. Improvements to roadways serving private property.

    1. In the passage of this section, the General Assembly is cognizant of the responsibilities of the county judge and of the county quorum court with respect to the establishment and operation of public roads and for the construction, maintenance, repair, and upkeep of county roads. The General Assembly is also mindful of the importance of providing reasonable access to the public roads system for the procurement of emergency medical services; the education of school-age children transported by school buses; the obtaining of mail and the goods of commerce; the marketing of the agricultural, livestock, and poultry products produced on Arkansas farms; and access to numerous other services essential to the health, safety, and welfare of thousands of rural families in this state.
      1. It is, therefore, the purpose and intent of this section to authorize the quorum courts of counties having a population of no less than seven thousand (7,000) nor more than seven thousand five hundred (7,500), according to the 1980 Federal Decennial Census, to enact ordinances authorizing the county judge to provide for the use of county road machinery and equipment, materials, supplies, and labor to make improvements to the roadways serving private property that are deemed essential, under standards and procedures established by the court, to provide access to the public roads of the county in cases of bad weather or the occurrence of other events which may impair citizens of this state from obtaining reasonable and necessary access to the public roads of this state.
        1. The ordinance enacted by the quorum court shall prescribe the conditions, circumstances, and limitations under which the county judge is authorized to make improvements or to perform work upon roads used for access from private property to the public roads.
        2. In addition, the court may request the county judge to file reports from time to time, outlining the work performed in providing access of private property to the public roads, in such detail and at such frequencies as may be requested by the court.
    1. All work performed by the county judge on improvements necessary to make private property accessible to the public roads, as authorized in this section, and which is performed in compliance with the ordinance adopted by the county quorum court authorizing the work, shall be deemed to be public work for which public funds may be expended.
    2. All expenditures of county funds made by the county judge in compliance with this section are determined to be for a public purpose, as defined in this section.

History. Acts 1981, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-3810, 17-3811.

14-14-811. Salary of county judge and emergency management personnel.

  1. The quorum court of each county is authorized to pay a portion of the salary and related matching benefits of the county judge from the county road fund and the county solid waste fund.
    1. The portion of the county judge's salary paid from the county road fund shall not exceed fifty percent (50%).
    2. The portion paid from the county solid waste fund shall not exceed thirty-four percent (34%).
  2. However, the portion to be paid from the county general fund shall be at least one-third (1/3) of the total salary and matching benefits.
    1. At the discretion of the county judge, a county may pay a portion of the salary and related matching benefits of personnel of the local emergency management jurisdiction from the county road fund.
    2. The portion paid from the county road fund shall not exceed fifty percent (50%).

History. Acts 1987, No. 675, § 2; 1999, No. 725, § 1; 2011, No. 345, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 675, § 1, provided:

“It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Section 78 of Chapter 4 of Act 742 of 1977, as amended, and various other laws charge the county judge with the responsibility of constructing, maintaining, and operating a system of county roads, bridges, and ferries and gives the county judge broad administrative authority and responsibility with respect to the construction, maintenance, and operation of county roads; that as a result of this responsibility, a substantial portion of each county judge's time must be dedicated to the administration of the county road system; that under current interpretation of the present law, there is no clear authority to pay any portion of the salary of the county judge out of county road funds; that fairness and equity dictate that the county road system bear a fair share of the salary of the county judge since a substantial part of his time is dedicated to his responsibilities as administrator of the county road system. Therefore, it is the intent and purpose of this act to authorize the payment of up to one-half (½) of the salary of each county judge from the county road fund.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote the section heading and added (d).

Cross References. Compensation of elected county officers, § 14-14-1204.

14-14-812. Cemetery access roads.

  1. A “cemetery”, as used in this section, means any burying place for the dead, a burial plot, a graveyard, or any land, public or private, dedicated and used for the interment of human remains which includes at least six (6) grave markers.
    1. The county judges of the several county governments in Arkansas shall be authorized to improve and maintain any roads across public or private lands used or to be used for access to a cemetery.
    2. The cemetery access roads shall be constructed to a standard and nature to permit their use by automobiles.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1317, § 2; 1997, No. 1286, § 2.

Cross References. Cemeteries — Access — Debris — Disturbance, § 5-39-212.

Cemeteries generally, § 20-17-901 et seq.

Cemetery Act for Perpetually Maintained Cemeteries, § 20-17-1001 et seq.

Cemetery improvement districts, § 20-17-1101 et seq.

14-14-813. Authority to regulate unsanitary conditions.

  1. To the extent that it is not inconsistent with the powers exercised by incorporated towns and cities of the first class and cities of the second class under § 14-54-901 et seq., counties are empowered to order the owner of real property within the county to:
    1. Abate, remove, or eliminate garbage, rubbish, and junk as defined in § 27-74-402, and other unsightly and unsanitary articles upon property situated in the county; and
    2. Abate, eliminate, or remove stagnant pools of water or any other unsanitary thing, place, or condition that might become a breeding place for mosquitoes and germs harmful to the health of the community.
  2. A copy of the order issued under subsection (a) of this section shall be posted upon the property and:
    1. Mailed to the last known address of the property owner by the county clerk or other person designated by the quorum court; or
    2. Published in accordance with § 14-14-104 if there is no last known address for the property owner.
    1. If the property owner has not complied with the order within thirty (30) days after notice is given in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, the county may:
      1. Do either of the following:
        1. Take any necessary corrective actions, including repairs, to bring the property into compliance with the order; or
        2. Remove or raze any structure ordered by the county to be removed or razed; and
      2. Charge the cost of any actions under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section to the owner of the real property.
    2. The county shall have a lien against the property for any unpaid cost incurred under subdivision (c)(1) of this section in addition to interest at the maximum legal rate.
  3. In all successful suits brought to enforce liens granted under this section, the county shall be reimbursed its costs, including title search fees and a reasonable attorney's fee.
  4. This section does not apply to:
    1. Land valued as agricultural property that is being farmed or otherwise used for agricultural purposes; or
    2. A parcel of land larger than ten (10) acres if the unsanitary condition on the parcel is not visible from a public road or highway.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1984, § 1; 2007, No. 126, § 1; 2007, No. 250, § 1; 2019, No. 383, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment rewrote the introductory paragraph of (b); deleted former (b)(1); redesignated former (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B) as (b)(1) and (b)(2); and added the introductory language of (c)(1)(A).

14-14-814. Authority to regulate private communities.

  1. Upon the written request of a property owners' association of a private community that is located outside the boundaries of a municipality, a county may by ordinance regulate the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the private community within all or any part of the area included in the private community.
  2. The quorum court may by ordinance regulate animals upon petition by a majority of landowners or a property owners' association within the private community, including without limitation leash or harness requirements for domestic animals when the animals are outside the animal owner's property.
  3. As used in this section, “private community” means a community outside the corporate limits of a municipality but within a platted subdivision or a condominium complex.
  4. The quorum court may enforce this section under § 14-14-906.

History. Acts 2007, No. 144, § 1; 2013, No. 567, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote (a); and added (b) through (d).

Subchapter 9 — Legislative Procedures

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 717, § 3: Apr. 3, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that a referendum period of longer than 30 days on measures pertaining to County bond issues requires an unreasonable waiting period between the adoption of a measure authorizing the bonds and actual issuance; that bond purchasers are reluctant to guarantee interest rates for longer than 30 days; and that counties are severally handicapped under present law in marketing bonds upon the most favorable terms. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 220, § 3: Feb. 26, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is confusion regarding the right of the people to exercise the initiative and referendum with respect to county and municipal measures; that this Act is designed to clarify this confusion and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 406, § 6: Mar. 8, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the law provides that the county tax is to be levied in November of each year; that the law is unclear on what county tax rate is to apply, if any, if the ordinance levying the tax is repealed by referendum; and that this act is immediately necessary to avoid severe financial hardship on county governments. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 1300, § 29: Apr. 10, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that Amendment No. 74 to the Arkansas Constitution was adopted by the electors of this state on November 5, 1996; that Amendment No. 74 became effective on adoption and applies to ad valorem property taxes due in 1997; that the tax books of each county will open for collection of taxes in the near future and that local officials and school districts must have direction on procedures and effects of the various actions required. The General Assembly further finds that Amendment No. 74 requires enactment of legislation to implement the provisions thereof and that this act provides such implementation and should be given effect immediately to accomplish the purposes of Amendment No. 74 in an orderly, effective and efficient manner. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 901, § 2: Mar. 19, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that mistakes may occur in the levying of millage rates and court ordered millage rollback corrections are necessary in order to ensure that citizens are being taxed at the correct rate. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 981, § 3: Mar. 20, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that a referendum period of longer than 30 days on measures pertaining to short-term financing obligations of counties requires an unreasonable waiting period between the adoption of a measure authorizing the obligation and the actual funding and that counties should be able to enter into such obligations upon the most favorable terms and that immediate passage of this act is necessary to enable counties to incur such short-term financing obligations in a timely manner. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 105, § 12: Feb. 10, 2004. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Arkansas Supreme Court has declared that the current method that the state uses to determine compliance with Amendment 74 to be unconstitutional and has instructed the General Assembly to take action before the termination of the court's stay of its mandate. It has also found that the people must be informed as early as possible of the impact of the court's ruling on the property taxes that they pay for education. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 543, § 2: Mar. 3, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current law is unclear and confusing; that due to the confusing nature of the current law there have been delays in passing emergency legislation in the quorum courts of the State of Arkansas; and that this act is immediately necessary to clarify the current voting procedure and provide for more efficient county government. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: July 31, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 14 and 15, § 8: May 23, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that school districts that have chosen to hold their annual school election in November of this year are currently required to print separate ballots from the general election ballots at an extraordinary and unnecessary expense to taxpayers; that some voters in the annual school election this November will have to vote at a separate location for the general election and for the annual school election even though the elections are held on the same day which may decrease voter turnout and infringe upon the suffrage rights of those voters; and that this act is immediately necessary to ensure the voting rights of all citizens of Arkansas and to eliminate unnecessary election costs. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 564, § 3: Jan. 1, 2020.

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-901. Legislative authority.

The legislative power of county government is vested in the quorum court of each county of the state, subject to the limitations imposed by the Arkansas Constitution and by state law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 84; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4001.

Case Notes

County Employees.

Since county judge has power to hire and fire road department employees, a quorum court cannot provide by resolution a procedure for dismissal of such employees. Horton v. Taylor, 767 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1985).

Cited: Wilson v. Robinson, 506 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

14-14-902. Quorum court administration.

  1. Secretariat.
    1. The secretariat of the county quorum court shall be the clerk of the county court of each county unless otherwise provided by county ordinance.
    2. Alternative Designation. A quorum court may provide by ordinance for the establishment of minimum qualifications and an appropriation for the employment of a secretariat of the court. The employee so designated shall be a staff member of the county clerk or the county judge as may be specified by the ordinance. Where the separate position of secretariat is created by ordinance, all legislative duties prescribed in this chapter for a county clerk shall thereafter become the duties of the secretariat.
    3. Duties of the County Clerk. Unless otherwise provided for by county ordinance, the clerk or the deputy clerk shall:
      1. Attend all regular and special meetings of the court;
      2. Perform all administrative and recordkeeping duties prescribed in this chapter; and
      3. Perform all other duties as may be required by the quorum court through county ordinance.
  2. Counsel.
    1. Legal Counsel. The prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy serving each county shall serve as legal counsel of the quorum court unless otherwise provided by county ordinance.
    2. Alternative Designation of Legal Counsel. A quorum court may provide by ordinance for the appropriation of county funds for the employment of legal counsel to serve the court.
    3. Duties of Legal Counsel. The legal counsel of a quorum court shall:
      1. Attend all regular and special meetings of the court;
      2. Perform all duties prescribed in this chapter; and
      3. Perform all other duties as may be required by a quorum court.
  3. Other Administrative Services. A quorum court may authorize and provide through ordinance, for the employment of any additional staff or the purchase of technical services in support of legislative affairs.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 97; 1979, No. 413, §§ 25-27; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4014.

Case Notes

Legal Counsel.

Where county prosecuting attorney was asked to serve as legal counsel to the quorum court under subsection (b) in suit filed by county officials against the county judge and the quorum court, he should be relieved of his responsibility to represent the quorum court under Disciplinary Rules 5-101, 5-105, 5-107 and Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, since he would otherwise be placed in the untenable position of representing county officials who have competing interests with respect to other county officials. McCuen v. Harris, 271 Ark. 863, 611 S.W.2d 503 (1981).

14-14-903. Record of proceedings.

  1. Minutes. The quorum court of each county shall provide for the keeping of written minutes which include the final vote on each ordinance or resolution indicating the vote of each individual member on the question.
  2. County Ordinance and Resolution Register.
    1. There shall be maintained by each quorum court a county ordinance and resolution register for all ordinances, resolutions, and amendments to each, adopted and approved by the court.
      1. Entries in this register shall be sequentially numbered in the order adopted and approved and shall be further designated by the year of adoption and approval.
      2. A separate sequential numbering system shall be maintained for both ordinances and resolutions.
    2. The register number shall be the official reference number designating an enactment.
    3. The register shall be maintained as a permanent record of the court and shall contain, in addition to the sequential register number, the following items of information:
      1. An index number which shall be the originating legislative agenda number of the enactment;
      2. The comprehensive title of the enactment;
      3. The type of ordinance or amendment: general, emergency, appropriation, initiative, or referendum;
      4. The date adopted by the quorum court;
      5. The date approved by the county judge, date of veto override, or date enacted by the electors;
      6. The effective date of the enactment;
      7. The expiration date of the enactment; and
      8. A recording index number designating the location of the enactments.
  3. Permanent Record of Ordinances and Resolutions.
      1. There shall be maintained a permanent record of all ordinances and resolutions in which each enactment is entered in full after passage and approval, except when a code or budget is adopted by reference.
      2. When a code or budget is adopted by reference, the date and source of the code shall be entered.
      1. The permanent record shall be so indexed to provide for efficient identification, location, and retrieval of all ordinances and resolutions by subject, register number, and date enacted.
      2. The permanent record indexing may be by book and page.
  4. Codification of Ordinances.
    1. At five-year intervals, county ordinances of a general and permanent nature enacted in each of the several counties shall be compiled into a uniform code and published.
      1. A quorum court may codify county ordinances and revise the codification of county ordinances at other periodic times as it considers necessary.
      2. The county ordinance adopting the codification or revision:
        1. Shall be enacted and published in accordance with the requirements for the passage of county ordinances under this subchapter; and
        2. May provide for the repeal of certain county ordinances and parts of county ordinances by the deletion or omission of them from the codification or revision.
    2. A quorum court shall file a code of county ordinances and subsequent revisions to the code of county ordinances with the county clerk under § 14-14-909(b).
    3. A code of county ordinances is prima facie evidence of the law contained within it.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 96; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4013; Acts 2015, No. 280, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment redesignated (d) as (d)(1); added (d)(2) through (4); and substituted “At five-year intervals, county ordinances of a general and permanent nature” for “No later than 1980 and at five-year intervals thereafter, all county ordinances” in (d)(1).

14-14-904. Procedures generally. [Effective until January 1, 2020.]

  1. Time and Place of Quorum Court Assembly.
        1. The justices of the peace elected in each county shall assemble and organize as a county quorum court body on the first regular meeting date after the beginning of the justices' term in office, or the county judge may schedule the biennial meeting date of the quorum court on a date in January other than the first regular meeting date of the quorum court after the beginning of the justices' term.
        2. At the first regular meeting, the quorum court shall establish the date, time, and location of meetings of the quorum court.
        3. The organizational ordinance adopted at the first regular meeting of the quorum court shall be effective upon adoption.
      1. Thereafter, the justices shall assemble each calendar month at a regular time and place as established by ordinance and in their respective counties to perform the duties of a quorum court, except that more frequent meetings may be required by ordinance.
    1. By declaration of emergency or determination that an emergency exists and the safety of the general public is at risk, the county judge may change the date, place, or time of the regular meeting of the quorum court upon twenty-four-hour notice.
  2. Levy of Taxes and Making of Appropriations.
        1. The quorum court at its regular meeting in November or December of each year shall levy the county taxes, municipal taxes, and school taxes for the current year.
        2. Before the end of each fiscal year, the quorum court shall make appropriations for the expenses of county government for the following year.
      1. The Director of the Assessment Coordination Division may authorize an extension of up to sixty (60) days of the date for levy of taxes upon application by the county judge and county clerk of any county for good cause shown resulting from reappraisal or rollback of taxes.
    1. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the quorum court from making appropriation amendments at any time during the current fiscal year.
    2. If the levy of taxes is repealed by referendum, the county may adopt a new ordinance levying taxes within thirty (30) days after the referendum vote is certified.
    3. If a county court determines that the levy of taxes by the quorum court is incorrect due to clerical errors, scrivener's errors, or failure of a taxing entity to report the correct millage rate to the quorum court, the county court shall issue an order directing the county clerk to correct the error in order to correct the millage levy.
    4. If a determination is made under this subchapter or § 26-80-101 et seq. that the taxes levied by the quorum court are out of compliance with Arkansas Constitution, Article 14, § 3, as amended by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 11, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 40, and Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 74, then upon notice from the Director of the Division of Elementary and Secondary Education, the county court shall immediately issue an order directing the county clerk to change the millage levy to bring the taxes levied into compliance with Arkansas Constitution, Article 14, § 3, as amended by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 11, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 40, and Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 74.
  3. Special Meetings of Quorum Court.
    1. The county judge or a majority of the elected justices may call a special meeting of the quorum court upon at least twenty-four (24) hours' notice in such manner as may be prescribed by local ordinance.
    2. In the absence of procedural rules, the county judge or a majority of the elected justices may call a special meeting of the quorum court upon written notification of all members not less than two (2) calendar days prior to the calendar day fixed for the time of the meeting. The notice of special meeting shall specify the subjects, date, time, and designated location of the special meeting.
      1. Notice of assembly of a county grievance committee or assembly of less than a quorum of the body, referred to under this section as a “regular committee” or “special committee”, may be provided upon oral notice to the members of at least forty-eight (48) hours unless an emergency exists.
      2. If an emergency exists, written notice of at least twenty-four (24) hours stating the basis of the emergency shall be provided.
  4. Presiding Officer.
      1. The county judge shall preside over the quorum court without a vote but with the power of veto.
      2. In the absence of the county judge, a quorum of the justices by majority vote shall elect one (1) of their number to preside but without the power to veto.
      1. The presiding officer shall appoint all regular and special committees of a quorum court, subject to any procedural rules that may be adopted by ordinance.
      2. A regular committee or special committee of the quorum court shall not consist of more than a quorum of the whole body without the consent of the county judge.
  5. Procedural Rules and Attendance at Meetings.
    1. Except as otherwise provided by law, the quorum court of each county shall determine at the first regular meeting its rules of procedure, whether by Robert's Rules of Order or otherwise, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as may be prescribed by ordinance.
    2. The determination of rules of procedure under subdivision (e)(1) of this section shall be made at the first regular meeting of the quorum court in its organizational ordinance.
  6. Quorum. A majority of the whole number of justices composing a quorum court shall constitute a quorum and is necessary to conduct any legislative affairs of the county.
  7. Legislative Affairs. All legislative affairs of a quorum court shall be conducted through the passage of ordinances, resolutions, or motions.
  8. Majority Vote Required. All legislative actions of a quorum court, excluding the adoption of a motion, shall require a majority vote of the whole number of justices composing a quorum court unless otherwise provided by the Arkansas Constitution or by law. A motion shall require a majority vote of the whole number of justices composing a quorum for passage.
  9. County Ordinance. A county ordinance is defined as an enactment of compulsory law for a quorum court that defines and establishes the permanent or temporary organization and system of principles of a county government for the control and conduct of county affairs.
  10. County Resolution. A county resolution is defined as the adoption of a formal statement of policy by a quorum court, the subject matter of which would not properly constitute an ordinance. A resolution may be used whenever the quorum court wishes merely to express an opinion as to some matter of county affairs, and a resolution shall not serve to compel any executive action.
  11. Motion. A motion is defined as a proposal to take certain action or an expression of views held by the quorum court body. As such, a motion is merely a parliamentary procedure that precedes the adoption of resolutions or ordinances. Motions shall not serve to compel any executive action unless such action is provided for by a previously adopted ordinance or state law.
  12. Ordinances. Ordinances may be amended and repealed only by ordinances.
  13. Resolutions. Resolutions may be amended and repealed only by resolutions.
  14. Initiative and Referendum. All ordinances shall be subject to initiative and referendum as provided for through Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 85; 1979, No. 413, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4002; Acts 1991, No. 406, § 1; 1997, No. 1300, § 24; 2001, No. 901, § 1; 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 105, § 5; 2005, No. 252, § 1; 2011, No. 837, § 3; 2013, No. 127, § 2; 2013, No. 985, §§ 1, 2; 2015, No. 1174, §§ 1, 2; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 14, § 7; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 15, § 7; 2019, No. 910, §§ 2236, 2237.

Publisher's Notes. For text of section effective January 1, 2020, see the following version.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted (a)(2).

The 2013 amendment by No. 127 rewrote (a)(1).

The 2013 amendment by No. 985, in (c), designated paragraphs as (c)(1) and (c)(2) and inserted (c)(3); and, in (d), designated paragraphs as (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B), and (d)(2)(A) and inserted (d)(2)(B).

The 2015 amendment redesignated former (a)(1)(A)(ii) as part of (a)(1)(A)(i); substituted “or” for “Alternatively” following “term in office” in (a)(1)(A)(i); added (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii); redesignated (e) as (e)(1); in (e)(1), inserted “at the first regular meeting” and inserted “whether by Robert's Rules of Order or otherwise”; and added (e)(2).

The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 14 and 15 inserted “or December” in (b)(1)(A)(i).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division” for “Department” in (b)(1)(B); and substituted “Division of Elementary and Secondary Education” for “Department of Education” in (b)(5).

Cross References. Limitation on counties — Tax levies, § 26-25-101.

Taxation generally, § 26-73-101 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Case Notes

Ratification.

Even if the county judge had merely acted as the agent of the county in making an order laying out the highway right-of-way and fixing the width of the right-of-way on each side of the centerline, still the county court adopted and ratified the order by paying out county money arising for right-of-way claims because of the order. Bollinger v. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n, 229 Ark. 53, 315 S.W.2d 889 (1958), aff'd, 230 Ark. 877, 327 S.W.2d 381 (Ark. 1959) (decision under prior law).

Special Meetings.

Where a county's lease on a building used as a courthouse had expired and the rentals to be paid for a building used as a courthouse would in a few years amount to enough to build a courthouse, an emergency existed justifying a special session of the quorum court for the purpose of considering and voting an appropriation for the construction of a courthouse. Kleiner v. Parker, 177 Ark. 671, 8 S.W.2d 434 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Taxes and Appropriations.

Taxes must have been appropriated to the purpose for which collected. Lee County v. Phillips County, 46 Ark. 156 (1885) (decision under prior law).

Taxation for county purposes has to be uniform throughout the county; the levying court cannot provide for a dual system. Hutchinson v. Ozark Land Co., 57 Ark. 554, 22 S.W. 173 (1893) (decision under prior law).

A county tax levy will not be invalid on collateral attack because the levying court appropriated an amount in excess of the limits set in § 14-20-103, in the absence of any affirmative showing that the county had no funds derived from any other sources. Fussell v. Mallory, 97 Ark. 465, 134 S.W. 631 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Whether the county levying court levied a school tax in a certain district had to be determined by the records of that court and not by the depositions of the officers who composed the court. Alexander v. Capps, 100 Ark. 488, 140 S.W. 722 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Where quorum court failed to show a designation of the amount of the school levy in any school district by figures alone or otherwise, and it was impossible to determine from an examination of the record the amount of the millage sought to be levied, the levy made was void. Tyer v. Hazel, 212 Ark. 140, 205 S.W.2d 18 (1947) (decision under prior law).

There is no provision in law allowing a quorum court to turn over to the county judge a sum of money “to use as he sees fit and deems necessary,” and such an appropriation is invalid. Martin v. Bratton, 223 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.2d 635 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Quorum court has power and duty to determine and levy millages for county purposes only. Layne v. Strode, 229 Ark. 513, 317 S.W.2d 6 (1958) (decision under prior law).

In action involving the ad valorem assessment of real property where assessor, after making up his assessment books and an abstract of the assessed property, filed claim with the county clerk, who made out his report in accordance with the assessor's abstract, forwarding the report to the state, during which time the county board of equalization was in session, the action of the quorum court directing taxes be collected from the value established by the assessor was void, since the court was without authority to levy millages on any basis other than the assessment of the assessor, as were equalized and adjusted by the equalization board. Layne v. Strode, 229 Ark. 513, 317 S.W.2d 6 (1958) (decision under prior law).

There is no provision in the Arkansas Constitution or the statutes which gives a county court the specific authority to pay dues to a county judges association. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960) (decision under prior law).

Trial court did not err in denying a writ of mandamus brought by pension and retirement board to require county clerk and county collector to collect a four-tenths millage ad valorem tax as the city council did not approve the resolution for the tax prior to the county quorum court's meeting, as required by subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Russellville Police Pension Ret. Bd. v. Johnson, 365 Ark. 99, 225 S.W.3d 357 (2006).

Circuit court judge did not have statutory or constitutional authority to retroactively apply a millage-rate increase to 2007 library taxes after the special election because once a city issued an ordinance authorizing the ad valorem tax rates for 2007, a quorum court had authority pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(A)(i) of this section to levy taxes for the current year in its November meeting. Robinson v. Villines, 2009 Ark. 632, 362 S.W.3d 870 (2009), appeal dismissed, 2012 Ark. 211 (2012).

Time and Place.

A quorum court was lawfully in session on giving notice of the session in any manner to justices of the peace affected. Cleveland County v. Pearce, 171 Ark. 1145, 287 S.W. 593 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Horton v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Ark. 1984).

14-14-904. Procedures generally. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

  1. Time and Place of Quorum Court Assembly.
        1. The justices of the peace elected in each county shall assemble and organize as a county quorum court body on the first regular meeting date after the beginning of the justices' term in office, or the county judge may schedule the biennial meeting date of the quorum court on a date in January other than the first regular meeting date of the quorum court after the beginning of the justices' term.
        2. At the first regular meeting, the quorum court shall establish the date, time, and location of meetings of the quorum court.
        3. The organizational ordinance adopted at the first regular meeting of the quorum court shall be effective upon adoption.
      1. Thereafter, the justices shall assemble each calendar month at a regular time and place as established by ordinance and in their respective counties to perform the duties of a quorum court, except that more frequent meetings may be required by ordinance.
    1. By declaration of emergency or determination that an emergency exists and the safety of the general public is at risk, the county judge may change the date, place, or time of the regular meeting of the quorum court upon twenty-four-hour notice.
  2. Levy of Taxes and Making of Appropriations.
        1. The quorum court at its regular meeting in November or December of each year shall levy the county taxes, municipal taxes, and school taxes for the current year.
          1. Before the end of each fiscal year, the quorum court shall make appropriations for the expenses of county government for the following year.
          2. Upon the final passage of the annual appropriations ordinance under subdivision (b)(1)(A)(ii)(a) of this section, the county clerk shall publish the ordinance and annual budget on a website owned or maintained by the county, the state, or the Association of Arkansas Counties.
      1. The Director of the Assessment Coordination Division may authorize an extension of up to sixty (60) days of the date for levy of taxes upon application by the county judge and county clerk of any county for good cause shown resulting from reappraisal or rollback of taxes.
    1. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the quorum court from making appropriation amendments at any time during the current fiscal year.
    2. If the levy of taxes is repealed by referendum, the county may adopt a new ordinance levying taxes within thirty (30) days after the referendum vote is certified.
    3. If a county court determines that the levy of taxes by the quorum court is incorrect due to clerical errors, scrivener's errors, or failure of a taxing entity to report the correct millage rate to the quorum court, the county court shall issue an order directing the county clerk to correct the error in order to correct the millage levy.
    4. If a determination is made under this subchapter or § 26-80-101 et seq. that the taxes levied by the quorum court are out of compliance with Arkansas Constitution, Article 14, § 3, as amended by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 11, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 40, and Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 74, then upon notice from the Director of the Division of Elementary and Secondary Education, the county court shall immediately issue an order directing the county clerk to change the millage levy to bring the taxes levied into compliance with Arkansas Constitution, Article 14, § 3, as amended by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 11, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 40, and Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 74.
  3. Special Meetings of Quorum Court.
    1. The county judge or a majority of the elected justices may call a special meeting of the quorum court upon at least twenty-four (24) hours' notice in such manner as may be prescribed by local ordinance.
    2. In the absence of procedural rules, the county judge or a majority of the elected justices may call a special meeting of the quorum court upon written notification of all members not less than two (2) calendar days prior to the calendar day fixed for the time of the meeting. The notice of special meeting shall specify the subjects, date, time, and designated location of the special meeting.
      1. Notice of assembly of a county grievance committee or assembly of less than a quorum of the body, referred to under this section as a “regular committee” or “special committee”, may be provided upon oral notice to the members of at least forty-eight (48) hours unless an emergency exists.
      2. If an emergency exists, written notice of at least twenty-four (24) hours stating the basis of the emergency shall be provided.
  4. Presiding Officer.
      1. The county judge shall preside over the quorum court without a vote but with the power of veto.
      2. In the absence of the county judge, a quorum of the justices by majority vote shall elect one (1) of their number to preside but without the power to veto.
      1. The presiding officer shall appoint all regular and special committees of a quorum court, subject to any procedural rules that may be adopted by ordinance.
      2. A regular committee or special committee of the quorum court shall not consist of more than a quorum of the whole body without the consent of the county judge.
  5. Procedural Rules and Attendance at Meetings.
    1. Except as otherwise provided by law, the quorum court of each county shall determine at the first regular meeting its rules of procedure, whether by Robert's Rules of Order or otherwise, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as may be prescribed by ordinance.
    2. The determination of rules of procedure under subdivision (e)(1) of this section shall be made at the first regular meeting of the quorum court in its organizational ordinance.
  6. Quorum. A majority of the whole number of justices composing a quorum court shall constitute a quorum and is necessary to conduct any legislative affairs of the county.
  7. Legislative Affairs. All legislative affairs of a quorum court shall be conducted through the passage of ordinances, resolutions, or motions.
  8. Majority Vote Required. All legislative actions of a quorum court, excluding the adoption of a motion, shall require a majority vote of the whole number of justices composing a quorum court unless otherwise provided by the Arkansas Constitution or by law. A motion shall require a majority vote of the whole number of justices composing a quorum for passage.
  9. County Ordinance. A county ordinance is defined as an enactment of compulsory law for a quorum court that defines and establishes the permanent or temporary organization and system of principles of a county government for the control and conduct of county affairs.
  10. County Resolution. A county resolution is defined as the adoption of a formal statement of policy by a quorum court, the subject matter of which would not properly constitute an ordinance. A resolution may be used whenever the quorum court wishes merely to express an opinion as to some matter of county affairs, and a resolution shall not serve to compel any executive action.
  11. Motion. A motion is defined as a proposal to take certain action or an expression of views held by the quorum court body. As such, a motion is merely a parliamentary procedure that precedes the adoption of resolutions or ordinances. Motions shall not serve to compel any executive action unless such action is provided for by a previously adopted ordinance or state law.
  12. Ordinances. Ordinances may be amended and repealed only by ordinances.
  13. Resolutions. Resolutions may be amended and repealed only by resolutions.
  14. Initiative and Referendum. All ordinances shall be subject to initiative and referendum as provided for through Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 85; 1979, No. 413, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4002; Acts 1991, No. 406, § 1; 1997, No. 1300, § 24; 2001, No. 901, § 1; 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 105, § 5; 2005, No. 252, § 1; 2011, No. 837, § 3; 2013, No. 127, § 2; 2013, No. 985, §§ 1, 2; 2015, No. 1174, §§ 1, 2; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 14, § 7; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 15, § 7; 2019, No. 564, § 1; 2019, No. 910, §§ 2236, 2237.

Publisher's Notes. For text of section effective until January 1, 2020, see the preceding version.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted (a)(2).

The 2013 amendment by No. 127 rewrote (a)(1).

The 2013 amendment by No. 985, in (c), designated paragraphs as (c)(1) and (c)(2) and inserted (c)(3); and, in (d), designated paragraphs as (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B), and (d)(2)(A) and inserted (d)(2)(B).

The 2015 amendment redesignated former (a)(1)(A)(ii) as part of (a)(1)(A)(i); substituted “or” for “Alternatively” following “term in office” in (a)(1)(A)(i); added (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii); redesignated (e) as (e)(1); in (e)(1), inserted “at the first regular meeting” and inserted “whether by Robert's Rules of Order or otherwise”; and added (e)(2).

The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 14 and 15 inserted “or December” in (b)(1)(A)(i).

The 2019 amendment by No. 564 added the (b)(1)(A)(ii) (a) designation; and added (b)(1)(A)(ii) (b)

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division” for “Department” in (b)(1)(B); and substituted “Division of Elementary and Secondary Education” for “Department of Education” in (b)(5).

Cross References. Limitation on counties — Tax levies, § 26-25-101.

Taxation generally, § 26-73-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 564, § 3: Jan. 1, 2020.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Watkins, Open Meetings Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 268.

Case Notes

Ratification.

Even if the county judge had merely acted as the agent of the county in making an order laying out the highway right-of-way and fixing the width of the right-of-way on each side of the centerline, still the county court adopted and ratified the order by paying out county money arising for right-of-way claims because of the order. Bollinger v. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n, 229 Ark. 53, 315 S.W.2d 889 (1958), aff'd, 230 Ark. 877, 327 S.W.2d 381 (Ark. 1959) (decision under prior law).

Special Meetings.

Where a county's lease on a building used as a courthouse had expired and the rentals to be paid for a building used as a courthouse would in a few years amount to enough to build a courthouse, an emergency existed justifying a special session of the quorum court for the purpose of considering and voting an appropriation for the construction of a courthouse. Kleiner v. Parker, 177 Ark. 671, 8 S.W.2d 434 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Taxes and Appropriations.

Taxes must have been appropriated to the purpose for which collected. Lee County v. Phillips County, 46 Ark. 156 (1885) (decision under prior law).

Taxation for county purposes has to be uniform throughout the county; the levying court cannot provide for a dual system. Hutchinson v. Ozark Land Co., 57 Ark. 554, 22 S.W. 173 (1893) (decision under prior law).

A county tax levy will not be invalid on collateral attack because the levying court appropriated an amount in excess of the limits set in § 14-20-103, in the absence of any affirmative showing that the county had no funds derived from any other sources. Fussell v. Mallory, 97 Ark. 465, 134 S.W. 631 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Whether the county levying court levied a school tax in a certain district had to be determined by the records of that court and not by the depositions of the officers who composed the court. Alexander v. Capps, 100 Ark. 488, 140 S.W. 722 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Where quorum court failed to show a designation of the amount of the school levy in any school district by figures alone or otherwise, and it was impossible to determine from an examination of the record the amount of the millage sought to be levied, the levy made was void. Tyer v. Hazel, 212 Ark. 140, 205 S.W.2d 18 (1947) (decision under prior law).

There is no provision in law allowing a quorum court to turn over to the county judge a sum of money “to use as he sees fit and deems necessary,” and such an appropriation is invalid. Martin v. Bratton, 223 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.2d 635 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Quorum court has power and duty to determine and levy millages for county purposes only. Layne v. Strode, 229 Ark. 513, 317 S.W.2d 6 (1958) (decision under prior law).

In action involving the ad valorem assessment of real property where assessor, after making up his assessment books and an abstract of the assessed property, filed claim with the county clerk, who made out his report in accordance with the assessor's abstract, forwarding the report to the state, during which time the county board of equalization was in session, the action of the quorum court directing taxes be collected from the value established by the assessor was void, since the court was without authority to levy millages on any basis other than the assessment of the assessor, as were equalized and adjusted by the equalization board. Layne v. Strode, 229 Ark. 513, 317 S.W.2d 6 (1958) (decision under prior law).

There is no provision in the Arkansas Constitution or the statutes which gives a county court the specific authority to pay dues to a county judges association. Ark. Ass'n of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960) (decision under prior law).

Trial court did not err in denying a writ of mandamus brought by pension and retirement board to require county clerk and county collector to collect a four-tenths millage ad valorem tax as the city council did not approve the resolution for the tax prior to the county quorum court's meeting, as required by subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Russellville Police Pension Ret. Bd. v. Johnson, 365 Ark. 99, 225 S.W.3d 357 (2006).

Circuit court judge did not have statutory or constitutional authority to retroactively apply a millage-rate increase to 2007 library taxes after the special election because once a city issued an ordinance authorizing the ad valorem tax rates for 2007, a quorum court had authority pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(A)(i) of this section to levy taxes for the current year in its November meeting. Robinson v. Villines, 2009 Ark. 632, 362 S.W.3d 870 (2009), appeal dismissed, 2012 Ark. 211 (2012).

Time and Place.

A quorum court was lawfully in session on giving notice of the session in any manner to justices of the peace affected. Cleveland County v. Pearce, 171 Ark. 1145, 287 S.W. 593 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Horton v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Ark. 1984).

14-14-905. Adoption and amendment of ordinances generally.

  1. Introduction of Ordinances and Amendments to Existing Ordinances. A county ordinance or amendment to an ordinance may be introduced only by a justice of the peace of the county or through the provisions of initiative and referendum pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7.
  2. Style Requirements.
    1. Generally.
      1. No ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance passed by a county quorum court shall contain more than one (1) comprehensive topic and shall be styled “Be It Enacted by the Quorum Court of the County of , State of Arkansas; an Ordinance to be Entitled:”.
      2. Each ordinance shall contain this comprehensive title, and the body of the ordinance shall be divided into articles, sequentially numbered, each expressing a single general topic related to the single comprehensive topic.
    2. Amendment to Existing Ordinances. No county ordinance shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended, or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length.
  3. Passage.
      1. On the passage of every ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded.
      2. A concurrence by a majority of the whole number of members elected to the quorum court shall be required to pass any ordinance or amendment.
      1. All ordinances or amendments to existing ordinances of a general or permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly read on three (3) different days unless two-thirds (2/3) of the members composing the court shall dispense with the rule.
      2. This subdivision (c)(2) shall not serve to:
        1. Require a vote after each individual reading, but a vote only after the third and final reading;
        2. Require the ordinance or amendment to be read in its entirety on the first, second, or third reading; or
        3. Restrict the passage of emergency, appropriation, initiative, or referendum measures in a single meeting as provided by law.
  4. Approval and Publication.
      1. Upon passage, all ordinances or amendments shall be approved by the county judge within seven (7) days unless vetoed and shall become law without his or her signature if not signed within seven (7) days.
      2. The ordinances or amendments shall then be published by the county clerk as prescribed by law.
      1. Approval by the county judge shall be demonstrated by affixing his or her signature and his or her notation of the date signed on the face of an original copy of the proposed ordinance.
      2. This approval and authentication shall apply to all ordinances or amendments to existing ordinances unless the power of veto is invoked.
  5. Effective Date.
    1. No ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance other than an emergency ordinance or appropriation ordinance shall be effective until thirty (30) calendar days after publication has appeared.
    2. An ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance may provide for a delayed effective date or may provide for the ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance to become effective upon the fulfillment of an indicated contingency.
  6. Reference to Electors.
    1. Generally.
        1. At the time of or within thirty (30) days of adoption and prior to the effective date of an ordinance, a quorum court may refer the ordinance to the electors for their acceptance or rejection.
        2. The referral shall be in the form of a resolution and shall require a three-fifths affirmative vote of the whole number of justices constituting a quorum court.
      1. This action by a court shall not be subject to veto and shall constitute a referendum measure.
    2. Manner and Procedure.
      1. Any ordinance enacted by the governing body of any county in the state may be referred to a vote of the electors of the county for approval or rejection in the manner and procedure prescribed in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, and laws enacted pursuant thereto, for exercising the local initiative and referendum.
      2. The manner and procedure prescribed therein shall be the exclusive method of exercising the initiative and referendum regarding these local measures.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 86; 1981, No. 220, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-4003, 17-4003.1; Acts 2005, No. 543, § 1.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subdivision (f)(2) did not repeal § 14-14-915(b)(2), but specifically preserved all previously enacted enabling legislation, including § 14-14-915(b)(2). Cox v. French, 277 Ark. 134, 640 S.W.2d 786 (1982).

Passage.

Law requiring the clerk to keep a record of the proceedings and to enter the name and the yea and nay votes of those voting on propositions to levy tax or to appropriate money was mandatory. Blakemore v. Brown, 142 Ark. 293, 219 S.W. 311 (1920) (decision under prior law).

Clerk's failure to keep record of voting on proposition to levy taxes, for nonpayment of which realty was subsequently sold, was a mere omission of an officer to do a positive duty required by statute and could be cured by curative statute. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Moss, 196 Ark. 553, 118 S.W.2d 873 (1938) (decision under prior law).

After confirmation of the state's title to tax-forfeited land under former §§ 26-38-10826-38-118, it was too late to object to the validity of the tax sale on the ground that the record of the quorum court did not show the vote or the names of the justices voting for the motion levying the tax. Nichols v. Kesselberg, 211 Ark. 673, 201 S.W.2d 997 (1947) (decision under prior law).

Style Requirements.

Where an ordinance contains the word “ordained” rather than the statutorily prescribed word “enacted,” the ordinance is not void. Henderson v. Russell, 267 Ark. 140, 589 S.W.2d 565 (1979).

Cited: Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 901 S.W.2d 809 (1995); Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98, 947 S.W.2d 749 (1997).

14-14-906. Penalties for violation of ordinances.

  1. Authority to Establish.
      1. A county quorum court may fix penalties for the violation of any ordinance, and these penalties may be enforced by the imposition of fines, forfeitures, and penalties on any person offending against or violating the ordinance.
      2. The fine, forfeiture, or penalty shall be prescribed in each particular ordinance or in an ordinance prescribing fines, forfeitures, and penalties in general.
      1. A quorum court shall have power to provide, by ordinance, for the prosecution, recovery, and collection of the fines, forfeitures, and penalties.
        1. A quorum court shall not have the power to define an offense as a felony or to impose any fine or penalty in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) for any one (1) specified offense or violation, or double that sum for each repetition of the offense or violation.
        2. If an act prohibited or rendered unlawful is, in its nature, continuous in respect to time, the fine or penalty for allowing the continuance thereof, in violation of the ordinance, shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each day that it may be unlawfully continued.
  2. Disposition. All fines and penalties imposed for violation of any county ordinance shall be paid into the county general fund.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 95; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4012; Acts 2009, No. 319, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” for “five hundred dollars ($500)” in (a)(2)(B)(i), substituted “five hundred dollars ($500)” for “two hundred fifty dollars ($250)” in (a)(2)(B)(ii), and made a minor stylistic change.

14-14-907. Appropriation ordinances.

    1. Generally. An appropriation ordinance or amendment to an appropriation ordinance is defined as a measure by which the county quorum court designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specific portion of county revenue in the treasury, to be applied to some general object of expenditure or to some individual purchase or expense of the county.
    2. An appropriation ordinance or amendment to an existing appropriation ordinance may be introduced in the manner provided by law for the introduction of ordinances.
    3. Appropriation measures enacted by a quorum court shall include the following categories of financial management:
      1. The levy of taxes and special property tax assessments as provided by law; and
      2. The enactment of specific appropriations by which a specified sum has been set apart in the treasury and devoted to the payment of a particular demand. Specific appropriations may be enacted through the adoption of an annual budget, a statement of estimated receipts and expenditures, in a manner prescribed by law.
  1. Adoption and Amendment by Reference. Any quorum court may adopt, amend, or repeal an appropriation ordinance which incorporates by reference the provisions of any county budget or portion of a county budget, or any amendment thereof, properly identified as to date and source, without setting forth the provisions of the adopted budget in full. At least one (1) copy of a budget, portion, or amendment which is incorporated or adopted by reference shall be filed in the office of the county clerk and there kept available for public use, inspection, and examination.
  2. Designation. All appropriation ordinances or an amendment to an appropriation ordinance shall be designated “appropriation ordinance”.
  3. Readings and Publication. An appropriation ordinance may be enacted without separate readings or publication prior to passage. However, publication shall be initiated within two (2) calendar days, excepting holidays, after approval of the measure by the county judge.
  4. Voting Requirements. The passage of appropriation ordinances or amendments to existing appropriation ordinances enacted without separate readings shall require a two-thirds vote of the whole number of justices comprising a quorum court. On the passage of every appropriations measure, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
  5. Effective Date. An appropriation measure is effective immediately upon passage by the quorum court and approval by the county judge.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 87; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4004.

Cross References. Appropriations to be specific — Limitations, § 14-20-103.

Political subdivisions not to become stockholders in or lend credit to private corporations, Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 5.

Case Notes

Appropriation Measures.

County ordinance was not labeled or designated an appropriation measure because it was not one as defined by this section. Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98, 947 S.W.2d 749 (1997).

Eligibility for Retirement System.

Substantial evidence supported the finding of the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System that former employees of nursing homes owned by counties were not “county employees” under the relevant statutes and were not eligible for membership in the retirement system because their compensation was payable from patient revenues rather than from appropriated funds. Bd. of Trs. of the Ark. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Garrison, 2019 Ark. App. 245, 576 S.W.3d 485 (2019).

Assuming that the nursing-home administrative boards and their respective counties were synonymous under the definitions of “County employees” and “Employees” in § 24-4-101, the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System's finding that the former employees of county-owned nursing homes were not paid from appropriated funds as required by the definition of “Employees” in § 24-4-101 was affirmed as no ordinances in the record specifically designated county money for their compensation. Bd. of Trs. of the Ark. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Garrison, 2019 Ark. App. 245, 576 S.W.3d 485 (2019).

Voting Requirements.

Where the record showed a unanimous vote for all appropriations, it was unnecessary to show the ayes and nays; record need not be signed. Hilliard v. Bunker, 68 Ark. 340, 58 S.W. 362 (1900) (decision under prior law).

14-14-908. Emergency ordinances or amendments.

  1. Generally. An emergency ordinance or emergency amendments to existing ordinances may be introduced in the manner provided by law for the introduction of ordinances. An emergency ordinance may be enacted only to meet public emergencies affecting life, health, safety, or the property of people.
  2. Limitations. An emergency ordinance or amendment shall not levy taxes, impose special property tax assessments, impose or change a service rate, or be enacted on any franchise or special privilege creating any vested right or interest or alienating any property. Every extension, enlargement, grant, or conveyance of franchise or any rights, property, easements, lease, or occupation of, or in, any road, street, alley, or any part thereof in real property or interest in real property owned by a county government exceeding in value three hundred dollars ($300), whether it be by ordinance or otherwise, shall be subject to referendum and shall not be subject to emergency enactment.
  3. Declaration of Emergency. An emergency ordinance must contain a declaration that an emergency exists and define the emergency. All emergency ordinances shall be designated “emergency ordinance”.
  4. Readings and Publication. An emergency measure does not require separate readings or publication prior to passage. However, publication shall be initiated within seven (7) calendar days, excepting holidays, after approval of the emergency measure by the county judge.
  5. Voting Requirements. The passage of emergency ordinances or emergency amendments to existing ordinances shall require a two-thirds vote of the whole number of justices comprising a quorum court. On the passage of every emergency measure, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
  6. Effective Date. An emergency ordinance or emergency amendment to an existing ordinance is effective immediately upon passage by the quorum court and approval by the county judge.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 88; 1979, No. 413, § 22; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4005.

Case Notes

Enacting Clause.

Where an ordinance contains the word “ordained” rather than the statutorily prescribed word “enacted,” the ordinance is not void. Henderson v. Russell, 267 Ark. 140, 589 S.W.2d 565 (1979).

Ordinance Held Invalid.

Emergency clause in municipal ordinance containing no statement to show that some unforeseen occurrence caused the existing ordinance for special meetings to be injurious to life, health, or safety, was invalid. Burroughs v. Ingram, 319 Ark. 530, 893 S.W.2d 319 (1995).

Ordinance Held Valid.

Emergency ordinance allowing county to open and close graves without charge, complied with this section and was not clearly and unmistakably in violation of the state or federal constitutions. Thruston v. Little River County, 310 Ark. 188, 832 S.W.2d 851 (1992).

Ordinance calling for an election to submit one cent sales and use tax to voters did not violate this section because the ordinance did not itself levy a tax but was merely the first step in a process authorized by § 26-74-201 for the collection of the tax. Sanders v. County of Sebastian, 324 Ark. 433, 922 S.W.2d 334 (1996).

Readings and Publication.

Where the approval of an ordinance was on Thursday, and it was published in the next issue of the local weekly newspaper on Monday, with Saturday and Sunday excepted, the publication was at least initiated within two (now seven) days as contemplated by subsection (d). Henderson v. Russell, 267 Ark. 140, 589 S.W.2d 565 (1979) (decision prior to 1979 amendment).

14-14-909. Incorporation by reference.

  1. For the purpose of this section, “code” means any published compilation of rules which has been prepared by various technical trade associations, model code organizations, federal agencies, or this state, or any agency thereof, and shall include specifically, but shall not be limited to, building codes, plumbing codes, electrical wiring codes, health or sanitation codes, together with any other code which embraces rules pertinent to a subject which is a proper local county affair.
  2. Any county quorum court may adopt or repeal an ordinance that incorporates by reference the provisions of any code, or portions of any code, or any amendment thereof, properly identified as to date and source, without setting forth the provisions of the code in full. Notice of the intent to adopt a code by reference shall be published after the second reading and prior to final adoption of the code. At least one (1) copy of the code, portion, or amendment which is incorporated or adopted by reference shall be filed in the office of the county clerk and there kept available for public use, inspection, and examination. The filing requirements prescribed in this subsection shall not be considered to be complied with unless the required copies of the codes, portion, amendment, or public record are filed with the county clerk for a period of thirty (30) days prior to final adoption of the ordinance which incorporates the code, portion, or amendment by reference.
  3. The quorum court may adopt or amend a code by reference by an emergency ordinance and without notice.
  4. The process for repealing an ordinance which adopted or amended a code by reference shall be the same as for repealing any other ordinance.
  5. Any ordinance adopting a code, portion, or amendment by reference shall state the penalty for violating the code, portion, or amendment, or any provision thereof, separately, and no part of any penalty shall be incorporated by reference.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 89; 1979, No. 413, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4006.

14-14-910. Interlocal agreements.

  1. Generally. The county court of each county may contract, cooperate, or join with any one (1) or more other governments or public agencies, including any other county, or with any political subdivisions of the state or any other states, or their political subdivisions, or with the United States to perform any administrative service, activity, or undertaking which any contracting party is authorized by law to perform.
  2. Definitions.
    1. “County interlocal agreement” means any service contract entered into by the county court which establishes a permanent or perpetual relationship thereby obligating the financial resources of a county. Grant-in-aid agreements enacted through an appropriation ordinance shall not be considered an interlocal agreement.
    2. “Permanent or perpetual relationship” means for purposes of this section any agreement exhibiting an effective duration greater than one (1) year, twelve (12) calendar months, or an agreement exhibiting no fixed duration but where the apparent intent of the agreement is to establish a permanent or perpetual relationship. The interlocal agreements shall be authorized by ordinance of the quorum court. Any interlocal agreement enacted by ordinance may provide for the county to:
      1. Cooperate in the exercise of any function, power, or responsibility;
      2. Share the services of any officer, department, board, employee, or facility; and
      3. Transfer or delegate any function, power, responsibility, or duty.
  3. Contents. An interlocal agreement shall:
    1. Be authorized and approved by the governing body of each party to the agreement;
    2. Set forth fully the purposes, powers, rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the contracting parties; and
    3. Specify the following:
      1. Its duration;
      2. The precise organization, composition, and nature of any separate legal entity created;
      3. The purposes of the interlocal agreement;
      4. The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and establishing and maintaining a budget;
      5. The permissible methods to be employed in accomplishing the partial or complete termination of an agreement and for disposing of property upon partial or complete termination. The methods for termination shall include a requirement of six (6) months written notification of the intent to withdraw by the governing body of the public agency wishing to withdraw;
      6. Provision for an administrator or a joint board responsible for administering the joint or cooperative undertaking including representation of the contracting parties on the joint board;
      7. The manner of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real and personal property used in the joint or cooperative undertaking; and
      8. Any other necessary and proper matters.
  4. Submission to Legal Counsel. Prior to and as a condition precedent to its final adoption and performance, every agreement made shall be submitted to legal counsel who shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and compatible with all applicable laws. The legal counsel shall approve any agreement submitted to him or her unless he or she finds it does not meet the conditions set forth in this section. Then he or she shall detail in writing addressed to the governing bodies of the public agencies concerned the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of law. Failure to disapprove an agreement within thirty (30) days of its submission shall constitute approval.
  5. Submission to Attorney General. Prior to and as a condition precedent to its final adoption and performance, every agreement including a state or a state agency shall be submitted to the Attorney General who shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and compatible with the laws of the State of Arkansas. The Attorney General shall approve any agreement submitted to him or her unless he finds it does not meet the conditions set forth in this section. Then he or she shall detail in writing addressed to the governing bodies of the public agencies concerned the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of law. Failure to disapprove an agreement within thirty (30) days of its submission shall constitute approval.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 90; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4007.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Former subdivision (6) of this section provided that, effective February 1, 1978, all interlocal agreements subject to the provisions of this section should be reenacted or terminated by ordinance of the county quorum court and provided that no termination should impair the obligation of contract unless agreed to by the parties involved.

Case Notes

Construction.

Plain language of this section contemplates that counties may contract for any administrative service as long as either the county or the public agency is legally authorized to perform it; the plain language of this section contemplates that counties may delegate administrative powers to other public agencies under the provisions of this section. Sullins v. Central Arkansas Water, 2015 Ark. 29, 454 S.W.3d 727 (2015).

Applicability.

This section was applicable because a watershed protection agreement between a county and Central Arkansas Water required the county to expend money from its general tax revenues in executing the agreement and thus implicated the financial resources of the county; additionally, the actual enforcement of the agreement would, at times, involve existing members of the county staff beyond those for which Central Arkansas Water was reimbursing the county. Sullins v. Central Arkansas Water, 2015 Ark. 29, 454 S.W.3d 727 (2015).

Illegal Exaction.

Circuit court correctly ruled that a watershed protection agreement was valid under the Interlocal Agreement Act, § 14-14-910, because it was for administrative activities that either the county or Central Arkansas Water was legally authorized to perform and the county's financial resources were obligated in the agreement; because the contract between the county and Central Arkansas Water was authorized by the Act, the expenditure of funds under the contract was not an illegal exaction. Sullins v. Central Arkansas Water, 2015 Ark. 29, 454 S.W.3d 727 (2015).

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

14-14-911. Veto of ordinances or amendments.

  1. Authority to Veto. The county judge of each county shall preside over the county quorum court with the power of veto.
  2. Limitations of Veto. The power of veto shall be limited to the total text of an ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance, and this veto power shall not be construed to permit the veto of any single part, section, or line item of any ordinance or amendment. The power of veto shall not apply to measures enacted through the provisions of initiative and referendum.
  3. Time Limitations for Veto. The veto of any ordinance of a general or permanent nature must be exercised within seven (7) calendar days after passage by a quorum court.
  4. Procedure and Authentication of Veto. The veto of any ordinance or amendment of a general or permanent nature shall be authenticated by the county judge and shall be demonstrated by the filing of a written statement of the reasons of veto with the county clerk.
  5. Notification of Veto. Upon filing of the written notification of veto by the county judge, the county clerk shall immediately provide written notification to each member of the quorum court and provide each member with a copy of the veto statement filed by the judge.
  6. Suspension of Force. No ordinance vetoed shall have any force or validity unless, at the next regular meeting after the filing of the veto statement, the quorum court shall exercise its power to override a veto pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 4.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 91; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4008.

14-14-912. Veto override.

  1. Power of Veto Override. The quorum court of each county shall have the power to override the veto of the county judge.
  2. Vote Required. An affirmative vote of three-fifths (3/5) of the total membership of a quorum court shall be required to override the veto of any ordinance or amendment to an existing ordinance. On the consideration of a veto override by a court, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
  3. Time of Veto Override. A quorum court shall exercise the power of veto override over permanent and temporary ordinances at the next regular session of the court following the written notification of veto. Failure to override a veto in a single vote of the court shall constitute a confirmation of veto by a court, and no further consideration of veto override on the measure shall be introduced in subsequent sessions of the court. However, any ordinance or amendment so vetoed and confirmed by failure to override the veto may be reintroduced in the manner prescribed by law for the introduction of ordinances and amendments to ordinances.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 92; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4009.

14-14-913. Adoption and amendment of resolutions.

  1. A county resolution or amendment to a resolution may be introduced only by a justice of the peace of the county.
  2. No resolution or amendment to a resolution passed by a county quorum court shall contain more than one (1) comprehensive topic and shall be styled “Be It Resolved by the Quorum Court of the County of , State of Arkansas That:”.
  3. No county resolution shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by references to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended, or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length.
  4. A proposed resolution must be read and adopted by a majority vote of the whole number of justices comprising a quorum court. On the passage of every resolution or amendment to an existing resolution, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
  5. Resolutions or an amendment to an existing resolution may be introduced and adopted in a single meeting of the quorum court.
  6. Upon passage, all resolutions or amendments to existing resolutions shall be entered into the records of the quorum court. Publication of resolutions shall not be required except where publication is specified in the resolution adopted by a court.
  7. All resolutions shall be immediately effective unless a delayed effective date is specified.
  8. The power of veto shall not apply to the adoption of resolutions or amendments to resolutions.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 93; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4010.

14-14-914. Initiative and referendum generally.

  1. County Legislative Powers Reserved. The powers of initiative and referendum are reserved to the electors of each county government pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7.
  2. Restrictions. No county legislative measure shall be enacted contrary to the Arkansas Constitution or any general state law which operates uniformly throughout the state, and any general law of the state shall have the effect of repealing any county ordinance which is in conflict therewith. All ordinances adopted by the county quorum court providing for alternative county organizations and all proposed reorganizations of county government that may be proposed by initiative petition of electors of the county under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, shall be submitted to the electors of the county only at the next following general election. However, such referendum shall be subject to initiative petition.
  3. Petition by Electors. The qualified electors of each county may initiate and amend ordinances and require submission of existing ordinances to a vote of the people by petition if signed by not less than fifteen percent (15%) of the qualified electors voting in the last general election for the office of circuit clerk, or the office of Governor where the electors have abolished the office of circuit clerk.
  4. Suspension of Force.
    1. General Ordinance. A referendum petition on a general ordinance, or any part thereof, shall delay the effective date on that part included in the petition until the ordinance is ratified by the electors. However, the filing of a referendum petition against one (1) or more items, sections, or parts of any ordinance shall not delay the remainder from becoming operative.
    2. Emergency Ordinance. A referendum petition on an emergency ordinance shall not suspend the force of the law, but the measure may be law until it is voted upon by the electors.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 94; 1979, No. 413, § 24; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4011.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Case Notes

Legislative Powers.

Where provisions of optional general stock law were never put in force in county, an initiated stock law covering the county was valid. Smith v. Plant, 179 Ark. 1024, 19 S.W.2d 1022 (1929) (decision under prior law).

The qualified electors of any particular county may enact salary laws applicable to that particular county. Dozier v. Ragsdale, 186 Ark. 654, 55 S.W.2d 779 (1932); Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72 (1935); Tindall v. Searan, 192 Ark. 173, 90 S.W.2d 476 (1936); Phillips v. Rothrock, 194 Ark. 945, 110 S.W.2d 26 (1937) (decisions under prior law).

Neither this section nor Ark. Const. Amend. 7, nor any other state law prohibits the voters of a county from using their right of initiative to call for a referendum whereby the people of the county can express their approval or disapproval of the quorum court's action in leasing a county owned hospital. Proctor v. Hammons, 277 Ark. 247, 640 S.W.2d 800 (1982).

Petition by Electors.

Where an elector wishes to place a bond issue on a special election ballot, but no votes were tabulated in the most recent general election for circuit clerk, the number of signatures required on the referendum petition should be determined by the total votes cast in the last general election in which votes were cast for the circuit clerk. Yarbrough v. Witty, 336 Ark. 479, 987 S.W.2d 257 (1999).

14-14-915. Initiative and referendum requirements.

  1. Style Requirements of Petitions. A petition for county initiative or referendum filed by the electors shall:
    1. Embrace only a single comprehensive topic and shall be styled and circulated for signatures in the manner prescribed for county ordinances and amendments to ordinances established in this section and § 7-9-101 et seq.;
    2. Set out fully in writing the ordinance sought by petitioners; or in the case of an amendment, set out fully in writing the ordinance sought to be amended and the proposed amendment; or in the case of referendum, set out the ordinance, or parts thereof, sought to be repealed; and
    3. Contain a written certification of legal review by an attorney at law duly registered and licensed to practice in the State of Arkansas. This legal review shall be conducted for the purpose of form, proper title, legality, constitutionality, and conflict with existing ordinances. Legal review shall be concluded prior to the circulations of the petition for signatures. No change shall be made in the text of any initiative or referendum petition measure after any or all signatures have been obtained.
  2. Time Requirements for Filing Petitions.
    1. Initiative Petitions. All petitions for initiated county measures shall be filed with the county clerk not less than ninety (90) calendar days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) calendar days prior to the date established for the next regular election.
    2. Referendum Petitions. All petitions for referendum on county measures must be filed with the county clerk within sixty (60) calendar days after passage and publication of the measure sought to be repealed.
    3. Certification. All initiative and referendum petitions must be certified sufficient to the county board of election commissioners not less than seventy (70) calendar days prior to a regular general election to be included on the ballot. If the adequacy of a petition is determined by the county clerk less than seventy (70) days prior to the next regular election, the election on the measure shall be delayed until the following regular election unless a special election is called on a referendum measure as provided by law.
  3. Filing of Petitions. Initiative and referendum petitions ordering the submission of county ordinances or measures to the electors shall be directed to and filed with the county clerk.
  4. Sufficiency of Petition. Within ten (10) days after the filing of any petition, the county clerk shall examine and ascertain its sufficiency. Where the petition contains evidence of forgery, perpetuated either by the circulator or with his or her connivance, or evidence that a person has signed a name other than his or her own to the petition, the prima facie verity of the circulator's affidavit shall be nullified and disregarded, and the burden of proof shall be upon the sponsors of petitions to establish the genuineness of each signature. If the petition is found sufficient, the clerk shall immediately certify the finding to the county board of election commissioners and the quorum court.
  5. Insufficiency of Petition and Recertification. If the county clerk finds the petition insufficient, within ten (10) days after the filing thereof the clerk shall notify the petitioners or their designated agent or attorney of record, in writing, setting forth in detail every reason for the findings of insufficiency. Upon notification of insufficiency of the petition, the petitioners shall be afforded ten (10) calendar days, exclusive of the day notice of insufficiency is receipted, in which to solicit and add additional signatures, or to submit proof tending to show that signatures rejected by the county clerk are correct and should be counted. Upon resubmission of a petition which was previously declared insufficient, within five (5) calendar days the county clerk shall recertify its sufficiency or insufficiency in the same manner as prescribed in this section and, thereupon, the clerk's jurisdiction as to the sufficiency of the petition shall cease.
  6. Appeal of Sufficiency or Insufficiency Findings. Any taxpayer aggrieved by the action of the clerk in certifying the sufficiency or insufficiency of any initiative or referendum petition, may within fifteen (15) calendar days, but not thereafter, may file a petition in circuit court for a review of the findings.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 94; 1979, No. 891, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4011; Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 50.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “not less than ninety (90) calendar days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) calendar days” for “not less than sixty (60) calendar days nor more than ninety (90) calendar days” in (b)(1); and substituted “seventy (70)” for “forty (40)” twice in (b)(3).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The 15-day time limit in subsection (f) of this section is not unconstitutional in violation of Ark. Const. Amend. 7. Committee for Util. Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 290 Ark. 283, 718 S.W.2d 933 (1986).

Subsection (d) does not conflict with U.S. Const. amend. 7 because under the statute, the person attacking the petition must first meet the burden of proving the petition contains evidence of forgery or that there is evidence a person has signed a name other than his or her own, and this is consistent with the constitution, which places the burden of proof on the challenger; because the burden is on the contestant in the first instance, the statute does not conflict with the constitution. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Construction.

Subsection (e) does not purport to preclude a circuit court from considering in its review the entirety of the petition, which includes all of the signatures submitted to a county clerk with the petition, but merely sets a deadline of five days for the county clerk to complete the task of determining whether thirty-eight percent of the registered voters signed the petition, after the sponsors have been given ten days to cure the previous deficiencies. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Filing.

Procedural deficiencies by county clerk on proper filing of petition held not fatal when there is yet time in which the clerk may correct such deficiencies. Brown v. Davis, 226 Ark. 843, 294 S.W.2d 481 (1956) (decision under prior law).

Signatures.

Subsection (e) does envision the collection of signatures following the clerk's notification that the petition, as originally submitted, is insufficient; however, there is nothing in the statute that expressly prohibits a sponsor from collecting signatures after the petition has been filed with the county clerk. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Circuit court clearly erred by refusing to consider 720 signatures in its review of the county clerk's certification of a ballot-question committee's local-option petition; a circuit court is called upon to determine whether the petition is sufficient, meaning whether thirty-eight percent of the registered voters signed the petition, and, in that review, a circuit court has to consider the entire petition, which includes all of the signatures submitted to a county clerk with the petition. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Although the statute couches the deadline in jurisdictional terms, it does not follow that a circuit court is prohibited from considering uncounted signatures when determining the correctness of a clerk's certification that thirty-eight percent of registered voters signed the petition; although a county clerk is required to meet the deadline, the clerk's loss of jurisdiction after five days does not limit the evidence that can be received in circuit court upon de novo review of certification. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Subsection (d) does not conflict with U.S. Const. amend. 7 because under the statute, the person attacking the petition must first meet the burden of proving the petition contains evidence of forgery or that there is evidence a person has signed a name other than his or her own, and this is consistent with the constitution, which places the burden of proof on the challenger; because the burden is on the contestant in the first instance, the statute does not conflict with the constitution. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Because a ballot-question committee presented no evidence verifying excluded signatures, the circuit court correctly excluded all of the signatures found on petitions where any one signature was found to be invalid; nothing in the language of the statute limits its application to the county clerk's verification process. Our Cmty., Our Dollars v. Bullock, 2014 Ark. 457, 452 S.W.3d 552 (2014).

Sufficiency of Petition.

One affidavit to each petition consisting of many pages was held sufficient. Blocker v. Sewell, 189 Ark. 924, 75 S.W.2d 658 (1934) (decision under prior law).

Where evidence is satisfactory that names appearing on initiative petitions are not, prima facie, qualified electors, and no proof is offered to overcome this showing, the names will be stricken from the lists. Hargis v. Hall, 196 Ark. 878, 120 S.W.2d 335 (1938) (decision under prior law).

Evidence that names appearing on initiative petition were written in groups and in handwritings other than that of persons whose names were being used held sufficient to establish fraud, requiring the names be purged from lists. Hargis v. Hall, 196 Ark. 878, 120 S.W.2d 335 (1938) (decision under prior law).

If persons' names are signed by others to petition for the submission of a proposed initiated act to the voters, in the absence of wrongful intent or connivance between the signers and circulators of the petition, only those names wrongfully signed should be stricken. Sturdy v. Hall, 204 Ark. 785, 164 S.W.2d 884 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Where affidavits filed by circulators of petitions for an initiated measure were found to be false, the court was not wrong, as a matter of law, in excluding entirely the petitions of those affiants when the affiants merely said that they did not actually see all the persons sign in their presence. Parks v. Taylor, 283 Ark. 486, 678 S.W.2d 766 (1984).

Trial judge properly set aside a county clerk's certification of initiative petitions and properly instructed an election commission to remove the issue from the ballot because there was sufficient evidence on which the trial judge could rely to find that certain people signed names other than their own on various initiative petitions submitted to the clerk; the trial court was well within its bounds under subsection (d) of this section to reject the validity of those petitions and invalidate all of the signatures. Save Energy Reap Taxes v. Shaw, 374 Ark. 428, 288 S.W.3d 601 (2008).

Trial court erred in dismissing appellants' complaint challenging the validity of a county clerk's certification of a “wet/dry” initiative petition for placement on the ballot at a general election because appellants satisfied their burden of proof under subsection (d) of this section regarding two allegedly forged signatures on a petition; because the county clerk failed to produce any evidence on the issue, all of the signatures on the petition that contained the alleged forgeries had to be decertified. Mays v. Cole, 374 Ark. 532, 289 S.W.3d 1 (2008).

Time Requirements.

Where filing dates of initiative petitions showed they were filed less than 60 days before election contrary to Arkansas Constitution, there could be no presumption that the public had notice of proceeding contemplated and required by the constitution, and there was, therefore, no authority for holding the election and, the election was a nullity. Phillips v. Rothrock, 194 Ark. 945, 110 S.W.2d 26 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Section 14-14-905(f)(2) did not repeal subdivision (b)(2), but specifically preserved all previously enacted enabling legislation, including subdivision (b)(2). Cox v. French, 277 Ark. 134, 640 S.W.2d 786 (1982).

Paragraph three of the local petitions part of Ark. Const. Amend. 7, which states that the time for filing referendum petitions is from 30 to 90 days from the passage of the county measure, is not self-executing, because it clearly anticipates that general laws may be enacted fixing a time for filing a referendum petition at a specific time between 30 and 90 days; therefore, where the General Assembly, by enacting subdivision (b)(2), fixed the time at 60 days, the General Assembly exercised its lawful power to enact enabling legislation. Cox v. French, 277 Ark. 134, 640 S.W.2d 786 (1982).

Supreme Court of Arkansas had appellate jurisdiction over an appeal of a circuit court order affirming the county clerk's determination that a local-option petition was insufficient to place on the ballot; the 10-day appeal period of § 3-8-205(b) only applied when the county clerk had certified a petition and indicated that it would be placed on the ballot, and appellants had timely appealed under this section. Keep Our Dollars in Independence Cnty. v. Mitchell, 2017 Ark. 154, 518 S.W.3d 64 (2017).

Cited: Henard v. St. Francis Election Comm., 301 Ark. 459, 784 S.W.2d 598 (1990); Lawson v. St. Francis County Election Comm'n, 309 Ark. 135, 827 S.W.2d 159 (1992).

14-14-916. Judicial jurisdiction over initiative and referendum.

  1. Jurisdiction of Circuit Court. Jurisdiction is vested upon the circuit courts to hear and determine petitions for writs of mandamus, injunctions, and all other actions affecting the submission of any proposed county initiative or referendum petitions. All such proceedings and actions shall be heard summarily upon five (5) calendar days' notice in writing and shall have precedence over all other suits and matters before the court.
  2. Limitation of Injunction or Stay of Proceedings. No procedural steps in submitting an initiative or referendum measure shall be enjoined, stayed, or delayed by the order of any court or judge after the petition has been declared sufficient, except in circuit court on petition to review as provided in this section. During the pendency of any proceeding to review, the findings of the county clerk shall be conclusive and binding and shall not be changed or modified by any temporary order or ruling, and no court or judge shall entertain jurisdiction of any action or proceeding questioning the validity of any such ordinance or measure until after it shall have been adopted by the people.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 94; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4011; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 21.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Case Notes

Injunction.

In suit to restrain enforcement of an initiative act and to have the act declared invalid, exhibits attached to motion to dissolve temporary restraining order, showing that jurisdictional requirements were met in respect of initiation of the act, showed prima facie the act was legally adopted. Sager v. Hibbard, 203 Ark. 672, 158 S.W.2d 922 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Jurisdiction.

The only jurisdiction conferred upon chancery courts is to review action of county clerk in determining the sufficiency of petitions for local laws. Hutto v. Rogers, 191 Ark. 787, 88 S.W.2d 68 (1935) (decision under prior law).

A chancery court has jurisdiction only to review the action of the county or city clerk in determining the sufficiency of petitions; proper jurisdiction of a suit to question the validity of a proposed measure lies in the circuit court. Dean v. Williams, 339 Ark. 439, 6 S.W.3d 89 (1999).

Cited: Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

14-14-917. Initiative and referendum elections.

  1. Time of Election for Initiative and Referendum Measures.
    1. Initiative. Initiative petition measures shall be considered by the electors only at a regular general election at which state and county officers are elected for regular terms.
    2. Referendum. Referendum petition measures may be submitted to the electors during a regular general election and shall be submitted if the adequacy of the petition is determined within the time limitation prescribed in this section. A referendum measure may also be referred to the electors at a special election called for the expressed purpose proposed by petition. However, no referendum petition certified within the time limitations established for initiative measures shall be referred to a special election, but shall be voted upon at the next regular election. No referendum election shall be held less than sixty (60) days after the certification of adequacy of the petition by the county clerk.
    3. Calling Special Elections. The jurisdiction to establish the necessity for a special election on referendum measures is vested in the electors through the provisions of petition. Where the jurisdiction is not exercised by the electors, the county court of each of the several counties may determine the necessity. However, a quorum court may compel the calling of a special election by a county court through resolution adopted during a regularly scheduled meeting of the quorum court. The resolution may specify a reasonable time limitation in which a county court order calling the special election shall be entered.
    4. Time of Special Election. The county court shall fix the date for the conduct of any special elections on referendum measures. The date shall be not less than established under § 7-11-201 et seq. When the electors exercise their powers to establish the necessity for a special election, the county court shall order an election according to the dates stated in § 7-11-201 et seq.
  2. Certification Requirements.
    1. Numeric Designation of Initiative and Referendum Measures. Upon finding an initiative or referendum petition sufficient and prior to delivery of the certification to a board of election commissioners and quorum court, the county clerk shall cause the measure to be entered into the legislative agenda register of the quorum court. This entry shall be in the order of the original filing of petition, and the register entry number shall be the official numeric designation of the proposed measure for election ballot purposes.
    2. Certification of Sufficiency. The certification of sufficiency for initiative and referendum petitions transmitted by the county clerk to the county board of election commissioners and quorum court shall include the ballot title of the proposed measure, the legislative agenda registration number, and a copy of the proposed measure, omitting signatures. The ballot title certified to the board shall be the comprehensive title of the measure proposed by petition, and the delivery of the certification to the chair or secretary of the board shall be deemed sufficient notice to the members of the board and their successors.
  3. Notice of Election.
    1. Initiative Petitions. Upon certification of any initiative or referendum petition measure submitted during the time limitations for a regular election, the county clerk shall give notice through publication by a two-time insertion, at not less than a seven-day interval, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county or as provided by law. Publication notice shall state that the measure will be submitted to the electors for adoption or rejection at the next regular election and shall include the full text, the ballot title, and the official numeric designation of the measure.
    2. Referendum Petition. Upon certifying any referendum petition prior to the time limitations of filing measures established for a regular election, the county clerk shall give notice through publication by a one-time insertion in a newspaper of general circulation in the county or as provided by law. Publication notice shall state that the measure will be submitted to the electors for adoption or rejection at the next regular election or a special election when ordered by the county court and shall include the full text, the ballot title, and the official numeric designation of the measure.
    3. Publication of Special Referendum Election Notice. Upon filing of a special election order by the county court, the county clerk shall give notice of the election through publication by a two-time insertion, at not less than a seven-day interval, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county or as provided by law. Publication shall state that the measure will be submitted to the electors for adoption or rejection at a special election and shall include the full text, the date of the election, the ballot title, and official numeric designation of the measure.
    4. Costs. The cost of all publication notices required in this section shall be paid out of the county general fund.
  4. Ballot Specifications for Initiative and Referendum Measures.
      1. Upon receipt of any initiative or referendum measure certified as sufficient by a county clerk, it shall be the duty of the members of the county board of election commissioners to take due cognizance and to certify the results of the vote cast thereon.
        1. Except as provided in subdivision (d)(1)(B)(ii) of this section, the board shall cause the ballot title to be placed on the ballot to be used in the election, stating plainly and separately the title of the ordinance or measure so initiated or referred by the quorum court to the electors with these words:
        2. If the election concerns repeal of an ordinance or measure by referendum petition, the ballot shall state plainly the title of the initiated ordinance or referred measure with these words:
    1. In arranging the ballot title on the ballot, the commissioners shall place it separate and apart from the ballot titles of the state acts, constitutional amendments, and the like. If the board of election commissioners fails or refuses to submit a proposed initiative or referendum ordinance when it is properly petitioned and certified as sufficient, the qualified electors of the county may vote for or against the ordinance or measure by writing or stamping on their ballots the proposed ballot title, followed by the word “FOR” or “AGAINST”, and a majority of the votes so cast shall be sufficient to adopt or reject the proposed ordinance.
  5. Conflicting Measures. Where two (2) or more ordinances or measures shall be submitted by separate petition at any one (1) election, covering the same subject matter and being for the same general purpose, but different in terms, words, and figures, the ordinance or measure receiving the greatest number of affirmative votes shall be declared the law, and all others shall be declared rejected.
  6. Contest of Election. The right to contest the returns and certification of the vote cast upon any proposed initiative or referendum measure is expressly conferred upon any ten (10) qualified electors of the county. The contest shall be brought in the circuit court and shall be conducted under the procedure for contesting the election of county officers, except that the complaint shall be filed within sixty (60) days after the certification of the vote, and no bond shall be required of the contestants.
  7. Vote Requirement for Enactment of Ordinance. Any measure submitted to the electors as provided in this section shall take effect and become law when approved by a majority of the votes cast upon the measure, and not otherwise, and shall not be required to receive a majority of the electors voting at the election. The measure so enacted shall be operative on and after the thirtieth day after the election at which it is approved, unless otherwise specified in the ordinance or amendment.

“FOR PROPOSED INITIATIVE (OR REFERRED) ORDINANCE (OR AMENDMENT OR MEASURE)

NO.

AGAINST PROPOSED INITIATIVE (OR REFERRED) ORDINANCE (OR AMENDMENT OR MEASURE)

NO.

“FOR REPEAL OF THE INITIATIVE (OR REFERRED) ORDINANCE (OR AMENDMENT OR MEASURE)

NO.

AGAINST REPEAL OF THE INITIATIVE (OR REFERRED) ORDINANCE (OR AMENDMENT OR MEASURE)

NO.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 94; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4011; Acts 2003, No. 1441, § 2; 2007, No. 1049, § 35; 2009, No. 1480, § 51; 2015, No. 1036, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” twice in (a)(4).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (d) as (d)(1) and (2); deleted “So that electors may vote upon the ordinance or measure” from the end of (d)(1)(A); in (d)(1)(B)(i), in the introductory language, added “Except as provided in subdivision (d)(1)(B)(ii) of this section” to the beginning and inserted “by the quorum court,” and added “OR MEASURE” twice throughout; and added (d)(1)(B)(ii).

Cross References. Special school elections, § 6-14-102.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Case Notes

Ballot Specifications.

The words “Initiative Act No. 1 of White County” preceding the title was no part of the title and the omission of the words “of White County” from the ballot did not affect its validity. Smith v. Plant, 179 Ark. 1024, 19 S.W.2d 1022 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Ballot title, “An act to fix the salaries and expenses of county officers and to fix the manner in which such compensations and salaries shall be paid and to reduce the costs of county government, and for other purposes,” was sufficient. Coleman v. Sherrill, 189 Ark. 843, 75 S.W.2d 248 (1934); Blocker v. Sewell, 189 Ark. 924, 75 S.W.2d 658 (1934); House v. Brazil, 196 Ark. 602, 119 S.W.2d 397 (1938) (decisions under prior law).

Calling Special Elections.

The matter of calling a special election, if not exercised by the electors, rests in the discretion of the county judge and/or the quorum court, either of which may determine the necessity of calling a special election. Quattlebaum v. Davis, 265 Ark. 588, 579 S.W.2d 599 (1979).

Contest of Elections.

Equity had no jurisdiction to try election contests involving initiated acts. Hutto v. Rogers, 191 Ark. 787, 88 S.W.2d 68 (1935) (decision under prior law).

Taxpayer's suit against county officials to enjoin disbursement of public revenues pursuant to provisions of initiated act by reason that submission of the question was unauthorized under the initiative and referendum act and enabling act passed pursuant thereto, and therefore did not become a law notwithstanding a favorable vote thereon, held not an election contest, and 60 day limitation would not apply to it. Phillips v. Rothrock, 194 Ark. 945, 110 S.W.2d 26 (1937) (decision under prior law).

In suit to restrain enforcement of an initiative act and to have the act declared invalid, exhibits attached to motion to dissolve temporary restraining order, showing that jurisdictional requirements were met in respect of initiation of the act, showed prima facie the act was legally adopted. Sager v. Hibbard, 203 Ark. 672, 158 S.W.2d 922 (1942) (decision under prior law).

Proper procedure to prevent calling of election on dog racing by board of commissioners was by suit against commissioners rather than against county clerk, since an election was under authority of former statutes relating to racing, and not under the power of initiative or referendum. Townes v. McCollum, 221 Ark. 920, 256 S.W.2d 716 (1953) (decision under prior law).

After a question is submitted to and voted upon by the people, the sufficiency of the petition was of no importance and could not be questioned. Herrington v. Hall, 238 Ark. 156, 381 S.W.2d 529 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Under former statute and Ark. Const. Amend. 7, validity of election wherein countywide stock law was adopted was not affected by failure of court to rule on action attacking validity of petition prior to the election where record showed no request for trial nor objection for failure to grant a trial. Herrington v. Hall, 238 Ark. 156, 381 S.W.2d 529 (1964) (decision under prior law).

When the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 was adopted, chancery courts had no jurisdiction with respect to election contests or the adjudication of political rights, and such jurisdiction could not be conferred by statute. McFerrin v. Knight, 265 Ark. 658, 580 S.W.2d 463 (1979) (decision under prior law).

Publication of Election Notices.

Acts 1911 (Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 15, relating to the publication of initiated measures, could have no applicability to local or county measures after the adoption of Ark. Const. Amend. 7. Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S.W.2d 72 (1935) (decision under prior law).

Vote Requirements.

An affirmative vote could not be given effect when the petition was not filed in compliance with the constitutional provisions. Phillips v. Rothrock, 194 Ark. 945, 110 S.W.2d 26 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Henard v. St. Francis Election Comm., 301 Ark. 459, 784 S.W.2d 598 (1990); Redd v. Sossomon, 315 Ark. 512, 868 S.W.2d 466 (1994).

14-14-918. Passage of initiative and referendum measures.

  1. Recording of Enactment. Upon passage of any initiative or referendum measure by the electors, the county clerk shall record the enactment in the county ordinance and resolution register in the manner provided by law for all county ordinances and resolutions. The register entry number designation shall thereby become the official reference number designating the enactment.
  2. Quorum Court Authority. No measure approved by a vote of the electors shall be amended or repealed by a quorum court except by affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the whole number of justices comprising a court. On the passage of an amendment or repealing measure, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded in the minutes of the meeting.
  3. Preservation of Records. All petitions, certificates, notices, and other evidences of procedural steps taken in submitting any ordinance shall be filed and preserved for a period of three (3) years by the county clerk.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 94; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4011.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296 (1980).

14-14-919. Referendum petitions on county bond issue.

All referendum petitions under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, against any measure, as the term is used and defined in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, pertaining to a county bond issue or a short-term financing obligation of a county under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78, must be filed with the county clerk within thirty (30) days after the adoption of any such measure.

History. Acts 1979, No. 717, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4011.1; Acts 2001, No. 981, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 981, § 2, provided:

“All laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict.”

Subchapter 10 — Judicial Powers

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 413, § 28: Mar. 20, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Act 742 of 1977 contains certain deficiencies and ambiguities detrimental to the citizens of this State; and that amendatory legislation must be immediately enacted to remedy the defects. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 193-230, 423-578.

14-14-1001. County court generally.

  1. Courts of Record. The county court shall be a court of record and shall keep just and faithful records of its proceedings.
  2. Seal of the Court. The county court of each county shall preserve and keep a seal with such emblems and devices as the court deems proper. The seal shall be clear and legible and capable of photographic reproduction. The impression of the seal of the court by stamp shall be sufficient sealing in all cases in which sealing is required.
  3. Establishment of Office. The county judge shall maintain an office in a county building at the county seat. The office shall be open to the public during normal business hours. However, in counties having more than one (1) county seat or judicial district, the county court may prescribe the times and places the offices shall be open to the public for the transaction of county business.
  4. Term of the County Court. The terms of the county courts shall be held at the times that are prescribed for holding the supervisor's courts or may otherwise be prescribed by law. There shall be no adjournment of county courts, but the courts shall be deemed in recess when not engaged in the transaction of county business. In counties having more than one (1) judicial district, the county court shall be concurrently in session in each district.
  5. Disqualification of Judges. Whenever a judge of the county may be disqualified for presiding in any cause pending in his or her court, he or she shall certify the facts to the Governor, who shall thereupon commission a special judge to preside in the cause during the time the disqualification may continue or until the cause may be fully disposed of.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 81; 1979, No. 413, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3904; Acts 2005, No. 1227, § 1; 2013, No. 469, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment inserted the second sentence in (b).

Case Notes

Unauthorized Practice of Law.

Circuit court did not err in dismissing a company's tax assessment appeal for lack of jurisdiction when its tax manager, a nonlawyer, initiated the appeal on its behalf because the company invoked the legal process and its nonattorney representative engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; the company, through a nonlawyer, lodged its appeal in the county court, initiating the appeal process in a court of record. Desoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Hill, 2017 Ark. 326, 531 S.W.3d 396 (2017).

14-14-1002. Other judicial authorities of county court.

  1. Injunctions, Restraining Orders, and Provisional Writs. In case of the absence of the circuit judge from the county, the county court may issue injunctions, restraining orders, and other provisional writs after the action has been commenced, but not before. However, either party may have the order reviewed by the circuit judge.
  2. Defense of County. In cases when appeals are prosecuted in the circuit court or Supreme Court, the county judge shall defend them, and all expenses or money paid out by reason of his or her defense shall be repaid by the proper county, by order of the county court.
  3. Writs of Habeas Corpus. The county judge shall have power, in the absence of the circuit judge from the county, to issue, hear, and determine writs of habeas corpus, under such regulations and restrictions as shall be provided by law.
  4. Compensation. The county judge shall receive such compensation for his or her services as presiding judge of the county court as may be provided by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 82; 1979, No. 413, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3905; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 22.

Case Notes

Cited: Villines v. Harris, 340 Ark. 319, 11 S.W.3d 516 (2000).

14-14-1003. Appeals.

Appeals from all judgments of the county courts may be taken to the circuit court, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 83; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3906; Acts 2017, No. 260, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment deleted “or courts of common pleas, when established,” following “county courts”.

Case Notes

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978); Union County v. Union County Election Comm'n, 274 Ark. 286, 623 S.W.2d 827 (1981).

Subchapter 11 — Executive Powers

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 394, § 5: Mar. 6, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that devastating tornadoes and flooding recently occurred in several counties of the state; that several of the affected counties have been declared disaster areas by the Governor; that as a result of the disaster considerable cleanup services and other services will be required on private property as well as public property; that it is in the best interests of the counties involved in such disasters as well as residents of those counties that the devastated areas be cleaned up and restored as quickly as is feasible; that the use of county equipment and labor to the extent the county judge deems appropriate would be beneficial to everyone involved, and that this act is designed to permit the use of county equipment and labor on private property in these limited circumstances and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 193-230, 423-578.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-1101. Powers of county judge generally.

  1. Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 3, established the following executive powers to be administered by the county judge:
    1. To preside over the county quorum court, without a vote but with the power of veto;
    2. To authorize and approve disbursement of appropriated county funds;
    3. To operate the system of county roads;
    4. To administer ordinances enacted by the quorum court;
    5. To have custody of county property; and
    6. To hire county employees, except those persons employed by other elected officials of the county.
  2. In the performance of such executive duties, the county judge shall be bonded in the manner provided by law, as required in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 6.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 78; 1979, No. 98, § 1; 1981, No. 994, § 1; 1983, No. 183, § 1; 1983, No. 232, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3901.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 994 became law without the Governor's signature.

Acts 1983, No. 183, § 3, provided that the General Assembly recognizes that the provisions of Acts 1981, No. 994 were confusing and contained language that could not be reconciled; that Acts 1981, No. 994 created considerable confusion and misunderstanding, and that some counties have entered into leases, contracts, and arrangements which may be questionable under the provisions of Acts 1981, No. 994; and that in order to avoid further confusion and misunderstanding, all such contracts, leases, or other arrangements entered into by any county during the period from the effective date of Acts 1981, No. 994 until the effective date of this act that were entered into in conformity with the law in existence prior to the effective date of Acts 1981, No. 994, or in conformity with Acts 1981, No. 994, were declared to be legal and binding.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Case Notes

Bond.

Where an action was brought for damages against county judge for dismissing a person from position of director of county program on aging, the county judge, in hiring and firing county employees, was exercising administrative and ministerial functions under this section, since the last paragraph of this section requires the judge to be bonded in the performance of his executive duties, including the hiring of county employees, and such bonding requirement would be meaningless if hiring and firing of county officials was a judicial function; thus, the county judge was not entitled to judicial immunity for his actions under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 28. Clark v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

14-14-1102. Exercise of powers by county judge.

  1. Performance. The General Assembly determines that the executive powers of the county judge as enumerated in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 3, are to be performed by him or her in an executive capacity and not by order of the county court.
  2. Procedures. In the exercise of the executive powers of the county judge as enumerated, the county judge shall adhere to the following procedures:
    1. Operation of System of County Roads, Bridges, and Ferries.
        1. The county judge shall be responsible for the administrative actions affecting the conduct of a plan of public roadways and bridges throughout the unincorporated areas of the county, including the maintenance and construction of public roadways and bridges and roadway drainage designated as eligible for expenditure of county funds. This jurisdiction shall be exercised pursuant to law, and nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting a county in performing public roadway and bridge maintenance and construction services within the incorporated municipal boundaries where permitted and in the manner prescribed by law.
        2. For the purposes of this section, the term “bridges” shall include all structures erected over a river, creek, ditch, or obstruction in a public roadway. The county judge shall administer the operation of county-owned ferries.
        1. The county court shall continue to exercise the powers granted by law for the granting of a right to maintain a ferry by a private individual at a particular place and at which a toll for the transportation of persons or property is levied to conduct an uninterrupted roadway over interrupted waters.
        2. The quorum court may establish by ordinance appropriate procedures and schedules of tolls that may be charged by private individuals who are granted authority to operate a private ferry on connecting public roadways;
    2. Authorization and Approval of the Disbursement of Appropriated County Funds.
        1. All vouchers for the payment of county funds out of the county treasury shall be approved and filed by the county judge or his or her designated representative, who shall be appointed by executive order of the judge and who shall be bonded in an amount equal to the county judge's bond in the manner provided by law.
        2. Approval for payment shall be signified by the signature of the county judge or his or her designated representative.
        3. A copy of the executive order evidencing the designated representative's appointment shall be filed in the office of county clerk with the original of the surety bond on the designated representative.
      1. Before approving any voucher for the payment of county funds, the county judge, or his or her designated representative, shall determine that:
        1. There is a sufficient appropriation available for the purpose and there is a sufficient unencumbered balance of funds on hand in the appropriate county fund to pay therefor;
        2. The expenditure is in compliance with the purposes for which the funds are appropriated;
        3. All state purchasing laws and other state laws or ordinances of the quorum court are complied with in the expenditure of the moneys;
        4. The goods or services for which expenditure is to be made have been rendered and the payment thereof has been incurred in a lawful manner and is owed by the county. However, a county judge may approve, in advance, claims payable to the University of Arkansas Cooperative Extension Service for educational services to be rendered during all or part of the current fiscal year.
        1. No money shall be paid out of the treasury until it shall have been appropriated by law and then only in accordance with the appropriation, and all contracts for erecting and repairing the public buildings in any county or for materials therefor, or for providing for the care and feeding of paupers where there are no public or private facilities or services available for such a purpose, shall be given to the lowest possible bidder under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
        2. The county judge shall have the authority to enter into necessary contracts or other agreements to obligate county funds and to approve expenditure of county funds appropriated therefor in the manner provided by law.
          1. The county judge of each county may promulgate appropriate administrative rules and regulations, after notice and hearing thereon, for the conduct of county financial affairs.
          2. The administrative rules and regulations shall be consistent with the provisions of laws relating to financial management of county government and the appropriate ordinances enacted by the quorum court.
          3. All such administrative rules and regulations adopted after hearings by the county judge shall be certified by the county judge and filed in the office of the county clerk to be open to public inspection at all normal hours of business.
      1. Custody of County Property. The county judge, as the chief executive officer of the county, shall have custody of county property and is responsible for the administration, care, and keeping of such county property, including the right to dispose of county property in the manner and procedure provided by law for the disposal of county property by the county court. The county judge shall have the right to lease, assign, or not assign use of the property whether or not the county property was purchased with county funds or was acquired through donations, gifts, grants, confiscation, or condemnation.
      2. In addition to other terms the county court finds reasonable and proper, the contract for the lease of county property shall provide that when the leased property ceases to be used for the purpose expressed in the lease or needs to be used by the county, the lease may be cancelled by the county court after reasonable notice.
    3. Administration of Ordinances Enacted by the Quorum Court. The county judge shall be responsible for the administration and performing the executive functions necessary for the management and conduct of county affairs, as prescribed by ordinance of the quorum court, unless the performance of such duties is vested in the county court by ordinances enacted by the quorum court or by the general laws of this state.
      1. Hiring of County Employees, Except Those Persons Employed by Other Elected Officials of the County. The county judge, as the chief executive officer of the county, is responsible for the employment of the necessary personnel or for the purchase of labor or services performed by individuals or firms employed by the county or an agency thereof for salaries, wages, insurance, or other forms of compensation.
        1. “County or subdivisions thereof”, for the purposes of this section, means all departments except departments administratively assigned to other elected officials of the county, boards, and subordinate service districts created by county ordinance.
          1. Jurisdiction for the hiring of employees of counties, administrative boards, or subordinate service districts may be delegated by ordinance to the board or service district, but where any county ordinance delegating authority to hire county employees interferes with the jurisdiction of the county judge, as provided in this section, it shall be implied that the delegation shall be performed only with the approval of the county judge.
          2. The jurisdiction to purchase the labor of an individual for salary or wages employed by other elected officials of the county shall be vested in each respective elected official.
    4. Presiding Over the Quorum Court Without a Vote, but with the Power of Veto.
      1. In presiding over the quorum court, the county judge shall perform such duties in connection therewith as may be provided by state law and in accordance with rules and procedures promulgated by the court for the conduct of its business.
      2. Nothing in this subdivision shall limit the veto power of the county judge as provided in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55.
    5. Accepting Gifts, Grants, and Donations from Federal, Public, or Private Sources.
      1. The county judge, as the chief executive officer, is authorized to accept, in behalf of the county, gifts, grants, and donations of real or personal property for use of the county. He or she may apply for, enter into necessary contracts, receive, and administer for and in behalf of the county, subject to such appropriation controls that the quorum court may elect to adopt by ordinance, funds from the federal government, from other public agencies, or from private sources.
      2. All such contracts or agreements shall be filed as public record with the county clerk.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 78; 1979, No. 98, § 1; 1979, No. 413, §§ 16, 17; 1981, No. 994, § 1; 1983, No. 183, § 1; 1983, No. 232, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3901; Acts 1997, No. 387, § 1; 2009, No. 410, §§ 1, 2; 2011, No. 837, § 4.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 994 became law without the Governor's signature.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (b)(3)(B) and redesignated the remaining text accordingly, inserted “lease” in (b)(3)(A), inserted “insurance” in (b)(5)(A), and made minor stylistic and punctuation changes

The 2011 amendment inserted “or her” in (b)(2)(A)(i); and deleted “manual” preceding “signature” in (b)(2)(A)(ii).

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply to bribes received by a county judge. Anderson v. Sharp County, 295 Ark. 366, 749 S.W.2d 306 (1988).

County Employees.

The county judge, as an executive officer of the county, is vested with responsibility with respect to hiring county employees and with respect to salaries, wages, and other forms of compensation. McCuen v. Jackson, 265 Ark. 819, 581 S.W.2d 326 (1979).

When a county judge entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union, the judge exercised his executive responsibility to provide county employees with other forms of compensation; therefore, the judge acted within his capacity to bind the county to the CBA and the county had an obligation to pay the insurance premiums for the county employees' dependents. AFSCME, Local 380 v. Hot Spring County, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (W.D. Ark. 2004).

County museum.

Designation of county building as a museum was not an illegal exaction since subdivision (b)(3) of this section and Ark. Const. Amend. 55, § 3, provide that the County Judge is the custodian of county property and is therefore authorized to determine how county property shall be used; moreover, §§ 14-14-802(b)(2)(C)(v) and 13-5-501 et seq. authorize the County to provide for a county museum. Haynes v. Faulkner County, 326 Ark. 557, 932 S.W.2d 328 (1996).

Expenditures.

By electing to appeal chancellor's award of a monetary judgment, the county judge was attempting to ensure that the requirements of this section that the expenses had been incurred in a lawful manner and that payment was owed by the county were met. Venhaus v. Pulaski County Quorum Court, 291 Ark. 558, 726 S.W.2d 668 (1987).

Summary judgment for gas company in its declaratory action was proper because the county's grant of a pipeline easement to manufacturer was null and void due to the county's failure to follow the appraisal, notice, and bidding procedures required in § 14-16-105; § 14-16-105 provides the “manner and procedure” for the conveyance of the pipeline easement and this section, which pertains to the use of county property, does not allow the county judge to forego the procedures set out in § 14-16-105. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).

Unlawful Activities.

A trial court properly prohibited a county judge from leasing county property to private interests and from contracting to use county property and employees to perform services for, and supply materials to, private interests, since such activities by the county judge would violate Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13, and Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 5. Pogue v. Cooper, 284 Ark. 105, 679 S.W.2d 207 (1984).

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

14-14-1103. Other county officials.

Executive powers and duties of all county officials other than the county judge comprising the executive division of the county government shall be those established by the Arkansas Constitution and by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 78; 1979, No. 98, § 1; 1979, No. 413, §§ 16, 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3901.

Case Notes

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978).

14-14-1104. Administrative rules and regulations.

    1. The county judge may promulgate reasonable and necessary administrative rules and regulations, after notice and hearing thereon, for the administration and conduct of the various laws and programs to be administered by the judge in his or her capacity as the chief executive officer of the county.
    2. These administrative rules and regulations shall be consistent with the state laws relating to the administration of county affairs by the county judge and the appropriate ordinances enacted by the quorum court.
  1. The administrative rules and regulations promulgated by the county judge in the performance of his or her executive functions shall not be applicable to the conduct of county business which is within the jurisdiction of the county court.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 79; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3902.

14-14-1105. Jurisdiction of county court.

  1. The General Assembly determines that all powers not vested in the county judge under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, to be exercised by the county judge as the chief executive officer of the county, shall continue to be exercised and administered by the county court, over which the judge shall preside.
  2. The county court of each county shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to:
    1. County Taxes. Jurisdiction shall include all real and personal ad valorem taxes collected by a county government, including all related administrative processes, assessment of property, equalization of assessments on appeal, tax levies, tax collection, and distribution of tax proceeds. This jurisdiction shall be exercised pursuant to law;
    2. Paupers. Jurisdiction shall include all county administrative actions affecting the conduct of public human services programs serving indigent residents of the county where such services are financed, in total or in part, by county funds;
    3. Apprenticeship of Minors. Jurisdiction over juvenile matters is vested in the county courts of each county and shall be exclusive in all cases of delinquency, juveniles in need of supervision, and dependency-neglect;
    4. Jurisdiction in Each Other Case that May Be Necessary to the Internal Improvement and Local Concern of the Respective Counties. Jurisdiction shall include county financial activities and works of general public utility or advantage designed to promote intercommunications, trade and commerce, transportation of persons and property, or the development of natural resources, which are not otherwise transferred to the county judge to be administered in his or her executive capacity under the provision of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55; and
    5. Other Jurisdiction. The county court shall have all other jurisdiction vested by law in the county court, excepting with respect to those powers formerly vested in the county court under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Article 7, § 28, which were transferred to the county judge under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 3.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 80; 1979, No. 413, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3903; Acts 1993, No. 403, § 4.

Case Notes

County Taxes.

It is settled law that county courts have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes under Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 28 and this section; however, a court of equity may grant relief against a void or illegal tax assessment. Pockrus v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 316 Ark. 468, 872 S.W.2d 416 (1994).

Although illegal taxes can be enjoined by a court of equity, if the taxes complained of are not themselves illegal, a suit for illegal exaction will not lie in chancery court; a flaw in the assessment of collection procedure, no matter how serious from the taxpayer's point of view, does not make the exaction itself illegal, and any relief from such county taxes must be sought in county court. Pockrus v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 316 Ark. 468, 872 S.W.2d 416 (1994).

The county court, and not the circuit court, had jurisdiction over a matter pertaining to the assessment of a penalty resulting from the delinquent payment of county taxes. Villines v. Pulaski County Bd. of Educ., 341 Ark. 125, 14 S.W.3d 510 (2000).

Circuit court was without jurisdiction and the claim against the county, tax assessor, city, and school district should have been filed in county court, pursuant to Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 28, because the taxpayers alleged that an erroneous assessment occurred for which they sought a refund of property taxes. Muldoon v. Martin, 103 Ark. App. 64, 286 S.W.3d 201 (2008).

Arkansas Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the circuit court, because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, when appellants' complaint challenged how the county was distributing the proceeds collected from the library tax, and such a challenge to the distribution of the tax proceeds should have been raised in county court pursuant to Ark. Const. Art. 7, § 28 and subdivision (b)(1) of this section; it was undisputed that the case dealt with a county ad valorem tax. Carnegie Pub. Library v. Carroll County, 2012 Ark. 128 (2012).

14-14-1106. Appeals from administrative acts.

Appeals by any aggrieved party from any administrative act performed, or from the nonperformance of any administrative act required by law to be performed, by the county judge acting in his or her capacity as the chief executive officer of the county, or any other elected county official, may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction in the manner provided by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 83; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3906.

Case Notes

Cited: Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978); Union County v. Union County Election Comm'n, 274 Ark. 286, 623 S.W.2d 827 (1981).

14-14-1107. Natural disasters.

In any county in which a natural disaster, including but not limited to a tornado or flood, results in the county being declared a disaster area by the Governor, an appropriate official of the United States Government, or the county judge of the county, the county judge is authorized to use county labor and equipment on private property to provide services which are required as a result of the natural disaster.

History. Acts 1997, No. 394, § 1.

Subchapter 12 — Personnel Procedures

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county governments and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 151, §§ 4, 5: effective retroactive to Jan. 1, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law establishing maximum and minimum salaries for elected county officers is unduly restrictive and in many cases denied certain officers reasonable compensation for their services; and that this Act is designed to alleviate this problem. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Approved February 20, 1979.

Acts 1981, No. 806, § 4: Mar. 28, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ranges of compensation now provided by law for the various county officials are inadequate to permit reasonable and equitable compensation to such officials for their services; that this Act is designed to permit the compensation of such officers to be increased to a fair level and to enable such officers to cope with the high rate of inflation, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 446, § 4: Mar. 14, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ranges of compensation now provided by law for the various county officials are inadequate to permit reasonable and equitable compensation to such officials for their services; that this Act is designed to permit the compensation of such officers to be increased to a fair level and to enable such officers to cope with the high rate of inflation, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 104, § 4: Feb. 12, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that County Sheriffs and the employees of the Sheriff's departments wear uniforms in the preservation of the public peace, health and safety and that requiring an itemized listing or numbered invoice for payment of a uniform allowance imposes a severe hardship on Sheriffs and the Sheriff's departments. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 398, § 4: Mar. 18, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ranges of compensation now provided by law for the various county officials are inadequate to permit reasonable and equitable compensation to such officials for their services; that this Act is designed to permit the compensation of such officers to be increased to a fair level and to enable such officers to cope with the high rate of inflation, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 694, § 5: Mar. 20, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ranges of compensation now provided by law for the various county officials are inadequate to permit reasonable and equitable compensation to such officials for their services; that this act is designed to permit the compensation of such officers to be increased to a fair level and to enable such officers to cope with the high rate of inflation, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 1161, § 5: Apr. 10, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ranges of compensation now provided by law for the various county officials are inadequate to permit reasonable and equitable compensation to such officials for their services; that this act is designed to permit the compensation of such officers to be increased to a fair level and to enable such officers to cope with the high rate of inflation, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 954, § 6: Apr. 8, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ranges of compensation now provided by law for the various county officials are inadequate to permit reasonable and equitable compensation to such officials for their services; that this act is designed to permit the compensation of such officers to be increased to a fair level and to enable such officers to cope with the high rate of inflation, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 616, § 3: July 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that the provisions of this act change the calculation of compensation for retirement purposes and should become effective on July 1, 2009, for consistent application and to avoid confusion; and that unless this emergency clause is adopted, this act will not go into effect until after the beginning of the next fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2009.”

14-14-1201. Surety bond for certain county and township officers and employees.

  1. Surety Bond Required. All elected or appointed county and township officers, and employees thereof, who receipt for cash funds or disburse public funds of a county by virtue of their office or employment shall obtain a surety bond.
  2. Amount of Bond.
    1. The amount for which a county or township officer or employee shall be bonded shall be based on the amount of money or property handled and the opportunity for defalcation. These amounts shall be fixed annually by ordinance of the quorum court of each county based on the total cash receipts and disbursements of the office for the preceding calendar year.
      1. These surety bonds shall be initiated in minimum amounts computed as follows:
        1. On the first one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), or any part thereof, of receipts or disbursements of the office, ten percent (10%) of the amount;
        2. On the next two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), or any part thereof, of receipts or disbursements of the office, seven and one-half percent (7½%) of the amount;
        3. On the next two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), or any part thereof, of receipts or disbursements of the office, five percent (5%) of the amount;
        4. On the next five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), or any part thereof, of the amount, two and one-half percent (2½%); and
        5. On all amounts in excess of one million dollars ($1,000,000), one percent (1%) of the amount.
      2. The maximum amount of any bond required of any elected officer or employee thereof shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
  3. Authorized Bonding Companies. Bonds purchased by a county government shall be executed by responsible insurance or surety companies authorized and admitted to execute surety bonds in the state.
  4. Conditions of Sureties. The condition of every official bond must be that the covered officers and employees shall perform all official duties required of them by law and also such additional duties as may be imposed on them by any law subsequently enacted, and that they will account for and pay over and deliver to the person or officer entitled to receive the same all moneys or other property that may come into their hands as such officers or employees. The sureties upon any official bond are also in all cases liable for the neglect, default, or misconduct in office of any deputy, clerk, or employee, appointed or employed by an officer or employee of county government.
  5. Purchase of Bonds. The county judge of each county shall purchase all surety bonds for county and township officers, and employees thereof, in the amounts fixed by ordinance of the county quorum court pursuant to the purchasing laws governing county government. A bond may cover an individual officer or employee, or a blanket bond may cover all officers and employees, or any group or combination of officers and employees.
  6. Appropriation of Bond Premiums. The quorum court of each county shall provide for by appropriation the payment of premiums for surety bonds of all county and township officers, and employees thereof.
  7. Approval and Filing of Bonds. All official bonds must be signed and executed by the county court of each county and one (1) or more surety companies organized under the laws of this state or licensed to do business in this state. The original of each such executed bond, as required in this section, shall be filed in the office of county clerk.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 113; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4206.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program,, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Case Notes

Actions on Bonds.

The state may bring an action on a county officer's bond for the amount of the officer's defalcation. State ex rel. Benton County v. Wood, 51 Ark. 205, 10 S.W. 624 (1889) (decision under prior law).

Suit cannot be brought on a county officer's bond until the amount due has been determined by a court. Graham v. State, 100 Ark. 571, 140 S.W. 735 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Attorney's Fees.

For an indemnity agreement contained in bond executed to state to indemnify sheriff to include attorney's fees and to be recoverable by the indemnitee, the attorney's fees had to be reasonable, proper, necessary, and incurred in good faith and with due diligence; were factual questions to be determined by the trier of fact; and when properly placed in dispute, were not matters to be disposed of on motion for summary judgment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Love, 260 Ark. 374, 538 S.W.2d 558 (1976) (decision under prior law).

Conditions of Sureties.

A county officer's bond that obligates the officer and his sureties that he will truly account for and pay over all moneys that come to his hands by virtue of his office is valid, although it names no obligee. State ex rel. Benton County v. Wood, 51 Ark. 205, 10 S.W. 624 (1889) (decision under prior law).

The failure of a county treasurer to bring funds into court when ordered constituted a breach of his bond, although the funds could have been lost by the insolvency of the bank in which they were deposited. State ex rel. Benton County v. Wood, 51 Ark. 205, 10 S.W. 624 (1889) (decision under prior law).

Liability of Sureties.

It is in the discretion of a court, upon a proper showing by a surety on an official bond of a county officer, to require the officer to give a new bond and discharge the surety from future liability; however, the court has no power to discharge the surety from past liability. Ex parte Talbot, 32 Ark. 424 (1877) (decision under prior law).

The amount for which the bond for a county officer is liable is the amount fixed by a court, with legal interest from the date of auditing. State ex rel. Benton County v. Wood, 51 Ark. 205, 10 S.W. 624 (1889) (decision under prior law).

The General Assembly may release an officer and bondsmen from liability for a claim legally due, but which would be unjust and oppressive to collect. Pearson v. State, 56 Ark. 148, 19 S.W. 499 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Sureties on bond approved by circuit judge in vacation were not liable for any funds that came into a treasurer's hands after rejection of the bond by the circuit court and the expiration of 15 days thereafter within which the treasurer failed to file new bond. Wood v. State, 63 Ark. 337, 40 S.W. 87 (1897) (decision under prior law).

Sureties on an officer's bond are not liable for penalties imposed by a statute passed after the execution of the bond. Hunter State Bank v. Mills, 90 Ark. 10, 117 S.W. 760 (1909) (decision under prior law).

A county treasurer depositing county funds in a bank that had not executed a bond payable to the county as required by statute was not relieved from liability on his official bond on the bank's insolvency, although the treasurer took a bond from the bank payable to himself to secure his deposits, which bond was approved by the county court. Huffstuttler v. State, 183 Ark. 993, 39 S.W.2d 721 (1931) (decision under prior law).

A surety is not liable for punitive damages assessed against county officer. Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Wilson v. Robinson, 506 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Ark. 1981).

14-14-1202. Ethics for county government officers and employees.

  1. Public Trust.
    1. The holding of public office or employment is a public trust created by the confidence which the electorate reposes in the integrity of officers and employees of county government.
    2. An officer or employee shall carry out all duties assigned by law for the benefit of the people of the county.
    3. The officer or employee may not use his or her office, the influence created by his or her official position, or information gained by virtue of his or her position to advance his or her individual personal economic interest or that of an immediate member of his or her family or an associate, other than advancing strictly incidental benefits as may accrue to any of them from the enactment or administration of law affecting the public generally.
  2. Officers and Employees of County Government Defined.
    1. For purposes of this section, officers and employees of county government include:
      1. All elected county and township officers and their employees;
      2. All district judicial officers serving a county and their employees; and
      3. All members of county boards and advisory, administrative, or subordinate service districts and their employees.
    2. Officials who are considered to be state officers or deputy prosecuting attorneys are not covered by this subsection.
  3. Rules of Conduct.
    1. No officer or employee of county government shall:
        1. Be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract or transaction made, authorized, or entered into on behalf of the county or an entity created by the county, or accept or receive any property, money, or other valuable thing for his or her use or benefit on account of, connected with, or growing out of any contract or transaction of a county.
          1. If in the purchase of any materials, supplies, equipment, or machinery for the county, any discounts, credits, or allowances are given or allowed, they shall be for the benefit of the county.
          2. It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee to accept or retain them for his or her own use or benefit;
      1. Be a purchaser at any sale or a vendor of any purchase made by him or her in his or her official capacity;
      2. Acquire an interest in any business or undertaking which he or she has reason to believe may be directly affected to its economic benefit by official action to be taken by county government;
        1. Perform an official act directly affecting a business or other undertaking to its economic detriment when he or she has a substantial financial interest in a competing firm or undertaking.
        2. Substantial financial interest is defined for purposes of this section as provided in Acts 1971, No. 313, § 7 [repealed].
        1. If the quorum court determines it is in the best interest of the county, the quorum court by ordinance upon a two-thirds (2/3) vote may permit the county to purchase goods, services, commodities, or real property directly or indirectly from a quorum court member, a county officer, or a county employee due to unusual circumstances.
        2. The ordinance permitting the purchase shall define specifically the unusual circumstances under which the purchase is permitted and the limitations of the authority.
      1. A quorum court member having an interest in the goods, services, commodities, or real property being considered under the procedures in this subdivision (c)(2) shall not vote upon the approval of the ordinance permitting the purchase of the goods, services, commodities, or real property.
      2. If goods, services, commodities, or real property are purchased under the procedures in this subdivision (c)(2), the county judge shall file an affidavit, together with a copy of the voucher and other documents supporting the disbursement, with the county clerk certifying that each disbursement has been made in accordance with the ordinance.
      1. No person shall simultaneously hold office and serve as an elected county justice of the peace and hold office and serve as an elected city council member.
      2. This subdivision (c)(3) shall not cut short the term of any office holder serving as such on September 1, 2005, but shall be implemented during the next election cycle of each office.
  4. Removal from Office or Employment.
    1. Court of Jurisdiction. Any citizen of a county or the prosecuting attorney of a county may bring an action in the circuit court in which the county government is located to remove from office any officer or employee who has violated the rules of conduct set forth in this section.
    2. Suspension Prior to Final Judgment.
      1. Pending final judgment, an officer or employee who has been charged as provided in this section may be suspended from his or her office or position of employment without pay.
      2. Suspension of any officer or employee pending final judgment shall be upon order of the circuit court or judge thereof in vacation.
    3. Punishment.
      1. Judgment upon conviction for violation of the rules of conduct set forth in this section shall be deemed a misdemeanor.
      2. Punishment shall be by a fine of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and the officer or employee shall be removed from office or employment of the county.
    4. Acquittal. Upon acquittal, an officer or employee shall be reinstated in his or her office or position of employment and shall receive all back pay.
    5. Legal Fees.
      1. Any officer or employee charged as provided in this section and subsequently acquitted shall be awarded reasonable legal fees incurred in his or her defense.
        1. Reasonable legal fees shall be determined by the circuit court or the Supreme Court on appeal.
        2. Such legal fees shall be ordered paid out of the general fund of the county treasury.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 115; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4208; Acts 1987, No. 930, § 1; 1989, No. 352, § 1; 1989, No. 681, § 1; 2005, No. 1924, § 1; 2017, No. 193, § 1; 2019, No. 383, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote (c)(2).

The 2019 amendment deleted “shall” following “government” in the introductory language of (b)(1); redesignated (b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and (b)(1)(A)(iii) as (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C); added “and their employees” in (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C); substituted “boards and advisory” for “boards, advisory” in (b)(1)(C); and deleted former (b)(1)(B).

Case Notes

Constable.

A constable is an official of the county and thus covered by workers' compensation. Farnsworth v. White County, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

Cited: Hester v. Langston, 297 Ark. 87, 759 S.W.2d 797 (1988); Farnsworth v. White County, 39 Ark. App. 98, 839 S.W.2d 229 (1992); Post v. Harper, 980 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1992).

14-14-1203. Compensation and expense reimbursements generally.

  1. Appropriation Required. All compensation, including salary, hourly compensation, expense allowances, training expenses, and other remunerations, allowed to any county officer, district officer, county officer-elect, district officer-elect, or employee is made only on specific appropriation by the quorum court of the county.
  2. Payments on Claims Approved by the County Judge. All compensation, including salary, hourly compensation, expense allowances, training expenses, and other remuneration, allowed to any county officer, district officer, county officer-elect, district officer-elect, or employee is made only upon claim or voucher presented to the county judge and approved by him or her in the manner prescribed by law for disbursement of county funds.
  3. Expense Reimbursement.
    1. Except as provided under subdivision (c)(2) of this section, all expense allowances, training expenses, and remunerations other than salary provided in this subchapter shall be made only upon voucher or claim itemizing the allowances or expenses, prepared in the manner prescribed by law, and presented to and approved by the county judge in the manner prescribed by law for the disbursement of county funds.
    2. County officials may make cash advances for travel-related expenses to employees, subject to rules adopted by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  4. Decreases in Salary. Any decrease in the annual salary or compensation of a county officer shall not become effective until January 1 following a general election held after the decrease has been fixed by the quorum court of the county.
  5. Enterprise Accounts Prohibited. An elected county or district officer or employee of the county or district shall not individually maintain or operate an account for financing self-supporting activities that render services on a user charge basis to the general public.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 112; 1983, No. 233, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4205; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 1; 2015, No. 279, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “training expenses” in (a), (b) and (c)(1); substituted “district” for “township” in (a), (b) and (e); inserted “or her” in (b); inserted “Except as provided under subdivision (c)(2) of this section” in (c)(1); and added (c)(2).

The 2015 amendment, in (a) and (b), substituted “county officer, district officer, county officer-elect, district officer-elect, or employee is” for “county or district officer or employee thereof shall be.”

Case Notes

Eligibility for Retirement System.

Substantial evidence supported the finding of the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System that former employees of nursing homes owned by counties were not “county employees” under the relevant statutes and were not eligible for membership in the retirement system because their compensation was payable from patient revenues rather than from appropriated funds. Bd. of Trs. of the Ark. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Garrison, 2019 Ark. App. 245, 576 S.W.3d 485 (2019).

Assuming that the nursing-home administrative boards and their respective counties were synonymous under the definitions of “County employees” and “Employees” in § 24-4-101, the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System's finding that the former employees of county-owned nursing homes were not paid from appropriated funds as required by the definition of “Employees” in § 24-4-101 was affirmed as no ordinances in the record specifically designated county money for their compensation. Bd. of Trs. of the Ark. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Garrison, 2019 Ark. App. 245, 576 S.W.3d 485 (2019).

14-14-1204. Compensation of elected county officers.

    1. The quorum court of each county shall fix by ordinance the annual salaries of the following county officers within the minimums and maximums provided in this section:
      1. The county judge;
      2. The sheriff and ex officio collector of taxes;
      3. The collector of taxes, where established by law;
      4. The circuit clerk;
      5. The county clerk, where established by law;
      6. The assessor;
      7. The treasurer;
      8. The coroner; and
      9. The surveyor.
    2. The minimum and maximum salaries under this section do not include any county-provided insurance benefits or other county benefits required by federal or state law, rule, or regulation.
  1. For purposes of determining the salaries of the elected county officers, unless otherwise specifically provided in this section, the counties shall be classified on the basis of population, as determined by the preceding federal decennial census, according to the following classifications:
    1. The annual salary of a county judge shall be in compensation for his or her services as the executive and administrator for the county, as judge of the county court, as presiding officer of the quorum court, and for all other services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
    2. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the county judge of a county shall be as follows:
      1. The annual salary of a sheriff shall be compensation for services as a law enforcement officer, as the supervisor of the county jail, as custodian of persons accused or convicted of crimes, as an officer of the circuit court or county court, as the ex officio county tax collector and delinquent tax collector in those counties where that office is combined with the office of sheriff, and for all other services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
      2. In any county in which the offices of sheriff and collector are combined into a single office, the maximum and minimum salaries for that office in the appropriate county classification shall be increased by the following amounts:
    1. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the sheriff of a county shall be as follows:
    1. In those counties where the office of county tax collector has been separated from the office of sheriff, the annual salary of a county tax collector shall be in compensation for services as tax collector and delinquent tax collector and for all other services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
    2. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the county tax collector in those counties where the office has been separated from the office of sheriff shall be as follows:
      1. The annual salary of a county and probate clerk shall be in compensation for his or her services as county clerk, probate clerk, clerk of the county court, clerk of the quorum court, registrar of voters, and for all other services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
      2. In those counties where the office of county and probate clerk is combined with the office of circuit clerk and ex officio recorder, the salary shall be as provided in this section.
      3. In those counties where the office of county and probate clerk is combined with the office of circuit clerk and ex officio recorder, the minimum and maximum salaries for that office in the appropriate county classification shall be increased by the following amounts:
    1. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the county and probate clerk of a county shall be as follows:
      1. The annual salary of a circuit clerk and ex officio recorder shall be in compensation for his or her services as clerk of the circuit court, as ex officio recorder, and for all other services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
      2. In those counties where the office of circuit clerk and ex officio recorder is combined with the office of county and probate clerk, the minimum and maximum salaries for that office in the appropriate county classification shall be increased by the following amounts:
    1. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the circuit clerk and ex officio recorder of a county shall be as follows:
      1. The annual salary of a county assessor shall be in compensation for all services performed as county assessor, appraiser, and as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
      2. In any county in which the offices of assessor and collector are combined into a single office, the maximum and minimum salaries of the county assessor and collector in the appropriate county classification shall be increased by the following amounts:
    1. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the county assessor of a county shall be as follows:
      1. The annual salary of a county treasurer shall be in compensation for all services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
      2. In any county in which the offices of treasurer and collector are combined into a single office, the maximum and minimum salaries of the county treasurer and collector in the appropriate county classification shall be increased by the following amounts:
    1. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum for the county treasurer of a county shall be as follows:
    1. The compensation of a county coroner shall be for all services performed as provided by the Arkansas Constitution, by law, or by county ordinance.
    2. The minimum and maximum salaries per annum of the county coroner of a county shall be as follows:
  2. Compensation of the county surveyor shall be fixed by the quorum court.

Classification Population Class 1 0 to 9,999 Class 2 10,000 to 19,999 Class 3 20,000 to 29,999 Class 4 30,000 to 49,999 Class 5 50,000 to 69,999 Class 6 70,000 to 199,999 Class 7 200,000 and above

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 2 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 3 not less than $32,000 nor more than $77,550 Class 4 not less than $33,000 nor more than $79,005 Class 5 not less than $34,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 6 not less than $35,000 nor more than $86,278 Class 7 not less than $36,000 nor more than $99,223

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Classification Additional Salary Class 1 $1,500 Class 2 $1,500 Class 3 $2,500 Class 4 $2,500 Class 5 $3,000 Class 6 $3,000 Class 7 $4,000

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 2 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 3 not less than $32,000 nor more than $77,550 Class 4 not less than $33,000 nor more than $79,005 Class 5 not less than $34,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 6 not less than $35,000 nor more than $86,278 Class 7 not less than $36,000 nor more than $99,223

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $27,000 nor more than $70,276 Class 2 not less than $28,000 nor more than $71,731 Class 3 not less than $29,000 nor more than $73,186 Class 4 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 5 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 6 not less than $32,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 7 not less than $33,000 nor more than $93,404

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Classification Additional Salary Class 1 $1,500 Class 2 $1,500 Class 3 $2,500 Class 4 $2,500 Class 5 $3,000 Class 6 $3,000 Class 7 $4,000

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $27,000 nor more than $70,276 Class 2 not less than $28,000 nor more than $71,731 Class 3 not less than $29,000 nor more than $73,186 Class 4 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 5 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 6 not less than $32,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 7 not less than $33,000 nor more than $93,404

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Classification Additional Salary Class 1 $1,500 Class 2 $1,500 Class 3 $2,500 Class 4 $2,500 Class 5 $3,000 Class 6 $3,000 Class 7 $4,000

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $27,000 nor more than $70,276 Class 2 not less than $28,000 nor more than $71,731 Class 3 not less than $29,000 nor more than $73,186 Class 4 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 5 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 6 not less than $32,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 7 not less than $33,000 nor more than $93,404

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Classification Additional Salary Class 1 $1,500 Class 2 $1,500 Class 3 $2,500 Class 4 $2,500 Class 5 $3,000 Class 6 $3,000 Class 7 $4,000

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $27,000 nor more than $70,276 Class 2 not less than $28,000 nor more than $71,731 Class 3 not less than $29,000 nor more than $73,186 Class 4 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 5 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 6 not less than $32,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 7 not less than $33,000 nor more than $93,404

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Classification Additional Salary Class 1 $1,500 Class 2 $1,500 Class 3 $2,500 Class 4 $2,500 Class 5 $3,000 Class 6 $3,000 Class 7 $4,000

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $27,000 nor more than $70,276 Class 2 not less than $28,000 nor more than $71,731 Class 3 not less than $29,000 nor more than $73,186 Class 4 not less than $30,000 nor more than $74,640 Class 5 not less than $31,000 nor more than $76,095 Class 6 not less than $32,000 nor more than $80,459 Class 7 not less than $33,000 nor more than $93,404

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Classification Salary per Annum Class 1 not less than $3,802 nor more than $12,990 Class 2 not less than $4,302 nor more than $13,990 Class 3 not less than $4,803 nor more than $16,990 Class 4 not less than $5,303 nor more than $30,990 Class 5 not less than $5,800 nor more than $40,900 Class 6 not less than $6,300 nor more than $48,990 Class 7 not less than $33,000 nor more than $93,404

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History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 108; 1979, No. 151, § 1; 1981, No. 806, § 1; 1983, No. 446, § 1; 1985, No. 398, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4201; Acts 1989, No. 694, § 1; 1991, No. 1161, § 1; 1993, No. 954, § 1; 1995, No. 661, § 1; 1997, No. 759, § 1; 1999, No. 1424, § 1; 2001, No. 1170, § 1; 2003, No. 109, § 1; 2005, No. 1214, § 1; 2007, No. 526, § 1; 2009, No. 320, § 1; 2017, No. 260, § 2; 2019, No. 400, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote the salary per annum amounts throughout the section and (d)(1)(B), (f)(1)(C), (g)(1)(B), (h)(1)(B), and (i)(1)(B).

The 2017 amendment deleted “as judge of the court of common pleas, where established” following “county court” in (c)(1).

The 2019 amendment redesignated (a) as (a)(1) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions in (a) accordingly; and added (a)(2).

Cross References. County judge's salary, § 14-14-811.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

County Assessors.

A county court did not have the power to disallow a portion of the monthly salary claim of a deputy tax assessor, such salary allowance for the deputy being mandatory on the county court, and the court had no power to disallow any salary claims on the ground of no service rendered during a specified month. Cowling v. Howard County, 228 Ark. 1047, 312 S.W.2d 186 (1958) (decision under prior law).

A county assessor was merely a county officer, his salary may have been fixed by county under initiative and referendum amendment, and money paid by the state as half of the assessor's salary was not over and above the amount provided by the initiated act. Dew v. Ashley County, 199 Ark. 361, 133 S.W.2d 652 (1939) (decision under prior law).

County Clerks.

School district was not required to reimburse a county for overtime pay provided by the county to the county clerk for work related to a school district election because the clerk was not entitled to overtime pay, since (1) a contract to pay an officer more or less compensation than that fixed by law was contrary to public policy and void; (2) although this section provided ranges for the salaries of elected county officers such as the clerk, it still instructed that, pursuant to those ranges, the annual salaries were to be fixed by ordinance; and (3) overtime pay to the county clerk was not an appropriate election expense pursuant to § 6-14-118, as given the history of this statute, it was clear that the legislature did not anticipate overtime pay of elected county officials when it created a law requiring school districts to pay for election expenses. Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 371 Ark. 574, 268 S.W.3d 879 (2007).

Sheriffs.

A sheriff was entitled to appoint a deputy to work with Junior Deputy Sheriffs League if the quorum court made an appropriation to pay the salary of the deputy, and the county court was required to allow deputy's claim for salary. Parker v. Adkins, 223 Ark. 455, 266 S.W.2d 799 (1954) (decision under prior law).

14-14-1205. Compensation of township officers.

      1. The per diem compensation for justices of the peace attending any official, regular, special, or committee meeting of a quorum court shall be fixed by ordinance in each county.
      2. The per diem compensation of justices shall not be less than one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per diem for each regular meeting nor exceed:
        1. Eight thousand seven hundred thirty-four dollars ($8,734) per calendar year in counties having a population of less than seventy thousand (70,000);
        2. Ten thousand three hundred seventy-six dollars ($10,376) per calendar year in counties having a population of at least seventy thousand (70,000) and less than two hundred thousand (200,000); and
        3. Thirteen thousand three hundred nineteen dollars ($13,319) per calendar year in counties having a population of two hundred thousand (200,000) or more.
    1. Per Diem Compensation Defined.
      1. Per diem compensation is defined as a per calendar day allowance, exclusive of allowable expenses, which shall be paid to a justice for attending meetings of the county quorum court. This compensation shall be based on attending meetings of a quorum court during any single calendar day without regard to the duration of the meetings.
      2. However, a member of the quorum court may receive per diem compensation for one (1) meeting per year for which the member is absent due to an emergency or for personal reasons.
    2. In addition to any other compensation expense reimbursement or expense allowances provided members of the quorum court, counties may provide medical insurance coverage or other insurance benefits for members of the quorum court.
  1. Justices of the Peace Serving in Judicial Capacity. The compensation of all justices of the peace serving in a judicial capacity shall be fixed by ordinance of the quorum court in each county. This basis of compensation shall not be computed on a percentage of the dollar amount of fines levied by a justice of the peace.
  2. Justice of the Peace as County Employee or Deputy. A justice of the peace shall not receive compensation as a county employee or deputy, nor shall any justice receive compensation or expenses from funds appropriated by the quorum court for any services performed within the county, other than as provided by this subchapter.
  3. Constables. The compensation of all constables serving in any official capacity established by law may be fixed by ordinance of the quorum court in each county.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 109; 1979, No. 151, § 2; 1981, No. 806, § 2; 1983, No. 446, § 2; 1985, No. 398, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4202; Acts 1989, No. 694, § 2; 1993, No. 954, § 2; 1995, No. 661, § 2; 1995, No. 1296, § 46; 1997, No. 363, § 1; 1997, No. 759, § 2; 1999, No. 749, § 1; 2001, No. 1170, § 2; 2003, No. 109, § 2; 2005, No. 1214, § 2; 2007, No. 526, § 2; 2009, No. 320, § 2; 2011, No. 561, § 2; 2019, No. 400, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment, in (a)(1)(B), substituted “Eight thousand seven hundred thirty-four dollars ($8,734)” for “Seven thousand five hundred thirty-four dollars ($7,534)” in (a)(1)(B)(i), “Ten thousand three hundred seventy-six dollars ($10,376)” for “Nine thousand one hundred seventy-six dollars ($9,176)” in (a)(1)(B)(ii), and “Thirteen thousand three hundred nineteen dollars ($13,319)” for “Twelve thousand one hundred nineteen dollars ($12,119)” in (a)(1)(B)(iii); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendment substituted “may be fixed” for “shall be fixed” in (d).

The 2019 amendment inserted “or other insurance benefits” in (a)(3).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former statutes which allowed a specified sum for an expense account in Pulaski County were not unconstitutional in violation of former Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 23 and Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 13, but were unconstitutionally applied where the expense allowances were paid to the officer whether or not the expenses were incurred and without any accounting for the expenses incurred. Tedford v. Mears, 258 Ark. 450, 526 S.W.2d 1 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Constitutionality of Ordinance.

County ordinance affecting compensation held to be contrary to Arkansas's applicable constitutional and statutory laws that specify and restrict the compensation and expenses that quorum court members and other county officials are entitled to receive. Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98, 947 S.W.2d 749 (1997).

County ordinance setting constable salaries at $25 per month did not violate equal protection because the evidence and testimony before the circuit court demonstrated that the quorum court had a rational basis for setting the $25-per-month salary for constables. Graves v. Greene County, 2013 Ark. 493, 430 S.W.3d 722 (2013).

14-14-1206. Compensation of county employees.

  1. Compensation. The quorum court of each county shall fix by ordinance the number and compensation of all county employees, including a bonus or lump-sum payment.
    1. County Employee Defined. “County employee” means an individual or firm providing labor or service to a county government for salary, wages, or any other form of compensation.
    2. As used in this section, “county government” means all offices, departments, boards, and subordinate service districts of county government created by law and subordinate to county government.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 110; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4203; Acts 2009, No. 616, § 1; 2011, No. 561, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “including a bonus or lump sum payment” in (a), and made a related change.

The 2011 amendment subdivided part of (b); in (b)(1), substituted “‘County employee’ means an” for “A county employee is defined as any” and inserted “government”; and deleted “including townships” preceding “created by” in (b)(2).

Case Notes

Constable.

A constable is an official of the county and thus covered by workers' compensation. Farnsworth v. White County, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

Eligibility for Retirement System.

Substantial evidence supported the finding of the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System that former employees of nursing homes owned by counties were not “county employees” under the relevant statutes and were not eligible for membership in the retirement system because their compensation was payable from patient revenues rather than from appropriated funds. Bd. of Trs. of the Ark. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Garrison, 2019 Ark. App. 245, 576 S.W.3d 485 (2019).

Assuming that the nursing-home administrative boards and their respective counties were synonymous under the definitions of “County employees” and “Employees” in § 24-4-101, the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Public Employees' Retirement System's finding that the former employees of county-owned nursing homes were not paid from appropriated funds as required by the definition of “Employees” in § 24-4-101 was affirmed as no ordinances in the record specifically designated county money for their compensation. Bd. of Trs. of the Ark. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Garrison, 2019 Ark. App. 245, 576 S.W.3d 485 (2019).

Cited: Farnsworth v. White County, 39 Ark. App. 98, 839 S.W.2d 229 (1992).

14-14-1207. Reimbursement of allowable expenses.

  1. Reimbursement Authorized.
    1. All county and district officials and authorized deputies or employees are entitled to receive reimbursement of expenses incurred in the conduct of official and nondiscretionary duties under an appropriation for the operating expenses of an office, function, or service. Reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of discretionary functions and services may be permitted when authorized by a specific appropriation of the quorum court.
    2. Reimbursement of expenses for discretionary functions and services may include training expenses for a county official-elect and a district official-elect if authorized by the quorum court.
  2. Allowance for Meals, Lodging, and Other Allowable Expenses.
    1. All reimbursements for the purchase of meals, meal tips, lodging, and other allowable expenses are based on the actual expense incurred or on a per diem basis if authorized by the quorum court.
    2. Reimbursement for meal tips under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the purchase amount of the meal.
    3. A per diem reimbursement under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be made under an accountable plan as defined by Internal Revenue Service regulations as in existence on January 1, 2009.
  3. Reimbursement of Travel Expense.
    1. Privately Owned Motor Vehicles.
        1. Any elected county officer, district officer, county officer-elect, district officer-elect, or employee using a privately owned motor vehicle in the conduct of county affairs may be reimbursed at a per-mile rate established by ordinance.
        2. Reimbursement is based only on official miles driven and legitimate automobile parking fees.
        3. When more than one (1) traveler is transported in the same vehicle, only the owner is entitled to mileage reimbursement.
      1. A county shall not assume responsibility for any maintenance, operational costs, accidents, and fines incurred by the owner of the vehicle while on official business for the county.
    2. Privately Owned Airplanes. Reimbursement for travel expense using privately owned airplanes is based upon the most direct route in air miles and at the same rate as established for privately owned motor vehicles.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 111; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4204; Acts 1999, No. 109, § 1; 2009, No. 74, § 1; 2009, No. 732, § 1; 2011, No. 614, § 2; 2015, No. 279, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 74, in (b), added (b)(2), inserted “meal tips” in the remaining text and redesignated it as (b)(1), and made a related change.

The 2009 amendment by No. 732 rewrote (a); inserted (b)(2) and (b)(3), redesignated the remaining text as (b)(1), and inserted “or on a per diem basis if approved by the quorum court” in (b)(1); substituted “district” for “township” in (c)(1)(A)(i); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendment inserted “based upon the most direct route in air miles and” in (2); and deleted (2)(B).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (a) as (a)(1) and added (a)(2); in the second sentence of (a)(1), deleted “that are” preceding “incurred” and substituted “authorized” for “provided for”; substituted “authorized” for “approved” in (b)(1); substituted “county officer, district officer, county officer-elect, district officer-elect, or employee” for “county or district officer or employee thereof” in (c)(1)(A)(i); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

District Officials.

While the plain language of this section authorized reimbursement for district officials, a constable was not a district official, but a township officer under constitutional and statutory law, and thus, the statute did not authorize the reimbursement of expenses for constables, and the circuit court did not err in denying the constable's claim for expenses. Graves v. Greene County, 2013 Ark. 493, 430 S.W.3d 722 (2013).

14-14-1208. Professional memberships and meetings.

  1. The quorum court of each county may provide, through specific appropriations, for a county to join, pay membership fees and service charges, and cooperate with the organizations and associations of county government of this state and other states for the advancement of good government and the protection of local government interests.
  2. Elected county officers, district officers, township officers, county officers-elect, district officers-elect, and township officers-elect of a county government may be allowed per diem and either mileage or actual transportation expenses for attendance at meetings of the appropriate association of local government officials. Reasonable expenses or charges against each local government, as a member of the association, may be paid by a county.
  3. Employees of a county government may be allowed per diem and either mileage or actual transportation expenses for attendance at meetings of professional organizations or associations, and a county government may pay membership fees and service charges to the organizations.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 114; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4207; Acts 2015, No. 279, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “Elected county officers, district officers, township officers, county officers-elect, district officers-elect, and township officers-elect” for “Elected county and township officials” in (b).

14-14-1209. Uniform and equipment allowance for sheriff's department.

  1. Upon request by the county sheriff, the county quorum court may approve and appropriate a uniform and equipment allowance for the sheriff and employees of the sheriff's department in lieu of reimbursement for actual uniform and equipment expenses. The uniform and equipment allowance may be used for the purchase of uniforms, ammunition, and other equipment, excluding firearms, used in the performance of law enforcement duties.
  2. Claims for this uniform and equipment allowance shall be processed and paid in accordance with the laws of the State of Arkansas. However, an itemized listing or numbered invoice is not required for payment of this uniform and equipment allowance.

History. Acts 1985, No. 104, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4205.1; Acts 1997, No. 223, § 1.

14-14-1210. Cost-of-living adjustment.

  1. Beginning January 1, 2011, and on each January 1 thereafter, three percent (3%) per annum shall be added to the minimum and maximum salaries and per diems of elected county officers as a cost-of- living adjustment.
  2. Beginning January 1, 2016, and on each January 1 thereafter, three percent (3%) per annum shall be added to the maximum per diem compensation of justices of the peace as a cost-of-living adjustment.
  3. Beginning September 1, 2010, and on each September 1 thereafter, the Association of Arkansas Counties shall provide each county and Arkansas Legislative Audit with a schedule of the minimum and maximum salaries and per diems of elected county officers and justices of the peace with the added cost-of-living adjustment for the following year.

History. Acts 2009, No. 320, § 3; 2015, No. 942, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted (b) and redesignated former (b) as (c); and inserted “and justices of the peace” in (c).

14-14-1211. Monthly, bimonthly, biweekly, weekly, and hourly salaries for county employees.

      1. Except for those counties that operate principally on a scholastic year, or on a part-time basis, or where salaries or personal services are specifically established for a period less than one (1) year, all salaries established by the General Assembly or the governing body of the county shall be considered to be a maximum amount to be paid for a twelve-month payroll period.
      2. A greater amount than that established for the maximum annual salary of any county official or employee shall not be paid to the employee during any twelve-month payroll period, nor shall more than one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual salary be paid to an employee during a calendar month unless otherwise authorized.
    1. The limitations set out in this section may be converted to biweekly or weekly increments of one-twenty-sixth (1/26) or one-fifty-second (1/52) of the maximum annual salary.
    2. For complying with federal requirements, upon approval of the county judge, the maximum annual salaries may be converted to hourly rates of pay for positions established on the basis of twelve (12) months or less if authorized by law.
  1. The remuneration paid to an employee of the county may exceed the maximum annual salary as authorized by the General Assembly or governing body of the county as follows, and the following shall not be construed as payment for services or as salary as contemplated by Arkansas Constitution, Article 16, § 4:
    1. Overtime payments as authorized by law;
    2. Payment of a lump sum to a terminating employee, to include lump-sum payments of sick leave balances upon retirement as provided by law;
    3. Payment for overlapping pay periods at the end of a fiscal year as defined or authorized by law;
    4. Payment for the biweekly twenty-seven (27) pay periods; and
    5. Payments for incentive, certificate, holiday, or working out of classification.

History. Acts 2013, No. 572, § 1.

14-14-1212. Coroner medicolegal death investigation training — Authorization for salary adjustment for certified county coroner — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “certified county coroner” means a county coroner who has obtained a certificate of satisfactory participation and completion of medicolegal death investigation training from the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training under § 14-15-308 or the American Board of Medicolegal Death Investigators.
  2. The quorum court of each county that has a certified county coroner is authorized to fix by ordinance the annual salary of a certified county coroner within the schedule of maximum salaries under § 14-14-1204.
  3. Beginning September 1, 2017, and on each September 1 thereafter, the compensation schedule prepared under § 14-14-1210(c) shall reflect a separate maximum annual salary for a certified county coroner with a salary adjustment made under subsection (b) of this section and § 14-14-1204(i).

History. Acts 2017, No. 194, § 1.

Subchapter 13 — Officers Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 118: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found by the General Assembly that the passage of Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution has caused major changes in the structure of county government and that, because of said changes, a need exists to modernize laws affecting county government. It is further found that the citizens of the several counties of the State are in need of services provided by county governments and said services can best be provided under the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the public health, welfare and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 378, § 2: Mar. 14, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that sometimes county officers resign from office during their term, often unavoidably; that some of these resignations and subsequent appointments to county office during the same term can conflict with certain retirement laws; and that this act is immediately necessary because it will ensure these conflicts do not occur and will preserve the integrity of county government. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 231 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 100 et seq.

14-14-1301. County, quorum court district, and township officers.

  1. County Officers. There shall be elected, until otherwise determined by law, in each of the several counties of this state the following county officers:
    1. County Judge.
      1. The county judge shall:
        1. Perform the administrative and executive functions and duties, and such additional duties as may be provided by law, to be performed by the judge provided in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, § 3;
        2. Preside over the county quorum court without a vote but with the power of veto; and
        3. Preside over the county court and exercise those judicial and ministerial duties of the county court that were not transferred to the judge to be performed in his or her capacity as the chief executive officer of the county by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55, or as may be provided by law.
      2. The judge shall be:
        1. At least twenty-five (25) years of age;
        2. A citizen of the United States;
        3. A person of upright character;
        4. A person of good business education; and
        5. A resident of the county at the time of his or her election and during his or her continuance in office;
    2. Clerk of the Circuit Court. The clerk of the circuit court shall be clerk of all divisions of the court, ex officio clerk of the county court, and recorder, except as provided in subdivision (a)(3) of this section;
    3. County Clerk. A county clerk may be elected in like manner as a circuit clerk, and in such cases, the clerk may be ex officio clerk of the probate division of circuit court, if such division exists, in the county until otherwise provided by the General Assembly, and if created as a separate office, bear witness and sign all writs and other judicial process acted upon by the respective courts served by the clerk;
    4. Assessor. The assessor shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law;
    5. Sheriff.
      1. The sheriff, who shall be ex officio collector of taxes, unless otherwise provided by law, shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law. It shall be the general duty of each sheriff to quell and suppress all assaults and batteries, affrays, insurrections, and unlawful assemblies.
      2. The sheriff shall:
        1. Apprehend and commit to jail all felons and other offenders;
        2. Execute all process directed to him or her by legal authority;
        3. Attend upon all courts held in his or her county until otherwise provided by law; and
        4. Perform all other acts and things that are required by law;
    6. Collector of Taxes. A separate collector of taxes may be elected as provided by law. Each collector, upon receiving the tax charge of the county, shall proceed to collect them as may be prescribed by law;
    7. Treasurer. The treasurer, who shall be ex officio treasurer of the common school fund of the county, shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law. However, nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to replace or modify any law of this state authorizing school boards to appoint a treasurer for school districts as provided by law;
    8. County Surveyor. The county surveyor shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law. It shall be the general duty of the surveyor to execute all orders directed by any court of record for surveying or resurveying any tract of land, the title of which is in dispute or in litigation before the court, and to obey all orders of surveys for the partition of real estate, and to provide services to the county court when required for the purpose of surveying and measuring any proposed road; and
    9. Coroner. The county coroner shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law.
  2. Quorum Court District and Township Officers.
      1. There shall be elected in each of the quorum court districts of the counties of this state one (1) justice of the peace who shall perform such judicial duties as may be prescribed by law and who shall serve as a member of the quorum court of the county in which elected and shall perform such legislative duties as may be prescribed by law.
      2. Each justice shall be a qualified elector and a resident of the district for which he or she is elected.
    1. There shall be elected in each township, as preserved and continued in § 14-14-401, one (1) constable who shall have the qualifications and perform such duties as may be provided by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 41; 1979, No. 413, §§ 6-8; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3601; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 23; 2017, No. 260, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated (b)(1) as (b)(1)(A) and (B); and deleted “preside over the justice of the peace courts and” preceding “perform such judicial duties” in (b)(1)(A).

Cross References. Circuit clerks — Election — Term of office — Ex officio duties — County clerks elected in certain counties, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 19.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Article, If the Constable Blunders, Does the County Pay?: Liability Under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 519.

Case Notes

Constable.

A constable is an official of the county and thus covered by workers' compensation. Farnsworth v. White County, 39 Ark. App. 98, 839 S.W.2d 229 (1992), aff'd, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

Where plaintiff was acting as constable when he sustained a gunshot wound to his abdomen, the county was required to furnish workers' compensation. Farnsworth v. White County, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

While the plain language of § 14-14-1207 authorized reimbursement for district officials, a constable was not a district official, but a township officer under constitutional and statutory law, and thus, the statute did not authorize the reimbursement of expenses for constables, and the circuit court did not err in denying the constable's claim for expenses. Graves v. Greene County, 2013 Ark. 493, 430 S.W.3d 722 (2013).

Immunity.

Where sheriff acted pursuant to a writ of assistance in evicting plaintiff he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity unless his conduct was beyond the scope of the immunity. Roach v. Madden, 728 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Ark. 1989).

Sheriffs.

Except in cases of escape or the removal of property after order of attachment comes into his hands, a sheriff has no authority to execute process beyond his own county. Blevins v. State, 31 Ark. 53 (1876) (decision under prior law).

In a proceeding by a judgment creditor against a sheriff and his securities for failure to return an execution, it was no defense that the defendant in the execution was insolvent and the plaintiff was therefore not damaged; nor was it a defense that the deputy sheriff endorsed a return upon the execution and went to the clerk's office to file it, but the clerk was absent, and he afterwards was prevented by his official duties from returning to the clerk's office, without further showing that the office remained closed beyond the life of the execution and he returned it as soon afterwards as practicable. Atkinson v. Heer & Co., 44 Ark. 174 (1884) (decision under prior law).

No liability accrues for failure of a sheriff to sell attached property in his possession, condemned by order of court to be sold, until a legal demand has been made for an execution of the order. State ex rel. Cotton v. Atkinson, 53 Ark. 98, 13 S.W. 415 (1890) (decision under prior law).

When a sheriff attempts to justify a seizure of goods in the hands of a mortgagee under execution against the mortgagor by proving that the mortgage is fraudulent, the mortgagee may prove that the judgment, which was rendered in a justice court, while regular on its face, was void for want of jurisdiction of the mortgagor. Townsly-Myrick Dry Goods Co. v. Fuller, 58 Ark. 181, 24 S.W. 108 (1893); Fitzhugh v. Hackley, 70 Ark. 54, 66 S.W. 146 (1902) (decisions under prior law).

Where sheriff was acting pursuant to a writ of assistance specifically provided for in a decree of foreclosure executed by chancery court, and sheriff contacted plaintiff on three separate occasions to inquire whether plaintiff and his family would voluntarily surrender possession of the farm, and it was not until plaintiff refused for a third time that defendant took possession of the farm, it was of no consequence that sheriff may have used a minimal amount of force to evict plaintiff and his family, given sheriff's responsibilities as defined by the Arkansas legislature, the writ issued by chancery court, and plaintiff's confrontational attitude and refusal to leave the farm voluntarily. Roach v. Madden, 728 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Ark. 1989).

Term Limits.

A county initiative fixing term limits for county officials was unlawful and invalid with respect to the county judge and justice of the peace as specific qualifications for those offices are listed in this section. Allred v. McLoud, 343 Ark. 35, 31 S.W.3d 836 (2000).

Cited: Henderson v. Dudley, 264 Ark. 697, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).

14-14-1302. Election of officers.

  1. County Officers. The qualified electors of each county in this state, at the time of electing members of the General Assembly, shall elect, until otherwise provided by law, all county officers for the term of two (2) years and until their successors are elected and qualified.
  2. Quorum Court District and Township Officers. The qualified electors of each county quorum court district and township in this state shall elect each district and township officer for the term of two (2) years and until his or her successor is elected and qualified. Election shall be held at the time of electing members of the General Assembly.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 42; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3602.

Case Notes

Successors Elected and Qualified.

Defaulting treasurer elected to succeed himself was entitled to hold over until his successor was elected and qualified. Hill v. Goodwin, 82 Ark. 341, 101 S.W. 752 (1907) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Farnsworth v. White County, 39 Ark. App. 98, 839 S.W.2d 229 (1992); Farnsworth v. White County, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

14-14-1303. Bond.

All county, county quorum court district, and township officers shall be bonded as prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 47; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3607.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-14-1304. Oath.

Each county, justice of the peace, and township officer, before entering upon the discharge of the duties of his or her office, shall take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in the Arkansas Constitution for officers.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 43; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3603.

14-14-1305. Commission.

  1. County Officers. All county officers shall be commissioned by the Governor in a manner prescribed by law.
    1. Quorum Court District and Township Officers. All township and county quorum court district officers, except constables, shall be commissioned by the Governor in a manner prescribed by law.
    2. Constables shall be furnished with a certificate of election by the county court on which the constable's official oath shall be endorsed.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 44; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3604.

14-14-1306. Residence required.

  1. All county, county quorum court district, and township officers shall reside within their respective townships, districts, and counties.
  2. An office shall be deemed vacant if a county officer removes his or her legal residence from the county or if a district or township officer removes his or her legal residence from the district township from which elected.
  3. For purposes of this section, legal residence shall be defined as the domicile of the officer evidenced by the intent to make such residence a fixed and permanent home.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 45; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3605.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section does not alter Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 3, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Davis v. Holt, 304 Ark. 619, 804 S.W.2d 362 (1991).

Determination of Residency.

In determining the residency of a candidate and whether he is qualified to run for office from a certain district, the conduct and actions of the candidate regarding his residency must be in conformity with his stated intent, and both the intent and conduct of the candidate must be considered as factors in determining his residency. Brick v. Simonetti, 279 Ark. 446, 652 S.W.2d 23 (1983).

Where, in an action challenging the residency qualifications of a candidate who had won an election for justice of the peace in District No. 11, the evidence showed that the candidate had resided in District No. 11 for many years until her place of residence was changed to District No. 10 by a quirk of redistricting that occurred shortly before her election, and that the candidate, after learning of the change, moved into an apartment within District No. 11, set up housekeeping, changed her voter registration to the new address, obtained a telephone at the apartment, ate most of her meals at the apartment, and began making the apartment her home, the evidence supported the finding that the candidate was a resident of District No. 11. Brick v. Simonetti, 279 Ark. 446, 652 S.W.2d 23 (1983).

Cited: State ex rel. Robinson v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989).

14-14-1307. Offices.

  1. The county court shall determine the location of the office of the various county, county quorum court district, and township officers.
  2. Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed to compel the county court to provide justices of the peace, constables, coroners, or surveyors with a formal office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 46; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3606.

14-14-1308. Vacancy in office.

A county, county quorum court district, or township office shall be considered vacant if any one (1) of the following conditions exists:

  1. The incumbent fails to meet the qualifications for office prescribed by law as evidenced by failure to be commissioned;
  2. The incumbent refuses or neglects to take and subscribe to the official oath required by law as evidenced by failure to be commissioned;
  3. The incumbent refuses, neglects, or for any other reason fails to secure an official bond required by law as evidenced by failure to be commissioned;
  4. The incumbent resigns;
  5. The incumbent ceases to meet any residence requirements for office;
  6. The incumbent is removed from office by judicial proceedings;
  7. The election or appointment of the incumbent is declared void by a judicial proceeding;
  8. The incumbent is convicted of a felony, incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct, malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office by judicial proceedings;
  9. The incumbent ceases to discharge the duties of his or her office for a period of three (3) months, except when prevented by sickness or excused by a quorum court through resolution;
  10. The incumbent is declared of unsound mind by judicial proceedings;
  11. The quorum court determines that the incumbent has become disabled to the degree that he or she cannot perform the duties of his or her office;
  12. The incumbent holds more than one (1) office or position in conflict with the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Article 4, § 2, or Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 6;
  13. The quorum court separates elective offices as provided by law; or
  14. The incumbent dies.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 49; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3609.

14-14-1309. Declaration of vacancy.

  1. Conditions. The quorum court of each county shall declare a county, county quorum court district, or township office vacant where conditions of vacancy exist as demonstrated in the following manner:
    1. Upon receipt of certification that a condition of vacancy exists as evidenced by failure of an officer to be commissioned or finding of judicial proceedings where such conditions serve as the cause of vacancy; and
    2. Upon determination by a quorum court that a condition of vacancy exists in all other causes not governed by failure to be commissioned or finding of judicial proceedings. Such determination by a quorum court shall be conducted through the process of resolution as prescribed by law if the resolution shall have been published prior to the meeting date in which the resolution is to be considered by the court.
  2. Appeal. Appeals by the county, quorum court district, or township officer so affected from a declaration of vacancy by the quorum court may be taken to the circuit court if the appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of publication as required for county resolutions.
  3. Notification of Governor. The quorum court shall upon declaration of a vacancy, or within ten (10) calendar days thereafter, in any elective township office cause the declaration to be filed in writing with the Governor.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 50; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3610.

14-14-1310. Filling vacancies in elective offices.

    1. County Elective Offices. Vacancies in all county elective offices shall be filled by the county quorum court through the process of resolution as prescribed by law.
    2. Eligibility Requirements and Term of Office.
      1. Qualifications. All officers appointed to fill a vacant county elective office shall meet all of the requirements for election to that office.
      2. Requirements. All officers appointed by a quorum court shall subscribe to the oath of office, be commissioned, and be bonded as prescribed by law.
        1. Persons Ineligible for Appointment. Any member of the quorum court shall be ineligible for appointment to fill any vacancy occurring in any county office, and resignation shall not remove the ineligibility. Husbands and wives of justices of the peace and relatives of the justices or their husbands and wives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity shall likewise be ineligible.
        2. Any county elected officer who resigns during a term of office shall be ineligible for appointment to any county elective office during the term for which he or she resigned.
      3. Term of Office. All officers so appointed shall serve until their successor is elected and qualified.
      4. Successive Terms of Appointed Officer Prohibited. A person appointed to fulfill a vacant or unexpired term of an elective county office shall not be eligible for appointment or election to succeed himself or herself.
  1. Elective Township Offices. All vacancies in elective township offices, including justice of the peace offices, shall be filled by the Governor.
  2. Emergency Vacancies.
      1. During a declaration of an emergency or circumstances that warrant a declaration of an emergency under § 12-75-107 or § 12-75-108, a vacancy in the office of county judge due to death or disability to the degree of inability to perform the duties of office shall be temporarily filled by executive order of the county judge issued prior to the incapacity of the county judge, designating three (3) persons in succession to fill the vacancy of the office of county judge on an interim basis until such time as the vacancy is filled by the quorum court as provided by this chapter or the disability of the county judge is abated.
      2. Persons so designated shall be listed in succession and may be identified by title or position.
      3. The death or disability of a person in the line of succession shall result in disqualification of the person and appointment of the next successive person.
      1. During a declaration of an emergency or circumstances that warrant a declaration of emergency under § 12-75-107 or § 12-75-108, a vacancy in the office of sheriff due to death or disability to the degree of inability to perform the duties of office shall be temporarily filled by a policy statement of the sheriff issued prior to the incapacity of the sheriff and adopted by resolution of the quorum court, designating three (3) persons in succession to fill the vacancy in the office of sheriff on an interim basis until such time as the vacancy is filled by the quorum court as provided by this chapter or the disability of the sheriff is abated.
      2. Persons so designated by the sheriff shall be listed in succession and may be identified by title or position.
      3. The death or disability of a person in the line of succession shall result in disqualification of the person and appointment of the next successive person.
      4. The sheriff shall affix his or her signature to the policy statement and to the resolution of the quorum court to signify that the line of succession for the office of sheriff is in accordance with his or her authority.
      1. The county judge and the sheriff shall file the executive order and the resolution with policy statement under subdivisions (c)(1) and (2) of this section with the county clerk, and a file-marked copy shall be provided to the Director of the Division of Emergency Management no later than sixty (60) days from the beginning of the elected term of office.
      2. Members of the quorum court are not eligible to fill the vacancy in the office of county judge or sheriff under this section.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, §§ 51, 52; 1979, No. 413, § 10; 1985, No. 682, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-3611, 17-3612; Acts 2009, No. 229, § 1; 2013, No. 378, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 5920.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (c).

The 2013 amendment redesignated former (a)(2)(C) as (a)(2)(C)(i); added (a)(2)(C)(ii), and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Director of the Division of Emergency Management” for “Arkansas Department of Emergency Management” in (c)(3)(A).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

14-14-1311. Removal from office.

The circuit court shall have jurisdiction, upon information, presentment, or indictment, to remove any county or township officer from office for incompetency, corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct, malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 53; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3613.

14-14-1312. Remuneration.

No officer of any county, county quorum court district, or township shall receive from county funds, directly or indirectly, for salary, wages, and perquisites more than the amount appropriated by the respective quorum court for each respective office per annum in par funds and paid to the officer by instrument drawn by the county judge on the treasury.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 48; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3608.

14-14-1313. Remittance of public funds.

All public funds coming into the possession of any officer of the county shall be remitted to the county treasury in a manner prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1977, No. 742, § 48; 1979, No. 413, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-3608.

14-14-1314. Constable training requirements — Uniform requirements.

      1. For a constable to have access to information from the Arkansas Crime Information Center:
        1. He or she shall satisfactorily complete the constable certification course provided by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training; and
        2. Each year after completing the certification course required under subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) of this section, he or she shall satisfactorily complete sixteen (16) hours of training certified by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training.
      2. For a constable to carry a firearm:
        1. He or she shall attend sixteen (16) hours of firearms training; and
        2. Each year after completing the training required under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of this section, he or she shall satisfy the firearm qualification standards for a law enforcement official.
    1. A constable holding office on July 31, 2007, is exempt from the requirements of subdivision (a)(1) of this section if the constable has completed:
      1. The Part-time Law Enforcement Officer training or higher level training course; and
      2. Mandatory racial profiling courses.
    1. In the performance of his or her official duties, a constable shall wear a uniform consisting of:
      1. A white shirt on formal occasions at any time;
        1. A constable identification patch on the left shoulder of the shirt and an American flag on the right shoulder.
        2. The top of each patch shall be one inch (1") down from the shoulder seam of the shirt;
      2. A name tag above the right pocket flap of the shirt;
      3. A six-point star containing the words “Arkansas Constable” on the left side of the shirt; and
      4. The following pants:
        1. Tan pants; or
        2. Blue or black pants on formal occasions.
    2. If a constable is engaged in search or rescue activities, he or she shall wear a uniform consisting of:
      1. A black shirt; and
      2. Black pants.
  1. In the performance of his or her official duties, a constable shall drive a motor vehicle that is:
    1. Equipped with emergency equipment; and
    2. Clearly marked with a six-point star and the words “Arkansas Constable”.
  2. The county may pay reasonable expenses associated with the requirements of this section.

History. Acts 2007, No. 841, § 2; 2011, No. 561, § 4; 2013, No. 1113, § 1; 2019, No. 151, § 10; 2019, No. 910, § 5921.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (d).

The 2013 amendment deleted (b)(1)(A) through (b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(F) and (b)(2)(C) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; redesignated former (b)(1)(A)(iii) as present (b)(1)(A); deleted “shall be” following “’Arkansas Constable’” in (b)(1)(D); and substituted “Equipped” for “Fully equipped” in (c)(1).

The 2019 amendment by No. 151 substituted “Officer training” for “Officer II training” in (a)(2)(A).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “training certified” for “training provided” in (a)(1)(A)(ii).

Cross References. Access to criminal history records, § 12-12-211.

Training for constables, § 12-9-115.

Chapter 15 Officers

Cross References. Term of office of certain officers, § 21-1-102.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 231 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 100 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1927, No. 85, § 5: effective on passage.

14-15-101. Audit of accounts after expiration of term.

When the term of any sheriff and ex officio collector or a county collector or county treasurer or any county official required by law to make bond expires, within ten (10) days the county judge shall employ a reputable public accountant or a qualified Division of Legislative Audit employee to audit the account of the retiring official and ascertain the amount due the county, state, and other funds. However, this audit shall not be made if the county judge of the county affected decides that the audit is unnecessary.

History. Acts 1927, No. 85, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10442; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-235.

14-15-102. Environmental officer.

  1. Each county within this state may employ an environmental officer who shall inspect all landfills within that county, ensure compliance with all environmental ordinances, collect evidence of noncompliance and present the evidence to the prosecuting attorney. This officer shall issue citations for violation of any county ordinance prohibiting dumping of waste, garbage, litter, or any hazardous materials throughout the county.
  2. The environmental officer may complete the training course for law enforcement officers at the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy. After satisfactory completion of the course the environmental officer shall be a law enforcement officer.
  3. After completing the training course at the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy, the environmental officer may carry firearms, execute and serve any warrant or other processes issued under the authority of the county pertaining to violations of county ordinances concerning environmental protection, and make arrests and issue citations for violations of county ordinances concerning environmental protection.

History. Acts 1991, No. 722, §§ 1-3.

Subchapter 2 — County Assessors

Effective Dates. Acts 1883, No. 114, § 226: effective on passage.

Acts 1889, No. 9, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1947, No. 111, § 4: July 1, 1947.

Acts 1991, No. 484, § 5: Mar. 13, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that school districts and other taxing units, which are required to pay the expenses of the office of county assessor, are not, under present law, provided with notice or knowledge of the proposed budgets of county assessors, or of proposed amendments thereto. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2001, No. 1275, § 4: Apr. 4, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that property tax reimbursements to the counties will most likely begin in April and it is critical to the counties to account for costs borne by the certification of amounts of real property tax reduction to the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-15-201. Form of oath.

On or before January 1 succeeding his or her election and before entering upon or discharging any of the duties of his or her office, every assessor shall take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20, and in addition thereto, the following oath or affirmation, which shall be endorsed upon the assessment books prior to their delivery to the assessor:

“I , assessor for County, do solemnly swear that the value of all real and personal property, moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, of which statements may be made to me by persons required by law, will be appraised at its actual cash value, that in no case will I, knowingly, omit to demand of any person, or corporation, of whom by law I may be required to make such demand, a statement of the description and value of personal property, or the amount of moneys and credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise, which he or she may be required to list, or in any way connive at any violation or evasion of any of the requirements of the law or laws in relation to the listing or valuation of property, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies or otherwise, of any kind for taxation.”

History. Acts 1883, No. 114, § 58, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., § 9874; Pope's Dig., § 13623; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-802.

Cross References. Constitutional oath requirement, § 14-14-1304.

Case Notes

Failure to Take Oath.

Tax deed based on sale for nonpayment of taxes for a year during which assessor took oath prescribed by Arkansas Constitution, but neglected to take the special statutory oath, is valid. Barton v. Lattourette, 55 Ark. 81, 17 S.W. 588 (1891).

A tax sale is not rendered invalid by an assessor's failure to take the oath. Sawyer v. Wilson, 81 Ark. 319, 99 S.W. 389 (1907).

Failure of tax assessor to take oath of office is no ground for quashing an assessment on certiorari. Moore v. Turner, 43 Ark. 243 (1884).

Failure of assessor to append proper oath to his assessment return is not ground to enjoin extending of assessment on tax books. Stell v. Watson, 51 Ark. 516, 11 S.W. 822 (1889).

Cited: Wildman v. Enfield, 174 Ark. 1005, 298 S.W. 196 (1927).

14-15-202. Extension of time to take oath.

Every assessor who shall have failed to take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in § 14-15-201 at the time therein stated is granted, until the time provided by law for entering upon the discharge of his or her duties, to take and subscribe to the oath prescribed in § 14-15-201, and the acts of every assessor who shall take the oath within the time granted in this section shall be as valid as if he or she had taken and subscribed to the oath at the time provided by law.

History. Acts 1889, No. 9, § 1, p. 8; C. & M. Dig., § 9875; Pope's Dig., § 13624; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-803.

14-15-203. Pro rata contribution to salaries.

    1. It is declared to be the policy of the state and local governments of Arkansas that from and after July 1, 1947, the state and every county, municipality, school district, and other taxing unit, excepting only special improvement districts to which the county assessor is not required by law to render service, receiving ad valorem or other tax funds collected by county collectors or certified to the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State pursuant to § 26-26-310 by county collectors shall contribute funds for the payment of the salaries, and the necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties, of the county assessors and their deputies.
      1. At least twenty (20) days prior to the quorum court meeting at which the annual budget is adopted, the county assessor shall provide to each taxing unit a copy of the proposed budget of the county assessor for the next year.
      2. At least ten (10) days prior to any meeting of the quorum court at which an amendment adding an appropriation exceeding one percent (1%) of the original budget amount to the budget of the county assessor shall be presented, the county assessor shall provide to each taxing unit a copy of the proposed amendment.
      3. Copies of the budget and any amendments shall be provided by giving copies to the following:
        1. For the county, to the county clerk;
        2. For a municipality, to the clerk or recorder; and
        3. For a school district, to the superintendent.
    1. For the purpose of carrying out this policy, the amount to be contributed annually by each of the taxing units shall be in the proportion that the total of such taxes collected or certified to the state pursuant to § 26-26-310 for the benefit of each taxing unit bears to the total of taxes collected for the benefit of all taxing units.
    2. The pro rata contribution of the salaries and expenses of any taxing unit that receives taxes collected or certified to the state pursuant to § 26-26-310 for the purpose of meeting debt service requirements of its issued and outstanding bonds shall be charged to and paid out of the taxing unit's general fund, and not to, or out of, any special fund it may maintain for this purpose, nor in such other manner as will diminish the amount necessary to meet the debt service requirements.

History. Acts 1947, No. 111, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-806; Acts 1991, No. 484, § 1; 2001, No. 1275, § 2.

Case Notes

In General.

The assessor's office can recover for its “salaries and necessary expenses” on a pro rata basis from taxing units it services for the collection of taxes. Mears v. Little Rock School Dist., 268 Ark. 30, 593 S.W.2d 42 (1980).

School Districts.

Where the General Assembly had not passed any legislation establishing an “assessment” reasonably related to the cost of any service or specific benefit provided by the county government, the Pulaski County Quorum Court was without the authority to order the school districts to pay a pro rata share of the salaries and expenses incurred in the collection of taxes by the county officers, other than the assessor's office. Mears v. Little Rock School Dist., 268 Ark. 30, 593 S.W.2d 42 (1980).

It is the duty of the county, not the school districts, to furnish a courthouse and to provide the necessary offices for the several county officers, including the assessor and collector; therefore, the county judge erred when he diverted money from the school board's tax collection account to the county's general fund to pay the office expenses of the assessor and collector. Venhaus v. Board of Educ., 280 Ark. 441, 659 S.W.2d 179 (1983).

Cited: Strawn v. Campbell, 226 Ark. 449, 291 S.W.2d 508 (1956).

14-15-204. Claim for salaries and expenses.

  1. The county assessor shall file an itemized claim, no less often than quarterly, with the clerk of the county court for salaries earned and for reimbursement of authorized expenses incurred. The county court shall promptly examine each claim, and if it finds the claim to be correct, the county court shall enter an order directing the county clerk to issue a warrant upon the county treasury, payable from the county assessor's fund, hereby created, for the amount so found to be due.
    1. Annually, at the time of making the final settlement of taxes collected by the county tax collector, the county funds of the various taxing units shall be charged with such units' respective pro rata shares of the salaries and expenses, as provided in § 14-15-203, and the amounts so charged shall be credited to the county assessor's fund of the county.
    2. In order to facilitate the payment of salaries and expenses, the county court may authorize and direct by order duly entered the county treasurer to make advance transfers from the collector's unapportioned fund, or the county general fund, to the county assessor's fund, with advances to be repaid at the time of making final settlement of amounts due the county assessor's fund.

History. Acts 1947, No. 111, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-807.

14-15-205. Professional development recognition payments.

    1. County assessors, full-time employees of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes shall become eligible for professional development recognition payments upon completion of the requirements enumerated in subsection (b) of this section for each year the employee is employed full time in the county assessor's office.
    2. Such payments shall be made from appropriated funds pro rata to eligible county assessors, full-time employees of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes up to the designated amounts from such funds as may be specifically appropriated for such payments.
        1. County assessors, full-time employees of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes designated as senior appraisers, Level 4, by the Assessment Coordination Department shall receive annually, to the extent moneys are available, a professional development recognition payment in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500).
        2. County assessors, full-time employees of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes designated as senior appraiser managers, Level 4, by the department shall receive annually, to the extent moneys are available, a professional development recognition payment in an amount not to exceed seven hundred fifty dollars ($750).
      1. A senior appraiser, Level 4, with four (4) years of appraisal experience may serve as an appraisal or reappraisal manager in a county if the appraiser complies with the standards established by the department.
    1. To the extent moneys are available, county assessors, full-time employees of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes designated as certified residential appraisers by the Arkansas Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board or as cadastral mapping specialists by the International Association of Assessing Officers shall annually receive a professional development recognition payment in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    2. To the extent moneys are available, county assessors, full-time employees of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes designated as certified general appraisers by the Arkansas Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board or as certified assessment evaluators by the International Association of Assessing Officers shall annually receive a professional development recognition payment in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000).
    1. A county assessor, full-time employee, or state employee who actively works with ad valorem taxes is eligible for only one (1) professional development recognition payment annually.
    2. To the extent moneys are available, if any county assessor, full-time employee, or state employee who actively works with ad valorem taxes is eligible for professional development recognition payments in two (2) or more categories enumerated in subsection (b) of this section, he or she shall annually receive the professional development recognition payment in the amount of the higher recognition payment category.
    1. In order to be eligible to receive a professional development recognition payment, the county assessor, full-time employee, or state employee who actively works with ad valorem taxes shall present proof of the appropriate agency's designation and proof that the appropriate agency's designation has been maintained for a minimum of twelve (12) months before the June 30 for which the payment is being requested to the Director of the Assessment Coordination Department, who shall authorize payment to the county assessor or employee no later than July 15.
    2. In order to receive professional development recognition payments in subsequent years, the county assessor or employee shall annually present proof to the director by June 1 that he or she has fulfilled the requirements to maintain a professional designation and that the employee has been a full-time county assessor or assessment employee for the previous year and continues to be a full-time assessor or employee.
  1. Professional development recognition payments authorized by this section shall be subject to withholding of all applicable state and federal taxes but shall not be included by retirement systems in determining benefits.

History. Acts 1995, No. 903, §§ 1, 2; 2001, No. 1393, § 1; 2013, No. 707, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment inserted “and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes” in (a)(1) and (a)(2); inserted “full-time” in (a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i), (iii), (b)(2) through (3), (c)(1), (2) and (d)(1); inserted “of county assessors' offices, and state employees who actively work with ad valorem taxes” in (b)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (b)(1)(B)(2) and (B)(3); inserted “or state employee who actively works with ad valorem taxes” in (c)(1), (2) and (d)(1); and added “and proof that the appropriate agency's designation has been maintained for a minimum of twelve (12) months before the June 30 for which the payment is being requested” in (d)(1).

Subchapter 3 — County Coroners

Publisher's Notes. Former §§ 14-15-30114-15-304, concerning the conservator of peace, his powers generally, and the issuance of recognizances and execution of process, were repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 3. They were derived from the following sources:

14-15-301. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 1571; Pope's Dig., § 1895; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-903.

14-15-302. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 1572; Pope's Dig., § 1896; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-904.

14-15-303. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 1573; Pope's Dig., § 1897; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-905.

14-15-304. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, §§ 7, 8; Acts 1917, No. 206, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1574, 1575; Pope's Dig., §§ 1898, 1899; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-906, 12-907.

Cross References. State and local officers — Income and expenditures, § 21-7-201 et seq.

Actions against sheriffs, coroners, and other officials, § 16-56-109.

Procurement of transplantable tissue — Procurement agencies, § 20-17-617.

Deaths, § 20-18-601 et seq.

Coroners' fees, § 21-6-304.

Coroners to report deaths, § 27-53-204.

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 484, § 4: Mar. 10, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that county coroners should be allowed to be employed by local emergency medical services; that this act so provides; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to grant such authorization as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 7: Apr. 23, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly that there exists confusion over the powers and duties of the various county coroners; that the confusion is compounded by a series of antiquated laws that bestow responsibilities on a coroner not connected to his duties in modern times. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Liability for wrongful autopsy. 18 A.L.R.4th 858.

14-15-301. Powers and duties of a coroner.

When a death is reported to the coroner, he or she shall conduct an investigation concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of an individual and gather and review background information, including, but not limited to, medical information and any other information which may be helpful in determining the cause and manner of death.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 1.

14-15-302. Coroner's investigation.

  1. A coroner's investigation does not include criminal investigation responsibilities. However, the coroner shall assist any law enforcement agency or the State Crime Laboratory upon request.
    1. A coroner shall be given access to all death scenes in order to perform the duties set forth in this subchapter.
    2. A coroner may issue subpoenas as necessary to secure pertinent medical or other records and testimony relevant to the determination of the cause and manner of death.
    1. A coroner or his or her deputy who has received instruction and has been deemed qualified by the State Crime Laboratory to take and handle toxicological samples from dead human bodies may do so for the purpose of determining the presence of chemical agents that may have contributed to the cause of death.
    2. Toxicological samples may be taken from dead human bodies in those cases in which the coroner is required by law to conduct an investigation.
    1. A person, institution, or office in this state that makes available information or material under this section is not criminally liable.
    2. A person, institution, or office in this state is not liable in tort for compliance with this section.
    1. A preliminary written report of the coroner's investigation shall be completed within five (5) working days and shall include a pronouncement of death. If indicated, a subsequent report shall be completed.
    2. If the death occurred without medical attendance or was the result of a homicide, an accident, or a suicide, then the preliminary written report shall include without limitation the following information regarding the decedent:
      1. Name;
      2. Date of birth or approximate age if unknown;
      3. Sex;
      4. Social security number if available;
      5. Home address;
      6. Location where the body was discovered;
      7. Time of death or approximate time if unknown;
      8. Condition of the body, including any recent trauma, body temperature, and position;
      9. Any prescribed medications;
      10. Pertinent medical history;
      11. Cause and manner of death;
      12. Photographs or information where photographs may be accessed in cases of non-natural deaths and deaths of persons under eighteen (18) years of age;
      13. List of all other governmental entities investigating the death; and
      14. Disposition of the body.
    3. Nothing in this section shall limit or otherwise restrict the exercise of professional judgment or discretion by a coroner or prohibit access to information or testimony necessary to complete a coroner's investigation.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 1; 1999, No. 812, § 1; 2007, No. 194, § 2; 2009, No. 1288, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “dead human” preceding “bodies” in (c)(2); subdivided (d); inserted “and shall include a pronouncement of death” in (e)(1); inserted “preliminary written” in the introductory language of (e)(2); substituted “date of birth” for “age” at the beginning of (e)(2)(E); and made minor stylistic changes.

Cross References. Coroner may collect and secure decedent's prescription medication, § 14-15-306.

Notification of certain deaths, § 12-12-315.

14-15-303. Death certificate.

If, after conducting an investigation, the law enforcement agency and prosecuting attorney of the jurisdiction are satisfied that no crime has occurred, the coroner is satisfied that the death is not the result of a crime, and the coroner knows to a reasonable certainty the cause and manner of death, the coroner or his or her designated deputy shall proceed to execute a death certificate in the form and manner required by law and release the body for final disposition.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 1.

14-15-304. Confidentiality.

  1. Records gathered and created during the course of a coroner's investigation shall be confidential and deemed exempt from the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq., but only until such time that the coroner issues his or her final report.
  2. Confidential medical information gathered during the course of the investigation shall remain exempt from public inspection and copying except as quoted in the coroner's final report.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1301, § 2.

14-15-305. Employment.

County coroners may be employed by any city emergency medical service, county emergency medical service, or joint city and county emergency medical service.

History. Acts 1989, No. 484, § 1.

14-15-306. Disposition of prescription medication.

  1. A coroner may collect and secure any prescription medication of the decedent to ensure that the medication does not come into the possession of a person who might use the medication in an illegal or harmful manner.
  2. Collected medication shall be disposed of under circuit court order or shall be forwarded to the Department of Health within thirty (30) days for proper destruction under § 20-64-214.
  3. This section shall not apply to any prescription medication in the custody or possession of an institutional healthcare provider or attending hospice nurse that is subject to other laws, rules, and regulations governing the destruction or disposition of patient or resident medication.

History. Acts 2007, No. 194, § 3; 2019, No. 315, § 986.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “rules” following “laws” in (c).

Cross References. Notification of certain deaths, § 12-12-315.

14-15-307. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The repeal of this section by Acts 2019, No. 383, supersedes the amendment of this section by Acts 2019, No. 910. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 4855, amended subdivision (a)(2)(G) to read as follows: “(G) The Secretary of the Department of Health or his or her designee; and”.

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the creation, powers, and duties of the Coroner's Advisory Task Force, was repealed by Acts 2019, No. 383, § 4, effective July 24, 2019. The section was derived from Acts 2009, No. 1275, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 4855.

14-15-308. Training and instruction.

  1. The Division of Law Enforcement Standards and Training, in coordination with the Department of Health, shall establish a training curriculum for medicolegal death investigators, coroners, and deputy coroners in Arkansas that consists of no less than sixteen (16) hours nor more than forty (40) hours of instruction, including without limitation courses on:
    1. Medicolegal death investigation leading to certification as a medicolegal death investigator;
    2. Scene investigation;
    3. Body recovery;
    4. Safety;
    5. Statutes and rules;
    6. Documentation and reporting;
    7. Communication and interviewing; and
    8. Proper completion of a death certificate and assignment of cause of death.
  2. The division shall:
    1. Issue a certificate of satisfactory participation and completion to a coroner, deputy coroner, or medicolegal death investigator who completes the instructional program required under subsection (a) of this section; and
      1. Administer the funds for the payment and reimbursement for materials, speakers, mileage, lodging, meals, the cost of the certificate, and training equipment that are in addition to compensation allowed under §§ 14-14-1203, 14-14-1204, and 14-14-1206.
      2. The division may receive funding for coroner training through grants-in-aid, donations, and the County Coroners Continuing Education Fund.
  3. The commission shall provide death investigation training:
    1. Free of charge to a law enforcement officer, a state death investigator, and an employee of the State Crime Laboratory; and
    2. For a fee under a memorandum of understanding between the commission and the Arkansas Coroner's Association to coroners and deputy coroners.
      1. Within one (1) year of beginning employment as a deputy coroner, a person employed as a deputy coroner after January 1, 2020, shall complete the training required under this section and obtain a certificate under subdivision (b)(1) of this section or present a certificate from the American Board of Medicolegal Death Investigators.
      2. A deputy coroner under subdivision (d)(1)(A) of this section who does not comply with this subsection shall not continue employment or activity as a deputy coroner, including without limitation signing death certificates or assisting in death investigations.
    1. Within one (1) year of the date of employment of a deputy coroner, the coroner shall provide the county judge with the deputy coroner's:
      1. Name;
      2. Address;
      3. Starting date of employment; and
      4. Copy of the certificate under subdivision (d)(1)(A) of this section.

History. Acts 2013, No. 551, § 5; 2019, No. 238, § 1; 2019, No. 910, §§ 5922-5924.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2019, No. 238, § 2, provided:

“(a) Before January 1, 2021, a person who is employed as a deputy coroner as of January 1, 2020, shall complete the requirements of § 14-15-308.

“(b) A deputy coroner under subsection (a) of this section who does not comply with this section shall not continue employment or activity as a deputy coroner, including without limitation signing death certificates or assisting in death investigations”.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 238 added (d).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Law Enforcement Standards and Training” for “Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training” in (a); and substituted “division” for “commission” twice in (b).

14-15-309. Mass fatality resource inventory and mutual aid agreement.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Fixed assets” means items that are permanently located but can be made available for use, including without limitation:
      1. Office space;
      2. Body refrigeration units;
      3. Personnel rehabilitation areas; and
      4. Equipment storage facilities;
    2. “Mobile assets” means items that can be transported to an affected area, including without limitation:
      1. Personal protective equipment such as masks, tyvek suits, gloves, boots, environmental protection, and hazards protection;
      2. Investigative equipment such as cameras, measuring devices, collection bags, and labeling devices;
      3. Body recovery equipment such as sheets, body bags, ropes, boards, and stretchers;
      4. Administrative equipment for the purposes of data recording, financial management, and records preservation; and
      5. Vehicular equipment such as cars, trucks, vans, trailers, and boats; and
    3. “Personnel assets” means:
      1. Coroners, deputy coroners, and medicolegal death investigators; and
      2. Other individuals or entities that possess specialized skills necessary for the comprehensive investigation of deaths in a mass fatality incident.
    1. The Department of Health may enter into a mass fatality resource inventory and mutual aid agreement among coroners in this state.
    2. A mass fatality resource inventory and mutual aid agreement under this section is effective when signed by the county judge in a county in which a coroner enters into an agreement under subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
    3. A mass fatality resource inventory and mutual aid agreement under this section may provide for the sharing of fixed assets, mobile assets, and personnel assets.
  2. The signatures of the county judge and the coroner are necessary for a county to pledge its deputies, equipment, and resources to the mass fatality mutual aid agreement.
  3. Only a coroner, deputy coroner, or medicolegal death investigator who receives documentation reflecting satisfactory participation and completion from the commission and is in good standing under this section may be allocated for assignment and duty in the mass fatality resource inventory and mutual aid agreement.
  4. The Department of Health shall maintain records of coroners, deputy coroners, and medicolegal death investigators who have received training and certificates of course completion under this section from the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training.

History. Acts 2013, No. 551, § 5.

Subchapter 4 — Recorders

Preambles. Acts 1959, No. 110, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, under the present law of this State no notice of the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding is required to be recorded in any county wherein is located any land in which a bankrupt or a debtor in any proceeding under the act of Congress relating to bankruptcy has any interest, and

“Whereas, an act of Congress, 11 U.S.C. Section 44(g), provides that such notice shall be recorded in any such county when the recording of the same is authorized by state law;

“Now therefore… .”

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 53: effective on passage.

Acts 1959, No. 168, § 3: Aug. 1, 1959.

Acts 2013, No. 999, § 6: Apr. 8, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that many instruments affecting title to real estate are being found to not provide constructive notice because of defects in the certificates of acknowledgment; and that this act is immediately necessary to protect property rights and interests. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Publisher's Notes. The clerk of the circuit court shall be ex officio recorder. See Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 19, and § 14-14-1301.

Cross References. Acknowledgment of instruments — Officials authorized to make within the state, § 16-47-202.

Detachment of territory generally — Order for exclusion, § 14-40-1802.

Order of incorporation — Transcript, § 14-38-104.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This subchapter does not apply to promissory notes, and of two assignments of the same note, the first in point of time will take precedence, even though the second was recorded and the first was not. Neal v. Bradley, 238 Ark. 714, 384 S.W.2d 238 (1964).

Sebastian County.

The two districts of Sebastian County are, in effect, separate counties, so far as the recording requirements of § 18-50-103 are involved. Henson v. Fleet Mtg. Co., 319 Ark. 491, 892 S.W.2d 250 (1995).

Uniform Commercial Code.

Sections 14-15-101 et seq. were repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code insofar as they refer to the recording of instruments concerning “goods and chattels” as giving notice to all persons. In re King Furn. City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965).

14-15-401. Duties generally.

    1. There shall be established in each county in this state an office to be styled the county recorder's office, which shall be kept at the seat of justice of each county.
      1. Unless otherwise provided by law, the county recorder is the circuit clerk of the county.
      2. In a county that under law has assigned the duties of the county recorder to the county clerk, all Arkansas Code references to circuit clerk that concern recording functions shall mean the county clerk.
  1. The county recorder:
    1. Shall duly attend to the duties of the county recorder's office;
    2. Shall provide and keep in the county recorder's office well-bound books in which the county recorder shall record in a fair and legible hand all instruments of writing authorized or required to be recorded in the manner provided; and
      1. May implement electronic filing and searching provisions and procedures under the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, § 14-2-301 et seq.
      2. Unless a county recorder has implemented the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, § 14-2-301 et seq., the transmission of an electronic document to the county recorder has no legal effect.
      3. A person that seeks to record an electronic document is solely responsible for determining if a county recorder has implemented the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, § 14-2-301 et seq.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8616, 8617; Pope's Dig., §§ 11208, 11209; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1001; Acts 2007, No. 734, § 2; 2009, No. 160, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (a)(2) and redesignated the remaining text accordingly.

Cross References. Public records generally, § 14-2-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Salary.

Although the clerk of a circuit court has the dual function of clerk and recorder, he fills but one office, so that a legislative act fixing the salary of the clerk of the circuit court fixes his salary both as clerk and as recorder. Durden v. Greenwood Dist., 73 Ark. 305, 83 S.W. 1048 (1904).

14-15-402. Instruments to be recorded.

  1. It shall be the duty of each recorder to record in the books provided for his or her office all deeds, mortgages, conveyances, deeds of trust, bonds, covenants, defeasances, affidavits, powers of attorney, assignments, contracts, agreements, leases, or other instruments of writing of or writing concerning any lands and tenements or goods and chattels, which shall be proved or acknowledged according to law, that are authorized to be recorded in his or her office.
    1. To be accepted by the county recorder for recording purposes, all documents shall:
      1. Be on eight and one-half by eleven inch (8½"x11") paper;
      2. Have a two and one-half inch (2.5") margin at the right top of the first page, one-half inch (0.5") margin on the sides and bottoms of all pages, and a two and one-half inch (2.5") margin at the bottom of the last page;
      3. Have an area reserved on the top right of the first page for the file mark of the recorder;
      4. Contain the following information:
        1. The title of the document; and
        2. The name of the grantor and grantee, when applicable;
      5. Be acknowledged or otherwise executed as permitted by § 16-47-107 or § 18-12-208; and
      6. Be legible.
      1. The county recorder shall have the discretion to waive the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section for:
        1. Good cause; and
        2. Any document that complies with the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, § 14-2-301 et seq.
      2. All documents and instruments executed before January 1, 2004, shall be exempt from the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
      3. All surveys and plats shall be exempt from the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
    2. A county recorder shall not refuse to record a document that has been executed in a manner permitted by § 16-47-107 or § 18-12-208.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, §§ 8, 9; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8624, 8625; Pope's Dig., §§ 11216, 11217; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-101, 16-102; Acts 2003, No. 757, § 1; 2005, No. 1428, § 1; 2007, No. 734, § 3; 2013, No. 999, § 5.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “or otherwise executed as permitted by § 16-47-107 or § 18-12-208” for “in accordance with § 16-47-207” in (b)(1)(E); added (b)(3), and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Complaint Not Reduced to Judgment.

As a matter of law, a complaint for money damages not yet reduced to judgment was not a matter of record required to be included in an abstract of title to real property. Bank of Cave City v. Abstract & Title Co., 38 Ark. App. 65, 828 S.W.2d 852 (1992).

Only the filing of a lis pendens against the property can render the complaint a matter of record before it is reduced to judgment, but lis pendens cannot be filed for a complaint merely for a money judgment and not directly affecting the title to the real estate. Bank of Cave City v. Abstract & Title Co., 38 Ark. App. 65, 828 S.W.2d 852 (1992).

Cited: Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

14-15-403. Instruments affecting title to property.

  1. No instrument by which the title to real estate or personal property, or any interest therein, or lien thereon, is conveyed, created, encumbered, assigned, or otherwise affected or disposed of shall be received for record or filing by the recorder unless:
    1. The name and address of the person who, and the governmental agency, if any, which, prepared the instrument appears on the face of the first page thereof; and
    2. The name is either printed, typewritten, stamped, or signed in a legible manner.
  2. An instrument will be in compliance with this section if it contains a statement in the following form:
  3. The receipt for record or filing of any instrument by the recorder without complying with the provisions of this section shall not prevent the instrument from becoming notice as provided by law.
    1. Any fee charged by the recorder for recording or filing of any instrument which does not conform with the provisions of this section shall be returned by the recorder to the person who paid the fee upon request, if made within six (6) months after recording or filing of the instrument.
    2. If no such request is made within that time, the fee shall be paid into the county general fund by the recorder.
  4. This section does not apply to any instrument executed prior to August 1, 1959, nor to any decree, order, judgment, writ of any court, will, or death certificate.

“This instrument was prepared by , (name) ” (address)

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1959, No. 168, §§ 1, 2; 1961, No. 437, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-118, 16-119.

Cross References. Certification of recorded real estate transfer to tax collector in counties adopting unit tax ledger system, § 26-28-204.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Secured Transactions: Article IX: Part 1, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 108.

Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 30.

14-15-404. Effect of recording instruments affecting title to property.

    1. Every deed, bond, or instrument of writing affecting the title, in law or equity, to any real or personal property within this state which is or may be required by law to be acknowledged or proved and recorded shall be constructive notice to all persons from the time the instrument is filed for record in the office of the county recorder of the proper county.
      1. A document filed under the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, § 14-2-301 et seq., is filed of record within the meaning of this subsection if recorded under § 14-15-407 during the county recorder's regular business hours.
      2. A document received after the county recorder's regular business hours shall be recorded in the order received.
  1. No deed, bond, or instrument of writing for the conveyance of any real estate, or by which the title thereto may be affected in law or equity, made or executed after December 21, 1846, shall be good or valid against a subsequent purchaser of the real estate for a valuable consideration without actual notice thereof or against any creditor of the person executing such an instrument obtaining a judgment or decree which by law may be a lien upon the real estate unless the deed, bond, or instrument, duly executed and acknowledged or proved as required by law, is filed for record in the office of the clerk and ex officio recorder of the county where the real estate is situated.

History. Acts 1846, §§ 1, 2, p. 77; 1846, §§ 1, 2, p. 108; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1536, 1537; Pope's Dig., §§ 1846, 1847; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-114, 16-115; Acts 2007, No. 734, § 4.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1846, § 3, p. 77, and Acts 1846, § 3, p. 108, provided that nothing contained in the acts would be construed to change, or in any manner affect, §§ 14-15-411, 18-40-101, and 18-40-102.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Laurence and Circo, An Exchange of Collegial Memoranda on the Attachment of a Judgment Lien to Real Property Subject to a Buy-Sell Agreement, 2006 Arkansas L. Notes 93.

Ark. L. Rev.

Secured Transactions: Article IX: Part 1, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 108.

Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured Transactions — Part 1: Scope of Article 9, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 377.

Case Note, Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.: A Portrait of Uncertainty for Title Examiners and Mineral Interest Owners, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 679.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Property Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1025.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Subsection (b) applies only to instruments touching and affecting real estate and has no applicability to assignments of promissory notes even though the notes are secured by a lien on real estate. Neal v. Bradley, 238 Ark. 714, 384 S.W.2d 238 (1964).

Actual Notice.

Deed for conveyance of real estate, duly executed, is good and valid against creditor of person executing such deed, obtaining a judgment, which, by law, is a lien on real estate, and also against a purchaser of such real estate at a judicial sale under the judgment, if actual notice of the deed is given to the purchaser and to the creditor, or to his attorney of record, or if such deed is filed for record at any time before the sale, though not until after the judgment is rendered and execution levied upon the land; such notice must be given at any time before, or at, the time of the sale under execution, and will be sufficient, though the deed is not produced. Byers v. Engles, 16 Ark. 543 (1855).

Absent recorded notice, a new barn, stockpond, barbed fence, and general clean-up were sufficient facts and circumstances as would put a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry, and thus a second purchaser was put on actual notice. Bowen v. Perryman, 256 Ark. 174, 506 S.W.2d 543 (1974).

Judgment was properly awarded to appellee in its quiet title action as appellee's chain of title was superior; evidence showed that appellants' predecessors had actual knowledge of the conveyance of the disputed strip of land to appellee's predecessor, and thus the deed of appellee's predecessor, although recorded later, took priority. Rice v. Welch Motor Co., 95 Ark. App. 100, 234 S.W.3d 327 (2006).

Constructive Notice.

Record of conveyance by mortgagee was not constructive notice to mortgagor. Turman v. Sanford, 69 Ark. 95, 61 S.W. 167 (1901).

Record of deed of owner as conveyed by an alias was constructive notice. Kendall v. J.I. Porter Lumber Co., 69 Ark. 442, 64 S.W. 220 (1901).

Record of deed of growing timber was constructive notice. Kendall v. J.I. Porter Lumber Co., 69 Ark. 442, 64 S.W. 220 (1901).

All persons are affected with notice of original instruments as they are filed for record in the recorder's office. Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457 (1929).

An unrecorded deed is not constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee. Davis v. Burford, 197 Ark. 965, 125 S.W.2d 789 (1939).

Where purchasers of second lien attempted, under the aegis of Arkansas case law, to get around an SBA first lien, they were frustrated where court held their conduct culpable and neglectful in ignoring constructive notice under subsection (a) as well as other knowledge they evidenced of the SBA mortgage. United States v. Hughes, 499 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1974).

Recording of lien created by bill of assurance of property owners' association against property as a result of members' delinquent and unpaid assessments constituted constructive notice to all persons. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners' Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651 (1975).

Facts in bankruptcy trustee's preferential transfer action against two creditor banks demonstrated clearly that the bank's mortgages were granted by and recorded against entities which were not record owners of the property mortgaged; thus, absent any other argument, since the banks' mortgages were not properly recorded against the entities which possessed legal interests in the properties, those mortgages did not affect title to the properties and would not operate as constructive notice under § 18-40-102 and subsection (a) of this section. Rice v. First Ark. Valley Bank (In re May), 310 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004).

Although the farm argued that, even if the notice was constitutionally insufficient, the railroad's claim to the mineral rights was barred by the one-year limitations period in § 26-37-203, the court found that: (1) this section, which provided that subsequent purchasers of real estate were put on constructive notice of a properly recorded deed, this section did not govern the running of the statute of limitations as to the railroad because it was not a subsequent purchaser of the mineral rights; and (2) imposition of § 26-37-203 presupposed adequate notice to the landowner, and due process required notice reasonably calculated under all of the circumstances to inform the property owner of the taking so that he may object, and if that notice was lacking, the passage of one year from the taking, without more, would not satisfy the requirements of due process. Linn Farms Timber Ltd. P'ship v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 4:09CV00663 JLH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51714 (E.D. Ark. May 25, 2010), aff'd, 661 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2011) (decided under prior version of statute).

Recorded affidavit of lost mortgage, with a copy of the mortgage appended, was not constructive notice to a bankruptcy trustee of the mortgagee's interest in the subject property because the affidavit was not an “instrument of writing affecting title,” under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, as (1) the affidavit did not affect title, since the affidavit's purpose was to give notice that there was a mortgage executed which was lost, and (2) an instrument affecting real estate had to be acknowledged before being admitted to record, under § 16-47-101, but the grantor did not acknowledge the affidavit, nor was the grantor required to, as the affidavit was witnessed and notarized only for the purpose of attesting to the signature of the lender's employee who stated the mortgage was lost and the bank claimed an interest in the property, so the trustee, as a bona fide purchaser for value, under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544, could avoid the mortgagee's lien. Wetzel v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2010 Ark. 242 (2010).

Transaction between the city and debtor appeared without doubt a deed absolute on its face intended by the parties to be a mortgage, and was treated as such under Arkansas law. Under the provisions of this section, the Lease and Agreement between the City and debtor which was duly recorded was “an instrument of writing affecting title, in law or equity, to any real or personal property” and constituted notice of the writing and was binding on the Trustee; therefore, the Trustee had constructive notice of the deed from debtor to the city and the Lease and Agreement containing the provision to repurchase the property back for a nominal sum because the documents were duly recorded in the records of White County, Arkansas. Ark. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Rice (In re Yarnell's Ice Cream Co.), 486 B.R. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2013).

Chapter 7 trustee was not allowed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 to avoid liens which a mortgagee held on real property Chapter 7 debtors owned in Arkansas because he was on notice of the mortgagee's interests; although two mortgages the mortgagee recorded contained only the street address of the debtors' property, the mortgages were not defective, they gave the trustee constructive notice of the mortgagee's liens and imposed a duty on the trustee to conduct an inquiry concerning the mortgagee's interests, and the trustee could have discovered the mortgagee's interests by making an inquiry to the assessor's office where the mortgages were recorded. Lee v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Savage), 504 B.R. 921 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014).

Fraud.

In fraud actions, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run, parties alleging fraud are charged with knowledge of any pertinent real estate conveyances from the time such conveyances are placed in public records, since filing for public record and concealment are mutually exclusive. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984).

Although Debtor deeded 600 acres of land to his son for $10 in 1986, for purposes of the Arkansas fraudulent transfer statute, the transfer and the effect upon the debtor and his insolvency status must be analyzed at the time the deed was recorded in 1995. Williams v. Marlar, 246 B.R. 606 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2000), aff'd, Williams v. Marlar (In re Marlar), 252 B.R. 743 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000).

Implied Repeal.

Subsection (a) was repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code insofar as it refers to the recording of instruments concerning “goods and chattels” as giving notice to all persons. In re King Furn. City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965).

Instruments Not Recorded.

Grant of mineral deed from person in possession under recorded deed that apparently conveyed title would not be set aside on ground that prior to such deed, the title had been conveyed to the deceased husband of grantor, where deed was lost and never placed of record. Henry v. Texas Co., 201 Ark. 996, 147 S.W.2d 742 (1941).

In suit to establish title to mortgaged land against purchaser at foreclosure sale on ground that, prior to execution of mortgage, plaintiff had deeded land to his wife, evidence was held to show that alleged deed was not recorded and that mortgagee knew nothing about it. Teel v. Harnden, 204 Ark. 103, 161 S.W.2d 1 (1942).

One who takes a deed with knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed to another is in the same position as though the prior deed had been of record. Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946).

Agreement accepting a new survey as correct property line, notwithstanding existence of fences located elsewhere, which was not recorded until after litigation had arisen, was not valid against persons who had no other knowledge of such agreement. Rindeikis v. Coffman, 231 Ark. 422, 329 S.W.2d 550 (1959).

An assignment of a mortgage need not be recorded to be valid against later claims against the assignor. Bryan v. Easton Tire Co., 262 Ark. 731, 561 S.W.2d 79 (1978).

Obligation to Inquire Not Satisfied.

Where subsequent purchaser was put on notice of prior interest in the property, he did not satisfy his obligation to inquire by consulting his own attorney, or by searching the records. There was no evidence that his attorney had any knowledge of the circumstances, and subsequent purchaser's search of the records was not a diligent inquiry as the “actual notice” exception to the protection afforded by subsection (b) covers situations in which a property interest does not appear in the records. Massey v. Wynne, 302 Ark. 589, 791 S.W.2d 368 (1990).

Recording.

Record of an unacknowledged mortgage is not notice. Challis v. German Nat'l Bank, 56 Ark. 88, 19 S.W. 115 (1892).

In case of contemporaneous conveyances of same land, deed first recorded holds. Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256, 67 S.W. 398 (1902); Storthz v. Chapline, 71 Ark. 31, 70 S.W. 465 (1902).

Presumption of delivery of deed from its being recorded was not rebutted by proof that deed was in grantor's possession. Estes v. German Nat'l Bank, 62 Ark. 7, 34 S.W. 85 (1896).

Where purchaser of lands records a deed absolute, and the intent of the parties is established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the deed is intended to be a mortgage, the court properly declares the deed a mortgage. Gunnels v. Machen, 213 Ark. 800, 212 S.W.2d 702 (1948).

When a properly executed and properly acknowledged lease is filed for recording, it protects the parties to the lease against intervening rights of third parties, even though it is not properly recorded. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

To the extent the borrowers argued that the creditor had a duty to record any assignment of the note or mortgage, there was no such duty, given that a mortgage's efficacy as to the original parties was not diminished if the mortgage went unrecorded, as the purpose of recording was to give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. Anderson v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 683, 450 S.W.3d 251 (2014).

In a declaratory judgment action, even if the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until there was notice that a first lease was being relied on, a complaint was time-barred due to a recordation of an assignment; the recording served as constructive notice from the time the instrument was filed for record, and the case was filed more than 5 years after an assignment was recorded. The circuit court did not err by treating the claim as raising contract enforcement issues and applying the relevant statutory period of limitations. McDougal v. Sabine River Land Co., 2015 Ark. App. 281, 461 S.W.3d 359 (2015).

Subsequent Purchasers.

A bona fide purchaser of real estate for a valuable consideration who enters into possession acquires a good title against a prior, unrecorded conveyance from the same vendor. Long v. Langsdale, 56 Ark. 239, 19 S.W. 603 (1892).

A subsequent purchaser is not charged with notice of any fact not connected with the course of his title. Abbott v. Parker, 103 Ark. 425, 147 S.W. 70 (1912).

Subsequent purchasers take subject to a lien mentioned in a recorded deed; assignment of such lien need not be recorded. Hebert v. Fellheimer, 115 Ark. 366, 171 S.W. 144 (1914).

Where range was omitted from description, purchaser would not be held to have had notice. Neas v. Whitener-London Realty Co., 119 Ark. 301, 178 S.W. 390 (1915).

Where purchaser quitclaimed back to grantor land erroneously included in his deed and quitclaim deed was recorded prior to the recording of purchaser's deed to a third person and without knowledge of it, original grantor should be regarded as an innocent purchaser for value without notice and entitled to the land. Davis v. Burford, 197 Ark. 965, 125 S.W.2d 789 (1939).

Where warranty deeds executed in 1932 and 1935 were not recorded until December, 1940, grantee who had obtained a deed in March, 1940, without notice of prior deeds, was an innocent purchaser under subsection (b). Sturgis v. Nunn, 203 Ark. 693, 158 S.W.2d 673 (1942).

A deed is effective to convey title upon its delivery to the grantee, whether recorded or not, and is good and valid against a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration who has actual knowledge of the deed. Halbrook v. Lewis, 204 Ark. 579, 163 S.W.2d 171 (1942).

A subsequent purchaser who places his deed on record acquires a title superior to a prior purchaser who does not file his deed for record until after the subsequent purchaser has filed his deed for record, if the subsequent purchase was for a valuable consideration and without actual knowledge of the prior conveyance. Halbrook v. Lewis, 204 Ark. 579, 163 S.W.2d 171 (1942).

Under subsection (b), a subsequent purchaser acquires a superior title when he places his title of record before a previous purchaser records his title only where the purchasers derived their interests from a common grantor. Richardson v. Fisher, 236 Ark. 612, 367 S.W.2d 440 (1963).

Where there was an executed contract by both deceased husband and widow that would be specifically enforced in equity against the prior unrecorded deed with deceased remaining in possession of the property and with widow having no knowledge of the unrecorded deed, it placed the widow in the position of being an innocent purchaser for value in possession and with title to her vested by the will relating back to death of decedent and prior to recording of unrecorded deed, and rule that a parol contract to execute a will may be enforced in equity only where the agreement is established by clear, cogent, and convincing testimony would not apply. Hogan v. Hogan, 241 Ark. 377, 407 S.W.2d 735 (1966).

Purchasers held to be innocent purchasers for value and, therefore, not bound by the terms of an unrecorded lease where lease was not recorded and because the circumstances were not such as to put purchasers on notice of the lease. Garmon v. Mitchell, 53 Ark. App. 10, 918 S.W.2d 201 (1996).

Trial court properly quieted title in the subsequent purchasers under the escrow contracts, which were also contracts of sale, because the subsequent purchasers' interests in the property was filed of record before the mortgage holder's later foreclosure action against the original purchaser, who executed a first mortgage which was released, then executed a subsequent mortgage, and the subsequent purchasers were thereby protected by this section. Hatchett v. Terry, 87 Ark. App. 276, 190 S.W.3d 302 (2004).

Court doubts that the principle that an unrecorded deed is not valid against a subsequent purchaser unless he had actual notice of the prior interest applies in mortgage priority disputes, given that every mortgage of real estate shall be a lien on the mortgaged property from the time it is filed in the recorder's office for record, and not before, and case law held that a defective mortgage constituted no notice to third parties of the existence of the mortgage. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC v. Summit Bank, N.A. (In re Francis), 750 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2014).

Sufficiency of Notice.

Evidence sufficient to find that subsequent purchasers of mineral leases had sufficient notice of prior interest to put them on guard for an inquiry. Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 303 Ark. 547, 798 S.W.2d 419 (1990).

Subsequent purchasers were not bona fide purchasers because a prior purchaser's possession of the property provided actual notice, and the subsequent purchasers were charged with notice when the land was in possession of someone other than the record owner, even though the subsequent purchasers were not aware of such. However, a fact issue remained as to whether the prior purchaser was in exclusive possession of the property. Walls v. Humphries, 2013 Ark. 286, 428 S.W.3d 517 (2013).

Tax Deeds.

Subsection (b) gives priority to the first recording only as between purchasers deriving their interest from a common grantor. It has no application to an intervening tax deed obtained from a county clerk. Thorne v. Magness, 34 Ark. App. 39, 805 S.W.2d 95 (1991).

Cited: Roach v. Terry, 263 Ark. 774, 567 S.W.2d 286 (1978); Reichenbach v. Kizer, 174 B.R. 997 (Bankr. E.D. Ark 1994).

14-15-405. Master Mortgage or Deed of Trust Recording Act of 1967.

  1. This section may be known and cited as the “Master Mortgage or Deed of Trust Recording Act of 1967”.
    1. An instrument containing a form or forms of covenants, conditions, obligations, powers, and other clauses of a mortgage or deed of trust may be recorded in the registry of deeds or mortgages of any county.
    2. The recorder of the county, upon the request of any person, on tender of the lawful fees therefor shall record the instrument in his or her registry.
    3. Every such instrument shall be entitled on the face thereof as a “Master form recorded by
    4. The instrument need not be acknowledged to be entitled to record.
  2. When the instrument is recorded, the recorder shall index the instrument under the name of the person causing it to be recorded in the manner provided for miscellaneous instruments relating to real estate.
    1. Thereafter any of the provisions of the master form instrument may be incorporated by reference in any mortgage or deed of trust of real estate situated within this state if the reference in the mortgage or deed of trust states:
      1. That the master form instrument was recorded in the county in which the mortgage or deed of trust is offered for record;
      2. The date when and the book and page where the master form instrument was recorded; and
      3. That a copy of the master form instrument was furnished to the person executing the mortgage or deed of trust.
    2. The recording of any mortgage or deed of trust which has so incorporated by reference therein any of the provisions of a master form instrument recorded as provided in this subsection shall have the same effect as if the provision of the master form so incorporated by reference had been set forth fully in the mortgage or deed of trust.
  3. Whenever a mortgage or deed of trust is presented for recording, on which is set forth matter purporting to be a copy or reproduction of the master form instrument or of part thereof, identified by its title as provided in subdivision (b)(3) of this section and stating the date when it was recorded and the book and page where it was recorded, preceded by the words “do not record” or “not to be recorded”, and plainly separated from the matter to be recorded as a part of the mortgage or deed of trust in such manner that it will not appear upon a photographic reproduction of any page containing any part of the mortgage or deed of trust, the matter shall not be recorded by the recorder to whom the instrument is presented for recording. In such a case the recorder shall record only the mortgage or deed of trust apart from the matter and shall not be liable for so doing, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
  4. This section shall be cumulative and supplemental to the laws of this state regarding the recording of instruments and shall repeal only such laws or parts of laws as are specifically in conflict herewith.

(name of person causing the instrument to be recorded).”

History. Acts 1967, No. 237, §§ 1-6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-121 — 16-125, 16-125n.

14-15-406. Recording certified copies of bankruptcy proceedings.

  1. The recorder of deeds of any county where any land in which a bankrupt or a debtor in any proceeding under the act of United States Congress relating to bankruptcy has any interest is located shall receive for record, and record, a certified copy of any pleading, decree, order, or other paper filed in the proceeding which any act of the United States Congress provides may be recorded in the records of such a county.
  2. The record shall impart notice to all persons of the bankruptcy proceeding and of the contents of the certified copy.
  3. The certified copy of the pleading, decree, order, or other paper shall be recorded and indexed in the record of deeds in the office of the recorder in the name of the bankrupt or debtor as grantor, and in the name of the trustee or receiver in bankruptcy or other person, if any, to whom the interest, or any part thereof, may pass by virtue of law or of the decree, order, or other paper as grantee.
  4. The recorder shall charge and collect the same fee for filing and recording any such document as is provided by law for filing, indexing, and recording deeds.

History. Acts 1959, No. 110, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-120.

14-15-407. Manner of recording.

Without delay, each recorder shall record every deed, mortgage, conveyance, deed of trust, bond, or other writing delivered to him or her for record with the acknowledgment, proofs, and certificates written on or attached to the writing and all other papers therein referred to and annexed thereto in the order and as of the time when the writing has been delivered for record by:

  1. Entering them word for word and letter for letter;
  2. Noting at the foot of each record all interlineations, erasures, and words visibly written on erasures; and
  3. Noting at the foot of the record the date of the month and year when the instrument so recorded was delivered to him or her or deposited in his or her office for record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 11; C. & M. Dig., § 8629; Pope's Dig., § 11221; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-105.

Case Notes

Acknowledgment.

Fact that recorder fails to record acknowledgment is not a valid reason to strike instrument from record book. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

Interlineations.

Where record establishing a lost deed shows no interlineations, none will be presumed to have been made. Wasson v. Lillard, 189 Ark. 546, 74 S.W.2d 637 (1934).

14-15-408. Tender of fees required.

No recorder shall be required to endorse any instrument presented to him or her for record as filed or to record the instrument unless the fees for recording and the tax thereon, if any, are first tendered to him or her, nor shall any recorder be subject to any action or liable in any manner for a failure or refusal to record any instrument unless the fees are first tendered.

History. Acts 1875, No. 77, § 16, p. 167; C. & M. Dig., § 4584; Pope's Dig., § 5670; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-113.

Cross References. Credit for fees prohibited — Exception, § 21-7-209.

Fees of recorder, § 21-6-306.

Case Notes

Cited: First Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 83 Ark. 109, 102 S.W. 683 (1907).

14-15-409. Entry of instruments.

When any deed, mortgage, deed of trust, bond, conveyance, or other instrument of writing authorized by law to be recorded is deposited in the recorder's office for record, the recorder shall enter in a book to be provided for that purpose in alphabetical order:

  1. The names of the persons;
  2. The date and the nature of the instrument; and
  3. The time of delivery for record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 8628; Pope's Dig., § 11220; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-103.

14-15-410. Receipt for instrument filed.

When any deed, mortgage, deed of trust, bond, conveyance, or other instrument of writing authorized by law to be recorded shall be deposited in the recorder's office for record, the recorder shall give to the person delivering the instrument, if required, a receipt specifying the particulars of it.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 8628; Pope's Dig., § 11220; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-103.

14-15-411. Endorsement of filing time.

  1. It shall be the duty of the recorder to endorse the precise time the instrument is filed for record in his or her office on every deed, bond, or instrument of writing affecting the title in law or equity to any property, real or personal, within this state which is or may be required by law to be acknowledged or proved and recorded.
  2. It shall be the duty of the recorder to endorse on every mortgage filed in his or her office for record, and note in the record, the precise time the mortgage was filed for record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 101, § 3; Acts 1846, § 1, p. 77; 1846, § 1, p. 108; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1536, 7383; Pope's Dig., §§ 1846, 9437; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-104, 16-114.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1846, § 3, p. 77, and Acts 1846, § 3, p. 108, provided that nothing contained in the acts would be construed to change, or in any manner affect this section or §§ 18-40-101 and 18-40-102.

Case Notes

Acknowledgment.

Fact that recorder fails to record acknowledgment is not a valid reason to strike instrument from record book. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

14-15-412. Certification of recording.

  1. Every deed, mortgage, conveyance, deed of trust, bond, or other instrument of writing shall be considered as recorded from the time it was delivered for record.
  2. The recorder shall certify and attach to every such deed, mortgage, conveyance, deed of trust, bond, and other instrument of writing so recorded:
    1. The day, month, and year when he or she received it; and
    2. The book and page in which it is recorded.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 12; C. & M. Dig., § 8630; Pope's Dig., § 11222; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-106.

Cross References. Attachment of mortgage liens when recorded, § 18-40-102.

Case Notes

Delivered for Record.

A mortgage is filed within the meaning of this section when it is delivered to the proper officer and by him received for the purpose of being recorded. Case & Co. v. Hargadine, 43 Ark. 144 (1884).

In counties where there are two districts, delivery to the recorder or his deputy without instructions is prima facie delivery for filing in the district where delivered. Beaver v. Frick Co., 53 Ark. 18, 13 S.W. 134 (1890).

14-15-413. Return of instrument.

When recorded, the recorder shall deliver the deed, mortgage, conveyance, deed of trust, bond, or other instrument of writing to the party entitled to the instrument on his or her order.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 12; C. & M. Dig., § 8630; Pope's Dig., § 11222; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-106.

14-15-414. Indexes to record books.

    1. Each recorder shall provide and keep in the recorder's office a well-bound book and make and enter in alphabetical order in the book an index to all books of record wherein deeds, mortgages, or other instruments in writing concerning lands and tenements are recorded, distinguishing the books and pages in which every deed or writing is recorded.
    2. The index shall contain:
      1. The names of the several grantors and grantees in alphabetical order;
      2. In case the deed is made by a sheriff, the name of the sheriff and the defendant in the execution;
      3. If by executors or administrators, their names and the names of their testator or intestate;
      4. If by attorney, the name of the attorney and his or her constituent; and
      5. If by a commissioner, the name of the commissioner and the person whose estate is conveyed.
    3. Each recorder shall make a reference in the several indexes of all deeds and conveyances that may be recorded, so as to afford, at all times, an easy reference to the records.
      1. If an assignment or a satisfaction or release of a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien is presented for recording, the assignment, satisfaction, or release shall state:
        1. The date the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien was recorded; and
        2. The instrument number, book and page numbers, or other recording reference at which the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien appears of record.
      2. The recorder shall note in the index of the book or record in which the assignment, satisfaction, or release is recorded:
        1. The book and page numbers, instrument number, or other recording reference for the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien assigned, satisfied, or released; and
        2. The name of the mortgagor or grantor under which the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien is indexed.
  1. In a similar manner, each recorder shall make, keep, and preserve:
    1. A full and perfect alphabetical index to all books of record in his or her office in which all deeds and instruments of writing in relation to personal property, marriage contracts, certificates of marriage, and all other papers are recorded; and
    2. A similar index of all the books of record in which commissions and official bonds are recorded, the name of the officers appointed, the obligors in any bond recorded, and a reference to the book and page where they are recorded.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, §§ 13-16; C. & M. Dig., §§ 8631-8634; Pope's Dig., §§ 11223-11226; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-107 — 16-110; Acts 2003, No. 1173, § 1.

Cross References. Index of lis pendens notices, § 16-59-104.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, Information Regarding Assignment of Liens, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 434.

14-15-415. Destruction of chattel mortgages.

Circuit clerks are authorized to destroy all chattel mortgages previously filed where the due date of the obligation secured has expired six (6) years or more prior to date of destruction, together with all bound records of the chattel mortgages containing the index or abstract thereof, except such records as are utilized for the purpose of abstracting claims of wheelwright liens.

History. Acts 1975, No. 296, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-101n.

Publisher's Notes. Clerk of the circuit court is ex officio recorder. See Publisher's Notes at beginning of this subchapter.

14-15-416. Failure to perform duty.

Any recorder to whom any deed or other writing proved or acknowledged according to law is delivered for record shall forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), to be recovered by action on his or her official bond, one-half (½) to the use of the county and one-half (½) to the use of the person who shall sue for it, and he or she shall also be liable to any person injured for all damages he or she may have sustained thereby, to be recovered by action on the official bond of the recorder if the recorder:

  1. Neglects or refuses to make an entry or give a receipt therefor, as required by §§ 14-15-402, 14-15-409, and 14-15-410;
  2. Neglects or refuses to record the deed or writing within a reasonable time after receiving the deed or writing;
  3. Records any deed or instrument of writing before another first deposited in his or her office and entitled to be recorded;
  4. Records any deed or other writing incorrectly; or
  5. Neglects or refuses to provide and keep in his or her office such indices as required by § 14-15-414.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 8635; Pope's Dig., § 11227; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-111.

14-15-417. Willful neglect of duty.

If any recorder willfully neglects to perform any of the duties required of him or her by §§ 14-15-401, 14-15-402, 14-15-407, 14-15-40914-15-414, and 14-14-41614-15-420 or willfully performs them in any other manner than is required by law, he or she shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office and shall be proceeded against accordingly.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 18; C. & M. Dig., § 8636; Pope's Dig., § 11228; A.S.A. 1947, § 16-112.

14-15-418. Action on bond.

If any person shall be damaged by the conduct of the recorder, that person may commence an action on his or her official bond in the name of the state to his or her use.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 8619; Pope's Dig., § 11211; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1003.

Cross References. Actions on official bonds, § 16-107-201 et seq.

14-15-419. Seal.

The seal of the circuit court shall be the seal of the recorder and shall be used as such in all cases in which his or her official seal may be required.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 8622; Pope's Dig., § 11214; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1006.

Cross References. Seal of circuit court, § 16-10-110.

14-15-420. Books and accounts.

Each recorder shall provide suitable books for his or her office and keep regular and faithful accounts of the expenses thereof. These accounts shall be audited by the county court and be paid out of the county treasury.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 124, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 8623; Pope's Dig., § 11215; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1007.

Cross References. Bonds of state, county, and district officers generally, § 21-2-107.

Subchapter 5 — Sheriffs — Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1883, No. 114, § 226: effective on passage.

Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1172, § 3: Feb. 11, 1976. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that new and expanded jail facilities have recently been constructed and placed into use in certain counties in the State; that the operation of such new and expanded facilities was not taken into consideration in prescribing the number of positions and compensation of deputies and other employees of the county sheriff's office when Act 830 of 1975 was enacted; that in such counties, it is essential that the sheriff's office be provided additional personnel in order that the new and expanded facilities may be utilized to their fullest capability; that this Act is designed to authorize the quorum court in such counties to provide such necessary additional positions and to prescribe the compensation therefor and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 237, § 3: Feb. 23, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that due to the increase in crime rate, especially in suburban areas, it is necessary to expand the authority of deputy sheriffs to provide more adequate protection to the citizens of this State, and that crime protection can be afforded planned communities by their employment of deputy sheriffs as security officers. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 171, § 3: Feb. 14, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Arkansas Statue 12-1107(b) presently provides that deputy sheriffs are authorized to exercise all powers as deputy sheriffs while in the course of their employment as security officers for property owners associations; that the wording regarding their employment as security officers has resulted in confusion regarding the authority and duty of the Law Enforcement Training Academy to accept and train such deputies; that the elimination of such wording will result in the Law Enforcement Training Academy clearly having the authority and duty to train such deputy sheriffs; and that this Act is immediately necessary to clarify this law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 70 Am. Jur. 2d, Sheriff, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. 80 C.J.S., Sheriffs & C., § 1 et seq.

14-15-501. Conservator of peace — Recognizances.

  1. Each sheriff shall be a conservator of the peace in his or her county and shall cause all offenders against the laws of this state, in his or her view or hearing, to enter into recognizance to keep the peace and appear at the next term of the circuit court of the county and, on the failure of the offender to enter into recognizance, to commit him or her to jail.
  2. The sheriff shall certify to the clerk of the circuit court all recognizances taken by him or her.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 140, §§ 8, 9; C. & M. Dig., §§ 9156, 9157; Pope's Dig., §§ 11817, 11818; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1108, 12-1109.

Case Notes

Municipal Courts.

Sheriff may serve process of municipal court. Miller County v. Magee, 177 Ark. 752, 7 S.W.2d 973 (1928).

14-15-502. Validity of bonds.

No bond entered into by a sheriff shall be deemed void for not having the approval of the court or clerk endorsed thereon.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 140, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 9150; Pope's Dig., § 11812; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1103.

14-15-503. Powers of deputies.

  1. Every deputy sheriff appointed as provided by law shall possess all the powers of his or her principal and may perform any of the duties required by law to be performed by the sheriff.
  2. Deputy sheriffs are authorized to make arrests for misdemeanor offenses and felony offenses and exercise all other powers as deputy sheriffs while in the course of their employment for planned community property owners' associations or suburban improvement districts.
  3. Every deputy sheriff so appointed shall possess the minimum qualifications as provided by law.
  4. Planned community property owners' associations shall purchase and maintain liability insurance to protect deputy sheriffs employed by such associations. Liability insurance coverage shall be in a principal amount of no less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for each deputy sheriff employed by the association.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 140, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 9155; Pope's Dig., § 11816; Acts 1977, No. 237, § 1; 1983, No. 171, § 1; 1985, No. 561, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1107.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Seventeenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law — Criminal Law, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 448.

Case Notes

In General.

This section is merely declaratory of the common law. Davidson v. Chandler, 206 Ark. 375, 175 S.W.2d 567 (1943) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

Appointment of Deputies.

Appointment of deputy expires with the term of the principal; on reelection of principal, new appointment is necessary. Greenwood v. State, 17 Ark. 332 (1856).

This section refers to general deputies and does not take away the common law right of a sheriff to depute his authority to another for a particular service. Putman v. State, 49 Ark. 449, 5 S.W. 715 (1887).

Sheriff was entitled to appoint deputy to work with Junior Deputy Sheriffs League if quorum court made an appropriation to pay the salary of the deputy, and county court was required to allow deputy's claim for salary. Parker v. Adkins, 223 Ark. 455, 266 S.W.2d 799 (1954).

Following a controlled-drug buy, defendant was arrested by Monticello, Arkansas, officers outside county limits; cocaine, the buy money, and drug paraphernalia were retrieved by the officers. Defendant was not entitled to suppress the evidence even though the officers were outside their jurisdiction; the officers carried commission cards which appointed them to act as deputies in Drew County, Arkansas, under § 14-15-503. Trotter v. State, 99 Ark. App. 37, 256 S.W.3d 521 (2007).

Authority of Deputies.

A deputy sheriff is not, by reason of such appointment, authorized to act as deputy collector, although both offices are held by his principal. Crowell v. Barham, 57 Ark. 195, 21 S.W. 33 (1893); Boone County Bank v. Eoff, 66 Ark. 321, 50 S.W. 688 (1899).

A deputy sheriff cannot, as such, engage to guard the property of a private person not in the custody of the law. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Hackett, 58 Ark. 381, 24 S.W. 881 (1894).

Where sheriff appointed a deputy and signed a card for identification purposes, the introduction of the card in evidence was not prejudicial when the evidence showed that the deputy acted and assumed he had authority to make an arrest for a traffic violation. Wilkerson v. State, 212 Ark. 603, 206 S.W.2d 758 (1947).

As a sheriff is given the legislative authority to be a conservator of the peace in his county under § 14-15-501, the same is true of a deputy sheriff employed by a planned community, for he is likewise authorized to stand in the stead of his sheriff and discharge his duties throughout his county. Gritts v. State, 315 Ark. 1, 864 S.W.2d 859 (1993).

Deputies employed by planned communities have the authority to arrest. Gritts v. State, 315 Ark. 1, 864 S.W.2d 859 (1993).

Lieutenant did not have a letter from the director of the Arkansas State Police authorizing his activities, but he was working interdiction on the interstate to locate drugs in vehicles as a deputy sheriff commissioned by the county sheriff's department, he produced his identification card showing his commission dates, and he testified that when he discovered defendant appeared to be intoxicated, he notified another lieutenant who was specifically working driving while intoxicated investigations; there was no clear error in the trial court's finding that the lieutenant was acting on behalf of the county when he conducted the traffic stop. Batchelor v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 682, 450 S.W.3d 245 (2014).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature intended to provide all deputy sheriffs with the power to perform all duties as required by law to be performed by a sheriff, and, in addition, these powers are specifically provided to deputy sheriffs while in the course of their employment for planned community property owners associations. Gritts v. State, 315 Ark. 1, 864 S.W.2d 859 (1993).

Liability of Sheriffs.

Sheriff is liable for unjustifiable assault of his deputy while in discharge of his duty. Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W. 591 (1925), overruled in part, Dillard v. State, 260 Ark. 743, 543 S.W.2d 925 (Ark. 1976).

Sheriff is not liable on account of his deputy's negligence in driving car on way to make an arrest. Usrey v. Yarnell, 181 Ark. 804, 27 S.W.2d 988 (1930).

The general rule is that for all civil purposes, the acts of a deputy sheriff are those of his principal; hence, a sheriff is liable for the act, default, tort, or other misconduct done or committed by his deputy, colore officii. Davidson v. Chandler, 206 Ark. 375, 175 S.W.2d 567 (1943).

Where citizen, who attempted to stop unjustified beating of elderly man by deputy sheriff following automobile collision while deputy was transporting prisoners to court, was killed by the deputy, sheriff was held not liable, since the act of the deputy was not, on the facts presented, done under the color of his office. Davidson v. Chandler, 206 Ark. 375, 175 S.W.2d 567 (1943).

Under the common law, a sheriff is liable for the actions of his appointed deputies and has control over their selection and retention. Dilday v. State, 300 Ark. 249, 778 S.W.2d 618 (1989).

Cited: Brenneman v. State, 264 Ark. 460, 573 S.W.2d 47 (1978); Pipes v. State, 22 Ark. App. 235, 738 S.W.2d 423 (1987).

14-15-504. Additional personnel for new jails.

In any county in this state in which newly constructed jail facilities have been put into use since November 1, 1975, the quorum court of the county is authorized to provide additional positions for the county sheriff's office, in addition to those positions authorized in Acts 1975, No. 830 [repealed], and to prescribe the compensation and allowances for persons holding such positions.

History. Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1172, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1119.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1975, No. 830, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1977, No. 742, § 117.

14-15-505. Settlement moneys received or due.

  1. It shall be the duty of a clerk of a court of record, at each term thereof, to settle with the sheriff of each county for all moneys received by him or her, or which he or she ought to have collected for the use of the county and which have not been accounted for. He or she shall make out two (2) separate lists of all sums chargeable to any sheriff and payable to any county, specifying on what account, and certify them under the seal of the court.
  2. One (1) of the lists so certified shall be immediately transmitted to the clerk of the county court to which the sums are payable, who shall immediately charge it accordingly, and the other shall be transmitted to the treasurer of the county.

History. Acts 1883, No. 114, §§ 182, 183, p. 199; C. & M. Dig., §§ 9163, 9164, 10144, 10145; Pope's Dig., §§ 11824, 11825, 13926, 13927; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1111, 12-1112.

Cross References. State and local officers — Income and expenditures, § 21-7-201 et seq.

Subchapter 6 — Sheriffs — Civil Service System

14-15-601 — 14-15-619. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 657, § 1. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-15-601. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1136.

14-15-602. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 1; 1981, No. 705, § 1; 1981, No. 966, § 1; 1983, No. 190, § 1; 1985, No. 395, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1120.

14-15-603. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1133.

14-15-604. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1137.

14-15-605. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 1; 1981, No. 705, § 1; 1981, No. 966, § 1; 1983, No. 190, § 1; 1985, No. 395, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1120.

14-15-606. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 1; 1981, No. 705, § 1; 1981, No. 966, § 1; 1983, No. 190, § 1; 1985, No. 395, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1120.

14-15-607. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 2; 1983, No. 190, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1121.

14-15-608. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1122.

14-15-609. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1123.

14-15-610. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1124; Acts 1987, No. 332, § 1.

14-15-611. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1125.

14-15-612. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1129.

14-15-613. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1128.

14-15-614. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1127.

14-15-615. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1132.

14-15-616. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1135.

14-15-617. Acts 1977, No. 952, §§ 7, 15; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1126, 12-1134.

14-15-618. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1131.

14-15-619. Acts 1977, No. 952, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1130.

Subchapter 7 — County Surveyors

Cross References. State and local officers — Income and expenditures, § 21-7-201 et seq.

Field Notes and records — Fees for copies, § 22-5-704.

Delivery of records to successor, § 21-12-401 et seq.

Fees for county surveyors, § 21-6-303.

Furnishing accurate description of all tracts by county assessor, § 26-26-717.

County timber inspector, § 15-32-201 et seq.

14-15-701. Qualifications.

No person shall be eligible to seek or hold the office of county surveyor unless the person is registered as a professional surveyor by the State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Professional Surveyors.

History. Acts 1963, No. 193, § 1; 1985, No. 549, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1222; Acts 2005, No. 1178, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 549, § 2, provided that any person having held the office of county surveyor in any county in this state on June 28, 1985, shall be registered as a land surveyor by the State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors if the person: (1) Files an application with the board for registration; (2) Furnishes satisfactory proof that the applicant is either registered as a professional engineer or has had at least two years of experience as a practical surveyor; and (3) Pays an application fee of $35.00.

Cross References. Surveyors, § 17-48-101 et seq.

14-15-702. Duties generally.

It shall be the duty of the county surveyor to execute all orders directed to him or her by any court of record for surveying or resurveying any tract of land, the title of which is in dispute or in litigation before the court, and to obey all orders of survey for the partition of real estate, and also to accompany viewers and reviewers of roads for the purpose of running and measuring any proposed road, whenever required by the viewers or reviewers.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 1888; Pope's Dig., § 2405; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1205.

14-15-703. Chainmen.

The necessary chainmen shall be employed by the person wanting surveying done, but they shall be good and disinterested persons, to be approved by the surveyor, and shall be sworn by the surveyor to measure justly and exactly, according to the best of their abilities.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 17; C. & M. Dig., § 1900; Pope's Dig., § 2417; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1204.

14-15-704. Appointment of another surveyor.

In all cases where the county surveyor may be interested in any survey which is required to be made by any court, the court shall direct the survey to be made by some competent person. The person so appointed shall have power to administer the necessary oaths to the chainmen, and shall return the survey under oath, and shall be entitled to the same fees for his or her services as the county surveyor would be entitled to receive for similar services.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 1902; Pope's Dig., § 2419; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1206.

14-15-705. Survey of lands sold for taxes.

It shall be the duty of the county surveyor to survey all lands sold for taxes in his or her county on the application of any person producing to him or her a certificate of purchase from the officer by whom the lands may have been sold.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 1887; Pope's Dig., § 2404; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1207.

14-15-706. Survey of public land.

  1. Any person who may have entered any of the public lands of the United States, having received from the proper officer a certificate of entry and desiring his or her lands surveyed and laid off according to the certificate, may apply to the county surveyor for that purpose, and the county surveyor shall make a survey in accordance with the entry.
  2. Before the county surveyor shall proceed to survey any such tract of land, he or she shall be satisfied that all persons owning lands adjoining and who may be in any manner affected by the survey have been notified to attend and be present at the surveying thereof.
  3. It shall be the duty of each county surveyor, when subdividing any section or part of a section of land originally surveyed under the authority of the United States, to make his or her survey conformably to the original survey.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, §§ 6-8; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1889-1891; Pope's Dig., §§ 2406-2408; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1208 — 12-1210.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where facts are such as to lead to the conclusion that a government survey, if made at all, was made on paper only, this section does not apply. Luther v. Denny, 175 Ark. 846, 1 S.W.2d 6 (1927).

Errors.

Where the official government survey establishes the section and quarter-section corners, the sections will stand though erroneous, but a deficiency or overplus in a quarter section will be apportioned among the subdivisions of which it is composed. Tolson v. Southwestern Imp. Ass'n, 97 Ark. 193, 133 S.W. 603 (1911).

Evidence.

The plaintiffs in a boundary line dispute failed to satisfy their burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence where their surveyor did not consult original field notes before making his survey and the survey offered in evidence by the defendants was a certified copy of a survey by the county surveyor and was consistent with two earlier surveys by two previous county surveyors. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

14-15-707. Establishment of corners.

For the purpose of perpetuating every survey, the surveyor shall establish his or her corners by taking bearings on trees and noting particularly their course and distance from the corner. When there are no trees within a reasonable distance, he or she shall perpetuate his or her corners by erecting mounds of turf at least two and one-half feet (2½') at the base and two feet (2') high. In lieu of mounds, stones may be planted in the ground to a depth not less than twelve inches (12"), which shall not be less than eighteen inches (18") long, eight inches (8") wide, and three inches (3") thick. The stones shall be described in the field book.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 1892; Pope's Dig., § 2409; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1211.

14-15-708. Calculating tract contents.

All calculations to ascertain the content of any tract of land by any county surveyor or other person shall be made by differences of latitude and departure.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 20; C. & M. Dig., § 1903; Pope's Dig., § 2420; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1212.

14-15-709. Instruments required — Record book.

  1. It shall be the duty of each county surveyor to furnish himself or herself with a compass of approved construction, having a nonius division; also, a two-pole chain of fifty (50) links, and a well-bound book, in which he or she shall carefully and legibly record and note down every survey made by him or her, giving the name of the person the survey of whose lands is recorded, and describing as near as practicable, the metes and bounds of the tract, and noting the date on which the survey was made.
  2. The record book required by this section to be kept by each county surveyor shall be furnished at the expense of the county.
  3. The record shall be subject to the inspection of every person who may deem himself or herself interested in the land record.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, §§ 10, 11, 21; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1893, 1894, 1904; Pope's Dig., §§ 2410, 2411, 2421; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1215 — 12-1217.

Publisher's Notes. Revised Stat., ch. 40, § 22, provided that the provisions of the act should extend to all county surveyors who had previously been, as those who were thereafter, elected.

Case Notes

Cited: Sherrin v. Coffman, 143 Ark. 8, 219 S.W. 348 (1920).

14-15-710. Delivery of records to successor.

  1. It shall be the duty of the county surveyor, or other person having the official record of the surveyor in his or her possession, to deliver up the record to his or her successor whenever he or she may be applied to for that purpose.
  2. If the surveyor, or the person having the possession of the record, shall refuse to deliver it to such successor when demanded, he or she shall forfeit and pay the sum of one dollar ($1.00) per day for every day he or she may retain it after demanded, to be recovered by a civil action before any justice of the peace, in the name of any person who may sue for it, one-half (½) to the use of the person suing and one-half (½) to the use of the county.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, §§ 12, 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1895, 1896; Pope's Dig., §§ 2412, 2413; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1218, 12-1219.

14-15-711. Conclusiveness of official survey.

No act or record by any county surveyor, or his or her deputy, shall be conclusive, but may be reviewed by any competent tribunal in any case where the correctness thereof may be disputed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 15; C. & M. Dig., § 1898; Pope's Dig., § 2415; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1221.

Case Notes

Prima Facie Evidence.

Preponderance of evidence, including survey by a duly qualified surveyor, overcomes the prima facie evidence of the correctness of a boundary line established by the introduction of the certificate of survey by a county surveyor. Mason v. Peck, 239 Ark. 208, 388 S.W.2d 84 (1965).

A state statute specifying that a certain record shall be prima facie evidence is binding upon a federal court, where the statute concerns not merely the admissibility of evidence (the certified copy of the county surveyor's record would be admissible whether such a state statute existed or not), but rather the legal effect of a certain type of survey in a case involving the title to land, traditionally a matter of state concern. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

If a certified copy of the official record of a county surveyor, as distinguished from his testimony only or a mere plat signed by him, is offered in evidence, then the corners and lines shown therein are established, unless the other party shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the location of the true line is other than as shown in the survey thus certified. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

The plaintiffs in a boundary line dispute failed to satisfy their burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence where their surveyor did not consult original field notes before making his survey and the survey offered in evidence by the defendants was a certified copy of a survey by the county surveyor and was consistent with two earlier surveys by two previous county surveyors. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

14-15-712. Admissibility of certified copy.

A certified copy of the record of any county surveyor, under the hand of the surveyor, shall be admitted as prima facie evidence in any court of record in this state.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, § 14; C. & M. Dig., § 1897; Pope's Dig., § 2414; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1220.

Cross References. Surveys admissible in evidence, § 16-46-103.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Documentary Evidence — Arkansas, 15 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

Case Notes

Certified Copy.

Where plaintiff introduced into evidence a plat with signature of surveyor thereon, defendant did not have burden of proof to show plat was erroneous, since plat introduced was not a certified copy of official record kept by the surveyor. Horn v. Hays, 219 Ark. 450, 243 S.W.2d 3 (1951).

Instructions.

In case involving dispute over boundary line in which county surveyor testified as to the actual survey line, an instruction by the court, which stated that testimony of surveyor and documentary evidence introduced by him along with stipulation of the parties constituted prima facie evidence of the correct line as it appears from the survey unless the defendant could prove by a preponderance of evidence a different line, was not erroneous. Polk v. Willey, 220 Ark. 506, 248 S.W.2d 693 (1952).

Prima Facie Evidence.

A certified copy of an official survey made by a county surveyor is prima facie correct, but any duly qualified surveyor may testify as to its correctness. Russell v. State, 97 Ark. 92, 133 S.W. 188 (1910).

Where a party to a controversy over a certain boundary line introduces the surveyor's record in evidence making a prima facie case, it becomes the duty of the other party to show that the location of the true line is otherwise than as shown in the survey thus certified. Buffalo Zinc & Copper Co. v. McCarty, 125 Ark. 582, 189 S.W. 355 (1916).

Oral testimony as to location of property line is properly excluded. Mason v. Mason, 167 Ark. 304, 267 S.W. 772 (1925).

A state statute specifying that a certain record shall be prima facie evidence is binding upon a federal court, where the statute concerns not merely the admissibility of evidence (the certified copy of the county surveyor's record would be admissible whether such a state statute existed or not), but rather the legal effect of a certain type of survey in a case involving the title to land, traditionally a matter of state concern. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

If a certified copy of the official record of a county surveyor, as distinguished from his testimony only or a mere plat signed by him, is offered in evidence, then the corners and lines shown therein are established, unless the other party shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the location of the true line is other than as shown in the survey thus certified. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

The plaintiffs in a boundary line dispute failed to satisfy their burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence where their surveyor did not consult original field notes before making his survey and the survey offered in evidence by the defendants was a certified copy of a survey by the county surveyor and was consistent with two earlier surveys by two previous county surveyors. Forshee v. Canard, 488 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

Unofficial Surveys.

A conviction for the wrongful cutting of timber was set aside where the evidence showed that an unofficial surveyor had surveyed the land and plainly marked the boundaries, but a subsequent official survey showed that the unofficial survey was less favorable to the defendant than the official survey. Sawyer & Austin Lumber Co. v. State, 75 Ark. 309, 87 S.W. 431 (1905).

Subchapter 8 — County Treasurers

Cross References. Fees — County treasurers, § 21-6-302.

Sale of county property generally, § 14-16-105.

Effective Dates. Acts 1877, No. 15, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1907, No. 190, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1989 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 178, § 6: July 1, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Seventh General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1989 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1989 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1989.”

Acts 1999, No. 342, § 12: July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly, that the current contribution level for continuing education for county officials is insufficient and when the contribution level is raised, the appropriation for this purpose is insufficient. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1999.”

Acts 2001, No. 348, § 10: Feb. 21, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2001 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2001 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2001.”

14-15-801. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning eligibility, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1279, § 1. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 39; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1318.

14-15-802. Office.

County treasurers shall keep their offices at their respective county sites.

History. Acts 1877, No. 15, § 3, p. 10; C. & M. Dig., § 1909; Pope's Dig., § 2426; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1304.

14-15-803. Counties having two judicial districts.

The treasurer shall keep in his or her office at each county site in counties having two (2) judicial districts, except Prairie, Woodruff, Lawrence, Yell, and Logan, the funds belonging to the school districts and road districts of the respective judicial districts for the purpose of paying warrants drawn thereon.

History. Acts 1907, No. 190, § 6, p. 446; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2044, 8360; Pope's Dig., §§ 2591, 10956; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1305; Acts 1991, No. 183, § 1; 1995, No. 354, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, this section is set out above as amended by Acts 1995, No. 354. Acts 1995, No. 334, § 1 purported to repeal this section.

14-15-804. Appointment of a deputy treasurer.

  1. Appointment of a deputy treasurer shall be:
    1. In writing;
    2. Signed by the county treasurer; and
    3. Recorded in the county recorder's office.
  2. A deputy treasurer shall possess powers as authorized by the county treasurer.

History. Acts 1883, No. 42, §§ 2-4, p. 65; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1911-1913; Pope's Dig., §§ 2428-2430; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1307 — 12-1309; Acts 2007, No. 122, § 1.

14-15-805. Duties generally.

It shall be the duty of each county treasurer to:

    1. Receive and give receipt for all moneys payable into the county treasury and to pay and disburse the moneys on warrants or checks drawn by order of the county court.
    2. Any nonrevenue receipts as defined in § 21-6-302(f)(2) shall be deposited into the same county fund from which the original expenditure was made;
    1. Refuse payment of any warrant or check that would cause a deficit balance in any special revenue account without an appropriated transfer of general funds to cover the deficit, except as provided in this section.
      1. A grant account that operates as a reimbursable grant fund may operate with a deficit balance if there is a county general fund cash balance or an appropriate special revenue fund cash balance sufficient to support the deficit.
      2. When the grant moneys are received by the county, the moneys shall be receipted to the proper grant fund by the county treasurer.
      3. Any remaining deficit balance at the conclusion of the grant cycle shall be brought to a zero balance with an appropriated transfer of general funds or an appropriated transfer from the applicable special revenue fund; and
    1. Maintain a positive general fund balance.
    2. The general fund shall include county general and any other ledger account on the treasurer's books accruable to county general.
    3. The treasurer shall refuse payment of any warrant or check that would cause a deficit balance of the general fund in aggregate.

History. Special Acts of 1923, No. 240, § 3; Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 1914; Pope's Dig., § 2431; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1310; Acts 1993, No. 200, § 1; 2019, No. 310, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was amended as to certain counties by Special Acts of 1923, p. 487.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment restructured former (a) as the introductory language and (1)(A); added (1)(B); redesignated former (b) as (2)(A); redesignated the three sentences of former (c) as (3)(A)-(C); added “except as provided in this section” in (2)(A); deleted “It shall be the duty of each county treasurer to” from the beginning of (2)(A) and (3)(A); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Legal Actions.

Treasurer is authorized to sue a bank to recover public funds that he has deposited which the bank has to pay on demand. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 135 S.W. 896 (1911).

Ministerial Duties.

County treasurer is a ministerial officer not vested with discretion in payment and disbursement of county funds, but acts only at the order of the county court. Mackey v. McDonald, 255 Ark. 978, 504 S.W.2d 726 (1974).

14-15-806. Neglect or refusal to pay warrant.

  1. If any county treasurer shall neglect or refuse to pay any warrant or check drawn on him or her by order of the county court of his or her county, having cash available in the fund on which the warrant or check is drawn, he or she shall forfeit and pay to the holder of the warrant four (4) times the amount thereof.
  2. The forfeiture may be recovered by a civil action in the name of the party aggrieved against the treasurer and his or her securities, and the treasurer shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office and upon conviction shall be removed from office.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, §§ 10, 11; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1920, 1921; Pope's Dig., § 2437; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1311, 12-1312; Acts 1993, No. 200, § 2.

Cross References. Removal or suspension of local officers, § 21-12-301 et seq.

14-15-807. Accounting of moneys received and disbursed.

  1. A county treasurer shall keep a true and just account of all moneys received and disbursed and a regular abstract of all warrants paid by him or her.
  2. A treasurer shall make duplicate receipts in favor of the proper person for all moneys paid into the treasury and keep the books, papers, and money pertaining to his or her office at all times ready for the inspection of the county court or the presiding judge thereof.
  3. A treasurer shall furnish the county court with an account of the receipts and expenditures of the county not previously accounted for at each term of the county court, if required.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, §§ 6-8; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1915-1917; Pope's Dig., §§ 2432-2434; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 12-1313 — 12-1315.

Cross References. County clerks — Duties as to accounts, § 16-20-402.

Fraudulent statement of accounts by collecting officer, § 26-2-111.

Loan or use of public money by officials, § 26-2-103.

14-15-808. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning annual settlements, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1279, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1873, No. 124, § 189, p. 294; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1918, 10174; Pope's Dig., §§ 2435, 13955; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1316.

14-15-809. Resignation, removal, or death.

If he or she resigns, is removed from office, or dies, a county treasurer, or his or her executor or administrator, shall immediately make his or her settlement and deliver to his or her successor in office all things pertaining to the office, together with all the moneys belonging to the county.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 9; C. & M. Dig., § 1919; Pope's Dig., § 2436; A.S.A. 1947, § 12-1317.

Case Notes

Settlement.

When the administrator of a deceased treasurer makes settlement with the county court pursuant to this section, the settlement is binding upon the sureties upon the treasurer's bond, although they were not parties to the proceeding in county court. Wycough v. State, 50 Ark. 102, 6 S.W. 598 (1887).

14-15-810. Relief from liability.

In all cases where any funds in the hands of any county treasurer of this state have been lost or become unavailable by reason of the insolvency of any bank in which the funds were deposited, and not through defalcation of the county treasurer, the county treasurers and their bondsmen, in cases where the bondsmen have not become sureties on account of the payment of a cash consideration, and in such cases only, are released and relieved from any and all liability for loss of the funds.

History. Acts 1935, No. 16, § 1.

14-15-811. Continuing education — Board and fund.

  1. There is created the County Treasurer's Continuing Education Board, which shall be composed of the following members:
    1. Eight (8) members of the Arkansas County Treasurers' Association, designated by the Arkansas County Treasurers' Association;
    2. One (1) member designated by the Association of Arkansas Counties; and
    3. The Auditor of State or a person designated by the Auditor of State.
    1. It shall be the responsibility of the board to establish a continuing education program for county treasurers of the various counties in the state. This program shall be designed to better equip persons elected to serve as county treasurers to carry out their official responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. The program shall include requirements and procedures for an effective certification program for county treasurers.
    2. It shall also be the responsibility of the board to disburse any funds made available to it from the County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund to establish and maintain a continuing education program and a certification program for county treasurers.
    1. There is created on the books of the Treasurer of State, the Auditor of State, and the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State the County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund.
      1. The quorum court of each county shall annually appropriate and pay into the County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund in the State Treasury the sum of seven hundred dollars ($700) from fees of the office of county treasurer.
      2. If any quorum court shall fail or refuse to appropriate and pay over the funds to the County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund in the State Treasury, the Treasurer of State shall withhold funds from the county aid due to the county and shall credit the funds to the County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund.
  2. The funds in the County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund shall be used exclusively for:
    1. Establishing and operating a continuing education program for county treasurers;
    2. Paying the meals, lodging, registration fees, and mileage at the rate prescribed in state travel rules of county treasurers who attend the continuing education program;
    3. Acquiring educational materials; and
    4. Paying presenter fees and expenses.

History. Acts 1987, No. 944, §§ 1-3; 1989 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 178, § 2; 1999, No. 342, § 1; 2001, No. 348, § 4; 2007, No. 246, § 1; 2013, No. 551, § 3; 2017, No. 443, §§ 1, 2; 2019, No. 315, § 987.

Publisher's Notes. For amount of appropriation for continuing education for county Treasurers of the Auditor of State - Continuing Education see Act 1999, No. 342, § 4.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “seven hundred dollars ($700)” for “six hundred dollars ($600)” in (c)(2)(A)

The 2017 amendment deleted “six (6)” preceding “members” in the introductory language of (a); in (a)(1), substituted “Eight (8)” for “Four (4)”; redesignated former (d) as the introductory language of (d), (d)(1), and (d)(2); deleted “the establishment and operation of” following “exclusively for” in the introductory language of (d); in (d)(1), inserted “Establishing and operating” and deleted “and for paying” following “treasurers” at the end; added “Paying” in (d)(2); added (d)(3) and (d)(4); and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (d)(2).

Cross References. County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund, § 19-5-947.

Publication Development and Resale Revolving Fund, § 19-5-1001.

Subchapter 9 — County Clerks

Effective Dates. Acts 1907, No. 190, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1919, No. 507, § 2: approved Mar. 28, 1919. Emergency declared.

14-15-901. Records — Multiple judicial districts.

  1. In counties having two (2) judicial districts, it shall be the duty of the county clerk to keep at each county site, in addition to the records now required by law to be kept, the following records:
    1. Record of marks and brands;
    2. Record of incorporations;
    3. Record of estrays;
    4. Record of advertisements and sale of delinquent lands;
    5. Record of lands sold to the state; and
    6. Record of lands sold to individuals.
  2. It shall be the duty of the county courts of such counties to immediately purchase such records for the use of the various counties as are required by this section, and all other expenses made necessary by the provisions of this section shall be borne by the respective counties embraced in this section.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to Prairie, Woodruff, and Lawrence counties.

History. Acts 1907, No. 190, §§ 1, 2, 7, p. 446; 1911, No. 94, § 1; 1919, No. 507, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2039, 2040, 8355, 8356, 8361; Pope's Dig., §§ 2586, 2587, 10951, 10952, 10957; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 16-301 — 16-303.

Cross References. Brands and marks of animals generally, § 2-34-101 et seq.

Drivers — Certificate of compliance, § 2-34-303.

Marriage licenses — Issuance of certificate by clerk and duty of clerk upon return of license, §§ 9-11-203, 9-11-220.

Record of livestock running at large or straying, § 2-38-110.

Recording personalty in only one district, § 14-2-101.

Case Notes

Failure to Record.

Failure to record delinquent tax list and publication of notice of sale are not mere irregularities, but matters of substance, rendering tax sale invalid beyond the features of a curative act. Carle v. Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061, 104 S.W.2d 445 (1937).

Subchapter 10 — County Collectors

Effective Dates. Acts 1999, No. 342, § 12: July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly, that the current contribution level for continuing education for county officials is insufficient and when the contribution level is raised, the appropriation for this purpose is insufficient. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1999.”

Acts 2001, No. 348, § 10: Feb. 21, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 2001 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 2001 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 2001.”

14-15-1001. Continuing education — Board and fund.

  1. There is created the County Collector's Continuing Education Board, which shall be composed of the following members:
    1. Eight (8) members of the Arkansas County Tax Collectors Association, designated by the Arkansas County Tax Collectors Association;
    2. One (1) member designated by the Association of Arkansas Counties; and
    3. The Auditor of State or a person designated by the Auditor of State.
    1. It shall be the responsibility of the board to establish a continuing education program for county collectors and sheriff-collectors of the various counties in the state. This program shall be designed to better equip persons elected to serve as county collectors and as sheriff-collectors to carry out their official responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. The program shall include requirements and procedures for an effective certification program for county collectors.
    2. It shall also be the responsibility of the board to disburse any funds made available to it from the County Collectors' Continuing Education Trust Fund to establish and maintain a continuing education program and a certification program for county collectors.
      1. There is created on the books of the Treasurer of State, the Auditor of State, and the Chief Fiscal Officer of the State the County Collectors’ Continuing Education Trust Fund.
      2. The quorum court of each county shall annually appropriate and pay into the fund in the State Treasury the sum of seven hundred dollars ($700) from fees of the office of county collector.
      3. If any quorum court shall fail or refuse to appropriate and pay over the funds to the County Collectors’ Continuing Education Trust Fund in the State Treasury, the Treasurer of State shall withhold funds from the county aid due to the county and shall credit the funds to the County Collectors’ Continuing Education Trust Fund.
    1. The County Collectors' Continuing Education Trust Fund shall consist of all moneys required to be paid in annually as set out herein, all interest earned from the investment of fund balances, and any remaining fund balances carried forward from year to year.
  2. The funds in the County Collectors' Continuing Education Trust Fund shall be used exclusively for:
    1. Establishing and operating a continuing education program for county collectors and sheriff-collectors;
    2. Paying the meals, lodging, registration fees, and mileage at the rate prescribed in state travel rules of county collectors and sheriff-collectors who attend the continuing education programs;
    3. Acquiring educational materials; and
    4. Paying presenter fees and expenses.

History. Acts 1989, No. 673, §§ 1-3; 1999, No. 342, § 2; 2001, No. 348, § 5; 2007, No. 246, § 2; 2013, No. 551, § 4; 2017, No. 443, §§ 3, 4; 2019, No. 315, § 988.

Publisher's Notes. For amount of appropriation for continuing education for county Collectors of the Auditor of State - Continuing Education see Act 1999, No. 342, § 5.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “seven hundred dollars ($700)” for “six hundred dollars ($600)” in (c)(1)(B).

The 2017 amendment, in the introductory language of (a), deleted “hereby” preceding “created” and deleted “six (6)” preceding “members” at the end; in (a)(1), substituted “Eight (8)” for “Four (4)” and twice substituted “Collectors” for “Collectors'”; redesignated former (d) as the introductory language of (d), (d)(1), and (d)(2); deleted “the establishment and operation of” following “exclusively for” in the introductory language of (d); in (d)(1), inserted “Establishing and operating” and deleted “and for paying” following “sheriff-collectors” at the end; added “Paying” in present (d)(2); added (d)(3) and (d)(4); and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (d)(2).

Cross References. Continuing education — Board and fund, § 14-15-811.

County Treasurers' Continuing Education Fund, § 19-5-947.

Publication Development and Resale Revolving Fund, § 19-5-1001.

Chapter 16 Powers of Counties Generally

Research References

Am. Jur. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 24.

22A Am. Jur. 2d, Dec. Judg., § 157.

56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 98 et seq., 193-230, 423-578, 848.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, §§ 49, 50 and 165 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Water and Environmental Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 665.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2015, No. 974, § 8, provided:

“MAXIMUM ANNUAL FUNDING FOR REAPPRAISALS/REVIEWS. Whether a county's reappraisal of real property is simply a review of existing data, or a more extensive reappraisal where every improvement is measured, funding to any county, provided through the Assessment Coordination Department, will be for the actual appraisal cost, up to a maximum of seven dollars per parcel, per year. Counties must use other taxing unit sources of revenue to provide for the cost of real property reappraisals if the cost to complete the reappraisal exceeds seven dollars per parcel.

“The provisions of this section shall be in effect only from July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016.”

Cross References. Jurdisdiction of county courts over county affairs, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 28.

Supervisor of county courts and county, local and municipal boards or officers exercised by circuit courts, § 16-13-203.

Effective Dates. Acts 1879, No. 16, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1949, No. 64, § 5: approved Feb. 8, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the United States is willing to convey lands for hospital purposes and,

“Whereas, the erection of county hospitals vitally affects the public health needs of the people of the State of Arkansas and this Act being necessary to preserve the public peace, health and safety of the inhabitants of the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 26, § 4: Jan. 30, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It being found and determined that there are counties owning real and personal property not needed for use by the county, and that the same is necessary to be used by nonprofit, nonsectarian educational institutions, which, because of the lack thereof, are unable properly to provide adequate facilities necessary for education and instruction, the passage of this Act is found necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1955, No. 73, § 2: Feb. 17, 1955. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the United States Government has made available funds to be used in the State of Arkansas for flood control purposes, and Whereas, it is necessary that Counties be given the authority to acquire land in order that such Federal funds may be used, and Whereas, it is important to the protection of the lives and property of the people of this State that such flood control projects be immediately commenced, Now Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 37, § 2: Feb. 12, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It being found and determined that there are counties in this state owning real and personal property not needed for use by the county, and that the same is necessary to be used by lawfully incorporated, nonprofit, nonsectarian Boys' Clubs or Girls' Clubs, in addition to educational institutions, which because of the lack thereof, are unable properly to provide adequate facilities for the welfare, betterment and recreation of boys or girls, the passage of this act having been found necessary for the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its approval.”

Acts 1963, No. 213, § 3: Mar. 8, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the provisions of this Act will be of great benefit to the various counties in this State by making it possible for such counties to receive better value for used county equipment and other property which the county desires to trade in when purchasing new equipment or property, and that this Act is immediately necessary to permit said counties to make such savings. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1965, No. 115, § 6: Feb. 23, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that certain counties of this State have county-owned hospitals which are vitally needed by municipalities in such counties for use as municipal hospitals and/or nursing homes; and, whereas, the General Assembly determines that it is immediately necessary for the preservation of the public health in such communities that legislation be immediately passed to authorize such sales or leases, Now, Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 150, § 3: Feb. 22, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there are certain counties in this State which are partially bordered by navigable streams or through which navigable streams flow, including Chicot County, that wish to establish and operate river port facilities on such navigable streams; that the establishment and operation of such facilities would be advantageous to and would promote industrial development in such county; that this Act is designed to authorize any such county, alone or in conjunction with another county or municipality as authorized in Act 310 of 1959, to establish, equip and operate such port facility and should be given effect immediately in order that any county desiring to take advantage of the provisions of this Act may do so immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 444, § 3: Mar. 29, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under present law, counties in this State have the authority to sell lands to municipalities within the county but that there is presently no specific authority for a county to lease county-owned lands to municipalities; that certain counties in the State have lands which they desire to lease to various municipalities for particular uses and that the lease of such lands to municipalities by the county would be advantageous both to the county and to the leasing municipality and that this Act should be given effect immediately in order to permit the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 192, § 3: Feb. 18, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is a dire need for legal authority for counties to lease lands to lawfully incorporated, quasipublic, nonprofit, nonsectarian organizations; and that such authority to lease county lands to such organizations is immediately necessary to encourage and promote the further protection of the public peace, health, welfare and safety of the citizens of this State; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 41, § 3: Jan. 25, 1980. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is unclear whether surplus county personal property can now be sold by public auction; that sale by public auction would in most cases result in receiving the highest sale price for surplus property and that this Act is immediately necessary to authorize such public auctions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 63, § 3: Feb. 4, 1980. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is unclear whether surplus county personal property can now be sold by public auction; that sale by public auction would in most cases result in receiving the highest sale price for surplus property and that this Act is immediately necessary to authorize such public auctions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 732, § 5: Mar. 26, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that county governments in Arkansas are operating recycling programs for solid waste; that county recycling programs generate recyclable materials which can technically be considered personal property of the county; that Arkansas law regulates the manner in which personal property of the county can be sold; and that, since the recycling markets are very time sensitive and price conscious, county government recycling programs should be exempt for these restrictions and procedures. Therefore, in order to permit county government to sell recyclable materials more rapidly and competitively, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-16-101. Actions on behalf of counties.

When any county has any demand against any persons or corporations, suit thereon may be brought by the county judge.

History. Acts 1879, No. 16, § 3, p. 13; C. & M. Dig., § 2045; Pope's Dig., § 2596; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-302; Acts 2009, No. 678, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “by the county judge” for “in the name of the state for the use of the county” and deleted the last sentence, which read: “In all such actions, all costs and expenses not recovered from the defendant shall be paid by the county.”

Cross References. Claims against counties, § 14-23-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section had no applicability to a cause in equity that accrued prior to its passage. Griffith v. Sebastian County, 49 Ark. 24, 3 S.W. 886 (1887).

Actions Allowed.

A suit could be prosecuted in the name of the state, for the use of a county, to annul and cancel an illegal and fraudulent lease made by the county judge of the county property. State ex rel. Garland County v. Baxter, 38 Ark. 462 (1882).

The state could bring an action on a county treasurer's bond in which the obligee was named for the use of a county for a defalcation of the treasurer. State ex rel. Benton County v. Wood, 51 Ark. 205, 10 S.W. 624 (1889).

Costs and Expenses.

Costs could not be taxed against a county in cases of failure of prosecution of suits by state against railroad companies for failure to maintain sufficient lights during nighttime on all their main line switches, the county not being a party to the suit, and in the absence of a statute making it so liable, could not properly be taxed with costs. Chicot County v. Matthews, 120 Ark. 505, 179 S.W. 1002 (1915).

Cited: Wade v. Moody, 255 Ark. 266, 500 S.W.2d 593 (1973).

14-16-102. Rights under contracts.

All notes, bonds, bills, contracts, covenants, agreements, or writings, made or to be made, whereby any person is, or shall be, bound to any county, or the commissioners of any county, or to any other person, in whatever form, for the payment of any debt or duty, or the performance of any matter or thing, to the use of any county, shall be valid and effectual to all intents and purposes to vest in the county all rights, interests, and actions which would be vested in any individual if any such contract had been made directly to him or her.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 35, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 1975; Pope's Dig., § 2504; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-301.

14-16-103. Deeds, etc., to county.

All deeds, grants, and conveyances which are made and duly acknowledged and recorded as are other deeds of conveyance to any county, or to the commissioners of any county, or to any other person, by whatever form of conveyance, for the use and benefit of any county, for all intents and purposes shall be good and valid instruments for vesting in the county, in fee simple or otherwise, all such right, title, interest, and estate as the grantor in any such deed or conveyance had in the lands conveyed at the time of the execution of the instrument and was intended by that means to be conveyed.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 35, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 1948; Pope's Dig., § 2477; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-303.

Case Notes

Cancellation.

A conveyance to a county under a mutual mistake will be canceled. Griffith v. Sebastian County, 49 Ark. 24, 3 S.W. 886 (1887).

In Fee Simple or Otherwise.

A county is authorized to take title to land “in fee simple or otherwise,” and a deed accepted by the county conveys what was intended to be conveyed; a condition subsequent in a deed to a county does not convey a fee simple. Jeffries v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 212 Ark. 213, 205 S.W.2d 194 (1947).

A county may acquire property for general county purposes by a deed that conveys less than the fee simple title; a condition subsequent in a deed to a county is in accordance with public policy and not void as against public policy. Jeffries v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 212 Ark. 213, 205 S.W.2d 194 (1947).

In order to determine the validity of a condition subsequent in a deed to a county, the sources that must be consulted to determine an issue of public policy are the federal and state constitutions, the statutes, and court decisions. Jeffries v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 212 Ark. 213, 205 S.W.2d 194 (1947).

14-16-104. Conveyances from federal government.

    1. Any and all counties of the State of Arkansas are authorized and empowered to accept conveyances of real estate from the federal government, or any authorized agency thereof, whether that conveyance contains reservations to oil, mineral, or fissionable material rights in the United States or not, and subject to such terms and conditions as the federal government, or an agency thereof, may reasonably require.
    2. Counties are authorized to accept conveyances containing reversion clauses providing for reversion of real estate to the federal government in case the real estate ceases to be used for the purposes for which conveyed.
  1. The word “conveyance” as used herein shall be construed to refer to either quit-claim or warranty deeds.
  2. The provisions of this section shall apply only to conveyances from the United States or from any authorized agency of the federal government.

History. Acts 1949, No. 64, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-310 — 17-312.

14-16-105. Sale of county property generally.

  1. The county court of each county shall have power and jurisdiction to sell and cause to be conveyed any real estate or personal property belonging to the county and to appropriate the proceeds of the sale for the use of the county by proceeding in the manner set forth in this section.
    1. When the county judge of a county shall consider it advisable and to the best interest of the county to sell and convey any real or personal property belonging to the county, he or she shall cause an order to be entered in the county court setting forth:
      1. A description of the property to be sold;
      2. The reason for the sale; and
      3. An order directing the county assessor to cause the property to be appraised at its fair market value and to certify his or her appraisal of the property to the county court within a time to be specified in the order.
    2. A certified copy of the order shall be delivered to the county assessor by the county clerk, and the county clerk shall certify the date of the delivery of the copy on the margin of the record where the order is recorded.
    3. An order and the procedures as used in this section shall not be required for any sale by the county of any materials separated, collected, recovered, or created by a recycling program authorized and operated by the county. However, the county judge shall maintain a record of the recyclable materials sold, whether they were sold at public or private sale, a description of the recyclables sold, the name of the purchaser, and the terms of the sale. All the proceeds of the sale shall be deposited with the county treasurer.
    4. An order and the procedures described in this section shall not be required for any conveyance by the county of a conservation easement as described in the Conservation Easement Act, § 15-20-401 et seq. However, this conveyance shall not be made unless authorized by a majority vote of the quorum court.
    5. If property is sold under § 14-16-106, the requirements of this section are not applicable.
    1. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the order, the county assessor shall view the property described in the order and shall cause the property to be appraised at its fair market value.
    2. Within the time specified in the order, the assessor shall file with the county clerk his or her written certificate of appraisal of the property.
    1. If the appraised value of the property described in the order is less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), the property may thereafter be sold and conveyed by the county judge, either at public or private sale, by sealed bids or internet sale for not less than three-fourths (¾) of the appraised value as shown by the certificate of appraisal filed by the assessor.
      1. If the property will be sold by internet sale, the notice of sale shall be placed on the website of the internet vendor for no less than eight (8) consecutive days before the date of sale and shall contain a description of the property to be sold and the time of the sale.
      2. An additional notice may be posted on a county-owned or county-affiliated website, trade website, or business website for no less than eight (8) consecutive days before the date of sale.
      1. When the sale has been completed, the county court shall enter its order approving the sale.
      2. The order shall set forth:
        1. The description of the property sold;
        2. The name of the purchaser;
        3. The terms of the sale;
        4. That the proceeds of the sale have been deposited with the county treasurer; and
        5. The fund or funds to which the proceeds were credited by the county treasurer.
      1. If the appraised value of the property to be sold exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000), the county judge may sell the property to the highest bidder, upon sealed bids received by the judge or by internet sale.
      2. The county judge shall not sell property under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section for less than three-fourths (¾) of the appraised value of the property as determined by the certificate of the assessor.
      1. Notice of the sale shall be published for two (2) consecutive weekly insertions in some newspaper published and having a general circulation in the county.
      2. The notice shall specify:
        1. The description of the property to be sold;
        2. The time and place for submitting written bids; and
        3. The appraised value of the property to be sold.
      3. The notice shall be dated and signed by the judge.
      4. If the sale is conducted on the internet, the notice shall be placed on the internet under this section, and the invoice from the internet vendor or publisher shall be accompanied by a statement from the internet vendor or publisher that the sale was published and conducted on the internet.
    1. The judge shall have the right to reject any bids received by him or her under the notice.
      1. When the judge has accepted a bid for the property, the judge may sell and convey the property to the highest bidder.
      2. When the sale has been approved and completed, the county court shall enter an order approving the sale, which shall set forth the details of the sale as provided in subdivision (d)(3)(B) of this section.
      1. Any sale or conveyance of real or personal property belonging to any county not made under the terms of this section shall be null and void.
      2. The county fixed asset listing shall be amended to reflect all sales or conveyances made by the county under this section.
        1. Any taxpayer of the county may bring an action to cancel the sale and to recover possession of the property sold within two (2) years from the date a sale is consummated.
        2. This action for the use and benefit of the county is to be taken in the circuit court of the county in which the sale is made or in any county where personal property so sold may be found.
        3. In the event the property is recovered for the county in the action, the purchaser shall not be entitled to a refund of the consideration paid by him or her for the sale.
    1. The procedures for sale and conveyance of county property set forth in this section shall not apply in these instances:
      1. When personal property of the county is traded in on new or used equipment and credit approximating the fair market price of the personal property is given to the county toward the purchase price of new equipment;
      2. When the sale of the personal property of the county involves the sale by the county of any materials separated, collected, recovered, or created by a recycling program authorized and operated by the county;
      3. When the county is conveying an easement, including, but not limited to, easements granted upon county lands for water improvements, sewer improvements, gas lines, electric lines, phone lines, utilities, railways, public roads, highways, and conservation easements as described in the Conservation Easement Act, § 15-20-401 et seq., for any of the purposes enumerated in the Conservation Easement Act, § 15-20-401 et seq., as the same may be amended from time to time;
      4. When the county is leasing county property, including, but not limited to, leasing county lands or property under §§ 14-16-108 — 14-16-110, or the Municipalities and Counties Industrial Development Revenue Bond Law, § 14-164-201 et seq.; or
      5. When a sale or disposal of property is conducted under another section of the Arkansas Code.
    1. County hospitals constructed or maintained in whole or part by taxes approved by the voters shall not be sold unless the sale is approved by the majority of electors voting on the issue at a general or special election. This subsection is applicable to county hospitals constructed before and after July 20, 1987.
    2. An election shall not be required for the sale of a county hospital that has been vacant or not used as a county hospital for more than one hundred twenty (120) days.

History. Acts 1945, No. 193, §§ 1-6; 1963, No. 213, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-304 — 17-309; Acts 1987, No. 448, § 1; 1993, No. 732, § 1; 1997, No. 1107, §§ 1, 2; 2001, No. 1050, §§ 1, 2; 2005, No. 1240, § 1; 2009, No. 410, §§ 3 — 5; 2011, No. 614, § 3; 2011, No. 1014, § 1; 2019, No. 212, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “two thousand dollars ($2,000)” for “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” in (d)(1); in (e), substituted “two thousand dollars ($2,000)” for “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” in (e)(1)(A)(i) and (e)(1)(B), inserted “including that the sale may be conducted on the Internet” in (e)(2)(B)(ii) and made a related change, and inserted (e)(2)(D); and in (g), inserted (g)(2) and redesignated the remaining text accordingly.

The 2011 amendment by No. 614 inserted “or by Internet sale” in (e)(1)(A)(i); inserted “the notice shall be placed on the Internet under this section, and” in (e)(2)(D); redesignated former (e)(4)(A) and (e)(4)(B)(i) as (e)(4)(A); deleted “he or she, as chair of the approval board, shall immediately call a meeting of the board, and the proposals to sell at the acceptable bid shall be submitted to the board for its approval” following “bid for the property” in (e)(4)(A); redesignated former (e)(4)(B)(ii) as (e)(4)(B); added (f)(1)(B) and redesignated former (f)(1)(B) as (f)(1)(C); and substituted “§§ 14-16-10814-16-110” for “§ 14-16-108, § 14-16-109, § 14-16-110” in (f)(2)(D).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1014 substituted “as used” for “prescribed” in (b)(3); inserted “the Conservation Easement Act” in (b)(4); inserted (b)(5); inserted “by sealed bids or Internet sales” in (d)(1); and inserted present (d)(2) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.

The 2019 amendment substituted “five thousand dollars ($5,000)” for “the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000)” in (d)(1) and (e)(1)(A); in (e)(1), deleted the former (e)(1)(A)(i) designation and deleted (e)(1)(A)(ii); deleted “and best” following “highest” in (e)(1)(A); in (e)(1)(B), substituted “The county judge shall not sell property under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section” for “The property, when it exceeds the appraised value of two thousand dollars ($2,000), shall not be sold”, and inserted “of the property”; deleted “including that the sale may be conducted on the Internet” following “bids” in (e)(2)(B)(ii); deleted “and if a majority of the board approves the sale” preceding “the judge may sell” in (e)(4)(A), and made stylistic changes.

Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Disposition of public use property, § 22-4-501.

Exercise of powers by county judge, § 14-14-1102.

Sale of county issued firearms to deputies, § 12-15-301.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 373.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The right of a county court to order sale of county property for such a consideration as it deemed proper did not conflict with Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 5. Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. Pulaski County, 113 Ark. 439, 168 S.W. 848 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Purpose.

Purpose in providing procedure for sale of county property is to make public all dispositions of county property. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).

Applicability.

This section is superseded with respect to cases coming within the purview of § 14-164-201 et seq. relating to county industrial development revenue bonds. Dumas v. Jerry, 257 Ark. 1031, 521 S.W.2d 539 (1975).

County judge complied with the procedures set forth in § 14-16-106(c) when he sold a gravel crusher belonging to the county after he conferred with the county assessor and they agreed it was junk that should be sold for scrap. The general assembly did not intend for the provisions of this section for sales of county property generally to apply to sales or disposal of surplus property under § 14-16-106. Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey, 2013 Ark. 84 (2013).

Authority to Sell.

When agent for commissioner for sale of county property delivered the commissioner's deed to the purchaser without receiving the purchase price, he would be personally responsible to the county therefor. Jacks v. State, 44 Ark. 61 (1884) (decision under prior law).

When county court had authority to sell the property of the county, nothing short of fraud or grossly inadequate consideration as would amount to fraud would invalidate an order of the court in directing a conveyance. Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. Pulaski County, 113 Ark. 439, 168 S.W. 848 (1914) (decision under prior law).

The consideration for the sale of county property could have been something other than money, and the county court in exercising its power could have determined what was to the best interests of the county. Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. Pulaski County, 113 Ark. 439, 168 S.W. 848 (1914); Washington County v. Lynn Shelton Post, 201 Ark. 301, 144 S.W.2d 20 (1940) (decisions under prior law).

Former similar statute conferred power upon the county court to sell and convey property of the county not held in trust for specific purposes. Washington County v. Lynn Shelton Post, 201 Ark. 301, 144 S.W.2d 20 (1940) (decision under prior law).

“New.”

The word “new,” as used in the second clause of subdivision (f)(2), means new to the county, although it may be second-hand equipment; although this interpretation renders two different meanings of the term within the same sentence, it is nevertheless a reasonable and proper interpretation of this section. Robinson v. Clark Contracting Co., 992 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1993).

Procedure for Sale.

There was no substantial compliance by the county court with procedure for sale of county auto where it merely orally requested an appraisement by county assessor without entering an order describing the property to be sold for delivery by clerk to the assessor. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).

Allowance of claim by county court for purchase of new truck by county less allowance for old truck did not constitute ratification where county court had not substantially complied with law in having old truck appraised. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).

A judge has no right to sell county property without complying with this section. Goodwin v. State, 235 Ark. 457, 360 S.W.2d 490 (1962).

Timeliness.

Steel manufacturer's counterclaims against a gas corporation, which challenged easements that were granted to the gas corporation by a county, were procedurally barred under § 14-16-105(f)(1)(A) because they were not brought within two years from the date the sales were consummated. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).

Void or Voidable Transactions.

Lease made contrary to former similar statute was held void for that and other reasons. State ex rel. Garland County v. Baxter, 50 Ark. 447, 8 S.W. 188 (1888) (decision under prior law).

County was not estopped to deny validity of sale of used truck owned by county in suit by taxpayer in behalf of county where procedure for appraisement of county property was not substantially complied with by the county court, since sale was void. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).

Car belonging to a county and sold to a dealer who, after expending money in repairs on it, resold it to the county, was properly excluded from lien on all other property purchased from the dealer, since this sale could have been found to be a part of an overall scheme to defraud the county with the dealer a part of that scheme. Goodwin v. State, 235 Ark. 457, 360 S.W.2d 490 (1962).

Where sale of county property was not contrary to provisions of this section, but was subject to attack for stifling of bidding, the sale was merely voidable, and equity could mold a remedy to fit the case. State ex rel. Peevy v. Cate, 236 Ark. 836, 371 S.W.2d 541 (1963).

Provision giving lessee of county property option to purchase was void, as was provision giving him right to any money received in any eminent domain proceeding, such provisions failing to comply with this section governing disposition of county property; however, with the two provisions stricken, the lease was valid. State ex rel. Peevy v. Cate, 236 Ark. 836, 371 S.W.2d 541 (1963).

Where taxpayer, before protesting sale of county property, allowed purchaser to expend over $28,000 for improvements, to sell a small parcel to others who built a home thereon, and to receive proceeds from condemnation proceedings, resale would not be decreed unless or until purchaser failed to pay the actual value of the property at time of sale, with interest and costs. State ex rel. Peevy v. Cate, 236 Ark. 836, 371 S.W.2d 541 (1963).

The Arkansas Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over county property in the county court so that a deed executed by the county judge purporting to convey a tract of county property was void from the outset, and two-year limitation in subsection (f) on bringing taxpayer's suits to cancel improperly made conveyances, being curative in nature, could not remedy such a defect. Maroney v. Universal Leasing Corp., 263 Ark. 8, 562 S.W.2d 77 (1978).

Summary judgment for gas company in its declaratory action was proper as the county's grant of a pipeline easement to manufacturer was null and void due to the county's failure to follow the appraisal, notice, and bidding procedures required in this section, and the exemptions set out in subdivision (f)(2) for conservation easements did not include the pipeline easement; further, the 2005 amendment to this section, which exempted all easements, could not be applied retroactively because the amendment changed prior law rather than merely clarifying it. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).

Judgment was properly awarded to a gas corporation in its action for a declaratory judgment that the grant of a pipeline easement by a county, so that a steel manufacturer could obtain gas from the interstate natural gas market, was null and void pursuant to § 14-16-105(f)(1)(A) where the conveyance was not made pursuant to the procedures of the statute. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).

Cited: Daniels v. City of Ft. Smith, 268 Ark. 157, 594 S.W.2d 238 (1980); Bell v. Crawford County, 287 Ark. 251, 697 S.W.2d 910 (1985); Dudley v. Little River County, 305 Ark. 102, 805 S.W.2d 645 (1991); Ark. Okla. Gas Corp. v. MacSteel Div. of Quanex, 370 Ark. 481, 262 S.W.3d 147 (2007); Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey, 2011 Ark. 533 (2011).

14-16-106. Sale or disposal of surplus property.

  1. If it is determined by the county judge to be surplus, any personal or real property owned by a county may be sold at public auction or by internet sale to the highest bidder.
    1. Notice of the public auction shall be published at least one (1) time a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper having general circulation in the county.
    2. The notice shall specify the description of the property to be sold and the time and place of the public auction or internet sale.
      1. If the property will be sold by internet sale, the notice of sale shall be placed on the website of the internet vendor for no less than eight (8) consecutive days before the date of sale and shall contain a description of the property to be sold and the time of the sale.
      2. An additional notice may be posted on a county-owned or county-affiliated website, trade website, or business website for no less than eight (8) consecutive days before the date of sale.
    1. If it is determined by the county judge and the county assessor that any personal property owned by a county is junk, scrap, discarded, or otherwise of no value to the county, then the property may be disposed of in any manner deemed appropriate by the county judge.
    2. However, the county judge shall report monthly to the quorum court any property that has been disposed of under subdivision (c)(1) of this section.
  2. The county fixed asset listing shall be amended to reflect all sales or disposal of county property made by the county under this section.
  3. If the sale is conducted on the internet, the invoice from the internet vendor or publisher shall be accompanied by a statement from the internet vendor or publisher that the sale was published and conducted on the internet.
    1. When the sale is complete, the county court shall enter an order approving the sale.
    2. The order shall set forth:
      1. The description of the property sold;
      2. The name of the purchaser;
      3. The terms of the sale;
      4. That the proceeds of the sale have been deposited with the county treasurer; and
      5. The funds to which the proceeds were credited by the county treasurer.

History. Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 41, § 1; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 63, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-322; Acts 1997, No. 364, § 1; 2005, No. 725, § 1; 2011, No. 614, § 4; 2011, No. 1014, § 2; 2019, No. 880, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 614 inserted “or by Internet sale” in (a), (b)(1) and (2); and added (d).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1014 added (b)(3), (e), and (f).

The 2019 amendment deleted “or Internet sale” following “public auction” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Compliance.

County judge complied with the procedures set forth in subsection (c) of this section when he sold a gravel crusher belonging to the county after he conferred with the county assessor and they agreed it was junk that should be sold for scrap. The general assembly did not intend for the provisions of § 14-16-105 for sales of county property generally to apply to sales or disposal of surplus property under this section. Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey, 2013 Ark. 84 (2013).

Cited: Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey, 2011 Ark. 533 (2011).

14-16-107. Sale of realty to certain organizations.

Whenever a portion of county lands are dedicated for the benefit of any lawfully incorporated, quasi-public, nonprofit, nonsectarian organizations including, but not limited to, medical clinics, that county real property may be sold to any buyer, upon the approval of the county judge and a two-thirds vote of the quorum court of the county, without the necessity of soliciting for competitive bids.

History. Acts 1977, No. 750, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-321.

14-16-108. Sale or lease of county hospital to municipality.

  1. Any other law notwithstanding in this state, from and after the passage of this act, the county court of each county of the State of Arkansas shall have the right to sell or lease any county-owned hospital, where there is no outstanding bonded indebtedness, upon such terms and conditions as the court may deem advisable for the best interests of the county, to any municipality located within the county.
    1. Before any such sale or lease shall be entered into, the proposition shall be submitted to the county quorum court for approval or rejection.
    2. If a majority of the county quorum court voting thereon approves it, then the county court is authorized to execute other instruments that may be necessary to facilitate the sale or lease.
  2. Each sale or lease shall recite in the instrument of conveyance that should the municipality that has been granted the sale or lease of the county-owned hospital have any reason to discontinue to use it for hospital or nursing home purposes, then, in that event, the property shall revert back to the county, and title to the hospital shall be revested in the county.

History. Acts 1965, No. 115, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-316 — 17-318.

Publisher's Notes. In reference to the term “passage of this act,” Acts 1965, No. 115, was signed by the Governor and became effective on February 23, 1965.

Cross References. Sale of county property generally, § 14-16-105.

14-16-109. Lease of county lands to municipality.

  1. Any county in this state may lease any lands owned by the county to any municipality in the county to be used for such purposes, subject to such restrictions, and for such consideration or compensation as shall be agreed upon by the contracting county and municipality.
  2. In addition to other terms the county court finds reasonable and proper, the contract for the lease of county property shall provide that when the leased property ceases to be used for the purpose expressed in the lease or needs to be used by the county, the lease may be cancelled by the county court after reasonable notice.

History. Acts 1971, No. 444, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-319; Acts 2009, No. 410, § 6.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment in (a) substituted “may” for “is authorized and empowered to”, and added (b), redesignated the remaining text accordingly, and made a minor stylistic change.

14-16-110. Lease of county property to educational institutions.

  1. Any lawfully incorporated nonprofit, nonsectarian educational institution; any lawfully incorporated nonprofit, nonsectarian boys' club or girls' club; or any lawfully incorporated quasi-public, nonprofit, nonsectarian organizations including, but not limited to community mental health centers, may petition the county court of any county or county district in which the institution, club, or organization is located to lease to it real or personal property belonging to the county for use by the institution, club, or organization.
    1. Immediately upon the filing of the petition, the judge of the county court shall make an order fixing a time and place for a public hearing on the petition, notice of which order shall be given by the county clerk by publication one (1) time in a legal newspaper having a bona fide legal circulation in the county or county district at least ten (10) days prior to the date fixed for the hearing.
      1. The notice shall state the time of filing, the substance and purpose of the petition, and the time and place of hearing it.
        1. The hearing shall be public, and all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the petition shall be entitled to be heard either in person or by attorney.
        2. The hearing may be continued or adjourned to a further date, at the discretion of the court, but no further notice thereof by publication shall be required.
    1. When satisfied from the petition or the evidence, if any, at the hearing that any real or personal property belonging to the county or county district is not, and in the future will not be, needed for use by the county and that the property may be used by any lawfully incorporated, quasi-public, nonprofit, nonsectarian institution, club, or organization in the county or county district, then the county court may order the lease of any property to the legally constituted directors or trustees of the institution, club, or organization for such time and upon such terms and conditions as the county court, in its discretion, shall find just, reasonable, and proper.
    2. The lease shall be signed and approved by the judge of the county court and by the directors or trustees of the institution, club, or organization and shall thereafter be and become a binding and valid contract when the order authorizing it shall have become final as provided in this section.
    3. Any such lease shall provide, in addition to any other terms as the county court shall deem reasonable and proper, that when the property ceases to be used for the foregoing purposes or needs to be used by the county, the lease may be cancelled by the county court, after reasonable notice.
      1. When a hearing shall have been had pursuant to notice, as provided in this section, and an order granting or denying the petition shall have been made, the order shall become final and binding thirty (30) days after entry unless within that thirty (30) days any interested person or taxpayer of the county or county district shall appeal to the circuit court of the county or county district, the appeal from the order to be prosecuted and determined in the same manner as provided by law for appeals from the county court to the circuit court in municipal annexation cases.
      2. In like manner, the final judgment of the circuit court may be appealed by any interested person or taxpayer to the Supreme Court likewise as in such cases.
    1. Any appeal to the circuit court or from the circuit court to the Supreme Court must be taken and transcript lodged in the appellate court not later than thirty (30) days after the judgment or order of the court appealed from, and that appeal shall be advanced on motion of any party thereto.
    2. In the event of any appeal from the order of the county court as provided in this subsection, the order shall not become final until the appeal is finally determined.

History. Acts 1951, No. 26, §§ 1, 2; 1957, No. 37, § 1; 1975, No. 192, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-313, 17-314; Acts 2009, No. 410, § 7.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment in (c)(3) inserted “or needs to be used by the county” and made minor stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Appeals.

Appeal from action of county court denying petition for order nunc pro tunc because of loss of original order under subsections (a)-(c) granting lease to chamber of commerce by county was governed by general provisions of § 16-67-201 rather than subsection (d). Piggott Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Hollis, 242 Ark. 205, 412 S.W.2d 595 (1967).

Cited: Piggott Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Hollis, 242 Ark. 205, 412 S.W.2d 595 (1967); Hollis v. Piggott Junior Chamber of Commerce, 248 Ark. 725, 453 S.W.2d 410 (1970).

14-16-111. Development of port facilities.

  1. Any county in this state which is partially bounded by a navigable stream or through which a navigable stream flows may independently, or jointly with another county, or with one (1) or more municipalities, establish, equip, maintain, and operate a river port or port facility at an appropriate place in the county. The county may issue bonds to provide funds for the construction and operation of the port facility in the manner and under the conditions and requirements as prescribed in §§ 14-186-401 — 14-186-417.
  2. The provisions of this section shall be supplemental to and shall not repeal, modify, or otherwise affect any other laws of this state relating to the establishment of port facilities by counties and cities in this state.

History. Acts 1971, No. 150, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-320, 17-320n.

Cross References. Harbors and port facilities generally, § 14-186-101 et seq.

14-16-112. Flood control.

    1. The counties of this state are authorized and empowered to enter upon, take, and hold any lands or interest, easement, or servitude therein, whether by purchase, grant, donation, devise, or otherwise, that may be necessary and proper for the location, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any floodway, reservoir, spillway, levee or diversion, or other flood control improvements.
      1. In order to acquire such rights, easements, and servitudes, the counties are given the authority and power to condemn lands or interest therein for these purposes.
      2. In the event it becomes necessary for counties to exercise the right of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings shall be instituted and conducted in the same manner as provided in §§ 18-15-304 — 18-15-307.
  1. Nothing in this section shall ever be so construed or applied as to relieve the federal government of any liability or responsibility which it has assumed by the passage of the Flood Control Act of May 15, 1928, or the Flood Control Act of June 15, 1936, or any other existing law, or any law that may hereafter be passed by the United States Congress.

History. Acts 1955, No. 73, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-315.

U.S. Code. The Flood Control Act of Congress approved May 15, 1928, referred to in this section, is codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 702a, 702b-702d, 702e-702g, 702h-702j, 702k, 702l, 702m, and 704.

The Flood Control Act of Congress approved June 15, 1936, referred to in this section, is codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 702a-1, 702a-2 — 702a-11, 702g-1, 702j-1, 702j-2, 702k-1, and 702k-2.

Cross References. Distribution of federal funds received for lease of lands for flood control purposes, § 19-7-403.

14-16-113. Sale proceeds paid into county road fund.

Upon the sale of county property which the county purchased with funds from the county road fund, the proceeds of the sale shall be paid into the county road fund. If, in addition to county road funds, other funds were used by the county to purchase the property, then the amount to be paid into the county road fund shall be a portion of the proceeds determined by using the ratio of the amount of county road funds used by the county in purchasing the property to the full purchase price paid by the county.

History. Acts 1989, No. 169, § 1.

14-16-114. Financial aid.

  1. Counties, pursuant to an ordinance properly and lawfully adopted by their quorum courts, are empowered and authorized to annually grant financial aid to any public postsecondary educational institution located within their borders for the purpose of assisting the institution in paying its lawful expenses of operation.
  2. The ordinance shall be effective for a period of twelve (12) months.

History. Acts 1993, No. 866, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 866, § 1, is also codified as § 14-58-505.

14-16-115. Resident bidding preference limitation.

Unless a bidding preference for firms resident in the county or in the state is authorized by state law, no county shall allow such a preference in the awarding of a construction contract.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1161, § 1.

14-16-116. Property exchange or transfer by counties.

  1. A county may:
    1. Exchange or transfer properties, real or personal, with other counties, municipalities, community colleges, or institutions of higher education; and
    2. Exchange real property with individuals or nonprofit corporations when in the best interest of the county.
    1. An exchange or transfer under this section shall be:
      1. Authorized, approved, or confirmed by ordinance of the quorum court; and
      2. Accomplished in accordance with procedures prescribed or confirmed by the quorum court.
    2. An ordinance adopted by the quorum court under this section shall be:
      1. Confirmed by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the quorum court; and
      2. Filed with the county clerk and include a copy of the bill of sale setting forth the terms and conditions of the sale, transfer, deed, or conveyance.
  2. An agreement for service, legal tender, or other consideration may be accepted in exchange for real or personal property under this section.
  3. A transfer made under this section is exempt from §§ 14-16-105 and 14-16-106, § 14-22-101 et seq., and the Arkansas Procurement Law, § 19-11-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1248, § 1; 2015, No. 98, § 1; 2019, No. 502, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1248 became law without the Governor's signature.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment designated the former section as (a) and (b); in (a), inserted “or transfer” and substituted “counties, municipalities, community colleges, or institutions of higher education” for “counties or with municipalities”; in (b), substituted “An exchange or transfer under this section” for “Provided, any such exchange,” deleted “shall be” preceding “accomplished,” and inserted “or confirmed”; added (c) and (d); and inserted “or transfer” in the section heading.

The 2019 amendment substituted “A county may” for “Counties are authorized to” in (a); added the (a)(1) designation; added “and” at the end of (a)(1); added (a)(2); added the (b)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B) designations and made related changes; substituted “Authorized, approved, or confirmed by ordinance” for “approved by ordinances” in (b)(1)(A); and added (b)(2).

14-16-117. Controlled burns.

A property owner in an unincorporated area of a county may conduct a controlled burn of a residence or structure on the property owner's property in the county if:

  1. The property owner applies to the county judge of that county and the fire department that is responsible for providing fire protection services for the property for approval to conduct the controlled burn;
  2. The application under subdivision (1) of this section is approved by the county judge and the fire department; and
  3. Before the approval under subdivision (2) of this section, the property owner demonstrates to the county judge and the fire department that:
    1. The property owner has complied with applicable state and federal environmental laws, rules, and regulations regarding asbestos abatement;
    2. The property owner ensures that the residence or structure is free of asbestos-containing materials, is free of contents, and otherwise demonstrates compliance with applicable state and federal environmental laws, rules, and regulations regarding hazardous wastes; and
    3. Provisions are made for the proper disposal of any remaining debris.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1274, § 1; 2017, No. 299, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 989.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “in an unincorporated area of a county” in the introductory language; and substituted “county judge” for “quorum court” in (1), (2), and (3).

The 2019 amendment inserted “rules” following “laws” in (3)(A) and (3)(B).

Subchapter 2 — Public Recreation and Playgrounds

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1941, No. 291 is also codified as § 6-21-501 et seq. and § 14-54-1301 et seq.

Cross References. Parks annexed to city, § 14-40-204.

Title to parks not acquired by adverse possession, § 22-1-201.

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 6: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the promotion of an adequate National Defense and an able-bodied citizenry, an emergency is declared to exist and the same shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Case Notes

Swimming Pools.

For cases discussing liability in operation of swimming pools by municipalities, see Handley v. City of Hope, 137 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. Ark. 1956), appeal dismissed, Handley v. Hope, 239 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956); Cabbiness v. City of N. Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957).

Cited: Kendall v. Henderson, 238 Ark. 832, 384 S.W.2d 954, 384 S.W.2d 955 (1964).

14-16-201. Authority to operate.

  1. Any county or county board may:
    1. Operate a program of public recreation and playgrounds;
    2. Acquire, equip, and maintain land, buildings, or other recreational facilities; and
    3. Expend funds for the operation of the program pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter.
  2. The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to § 17-22-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3601.

14-16-202. Operation of programs generally.

  1. Any county or county board may operate a program of public recreation and playgrounds independently; or they may cooperate in its conduct and in any manner in which they may mutually agree, including with cities, towns, or school districts; or they may delegate the cooperation of the program to a recreation board created by one or more of them and appropriate money voted for this purpose to the board.
  2. In the case of school districts, the right to enter into such agreements with any other public corporation, board, or body or the right to delegate power to a board for operating a program of recreation shall be authorized only by a majority vote cast at an annual school election.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3602.

14-16-203. State aid not used.

State aid shall not be used for recreational purposes as provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3602.

14-16-204. Use of school funds.

In all cases where school funds are utilized for programs under this subchapter, the State Board of Education shall prepare, or cause to be prepared, published, and distributed, adequate and appropriate manuals and other materials as it may deem necessary or suitable to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3604.

14-16-205. Gifts and bequests.

Any corporation, board, or body given charge of a recreation program shall have authority to accept gifts and bequests for the benefit of the recreational service.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3603.

14-16-206. Property used for activities.

Any corporation, board, or body given charge of a recreation program is authorized to conduct its activities on:

  1. Property under its custody and management;
  2. Other public property under the custody of any other public organization, body, or board, with the consent of the corporations, bodies, or boards; and
  3. Private property, with the consent of its owners.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3603.

14-16-207. Use of school facilities.

  1. The facilities of any school district operating a recreation program pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter shall be used primarily for the purpose of conducting the regular school curriculum and related activities, and the use of school facilities for recreation purposes authorized by this subchapter shall be secondary.
  2. In all cases where school property is utilized for programs under this subchapter, the State Board of Education shall prepare or cause to be prepared, published, and distributed adequate and appropriate manuals and other materials as it may deem necessary or suitable to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3604, 19-3605.

14-16-208. Directors and instructors.

  1. Any corporation, board, or body given charge of a recreation program shall have authority to employ directors and instructors of recreational work.
  2. In all cases where school funds or property are utilized for programs under this subchapter, the State Board of Education shall establish minimum qualifications of local recreational directors and instructors.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3603, 19-3604.

Subchapter 3 — Public Property for Processing Crude Biogenic Gases

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1983, No. 478, is also codified as § 14-54-401 et seq.

14-16-301. Authority to lease, etc.

Each county shall have the authority to lease, let, sell, or convey any real property owned or controlled by the county for the production, reclamation, and refining of crude biogenic gases pursuant to competitive sealed bidding procedures under this subchapter.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2356.

14-16-302. Bidding process.

    1. The county judge shall publish a notice inviting sealed bids for the leasing, letting, selling, or conveying of real property for the production, reclamation, and refining of crude biogenic gases. This notice shall be published in a legal newspaper in the county where the property is located one (1) time each week for the four (4) weeks immediately prior to the date set for receiving bids.
    2. No bid shall be received, accepted, or considered when received after the date set for the receipt of bids.
    1. Within thirty (30) days after the date set for the receipt of bids, the bids shall be opened and read at a public meeting of the county quorum court.
      1. At the meeting, the county judge shall select and award the lease to the property or award the property to the highest, responsible, and best bidder.
      2. The county judge may reject all bids and begin the bidding process anew.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2357.

14-16-303. Implementing legislation.

Each county may provide, by ordinance, for the implementation of this subchapter, but no provision shall be contrary to it.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2358.

14-16-304. Authority to issue bonds.

This subchapter shall not limit the authority of any county to lease, let, sell, or convey any real property pursuant to the Arkansas Constitution and the laws of Arkansas concerning the issuance of bonds for the purpose of industrial development and other lawful purposes.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2359.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Water and Environmental Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 665.

Subchapter 4 — Areas Adjacent to Shopping Centers

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1973, No. 472, is also codified as § 14-54-501 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 796, § 3: Mar. 28, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the administration of justice and the preservation of public order and safety in the areas affected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

14-16-401. Authority to control use.

The county courts of this state are delegated the power and authority to enter orders to limit and control the use of areas adjacent to shopping centers and other commercial enterprises which are privately owned but which are maintained for the convenience of the public so as to provide ingress and egress, loading and unloading areas, fire lanes, parking spaces, parking areas designated for the exclusive use of individuals with disabilities, and other measures for the safety and convenience of the public.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 1; 1985, No. 527, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2350.

14-16-402. Plat of area.

  1. No order shall be entered unless and until the owner or lessee of an area sought to be regulated has presented to the county court a plat of the area upon which is shown the proposed limitations and controls.
  2. The plat shall in no way limit the power and authority of the county court but shall be advisory only.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2351.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Water and Environmental Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 665.

14-16-403. Posting of signs, etc. — Penalty.

  1. When the county court has entered an order, at his or her expense the owner or lessee of the area to be controlled shall post the signs, paint the lines, arrows, and curbings in the required colors, and install the devices and signals to apprise the public of the existence of the court order.
  2. Thereafter, persons who violate these orders shall be punished as provided in the orders. However, no fine shall be less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00).

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2352.

14-16-404. Policing of area.

  1. No county shall be required to patrol the area which is controlled as provided in this subchapter, but, upon being called, law enforcement officers shall come to the scene of the alleged violation and, where warranted by law or ordinance, issue citations or make arrests.
  2. This section is cumulative to other laws on this subject and specifically does not repeal § 16-81-108.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 4; 1977, No. 796, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2353, 19-2353.1.

14-16-405. Tort liability unchanged.

Nothing in this subchapter shall limit or extend the law of this state with reference to tort liability of any person, firm, or corporation.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2354.

Subchapter 5 — Regulation of Use of Firearms and Archery Equipment

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 14-16-50114-16-503 may not apply to § 14-16-504 which was enacted subsequently.

Cross References. Sport shooting range noise pollution, § 16-105-501 et seq.

14-16-501. Regulation upon request of suburban improvement district.

  1. Upon the written request of the governing body of a suburban improvement district, a county may by ordinance regulate the discharge of firearms and the shooting of archery equipment within all or any part of the suburban improvement district.
  2. As used in this section, “suburban improvement district” means a suburban improvement district which includes as one of its purposes for organization the construction or maintenance of roads or streets and which is governed by § 14-92-201 et seq. or its predecessor acts.

History. Acts 1991, No. 385, § 1; 1991, No. 681, § 1.

14-16-502. Regulation upon request of property owners' association.

Upon the written request of a property owners' association which has a population at least equal to that prescribed for cities of the first class and which is located outside the boundaries of a municipality, a county may by ordinance regulate the discharge of firearms and the shooting of archery equipment within all or any part of the area included in the property owners' association.

History. Acts 1991, No. 385, § 2.

14-16-503. Exemptions.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prohibit:

  1. The discharge of a firearm or archery equipment in the defense of life or property;
  2. The discharge of a firearm or archery equipment at a public or private shooting range or gallery; or
  3. The discharge of a firearm by a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duty.

History. Acts 1991, No. 385, § 3.

14-16-504. Regulation by local unit of government.

  1. As used in this section, “local unit of government” means a city, town, or county.
      1. A local unit of government shall not enact any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner, the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, or possession of firearms, ammunition for firearms, or components of firearms, except as otherwise provided in state or federal law.
      2. The provision in subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section does not prevent the enactment of an ordinance regulating or forbidding the unsafe discharge of a firearm.
      1. A local unit of government shall not have the authority to bring suit and shall not have the right to recover against any firearm or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public.
      2. The authority to bring any suit and the right to recover against any firearm or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief shall be reserved exclusively to the State of Arkansas.
      3. However, subdivisions (b)(1)(A) and (B) of this section do not prevent a local unit of government from bringing suit against a firearm or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by the local unit of government.
    1. The governing body of a local unit of government, following the proclamation by the Governor of a state of emergency, is prohibited from enacting an emergency ordinance regulating the transfer, transportation, or carrying of firearms or components of firearms.
    2. A person who has his or her firearm seized in violation of subdivision (c)(1) of this section may bring an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction for the return of the seized firearm.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1100, §§ 1-3; 1999, No. 951, § 1; 2011, No. 165, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 14-16-50114-16-503 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1100, §§ 1-3, are also codified as § 14-54-1411.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “The provision in subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section does” for “This shall” in (b)(1)(B); substituted “However, subdivisions (b)(1)(A) and (B) of this section do” for “Provided, this shall” in (b)(2)(C); in (c)(1), deleted “Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section” at the beginning and substituted “is prohibited from enacting” for “may enact”; and rewrote (c)(2).

Subchapter 6 — Rent Control Preemption

14-16-601. Rent control preemption.

  1. As used in this section, “local governmental unit” means a political subdivision of this state, including, but not limited to, a county, city, village, or township, if the political subdivision provides local government services for residents in a geographically limited area of this state as its primary purpose and has the power to act primarily on behalf of that area.
  2. A local governmental unit shall not enact, maintain, or enforce an ordinance or resolution that would have the effect of controlling the amount of rent charged for leasing private residential or commercial property.
  3. This section does not impair the right of any local governmental unit to manage and control residential property in which the local governmental unit has a property interest.

History. Acts 1993, No. 545, §§ 1-3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 545, §§ 1-3 are also codified as § 14-54-1409.

Subchapter 7 — Regulation of Dogs and Cats

14-16-701. Regulation by suburban improvement district.

  1. Upon the written request of the governing body of a suburban improvement district, a county may by ordinance control and regulate dogs and cats within all or any part of the suburban improvement district.
  2. As used in this section, “suburban improvement district” means a suburban improvement district which includes as one of its purposes for organization the construction or maintenance of roads or streets and which is governed by § 14-92-201 et seq. or its predecessor acts.

History. Acts 1993, No. 622, § 1.

Subchapter 8 — Preservation of Local Public Roads Act

Effective Dates. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 2: Apr. 3, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that while oil or gas exploration has stimulated Arkansas's economy, the hauling operations for the disposal of materials and production fluids from oil or gas operations require the hauling of heavy loads that cause damage to roads; that the costs of repairing, resurfacing, and maintaining roads has increased dramatically in the last two (2) years, while many counties are facing declining revenue collections; and that this act is immediately necessary to provide a uniform procedure for counties that do not have road maintenance agreements with disposal haulers and disposal operators to use to ensure that adequate revenue is available to make repairs necessary to local public roads. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-16-801. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Preservation of Local Public Roads Act”.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-802. Purpose.

The purpose of this subchapter is to provide a procedure for addressing the anticipated damage to county roads caused by disposal hauling operations related to oil or gas exploration and to provide compensation for the anticipated damage to the roads from disposal haulers.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-803. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Designated local road truck route” means a local public road established by the county judge as the route to be used by disposal haulers to transport materials and production fluids related to oil or gas exploration to and from a disposal facility;
  2. “Disposal facility” means a surface or injection well disposal facility designated for the disposal of materials and production fluids related to oil or gas exploration that is located on or off a local public road in the state;
  3. “Disposal hauler” means the driver, owner, or operator of a motor vehicle that is engaged in hauling materials or production fluids related to oil or gas exploration to a disposal facility;
  4. “Disposal operator” means the owner, manager, or operator of a disposal facility;
    1. “Local public road” means any public road that lies between the disposal facility and a road, street, or highway that is part of the state highway system.
    2. “Local public road” does not include a road, street, or highway that is part of the state highway system; and
  5. “Road maintenance agreement” means an agreement between the county and a disposal operator regarding compensation for damages caused by disposal haulers to any designated local road truck route.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-804. Evaluation by county judge.

  1. Notwithstanding any other procedure or authority available under law, if a county does not have a road maintenance agreement, the county judge may use the procedures under this section to evaluate the use and anticipated damage caused to local public roads in the county by disposal haulers.
  2. As part of the evaluation process, the county judge may:
    1. Receive and consider input from disposal operators on the designated local road truck route;
    2. Estimate the number of loads and damages to be sustained upon the designated local road truck route by disposal haulers;
    3. Estimate the total dedicated road revenues available to the county on an average per-mile basis for all of the local public roads in his or her respective county; and
    4. Estimate the additional revenue that may be necessary to repair and maintain the designated local road truck route because of anticipated damages.
  3. A county judge who has performed an evaluation under this section may file a report of the evaluation determinations with the quorum court.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-805. Recommendation for assessment ordinance.

  1. A county judge who has performed an evaluation under § 14-16-804 may submit to the quorum court a recommendation that an assessment be made by the county in the form of a proposed assessment ordinance as provided under this section.
    1. The proposed assessment ordinance shall include the amount that the county judge recommends to be assessed on a per-load basis for each load that is transported by a disposal hauler to a disposal facility.
    2. The maximum amount of the assessment in the proposed assessment ordinance is five dollars ($5.00) per load of materials or production fluids from oil or gas exploration.
  2. The proposed assessment ordinance shall include a penalty as provided under § 14-16-808.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-806. Assessment ordinance — Collection.

  1. If a quorum court enacts the proposed assessment ordinance recommended by the county judge under § 14-16-805, the assessment ordinance:
    1. Is limited to a maximum amount of five dollars ($5.00) per load of materials or production fluids from oil or gas exploration; and
    2. Shall include a penalty as provided under § 14-16-808.
    1. If a quorum court enacts an assessment ordinance under this subchapter, the assessment shall be collected by the disposal operator and remitted to the county treasurer on a monthly basis as provided in the ordinance.
    2. All revenue generated by this assessment shall be used exclusively to maintain and repair the designated local road truck route.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-807. Oversight.

  1. If a county judge makes recommendations under this subchapter, the county judge shall annually review his or her evaluation and recommendations as provided under this subchapter.
  2. If there is a significant change in conditions, the county judge shall file a revised evaluation and revised recommendations for consideration by the quorum court using the same procedures under which the original evaluation and recommendations were made under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

14-16-808. Penalties.

The quorum court may provide penalties for the violation of an ordinance enacted under this subchapter to include a fine to be levied:

  1. For the failure of a disposal hauler to follow the designated local road truck route; and
  2. Against a disposal operator who fails to comply with § 14-16-806(b).

History. Acts 2009, No. 810, § 1.

Chapter 17 County Planning

Research References

ALR.

Zoning regulations prohibiting or limiting fences, hedges, or walls. 1 A.L.R.4th 373.

Validity of “war zone” ordinances restricting location of sex-oriented businesses. 1 A.L.R.4th 1297.

Enforcement of zoning regulation as affected by other violations. 4 A.L.R.4th 462.

Validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding protest by neighboring property owners. 7 A.L.R.4th 732.

Standing of civic or property owners' association to challenge zoning board decision (as aggrieved party). 8 A.L.R.4th 1087.

Construction of new building or structure on premises devoted to nonconforming use as zoning violation. 10 A.L.R.4th 1122.

Ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone. 12 A.L.R.4th 238.

Standing of zoning board of appeals or similar body to appeal reversal of its decision. 13 A.L.R.4th 1130.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance protecting historical landmarks. 18 A.L.R.4th 990.

Local use zoning of wetlands or flood plain as taking without compensation. 19 A.L.R.4th 756.

Applicability and application of zoning regulations to single residences employed for group living of mentally retarded persons. 32 A.L.R.4th 1018.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp. & Coun., § 161.7.

83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning, §§ 7 et seq., 13, 17 et seq., 128 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the “Takings Trilogy,” 44 Ark. L. Rev. 65.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Property — Zoning — The Courts Further Define Their Limited Role. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981). 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved]

Subchapter 2 — County Planning Boards

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 516, § 4: Mar. 16, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the conflict contained in Section 1.0 of Act 422 of 1977 and in Section 103 of Chapter 6 of Act 742 of 1977 regarding the number of members of county planning boards has created considerable confusion and has been detrimental to the effective and efficient operation of planning boards in the respective counties; that this Act is designed to correct this conflict and to specifically provide that county planning boards shall consist of not less than five (5) nor more than twelve (12) members; and that this Act should be given effect immediately in order to enable the county planning board in the respective counties to carry out their functions and duties as prescribed by law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 532, § 2: Mar. 17, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the filing of instruments transferring title to property is fundamental to protecting a person's title to such property, and that it is in the public interest that the county recorder accept such instruments as are presented for record, and that in order to assure said rights, it is immediately necessary to amend Act 422 of 1977 to clarify the provisions of the County Planning Law, and to prohibit the County Planning Board from adopting any regulation that might restrict a person's right to file deeds or other instruments of property transfer with the county recorder for record. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 691, § 2: Mar. 23, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the filing of plats is fundamental to protecting a person's title to property, and that it is in the public interest that the County Recorder cooperate with the Planning Board in counties with populations of 300,000 or greater in acceptance of such plats as are presented for record, and that in order to assure said rights and cooperation, it is immediately necessary to amend Act 422 of 1977, to clarify the provisions of the County Planning Law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Olson, Agricultural Zoning: A Remedy for Land Use Conflicts Between Poultry Production and Residential Development In Northwest Arkansas, 1997 Ark. L. Notes 119.

14-17-201. Construction.

This subchapter shall be construed liberally. The enumeration of any object, purpose, power, manner, method, or thing shall not be deemed to exclude like or similar objects, purposes, powers, manners, methods, or things.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 10.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1116.

14-17-202. Applicability.

  1. Nothing in this subchapter shall invalidate any plans, ordinances, or regulations duly adopted in accordance with the statutes in effect at the time of adoption.
  2. No alteration or amendments shall be made to existing plans, ordinances, and regulations unless in conformity with the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 8.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1114.

14-17-203. Creation and organization.

  1. With the approval of the majority of the members of the county quorum court, the county judge of any county may create a county planning board. The board shall consist of not less than five (5) members nor more than twelve (12) members appointed by the judge and confirmed by the court. At least one-third (1/3) of the members shall not hold any other elective office or appointment, except membership on a municipal or joint planning commission or a zoning board of adjustment.
  2. The term of each member shall be four (4) years. In the initial appointments to the board, a majority, but not exceeding three-fifths (3/5) of the total membership of the board, shall be appointed for two (2) years and the remaining members for four (4) years. A vacancy in the membership due to death, resignation, removal, or other cause shall be filled by an appointee of the judge, confirmed by the court, for the unexpired term. Any member of the board shall be subject to removal for cause upon recommendation of the judge and confirmation by the court.
  3. The board shall designate one (1) of its members as chair and select a vice chair and such other officers as it may require.
  4. A regular meeting date shall be established providing for at least one (1) regular meeting to be held in each quarter of each calendar year.
  5. The board shall adopt rules and regulations for the discharge of its duties and the transaction of business and shall keep a public record of all business, resolutions, transactions, findings, and determinations.
  6. County quorum courts may elect to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the board. Such a determination shall be implemented by ordinance. A court which elects to exercise this option shall not be bound by the provisions of this section and § 14-17-204, but may establish by ordinance such administrative changes as may be appropriate.
      1. A county quorum court may elect to act as a board of administrative appeal prior to an appeal to circuit court from a decision of the county planning board.
      2. The county judge shall be the chair of the board of administrative appeal but shall vote only in the event of a tie.
      3. The county quorum court shall determine the number of quorum court members who shall sit on the board of administrative appeal.
    1. Any appeal concerning roads shall be appealed directly to circuit court.

History. Acts 1981, No. 516, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1107; Acts 2007, No. 565, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 516, § 1, provided that it is found and determined by the General Assembly that Acts 1977, No. 422, § 1.0, provides that the county planning board in each county shall consist of not less than five (5) nor more than twelve (12) members; that Acts 1977, No. 742 provides that county administrative boards shall consist of five (5) members; that as a result of the conflict in the two acts regarding the number of members on county planning boards, there is considerable confusion and disagreement regarding the membership of county planning boards; that this conflict and confusion should be corrected in order to enable county planning boards to carry out their responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner; therefore, it is the purpose and intent of this act to reenact Acts 1977, No. 422, § 1.0, to clarify this conflict and to remove the confusion regarding county planning boards by specifically providing that county planning boards shall consist of not less than five (5) nor more than twelve (12) members.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The General Assembly has the authority to create county planning boards and to provide rules and regulations for their government. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Due Process.

Planning board member did not abuse the member's discretion as a board member, after a recusal due to a conflict of interest, by voicing the member's opposition as a member of the public at meetings and a review regarding an application for a large-scale development permit because the applicants for the permit, thereby. were not denied due process. Lewis v. Benton County, 2014 Ark. App. 316, 436 S.W.3d 181 (2014).

14-17-204. Employees and facilities.

  1. The county judge may appoint such employees as he or she may deem necessary for the county planning board's work, whose appointment, promotion, demotion, or removal shall be subject to the same provisions of the law as govern other employees of the county. In the manner provided by law, the county may contract for services necessary to carry out the functions of the board.
  2. The county may receive and spend funds from federal, state, county, municipal, and other public and private sources for planning activities and may contract with respect thereto. All board expenditures shall be within the amounts appropriated by the county quorum court.
  3. Members of the board established pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter shall be entitled to receive such compensation, if any, for attendance at board meetings and the carrying out of board-related activities as may be authorized by ordinance duly adopted by the court.
  4. The board shall be supplied with necessary office space in the county courthouse or other suitable quarters and shall be provided with the necessary equipment to carry out its activities.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 2.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1108.

14-17-205. Powers, duties, and functions.

  1. The general purpose of the county planning board is to promote public interest in planning, to prepare or have prepared plans for the county, to receive and make recommendations on public and private proposals for development, to prepare and transmit to the county quorum court recommended ordinances implementing plans, and to advise and counsel the county judge, the court, and other public bodies on planning-related matters.
  2. The board may prepare and recommend an official plan for the development of the county. The board shall have the authority to confer with federal, state, municipal, and other county and regional authorities regarding matters pertaining to or affecting the planning or development of the county, or vice versa, for the purpose of assuring proper coordination of county development with that of other political subdivisions.
  3. All public officials, departments, and agencies of the county, upon request and within a reasonable time, shall furnish the board with such available information as it may require for its work. The board may prepare and keep up-to-date a long-term coordinated program of public works and budgets therefor in conformity with an official county plan.
  4. The board, its members, officers, and employees, in the performance of their functions, may enter upon any land to make necessary inspections.
  5. For the purpose of special surveys, the county judge may assign or detail members of the staff or personnel of any county administrative department, bureau, or agency to the board or may direct any such department, bureau, or agency to make special surveys or studies for the board.
  6. The board shall have such powers, duties, and functions in the areas of plan adoption and enforcement, subdivision, and zoning as specified in §§ 14-17-207 — 14-17-209 and such other duties as may be assigned by the court.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 3.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1109.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Where there was a conflict over the exercise of jurisdiction over roads in an unincorporated portion of a county, between the county court and any creature of the General Assembly, the latter had to give way. Butler v. City of Little Rock, 231 Ark. 834, 332 S.W.2d 812 (1960) (decision under prior law).

Zoning.

While the county planning commission could recommend zoning of unincorporated areas as to land use, such recommendations were not binding until adopted by the county court, after a public hearing; and where this necessary action was not disclosed in the record, landowners who sought to enforce provisions of bill of assurance covering nearby subdivision did not have standing under precedents permitting owners of nearby property to challenge changes in zoning, even though they owned no property in the rezoned area. Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973) (decision under prior law).

14-17-206. Purpose and content of county plan.

  1. The county plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, efficient, and economic development of the county, or part thereof. In accordance with one (1) or more of the following criteria, the plan shall seek to best promote the health, safety, convenience, prosperity, and welfare of the people of the county.
  2. Each county plan shall reflect the county's development policies and shall contain a statement of the objectives and principles sought to be embodied therein. Each plan, with the accompanying maps, charts, and descriptive matter, may make recommendations, among other things, as to:
    1. The conservation of natural resources;
    2. The protection of areas of environmental concern;
    3. The development of land subject to flooding;
    4. The provision of adequate recreation, education, and community facilities, including water, sewer, solid waste, and drainage improvements;
    5. The development of transportation facilities, housing development, and redevelopment;
    6. The consideration of school district boundaries; and
    7. Other matters which are logically related to or form an integral part of a long-term plan for orderly development and redevelopment of the county.
    1. Areas of critical environmental concern include, among other things, aquifers and aquifer recharge areas, soils poorly suited to development, floodplains, wetlands, prime agricultural and forestlands, the natural habitat of rare or endangered species, areas with unique ecosystems, or areas recommended for protection in the Arkansas natural areas plan. Plans for these areas shall give consideration to protective mechanisms which seek to regulate activities or development in the areas.
    2. These mechanisms may include establishment of special zoning districts, adoption and enforcement of building codes, acquisition of easements or land through capital expenditures programming, and specialized development policies. Where appropriate, county management activities for areas of critical environmental concern shall involve cooperative agreements with interested state and federal agencies.
  3. In the preparation of all plans for the county or part of a county, the county planning board shall:
    1. Provide that plans are consistent with state plans and other related regional, county, and municipal plans, and school district boundaries in order to avoid inconvenience and economic waste and to assure a coordinated and harmonious development of the county, region, and state; and
    2. Notify by first-class mail the boards of directors of all school districts affected by a plan sufficiently in advance to allow representatives of all affected school districts to submit comments on any proposed plan.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 4.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1110; Acts 2005, No. 2144, § 1.

14-17-207. Adoption, amendment, and enforcement of official plans and implementing ordinances.

  1. The county planning board, by majority vote of its entire membership, may recommend to the county quorum court the adoption, revision, or rescission of an official plan for the county or zoning, subdivision, setback, or entry control ordinances referred to as implementing ordinances in this subchapter.
    1. Before the adoption or revision of an official plan or implementing ordinance, or parts thereof, the board shall hold at least one (1) public meeting on the adoption or revision. The meeting may be adjourned from time to time. Prior to the meeting, the board chair shall notify the court of the purpose and intent of the meeting in sufficient time to allow the justices to attend the meeting if they so desire. At the same time, the public shall be notified of the meeting through the local newspapers and other media.
    2. In addition, the board of directors of each school district affected by a proposed official plan or implementing ordinance shall be notified of the meeting by first class mail sufficiently in advance to allow representatives of each affected school district a reasonable opportunity to attend the public meeting and submit comments on any proposed official plan or implementing ordinance.
  2. Following the public meeting and endorsement of the plan or implementing ordinances by the board, as provided in this section, it shall be forwarded to the quorum court for its consideration. The court may adopt the plan as the official plan for the county by ordinance, may modify the plan or parts of the plan, or may return the plan or parts of the plan to the board for further consideration. In the event the court modifies the plan or parts of the plan, it shall return the plan, as modified, to the board with instructions to conduct a public hearing on the modifications as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Following the hearing, the court may adopt, modify, or reject the plan as modified, whether or not the board endorses the modified plan. The same procedures shall be followed for any implementing ordinances enacted by the county. Planning and zoning recommendations initiated by the court shall be sent to the board for the public meeting as required by this subsection.
  3. From and after the adoption by the court of the official county plan, no improvements shall be made or authorized and no property shall be acquired, or its acquisition authorized, by any county or public agency which has, or is likely to have, definite part in or relation to the official county plan unless the proposed location, character, and extent thereof shall have been submitted by the agency concerned to the board and a report and recommendation of the board thereon shall have been received. If the board fails to initiate deliberation on such improvement or acquisition within thirty (30) days after receipt thereof and to furnish in writing its report and recommendations upon a proposal within sixty (60) days thereafter, the agency may proceed without the report and recommendation.
  4. In case any such improvement, ground, building, structure, or property is given a location or extent which does not accord with the report and recommendations of the board, the county official, department, or any other public agency having charge of the location, authorization, acquisition, or construction of it shall file in the office of the board a statement of its or his or her reasons for the departure from the report and recommendation, and such statement shall be open to public inspection.
  5. The quorum court shall provide for the means of enforcing the official plan or zoning, subdivision, setback, and entry control ordinances, shall provide penalties for violations, and may seek appropriate remedies for violations. Any individual aggrieved by a violation of any such plan or ordinance may request an injunction against any individual or property owner in violation or may mandamus any official to enforce the provisions of the ordinance.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 5.0; 1981, No. 278, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1111; Acts 2005, No. 2144, § 2.

14-17-208. Subdivision, setback, and entry control ordinances.

  1. The county planning board may prepare and, after approval by the county quorum court, shall administer the ordinance controlling the development of land. The development of land includes, but is not limited to, the provision of access to lots and parcels, the provision of utilities, the subdividing of land into lots and blocks, and the parceling of land resulting in the need for access and utilities.
  2. The ordinance controlling the development of land may establish or provide for minimum requirements as to:
    1. Information to be included on the plat filed for record;
    2. The design and layout of the subdivision, including standards for lots and blocks, streets, public rights-of-way, easements, utilities, consideration of school district boundaries, and other similar items; and
    3. The standards for improvements to be installed by the developer at his or her expense, such as street grading and paving, curbs, gutters, and sidewalks, water, storm, and sewer mains, street lighting, and other amenities.
  3. The ordinance shall require that all plats of two (2) or more parcels be submitted to the county planning board for its approval and certification.
  4. The ordinance may require the installation or assurance of installation of required improvements before plat approval. Further, the regulations may provide for the dedication of all rights-of-way to the public.
  5. Neither the county planning board nor the court shall restrict nor limit the right of any person to file a deed or other instrument of transfer of property with the county recorder to be filed of record.
  6. The ordinance shall establish the procedure to be followed to secure plat approval by the county planning board.
  7. The ordinance shall require the development to conform to the official plan currently in effect. The ordinance may require the reservation or reasonable equivalent contribution of cash, other land, or considerations as approved by the county planning board for future public acquisition of land for community or public facilities indicated in the official plan. The reservation may extend over a period of not more than one (1) year from the date of recording the final plat with the county recorder.
  8. Adoption of a county subdivision ordinance shall be preceded by:
    1. The adoption of an official road plan for the unincorporated areas of the county. The plan shall include, as a minimum, designation of the general location, characteristics, and functions of roads, and the general location of roads to be reserved for future public acquisition. The plan may also recommend, among other things, the removal, relocation, widening, narrowing, vacating, abandonment, change of use, or extension of any public ways; and
    2. Notification by first class mail of the board of directors of each school district affected by a proposed county subdivision ordinance sufficiently in advance to allow representatives of all affected school districts a reasonable opportunity to submit comments on any proposed county subdivision ordinance.
  9. In unincorporated areas adjoining the corporate limits of a municipality in which the authority to control the subdivision of land is vested and is being exercised in accordance with and under the provisions of §§ 14-56-401 — 14-56-408 and 14-56-410 — 14-56-425, or any amendments thereto or thereof, or other acts of a similar nature enacted by the General Assembly, the municipal authority shall have subdivision jurisdiction, but shall transmit copies of proposed plats for the areas to the county planning board and the board of directors of each affected school district for review and comment, which shall be made to the municipal authority within sixty (60) days from the time it is received by the county planning board and the board of directors of each affected school district unless further time is allowed by the municipal authority.
  10. When an official road plan has been adopted and filed as provided for in § 14-17-207, the court, upon recommendation of the county planning board, may enact ordinances establishing setback lines on the major streets and highways as are designated by the plan and may prohibit the establishment of any structure or other improvements within the setback lines.
  11. When an official road plan has been adopted and filed as provided for in § 14-17-207, the court, upon recommendation of the county planning board, may enact ordinances providing for the control of entry into any of the roads shown in the official plan.
    1. Following the adoption of any subdivision, setback, or entry control ordinances by the court, the county recorder shall not accept any plat in the unincorporated area of the county not within the exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality for record without the approval of the county planning board.
    2. The county recorder shall not accept any plats in the unincorporated area of the county without the county court's acceptance of:
      1. Roads for perpetual maintenance; and
      2. Any dedication of land for public purposes.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 6.0; 1981, No. 532, § 1; 1981, No. 691, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1112; Acts 2005, No. 862, § 1; 2005, No. 2144, § 3.

Cross References. Municipal planning commission territorial jurisdiction, § 14-56-413.

Case Notes

Descriptions.

In a boundary dispute between adjoining property owners involving an alleged “spite” fence, a metes-and-bounds description of the property was not required where the survey that was part of the record sufficiently identified the parties' respective properties so that each party was capable of knowing where their boundary was. Jenkins v. Fogerty, 2011 Ark. App. 720, 386 S.W.3d 704 (2011).

Plats.

In mandamus proceeding to compel circuit clerk to record plat not approved by county planning board because of refusal to dedicate additional strips for roads, court was held not authorized, without any evidence and without any claim that the board acted arbitrarily, to set aside its judgment. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941) (decision under prior law).

In mandamus proceedings to compel circuit clerk to record plat not approved by county planning board because of refusal to dedicate additional strips for roads, trial court's holding that action of the board was unauthorized because no provision was made for compensation to the landowner was held erroneous. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Approval of bill of assurance and plat of subdivision by county planning commission did nothing more than entitle the owner to place them of record, and such approval did not operate to confer standing upon landowners outside the subdivision to enforce the bill of assurance; and cases holding that owners of nearby property could challenge changes in zoning, even though they owned no property in the rezoned area, had no applicability where it did not appear that there was any zoning of the subdivision in question. Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973) (decision under prior law).

14-17-209. Zoning ordinance — Board of zoning adjustment.

  1. The county planning board shall have authority to prepare, or to cause to be prepared, a zoning ordinance for all or part of the unincorporated area of the county, which ordinance shall include both a map and a text. The zoning ordinance may regulate the location, height, bulk, number of stories, and the size of building; open space; lot coverage; density and distribution of population; and the uses of land, buildings, and structures. It may require off-street parking and loading. It may provide for districts of compatible uses, for large-scale unified development, for the control and elimination of uses not in conformance with provisions of the ordinance, and for such other matters as are necessary to the health, safety, and general welfare of the county. The zoning ordinance shall designate districts or zones of such shape, size, or characteristics as deemed advisable for all, or part, of the unincorporated area of the county. The regulations imposed within each district or zone shall be uniform throughout the district or zone.
  2. The determination of zones shall be consistent with any officially adopted plans for the area to be zoned. In the development of zoning districts and their boundaries, due consideration shall be given to the adopted plans of municipal planning commissions for extraterritorial planning areas.
  3. The zoning ordinance shall be observed through denial of the issuance of building permits and use permits.
  4. It shall be unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, maintain, or use any land, building, or structure in violation of any ordinance of the county quorum court.
  5. The zoning ordinance shall provide for a board of zoning adjustment which shall be formed in either of the following ways:
    1. A minimum of three (3) residents of the county may be appointed to the board of zoning adjustment; or
    2. The planning board as a whole may sit as the board of zoning adjustment.
  6. Whenever a separate board of zoning adjustment is established, appointments, length of term, vacancies, removal, and compensation shall be the same as for the county planning board.
  7. The board of zoning adjustment shall have the following functions:
    1. To hear appeals from administrative decisions with respect to the enforcement and application of the ordinance and affirm or reverse, in whole or part, the administrative decisions; and
    2. To hear requests for variances from the literal provisions of the zoning ordinance in instances where strict enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause undue hardship due to circumstances unique to the individual property under consideration and to grant such variances only when it is demonstrated that such action will be in keeping with the spirit and intent of the provisions of the zoning ordinance. The board of zoning adjustment may impose conditions in the granting of a variance to ensure compliance and to protect adjacent property.
  8. The board of zoning adjustment shall not permit, as a variance, any use in a zone that is not permitted under the ordinance.
    1. Decisions of the board of zoning adjustment in respect to subsections (a)-(h) of this section shall be subject to appeal only to a court of record having jurisdiction.
      1. However, a county quorum court may elect to act as a board of administrative appeal prior to an appeal to a court of record from a decision of the board of zoning adjustment.
      2. The county judge shall be the chair of the board of administrative appeal but shall vote only in the event of a tie.
      3. The county quorum court shall determine the number of quorum court members who shall sit on the board of administrative appeal.
    2. Any appeal concerning roads shall be appealed directly to circuit court.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 7.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1113; Acts 2007, No. 565, § 2.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Johnson v. Sunray Services, Inc.: Possible Solutions to the NIMBY Syndrome, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 657.

Case Notes

Landfill Sites.

The planning board does have authority to prepare a zoning ordinance for the county, but that is not exclusive authority which divests the quorum court of its power to adopt standards for the location of landfill sites. Johnson v. Sunray Servs., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 816 S.W.2d 582 (1991).

14-17-210. Unincorporated areas being developed with federal funds.

The county planning board shall have the exclusive zoning and planning jurisdiction over all unincorporated areas lying within a county and along a navigable stream notwithstanding the fact that such areas may be within five (5) miles of the corporate limits of a city having a planning commission if the unincorporated areas are lands upon which a new community has been or is being developed with funds guaranteed, in whole or in part, by the federal government under Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 or under Title VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970.

History. Acts 1981, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1117.

U.S. Code. Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, referred to in this section, has been largely repealed. A portion of the title is codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1464. Title VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 is codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1464, 42 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.

14-17-211. Appeals.

In addition to any remedy provided by law, appeals from final action taken by administrative, quasi-judicial, and legislative agencies concerned in the administration of this subchapter may be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county where they shall be tried de novo according to the same procedure applicable to appeals in civil actions from decision of inferior courts, including the right of trial by jury.

History. Acts 1977, No. 422, § 9.0; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1115.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Circuit court did not err in denying landowners a de novo, jury trial review of a quorum court's decision that changed the land use authorized by a local zoning ordinance when it granted an LLC a conditional use permit to operate a rock quarry. The quorum court's actions were legislative in nature; thus this section did not apply. Bolen v. Wash. County Zoning Bd. of Adjustments, 2011 Ark. App. 319, 384 S.W.3d 33 (2011).

Cited: Benton County v. Overland Dev. Co., 371 Ark. 559, 268 S.W.3d 885 (2007).

14-17-212. County regulation of residential building design elements prohibited — Findings — Exceptions — Definition.

  1. The General Assembly finds that:
    1. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and other provisions of federal law establish the principles and standards in this section;
    2. It is difficult and expensive for citizens to readily access fundamental property rights protection in federal court; and
    3. This section is necessary to ensure property rights protection is accessible and to ensure state law is consistent with federal law.
  2. A county shall not regulate residential building design elements.
    1. As used in this section, “residential building design elements” means:
      1. Exterior building color;
      2. Type or style of exterior cladding material;
      3. Style or materials of roof structures, roof pitches, or porches;
      4. Exterior nonstructural architectural ornamentation;
      5. Location, design, placement, or architectural styling of windows and doors, including garage doors and garage structures;
      6. The number and types of rooms;
      7. The interior layout of rooms; and
      8. The minimum square footage of a structure.
    2. As used in this section, “residential building design elements” does not include:
      1. The height, bulk, orientation, or location of a structure on a lot; or
      2. Buffering or screening used to:
        1. Minimize visual impacts;
        2. Mitigate the impacts of light and noise; or
        3. Protect the privacy of neighbors.
  3. This section does not apply to:
    1. A structure located in an area designated as a local historic district under applicable state law;
    2. A structure located in an area designated as a historic district on the National Register of Historic Places;
    3. A structure designated as a local, state, or national historic landmark;
    4. A regulation created by a valid private covenant or other contractual agreement among property owners relating to residential building design elements, including without limitation a cooperative contractual agreement between a property owner and a county;
    5. A regulation directly and substantially related to the requirements of applicable state or federal building or safety codes;
    6. A regulation applied to manufactured housing in a manner consistent with applicable law;
    7. A regulation adopted as a condition for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program;
    8. A central business improvement district under the Central Business Improvement District Act, § 14-184-101 et seq.;
    9. A multifamily residential structure or other nonsingle-family dwelling;
    10. The application of a county policy, regulation, or ordinance affecting residential building design elements on an existing property on or before February 28, 2019, but not as to any other property thereafter;
    11. A county policy, regulation, or ordinance derived from the county's police power and directly related to an established immediate public health or safety hazard;
    12. A valid exercise of express statutory authority to regulate residential building design elements under § 14-95-101 et seq., concerning urban service districts; or
    13. A policy or regulation of an overlay district, if before the policy or regulation is implemented:
      1. Notice is provided to property owners of an overlay district under § 14-56-422;
      2. A petition to support the policy or regulation is attached with signatures of a majority of property owners in the proposed overlay district; and
      3. The overlay district makes a determination that the policy or regulation complies with the Private Property Protection Act, § 18-15-1701 et seq.

History. Acts 2019, No. 446, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Metropolitan or Regional Planning Commissions

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1955, No. 26 is also codified as § 14-56-501 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 8: Feb. 1, 1955. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined by the General Assembly that many cities and counties are faced with many problems which have arisen due to increased population, expansion of urban areas, and many other problems which have resulted from improper planning and which have resulted in the endangering of the health, safety and welfare of the people of such areas and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to alleviate such conditions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

14-17-301. Provisions supplemental.

  1. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to remove or limit the powers of the cooperating cities and counties as provided by state law.
  2. All legislative power with respect to zoning and other planning legislation shall remain with the governing body of the cooperating cities and counties.
  3. Each participating city or county may continue to have its own planning commission or board, but under the joint agreement and in the interest of economy and efficiency and in the interest of uniform standards and procedures, may request the metropolitan or regional planning commission to assume duties and functions of local planning agencies, in whole or in part.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2824.

14-17-302. Authority generally.

Any two (2) or more cities of the first class, cities of the second class, incorporated towns, or counties, or other civil subdivisions having adjoining planning jurisdictions, or any counties and cities adjacent to or within the county may jointly cooperate in the exercise and performance of planning powers, duties, and functions as provided by state law for cities and counties.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2820.

Case Notes

Annexation.

Since Acts 1957, No. 26, concerning the establishment, powers, and duties of a joint planning commission in no way deals with annexation, the annexation of an area to a city will not be denied because the annexation has not been approved by a planning commission. City of Sherwood v. Hardin, 230 Ark. 762, 325 S.W.2d 75 (1959).

14-17-303. Contents of joint agreement.

  1. The cooperating cities and counties which join to create a metropolitan or regional planning commission shall determine through joint agreement the number and qualifications of the members of the commission.
  2. The joint agreement shall also provide for the manner of cooperation and the means and methods of the operation and functioning of the commission, including the employment of a director of planning and such staff and consultants as it may require, the proportionate share of costs and expenses, and the purchase of property and materials for the use of the commission.
  3. The joint agreement may also allow for the addition of other public bodies to the cooperative arrangement.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 3; 1967, No. 29, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2822.

14-17-304. Establishment of commission.

  1. When two (2) or more cities and counties shall adopt joint planning cooperation by ordinance, resolution, rule, or order, there shall be established a joint planning commission for the metropolitan area or region comprising the area coterminous with the areas of planning jurisdiction of the cities or counties cooperating jointly.
  2. A joint planning agency for the metropolitan area or region may be empowered to carry into effect such provisions of state law relating to planning which are authorized for the joining cities or counties and which each may separately exercise and perform under existing laws.
  3. Any other public authority or agency which operates within, wholly or in part, the area covered by this joint planning cooperation may likewise join with the cooperating cities or counties in cooperative planning through resolution of its governing board or commission.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2820.

14-17-305. Purpose of commission.

The general purpose of a metropolitan or regional planning commission shall be to make those studies and plans for the development of the metropolitan area or region that will:

  1. Guide the unified development of the area;
  2. Eliminate planning duplication;
  3. Promote economy and efficiency in the coordinated development of the area; and
  4. Promote the general welfare and prosperity of its people.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2821.

14-17-306. Duty of commission.

The metropolitan or regional planning commission shall have the duty and function of promoting public interest and understanding of the economic and social necessity for long-term coordinated planning for the metropolitan or regional area, but its official recommendations shall be made to the governing bodies or the county judges of the cooperating cities or counties.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2824.

14-17-307. Plans and recommendations.

    1. The metropolitan or regional commission shall make plans for development for the area. These plans may include, but shall not be limited to, recommendations for principal highways, bridges, airports, parks and recreational areas, schools and public institutions, and public utilities.
    2. Any metropolitan or regional plan so developed shall be based on studies of physical, social, economic, and governmental conditions and trends.
  1. The plans and its recommendations may be adopted in whole or in part by the governing bodies of the cooperating cities and counties as the general plans of such cities and counties.
  2. The commission may also assist:
    1. The cities and counties within its area of jurisdiction in carrying out any regional plans developed by the commission; and
    2. Any planning commission, board, or agency of the cooperating cities or counties in the preparation or effectuation of local plans and planning consistent with the program of the commission.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2821.

14-17-308. Receipt of funds.

A metropolitan or regional planning commission established under the provisions of this subchapter is authorized to receive, for its own uses and purposes, any funds or moneys from any participating city or county, from the state or federal government, and from any other source any other funds, including bequests, gifts, donations, or contributions.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2823.

14-17-309. Appropriations.

The participating cities and counties, or other public bodies, are authorized to appropriate funds for the expenses and costs required by the metropolitan or regional planning commission in the performance of its purposes and functions.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2823.

Subchapter 4 — Commercial Medical Waste Incinerators

Cross References. Municipal planning — Commercial medical waste incinerators, § 14-56-601 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 7: Feb. 24, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the powers of local governments in Arkansas to regulate the construction or operation of commercial medical waste incinerators are vague or incomplete; that the unregulated incineration of commercial medical waste poses a threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Arkansas cities and counties; and therefore commercial medical waste incinerators should be made subject to the regulation by and control of local governments in Arkansas. Therefore, in order to clearly establish the authority of local governments to limit and regulate commercial medical waste incinerators, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-17-401. Definition.

“Commercial medical waste” means any medical waste transported from a generator to an off-site facility for disposal where such off-site disposal facility is engaged in medical waste disposal for profit.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 3 is also codified as § 14-56-601.

14-17-402. Authorization to establish zones.

Notwithstanding any and all laws regarding county planning and zoning, all counties in Arkansas are authorized to establish, by ordinance, zones to limit or to regulate the construction or operation, or both, of commercial medical waste incinerators within their boundaries.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 2.

14-17-403. Enforcement.

The commercial medical waste incinerator zoning ordinance shall be enforced through the issuance or denial of building and use permits in accordance with the conditions and terms of the limitations and regulations established by the ordinance.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 2.

14-17-404. Unlawful construction or operation.

When the county quorum court shall have laid off zones, by ordinance, to limit or to regulate the construction or operation, or both, of commercial medical waste incinerators, it shall be unlawful for anyone to construct or to operate a commercial medical waste incinerator within a given zone except in accordance with any building and use permits issued for the incinerator.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 2.

14-17-405. Violation — Penalty — Injunction.

    1. Violation of any provision of an ordinance adopted as authorized by this subchapter shall be considered a misdemeanor.
    2. Each day's violation shall be considered a separate offense.
  1. The county adopting the ordinance or any individual aggrieved by a violation of the ordinance may request an injunction against any commercial medical waste incinerator or property owner who is in violation of the ordinance.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 2.

Chapter 18 Platted Lands Outside Municipalities

Cross References. Additions to cities and incorporated towns — Filing and recording requirements, § 14-41-201 et seq.

Additions to cities and incorporated towns — Reduction to acreage, § 14-41-301 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1943, No. 259 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, in the boom period prior to the depression, much acreage land not in any town or city, but adjacent to towns or cities, was platted into lots and blocks. In many instances, none of the lots were sold, or the lots that were sold came back to the original owners; and

“Whereas, under various proceedings the lands were thrown back into acreage and in some cases questions have arisen as to whether or not the reducing of the platted lots to acreage was entirely valid, and thus the conveying of the land is complicated….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1945, No. 56, § 5: approved Feb. 16, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “The public health, convenience and necessity requiring, this act shall become effective from and after its passage.”

Acts 1945, No. 164, § 8: approved Mar. 2, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby determined by the General Assembly that in some counties of the state, lands outside of cities and towns have been platted into additions and the plats filed of record in the county; that in many cases the streets and alleys, or parts thereof, dedicated by the plat have never been opened or used and are of no use to the public or the property owners in the addition as streets and alleys; that some tracts of land containing such streets and alleys are suitable sites for industries but can not be used, or sold to be used, for that purpose because the title is clouded by the dedication of said streets and alleys and uncertainty now exists as to the power to vacate such streets and alleys; that some industries are now considering coming into the state and purchasing such tracts if they can secure clear titles; that they might go to other states if there is delay in the taking effect of this act, which would deprive the counties of additional tax revenues badly needed by them for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; that for said reasons it is hereby declared necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety that this act shall become effective without delay. An emergency, therefore, exists and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1965, No. 129, § 3: Mar. 1, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law relative to vacating platted streets and alleys outside municipal corporations is in a state of confusion, especially with respect to the period of nonuse which must be shown in order to vacate the same; that it is in the best interests of the citizens of this State that said law be clarified immediately, and that this Act will provide such clarification. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

14-18-101. Subdivision of lands — Filing.

  1. The owners of land lying beyond the confines of municipal corporations, which have not theretofore been subdivided as additions or subdivisions of any city or town, may have their lands surveyed and divided into numbered plots by a competent surveyor, who shall make a plat thereof.
  2. The plat, when duly certified by the surveyor, shall be filed for record with the recorder of deeds, and a copy of the plat shall be filed with the county assessor of the county in which the lands are situated.

History. Acts 1945, No. 56, § 1; 1963, No. 495, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1201.

Case Notes

Evidence.

Private unauthenticated and unrecorded plat was inadmissible in condemnation proceedings where subdivision which it purported to show was not in existence, stakes were no longer in place, roads shown had not been dedicated and apparently had not been built, and there was no evidence that lots had been offered for sale. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Lawrence, 239 Ark. 365, 389 S.W.2d 431 (1965).

Cited: Butler v. City of Little Rock, 231 Ark. 834, 332 S.W.2d 812 (1960); Martin v. Shew, 96 Ark. App. 32, 237 S.W.3d 497 (2006).

14-18-102. Descriptions deemed legal.

The descriptions of the lands platted and recorded as set out in this chapter may be employed by any and all improvement districts for the purpose of assessing benefits for local improvements. These descriptions shall be legal descriptions in all deeds, mortgages, and other instruments relating to lands, or whereby the title to lands may be affected.

History. Acts 1945, No. 56, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1203.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of additions and subdivisions of lands pursuant to Acts 1945, No. 56 and Acts 1945, No. 164, see Acts 1959, No. 289, §§ 3, 4.

Case Notes

Deficiencies in Descriptions.

Where a description of property was deficient in stating that it was in Township 18 North, whereas it was in Township 19 North, but the description also contained a correct reference to the recorded plat, the mortgage description was valid as against a federal tax lien. Caraway Bank v. United States, 258 Ark. 858, 529 S.W.2d 351 (1975).

Trial court properly found that, as the 2002 conveyance from developer to trustees did not convey the property encompassing Tract 5 by reference to the July 2001 survey, the division was never effective; the 2002 conveyance only referred to a metes-and-bounds description of Tract 5 (and one-half of Tract 4) from the 1999 survey. Martin v. Shew, 96 Ark. App. 32, 237 S.W.3d 497 (2006).

14-18-103. Expense of survey — Recording.

  1. The expense of surveys shall be borne by the owners of the lands affected, and the recorder shall collect the same fees for recording plats of the lands as are collected by recorders for recording plats of lands platted as subdivisions of a municipal corporation.
  2. Each plat, as filed, shall be recorded, and the recorder for identification shall number each plat consecutively upon the record.

History. Acts 1945, No. 56, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1204.

Cross References. Recorder's fees, § 21-6-306.

14-18-104. Taxation of platted lands.

After the recordation of a plat, the lands described therein and thereon shall be assessed in accordance with the descriptions on the plat, and taxes shall be levied and collected thereon in such manner as taxes are levied and collected on real estate in cities and towns. However, nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the levying and collecting of a city tax on property outside the city limits.

History. Acts 1945, No. 56, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1202.

14-18-105. Authority to vacate street, alley, or roadway.

In all cases where the owner of lands situated in a county and outside of a city of the first or second class or incorporated town has dedicated a portion of the lands as streets, alleys, or roadways by platting the lands into additions or subdivisions and causing the plat to be filed for record in the county and any street, alley, or roadway, or portion thereof shown on the plat so filed shall not have been opened or actually used as a street, alley, or roadway for a period of five (5) years, or where any strip over the platted lands, although not dedicated as a street, has been used as a roadway, the county court shall have power and authority to vacate and abandon the street, alley, or roadway, or a portion thereof, by proceeding under the conditions and the manner provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1945, No. 164, § 1; 1965, No. 129, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1205.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of the vacation of streets and alleys pursuant to Acts 1945, No. 164, see Acts 1959, No. 289, §§ 1, 4.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Sections 14-18-105 to 14-18-109 did not apply to an action pertaining to the vacation of a county road; the sections only apply to the vacation of streets in platted lands outside municipalities. Perry v. Lee County, 71 Ark. App. 47, 25 S.W.3d 443 (2000).

Cited: Andreasen v. South Mt. Estates Prop. Owners Ass'n, 2018 Ark. App. 530, 564 S.W.3d 262 (2018).

14-18-106. Petition to vacate street, etc.

    1. The owners of all lots and blocks abutting upon any street, alley, or roadway, or portion thereof, desired to be vacated shall file a petition in the county court requesting the court to vacate it.
    2. The petition shall clearly designate or describe the street, alley, or roadway, or portion thereof, to be vacated, give the name of the addition in which they are located and the date the plat was filed, and attach as an exhibit a certified copy of the plat.
    1. Upon the filing of the petition, the county clerk shall promptly give notice, by publication once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in the county and having a general circulation therein, that the petition has been filed and that on a certain day therein named the county court will hear all persons desiring to be heard on the question of whether the street, alley, or roadway, or portion thereof, shall be vacated.
    2. The notice shall give the names of property owners signing the petition, clearly describe the street, alley, or roadway, or portion thereof, to be vacated, and give the name of the addition in which they are located.

History. Acts 1945, No. 164, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1206.

Case Notes

Consent.

Appellees' petition to vacate a section of a road in their subdivision was properly granted because, under the terms of subdivision (b)(2) of this section, appellant, who owned property outside and adjacent to the subdivision, did not need to sign the petition or consent to it; at most, appellant was entitled to an opportunity to be heard under § 14-18-107(a) as a member of the public or any other party otherwise affected by the vacation, and appellant was afforded that right. Weisenbach v. Dewayne, 104 Ark. App. 245, 290 S.W.3d 614 (2009).

14-18-107. Determination on vacation of street, etc.

  1. At the time named in the notice, the parties signing the petition and any other parties owning lots or blocks in the platted lands not abutting on the streets, alleys, or roadways, or portions thereof, to be vacated or otherwise affected by the vacation shall be heard; and the court shall determine whether the streets, alleys, roadways, or portion thereof, should be vacated as proposed in the petition.
  2. No street, alley, or roadway, or portion thereof, shall be vacated if the court finds that it would be against the interest of the public or that no means of ingress and egress would be left to any lots in the addition not abutting on them, unless the owners of the lots file their written consent to the vacation with the court.

History. Acts 1945, No. 164, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1207.

Case Notes

Right to Be Heard.

Appellees' petition to vacate a section of a road in their subdivision was properly granted because, under the terms of § 14-18-106(b)(2), appellant, who owned property outside and adjacent to the subdivision, did not need to sign the petition or consent to it; at most, appellant was entitled to an opportunity to be heard under subsection (a) of this section as a member of the public or any other party otherwise affected by the vacation, and appellant was afforded that right. Weisenbach v. Dewayne, 104 Ark. App. 245, 290 S.W.3d 614 (2009).

14-18-108. Order vacating streets, etc.

  1. If the county court shall find that the petition should be granted, either in whole or in part, it shall enter an order vacating the streets, alleys, roadways, or portions thereof.
    1. The finding and order of the county court shall be conclusive on all parties having or claiming any rights or interest in the streets, alleys, roadways, or portions thereof, vacated. However, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court and perfected within thirty (30) days from the entry of the order, and an appeal may be taken from the circuit court to the Supreme Court and perfected within thirty (30) days from the entry of the order of the circuit court.
    2. A certified copy of the order shall be filed in the office of the recorder of the county and recorded in the deed records of the county.
    1. The costs of the publication of the notice, the recording of the order, and the court costs shall be paid by the petitioners.
    2. The court costs shall be paid by parties who unsuccessfully contest the petition.

History. Acts 1945, No. 164, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1208.

14-18-109. Abutting lots reduced to acreage.

  1. The owners of all lots abutting on the streets, alleys, or roadways, or portions thereof, vacated by an order of the county court, as provided for in § 14-18-108, shall have the right to have reduced to acreage such lots and the streets or alleys so vacated by petition to the county court where the property is situated.
  2. The county court shall promptly hear the petition and, upon proper showing that it is signed by all of the owners, shall order that the lots and streets, alleys, or roadways be reduced to acreage, and they shall thereafter be assessed as acreage for taxation of all kinds.
  3. The petition may be included in the petition for the vacation of the streets, alleys, or roadways, and the order may be included in the order vacating it, or the petition may be filed and the order entered separately.

History. Acts 1945, No. 164, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1209.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of the reduction to acreage of lots and blocks in subdivisions pursuant to Acts 1945, No. 164, see Acts 1959, No. 289, §§ 2, 4.

14-18-110. Validating return of platted land to acreage.

  1. In all cases where land theretofore platted into lots and blocks has been returned to acreage under the order of the county court in which the land lies and where the return to acreage did not involve the closing of any public road or thoroughfare, the action of the court in ordering the land returned to acreage and in cancelling or annulling the platting of the lands into lots and blocks is validated and affirmed.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any lands lying within the corporate limits of any town or city, nor shall it affect the title to any lands but shall merely validate the conversion of the lands from lots and blocks into acreage.

History. Acts 1943, No. 259, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-1210, 17-1211.

Chapter 19 County Buildings

Cross References. County seats, § 14-14-301 et seq.

Exemption of realty owned by counties from adverse possession, § 22-1-204.

Execution of judgments against corporations — Attachment, § 16-66-114.

Effective Dates. Acts 1885, No. 61, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1927, No. 43, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1953, No. 414, § 4: approved Mar. 28, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that a number of hospitals in judicial districts of counties having two judicial districts are in dire financial circumstances and are unable to operate properly to insure the proper care and correct treatment of the people of said areas and that the health and welfare of the people of these areas is endangered because of these conditions and a dire need exists to remedy these wants; that the maintaining and operating of hospitals are local concerns and that those counties having two judicial districts are two separate and distinct counties so far as to local concerns; that the passage of this act is necessary to the proper maintenance and operation of hospitals and is necessary for the preservation of the health and welfare of the people of these areas. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1972 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 60, § 6: Mar. 6, 1972. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Sixty-Eighth General Assembly that the present law is not clear regarding the authority of counties to expend county general funds to match available federal funds for the construction, reconstruction or expansion of the jail facilities of such county; that under present law there is some question regarding the authority of municipalities to expend funds of the municipality to assist financially in the construction, reconstruction or expansion of the county jail facility; that federal funds are available on a matching basis for construction of jail facilities and that counties should be given specific authority to use county general funds to match federal funds for constructing facilities in order that suitable jail facilities can be provided in the various counties; that municipalities in the State should be specifically authorized to contribute funds toward the construction, reconstruction or expansion of the county jail since the county jail is often used by certain municipalities in the county; that this authority should be granted the various counties and municipalities in the State immediately in order that such counties and municipalities may take advantage of the available federal funds for this purpose and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide such authority. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 64, § 7: Aug. 26, 1994. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas meeting in the Second Extraordinary Session of 1994 that some local governments have an immediate and pressing need to finance capital improvements for criminal justice projects without incurring unnecessary bond issue expenses; that until this act becomes effective, the local governments must either finance those capital improvements through bond issues or delay commencing the capital improvements which would in either case result in greater cost than using the method provided by this act and a greater threat to the general public safety from criminals; and that this act should be given effect immediately in order to minimize the amount of taxes necessary to finance capital improvements for criminal justice purposes and to insure the public safety. Therefore, in order to authorize the people of counties and cities to vote as soon as possible on the issue of levying sales taxes for capital improvements for criminal justice projects, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Waiver of competitive bidding requirements for state and local public building and construction contracts. 40 A.L.R.4th 968.

Amount of appropriation as limitation on damages for breach of contract recoverable by one contracting with government agency. 40 A.L.R.4th 998.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 532 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 165 et seq.

14-19-101. Commissioner of public buildings.

    1. When a county court shall have made an order for the erection of any public building, it shall appoint some suitable person as commissioner of public buildings, who shall superintend the erection of it.
    2. The court shall fill, from time to time, any vacancy that may happen in the office of the commissioner.
  1. The commissioner of public buildings for any county shall receive such compensation for his or her services as the court shall deem reasonable, to be paid out of the county treasury as other county claims are paid.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, §§ 6, 7, 18; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1931, 1932, 1943; Pope's Dig., §§ 2453, 2454, 2465; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-903, 17-904, 17-915.

Case Notes

Compensation.

Order of a county court appointing an assistant commissioner of public buildings where a commissioner has already been appointed and order making the former an allowance for his services were ultra vires and void; more than one commissioner might have been appointed, but the compensation allowed can be a reasonable one for only one person. Izard County v. Williamson, 122 Ark. 596, 184 S.W. 420 (1916).

14-19-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning sites for buildings, was repealed by Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No 64, § 3. The section was derived from Rev. Stat., ch. 36, §§ 8-10; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1933-1935; Pope's Dig., §§ 2455-2457; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-905 — 17-907.

14-19-103. Plans — Contracts.

  1. When the ground for erecting any public building shall be designated as indicated in § 14-19-102 [repealed], the commissioner of public buildings shall prepare and submit to the county court a plan of the building to be erected, the dimensions thereof, and the materials of which it is to be composed, with an estimate of the probable cost thereof.
    1. When the plan shall be approved by the court, the commissioner shall advertise for receiving proposals for erecting the building and shall contract with the person who will agree to do the work on the lowest and best terms, not exceeding the amount so appropriated by the court.
    2. The commissioner may let parts of the work to different persons.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, §§ 11, 12, 14; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1936, 1937, 1939; Pope's Dig., §§ 2458, 2459, 2461; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-908, 17-909, 17-911.

Cross References. Legal notices and advertisements, § 16-3-101 et seq.

Contracts for public buildings, Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 16.

Case Notes

Architects.

Where a county undertakes the erection of a county courthouse, it is proper for the county court to employ an architect, in addition to the commissioner of public buildings, and to pay him a reasonable compensation. Mississippi County v. Grider, 126 Ark. 219, 190 S.W. 102 (1916).

14-19-104. Supervision of work.

It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public buildings to:

  1. Superintend and direct the execution of the work;
  2. See that the materials employed are good and the work is executed according to contract; and
  3. Make report of the progress and condition thereof from time to time to the county court.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, § 15; C. & M. Dig., § 1940; Pope's Dig., § 2462; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-912.

Cross References. Public works — Observation by registered professionals required, § 22-9-101.

14-19-105. Payment of installments.

  1. When any installment shall become due to the contractor according to contract, the county court shall make an order that it be paid out of the county treasury.
  2. No such order shall be made, except on the certificate of the commissioner of public buildings, that due proportion of the work has been completed and executed according to contract.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, §§ 16, 17; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1941, 1942; Pope's Dig., §§ 2463, 2464; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-913, 17-914.

Case Notes

Executed According to Contract.

A county court cannot make an order for the payment of any amount contracted to be paid for the building of a courthouse or jail before any part of the contract is performed. Armstrong v. Truitt, 53 Ark. 287, 13 S.W. 934 (1890).

14-19-106. Alteration and preservation.

The county court shall have power, from time to time, to alter, repair, or rebuild any county building which has been erected in their county and may cause necessary buildings and fixtures to be erected, as circumstances may require and the funds of the county may admit. Moreover, it shall take such measures as shall be necessary to preserve all buildings and property of the county from waste or damage.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, § 19; C. & M. Dig., § 1944; Pope's Dig., § 2466; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-916.

14-19-107. Replacement or repair of destroyed buildings.

    1. In every case where any public buildings belonging to any county in this state have been destroyed by fire, or otherwise, and the loss of the building calls for speedy and prompt action for repair or rebuilding thereof, the county judge of the county may hold a special term of the county court for the purpose of taking such action and making such provisions as shall be proper for repairing or rebuilding the destroyed property.
      1. Notice of the meeting of the court shall be published ten (10) days by advertisement in some newspaper printed in the county.
      2. If there is no such paper, the publication shall be by written notices posted at some public place at the county site of the county and at nine (9) other public places in the county, ten (10) days before the convening of such court.
  1. In all cases provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the court for levying the county taxes and making appropriations for county purposes may convene in special session at such time as the county judge may name in a call for the meeting of the court. This call shall be published for the length of time and in the manner provided for the special terms of the county court as named in subsection (a) of this section.
      1. When so convened in special session, the county court and court for levying county taxes and making appropriations for county purposes shall have all the powers, right, and authority of the same courts when held at the times fixed by law.
        1. The county court may let contracts, and the levying courts may make appropriations and levy taxes.
        2. Either or both of the courts may take any and all steps proper in the premises to the same extent and with like effect as if done in regular term.
      1. The courts may adjourn from day to day and from time to time until the business for which they were convened is completed.
      2. A minority of the levying court, when so convened, shall have the right to adjourn from day to day until a quorum is secured as provided for in the law governing the court.

History. Acts 1885, No. 61, §§ 1-3, p. 84; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1945-1947; Pope's Dig., §§ 2474-2476; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-917 — 17-919.

Case Notes

In General.

Upon courthouse being destroyed by fire, county court had authority to direct erection of new building for use of the courts of the district. Law v. Falls, 109 Ark. 395, 159 S.W. 1130 (1913).

Applicability.

This section relates solely to repair or replacement of public buildings. Cleveland County v. Pearce, 171 Ark. 1145, 287 S.W. 593 (1926).

Temporary Facilities.

When courthouse has been destroyed by fire, the court may lawfully be held in a temporary courthouse. Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S.W. 16 (1892).

14-19-108. Courthouse and jail.

  1. There shall be erected in each county, at its established seat of justice, a good and sufficient courthouse and jail.
  2. The quorum court may determine by a majority vote or by referral to a vote of the people the location of the jail facility at some location other than the established seat of justice.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 1929; Pope's Dig., § 2451; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-901; Acts 1994 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 64, § 2.

Cross References. County bonds for construction of courthouses and jails, § 14-72-301 et seq.

County houses of correction, § 12-41-301.

Case Notes

In General.

County court had continuing control over an order to build a courthouse that extends beyond the close of the term. Craig v. Griffin, 107 Ark. 298, 154 S.W. 945 (1913).

County court could revoke order to build a courthouse at a subsequent term, subject to contractual liabilities incurred under the former order. Jennings v. Fort Smith Dist., 115 Ark. 130, 171 S.W. 920 (1914).

Contracts.

Validity of contract for building courthouse was not affected by former statute similar to § 14-20-106, relating to limitations on contracts by quorum or levying courts. Durritt v. Buxton, 63 Ark. 397, 39 S.W. 56 (1897); Sadler v. Craven, 93 Ark. 11, 123 S.W. 365 (1909).

Remedy of taxpayers where county court had proceeded irregularly to contract for building a courthouse was by becoming a party to the proceedings and then appealing. Bowman v. Frith, 73 Ark. 523, 84 S.W. 709 (1905); Sadler v. Craven, 93 Ark. 11, 123 S.W. 365 (1909).

Necessary changes in a contract for building a courthouse may be made. Shackleford v. Campbell, 110 Ark. 355, 161 S.W. 1019 (1913).

Where county judge contracted with an architect to draw plans for a county jail, but no order of the county court appointing an architect was made nor was any appropriation ever made to pay for the work, it was held that, although bids were taken and a contract let, the architect was not entitled to any compensation under his contract with the county judge. Klingensmith v. Logan County, 116 Ark. 65, 171 S.W. 1191 (1914).

Designation of Place.

A county court has no authority to order the erection of a county courthouse upon land that does not belong to the county. Jennings v. Fort Smith Dist., 115 Ark. 130, 171 S.W. 920 (1914).

A county court is authorized to select and purchase a site for a courthouse, if necessary, and a quorum court is only authorized to determine when the courthouse shall be built, the amount of expenditure, and the manner of payment. Ivy v. Edwards, 174 Ark. 1167, 298 S.W. 1006 (1927).

Under former Ark. Const. Amend. 17, a hospital did not have to be located at the seat of justice. Kervin v. Hillman, 226 Ark. 708, 292 S.W.2d 559 (1956).

Duties of Commissioners.

An appropriation by the levying court to build a county hospital carries authority to purchase ground on which to build it. Kerwin v. Caldwell, 80 Ark. 280, 96 S.W. 1058 (1906).

A commissioner of public buildings is required to select a proper piece of ground at the seat of justice, and may purchase or receive by donation a lot of ground for the purpose of erecting public buildings. Jeffries v. State ex rel. Woodruff County, 212 Ark. 213, 205 S.W.2d 194 (1947).

A county court has authority to purchase a site for a county hospital. Bond v. Kennedy, 213 Ark. 758, 212 S.W.2d 336 (1948).

A commissioner of public buildings is required to select a proper piece of ground for the erection of public buildings and take a good and sufficient deed in fee simple, if the county has no land suitable for the use intended. Bond v. Kennedy, 213 Ark. 758, 212 S.W.2d 336 (1948).

Examination and Approval.

Where a county court orders that proceedings be instituted to determine the right of a county to erect a courthouse on a certain piece of property, the county commissioner cannot make any valid contract looking to the erection of a courthouse until the title to the site upon which it is proposed to build is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be in the county. Jennings v. Fort Smith Dist., 115 Ark. 130, 171 S.W. 920 (1914).

Funding.

County court could build courthouse though no appropriation therefor had been made. Durritt v. Buxton, 63 Ark. 397, 39 S.W. 56 (1897); Bowman v. Frith, 73 Ark. 523, 84 S.W. 709 (1905); Thompson v. Mayo, 135 Ark. 143, 204 S.W. 747 (1918) (decisions prior to Ark. Const. Amend. 62).

The power to make an appropriation for a courthouse, and to fix the cost thereof, was transferred to the quorum court. Thompson v. Mayo, 135 Ark. 143, 204 S.W. 747 (1918) (decision prior to Ark. Const. Amend. 62).

14-19-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the expenditure of current funds for jail facilities, is repealed by Acts 2001, No. 1223, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1972 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 60, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-924, 17-924n, 17-925, 17-926.

14-19-110. Fireproof building or vault.

As soon as the courthouse and jail shall be erected and the circumstances of the county will permit, there shall also be erected a fireproof building at some convenient place near the courthouse or a fireproof vault in the courthouse, in which shall be kept the records of the recorder and of the clerks of the several courts held in the county.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 36, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 1930; Acts 1927, No. 43, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2452; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-902.

14-19-111. Hospitals in counties having two judicial districts.

    1. In all counties which are divided into two (2) judicial districts, either by the Arkansas Constitution or by legislative enactment, the qualified electors of the county residing in each judicial district of a county so divided shall have and are vested with all the powers and rights for the judicial district that the qualified electors of counties have for the entire county for the purposes authorized by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 32, and may authorize the maintaining, operating, and supporting of a county hospital in the judicial district and may authorize the levy of a tax not to exceed one (1) mill on the dollar of the assessed value of real and personal property in the county.
    2. No tax shall be levied on any property within the county or judicial district for the purposes authorized by the Arkansas Constitution and this section in excess of the total tax authorized by the Arkansas Constitution.
  1. It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly that the maintaining, operating, and supporting of a county hospital is a local concern, and, for the purposes of this section, the judicial districts of the counties are deemed and are declared by the General Assembly to be separate and distinct counties.

History. Acts 1953, No. 414, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-922, 17-923.

Chapter 20 Quorum or Levying Courts

Effective Dates. Acts 1917, No. 217, § 5: approved Mar. 10, 1917. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1969, No. 92, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 24, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly: (a) that although funds have been appropriated from time to time for making studies of ways and means to improve the operation of the state government, no funds have ever been appropriated for making studies of ways and means to improve the operation of county government in this State; (b) that such county studies should be made for the purpose aforesaid, and that the same should be instituted at the earliest possible time; and (c) that only by the immediate passage and approval of this Act may the association be assured of adequate financing so that it may make and complete its plan of operation not later than the date on which the funds first become available. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 130, § 21: Jan. 1, 1977.

Acts 1977, No. 178, § 8: Feb. 17, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that certain cities within the State are in dire need of additional funds to provide essential services and facilities of the city; that the most appropriate way for such cities to increase revenues for this purpose is the levy of an increased gross receipts tax on the gross receipts derived from certain business within the city; that this Act is designed to specifically authorize the levy of a gross receipts tax or an additional gross receipts tax to provide much needed revenues to the levying city and should be given effect at the earliest possible date. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 495, § 3: Mar. 18, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that some confusion has arisen regarding the responsibility for collection of delinquent taxes in the various counties; that it is essential to the proper financing of the counties, cities, and school districts in the counties that appropriate action be taken to assure that delinquent taxes are collected at the earliest possible date; that the quorum court is the appropriate body in each county to determine who should have the responsibility for collecting delinquent taxes; that this Act is designed to give the quorum court the authority and responsibility to provide for the collection of such taxes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 465, § 4: Mar. 10, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that due to the phasing out of revenue sharing by the federal government, many counties are faced with insufficient revenues to offer necessary services; that this act will provide the county with an optional source of revenue by collection of the additional fee; that the immediate passage of this act is necessary to insure that necessary services are not interrupted. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 904, § 28: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the language of certain court cost statutes lacks uniformity; that such lack of uniformity is detrimental to the proper collection of such court costs; and that such language should be standardized to promote the proper collection of such costs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 1003, § 5: Apr. 8, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the quorum court of any county should be authorized to appropriate monies from its general fund to pay the reasonable cost incurred in the defense of indigents; that this Act so provides; and that this Act should go into effect immediately in order to provide a mechanism to protect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 1193, § 21: July 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly that the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in State v. Post et al, Case No. 92-787, has created great uncertainty regarding the payment of the legal fees and expenses in connection with the legal representation of indigent persons charged with crimes punishable by imprisonment and that delay in the effective date of this act beyond July 1, 1993, would cause irreparable harm to the proper implementation of a statewide public defender program. Therefore, and emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 711, § 5: Mar. 20, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that devastating tornadoes and flooding recently occurred in several counties of the state; that several of the affected counties have been declared disaster areas by the Governor; that as a result of the tornadoes and flooding, considerable expenditures will be required of the counties to clean and repair streets, to dispose of debris, to repair or replace county facilities and equipment damaged or destroyed, and to cover other necessary expenses occasioned by the natural disaster; that under present law, the county quorum court may not appropriate more than ninety percent of anticipated revenues for the year; and that it is the intent and purpose of this act to permit the appropriation and expenditure for disaster related expenses of all or a portion of the ten percent reserve otherwise required and that this act should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2005, No. 2314, § 3: Apr. 14, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that existing law restricts the ability of a county to levy an advertising and promotion tax within the county; that existing law restricts the ability of a municipality to collect advertising and promotion tax; that advertising and promotion tax provides a source of municipality and county funds for promoting tourism and enhances the state's economy; and that this act is immediately necessary in order to provide cities and counties with the ability to control local finances. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 182, § 32: Jan. 1, 2008.

Acts 2007, No. 473, § 4: Mar. 23, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that tourist season is rapidly approaching and cities and towns depend on the local tax revenue generated through local hotels, motels, restaurants, or similar establishments; that the law as currently written does not allow the local government the flexibility to collect the tax in a manner that reflects local business establishments; and that this act is necessary because it is imperative to the successful operation of local government to capture the tax revenue from the approaching tourist season. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: July 31, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2015, No. 693, § 2: Mar. 25, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are scores of volunteer fire departments in this state; that in many areas the only fire protection available is through the local volunteer fire department; and that this act is immediately necessary to ensure the volunteer fire departments can remain viable and continue to serve the state. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-20-101. Prohibition of and punishment for offenses.

  1. A county is authorized to prohibit and punish any act, matter, or thing which the laws of this state make a misdemeanor and to prescribe penalties for all offenses in violation of any ordinance of the county not greater nor less than the penalties prescribed for similar offenses against the laws of this state.
  2. Upon conviction of any person under such ordinance by any court, the conviction shall operate as a bar to further prosecution in any of the courts of this state for the same offense.

History. Acts 1975, No. 130, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-443.

14-20-102. County funds for defense of indigents — Fees assessed.

    1. There is hereby created on the books of the treasurer of each county in the state a fund to be used for the purpose of paying reasonable and necessary costs incurred in the defense of indigent persons accused of criminal offenses and in the representation of persons against whom involuntary admissions procedures for mental health or alcohol and narcotic commitments or criminal commitments have been brought, and for representation in civil and criminal matters of persons deemed incompetent by the court due to minority or mental incapacity, which have been brought in any circuit courts or city or county division of district courts, including, but not limited to, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, and legal fees.
    2. Where there are adequate unappropriated moneys in this fund, the quorum court may also provide for the use of the funds for the purpose of defraying the cost of the juvenile division of circuit court.
    3. Where there are adequate unappropriated moneys in this fund, the quorum court may also provide for the use of the funds for the purpose of defraying the cost of medical and dental costs incurred by the county for indigent defendants incarcerated in the county jail.
    4. The quorum court is authorized to supplement the fund by additional appropriation from the county general fund, and expenditures from the fund shall be made in the manner and amounts prescribed by the quorum court.
  1. In any county where a public defender commission has been established under §§ 16-87-101 — 16-87-112 [repealed], the amount to be paid for attorney fees, investigative costs, and other costs under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be determined in a manner prescribed by the quorum court acting with the advisory resolution of the public defender commission.

History. Acts 1983, No. 695, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-456 — 17-458; Acts 1987, No. 96, § 1; 1989, No. 406, §§ 1, 2; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 100, § 1; 1991, No. 904, §§ 4, 20; 1991, No. 1003, § 1; 1993, No. 1193, § 15; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to Acts 1971, No. 153, references to “mayor's courts” in this section were deleted.

Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(B)(2) provided: “District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Joiner, Criminal Procedure, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 123.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

Case Notes

Construction.

The purpose of §§ 16-10-307 and 16-87-306 is to provide representation for indigents in cases in which there is a potential for loss of liberty, but the provision of this section that grants authority for the trial court to appoint attorneys for minors in civil litigation to be paid by county funds was not incorporated in the statutes establishing and defining the duties and responsibilities of the Commission. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

Fee Cap.

Ordinance enacted pursuant to this section containing fee caps similar to those contained in § 16-92-108 (repealed), held invalid. State v. Post, 311 Ark. 510, 845 S.W.2d 487 (1993).

Civil Representation of Minor.

Section 16-10-307, which allocates to the Public Defender Commission a portion of county funds established by this section, does not contain language authorizing the Commission to expend funds for the civil representation of a minor. Ark. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).

Cited: State v. Independence County, 312 Ark. 472, 850 S.W.2d 842 (1993).

14-20-103. Appropriations to be specific — Limitation.

  1. The quorum court shall specify the amount of appropriations for each purpose in dollars and cents, and except as authorized in this section, the total amount of appropriations for all county or district purposes for any one (1) year shall not exceed ninety percent (90%) of the anticipated revenues for that year.
    1. The quorum court may appropriate for any one (1) year up to one hundred percent (100%) of the anticipated revenues for that year for federal or state grants overseen by the county.
    2. For revenues to qualify as a grant under this section, the county shall demonstrate that the state or federal agency characterized the revenues as a grant.
    1. In any county in which a natural disaster, including without limitation a flood or tornado, results in the county's being declared a disaster area by the Governor or an appropriate official of the United States Government, the quorum court may appropriate in excess of ninety percent (90%) of anticipated revenues.
    2. However, appropriation of funds in excess of ninety percent (90%) of anticipated revenues shall be made only for street cleanup and repair, collection, transportation and disposal of debris, repair or replacement of county facilities and equipment, and other projects or costs directly related to or resulting from the natural disaster.
    1. In any county in which sales and use tax revenues have been dedicated for a specific purpose, the quorum court may appropriate up to one hundred percent (100%) of anticipated revenues from the dedicated sales and use tax, provided that any appropriation of funds up to one hundred percent (100%) of anticipated revenues shall be made and expended only for the dedicated specific purpose of the tax.
    2. Subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall not:
      1. Apply to dedicated revenues that have been pledged for bonds; or
      2. Include general sales and use tax revenues.
  2. In any county in which the quorum court deems it financially necessary, the quorum court may appropriate for any one (1) year in excess of ninety percent (90%) of the commissions and tax revenues anticipated for that year for the county general fund operation of the offices of assessor, collector, and treasurer.

History. Acts 1879, No. 77, § 7, p. 109; C. & M. Dig., § 1985; Pope's Dig., § 2530; Acts 1973, No. 128, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-411; Acts 1989, No. 141, § 1; 1991, No. 60, § 1; 1997, No. 711, § 1; 2005, No. 876, § 1; 2007, No. 17, § 1; 2015, No. 406, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1879, No. 77, § 14, provided that nothing in the act shall be so construed as to enlarge the functions or powers of the County Court of Sebastian County as under existing laws.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment, in (a), deleted “county” preceding “quorum court”, deleted “subsections (c) and (d) of” preceding “this section”, and deleted “except for federal or state grants overseen by counties for which the court may appropriate up to one hundred percent (100%) of the anticipated revenues for that year” at the end; inserted (b)(1) and redesignated (b) as (b)(2); substituted “shall” for “must” in present (b)(2); in (c)(1), substituted “without limitation” for “but not limited to”, and deleted “of the county” preceding “may appropriate”; substituted “However” for “Provided, any” in (c)(2); deleted “of the county” preceding “may appropriate” in (d)(1); and added (e).

Cross References. Appropriation ordinances, § 14-14-907.

County or city hospital tax, Ark. Const., Amend. 32.

Limitation on county tax levy, § 26-25-101.

County library tax, Ark. Const., Amend. 38.

Case Notes

Limitation.

This section does not prevent a court from also appropriating the revenue accruing to a county from fines, forfeitures, and licenses. Allis v. Jefferson County, 34 Ark. 307 (1879).

This section does not inhibit a county court from appropriating all the county funds derived from any source after reserving 10 percent of the current tax levy. Kerwin v. Caldwell, 80 Ark. 280, 96 S.W. 1058 (1906).

An appropriation of more than 90 percent is good on collateral attack in the absence of any showing that the county had no funds derived from other sources. Fussell v. Mallory, 97 Ark. 465, 134 S.W. 631 (1911).

The limitation applies to current or ordinary expenses, not to appropriations for building courthouses. Thompson v. Mayo, 135 Ark. 143, 204 S.W. 747 (1918).

14-20-104. Appropriations and allowances.

  1. Every order of allowance made by the county court shall set forth the appropriation out of which it is to be paid.
  2. It shall be the duty of the clerk annually and immediately after the adjournment of the county quorum court for the levy of taxes and the making of the appropriations to open a book to be kept for that purpose in which he or she shall debit each appropriation by the amount appropriated therefor, and as the allowances are made by the county court, he or she shall credit each appropriation by the allowance ordered to be paid out of the appropriation.

History. Acts 1879, No. 77, §§ 8, 12, p. 109; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1986, 1989; Pope's Dig., §§ 2531, 2534; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-412, 17-414.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1879, No. 77, § 14, provided that nothing in the act shall be so construed as to enlarge the functions or powers of the County Court of Sebastian County as under existing laws.

Case Notes

Allowances.

It is the duty of a clerk to issue warrants on allowances when made. Worthen v. Roots, 34 Ark. 356 (1879).

A county court is not prohibited from allowing claims against the county in excess of appropriations. Worthen v. Roots, 34 Ark. 356 (1879).

An assessment of benefits received by the public roads in a drainage district, although approved by the county court, is not a judgment against the county, rather, it is the basis of a claim against it. Rolfe v. Spybuck Drainage Dist. No. 1, 101 Ark. 29, 140 S.W. 988 (1911).

Appropriations.

There is no provision in law allowing a quorum court to turn over to a county judge a sum of money “to use as he sees fit and deems necessary,” and such an appropriation is invalid. Martin v. Bratton, 223 Ark. 159, 264 S.W.2d 635 (1954).

Cited: Lake v. Tatum, 175 Ark. 90, 1 S.W.2d 554 (1927).

14-20-105. Monthly report by county treasurer or county comptroller.

The county treasurer or the county comptroller shall submit each month to the county quorum court a full report and a detailed statement of the financial condition of the county, showing receipts, disbursements, and balance on hand.

History. Acts 1975, No. 130, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-448; Acts 1987, No. 724, § 1; 1995, No. 232, § 3; 2019, No. 310, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “or the county comptroller”.

14-20-106. Limitations on contracts.

No county court or agent of any county shall make any contract on behalf of the county unless an appropriation has been previously made therefor and is wholly or in part unexpended. In no event shall any county court or agent of any county make any contract in excess of any appropriation made, and the amount of the contract shall be limited to the amount of the appropriation made by the county quorum court.

History. Acts 1917, No. 217, § 3, p. 1184; C. & M. Dig., § 1976; Pope's Dig., § 2505; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-416.

Publisher's Notes. For amendment of section with respect to certain specified counties, see Acts 1923, No. 240, § 1.

Cross References. Contracts in excess of revenues prohibited, § 14-23-107.

Case Notes

Purpose.

Purpose of this section is to withdraw from a county court the power to make an order to build a courthouse if deemed expedient and if the circumstances of the county would permit a levy of taxes for that purpose. Thompson v. Mayo, 135 Ark. 143, 204 S.W. 747 (1918).

Applicability.

The circuit clerk of Madison County was authorized to purchase a typewriter, this section having no applicability to that county. Madison County v. Simpson, 173 Ark. 755, 293 S.W. 34 (1927).

Appropriations.

This section invests quorum court with power to make an appropriation for building a courthouse in any sum it may deem proper, regardless of the amount of taxes to be levied and of an appropriation for this purpose. Thompson v. Mayo, 135 Ark. 143, 204 S.W. 747 (1918).

An allowance by the county court for a street improvement out of a special bridge fund on hand was not invalid by reason of the fact that the county court agreed to make additional allowances out of the revenues of future years. Shofner v. Dowell, 168 Ark. 229, 269 S.W. 588 (1925).

Resolution of county quorum court appropriating money for street improvement in aid of an improvement district and reciting that the necessity for the appropriation arose from the state's failure to bear its share of the proposed improvement, was a mere expression of the court's opinion as to the state's duty, and the appropriation was proper, as the streets to be improved were part of the county highway system. Shofner v. Dowell, 168 Ark. 229, 269 S.W. 588 (1925).

Appropriation by county quorum court for expenses of county judge other than for current year, is void. Ladd v. Stubblefield, 195 Ark. 261, 111 S.W.2d 555 (1937).

Contract unenforceable where no appropriation was made to support the contract. Sanders v. Bradley County Human Servs. Pub. Facilities Bd., 330 Ark. 675, 956 S.W.2d 187 (1997).

Authority of County Judge.

County judges have no authority to make contracts on behalf of a county, such authority being conferred upon the county courts. Lyons Mach. Co. v. Pike County, 192 Ark. 531, 93 S.W.2d 130 (1936).

Furnisher of item under contract entered into by county judge, never approved by county court, is not entitled to recover on quantum meruit where county never accepts the items or makes claim to them, even though county judge accepts delivery and stores the shipment on county property. Lyons Mach. Co. v. Pike County, 192 Ark. 531, 93 S.W.2d 130 (1936).

Essential Services.

Arkansas Ark. Const. Amend. 10 was not effective to prevent county court from allowing claims for essential and indispensable government services although in excess of appropriation. Mackey v. McDonald, 255 Ark. 978, 504 S.W.2d 726 (1974).

Particular Contracts.

Although county court could not lawfully make a contract for the purchase of road machinery until an appropriation had been made for that purpose, yet when an appropriation for such purchase had been made after the purchase and the machinery was delivered to the county and kept by it, it could not defeat a recovery for the purchase money of the machinery. International Harvester Co. v. Searcy County, 136 Ark. 209, 206 S.W. 312 (1918).

In the absence of an appropriation, a sheriff is without authority to purchase a supply of items on behalf of the county and the county judge cannot make a contract on his own motion to purchase the items nor ratify a contract for them made by the sheriff. American Disinfecting Co. v. Franklin County, 181 Ark. 659, 27 S.W.2d 95 (1930).

Contract employing lawyers on a contingent basis, to be paid out of adjustments and settlements of amounts due the county, is not forbidden by this section where no appropriation is made for this purpose. Botts v. Arkansas County, 186 Ark. 981, 57 S.W.2d 563 (1933).

Even though a contract between a county and the United States would be void under the provisions of this section, where the federal government has fully performed its obligations under the contract, the county is in no position to defend on the ground of the alleged invalidity of the contract. Cravens v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Contract where county agreed to hold and save federal government harmless from liability on account of inundation of roads in connection with construction of a dam could be enforced by the federal government, notwithstanding provisions of this section to the effect that contracts by county must be in consequence of valid appropriation, especially if the federal government had fully performed its obligations under the contract. Cravens v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Warrants.

Warrant issued under contract of a county court for an amount in excess of the appropriation available are void. State ex rel. Prairie County v. E.F. Leathem & Co., 170 Ark. 1004, 282 S.W. 367 (1927).

Where county quorum court appropriated a maximum sum for building a courthouse, requiring the one-mill levy to be paid out of the levy of five mills and by levies to be paid each year covering all the expenses of government and not in excess of five-mill levy, there was no continuing levy of one mill annually for courthouse construction, and warrants should not be drawn on a specific fund, but on the general county fund out of which the appropriation was made. Ivy v. Edwards, 174 Ark. 1167, 298 S.W. 1006 (1927).

Cited: Dean Leasing, Inc. v. Van Buren County, 27 Ark. App. 134, 767 S.W.2d 316 (1989); AFSCME, Local 380 v. Hot Spring County, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (W.D. Ark. 2004).

14-20-107. Appropriations for Association of Arkansas Counties.

    1. The quorum court of each county in this state may provide for the participation of its county in the services and activities of the Association of Arkansas Counties, a domestic corporation organized and existing under the provisions of the Arkansas Nonprofit Corporation Act, §§ 4-28-201 — 4-28-206 and 4-28-209 — 4-28-224.
    2. If the quorum court of a county authorizes the participation of the county in the association, then the quorum court shall annually appropriate from county general funds an amount that shall be equal to one percent (1%) of the general revenues received by that county from the County Aid Fund in the State Treasury during the preceding fiscal year.
    3. Participation by each county in the association shall be optional with the quorum court of each of the respective counties as provided in this section.
    1. The funds so received by the association shall be used exclusively by it to finance the object of its existence, namely, to aid in the improvement of county government in the State of Arkansas.
    2. All funds so received by the association shall be subject to audit by the State of Arkansas, and the association shall make available to the auditors at all reasonable times all books, files, and records concerning such funds.
  1. Moneys appropriated by the court as the county's contribution to the association shall be paid to the association during the month of July for the fiscal year commencing on July 1 and ending on June 30 next following.
  2. The association is recognized as the official agency of the counties of this state to receive funds and use them for making a continuing study of ways and means to improve county government in Arkansas.
    1. There is created on the books of the Association of Arkansas Counties a trust fund to be known as the “Automated Records Systems Fund”.
      1. The Automated Records Systems Fund shall be funded by counties in Class 6 and Class 7 in the State of Arkansas.
      2. The county recorder of the Class 6 and Class 7 counties shall remit one dollar ($1.00) for each document recorded in the county recorder's office directly to the Automated Records Systems Fund on a monthly basis.
      1. The Automated Records Systems Fund shall be administered by a committee composed of the county recorders of the counties in Class 6 and Class 7 to be known as the “Automated Records Systems Fund Committee”.
      2. The committee shall meet biannually to review grant applications made by county recorders in Class 1 — Class 5 solely for purposes directly related to office automation.
      3. The committee shall not disburse any moneys from the Automated Records Systems Fund to counties in Class 6 and Class 7.
      4. The committee shall expend substantially all of the money from the fund on an annual basis.
      5. Each member of the committee may receive expense reimbursement in accordance with § 25-16-901 et seq.

History. Acts 1969, No. 92, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-425 — 17-428; Acts 2007, No. 615, § 2; 2009, No. 725, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (e)(3)(E).

14-20-108. Dues for volunteer fire departments.

      1. The quorum court of each county, upon request filed with the quorum court by one (1) or more volunteer fire departments in the county, may adopt an ordinance authorizing a designated county official to collect and remit to the volunteer fire department the annual dues charged by the volunteer fire department in consideration of providing fire protection to unincorporated areas in the county.
          1. When a quorum court receives a request for the levy of volunteer fire department dues and the request has been signed by the fire chief and the chair and secretary of the board of directors, if any, of a volunteer fire department and filed with the county clerk, the quorum court by ordinance shall call for an election on the issue of the levy of the volunteer fire department dues on each residence and on each business having an occupiable structure.
            1. The issue may be placed on the ballot at a special election by order of the quorum court in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
            2. The special election shall be held by August 1.
          2. If an attested petition is filed with the county clerk and signed by a majority of registered voters in the volunteer fire department district voting in the immediately preceding general election, then the quorum court by ordinance shall dispense with a special election on the issue of the levy of volunteer fire department dues.
            1. If the levy of volunteer fire department dues is approved by a majority of those voting on the issue or the county clerk determines that the number of signatures of registered voters is sufficient and the quorum court dispenses with a special election, the volunteer fire department dues shall be listed annually on real property tax statements and collected by the county collector at the same time and in the same manner as real property taxes.
              1. The county collector shall report delinquencies to the volunteer fire department for collection.
              2. A volunteer fire department may collect volunteer fire department dues that have become delinquent and may enforce collection by proceedings in a court of proper jurisdiction.
              3. If the issue is approved by a majority of those voting on the issue, the incorporated town or city of the second class shall be served by the volunteer fire department district with the volunteer fire department dues levied and collected in the same manner as in the unincorporated areas served by the volunteer fire department district.
              4. The cost of the election shall be borne by the governing body of the incorporated town or city of the second class that called for the election.
        1. The cost of the election shall be borne by the volunteer fire department that requested the levy.
    1. The ordinance enacted by the quorum court shall set forth the terms and conditions on which the volunteer fire department dues are to be collected by the county and for the remission of the volunteer fire department dues to the volunteer fire department.
    2. However, an active member of a volunteer fire department whose annual volunteer fire department dues are collected in this manner may be exempt from the annual volunteer fire department dues at the discretion of the volunteer fire department in consideration of providing services to the volunteer fire department.
    1. The quorum court by majority vote may designate the geographical area that a volunteer fire department serves.
    2. Upon request by a volunteer fire department, the quorum court of each county involved may authorize a volunteer fire department to extend its geographical service area across the county boundary lines.
  1. The quorum court may establish its own countywide fire department, either regular or voluntary.
  2. This section does not change the authority of intergovernmental cooperation councils to enter into reciprocal agreements or to distribute funds under § 14-284-401 et seq. and § 26-57-614.
    1. If approved by ordinance by the governing body of an incorporated town or a city of the second class on the signed request of the fire chief and the chair and secretary of the board of directors, if any, of a volunteer fire department, an incorporated town or a city of the second class located in the volunteer fire department district that is not served by a fire department may be included in the fire protection area with the volunteer fire department dues levied and collected in the same manner as in the unincorporated areas served by the volunteer fire department district.
      1. The governing body of the incorporated town or city of the second class by ordinance shall call for an election on the ordinance under subdivision (e)(1) of this section.
      2. The issue may be placed on the ballot at a special election by order of the governing body in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq., and the special election shall be held by August 1.
  3. At the discretion of a volunteer fire department, a church served by a volunteer fire department may be exempt from volunteer fire department dues if the church is exempt from real property taxes.
      1. By December 15 of each year or upon the creation of a volunteer fire department, a volunteer fire department that uses or intends to use the county collector for collection of the volunteer fire department dues shall file an annual report with the county clerk in any county in which a portion of the volunteer fire department is located.
      2. The county clerk shall not charge any costs or fees for filing the annual report.
      3. The volunteer fire department shall deliver a filed copy of the annual report to the county collector within five (5) days of filing.
    1. The annual report shall contain the following information as of December 15 of the current calendar year:
      1. Identification of the volunteer fire department board members and contact information;
      2. The contact information for the volunteer fire department chief;
      3. Information concerning to whom the official designated to remit the volunteer fire department dues is to pay volunteer fire department dues; and
      4. The amount of the annual dues charged by the volunteer fire department by parcel or on each residence or business having an occupiable structure.
  4. The official designated to remit the volunteer fire department dues under this section shall not remit the dues collected by the county collector to any volunteer fire department until the annual report has been filed.
  5. A volunteer fire department that is required to file a report under § 14-86-2102 is not required to file a separate report under this section.
  6. This section applies to all volunteer fire departments, however organized.

History. Acts 1977, No. 512, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-455; Acts 1991, No. 1038, § 1; 1995, No. 744, § 1; 2001, No. 984, §§ 1, 2; 2003, No. 201, § 1; 2005, No. 2145, § 18; 2007, No. 96, § 1; 2007, No. 1049, § 36; 2009, No. 300, § 1; 2009, No. 1480, § 52; 2015, No. 693, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2007, No. 96, § 2, provided: “This act shall not be construed to invalidate any election under Arkansas Code § 14-20-108 held prior to the effective date of this act that levied volunteer fire department dues only on residences.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 300 inserted “quorum” in (a)(1)(A), (b), and (c); rewrote (a)(1)(B); added (e); and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 1480 substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a)(1)(B)(i)(b)(1).

The 2015 amendment inserted “volunteer fire department” preceding “dues” in (a)(1)(B)(i) (d)(2)(B) , (a)(2), (e)(1), (e)(2)(C), and (f); deleted “or quarterly” following “annual” in (a)(1)(A); inserted present (a)(1)(B)(i) (c) and redesignated former (a)(1)(B)(i) (c) as (a)(1)(B)(i) (d) ; in (a)(1)(B)(i) (d)(1) , inserted “of volunteer fire department dues,” “or the county clerk determines that the number of signatures of registered voters is sufficient and the quorum court dispenses with a special election,” and “volunteer fire department” preceding “dues shall be”; in (a)(3), substituted “whose annual volunteer fire department dues” for “whose annual or quarterly dues” and “annual volunteer fire department dues at the discretion” for “annual or quarterly dues charged by the volunteer fire department at the discretion”; substituted “to extend its geographical service area” for “to serve a geographical area to extend” in (b)(2); substituted “signed request of” for “request of and signed by” in (e)(1); and added (g) through (j).

Cross References. Civil immunity of volunteer firefighters, § 16-5-101.

14-20-109. Rural solid waste disposal services.

    1. The quorum court of each county is authorized to establish garbage and trash collecting services, solid waste disposal facilities, and similar services for the benefit of the rural residents of the counties to provide, for such rural residents, services comparable to those provided within cities and unincorporated towns.
        1. The court may assess reasonable fees to be paid by each property owner, or renter of property, benefiting from such services.
        2. The courts shall establish the amount of such fees and the methods of collection thereof.
      1. The courts may authorize the counties to contract with one (1) or more public utilities or municipally owned and operated utilities within the cities and towns of the county to collect the fees to be remitted to the county, after retaining therefrom a reasonable service charge agreed to by the court and the city or town to defray the cost of collecting the fees.
  1. The provisions of this section shall be supplemental to the existing laws of this state governing the powers and duties of the quorum courts and are intended to repeal only such laws or parts of laws specifically in conflict with it.

History. Acts 1977, No. 473, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-453, 17-454.

Case Notes

Cited: Ark. County v. Burris, 308 Ark. 490, 825 S.W.2d 590 (1992).

14-20-110. Marriage officials.

The county quorum courts may appoint special officials to solemnize marriages within their respective counties. However, the maximum number of such officials shall not exceed two (2) per ten thousand (10,000), or fraction thereof, population in the county as determined by the last census.

History. Acts 1977, No. 95, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-449.

14-20-111. Marriage license fee.

  1. The quorum court of any county may levy, in addition to fees and taxes now charged, a fee not to exceed five dollars ($5.00) on each application for a marriage license. Such a fee shall be collected by the county clerk at the time application is made.
  2. All fees collected under the provisions of this section shall be credited by the county treasurer to the county general fund and shall be appropriated by the quorum court as provided by law.

History. Acts 1953, No. 45, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-423; Acts 1989, No. 465, § 1.

Cross References. Marriage license fee, § 21-6-406.

Other marriage license fee provisions, § 20-7-123.

14-20-112. County gross receipts tax on hotels and restaurants.

        1. Any county in which there is located a municipality that levies a gross receipts tax on hotels, motels, restaurants, or similar establishments as authorized in the Advertising and Promotion Commission Act, § 26-75-601 et seq., may levy by ordinance of the county quorum court a like tax at the same rate as the levying municipality or at a lesser rate upon the gross receipts from furnishing of hotel or motel accommodations and upon the gross receipts of restaurants or similar establishments located within the county outside the boundaries of the levying municipality.
        2. The tax levied under this subdivision (a)(1)(A) shall apply to hotels, motels, restaurants, or similar establishments located within unincorporated areas of the county.
      1. Any county in which there is located a municipality that levies a gross receipts tax on hotels, motels, restaurants, or similar establishments as authorized in § 26-75-701 et seq. may levy by ordinance of the county quorum court a like tax at the same rate as the levying municipality or at a lesser rate upon the furnishing of hotel or motel accommodations, the admission price to tourist attractions as defined in § 26-63-401, the gross receipts of gift shops referred to in § 26-75-701, restaurants, or similar establishments located within any township in the county outside the boundaries of the levying municipality.
    1. When any county levies the tax authorized in this section, the tax so levied shall be paid by the persons, firms, and corporations liable therefor and shall be collected by the levying county in the same manner and at the same time as the gross receipts tax levied by the Arkansas Gross Receipts Act of 1941, § 26-52-101 et seq.
        1. The quorum court levying such tax and the governing body of the municipality levying a like tax may enter into an agreement whereby the tax levied by the county will be collected by the municipality.
        2. If the tax levied by the county is collected by the municipality, all revenues derived from the tax shall be deposited into the municipality's advertising and promotion fund.
      1. If the tax is collected by the levying county, all revenues derived from the tax, after deducting an amount equal to the cost of collecting it, shall be deposited into the advertising and promotion fund of the municipality located within the county that levies a like tax.
      2. All such funds deposited in the municipality's advertising and promotion fund shall be used for the purposes prescribed in §§ 26-75-601 — 26-75-613.
  1. When any county levies a tax as authorized in this section, the tax shall be reported and remitted in the manner and on forms prescribed by the county or the municipality.

History. Acts 1977, No. 178, §§ 3-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-450 — 17-452; Acts 2001, No. 1647, § 1; 2005, No. 2314, § 1; 2007, No. 182, § 12; 2007, No. 473, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. The introductory language of Acts 2001, No. 1647, § 1 provided: “Arkansas Code 14-20-112 (a)… is amended to read as follows”; however, Acts 2001, No. 1647, § 1 only set out subdivision (a)(1) and did not specifically repeal subdivision (a)(2). Subdivision (a)(2) has been printed at the request of the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

Cross References. County sales and use taxes for capital improvements, § 26-74-201 et seq.

Taxation generally, § 26-73-101.

14-20-113. Collection of delinquent taxes.

The quorum court in each county shall provide for the collection of delinquent taxes within the county and shall place by ordinance the responsibility therefor in the office of the county collector or the combined office of sheriff and collector, or may provide for the collection of delinquent taxes by a person designated by a board composed of the county judge, an appropriate representative of the public schools in the county, and the mayor of the county seat or of each county seat in the case of those counties having two (2) county seats.

History. Acts 1977, No. 495, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-401.1.

Case Notes

Purpose.

By the enactment of Ark. Const. Amend. 55, §§ 21-6-301 and 21-6-310, and this section, there was no intent to abolish the office of delinquent tax collector; rather only an intent to abolish the fee compensation system. Bahil v. Scribner, 265 Ark. 834, 581 S.W.2d 334 (1979).

14-20-114. Extension of levies on tax books.

The taxes levied for county purposes named and specified shall be extended upon the tax books under the general head of county expenses, and warrants drawn by the clerk shall specify the fund or appropriation upon which they are drawn, respectively, and shall be made payable to the person in whose favor the allowance was made, or to the bearer. When so lawfully drawn and issued, the warrants shall be receivable by the sheriff and collector of revenue of the county for all licenses or debts due to the county.

History. Acts 1879, No. 77, § 10, p. 109; C. & M. Dig., § 1987; Pope's Dig., § 2532; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-413.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1879, No. 77, § 14, provided that nothing in the act shall be so construed as to enlarge the functions or powers of the County Court of Sebastian County as under existing laws.

Case Notes

Warrants.

Warrants issued should state on their face the purpose for which issued. Lake v. Tatum, 175 Ark. 90, 1 S.W.2d 554 (1927).

14-20-115. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning fund for costs of court personnel and equipment in counties of 65,000 or more, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 1256, § 20, as amended by Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1988 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 33, § 1; 1991, No. 786, § 11.

14-20-116. Youth accident prevention program.

  1. The quorum courts of the counties of Arkansas are hereby authorized by ordinance to establish a youth accident prevention program designed to educate junior and senior high school students about driving while intoxicated, seat belt safety, and injuries resulting from drinking and driving and not being belted. These programs may be conducted up to four (4) days in length, and the cost of salaries, equipment, supplies, and other items related to the operation of the program shall be paid by the county.
  2. The district courts of Arkansas are hereby authorized to allocate up to five dollars ($5.00) of every fine, penalty, and forfeiture imposed and collected from every person convicted of a moving traffic offense for any youth accident prevention program created under subsection (a) of this section, and the same allocation shall pertain to any bond which is forfeited for any such offenses. These funds are to be remitted to the county treasurer and deposited into a special fund. Funds may be expended from this fund only for the purposes of this section.

History. Acts 1993, No. 594, §§ 1, 2.

Cross References. District courts generally, § 16-17-101 et seq.

Chapter 21 County Funds

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp. & Coun., § 637 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Clerks of courts to pay money to county treasurers, § 16-20-106.

Depositories for public funds, § 19-8-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1883, No. 37, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 107, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 210, § 2: approved Mar. 27, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1931, No. 201, § 2: approved Mar. 26, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and ascertained that there are public funds on deposit in closed banks in this State and that it is imperative that said banks be re-opened that the public may have the benefit of said funds; that an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this act should be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1943, No. 60, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1977, No. 276, § 3: Feb. 28, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some cases when Amendment 49 bonds have been wholly retired, unexpended balances remain in the bond redemption fund; and that these funds could be put to effective use by the county, city or town that initially issued the bond. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 564, § 3: Jan. 1, 2020.

14-21-101. Comprehensive financial management system.

    1. In order to provide necessary financial information for the county judge, the members and committees of the county quorum court, and other interested officers and departments of the county, the Legislative Auditor is authorized and directed to develop a comprehensive financial management system for appropriate funds of the various counties in the State of Arkansas.
    2. This financial management system shall provide for adequate controls over revenues, expenditures, and balances to assure that current information will always be available concerning the financial condition of the county and its various offices and departments.
    3. The system shall include a budgeting and accounting system designed to classify the receipt of and the appropriations and disbursements of county funds in accordance with the object and purpose of the expenditures in such detail as will be suitable for an analysis of the operations of all county offices and departments and which will provide a breakdown and itemization of all expenditures compatible with and comparable to the appropriations of the quorum court.
  1. In the event any county is of the opinion that its system of budgeting and accounting for appropriated county funds is such that it equals or exceeds the basic system prescribed by this section, the county, acting through the quorum court, may request a review of its system by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee. If the committee concurs with the county, the committee may issue a certificate to the county stating that the county's budgeting and accounting system is of such degree of sophistication that the basic requirements of this section are being met and exempting the county from the requirements of the particulars of the system prescribed by this section.

History. Acts 1981, No. 122, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-609.

Publisher's Notes. The former last two sentences of subdivision (a)(3) of this section provided that the Legislative Auditor should develop the system and prepare a manual for implementing it, to be supplied to all counties, on or before October 1, 1981, and that the system developed by the auditor should be implemented by the counties before January 1, 1983.

Cross References. Division of Legislative Audit, § 10-4-401 et seq.

14-21-102. Annual financial report. [Effective until January 1, 2020.]

    1. The clerk of the county court and the county treasurer shall make out or cause to be made out a full and complete annual financial report of the county, using the financial records of the county clerk and county treasurer, giving:
      1. The treasurer's report of the beginning cash balance;
      2. The treasurer's report as to the amount of revenue from each source classification;
      3. The treasurer's report as to the ending cash balance;
      4. The county clerk's report as to the amount expended during the fiscal year for all purposes; and
      5. A statement of the bonded indebtedness and short-term indebtedness of the county.
    2. The annual county financial report shall include all operating accounts of the county for which the quorum court has appropriating control.
    3. The treasurer shall submit all reports required under this section to the clerk of the county court by March 1.
      1. The clerk of the county court shall cause to be published one (1) time in one (1) newspaper published in the county the annual financial report of the county.
      2. If no newspaper is published in the county, then the clerk of the county court shall cause the annual financial report of the county to be published one (1) time in the newspaper having the largest circulation in the county.
    1. The annual financial report shall be published by March 15 of each year for the previous fiscal year of the county.
  1. All costs associated with the publication of the annual financial report of the county may be prorated equally between the clerk of the county court and the county treasurer.

History. Acts 1993, No. 538, §§ 2, 3; 1995, No. 232, § 4; 2009, No. 315, § 1; 2011, No. 614, § 5.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 14-21-102, concerning semiannual financial statement, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 538, § 1. The former section was derived from Acts 1967, No. 314, § 1; 1981, No. 677, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-710.

For text of section effective January 1, 2020, see the following version.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “and short-term indebtedness” in (a)(3).

The 2011 amendment inserted “and the county treasurer” in (a)(1); rewrote (a)(1)(A) through (D); added (a)(1)(E); rewrote (a)(3); deleted the last sentence in (b)(1)(A); added (b)(1)(B); rewrote (b)(2); and added (c).

14-21-102. Annual financial report. [Effective January 1, 2020.]

    1. The clerk of the county court and the county treasurer shall make out or cause to be made out a full and complete annual financial report of the county, using the financial records of the county clerk and county treasurer, giving:
      1. The treasurer's report of the beginning cash balance;
      2. The treasurer's report as to the amount of revenue from each source classification;
      3. The treasurer's report as to the ending cash balance;
      4. The county clerk's report as to the amount expended during the fiscal year for all purposes; and
      5. A statement of the bonded indebtedness and short-term indebtedness of the county.
    2. The annual county financial report shall include all operating accounts of the county for which the quorum court has appropriating control.
    3. The treasurer shall submit all reports required under this section to the clerk of the county court by March 1.
      1. The clerk of the county court shall publish the annual financial report of the county:
        1. One (1) time in one (1) newspaper published in the county; and
        2. On a website owned or maintained by the county, the state, or the Association of Arkansas Counties.
      2. If a newspaper is not published in the county, the clerk of the county court shall publish the annual financial report of the county one (1) time in the newspaper having the largest circulation in the county.
    1. The annual financial report shall be published by March 15 of each year for the previous fiscal year of the county.
  1. All costs associated with the publication of the annual financial report of the county may be prorated equally between the clerk of the county court and the county treasurer.

History. Acts 1993, No. 538, §§ 2, 3; 1995, No. 232, § 4; 2009, No. 315, § 1; 2011, No. 614, § 5; 2019, No. 564, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 14-21-102, concerning semiannual financial statement, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 538, § 1. The former section was derived from Acts 1967, No. 314, § 1; 1981, No. 677, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-710.

For text of section effective until January 1, 2020, see the preceding version.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “and short-term indebtedness” in (a)(3).

The 2011 amendment inserted “and the county treasurer” in (a)(1); rewrote (a)(1)(A) through (D); added (a)(1)(E); rewrote (a)(3); deleted the last sentence in (b)(1)(A); added (b)(1)(B); rewrote (b)(2); and added (c).

The 2019 amendment substituted “shall publish the annual financial report” for “shall cause to be published one (1) time in one (1) newspaper published in the county the annual financial report” in (b)(1)(A); added (b)(1)(A)(i) and (b)(1)(A)(ii); and substituted “If a newspaper is not published in the county, the clerk of the county court shall publish the annual financial report of the county one (1) time” for “If no newspaper is published in the county, then the clerk of the county court shall cause the annual financial report of the county to be published one (1) time” in (b)(1)(B).

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 564, § 3: Jan. 1, 2020.

14-21-103. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the county salary fund, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 232, § 11. The section was derived from Acts 1967, No. 184, § 1; 1975, No. 370, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-606, 17-608.

14-21-104. County funds in State Treasury.

    1. Whenever there is any money or funds of any kind, from whatever source derived, in the State Treasury belonging to any county, the county court of the county shall make an order authorizing and directing the county treasurer to draw them.
    2. Upon the county treasurer presenting to the Auditor of State a copy of the order, duly certified to by the clerk of the county court, under his or her official seal, the Auditor of State shall draw his or her warrant upon the Treasurer of State for whatever money or funds there may at the time be in the State Treasury belonging to the county. Then the county treasurer shall execute to the Auditor of State a receipt for the warrant. Upon the presentation of the warrant of the Auditor of State, the Treasurer of State shall pay it.
  1. Upon the receipt of any such funds or money by the county treasurer of any county, he or she shall receipt therefor in duplicate, one (1) of which shall be retained by the Treasurer of State and the other of which shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county, and the county treasurer shall thereupon charge himself or herself with the funds or money so received by him or her as county treasurer.

History. Acts 1883, No. 37, §§ 1, 2, p. 59; 1883, No. 107, § 1, p. 191; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1925-1928; Pope's Dig., §§ 2441-2444; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-601, 17-602.

14-21-105. Funds in closed banks.

  1. Where various funds of counties are on deposit in a closed bank and the bank could be reopened by agreements for deferred payments of deposits, the county court of any county in which any closed bank is situated is authorized, by proper order of the county court, to consent to deferred payments of deposits of all public funds in the closed bank upon such terms as may be fixed by the order of the court.
  2. This section shall apply to all county general, roads, school, and all other funds which are handled by county treasurers.

History. Acts 1931, No. 201, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2624; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-604.

14-21-106. Surplus funds.

When any surplus is left remaining unexpended and unappropriated in the county general fund, the county road fund, the school fund, or any other special fund provided by law from any previous year, the county court of any such county is authorized, by proper order made and entered, to transfer and add the surplus to the respective funds of which the surplus remains unexpended and use it as the revenues for the current fiscal year into which it is transferred and added if all outstanding indebtedness for the fiscal years in which the surplus accrued has been paid.

History. Acts 1929, No. 210, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2623; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-603.

Case Notes

Cited: Western Sur. Co. v. Washington County, 244 Ark. 1227, 429 S.W.2d 99 (1968).

14-21-107. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of unexpended balances in bond redemption funds, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1150, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1943, No. 60, § 1; 1973, No. 51, § 1; 1977, No. 276, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-605, 17-607.

14-21-108. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning photographic images of checks for county governments, was repealed by Acts 2001, No. 469, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1997, No. 121, § 1.

14-21-109. Abolished positions — Transfer of designated funds.

If county funds are designated for a specific position in the county and the position is subsequently abolished, the county court, by appropriate order, may transfer any remaining balance of county funds designated for that purpose to the county general revenue fund to be used for all purposes for which the county general revenue fund may be used.

History. Acts 2013, No. 958, § 2.

Subchapter 2 — County Drug Enforcement Fund

14-21-201. Establishment of drug enforcement fund.

  1. Ordinance. Each quorum court may by ordinance establish a drug enforcement fund. The ordinance shall set a maximum amount for the fund, not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). The drug enforcement fund shall be administered by the county sheriff in accordance with the provisions and procedures of this subchapter. All funds shall initially be deposited into a drug enforcement fund bank account. The bank account shall be established at a bank located in the State of Arkansas and authorized by law to receive the deposit of public funds.
  2. Source of Funds. The source of all funds deposited into the drug enforcement fund shall be funds appropriated by the quorum court. The initial funding and any subsequent reimbursements to the drug enforcement fund shall be appropriated by the quorum court and subject to the normal disbursement procedures required by law. No funds from other sources, including seized property, shall be deposited into the drug enforcement fund.

History. Acts 1997, No. 362, § 1; 2013, No. 154, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” in the second sentence of (a).

14-21-202. Restrictions on use of funds.

  1. Drug enforcement funds shall be used only for direct expenses associated with the investigation of the criminal drug laws of this state, including without limitation:
    1. The purchase of evidence;
    2. The payment of informants;
    3. The relocation or security of witnesses, or both;
    4. Emergency supply purchases; and
    5. Emergency travel expenses.
  2. Drug enforcement funds shall not be used for:
    1. Equipment purchases or leasing, salaries or wages, professional services, training, or any other purpose not directly related to a criminal drug investigation; or
    2. Administrative costs associated with the sheriff's office.

History. Acts 1997, No. 362, § 2; 2019, No. 383, § 5.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (a), substituted “shall be used only” for “may only be used” and substituted “including without limitation” for “such as, but not limited to”; added the (a)(1) through (a)(5), (b)(1), and (b)(2) designations; added “The” in (a)(2) and (a)(3); in (a)(3), substituted “or” for “and/or”, and added “or both”; substituted “shall” for “may” in the introductory language of (b); and deleted “In addition, these funds may not be used for” from the beginning of (b)(2).

14-21-203. Approval of claims by county judge.

  1. After a quorum court has approved a proper ordinance establishing a drug enforcement fund, set the maximum amount of the fund, and appropriated funds for the fund, the county judge may approve a county claim for the initial establishment of the drug enforcement fund.
  2. If adequate appropriations and funds are available, the drug enforcement fund may be replenished upon presentation and approval of a claim as provided in the normal county disbursement procedures. The total amount of funds held in the drug enforcement fund bank account and cash funds held by the sheriff's office shall not exceed the maximum amount established by the quorum court.

History. Acts 1997, No. 362, § 3.

14-21-204. Accounting records.

Accounting records shall be maintained by the sheriff's office for the receipt, disbursement, accounting, and documentation of funds according to the written procedures established by the Division of Legislative Audit.

History. Acts 1997, No. 362, § 4.

Chapter 22 County Purchasing Procedures

Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1975, No. 439, § 7: Mar. 17, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the efficient operation of the affairs of county government necessitates the establishment of realistic and reasonable purchasing procedures, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to make immediate changes and improvements in the existing laws governing county purchasing procedures, thereby promoting efficiency in the operation of county government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 617, § 7: Mar. 28, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the efficient operation of the affairs of county government necessitates the establishment of realistic and reasonable purchasing procedures, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to make immediate changes and improvements in the existing laws governing county purchasing procedures, thereby promoting efficiency in the operation of county government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 306, § 3: Mar. 4, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is impractical and contrary to the best interests of the citizens of this State that advanced emergency medical services provided by a private nonprofit corporation to counties be covered by the County Purchasing Law and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide such exemption. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 745, § 4: Aug. 1, 1985.

Acts 1989, No. 879, § 4: Mar. 22, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that present law requires counties to purchase by competitive bids used pipes if the purchase would be in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000.) that the opportunity now exists for counties to purchase such materials at a substantially lower price than they could purchase it if they are required to take bids due to the fact that the used pipe will not be available but for a short period of time; and that this Act should therefore be given immediate effect. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 756, § 25: Apr. 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that motor vehicle dealers are experiencing economic difficulties related to the state of the national economy and the motor vehicle industry in particular; that an unprecedented number of motor vehicle dealers may terminate their franchises as a result of these economic conditions; and that this act is immediately necessary to assist dealers that are facing possible termination of their franchise. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

ALR.

Waiver of competitive bidding requirements for state and local public building and construction contracts. 40 A.L.R.4th 968.

Amount of appropriation as limitation on damages for breach of contract recoverable by one contracting with government agency. 40 A.L.R.4th 998.

Public contracts: low bidder's monetary relief against state or local agency for nonaward of contract. 65 A.L.R.4th 93.

Validity, construction, and effect of state and local laws requiring governmental units to give “purchase preference” to goods manufactured or services performed in state. 84 A.L.R.4th 419.

Validity, construction, and effect of requirement under state statute or local ordinance giving local or locally qualified contractors a percentage preference in determining lowest bid. 89 A.L.R.4th 587.

Case Notes

Purpose.

Purpose of this chapter is to regulate purchasing procedures. Mackey v. State, 257 Ark. 497, 519 S.W.2d 760 (1975).

14-22-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Commodities” means all supplies, goods, material, equipment, machinery, facilities, personal property, and services other than personal services, purchased for or on behalf of the county;
  2. “Formal bidding” means the procedure to be followed in the solicitation and receipt of sealed bids, wherein:
    1. Notice shall be given of the date, time, and place of opening of bids, and the names or a brief description and the specifications of the commodities for which bids are to be received, by one (1) insertion in a newspaper with a general circulation in the county, not less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty (30) days prior to the date fixed for opening such bids;
    2. Not less than ten (10) days in advance of the date fixed for opening the bids, notices and bid forms shall be furnished to all eligible bidders on the bid list for the class of commodities on which bids are to be received, and to all others requesting them; and
    3. At least ten (10) days in advance of the date fixed for opening bids, a copy of the notice of invitation to bid shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the county courthouse;
  3. “Open market purchases” means those purchases of commodities by any purchasing official in which competitive bidding is not required;
  4. “Purchase” means not only the outright purchase of a commodity, but also the acquisition of commodities under rental-purchase agreements or lease-purchase agreements or any other types of agreements whereby the county has an option to buy the commodity and to apply the rental payments on the purchase price thereof;
  5. “Purchase price” means the full sale or bid price of any commodity, without any allowance for trade-in;
  6. “Purchasing official” means any county official, individual, board, or commission, or his or her or its lawfully designated agent, with constitutional authority to contract or make purchases on behalf of the county;
  7. “Trade-in purchases” means all purchases where offers must be included with the bids of each bidder for trade-in allowance for used commodities; and
    1. “Used or secondhand motor vehicles, equipment, or machinery” means motor vehicles, equipment, or machinery at least one (1) year in age from the date of original manufacture or that has at least two hundred fifty (250) working hours' prior use or five thousand (5,000) miles' prior use.
      1. A purchase of a used motor vehicle, equipment, or machinery shall be accompanied by a statement in writing from the vendor on the bill of sale or other document that the motor vehicle, equipment, or machinery is at least one (1) year in age from the date of original manufacture or has been used a minimum of two hundred fifty (250) hours or driven a minimum of five thousand (5,000) miles.
      2. This statement shall be filed with the county clerk at the time of purchase.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 2; 1975, No. 439, § 2; 1975, No. 617, § 2; 1985, No. 844, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1602; Acts 2001, No. 219, § 1; 2009, No. 410, § 8; 2009, No. 756, § 21; 2015, No. 561, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 410 inserted “on the bill of sale or otherwise documenting” in (8)(B)(i).

The 2009 amendment by No. 756 inserted “on the bill of sale or other document” in (8)(B)(i).

The 2015 amendment, in (8)(A) and (B), substituted “one (1) year” for “two (2) years,” substituted two hundred fifty (250)” for “five hundred (500),” and substituted “five thousand (5,000)” for “ten thousand (10,000).”

Case Notes

Formal Bidding.

Purchase of voting machines without complying with subdivision (5) was invalid even though it was known that there were only two eligible bidders, who were notified and invited to submit bids and did submit bids. Davis v. Jerry, 245 Ark. 500, 432 S.W.2d 831 (1968).

14-22-102. Applicability.

  1. It is unlawful for any county official to make any purchases with county funds in excess of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), unless the method of purchasing prescribed in this chapter is followed.
  2. This chapter shall not apply to any purchases under twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or to the purchase of commodities set forth in § 14-22-106.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 1; 1975, No. 439, § 1; 1975, No. 617, § 1; 1985, No. 745, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1601; Acts 1995, No. 431, § 1; 2003, No. 209, § 1; 2007, No. 249, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” in (a) and (b).

Case Notes

Cited: Dean Leasing, Inc. v. Van Buren County, 27 Ark. App. 134, 767 S.W.2d 316 (1989).

14-22-103. Penalty.

Any person or official who intentionally violates the provisions of this chapter upon conviction shall be fined in any amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). In addition thereto, he or she may be removed from his or her office or position of employment with the county.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1613.

14-22-104. Purchases permitted.

All purchases of commodities made by any county purchasing official with county funds, except those specifically exempted by this chapter, shall be made as follows:

  1. Formal bidding shall be required in each instance in which the estimated purchase price shall equal or exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000);
  2. Open market purchases may be made of any commodities where the purchase price is less than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000); and
  3. No purchasing official shall parcel or split any items of commodities or estimates with the intent or purpose to change the classification or to enable the purchase to be made under a less restrictive procedure.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 3; 1975, No. 439, § 3; 1975, No. 617, § 3; 1985, No. 745, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1603; Acts 1995, No. 431, § 2; 2003, No. 209, § 2; 2007, No. 249, § 2.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” in (1) and (2).

Case Notes

Purpose.

Purpose of this section is to regulate purchasing procedures. Mackey v. State, 257 Ark. 497, 519 S.W.2d 760 (1975).

Formal Bidding.

The purchase of sixty voting machines at a cost far in excess of the statutory amount required formal bidding under subdivision (1). Davis v. Jerry, 245 Ark. 500, 432 S.W.2d 831 (1968).

Parcel or Split.

Mere suspicion was not enough to prove that defendant intentionally violated the prohibition against splitting purchases to avoid the necessity of soliciting competitive bids where the evidence showed only that materials of the same kind were purchased on successive days for amounts under the statutory requirements. Mackey v. State, 257 Ark. 497, 519 S.W.2d 760 (1975).

Purchases.

Approval by county judge of purchases already made by others does not amount to purchases by the judge, and therefore a judge does not violate the purchasing restrictions, where no conspiracy between the judge and those making the purchases is proved. Mackey v. State, 257 Ark. 497, 519 S.W.2d 760 (1975).

Cited: Dean Leasing, Inc. v. Van Buren County, 27 Ark. App. 134, 767 S.W.2d 316 (1989).

14-22-105. Purchase of motor fuels and accessories.

For the purpose of this chapter, any county within this state may be considered a state agency for the purpose of purchasing gasoline, oil, and other motor fuels, and batteries, tires, and tubes for motor vehicles. Any county purchasing agent within this state may, by complying with Acts 1955, No. 313, §§ 13, 14 [repealed], purchase such commodities through the state purchasing agent under the authority set forth in these statutes.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1611.

Publisher's Notes. For present law on state purchasing, see the Arkansas Procurement Law, § 19-11-201 et seq..

14-22-106. Purchases exempted from soliciting bids.

The following listed commodities may be purchased without soliciting bids:

  1. Perishable foodstuffs for immediate use;
  2. Unprocessed feed for livestock and poultry;
  3. Advanced emergency medical services provided by a nonprofit corporation and proprietary medicines when specifically requested by a professional employee;
  4. Books, manuals, periodicals, films, and copyrighted educational aids for use in libraries and other informational material for institutional purposes;
  5. Scientific equipment and parts therefor;
  6. Replacement parts and labor for repairs of machinery and equipment;
  7. Commodities available only from the United States Government;
    1. Any commodities needed in instances in which an unforeseen and unavoidable emergency has arisen in which human life, health, or public property is in jeopardy.
    2. An emergency purchase under subdivision (8)(A) of this section shall not be approved unless a statement in writing is attached to the purchase order describing the emergency necessitating the purchase of the commodity without competitive bidding;
  8. Utility services, the rates for which are subject to regulation by a state agency or a federal regulatory agency;
  9. Sand, gravel, soil, lumber, used pipe, or used steel;
  10. Used or secondhand motor vehicles, machinery, or equipment, except a used or secondhand motor vehicle that has been under lease to a county when the vehicle has fewer than five thousand (5,000) miles of use shall not be purchased by the county when it has been used five thousand (5,000) miles or more except upon competitive bids as provided in this chapter;
  11. Machinery, equipment, facilities, or other personal property purchased or acquired for or in connection with the securing and developing of industry under the Municipalities and Counties Industrial Development Revenue Bond Law, § 14-164-201 et seq., or any other provision of law pertaining to the securing and developing of industry;
  12. Registered livestock to be used for breeding purposes;
  13. Motor fuels, oil, asphalt, asphalt oil, and natural gas;
  14. Motor vehicles, equipment, machinery, material, or supplies offered for sale at public auction or through a process requiring sealed bids;
  15. All goods and services that are regularly provided to state agencies and county government by the Division of Correction's various penal industries;
    1. New motor vehicles purchased from a licensed automobile dealership located in Arkansas for an amount not to exceed the fleet price awarded by the Office of State Procurement and in effect at the time the county submits the purchase order for the same make and model motor vehicle.
    2. The purchase amount for a new motor vehicle may include additional options up to six hundred dollars ($600) over the fleet price awarded;
  16. Renewal or an extension of the term of an existing contract;
  17. Purchase of insurance for county employees, including without limitation health insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, life insurance, risk management services, or dental insurance;
  18. Purchases made through programs of the National Association of Counties or the Association of Arkansas Counties;
  19. Goods or services if the quorum court has approved by resolution the purchase of goods or services through competitive bidding or procurement procedures used by:
    1. The United States Government or one (1) of its agencies;
    2. Another state; or
    3. An association of governments or governmental agencies including associations of governments or governmental agencies below the state level; and
    1. Goods or services available only from a single source.
    2. A purchase under this subdivision (22) shall be supported with:
      1. Documentation concerning the exclusivity of the single source; and
      2. A county court order filed with the county clerk that sets forth the basis for the single source procurement.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 6; 1975, No. 439, §§ 5, 6; 1975, No. 617, §§ 5, 6; 1981, No. 306, § 1; 1985, No. 844, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1606; Acts 1989, No. 879, § 1; 1991, No. 786, § 12; 1993, No. 237, § 1; 2001, No. 219, § 2; 2007, No. 13, § 1; 2009, No. 410, §§ 9, 10; 2009, No. 756, § 22; 2011, No. 1044, § 1; 2013, No. 465, § 1; 2015, No. 561, § 2; 2019, No. 910, § 846.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Ark. Const., Amend. 62, § 11, provides that all provisions of the Arkansas Constitution, or amendments thereto, in conflict with Ark. Const., Amend. 62, including Ark. Const., Amends. 17 and 49, are repealed.

Acts 1991, No. 786, § 37, provided:

“The enactment and adoption of this Act shall not repeal, expressly or impliedly, the acts passed at the regular session of the 78th General Assembly. All such acts shall have full effect and, so far as those acts intentionally vary from or conflict with any provision contained in this Act, those acts shall have the effect of subsequent acts and as amending or repealing the appropriate parts of the Arkansas Code of 1987.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 410 inserted “oil, asphalt, asphalt oil, and natural gas” in (14) and made a related change; and added (17) through (20).

The 2009 amendment by No. 756 subdivided (8) and inserted “under subdivision (8)(A) of this section” in (8)(B); deleted “or pursuant to the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 49 [repealed]” following “under” in (12); inserted “oil, asphalt, asphalt oil, and natural gas” in (14); added (17) and (18); and made related and minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendment added (21).

The 2013 amendment added (22).

The 2015 amendment, in (11), deleted “that” following “except” and substituted “five thousand (5,000)” for “ten thousand (10,000)” twice.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction’s” for “Department of Correction’s” in (16).

Case Notes

Attached Statement.

The purpose of the statement requirement in subdivision (8) is likely to assure that the exemption only applies to equipment that is truly used equipment. Robinson v. Clark Contracting Co., 992 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1993).

Where a party did not timely file a subdivision (8) statement, the party's substantial compliance as to the time of filing allowed the exemption in subdivision (11) to be applicable. Robinson v. Clark Contracting Co., 992 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1993).

Nonexempt Purchases.

The purchase of voting machines is not within the exceptions enumerated in this section. Davis v. Jerry, 245 Ark. 500, 432 S.W.2d 831 (1968).

14-22-107. List of eligible bidders.

  1. The county purchasing official shall establish and maintain a list of eligible bidders covering all commodities and shall furnish copies of it to all purchasing officials of the county.
  2. Any firm which desires to bid and have its name on the list of prospective bidders shall notify the purchasing official in writing of this desire, setting forth the class and description of commodities on which it desires to bid and the firm's qualifications as a responsible bidder.
  3. Every effort shall be made by the purchasing official to notify all eligible bidders before purchases are made.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1607.

14-22-108. Bidding procedure.

  1. All bids which require either formal or informal bidding shall be opened in public and read at the time and place specified in the notice.
  2. The awarding of contracts need not be upon the day of the opening of the bids but may be at a later date to be determined by the purchasing official.
  3. In order to assure that the bidder will accept and perform a contract under the terms of his or her bid, the purchasing official may require bids to be accompanied by certified check or surety bond furnished by a surety company authorized to do business in this state in such a reasonable amount as the purchasing official shall determine.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1608.

14-22-109. Descriptions and specifications.

  1. Descriptions and specifications shall be sufficiently restricted or specific so as to exclude cheap or inferior commodities which are not suitable or practicable for the purpose for which they are to be used, but at no time shall they be so specific in detail as to restrict or eliminate competitive bidding of any items of comparable quality and coming within a reasonably close price range.
  2. Brand names may be used to simplify or indicate the general description of the commodities required, but at no time, except for repair parts or items for use with existing equipment and machines or other health aids requested by a professional employee, shall such names be used to indicate any preference or to prevent bidding on commodities of like quality and coming within reasonably close price range.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 4; 1975, No. 439, § 4; 1975, No. 617, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1604.

14-22-110. Testing and examination of products.

  1. The purchasing official is authorized to establish and enforce standards for all commodities for which formal bidding is required and to make or cause to be made any test, examination, or analysis necessary therefor. He or she may require samples to be submitted and a certified analysis to accompany bids prior to awarding contracts.
  2. After the bids have been opened, the lowest responsible bidder may be required to submit his or her product or article to further testing and examination prior to awarding the contract.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 4; 1975, No. 439, § 4; 1975, No. 617, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1604.

14-22-111. Awarding of contracts.

  1. All contracts shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, taking into consideration all relevant facts, including without limitation quality, time of performance, probability of performance, and location.
    1. Any bid may be rejected by the purchasing official.
      1. Where bids are rejected, but the proposed purchase is not abandoned, and the circumstances indicate that further solicitation for bids would be to the best interest of the county, new bids may be called for.
      2. If the low bid is not accepted, a written statement shall be made by the purchasing agent and filed with the county clerk giving reasons for such refusal.
  2. All bidders shall be given equal consideration under the provisions of this chapter, except that when the bid represents items manufactured or grown in the county or offered for sale by business establishments having their principal place of business in the county with the quality being equal to articles offered by competitors outside the county, then the bidder shall be allowed a differential of not to exceed three percent (3%) of the purchase price in determining the low bid. However, in each instance in which this bid preference is requested, the bidder must so indicate before the date and time fixed for opening the bids and thereafter furnish satisfactory proof if requested.
  3. In all cases where there are equal or tie bids, preference shall be given to residents or firms located and doing business in the county.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1605.

Case Notes

Cited: Massongill v. County of Scott, 329 Ark. 98, 947 S.W.2d 749 (1997).

14-22-112. Order of approval.

  1. No contract shall be awarded or any purchase made until it has been approved by the county court, and no contract shall be binding on any county until the court shall have issued its order of approval.
  2. The order of the court shall be properly docketed. All documents and bids pertaining to the solicitation of bids and awarding of contracts under the purchasing procedure of this chapter shall be filed with the county clerk, together with the order of the court, which shall be filed by the clerk.
  3. No claim filed with the county for payment of any commodity, the purchase of which is regulated by this chapter, shall be paid; or no warrant shall be issued by the county clerk for the payment of it until the order of the court approving it shall have been issued and filed with the clerk.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1609.

Case Notes

Cited: Dean Leasing, Inc. v. Van Buren County, 27 Ark. App. 134, 767 S.W.2d 316 (1989).

14-22-113. Trade-ins.

  1. In the case of a purchase contract in which trade-ins are being offered on the purchase of commodities, the full purchase price shall govern the classification or purchase procedure to be followed in the solicitation for bids and the awarding of the contract.
  2. The purchasing official shall determine, with respect to trade-ins, what procedure shall be for the best interest of the county. If he or she so determines, such equipment or machinery may be sold outright under the law as provided.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1610.

14-22-114. Failure of performance.

If any bidder to whom a purchase contract is awarded under the provisions of this chapter shall refuse or fail to perform the contract or to make delivery when required by the contract, or shall deliver commodities which are inferior or do not meet the specifications under the bid, the county may pursue any remedy available at law or in equity, including, without limitation, the voiding of the contract.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1610.

14-22-115. Legal counsel.

The purchasing official, upon approval of the county court, may call upon the prosecuting attorney of the district in which the county lies, or employ counsel for advice and aid in the preparation of necessary contracts and all other legal matters in connection with those purchases.

History. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 52, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1612.

Chapter 23 Claims Against Counties

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Indemnification by state for certain actions, § 21-9-304.

Immunity from tort liability, § 21-9-301 et seq.

Trees destroyed by State Plant Board, § 2-16-101.

Workers' compensation, § 14-26-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 30: effective on passage.

Acts 1873, No. 114, § 10: effective on passage.

Acts 1879, No. 16, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1881, No. 65, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 135, § 3: effective 90 days after passage.

Acts 1937, No. 193, § 4: approved Mar. 3, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Although the people of this State adopted Amendment No. 10 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas for 1874, and although its provisions are adequate if properly enforced, the same have not been enforced and has thereby brought about a condition of laxity on the part of our county officials relative to expending more funds than received during each fiscal year; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 299, § 6: approved Mar. 14, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It being found by the General Assembly that there are many counties in this state where the officers in good faith have allowed claims for highway purposes to accumulate prior to January 1, 1939, and with the intention of paying the same from Turnback funds due such counties prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas construing Act 193 of the Acts of 1937; and it being further found that there are many citizens of the state who in good faith hold claims against many counties for highway purposes that should be paid, but cannot now be paid under the present law; and it being further found that the fiscal affairs of many counties of this state are in a bad condition as a result of the failure of some county officers to comply strictly with the provisions of Amendment No. 10; an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1977, No. 756, § 4: Mar. 24, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is currently no means of approving claims made on the county other than by certification; that this process is time consuming, cumbersome, and unnecessary to insure honesty in claims presented to the county; that this Act would make the payment of claims less cumbersome and more efficient, resulting in a saving of time and effort. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance limiting the kinds or amount of actual damages recoverable in tort action against governmental unit. 43 A.L.R.4th 19.

Right of one government subdivision to sue another such subdivision for damages. 11 A.L.R.5th 630.

Am. Jur. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Est. & Waiv., § 127.

56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 680 et seq., 848 et seq.

57 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. & Coun. Tort., § 5 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

State Immunity and the Arkansas Claims Commission, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 180.

Hall v. University of Nevada: Sovereign Immunity and the Transitory Action, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 546.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 297 et seq.

14-23-101. Presentment to county court — Appeals.

  1. All persons having demands against any county shall present them, duly verified according to law, to the county court of the county for allowance or rejection.
  2. From the order of the court thereon, appeals may be prosecuted as provided by law. If on any such appeal the judgment of the county court is reversed, the judgment of reversal shall be certified by the court rendering it to the county court, and the court shall thereupon enter the judgment of the superior court as its own.

History. Acts 1879, No. 16, § 2, p. 13; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2025, 2026; Pope's Dig., §§ 2579, 2580; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-702.

Cross References. Allowance to set forth appropriation from which to be paid, § 14-20-104.

Appeal from county allowances to circuit court — Bond, Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 51.

Case Notes

Claims Allowed.

An allowance of interest on a judgment against a county is not a contract by a county to pay interest, and does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 1, prohibiting counties from lending credit. Nevada County v. Hicks, 50 Ark. 416, 8 S.W. 180 (1888).

County was liable for costs expended in procuring allowance, including fee for filing claim. Jefferson County v. Philpot, 66 Ark. 243, 50 S.W. 453 (1899).

Where construction of road was an accomplished fact, landowner's only remedy against county was to file a claim in the county court for just compensation for a completed taking, inasmuch as exclusive jurisdiction of a claim for compensation was vested in the county court as a matter relating to county roads, and the county could not be sued to recover this compensation by inverse condemnation proceedings. Chamberlain v. Newton County, 266 Ark. 516, 587 S.W.2d 4 (1979).

Claims Not Allowed.

A county is not the subject of garnishment, but may be required in equity to pay the creditor of its insolvent creditor. Riggin v. Hilliard, 56 Ark. 476, 20 S.W. 402 (1892).

County was not liable for clerk's fee for filing accounts of claimants against county. Prairie County v. Vaughan, 64 Ark. 203, 41 S.W. 420 (1897).

County was not liable to refund purchase money of tax land. Nevada County v. Dickey, 68 Ark. 160, 56 S.W. 779 (1900).

County was not liable for fee for filing warrants for allowance and reissuance. Duncan v. Scott County, 70 Ark. 607, 70 S.W. 314 (1902).

Jurisdiction.

This section does not prevent a citizen of another state from maintaining a suit against a county on its obligations or contracts in a federal court, when all other jurisdictional facts appear to give this jurisdiction. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 13 S. Ct. 695, 37 L. Ed. 546 (1893).

Cited: Pulaski County v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 54 (1883); Jones v. Capers, 231 Ark. 870, 333 S.W.2d 242 (1960); Deason v. City of Rogers, 247 Ark. 1061, 449 S.W.2d 410 (1970); Bigelow v. Union County, 287 Ark. 486, 701 S.W.2d 125 (1985).

14-23-102. Itemized account required.

In all cases, the county court shall require an itemized account of any claim presented to it for allowance, certified or sworn to as required by law, and, in addition, the court may require in all cases satisfactory evidence of the correctness of the account.

History. Acts 1873, No. 114, § 8, p. 277; C. & M. Dig., § 2030; Pope's Dig., § 2584; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-704.

Case Notes

In General.

On a claim against a county, it is error to allow charges that are not itemized. Desha County v. Jones, 51 Ark. 524, 11 S.W. 875 (1889); Clark County v. Callaway, 52 Ark. 361, 12 S.W. 756 (1890); St. Francis County v. Cummings, 55 Ark. 419, 18 S.W. 461 (1892).

Former statutes providing expense allowances for county officials were unconstitutional as applied, since, in some cases, the officials received the expenses in advance and made no accounting therefore and, in other cases, the officials filed a claim each month, but without an itemized account. Tedford v. Mears, 258 Ark. 450, 526 S.W.2d 1 (1975).

Appeals.

Where no objection is raised in a trial court that a claim against a county was not itemized, the objection cannot be raised on appeal. Hempstead County v. Wilson, 144 Ark. 267, 222 S.W. 48 (1920).

14-23-103. Examination of parties and documents.

In the investigation of any account, each county court may examine all the parties and witnesses, on oath, touching the matter, or any other matter arising under this act and shall have power to compel the production of all books, accounts, papers, or documents which may be necessary in the investigation of any matter arising under the provisions of this act.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 35; C. & M. Dig., § 2030; Pope's Dig., § 2584; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-705.

Meaning of “this act”. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, codified as §§ 14-15-801, 14-15-80514-15-807, 14-15-809, 14-23-103, 14-24-10214-24-105, 14-24-110, 14-24-111, and 21-7-211.

14-23-104. Court order for payment.

No moneys appropriated by the county quorum court from a tax levied or from any other source shall be paid out of the county treasury, except on an order duly made by the county court, while in session, and entered upon the records of its proceedings.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 11, p. 53; C. & M. Dig., § 2027; Pope's Dig., § 2581; Acts 1977, No. 756, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-701.

Case Notes

Payment.

Where circuit clerk and deputy sheriff rendered services for county in felony cases during 1937 and 1938 and the cases were disposed of in 1939, claims for such services accrued in 1939 and were allowable out of 1939 revenue, and not out of the revenue of previous years, and could still be paid out of such revenue in 1940 if there was a sufficient surplus at the close of 1939. Poinsett County v. Lady, 199 Ark. 657, 135 S.W.2d 665 (1940).

Cited: Rolfe v. Spybuck Drainage Dist. No. 1, 101 Ark. 29, 140 S.W. 988 (1911); Jones v. Capers, 231 Ark. 870, 333 S.W.2d 242 (1960).

14-23-105. Supporting documentation.

      1. Before any account, claim, demand, or fee bill shall be allowed by any county court, the court shall require the person, or his or her legal representative, claiming it to be due, to attach to the county claim for payment an itemized listing or numbered invoice which may be designated as supporting documentation.
      2. The itemized listing or numbered invoice shall be made a part of the county claim for payment and shall be approved for payment by the appropriate county elected official, or his or her designated representative, prior to the claim’s being filed and docketed with the county clerk.
      1. The allowed claim, demand, or fee bill, together with the itemized listing or numbered invoice for payment, shall be filed with the county clerk and kept in his or her office for the term of three (3) years, and these documents shall be subject to the inspection of any member of the grand jury of the county at each term of the grand jury or by the prosecuting attorney of the circuit court.
      2. Any claim which is a matter of record or any claim in the circuit court when it is duly certified down to the county court by the clerk of the circuit court shall be sufficient justification for the claim for the payment to be allowed.
  1. The county clerk shall preserve all claims and supporting documents for a period of seven (7) years after they have been audited by the Division of Legislative Audit and the audit report in regard thereto has been accepted and filed by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, at which time he or she may obtain a county court order to destroy them by shredding or other appropriate means.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 12, p. 57; 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 44, § 2, p. 51; 1881, No. 65, § 1, p. 130; C. & M. Dig., § 2029; Pope's Dig., § 2583; Acts 1957, No. 162, § 1; 1977, No. 756, § 2; 1983, No. 727, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-703.

Case Notes

In General.

Where county court makes an order directing the payment of a claim against the county, it is not necessary to comply with this section. West Twelfth St. Road Improv. Dist. v. Kinstley, 188 Ark. 77, 63 S.W.2d 980 (1933).

The requirements of this section are not merely formal, but a substantial and substantive part of the law, and must be substantially followed either in the exact words of the statute or in words of equal import and meaning. National Supply Co. v. Izard County, 190 Ark. 744, 81 S.W.2d 842 (1935).

Applicability.

This section does not apply if there is a special statute directing the manner in which claims are to be presented. Saline County v. Kinkead, 84 Ark. 329, 105 S.W. 581 (1907).

Certification.

Objection that account was not verified could not be raised for first time on appeal. Road Dist. of Crawford County v. Spradley, 151 Ark. 494, 236 S.W. 842 (1922) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

County was held liable for construction of bridge even though affidavit was defective. Woodruff County v. Road Improv. Dist., 165 Ark. 101, 262 S.W. 994 (1924) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

Petition to restore lost record of claim against county and of the allowance thereof by the county court that alleged the filing of the claim, duly verified, and its allowance by the county court, but that the order was not placed on the court records and no warrant was issued and that the claim had been lost, stated a cause of action. McDaniel v. Prairie County, 187 Ark. 38, 58 S.W.2d 200 (1933) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

Affidavit attached to claim against county alleging that account was true and correct, that no part of the account had been paid, and that it was due and payable was held not to comply with this section. National Supply Co. v. Izard County, 190 Ark. 744, 81 S.W.2d 842 (1935) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

No affidavit as required in ordinary contractual claims against a county was required on claims by circuit clerk and deputy sheriff for services rendered in criminal cases. Poinsett County v. Lady, 199 Ark. 657, 135 S.W.2d 665 (1940) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

A leasehold interest in realty was held to be a very real and tangible thing, and “services charged for or materials furnished” were actually furnished within meaning of this section when the lease contract was completed by formal ratification. Watts & Sanders v. Myatt, 216 Ark. 660, 226 S.W.2d 800 (1950) (decision prior to 1977 amendment).

Criminal Violations.

Before a conviction can be sustained on a charge of violating this section, there must be some showing of a willful violation of the statute inferring corrupt motives. Gordon v. State, 233 Ark. 256, 343 S.W.2d 780 (1961).

Jurisdiction.

This section does not take away the jurisdiction of a county court over claims against the county and does not prohibit the court from adjudicating the validity of a claim. Lamb & Rhodes v. Howton, 131 Ark. 211, 198 S.W. 521 (1917).

Cited: Jones v. Capers, 231 Ark. 870, 333 S.W.2d 242 (1960).

14-23-106. Allowance of more than amount due unlawful.

    1. It shall be unlawful for any county court in this state to allow any greater sums for any account, claim, demand, or fee bill against the county than the amount actually due, estimating one dollar ($1.00) in county warrants as at par with one dollar ($1.00) in lawful money of the United States, dollar for dollar, according to the legal or ordinary and customary compensation for services rendered, materials furnished, and salaries or fees of officers, when they are paid in such lawful money.
    2. No county court shall direct the issue of any warrants, nor, if directed in violation of this act, shall any clerk issue any such warrant upon such accounts, claims, demands, or fee bills for more than the actual amount so allowed, which is one dollar ($1.00) in lawful money of the United States for one dollar ($1.00) in county warrants, and no more.
  1. Any county court, or any judge of the county court, or clerk of the court who shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this act, or neglect or refuse to perform any duty imposed in this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and shall be removed from office.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, §§ 11, 26, p. 57; 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 44, § 1, p. 51; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2028, 2815; Pope's Dig., §§ 2582, 3533; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-706, 17-707.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1873, No. 31, codified as §§ 14-23-10414-23-106, 14-24-101, 14-319-101, 16-15-106, 16-15-107, 16-15-110, 16-15-112, 16-20-401, 16-67-208, 27-87-102, 27-87-301, 27-87-302, 27-87-401.

Case Notes

In General.

A county court is prohibited from allowing any greater sum against the county than is actually due in money. Goyne v. Ashley County, 31 Ark. 552 (1876); Barton v. Swepston, 44 Ark. 437 (1884); Chicot County v. Kruse, 47 Ark. 80, 14 S.W. 469 (1885).

Applicability.

This section applies to bridge contracts. Watkins v. Stough, 103 Ark. 468, 147 S.W. 443 (1912).

This section does not apply to sale of account due a county. Allen v. Barnett, 186 Ark. 494, 54 S.W.2d 399 (1932).

Penalty.

An indictment of a county judge under this section is defective if it fails to allege that the neglect was willful. Casey v. State, 53 Ark. 334, 14 S.W. 90 (1890).

If a county judge is liable to indictment for failure to require a sheriff to make a quarterly settlement of the fees and emoluments of his office, an indictment of a county judge for failure to make such a settlement is defective in failing to allege that the sheriff did not make the settlement. Williams v. State, 93 Ark. 81, 123 S.W. 780 (1909).

A county judge cannot be convicted for a mere negligent performance of his duty in allowance of an account against the county. Bromley v. State, 136 Ark. 270, 206 S.W. 436 (1918).

Cited: Chicot County v. Kruse, 47 Ark. 80, 14 S.W. 469 (1885).

14-23-107. Enforcing provisions against allowances in excess of revenues.

    1. It shall be the express duty of the prosecuting attorney in each respective judicial district in this state to enforce, without requiring affidavits of information, the terms and conditions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 10, wherein it is provided, among other things, that no county judge, county clerk, or other county officer shall sign or issue any scrip or warrant, or make any allowance for any purpose whatsoever, or authorize the issuance of any contracts or other scrip or other evidence of indebtedness in excess of the revenue received from all sources.
    2. Included within the terms and conditions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 10, are county turnback funds of every kind and character for any current fiscal year.
    1. If any prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney in any judicial district of this state fails to enforce the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 10, and the application of its terms and conditions to all turnback funds flowing to any county of the state, he or she shall be liable to impeachment in office.
    2. In order that the prosecuting attorney and deputy prosecuting attorney can carry out their duties as prescribed in this section, the county treasurer of each county shall provide upon request to the prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney of the judicial district in which the county is located a copy of the financial report which the county treasurer is required by § 14-20-105 to file with the quorum court of the county.

History. Acts 1937, No. 193, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 2558, 2559; Acts 1939, No. 299, §§ 2-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-711, 17-712, 17-712n; Acts 1987, No. 724, § 2; 1995, No. 232, § 5.

Cross References. Contracts in excess of appropriations prohibited, § 14-20-106.

Impeachment proceedings, § 21-12-201 et seq.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was constitutionally enacted. Carpenter v. McLeod, 202 Ark. 359, 150 S.W.2d 607 (1941).

This section is in conflict with Ark. Const. Amend. 20 as in effect, the state borrows money and pledges its revenues. Carpenter v. McLeod, 202 Ark. 359, 150 S.W.2d 607 (1941).

In General.

This section is not one where a law was revised, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only. Taylor v. J.A. Riggs Tractor Co., 197 Ark. 383, 122 S.W.2d 608 (1938).

Purpose.

This section is intended to prevent expenditures in excess of county revenues for fiscal year in which contract is made from county turnback fund. Taylor v. J.A. Riggs Tractor Co., 197 Ark. 383, 122 S.W.2d 608 (1938).

Prosecuting Attorney.

It is the express duty of a prosecuting attorney to enforce the terms of Ark. Const. Amend. 10, dealing with the prohibition against a county judge authorizing any contract in excess of the revenues. Goodwin v. State, 235 Ark. 457, 360 S.W.2d 490 (1962).

Turnback Funds.

Subsection (a), being purely descriptive, has no legislative force or effect and can place no limitation upon the expenditure of a turnback fund. Taylor v. J.A. Riggs Tractor Co., 197 Ark. 383, 122 S.W.2d 608 (1938).

Although the effect of this section was to give to a turnback fund all the attributes of a county fund, a turnback fund, not being one within the orbit of Ark. Const. Amend. 10, may be dealt with by the state through legislative action. Carpenter v. McLeod, 202 Ark. 359, 150 S.W.2d 607 (1941).

14-23-108. Unauthorized or constructive fees prohibited.

  1. The county courts of the counties in this state are prohibited from auditing an officer and from allowing to any officer any fee or allowance not specifically allowed the officer by law, and in no case shall constructive fees be allowed to or paid officers by any county of this state.
  2. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section or § 14-23-102, or corruptly charging or receiving from any county a greater sum than that allowed by law, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), with the conviction working a forfeiture of the office.

History. Acts 1873, No. 114, §§ 1, 9, p. 277; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2034, 2811; Pope's Dig., §§ 2585, 3529; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-708, 17-709.

Cross References. Penalty for illegal fees, § 21-6-103.

Case Notes

In General.

A court cannot allow fees except on statutory authority. Honey v. Greene County, 102 Ark. 106, 143 S.W. 592 (1912).

Traveling expenses and expenses incurred in the purchase of postage stamps could not be charged against the county, and an act placing the officers of a county on salary did not enlarge or vary this section. Columbia County v. Rowe, 111 Ark. 141, 163 S.W. 519 (1914).

Attorneys.

A person acting as deputy prosecuting attorney under authority of the prosecuting attorney, but not appointed in writing, without the appointment being approved by the circuit court, such a person is a de facto officer only, not one de jure, and is not entitled to collect the fees and emoluments of the office. Williford v. Eason, 110 Ark. 303, 161 S.W. 498 (1913).

County was not liable for fees for special attorney employed by county judge to defend proceedings brought to restrain building of county courthouse. Oglesby v. Ft. Smith Dist., 119 Ark. 567, 179 S.W. 178 (1915).

Clerks.

County clerk was not entitled to fee of 10 cents for each warrant presented by treasurer for allowance. Johnson County v. Bunch, 63 Ark. 315, 38 S.W. 518 (1896).

County was not liable to county clerk for his fee for filing accounts of claimant against county. Prairie County v. Vaughan, 64 Ark. 203, 41 S.W. 420 (1897).

County clerk was entitled to fee of 10 cents for entering each order of allowance and 10 cents for each warrant issued on allowance; however, the clerk was not entitled to be paid for warrants ordered but not issued. St. Francis County v. Folbre, 66 Ark. 91, 48 S.W. 1070 (1899).

County was liable to claimant for costs, including county clerk's fee for filing claim. Jefferson County v. Philpot, 66 Ark. 243, 50 S.W. 453 (1899).

Allowance of a warrant was not a settlement entitling a county clerk to a fee of 10 cents for making settlement of each account with the county. Duncan v. Scott County, 70 Ark. 607, 70 S.W. 314 (1902).

County was not liable for county clerk's fee for filing county warrants for allowance and reissuance. Duncan v. Scott County, 70 Ark. 607, 70 S.W. 314 (1902).

Sheriffs.

Sheriff was entitled to fees for keeping county prisoners. Cain v. Woodruff County, 89 Ark. 456, 117 S.W. 768 (1909).

Right of a sheriff to charge fees is derived from and dependent upon statute, and he is not entitled to any compensation except as is given to him by law. Miller County v. Magee, 177 Ark. 752, 7 S.W.2d 973 (1928).

Treasurers.

County treasurer who succeeded himself was entitled to commissions on funds carried over from one term to another, except as to school funds. Shaver v. Sharp County, 62 Ark. 76, 34 S.W. 261 (1896).

Where county treasurer collected a fee to which he was not entitled and which constituted a fraud in law, after the expiration of two years and the matter had passed beyond the control of the county court, equity had jurisdiction to relieve against the fraud. Fuller v. State, 112 Ark. 91, 164 S.W. 770 (1914).

Cited: Johnson County v. Bost, 139 Ark. 35, 213 S.W. 388 (1919).

14-23-109. Time limit on payment of allowed claims.

    1. Whenever any claim of any person for services rendered any county in this state or material furnished shall have been adjusted and allowed by the county court and ordered paid, it shall be the duty of the person for whom the allowance shall have been made to call on the county clerk of the county in which the allowance is made within three (3) years from the date of the allowance and procure a warrant on the treasurer of the county in which the allowance shall have been made.
    2. All allowances shall be barred if not demanded within three (3) years from the date of their allowance.
    3. All warrants issued by any county clerk and remaining unclaimed in his or her possession shall be cancelled by the county court whenever the allowances on which they are based shall be barred under this section.
  1. At the expiration of three (3) years from the date of the allowances, if the claimant has not demanded his or her warrant from the clerk, it shall be the duty of the clerk to enter a marginal note on the county court record to the effect that the claim is barred by limitation, and it shall be unlawful for any clerk to issue any warrant based upon the claim thereafter, and the claimants shall not thereafter be allowed anything for that particular service or material furnished, by revival or otherwise.

History. Acts 1895, No. 135, §§ 1, 2, p. 198; C. & M. Dig., §§ 2003, 2004; Pope's Dig., §§ 2549, 2550; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-713, 17-714.

Cross References. Issuance of warrant on claim, § 14-24-101.

Subchapter 2 — Presentment to County Court

Effective Dates. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 10: Feb. 22, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the laws of this State pertaining to the method of filing and approving claims against counties are totally inadequate and that in order to provide for the proper expenditure of county funds, the immediate passage of this Act is necessary. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-23-201. Applicability.

The provisions of this subchapter shall not be applicable to any county in this state having a county comptroller established pursuant to legislative act.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-720.

14-23-202. Penalty.

Any person violating the provisions of this subchapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In addition, any county official violating this subchapter shall be guilty of malfeasance in office and, upon conviction, shall be removed from office.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-722.

14-23-203. Claims filed with county clerk.

  1. Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association having a claim against any county of this state for commodities, services, labor, goods and supplies, except sundry supplies used in the administration of the county offices, and materials, equipment, machinery, or any other item of tangible personal property payable from any county fund shall present a claim for payment to the county clerk of the county in the manner and form as is required by law.
  2. The clerk shall keep and maintain journals in which the claims and transfers shall be recorded, as provided in § 14-23-204, to include a county court claims journal for each fund in which all claims payable from the appropriate fund shall be recorded.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-715; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), inserted “commodities, services, labor” and substituted “any county fund” for “the county general fund or the county road fund”; deleted former (b)(2); in (b), substituted “journals” for “two (2) dockets,” inserted “and transfers,” substituted “to include a” for “as follows: A,” and “journal’ for each fund” for “docket,” deleted “shall be recorded” following “which,” and substituted “appropriate fund shall be recorded” for “county general fund; and.”

14-23-204. Information recorded on dockets.

The journals required under § 14-23-203 shall include the following information with respect to each claim filed:

  1. The claim number, to be listed consecutively;
  2. The date the claim is filed;
  3. The name and address of the person or firm presenting the claim;
  4. The amount of the claim;
  5. The date presented to the county court;
  6. The action of the county court regarding the claim and the date thereof; and
  7. The warrant or check number, and the date of issuance thereof, for payment of the claim, if any.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-716; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 6.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The 2011 amendment omitted “to be listed consecutively” in subdivision (1) without striking through the language to indicate its repeal.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in the introductory paragraph, substituted “journals” for “dockets” and deleted “columns for recording” following “include”; and inserted “or check” in (7).

14-23-205. Recording in proper journal.

    1. Upon receipt of any claim against the county, the county clerk shall examine the claim and determine the appropriate fund from which it would be payable and if the claim is supported by an appropriation.
    2. The clerk shall record the claim in the appropriate journal as provided under § 14-23-203.
  1. All claims shall be recorded on the date of receipt, and at the time of recording them the clerk shall stamp or write on the statement or bill representing the claim the date of receipt and the number of the claim.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-717; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “the appropriate fund from which it would be payable and if the claim is supported by an appropriation” for “whether, if allowed, it would be payable from the county general fund or county road fund” in (a)(1); in (a)(2), substituted “The clerk” for “Upon making this determination, he” and “journal” for “docket”; and deleted (b)(2).

14-23-206. Approval or disapproval by county court.

    1. The county clerk shall not present a claim later than fifteen (15) days, holidays excepted, from the date on which the claim is received and recorded. Within thirty (30) days from the date on which the claim is presented to the court, the court shall enter an order approving or disapproving the claim.
    2. The action of the court and the date thereof shall be entered in the appropriate journal in which the claim is recorded.
  1. The court shall consider each claim covered by this subchapter in the order in which it appears in the journal being considered. The county court shall not proceed to consider any claim bearing a subsequent number in the journal until an order of approval or disapproval of all preceding numbered claims has been entered.
  2. Any person aggrieved by the order of the court concerning any claim may appeal from the order in the manner provided by law for appeals from orders of the county court.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-718; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “The county clerk shall not present a claim later than fifteen (15) days, holidays excepted, from the date on which the claim is received and recorded” for “No later than fifteen (15) days, holidays excepted, from the date on which any claim is received and recorded, the county clerk shall present it to the county court” in (a)(1); substituted “journal” for “docket” in (a)(2) and twice in (b); and inserted “county” in (c).

14-23-207. Payment of claims generally.

  1. All warrants or checks issued by the county clerk of any county in this state on order of the county court for the payment of any claim in any journal provided under § 14-23-203 shall be issued in the order in which the claim appears in the appropriate journal.
  2. The clerk shall be liable on his or her official bond for any loss suffered by any person due to any violation of the provisions of this subchapter by the clerk.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-719; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), inserted “or checks” and substituted “in any journal” for “on either of the dockets” and “journal” for “docket”; and inserted “or her” following “his” in (b).

14-23-208. Payment of rent on equipment and machinery.

  1. It shall be unlawful for the county court to approve any claim for the payment of rent on equipment and machinery used by the county, and it shall be unlawful for the county clerk to issue any warrant for the payment of any such claim which may have been allowed by the court, unless a written contract providing for the payment of the rent shall have been first approved by order of the court. This copy shall be delivered by the county judge to the clerk, who shall record it in the minutes of the court in the office of the clerk, to be kept with the appropriate docket provided for by § 14-23-203.
  2. The provisions of this section shall apply to all rentals of equipment and machinery by the county whether they shall be for temporary use only, or whether they shall be in the form of a rental-purchase or lease-purchase agreement or contract whereby the county rents or leases such equipment or machinery and under the terms of which agreement the county has the option to buy the equipment or machinery and to apply the rental payments on the purchase price.

History. Acts 1961, No. 139, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-721.

Chapter 24 County Warrants

Research References

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 248 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Cancellation of warrant when claim barred, § 14-23-109.

Effective Dates. Acts 1846, p. 62, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1853, p. 81, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1857, p. 50, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 57, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1875, No. 80, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1969, No. 306, § 5: Mar. 21, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that many warrants issued by the County Treasurer of the various counties in this State are not redeemed by the payee of such warrants; that under these circumstances the County Treasurer is not able to close his books to determine the actual liabilities of the County; and that only by placing a limitation upon the period for which such warrants may be redeemed can this situation be remedied; therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 269, § 3: July 1, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under present law, county warrants are redeemable at any time within three (3) years from the date of issuance; that this extended period for redeemed county warrants places a severe hardship on the various counties; that it is essential to the efficient and effective operation of county government that warrants and checks issued by the county be redeemed within one (1) year from the date of issuance and that this Act is designed to limit the period within which such warrants and checks may be redeemed and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after July 1, 1987.”

14-24-101. Issuance of warrant — Payment.

  1. Whenever any allowance has been approved by any county court, in accordance with §§ 14-23-104 and 14-23-105, when requested by the person in whose favor allowance has been approved or any person authorized to receive it, the county clerk shall issue a warrant or check on the treasurer of the county for the amount of the allowance. The treasurer shall pay it out of cash available in the fund on which the warrant or check is drawn.
    1. If money is not available in the fund on which the warrant or check is drawn, the treasurer, in accordance with § 14-15-805, shall refuse payment of the warrant or check until such time as the funds are available.
    2. In counties using the “batch-redeem” warrant system, the county clerk shall ascertain from the county treasurer's records that cash is available in the fund on which the warrant or check is to be drawn before the warrant or check is issued.

History. Acts 1873, No. 31, § 13, p. 53; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-801; Acts 1995, No. 232, § 6; 2011, No. 614, § 7.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “approved” for “made” twice in (a),

Case Notes

Allowance.

An order of allowance by a county court may be reviewed or opened: (1) By appeal to the circuit court; (2) By certiorari, where it appears upon the fact of the record that the claim allowed was not, by law, a charge against the county and the court had no authority or discretion to allow it upon any evidence that could be advanced; (3) The county court is authorized to call in its warrants for review, etc. and can then reject any warrants founded upon claims illegally or fraudulently allowed; (4) In chancery for fraud, accident, or mistake. State ex rel. Izard County v. Hinkle, 37 Ark. 532 (1881).

An order of allowance is in the nature of a judgment and cannot be impeached collaterally by proof that the debt had been paid before the order was made. Cope v. Collins, 37 Ark. 649 (1881).

The allowance or rejection of a claim by a county court is in the nature of a judgment, and after the lapse of the term, the court loses all control over it and the same matter cannot be litigated again between the same parties except upon review in a higher court. Lincoln County v. Simmons, 39 Ark. 485 (1882); Howard v. State, 72 Ark. 586, 82 S.W. 196 (1904).

Warrants.

Warrants issued by county clerk without an order of the county court directing their issue are void and cannot be made the foundation of a claim against the county. Parsel v. Barnes & Bro., 25 Ark. 261 (1868) (decision under prior law).

Warrants issued by pretended county court not sitting at authorized place are void. Williams v. Reutzel, 60 Ark. 155, 29 S.W. 374 (1895).

Delivery of warrant to wrong person does not pass title. Shelton v. Landers, 167 Ark. 638, 270 S.W. 522 (1925).

Cited: Jones v. Capers, 231 Ark. 870, 333 S.W.2d 242 (1960).

14-24-102. Form of warrant.

A county warrant shall be in the following form: “No Treasurer of the County of pay to , or order dollars, out of any money in the treasury appropriated for county expenditures (or express the particular fund out of which the warrant is to be paid). Given at , this day of , 20 $ A.B., Clerk.”

Click to view form.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 28; C. & M. Dig., § 1999; Pope's Dig., § 2545; Acts 1957, No. 162, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-802.

Cross References. Warrant made payable to person in whose favor allowance was made or bearer, § 14-20-114.

Warrants to specify fund or appropriation on which drawn, § 14-20-114.

Case Notes

Irregular Form.

County warrants not strictly following this section, but containing all of its essential requirements, are invalid only to the extent that they contain provisions not authorized by statute. Franklin County v. Harriman Nat'l Bank, 19 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 542, 48 S. Ct. 37, 72 L. Ed. 416 (1927).

14-24-103. Signing — Numbering.

County warrants shall be signed by the clerk of the county court and shall be numbered progressively throughout the year, commencing on January 1 in each year.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 29; C. & M. Dig., § 2000; Pope's Dig., § 2546; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-803.

14-24-104. Clerk's register of warrants.

  1. Each clerk of the county court shall keep a register of all warrants issued, in which he or she shall set forth the numbers, date, name of person in whose favor drawn, on what account, and the amount thereof.
  2. The register may be in the following form:

NO. DATE IN WHOSE FAVOR DRAWN ON WHAT ACCOUNT AMOUNT Dols. / Cts.

Click to view table.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 30; C. & M. Dig., § 2001; Pope's Dig., § 2547; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-804.

14-24-105. Cancellation of scrip.

It shall be the duty of the county court of each county, on application of any person holding scrip against the county, to cancel the scrip and cause warrants to be issued therefor in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 40; C. & M. Dig., § 2006; Pope's Dig., § 2552; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-806.

14-24-106. Loss of certificates.

When any person shall produce proof, to the satisfaction of the county court, that he or she has lost any one (1) or more county certificates or scrip of any certain amount owned by him or her and that it has not been paid over on settlement with the county treasury, it shall be the duty of the county court to order other certificates to be issued to the owner.

History. Acts 1836, § 2, p. 94; C. & M. Dig., § 2005; Pope's Dig., § 2551; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-807.

Case Notes

Reissuance.

County court may issue new scrip for that which has been lost or burned. Craig v. Chicot County, 40 Ark. 233 (1882).

The owner of a lost warrant may apply through an agent for reissue. Twerell v. Ashley County, 137 Ark. 200, 208 S.W. 585 (1919).

Setoff.

In the settlement of accounts of collectors of public revenue, attempts to enforce their claims for scrip alleged to be burned by way of setoff ought not to be encouraged in the absence of statutory authority. Craig v. Chicot County, 40 Ark. 233 (1882).

14-24-107. Fraudulent or wrongfully issued warrants.

  1. If, upon adjudication of any warrant by the county court, the warrant shall be found to have been fraudulently or wrongfully issued, without due authority from the court, the court shall endorse that fact thereon and cause it to be deposited, without renewal, in the office of the clerk of the court.
  2. Any clerk who shall fraudulently or wrongfully, without authority of law, issue any such warrant shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one (1) year and not more than three (3) years.

History. Acts 1846, § 4, p. 62; 1875, No. 57, §§ 1, 2, p. 147; C. & M. Dig., § 2009; Pope's Dig., § 2555; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-808.

Case Notes

Construction.

Words “any such warrants” refer to words “fraudulently or wrongfully, without authority of law, issue ” and not to the words “shall endorse such fact thereon and cause it to be deposited.” Porter v. State, 188 Ark. 6, 64 S.W.2d 336 (1933).

Appeals.

An order of the county court rejecting and cancelling warrants as fraudulent or for any other purpose is a judgment from which the holder of such warrants adversely affected has a right to appeal. Covington v. Johnson County, 172 Ark. 442, 289 S.W. 326 (1926).

14-24-108. Order of payment.

All county scrip, and every warrant issued in cancellation of any county scrip in any county of this state, according to the provisions of § 14-24-105, shall be redeemed and paid by the county treasurer in the order of their number and date. No scrip or warrants shall be thus discharged in preference to any of older dates, or until all of a prior date are paid, if the county treasurer upon whom the scrip and warrants are drawn shall not be able to meet all demands against him or her.

History. Acts 1846, § 2, p. 62; C. & M. Dig., § 2007; Pope's Dig., § 2553; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-809.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to all county warrants and is not limited to warrants issued in cancellation of county scrip. Stanfield v. Kincannon, 185 Ark. 120, 46 S.W.2d 22 (1932).

Warrants drawn on county fund are redeemable in order of their number and date. Stanfield v. Kincannon, 185 Ark. 120, 46 S.W.2d 22 (1932); Stanfield v. Friddle, 185 Ark. 873, 50 S.W.2d 237 (1932).

Payment.

Statute of limitations could be pleaded to petition for mandamus to compel county treasurer to pay county warrant delivered more than five years, notwithstanding it had county seal affixed to it. Crudup v. Ramsey, 54 Ark. 168, 15 S.W. 458 (1891) (decision prior to enactment of § 14-24-120).

When there is an invalid judgment against county on valid warrants, invalidity of judgment is not ground for restraining county treasurer from paying funds raised therefor. Bush v. Wolf, 55 Ark. 124, 17 S.W. 709 (1891).

14-24-109. Receipt for public payments.

All county scrip and warrants drawn on the county treasury in any county in this state shall be received, irrespective of their number and date, in payment of all taxes, duties, fines, penalties, and forfeitures accruing to the county.

History. Acts 1846, § 3, p. 62; C. & M. Dig., § 2008; Pope's Dig., § 2554; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-810.

Cross References. County taxes may be paid in county warrants, §§ 26-35-502, 26-35-504.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was held not to contravene provisions of the United States Constitution declaring that nothing but gold and silver shall be made legal tender. State ex rel. Chicot County v. Rives, 12 Ark. 721 (1852).

Fees.

Warrants were held not receivable in payment of clerk's fees. Powell v. Durden, 61 Ark. 21, 31 S.W. 740 (1895).

Taxes.

A county cannot refuse to receive its warrants for taxes, regardless of date of issue. Daniel v. Askew, 36 Ark. 487 (1880); Vale v. Buchanan, 98 Ark. 299, 135 S.W. 848 (1911) (decisions prior to enactment of § 14-24-120).

A tax to build a new courthouse may be paid in county warrants drawn upon funds appropriated for ordinary county purposes. Stillwell v. Jackson, 77 Ark. 250, 93 S.W. 71 (1905).

Valid county warrants may be received in payment of taxes due to the county even though they are prior warrants not paid or provided for. Stanfield v. Friddle, 185 Ark. 873, 50 S.W.2d 237 (1932).

On redemption of land sold to state for taxes, treasurer is required to accept county warrants for portion of taxes owing to the county. Bradford v. Burrow, 188 Ark. 380, 65 S.W.2d 554 (1933).

14-24-110, 14-24-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning treasurer's register of warrants and the filing of redeemed warrants, were repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1279, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

14-24-110. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, §§ 31, 32; C. & M. Dig., §§ 1922, 1923; Pope's Dig., §§ 2438, 2439; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-811, 17-812.

14-24-111. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 34; C. & M. Dig., § 1924; Pope's Dig., § 2440; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-813.

14-24-112. Record of redeemed warrants.

It shall be the duty of the county clerk of each county in the State of Arkansas to enter in a book, to be provided by him or her for that purpose, the amount, number, and date of all redeemed scrip or warrants that may have been cancelled, so as to show at all times the full amount of the indebtedness of the county.

History. Acts 1853, § 1, p. 81; C. & M. Dig., § 2010; Pope's Dig., § 2556; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-814.

14-24-113. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning preservation and destruction of warrants, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1279, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1931, No. 41, § 11; Pope's Dig., §§ 1728, 2520; Acts 1979, No. 279, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-815.

14-24-114. Calling in outstanding scrip.

Whenever the county court of any county in this state may deem it expedient to call in the outstanding scrip of the county in order to redeem, cancel, reissue, or classify the scrip under existing laws, or for any other lawful purpose, it shall be the duty of the court to make an order for that purpose, fixing the time for the presentation of the scrip, which shall be at least three (3) months from the date of the order.

History. Acts 1857, § 1, p. 50; C. & M. Dig., § 1994; Pope's Dig., § 2540; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-816.

Case Notes

In General.

A federal court was not deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that, prior to a nonresident's action on county warrants, the nonresident, as required by a calling in order, had filed the warrants with the county court and that court had made no further order respecting the warrants. Desha County v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 72 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1934).

If county judge, disregarding his duty to pay indispensable obligations before permissive ones, allows contractual obligations within the revenue for the year, warrant issued in payment of contractual claims remains valid even after issuance of a warrant in payment of indispensable claim when county's total revenue had been expended, validity of any warrant being dependent upon the state of the county's revenues at the time of its allowance. Miller County v. Blocker, 192 Ark. 101, 90 S.W.2d 218 (1936).

Applicability.

This section applies to county road warrants. A.L. Greenberg Iron Co. v. Wood, 153 Ark. 371, 240 S.W. 1074 (1922).

County warrants issued by county court and payable out of road fund apportioned to a certain road district are within the contemplation of this section and are barred unless presented within the designated time. Wilkes v. Bank of Augusta & Trust Co., 163 Ark. 455, 260 S.W. 398 (1924).

Warrants drawn on highway turnback funds are county warrants within the meaning of this section. United States San. Specialty Corp. v. Pike County, 195 Ark. 724, 113 S.W.2d 1090 (1938).

Cancellation.

A warrant payable out of highway fund for sanitary supplies sold to county, being illegal on its face, was held subject to cancellation. United States San. Specialty Corp. v. Pike County, 195 Ark. 724, 113 S.W.2d 1090 (1938).

Exchange of Warrants.

A contract between a county judge and the holders of certain county warrants, each for a large amount, providing for the exchange of the warrants for warrants of smaller amounts payable over a longer period of years was not prohibited by Ark. Const. Amend. 10. Alphin v. Tatum, 189 Ark. 862, 75 S.W.2d 377 (1934).

Other Lawful Purposes.

The ascertainment of the actual financial condition of a county is a sufficient legal purpose to call in outstanding scrip of the county. Cole v. Schoonover, 117 Ark. 254, 174 S.W. 539 (1915).

Reissuance.

The county court, when examining scrip under a calling in order, may refuse to reissue when it is shown that the original judgment of allowance was void. Adams v. Van Buren County, 200 Ark. 269, 139 S.W.2d 9 (1940).

Time for Presentation.

An order under this section which gives less than three months from its date to the time appointed for presenting the warrants is invalid, and a scrip holder is not obliged to appeal from it or quash it by certiorari, but may compel the collector by mandamus to receive his scrip for county taxes. Fry v. Reynolds, 33 Ark. 450 (1878); Howell v. Hogins, 37 Ark. 110 (1881).

Cited: Irwin v. Alexander, 184 Ark. 572, 43 S.W.2d 85 (1931).

14-24-115. Notice of redemption, etc.

It shall be the duty of the clerk of the county court to furnish the sheriff of the county with a true copy of the order of the court within ten (10) days after the adjournment of the court. Then it shall be the duty of the sheriff to notify the holders of the county scrip to present the scrip to the court, at the time and place fixed, for redemption, cancellation, reissuance, or classification of it, or for any other purpose whatever specified in the order of the court, by putting up at the courthouse door and at the election precincts in each township of the county, at least thirty (30) days before the time appointed by the order of the court for the presentation of the scrip, a true copy of the order of the court in the premises, and by publishing it in newspapers printed and published in the State of Arkansas for two (2) weeks in succession, the last insertion to be at least thirty (30) days before the time fixed by the court for the presentation of the scrip.

History. Acts 1857, § 2, p. 50; C. & M. Dig., § 1995; Pope's Dig., § 2541; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-817.

Case Notes

In General.

Sheriff's return was held conclusive under this section. Monroe County v. Clark, 134 Ark. 100, 203 S.W. 264 (1918).

Construction.

This section must be strictly complied with. Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238, 2 S.W. 847 (1887); Gibney v. Crawford, 51 Ark. 34, 9 S.W. 309 (1888); Crudup v. Richardson, 61 Ark. 259, 32 S.W. 684 (1895); Baker v. York, 65 Ark. 142, 45 S.W. 57 (1898); Miller County v. Gazola, 65 Ark. 353, 46 S.W. 423 (1898).

This section must be strictly complied with; notices must be posted in every voting precinct. Haltom v. Craighead County, 129 Ark. 207, 195 S.W. 354 (1917).

Posting.

That notices were posted as required by this section can only be proved by record, and not by parol. Gibney v. Crawford, 51 Ark. 34, 9 S.W. 309 (1888).

Where sheriff's return fails to show that the notice or the order was posted at the courthouse door, the finding of the court “that proper returns have been made and proper proofs filed” is void because not sustained by the record evidence. Nevada County v. Williams, 72 Ark. 394, 81 S.W. 384 (1904).

An order is not void because sheriff's return shows that the notice was posted at the “entrance” of the courthouse. Yell County v. Wills, 83 Ark. 229, 103 S.W. 618 (1907).

An order is not void because the sheriff's return shows that he posted the notice at each of the election precincts in the townships named in the return without showing that these townships were all the ones in the county. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Perry County, 87 Ark. 406, 112 S.W. 977 (1908).

Presentment.

Fixing Sunday as day for presenting warrants does not affect the validity of the proceedings. Crudup v. Richardson, 61 Ark. 259, 32 S.W. 684 (1895).

Publication.

When an order is published in only one newspaper, scrip will not be barred by the failure of a holder to present it within the time required by the order, though he has actual notice of it; the notice must be given as required by this section, but presentation of the scrip is a waiver of the insufficiency of the notice. Allen v. Bankston, 33 Ark. 740 (1878); Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238, 2 S.W. 847 (1887).

An order is invalid where it appears neither in the judgment record nor sheriff's return that one of the newspapers in which notice was given is published in the county. Crudup v. Richardson, 61 Ark. 259, 32 S.W. 684 (1895).

14-24-116. Failure to present scrip.

All persons who shall hold any scrip of the county and neglect or refuse to present it, as required by the order of the county court of the county and the notice as provided in §§ 14-24-114 and 14-24-115, shall thereafter be forever debarred from deriving any benefits from their claims.

History. Acts 1857, § 3, p. 50; C. & M. Dig., § 1996; Pope's Dig., § 2542; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-818.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is constitutional. Parsel v. Barnes & Bro., 25 Ark. 261 (1868).

In General.

Warrants not presented as required by an order of a county court are forever barred. Parsel v. Barnes & Bro., 25 Ark. 261 (1868).

This section is the law of the contracts as to warrants issued after its passage. Allen v. Bankston, 33 Ark. 740 (1878); Desha County v. Newman, 33 Ark. 788 (1878); Cope v. Collins, 37 Ark. 649 (1881).

One who fails to present his warrants when called for is barred from the collection of the warrants thereafter, without any further order or judgment of the court. Cole v. Schoonover, 117 Ark. 254, 174 S.W. 539 (1915).

14-24-117. Right to call in annually.

Every year the county court of any county in this state may call in the outstanding scrip or warrants of the county for the purposes of cancelling and reissuing them.

History. Acts 1875, No. 80, § 1, p. 189; C. & M. Dig., § 1997; Pope's Dig., § 2543; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-819.

Case Notes

In General.

An order is not void because it fails to recite that no such order had been made by the court within the previous year. Yell County v. Wills, 83 Ark. 229, 103 S.W. 618 (1907); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Perry County, 87 Ark. 406, 112 S.W. 977 (1908).

14-24-118. Duty on presentation.

When the scrip or warrants so called in shall be presented to the county court, it shall be the duty of the court to examine them thoroughly and to reject all such evidences of indebtedness, as in their judgment, their county is not justly and legally bound to pay, subject to appeal to the circuit court.

History. Acts 1875, No. 80, § 3, p. 189; C. & M. Dig., § 1998; Pope's Dig., § 2544; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-820.

Case Notes

In General.

Orders with reference to calling in county warrants must be made by county court, not by county judge, and must be spread upon the record. Covington v. Johnson County, 172 Ark. 442, 289 S.W. 326 (1926).

Appeals.

On appeal to circuit court from an order rejecting warrants presented for reissuance, the court can render only such judgment as the county court could render; it can exercise no equity power, such as directing a reference to a master to state an account between the holder of the warrants and the county; it can only ascertain from the evidence whether the warrants are legal or illegal demands. Pride v. State, 52 Ark. 502, 13 S.W. 135 (1890).

Cancellation.

Warrants not presented are not affected by an order of cancellation unless all the statutory requirements are complied with and the compliance therewith shown in the statutory method. Gibney v. Crawford, 51 Ark. 34, 9 S.W. 309 (1888).

Publication.

When proof of publication fails to show that all of the requirements of the publication were complied with, it is a nullity and cannot be received as evidence of the publication required. Gibney v. Crawford, 51 Ark. 34, 9 S.W. 309 (1888).

A recital of the judgment of a county court that the notice of the order calling in warrants had been given as required by law is conclusive. Newton v. Askew, 53 Ark. 476, 14 S.W. 670 (1890).

Rejection.

It is the duty of the court to refuse to allow a warrant which, after its issuance, was invalidated by order of the circuit court on appeal. Murphy v. Garland County, 99 Ark. 173, 137 S.W. 813 (1911).

Those warrants may be rejected which could not have been valid claims against the county, or where the judgment of allowance was obtained by fraud. Monroe County v. Brown, 118 Ark. 524, 177 S.W. 40 (1915).

An order of rejection must be entered of record. Covington v. Johnson County, 172 Ark. 442, 289 S.W. 326 (1926).

14-24-119. Time scrip must be presented.

  1. Every two (2) years, all scrip outstanding and unredeemed in any county of the state shall be presented for adjudication to the county court of the county, and if found to be genuine and properly issued, warrants shall be issued upon the county treasurer in cancellation thereof.
  2. All persons holding any county scrip in any county in this state who do not present it for inspection to the county court of the county, at the times specified in this section shall be rated with the last class to be paid. However, it shall always be good in the payment of taxes and other dues to the county treasury.

History. Acts 1846, §§ 1, 5, p. 62; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-821, 17-822.

14-24-120. Time warrants and checks to be redeemed.

    1. All warrants and checks issued by any county of this state drawn upon the county treasurer shall be valid and redeemable only for a period of one (1) year from the date of issuance.
    2. All warrants and checks issued by a county shall contain on the face of the warrant or check the following words: “This warrant (check) void after one (1) year from date of issuance”.
    1. If any county warrant or check is not redeemed or reissued within the time prescribed in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, there is established a presumption that the payee declined its presentment, and it shall be the duty of the county treasurer to cancel the warrant or check and to credit the fund from which the warrant or check is drawn.
    2. If any county warrant or check is returned and is not deliverable to the payee, the warrant or check shall be considered unclaimed and shall be submitted as unclaimed property to the Auditor of State in accordance with the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, § 18-28-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1969, No. 306, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-823, 17-824; Acts 1987, No. 269, § 1; 2001, No. 1261, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 269, § 1, provided, in part, that warrants and checks issued prior to July 1, 1987, shall be null and void if not redeemed within three years from date of issuance.

Cross References. Time limit on payment of allowed claims, § 14-23-109.

14-24-121. Electronic warrants transfer system.

  1. The quorum court of each county may establish by ordinance an electronic warrants transfer system directly into payees' accounts in financial institutions in payment of any account allowed against the county.
    1. For purposes of this section, counties opting for the electronic warrants transfer system shall establish written policies and procedures to ensure that the electronic warrants transfer system provides for internal accounting controls and documentation for audit and accounting purposes.
    2. The electronic warrants transfer system under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall comply with the information systems best practices approved by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee before implementation by the county.
  2. A single electronic warrants transfer may contain payments to multiple payees, appropriations, characters, and funds.

History. Acts 1997, No. 329, § 1; 2009, No. 500, § 2; 2019, No. 138, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (b).

The 2019 amendment substituted “written policies and procedures to ensure that the electronic warrants transfer system” for “their own electronic payment method that” in (b)(1); substituted “warrants transfer system” for “payment method”, and substituted “shall comply with the information systems best practices” for “shall be” in (b)(2).

Subchapter 2 — Payment by Check

14-24-201. Purpose.

It is the intent of this subchapter to allow the counties to change and modernize, to better comply with current business and banking practices, the warrant system as a means of payment of claims against counties, but all other provisions and procedures required by law relative to claims against counties and those relative to the allowance of payment thereof, shall remain as provided by law.

History. Acts 1975, No. 22, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-826.

14-24-202. Modification of warrant system permitted.

  1. Effective July 9, 1975, any county may modify the warrant system as a means of payment of claims properly presented and allowed against counties of this state to better comply with current business and banking practices.
  2. All claims properly presented and allowed by the respective county courts and school districts of this state, as provided by law, may be ordered paid by check drawn against county funds maintained by the county treasurer in his or her official capacity as custodian of the funds.

History. Acts 1975, No. 22, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-825.

14-24-203. Court approval of implementation.

  1. In implementing the procedures as set forth in §§ 14-24-204 and 14-24-205, the county treasurer and county clerk must jointly petition the county court for approval of such implementation, and none of the procedures set forth shall be followed without court approval.
  2. Adoption of § 14-24-206 shall require the treasurer and the superintendent of each school district to jointly petition the court for approval, and no such procedures shall be implemented without court approval.

History. Acts 1975, No. 22, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-831.

14-24-204. Payment generally.

    1. It is the intent of this subchapter that after a claim has been properly presented to a county court with a proper certification and itemization thereof, as provided by law, then upon approval the county clerk may cause a check to be prepared in payment of the claim. This check must be accompanied by an attached certification from the clerk stating that the check is for payment of a valid claim against the county, properly presented and allowed, as provided by law, the check being presented to the county treasurer for his or her signature, the check being in duplicate form, allowing for the following information and distribution:
      1. An original check, after being transmitted to the treasurer for his or her signature, will be delivered to the party presenting the claim to the treasurer; and
        1. A duplicate copy of the check, which will provide the printed certification thereon by the clerk to the treasurer and provide for the original signature of the clerk on the certification, will be maintained by the treasurer.
        2. A duplicate copy of the check may be retained in electronic form rather than paper.
      1. The checks shall be prenumbered and designed in such form that the particular fund affected out of which the check is to be paid is noted thereon.
      2. A county may use computer equipment for check preparation if the use of an automated software program that accomplishes the same purpose as prenumbered checks and other required denotations is in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    1. In lieu of the provisions of this section pertaining to the issuance of a check in duplicate form, if a county so chooses, the following provisions may apply:
      1. Once the aforementioned claim procedures have been completed, the treasurer may cause a check to be prepared in payment of claims filed with the county court;
      2. Each claim properly recorded and approved for payment by the county court shall be proper certification from the clerk to the treasurer that a valid claim exists; and
        1. The checks shall be prenumbered and so designed that the particular fund affected out of which the check is to be paid shall be noted thereon.
        2. A county may use computer equipment for check preparation if the use of an automated software program that accomplishes the same purpose as prenumbered checks and other required denotations is in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    2. The check drawn in connection with the disbursement of county funds for which the county treasurer is responsible shall:
      1. Bear the manual signature of the county treasurer or his or her authorized deputy; or
        1. Contain or bear a mechanically produced facsimile signature of the county treasurer under § 21-10-101.
        2. The county treasurer may use his or her computer-generated digitized signature when the county treasurer has established adequate internal administrative procedures and controls approved by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.

History. Acts 1975, No. 22, § 3; 1981, No. 525, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-827; Acts 2007, No. 75, § 1; 2009, No. 500, § 1; 2011, No. 614, § 8; 2013, No. 451, §§ 1, 2; 2017, No. 369, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment in (a) inserted (a)(1)(B)(ii), redesignated the remaining text of (a)(1)(B) accordingly, and deleted “specific appropriation applicable and” following “that the” in (a)(2); and substituted “particular fund affected” for “specific appropriation applicable, particular fund affected, and claim number” in (b)(3).

The 2011 amendment inserted “then upon approval” in (a)(1); and substituted “recorded” for “docketed” in (b)(2).

The 2013 amendment redesignated former (a)(2) as (a)(2)(A), and added (a)(2)(B); and redesignated former (b)(3) as (b)(3)(A), and added (b)(3)(B).

The 2017 amendment redesignated the former introductory language in (b) as present (b)(1); redesignated former (b)(1) and (b)(2) as (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B); redesignated former (b)(3)(A) and (b)(3)(B) as (b)(1)(C)(i) and (b)(1)(C)(ii); and added present (b)(2).

14-24-205. Check disbursement record.

  1. If a county should adopt the payment by check system, the county treasurer shall maintain a check disbursement record which shall be a book or file of the duplicate copies of checks issued by the treasurer, arranged in numerical sequence. This book or file shall provide a detailed check-by-check record of the disbursements from the various funds accounts maintained by the treasurer in a fund account book reflecting receipts and disbursements of the various funds.
  2. In lieu of the provisions of this section pertaining to the requirement of the keeping of duplicate copies of the checks, if a county so chooses, the following provisions shall apply:
    1. The treasurer shall maintain a check disbursement record which shall provide a detailed check-by-check record, in numerical sequence, of the disbursements from the various fund accounts so maintained;
    2. For the purposes of this subsection, “check disbursement record” shall be a book or file similar to the warrant register previously maintained by the treasurer by § 14-24-110 [repealed], or, if the county utilizes computer equipment for check preparation, the computer product or check register showing the payee, specific appropriation, fund affected, check number, and claim number, the latter two (2) elements being in their respective numerical sequence; and
    3. The treasurer shall deliver to the county clerk a duplicate of the computer product or check register, which product shall be utilized for necessary posting to the claims docket.

History. Acts 1975, No. 22, § 4; 1981, No. 525, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-828.

14-24-206. Claims against school districts.

  1. It is the intent of this subchapter to allow that all claims duly verified and allowed against the school districts of this state may be handled in accordance with the following procedure:
    1. The ex officio financial secretary of the school district may cause a check to be prepared in payment of claims against the district. The check is to be accompanied by an attached certification from the ex officio financial secretary stating that the check is for payment of a valid claim against the school district properly presented and allowed, as provided by law, the check being presented to the county treasurer for his or her signature and the check being in triplicate snap-out form, allowing for the following information and distribution:
      1. Original check, after being transmitted to the county treasurer for his or her signature, will be delivered to the party presenting the claim to the school district;
      2. Duplicate copy of the check, which will provide the printed certification thereon by the ex officio financial secretary to the county treasurer and provide for the original signature of the ex officio financial secretary on the certification, will be maintained by the county treasurer; and
      3. Triplicate copy of the check and attached certification which is a part thereof, will be maintained by the school district, with all supporting documentation for the payment being filed with this copy; and
    2. The checks shall be prenumbered and designed in such form that the specific appropriation applicable and particular fund affected, out of which the check is to be paid, is noted thereon.
  2. A county may elect to adopt procedures as set forth in §§ 14-24-204 and 14-24-205 and not follow this section, leaving the procedures for payment of just claims against school districts as they exist.

History. Acts 1975, No. 22, §§ 5, 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-829, 17-830.

Chapter 25 County Accounting and Responsible Management Entity

Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — Arkansas County Accounting Law of 1973

Publisher's Notes. Due to the enactment of subchapter 2 by Acts 2007, No. 844, the existing provisions of this chapter have been designated as subchapter 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 741, § 6: Jan. 1, 2016.

14-25-101. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and cited as the “Arkansas County Accounting Law of 1973”.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1801.

14-25-102. Bank accounts.

All county officials of this state who receive public funds by virtue of their office shall maintain all public funds in depositories approved for such purposes by law. The funds shall be maintained in these depositories in the name of the county office, with the official's name appearing secondarily to the name of the county office.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1802.

14-25-103. Deposit of funds.

  1. All funds received by a county official by virtue of his or her official position shall be deposited intact to the accounts authorized in § 14-25-102. This section shall apply to all public funds coming into the hands of the official, including, but not limited to, the following: fines, fees, taxes, trust funds, federal funds, etc.
  2. Public funds received by one (1) county official and required by law to be transferred to another county official shall be deposited into the account of the first official receiving the funds, and then a check shall be written upon that account to properly transfer the funds.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1803.

14-25-104. Prenumbered checks.

  1. All disbursements of county funds, except as noted in § 14-25-105, which refers to petty cash funds, and § 14-25-112(b)(2), which refers to debit cards issued for the balance of an inmate commissary trust account, are to be made by prenumbered checks drawn upon the bank account of that county official.
  2. The checks shall be of the form normally provided by commercial banking institutions and shall contain as a minimum the following information:
    1. Date of issue;
    2. Check number;
    3. Payee;
    4. Amount both in numerical and written form; and
    5. Signature of authorized disbursing officer of the county office.
  3. The county official shall maintain printers' certificates as to the numerical sequence of checks printed.
  4. The county official shall retain all voided checks for audit purposes.
  5. A county may use computer equipment for check preparation if the use of an automated software program that accomplishes the same purpose as prenumbered checks and other required denotations is in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1804; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 1; 2013, No. 451, § 3; 2013, No. 1158, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (d).

The 2013 amendment by No. 451 added (e).

The 2013 amendment by No. 1158 inserted “and § 14-25-112(b)(2), which refers to debit cards issued for the balance of an inmate commissary trust account” in (a).

14-25-105. Petty cash funds.

  1. County officials are permitted to establish petty cash funds, so long as the funds are maintained on the basis set forth in this section.
    1. The establishment of a petty cash fund must be approved by the county quorum court.
      1. In establishing a petty cash fund, a check is to be drawn payable to “petty cash”.
      2. That amount may be maintained in the county offices for the handling of small operating expenditures.
    1. A paid-out slip is to be prepared for each item of expenditure from the fund and signed by the person receiving the moneys.
    2. These paid-out slips shall be maintained with the petty cash.
  2. When the fund becomes depleted, the county official may then draw another check payable to “petty cash” in an amount which equals the total paid-out slips issued, and, at that time, the paid-out slips shall be removed from the petty cash fund and utilized as invoice support for the check replenishing petty cash.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1805; Acts 2011, No. 614, § 9.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “a petty cash” for “such a” in (b)(1) and (b)(2)(A); and, in (b)(2)(B), inserted “operating” and deleted “for items such as light bulbs, delivery fees, etc.” at the end.

14-25-106. Fixed asset records.

    1. All county officials shall establish by major category and maintain, as a minimum, an itemized listing of all fixed assets owned by, or under the control of, their offices.
    2. Each county official shall maintain the listing unless the quorum court designates one (1) county official or employee of the county to be responsible for maintaining the list for the county.
    3. Each county official shall total the listing by category with a total of all categories. The categories of fixed assets may include without limitation:
      1. Land;
      2. Buildings;
      3. Motor vehicles; and
      4. Equipment.
    4. The listing shall contain as a minimum:
      1. Property item number, if used by the county;
      2. Brief description;
      3. Serial number, if available;
      4. Location of property;
      5. Date of acquisition; and
      6. Cost of property.
  1. Fixed asset records shall constitute a part of the general records of the county and, accordingly, shall be made available for utilization by the auditor at the time of audit.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1806; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (a); and in (b), deleted “and equipment” following “asset,” substituted “county” for “office,” and made a minor stylistic change.

14-25-107. Reconciliation of bank accounts.

  1. All county officials maintaining bank accounts as prescribed in § 14-25-102 shall reconcile, on a monthly basis, the bank balance to the book balance.
  2. The reconciliations shall take the following form:

County of Date Amount Per Bank Statement Dated $ .00 ADD: Deposits in transit (Receipts recorded in Cash Receipts Journal not shown on this bank statement). DATE RECEIPT NO. AMOUNT $ .00 .00 .00 $ .00 DEDUCT: Outstanding Checks (Checks issued and dated prior to date of bank statement per Cash Disbursements Journal not having yet cleared the bank). DATE PAYEE AMOUNT $ .00 .00 .00 .00 RECONCILED BALANCE $ .00 This reconciled balance shall agree to either the cash balance as shown on the official's check stubs running bank balance, or the official's general ledger cash balance, whichever system the official employs.

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1807; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 3.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “the bank balance to the book balance” for “their cash receipts and cash disbursement journal to the amount on deposit in banks” in (a).

14-25-108. Prenumbered receipts.

    1. All items of income, except as noted in subsection (b) of this section, are to be formally receipted by the use of prenumbered receipts or mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers or validating equipment.
    2. In the use of prenumbered receipts the following minimum standards shall be met:
      1. Receipts are to be prenumbered by the printer, and a printer's certificate obtained and retained for audit purposes. The certificate shall state the date printing was done, the numerical sequence of receipts printed, and the name of the printer;
      2. The prenumbered receipts shall contain the following information for each item receipted:
        1. Date;
        2. Amount of receipt;
        3. Name of person or company from whom money was received;
        4. Purpose of payment;
        5. Fund to which receipt is to be credited; and
        6. Signature of employee receiving money;
      3. The original receipt should be given to the party making payment. One (1) duplicate copy of the receipt shall be maintained in numerical order in the receipt book and made available to the auditors during the course of annual audit. Additional copies of the receipt are optional with the county office and may be used for any purposes it deems fit; and
      4. All copies of voided receipts shall be retained for audit purposes.
    3. A county may use an electronic receipting system that accomplishes the same purpose as prenumbered receipts if the system is in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  1. This section shall not apply to the county collector's office in regard to the collection of property taxes. However, this section shall apply to the collector's office for receipting of all other moneys.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, §§ 8, 9; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-1808, 17-1809; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 4; 2013, No. 451, § 4.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (a)(2)(D).

The 2013 amendment rewrote (a)(3).

14-25-109. County clerk.

    1. The county clerk shall maintain all bank accounts and records of accounts as prescribed by law in reference to the duties of his or her office. In addition, the clerk shall maintain separate records and separate bank accounts for fee accounts and for accounts pertaining to the court.
    2. The bank accounts shall be maintained as prescribed in § 14-25-102, and the provisions of §§ 14-25-103, 14-25-104, 14-25-107, and 14-25-108(a) shall apply to the accounts.
    1. Checks written shall be recorded in a cash disbursement journal that indicates the date, payee, check number, and amount of each check written.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall also contain the classification of the disbursement.
    1. Receipts shall be recorded in a cash receipts journal that indicates:
      1. Date of receipt;
      2. Identification of payor;
      3. Receipt number;
      4. Total amount received; and
      5. Classification of receipts.
    2. If using mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers, the cash receipts journal shall indicate the:
      1. Date of collections;
      2. Tape number, if applicable;
      3. Total amount collected; and
      4. Classification of collections.
    1. The cash disbursement journal and the cash receipts journal shall be totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The cash receipts journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the monthly bank statement.
    1. For each trust and agency account, the clerk shall establish a record showing the beginning balance, receipts, disbursements, and ending balance.
    2. All transactions affecting trust accounts shall be posted on the appropriate individual trust record, in addition to being posted on the cash disbursement journal, or cash receipts journal as prescribed in this section.
      1. Monthly, the clerk shall reconcile these individual detail trust and agency records to the bank balance of the trust account.
      2. Copies of such reconciliations shall be maintained and made a part of the records of the office.
      1. The county clerk shall establish and maintain, as a minimum, a listing of all bonded debt and short-term obligations of the county as authorized by §§ 14-72-101 and 14-72-102, § 14-72-201 et seq., § 14-72-301 et seq., and the Local Government Short-Term Financing Obligations Act of 2001, § 14-78-101 et seq.
      2. The listing shall contain as a minimum:
        1. A brief description of the obligation;
        2. The date of issuance;
        3. The date of final maturity;
        4. The rate of interest;
        5. The total amount authorized and issued;
        6. The total amount retired to date;
        7. The balance at the beginning of each calendar year;
        8. The amount authorized and issued during each calendar year;
        9. The amount retired during each calendar year; and
        10. The balance at the end of each calendar year.
    1. The bonded debt and short-term obligation records constitute a part of the general records of the county clerk's office and shall be made available for utilization by the auditor at the time of audit.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1810; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 5.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (b) and (c), inserted (d) and (f), and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and in (e)(2), substituted “cash disbursement journal” for “check disbursement record,” substituted “cash receipts journal” for “cash receipts record,” and made a minor stylistic change.

Cross References. Investment of money held by circuit, chancery clerks — Disposition of funds, § 16-20-108.

14-25-110, 14-25-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning fee-basis sheriffs and fee-basis collectors, were repealed by Acts 2009, No. 287, § 6. The sections were derived from the following sources:

14-25-110. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1811.

14-25-111. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1812.

14-25-112. Sheriff.

  1. The sheriff, in addition to following the procedures and requirements of §§ 14-25-101 — 14-25-108, shall establish and maintain a cash receipts journal and a cash disbursements journal for each bank account.
    1. Checks written shall be recorded in a cash disbursements journal that indicates the date, payee, check number, and amount of each check written.
      1. A debit card may be issued to a released inmate rather than a check for the balance in his or her account in order to dispose of the inmate's commissary trust account.
      2. If a debit card is issued rather than a check, proper accounting of the funds must still be maintained in compliance with the written procedures established by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    2. The cash disbursements journal shall also contain the classification of the disbursement.
    1. Receipts shall be recorded in a cash receipts journal that indicates the:
      1. Date of the receipt;
      2. Identification of payor;
      3. Receipt number;
      4. Total amount received; and
      5. Classification of receipts.
    2. If mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers are used, the cash receipts journal shall indicate the:
      1. Date of collections;
      2. Tape number, if applicable;
      3. Total amount collected; and
      4. Classification of collections.
    1. The cash disbursements journal and the cash receipts journal shall be totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursements journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The cash receipts journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the monthly bank statement.
  2. The sheriff shall be required to maintain such books and records as prescribed by this chapter and shall keep all books and records posted on a current basis, making an entry into the cash receipts journal for all items of cash receipts and an entry into the cash disbursements journal for each disbursement made.
  3. The sheriff shall provide a copy of the reconciled cash disbursements journal and a copy of the reconciled cash receipts journal to the county treasurer by the tenth day of each calendar month for the county sheriff's communications facility and equipment fund or other fund that may not be on the books of the county treasurer.
  4. Arkansas Legislative Audit shall review for substantial compliance with this section.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1813; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 7; 2013, No. 1158, § 2; 2015, No. 741, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “Sheriff” for “Fee-basis sheriffs” in the section heading; rewrote (a); inserted (b) through (d) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and inserted “cash” twice in (e).

The 2013 amendment inserted present (b)(2) and redesignated former (b)(2) as (b)(3).

The 2015 amendment added (f) and (g).

Effective Dates. Acts 2015, No. 741, § 6: Jan. 1, 2016.

14-25-113. Collector.

  1. The collector, in addition to following the procedures and requirements of §§ 14-25-101 — 14-25-108, shall establish and maintain a system of bookkeeping that meets the minimum requirements of a cash receipts journal and a cash disbursements journal for the recording and disbursing of tax collections.
    1. Checks written shall be recorded in a cash disbursements journal that indicates the date, payee, check number, and amount of each check written.
    2. The cash disbursements journal shall also contain the classification of the disbursement.
    1. Receipts shall be recorded in a cash receipts journal that indicates the:
      1. Date of the receipt;
      2. Identification of payor;
      3. Receipt number;
      4. Total amount received; and
      5. Classification of receipts.
    2. If mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers are used, the cash receipts journal shall indicate the:
      1. Date of collections;
      2. Tape number, if applicable;
      3. Total amount collected; and
      4. Classification of collections.
    1. The cash disbursements journal and the cash receipts journal shall be totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursements journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The cash receipts journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the monthly bank statement.
  2. The collector shall be required to maintain such books and records as prescribed by this chapter and shall keep all books and records posted on a current basis, making an entry into the cash receipts journal for all items of cash receipts and an entry into the cash disbursements journal for each disbursement made.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1814; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 7.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (a); inserted (b) through (d) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and inserted “cash” twice in (e).

14-25-114. County treasurer.

    1. The county treasurer shall receive and receipt for all moneys payable to the county treasury and pay and disburse them on warrants or checks drawn by order of the county court.
    2. The treasurer shall keep a true and accurate account of all moneys received and disbursed and a true and accurate record of all warrants or checks paid by him or her.
    3. The treasurer shall maintain and issue prenumbered receipts for all moneys paid into the treasury in accordance with § 14-25-108.
  1. The treasurer shall establish and maintain the following accounting practices, in relation to the operations of the office:
    1. The number and date of checks paying warrants where the county is using a system of paying several warrants presented by the bank shall be identified with the warrants in posting to the treasurer's book or record of accounts;
    2. The check number and its date shall be entered on the warrant, and the warrant number and its date shall be entered on the face of the check and on the check stub, as well as the account represented;
    3. Postings to the treasurer's book or record of accounts of warrants and checks shall be under the transaction date on the instruments, not the date the items are entered in the books or records of accounts;
    4. Banks shall be requested to present all warrants held at the end of the month promptly so that they may be included in the treasurer's book or record of accounts in the month to which they pertain;
    5. All funds in the treasurer's book or record of accounts shall be reconciled with the bank monthly. Reconciliations shall be retained and filed with the bank statements;
    6. Clear reference shall be made in the treasurer's book or record of accounts as to the origins of all moneys. This may be by notation citing the origin, date, receipt number, and other pertinent information;
    7. Transfers shall clearly state the fund to which the moneys are being transferred, and the recipient fund shall state the origin of its receipt;
    8. A brief explanation of the computation of the treasurer's commission to provide a clear and permanent record of how the commission was determined shall be maintained;
    9. Corrections to the treasurer's book or records of accounts shall be entered at the time of discovery and under the date of the entry into the treasurer's records. A notation shall be made at the erroneous balance if it is at a previous date, but under no circumstances shall a previous month's balance be changed when it has been brought forward into the succeeding period;
    10. Receipts shall be prepared for all moneys received, but shall never be used to effect any other type of accounting transaction. Bank deposits shall be intact, prompt, and identified as to type of receipts;
    11. Copies of all receipts shall be retained, including copies of voided receipts;
    12. Printers' certificates shall be obtained and kept for each printing order of formally prenumbered receipts;
    13. All balances on the treasurer's book not belonging to the county and awaiting clearance shall be remitted on or before December 31, or promptly thereafter, as of December 31; and
    14. Municipal fund revenue shall be remitted to the municipality by separate check for each appropriate dedicated municipal fund.

History. Acts 1973, No. 173, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1815; Acts 2009, No. 287, § 8; 2011, No. 614, § 10; 2019, No. 132, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment in (b) inserted “or record of accounts” following “treasurer's book” throughout the subsection, deleted the second sentence in (b)(5), which read: “The reconciliation should, preferably, be from the bank statement to the books, since the book balance is what the treasurer is trying to prove.”, deleted the second sentence in (b)(7), which read: “Explanations on the treasurer's book as the reason for the transfer will be most helpful”, deleted the second sentence in (b)(13), which read: “Generally, these are moneys belonging to agencies of the state.” and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendment inserted “or checks” in (a)(1) and (a)(2).

The 2019 amendment added (b)(14).

14-25-115. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning exemption of officials, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 287, § 9. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 173, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-1816.

14-25-116. Circuit clerk.

    1. The circuit clerk shall maintain all bank accounts and records of bank accounts as prescribed by law in reference to the duties of his or her office. In addition, the circuit clerk shall maintain separate records and separate bank accounts for fee accounts and for accounts pertaining to the court.
    2. The bank accounts shall be maintained as prescribed in § 14-25-102, and the provisions of §§ 14-25-103, 14-25-104, 14-25-107, and 14-25-108(a) shall apply to the accounts.
    1. Checks written shall be recorded in a cash disbursement journal that indicates the date, payee, check number, and amount of each check written.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall also contain the classification of the disbursement.
    1. Receipts shall be recorded in a cash receipts journal that indicates the:
      1. Date of receipt;
      2. Identification of payor;
      3. Receipt number;
      4. Total amount received; and
      5. Classification of receipts.
    2. If using mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers, the cash receipts journal shall indicate the:
      1. Date of collections;
      2. Tape number, if applicable;
      3. Total amount collected; and
      4. Classification of collections.
    1. The cash disbursement journal and the cash receipts journal shall be totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The cash receipts journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the monthly bank statement.
    1. For each trust and agency account, the clerk shall establish a record showing the beginning balance, receipts, disbursements, and ending balance.
    2. All transactions affecting trust accounts shall be posted on the appropriate individual trust record, in addition to being posted on the cash disbursement journal, or cash receipts journal as prescribed above.
      1. Monthly, the clerk shall reconcile these individual detail trust and agency records to the bank balance of the trust account.
      2. Copies of such reconciliations shall be maintained and made a part of the records of the office.

History. Acts 2009, No. 287, § 10.

14-25-117. County assessor.

    1. The assessor shall maintain a bank account and record of the account for any public funds collected by virtue of his or her office.
    2. The bank account shall be maintained as prescribed in § 14-25-102, and the provisions of §§ 14-25-103, 14-25-104, 14-25-107, and 14-25-108(a) shall apply to the account.
    1. Checks written shall be recorded in a cash disbursement journal that indicates the date, payee, check number, and amount of each check written.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall also contain the classification of the disbursement.
    1. Receipts shall be recorded in a cash receipts journal that indicates the:
      1. Date of receipt;
      2. Identification of payor;
      3. Receipt number;
      4. Total amount received; and
      5. Classification of receipts.
    2. If using mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers, the cash receipts journal shall indicate the:
      1. Date of collections;
      2. Tape number, if applicable;
      3. Total amount collected; and
      4. Classification of collections.
    1. The cash disbursement journal and the cash receipts journal shall be totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The cash receipts journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the monthly bank statement.

History. Acts 2009, No. 287, § 11.

14-25-118. County judge.

    1. The county judge shall maintain a bank account and record of the account for any public funds collected by virtue of his or her office.
    2. The bank account shall be maintained as prescribed in § 14-25-102, and the provisions of §§ 14-25-103, 14-25-104, 14-25-107, and 14-25-108(a) shall apply to the account.
    1. Checks written shall be recorded in a cash disbursement journal that indicates the date, payee, check number, and amount of each check written.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall also contain the classification of the disbursement.
    1. Receipts shall be recorded in a receipts journal that indicates the:
      1. Date of receipt;
      2. Identification of payor;
      3. Receipt number;
      4. Total amount received; and
      5. Classification of receipts.
    2. If using mechanical receipting devices such as cash registers, the receipts journal shall indicate the:
      1. Date of collections;
      2. Tape number, if applicable;
      3. Total amount collected; and
      4. Classification of collections.
    1. The cash disbursement journal and the cash receipts journal shall be totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursement journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The cash receipts journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the monthly bank statement.

History. Acts 2009, No. 287, § 12.

Subchapter 2 — Community Sewer System Management

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

14-25-201. Responsible management entities — Wastewater treatment systems.

  1. As used in this section, “responsible management entity” means a wastewater treatment system service provider organized and operating under this section.
  2. A nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of providing responsible management of wastewater treatment systems where municipal sewer service is not available shall operate in accordance with § 14-250-113 and have the powers set forth in § 14-250-111.
  3. Any of the following may enter into an agreement to become a responsible management entity for the purpose of providing responsible management of wastewater treatment systems, including community sewer systems and groups of septic systems in a contiguous development where municipal sewer service is not available:
    1. A political subdivision of the state;
    2. A district or an authority formed under the Joint County and Municipal Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 14-233-101 et seq., or § 8-6-723;
    3. A nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of providing responsible management of wastewater treatment systems; or
    4. A rural water association.
    1. Any installation, operation, or maintenance performed on a wastewater treatment system on behalf of a responsible management entity shall be done in compliance with the Arkansas Water and Air Pollution Control Act, § 8-4-101 et seq., and the rules of the Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission as administered by the Division of Environmental Quality or its successor and the Department of Health or its successor.
    2. A responsible management entity must also ensure that all appropriate operator licenses are current and any continuing education requirements are fulfilled.
    1. A developer constructing a new wastewater treatment system where municipal sewer service is not available may transfer all liabilities for the wastewater treatment system to a responsible management entity if:
      1. Before the construction of a wastewater treatment system begins, the developer secures written approval of the proposed wastewater treatment system from the Department of Health and complies with all applicable permitting requirements, including stormwater, through the Division of Environmental Quality pursuant to the Arkansas Water and Air Pollution Control Act, § 8-4-101 et seq., and the rules of the Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission;
      2. Covenants are contained in the deed for the wastewater treatment system requiring payment of reasonable fees by the purchaser to the responsible management entity for ongoing operations and maintenance of the system; and
      3. Ownership of the wastewater treatment system is transferred to the responsible management entity upon completion.
    2. Under no circumstances shall the liability for fraud or negligence on the part of the developer be transferred.

History. Acts 2007, No. 844, § 1; 2019, No. 315, §§ 990, 991; 2019, No. 910, §§ 3030, 3031.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 315 substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (d)(1) and (e)(1)(A).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Environmental Quality” for “Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality” in (d)(1) and (e)(1)(A).

Chapter 26 Workers' Compensation

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 886, as amended, is also codified as § 14-60-101 et seq.

Cross References. Volunteer public safety workers, workers' compensation, § 14-28-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 2: July 11, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 866 of 1985 mandated that municipalities and counties provide Worker's Compensation coverage for their employees, with such coverage to be provided through private carriers or through one or more self-funding groups on a statewide basis; that such Act is in need of clarification with respect to the self-funding groups established on a statewide basis to authorize the formation of one or more self-funding groups of municipalities, or counties, or for both municipalities and counties, so long as safeguards are provided whereby any municipality or county shall have a right to participate in such group, if application is made for coverage thereunder; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to make said clarification and to assure competition in the providing of Worker's Compensation coverage for employees of municipalities and counties in this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 206, § 3: Mar. 13, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it is difficult, if not impossible, to buy adequate excess reinsurance in the commercial insurance market without paying an exorbitant price; and, Whereas, this Act will more than adequately insure that Workers' Compensation claims of municipal and county employees will be paid in a timely fashion and will save municipal and county governments thousands of dollars which can be used to provide better municipal and county services. Now, therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary to protect the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately on its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 901, § 52: Apr. 6, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present laws addressed in this omnibus Act on workers' compensation benefits and insurance licensure and other insurance regulatory issues are inadequate for the protection of the Arkansas public and immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order to provide for the protection of the public. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this omnibus Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Workers' Compensation, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 617.

14-26-101. Requirement generally.

  1. All counties shall be required to provide workers' compensation coverage for their officials, employees, and municipal volunteer fire-fighters.
  2. Coverages shall be provided for losses incurred while performing work for the county.
  3. Individuals convicted of a criminal offense and committed to a county detention facility or state correctional facility who are required to perform work for the county shall not be considered employees of the county.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1364; Acts 1993, No. 901, § 2.

Case Notes

Applicability.

A constable is an official of the county and thus covered by workers' compensation. Farnsworth v. White County, 39 Ark. App. 98, 839 S.W.2d 229 (1992), aff'd, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

Where plaintiff was acting as constable when he sustained a gunshot wound to his abdomen, the county was required to furnish workers' compensation. Farnsworth v. White County, 312 Ark. 574, 851 S.W.2d 451 (1993).

14-26-102. Date of coverage.

  1. This chapter shall be effective July 1, 1985.
    1. Claims incurred prior to July 1, 1985, shall continue to be the responsibility of the state.
    2. Claims incurred on and after July 1, 1985, shall be the responsibility of the counties.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1366.

14-26-103. Responsibility for providing coverage.

  1. County quorum courts shall be responsible for providing the workers' compensation coverage required by this chapter.
  2. Each county quorum court is authorized to require reimbursement of its general fund on a pro rata basis from the budgets of its various county departments and agencies for whom the workers' compensation coverage is provided.
  3. Failure of a county to provide the workers' compensation coverage as required in this chapter shall result in the loss of the county's general revenues turn-back from the State of Arkansas for the period for which workers' compensation coverage is not provided.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1367.

14-26-104. Coverage through private carrier or self-funding.

  1. Counties may provide workers' compensation coverage either through private carriers or through one (1) or more self-funding groups.
  2. Self-funding groups established for this purpose shall meet the following requirements:
    1. Any self-funding group established to provide coverage to counties only shall offer coverage to any county in the state that applies for coverage;
    2. Any self-funding group established to provide coverage for both municipalities and counties shall offer coverage to any municipality or county in the state desiring to participate;
    3. Any group established to provide workers' compensation coverage to counties or to counties and municipalities shall offer the coverage at rates as established and filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission by the organization establishing the self-funding group, and rates for counties participating in any self-funding group shall be revised annually based on the cost experience of the particular county, group of counties, or group of municipalities and counties;
      1. Any self-funding group of participating municipalities or counties that is governed by a board of trustees of elected municipal or county officials shall be subject to the rules of the Workers' Compensation Commission applicable to self-insured groups or providers.
      2. However, cities and counties shall not be required to enter into an indemnity agreement binding them jointly and severally.
      3. Each board governing a self-funded group shall be permitted to declare dividends or give credits against renewal premiums based on annual loss experience.
      4. All self-funded groups shall obtain excess reinsurance from an admitted or approved insurance company doing business in Arkansas; and
    4. However, in lieu of the reinsurance requirements in subdivision (b)(4)(D) of this section, any self-funded group under this section with one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000) or more in annually collected premiums may provide excess reserves of twenty percent (20%) of annual premiums by any one (1) of the following ways:
      1. Cash or certificates of deposit in Arkansas banks;
      2. Letters of credit from an Arkansas bank; or
      3. The purchase of reinsurance from the NLC Mutual Insurance Company or County Reinsurance, Limited, a national reinsurance facility for county governments.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 2; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 1; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1365; Acts 1987, No. 206, § 1; 1999, No. 583, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 992.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (b)(4)(A).

Chapter 27 County Intergovernmental Cooperation Councils

Effective Dates. Acts 1997, No. 385, § 9: Mar. 6, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 10 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1995 abolished the original ten subject matter joint interim committees of the General Assembly and in their place established House interim committees and Senate interim committees; that as a result, various sections of the Arkansas Code that refer to the joint interim committees should now refer to the House and Senate interim committees; that this act so provides; and that this act should go into effect as soon as possible in order to make those sections of the Arkansas Code compatible. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 784, § 2: Mar. 14, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that the existing requirement that county intergovernmental cooperation councils meet at least four (4) times a year is overly burdensome and results in inefficiency in the operation of local governments; this act removes that obstacle and provides more flexibility for the operation of local government; and that until this act becomes effective, local governments will be burdened with the unnecessarily overburdensome provisions of Arkansas Code 14-27-103(a). Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-27-101. Purpose.

  1. It is the purpose of this chapter to require the executives of all political subdivisions of each county to meet on a regular basis for the purpose of encouraging cooperation by the various local government jurisdictions within each county in the most efficient use of their mutual resources and in the providing of services to their local communities in the most efficient and mutually advantageous manner possible.
  2. It is expected that regular dialogue between the executives of the various local government subdivisions within each county will encourage these governmental units to:
    1. Share facilities, equipment, employees, and services to provide each with a mutual benefit to the advantage of all governments within the county;
    2. Explore the use of joint purchasing and buying agreements to purchase goods and services in an effort to achieve economies of scale that would not be possible without mutual cooperation; and
    3. Identify the areas of duplication of services so they may be eliminated to the maximum extent possible.

History. Acts 1987, No. 510, § 1.

14-27-102. Creation — Membership, etc.

  1. There is established within each county of this state a county intergovernmental cooperation council to facilitate cooperation among all the local government subdivisions of each county, to encourage the efficient use of local government resources, and to eliminate the duplication of services by local governments.
    1. The membership of each cooperation council shall consist of the county judge, the county clerk, and the mayor of each city and incorporated town within each county.
      1. The county judge of each county shall serve as chair of the cooperation council.
      2. The county judge shall have full voting power and shall have veto power over any action taken by the council.
      3. It shall require a two-thirds majority vote of all council members to override a veto.
    2. The county clerk of each county shall serve as the secretary of the cooperation council, shall preside over cooperation council meetings in the absence of the council chair, and shall be responsible for writing and submitting all reports of the cooperation council.
  2. Each member of the council shall have one (1) vote for the local government jurisdiction he or she represents on the cooperation council.
  3. The members of the cooperation council shall serve without compensation for their services.
  4. A quorum shall consist of a majority of the council's membership and shall be necessary to conduct its business.

History. Acts 1987, No. 510, § 2; 1993, No. 232, § 2; 1993, No. 776, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, this section is set out as amended by Acts 1993, No. 776, § 1. This section was also amended by Acts 1993, No. 232, § 2 to read as follows:

“(a) There is established within each county of this state a county intergovernmental cooperation council to facilitate cooperation among all the local government subdivisions of each county, to encourage the efficient use of local government resources, and to eliminate the duplication of services by local governments.

“(b) The membership of each cooperation council shall consist of the county judge, the county clerk, and the mayor of each city and incorporated town within each county.

“(1) The county judge of each county shall serve as chairman and preside over the cooperation council with a vote and with the power of veto.

“It shall require a two-thirds (2/3's) majority of all council members to override a veto.

“All other members of the council shall have one (1) vote for the local government jurisdiction they represent on the cooperation council.

“(2) The county clerk of each county shall serve as the secretary of the cooperation council, shall preside over cooperation council meetings in the absence of the council chairman, and shall be responsible for writing and submitting all reports of the cooperation council.

“(c) The members of the cooperation council shall serve without compensation for their services.

“(d) A quorum shall consist of a majority of the council's membership and shall be necessary to conduct its business.”

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 232, § 1, provided:

“It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the method of voting as outlined in Act 510 of 1987, which established the County Intergovernmental Cooperation Council is heavily weighted in favor of cities and incorporated towns and due to this inequity has left the rural, unincorporated areas of the several counties of Arkansas in danger of under representation. It is further found and determined that it is the public policy of the state to provide full and equal representation to all of its citizens at all levels and in all subdivisions of government and that the provisions of this act are necessary for the furtherance of the goal of fair and equal representation.”

14-27-103. Meetings — Notice.

  1. A county intergovernmental cooperation council shall meet at least one (1) time annually.
  2. Meetings of the council shall be open to the public and held in a public meeting room.
  3. Meetings of the council shall be at the call of the chair unless a majority of the council's membership petition for a meeting to be held.
  4. The secretary of the council shall notify the public and the press of council meetings at least three (3) days before the meetings.

History. Acts 1987, No. 510, § 3; 2001, No. 784, § 1; 2019, No. 291, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “at least three (3) days before the meetings” for “no later than ten (10) days prior to the date of such meetings” in (d); and made stylistic changes.

14-27-104. Annual review of services.

  1. At least one (1) time annually, the county intergovernmental cooperation council shall review the delivery of services by the various local government subdivisions within the county in the following areas:
    1. Law enforcement services;
    2. Fire protection services;
    3. Jail facilities and correctional services;
    4. Ambulance and emergency medical services;
    5. Library services;
    6. Motor vehicle liability insurance;
    7. Workers' compensation coverage;
    8. Solid waste management services;
    9. Street, road, and highway repair and construction;
    10. Parks and recreation facilities and services;
    11. Planning and zoning services;
    12. Health and sanitation services;
    13. Public transit and transportation services; and
    14. Any other service area of local government.
    1. The annual review of various services can occur at any or all meetings of the council during the year.
    2. Each service area shall be examined to determine whether or not the employees, equipment, or facilities of service areas could be shared to reduce cost or eliminated to avoid the duplication of services and whether or not the goods and services purchased individually in each of these areas could be purchased jointly or cooperatively to reduce the unit cost to all local governments within the county.
    3. If it is determined by the cooperation council that duplicative services exist and can be eliminated or that joint purchases could be made at reduced costs, this determination shall be reported to the governing body of the local government jurisdictions involved along with any recommendations for consolidation of services or purchases.

History. Acts 1987, No. 510, § 4.

14-27-105. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the annual report to the General Assembly, was repealed by Acts 2001, No. 916, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 510, § 5; 1997, No. 385, § 1.

Chapter 28 Volunteer Public Safety Workers

Cross References. Workers' compensation for county employees, § 14-26-101 et seq.

14-28-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Volunteer public safety organization” means:
    1. A county organization for emergency services formed pursuant to the Arkansas Emergency Services Act of 1973, § 12-75-101 et seq.;
    2. A sheriff's auxiliary formed pursuant to § 12-9-301 et seq.;
    3. An ambulance service or rescue squad formed pursuant to § 14-282-101 et seq. or any other improvement district law of this state or formed as a subordinate service district of the county; or
    4. A rural volunteer fire department formed as a subordinate service district of the county or as an improvement district, or a subscription fire service department formed as a nonprofit organization under the laws of this state; and
  2. “Volunteer public safety worker” means an active volunteer member of a volunteer public safety organization.

History. Acts 1987, No. 527, § 1.

14-28-102. Workers' compensation coverage generally.

  1. The county governments of this state are authorized to provide workers' compensation coverage pursuant to this chapter for personal injury, disability, or death of volunteer public safety workers while actually engaged in performing volunteer public safety duties.
  2. Any volunteer public safety organization desiring workers' compensation coverage for volunteer public safety workers of the organization may petition the quorum court of the county served by the organization for workers' compensation coverage under this chapter. By majority vote, the quorum court may elect to include the volunteer public safety workers as county employees for the sole purpose of workers' compensation coverage under the provisions of this chapter and §§ 14-60-101 — 14-60-104 and subject to the limitations of this chapter. The action by the quorum court shall not entitle the volunteer public safety workers to any benefits from the county other than workers' compensation coverage.
  3. At its discretion, the quorum court may require as a condition for coverage that a volunteer public safety organization requesting workers' compensation coverage under this chapter pay the premium for that coverage from any public funds available to the organization or that the quorum court make a deduction in the amount of the cost of the coverage from any amounts which the county would normally provide to the volunteer public safety organization.
  4. Volunteer public safety workers covered by workers' compensation pursuant to this chapter shall be deemed to have received such wages as will qualify them for minimum benefits applicable with respect to injury, disability, or death.

History. Acts 1987, No. 527, § 2.

14-28-103. Terms of coverage.

Any insurer or other entity providing workers' compensation coverage to a county shall offer coverage for volunteer public safety workers on the same terms as for county employees.

History. Acts 1987, No. 527, § 3.

Chapters 29-35 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 3. Municipal Government

Chapter 36 General Provisions

[Reserved]

Chapter 37 Classification of Cities and Towns

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 145, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1903, No. 46, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 306, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1931, No. 61, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1931, No. 119, § 2: approved Mar. 9, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “By reason of the fact that many towns in the State with more than seventeen hundred and fifty inhabitants wish to undertake public improvements that are not practicable under improvement district laws, an emergency is declared to exist, and that for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety it is necessary that this act shall take effect and be in force immediately upon its passage, and thereupon the same shall be in force immediately upon passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 92, § 3: approved Feb. 15, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there are cities and towns as described herein which are losing revenue, and because there are people living outside of said cities and towns which are deprived of the privilege of police protection, and this act will provide additional revenue for said cities and will provide said people with adequate police protection, this act is found necessary for the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 211, § 2: approved Mar. 9, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the depression continuing there are several incorporated towns in the State of Arkansas, that are now handicapped by not being able to become cities of the second class so that this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1943, No. 160, § 2: Mar. 4, 1943.

Acts 1945, No. 247, § 6: Mar. 20, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, that it would be advantageous to many cities not having four thousand or more inhabitants to become cities of the first class, since the Statutes of Arkansas give the cities of the first class greater rights than the cities of the second class; an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1947, No. 227, § 3: approved Mar. 18, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and declared that there are a large number of towns in the State of Arkansas which have raised their classifications under the provisions of Act No. 334 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1937, and under the provisions of Act No. 334 of the General Assembly of 1937 as amended by Act 211 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1939 and their operations and advantages as cities of the second class are being delayed by reason of the present law so that this Act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1967, No. 498, § 3: Apr. 4, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that various laws of this State have been enacted applicable to cities of this State within defined population classifications, but that subsequent thereto many of the cities to which said laws are applicable have either increased or decreased their population to an extent that such laws are no longer applicable to such cities, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order that the laws formerly applicable to said cities may continue to be applicable thereto. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 1 et seq., 105 et seq.

Ark. L. Rev.

Municipal Improvement Bonds in Arkansas, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 146.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Goldner, A Call for Reform of Arkansas Municipal Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

14-37-101. Applicability.

All corporations which existed when the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 took effect for the purpose of municipal government, and described or denominated in any law then in force, are organized into cities of the first and second class, as the case may be, and incorporated towns with the territorial limits respectively prescribed or belonging.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 5, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7456; Pope's Dig., § 9489; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-203.

Publisher's Notes. The Arkansas Constitution of 1874 was ratified by the people October 13, 1874, and its adoption was proclaimed October 30, 1874.

Case Notes

Boundaries.

When a municipal corporation has definite boundaries that are in dispute, it is for the courts, and not the General Assembly, to determine their location. State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81 (1881).

14-37-102. Division into classes.

In respect to the exercise of certain corporate powers and to the number, character, powers, and duties of certain officers, municipal corporations are divided into the following classes:

  1. Cities of the first class;
  2. Cities of the second class; and
  3. Incorporated towns.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 1, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7448; Pope's Dig., § 9480; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-201.

14-37-103. Population limits.

    1. All municipal corporations having over two thousand five hundred (2,500) inhabitants shall be deemed cities of the first class.
    2. All cities having five hundred (500) inhabitants or more and fewer than two thousand five hundred (2,500) inhabitants shall be deemed cities of the second class.
    3. All others shall be incorporated towns and shall be governed by the provisions of this subtitle.
    1. Any incorporated towns of fewer than five hundred (500) inhabitants who have voted to be a city of the second class under § 14-37-112 shall continue to be a city of the second class.
    2. Any city having a population of one thousand five hundred (1,500) or more may become a city of the first class upon the enactment of an ordinance therefor, with all powers, authority, and responsibility of other cities of the first class.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 5, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7457; Pope's Dig., § 9490; Acts 1945, No. 247, § 4; 1965, No. 108, § 1; 1971, No. 269, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-202.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1945, No. 247, § 5, provided that this act shall be cumulative to §§ 14-37-105(b) and 14-37-112 and shall not affect the provisions of these sections.

14-37-104. Cities of the first class.

  1. All cities, which at the last federal census had, or now have, a population exceeding two thousand five hundred (2,500) inhabitants shall be deemed cities of the first class.
  2. All cities which, at any future federal census, or any census which may be taken in pursuance of the laws of this state, shall be found to have a population of two thousand five hundred (2,500) inhabitants shall thereafter be deemed cities of the first class.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 2, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7449, 7450; Pope's Dig., §§ 9481, 9482; Acts 1945, No. 247, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-204, 19-205.

Case Notes

Paris.

The municipality of Paris, Arkansas, is a city of the first class as the 1990 census reports a population of approximately three thousand six hundred (3,600) inhabitants. Pearson v. City of Paris, 839 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

Cited: City of Cabot v. Thompson, 286 Ark. 395, 692 S.W.2d 235 (1985).

14-37-105. Cities of the second class.

  1. Any incorporated town of the State of Arkansas which, at any future federal census, or any census taken under the authority of the State of Arkansas, shall be found to have a population exceeding five hundred (500) persons who shall be inhabitants of the town and less than two thousand five hundred (2,500) inhabitants shall be deemed in all respects to be a city of the second class. However, this section shall not apply to cities that are now classified as cities of the first class.
    1. In all counties having two (2) levying courts, in which there is a county seat town of less than five hundred (500) population, according to the last federal census, the county seat towns are made cities of the second class, with all the powers and privileges conferred upon cities of the second class by law.
    2. Any of the towns described in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, through the governing body thereof, shall have the power, by ordinance, to annex to the city or town all heretofore platted additions thereto, so as to make them a part of the city and included within its boundaries and subject to all the rights, duties, and privileges of the original territory of the city.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 2, p. 1; 1909, No. 306, § 1, p. 915; C. & M. Dig., § 7451; Acts 1931, No. 119, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9483; Acts 1939, No. 92, §§ 1, 2; 1945, No. 247, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-206, 19-207.

14-37-106. Board of Municipal Corporations.

The Board of Municipal Corporations shall consist of the Auditor of State, Secretary of State, and Attorney General. The Secretary of State shall be president.

History. Acts 1893, No. 145, § 2, p. 251; C. & M. Dig., § 7454; Pope's Dig., § 9487; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-208.

Case Notes

Facilities Boards.

Facilities boards are not the type of company, association or corporation contemplated by this section; rather, facilities boards are agencies created by the counties to carry out various county activities. McCutchen v. Huckabee, 328 Ark. 202, 943 S.W.2d 225 (1997).

14-37-107. Advancement of cities and towns according to census.

    1. It shall be the duty of the Governor, the Auditor of State, and the Secretary of State, or any two (2) of them, to ascertain from the federal census and census provided for by law of this state, what cities of the second class are entitled to become cities of the first class and what incorporated towns are entitled to become cities and their proper class.
    2. The Governor shall cause a statement stating the grade to which the city has been advanced to be prepared and transmitted to the mayor of the city or town.
  1. As soon as the statement has been received by the mayor, as provided in subsection (a) of this section, showing that any city or town will be entitled to be organized into a city of the first class or city of the second class at the next regular annual period for the election of municipal officers, it shall be the duty of the proper corporate authority of the city or incorporated town to make and publish bylaws or ordinances necessary to perfect the organization in respect to the election, duties, and compensation of municipal officers, or otherwise.
  2. When a city of the second class becomes a city of the first class, the recorder of the affected city of the second class automatically becomes the city clerk of the city when the change in classification occurs.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, §§ 3, 4, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7452, 7455; Pope's Dig., §§ 9485, 9488; Acts 1943, No. 160, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-209, 19-210; Acts 2005, No. 44, § 1.

Case Notes

Void Orders.

An order made by the state board of municipal corporations raising an incorporated town to a city of the second class was void where census list required by statute had not been filed in mayor's office 30 days prior to the date the order was made. Bush v. Echols, 178 Ark. 507, 10 S.W.2d 906 (1928).

Where 1910 federal census showed a population of 2,331 and 1920 federal census showed a population of 2,836, it was proper to find that the special census taken in 1879 was fraudulent (there being testimony that some persons included in the count did not live within the city), that the order making it a second-class city was void ab initio, and that the town did not become a city until after 1910. City of Searcy v. Roberson, 256 Ark. 1081, 511 S.W.2d 627 (1974).

Cited: Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

14-37-108. Application for advancement between census periods.

  1. The Auditor of State, Secretary of State, and Attorney General may declare incorporated towns cities of the second class, and cities of the second class cities of the first class, between the periods fixed in § 14-37-107(a), upon application from any incorporated town or city of the second class, accompanied by a resolution adopted by the town or city council, asking to be so declared a city of the first or second class, as the case may be.
  2. The application shall be accompanied with satisfactory evidence showing the population of the town or city to be large enough to entitle it to such advancement.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 3, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7453; Pope's Dig., § 9486; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-211.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of acts, proceedings, enumerations, resolutions, and ordinances passed by incorporated towns declared to be cities of the second class, notwithstanding any irregularities, defects, errors, or informalities in such proceedings, see Acts 1909, No. 167, § 1. As to ratification of the actions of de facto officers of cities that been advanced under special acts that had been held unconstitutional, see Acts 1915, No. 212, § 1.

Case Notes

Validating Acts.

Acts 1909, No. 167 was not intended to cure an ordinance fixing a date for the election of city officers different from the date fixed by statute for such an election. McMahan v. State, 102 Ark. 12, 143 S.W. 94 (1912).

The actions of municipal officers in creating a local improvement district and levying assessments, performed subsequent to the passage of Acts 1915, No. 212, and before an election was held to elect new officers, were valid as were the formation of the district and the assessments. Cotten v. Hughes, 125 Ark. 126, 187 S.W. 905 (1916).

14-37-109. Appointment of enumerators to take census.

    1. If a city or incorporated town desires to be made a city of the first class or a city of the second class, or if it is deemed necessary to determine the number of inhabitants within the city or incorporated town for any purpose, on petition of ten (10) qualified voters of the city or incorporated town filed with the recorder of the city or incorporated town, the city or town council shall consider the petition at its next regular meeting.
    2. If the city or town council deems the prayer of petitioners well founded and deems that a census of the city or incorporated town should be taken in accordance with the prayer of the petitioners, the city or town council may pass a resolution authorizing and directing the taking of a census of the city or incorporated town, and the mayor shall appoint enumerators to take the census, the appointees to be approved by the city or town council.
    1. The resolution authorizing the taking of census shall prescribe the duties of the enumerators as to when and how to proceed.
      1. Not more than one (1) enumerator shall be appointed for each ward.
      2. However, one (1) enumerator may take more than one (1) ward if the city or town council deems it proper.

History. Acts 1903, No. 46, § 1, p. 78; C. & M. Dig., § 7662; Pope's Dig., § 9784; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-212; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote the section.

14-37-110. Return of enumerators.

    1. Before the enumerators shall enter upon their duties, they shall make and subscribe to an oath to well and faithfully perform their duties, and their return shall be taken as true.
      1. However, the returns so made by the census enumerators shall be filed in the office of the mayor and shall be subject to examination of the public for thirty (30) days.
      2. Any correction of the returns may be made if proper proof is made before the city or town council to its satisfaction authorizing the correction sought to be made.
  1. The enumerators shall be entitled to and receive two and one-half cents (2 1/2¢) per name for all names found to be authentic by the city or town council, to be paid by the city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1903, No. 46, §§ 2, 3, p. 78; C. & M. Dig., § 7663; Pope's Dig., § 9785; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-213, 19-214; Acts 2017, No. 878, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (a)(2)(B), substituted “of the returns” for “thereof”, and substituted “city or town council to its” for “board of aldermen to their”; and, in (b), substituted “city or town council” for “board of aldermen”, and substituted “city or incorporated town” for “town or city”.

14-37-111. Reduction of city to lower grade — In general.

  1. Whenever the last federal census shows that any city of the first class has fewer than two thousand five hundred (2,500) inhabitants and that any city of the second class has fewer than five hundred (500) inhabitants, the city may be reduced to a city of the second class or to an incorporated town, respectively, upon the adoption of a resolution by the council of the municipal corporations requesting that the grade of the corporations be reduced.
    1. The Board of Municipal Corporations, upon the receipt of a certified copy of the resolution, shall make an order reducing the grade of the municipal corporation.
    2. Upon being advised of the action of the board, the Governor shall cause a statement to be prepared and transmitted to the mayor of the city or town stating the grade to which it has been reduced.
  2. When the grade of a city has been reduced to city of the second class or to incorporated town, all officers of that city or town shall continue in office until the next general election for the city or town.

History. Acts 1931, No. 61, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 9547, 9548; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-216, 19-217; Acts 2017, No. 260, § 4.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(B)(2) provided: “District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (c), deleted the former first sentence and substituted “When the grade of a city has been reduced to city of the second class or to incorporated town, all officers of that city or town” for “All other officers of a city whose grade may be reduced”.

14-37-112. Incorporated town may become city of the second class.

    1. Any incorporated town in this state may become a city of the second class by the adoption and publication of an ordinance, duly adopted and published as provided by law, converting the incorporated town into a city of the second class. However, after the adoption and publication of the ordinance, the qualified voters of the town shall vote in any general election or a special election called by the mayor to be held in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq., in favor of the ordinance.
    2. If a majority of the qualified electors voting in the election vote in favor of the ordinance, a certified copy of the ordinance shall be filed with the Secretary of State. Thereupon the incorporated town shall become a city of the second class.
    1. The officers of the incorporated town, upon filing with the Secretary of State the certified copy of the ordinance, shall immediately become officers of the city of the second class with full authority to proceed, do, and perform any and all things for, and on behalf of, the city of the second class as if elected as officers of the city of the second class. They shall serve as officers for the full period of time for which they were elected or until their successors are elected and qualified.
      1. At the regular time for holding election of officers of incorporated towns, there shall be an election for the election of officers of the city of the second class, who shall hold office as officers of the city of the second class until the next regular time fixed by law for electing officers of a city of the second class or until their successors are elected and qualified.
      2. However, the mayor of the incorporated town which has been raised to a city of the second class may call a special election by proclamation, to be held in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq., which shall be published by two (2) insertions in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the city is located. This special election shall be held for the purpose of electing officers for the city of the second class.

History. Acts 1937, No. 334, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9484; Acts 1939, No. 211, § 1; 1947, No. 227, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-215; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 19; 2007, No. 1049, § 37; 2009, No. 1480, §§ 53, 54.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of acts of officers of municipalities that raised their classification from incorporated town to cities of the second class under Acts 1937, No. 334, as amended by Acts 1939, No. 211, see Acts 1947, No. 227, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in the last sentence of (a)(1); and substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in the first sentence of (b)(2)(B).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was held not unconstitutional as delegating to towns or the inhabitants thereof the authority to raise the classification of towns. Gross v. Homard, 201 Ark. 391, 144 S.W.2d 705 (1940).

Applicability.

This section applies to all incorporated towns in the state and is a general and not a special law. Gross v. Homard, 201 Ark. 391, 144 S.W.2d 705 (1940).

Certified Copy of Ordinance.

When certified copy of ordinance raising classification of municipality from town to city of the second class is filed with secretary of state as required, the town immediately becomes a city of the second class and the officers thereof immediately become officers of a city of the second class. Luther v. Gower, 233 Ark. 496, 345 S.W.2d 608 (1961).

Cited: Logan v. Harris, 213 Ark. 37, 210 S.W.2d 301 (1948).

14-37-113. Effect of population changes on legislation.

Whenever any law of this state provides that the provisions of it shall apply to any city within a defined population classification, it is declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that, in the event any city to which the law was applicable at the time of the enactment of that law shall subsequently achieve a lesser or greater population than the classification prescribed by law, the law shall nevertheless thereafter be equally applicable to any such city, irrespective of the fact that the city no longer has a population within the classification prescribed by the law.

History. Acts 1967, No. 498, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-218.

14-37-114. Reduction of city of the first class to city of the second class.

  1. Whenever the last federal census shows that any city of the first class has less than five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, the city may be reduced to a city of the second class upon the adoption of a resolution by the council of the municipal corporation requesting that the grade of the municipal corporation be reduced.
  2. The Board of Municipal Corporations, upon the receipt of a certified copy of the resolution, shall make an order reducing the grade of the municipal corporation, and, upon being advised of the action of the board, the Governor shall cause a statement thereof to be prepared and transmitted to the mayor of the city stating the grade to which the municipal corporation has been reduced.

History. Acts 1991, No. 514, § 1.

Chapter 38 Incorporation and Organization of Municipalities

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 31, preserved the rights, liabilities, and property of municipal corporations organized prior to adoption of the act.

Cross References. Emergency temporary location for political subdivisions, § 14-14-308.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1961, No. 131, § 3: Feb. 22, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, a number of cities and towns in the State of Arkansas lie within more than one county, and whereas, confusion exists as to the validity of the acts of the officers of such cities and towns and as to the manner and form of holding elections therein and the exercising of corporate powers by the officers of said cities and towns thereby threatening the health, peace, safety, and general welfare of citizens of the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 711, § 4: Apr. 28, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that a number of incorporated towns have become inactive in this State, but the activations of such incorporated towns is essential to the providing of necessary municipal services for the citizens of such incorporated town, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to establish procedures for the reactivation of such incorporated towns, and for the election of the officials thereof. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 635, § 2: Sept. 1, 1975.

Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 3: Jan. 25, 1980. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that when a municipality votes to change its form of government that a hardship exists when such municipality must wait to elect officials of such municipality in the manner and time provided by law for the election of such municipal officials; that a need exists that such municipality government offices be filled immediately by the calling of a special election to allow such municipality to properly effectuate the newly elected change of government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 70, § 3: Feb. 6, 1980. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that when a municipality votes to change its form of government that a hardship exists when such municipality must wait to elect officials of such municipality in the manner and time provided by law for the election of such municipal officials; that a need exists that such municipality government offices be filled immediately by the calling of a special election to allow such municipality to properly effectuate the newly elected change of government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 439, § 3: Mar. 13, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present procedure for the incorporation of rural communities is unduly restrictive and that many parts of rural Arkansas which need the services of an incorporated town are unable to incorporate due to the present requirements of the law, and that this Act is necessary to liberalize the incorporation requirements for such rural communities. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 653, § 3: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that an urgent need exists to clarify the official effective dates of municipal boundary actions, to aid the United States Bureau of the Census in the bureau's decennial census counts, and to maintain more accurate records regarding municipal boundary changes; and that this act is immediately necessary to clarify the effective dates of municipal boundary changes. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 30 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 6 et seq.

87 C.J.S., Towns, § 6.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

14-38-101. Petition for incorporation.

    1. When the inhabitants of a part of any county not embraced within the limits of any city or incorporated town shall desire to be organized into a city or incorporated town, they may apply, by a petition in writing, signed by the greater of either two hundred (200) or a majority of the qualified voters residing within the described territory, to the county court of the proper county.
    2. The petition shall:
      1. Describe the territory proposed to be embraced in the incorporated town and have annexed to it an accurate map or plat of the territory;
      2. State the name proposed for the incorporated town; and
      3. Name the persons authorized to act in behalf of the petitioners in prosecuting the petition.
    1. Unless the governing body of the municipal corporation has affirmatively consented to the incorporation by written resolution or the area that seeks to be incorporated contains a population of one thousand five hundred (1,500) or more, the court shall not approve the incorporation of a municipality if any portion of the territory proposed to be embraced in the incorporated town lies within:
      1. Three (3) miles of an existing municipal corporation; or
      2. The area in which that existing municipal corporation is exercising its planning territorial jurisdiction.
    2. The planning territorial jurisdiction limitation shall not apply if the area proposed to be incorporated is land upon which a real estate development by a single developer, containing not less than four thousand (4,000) acres, has been or is being developed under a comprehensive plan for a community containing streets and other public services, parks, and other recreational facilities for common use by the residents of the community, churches, schools, and commercial and residential facilities, and which has been subdivided into sufficient lots for residential use to accommodate a projected population of not fewer than one thousand (1,000) persons, and for which a statement of record has been filed with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.
  1. When any petition shall be presented to the court, it shall be filed in the office of the county clerk, to be kept there, subject to the inspection of any persons interested, until the time appointed for the hearing of it.
    1. At or before the time of the filing, the court shall fix and communicate to the petitioners, or their agent, a time and place for the hearing of the petition, which time shall not be less than thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition.
        1. Thereupon, the petitioners or their agent shall cause a notice to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the county for not less than three (3) consecutive weeks.
        2. If there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county, a notice shall be posted at some public place within the limits of the proposed incorporated town for at least three (3) weeks before the time of the hearing.
      1. The notice shall contain the substance of the petition and state the time and place appointed for the hearing.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 35, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7664; Pope's Dig., § 9786; Acts 1975, No. 635, § 1; 1979, No. 606, § 1; 1983, No. 439, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-101; Acts 2001, No. 1233, §§ 1, 2; 2001, No. 1831, § 1; 2007, No. 118, § 1; 2017, No. 1055, § 1; 2019, No. 932, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated former (b)(1) as (b)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B)(i); in the introductory language of (b)(1), substituted “a” for “any” and “lies within” for “shall lie within”; in (b)(1)(A), substituted “Three (3)” for “five (5)” and “or” for “and within the”; inserted “The” in (b)(1)(B)(i); and added (b)(1)(B)(ii).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Unless the governing body of the municipal corporation has affirmatively consented to the incorporation by written resolution or the area that seeks to be incorporated contains a population of one thousand five hundred (1,500) or more, the court” for “The court” in the introductory language of (b)(1); deleted the (b)(1)(B)(i) designation; deleted “unless the governing body of the municipal corporation has affirmatively consented to the incorporation by written resolution” following “jurisdiction” in (b)(1)(B); deleted (b)(1)(B)(ii); and made stylistic changes.

U.S. Code. The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, referred to in this section, is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Handbook to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. 27 Ark. L. Rev. 65.

Case Notes

Agents.

Statutory provisions relating to annexation of territory at the instance of agents of an existing municipal corporation were held intended to afford a right of action to parties claiming to be affected, but such an action was held to be an independent proceeding, as distinguished from appeal. Pike v. City of Stuttgart, 200 Ark. 1010, 142 S.W.2d 233 (1940).

Description of Territory.

Where limits of proposed municipality are unreasonably large, incorporation of the municipality will be denied. Arkansas & O. Ry. v. Busch, 223 Ark. 27, 264 S.W.2d 54 (1954).

Contention that lands to be annexed were not described in petition and that no map or plat was filed as required by law held to have failed. Mahone v. Rogers, 234 Ark. 540, 353 S.W.2d 184 (1962).

A description of property under this section must be sufficient to render possible the ascertainment of the boundaries involved and the territories intended to be included. Parrish v. City of Russellville, 253 Ark. 1000, 490 S.W.2d 126 (1973).

Published description of property required by this section is insufficient where description does not encircle any geographical area nor describe a geographical area to be annexed, but merely describes a line, as such a description fails to comply with requirement that the petition describe “the territory to be embraced.” Parrish v. City of Russellville, 253 Ark. 1000, 490 S.W.2d 126 (1973).

Notice.

Erroneous legal description in published notice does not void incorporation, because this section only requires the published notice to contain substance of petition and the time and place of the hearing. Dunkum v. Moore, 265 Ark. 544, 580 S.W.2d 183 (1979).

Qualified Voters.

While petition of required number of electors can initiate incorporation procedure, concurrence of majority of area inhabitants is required to override challenge to incorporation lodged under § 14-38-107. Town of Wrightsville v. Walton, 255 Ark. 523, 501 S.W.2d 241 (1973).

The term “inhabitants” as used in this section means qualified voters residing within the proposed municipality. Dunkum v. Moore, 265 Ark. 544, 580 S.W.2d 183 (1979).

Cited: Gerrin v. Hickey, 464 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Ark. 1979); White v. Lorings, 274 Ark. 272, 623 S.W.2d 837 (1981); Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

14-38-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning refiling of certain petitions withdrawn prior to court action, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1121, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 556, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-101.4.

14-38-103. Hearing on petition.

    1. Every incorporation hearing under this chapter shall be public and may be adjourned from time to time.
    2. Any person interested may appear and contest the granting of the prayer of the petition, and affidavits in support of or against the petition, which may be prepared and submitted, shall be examined by the county court.
    1. In its discretion, the court may permit the agent named in the original petition to amend or change it.
    2. However, no amendment shall be permitted whereby territory not before embraced shall be added or the character of the proposed city or incorporated town changed from special to general, or from general to special, without appointing another time for a hearing and requiring new notice to be given as provided in § 14-38-101.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 36, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7665; Pope's Dig., § 9787; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-102.

Cross References. Hearing on petitions in annexation proceedings, § 14-40-602.

Case Notes

In General.

An injunction in equity to prohibit the incorporation of a municipality and to prevent the elected officers from functioning would be denied since there was an adequate remedy at law. Bragg v. Thompson, 177 Ark. 870, 9 S.W.2d 24 (1928).

Petition to incorporate a new municipality and petition to annex such territory to an existing city are properly consolidated for hearing and appeal. Chastain v. City of Little Rock, 208 Ark. 142, 185 S.W.2d 95 (1945).

Amendments.

It is not within the jurisdiction of a county court to amend an annexation petition by adding territory. Rooker v. City of Little Rock, 234 Ark. 372, 352 S.W.2d 172 (1961).

On appeal, a circuit court is within the bounds of its authority when it disregards a void amendment allowed by the county court in an annexation proceeding and hears the case on the original petition, as if it had been originally brought in the circuit court, and as if no amendment had been made. Rooker v. City of Little Rock, 234 Ark. 372, 352 S.W.2d 172 (1961).

Any Person Interested.

Protestants who appeared at the hearing and orally objected to the proposed annexation were qualified to appeal from the county court to the circuit court even though they had filed no written remonstrance or other pleading. Skinner v. City of El Dorado, 248 Ark. 916, 454 S.W.2d 656 (1970).

“Any person interested” means any person who has some interest in the municipality or the area to be annexed. City of Crossett v. Anthony, 250 Ark. 660, 466 S.W.2d 481 (1971); Turner v. Wiederkehr Village, 261 Ark. 72, 546 S.W.2d 717 (1977).

In case where city was petitioning for annexation of two separate areas and persons who opposed all resided or had property in one area, there was no interested party contesting the annexation of the other area, and a motion to dismiss as to the latter area should have been granted. City of Crossett v. Anthony, 250 Ark. 660, 466 S.W.2d 481 (1971).

At least some interest must be shown on trial de novo in a circuit court in the face of a motion to dismiss for lack of interest. Turner v. Wiederkehr Village, 261 Ark. 72, 546 S.W.2d 717 (1977).

Attorney who owned property near village to be annexed and had contingent fee contract under which he would acquire property in the village if he won his client's lawsuit did not have standing to challenge the incorporation in the absence of a showing that he was threatened with a direct pecuniary damage not shared by members of the public in general. Turner v. Wiederkehr Village, 261 Ark. 72, 546 S.W.2d 717 (1977).

A person need not appear at the hearing on a petition for incorporation and contest the petition, in order to have standing to file a complaint for injunction in circuit court against such incorporation, as provided in § 14-38-106. Campbell v. City of Cherokee Village W., 333 Ark. 310, 969 S.W.2d 179 (1998).

Cited: Town of Ouita v. Heidgen, 247 Ark. 943, 448 S.W.2d 631 (1970); White v. Lorings, 274 Ark. 272, 623 S.W.2d 837 (1981); Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984).

14-38-104. Order of incorporation — Transcript.

  1. The county court shall make out and endorse on the petition an order to the effect that the city or incorporated town as named and described in the petition may be organized if the court shall be satisfied after hearing the petition that:
    1. The greater of either two hundred (200) or a majority of the qualified voters residing within the described territory have signed the petition;
    2. The limits have been accurately described and an accurate map or plat of the limits made and filed;
    3. The name proposed for the city or incorporated town is proper and sufficient to distinguish it from others of like kind in the state; and
    4. Moreover, that it shall be deemed right and proper in the judgment and discretion of the court that the petition shall be granted.
    1. The order shall be signed and delivered by the court, together with the petition and the map or plat, to the recorder of the county, whose duty it shall be to record it as soon as possible in the proper book or records and to file and preserve in his or her office the original papers, having certified thereon that it has been properly recorded.
    2. It shall also be the duty of the recorder to make out and certify, under his or her official seal, two (2) transcripts of the record. The recorder shall forward one (1) copy to the Secretary of State and deliver one (1) copy to the agent of the petitioners, with a certificate thereon that a similar transcript has been forwarded to the Secretary of State as provided by this section.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 37, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7666; Pope's Dig., § 9788; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-103; Acts 1995, No. 299, § 1; 2001, No. 1233, § 3.

Case Notes

In General.

On the passage of the Act of April 20, 1873, for the addition of territory to municipal corporations, Du Val's addition to the city of Little Rock became and continued a part of the city and was not cut off, as was attempted by the Act of March 9, 1877, “to define the boundary of the city,” the act being unconstitutional. City of Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark. 166 (1880).

Appeals.

Parties who file a remonstrance and thus become parties may appeal. Barnwell v. Town of Gravette, 87 Ark. 430, 112 S.W. 973 (1908).

In action by municipality for annexation of additional territory, the circuit court on appeal from the county court will try the case de novo, and such decision by the circuit court will be affirmed by the Supreme Court if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Burton v. City of Ft. Smith, 214 Ark. 516, 216 S.W.2d 884 (1949).

Judgment in favor of annexation of large tract of land on ground that annexation was needed for municipal expansion will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support such judgment, although there is evidence that some of the land is valuable as agricultural land. Burton v. City of Ft. Smith, 214 Ark. 516, 216 S.W.2d 884 (1949).

Maps or Plats.

Corners established by a government survey are conclusive and cannot be collaterally attacked. Burton v. City of Ft. Smith, 214 Ark. 516, 216 S.W.2d 884 (1949).

Transcripts.

The transcripts mentioned in this section are the records required to be delivered to the county recorder, and in turn certified. Pike v. City of Stuttgart, 200 Ark. 1010, 142 S.W.2d 233 (1940).

Cited: Dunkum v. Moore, 265 Ark. 544, 580 S.W.2d 183 (1979).

14-38-105. Completion of incorporation.

  1. As soon as the record shall be made and the transcript certified, forwarded, and delivered, the inhabitants within the limits described in the petition shall be deemed a city or incorporated town, to be organized and governed under the provisions of this subtitle in like manner as if specially named therein.
  2. As soon as the city or incorporated town shall be actually organized, by election of its officers as provided in § 14-38-108, notice of its existence as such shall be taken in all judicial proceedings in the state.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 38, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7667; Pope's Dig., § 9789; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-104.

14-38-106. Complaint to prevent organization.

  1. One (1) month shall elapse from the time the transcripts are forwarded and delivered before notice shall be given of an election of officers in the city or incorporated town.
  2. At any time within the one (1) month, any person interested may make complaint in writing, in the nature of an application for an injunction to the circuit court, or the judge in vacation, having given at least five (5) days' notice thereof. He or she shall furnish a copy of the complaint to the agent of the petitioners for the purpose of having the organization of the proposed city or incorporated town prevented.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 39, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7668; Pope's Dig., § 9790; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-105.

Case Notes

Appeals.

Where, following dismissal by county court of complaint protesting annexation of territory, affidavit and prayer for appeal was filed within 30 days, appeal was granted, and transcript was lodged with the circuit clerk more than 30 days after dismissal, transcript was held filed in ample time and appeal was held improperly dismissed. Pike v. City of Stuttgart, 200 Ark. 1010, 142 S.W.2d 233 (1940).

Collateral Attack.

Action attacking validity of organization of municipality instituted more than one month after transcript of the county court's order authorizing its organization has been forwarded and delivered is a collateral attack on the judgment of the court. Bragg v. Thompson, 177 Ark. 870, 9 S.W.2d 24 (1928).

County court's order of incorporation of a town that appears valid on its face was held not subject to collateral attack by action instituted by taxpayer over one month after forwarding and delivery of the order of incorporation to the secretary of state. Bridges v. Incorporated Town of Gateway, 192 Ark. 411, 91 S.W.2d 592 (1936).

Standing.

A person need not appear at the hearing on a petition for incorporation and contest the petition, as provided in § 14-38-103, in order to have standing to file a complaint for injunction in circuit court against such incorporation, as provided in this section. Campbell v. City of Cherokee Village W., 333 Ark. 310, 969 S.W.2d 179 (1998).

Cited: Town of Wrightsville v. Walton, 255 Ark. 523, 501 S.W.2d 241 (1973).

14-38-107. Hearing on complaint — Annulment.

  1. It shall be the duty of the court or judge to hear the complaint in a summary manner, receiving answers, affidavits, and proofs, as may be deemed pertinent.
  2. If it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court or judge that the proposed city or incorporated town does not contain the requisite number of inhabitants, that a majority of them have not signed the original petition, or that the limits of the proposed city or incorporated town are unreasonably large or small or are not properly and sufficiently described, then the court or judge shall order the record of the incorporated town to be annulled.
    1. It shall be the duty of the county recorder to endorse on the record the order so made and to certify and transmit to the Secretary of State a copy of the order.
    2. Thereupon, the record shall be of no effect, but the proceeding shall in no manner bar a subsequent petition to the county court, on the same subject, by complying with the provisions of this chapter.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 39, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7669; Pope's Dig., § 9791; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-106.

Case Notes

Interested Parties.

The plaintiff had standing to bring a complaint against the incorporation of a town and was entitled to a hearing on the complaint, notwithstanding that he failed to appear personally at a public hearing to object to the incorporation and did not file a written objection thereto, since as he was a resident of the affected area of incorporation, he was an interested person. Campbell v. City of Cherokee Village W., 333 Ark. 310, 969 S.W.2d 179 (1998).

Limits Large or Small.

Where evidence shows that the limits of a proposed municipality are unreasonably large, incorporation of the municipality will be denied. Arkansas & O. Ry. v. Busch, 223 Ark. 27, 264 S.W.2d 54 (1954).

A court errs in refusing to approve an incorporated area where the area is not unreasonably large based on size, population, and buildings located in it. White v. Lorings, 274 Ark. 272, 623 S.W.2d 837 (1981).

Majority of Inhabitants.

Where majority of inhabitants in area that seeks to incorporate into municipality have not concurred on incorporation, order of incorporation is properly set aside. Town of Wrightsville v. Walton, 255 Ark. 523, 501 S.W.2d 241 (1973).

While incorporation order can be entered based on petition of requisite number of electors, concurrence of majority of area inhabitants is required to override challenge to incorporation lodged under this section. Town of Wrightsville v. Walton, 255 Ark. 523, 501 S.W.2d 241 (1973).

Proper and Sufficient Description.

The fact that there is error in a trial court's finding that the description of the proposed corporated limits is vague and indefinite will not necessarily require reversal where the judgment is required to be affirmed on other grounds. Town of Ouita v. Heidgen, 247 Ark. 943, 448 S.W.2d 631 (1970).

Requisite Number of Inhabitants.

The term “inhabitants,” as used in this section, means qualified voters residing within the proposed municipality. Dunkum v. Moore, 265 Ark. 544, 580 S.W.2d 183 (1979).

Testimony of county clerk as to the number of qualified voters in an area proposed for incorporation is properly admitted, whether the testimony of the county clerk is considered opinion testimony of a lay witness or an opinion of an expert. Dunkum v. Moore, 265 Ark. 544, 580 S.W.2d 183 (1979).

14-38-108. First election of officers.

  1. Unless the agent of the petitioners, within thirty (30) days after a transcript shall be delivered as provided in § 14-38-104, shall be notified of a complaint having been made to the circuit court of the county, or a judge thereof, then, at the end of the thirty (30) days after the dismissal of the complaint, the agent shall give public notice, by posting a notice at three (3) or more public places within the limits of the city or incorporated town, of the time and place of holding the first election for officers of the city or incorporated town.
  2. The election shall be conducted and the officers elected and qualified in the manner prescribed by law in like cases.
  3. If the election shall be held at any other time than that prescribed by law for the regular election of the officers, the officers elected shall continue in office so long and in like manner as if they had been elected at the preceding period of the regular election.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 40, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7670; Pope's Dig., § 9792; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-107.

14-38-109. City or town lying in more than one county.

  1. Every city and incorporated town presently lying in more than one (1) county and presently exercising the rights, privileges, and powers of a municipal corporation, de facto or de jure, and heretofore incorporated or attempted to have been incorporated under any special act of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, or in any other manner incorporated under color of law, is declared to be a duly incorporated city or incorporated town of that classification which the city or town may presently enjoy as certified by the Secretary of State, as fully to all intents and purposes as though the city or town had been duly incorporated under the general laws of the State of Arkansas.
  2. Each act and deed heretofore done by any officers of the city or incorporated town in their official capacity under color of office for or in behalf of the city or incorporated town is cured, validated, and declared confirmed and shall have the same force and effect as though the city or incorporated town had been lawfully incorporated under the general statutes of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1961, No. 131, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-109.

14-38-110, 14-38-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning area near national forest and relocation of community because of reservoir, were repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. They were derived from the following sources:

14-38-110. Acts 1979, No. 472, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-101.1 — 19-101.3.

14-38-111. Acts 1981, No. 976, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-113.

14-38-112. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning reactivation of inactive city or incorporated town, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 135, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1971, No. 711, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-112; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 20; 2007, No. 1049, § 38; 2009, No. 1480, § 55.

Case Notes

Cited: Cash v. Holder, 293 Ark. 537, 739 S.W.2d 538 (1987).

14-38-113. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning reorganization under different form of government, was repealed by Acts 2019, No. 105, § 1, effective July 24, 2019. The section was derived from Acts 1965, No. 497, § 1-3; 1975, No. 6, § 1; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 1; 1980 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 70, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-110, 19-111, 19-111n; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 21; 2007, No. 1049, § 39; 2009, No. 1480, §§ 56, 57; 2017, No. 878, § 2.

14-38-114. Preservation of papers.

The Secretary of State shall receive and preserve in his or her office all papers transmitted to him or her in relation to the organization, incorporation, or annexation of territory to cities and towns.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 85, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7469; Pope's Dig., § 9502; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-108.

14-38-115. Alternative method of incorporation — Petition and election.

    1. In addition to the procedures for incorporating a city or town under §§ 14-38-101 — 14-38-108, the inhabitants of a part of any county not embraced within the limits of any city or incorporated town may apply to the county judge of the proper county to call for an election on the issue of incorporating a city or town and for electing municipal officials if the following conditions are met:
      1. The territory proposed to be incorporated has at least one thousand five hundred (1,500) inhabitants according to the most recent federal decennial census; and
      2. The county judge is presented a written petition that:
        1. Meets the requirements of subdivision (a)(2) of this section; and
        2. Is signed by at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed to be incorporated.
    2. The petition shall:
      1. Describe the territory proposed to be embraced in the incorporated city or town and have attached to it an accurate map or plat of the territory;
      2. State the name proposed for the incorporated city or town; and
      3. Name the persons authorized to act in behalf of the petitioners in prosecuting the petition.
  1. The county judge shall not approve a petition for incorporation of any city or town if any portion of the territory proposed to be incorporated is ineligible under the criteria in § 14-38-101(b).
  2. If a petition for incorporation is presented to the county judge, it shall be filed in the office of the county clerk to be kept there, subject to the inspection of any persons interested, until the time appointed for a public hearing on the petition.
    1. Upon the filing of a petition for incorporation, the county judge shall set the time for a public hearing on the petition and shall communicate to the petitioners or their agent a time and place for the hearing that shall be not less than thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition.
      1. The petitioners or their agent shall publish a notice in some newspaper of general circulation in the county for not less than three (3) consecutive weeks.
      2. The notice shall contain the substance of the petition and state the time and place set for the public hearing.
  3. The county judge shall hold the public hearing at the time and place determined, and the procedure for a hearing set forth in § 14-38-103 shall be followed in the proceedings concerned in this section to the extent applicable.
    1. After the hearing, if the county judge is satisfied that the procedures for filing the petition for incorporation were followed, that the requirements for signatures under subsection (a) of this section have been met, that the limits of the territory to be incorporated have been accurately described and an accurate map was made and filed, and if the prayer of the petitioner is right and proper, then the county judge shall enter an order that:
      1. Grants the petition to hold an election on the date of the next election; and
      2. Sets the date of the next election as the date of the election on the issue of incorporating the city or town and electing officers.
    2. The order shall be recorded by the clerk of the county.
      1. If the county judge orders an election on the issue of incorporation, the county clerk shall notify the county election commission at least sixty (60) days before the election that the issue of incorporation shall also appear on the election ballot for a proposed city or incorporated town.
        1. No later than forty-five (45) days prior to the election, the county clerk shall identify all persons who reside within the territory proposed to be incorporated, and the county clerk shall determine the names and addresses of all qualified electors residing within that territory.
        2. The failure to identify all persons residing within the territory proposed to be incorporated or the failure to determine the names and addresses of all qualified electors residing within that territory shall not invalidate or otherwise affect the results of the election.
      2. All qualified electors residing within the territory to be incorporated shall be entitled to vote on the issue of incorporation.
      3. The county clerk shall give notice of the election by publication by at least one (1) insertion in some newspaper having a general circulation in the county.
      1. The county clerk shall prepare a list by precinct of all those qualified electors residing within the territory to be incorporated who are qualified to vote in that precinct and furnish that list to the election officials.
      2. The county clerk shall give notice of the voter registration deadlines at least forty (40) days before the election by ordinary mail to those persons whose names and addresses are on the list.
    1. The election on the issue of incorporation shall be held in accordance with the procedures established for other municipal elections, and the ballot for the election shall be printed substantially as follows:
    2. No later than seven (7) days following the election, the county clerk shall:
      1. Certify the election results;
      2. Record the election results in the county records; and
      3. File a certified copy with the county judge.
      1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue of incorporation in the election vote for the issue, then the county clerk shall no later than seven (7) days following the election:
        1. Certify the election results;
        2. Record the election results in the county records; and
        3. File a certified copy with the Secretary of State.
      2. Upon the county clerk's filing of the election results, the county judge shall:
        1. Approve the petition of incorporation as ratified by the voters; and
        2. Endorse on the petition an order that the city or incorporated town as named and described in the petition is organized and that the petition shall be granted.
        1. The order, petition, and map or plat shall be signed and delivered to the county recorder to record them in the proper records and to file and preserve in his or her office the original papers, having certified on the papers that they have been properly recorded.
          1. It shall also be the duty of the recorder to make out and certify, under his or her official seal, two (2) transcripts of the record.
          2. The recorder shall forward one (1) copy to the Secretary of State and deliver one (1) copy to the agent of the petitioners, with a certificate on the transcript that a similar transcript has been forwarded to the Secretary of State.
        1. The incorporation shall be effective on the date the order of the county judge is filed and recorded.
        2. The election of municipal officers shall be effective upon that date.
    1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue at the election vote against the issue of incorporation, the incorporation petition is null and void.
    1. If an order of the county judge provides for an election on the issue of incorporation, then the election of officers for the proposed city or town is to take place at the same time as the election on the issue of incorporation at the next general election.
    2. The county clerk shall notify the county election commission at least sixty (60) days before the election that the election of city or town officers shall also appear on the election ballot along with the issue of incorporation of the proposed city or incorporated town.
      1. The county election commission is responsible for holding the first election of officers for the proposed city or town.
      2. The type of officers to be elected and qualified and the election itself shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by law in like cases for a city or town of like size or class.
    3. If the election is held at any other time than that prescribed by law for the regular election of the officers of the city or town of like size or class, the officers elected shall continue in office as long as and in the same manner as if they had been elected at the preceding period of the regular election of officers of the city or town of same size or class.

“[ ] FOR THE INCORPORATION OF THE CITY (OR TOWN) OF (NAME OF PROPOSED CITY OR INCORPORATED TOWN), ARKANSAS.

[ ] AGAINST THE INCORPORATION OF THE CITY (OR TOWN) OF (NAME OF PROPOSED CITY OR INCORPORATED TOWN), ARKANSAS.”

History. Acts 2005, No. 1237, § 1; 2019, No. 932, §§ 2, 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “one thousand five hundred (1,500) inhabitants” for “four thousand (4,000) inhabitants” in (a)(1)(A); and deleted “general” preceding “election” in (f)(1)(A) and (f)(1)(B).

Case Notes

Cited: Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

14-38-116. Map required with Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office upon incorporation or disincorporation.

Before an entity undertakes an incorporation or disincorporation proceeding under this chapter, the entity shall coordinate with the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office for preparation of legal descriptions and digital mapping for the relevant incorporated or unincorporated areas.

History. Acts 2015, No. 914, § 1.

14-38-117. Effective date of incorporation required.

    1. The county court order of incorporation affecting territory under this chapter shall include the effective date upon which the petition for incorporation is granted and the municipality is considered organized.
    2. County court orders that fail to include a specified effective date in the order shall require using the date of the county clerk's file mark as the effective date for all purposes.
  1. The effective date specified in the order of incorporation issued under § 14-38-104 is the official effective date to be used by any county or state official charged with recording, forwarding, maintaining, or instituting the order of incorporation.
    1. In the event of a circuit court challenge to the county court order of incorporation, the final order of the circuit court shall specify a change to the effective date, if any.
    2. In the absence of a specific attestation, the county court-ordered effective date is the effective date.

History. Acts 2017, No. 653, § 1.

Chapter 39 Surrender of Charter by City of the Second Class or Incorporated Town

Effective Dates. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 12: effective on passage.

Acts 1957, No. 224, § 2: Mar. 12, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are several inactive incorporated towns in this State, that the keeping of records of such inactive incorporated towns is an unnecessary expense to the State of Arkansas, that this Act eliminates this unnecessary expense by revoking the Charters of such inactive towns, and that its immediate effect is needed in order to authorize the elimination of such expense immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and welfare, shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 2 and 3, § 128: July 1, 2016.

Acts 2017, No. 655, § 5: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that municipal boundary changes shall be effective by December 31, 2017, and shall be reported to the United States Bureau of the Census by May 31, 2018, to be assured of inclusion in the 2020 Federal Decennial Census; that there is a need for counties and municipalities to give timely, complete, and accurate written notice to the Secretary of State of municipal boundary changes to ensure an accurate census; and that any modification to statutes after December 31, 2018, would be ineffective in ensuring an accurate census in 2020. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 91.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 101 et seq.

87 C.J.S., Towns, § 17.

14-39-101. Authority generally.

  1. The charters, and all the amendments thereto, of all municipal corporations within this state designated as cities of the second class and incorporated towns may be surrendered, all offices held thereunto abolished, and the territory and inhabitants thereof remanded to the government of this state in the manner provided in this chapter.
  2. Before a municipal corporation undertakes a surrender of charter under this chapter, the municipal corporation shall coordinate with the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office for preparation of legal descriptions and digital mapping of the relevant territory.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 1, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., § 7638; Pope's Dig., § 9760; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-501; Acts 2017, No. 655, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (b).

14-39-102. Revocation due to inactivity.

    1. The charter of any incorporated town or city of the second class that has been inactive as an incorporated place for five (5) years or longer shall be revoked by order of the county court of the county in which the incorporated town or city of the second class is located.
    2. Upon petition by the prosecuting attorney of the county, the county court of the county may make and enter an order revoking any charter of an incorporated town or city of the second class upon a finding that the town or city will no longer be in existence.
  1. When the county court revokes the charter of any incorporated town or city of the second class, the court shall order the clerk of the court to make out and certify under the official seal of the clerk, a transcript of the order, which the clerk shall forward to the Secretary of State, to be kept on file in the office of the Secretary of State. The clerk shall also forward a copy to the Arkansas State Archives.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 2, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7639-7642; Pope's Dig., §§ 9761-9764; Acts 1957, No. 224, § 1; 1983, No. 185, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-502; Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 122; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 122.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 2 and 3, § 1, provided:

“(a) The General Assembly finds:

“(1) State government provides vital functions that impact the lives of Arkansas citizens on a daily basis;

“(2) While these functions are important, it is equally important to ensure that state government operates efficiently and effectively to eliminate unnecessary spending of tax dollars and provide timely and quality services to Arkansas citizens; and

“(3) Issues such as the administrative organization of a governmental entity, the appointment structure of a governmental entity's governing board, and extraneous duties assigned to governmental entities hamper the operation of state government and result in unnecessary expenses and delays in the provision of state services.

“(b) It is the intent of this act to amend provisions of law applicable to certain agencies, task forces, committees, and commission to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of state government as a whole.”

Amendments. The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 2 and 3 substituted “State Archives” for “History Commission” in (b).

Cross References. Arkansas History Commission, § 13-3-101 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

The 1957 amendment of this section expressly repealed the previous provision (Acts 1883, No. 22, § 2) governing surrender of town charters and now sets out the exclusive procedure for such surrender. Simons v. Davis, 263 Ark. 574, 566 S.W.2d 730 (1978).

14-39-103. Surrender and repeal of charter.

    1. When the county court shall have made the order mentioned in § 14-39-102, the charter, and all amendments thereto, of any such municipal corporation shall be deemed to be surrendered and repealed and shall then cease to exist.
    2. The population and territory thereof theretofore governed under and by virtue of the charter and the amendments thereto shall then be resolved back into the body of the state.
    3. All offices theretofore held under, and by force of, the charter and the amendments thereof shall be abolished.
    4. All power of taxation, in any form whatever, theretofore vested in, or exercised by, the authorities of the municipal corporation by virtue of its charter and the amendments thereto shall then be forever withdrawn and reserved to the General Assembly.
      1. The public buildings, squares, promenades, wharves, streets, alleys, parks, fire engines, hose and carriages, horses and wagons, engine houses, engineer instruments, and all other real, personal, or mixed property theretofore used or held by the municipal corporation for municipal purposes shall be transferred to the custody and control of the state, to remain public property as it has always been for the uses to which the property has been applied.
      2. The county court of the counties, in which the extinct municipal corporations, respectively, were situated, shall take immediate possession of and control the same until otherwise provided by law.
  1. From and after the surrender and repeal of the charter as provided in this section, no person holding office under and by virtue of the charter of the municipal corporation shall exercise or attempt to exercise any of the powers or functions of that office.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 3, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7643, 7644; Pope's Dig., §§ 9765-9766; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-503.

14-39-104. Appointment of receiver and back-tax collector.

  1. As to all municipal corporations in this state whose charters may be surrendered and repealed under the provisions of this chapter, the Governor shall appoint an officer for the extinct corporations, respectively, to be known as a receiver and back-tax collector.
  2. The receiver and back-tax collector shall take the oath required of other collectors of the public revenue and shall give bond with good sureties, to be approved by the county court of the county in which the extinct corporations were situated, in such sum as the court may prescribe.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 4, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., § 7645; Pope's Dig., § 9767; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-504.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-39-105. Duties of receiver, etc.

  1. As soon as appointed and qualified, the receiver and back-tax collector shall enter upon the duties of his or her office.
  2. It shall be the receiver and back-tax collector's duty, and he or she is empowered, to take possession of all books, papers, and documents pertaining to the assessment and collection of taxes embraced by this chapter. He or she shall also take possession of all the private property, if any, belonging to the extinct corporation, respectively.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 5, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., § 7646; Pope's Dig., § 9768; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-505.

14-39-106. Reports and collections by receiver, etc.

  1. Every six (6) months the receiver and back-tax collector shall make to the circuit court, in the county in which the extinct corporation was situated, a full, clear, and complete statement showing all taxes collected and settled, and all in his or her hands that remain to be collected and settled.
    1. The receiver and back-tax collector, at the end of each month, shall pay into the State Treasury the whole sum collected or received by him or her, less his or her compensation.
    2. He or she shall distinguish, in making such payments, the respective sources from which the moneys paid in are derived, showing what is collected from taxes for general purposes and what is collected for special purposes, and designating the particular or special purpose, so that the moneys may be kept separate in the State Treasury in order that the Treasurer of State may pay them according to any lien, priority or equity, which may be declared by any court touching any of the funds in favor of any creditor or class of creditors.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 6, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7647, 7648; Pope's Dig., §§ 9769, 9770; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-506.

14-39-107. Compensation of receiver, etc.

The receiver and back-tax collector shall receive such compensation for his or her services as shall be fixed by the county court of the county in which the extinct corporation was situated.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 11, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., § 7661; Pope's Dig., § 9783; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-511.

14-39-108. Proceedings to collect revenue due.

  1. For the purpose of collecting the revenue embraced in the provisions of this chapter, the receiver and back-tax collector is empowered and authorized to file a general creditors' bill in the name of the state, in behalf of all creditors, against all the delinquent taxpayers who owed taxes to the extinct corporation at the time of the surrender or repeal of its charter, which shall be filed in the circuit court, held in and for the county in which the extinct corporation was situated.
    1. All the delinquents in any one (1) county shall be embraced in one (1) summons to answer.
    2. For the issuance of the summons, the clerk shall receive a fee of five cents (5¢) for each defendant named in the summons, except for the first, and for that the fee allowed by law in other cases. However, he or she shall not receive a fee exceeding twenty dollars ($20.00) for the summons.
    3. The sheriff, for serving the summons, shall receive for each defendant ten cents (10¢), except for the first, and for that the fee allowed for like services in other cases.
  2. Publication for nonresidents shall embrace in the same publication, if practicable, all nonresident defendants, the object being to make one (1) proceeding embrace the whole taxes of any one of the extinct corporations.
  3. All pending suits in favor of any of the extinct corporations are to be revived in the name of the state and consolidated with the general proceedings provided for in this chapter and when so consolidated shall form part of the general proceeding.
    1. The court in which the proceeding may be instituted shall have power to settle and adjust all equities, priorities, and liens and to give all relief, both to the defendants and creditors, that might be given if there were as many separate suits as there are creditors and delinquent taxpayers.
      1. The court shall have power to enforce all liens upon property for the payment of the taxes and to order and make all sales of property necessary to the collection of the taxes.
      2. The taxes embraced by this chapter, and which it provides for, are all taxes imposed by extinct municipal corporations up to the time of the surrender or repeal of their respective charters, and none other.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 7, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7649-7654; Pope's Dig., §§ 9771-9776; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-507.

14-39-109. Filing of claims — Appeals.

  1. Publication shall make all creditors parties, with the right to relief as fully as if especially named. At any time, they may file with the clerks of the courts their claims, or attested copies, retaining the original, if they desire. However, the court may order that the original be produced and placed in the custody of the clerk.
    1. The simple filing of claims, respectively, attested by the affidavit of the owner or his or her agent or attorney shall be proof of the claims in common form and, if not contested, entitles him or her to payment pro rata.
    2. For administering the oath in proving the claims, in common form and, filing them, the clerk shall receive the sum of ten cents (10¢) to be paid at the time of making the oath and filing the claim.
    1. If any creditor or receiver and back-tax collector shall desire to contest the validity, in whole or in part, of any claim filed in common form, he or she may do so in a summary way, in the progress of the cause.
      1. The opposing parties in these contests shall reduce to writing the facts that are necessary to their determination and file them.
      2. When filed, they shall become part of the record, and the court shall have power, upon motion and in a summary way, to hear and determine all questions of priority of payment in the progress of the cause.
    1. When any party is dissatisfied with the decision of any litigated question, he or she may have the question reheard, upon appeal or writ of error in the Supreme Court. However, only so much of the record as pertains to that particular litigation shall form the transcript and record for the appellate court.
    2. The costs shall be paid by the parties to such appeal as the appellate court may direct unless the receiver and back-tax collector is a party to the litigation on behalf of creditors generally. In that case, if the appellate court thinks proper, the costs may be charged to the whole or to some particular fund, as right and justice may require.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 8, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7655-7658; Pope's Dig., §§ 9777-9780; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-508.

14-39-110. Payment of funds collected.

Funds collected under this chapter shall be paid out by the Treasurer of State from time to time to those entitled thereto and in such manner as the circuit court may adjudge and decree, on the warrant of the receiver and back-tax collector, countersigned by the judge of the court.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 10, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., § 7660; Pope's Dig., § 9782; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-510.

14-39-111. Disposition of private property.

  1. The receiver and back-tax collector shall make to the circuit court a full and complete statement of all the private property, if any, belonging to the extinct corporations, respectively. All such property shall be considered by the court as a part of the subject matter of the creditor's bill.
  2. The court shall make all orders and decrees as may be deemed necessary and proper for the sale thereof and shall decree the application of the proceeds of the sale to the payment of the debts of the extinct corporations, respectively.

History. Acts 1883, No. 22, § 9, p. 33; C. & M. Dig., § 7659; Pope's Dig., § 9781; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-509.

Chapter 40 Annexation, Consolidation, and Detachment by Municipalities

Research References

ALR.

Right of one governmental subdivision to challenge annexation proceedings by another such subdivision. 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 50 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 38 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, No. 653, § 3: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that an urgent need exists to clarify the official effective dates of municipal boundary actions, to aid the United States Bureau of the Census in the bureau's decennial census counts, and to maintain more accurate records regarding municipal boundary changes; and that this act is immediately necessary to clarify the effective dates of municipal boundary changes. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 655, § 5: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that municipal boundary changes shall be effective by December 31, 2017, and shall be reported to the United States Bureau of the Census by May 31, 2018, to be assured of inclusion in the 2020 Federal Decennial Census; that there is a need for counties and municipalities to give timely, complete, and accurate written notice to the Secretary of State of municipal boundary changes to ensure an accurate census; and that any modification to statutes after December 31, 2018, would be ineffective in ensuring an accurate census in 2020. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-40-101. Map required with Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office upon annexation, consolidation, or detachment.

Before an entity undertakes an annexation, consolidation, or detachment proceeding under this chapter, the entity shall coordinate with the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office for preparation of legal descriptions and digital mapping for the relevant annexation, consolidation, and detachment areas.

History. Acts 2015, No. 914, § 2.

Case Notes

Compliance.

City complied with the statutory requirements for annexation of an enclave where the passage of the annexation ordinance was merely preparation for “undertaking annexation”, and therefore the city contacted the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office (GIS) before it “undertook” the annexation, as required by this section. Even if the ordinance amounted to “undertaking” the annexation, the ordinance did nothing and was invalid before its post-enactment publication. Thus, the city's contacting GIS within 48 hours of the ordinance's passage was in accordance with the statute. Houston v. City of Hot Springs, 2018 Ark. App. 196, 546 S.W.3d 545 (2018).

14-40-102. Effective date of annexation, consolidation, or detachment required.

    1. An annexation, consolidation, or detachment action that affects territory under this chapter shall include in its ordinance or resolution the date upon which the annexation, consolidation, or detachment is considered final.
    2. An ordinance or resolution that fails to include a specified effective date shall use the date of the municipal clerk or municipal recorder file mark or attestation, whichever is later in time, as the effective date for all purposes.
    1. The date specified in the ordinance or resolution is the official effective date of the annexation, consolidation, or detachment.
    2. An amendment to the ordinance or resolution shall carry its own effective date or modification of the effective date.
    3. An amendment that fails to include a specified effective date shall use the date of the municipal clerk or municipal recorder file mark or attestation, whichever is later in time, as the effective date of the amendment for all purposes.
    1. If a municipality initiates an annexation, consolidation, or detachment action under § 14-40-204 or § 14-40-501, the effective date shall be specified.
    2. An ordinance or resolution that fails to include a specified effective date shall use the date of the municipal clerk or municipal recorder file mark or attestation, whichever is later in time, as the effective date for all purposes.
  1. The effective date specified in an ordinance or resolution issued under this chapter is the official effective date to be used by any county or state official charged with recording, forwarding, maintaining, or instituting the ordinance or resolution.
    1. In the event of a circuit court challenge to a county court order approving a municipal boundary change under this chapter, the final order of the circuit court shall specify a change to the effective date, if any.
    2. In the absence of a specific attestation, the municipally designated effective date is the effective date.

History. Acts 2017, No. 653, § 2.

14-40-103. Notice to Secretary of State upon municipal boundary change — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
      1. “Municipal boundary change” means an incorporation, annexation, consolidation, detachment, surrender of charter, revocation of charter, or municipal disincorporation under this subchapter, § 14-38-101 et seq., or § 14-39-101 et seq.
      2. “Municipal boundary change” includes court orders, amendments, and judicial corrections of boundaries or property descriptions; and
    1. “Municipality” means a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town.
    1. Within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of any ordinance or resolution effecting a municipal boundary change under this subchapter, § 14-38-101 et seq., or § 14-39-101 et seq., the city clerk shall provide written notice, along with complete documentation, to the county clerk of each county in which the territory is affected.
    2. Within thirty (30) days of receipt from a municipality, each respective county clerk shall provide written notice to the Secretary of State of filings and records related to the municipal boundary change as required by statute or by the Secretary of State, to be kept by the county clerk, and shall provide those records with notice delivered to the Secretary of State.
      1. Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of a summons, complaint, circuit court order, or court judgment concerning a municipal boundary change, each municipality shall notify in writing the Secretary of State and the respective county clerk of each county in which the territory is or may be affected.
      2. Upon receipt of notice of a court challenge, the county clerk shall provide written notice to the Secretary of State of a summons, complaint, circuit court order, or court judgment that may affect a municipal boundary change.
  2. Absent notice of a court challenge, within thirty (30) days of receipt of a notice of a municipal boundary change, the Secretary of State shall forward appropriate notice and a copy of the appropriate records to the:
    1. Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office;
    2. Tax Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission;
    3. Arkansas Department of Transportation; and
    4. Department of Finance and Administration.
  3. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice of a municipal boundary change from the Secretary of State, the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office shall provide notice and the appropriate electronic records to the:
    1. Tax Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission;
    2. Arkansas Department of Transportation; and
    3. Department of Finance and Administration.
  4. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice from the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office or the Secretary of State of a municipal boundary change, the Arkansas Public Service Commission shall file and preserve the appropriate records and shall notify the entities under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Public Service Commission that have property in the municipality of the annexation.
  5. The Secretary of State may prescribe documents for providing appropriate notice and may prescribe a mandatory form for providing sufficient notice.

History. Acts 2017, No. 655, § 2; 2019, No. 383, § 6.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Municipality” for “Municipal corporation” in (a)(2); and substituted “jurisdiction of the Arkansas Public Service Commission” for “commission's jurisdiction” in (e).

Subchapter 2 — Annexation Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1887, No. 14, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1939, No. 401, § 2: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 30, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1963, No. 88, § 3: Feb. 27, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It being found that the lack of definite jurisdiction over annexation in counties to which this Act is applicable is creating dangerous hazards for lack of adequate fire protection and water supply, and is threatening to hamper the industrial growth of such counties, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2003, No. 1089, § 2: effective retroactively to July 4, 1996.

Acts 2015, No. 826, § 2: Mar. 29, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are some property owners in Arkansas with property that crosses the boundary of two (2) municipalities; that the physical location of a building on the property is sometimes on the boundary line, causing sales tax and other issues for the property owners; and that this act is immediately necessary to ensure that there is clarity to the property owner and to the municipalities as to which municipality is the legal location of the property. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This subchapter is not an unconstitutional attempt to delegate legislative authority. City of Lowell v. City of Rogers, 345 Ark. 33, 43 S.W.3d 742 (2001).

14-40-201. Territory contiguous to county seat.

In counties having two (2) levying courts or in counties having a population of not less than thirteen thousand two hundred fifty (13,250) and not more than fourteen thousand (14,000) according to the most recent federal census where territory contiguous to the county seat needs fire, police, water, and sanitary services of that town to protect the public health, safety, and convenience of inhabitants of both the town and its contiguous territory, the council of any such incorporated town or city of the second class shall have the power to annex the territory contiguous thereto by ordinance, passed and published in the manner provided by law for the passage and publication of ordinances.

History. Acts 1939, No. 401, § 1; 1941, No. 469, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-308.

Case Notes

Cited: Gay v. City of Springdale, 298 Ark. 554, 769 S.W.2d 740 (1989).

14-40-202. Territory annexed in different judicial district.

  1. In any county in this state in which there is more than one (1) judicial district of its county court with a separate levying or quorum court in and for each of the districts, lands lying in one (1) of the districts may be annexed to a city or incorporated town lying in another of the districts, and be and become a part of the city or incorporated town, if otherwise the lands may be annexed, in the manner provided by law.
  2. For the purposes of this section, the county court of the district in which the city or incorporated town is located is vested with jurisdiction over that portion of the county where lie the lands to be annexed in the hearing and determination of the annexation.
  3. Appeals from any orders therein of the county court shall be taken to the circuit court of the same district, all as in the manner provided by law.
    1. In the event of any such annexation, any lands so annexed shall thereafter be and become, for all purposes provided by law, including local option election status, a part of the same district in which the city or incorporated town is located.
    2. Thereafter the county, circuit, and district courts of the district shall have and exercise jurisdiction over the annexed lands and the residents thereof the same as if the lands had been located in the district when it was created.

History. Acts 1963, No. 88, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-328; Acts 2003, No. 1089, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(B)(2) provided:

“District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”

Cross References. Qualifications of justices and judges, Ark. Const. Amend. 80.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section satisfies Ark. Const. Amend. 14 as it makes reasonable classification and legislation relating to administration of justice and is not local. Smalley v. City of Fort Smith, 239 Ark. 39, 386 S.W.2d 944 (1965).

14-40-203. Assignment of annexed territory to ward.

  1. When any territory shall have been annexed to any incorporated town or city, it may be, and it is, the duty of the town or city council of the incorporated town or city to attach and incorporate the annexed territory to and in one (1) or more wards of the incorporated town or city lying adjacent thereto, which may be done by ordinance duly passed by a majority of the members elected to the council.
  2. The territory so assigned and attached to a ward shall immediately be considered and become a part thereof as fully as any other part of it.

History. Acts 1887, No. 14, § 1, p. 17; C. & M. Dig., § 7470; Pope's Dig., § 9503; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-309.

14-40-204. Annexation of city-owned parks and airports.

    1. From and after the passage of this subsection, all city-owned parks and city-owned airports in cities of populations between forty thousand (40,000) and eighty thousand (80,000) in counties whose population is one hundred forty thousand (140,000) or over are annexed to the cities owning the parks and airports.
    2. This subsection shall apply to other cities and counties in the future meeting the population requirements, as shown by the federal census.
  1. All city-owned parks owned by cities in this state having a population of not less than six thousand (6,000) and not more than six thousand four hundred fifty (6,450) and located in counties having a population of not less than twenty-two thousand six hundred (22,600) and not more than twenty-two thousand eight hundred (22,800), according to the most recent federal census, are annexed to the cities owning the parks.
  2. All city-owned parks with a minimum of thirty (30) acres and owned by cities in this state having a population of not less than fifteen thousand (15,000) and not more than eighteen thousand (18,000) and located in counties having a population of not less than two hundred twenty thousand (220,000) and not more than two hundred sixty thousand (260,000), according to the most recent federal decennial census, are annexed to the cities owning the parks.

History. Acts 1951, No. 295, § 1; 1959, No. 49, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-323, 19-324; Acts 2017, No. 192, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. In reference to the term “the passage of this subsection,” Acts 1951, No. 295, was signed by the Governor on March 19, 1951, and became effective on June 7, 1951.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (c).

14-40-205. Territory within one-half mile of state park.

  1. The annexation laws of this state do not apply in the area within one-half mile of the boundaries of a state park located in a county with a population in excess of three hundred fifty thousand (350,000) unless:
    1. The annexation is approved by a majority of the voters residing within the one-half-mile area;
    2. The area to be annexed is on the opposite side of a navigable river from the state park;
    3. The area to be annexed is on the opposite side of and south of an existing railroad right-of-way from the state park; or
    4. The area to be annexed contains a public or private school.
    1. An order of the county court issued in contradiction of this section is void if the order is issued after August 1, 1997.
    2. A county court order issued after August 1, 1997, annexing an area on the opposite side of and south of an existing railroad right-of-way from a state park is valid and not void.

History. Acts 1997, No. 1216, § 1; 1999, No. 1495, § 1; 2017, No. 536, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated former (a) as the introductory language of (a) and (a)(1) through (a)(3); in the introductory language of (a), substituted “The annexation laws of this state do not apply” for “None of the annexation laws of this state shall have any application” and “a state park” for “any state park”, and deleted “persons” following “(350,000)”; substituted “the one-half mile” for “such one-half mile” in (a)(1); added (a)(4); in (b)(2), substituted “A county court order issued” for “However, if any county court order was issued” and “is valid and not void” for “then the county court order is declared valid and not void” at the end; and made stylistic changes.

14-40-206. Territory annexed with prior county permit or approval in use.

If a county had issued a permit or approval for construction, operation, or development before a municipal annexation proceeding begins for a project in the area that the municipality intends to annex, the municipality shall honor and give full effect to county permits and approvals on lands to be annexed.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1506, § 1.

14-40-207. Building situated or to be situated upon municipal boundary line — Option to choose municipal location.

    1. A property owner who has a building that is currently situated upon the boundary line between two (2) municipalities may choose either one (1) of the municipalities as the legal location of the building.
    2. When the expansion of a building will result in the expansion's being situated upon the boundary line between two (2) municipalities, the property owner of the building may choose either one (1) of the municipalities as the legal location of the building if the property owner has first obtained the necessary authorizations or permits for expansion of the building from the municipality upon which the building is located before the expansion or from the municipality upon which the building expansion will be located.
    1. The property owner shall provide written notice to the governing body of both municipalities as to which municipality is chosen under subsection (a) of this section.
    2. The written notice to the chosen municipality shall include a request for annexation into the chosen municipality.
  1. The property upon which the building is situated or will be situated after expansion and up to two (2) acres of the property owner's property surrounding the building and expansion shall be annexed into the municipality chosen by the owner under subsection (a) of this section.
  2. Within sixty (60) days of receipt of the written notice under subsection (b) of this section, the municipality chosen by the owner under subsection (a) of this section shall coordinate with the Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office for preparation of legal descriptions and digital mapping for the relevant area.

History. Acts 2015, No. 826, § 1.

14-40-208. Annexation of territory under municipal territorial jurisdiction.

  1. If a municipality states its intent by resolution or ordinance to annex a specifically defined territory or portion of the territory over which it is exercising territorial jurisdiction under § 14-56-413, the municipality shall initiate annexation proceedings within five (5) years of the stated intent.
    1. During the five (5) years under subsection (a) of this section, the municipality may continue to exercise its territorial jurisdiction under § 14-56-413, including the defined territory specified within its intent to annex.
    2. If the municipality does not initiate annexation proceedings of the territory specified within its intent to annex within five (5) years of the effective date of the resolution or ordinance under subsection (a) of this section, the municipality is prohibited from again exercising territorial jurisdiction over the territory specified within its intent to annex for the next five (5) years.

History. Acts 2015, No. 845, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Municipal Annexation of Contiguous Lands

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 298, § 6: emergency clause failed to pass. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that many cities and towns have grown beyond their legal boundaries and for the betterment of the entire State a modernized annexation law is drastically needed. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 309, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 4, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that many cities and towns have grown beyond their legal boundaries and for the betterment of the entire State a modernized annexation law is drastically needed. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 904, § 3: Apr. 7, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that many cities and towns have grown beyond their legal boundaries and for the betterment of the entire State a modernized annexation law is drastically needed. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Owen, Note: Local Government — Municipal Corporation — Annexation Invalidation, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 105.

Hardin, Survey of Arkansas Law: Public Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 281.

Arkansas Law Survey, Scroggins, Property, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This subchapter is not unconstitutional because the burden of going forward with proof is placed upon property owners objecting to annexation. Floyd v. Town of Mayflower, 256 Ark. 992, 511 S.W.2d 490 (1974).

14-40-301. Construction.

The provisions of this subchapter shall not be construed to give any municipality the authority to annex any portion of another city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1971, No. 298, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-307.4.

Case Notes

Cited: Gay v. City of Springdale, 298 Ark. 554, 769 S.W.2d 740 (1989); Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 101 S.W.3d 191 (2003).

14-40-302. Authority — Exceptions.

  1. By vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the total number of members making up its governing body, any municipality may adopt an ordinance to annex lands contiguous to the municipality if the lands are any of the following:
    1. Platted and held for sale or use as municipal lots;
    2. Whether platted or not, if the lands are held to be sold as suburban property;
    3. When the lands furnish the abode for a densely settled community or represent the actual growth of the municipality beyond its legal boundary;
    4. When the lands are needed for any proper municipal purposes such as for the extension of needed police regulation; or
    5. When they are valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective municipal uses.
    1. Contiguous lands shall not be annexed if they:
      1. At the time of the adoption of the ordinance, have a fair market value of lands used only for agricultural or horticultural purposes and the highest and best use of the lands is for agricultural or horticultural purposes;
      2. Are lands upon which a new community is to be constructed with funds guaranteed, in whole or in part, by the federal government under Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 or under Title VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970;
      3. Are lands that do not include residents, except as agreed upon by the mayor and county judge; or
      4. Are lands that do not encompass the entire width of public road right-of-way or public road easements within the lands sought to be annexed, except as agreed upon by the mayor and county judge.
    2. Any person, firm, corporation, partnership, or joint venturer desiring to come within this exclusion must have received from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development a letter of preliminary commitment to fund the new community under one (1) of the federal acts.
    3. If any lands are annexed that are being used exclusively for agricultural purposes, the lands may continue to be used for such purposes so long as the owner desires and the lands shall be assessed as agricultural lands.
  2. However, a municipality having a population of fewer than one thousand (1,000) persons shall not annex in any one (1) calendar year contiguous lands in excess of ten percent (10%) of the current land area of the municipality.
    1. Whenever practicable, a city or incorporated town shall annex lands that are contiguous and in a manner that does not create enclaves.
    2. As used in this section, “enclave” means an unincorporated improved or developed area that is enclosed within and bounded on all sides by a single city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1971, No. 298, § 1; 1975, No. 309, § 1; 1975, No. 904, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-307.1; Acts 2001, No. 1751, § 1; 2013, No. 1072, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (b)(1)(A), inserted “At the time of the adoption of the ordinance” preceding “have” and deleted “at the time of the adoption of the ordinance” preceding “of lands used”; and added (b)(1)(C) and (D), and (d).

U.S. Code. Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, referred to in this section, has been largely repealed. A portion of the title is codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1464. Title VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, referred to in this section, is codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1464, and 42 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction and Application of State Statutory Limitations Periods Governing Election Contests. 60 A.L.R.6th 481.

Ark. L. Notes.

Watkins, Procedural Issues in an Annexation Case: A Dissenting Opinion to Gay v. City of Springdale, 1986 Ark. L. Notes 55.

Case Notes

Agricultural or Horticultural Purposes.

This section, as amended by Acts 1975, No. 309, providing that contiguous lands shall not be annexed when they have a fair market value of land used for agricultural purposes and the best use of the land is for agricultural purposes, deals with a substantive matter and should not be given a retroactive effect. Herrod v. City of N. Little Rock, 260 Ark. 890, 545 S.W.2d 620 (1977).

The prohibition against annexing lands being used for agricultural or horticultural purposes is not absolute; such lands may be annexed to a municipality if the highest and best use of those lands is for something other than agriculture or horticulture and one of the five criteria of subsection (a) is met. Gay v. City of Springdale, 287 Ark. 55, 696 S.W.2d 723 (1985).

The prohibition against annexing agricultural lands is no longer absolute; the lands may be annexed if their highest and best use is for a purpose other than agriculture. Chappell v. City of Russellville, 288 Ark. 261, 704 S.W.2d 166 (1986).

The fact that the land is agricultural and the owner does not want it developed does not determine its fate as to annexation; the owner will not have to abandon its use, and its assessment for taxation shall be as agricultural land. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1986).

Trial court properly found under Ark. Code Ann. subsection 2(b) of this section that the property owner failed to prove that the highest and best use of any parcel within an annexed area was horticultural or agricultural; merely because the owner disagreed with expert testimony and was able to point to conflicting testimony did not demonstrate reversible error. Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 101 S.W.3d 191 (2003).

Criteria Generally.

This section is disjunctive, and annexation of land is proper when the proof sufficiently complies with any one of its conditions. Holmes v. City of Little Rock, 285 Ark. 296, 686 S.W.2d 425 (1985); Gay v. City of Springdale, 298 Ark. 554, 769 S.W.2d 740 (1989).

It was permissible to annex a tract of land where that tract was more valuable for city purposes than for agriculture, even if one part of the tract was more valuable for farming purposes than for city purposes where: (1) there were a variety of land uses in the tract; (2) access to the tract existed by city streets; (3) city utilities were available; (4) a municipal airport commission would purchase part of the tract; (5) the tract was surrounded on three sides by present city boundaries and on the fourth side by the Arkansas River; (6) the tract was substantially urbanized; and (7) the biggest part of the tract consisted of platted residential development. Holmes v. City of Little Rock, 285 Ark. 296, 686 S.W.2d 425 (1985).

The five criteria listed in subsection (a) are disjunctive, and annexation may be proper when any one of the five conditions is met. Gay v. City of Springdale, 287 Ark. 55, 696 S.W.2d 723 (1985).

The lands sought to be annexed must meet one of the five criteria in this section; if a part of the proposed area does not meet one of the requirements, then the annexation of the entire area is voided in toto. Chappell v. City of Russellville, 288 Ark. 261, 704 S.W.2d 166 (1986).

Annexation is not prohibited simply because a tract is rather rugged or heavily wooded with sparse population; the value of the land is derived from its actual and prospective use for city purposes. Chappell v. City of Russellville, 288 Ark. 261, 704 S.W.2d 166 (1986).

Circuit court properly upheld the annexation of four tracts of real property totaling approximately 1,951 acres into the City of Sherwood, Arkansas because the land met two of the Vestal criteria for annexation; the land was held to be sold as suburban property, and it was valuable by reason of its adaptability for prospective municipal purposes. City of Jacksonville v. City of Sherwood, 375 Ark. 107, 289 S.W.3d 90 (2008).

Criteria in subsection (a) of this section apply regardless of whether an annexation proceeding was initiated by a city or by adjoining landowners. City of Centerton v. City of Bentonville, 375 Ark. 439, 291 S.W.3d 594 (2009).

Evidence.

A majority of electors voting in favor of annexation makes a prima facie case for annexation, and the burden rests on those objecting to produce sufficient evidence to defeat the prima facie case. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1986).

Proper Municipal Purposes.

Where the trial court found that much of the lands represented the actual growth of the city beyond its legal boundary, that the lands were needed for extension of police and fire protection, that the lands were valuable by reason of their adaptability for prospective municipal purposes, and that, although some acreage was presently used for agricultural purposes, the highest and best use of these lands was for purposes other than their present use, the findings were not clearly wrong and annexation was proper. Chappell v. City of Russellville, 288 Ark. 261, 704 S.W.2d 166 (1986).

A city's proposed annexation was an honest effort to extend its boundaries to encompass the actual growth of the city and land needed for municipal purposes as defined by law; however, the Supreme Court will not recognize annexation proposals that are essentially land grabs beyond the actual growth of the city with no serious goal of responsible land use planning. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1986).

Land in a flood plain is not excluded from consideration for annexation. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1986).

Trial court properly found that farm property located within the city limits in the floodway was needed for a proper municipal purpose under subsection (a) of this section, such as for the extension of needed police and fire regulation; in addition, the city's proposed use of property as open space or to expand city's existing park plan was a higher use that also mitigated towards annexation. Chandler v. City of Little Rock, 351 Ark. 172, 89 S.W.3d 913 (2002).

Trial court found that subdivision (a)(4) of this section was met because the lands in question were needed for the purpose of municipal growth and expansion, and the lands were valuable under subdivision (a)(5) of this section by reason of the lands' adaptability for the prospective municipal uses; the trial court properly found that the city was very limited in any areas for expansion within its present boundaries, and the court affirmed the annexation by the city of the lands. Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 101 S.W.3d 191 (2003).

Trial court properly awarded judgment to appellee in its action to have appellant's annexation of an area of unincorporated and surrounded land declared invalid because appellant did not meet the criteria in subsection (a) of this section; appellant stated plainly that the annexation was necessary to protect its loans, funding, and plans for water service. City of Centerton v. City of Bentonville, 375 Ark. 439, 291 S.W.3d 594 (2009).

Time Limitation.

While the property owners argued that § 14-40-304 did not apply to claims under § 14-40-303, the law was otherwise. The 30-day limitations period set forth in § 14-40-304 extended to challenges to all procedures outlined in § 14-40-301 et seq., and not only to those enumerated in this section. Conrad v. City of Beebe, 2012 Ark. App. 15, 388 S.W.3d 465 (2012).

Cited: White v. Lorings, 274 Ark. 272, 623 S.W.2d 837 (1981); Magruder v. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 287 Ark. 343, 698 S.W.2d 299 (1985); Duennenberg v. City of Barling, 309 Ark. 541, 832 S.W.2d 237 (1992).

14-40-303. Annexation ordinance — Election — Procedures.

  1. The annexation ordinance shall:
    1. Contain an accurate description of the lands desired to be annexed;
    2. Include a schedule of the services of the annexing municipality that will be extended to the area within three (3) years after the date the annexation becomes final;
    3. Fix the date for the annexation election under this section; and
    4. Be heard at three (3) consecutive regular meetings of the governing body of the annexing municipality.
    1. The annexation ordinance shall not become effective until the question of annexation is submitted to the qualified electors of the annexing municipality and of the area to be annexed at the next general election or at a special election. The special election shall be called by ordinance or proclamation of the mayor of the annexing municipality in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
      1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting in the election vote for the annexation, no later than fifteen (15) days following the election, the county clerk shall certify the election results and record the same, along with the description and a map of the annexed area, in the county records, and file a certified copy thereof with the Secretary of State.
      2. The annexation shall be effective, and the lands annexed shall be included within the corporate limits of the annexing municipality thirty (30) days following the date of recording and filing of the description and map, as provided in this section, or in the event an action is filed with the circuit court as provided in § 14-40-304, on the date the judgment of the court becomes final.
    2. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue at the election vote against the annexation, the annexation ordinance shall be null and void.
      1. The city clerk shall certify two (2) copies of the annexation ordinance and a plat or map of the area to be annexed and convey one (1) copy to the county clerk and one (1) copy to the county election commission at least sixty (60) days before the election.
        1. No later than forty-five (45) days prior to the election, the city shall identify all persons who reside within the area proposed to be annexed, and the county clerk shall assist the city in determining the names and addresses of all qualified electors residing within that area.
        2. The failure to identify all persons residing within the area proposed to be annexed or the failure to determine the names and addresses of all qualified electors residing within that area shall not invalidate or otherwise affect the results of the election.
      2. All of the qualified electors residing within the territory to be annexed shall be entitled to vote in the election.
      3. The city clerk shall give notice of the election by publication by at least one (1) insertion in some newspaper having a general circulation in the city.
      1. The county clerk shall give notice of the voter registration deadlines at least forty (40) days before the election by ordinary mail to those persons whose names and addresses are on the list provided by the city clerk.
      2. The county clerk shall prepare a list by precinct of all those qualified electors residing within the area to be annexed who are qualified to vote in that precinct and furnish that list to the election officials at the time the ballot boxes are delivered.
    1. If the county clerk or the county election commission shall fail to perform any duties required of it, then any interested party may apply for a writ of mandamus to require the performance of the duties. The failure of the county clerk or the county election commission to perform the duties shall not void the annexation election unless a court finds that the failure to perform the duties substantially prejudiced an interested party.
  2. If the annexation is approved and becomes final, as soon as practical after the annexation the governing body of the city shall attach and incorporate by ordinance the annexed territory to and in one (1) or more wards of the city lying adjacent thereto, and the territory so assigned and attached to a ward shall thereafter be considered and become a part thereof as fully as any other part of the city.
  3. From the map or plat provided by city ordinance of the wards assigned, the county clerk shall proceed to ascertain and determine the voters' proper precinct and shall enter the same upon the voter registration records of those inhabitants of the territory so annexed and give notice of that change within thirty (30) days after the adoption of the city ordinance assigning the territory to wards.
    1. In the event that within thirty (30) days of the date that one (1) city calls for an annexation election, another city calls for an annexation election on all or part of the same land proposed to be annexed by the first city, then both annexation elections shall be held, provided that the second city must call for its annexation election to be held on the next available date in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq. before or after the holding of the first city's election.
      1. If the annexation election held first is approved by the voters, the results of it shall be stayed until the second annexation election is held.
        1. If only one (1) of the annexation elections is approved by the voters, then the city that called that election shall proceed with the annexation of the land.
          1. Except as provided in subdivisions (f)(2)(B)(ii)(b) and (c) of this section, if both annexation elections are approved by the voters, then a third election shall be held three (3) weeks after the second annexation election. The provisions of § 7-11-201 et seq., governing the procedures and dates on which special elections may be held shall not apply to the third annexation election provided in this subsection.
          2. If the date of the third election falls upon a legal holiday, the election shall be held four (4) weeks after the second annexation election.
          3. If the date of the election under subdivision (f)(2)(B)(ii)(b) of this section is a legal holiday, the election shall be held five (5) weeks after the second annexation election.
        2. Notice of the third election shall be published in a newspaper circulated in the area to be annexed during the period following the second election.
        3. Only the residents of the area proposed to be annexed by both cities shall vote in the third election.
        4. The issue on the ballot in the third election shall be into which of the two (2) cities the residents of the area want to be annexed.
        5. The area shall be annexed into the city receiving the most votes in the third election.
        6. In the event of a tie vote in the third election, the area shall be annexed to the city that had the highest percentage vote in favor of the annexation in the first or second election.
    2. If the city that does not get to annex the area voted on by both cities included land in its annexation election other than the land voted on by both cities, then that land shall be annexed into the city if it is still contiguous to the city after the other land is annexed to the other city, but the land shall remain part of the county if it is not so contiguous.

History. Acts 1971, No. 298, § 2; 1975, No. 309, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-307.2; Acts 1991, No. 725, § 1; 1993, No. 356, § 1; 1999, No. 639, § 1; 2005, No. 2145, § 22; 2007, No. 557, § 1; 2007, No. 1049, § 40; 2009, No. 420, § 1; 2009, No. 1480, §§ 58, 59; 2019, No. 219, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 420, in (f)(2)(B), inserted “Except as provided in subdivisions (f)(2)(B)(ii) (b) and (c) of this section” in (f)(2)(B)(i), inserted (f)(2)(B)(ii) (b) and (c) , redesignated the remaining text of (f)(2)(B)(ii) accordingly, and made a related change.

The 2009 amendment by No. 1480 substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (b)(1), (f)(1), and (f)(2)(B)(ii) (a)

The 2019 amendment substituted “annexation election under” for “election provided in” in (a)(3); and added (a)(4).

Case Notes

Applicability.

Although the circuit court erred in finding that subsection (f) of this section was applicable, because it governed the procedures for two cities that have called for annexation elections on all or part of the same land, the circuit court reached the right result in finding that 3360 acres annexed pursuant to an election 15 years earlier became a part of the city of West Memphis. City of Marion v. City of W. Memphis, 2012 Ark. 384, 423 S.W.3d 594 (2012).

Description of Lands.

Annexation proceedings based on a description of land that describes only a line and does not encircle any geographical area are invalid. City of North Little Rock v. Garner, 256 Ark. 1025, 511 S.W.2d 656 (1974).

Where the city described all the land sought to be annexed by metes and bounds as “the area included in the following description not currently in the City” and a map was referred to in the ordinance and was duly filed with the circuit clerk after the election, the description of the property to be annexed was proper and sufficient. Lee v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 Ark. 204, 710 S.W.2d 205 (1986).

Although subdivision (b)(1)(B)(i) required city to file a description and map of annexed area and correct election results with the county clerk and Secretary of State, city's failure to file such matters with the Secretary of State did not toll the 30-day requirement to bring suit under § 14-40-304; subdivision (b)(1)(B)(ii) provides that a municipality's annexation shall be effective 30 days following its filing the description and map of the annexed property with only the county clerk. City of Springdale v. Town of Bethel Heights, 311 Ark. 497, 845 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Although the property owners argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to set aside the annexation of their property because the city failed to attach a map and legal description of the property proposed to be annexed in its newspaper publication in violation of subdivision (c)(1)(D) of this section, the language in this section required only that the city give notice of the election, which it did in the instant case. While publication of a map or legal description might have been helpful to the voters, the statute did not require the city to include either. Conrad v. City of Beebe, 2012 Ark. App. 15, 388 S.W.3d 465 (2012).

Effective Date of Annexation.

Residents of an area in the process of being annexed to a city do not have the right to vote in a municipal bond election until after the annexation becomes effective and, accordingly, where a circuit court order upholding a contested annexation was not signed until nine days after the bond election, such election was valid despite the fact that residents of the annexed area did not vote therein. Tanner v. City of Little Rock, 261 Ark. 573, 550 S.W.2d 177 (1977).

Where a city collected franchise taxes from residents of annexed area during pendency of appeals from circuit court's final order holding annexation valid, the franchise taxes were not illegal exactions that had to be refunded since, pursuant to this section, the annexation was effective on the date of final judgment; moreover, because no supersedeas or stay was issued under ARAP Rule 8 and ARCP Rule 62, the city had the authority and responsibility to furnish services to the annexed area and collect franchise taxes during pendency of the appeal. Jackson v. City of Little Rock, 274 Ark. 51, 621 S.W.2d 852 (1981).

Filing Election Returns.

Nothing in this section requires the filing of correct election returns with the Secretary of State. City of Springdale v. Town of Bethel Heights, 311 Ark. 497, 845 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Schedule of Services.

The requirement of a schedule of services is intended to assist voters by furnishing them with detailed information about the annexation proposal. Carter v. City of Sherwood, 263 Ark. 616, 566 S.W.2d 746 (1978).

Where a city ordinance calling an annexation election merely stated that the city committed itself to the extension into the annexed area “of public services now available to the residents of [the city] … and such services shall include all city services,” the ordinance was inadequate under this section. Carter v. City of Sherwood, 263 Ark. 616, 566 S.W.2d 746 (1978).

Cited: Pennington v. Sherwood, 304 Ark. 362, 802 S.W.2d 456 (1991); Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 101 S.W.3d 191 (2003); Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs, 2017 Ark. 95, 514 S.W.3d 447 (2017).

14-40-304. Judicial review.

  1. If it is alleged that the area proposed to be annexed does not conform to the requirements and standards prescribed in § 14-40-302, a legal action may be filed in the circuit court of the county where the lands lie within thirty (30) days after the election to nullify the election and to prohibit further proceedings pursuant to the election.
  2. In any such action filed in the circuit court of the county where the lands lie, the court shall have jurisdiction and the authority to determine whether the procedures outlined in this subchapter have been complied with and whether the municipality has used the proper standards outlined in § 14-40-302 in determining the lands to be annexed.

History. Acts 1971, No. 298, §§ 2, 3; 1975, No. 309, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-307.2, 19-307.3.

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction and Application of State Statutory Limitations Periods Governing Election Contests. 60 A.L.R.6th 481.

Case Notes

In General.

Election contests have no common law existence; they are solely the creatures of constitution or statute. Duennenberg v. City of Barling, 309 Ark. 541, 832 S.W.2d 237 (1992).

Appeals.

The order of a circuit court in annexation cases will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Holmes v. City of Little Rock, 285 Ark. 296, 686 S.W.2d 425 (1985).

Enabling Ordinance.

Nothing in this section or in this chapter requires that the enabling ordinance be identified or specifically challenged. Duennenberg v. City of Barling, 309 Ark. 541, 832 S.W.2d 237 (1992).

Where original complaint, which was timely, was not deficient in stating a cause of action, later amendment, which merely corrected an obvious error in the designation of the particular ordinance, was not essential to that cause of action. Duennenberg v. City of Barling, 309 Ark. 541, 832 S.W.2d 237 (1992).

Time Limitation.

Where neither appellants nor others filed suit within 30 days of the annexation election, appellants' attempt to raise such an issue in a later collateral proceeding failed. City of Springdale v. Town of Bethel Heights, 311 Ark. 497, 845 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Although § 14-40-303(b)(1)(B)(i) required city to file a description and map of annexed area and correct election results with the county clerk and Secretary of State, city's failure to file such matters with the Secretary of State did not toll the 30-day requirement to bring suit under this section; § 14-40-303(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides that a municipality's annexation shall be effective 30 days following its filing the description and map of the annexed property with only the county clerk. City of Springdale v. Town of Bethel Heights, 311 Ark. 497, 845 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Challenges to procedures outlined in this subchapter must be made within 30 days of the annexation elections, whether or not such challenges arise from requirements prescribed by this section. Williams v. Harmon, 67 Ark. App. 281, 999 S.W.2d 206 (1999).

While the property owners argued that this section did not apply to claims under § 14-40-303, the law was otherwise. The 30-day limitations period set forth in this section extended to challenges to all procedures outlined in § 14-40-301 et seq., and not only to those enumerated in § 14-40-302. Conrad v. City of Beebe, 2012 Ark. App. 15, 388 S.W.3d 465 (2012).

Cited: Utley v. City of Dover, 352 Ark. 212, 101 S.W.3d 191 (2003).

Subchapter 4 — Annexation of Lands in Adjoining County

Publisher's Notes. Former subchapter 4, concerning annexation of lands in adjoining county, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The former subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-40-401. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-329.

14-40-402. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-330.

14-40-403. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-331.

14-40-404. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-332.

14-40-405. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-333.

14-40-406. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-334.

14-40-407. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-335.

14-40-408. Acts 1967, No. 651, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-336.

14-40-401. Authority.

  1. The General Assembly finds that there are areas within adjoining counties that are so necessary to the satisfactory conducting of a city's business that there is a need to annex land lying in the adjoining county into the city. This law will aid the residents to receive needed services to improve the quality of life in the unincorporated area.
  2. Any lands contiguous to a municipality having a population of seventy-five thousand (75,000) or less, although located in an adjoining county, may become annexed to the municipality in the manner provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1995, No. 1286, §§ 1, 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1995, No. 1286 became law without the Governor's signature.

Subchapter 5 — Annexation of Surrounded Land

Effective Dates. Acts 1979, No. 314, § 4: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 7, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, many islands of small unincorporated areas have been created within the limits of existing municipalities, and whereas, this causes great confusion to the public and also great expense to municipalities in having to run vital services around these islands; now, therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately on its passage and approval.”

14-40-501. Authority — Exceptions.

        1. Whenever the incorporated limits of a municipality have completely surrounded an unincorporated area, the governing body of the municipality may propose an ordinance calling for the annexation of the land surrounded by the municipality.
        2. Subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) of this section includes situations in which the incorporated limits of a municipality have surrounded an unincorporated area on only three (3) sides because the fourth side is a boundary line with another state, a military base, a state park, a national forest, a lake, or a river.
      1. If the incorporated limits of two (2) or more municipalities have completely surrounded an unincorporated area, the governing body of the municipality with the greater distance of city limits adjoining the unincorporated area's perimeter may propose an ordinance calling for the annexation of the land surrounded by the municipalities, unless it is agreed by the adjoining municipalities that another of the adjoining municipalities should propose an ordinance calling for the annexation.
    1. The ordinance will provide a legal description of the land to be annexed and describe generally the services to be extended to the area to be annexed.
    1. The unincorporated area to be annexed shall comply with the standards for lands qualifying for annexation which are set forth in § 14-40-302.
    2. Privately owned lakes exceeding six (6) acres of water surface which are used exclusively for recreational purposes and lands adjacent to them not exceeding twenty (20) acres in size which are used exclusively for recreational purposes in relation to the lake shall not qualify for annexation under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1979, No. 314, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-337; Acts 2005, No. 1819, § 1; 2007, No. 150, § 1; 2013, No. 1243, § 1; 2015, No. 109, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added “a military base, a state park, or a national forest” at the end of (a)(1)(A)(ii).

The 2015 amendment, in (a)(1)(A)(ii), substituted “section includes” for “section shall include” and “a national forest, a lake, or a river” for “or a national forest.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

City could annex unincorporated areas by ordinance alone because (1) citizens have no constitutional right to vote on annexation, and (2) such annexation did not violate equal protection, as no fundamental right was at stake, and plaintiff did not claim that this section creates any suspect classifications or lacks a rational basis. Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs, 2017 Ark. 95, 514 S.W.3d 447 (2017).

Scope.

Subdivision (a)(1)(A)(ii) of this section, which contains the word “includes”, provides an example of unincorporated areas that are “completely surrounded” by a municipality but does not exhaust the list of areas “completely surrounded” by a municipality. Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs, 2017 Ark. 95, 514 S.W.3d 447 (2017).

Citizen did not show annexed tracts were outside the procedure in this section due to being surrounded on two sides by a city and on two sides by a lake because the phrase “completely surrounded” in subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i) of this section was not intended to limit a tract that can be annexed to areas surrounded by a city; the phrase “completely surrounded” included the area at issue, which did not have four distinct sides and had no borders other than those with a single municipality and a lake. Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs, 2017 Ark. 95, 514 S.W.3d 447 (2017).

14-40-502. Hearing — Notice.

  1. A public hearing shall be conducted within sixty (60) days of the proposal of the ordinance calling for annexation.
  2. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the public hearing, the governing body of the municipality shall publish a legal notice setting out the legal description of the territory proposed to be annexed and notify by certified mail all the property owners within the area proposed to be annexed of their right to appear at the public hearing to present their views on the proposed annexation.

History. Acts 1979, No. 314, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-338.

Case Notes

Due Process

Assuming that the City of Van Buren Council failed to provide landowner notice before the annexation of his property, the violation of this section did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because he did not show that Arkansas lacked an adequate postdeprivation mechanism to provide him with just compensation for the alleged taking; therefore, landowner's due process claim failed. Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2007).

Hearing.

City's actions to comply with the maximum-occupant load at the board meeting did not violate this section where evidence was lacking that anyone who wished to speak was not allowed to do so. Houston v. City of Hot Springs, 2018 Ark. App. 196, 546 S.W.3d 545 (2018).

Residents' equal protection argument failed where the city held a public hearing as required by this section and allowed anyone to sign up to speak at that hearing. Houston v. City of Hot Springs, 2018 Ark. App. 196, 546 S.W.3d 545 (2018).

14-40-503. Procedure for annexation.

      1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section, at the next regularly scheduled meeting following the public hearing, the governing body of the municipality proposing annexation may bring the proposed ordinance up for a vote.
      2. An ordinance shall not be enacted within fifty-one (51) days of a scheduled election to consider annexing all or part of the area in question.
    1. If a majority of the total number of members of the governing body vote for the proposed annexation ordinance, then a prima facie case for annexation shall be established, and the city shall proceed to render services to the annexed area.
  1. The decision of the municipal council shall be final unless suit is brought in circuit court of the appropriate county within thirty (30) days after passage to review the actions of the governing body.

History. Acts 1979, No. 314, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-339; Acts 2011, No. 1051, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added the exception in (a)(1)(A); inserted (a)(1)(B); and substituted “circuit court” for “chancery court” in (b).

14-40-504. Enclaves prohibited.

  1. As used in this section, “enclave” means an unincorporated improved or developed area that is enclosed within and bounded on all sides by a single city or incorporated town.
  2. Whenever practicable, a city or incorporated town shall annex lands that are contiguous and in a manner that does not create enclaves.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1071, § 1.

Subchapter 6 — Annexation Proceedings by Adjoining Landowners

Publisher's Notes. For cases dealing with certain procedural aspects of annexation, see case notes under sections in Chapter 38 of this title.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1953, No. 142, § 5: approved Feb. 25, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are now areas contiguous to and adjoining various municipalities in the State which should be annexed to said municipalities, but that such annexation is being delayed by the present annexation procedure. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1963, No. 549, § 3: Mar. 29, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there now exists in the State of Arkansas cities whose urban population has spread beyond its existing city limits, and there is a great need to authorize and permit cities to extend their boundaries, therefore, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, the same shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1999, No. 128, § 5: Feb. 17, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that certain lands may be inadvertently and unwisely annexed to municipalities in Arkansas while other lands owned by the same person remain outside the municipal boundaries; that this situation creates an inequitable situation for landowners when part of their lands can become divided among various different jurisdictions for land-use regulation and taxation purposes; and that it is possible for these annexation proceedings to occur at any time and this inequitable situation must be remedied at the earliest opportunity. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2017, No. 655, § 5: Mar. 27, 2017. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that municipal boundary changes shall be effective by December 31, 2017, and shall be reported to the United States Bureau of the Census by May 31, 2018, to be assured of inclusion in the 2020 Federal Decennial Census; that there is a need for counties and municipalities to give timely, complete, and accurate written notice to the Secretary of State of municipal boundary changes to ensure an accurate census; and that any modification to statutes after December 31, 2018, would be ineffective in ensuring an accurate census in 2020. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Changing Boundaries of Municipal Corporations in Arkansas, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 135.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Owen, Note: Local Government — Municipal Corporation — Annexation Invalidation, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 105.

14-40-601. Application by petition.

  1. When a majority of the real estate owners of any part of a county contiguous to and adjoining any city or incorporated town desires to be annexed to the city or town, they may apply by attested petition in writing to the county court of the county in which the city or town is situated, shall name the persons authorized to act on behalf of the petitioners, and may include a schedule of services of the annexing municipality that will be extended to the area within three (3) years after the date the annexation becomes final.
  2. The “majority of real estate owners” referred to in this section means a majority of the total number of real estate owners in the area affected if the majority of the total number of owners own more than one half (½) of the acreage affected.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 79, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7462; Pope's Dig., § 9495; Acts 1953, No. 142, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-301; Acts 2013, No. 1071, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote (a); and substituted “means” for “shall mean” preceding “a majority” and deleted “shall” preceding “own more” in (b).

Case Notes

In General.

Where annexation of territory contiguous to a municipality is desired, a petition signed by a majority of real estate owners in the territory sought to be annexed and by a majority of the real estate owners of the affected area who are residents of the county in which the municipality and area affected must be filed. Call v. Wharton, 204 Ark. 544, 162 S.W.2d 916 (1942).

Amendments.

Although this section does not specifically provide for amendments to a petition for annexation, there is nothing wrong with court looking to petition and amended petition to ascertain whether or not a majority of the owners of record who own the majority of land have in fact petitioned to be annexed and that the area has been sufficiently identified. Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987).

Contiguous Land.

Land held not contiguous to municipality. Clark v. Holt, 218 Ark. 504, 237 S.W.2d 483 (1951).

Land held contiguous to municipality. Louallen v. Miller, 229 Ark. 679, 317 S.W.2d 710 (1958).

There is no requirement that land be completely contiguous. Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987).

City challenging annexation did not show that the property owners' request to be annexed into a particular city was invalid under this subchapter as the property owners' petition showed that a majority of the property owners of land contiguous to and adjoining the particular city to which the property owners wanted to annex their property approved of the annexation request. City of Dover v. City of Russellville, 346 Ark. 279, 57 S.W.3d 171 (2001).

Majority of Real Estate Owners.

When annexation is desired, petition filed with county court must be signed by majority of real estate owners of the area sought to be annexed and also a majority of such owners who are residents of the county in which the municipality and area are located. Call v. Wharton, 204 Ark. 544, 162 S.W.2d 916 (1942).

Petition of majority of real estate owners does not mean resident landowners, but a majority of the total number of real estate owners in area affected. Smalley v. City of Fort Smith, 239 Ark. 39, 386 S.W.2d 944 (1965).

Evidence showed majority of landowners had signed the petition for annexation. Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987).

Notice.

In an action challenging a petition for annexation of certain lands to the city, the circuit court entered an order finding that notice of the annexation was given in accordance withthis section because the published notice accurately described the real property to be annexed and more than fifty percent of the owners within the area to be annexed approved of the annexation. Thompson v. City of Bauxite, 2012 Ark. App. 580 (2012).

Property Description.

Although original petition contained an incorrect property description, map attached thereto, which was also one of exhibits at trial, properly and sufficiently described property sought to be annexed. Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987).

Cited: Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984); Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1234 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Britton v. City of Conway, 36 Ark. App. 232, 821 S.W.2d 65 (1991).

14-40-602. Hearing on petition.

    1. When the petition shall be presented to the county court, the clerk shall file it, and the court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition.
    2. The date for the hearing shall not be less than thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition.
      1. Between the time of the filing of the petition and the date of the hearing, the petitioners shall cause a notice to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the county.
      2. The notice shall be published one (1) time a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.
    1. If there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county, notice shall be posted at some public place within the limits of the incorporated town or city for at least three (3) weeks before the date of the hearing.
    2. The notice referred to in this subsection shall contain the substance of the petition and state the time and place appointed for the hearing thereof.
  1. The hearing procedure set forth in § 14-38-103 shall be followed in the proceedings concerned in this section insofar as such procedure is not in conflict with any provision expressly set out in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 80, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7463; Pope's Dig., § 9496; Acts 1953, No. 142, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-302.

Cross References. Hearing on petition to incorporate, § 14-38-103.

Case Notes

Evidence.

The substantial evidence rule applies in annexation proceedings initiated by petition, and the courts are authorized to exercise the same discretion as to the rightness and propriety thereof that they exercise in the case of annexation proceedings by municipality. Cantrell v. Vaughn, 228 Ark. 202, 306 S.W.2d 863 (1957).

Notice.

Although notice of proceeding for annexation of territory to a municipality can be waived by all the interested parties, on appeal, the court cannot indulge the presumption that only owners were the petitioners and that all interested parties were present and waived notice. Posey v. Paxton, 201 Ark. 825, 147 S.W.2d 39 (1941).

Notice of proposed annexation held sufficient. Chastain v. Davis, 294 Ark. 134, 741 S.W.2d 632 (1987).

Cited: Louallen v. Miller, 229 Ark. 679, 317 S.W.2d 710 (1958); Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984).

14-40-603. Order for annexation.

  1. After the hearing, if the county court shall be satisfied that the allegations of the petition were sustained by the proof, if the court shall be satisfied that the requirements for signatures under § 14-40-601 have been complied with, and if the court shall be satisfied that the limits of the territory to be annexed have been accurately described and an accurate map thereof made and filed, and that the prayer of the petitioner is right and proper, then the court shall enter its order granting the petition and annexing the territory.
  2. The order shall be recorded by the clerk of the county.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 80, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7463; Pope's Dig., § 9496; Acts 1953, No. 142, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-302.

Cross References. Order to incorporate, § 14-38-104.

Case Notes

In General.

Judgment or order entered in proceedings for annexation of territory must necessarily show on its face the fulfillment of statutory requirements to give court jurisdiction. Posey v. Paxton, 201 Ark. 825, 147 S.W.2d 39 (1941).

Determination.

When county court to which petition is presented is satisfied that qualified voters own property in the territory sought to be annexed and reside therein and also finds that a majority of them have signed the petition and that other conditions have been complied with, it has duty to grant petition. Call v. Wharton, 204 Ark. 544, 162 S.W.2d 916 (1942).

Where evidence was conclusive that 90 percent of territory sought to be annexed to a municipality was used for agricultural purposes and was not needed for prospective municipal purposes, county court was justified in denying landowner's petition for annexation. Cantrell v. Vaughn, 228 Ark. 202, 306 S.W.2d 863 (1957).

Signatures.

Order annexing territory to municipality which failed to show that notice of the proceeding was given based on a petition which failed to show that those who signed it were the only property owners in the territory to be annexed was void ab initio and no rights accrued under it. Posey v. Paxton, 201 Ark. 825, 147 S.W.2d 39 (1941).

Where annexation petition was signed by a majority of the resident landowners in the territory sought to be annexed, but not a majority of the landowners living in the county, judgment denying annexation on remonstrator's petition was held correct. Call v. Wharton, 204 Ark. 544, 162 S.W.2d 916 (1942).

Void Orders.

In collateral attack upon order entered in proceeding for annexation of territory, the court must decide whether notice was given or waived by an inspection of the record only, and order showing that the petition was approved the same day as filed and not showing that all parties interested in the annexation of the proposed territory were present when the order was made is void ab initio. Posey v. Paxton, 201 Ark. 825, 147 S.W.2d 39 (1941).

Cited: Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984); Town of Houston v. Carden, 332 Ark. 340, 965 S.W.2d 131 (1998).

14-40-604. Proceedings to prevent annexation.

    1. No further action shall be taken for a period of thirty (30) days after the order for annexation has been entered. Within that time any person interested may institute a proceeding in the circuit court to have the annexation prevented.
      1. If the court or judge hearing the proceeding shall be satisfied that the requirements for annexation as set out in this subchapter have not been complied with, that the territory proposed to be annexed is unreasonably large, or that the territory is not properly described, the court or judge shall make an order restraining any further action under the order of the county court and annulling it. However, the proceeding shall not bar any subsequent petition.
      2. If the court or judge shall determine that the order of the county court was proper, then the order of the county court shall be affirmed, and the proceedings to prevent the annexation shall be dismissed.
  1. When any complaint shall be made in accordance with this section to prevent an annexation of territory, notice thereof shall be given to the city or incorporated town authorities and the agent of the petitioners.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, §§ 81, 82, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7464, 7465; Pope's Dig., §§ 9497, 9498; Acts 1953, No. 142, § 3; 1959, No. 212, § 1; 1961, No. 474, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-303, 19-304.

Case Notes

Construction.

Subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section does not improperly shift the burden of proof in an action which challenges the annexation of property by a town and, instead, merely mandates the court to restrain and annul an annexation order if the requirements for annexation have not been met. Town of Houston v. Carden, 332 Ark. 340, 965 S.W.2d 131 (1998).

Purpose.

The sole purpose of this section is to give to remonstrants an opportunity to appeal a county court order to the circuit court. Palmer v. City of Conway, 271 Ark. 127, 607 S.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1980).

Annexation Proceeding Not Shown.

Mere filing of plat by owner of land adjoining city boundary showing the lands to be divided in lots, blocks, and streets and designated as an “addition” to the city was in no way a compliance with statutory provisions regarding annexation and in no way amounted to annexation. Van Marion v. Hawkins, 224 Ark. 199, 272 S.W.2d 317 (1954).

Annulment.

The court properly annulled the annexation of land by a town where there was little, if any, credible evidence that the town itself would be benefited by the annexation and since the town could not annex land simply to prevent the establishment of a hog farm on part of the land. Town of Houston v. Carden, 332 Ark. 340, 965 S.W.2d 131 (1998).

Any Persons Interested.

Petition of parties to quash order of court annexing territory to a municipality must show that the petitioners have an interest as residents or owners of property either in the old municipality or the territory annexed. Perkins v. Holman, 43 Ark. 219 (1884).

Writ to quash order of annexation of territory to a municipality that was granted upon petition of owners of the annexed territory will be refused unless the owners or persons named in their petition as authorized to act in their behalf are made parties to the proceedings. Black v. Brinkley, 54 Ark. 372, 15 S.W. 1030 (1891).

Parties who filed remonstrance in county court protesting against annexation of territory to a municipal corporation should be treated as parties to such proceeding and be allowed to appeal from an adverse judgment of that court. Barnwell v. Town of Gravette, 87 Ark. 430, 112 S.W. 973 (1908).

“Any person interested” means any person who has some interest in the municipality or the area to be annexed. City of Crossett v. Anthony, 250 Ark. 660, 466 S.W.2d 481 (1971); Turner v. Wiederkehr Village, 261 Ark. 72, 546 S.W.2d 717 (1977).

In case where city was petitioning for annexation of two separate areas and the persons who opposed all resided or owned property in one area, there was no interested party contesting the annexation of the other area. A motion to dismiss as to the latter area should have been granted. City of Crossett v. Anthony, 250 Ark. 660, 466 S.W.2d 481 (1971).

At least some interest must be shown on trial de novo in a circuit court in the face of a motion to dismiss for lack of interest. Turner v. Wiederkehr Village, 261 Ark. 72, 546 S.W.2d 717 (1977).

Attorney who owned property near village to be annexed and had contingent fee contract under which he would acquire property in the village if he won his client's lawsuit did not have standing to challenge the incorporation in the absence of a showing that he was threatened with a direct pecuniary damage not shared by members of the public in general. Turner v. Wiederkehr Village, 261 Ark. 72, 546 S.W.2d 717 (1977).

Where plaintiff testified that he owned land within the city to which the land was to be annexed, filed a pro se petition in county court opposing annexation, was one of the named remonstrants in circuit court, and was opposed to the annexation, the circuit court erred in finding that there was no plaintiff in that court who had standing to contest the annexation. Britton v. City of Conway, 36 Ark. App. 232, 821 S.W.2d 65 (1991).

Evidence.

If municipality renders a favorable vote in favor of annexation of territory to it, such vote makes a prima facie case as to the propriety of annexation, and burden of showing sufficient cause against it is placed upon the remonstrants. Burton v. City of Ft. Smith, 214 Ark. 516, 216 S.W.2d 884 (1949).

Notice.

Where property owner filed independent action in circuit court to challenge county court order allowing municipality to annex certain property and only purported notice that plaintiff gave to the municipality during the 30-day period following the county court annexation order was the mailing of a copy of the circuit court complaint to the municipal attorney, since the plaintiff was not serving notice of an appeal, but was commencing an independent attack on the annexation, the mailing of a copy of the complaint to the municipal attorney did not constitute notice within the meaning of this section and § 14-40-605. Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984).

A complaint filed in circuit court under the provisions of this section is not an appeal but is an independent attack on the annexation, and the notice required means service of process pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4. Britton v. City of Conway, 36 Ark. App. 232, 821 S.W.2d 65 (1991).

Where the petition for annexation filed in county court clearly indicated that a law firm was an agent for the petitioners, § 14-40-601 required that summons be served on them. Britton v. City of Conway, 36 Ark. App. 232, 821 S.W.2d 65 (1991).

Section 14-40-601 requires service of summons on the agent of the petitioners for annexation, but rather than dismissing the complaint in opposition to the annexation for failure to serve notice, the trial court should have directed that the petitioners be made a party by service of summons on their agent. Britton v. City of Conway, 36 Ark. App. 232, 821 S.W.2d 65 (1991).

Size of Area.

Annexation of an area to a municipality will not be denied because the proposed area is too small. City of Sherwood v. Hardin, 230 Ark. 762, 325 S.W.2d 75 (1959).

Thirty-Day Period.

Remonstrants were not prejudiced by action of city in passing ordinance accepting annexation two days before 30-day period had elapsed, where the remonstrants were in no way prevented from taking their appeal to the circuit court. Palmer v. City of Conway, 271 Ark. 127, 607 S.W.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1980).

Where the final order of the county court granting annexation was entered on December 4, 2007, appellants' complaint to challenge the annexation order should have been filed by January 4, 2008; however, the complaint was not filed until July 31, 2008. Because appellants filed their complaint beyond the time allowed by subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint was not erroneous. Thompson v. City of Bauxite, 2012 Ark. App. 580 (2012).

Cited: Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984); Campbell v. City of Cherokee Village W., 333 Ark. 310, 969 S.W.2d 179 (1998).

14-40-605. Confirmation of annexation.

  1. If no notice under § 14-40-604(b) is given within thirty (30) days from the making of the order of annexation by the county court, the proceeding before the court shall in all things be confirmed, if the city or incorporated town council shall accept by ordinance or resolution the territory.
      1. If the council accepts the territory and notifies the county clerk of each county in which territory is affected, the county clerk shall certify one (1) copy of the plat of the annexed territory and one (1) copy of the order of the court and the resolution or ordinance of the council.
      2. The county clerk shall forward a copy of each document to the Secretary of State, who shall file and preserve each copy.
    1. The county clerk shall forward a certified copy of the order of the court to the council.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 82, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7466; Pope's Dig., § 9499; Acts 1959, No. 212, § 1; 1961, No. 474, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-305; Acts 2017, No. 655, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “under § 14-40-604(b) is” for “shall be” in (a); redesignated former (b)(1) as (b)(1)(A) and (B); in (b)(1)(A), inserted “and notifies the county clerk of each county in which territory is affected” and deleted “duly” preceding “certify”; in (b)(1)(B), inserted “county”, substituted “each copy” for “them”, and deleted the last sentence; and inserted “county” in (b)(2).

Cross References. Secretary of state to preserve papers, § 14-38-114.

Case Notes

Acceptance.

Even though there is no ordinance or resolution of a municipality accepting annexation, other evidence is sufficient to substantiate such acceptance. Gowers v. Van Buren, 210 Ark. 776, 197 S.W.2d 741 (1946).

Where there was no showing in record that city made effort to comply with statutory requirements regarding annexation, but merely “accepted” platted area adjoining city boundary by resolution of city council, the city council had no jurisdiction to make the annexation. Van Marion v. Hawkins, 224 Ark. 199, 272 S.W.2d 317 (1954).

Where city council passed resolution “accepting” an area adjoining city boundary which had been previously platted to show lands divided into lots, blocks, and streets, taxpayers were not estopped to deny validity of the “annexation” on theory that they had for many years paid municipal taxes and accepted municipal benefits. Van Marion v. Hawkins, 224 Ark. 199, 272 S.W.2d 317 (1954).

Notice.

Where property owner filed independent action in circuit court to challenge county court order allowing municipality to annex certain property and only purported notice that plaintiff gave to the municipality during the 30-day period following the county court annexation order was the mailing of a copy of the circuit court complaint to the municipal attorney, since the plaintiff was not serving notice of an appeal, but was commencing an independent attack on the annexation, the mailing of a copy of the complaint to the municipal attorney did not constitute notice within the meaning of § 14-40-604 and this section. Proposed Annexation to Beaver v. Ratliff, 282 Ark. 516, 669 S.W.2d 467 (1984).

Cited: Gregg v. Hartwick, 292 Ark. 528, 731 S.W.2d 766 (1987).

14-40-606. Rights and privileges of new inhabitants.

As soon as the resolution or ordinance declaring the annexation has been adopted or passed, the territory shall be deemed and taken to be a part and parcel of the limits of the city or incorporated town, and the inhabitants residing therein shall have and enjoy all the rights and privileges of the inhabitants within the original limits of the city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 83, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7467; Pope's Dig., § 9500; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-306.

Case Notes

Cited: Gregg v. Hartwick, 292 Ark. 528, 731 S.W.2d 766 (1987).

14-40-607. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning annexation proceedings by a municipality, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1121, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 1, § 84, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7468; Pope's Dig., § 9501; Acts 1963, No. 549, § 1; 1969, No. 65, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-307.

14-40-608. Right to detach certain lands after annexation proceeding.

  1. Within eight (8) years after an annexation proceeding is completed under the provisions of this subchapter and the land remains the boundary of the city or town, the person owning all lands originally annexed into the city or town may be authorized to detach those annexed lands from the city or town under the provisions of this section, so long as the city or town has not provided utility services to those lands.
    1. When a qualifying landowner notifies the municipality that he or she wishes to detach his or her land from the city or town under this section, the governing body of the municipality may pass an ordinance within thirty (30) days to detach the annexed, qualifying land from the municipality.
      1. In order to notify the city or town, the landowner shall file an affidavit with the city clerk or recorder stating that:
        1. His or her land was annexed;
        2. His or her land is located inside the city or town along the municipal boundary; and
        3. He or she desires the annexed land to be detached from the municipality.
      2. The affidavit shall be filed along with a certified copy of the plat of the annexed land he or she desires to be detached and a copy of the order of the county court approving the annexation and the resolution or ordinance of the municipal governing body accepting the annexation.
  2. If the municipal governing body approves the ordinance to detach the territory, the clerk or recorder of the municipality shall duly certify and send one (1) copy of the plat of the detached territory, one (1) copy of the ordinance detaching the territory, and one (1) copy of the qualifying affidavit to the county clerk.
    1. The county clerk shall forward a copy of each document to the Secretary of State, who shall file and preserve them.
    2. The county clerk shall forward one (1) copy of the plat of the detached territory and one (1) copy of the ordinance detaching the territory to the Director of the Tax Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission, who shall file and preserve them and shall notify all utility companies having property in the municipality of the detachment proceedings.

History. Acts 1999, No. 128, § 1; 2011, No. 740, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “eight (8) years” for “three (3) years” in (a).

Case Notes

Procedure.

Land of landowners who failed to follow the procedures of this section to detach their land from the City of West Memphis prior to seeking annexation into the City of Marion remained part of West Memphis. The West Memphis annexation of the land 15 years earlier was not void on the ground that the ballot included some land that was not annexed. City of Marion v. City of W. Memphis, 2012 Ark. 384, 423 S.W.3d 594 (2012).

14-40-609. Annexation by 100% petition — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “city or town” means:
    1. A city of the first class;
    2. A city of the second class; and
    3. An incorporated town.
    1. Individuals who own property in a county that is contiguous to a city or town may petition the governing body of the city or town to annex the property that is contiguous to the city or town.
    2. The petition under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall:
      1. Be in writing;
      2. Contain an attestation signed before a notary or notaries by the property owner or owners of the relevant property or properties confirming the desire to be annexed;
      3. Contain an accurate description of the relevant property or properties;
      4. Contain a letter or title opinion from a certified abstractor or title company verifying that the petitioners are all owners of record of the relevant property or properties;
      5. Contain a letter or verification from a certified surveyor or engineer verifying that the relevant property or properties are contiguous with the annexing city or town and that no enclaves will be created if the property or properties are accepted by the city or town; and
      6. Include a schedule of services of the annexing city or town that will be extended to the area within three (3) years after the date the annexation becomes final.
    3. The petition shall be filed with the county assessor and the county clerk, and within fifteen (15) business days of the filing, the county assessor and the county clerk shall verify that the petition meets the requirements of subdivision (b)(2) of this section.
    1. Upon completion of the requirements under subsection (b) of this section, the county clerk shall present the petition and records of the matter to the county judge who shall review the petition and records for accuracy.
    2. Within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the petition and records, the county judge shall:
      1. Review the petition and records for completeness and accuracy;
      2. Determine that no enclaves will be created by the annexation;
      3. Confirm that the petition contains a schedule of services;
      4. Issue an order articulating the findings under subdivisions (c)(2)(A)-(C) of this section and forward the petition and order to the contiguous city or town; and
      5. Require at his or her discretion that the city or town annex dedicated public roads and rights of way abutting or traversing the property to be annexed.
      1. By ordinance or resolution, the city or town may grant the petition and accept the property for annexation to the city or town.
      2. The city or town is not required to grant the petition and accept the property petitioned to be annexed.
    1. The ordinance or resolution shall contain an accurate description of the property to be annexed.
      1. If the governing body of the city or town accepts the contiguous property, the clerk or recorder of the city or town shall certify and send one (1) copy of the plat of the annexed property and one (1) copy of the ordinance or resolution of the governing body of the city or town to the county clerk.
        1. The county clerk shall forward a copy of each document received under subdivision (d)(3)(A) of this section to the county judge.
        2. If the county judge determines the requirements of this section have been complied with and the annexation is in all respects proper, the county judge shall enter an order confirming the annexation.
  2. Upon receipt of the order of the county judge confirming the annexation, the county clerk shall forward a copy of each document received under subdivision (d)(3) of this section to the Secretary of State, who shall file and preserve each copy.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provisions in this chapter, thirty (30) days after passage of the ordinance or resolution by the governing body of the city of town under this section, the annexation shall be final and the property shall be within the corporate limits of the city or town.
    2. The inhabitants residing in the newly annexed property shall have and enjoy all the rights and privileges of the inhabitants within the original limits of the city or town.
    1. During the thirty-day period under subdivision (f)(1) of this section, a cause of action may be filed in the circuit court of the county of the annexation by a person asserting and having an ownership right in the property objecting to the petition or by any person asserting a failure to comply with this section.
    2. After the thirty-day period, an action under subdivision (g)(1) of this section is not timely.

History. Acts 2015, No. 991, § 1; 2017, No. 567, § 1; 2017, No. 655, § 4.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 655 deleted the former (e)(1) designation; and deleted (e)(2).

The 2017 amendment by No. 567 rewrote the section.

Subchapters 7-11

Subchapter 12 — Consolidation of Municipalities

Effective Dates. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 6: approved Apr. 2, 1913. Emergency clause provided: “It being necessary to the peace and safety of the state that this act shall take immediate effect, it is hereby provided that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 806, § 5: Mar. 28, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Arkansas law on municipal consolidation currently allows as few as fifty (50) voters in small towns or cities to force an election on the question of consolidating two (2) cities into one; that special elections at anytime can be an expensive matter and the cost of the election is to borne by the city treasuries; that is would be more equitable and uniform to set the standard for calling special elections on consolidations at the level required for initiative and referendum questions. Therefore, in order to reduce unnecessary expenses for city special elections, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 1333, § 5: became law without Governor's signature. Noted Apr. 12, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 806 of 1995 changes the number of signatures required to petition for an election to consolidate two municipalities; that Act 806 of 1995 passed both houses containing an emergency clause and was signed by the Governor on March 28, 1995; that it has now been discovered that the immediate implementation of Act 806 will work to the detriment of some of the citizens of this state who have expended energy and effort in reliance upon the prior law; that it was not the intent of the General Assembly to detrimentally affect those people; that this act will, in effect, postpone implementation of the provisions of Act 806 until July 1, 1995. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 2264, § 2: Apr. 13, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the procedure for the merger of municipalities is unclear on certain issues; that one (1) unintended consequence of a merger of two (2) or more municipalities is the forcing from office of at least one (1) or more mayors; and that this act is immediately necessary to clarify the procedure for the merger of municipalities and to prevent unfairness to elected officials who are forced out of office because of a merger of two (2) or more municipalities. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-40-1201. Petition for consolidation.

      1. Beginning July 1, 1995, when the inhabitants of any city or incorporated town adjoining or contiguous to another smaller municipal corporation of any class in the same county shall desire that the city or incorporated town annex to it or consolidate with it the smaller municipal corporation, they may apply, by a petition in writing signed by a number of qualified electors from each of the municipal corporations equal to not less than fifteen percent (15%) of the total vote cast for the office of mayor in the respective city or town in the last preceding general election, to the city or town council of the larger municipal corporation.
      2. Municipal corporations separated by a river shall be deemed contiguous.
    1. The petition shall:
      1. Describe the municipal corporations to be consolidated; and
      2. Name the persons authorized to act in behalf of the petitioners presenting the petition as provided in this section.
      1. Beginning July 1, 1995, the petitions shall be filed with the city clerk or town recorder of each municipal corporation, who shall determine the sufficiency of the petitions in each municipality.
        1. If any petition is determined insufficient, he or she shall notify the petitioners in writing without delay, and the petitioners shall be permitted ten (10) days from the notification to solicit additional signatures or to prove any rejected signatures.
        2. If the city clerk or town recorder of the respective municipalities decides the petitions are sufficient, he or she each shall notify the petitioners in writing and shall present the petitions to the city or town council of the larger municipal corporation.
      1. When the petition is presented to the council, the council shall pass an ordinance in favor of the annexation and approving and ratifying the petition.
      2. If the council fails to pass the ordinance required under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section, then any interested party may apply for a writ of mandamus to require the performance of the requirement.
    1. In that event, it shall be the duty of the persons named in the petition authorized to act in behalf of the petitioners to file the petition, together with a certified copy of the ordinance, in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the municipal corporations are situated.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7471; Pope's Dig., § 9504; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-310; Acts 1995, No. 806, § 1; 1995, No. 1333, § 1; 1997, No. 214, § 1; 2003, No. 1171, § 1.

14-40-1202. Special election called.

      1. Upon presentation of the petition to the county court by the authorized persons, the court shall at once order and call a special election, to be held in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq., in both of the municipal corporations on the question of the annexation and the name of the proposed consolidated municipality.
      2. The court shall give thirty (30) days' notice of the election by publication one (1) time a week in some newspaper with a bona fide circulation in the territory and by notices posted in conspicuous places in the territory.
    1. The court shall appoint one (1) judge and one (1) clerk in each ward or other division of each municipal corporation, and the mayor and city council of each of the municipal corporations shall select two (2) judges and one (1) clerk for each of the wards or other divisions having the qualifications of electors, to act as judges and clerks of election within the respective wards.
    2. The court shall fix all polling places at which the voting shall take place.
    1. The election shall be held and conducted in each corporation in the manner prescribed by law for holding elections for cities or incorporated towns, so far as they are applicable. Election expenses are to be paid by the larger city or incorporated town.
      1. All elections held under this subchapter are made legal elections.
        1. The elections shall be governed by and subject to all the laws relating to general elections so far as applicable.
        2. All judges, clerks, and persons voting in the elections shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the general election laws of the state for any violation of the general election laws to the same extent as though the elections were specifically included in the general election laws of the state.
    2. The returns of the elections shall be made to the court and the result thereof declared by the court.
  1. In order to provide for an orderly transition of affairs if the petition calls for a delay in the implementation of the consolidation, the consolidation shall not take effect until the date specified in the petition, except that the consolidation shall be delayed not longer than eighteen (18) months from the date the election results are declared by the court.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7472; Pope's Dig., § 9505; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-311; Acts 1999, No. 1266, § 1; 2003, No. 1171, § 2; 2005, No. 2145, § 23; 2007, No. 1049, § 41; 2009, No. 1480, § 60.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a)(1)(A).

14-40-1203. Election results.

  1. At any election held under this subchapter, all qualified electors who are residents of either municipality shall be allowed to vote on the adoption or rejection of the proposed annexation or consolidation and the name of the proposed consolidated municipality.
        1. If a majority of the votes cast in each of the respective municipalities, considered as a separate and distinct unit and without reference to the vote cast in the other, shall be in favor of the consolidation or annexation, then the county court shall declare, by an appropriate order, the annexation or consolidation consummated unless the petition has requested a delayed date for implementation of the consolidation.
        2. If the petition calls for a delay in the implementation of the consolidation and if a majority of the votes cast in each of the respective municipalities is in favor of the consolidation, then the county court shall order the annexation or consolidation consummated on the date specified in the petition, except that the date shall not be more than eighteen (18) months after the date election results are declared by the court.
        1. If a majority of the votes cast in each of the respective municipalities, considered as a separate and distinct unit and without reference to the vote cast in the other, shall be in favor of the same name of the municipality, then the county court shall declare, by appropriate order, the name of the consolidated municipality.
        2. If a majority of the votes cast in each of the respective municipalities, considered as a separate and distinct unit and without reference to the vote cast in the other, shall not be in favor of the same name of the municipality, then the county court shall declare, by appropriate order, the name of the consolidated municipality to be the name of the larger municipality.
        1. Upon the making of the order, the smaller municipal corporation and the territory comprising it shall, in law, be deemed and be taken to be included and shall be a part of the larger municipal corporation.
        2. The inhabitants thereof shall in all respects be citizens of the larger municipal corporation.
    1. If a majority of the votes of either municipal corporation shall be against annexation, then the city or incorporated town shall not be again permitted to attempt the consolidation for two (2) years.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7473; Pope's Dig., § 9506; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-312; Acts 1999, No. 1266, § 2; 2003, No. 1171, § 3.

Case Notes

In General.

The General Assembly did not create an inharmonious or unworkable scheme of procedure when it empowered the county courts to canvass election returns and, at the same time, authorized the circuit courts to adjudicate contests of elections in an original proceeding. Russell v. Cockrill, 211 Ark. 123, 199 S.W.2d 584 (1947).

Annexation of Unincorporated Lands.

The court rejected the argument that the two-year time limit contained in this section, which applies to the consolidation of two municipalities, should be read into statutes governing the annexation of unincorporated lands as a reasonable time period within which to prohibit further attempts at annexation. Lewis v. City of Bryant, 291 Ark. 566, 726 S.W.2d 672 (1987).

14-40-1204. Contest of election.

Any elector shall have the right to test the legality and fairness of the election and the declared results in a proceeding before the circuit court without being required to give bond for costs. However, no such contest shall interfere with the consolidation until finally decided.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7473; Pope's Dig., § 9506; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-312.

Case Notes

In General.

The General Assembly did not create an inharmonious or unworkable scheme of procedure when it empowered the county courts to canvass election returns and, at the same time, authorized the circuit courts to adjudicate contests of elections in an original proceeding. Russell v. Cockrill, 211 Ark. 123, 199 S.W.2d 584 (1947).

14-40-1205. Division of smaller municipality into wards.

  1. As soon as practicable after the annexation, the council of the larger city or incorporated town shall form by ordinance the territory of the smaller municipality into such number of wards as shall seem to be to the best interest of the combined city or incorporated town, or shall change the number and boundaries of all the wards of the entire city or incorporated town, or any part of them, as shall seem to be to the best interests of the combined city or incorporated town. In such way, however, the wards shall have as nearly an equal population and assessed valuation of property as practicable and as, in the opinion of the council, would best subserve the true interest of the citizens and taxpayers of the combined city or incorporated town.
  2. The territory and inhabitants of the smaller municipal corporation shall receive that fair and just representation in the city council as the size, population, and assessed valuation of property demands, as compared with the representation accorded to other wards of the city or incorporated town.
  3. If inhabitants of the smaller municipal corporation feel aggrieved at the number of wards, or in any manner dissatisfied with the division of the territory into wards, upon petition of fifty (50) qualified electors, the circuit court is authorized to make changes in the number of wards as the justice of the case requires, in the manner provided in § 14-43-311, so far as applicable.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 7474; Pope's Dig., § 9507; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-313.

Cross References. Redistricting of wards § 14-43-311.

14-40-1206. Plat of consolidated municipality.

  1. The council of the larger city or incorporated town shall cause a plat to be made of the entire city or incorporated town after the annexation thereto and the division into wards of the smaller municipal corporation.
    1. A certified copy of the plat shall be filed and recorded in the office of the circuit court and ex officio recorder of the county and with the Secretary of State.
      1. Thereafter, the plat shall stand, be, and remain the division of the city or incorporated town into wards, and the number and boundaries thereof, until such time as it may be afterwards changed according to law.
      2. However, a change in the boundaries of the wards of the larger city or incorporated town shall not determine or affect the time of service of any previously elected council member of any ward in the larger city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 7475; Pope's Dig., § 9508; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-314; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 4.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (b)(2)(B), substituted “a change” for “no change”, inserted “not”, and substituted “council member” for “alderman”.

14-40-1207. Special election of council members or all city officials.

      1. Except as provided under subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section, the city or town council shall call a special election of council members to be held at such times and places as the council may direct pursuant to a proclamation issued by the mayor in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq., in the wards of the smaller municipality and for the election of council members from any other new wards that may be created by the council out of territory included in the larger city or incorporated town before the annexation, as provided in this subchapter.
      2. If the petition calls for a citywide election for all officials of the new consolidated city or incorporated town, then the city or town council shall call a special election pursuant to a proclamation issued by the mayor in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq. for all city or town officials to be held at the times and places as the city or town council may direct throughout each ward of the consolidated city or incorporated town.
    1. If the implementation of the consolidation of the cities or towns is delayed, the special election for new council members to a city or town council or all city officials shall be held at least forty-five (45) days before the effective date of the consolidation.
  1. Each ward of the consolidated city or incorporated town shall have two (2) council members, to be elected in the same manner and for the same term as council members are elected in cities and incorporated towns.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 7476; Pope's Dig., § 9509; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-315; Acts 2003, No. 1171, § 4; 2005, No. 2145, § 24; 2007, No. 1049, § 42; 2009, No. 1480, § 61; 2017, No. 879, § 5.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in the section heading, and twice in (a)(1)(A) and (b); substituted “the city or town council” for “it” in (a)(1)(B); and substituted “council members to a city or town council” for “aldermen” in (a)(2).

14-40-1208. Existing officers, etc.

  1. The term of office of all officers, council members, and employees of the smaller municipality and all laws in force in the smaller municipality shall cease upon and after the consolidation.
    1. Any mayor who is forced from office because of a merger of two (2) or more municipalities under this subchapter is presumed to meet the minimum service period under § 24-12-123.
    2. If the mayor who is forced from office has less than ten (10) years of actual service as mayor, then he or she is entitled to a prorated retirement benefit in an amount equal to the percentage of the mayor's actual amount of service divided by the minimum ten (10) years of service required under § 24-12-123.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 7476; Pope's Dig., § 9509; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-315; Acts 2005, No. 2264, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 6.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (a).

Case Notes

Cited: Municipality of Helena-West Helena v. Weaver, 374 Ark. 109, 286 S.W.3d 132 (2008).

14-40-1209. Public property.

All public property of the smaller municipality shall belong to the consolidated city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 7477; Pope's Dig., § 9510; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-316.

14-40-1210. Payment of existing debts.

    1. The debts of each municipality owing prior to or at the time of the consolidation shall be paid by the consolidated municipality by appropriating the revenues derived from year to year from the territory and the inhabitants of what was formerly the larger municipality to the payment of the debts of the larger municipality owing before the consolidation.
    2. In like manner, the debts of the smaller municipality owing prior to and at the time of the consolidation shall be paid by appropriating the revenues derived from what was formerly the smaller municipality in such manner as to do the least injustice to the inhabitants of each former municipality in the way of a decrease in the improving or bettering of the territory as it formerly existed.
  1. In appropriating the revenues of either municipality to pay its own debts existing prior to the consolidation, neither the territory nor inhabitants of what was formerly the larger or smaller municipality shall be discriminated against in the distribution of police protection, board of health service, fire protection, public lighting, or other like public service.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 7477; Pope's Dig., § 9510; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-316.

14-40-1211. Prior debts not preferred.

  1. Creditors of either municipal corporation, on account of obligations made prior to consolidation, shall not be paid sooner or shall not be permitted to enforce the collection of their debts sooner against the consolidated city or incorporated town than the separate municipality prior to consolidation could have paid its own debts or could have been forced to do so.
  2. In any proceeding in court, by mandamus or otherwise, against a consolidated city or incorporated town to enforce the obligations created by either municipal corporation prior to consolidation, no greater part of the revenue of the consolidated city or incorporated town shall be subject to be applied by the court at the instance of the creditor to the payment of the obligations than could have been subjected against the revenues of the particular city or incorporated town creating the obligation prior to consolidation if the particular municipal corporation having so created the obligation had not been annexed.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 7479; Pope's Dig., § 9512; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-318.

14-40-1212. Rights of annexed territory to benefits of its revenues.

  1. The wards formed out of the territory comprising the former territory of the smaller municipal corporation annexed under the provisions of this subchapter shall always receive betterments and improvements in an amount equal to the amount of revenue derived by the consolidated municipality from the territory and inhabitants of the smaller municipal corporation, after having deducted the pro rata share of the territory of the running expenses necessary to be expended in maintaining the government of the entire city or incorporated town and after having taken into consideration the amount of revenues necessarily appropriated to pay the indebtedness due by the smaller municipality before consolidation, until the indebtedness is paid. In addition, those wards shall always receive their fair and equitable proportion of the police, board of health, fire protection, and lighting service of the larger city or incorporated town. They shall in all other ways receive fair and liberal treatment and their fair proportion of the expenditure of moneys made by the larger city or incorporated town.
  2. Council members representing the wards composing the territory of the smaller municipal corporation before consolidation have a right:
    1. At all times, to demand of the city or town council the benefit of the revenue collected from the wards, as provided for in this section; and
    2. On the refusal by the city or town council of the demand made under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, to enforce the revenue rights by mandamus or other appropriate proceedings.
  3. In the event the council members, or fifty (50) qualified electors of the territory annexed, feel aggrieved in reference to the amount of revenue expended on the territory or as to the other rights guaranteed in this section to the annexed municipality, they may submit the matter to the circuit court, which is authorized by appropriate orders to compel the consolidated city or incorporated town to give the former territory of the smaller municipal corporation the full benefit of its revenue as provided in this section.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 7478; Pope's Dig., § 9511; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-317; Acts 2017, No. 879, §§ 7, 8.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote (b); and substituted “council members” for “alderman” near the beginning of (c).

14-40-1213. Franchises, contracts, and other obligations.

No franchises, contracts, or other obligations of an extraordinary nature, or other than those necessary for the ordinary and usual running of the affairs of either municipal corporation, which have been granted, made, or created by either municipal corporation after the passage of an ordinance favoring annexation, and prior to the consummation of the annexation, shall be valid and binding against the consolidated municipality, or any part thereof, in the event that a consolidation is effected within sixty (60) days after passage of the ordinance, unless they shall be afterward ratified by the consolidated city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1913, No. 318, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 7480; Pope's Dig., § 9513; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-319.

Case Notes

Cited: Mann v. City of Hot Springs, 234 Ark. 9, 350 S.W.2d 317 (1961).

Subchapters 13-17

Subchapter 18 — Detachment of Territory Generally

Cross References. Reduction to acreage, § 14-41-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1997, No. 140, § 6: Feb. 13, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law prescribing the procedure for the detachment of territory located within a municipal corporation is unduly burdensome and expensive on the taxpayers; that this act grants an alternative procedure which is more efficient and less costly; and that this act should go into effect immediately in order to grant cities and counties the flexibility provided herein as soon as possible. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-40-1801. Proceedings generally.

  1. Whenever any municipal corporation shall desire to throw any portion of the territory lying within its corporate limits outside of the limits and remit it back to the county in which the municipal corporation is situated, it shall be lawful for the council of the municipal corporation to submit the question to the qualified electors of the municipal corporation at an election to be held for that purpose. The election shall be held after giving notice of such election four (4) weeks by advertisement in one (1) of the papers published in the municipal corporation or, if there is no paper published in the municipal corporation by advertisement posted in two (2) of the most public places in the municipal corporation.
  2. If a majority of the votes cast on that question shall be in favor of throwing the territory outside of its municipal corporate limits, the municipal corporation shall present to the county court a petition praying for such change in its territorial limits, and the hearing shall be had on the petition as is prescribed in § 14-38-103.
  3. Alternatively, upon petition of the landowners affected and provided the territory is unimproved and uninhabited wetlands, the city council may resolve to request the county court to exclude the territory from the limits of the municipal corporation and remit it back to the county and a hearing shall be had on the petition as prescribed in § 14-38-103.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 90, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7487; Pope's Dig., § 9530; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-320; Acts 1997, No. 140, § 1.

14-40-1802. Order for exclusion.

  1. After hearing the petition, if the county court shall be satisfied that a majority of the qualified electors of the corporation are in favor of the exclusion of the territory mentioned in the petition from within its limits, or alternatively that the city council has resolved to request that the territory be excluded from the limits of the municipal corporation and remitted back to the county, that the territory to be excluded has been accurately described, and that it would be proper and right to grant the petition, it shall make an order excluding the territory in the petition mentioned from the limits of the municipal corporation and remitting it back to the county.
    1. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to make out a certified copy of the order and to deliver it to the recorder of his or her county, whose duty it shall be to record the order in the proper book of records in his or her office.
    2. It shall also be the duty of the recorder to make out and forward to the Secretary of State a certified copy of the record.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 90, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7488; Pope's Dig., § 9531; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-321; Acts 1997, No. 140, § 2.

14-40-1803. When effective — Limitation.

  1. After the record shall have been filed and a copy forwarded to the Secretary of State, the territory shall cease to be a part of the municipal corporation.
  2. The limits of cities of the first and second class shall not be reduced to an area less than they were on January 1, 1872.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 90, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7489; Pope's Dig., § 9532; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-322.

Subchapter 19 — Detachment of Unsuitable Territory

Effective Dates. Acts 1961, No. 92, § 3: Feb. 16, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it appears that there are now municipal corporations within the State whose original city limits were extended so as to include areas which, because of error or otherwise, are no longer recognized by City and County Officials as being a part of said corporations, and whereas portions of such areas are no longer suitable for urban development within the foreseeable future, the official maintaining of such areas within the corporate limits is causing confusion among officials and working a hardship upon property owners in both the corporations and in such area or territory, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

14-40-1901. Designation by resolution.

  1. Whenever it appears that the official corporate limits as shown by the records of the Secretary of State for any city or incorporated town have for more than ten (10) years included an area or territory that has not been recognized by city or incorporated town officials and assessed for taxation as a part of the city or incorporated town during the period, because of error or otherwise, and which has not been legally detached from the city or incorporated town, then the city or incorporated town council may designate and determine by resolution for any portion of the area or territory which it believes is unsuitable for urban development in the foreseeable future, that it is no longer necessary for corporate purposes, and that it desires to officially detach the designated area or territory outside of its corporate limits, retaining the remainder of the unrecognized territory therein.
  2. A certified copy of the resolution shall then be filed with the county court of the county where the city or town is situated or the county where the area or territory affected is situated, together with a petition that a hearing be held by the court to determine whether the designated portions of the area or territory shall be officially excluded from the city or incorporated town limits.

History. Acts 1961, No. 92, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-325.

14-40-1902. Hearing and determination.

  1. Upon the filing of the petition, the county court shall set a date for hearing thereon, not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days after the first publication of notice of the filing of the petition. Notice of the filing shall be published once each week for not less than two (2) weeks in a newspaper having a general circulation in the city or incorporated town.
    1. After hearing the petition, if the court shall be satisfied that the designated area or territory has not been recognized by city or incorporated town officials and has not been assessed for taxation as a part of the city or incorporated town for more than ten (10) years, that it is no longer suitable for urban development, that the territory to be excluded is accurately described, and that the welfare of the inhabitants and property owners of both the city or incorporated town and of the area or territory affected will be best served, it shall make an order excluding designated area or territory described in the petition or such portions thereof as it determines should be so excluded from the limits of the city or incorporated town and remitting it back to the county.
    2. The clerk of the county shall certify a copy of the order to the recorder of the county, to be recorded by him or her, and shall likewise cause a certified copy to be forwarded to the Secretary of State, to be otherwise filed as provided by law.

History. Acts 1961, No. 92, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-326.

14-40-1903. Public utility service.

Any public utility serving the area detached shall have the right to continue to serve in the detached area on the same basis as service had been previously rendered prior to the action of the city or incorporated town council in adopting the resolution detaching the territory, except that no franchise tax shall be payable thereafter to the city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1961, No. 92, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-327.

Subchapter 20 — Municipal Services

Effective Dates. Acts 1999, No. 779, § 6: Mar. 22, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that certain lands may be inadequately served by the municipality in which it is located while the needed services exist in a bordering municipality; that this creates an inequitable situation for the landowner; that annexation into the other municipality should be allowed in order for the land to be put to its best use; and that this inequitable situation must be remedied at the earliest opportunity. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1522, § 2: Apr. 12, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that certain Arkansas public trusts with lands from military reservations have made requests for services from municipalities under Act 779 of 1999; that the availability of municipal utility services and infrastructure is critical to the development plans for those public trusts; that those public trusts must preserve the current law under Act 779 to meet their needs to fulfill development plans for infrastructure needed to support development of the former military reservation lands; and that it is necessary for this act to have immediate effect to preserve the current state of law under Act 779 for these kinds of entities. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2001, No. 1525, § 4: Apr. 12, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Act 779 of 1999 was enacted because certain lands were being inadequately served by the municipality in which they were located while the needed services existed in a bordering municipality and the act authorized a landowner to annex into another municipality for new services to put the land to its best use; that Act 779 lacked sufficient safeguards in its time limits and lacked a fact finding process and decision-maker to determine certain issues; and that these weaknesses need to be addressed and implementation of these safeguards should take effect as soon as possible to eliminate any further situations which must be remedied. It is also determined that it would be inequitable to apply these changes in law to any detachment which was requested prior to its effective date. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Cross References. Land use in adjacent and contiguous cities, § 14-56-306.

14-40-2001. Purpose.

It is the purpose of this subchapter to assist landowners to obtain municipal services by making the services reasonably available. However, nothing in this subchapter shall relieve a landowner from the obligation to pay regular fees and costs for connecting to services or from the obligation to pay the regular cost of the services.

History. Acts 1999, No. 779, § 1.

Case Notes

Annexation.

Detachment-Annexation Statutes were met in the company's action seeking to have a second city annex its property where the circuit court erred in its interpretation that the first city did not provide water and sewer services to its citizens because the city did not own a water or sewer system. City of Maumelle v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 353 Ark. 686, 120 S.W.3d 55 (2003).

Trial court did not err in finding that landowners' annexation into an adjoining city complied with this section and § 14-40-2002, and the court rejected the city's argument that the necessary services were already available to the landowners; sewer service, as defined in § 14-40-2002(e), was not available to the landowners when they requested such services by the city, and sewer service was necessary to maximize the use of property as provided in the statute. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 356 Ark. 393, 155 S.W.3d 9 (2004).

Commitment to Provide Services.

Because the city failed to demonstrate a commitment to providing services within a reasonable time, the trial court did not err in finding that the city did not meet its burden of showing compliance with this section and § 14-40-2002. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 356 Ark. 393, 155 S.W.3d 9 (2004).

Cited: City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2010 Ark. 449, 374 S.W.3d 660 (2010); City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 326, 525 S.W.3d 18 (2017).

14-40-2002. Annexation into adjoining municipality.

    1. A landowner or group of landowners seeking additional municipal services may have its land detached from the municipality in which it is located and annexed into another municipality that borders the land.
    2. However, before annexation is allowed, the municipality in which the land is located shall have an opportunity to provide the additional services.
  1. The following procedure shall apply:
    1. The landowner or landowners shall file a statement with the municipality in which the land is located listing the additional municipal service or services being sought and stating that:
      1. The municipality is not providing services necessary to create improvements, provide employment or additional employment, subdivide, or otherwise maximize the use and value of the property;
      2. All the land in the request composes one (1) area that is contiguous to another municipality;
      3. The additional services are available in another municipality that borders the land subject to the request; and
        1. The municipality is requested to make a commitment to take substantial steps, within ninety (90) days after the statement is filed, toward providing the additional services and, within each thirty-day period thereafter, to continue taking steps to demonstrate a consistent commitment to provide the service within a reasonable time, as determined by the kind of services requested.
        2. The commitment shall be made in writing to the landowner within thirty (30) calendar days of the filing of the statement, or the landowner may seek to have the land detached from the municipality and annexed into the other municipality.
        3. The landowner shall take appropriate steps to make the land accessible to the service and comply with reasonable requests of the municipality that are necessary for the service to be provided;
    2. The landowner or landowners may request the annexation of the land into the other municipality and thereby detach the land from the boundaries of the municipality in which the land is currently located if:
      1. The municipality in which the land is located fails to execute a commitment to services within thirty (30) days after the statement is filed; or
      2. The municipality executes the commitment to services but fails to take the action required under subdivision (b)(1)(D) of this section;
      1. The land shall be annexed into the other municipality if, after a request by the landowner or landowners, the governing body of the municipality into which annexation is sought indicates by ordinance, resolution, or motion its commitment to make the services available and its approval of the request for annexation.
        1. The annexation shall be void and the land shall be returned to the original municipality if the annexing municipality fails to take substantial steps within ninety (90) days after the passage of the ordinance, resolution, or motion to make the services available and, within each thirty-day period thereafter, continues taking steps demonstrating a consistent commitment to make the additional service available within a reasonable time, as determined by the kind of services requested.
        2. The landowner shall have taken appropriate steps to make the land accessible to the service and complied with the reasonable requests of the municipality that are necessary for the service to be provided.
        3. However, if the requested services are not available within one hundred eighty (180) days after the property is accepted by the annexing jurisdiction or substantial steps are not taken to make the services available within this time period, then the detachment and annexation shall be void and all property returned to its original jurisdiction; and
    3. The land shall remain in the original municipality until it is annexed into the other municipality.
  2. Land annexed pursuant to this section shall not be eligible for reannexation under this section for a period of two (2) years.
  3. This section shall apply to residential, commercial, industrial, and unimproved land.
  4. For the purposes of this section, “services” means electricity, water, sewer, fire protection, police protection, drainage and storm water management, or any other offering by the municipality that materially affects a landowner's ability to develop, use, or expand the uses of the landowner's property.

History. Acts 1999, No. 779, § 2; 2001, No. 1522, § 1; 2001, No. 1525, §§ 1, 2; 2013, No. 1455, § 1; 2019, No. 838, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1522, § 1 provided:

“If any changes are made to this section [§ 14-40-2002] during the 2001 Regular Session of the General Assembly, those changes of law shall not be applicable to the land, buildings, or improvements which were a part of any military reservation which has been or in the future is conveyed to an Arkansas public trust by the United States of America or any agency, branch, arm, or department thereof, except that § 14-40-2003 shall be applicable to those lands, buildings, and improvements.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment inserted “additional” in (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D)(i), and (b)(3)(B)(i); deleted “available” following “services” in (b)(1)(D)(i) and (b)(3)(B)(i); and in (b)(3)(B)(iii), substituted “available” for “provided, accepted, and in place,” substituted “make” for “provide, accept, and have,” and substituted “available” for “in place.”

The 2019 amendment substituted “shall” for “must” in (b)(1)(D)(ii), (b)(1)(D)(iii), and (b)(3)(B)(ii); substituted “composes” for “must compose” in (b)(1)(B); substituted “ninety (90) days” for “one hundred eighty (180) days” in (b)(1)(D)(i) and (b)(3)(B)(i); substituted “shall” for “must” in (b)(1)(D)(ii), (b)(1)(D)(iii), and (b)(3)(B)(ii); and substituted “one hundred eighty (180) days” for “twelve (12) months” in (b)(3)(B)(iii).

Case Notes

Annexation.

The requirements of the Detachment-Annexation Statutes were met in a company’s action seeking to have a second city annex its property where the circuit court erred in its interpretation that the first city did not provide water and sewer services to its citizens because the city did not own a water or sewer system. City of Maumelle v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 353 Ark. 686, 120 S.W.3d 55 (2003).

Trial court did not err in finding that landowners' annexation into an adjoining city complied with this section and § 14-40-2001, and the court rejected the city's argument that the necessary services were already available to the landowners; sewer service, as defined in subsection (e) of this section, was not available to the landowners when they requested such services by the city, and sewer service was necessary to maximize the use of property as provided in the statute. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 356 Ark. 393, 155 S.W.3d 9 (2004).

In appellant's action to declare an annexation void, a circuit court's finding that appellee and landowners were substantially in compliance with the annexation requirements of this section was proper as appellee provided a sewer line for the landowners to connect to and the landowners took steps towards connecting to the line. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2010 Ark. 449, 374 S.W.3d 660 (2010).

When annexed lands did not compose one area, under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the annexations were not invalid because separate lands could be annexed at one time. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2012 Ark. 445, 424 S.W.3d 870 (2012).

Annexation of lands from a city to a municipality, at the request of the lands' owners, was not invalid due to being done by resolution, rather than ordinance because (1) this section clearly contemplated annexation by resolution, and (2) a reference in § 14-40-2004(c) to “ordinance” did not govern, as this section was the more specific statute. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2012 Ark. 445, 424 S.W.3d 870 (2012).

Annexation of lands from a city to a municipality, at the request of the lands' owners, was not invalid when the city's streets separated annexed lands from the municipality, for lack of contiguity to the municipality, under subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section, because a street did not break contiguity, since landowners held all rights to the land not inconsistent with public use of the street. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2012 Ark. 445, 424 S.W.3d 870 (2012).

Commitment to Provide Services.

The trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that a municipality did not make a commitment to provide requested sewer services where the municipality hired an engineering firm to conduct a feasibility study and committed to provide sewer service “as soon as feasibly possible.” City of Lowell v. City of Rogers, 345 Ark. 33, 43 S.W.3d 742 (2001).

Because the city failed to demonstrate a commitment to providing services within a reasonable time, the trial court did not err in finding that the city did not meet its burden of showing compliance with this section and § 14-40-2001. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 356 Ark. 393, 155 S.W.3d 9 (2004).

Circuit court properly granted declaratory judgment to the landowner bank where the municipality failed to inform the bank that specific plans and an engineer were needed before sewer and water services could be provided to the unimproved portion of the property; the municipality failed to take substantial steps, as required by this section, toward providing the services. City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 333, 522 S.W.3d 834 (2017).

Jurisdiction.

Circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a landowner bank's petition for an order declaring that a municipality had failed to comply with this section, where the pleadings stated the statutory basis for jurisdiction and § 14-40-2004 allowed for such a petition. City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 333, 522 S.W.3d 834 (2017).

Standing.

A city in which property was originally located had standing to argue that another city which annexed the property did not meet the requirements of the annexation statute, as whether the property remained a part of the first city depended upon whether the second city met its obligations under the annexation statute. City of Lowell v. City of Rogers, 345 Ark. 33, 43 S.W.3d 742 (2001).

14-40-2003. No split or island.

  1. In no event shall the provisions of this subchapter allow a municipality to be split in half or to have any of its land separately encircled, thereby creating an island of that city within the boundaries of another city.
  2. Any detachment and annexation occurring that creates a split or island shall be void and all properties returned to their original municipality.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1525, § 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2001, No. 1522, § 1 provided:

“If any changes are made to this section [§ 14-40-2002] during the 2001 Regular Session of the General Assembly, those changes of law shall not be applicable to the land, buildings, or improvements which were a part of any military reservation which has been or in the future is conveyed to an Arkansas public trust by the United States of America or any agency, branch, arm, or department thereof, except that § 14-40-2003 shall be applicable to those lands, buildings, and improvements.”

As amended in 2001, subsection (b) began:

“After April 12, 2001.”

14-40-2004. Hearing in circuit court — Appeal.

    1. The circuit courts of the state shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all matters related to this subchapter.
    2. The circuit court of the county in which the municipalities are located or, in the event that the municipalities are located in different counties or judicial districts, the circuit court of the county or judicial district that has within the county's or judicial district's boundaries the smallest of the two (2) municipalities in population according to the latest federal decennial census, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all matters related to this subchapter.
      1. Upon petition of either affected municipality, the landowner or group of landowners, or its representatives, the circuit judge shall hold a hearing or series of hearings related to the provisions of this subchapter.
      2. The municipalities, the landowner who requested annexation, and a landowner who began owning land after the annexation request are parties to the hearings.
    1. The circuit judge shall make findings as are necessary to determine whether there has been substantial compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of this subchapter.
  1. The petition under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be filed no later than twenty (20) days after the adoption or rejection of the ordinance, resolution, or motion bringing the subject property into the annexing jurisdiction.
  2. In the event an action is brought in circuit court by any party, the time period for the requested services to be available as provided in § 14-40-2002(b)(3)(B)(iii) shall be tolled until entry of a ruling by the circuit judge and the conclusion of any appeals from that court.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1525, § 3; 2013, No. 1455, § 2.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added the (b)(1)(A) designation, and added (b)(1)(B); substituted “petition” for “request” in (b)(1)(A); rewrote subsection (c); and substituted “available” for “provided, accepted, and in place” in (d).

Case Notes

Annexation.

Annexation of lands from a city to a municipality, at the request of the lands' owners, was not invalid due to being done by resolution, rather than ordinance because (1) § 14-40-2002 clearly contemplated annexation by resolution, and (2) a reference in subsection (c) of this section to “ordinance” did not govern, as § 14-40-2002 was the more specific statute. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2012 Ark. 445, 424 S.W.3d 870 (2012).

Dismissal with Prejudice.

Dismissing with prejudice a municipality's petition challenging annexation against a landowner bank, which had requested detachment under § 14-40-2002, was not error where the municipality had not completed any service at all on the bank, and as a result, the savings statute, § 16-56-126, did not apply. City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 326, 525 S.W.3d 18 (2017).

Required Parties.

Circuit court erred in dismissing the neighboring town and the purchaser of the annexed property based solely on the landowner's dismissal from the case as nothing in subdivision (b)(1) of this section required that the bank, as the landowner requesting annexation, be or remain a party to the lawsuit. City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 326, 525 S.W.3d 18 (2017).

Although subdivision (b)(1) of this section provides that the municipalities, the landowner who requested annexation, and a landowner who began owning land after the annexation request “are parties”, the Act nowhere requires all of them to be or remain parties in every lawsuit filed under the Act. This section does not use the words “shall be parties”, and the Court of Appeals will not read those words into the statute. City of Tontitown v. First Sec. Bank, 2017 Ark. App. 326, 525 S.W.3d 18 (2017).

14-40-2005. Filing.

  1. All documents produced by landowners, municipalities, or others relating to detachment and annexation as enumerated in this subchapter shall be filed with the circuit clerk with copies served upon the municipality and landowners.
    1. The circuit clerk shall establish a system of filing for these matters upon action's having been taken by a landowner or group of landowners pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter.
    2. The circuit clerk's file shall be considered the official record of all matters and proceedings under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1525, § 3.

14-40-2006. Provision of municipal services.

In a municipal services matter under this subchapter, if a city or incorporated town from which the inhabitants detached determines that the scheduled services are available or became available to the detaching inhabitants by the city or incorporated town to which the inhabitants were annexed into, the inhabitants shall automatically be detached and annexed back into the original city or incorporated town after the expiration of one hundred eighty (180) days following the date the schedule of services became available to the inhabitants and the inhabitants have not used the services.

History. Acts 2015, No. 882, § 1.

Subchapter 21 — Simultaneous Detachment and Annexation

14-40-2101. Simultaneous detachment and annexation by two cities.

  1. When the boundaries of two (2) municipalities are contiguous to and adjoining one another, and one (1) municipality desires to detach and annex territory in another municipality, then the governing body of the municipality desiring to detach and annex territory may propose an ordinance calling for the simultaneous detachment of the lands from the one (1) municipality and the annexation of the lands into its municipal limits. The municipality desiring to annex land in the adjoining city, after the passage of the ordinance calling for detachment and annexation, shall send the ordinance to the governing body of the city or town in which the lands are located.
    1. The ordinance will provide a legal description of the lands proposing to be detached and annexed and describe generally the reasons for proposing the action.
    2. The governing body of the city or town in which the lands are located shall conduct a public hearing within sixty (60) days of the proposal of the ordinance calling for the detachment and annexation.
    3. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the public hearing, the governing body of the proposing municipality shall publish a legal notice setting out the legal description of the territory proposed to be detached and annexed. Municipal officials of the proposing city or town, officials of the city or town in which the lands are located, and property owners within the area proposed to be detached and annexed may appear at the public hearing to present their views on the proposal.
    1. At the next regularly scheduled meeting following the public hearing, the governing body of the municipality in which the lands are located may bring the proposed ordinance up for a vote to concur in the detachment and annexation.
    2. If a majority of the total number of members of the governing body vote for the proposed detachment and annexation ordinance, then a prima facie case for detachment and annexatiion shall be established, and the proposing municipality shall proceed to render services to the newly annexed area.
  2. The decision of the municipal governing bodies shall be final unless suit is brought in the circuit court of the appropriate county within thirty (30) days after passage of the ordinance to review the mutual actions of the governing bodies.
    1. As soon as the ordinance proposing the detachment and annexation is final, the territory shall be deemed and taken to be a part and parcel of the limits of the city or town annexing it, and the inhabitants residing therein shall have and enjoy all the rights and privileges of the inhabitants within the original limits of the city or town.
    2. The governing body of the annexing city or town shall direct the municipal clerk or recorder to duly certify one (1) copy of the plat of the annexed territory and one (1) copy of the proposing ordinance as adopted by both governing bodies to the county clerk.
    3. The clerk shall forward a copy of each document to the Secretary of State, who shall file and preserve them.

History. Acts 1999, No. 988, § 1.

Subchapter 22 — Annexation and Detachment Transparency Act

14-40-2201. Annexation and provision of scheduled services.

    1. Beginning March 1, 2014, and each successive year thereafter, the mayor or city manager of a city or incorporated town shall file annually with the city clerk or recorder, town recorder, and county clerk a written notice describing any annexation elections that have become final in the previous eight (8) years.
    2. The written notice shall include:
      1. The schedule of services to be provided to the inhabitants of the annexed portion of the city; and
      2. A statement as to whether the scheduled services have been provided to the inhabitants of the annexed portions of the city.
  1. If the scheduled services have not been provided to the new inhabitants within three (3) years after the date the annexation becomes final, the written notice reporting the status of the extension of scheduled services shall include a statement of the rights of inhabitants to seek detachment.
  2. A city or incorporated town shall not proceed with annexation elections if there are pending scheduled services that have not been provided in three (3) years as prescribed by law.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1502, § 1.

14-40-2202. Inhabitants of annexed area.

  1. In all annexations under § 14-40-303 and in accordance with § 14-40-606, after the territory declared annexed is considered part of a city or incorporated town, the inhabitants residing in the annexed portion shall:
    1. Have all the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the annexing city or incorporated town; and
      1. Be extended the scheduled services within three (3) years after the date the annexation becomes final.
      2. The mayor of the municipality shall file a report with the city clerk or recorder, town recorder, and county clerk of the extension of scheduled services.
  2. If the scheduled services have not been extended to the area and property boundaries of the new inhabitants within three (3) years after the date annexation becomes final, the written notice reporting the status of the extension of scheduled services shall:
    1. Include a written plan for completing the extension of services and estimated date of completion; and
    2. Include a statement of the rights of inhabitants to seek detachment.
  3. A city or incorporated town shall not proceed with any additional annexation elections if there are pending scheduled services that have not been extended as required under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1502, § 1.

Chapter 41 Additions to Cities and Incorporated Towns

Research References

C.J.S. 87 C.J.S., Towns, §§ 10-16.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved]

Subchapter 2 — Filing and Recording Requirements

Cross References. Copies of plats for areas outside municipality to be transmitted to county planning board, § 14-17-208.

Subdividing land outside cities and towns, § 14-18-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1907, No. 306, § 7: effective on passage.

14-41-201. Plats of new additions to be filed and recorded — Penalty.

  1. Any person or corporation owning any real estate who shall make any addition of real estate to any incorporated town or city in this state shall be required to file and record a regular plat of it in the office of the circuit clerk and recorder of the county in which the land is situated within thirty (30) days after the addition.
    1. It shall be a misdemeanor for any person, joint-stock company, or corporation to sell or offer for sale any lot or block designated on the map or plat referred to in this section until it has been duly filed in the office of the circuit court and ex officio recorder as required in this section.
    2. Any person, joint-stock company, or corporation who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History. Acts 1907, No. 306, §§ 1, 3, p. 730; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7481, 7483; Pope's Dig., §§ 9524, 9526; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-401, 19-403.

Case Notes

Roadways.

A dedication of streets and alleys across a tract of land is not established merely by proof of making and recording the plat where the lands remain enclosed by the original owner. Balmat v. City of Argenta, 123 Ark. 175, 184 S.W. 445 (1916).

14-41-202. Certification of matters — Penalty.

  1. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the circuit court when any map or plat of any addition to any city or incorporated town in the State of Arkansas has been filed in his or her office as required by § 14-41-201(a) to forthwith certify under his or her hand and seal of office, to the county clerk of the county, in those counties where there are both county and circuit clerks, the name of the addition and the date of the filing of the plat.
  2. The failure of the clerk to so certify the matters to the county clerk for thirty (30) days shall be a misdemeanor. On conviction, the clerk shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History. Acts 1907, No. 306, § 2, p. 730; C. & M. Dig., § 7482; Pope's Dig., § 9525; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-402.

14-41-203. Entry on tax books required — Penalty.

  1. It shall be the duty of the county clerk on receiving the certificate provided for in § 14-41-202(a) to file it in his or her office. Thereafter, before he or she shall deliver the tax books to the assessor, he or she shall enter the number of each lot and block on the tax book for real estate as other real estate is entered, and it shall be assessed as other real estate of like character.
  2. In counties where there is no county clerk, it shall be the duty of the circuit clerks, before they shall thereafter deliver the tax books to the assessor, to enter the number of each lot and block appearing upon any map or plat of any addition to any city or incorporated town in this state which is filed in their office on the tax books for real estate, and it shall be assessed as other real estate of like character.
  3. The failure of any county clerk to comply with the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be a misdemeanor. On conviction, he or she shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00).

History. Acts 1907, No. 306, §§ 4-6, p. 730; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7484-7486; Pope's Dig., §§ 9527-9529; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-404 — 19-406.

Subchapter 3 — Reduction to Acreage

Cross References. Validation of return to acreage of platted land outside cities or towns, § 14-18-110.

Effective Dates. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 8: approved Mar. 7, 1929. Emergency clause provided. “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the State of Arkansas, shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-41-301. Applicability.

This subchapter shall not apply to any part of an addition or division less than one-third (1/3) of the whole as shown by the original plat filed in the office of the circuit clerk.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 9517; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-410.

14-41-302. Right generally.

The owner of any addition or division to any city or incorporated town in this state where no lots or blocks, or any part thereof, have been sold and the streets and alleys have not been used by the public for the last seven (7) years prior to the filing of the petition shall have the right to reduce the addition or division to acreage by petition to the county court where the property is situated.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9514; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-407.

Case Notes

Cited: Rinke v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900, 341 S.W.2d 44 (1960).

14-41-303. Parties to petition.

If at any time one (1) person owns, or two (2) or more persons own jointly or as tenants in common, or a corporation owns all the lots and blocks in any addition or division to any city or incorporated town in this state, the streets and alleys of which have not been used by the public for the last seven (7) years prior to the filing of the petition, then the person, persons, or corporation may have the addition or division reduced to acreage by proper petition to the county court.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9515; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-408.

14-41-304. Owners of parts.

The owners of any part of an addition or division shall have the right to have it reduced to acreage, as in the cases provided in §§ 14-41-302 and 14-41-303. However, the lots and blocks shall be contiguous. No streets and alleys shall be included in the order reducing the parts of additions or divisions to acreage unless the owners shall have the legal title and be in the actual possession of all the lots and blocks surrounding the streets and alleys.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 9516; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-409.

14-41-305. Notice of petition.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition, the county court shall immediately cause notice to be published for two (2) consecutive weeks by at least two (2) insertions in some newspaper published in the county having a bona fide circulation therein, stating the substance contained in the petition.
  2. The county court shall immediately provide the filed petition to the city clerk of the city or incorporated town in which the property is located.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9518; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-411; Acts 2007, No. 14, § 1.

14-41-306. Hearing and order.

  1. The county court shall hear the petition at the first day of the court held after publication of the notice filed under § 14-41-305 if not continued for cause and upon proper showing shall order that the addition or division, or part thereof, be reduced to acreage.
  2. If the county court issues an order pursuant to subsection (a) of this section that the addition or division be reduced to acreage, then the addition or division shall thereafter be assessed as acreage for taxation of all kinds.
  3. The county court shall immediately provide the filed order to the city clerk of the city or incorporated town in which the property is located.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 9519; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-412; Acts 2007, No. 14, § 2.

14-41-307. Appeals.

Any person aggrieved by an order under § 14-41-306 may appeal to the circuit court in the manner provided by law for appeals from the county court.

History. Acts 1929, No. 91, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 9520; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-413.

Chapter 42 Government Of Municipalities Generally

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp, § 98 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 106 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Preambles. Acts 1945, No. 10 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the municipalities of this state are now losing competent employees to private industry who are attracted not so much by high wages as by the fact that they desire the protection afforded by being included under a retirement system; and

“Whereas, qualified individuals are refusing to enter municipal employment, because such protection is not given; and

“Whereas, municipal employees are not now covered by Social Security; and

“Whereas, municipal payrolls now include many elderly employees whose productive capacity has been impaired; and

“Whereas, the retention of aged individuals tends to induce other employees on the same job to slacken their efforts to the same level of production….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 120, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1895, No. 54, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1919, No. 230, § 4: approved Mar. 11, 1919. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1923, No. 153, § 6: approved Feb. 21, 1923. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1929, No. 115, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1941, No. 288, § 4: Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that there is much suffering in the State which can be relieved through Community Chest and other charitable organizations. These organizations are badly in need of funds, and, this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1945, No. 10, § 2: approved Jan. 31, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “That this act shall take effect from and after its passage, the public welfare requiring it.”

Acts 1963, No. 182, § 2: approved Mar. 7, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “Under existing law, considerable doubt exists as to the validity of business transactions between a municipal corporation and various banks, utilities, newspapers, and other services institutions located within the municipality and in which Aldermen or members of municipal councils are minority stockholders so that the right of the municipal corporation to do business of this nature with any local institution is often brought into question, making this Act necessary to protect the public peace, health, safety and welfare; and an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1975, No. 161, § 3: Feb. 12, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is necessary to the efficient and effective operation of municipal government in certain second-class cities and incorporated towns that there be selected an official city attorney to represent such cities; that this Act is designed to permit the appointment of such attorneys in those cities in which such attorneys have not been elected, and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 9, § 4: Jan. 27, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, in many cities and towns vacancies exist on municipal governing bodies and as a result of existing law a unanimous vote or an extraordinary majority is required to make appointments to fill such vacancies and therefore these municipalities are sometimes hampered in their ability to adequately render municipal services for the people of this State; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 124, § 3: Feb. 19, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is in the public interest that the citizens of this State be encouraged to participate in public affairs; that due to confusion in the present laws, many persons who serve as volunteer firemen are uncertain as to whether such service limits or restricts their authority to seek election to, and to serve on, the governing body of the municipality in which they serve as volunteer firemen; that it is the consensus of the General Assembly that the small amount of pay received by volunteer firemen only when they are called upon to render fire service duties does not constitute a conflict of interest within any statutory or constitutional limitation, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify the authority of volunteer firemen to serve on the governing body of the municipality wherein the firemen serve. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 303, § 4: Mar. 4, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that when vacancies exist in the position of alderman and the remaining term exceeds one year in cities of over 50,000 having a mayor-council form of government and in which the electors of each ward elect at least one (1) alderman, the filling of the vacant position by appointment deprives the people of a voice in filling what should be an elected position; that this Act is designed to correct this undesirable situation and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 485, § 3: Mar. 13, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the state of Arkansas that the provisions of Arkansas Statutes 19-909 which provide that no member of a city council shall be interested in the profits of any contract for work or services performed for the city or town are unduly restrictive especially as applied by small cities and towns where a member of the council may have a majority interest in the only business in town offering the supplies, equipment or services covered by the proposed contract; that the public interest will best be served by permitting council members to have a pecuniary interest in contracts entered into with the city or town if the governing body of the city specifically authorizes the same by ordinance; that this Act is designed to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 914, § 7: Apr. 5, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some instances vacancies in the positions of the department heads of some cities are not being timely filled; that this results in confusion and inefficiency within the municipal government; that this act provides a mechanism whereby the vacancies in department head positions may be filled more efficiently in a more timely manner; therefore this act should go into effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after passage and approval.”

Acts 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 13: Oct. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the current system of funding the state judicial system has created inequity in the level of judicial services available to the citizens of the state; and it is further determined that the current method of financing the state judicial system has become so complex as to make the administration of the system impossible, and the lack of reliable data on the current costs of the state judicial system prohibits any comprehensive change in the funding of the system at this time. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 163, § 2: Feb. 15, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is currently no statute that authorizes the removal of a municipal official who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, a federal offense. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 1185, § 21: Oct. 2, 2011.

Research References

ALR.

Modern status of rule excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only general, not particular, duty was owed under circumstances. 38 A.L.R.4th 1194.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance limiting the kinds or amount of actual damages recoverable in tort action against governmental unit. 43 A.L.R.4th 19.

Municipal liability for negligent fire inspection and subsequent enforcement. 69 A.L.R.4th 739.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp. & Coun., § 125 et seq.

14-42-101. Savings provision.

Any municipal corporation in which, under its former organization prior to March 9, 1875, by any law or charter regulating any literary, charitable, or benevolent institution, vested any power of appointing officers of supervision or control, shall continue to hold and possess the like power and authority in every respect.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 32, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7519; Pope's Dig., § 9579; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-906.

14-42-102. Corporate authority of cities.

The corporate authority of cities that are organized shall be vested in one (1) principal officer, to be called the mayor, and one (1) board of council members, to be called the city council, together with such other officers as are mentioned in this subtitle or may be created under its authority.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 5, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7459; Pope's Dig., § 9492; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-901; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 9.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “alderman”.

Cross References. Corporate authority of towns, § 14-45-101.

Case Notes

In General.

No one but the state may challenge the existence of a municipal corporation, nor take advantage of the abandonment of corporate rights. Searcy v. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269, 1 S.W. 319 (1886); Town of Madison v. Bond, 133 Ark. 527, 202 S.W. 721 (1918).

Mayors.

The mayor of a second class city is a member of the council of a second class city and thereby entitled to vote on the municipal council's ordinances. Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

Cited: Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock, 499 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. 1980).

14-42-103. Vacancies in municipal offices.

    1. Vacancies in municipal offices that are authorized by state law to be filled by appointment by the city or town governing body require a majority vote of the remaining members of the governing body.
    2. However, a majority of a quorum of the whole number of the governing body is required to fill the vacancy.
    1. The governing body may appoint any qualified elector, including members of a governing body, to fill the vacancy.
    2. However, a member of the governing body shall not vote on his or her own appointment.
  1. This section does not apply to circumstances prescribed under § 14-43-501(a) or § 14-43-411(a).

History. Acts 1977, No. 9, §§ 1, 2; 1981, No. 303, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-905.1; Acts 2009, No. 185, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment redesignated (a) and (b), added (c), and made minor stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Resignation.

Arkansas law does not designate who is the proper authority to accept a municipal officer's resignation. Hopper v. Garner, 328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997).

14-42-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning vacancies in certain alderman positions, was repealed by Acts 2009, No. 385, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 9, §§ 1, 2; 1981, No. 303, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-905.1; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 25; 2007, No. 1049, § 43; 2007, No. 188, § 1.

14-42-105. Appointments of officers by council.

  1. All appointments of officers by any council of a municipal corporation shall be made viva voce, and the concurrence of a like majority shall be required.
  2. On the votes resulting in the appointment, the names of those voting and for whom they voted shall be recorded, and all such voting shall be public.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 29, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7518; Pope's Dig., § 9578; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-905.

Case Notes

In General.

Election of member to board by oral motion duly passed by municipal council is valid. Steward v. Rust, 221 Ark. 286, 252 S.W.2d 816 (1952).

Jurisdiction.

Courts of equity will not interfere by injunction to determine questions concerning the appointment or election of public officers or their title to office. Davis v. Wilson, 183 Ark. 271, 35 S.W.2d 1020 (1931).

Record.

Appointment to fill a vacancy must be proved by record itself, in the absence of proof that the record has been lost or destroyed. Hill v. Rector, 161 Ark. 574, 256 S.W. 848 (1923).

Voting.

A motion and a second are not required for a valid city council vote. O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 293 Ark. 19, 732 S.W.2d 146 (1987).

14-42-106. Oath and bond required.

  1. All officers elected or appointed in any municipal corporation shall take the oath or affirmation prescribed for officers by the Arkansas Constitution.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(2) of this section, the officers shall take their oaths before:
      1. The Secretary of State or his or her official designee;
      2. A justice or judge;
      3. A judge of the county court;
      4. A clerk of the:
        1. County court;
        2. Circuit court; or
        3. City of the first class;
      5. A recorder of:
        1. A city of the second class; or
        2. An incorporated town; or
      6. A justice of the peace.
    2. The council members also may take their oaths before the mayor of the municipality.
  2. The council members of a municipal corporation may require from the officers, as they think proper, a bond with good and sufficient security and with a proper penalty for the faithful discharge of their office and duty.
  3. The council members shall have the power to declare the office of any elected or appointed person vacant who shall fail to take the oath of office or give the bond required in this section within ten (10) days of the first day of January after his or her election or within ten (10) days after he or she has been notified of his or her appointment. In such case, the council members shall proceed to appoint as in other cases of vacancy.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 73, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7517; Pope's Dig., § 9577; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-904; Acts 1999, No. 650, § 1; 2007, No. 601, § 1; 2017, No. 138, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 10.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 138 rewrote (b)(1).

The 2017 amendment by No. 879 substituted “council members” for “alderman” in (b)(2); substituted “council members” for “alderman or council” in (c); and substituted “members” for “or aldermen” twice in (d).

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Oath of office prescribed by Constitution, Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 20.

Case Notes

Bond.

Official bond containing exact requirements of statute under which it is executed, followed by other provisions not required or recognized by statute, is a statutory bond, and its provisions not in accord with the statute should be treated as surplusage. Jones v. Hadfield, 192 Ark. 224, 96 S.W.2d 959 (1936), cert. denied, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Jones, 300 U.S. 667 (1937).

Striking out of statutory bond, so intended by the parties, a conflicting clause incorporated therein contrary to statute, was held not to infringe upon the rights of the parties to contract. Jones v. Hadfield, 192 Ark. 224, 96 S.W.2d 959 (1936), cert. denied, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Jones, 300 U.S. 667 (1937).

Surety company executing municipal officer's bond is charged with knowledge at the time of the execution of the bond of what the law requires. Jones v. Hadfield, 192 Ark. 224, 96 S.W.2d 959 (1936), cert. denied, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Jones, 300 U.S. 667 (1937).

Cited: Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948).

14-42-107. Interest in offices or contracts prohibited.

    1. A council member or elected official of a municipal corporation, during the term for which he or she has been elected or one (1) year thereafter, shall not be appointed to any municipal office that was created or the emoluments of which have been increased during the time for which he or she has been elected except to fill a vacancy in the office of mayor, council member, clerk, clerk-treasurer, recorder, or recorder-treasurer.
    2. A council member shall not be appointed to any municipal office, except in cases provided for in this subtitle, during the time for which he or she may have been elected.
    1. A council member, official, or municipal employee shall not be interested, directly or indirectly, in the profits of any contract for furnishing supplies, equipment, or services to the municipality unless the governing body of the city has enacted an ordinance specifically permitting council members, officials, or municipal employees to conduct business with the city and prescribing the extent of this authority.
    2. The prohibition prescribed in this subsection does not apply to contracts for furnishing supplies, equipment, or services to be performed for a municipality by a corporation in which no council member, official, or municipal employee holds any executive or managerial office or by a corporation in which a controlling interest is held by stockholders who are not council members.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 86, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7520; Pope's Dig., § 9580; Acts 1963, No. 182, § 1; 1981, No. 485, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-909; Acts 2003, No. 1299, § 1; 2009, No. 403, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 11.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “except to fill a vacancy in the office of mayor, alderman, clerk, clerk-treasurer, recorder, or recorder-treasurer” in (a)(1).

The 2017 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “A council member” for “No alderman, member of any council”, inserted “not” following “shall”, and substituted “council member” for “alderman”; substituted “A council member shall not” for “No alderman or council member shall” in (a)(2); in (b)(1), substituted “A council” for “No alderman, council”, and deleted “alderman” following “permitting”; and in (b)(2), substituted “does not” for “shall not”, deleted “alderman” following “which no”, and deleted “alderman or” following “are not”.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Contractual and Quasi-Contractual Liability of Arkansas Local Government Units, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 292.

Official misconduct under the Arkansas Criminal Code, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 160.

Case Notes

Purpose.

By enacting this section, the General Assembly has made an expression of public policy to the effect that aldermen or members of a municipal council are prohibited from entering into contracts with themselves on behalf of the municipality for the purchase of “materials” or for “work or services to be performed for the corporation.” Price v. Edmonds, 232 Ark. 381, 337 S.W.2d 658 (1960).

Common Law.

Common-law rule prohibited municipal officers from self-dealing in regard to the sale of materials as well as in contracts or jobs for work or services. Contracts for materials were held not prohibited by this section, but there could be no reason for invoking a maxim to give validity to a contract void at common law as against public policy simply because it did not fall within the prohibitions of the statute. Price v. Edmonds, 232 Ark. 381, 337 S.W.2d 658 (1960) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

Contracts.

An ordinance leasing municipal utility plant to the mayor and aldermen of the city is void. Rogers v. Sangster, 180 Ark. 907, 23 S.W.2d 613 (1930).

Corporate Interests.

Ratification by municipal council of a contract between the municipality and a corporation in which members of the council were stock holders was held prohibited. Gantt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 189 Ark. 449, 74 S.W.2d 232 (1934) (decision prior to 1963 amendment).

Municipal Offices.

Mayor could not act as manager of municipal system and draw a salary as such while, at the same time, occupying the office of mayor, as such a double role is inconsistent and compatible. Davis v. Doyle, 230 Ark. 421, 323 S.W.2d 202 (1959).

Where the mayor of a city also held a position as bookkeeper for the city, the latter position constituted a prohibited interest in the profits of a contract for the furnishing of services. Thompson v. Roberts, 333 Ark. 544, 970 S.W.2d 239 (1998).

14-42-108. Prohibited actions by municipal officials or employees — Penalty.

    1. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of any municipal corporation of this state to receive or accept any water, gas, electric current, or other article or service from the municipal corporation, or any public utility operating therein, without paying for it at the same rate and in the same manner that the general public in the municipal corporation pays therefor.
      1. This section shall not affect rights to free or other special services given to certain municipal officials and employees under the terms of franchises in effect with public utilities in this state.
      2. This section shall not apply to any city official or employee of any municipal corporation of this state as to free streetcar transportation.
    1. It shall be unlawful for any city official or employee of any municipal corporation in this state to furnish or give to any person, concerns, or corporations any property belonging to the municipal corporation, or service from any public utility owned or operated by the municipal corporation, unless payment is made therefor to the municipal corporation at the usual and regular rates, and in the usual manner, except as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
    2. The waterworks commission of cities of the first class shall be authorized to make donations of money from the revenue of municipal waterworks systems to the local United Way campaign or other citywide nonsectarian, incorporated charitable organizations.
    1. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250).
    2. Conviction shall ipso facto remove the official or employee from the municipal office or position held by him or her and shall render him or her ineligible to thereafter hold any office or position under, or in connection with, the municipal corporation.

History. Acts 1919, No. 230, §§ 1-3; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7522-7524; Pope's Dig., §§ 9582-9584; Acts 1941, No. 288, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-916 — 19-918.

Cross References. Penalty provided for in this section not applicable to commissioners making donations to local United Way campaigns, § 14-234-307.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Official misconduct under the Arkansas Criminal Code, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 160.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws; the coupling of the grant of power to a municipal officer with a provision of ineligibility to hold office if that power is abused is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Allen v. State, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997), review or rehearing denied, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997), review or rehearing denied, Allen v. Arkansas, 327 Ark. 366A (1997).

Applicability.

In prosecution for drunken driving this section had no applicability where defendant, requested to have the municipality that was prosecuting him turn over a perchlorate tube which the police had used in making a blood-alcohol test. City of Rogers v. Municipal Court, 259 Ark. 43, 531 S.W.2d 257 (1976).

United Way.

The 1941 amendment of this section was held ineffective to authorize municipality to make a binding subscription to Community Chest (now United Way) payable out of waterworks revenues where this fund was pledged prior to enactment of the amendment for payment of revenue bonds under trust indenture, since payment of the subscription would be a diversion of the security and an impairment of the obligation, the General Assembly was without power to authorize the impairment of the contract, and the fact that revenue is amply sufficient to pay all obligations was held immaterial. City of Little Rock v. Community Chest, 204 Ark. 562, 163 S.W.2d 522 (1942).

Municipality had authority under this section, as amended in 1941, to subscribe to Community Chest (now United Way), there being funds in the municipal treasury sufficient for that purpose. Neel v. City of Little Rock, 204 Ark. 568, 163 S.W.2d 525 (1942).

Violation Found.

Evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict against the mayor for receiving sewer services for his store without paying at the same rate and in the same manner as the general public. Allen v. State, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997), review or rehearing denied, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997), review or rehearing denied, Allen v. Arkansas, 327 Ark. 366A (1997).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction against the mayor for adjusting bills of persons using water and sewer services so that they were not paying at the regular rates. Allen v. State, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997), review or rehearing denied, 327 Ark. 350, 939 S.W.2d 270 (1997), review or rehearing denied, Allen v. Arkansas, 327 Ark. 366A (1997).

14-42-109. Removal of elective or appointed officers.

      1. If the mayor, member of the city council, or any other elective officer of any city of the first class or second class or incorporated town in this state shall wilfully and knowingly fail, refuse, or neglect to execute, or cause to be executed, any of the laws or ordinances within their jurisdiction, they shall be deemed guilty of nonfeasance in office.
        1. It shall be the duty of the circuit court of any county within which any officer may be commissioned and acting, upon indictment charging any such officer with nonfeasance in office, to hear and determine the charges.
        2. If, upon hearing, the charges are proved to be true, the court shall enter a judgment of record removing the guilty officer from office.
    1. The council of any city or incorporated town may provide, by proper ordinance, for the removal of any appointive officer upon a majority vote of the council.
    1. Upon the entering of judgment as provided in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the office of mayor shall become vacant.
      1. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the circuit court to immediately make out and deliver to the Governor a true and certified copy of the judgment.
      2. Thereupon, it shall be the duty of the Governor to at once appoint and commission a mayor for the city or town to fill the vacancy until his or her successor is elected at the next regular election and qualified.
  1. Any mayor so removed from office shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. However, no appeal shall have the effect of suspending the judgment of removal of the circuit court. If the judgment is reversed, it shall have the effect of reinstating the officer to his or her office.

History. Acts 1895, No. 54, §§ 1-4, p. 69; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7525-7527; Acts 1929, No. 115, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 9585-9587; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-919 — 19-921; Acts 2017, No. 260, § 5.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(B)(2) provided:“District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”

Amendments. The 2017 amendment deleted “or police judge” following “mayor” throughout the section.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

An ordinance limiting the city attorney's salary to $1.00 per annum when in fact the city attorney was uncontested in his bid for the election, passed simultaneously with an ordinance removing the city attorney from office on the eve of the election, was punitive in that it intended to constructively bar him from assuming the position to which he was duly elected by the people; accordingly, the first ordinance and its implementing resolution were unconstitutional as bills of attainder. Crain v. Mountain Home, 611 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1979).

Hearing and Determination.

A writ of prohibition would not lie to a circuit court to prohibit a circuit judge from proceeding to try the mayor of a city for nonfeasance in office without a jury; such an action of the circuit judge, if erroneous, was reversible only on appeal. McClendon v. Wood, 125 Ark. 155, 188 S.W. 6 (1916).

Nonfeasance.

The enforcement of the laws rests on the mayor, police judge, and other elective officials. Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949).

Removal.

The actions of a municipal council in impeaching a municipal judge are judicial in their nature, and where the accused has been granted a public hearing and has been represented by council, it is proper for the council to retire and consider their verdict in secret. Faucette v. Gerlach, 132 Ark. 58, 200 S.W. 279 (1918).

Cited: Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

14-42-110. Appointment and removal of department heads.

    1. Mayors in cities of the first class and second class and incorporated towns shall have the power to appoint and remove all department heads, including city and town marshals when an ordinance has been passed making city and town marshals appointed, unless the city or town council shall vote by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the council to override the mayor's action.
    2. Provided, however, that in cities of the first class and second class with civil service commissions, the governing body of the city may delegate by ordinance the authority to appoint and remove the heads of the police and fire departments to the city's civil service commission.
  1. City managers in cities having a city manager form of government shall have the power to appoint and remove all department heads. In cities with a city manager form of government and with civil service commissions, the civil service commission shall have the power to override the city manager's appointment or removal of the police or fire chief by a majority vote of the total membership of the commission.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to department heads not under the control of the governing body of the city and shall not apply to cities having a city administrator form of government.

History. Acts 1981, No. 795, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1013.1; Acts 1995, No. 534, § 1; 1995, No. 914, § 1.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The 1995 amendment to this section applies to persons terminated after its amendment, including those hired before its amendment. Sykes v. City of Gentry, 114 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1997).

Interest in Employment.

Although police chief was hired before 1995, his property interest in his position was eliminated in 1995 when the General Assembly amended this section. Sykes v. City of Gentry, 114 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1997).

Prior to the amendment of this section in 1995, §§ 14-43-504(e)(2) and former § 14-43-505 created a property interest for a police chief in the position. Sykes v. City of Gentry, 114 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1997).

Police chief did not show a due process violation when the chief was summarily terminated by the mayor because this section did not give the chief a right to a hearing before city council. Sullivan v. Coney, 2013 Ark. 222, 427 S.W.3d 682 (2013).

Cited: Weaver v. Collins, 2010 Ark. App. 707, 379 S.W.3d 582 (2010).

14-42-111. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning mayor of city of the second class or incorporated town unable to perform duties, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 753, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1883, No. 120, § 1, p. 297; C. & M. Dig., § 7673; Pope's Dig., § 9795; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-910.

14-42-112. Municipal attorneys for cities of the second class or incorporated towns.

    1. All cities of the second class and incorporated towns within the State of Arkansas may elect a municipal attorney at the time of the election of other officers of these cities of the second class and incorporated towns, if it is not established by ordinance that the office of the city attorney will be appointed.
      1. All municipal attorneys elected under the provisions of this section shall be regularly licensed attorneys of this state.
      2. When no attorney resides within the limits of the city or town or when no resident attorney has been elected as municipal attorney, the mayor and city or town council may appoint any regularly licensed attorney of this state to serve as the municipal attorney.
  1. Any municipal attorney elected or appointed under the provisions of this section shall subscribe to the oath of office as all other officers of these cities or towns.
  2. All municipal attorneys are authorized to file information for the arrest of any person for the violation of any ordinance of the city or town or of the laws of this state which are violated within the limits of the city or town.
    1. The duties of the municipal attorney shall be to represent the city or town in all actions, both civil and criminal.
      1. It shall be the duty of the municipal attorney to:
        1. Advise with all city or town officials at any time needed;
        2. Prepare all legal papers, blank forms, etc.;
        3. File a complete report of his or her work with the city or town council at the end of each year; and
        4. If requested to do so, furnish all information in his or her possession to the state courts for the prosecution of cases in the state courts.
      2. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the city or town council from prescribing other duties, and they are authorized to prescribe such other duties as they desire which shall be done by proper ordinance by the council.
  3. The term of office for an elected municipal attorney shall be four (4) years.

History. Acts 1923, No. 153, §§ 1-5; Pope's Dig., §§ 9752-9756; Acts 1975, No. 161, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-911 — 19-915; Acts 1993, No. 1306, § 8; 1995, No. 1256, § 20; 1995 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 13, § 4; 1997, No. 645, § 1; 2005, No. 133, § 1.

Cross References. Attorney of cities of the second class and towns, § 14-88-406.

Election of attorney in cities of the first class, § 14-43-313.

Retirement benefits for city attorneys in cities of the first and second class, § 24-12-120.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section is inapplicable to city attorney of Hot Springs. Campbell v. City of Hot Springs, 232 Ark. 878, 341 S.W.2d 225 (1960).

Fees.

Attorney who represented city in rate case could not recover fees out of refund decreed by Supreme Court, since there was no agreement by customers of utility providing for deduction of attorney fee from refund. City of Ft. Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 220 Ark. 70, 247 S.W.2d 474 (1952).

Vacancy.

This section does not require second-class cities to fill a vacancy in the city attorney's office in any particular manner. Hopper v. Garner, 328 Ark. 516, 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997).

Cited: Hagen v. State, 315 Ark. 20, 864 S.W.2d 856 (1993).

14-42-113. Salaries of officials — Salary withheld if professional license or registration suspended — Definition.

    1. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the salary of an official of a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town may be increased during the term for which the official has been elected or appointed and may be decreased during the term only if requested by the official.
    2. When any city official whose salary is decreased under subdivision (a)(1) of this section leaves office before the expiration of his or her term, his or her successor shall receive a salary not less than the salary for the office immediately before the salary was decreased under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
    1. The salary of an elected official of a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town shall be withheld if:
      1. The elected official is required to hold a professional license or registration as a qualification of his or her position; and
      2. The elected official's professional license or registration is suspended.
    2. Upon suspending the professional license or registration of an elected official of a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town, the agency, board, commission, or other authority that issues the professional license or registration at issue shall notify in writing the appropriate municipality or incorporated town.
    3. Upon learning that an elected official's required professional license or registration has been suspended, the governing body of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town may cease paying the elected official's salary from the date of suspension.
      1. Upon restoration of the elected official's professional license or registration, the elected official of a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town may petition the governing body of the city or town for a resumption of salary, and the governing body shall initiate measures to ensure that the elected official's salary is resumed.
      2. The elected official whose salary is resumed under subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this section shall not receive his or her salary for the period that the salary was withheld.
      1. As used in this subsection, “salary” means the compensation paid to an elected official of a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town for service in that position.
      2. “Salary” includes without limitation any benefits provided to the elected official by virtue of his or her position, including without limitation:
        1. Health insurance;
        2. Retirement contributions; and
        3. Retirement benefits.
    1. The salary for a municipal office may be lowered if the municipal office is vacant.
    2. As used in this subsection, “municipal office” means:
      1. Treasurer;
      2. Clerk;
      3. Recorder;
      4. Clerk-treasurer; and
      5. Recorder-treasurer.

History. Acts 1969, No. 249, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-907.1; Acts 2001, No. 563, § 1; 2011, No. 199, § 1; 2013, No. 523, § 1; 2017, No. 260, § 6; 2019, No. 336, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1); inserted the exception in (a)(1); redesignated former (b) as present (a)(2); and added present (b).

The 2013 amendment, in (a)(2), substituted “subdivision (a)(1)” for “subsection (a)(1)” and “before” for “prior to”; and rewrote (b)(3) and (b)(4)(A).

The 2017 amendment substituted “official whose salary is resumed” for “official who receives an order for the resumption of his or her salary” in (b)(4)(B).

The 2019 amendment substituted “subsections (b) and (c)” for “subsection (b)” in (a)(1); in (a)(2), substituted “decreased under subdivision (a)(1)” for “decreased pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)” and substituted “before the salary was decreased under subdivision (a)(1)” for “before its being decreased pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)”; substituted “the elected official of a city” for “an elected official of a city” in (b)(4)(A); substituted “The elected official” for “An elected official” in (b)(4)(B); added (c); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Cited: Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

14-42-114. Social security for municipal employees.

Any municipality incorporated under the laws of the State of Arkansas shall have the power, by a majority vote of its city council or legislative body, to provide for establishing and maintaining a system of social security or old age pensions, or both, for its employees that are not covered by social security or old age pension legislation under such terms and conditions as the city council or legislative body may enact.

History. Acts 1945, No. 10, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-908.

Cross References. Workers' compensation coverage, § 14-60-101 et seq.

14-42-115. Volunteer firefighter or volunteer police officer on governing body.

    1. It is lawful for a volunteer firefighter or a volunteer police officer in any city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town in this state to seek election to, and if elected, to serve as a member of the city council or other governing body of the city or town.
    2. This service shall not be deemed a conflict of interest and shall not be prohibited by the civil service regulations of any city or town.
  1. A person may serve and receive compensation as a member of the governing body of any city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town and simultaneously serve as a volunteer firefighter or a volunteer police officer and receive compensation as a firefighter or a police officer.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply after August 13, 1993, to any city having a city administrator form of government.

History. Acts 1981, No. 124, § 1; 1981, No. 440, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-943, 19-944; Acts 1993, No. 476, § 1; 2003, No. 1048, § 1.

14-42-116. Retirement systems and benefits.

No city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town, regardless of the form of government, shall hereafter establish any retirement benefit system or plan for members of the governing body of the city or town except cities of the first class, cities of the second class, or incorporated towns which had established such system or plan prior to July 3, 1989. However, all systems and plans in existence on July 3, 1989, may continue.

History. Acts 1989, No. 308, § 1.

14-42-117. Election of retirement benefits.

Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, any employee of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town, and any elected official of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town who is entitled by an act of the General Assembly to retirement benefits for service as such an employee or elected official and who also participates in another retirement plan established by the city for the same period of service shall be entitled to only one (1) retirement benefit for the same period of service to the municipality, provided that no elected official may withdraw in a lump sum or roll over into a private account any accumulated benefits established by the municipality for which the official was employed and at the same time receive a pension as provided for under an act of the General Assembly, and the employee or elected official may choose whether to receive the retirement benefit provided by law or provided by the plan offered by the municipality.

History. Acts 1989, No. 723, § 1; 1991, No. 604, § 1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

There was no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the application of § 14-42-117 to a man whose right to retirement benefits did not vest prior to the enactment of the statute. Robinson v. Taylor, 342 Ark. 459, 29 S.W.3d 691 (2000).

Construction With Other Laws.

A mayor's right to retirement benefits did not vest until she completed 10 years of service to the city, which occurred after the enactment of this section, and, therefore she forfeited her right to receive the retirement benefit provided by § 24-12-123 when she elected to receive a lump-sum payment from a plan offered by the city. Robinson v. Taylor, 342 Ark. 459, 29 S.W.3d 691 (2000).

14-42-118. Removal of municipal officer for federal offense.

  1. Upon petition by any citizen of the municipality or the prosecuting attorney to the circuit court having jurisdiction, any municipal officer who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to or is found guilty of a federal offense involving embezzlement of public funds, bribery, forgery, or other infamous crime or criminal conduct amounting to a felony, malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office shall be removed from office.
  2. The circuit clerk shall transmit to the Governor and city clerk of the municipality a certified transcript of the removal judgment of the court.
  3. The vacancy shall be filled as may be prescribed by law at the time the vacancy occurs.

History. Acts 2005, No. 163, § 1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 373.

14-42-119. Removal of certain elected municipal officials.

  1. A person who holds an elected office in a municipality for a term of four (4) years in a mayor-council form of government is subject to removal from the office by the electors qualified to vote for a successor of the incumbent.
  2. The procedure for the removal of a person holding the office is as follows:
      1. When a petition requesting the removal of an officer under this section, signed by a number of qualified electors equal to twenty-five percent (25%), is filed with the county clerk, the county clerk shall determine the sufficiency of the petition within ten (10) days from the date of the filing.
      2. A petition shall be filed by 12:00 noon not more than one hundred five (105) days nor less than ninety-one (91) days before the next general election following the election at which the officer was elected;
    1. If the petition is deemed sufficient, the county clerk shall certify it to the county board of election commissioners;
    2. At the election, the question shall be submitted to the qualified electors in substantially the following form:
        1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the question at the election vote for the removal of the officer, a vacancy shall exist in the office.
        2. The officer shall vacate the office immediately upon certification of the election.
      1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the question at the election vote against the removal of the officer, the officer shall continue to serve during the term for which he or she was elected.

“FOR the removal of (name of officer) from the office of (name of office)

AGAINST the removal of (name of officer) from the office of (name of office) [ ]”; and

History. Acts 2009, No. 362, § 1; 2011, No. 1028, § 1; 2011, No. 1185, § 17.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 1028 substituted “county clerk” for “city clerk” in (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2); and added (b)(4)(A)(ii).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1185, in (b)(1)(B), substituted “one hundred five (105)” for “ninety (90)” and “ninety-one (91)” for “seventy (70).”

14-42-120. Monthly, bimonthly, biweekly, weekly, and hourly salaries for municipal employees.

      1. Except for those municipalities that operate principally on a scholastic year, or on a part-time basis, or where salaries or personal services are specifically established for a period less than one (1) year, all salaries established by the General Assembly or the governing body of the municipality shall be considered to be a maximum amount to be paid for a twelve-month payroll period.
      2. A greater amount than that established for the maximum annual salary of any municipal official or employee shall not be paid to the employee during any twelve-month payroll period, nor shall more than one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual salary be paid to an employee during a calendar month unless otherwise authorized.
    1. The limitations set out in this section may be converted to biweekly or weekly increments of one-twenty-sixth (1/26) or one-fifty-second (1/52) of the maximum annual salary.
    2. For complying with federal requirements, upon approval of the clerk-recorder or treasurer of the municipality, the maximum annual salaries may be converted to hourly rates of pay for positions established on the basis of twelve (12) months or less if authorized by law.
  1. The remuneration paid to an employee of the municipality may exceed the maximum annual salary as authorized by the General Assembly or governing body of the municipality as follows, and the following shall not be construed as payment for services or as salary as contemplated by Arkansas Constitution, Article 16, § 4:
    1. Overtime payments as authorized by law;
    2. Payment of a lump sum to a terminating employee, to include lump-sum payments of sick leave balances upon retirement as provided by law;
    3. Payment for overlapping pay periods at the end of a fiscal year as defined or authorized by law;
    4. Payment for the biweekly twenty-seven (27) pay periods; and
    5. Payments for incentive, certificate, holiday, or working out of classification.

History. Acts 2013, No. 572, § 2.

14-42-121. Allowance for meal tips.

  1. If authorized by the governing body of the municipality, reimbursements to municipal employees for the purchase of meals and meal tips shall be:
    1. Based on the actual expense incurred; or
      1. Made on a per diem basis.
      2. A per diem reimbursement under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section shall be made under an accountable plan as defined by Internal Revenue Service regulations as in existence on January 1, 2017.
  2. Reimbursement for meal tips under subsection (a) of this section shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the purchase amount of the meal.

History. Acts 2017, No. 919, § 1.

14-42-122. City attorney in mayor-council cities of fewer than 10,000.

    1. If not established by ordinance that the office of the city attorney will be appointed, the qualified voters of cities of the first class having a population of fewer than ten thousand (10,000) and having the mayor-council form of government shall elect a city attorney for four (4) years on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 2022 and every four (4) years thereafter.
    2. An incumbent city attorney shall continue in office until his or her successor is elected and qualified.
    1. If no attorney residing in the city is elected as city attorney, the city council may appoint a resident attorney to fill the office for the remainder of the unfilled term.
      1. If no attorney of the city serves as city attorney by election or appointment or if no attorney resides within the municipal boundaries of the city, then upon a two-thirds vote the city council may contract with any licensed attorney of this state or the licensed attorney's law firm to serve as legal advisor, counselor, or prosecutor.
      2. The duties of an attorney under contract shall be prescribed by ordinance.

History. Acts 2019, No. 609, § 1.

14-42-123. Uniform catastrophic leave program — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “municipality” means a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town.
    1. A municipality may develop, implement, and maintain a catastrophic leave program by ordinance.
    2. A municipal employee may irrevocably donate his or her accrued leave to a catastrophic leave program at the option of the municipal employee.
    3. A municipality may create a “presumptive illness list” of illnesses that are presumed to qualify for catastrophic leave, if the municipality creates the list based on peer-reviewed scientific data.
  2. Catastrophic leave with pay may be granted to a municipal employee if the municipal employee is unable to perform his or her duties due to a catastrophic illness and is, or is reasonably expected to be, on leave without pay as a result of the need for catastrophic leave.
  3. A municipal employee may be eligible for catastrophic leave under this section if the municipal employee:
    1. Works full time;
    2. Has been employed by the municipality for the immediately preceding five (5) consecutive years or more in a full-time position, unless the municipality determines a shorter term of years is appropriate;
    3. Has exhausted all available leave time;
      1. An acceptable medical certificate from a physician supporting the continuing absence is on file and includes without limitation an approximate date of return.
      2. A municipality may require a municipal employee to receive more than one (1) physician opinion; and
    4. Has not been disciplined or counseled for an abuse of leave during the immediately preceding five (5) years.
  4. Unless the municipality determines otherwise, catastrophic leave is not available to a municipal employee under this section if the municipal employee has applied for catastrophic leave as a result of an illness or injury that is covered by workers' compensation benefits under applicable law.
  5. Catastrophic leave under this section shall:
    1. Run concurrently with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3;
    2. Be donated and taken in one-hour increments and donated or applied for on approved forms;
    3. Not be awarded retroactively; and
    4. Be awarded only if catastrophic leave is available in the municipality's catastrophic leave program.

History. Acts 2019, No. 883, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Elections

Cross References. Conduct of elections, § 7-5-301 et seq.

Elections in cities of the first class, §§ 14-43-201 et seq. and 14-43-301 et seq.

Elections in incorporated towns, §§ 14-45-102, 14-45-104, 14-45-108.

Elections in cities of the second class, §§ 14-44-103, 14-44-105, 14-44-111, 14-44-115.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 2001, No. 1789, § 12: July 1, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution becomes effective on July 1, 2001; that this implements the nonpartisan election of justices and judges as mandated by Amendment 80; and that to effectively implement Amendment 80, this act should become effective on July 1, 2001. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2001.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 1185, § 21: Oct. 2, 2011.

Acts 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 8: May 29, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that independent candidates may circulate petitions for candidacy for ninety (90) days before the deadline for filing as a candidate for office; and that without an emergency clause, the effective date of this act will cause confusion regarding the rights and interests of independent candidates and the time period for circulating petitions for candidacy. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2019, No. 597, § 10: July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is a need for uniform candidate filing and petition circulation periods; that if there is a delay in implementation, some candidate filing and petition circulation periods may be disrupted by the change in the middle of a candidate's campaign; and that this act should become effective before candidates begin circulating petitions and filing for candidacy in the 2019 November annual school elections. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

14-42-201. Election of municipal officers generally.

  1. The general election for the election of municipal officials in all cities and incorporated towns shall be held on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November.
  2. All municipal officials of the cities and towns of the State of Arkansas shall take office January 1 of the year following their election.
    1. In addition to other residency requirements imposed by state law for municipal office holders, candidates for the positions of mayor, clerk, recorder, or treasurer must reside within the corporate municipal limits at the time they file as candidates and must continue to reside within the corporate limits to retain elective office.
    2. In cities of the first class and cities of the second class, candidates for the position of council member shall reside within the corporate limits and their respective wards at the time they file as candidates for council member and when holding that office.

History. Acts 1949, No. 307, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-902.1 — 19-902.3; Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1; 1995, No. 671, § 1; 1999, No. 642, § 1; 2001, No. 1833, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 12.

Publisher's Notes. The former last part of subsection (c) provided that all officials elected at general municipal elections then serving four-year terms should continue in office until their successors are elected at the first general election following the expiration of their terms and assume the offices on January 1 of the year after the date of the general election, to be elected every four years thereafter.

Subsection (d) was redesignated as (c) at the direction of the Arkansas Code Revision Commission. Former subsection (c) was repealed prior to the 2001 amendment.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (c)(2), substituted “council member” for “alderman” twice.

Case Notes

Residency Requirements.

Where a mayor-elect owned a home outside of the city limits, but rented a residence within the city limits, the circuit court did not clearly err when it found that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that the mayor-elect did not reside within the city limits, as required under subdivision (c)(1) of this section. For the purposes of subsection (c)(1), the legislature intended for “reside” to mean live or be physically present. State v. Jernigan, 2011 Ark. 487, 385 S.W.3d 776 (2011).

In determining the residency of voters and public officials, the Supreme Court of Arkansas considers (1) whether a person is physically present in a particular location, or (2) whether a person intends to establish a domicile in a particular location. In other words, if a candidate is unable to establish residency by showing physical presence in the requisite location, the court allows a candidate to establish residency by showing domiciliary intent in the requisite location. State v. Jernigan, 2011 Ark. 487, 385 S.W.3d 776 (2011).

Cited: Whittaker v. Carter, 238 Ark. 1074, 386 S.W.2d 498 (1965).

14-42-202. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning election of governing boards of certain cities, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 808, §§ 1-5; 1983, No. 647, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-902.5 — 19-902.9; Acts 1987, No. 840, § 1; 1991, No. 786, § 13.

14-42-203. Special elections of city mayors.

  1. Special elections of mayors of cities of the first class and cities of the second class shall be held at such time and place as the council directs in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq.
  2. In all cities there shall be a place appointed in each ward for holding elections, except in cities of the second class electing their council members citywide, where there may be one (1) public place only for holding elections.
  3. Any person who, at the time of the election of municipal officers, is a qualified elector and registered to vote in the city precinct where he or she resides shall be deemed a qualified elector.
  4. All elections shall be held and conducted in the manner prescribed by law for holding state and county elections, so far as the laws may be applicable.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 71, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7515; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9574; Acts 1959, No. 114, § 1; 1985, No. 422, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-902; Acts 1997, No. 645, § 2; 2005, No. 2145, § 26; 2007, No. 1049, § 44; 2009, No. 1480, § 62; 2017, No. 879, § 13.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in (a).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (b).

Case Notes

Qualified Electors.

Where alderman had moved to another state and voted there, even though he claimed he had never changed his residence from Arkansas, there was substantial evidence to support judgment that he was ineligible as alderman because he was not a qualified elector of the city. Charisse v. Eldred, 252 Ark. 101, 477 S.W.2d 480 (1972) (decision prior to 1985 amendment).

Cited: Whittaker v. Carter, 238 Ark. 1074, 386 S.W.2d 498 (1965); Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

14-42-204. Election returns generally.

  1. The returns of all municipal corporations shall be made to the county board of election commissioners of the county in which the corporation is situated and shall be opened by them within three (3) days after their receipt.
    1. The election board shall count the vote as it appears from the pollbooks, make an abstract thereof, and forward it to the mayor.
    2. In like manner and without delay, the board shall furnish to each candidate elected a certificate of election or leave it at his or her usual place of abode.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 72, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7516; Pope's Dig., § 9576; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-903.

14-42-205. Elections in municipalities situated in different counties.

  1. In all municipal elections in municipalities situated in two (2) or more counties, a candidate for municipal office shall file for office with the county clerk of the county with the highest population of the municipality based upon the most recent city federal census. The county clerk of the county with the highest population shall certify the municipal candidate to the other counties.
  2. An independent candidate shall file a nominating petition with the county clerk with the highest population in the municipality. The county clerk of the county with the highest population in the municipality shall verify the signatures on a nominating petition from that county and, if necessary to verify signatures from a different county, shall forward the petition to the appropriate county clerk. That county clerk shall return the petition to the county clerk of the county with the highest population in the municipality within five (5) days of receipt. The county clerk of the county with the highest population in the municipality shall certify the sufficiency of the petition and, in order for the name of the candidate to be printed on all ballots, shall file the certification with each county board of election commissioners where the municipal election will be held.
  3. In all municipal elections in municipalities situated in two (2) or more counties, the county board of election commissioners in the county in which fewer residents of the municipality reside shall certify the election results in municipal offices and issues in that portion of the municipality located in such county to the election board of the county in which the greater number of residents of the municipality reside.
  4. The county board of election commissioners in which the greater population of the municipality resides shall tabulate the votes cast on municipal offices and issues and shall certify the election results to the mayor of the municipality as provided in § 14-42-204.

History. Acts 1969, No. 450, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-903.1; Acts 1997, No. 729, § 1.

14-42-206. Municipal elections — Nominating petitions.

    1. The city or town council of any city or town with the mayor-council form of government, may request the county party committees of recognized political parties under the laws of the state to conduct party primaries for municipal offices for the forthcoming year by resolution passed:
      1. Before January 1 of the year of the election, if the election will occur in a year in which the preferential primary election is held in May under § 7-7-203; and
      2. No less than sixty (60) days before the party filing period begins under § 7-7-203, if the election will occur in a year in which the preferential primary election is held in March under § 7-7-203.
    2. The resolution shall remain in effect for the subsequent elections unless revoked by the city or town council.
    3. When the resolution has been adopted, the clerk or recorder shall mail a certified copy of the resolution to the chairs of the county party committees and to the chairs of the state party committees.
    4. Candidates nominated for municipal office by political primaries under this section shall be certified by the county party committees to the county board of election commissioners and shall be placed on the ballot at the general election.
    1. Any person desiring to become an independent candidate for municipal office in cities and towns with the mayor-council form of government shall file during a one-week period ending at 12:00 noon ninety (90) days before the general election with the county clerk the petition of nomination in substantially the following forms:
      1. For all candidates except council members in cities of the first class and cities of the second class:
      2. For candidates for council member elected by ward in cities of the first class and cities of the second class, the nominating petitions shall be signed only by qualified electors of the ward in the following manner:
      3. For at-large candidates for council member of a ward in cities of the first class and cities of the second class, the nominating petitions shall be signed by a qualified elector of the city in the following manner:
      1. An independent candidate for municipal office may qualify by a petition to be circulated for no longer than ninety (90) days of not fewer than ten (10) electors for incorporated towns and cities of the second class and not fewer than thirty (30) electors for cities of the first class of the ward or city in which the election is to be held.
        1. The county clerk shall determine no later than ten (10) days from filing whether the petition contains the names of a sufficient number of qualified electors and certify that no signatures are dated more than ninety (90) days before the filing of the petition.
        2. The county clerk's determination shall be made no less than seventy-five (75) days before the general election.
      2. The county clerk promptly shall notify the candidate of the result.
    2. Independent candidates for municipal office shall file a political practices pledge and an affidavit of eligibility at the time of filing their petitions.
      1. An independent candidate shall state the position, including the position number, if any, on his or her petition.
      2. When a candidate has identified the position sought on the notice of candidacy, the candidate shall not be allowed to change the position but may withdraw a notice of candidacy and file a new notice of candidacy designating a different position before the deadline for filing.
    3. The sufficiency of a petition filed under this section may be challenged in the same manner as election contests under § 7-5-801 et seq.
    4. A person who has been defeated in a party primary shall not file as an independent candidate in the general election for the office for which he or she was defeated in the party primary.
      1. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in the general election, the two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast for the office to be filled shall be the nominees for the respective offices, to be voted upon in a runoff election pursuant to § 7-5-106.
      2. In any case, except for the office of mayor, in which only one (1) candidate has filed and qualified for the office, the candidate shall be declared elected and the name of the person shall be certified as elected without the necessity of putting the person's name on the general election ballot for the office.
    1. If the office of mayor is unopposed, then the candidate for mayor shall be printed on the general election ballot and the votes for mayor shall be tabulated as in all contested races.
      1. The governing body of any city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town may enact an ordinance requiring independent candidates for municipal office to file petitions for nomination as independent candidates with the county clerk:
        1. No earlier than twenty (20) days prior to the preferential primary election; and
        2. No later than 12:00 noon on the day before the preferential primary election.
      2. The governing body may establish this filing deadline for municipal offices even if the municipal offices are all independent or otherwise nonpartisan.
      1. The ordinance shall be enacted no later than ninety (90) days prior to the filing deadline.
      2. The ordinance shall be published at least one (1) time a week for two (2) consecutive weeks immediately following adoption of the ordinance in a newspaper having a general circulation in the city.
  1. A person filing for municipal office may file for only one (1) municipal office during the municipal filing period.
  2. Nothing in this section shall repeal any law pertaining to the city administrator form of government or the city manager form of government.
  3. This section does not apply in any respect to the election of district judges.

“PETITION OF NOMINATION

We, the undersigned qualified electors of the city (town) of , Arkansas, being in number not less than ten (10) for incorporated towns and cities of the second class, and not less than thirty (30) for cities of the first class, do hereby petition that the name of be placed on the ballot for the office of (A candidate for council member in an incorporated town shall identify the position for which he or she is running) at the next election of municipal officials in 20

Printed Name:

Signature:

Street Address:

Date of Birth:

Date of Signing:

“PETITION OF NOMINATION

We, the undersigned qualified electors of Ward of the city of , Arkansas, being in number not less than ten (10) for cities of the second class, and not less than thirty (30) for cities of the first class, do hereby petition that the name of be placed on the ballot for the office of council member, Ward , position , of the next election of municipal officials in 20

Printed Name:

Signature:

Street Address:

Date of Birth:

Date of Signing: ”; and

“PETITION OF NOMINATION

We, the undersigned qualified electors of the city of , Arkansas, being in number not less than ten (10) for cities of the second class, and not less than thirty (30) for cities of the first class, do hereby petition that the name of be placed on the ballot for the office of council member, Ward , position , of the next election of municipal officials in 20

Printed Name:

Signature:

Street Address:

Date of Birth:

Date of Signing:

History. Acts 1991, No. 59, §§ 2, 3; 1991, No. 430, §§ 2, 3; 1995, No. 82, § 1; 1995, No. 665, § 1; 1997, No. 645, § 3; 1999, No. 752, § 1; 2001, No. 1789, § 8; 2003, No. 542, § 3; 2003, No. 1104, § 1; 2003, No. 1165, § 10; 2003, No. 1185, § 24; 2007, No. 1020, § 21; 2007, No. 1049, § 45; 2009, No. 1480, § 63; 2011, No. 519, § 1; 2011, No. 1185, §§ 18, 19; 2013, No. 1066, § 1; 2015, No. 4, § 4; 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 4; 2017, No. 879, § 14; 2019, No. 545, § 8; 2019, No. 597, § 8.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to § 1-2-207, subdivision (b)(1) is set out as amended by Acts 2007, No. 1049. The introductory language of Subdivision (b)(1) was also amended by Acts 2007, No. 149, to read as follows:

“(b)(1) Any person desiring to become an independent candidate for municipal office in cities and towns with the mayor-council form of government shall file not more than eighty (80) days nor less than sixty (60) days prior to the general election by 12:00 noon with the county clerk the petition of nomination in substantially the following forms:”

Acts 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 6, provided:

“(a) To ensure that independent candidates are provided the maximum number of days allowed by law to circulate petitions to qualify as an independent candidate, the provisions of this act are retroactive to August 1, 2015.

“(b) Signatures on a petition to have the name of a person placed upon the ballot as an independent candidate under § 7-7-103 collected between August 11, 2015, and the effective date of this act shall be counted if:

“(1) The signatures are not otherwise collected in violation of Arkansas law;

“(2) The signatures otherwise comply with applicable Arkansas law; and

“(3) The petition is lawfully filed.”

Acts 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 7, provided:

“(a) This act is cumulative of existing laws and shall not repeal but merely suspend any law in conflict with the act.

“(b) The provisions of this act are temporary and expire on December 31, 2016.

“(c) On and after December 31, 2016, the provisions of law suspended by this act shall be in full force and effect.

“(d) The expiration of this act shall not affect rights acquired under it or affect suits then pending.”

Publisher's Notes. Former § 14-42-206 was held unconstitutional in Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

Former § 14-42-206, concerning nominating petitions for municipal primary elections, was repealed by Acts 1991, Nos. 59 and 430, § 1. The former section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 905, §§ 1-5, 8.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote (b)(2); inserted “and an affidavit of eligibility” in (b)(3); and added (b)(4) through (b)(6).

The 2011 amendment, in (b)(1), inserted “(A candidate for alderman in an incorporated town shall identify the position for which he or she is running)” in the petition of nomination paragraph in (b)(1)(A); and deleted “incorporated towns and” following “not less than (10) for” in the petition of nomination paragraphs of (b)(1)(B) and (C).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1028, in (b)(1), inserted “(A candidate for alderman in an incorporated town shall identify the position for which he or she is running)” in the petition of nomination paragraph in (b)(1)(A); and deleted “incorporated towns and” following “not less than ten (10) for” in the petition of nomination paragraphs of (b)(1)(B) and (C).

The 2011 amendment by No. 1185 substituted “not more than one hundred two (102) nor less than eighty-one (81)” for “not more than ninety (90) nor less than seventy (70)” in (b)(1); and inserted (b)(2)(B)(ii).

The 2013 amendment inserted present (e) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

The 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.) amendment substituted “no less than sixty (60) days before the party filing period under § 7-7-203” for “before January 1 of the year of the election” in (a)(1).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council member” for “alderman” and made similar substitutions throughout (b)(1); and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment by No. 545, in the introductory language of (a)(1), deleted “by resolution passed before January 1 of the year of the election” following “government” and added “by resolution passed”; and added (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B).

The 2019 amendment by No. 597 substituted “file during a one-week period ending at 12:00 noon ninety (90) days before the general election” for “file not more than one hundred two (102) days nor less than eighty-one (81) days before the general election by 12:00 noon” in the introductory language of (b)(1); inserted “to be circulated for no longer than ninety (90) days” in (b)(2)(A); added “and certify that no signatures are dated more than ninety (90) days before the filing of the petition” in (b)(2)(B)(i); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section represents a systematic and deliberate attempt to reduce black political opportunity, and is plainly unconstitutional. Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. 1990), appeal dismissed, 498 U.S. 1129, 111 S. Ct. 1096, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1200 (1991) (decision under prior law).

Subchapter 3 — Charters for Cities of the First Class and Second Class

Effective Dates. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 11: Mar. 4, 1953.

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-42-301. Construction.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the powers of municipalities which shall continue to operate under the general laws of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1059.

14-42-302. Appointment of commission.

    1. The governing body of any city of the first or second class, upon passage of a municipal ordinance, may create a commission to frame a charter for the city.
    2. The commission shall be appointed by the governing body and shall be composed of not less than nine (9) members, who shall serve without compensation, and at least two-thirds (2/3) of whom shall not hold any other municipal office or appointment.
  1. The governing body of the municipality, if so requested by the commission, shall appropriate money to provide the reasonable expenses of the commission and for publication of the completed charter, and any separate or alternative provisions thereof.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 1; 1961, No. 431, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1051.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Home Rule for Arkansas Cities, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Goldner, A Call for Reform of Arkansas Municipal Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

14-42-303. Election on proposed charter.

    1. Any charter framed as provided in § 14-42-302 shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the municipality at any election to be held at a time determined by the charter commission, but it shall be held within one (1) year after the appointment of the commission.
    2. Any part of the charter, or any alternative provision thereof, may be submitted to be voted upon separately.
  1. The commission shall publish, not less than thirty (30) days before any election, the proposed charter and any separate parts and alternative provisions thereof.
  2. Within thirty (30) days after its approval, the county board of election commissioners shall certify a copy of the charter to the Secretary of State.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1052.

14-42-304. Amendments to charter.

  1. Amendments to any charter may be proposed by a two-thirds vote of the governing body of the municipality or by petition of ten percent (10%) of the qualified electors of the municipality.
  2. The amendment shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the municipality at a regular or special election called in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
  3. The proposed amendment shall be published at least one (1) time in some newspaper of general circulation throughout the municipality.
  4. Any amendment approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon shall become a part of the charter at the time fixed in the amendment and shall be certified to the Secretary of State.
  5. Each amendment submitted shall be confined to one (1) subject, and when more than one (1) amendment shall be submitted at the same time, they shall be so submitted as to enable the voters to vote on each amendment separately.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1054; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 27; 2007, No. 1049, § 46; 2009, No. 1480, § 64.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (b).

14-42-305. Effect of approval.

Any proposed charter which is approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, and with the additions of any such parts and as modified by any such alternative provisions as may be separately submitted and approved by those voting on any such parts and provisions, shall become the organic law of the municipality at the time fixed in the charter and shall supersede all laws affecting the organization and government of the municipality which are in conflict therewith.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1052.

14-42-306. Limitations on charters.

  1. No charter adopted pursuant to this subchapter shall be in conflict with it, nor shall it alter any civil service or pension laws in existence under the general laws of this state, any seventy-two-hour laws, vacation laws, two-platoon law for firefighters, or the Arkansas Constitution.
  2. No charter shall alter or change any statutory laws providing for the powers, duties, and manner of appointment of any airport, water, sewer, or housing authority commissions within the city.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1052.

14-42-307. Powers of municipalities.

    1. Each municipality operating under a charter shall have the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs.
    2. This grant of authority shall not be deemed to limit or restrict the powers of the General Assembly in matters of state affairs, nor shall this subchapter be construed as increasing or diminishing the powers of the state to regulate utilities not municipally owned or fix the rates thereof.
  1. The following shall be deemed to be a part of the powers conferred upon the municipalities by this subchapter:
    1. To levy, assess, and collect taxes within the limits prescribed in the charter adopted by the municipality and the limits prescribed in the Arkansas Constitution;
    2. To furnish all local public services and to acquire property therefor by condemnation or otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, subject, however, to the provisions of the general laws of the State of Arkansas, including any law requiring that the acquisition of a utility plant be approved by a municipal election. However, no property can be acquired under this subchapter by the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidence of indebtedness unless the bonds, notes, or evidence of indebtedness is secured by the credit of the city and all the property therein; and
    3. To exercise all powers conferred by the state constitution and the General Assembly generally upon municipalities not contrary to this subchapter.
  2. No municipality shall pass any laws contrary to the criminal laws of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, §§ 6, 8; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1056, 19-1058.

14-42-308. Annual budget, taxes, and rates.

  1. The governing body of each municipality operating under a charter shall prepare, approve, and publish, not less than sixty (60) days in advance of the annual municipal general election, a proposed budget of operational expenditures of the municipality for the forthcoming year, together with proposed taxes and rate or rates sufficient to provide the funds therefor, excluding the rates under any continuing levies previously authorized.
    1. The taxes and the rate or rates so proposed shall be submitted to the qualified electors at the next annual municipal general election.
      1. The proposed taxes shall be approved or disapproved in their entirety.
        1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon shall approve the taxes so proposed, then the taxes so approved shall be collected at the rate provided.
        2. In the event a majority of the qualified electors voting in the election shall disapprove the proposed taxes, then the taxes shall be collected at the last rate legally levied.
        3. One (1) council member from each ward of the city.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1055.

Cross References. Taxation, generally, § 26-73-101 et seq.

14-42-309. Election results.

  1. In all elections provided for in this subchapter, the results of the vote shall be certified immediately after the election by the county board of election commissioners to the mayor.
  2. The certified results shall become final and conclusive if they are not attacked in the courts within a period of thirty (30) days thereafter.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1057.

14-42-310. Election expenses.

The expenses of the elections provided by this subchapter shall be borne by the municipality concerned.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1053.

14-42-311. Expiration of charter.

By amendment to the charter, a date may be fixed for the expiration of the charter. On the date specified, the municipality shall cease to operate under this subchapter.

History. Acts 1953, No. 207, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1054.

Subchapter 4 — Departments of Public Safety

Cross References. Civil service for police and fire departments, § 14-51-101 et seq.

Fire departments, § 14-53-101 et seq.

Firemen's relief and pension funds, § 24-11-801 et seq.

Police departments, § 14-52-101 et seq.

Police pension and relief funds, § 24-11-301 et seq.

14-42-401 — 14-42-425. [Repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The repeal of this subchapter by Acts 2019, No. 150, supersedes the amendment of §§ 14-42-409 and 14-42-425(b) by Acts 2019, No. 315.

Acts 2019, No. 315, § 993, amended §§ 14-42-409 to read as follows: “14-42-409. Applicable regulations, rules, and laws. All applicable regulations, rules, and statutes regulating the conduct of police or fire departments or their functions shall apply to a department of public safety and its employees.”

Acts 2019, No. 315, § 994, amended § 14-42-425(b) to read as follows: “(b) All applicable regulations, rules, and statutes regulating the certification of law enforcement officers, the certification of fire departments, and the conduct of police or fire departments or their functions shall apply to a department of public safety and its employees.”

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 2019, No. 150, § 1, effective July 24, 2019. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-42-401. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-947.

14-42-402. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-948.

14-42-403. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-949; Acts 1989, No. 839, § 1.

14-42-404. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-950.

14-42-405. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-951.

14-42-406. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-952.

14-42-407. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-953.

14-42-408. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-954.

14-42-409. Acts 1985, No. 481, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-955; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 993.

14-42-410. Acts 1979, No. 659, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1060; Acts 1989, No. 262, §§ 1, 2.

14-42-411. Acts 1979, No. 659, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1061.

14-42-412. Acts 1979, No. 659, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1062.

14-42-413. Acts 1979, No. 659, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1063.

14-42-414 — 14-42-420. [Reserved.]

14-42-421. Acts 1997, No. 728, § 1.

14-42-422. Acts 1997, No. 728, § 2.

14-42-423. Acts 1997, No. 728, § 3.

14-42-424. Acts 1997, No. 728, § 4.

14-42-425. Acts 1997, No. 728, § 5; 2019, No. 315, § 994.

Chapter 43 Government of Cities of the First Class

Cross References. Mayors of cities of first class — Retirement benefits, § 24-12-123.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

[Reserved]

Subchapter 2 — Elections Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1935, No. 105, § 3: Mar. 12, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “In order that this may apply to the forthcoming municipal elections such fact is hereby declared to constitute an emergency and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect upon its approval by the governor as an emergency measure.”

14-43-201. Odd-year elections abolished.

  1. Municipal elections in 1965 and all odd years in the future are abolished.
  2. It is the purpose of this section to elect municipal officials at the regular general election for the election of state and county officials.

History. Acts 1965, No. 484, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1002.8.

Publisher's Notes. The former second sentence of this section provided that the term of any municipal judge or other official that would expire in an odd-numbered year would be extended one year until the next regular general election in an even-numbered year.

14-43-202. Write-in votes not counted.

In all general elections held in cities of the first class and second class and incorporated towns for the election of officials of these municipalities, no ballots shall be counted for any person whose name is written in thereon. Only votes cast for the regularly nominated, or otherwise qualified, candidates whose names are printed on the ballot as candidates in the election shall be counted by the judges and clerks.

History. Acts 1935, No. 105, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9575; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1001; Acts 1995, No. 179, § 1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Prohibiting voting for write-in candidates at city elections is constitutional. Davidson v. Rhea, 221 Ark. 885, 256 S.W.2d 744 (1953).

In General.

This section was not changed by 1949 enactment providing a line “for possible write-in votes” in all elections except in primary elections, since latter provision only recognized right that, at some time in the future, the General Assembly might provide for write-in votes in general elections. Davidson v. Rhea, 221 Ark. 885, 256 S.W.2d 744 (1953).

Applicability.

This section does not apply to city election where there are no “write-in” candidates. Clark v. Porter, 223 Ark. 682, 268 S.W.2d 383 (1954).

Subchapter 3 — Election of City Officials

Cross References. Elections generally, § 14-42-201 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1961, No. 430 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the office of City Clerk is the hub of city activities and requires a person of professional nature, and

“Whereas, said office of City Clerk in the cities of the first class performs a multitude of services for the city government and community, and

“Whereas, said office of City Clerk and the persons holding said office in the various cities of the first class have shown an outstanding record of efficiency, and

“Whereas, the time necessary for a person having been first elected to said office of City Clerk to fully acquaint themselves with said various duties to be performed is equal to or greater than the two (2) year term for which said person is now elected, and

“Whereas, said office of City Clerk in the various cities of the first class in the State of Arkansas has shown a tendency for reelection of the persons holding said office for many years, and

“Whereas, a four (4) year term of office is desirable and necessary for the continued efficiency in the office of City Clerk in the cities of the first class,

“Now, Therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1885, No. 67, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1893, No. 151, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1905, No. 275, § 2: became law without Governor's signature, May 6, 1905.

Acts 1943, No. 248, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1949, No. 112, § 4: approved Feb. 18, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there is a great need for clarifying the laws of this state concerning the nomination and election of aldermen in cities of the first class; and, whereas, much confusion is resulting from the lack of such legislation; and, whereas, the election of aldermen is of proper and grave concern to the wellbeing and proper administration of the municipalities of the State of Arkansas, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the inhabitants of the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 123, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1951, No. 365, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1959, No. 176, § 4: Mar. 4, 1959. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there are many municipal problems peculiar to cities of over 50,000 population, and whereas, the legislature does determine that a 4-year term for municipal officials in cities having the mayor-council form of government and also have or may hereafter have more than 50,000 population according to the Federal Census, is necessary for the proper administration of municipal affairs, and whereas, this act is needed to save unnecessary expenditures of the taxpayers' money in holding odd-year municipal elections, and this act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1965, No. 12, § 3: Feb 1, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined that matters vitally affecting the welfare of the State of Arkansas must be dealt with by the 65th General Assembly, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the peace, health and safety of the people, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1965, No. 131, § 3: Mar. 1, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined that matters vitally affecting the welfare of the State of Arkansas must be dealt with by the 65th General Assembly, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the peace, health and safety of the people, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 154, § 6: approved Mar. 3, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, this Act is necessary to establish the appointment of city attorneys in cities within the provisions of this Act and to properly protect the public peace, health, and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1973, No. 600, § 3: approved Apr. 4, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that some confusion exists concerning the election of aldermen and when incumbent aldermen continue in office when ward boundaries are reapportioned; that clarification is necessary to assure that incumbent aldermen who are not up for reelection will not have to run for office when such reapportionment permits such aldermen to remain in their old ward or part thereof; that filing deadlines for the primary elections will be held before ninety (90) days after the adjournment of this session and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1975, No. 269, § 4: approved Feb. 25, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present General Election laws fail to clearly provide that mayors of first-class cities shall be elected by a majority vote of the electors voting on said mayors in the election; that the situation now exists that the choice of a minority of the voters can elect a mayor; that legislation is necessary to provide for a special runoff election to insure that such officials are a choice of the majority of the voters and to insure a representative government, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and the Act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1977, No. 171, § 5: Feb. 15, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under present law, city attorneys in some of the larger cities are appointed by the mayor with the approval of the city council; that this procedure for selecting a city attorney in such cities is a practical one but that if an attorney so appointed elects not to serve in that position and resigns his or her position as city attorney in such city after January 1, 1977, the city attorney in that city should thereafter be elected by the qualified electors of the city; that the electors in such city should be given an opportunity to elect a city attorney at the earliest possible date after resignation of an appointed city attorney; that this Act is designed to establish a procedure for the election of a city attorney in such cities and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 1002, § 3: Apr. 17, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Second General Assembly that there is an immediate need for establishing salary guidelines for City Attorneys of cities of the first class having a population of 50,000 or more and having a mayor-council form of government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 421, § 3: Mar. 20, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient administration of municipal government that cities be given greater discretion in determining the method of selection of members of the governing bodies of such municipalities and that this Act is designed to grant such discretion and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 857, § 5: Apr. 2, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this act empowers cities in transition to the mayor-council form of government to provide that all aldermen be elected by ward; that some elections for aldermen are to be held in the near future; and that this act should become effective as soon as possible in order to conduct elections in accordance with this act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 231 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 468 et seq.

14-43-301. Type of election.

In cities of the first class, all officers to be elected shall be elected at the regular general election for municipal corporations.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 62, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7744; Pope's Dig., § 9940; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1011; Acts 1995, No. 359, § 1.

14-43-302. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning election of city officers generally, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 214, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7690; Pope's Dig., § 9819; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1002.

14-43-303. Officials in mayor-council cities of 50,000 or more.

      1. In the general election in the year 1960, and every four (4) years thereafter, cities of the first class that have a population of fifty thousand (50,000) persons or more, according to the latest federal decennial census or special federal census, and that also have the mayor-council form of government shall elect the following officials:
      2. All of these officials shall hold office for a term of four (4) years and until their successors are elected and qualified.
      1. At the general election in the year 1962 and every four (4) years thereafter, the city shall elect:
        1. One (1) city attorney;
        2. One (1) city treasurer; and
        3. One (1) council member from each ward of the city.
      2. All of these officials shall hold office for a term of four (4) years and until their successors are elected and qualified.
    1. The governing body of a city in transition to the mayor-council form of government may provide by ordinance that the mayor, city clerk, city attorney, and city treasurer shall be elected on the same date and every four (4) years thereafter.
  1. In all primaries or general elections, the candidates for the office of council member shall reside in their respective wards. However, all qualified electors residing in these cities and entitled to vote in the elections may vote at their several voting precincts for each and every candidate so to be nominated or elected.
  2. All odd-year elections for municipal officials in the cities of the first class that have a population of fifty thousand (50,000) or more persons, according to the latest federal census, and that also have the mayor-council form of government are abolished.
    1. If a city first attains a population of fifty thousand (50,000) as shown in a federal decennial census or special federal census completed after January 1, 1997, and the mayor or other elected official of the city last elected before the census was elected to a four-year term and the term will expire two (2) years before the quadrennial general election year at which city officials are elected as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the terms of such officials shall be extended for a period of two (2) years in order that the terms will coincide with the next quadrennial general election year. At that quadrennial general election and at each quadrennial general election thereafter, the mayor and such other municipal officials shall be elected to terms of four (4) years as provided in this section.
    2. The provisions of this subsection shall not affect in any way the provisions of this section that provide for staggering the terms of office of council members so that one (1) council member will be elected from each ward every two (2) years.

(i) One (1) mayor;

(ii) One (1) city clerk; and

History. Acts 1959, No. 176, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1002.2, 19-1002.3; Acts 1997, No. 707, §§ 2, 3; 2003, No. 1185, § 25; 2015, No. 233, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 15; 2019, No. 1092, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, No. 707, § 1, provided:

“It is found and determined by the General Assembly that there is some disagreement as to whether the term ‘latest federal census’ in Arkansas Code 14-43-303 means a federal decennial census or includes a special federal census and it is the purpose of this act to assure that a special federal census is included.

“It is further found and determined by the General Assembly that one or more cities in the State will first attain a population of 50,000 soon after January 1, 1997; that the mayor and some other officials of such city or cities were elected to terms of four (4) years at the 1994 general election and their terms will expire at the end of 1998; that under the current law relating to election of the mayor and some other city officials in cities having a population of 50,000 or more such officials are required to be elected to four-year terms at the quadrennial general election which means that there will be a two-year period between the normal expiration of their current terms and the quadrennial general election at which the officers are required by current law to be elected for four-year terms; that this situation may occur repeatedly in the future as new cities attain a population of 50,000; that the primary options are to either extend the terms by two (2) years in order that the terms will expire at the appropriate time to be filled at the next quadrennial general election or to reduce the four-year terms immediately before the quadrennial election year to two (2) years; that it appears more equitable to extend the four-year terms to six-year terms than to cut terms short to accommodate the election schedule prescribed in Arkansas Code 14-43-303(a). It is therefore the intent and purpose of this act to provide for the extension of such terms of office to accommodate the election schedule currently provided by law for such offices.”

Publisher's Notes. The former last part of what is now subsection (c) of this section provided that any municipal official or judge whose term expired at a time requiring election in an odd year would be elected at the next general election in an even year.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment deleted former (a)(2); and redesignated former (a)(3) as present (a)(2).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council member” for “alderman” in (a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(A)(iii), (b), and twice in (d)(2); and substituted “may vote” for “shall have the right to vote” in (b).

The 2019 amendment added (a)(3).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Since the classification made by this section bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law, it does not constitute local legislation in violation of Ark. Const. Amend. 14. Lovell v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387 (1959).

Although this section was expressed in general terms, it had exclusive applicability to two cities; therefore, a three-judge court was improperly convened in an action challenging the statute's constitutionality. Dove v. Bumpers, 497 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1974).

14-43-304. Mayors in cities having mayor-council government.

    1. A mayor of a city of the first class having a mayor-council form of government shall be elected:
      1. By a majority vote of the qualified electors of the city; or
      2. In accordance with § 7-5-106.
    2. This section does not apply to a city of the first class with a city manager form of government or a city administrator form of government.
    1. As soon as the returns from all precincts are received, but no later than the fifteenth day after the election, the county board of election commissioners shall proceed to ascertain, from the certificates and ballots received from the several precincts, and declare the result of the election and deliver a certificate of his or her election to any person having the requisite amount of legal votes for the office of mayor.
    2. The county board of election commissioners shall also file in the office of the clerk of the county court a certificate setting forth in detail the results of the election.
    1. If no candidate for mayor of a city of the first class receives the requisite amount of the votes cast in the general election, the two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall be certified to a special runoff election that shall be held four (4) weeks from the day on which the general election is held.
    2. The special runoff election shall be conducted in the same manner as provided by law, and the election results of the special runoff election shall be canvassed and certified in the manner provided by law.
  1. If a vacancy occurs in the office of mayor of a city described in this section and the unexpired term is more than one (1) year, the vacancy shall be filled by a special election and special runoff election, if necessary, as provided in subsection (c) of this section.

History. Acts 1975, No. 269, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1002.9 — 19-1002.11; 2003, No. 1165, § 13[11]; 2017, No. 163, § 1; 2017, No. 1104, § 7.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1165 did not contain a Section 11 or 12.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 163 rewrote the section.

The 2017 amendment by No. 1104, in (c)(1), substituted “If” for “In the event that”, “the requisite amount” for “a majority”, and “four (4) weeks” for “three (3) weeks”.

14-43-305. Mayors in mayor-council cities of less than 50,000.

  1. The qualified voters of cities of the first class having a population of less than fifty thousand (50,000) and having the mayor-council form of government, on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November of 1970 and every four (4) years thereafter, shall elect a mayor for four (4) years.
  2. Incumbent mayors shall continue in office until their successors are elected and qualified.

History. Acts 1965, No. 12, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1002.4.

Publisher's Notes. Formerly, this section provided, in part, for the election of mayors to serve from January 1, 1967, to January 1, 1971.

14-43-306. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning mayors in cities between 28,000 and 35,000, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1121, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1953, No. 244, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1002.1.

14-43-307. Election of council members at large or by ward.

    1. Candidates for the office of council member in cities of the first class shall reside in the ward from which they seek to be elected and shall run at large.
      1. All of the qualified electors of these cities shall be entitled to vote in the election.
          1. Except as provided under subsection (b) of this section, provisions shall be made by the election commissioners in these cities so that the qualified electors of each ward shall have at least one (1) voting site in each ward where the resident electors thereof may cast their ballots.
          2. The county board of election commissioners may reduce the number of voting sites in a city of the first class by unanimous vote if:
            1. In the most recent federal decennial census the city has a population of five thousand (5,000) or less; and
            2. The county in which the city is situated has established vote centers under § 7-5-101.
        1. Cities of the second class that elect their council members citywide may have one (1) public place only for holding elections.
      1. The city council of any such city or the governing body of any city in transition to the mayor-council form of government may provide by ordinance that all council members be elected by ward, in which event each council member shall be voted upon by the qualified electors of the ward from which he or she is a candidate.
        1. When so provided by city ordinance, the name of the candidate shall appear upon the ballot only in the ward in which he or she is a candidate.
        2. The city council of these cities may provide for the election of one (1) council member from each ward citywide and the other council members from each ward by the voters of the ward only.
    1. All such cities choosing to elect all council members by wards or in part by wards shall provide, in the manner provided by law, for the establishment of wards of substantially equal population in order that each council member elected from each ward shall represent substantially the same number of people in the city.

History. Acts 1965, No. 484, § 3; 1969, No. 45, § 1; 1973, No. 501, § 1; 1985, No. 421, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1002.7; Acts 1993, No. 857, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 16; 2019, No. 949, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The 1985 amendment to this section made the section applicable to cities of the second, as well as the first, class. The provisions of the 1985 act, as they apply to cities of the first class are codified in this section, while the provisions as applicable to cities of the second class are codified as part of § 14-44-103.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council member” for “alderman” and made similar changes throughout the section; and in (b)(1)(A), substituted “may provide by ordinance” for “is empowered and authorized to provide, by ordinance” and substituted “he or she” for “the person”.

The 2019 amendment added the (a)(2)(B)(i) (a) designation; in (a)(2)(B)(i) (a) , substituted “Except as provided under subsection (b) of this section, provisions” for “Provisions” and substituted “site” for “precinct”; and added (a)(2)(B)(i) (b) .

Cross References. Special election of council member in territory annexed by municipality, § 14-40-1207.

Case Notes

At Large.

Evidence was held sufficient to establish that at-large electoral system in city was unconstitutionally maintained to intentionally deprive black voters of their rights. Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 801, 103 S. Ct. 33 (1982).

By Wards.

A claim that the existing voting wards of a city are not substantially equal in size as required by this section must be resolved in a proceeding before a county circuit court under § 14-43-311, rather than a federal district court, despite the general rule against requiring exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies in § 1983 civil rights actions. Perkins v. City of W. Helena, 514 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Ark. 1981), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).

14-43-308. Residence qualifications of council members in primaries.

    1. In all primaries held in any city of the first class by any organized political party, the candidates for nomination for the office of council member shall reside in their respective wards.
    2. All qualified electors residing in these cities and entitled to vote in the primaries may vote at their several voting precincts for each and every candidate so to be nominated.
    1. The city council may provide by ordinance that the candidate shall only be voted upon by qualified voters of the ward who are entitled to vote in the primary from which the person is a candidate.
    2. When provided by ordinance, a candidate under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall appear upon the ballot only in the ward in which he or she is a candidate.

History. Acts 1949, No. 112, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1003.1; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 17.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in the section heading; substituted “council member” for “alderman” in (a)(1); substituted “may vote” for “shall have the right to vote” in (a)(2); substituted “may provide by ordinance” for “is authorized and empowered to provide, by ordinance” in (b)(1); and substituted “provided by ordinance, a candidate under subdivision (b)(1) of this section” for “so provided by ordinance, any of the candidates in such a case” in (b)(2).

Case Notes

Cited: Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock, 499 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. 1980).

14-43-309. Residence qualifications of council members in general elections.

    1. In all general elections for council members in cities of the first class, the council members so elected shall reside in their respective wards, as provided by law.
    2. All qualified electors residing in these cities may vote at their several voting precincts for each council member so to be elected.
    1. The city council of a a city of the first class may provide by ordinance that each council member shall only be voted upon by qualified voters of the ward from which the person is a candidate.
    2. When provided by ordinance, the name of the candidate shall appear upon the ballot only in the ward in which he or she is a candidate.

History. Acts 1949, No. 112, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1003.2; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 18.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in the section heading and made similar changes throughout the section; in (a)(2), substituted “may vote” for “shall have the right to vote” and substituted “council member” for “and every alderman”; substituted “a city of the first class may provide by ordinance that each council member” for “any such city is empowered and authorized to provide, by ordinance, that the aldermen” in (b)(1); and deleted “so” following “When” in (b)(2).

14-43-310. Council member ceasing to reside in ward.

If any duly elected council member shall cease to reside in the ward from which he or she was elected, that person shall be disqualified to hold the office and a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled as prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7692; Pope's Dig., § 9835; Acts 1961, No. 444, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1004; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 19.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council member” for “alderman” in the section heading and the section.

Case Notes

Cited: Lovell v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387 (1959); Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).

14-43-311. Redistricting of wards.

      1. City councils in cities of the first class may redistrict the wards in their city when they determine that the people can best be served by adding wards, combining wards, or changing ward boundary lines to equalize the population in the various wards.
      2. The city council shall ensure that each ward has as nearly an equal population as would best serve the interest of the people of the city.
      1. Within ninety (90) days after redistricting, if one hundred (100) or more qualified electors in the city are dissatisfied with the redistricting of the city into wards, the electors may petition the circuit court.
      2. The court, after due hearing, may redistrict the city into such wards as the court shall deem best if the court finds that the redistricting action by the city council was arbitrary and capricious.
  1. At the next city election held, more than twenty (20) days after the approval of redistricted wards, there shall be elected from each of the new wards two (2) council members who shall organize the new city council at the first council meeting in January after their election.
      1. All council members elected in the city prior to redistricting of wards shall give up their positions to the new council members at the time for the organization of the new city council, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
      2. From that date the terms of office of all previously elected council members shall cease and terminate.
      1. It shall be lawful to increase the number of wards or continue the same number of wards without affecting the terms of office of incumbent council members of the city.
        1. When the wards are reapportioned so as to increase the number of wards or readjust existing wards so that the wards contain nearly equal population, a council member who remains in his or her old ward, or part thereof, shall continue in office.
        2. New council members shall be elected only for new wards actually formed out of the territory of old wards.
    1. All clerk's costs and other costs incurred in the proceedings authorized in this section shall be paid by the persons at whose instance the services were rendered.
      1. In case these proceedings result in the redistricting of the city into new wards, the compensation of those individuals making the redistricting shall be fixed by the circuit judge, certified to the city council, and paid out of the city treasury.
      2. This compensation shall not exceed the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) each.

History. Acts 1885, No. 67, § 6, p. 92; 1905, No. 275, § 1, p. 693; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7720-7724, 7726; Pope's Dig., §§ 9890-9894, 9896; Acts 1973, No. 600, § 1; 1983, No. 253, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1005 — 19-1007, 19-1009; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 20.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “may” for “shall have the authority to” in (a)(1)(A), and (a)(2)(B); substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (b), twice in (c)(1)(A), once in (c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(A), and (c)(2)(B)(ii); substituted “The city council shall ensure” for “It shall be the duty of the council to see” in (a)(1)(B); substituted “the electors may” for “they shall have the authority to” in (a)(2)(A); inserted “city” in (a)(2)(B) and (c)(1)(A); and substituted “the wards contain nearly equal population, a council member who remains in his or her” for “such wards contain nearly equal population, the aldermen who remain in their” in (c)(2)(B)(i).

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

A claim that the existing voting wards of a city are not substantially equal in size as required by § 14-43-307 must be resolved in a proceeding before a county circuit court under this section rather than a federal district court despite the general rule against requiring exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies in § 1983 civil rights actions. Perkins v. City of W. Helena, 514 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Ark. 1981), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).

A claimant in federal district court who challenged the manner of election of at-large city council members was denied federal relief and was referred to county circuit court under this section on the basis of comity, since the speed with which action can be taken under this section exceeds that of the federal court, the proceedings are likely to be informal and better suited to a resolution of the problem, and there will be no lengthy appellate proceedings because this section allows for no appeal. Perkins v. City of W. Helena, 514 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Ark. 1981), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).

Cited: Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

14-43-312. Council members in mayor-council cities of fewer than 50,000.

    1. On the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1966 and every two (2) years thereafter, the qualified voters of all cities of the first class having the mayor-council form of government with fewer than fifty thousand (50,000) inhabitants shall elect two (2) council members from each ward for a term of two (2) years, except that by ordinance any city of the first class may refer the question to voters to elect two (2) council members from each ward to four-year terms as more particularly set out in subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section.
      1. On or before February 1 of the election year when the procedure will go into effect, any city of the first class, by ordinance referred to and approved by the voters at the previous general election or at a special election called for that purpose, may elect two (2) council members from each ward to four-year terms, except for the initial terms as provided in subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section.
        1. If this procedure is adopted by ordinance referred to and approved by the voters of the city, the council member representing position number one from each ward shall be elected to a four-year term at the next general election.
        2. The council member representing position number two from each ward shall be elected to an initial two-year term at the next election, and thereafter shall be elected to four-year terms, resulting in staggered terms with one (1) council member being elected to a four-year term from each ward every two (2) years.
    1. The council members shall be designated as “council member number one” and “council member number two”.
      1. A candidate for the office of council member shall designate the number of the council member's office which the candidate is seeking on the petition filed under § 14-42-206.
      2. When this designation has been made, the candidate shall not be permitted thereafter to change the designation on that petition.
      3. The county clerk shall not accept a petition for filing that does not designate the number of the office for council member sought.
      4. Each city shall maintain in its records a document showing the name of each council member and the number of the office which the candidate holds.
      1. The city council may refer an ordinance to voters on the question of returning a city to electing council members to two-year terms.
      2. The ordinance shall be passed by a two-thirds vote of the city council before it is referred to and approved by voters at a general election.
    1. If the voters approve returning the city to electing council members to two-year terms, all council members shall be elected to two-year terms at the next general election and thereafter, except that those council members serving four-year terms shall complete their terms.
    2. The city council may not refer another question to voters on electing council members to four-year terms or on returning the city to electing council members to two-year terms unless at least four (4) years have passed since the last election on changing the terms of council members.

History. Acts 1965, No. 484, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1002.5, 19-1002.6; Acts 2001, No. 543, § 1; 2003, No. 244, § 1; 2005, No. 81, § 1; 2013, No. 503, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 21.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote (b).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in the section heading and made similar changes throughout the section; and substituted “shall” for “will” in (a)(2)(B)(i) and twice in (a)(2)(B)(ii); and substituted “shall be” for “must be” in (c)(1)(B).

Case Notes

At-Large Elections.

Evidence was held sufficient to establish that at-large electoral system in the city was unconstitutionally maintained to intentionally deprive black voters of their rights. Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 801, 103 S. Ct. 33 (1982).

14-43-313. City clerks and city attorneys generally.

The city clerks and the city attorneys in cities of the first class shall give the bond, perform the duties, and receive such salary as is prescribed by ordinance in each of these cities.

History. Acts 1893, No. 151, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7690; Pope's Dig., § 9819; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1015; Acts 2003, No. 113, § 1.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Case Notes

Duties of City Attorneys.

There is a duty on the part of a city attorney to enforce the city ordinances in the police court, and the failure and refusal to do it is nonfeasance in office. Rowland v. State, 213 Ark. 780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918, 69 S. Ct. 641, 93 L. Ed. 1081 (1949).

Inasmuch as this section does not prescribe the duties of a city attorney in detail, but leaves it to city council to fix such duties, a court cannot take judicial notice of duties of a city attorney as fixed by municipal ordinance. Campbell v. City of Hot Springs, 232 Ark. 878, 341 S.W.2d 225 (1960).

Authority of city attorney to represent city in circuit court on appeal from proceeding for dismissal of police officer will be presumed in absence of showing that attorney lacked authority to prosecute such an appeal. Campbell v. City of Hot Springs, 232 Ark. 878, 341 S.W.2d 225 (1960).

Salary of City Attorneys.

Prosecuting attorney could not appear and prosecute in the name of a city under a municipal ordinance and receive a fee therefor. Miller v. City of Ft. Smith, 160 Ark. 487, 254 S.W. 1068 (1923) (decision prior to § 14-43-410).

Cited: Lovell v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387 (1959).

14-43-314. City attorney in mayor-council cities of 50,000 or more.

    1. The city attorney in any city of this state having a mayor-council form of government and having a population of fifty thousand (50,000) or more inhabitants shall be elected by the qualified electors of the city in the same manner as other municipal officials are elected.
    2. At the November 1978 general election and each four (4) years thereafter, the qualified electors of each city under this section shall elect a city attorney to take office on the next following January 1 to serve for a term of four (4) years.
  1. Any person elected as city attorney under the provisions of this section shall perform such duties, possess such qualifications, employ such staff, and be paid such salary and expenses as may be established by ordinance by the city council of the city.
    1. If no attorney residing in the city is elected as city attorney, the city council may select a resident attorney to fill the office for the remainder of the unfilled term.
      1. If no resident attorney of the city is willing to serve as city attorney or if no attorney resides within the limits of the city, the mayor and city council may contract with any licensed attorney of this state or the attorney's firm to serve as legal advisor, counselor, or prosecutor until a qualified city attorney is elected or appointed.
      2. The duties of a nonresident attorney under contract shall be prescribed by ordinance.

History. Acts 1969, No. 154, §§ 1, 3; 1977, No. 171, §§ 1, 4; 1979, No. 1002, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1015.3, 19-1015.5, 19-1015.7; Acts 1993, No. 1121, § 1; 2003, No. 1361, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Formerly, subdivision (a)(1) of this section provided, in part, for the appointment of city attorneys until the general election of 1978. Other provisions of Acts 1969, No. 154, which enacted this statute, provided for the intent and purpose of this legislation (§ 4) and provided that any person so appointed would be deemed to be an employee of the city and not an official (§ 2).

14-43-315. City attorney in mayor-council cities of fewer than 50,000.

  1. The qualified voters of cities of the first class having a population of fewer than fifty thousand (50,000) and having the mayor-council form of government shall elect a city attorney for four (4) years on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1970 and every four (4) years thereafter.
  2. Incumbent city attorneys shall continue in office until their successors are elected and qualified.
    1. If no attorney residing in the city is elected as city attorney, the city council may select a resident attorney to fill the office for the remainder of the unfilled term.
      1. If no resident attorney of the city is willing to serve as city attorney or if no attorney resides within the limits of the city, the mayor and city council may contract with any licensed attorney of this state or the attorney's firm to serve as legal advisor, counselor, or prosecutor until a qualified city attorney is elected or qualified.
      2. The duties of a nonresident attorney under contract shall be prescribed by ordinance.

History. Acts 1965, No. 131, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1015.1; Acts 2003, No. 1361, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Formerly, this section provided, in part, for the election of city attorneys to serve from January 1, 1967, to January 1, 1971.

14-43-316. City clerk, treasurer, or clerk-treasurer in mayor-council cities of fewer than 50,000.

    1. The qualified voters of cities of the first class having a population of fewer than fifty thousand (50,000) and having the mayor-council form of government shall elect on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November, 1962, and every four (4) years thereafter:
      1. One (1) city clerk and, unless appointed pursuant to § 14-43-405, one (1) city treasurer; or
      2. One (1) city clerk-treasurer.
    2. The city clerk and city treasurer, or the city clerk-treasurer, shall hold office for four (4) years and until a successor is elected and qualified.
  1. The city clerk and the city treasurer, or the city clerk-treasurer, shall take the oath of office with the other city officials that are elected in the general election in 1962 and in that manner every four (4) years thereafter.
  2. The city clerk and city treasurer, or city clerk-treasurer, shall give the bond and perform the duties as are prescribed by law and shall receive a salary as is prescribed by ordinance in each of these cities.
  3. Each incumbent in any city having this population shall continue to be the city clerk, city treasurer, or city clerk-treasurer and receive the salary and perform the duties until a successor is elected and qualified.

History. Acts 1943, No. 248, § 1; 1951, No. 123, § 1; 1961, No. 430, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1016; Acts 2001, No. 364, § 1; 2019, No. 383, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The language “on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November, 1962” in subsection (a) originally applied to the city clerk position and its application to the treasurer or clerk-treasurer position concerns the 2002 date when those positions will next be elected.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment deleted (a)(1)(A)(i); redesignated (a)(1)(A)(ii) as (a)(1)(A); substituted “One (1) city clerk and, unless appointed pursuant to § 14-43-405, one (1) city treasurer” for “One (1) city treasurer, unless appointed pursuant to § 14-43-405” in (a)(1)(A); and substituted “One (1)” for “A” in (a)(1)(B).

14-43-317. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning clerk in cities between 28,000 and 35,000, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1121, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1943, No. 248, § 1; 1951, No. 365, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1016.1.

14-43-318. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning police judges of cities of the first class, was repealed by Acts 2005, No. 45, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1987, No. 684, § 1.

14-43-319. City attorney in mayor-council cities of fewer than 5,000.

    1. If not established by ordinance that the office of the city attorney will be appointed, the qualified voters of cities of the first class having a population of fewer than five thousand (5,000) and having the mayor-council form of government shall elect a city attorney for four (4) years on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 2006 and every four (4) years thereafter.
    2. An incumbent city attorney shall continue in office until his or her successor is elected and qualified.
    1. If no attorney residing in the city is elected as city attorney, the city council may select a resident attorney to fill the office for the remainder of the unfilled term.
      1. If no resident attorney of the city is willing to serve as city attorney or if no attorney resides within the limits of the city, the mayor and city council may contract with any licensed attorney of this state or the attorney's firm to serve as legal advisor, counselor, or prosecutor until a qualified city attorney is elected or qualified.
      2. The duties of a nonresident attorney under contract shall be prescribed by ordinance.

History. Acts 2005, No. 387, § 1.

Subchapter 4 — Officers and Employees Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1943, No. 154, § 3: Mar. 4, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there now exists no satisfactory and permanent method of filling vacancies in the office of alderman in cities of the first class and whereas, it is highly desirable in the interest of the public peace, health and safety that vacancies in the office of alderman be filled as rapidly as possible after they occur, an emergency is hereby found to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 9, § 5: Feb. 1, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that laws authorizing the appointment of deputy city attorneys in certain cities of the first class are inadequate in that no specific provision exists for such appointments in many cases; that by reason of physical disability of various city attorneys and the calling into military service of city attorneys, there is an urgent need for specific statutory authority for such appointments and that enactment of this measure will remedy this situation. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 431, § 3: Mar. 16, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the work load of City Attorneys of cities of the First Class is steadily increasing and that the salaries presently provided for such City Attorneys are not sufficient to adequately compensate said Attorneys for their services and that cities of the First Class are without adequate funds to increase the compensation of said City Attorneys for their services and that unless the compensation of City Attorneys is increased, the administration of justice will be seriously hampered. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 8, § 3: Jan. 27, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there is uncertainty as to whether the city governing body in cities of the first class can appoint an acting mayor to serve from the time of vacancy until a new mayor is elected at a special election and many cities are unable to adequately perform municipal services for the people of this State because of this uncertainty. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately on its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 303, § 4: Mar. 4, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that when vacancies exist in the position of alderman and the remaining term exceeds one year in cities of over 50,000 having a mayor-council form of government and in which the electors of each ward elect at least one (1) alderman, the filling of the vacant position by appointment deprives the people of a voice in filling what should be an elected position; that this Act is designed to correct this undesirable situation and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 171, § 3: Feb. 22, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law does not specifically authorize cities of the second class to levy fees for prosecutions conducted by the city attorneys of such cities; that second class cities are in urgent need of such authority to enable such cities to provide adequate compensation to their city attorneys and to assure the effective and efficient administration of justice in such cities; and that this Act is designed to expressly grant such authority and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 231 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 462 et seq.

14-43-401. Mayor generally.

    1. The mayor shall hold his or her office during the term for which he or she shall have been elected and until his or her successor shall have been elected and qualified.
    2. The mayor shall keep an office at some convenient place in the city, to be provided by the city council, and shall keep the corporate seal of the city in his or her charge.
      1. In case of the mayor's death, disability, resignation, or other vacation of his or her office, the city council, by vote of a majority of all its members, may appoint some other person to act until the expiration of his or her term or disability if the unexpired term of his or her office is less than one (1) year. Otherwise, an election shall be ordered in accordance with the laws of the state.
      2. A removal from the city shall be deemed a vacation of his or her office.
      1. In all cases in which the unexpired term has one (1) year or more to run and a special election has been called to fill the vacancy in the office of mayor, the city governing body may appoint a qualified elector of the city, including any member of the city council, to serve as acting mayor until the office is filled at the special election.
      2. A member of the council shall not vote on his or her own appointment.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 53, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7695, 7696; Pope's Dig., §§ 9838, 9839; Acts 1977, No. 8, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1012; Acts 2015, No. 339, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment redesignated (b)(1) as (b)(1)(A) and (B); in (b)(1)(A), substituted “the mayor’s” for “his or her,” inserted “city,” and substituted “one (1) year” for “six (6) months”; redesignated (b)(2) as (b)(2)(A) and (B); and, in (b)(2)(A), substituted “in which” for “where,” “one (1) year or more” for “more than six (6) months,” and “may appoint a” for “is authorized to appoint any,” and inserted “city.”

14-43-402 — 14-43-404. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning vice mayor for city in county of 40,000 to 45,000; vice mayor for cities of 25,500 to 27,000; vice mayor for cities of 9,500 to 11,500, were repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The sections were derived from the following sources:

14-43-402. Acts 1969, No. 316, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1010.1 — 19-1010.3.

14-43-403. Acts 1971, No. 18, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1010.6, 19-1010.7.

14-43-404. Acts 1971, No. 256, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1010.4, 19-1010.5.

14-43-405. Treasurer — Clerk-treasurer in mayor-council cities.

    1. Each city of the first class having the mayor-council form of government may provide by ordinance for the election or appointment of its city treasurer.
      1. The city council may designate by ordinance or resolution the city clerk as “clerk-treasurer”, allowing one (1) person to assume the duties of both clerk and treasurer.
      2. The city council may combine the offices of clerk and treasurer to take effect at the next election under § 14-43-316 or when the offices are vacant.
    2. When one (1) person assumes the duties of both clerk and treasurer, the position shall not be separated during the elected clerk-treasurer's term unless the position is vacant.
  1. The term of office for these positions, combined or separate, is four (4) years.

History. Acts 1965, No. 484, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1015.2; Acts 2001, No. 364, § 2; 2019, No. 336, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a)(2)(A) designation and added (a)(2)(B) and (a)(3).

14-43-406. City clerk's seal.

  1. Each city council shall cause to be provided for its clerk's office a seal, in the center of which shall be the name of the city and around the margin the words “city clerk”.
  2. The seal shall be affixed to all transcripts, orders, or certificates which it may be necessary or proper to authenticate under the provisions of this subtitle, or of any bylaw or ordinance of the city.
  3. For all attested certificates and transcripts, other than those ordered by the council, the same fees shall be paid as are allowed county clerks for similar services.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 61, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7743; Pope's Dig., § 9939; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1017.

14-43-407. Deputy city attorneys.

  1. Any city attorney of a city of the first class, subject to the provisions of this section, shall have the power to appoint one (1) or more deputies for whose official acts the officer appointing the deputy shall be responsible.
  2. A deputy city attorney appointed pursuant to the provisions of this section shall serve at the will of the officer appointing him or her.
  3. Unless otherwise provided by ordinance of the city council, the salary or other compensation of any deputy city attorney appointed pursuant to this section shall be paid by the city attorney from his or her own compensation.
  4. This section is cumulative as to any law authorizing the appointment of a deputy city attorney in certain cities of the first class. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to invalidate the appointment of any such deputy made pursuant to law, nor to change the compensation thereof as previously fixed by law or by the action of any council. Nor shall this section be deemed to limit or impair the right of the council hereafter to fix the compensation or salary of such a deputy appointed pursuant to the provisions of this section or any other legislation.

History. Acts 1957, No. 9, §§ 1-4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1019.1 — 19-1019.4.

14-43-408. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning deputy clerks, attorneys, and treasurers in cities between 11,700 and 11,750, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1949, No. 225, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1019.

14-43-409. Compensation of officers generally.

Any officer provided for in this subtitle, and by ordinance of any city under this subtitle, shall receive such salary as the council of any city may designate, and in no instance shall he or she receive an additional compensation by way of fees, fines, or perquisites.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7693; Pope's Dig., § 9836; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1025; Acts 2007, No. 663, § 17.

Case Notes

In General.

Municipal officers shall receive salaries, but in no instance shall they receive additional compensation. Miller v. City of Ft. Smith, 160 Ark. 487, 254 S.W. 1068 (1923).

Applicability.

While this section empowers first-class cities to fix their officers' salaries, nowhere in Acts 1875, No. 1 is such power given to second-class cities and towns; however, the 1875 act does, by implication, delegate such power to second-class cities and incorporated towns. Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950).

Additional Compensation.

Attorney who represents city in rate case cannot recover fees out of refund decreed by Supreme Court. City of Ft. Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 220 Ark. 70, 247 S.W.2d 474 (1952).

14-43-410. Compensation of city attorneys.

  1. Any city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town in the State of Arkansas may provide by ordinance that the city attorney of the city shall receive as part of his or her compensation, for all prosecutions tried by the city attorney for violations of ordinances of the city and for all prosecutions tried by the city attorney for violations of state laws committed within the corporate limits of the cities, the same fees as are allowed prosecuting attorneys in this state in all criminal cases.
      1. By proper ordinance, any city or town may specify pay for the city attorney as the council may desire.
      2. The pay may include salary, hourly fees, costs, fees, or other like compensation, in combination or singularly, as the council may deem appropriate.
    1. In the event the city attorney is paid a salary only, the city is authorized to collect the fees referred to in this section and they are to be applied as the council may direct.

History. Acts 1967, No. 431, § 1; 1985, No. 171, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1025.1; Acts 2001, No. 366, § 1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

An ordinance limiting the city attorney's salary to $1.00 per annum when in fact the city attorney was uncontested in his bid for the election, passed simultaneously with an ordinance removing the city attorney from office on the eve of the election, was punitive in that it intended to constructively bar him from assuming the position to which he was duly elected by the people; accordingly, the first ordinance and its implementing resolution were unconstitutional as bills of attainder. Crain v. Mountain Home, 611 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1979).

14-43-411. Council member vacancy in mayor-council form of government.

      1. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of council member in a city of the first class having a population of less than twenty thousand (20,000) according to the most recent federal decennial census, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the city council shall proceed to elect by a majority vote of the remaining members elected to the council a council member to serve for the unexpired term.
        1. However, at least a quorum of the whole number of the city council shall remain in order to fill a vacancy.
        2. The election by the remaining members of the city council is not subject to veto by the mayor.
    1. The person elected by the council shall be a resident of the ward where the vacancy occurs at the time of the vacancy.
  1. When a vacancy occurs in any position of council member in a city having a population of twenty thousand (20,000) or more according to the most recent federal decennial census, a new council member shall be chosen in the following manner:
    1. If the unexpired portion of the term of a council member exceeds one (1) year, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the city council shall proceed to either elect by a majority vote of the remaining members elected to the council a council member to serve for the unexpired term or call for a special election to be held in accordance with § 7-11-101 to fill the vacancy; or
    2. If the unexpired portion of the term of a council member is one (1) year or less, a successor shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members of the council.

History. Acts 1943, No. 154, § 1; 1981, No. 303, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1026; Acts 1997, No. 202, § 1; 2005, No. 2145, § 28; 2007, No. 1049, § 47; 2009, No. 185, § 2; 2009, No. 385, § 2; 2009, No. 1480, § 65.

Publisher's Notes. This section is being set out to correct references throughout from “alderman” to “council member”, for consistency with Acts 2017, No. 879.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 185 redesignated (a)(1), added (a)(1)(C), and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 385 inserted “in mayor-council form of government” in the section heading; inserted “having a population of less than twenty thousand (20,000) according to the most recent federal decennial census” and substituted “the first” for “any” in (a)(1)(A), and redesignated (a)(1)(B) and (C); in (b), in the introductory language, substituted “twenty thousand (20,000)” for “fifty thousand (50,000)” and deleted “and having a mayor-council form of government in which the electors of each ward elect one (1) or more aldermen” following “census,” and rewrote (b)(1); and made related changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 1480 substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Reinstatement of Former Alderman.

Where an alderman was regularly elected in a city of the first class to fill the office of an alderman convicted of a crime, he was elected for the unexpired term and, in the absence of a statute providing for reinstatement or restoration to office under the circumstances, the former alderman could not be reinstated to office upon reversal of his conviction, since the public interest must be considered paramount. May v. Edwards, 255 Ark. 1041, 505 S.W.2d 13 (1974).

14-43-412. Vacancies in other elected offices.

  1. In case any office of an elected officer, except council members of the ward, becomes vacant before the expiration of the regular term, then the vacancy shall be filled by the city council until a successor is duly elected and qualified.
  2. The successor shall be elected for the unexpired term at the first general election that occurs after the vacancy has happened.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 63, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7746; Pope's Dig., § 9941; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1027; Acts 2011, No. 134, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 22.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “first general” for “first annual” in (b).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (a).

Subchapter 5 — Powers and Duties Generally

Cross References. Civil service system for cities of 75,000 or over, § 14-49-101 et seq.

Firemen's relief and pension fund board, ex officio officers, § 24-11-801.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1885, No. 67, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1913, No. 226, § 2: approved Mar. 29, 1913. Emergency clause provided: “This act, being for the protection of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1995, No. 914, § 7: Apr. 5, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in some instances vacancies in the positions of the department heads of some cities are not being timely filled; that this results in confusion and inefficiency within the municipal government; that this act provides a mechanism whereby the vacancies in department head positions may be filled more efficiently in a more timely manner; therefore this act should go into effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after passage and approval.”

Acts 2001, No. 354, § 2: Feb. 22, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly that there are certain cities in Arkansas whose governing bodies have not been able to meet due to a lack of quorum and that those cities have been unable to enact legislation or to conduct municipal business which is necessary to the operation of the city and its provision of necessary services to the citizens of the city. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 139-180, 275-283.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 385 et seq. and § 462 et seq.

14-43-501. Organization of governing body — Definition.

    1. The members of a governing body elected for each city or town shall annually in January assemble and organize the governing body.
      1. A majority of the whole number of members of a governing body constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
        1. The governing body shall judge the election returns and the qualifications of its own members.
        2. These judgments of the governing body are not subject to veto by the mayor.
        1. The governing body shall determine the rules of its proceedings and keep a journal of its proceedings, and the journal shall be open to the inspection and examination of any citizen.
        2. The governing body may also compel the attendance of absent members in such a manner and under such penalties as it prescribes.
        3. The governing body may consider the passage of rules on the following subjects, including without limitation:
          1. The agenda for meetings;
          2. The filing of resolutions and ordinances; and
          3. Citizen commentary.
      1. In a mayor-council form of government, the mayor shall be ex officio president of the city council and shall preside at its meetings.
      2. The mayor shall have a vote to establish a quorum of the city council at any regular or special meeting of the city council and when his or her vote is needed to pass any ordinance, bylaw, resolution, order, or motion.
    1. In the absence of the mayor, the city council shall elect a president pro tempore to preside over council meetings.
    2. If the mayor is unable to perform the duties of office or cannot be located, one (1) of the following individuals may perform all functions of a mayor during the disability or absence of the mayor:
      1. The city clerk;
      2. Another elected official of the city if designated by the mayor; or
      3. An unelected employee or resident of the city if designated by the mayor and approved by the city council.
  1. As used in this section, “governing body” means the city council in a mayor-council form of government, the board of directors in a city manager form of government, and the board of directors in a city administrator form of government.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7738-7741; Pope's Dig., §§ 9934-9937; Acts 1981, No. 345, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1010; Acts 2001, No. 354, § 1; 2005, No. 190, § 1; 2009, No. 185, § 3; 2011, No. 110, § 1; 2013, No. 753, § 1; 2015, No. 235, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (a)(2)(B)(ii) and redesignated the remaining text of (a)(2)(B) accordingly; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2011 amendment added “to preside over council meetings” at the end of (b)(2); and added (b)(3).

The 2013 amendment rewrote (b)(3).

The 2015 amendment rewrote (a); added “In a mayor-council form of government” at the beginning of (b)(1)(A); inserted “or special” in (b)(1)(B); inserted “individuals” in (b)(3); and added (c).

Case Notes

Election Returns.

The authority of a city council is limited to passing upon the face of election returns. Doherty v. Cripps, 82 Ark. 529, 102 S.W. 394 (1907).

Mayors.

The mayor is not an elected member of the city council, but only an ex-officio member by virtue of his executive position, and therefore his vote cannot be used in amending or repealing any part of an initiated act; thus, where only five members of a nine-member council voted to repeal an initiated ordinance, there was not the two-thirds majority required by Ark. Const. Amend. 7, and the mayor's favorable vote could not be counted as the sixth vote necessary to attain a two-thirds majority. Thompson v. Younts, 282 Ark. 524, 669 S.W.2d 471 (1984).

Where subdivision (b)(1)(B) repealed that part of this section that required a majority of the “aldermen” of a municipal corporation to approve appropriations, mayor of a city of first class could break five to five tie vote to pass no appropriation ordinance. Gibson v. City of Trumann, 311 Ark. 561, 845 S.W.2d 515 (1993).

Meetings.

The proceedings of a special meeting of a city council are legal if all the members had notice, whether all attended or not; when all the members of the council are voluntarily present in a council meeting and participate therein, it is a legal meeting for all purposes, unless the law provides otherwise, and an ordinance passed at such a meeting is valid. City of Mena v. Tomlinson Bros., 118 Ark. 166, 175 S.W. 1187 (1915).

Quorum.

An ordinance passed by less than the majority of all the members of a city council is void. Newbold v. City of Stuttgart, 145 Ark. 544, 224 S.W. 993 (1920).

14-43-502. Powers of council generally.

  1. The city council shall possess all the legislative powers granted by this subtitle and other corporate powers of the city not prohibited in it or by some ordinance of the city council made in pursuance of the provisions of this subtitle and conferred on some officer of the city.
    1. The council shall have the management and control of finances, and of all the real and personal property belonging to the corporation.
      1. The council shall provide the times and places of holding its meetings, which shall at all times be open to the public.
      2. The mayor or any three (3) council members of any city or town, regardless of size or classification, may call special meetings in the manner as may be provided by ordinance.
    2. The council shall appoint, or provide by ordinance, that the qualified voters of the city, of the wards, or districts as the case may require, shall elect all such city officers as shall be necessary for the good government of the city and for the due exercise of its corporate powers, and which shall have been provided by ordinance, as to whose appointment or election provision is not made in this subtitle and not provided by any general law of the state in reference to cities of the first class.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 62, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7744; Pope's Dig., § 9940; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1011; Acts 2001, No. 365, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 23.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (b)(2)(B).

Case Notes

Committees.

A committee of a city council having jurisdiction over the city parks has no legislative powers, as the legislative powers are conferred upon the council sitting as such. Satterfield v. Fewell, 202 Ark. 67, 149 S.W.2d 949 (1941).

14-43-503. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning imposition of costs on misdemeanor convictions, was repealed by Acts 1999, No. 1081, § 11. The section was derived from Acts 1977, No. 564, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1011.1.

14-43-504. Powers and duties of mayor generally.

  1. The mayor of the city shall be its chief executive officer and conservator of its peace. It shall be his or her special duty to cause the ordinances and regulations of the city to be faithfully and constantly obeyed.
  2. The mayor shall:
    1. Supervise the conduct of all the officers of the city, examine the grounds of all reasonable complaints made against them, and cause all their violations of duty or other neglect to be properly punished or reported to the proper tribunal for correction;
    2. Have and exercise the power conferred on sheriffs, within the city limits, to suppress disorder and keep the peace; and
    3. Perform such other duties compatible with the nature of his or her office as the city council may from time to time require.
  3. The mayor shall report, within the first ninety (90) days of each year and at such other times as he or she shall deem expedient, to the council the municipal affairs of the city and recommend such measures as may seem advisable.
    1. In addition to the powers and duties already pertaining to that office, the mayor of any city of the first class shall be clothed with and exercise and perform the following:
      1. A mayor may veto within five (5) days, Sundays excepted, after the action of the city council thereon, any ordinance, resolution, or order adopted or made by the council, or any part thereof, which in his or her judgment is contrary to the public interest; and
        1. In case of a veto, before the next regular meeting of the council, the mayor shall file in the office of the city clerk, to be laid before that meeting, a written statement of his or her reasons for so doing.
        2. An ordinance, an order, or a resolution or part thereof, vetoed by the mayor is invalid unless, after the written statement is laid before it, the council, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all the council members elected thereto, passes it over the veto.
    2. The mayor does not have the power of veto in circumstances prescribed under § 14-43-501(a) or § 14-43-411(a).

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 53, p. 1; 1885, No. 67, § 2, p. 92; 1893, No. 42, §§ 1, 2, p. 64; 1913, No. 226, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7697-7701; Pope's Dig., §§ 9840-9844; Acts 1979, No. 153, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1013, 19-1014; Acts 1991, No. 786, § 14; 1995, No. 534, § 2; 1995, No. 914, § 2; 2009, No. 161, § 1; 2009, No. 185, § 4; 2017, No. 879, § 24.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 786, § 37, provided:

“The enactment and adoption of this Act shall not repeal, expressly or impliedly, the acts passed at the regular session of the 78th General Assembly. All such acts shall have full effect and, so far as those acts intentionally vary from or conflict with any provision contained in this Act, those acts shall have the effect of subsequent acts and as amending or repealing the appropriate parts of the Arkansas Code of 1987.”

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 161 substituted “within the first ninety (90) days of each year” for “at the second regular meeting of the council in each year” in (d).

The 2009 amendment by No. 185 added (e)(3) and made minor stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (d)(1)(B)(ii).

Case Notes

Construction.

Prior to the enactment of § 14-42-110 in 1995, subdivision (e)(2) of this section and former § 14-43-505 created a property interest for a police chief in the position. Sykes v. City of Gentry, 114 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1997).

Annexation.

Mayor was authorized to sign an annexation petition on behalf of the city, where the city owned land whose annexation was proposed, as an exercise of his authority as chief executive officer of the city. City of Marion v. Guaranty Loan & Real Estate Co., 75 Ark. App. 427, 58 S.W.3d 410 (2001).

Chiefs of Police.

A chief of police in a city of first class, appointed under an ordinance fixing his term at one year, who surrendered office at the end of the year without protest, was estopped to claim that his term was two years under this section, and therefore he could not recover salary for the second year. City of West Helena v. Patrick, 185 Ark. 71, 46 S.W.2d 36 (1932).

The mayor of a city had the power to appoint the chief of police prior to 1933, when this power was limited only to cities not operating under the municipal Civil Service Act. Connor v. Ricks, 212 Ark. 833, 208 S.W.2d 10 (1948).

Subdivision (e)(2) of this section creates a property interest in the chief of police position for any city of the first class by providing for a term of employment, from the date of appointment to the following mayoral election, and by providing for removal only for cause. Pearson v. City of Paris, 839 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

Although police chief was hired before 1995, his property interest in his position was eliminated in 1995 when the General Assembly enacted § 14-42-110. Sykes v. City of Gentry, 114 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1997).

Ordinances, Resolutions, or Orders.

The mayor is required to sign or approve an ordinance in order that it may become effective. Lewis v. Forrest City Special Imp. Dist., 156 Ark. 356, 246 S.W. 867 (1923).

Mayor is entitled to veto resolution of city council selecting member to board of public welfare. Steward v. Rust, 221 Ark. 286, 252 S.W.2d 816 (1952).

Salaries.

Ordinances raising salaries of city officials during their terms of office by allowing each of them an expense account was held contrary to this section, and at most could be treated as an increase to take effect at the expiration of their terms of office. Laman v. Moore, 193 Ark. 446, 100 S.W.2d 971 (1937).

14-43-505. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning removal of police or fire chief, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 534, § 3 and Acts 1995, No, 914, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 1885, No. 67, § 2, p. 92; 1893, No. 42, § 2, p. 64; C. & M. Dig., § 7747; Pope's Dig., § 9943; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1028. For present law, see §§ 14-42-110 and 14-43-504.

14-43-506. Duties of city clerk.

  1. The city clerk in cities of the first class shall have the custody of all the laws and ordinances of the city and shall keep a regular and correct journal of the proceedings of the city council.
      1. The city clerk, city clerk-treasurer, or city treasurer, as the case may be, shall submit monthly a full report and a detailed statement of the financial condition of the city.
      2. The report shall show receipts, disbursements, and balance on hand, together with all liabilities of the city.
    1. The report shall be submitted to the council in open session.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7694; Pope's Dig., § 9837; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1018; Acts 2007, No. 71, § 1; 2017, No. 761, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment redesignated former (b)(1) as (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B); substituted “shall submit monthly” for “shall be required to submit quarterly” in (b)(1)(A); and substituted “The” for “This” in (b)(1)(B).

Case Notes

Records.

The record of the passage of an ordinance, duly proved, cannot be contradicted by parol evidence. Roberts v. Street Improv. Dist., 156 Ark. 248, 245 S.W. 489 (1922).

Cited: Condon v. City of Eureka Springs, 135 F. 566 (W.D. Ark. 1905).

14-43-507. Duties of treasurers.

Treasurers in cities of the first class shall be required to make similar reports as prescribed in § 14-43-506 and shall perform such other duties as may be required by the ordinances of the city.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7694; Pope's Dig., § 9837; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1018.

Case Notes

Cited: Condon v. City of Eureka Springs, 135 F. 566 (W.D. Ark. 1905).

14-43-508. Duties of collectors.

Collectors in cities of the first class shall be required to make similar reports as prescribed in § 14-43-506 and shall perform such other duties as may be required by the ordinances of the city.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 51, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7694; Pope's Dig., § 9837; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1018.

Cross References. Fines collected for violation of city ordinances paid to collector, § 16-96-403.

Case Notes

Cited: Condon v. City of Eureka Springs, 135 F. 566 (W.D. Ark. 1905).

14-43-509. Officers without prescribed terms.

In cities of the first class, all city officers whose terms of office are not prescribed, and whose powers and duties are not defined in this subtitle, or by bylaw or ordinance, shall perform such duties and exercise such powers, and continue in office two (2) years, unless sooner removed for cause.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 62, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7744; Pope's Dig., § 9940; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1011.

Subchapter 6 — Powers over Municipal Affairs

Effective Dates. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 9: Mar. 12, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas it is found and declared that numerous and pressing needs of Arkansas municipalities are, because of their urgency, creating burdens on the General Assembly due to the requirement that the General Assembly examine each individual problem and authorize each specific power to municipalities, according to the provisions of the so-called Dillon's Rule which requires an express grant of authority to a municipality by the General Assembly, and which rule is now considered obsolete and should be repealed immediately in order that the General Assembly may attend to matters of statewide concern; therefore, it is declared for these reasons that an emergency exists and this act being essential for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 537, § 4: Apr. 5, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 266 of 1971 was intended to grant broad authorities to cities of the first class to exercise functions or legislative powers pertaining to the local municipal affairs of the city, and that it was not the intention of the General Assembly in Subsection (a) of Section 4 to repeal, restrict, or limit the existing authority of cities of the first class to regulate rates for services charged by public utilities, telephone and telegraph companies, taxicabs, buslines or other utilities or carriers operating under city franchise, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify said Subsection (a) of Section 4 of said Act 266 of 1971. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 193-230, 423-578.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 106 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Goldner, A Call for Reform of Arkansas Municipal Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

Halbert, Municipal Law—Utility Franchise Fees—True Nature of Levy Immaterial When City Possesses Statutory Authority. City of Little Rock v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 318 Ark. 616, 888 S.W.2d 290 (1994), 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 259.

Case Notes

Court Costs.

This subchapter does not give a city council authority to repeal legislation allowing use of court costs to support law library (§ 16-23-101 et seq.) or to erect law library building (§ 16-23-102). Nahlen v. Woods, 255 Ark. 974, 504 S.W.2d 749 (1974).

14-43-601. Municipal affairs delineated.

  1. As used in this subchapter:
    1. “Municipal affairs” means all matters and affairs of government germane to, affecting, or concerning the municipality or its government except the following, which are state affairs and subject to the general laws of the State of Arkansas:
      1. Public information and open meetings;
      2. Uniform requirements for competitive bidding on contracts;
      3. Claims against a municipality;
      4. Requirements of surety bonds for financial officers;
      5. Collective bargaining;
      6. Pension and civil service systems;
      7. Hours and vacations, holidays, and other fringe benefits of employees;
      8. The definition, use, and control of surplus revenues of municipally owned utilities;
      9. Vacation of streets and alleys;
      10. Matters coming within the police power of the state, including minimum public health, pollution, and safety standards;
      11. Gambling and alcoholic beverages;
      12. Traffic on or the construction and maintenance of state highways;
      13. Regulations of intrastate commerce, including rates and terms of service of railroad, bus, and truck lines, cooperatives, and nonmunicipally owned utilities;
      14. The incorporation and merger of municipalities and annexation of territory to municipalities; and
      15. Procedure for the passage of ordinances by the governing body of the municipality; and
      1. “Municipality” means a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town.
      2. A municipality may legislate upon the state affairs described in subdivision (a)(1) of this section if not in conflict with state law.
    1. Matters of public health that concern emergency medical services, emergency medical technicians, and ambulances, as defined in §§ 20-13-201 — 20-13-209 and 20-13-211, and ambulance companies, shall be included in the term “municipal affairs”.
      1. Municipalities shall have the authority to enact and establish standards, rules, or regulations that are equal to or greater than those established by the state concerning emergency medical services, emergency medical technicians, ambulances, and ambulance companies.
      2. The standards, rules, or regulations shall not be less than those established by the state for the rating of the service offered.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 2; 1981 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 23, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1043; Acts 2011, No. 1187, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 1001, § 8, provided that nothing in the act repealed, by implication or otherwise, Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 23, which is codified as this section and §§ 14-54-704, 14-137-103, 14-137-106, and 14-266-10114-266-110.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “of the municipality” in (a)(1)(O); inserted (a)(2)(A); rewrote (a)(2)(B); deleted “of cities of the first class” at the end of (b)(1); and substituted “Municipalities” for “These cities” in (b)(2)(A).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justin Craig, Note: Municipal Police Power & Its Adverse Effects on Small Businesses in Arkansas: A Proposal for Reform, 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 177 (2014).

Case Notes

Gambling and Alcoholic Beverages.

A first-class city had the power to enact an ordinance that prohibited private clubs from serving or allowing consumption of mixed drinks between 2:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., since this section defines alcoholic beverages to be a “state affair” and authorizes any city of the first class to enact an ordinance dealing with state affairs so long as the ordinance avoids conflict with state law. Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 658 S.W.2d 404 (1983).

Police Powers of State.

This section excludes city control over functions that fall within state police powers. City of Ft. Smith v. Housing Auth., 256 Ark. 254, 506 S.W.2d 534 (1974).

Public Health.

A housing authority is an agent of the state dealing with public health standards, and thus is not a matter pertaining to “municipal affairs.” City of Ft. Smith v. Housing Auth., 256 Ark. 254, 506 S.W.2d 534 (1974).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Chartwell Valley Ltd. Partnership, 299 Ark. 542, 772 S.W.2d 616 (1989).

14-43-602. Authority generally.

  1. A municipality is authorized to perform any function and exercise full legislative power in any and all matters of whatsoever nature pertaining to its municipal affairs, including, but not limited to, the power to tax.
  2. The rule of decision known as “Dillon's Rule” is inapplicable to the municipal affairs of municipalities.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1042; Acts 2011, No. 1187, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “A municipality” for “Any city of the first class” in present (a); and added (b).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The delegation by the legislature of authority to first-class cities to legislate upon an existing general law is prohibited by Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 4. City of Ft. Smith v. Housing Auth., 256 Ark. 254, 506 S.W.2d 534 (1974).

It is unconstitutional to interpret this section as conferring upon a city the authority to repeal, by an implementing ordinance, a general law and substitute its own method of filling vacancies on a housing authority board. City of Ft. Smith v. Housing Auth., 256 Ark. 254, 506 S.W.2d 534 (1974).

This section, under Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 4 and under § 14-43-601, could not be interpreted to abridge § 14-169-208 in respect to filling of vacancies on a board of commissioners of a local housing authority. City of Ft. Smith v. Housing Auth., 256 Ark. 254, 506 S.W.2d 534 (1974).

Financial Affairs.

This section contains authority for a city ordinance to create a position of finance director to handle the financial affairs of the city. Besharse v. City of Blytheville, 254 Ark. 382, 493 S.W.2d 708 (1973).

Cited: Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 658 S.W.2d 404 (1983); Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 305 Ark. 476, 809 S.W.2d 688 (1991); Davis v. City of Blytheville, 2015 Ark. 482, 478 S.W.3d 214 (2015).

14-43-603. Felonies.

No municipality may declare any act a felony.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1044.

14-43-604. Gambling.

A municipality may not authorize gambling except as provided by state law.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1044; Acts 2011, No. 1187, § 3.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added “except as provided by state law.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 889.

14-43-605. Alcoholic beverages.

No municipality may authorize the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1044.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justin Wayne Harper, Note: A Spirited Revolution: Local Option Elections and the Impending Death of Prohibition in Arkansas, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 527 (2016).

14-43-606. Taxation generally.

  1. No municipality shall levy any sales, which includes gross receipts or gross proceeds, use, payroll, or income tax other than those authorized by law.
  2. No tax on alcoholic beverages shall be levied by a municipality other than those authorized by law.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 4; 1971, No. 537, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1045.

Cross References. Taxation generally, § 26-73-101 et seq.

14-43-607. Income tax.

  1. After approval of a majority of those voting on the question in the municipality in a general or special election, a city of the first class may levy a tax on income of individual residents of that city.
  2. Upon the condition that a tax is levied pursuant to this section at the same or higher rate upon income of individual residents of that city, then after approval at the same election required in this section or at a subsequent election, the city may levy a tax on income earned by other individuals derived from activities, services rendered, or employment within the levying city.
  3. The rate of tax on income authorized by this section shall be a single percentage of the net income tax payable to the State of Arkansas.
    1. One-half (½) of a taxpayer's income which is subject to a tax authorized by this section, in a city which is not his or her residence, shall be exempt from payment of the tax if a tax authorized by this section is levied by a city in which the taxpayer resides.
    2. The other one-half (½) of a taxpayer's income subject to a tax authorized by this section shall be exempt from payment of the tax authorized by this section in the city in which the taxpayer resides.
      1. The governing body of any city levying the tax authorized in this section and the Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration are authorized and empowered to enter into a contractual agreement whereby the secretary shall collect any of the taxes assessed by the city, whether by withholding of income tax or otherwise, and remit them to the city.
      2. This agreement may also provide for a consideration to be allowed the secretary for services rendered in making such collections.
    1. The secretary may establish rules concerning the procedures for collecting these taxes by him or her.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1045; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 995; 2019, No. 910, § 3378.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 315 substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (e)(2).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration” for “Director” in (e)(1)(A); and substituted “secretary” for “director” in (e)(1)(A), (B) and (e)(2).

14-43-608. Regulation of prices.

  1. No municipality shall have the power to regulate prices for goods, rentals, or services sold or performed within the municipality by individuals or firms.
  2. Nothing in this section shall prohibit municipalities from establishing prices for goods, rentals, or services furnished by, or performed by, the municipality or an instrumentality thereof.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 4; 1971, No. 537, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1045.

14-43-609. Public utilities and carriers.

The provisions of this subchapter shall not repeal, limit, modify, or affect any of the powers conferred upon municipalities to regulate, in the manner prescribed by law, the rates or charges to be made for services rendered in the municipality by any regulated public utility or carrier operating under franchise issued by the municipality, including without limitation any of the following:

  1. Electric, gas, or water utilities;
  2. Telephone or telegraph companies;
  3. Taxicabs;
  4. Municipal bus companies; or
  5. Other utilities or carriers operating under public service franchise issued by the municipality.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 4; 1971, No. 537, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1045; Acts 2011, No. 1187, § 4.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “municipalities” for “cities of the first class” in the introductory language; substituted “municipality” for “city” or variant twice in the introductory language, in (4) and (5).

14-43-610. Reservation of state power.

Nothing in this subchapter shall limit the power reserved to the General Assembly to specifically limit the exercise of any powers, functions, and authority granted in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1046.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1971, No. 266, § 7, provided that any existing state statute which now limits or prohibits the exercise of a function or legislative power of a city of the first class pertaining to its municipal affairs is hereby repealed upon the passage of an ordinance or resolution by a city of the first class which provides for, regulates, controls or otherwise affects its municipal affairs now limited by that state statute. It is the intent of this Section that State laws now limiting or prohibiting the exercise of a function or legislative power of a city of the first class pertaining to its municipal affairs shall remain in effect until action is taken on the subject matter of said statute by the governing body of a city of the first class.

14-43-611. Sale of city property to college or university.

Any city of the first class may sell, under such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate, city property to any publicly supported postsecondary educational institution.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1044, § 1.

Chapter 44 Government of Cities of the Second Class

Cross References. City attorney, § 14-42-112.

Firemen's relief and pension fund board, ex officio officers, § 24-11-801.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1881, No. 16, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 63, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 10, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1921, No. 450, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1927, No. 124, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 251, § 5: effective on passage and approval.

Acts 1949, No. 42, § 3: approved Feb. 2, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 44, § 4: Feb. 3, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary for the protection of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1953, No. 172, § 3: approved Mar. 2, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly that many cities of the second class are suffering because of inadequate law enforcement, therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1953, No. 184, § 4: Mar. 2, 1953.

Acts 1967, No. 427, § 3: Mar. 16, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present laws of this State authorize the city council of cities of the second class to fill vacancies in the office of Mayor of such cities, and do not afford an opportunity whereby all electors of said cities may be permitted to vote in choosing a Mayor to fill the unexpired portion of the term; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to correct this situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 10, § 3: Jan. 30, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Arkansas Supreme Court in a 1950 case involving an elected city marshal in a city of the second class held that the city marshal was an officer of the city and must reside within the corporate limits of the city; that the General Assembly by Act 172 of 1953 permitted city councils in cities of the second class to pass an ordinance providing the city marshal would be appointed by the mayor rather than elected by the people; that the elected city marshal is an elected officer and, therefore, of necessity is required to be a qualified elector of the city which includes being a legal resident of the city, but an appointed city marshal is an employee of the city similar to members of police departments in cities of the first class and many cities and towns permit their employees to reside outside the corporate limits; and, there is currently great confusion concerning whether an appointed city marshal must also be a legal resident, and that this Act is designed to correct this confusion and should be given effect as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 1122, § 5: Apr. 5, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there are cities in Arkansas whose governing bodies have not been able to meet due to lack of a quorum, and have thus been unable to enact legislation or conduct business which is necessary to the operation of the city and the provision of necessary services to the citizens in the city. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date on its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided: “(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008. (b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012. (c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except: (1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and (2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-44-101. Creation of wards.

  1. As soon as practicable after an incorporated town becomes a city of the second class, the city council shall form the city into the number of wards that, to it, will seem to best serve the interests of the city.
  2. It shall be the duty of the council to see that each ward has as nearly an equal population to each of the other wards as would best serve the interests of the taxpayers of the city.

History. Acts 1949, No. 44, § 1; 1983, No. 253, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1113.

14-44-102. Redistricting of wards.

  1. City councils in cities of the second class shall have the authority to redistrict the wards of their cities when they determine that the people can best be served by adding wards, combining wards, or changing ward boundary lines to equalize the populations in the various wards.
    1. Within ninety (90) days after redistricting, if fifty (50) or more qualified electors in the city are dissatisfied with the division of the city into wards, they shall have the authority to petition the circuit court.
    2. The court, after due hearing, shall have authority to redistrict the city into such wards as it shall deem best if it finds that the redistricting action by the council was arbitrary and capricious.

History. Acts 1949, No. 44, §§ 1, 2; 1983, No. 253, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1113, 19-1114.

14-44-103. Election of council members.

    1. Except as provided under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1982, and every two (2) years thereafter, the qualified voters in cities of the second class shall elect for each of the wards of these cities two (2) council members, who shall compose the city council.
    2. The qualified electors of every city of the second class shall elect from each ward of the city two (2) council members, who shall be designated as “council member number one” and “council member number two” of the ward.
      1. A candidate for the office of council member shall designate the number of the council member's office that the candidate is seeking on the petition filed pursuant to § 14-42-206.
      2. When this designation has been made, the candidate shall not be permitted thereafter to change the designation on that petition.
      3. The county clerk shall not accept a petition for filing that does not designate the number of the office of council member sought.
      4. Each city shall maintain in its records a document showing the name of each council member and the number of the office which the candidate holds.
      1. The city council of a city of the second class may refer to voters an ordinance on the question of electing the two (2) council members for each ward to four-year terms.
      2. The voters shall vote on the ordinance at a general election or at a special election called for that purpose by proclamation of the mayor in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq. However, the election to approve the four-year election procedure shall be held no later than February 1 of the year of the general election in which the procedure is proposed to be effective.
      1. If this procedure is adopted by ordinance referred to and approved by the voters of the city, the initial term for the council member designated as “council member number one” of each ward shall be a four-year term at the next general election.
      2. The initial term for the council member designated as “council member number two” of each ward shall be a two-year term at the next general election, and thereafter shall be a four-year term, resulting in staggered terms for the ward.
      1. The city council may refer to voters an ordinance on the question of returning the city to electing council members to two-year terms using the procedures of subdivisions (a)(4)-(7) of this section.
      2. If the voters approve returning a city to two-year terms, all council members shall be elected to two-year terms at the next general election and thereafter.
    3. The city council may not refer to voters another question on electing council members to four-year terms or on returning the city to electing council members to two-year terms unless at least four (4) years have passed since the last election on changing the council members' terms.
      1. A candidate for the office of council member in a city of the second class shall reside in the ward from which he or she seeks to be elected and shall run for election at large, except if the council member is elected by ward under subsection (c) of this section.
      2. All of the qualified electors of the city may vote in the election.
        1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) of this section, the election commissioners in the city shall ensure that the qualified electors of each ward have at least one (1) voting precinct in each ward where the resident electors of the ward may cast their ballots.
        2. Subdivision (b)(1)(C)(i) of this section does not apply if the county board of election commissioners of the county in which the city is situated has established vote centers under § 7-5-101.
    1. If any duly elected council member shall cease to reside in the ward from which he or she was elected, that person shall be disqualified to hold the office and a vacancy shall exist, which shall be filled as prescribed by law.
      1. The city council of any such city may provide by ordinance that all council members be elected by ward, in which event each council member shall be voted upon by the qualified electors of the ward from which the person is a candidate.
        1. When provided by city ordinance, the name of the candidate shall appear upon the ballot only in the ward in which he or she is a candidate.
        2. The city council of these cities may provide for the election of one (1) council member from each ward citywide and the other council members from each ward by the voters of the ward only.
    1. All such cities choosing to elect all council members by wards or part by wards shall provide, in the manner provided by law, for the establishment of wards of substantially equal population in order that each council member elected from each ward shall represent substantially the same number of people in the city.
  1. Cities of the second class that elect their council members citywide may have one (1) public place only for holding elections.

History. Acts 1887, No. 10, § 1, p. 11; C. & M. Dig., § 7679; Pope's Dig., § 9801; Acts 1953, No. 184, §§ 1-3; 1961, No. 444, § 2; 1965, No. 484, § 3; 1969, No. 45, § 1; 1973, No. 501, § 1; 1981, No. 346, § 1; 1985, No. 421, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1002.7, 19-1101 — 19-1101.3; Acts 2003, No. 328, §§ 1, 2; 2005, No. 2145, § 29; 2007, No. 1049, § 48; 2009, No. 1480, § 66; 2013, No. 503, § 2; 2017, No. 300, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 25.

A.C.R.C. Notes. This section combines the provisions of A.S.A. §§ 19-1101 — 19-1101.3, which governed elections of aldermen in cities of the second class, with compatible provisions of A.S.A. § 19-1002.7, which originally governed only cities of the first class, but was amended in 1985 to apply to elections of aldermen in cities of the second, as well as the first, class.

The 2013 amendment omitted subdivisions (a)(4)-(7) without striking through the language to indicate the repeal of those subdivisions.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a)(4)(B).

The 2013 amendment rewrote (a)(3).

The 2017 amendment by No. 300 added the (b)(1)(C)(i) and (b)(1)(C)(ii) designations; in (b)(1)(C)(i), substituted “Except as provided in subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) of this section” for “Provision shall be made by”, substituted “the city shall ensure” for “these cities so”, deleted “shall” preceding “have at least”, and substituted “of the ward” for “thereof”; and added (b)(1)(C)(ii).

The 2017 amendment by No. 879 substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in the section heading and made similar changes throughout the section; substituted “may” for “shall be entitled to” in (b)(1)(B); substituted “may provide by ordinance” for “is empowered and authorized to provide, by ordinance” in (c)(1)(A); and deleted “so” following “When” in (c)(1)(B)(i).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, Election of Aldermen, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 433.

Case Notes

Election Procedures.

—Compliance.

Election procedures that are mandatory before an election are only directory after the election; therefore, failure of city council to comply with the election procedures of this section after ordinance had been passed raising the municipality from a town to a city of the second class had no effect on special election called for the purpose of issuing bonds for city improvement. Luther v. Gower, 233 Ark. 496, 345 S.W.2d 608 (1961).

—Time.

A city of the second class that was raised from an incorporated town in June, 1908, was required to hold its next election on the first Tuesday in April, 1910, and persons voted for in a pretended election held in 1911 acquired no right thereby to the offices which they claimed to hold thereunder. McMahan v. State, 102 Ark. 12, 143 S.W. 94 (1912) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

—Voting.

Failure to have a voting precinct in each ward as required by this section will not affect the validity of the election where there is no showing that such failure resulted in denying any voter the privilege of voting. Rogers v. Mason, 246 Ark. 1, 436 S.W.2d 827 (1969).

Cited: Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948); Sitton v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 574, 226 S.W.2d 544 (1950); Gore v. Emerson, 262 Ark. 463, 557 S.W.2d 880 (1977).

14-44-104. Vacancy in council member's office.

  1. If a vacancy occurs in the office of council member in any city of the second class, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the city council shall proceed to elect, by a majority vote of the council, a council member to serve for the unexpired term.
  2. The election to fill the vacancy under subsection (a) of this section is not subject to veto by the mayor.

History. Acts 1927, No. 124, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 9802, 9942; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1111; Acts 2013, No. 1325, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 26.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “occurs” for “shall occur” in (a); and added (b).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council member's” for “alderman's” in the section heading; substituted “council member” for “alderman” twice in (a); and substituted “If” for “Whenever” in (a).

Case Notes

Authority of Circuit Court.

Where the circuit court acted outside of its statutory authority in directing that a special election be held and because of the public policy considerations inherent in the election of public officials, the order of the circuit court was reversed and remanded for an order declaring a vacancy in the alderman's position and for additional proceedings as may be required. Phillips v. Earngey, 321 Ark. 476, 902 S.W.2d 782 (1995).

Election.

Where aldermen received a majority vote when selected, the fact that there was no formal motion and second did not render their election illegal, as a motion and a second are not required for a valid city council vote. O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 293 Ark. 19, 732 S.W.2d 146 (1987).

14-44-105. Election of mayor.

The qualified voters of cities of the second class shall elect a mayor for a term of four (4) years on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1966 and every four (4) years thereafter.

History. Acts 1965, No. 554, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1101.4.

14-44-106. Vacancy in mayor's office.

If a vacancy occurs in the office of mayor in any city of the second class, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the city council shall proceed to either elect by a majority vote of the council members a mayor to serve the unexpired term or call for a special election to be held in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq. to fill the vacancy. At this election, a mayor shall be elected to serve the unexpired term.

History. Acts 1959, No. 54, § 1; 1967, No. 427, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1110; Acts 1997, No. 645, § 4; 2005, No. 2145, § 30; 2007, No. 1049, § 49; 2009, No. 1480, § 67; 2017, No. 879, § 27.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a).”

The 2017 amendment, in the first sentence, substituted “If” for “Whenever” and substituted “council members” for “aldermen”; and substituted “serve” for “fill out” in the last sentence.

Case Notes

Election or Appointment.

The election or appointment of a mayor to fill a vacancy must be proved by the record itself in the absence of proof that such record has been lost or destroyed. Hill v. Rector, 161 Ark. 574, 256 S.W. 848 (1923).

Special Elections.

If the provisions of the general election laws as to the certification of nomination, printing of ballots, and forbidding the printing thereon of the name of any candidate not certified and filed in the time prescribed apply to special elections for mayor, these irregularities will not avoid such an election at the instance of one who holds the office of mayor without authority and was not a candidate at the special election. Hogins v. Bullock, 92 Ark. 67, 121 S.W. 1064 (1909) (decision under prior law).

14-44-107. Powers of mayor generally.

  1. The mayor in cities of the second class shall be ex officio president of the city council, shall preside at its meetings, and shall have a vote to establish a quorum of the council, or when the mayor's vote is needed to pass any ordinance, bylaw, resolution, order, or motion.
    1. The mayor in these cities shall have the power to veto, within five (5) days, Sundays excepted, after the action of the council thereon, any ordinance, resolution, or order adopted or made by the council, or any part thereof, which in his or her judgment is contrary to the public interest.
      1. In case of a veto, before the next regular meeting of the council, the mayor shall file in the office of the city recorder, to be laid before the meeting, a written statement of his or her reasons for so doing.
      2. An ordinance, resolution, or order, or part thereof, vetoed by the mayor shall not have any force or validity unless, after the written statement is laid before it, the council passes it over the veto by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all the council members elected thereto.
  2. If the mayor is unable to perform the duties of office or cannot be located, one (1) of the following may perform all functions of a mayor during the disability or absence of the mayor:
    1. The recorder;
    2. Another elected official of the city if designated by the mayor; or
    3. An unelected employee or resident of the city if designated by the mayor and approved by the city council.

History. Acts 1887, No. 10, § 1, p. 11; C. & M. Dig., § 7679; Pope's Dig., § 9801; Acts 1981, No. 346, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1101; Acts 1997, No. 1122, § 1; 2013, No. 753, § 2; 2017, No. 879, § 28.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added (c).

The 2017 amendment, in (b)(2)(B), substituted “An” for “No”, inserted “not”, substituted “passes” for “shall pass”, and substituted “council members” for “aldermen”.

Cross References. Removal of elective or appointive officers, § 14-42-109.

Case Notes

Voting.

The mayor of a second class city is a member of the council of a second class city and thereby entitled to vote on the municipal council's ordinances. Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

Cited: Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948); Sitton v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 574, 226 S.W.2d 544 (1950); Gore v. Emerson, 262 Ark. 463, 557 S.W.2d 880 (1977).

14-44-108. Mayor of city of the second class.

The mayor of a city of the second class shall perform all duties required by the ordinances of the city and shall give bond and security in any amount to be determined and approved by the city council.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 48, p. 1; 1881, No. 16, § 1, p. 29; 1883, No. 63, § 2, p. 97; C. & M. Dig., § 7681; Pope's Dig., § 9809; Acts 1941, No. 284, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1102; Acts 1995, No. 298, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 26; 2007, No. 663, § 18.

Cross References. No jury trial in city court, § 16-96-112.

Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

A defendant appearing in the city court on charges of violating a city ordinance was deprived of due process of law when the mayor, who was sitting as judge of the court, also presided over meetings of the city council where decisions were made concerning the expenditures of revenue from fines, forfeitures, and penalties. Gore v. Emerson, 262 Ark. 463, 557 S.W.2d 880 (1977).

In General.

Provision in § 14-45-106 exempting five counties from provisions of § 14-45-106 governing mayor's court in incorporated towns does not apply to this section, governing mayor's court in second class cities; hence this section is not invalid on the ground of local legislation. Mountain Home v. Ray, 223 Ark. 553, 267 S.W.2d 503 (1954).

Fines and Penalties.

A city is entitled to retain all the fines and penalties imposed by the mayor's court for violation of its ordinances, notwithstanding that the ordinances make the same acts offenses as are made offenses against the state by statute, and the county is entitled only to such fines and penalties as are imposed by the mayors of these courts, acting in their capacity of justices of the peace for violation of the state laws within their jurisdiction. Incorporated Town of Pocahontas v. State ex. rel. Randolph County, 114 Ark. 448, 170 S.W. 89 (1914).

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the mayor's court, like that of the justice of the peace, is subject to a motion to transfer to municipal court when a state offense is involved. Russell v. Miller, 253 Ark. 583, 487 S.W.2d 617 (1972); City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399 (1987).

Divestment of jurisdiction from the city court is not contrary to Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 43, which gives the General Assembly authority to set jurisdiction of corporation courts. City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399 (1987).

Writ of prohibition held proper where trial court was entirely without jurisdiction. City Court v. Tiner, 292 Ark. 253, 729 S.W.2d 399 (1987).

Substitutes.

Should a mayor become disqualified, the city recorder may act in his place. Incorporated Town of Pocahontas v. State ex. rel. Randolph County, 114 Ark. 448, 170 S.W. 89 (1914).

14-44-109. City marshal, recorder, and treasurer generally.

      1. At the time prescribed in this subtitle, the qualified voters of each city of the second class shall elect a city marshal, a city recorder, and a city treasurer.
      2. Each city marshal, city recorder, or city treasurer shall continue in office until his or her successor is elected and qualified.
      1. The city council may provide by ordinance for the appointment of the city treasurer.
      2. An ordinance under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section shall be passed before the filing period begins for an election for the office of city treasurer, but no later than the February preceding the beginning of the early filing period.
  1. These officers shall have such powers and perform such duties as are prescribed in this subtitle, or as may be prescribed by any ordinance of the city, consistent with the provisions of this subtitle.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 49, p. 1; 1881, No. 16, § 2, p. 29; C. & M. Dig., § 7682; Pope's Dig., § 9810; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1103; Acts 2019, No. 234, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (a), inserted the (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) designations; substituted “city marshal, city recorder, or city treasurer” for “of these officers” in (a)(1)(B); added (a)(2); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

City Marshals.

—Appointment or Election.

This section provides that a city marshal shall be elected; therefore a person appointed by a city council is only a de facto officer and has no right to salary. Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948) (decision prior to § 14-44-111).

While this section requires a city to have an elected city marshal, the fact that the city attempted to change the office to an appointive one by an ordinance that failed for lack of publication required by § 14-55-206 was of no consequence, and the city marshal who was subsequently elected in a general election was duly elected and would be entitled to hold office for his elective period. Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

—Authority.

Prior to the effective date of § 14-44-111, a city council was without power to pass an ordinance abolishing the elective office of marshal and transferring his powers to a chief of police. City of Augusta v. Angelo, 225 Ark. 884, 286 S.W.2d 321 (1956).

—Compensation.

Where city marshal held over and continued to perform the duties of his office after expiration of his term, he was entitled to the same compensation he received during the regular term, and an attempt by the city to reduce such compensation was ineffective. City of Berryville v. Binam, 222 Ark. 962, 264 S.W.2d 421 (1954).

Where city marshal holds over and continues to perform the duties of his office after expiration of his term, he is entitled to compensation up to the time he ceases to discharge his duties, and the period of holding over in such cases is as much a part of the officer's term of office as the regular period fixed by law. City of Berryville v. Binam, 222 Ark. 962, 264 S.W.2d 421 (1954).

Marshal of city of second class is an officer and therefore his salary was governed by the provisions of Acts 1875, No. 1, § 86 (6th to 8th sentences) (superseded by § 14-42-113). Horton v. City of Marshall, 227 Ark. 141, 296 S.W.2d 418 (1956).

—Duties.

This section contemplates that other duties may be performed by a city marshal and authorizes the establishing of other officers for law enforcement, for whose duties the city is authorized to pay. Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950).

Cited: City of Greenbrier v. Cotton, 293 Ark. 264, 737 S.W.2d 444 (1987).

14-44-110. Residency of appointed marshals.

Cities of the second class shall have the authority to require their appointed marshals to reside within their corporate limits, and they shall have the authority to permit their appointed marshals to reside outside their corporate limits.

History. Acts 1979, No. 10, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1103.4.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

A city marshal is an officer within the meaning of Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 3, and therefore must be a resident of the city. Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948) (decision under prior law).

14-44-111. Election or appointment of marshal.

The city marshal of cities of the second class shall be elected by the voters as provided by law. However, the city council of any such city, if the council deems it to be in the best interests of the city, and upon passage of an ordinance by the majority of the council, may provide that the marshal shall be appointed or removed by the mayor unless the council shall vote by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the council to override the mayor's action.

History. Acts 1953, No. 172, § 1; 1983, No. 79, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1103.2.

Cross References. Removal of city marshal by mayor, § 14-42-110.

Case Notes

In General.

Prior to the effective date of this section, a city council was without power to pass an ordinance abolishing the elective office of marshal and transferring his powers to a chief of police. City of Augusta v. Angelo, 225 Ark. 884, 286 S.W.2d 321 (1956).

Appointments.

Where a city ordinance making the marshal's office appointive rather than elective was adopted by the affirmative votes of the mayor and of two of the four councilmen, the ordinance was validly enacted, since the mayor of a second class city is a member of the council and thereby entitled to vote. Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

Elections.

While § 14-44-109 requires a city to have an elected city marshal, the fact that the city attempted to change the office to an appointive one by an ordinance that failed for lack of publication required by § 14-55-206 was of no consequence, and the city marshal who was subsequently elected in a general election was duly elected and would be entitled to hold office for his elective period. Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

Removals.

A mayor did not have statutory authority to remove city marshal without the approval of city council, nor did the mayor have inherent power to do so, since he was in no way responsible for the performance of the marshal's duties. Kennedy v. Garner, 230 Ark. 698, 326 S.W.2d 810 (1959) (decision prior to 1983 amendment).

Where city marshal continued to serve after passage of this section and to draw his salary until his services were found to be unsatisfactory, he recognized the power of the city to remove him at any time, and if he had wanted the protection of Acts 1875, No. 1, § 86 (6th to 8th sentences) (superseded by § 14-42-113) and to remain on the basis of fees due a constable, he should have made the claim before an ordinance was enacted under this section. Jeffery v. City of Mt. View, 235 Ark. 657, 361 S.W.2d 540 (1962).

Where city marshal took the monthly payment under ordinance enacted under this section, he precluded himself from challenging the validity of the ordinance regulating his salary and tenure of office. Jeffery v. City of Mt. View, 235 Ark. 657, 361 S.W.2d 540 (1962).

City marshal is employee at will and his discharge is not wrongful; ultimate rehire is not a statutory override. Even if written city personnel policy provided for discharge only with cause or even if the city council meeting minutes clearly reflected that city council voted for a policy of no discharge until after three reprimands, city marshal would not prevail, since state law provides that a city marshal may be discharged by the mayor, subject only to an override by a two-thirds vote of the city council. Robbins v. City of Dover, 294 Ark. 432, 743 S.W.2d 807 (1988).

Cited: City of Greenbrier v. Cotton, 293 Ark. 264, 737 S.W.2d 444 (1987).

14-44-112. Vacancy in marshal's office.

If a vacancy occurs in the office of marshal in any city of the second class, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the city council shall proceed to elect by a majority vote of all the council members a marshal to serve for the unexpired term.

History. Acts 1921, No. 450, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9811; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1112; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 29.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “If a vacancy occurs” for “Whenever a vacancy shall occur”, and substituted “council members” for “aldermen”.

Case Notes

Holding Over.

Where city marshal held over and continued to perform the duties of his office after expiration of his term, he was entitled to the same compensation he received during the regular term, and an attempt by the city to reduce such compensation was ineffective. City of Berryville v. Binam, 222 Ark. 962, 264 S.W.2d 421 (1954).

Where city marshal holds over and continues to perform the duties of his office after expiration of his term, he is entitled to compensation up to the time he ceases to discharge his duties, and the period of holding over in such cases is as much a part of the officer's term of office as the regular period fixed by law. City of Berryville v. Binam, 222 Ark. 962, 264 S.W.2d 421 (1954).

Voting.

A motion and a second are not required for a valid city council vote. O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 293 Ark. 19, 732 S.W.2d 146 (1987).

Cited: Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948).

14-44-113. Powers and duties of marshals.

  1. The marshal of cities of the second class shall execute and return all writs and process directed to him or her by the mayor. In criminal cases or cases of a violation of the city ordinance, he or she may serve them in any part of the county.
  2. It shall be the marshal's duty to:
    1. Suppress all riots and disturbances and breaches of the peace;
    2. Apprehend all disorderly persons in the city;
    3. Pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state; and
    4. Apprehend any person in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state or ordinances of the city and forthwith to bring such persons before the mayor, or other competent authority, for examination or trial.
  3. The marshal shall have power to appoint one (1) or more deputies, for whose official acts he or she shall be responsible.
  4. In the discharge of his or her proper duties, the marshal shall have like powers, be subject to like responsibilities, and receive the like fees as sheriffs and constables in similar cases.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 50, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7683; Pope's Dig., § 9812; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1104.

Case Notes

Compensation.

Statutory provision that city marshal shall receive like fees as sheriffs and constables in similar cases does not prevent a second-class city from paying the marshal a salary. Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950).

City council was not required to pay duly elected city marshal any certain or stated salary, or any salary at all, in addition to the fees provided by this section, and the city's authority to fix his salary was unrestricted, except that it could not change his salary during any certain term once it had been fixed. City of Augusta v. Angelo, 225 Ark. 884, 286 S.W.2d 321 (1956) (decision prior to § 14-42-113).

Deputies.

In an action against a city by deputy marshal for salary fixed by ordinance, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of the ordinance obligating the city to pay him the salary claimed. City of El Dorado v. Faulkner, 107 Ark. 455, 155 S.W. 516 (1913).

Where deputy marshals, who had been appointed for one year, were dismissed by mayor who exceeded his authority, they were not entitled to receive their salaries where they did no work after dismissal, even though there was a city ordinance fixing their salaries, but were only entitled to the fees set out in this section for deputy marshals. City of Jacksonville v. Williams, 238 Ark. 519, 383 S.W.2d 103 (1964).

Although a marshal may appoint deputies pursuant to this section, it is the exclusive responsibility of the city council to determine whether any salary shall be paid. City of Greenbrier v. Cotton, 293 Ark. 264, 737 S.W.2d 444 (1987).

Powers.

Prior to the effective date of § 14-44-111, a city council was without power to pass ordinance abolishing the elective office of marshal and transferring his powers to the chief of police. City of Augusta v. Angelo, 225 Ark. 884, 286 S.W.2d 321 (1956).

14-44-114. Recorder-treasurer offices combined.

    1. The city council of any city of the second class, if the city council deems it to be in the best interests of the city, and upon passage of an ordinance by a majority vote of the city council, may combine the offices of city recorder and city treasurer, authorizing one (1) person to hold this position.
    2. The city council may combine the offices of city recorder and city treasurer to take effect at the next election under § 14-44-109 or when the offices are vacant.
  1. When combined, the office shall be known as “city recorder-treasurer”.
  2. When one (1) person assumes the duties of both recorder and treasurer, the position shall not be separated during the elected city recorder-treasurer's term unless the position is vacant.

History. Acts 1949, No. 42, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1103.1; Acts 2019, No. 336, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a)(1) designation; in (a)(1), deleted “in the State of Arkansas” following “second class”, inserted “city” preceding the second and third occurrences of “council”, and deleted “thereby” preceding “authorizing”; added (a)(2); substituted “‘city recorder-treasurer’” for “‘recorder-treasurer for the city’” in (b); and added (c).

14-44-115. Election of recorder, treasurer, or recorder-treasurer.

  1. On the Tuesday following the first Monday in November, 1972, and every four (4) years thereafter, the qualified voters of cities of the second class shall elect a recorder, a treasurer, or a recorder-treasurer, as the case may be, for a term of four (4) years.
    1. The city council may provide by ordinance for the appointment of the city treasurer.
    2. An ordinance under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be passed before the filing period begins for an election for the office of city treasurer, but no later than the February preceding the beginning of the early filing period.

History. Acts 1969, No. 272, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1103.3; Acts 2001, No. 364, § 3; 2019, No. 234, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The language “on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November, 1972” in this section originally applied to the recorder or recorder-treasurer positions and its application to the treasurer position concerns the 2004 date when that position will next be elected.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment designated the existing text as (a); and added (b).

14-44-116. Vacancy in office of recorder, treasurer, or recorder-treasurer.

If a vacancy occurs in the office of recorder, treasurer, or recorder-treasurer in any city of the second class, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the city council shall elect by a majority vote of all the council members a person to serve for the unexpired term.

History. Acts 1921, No. 450, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9811; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1112; Acts 2007, No. 62, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 30.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “If a vacancy” for “Whenever a vacancy”, and substituted “council members” for “aldermen”.

Case Notes

Election.

Where recorder received a majority vote when selected, the fact that there was no formal motion and second did not render his election illegal, as a motion and a second are not required for a valid city council vote. O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 293 Ark. 19, 732 S.W.2d 146 (1987).

Cited: Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948).

14-44-117. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning city collectors, was repealed by Acts 2019, No. 221, § 1, effective July 24, 2019. The section was derived from Acts 1929, No. 251, §§ 1-5; Pope's Dig., §§ 9804-9808; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1105 — 19-1109.

Chapter 45 Government of Incorporated Towns

Cross References. Firemen's relief and pension fund board, ex officio officers, § 24-11-801.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 106, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1989, No. 386, § 4: Mar. 7, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there exists no provision in the law which provides for the filling of vacancies in elective offices of incorporated towns; that the failure to have such a provision has resulted in undue hardship on many of the citizens of this state; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately on its passage and approval.”

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Research References

C.J.S. 87 C.J.S., Towns, §§ 34-89.

14-45-101. Corporate authority.

  1. The corporate authority of incorporated towns shall vest in a town council composed of the five (5) council members who shall be qualified electors residing within the limits of the incorporated town and who shall hold office until their successors are elected and qualified.
  2. A majority of the whole number of council members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 41, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7671; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9793; Acts 1965, No. 483, § 1; 1981, No. 343, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1201; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 31.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (a) and (b); and substituted “incorporated town” for “corporation” in (a).

Case Notes

Cited: Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

14-45-102. Election of council members.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1982 and every two (2) years thereafter, the qualified voters of incorporated towns shall elect five (5) council members.
      1. The town council of an incorporated town may refer to the voters an ordinance on the question of electing the five (5) council members to four-year terms.
        1. The voters shall vote on the ordinance at a general election or at a special election called for that purpose.
        2. The election to approve the four-year election procedure shall be held no later than February 1 of the year of the general election in which the procedure is proposed to be effective.
      2. If this procedure is adopted by an ordinance referred to and approved by the voters of the incorporated town, the initial terms for council members representing positions numbered “one”, “three”, and “five” shall be four-year terms at the next general election and the initial terms for council members representing positions numbered “two” and “four” shall be two-year terms and thereafter four-year terms, resulting in staggered terms.
        1. The town council may refer to voters an ordinance on the question of returning the incorporated town to electing council members to two-year terms using the procedures of subdivision (a)(2) of this section.
        2. If the voters approve returning an incorporated town to two-year terms, all council members shall be elected to two-year terms at the next general election and thereafter.
      3. The town council may not refer to voters another question on electing council members to four-year terms or on returning the incorporated town to electing council members to two-year terms unless at least four (4) years have passed since the last election on changing the terms of council members.
    1. A candidate for the office of council member shall designate the number of the office for council member that the candidate is seeking on the petition filed pursuant to § 14-42-206.
    2. If there is a designation under subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the candidate shall not change the designation on that petition.
    3. The county clerk shall not accept a petition for filing that does not designate the number of the office for council member sought.
    4. Each incorporated town shall maintain in its records a document showing the name of each council member and the number of the office that the candidate holds.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 41, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7671; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9793; Acts 1965, No. 483, § 1; 1981, No. 343, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1201; Acts 2005, No. 46, § 1; 2013, No. 503, § 3; 2017, No. 879, § 32.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1965, No. 483, § 2, provided that the purpose of this act is to provide that the time for election of the officials of incorporated towns shall be at the regular general election for the election of state and county officials and to abolish the odd year election for the election of officials of incorporated towns.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote (b).

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in the section heading and made similar changes throughout the section; inserted “incorporated” in (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D)(i), (a)(2)(E), and (b)(4); and substituted “an incorporated town” for “a town” in (a)(2)(D)(ii).

Case Notes

Cited: Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

14-45-103. Vacancies.

  1. When a vacancy occurs in the office of council member in an incorporated town, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the town council shall elect by a majority vote of the town council a council member to serve for the unexpired term.
  2. When a vacancy occurs in the office of recorder-treasurer in an incorporated town, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the town council shall elect by a majority vote of the town council a recorder-treasurer to serve for the unexpired term.
  3. When a vacancy occurs in the office of mayor in an incorporated town, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy, the town council shall:
    1. Elect by a majority vote of the council members a mayor to serve the unexpired term; or
      1. Call for a special election to be held under § 7-11-101 et seq. to fill the vacancy.
      2. At the special election, a mayor shall be elected to complete the unexpired term.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 43, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7674; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 9796; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1206; Acts 1989, No. 386, § 1; 2013, No. 978, § 1; 2017, No. 171, § 1; 2017, No. 879, § 33.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

The 2017 amendment by No. 171 added (b); redesignated former (b) as (c); and substituted “under” for “in accordance with” in (c)(2)(A).

The 2017 amendment by No. 879 substituted “council member” for “alderman” in (a) twice; and substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (b)(1).

Case Notes

Cited: Langston v. Johnson, 255 Ark. 933, 504 S.W.2d 349 (1974).

14-45-104. Election of mayor.

The qualified electors in incorporated towns shall elect a mayor for a term of four (4) years on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1966 and every four (4) years thereafter.

History. Acts 1965, No. 554, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1201.1.

Case Notes

Cited: Langston v. Johnson, 255 Ark. 933, 504 S.W.2d 349 (1974).

14-45-105. Powers of mayor generally.

  1. The mayor in incorporated towns shall be ex officio president of the town council, shall preside at its meetings, and shall have a vote when the mayor's vote is needed to pass any ordinance, bylaw, resolution, order, or motion.
    1. The mayor in these towns shall have the power to veto, within five (5) days, Sundays excepted, after the action of the council thereon, any ordinance, resolution, or order adopted or made by the council, or any part thereof, which in his or her judgment is contrary to the public interest.
      1. In case of a veto, before the next regular meeting of the council the mayor shall file a written statement of his or her reasons for the veto in the office of the town recorder-treasurer to be laid before the meeting.
      2. An ordinance, resolution, or order, or part thereof, vetoed by the mayor shall not have any force or validity unless, after the written statement is laid before it, the council passes it over the veto by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all the council members elected thereto.
  2. If the mayor is unable to perform the duties of office or cannot be located, one (1) of the following may perform all functions of a mayor during the disability or absence of the mayor:
    1. The recorder;
    2. Another elected official of the city if designated by the mayor; or
    3. An unelected employee or resident of the city if designated by the mayor and approved by the city council.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 41, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7671; Pope's Dig., § 9793; Acts 1981, No. 343, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1201; Acts 2013, No. 753, § 3; 2017, No. 879, § 34.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added (c).

The 2017 amendment, in (b)(2)(B), substituted “An” for “No”, inserted “not”, substituted “passes” for “shall pass”, and substituted “council members” for “aldermen”.

Case Notes

Cited: Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

14-45-106. Mayor of an incorporated town.

  1. The mayor of an incorporated town shall perform all duties required by the ordinances of the city and shall give bond and security in any amount to be ascertained and approved by the city council.
  2. In addition for his or her services as mayor, the council, by ordinance, may make proper allowance for, and payment of, compensation.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 45, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7676; Acts 1921, No. 368, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9798; Acts 1941, No. 284, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1204; Acts 1995, No. 298, § 2; 2003, No. 114, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 27; 2007, No. 663, § 19.

Cross References. No jury trial in city court, § 16-96-112.

Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 152.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Provision exempting five counties from provisions of this section governing mayor's court in incorporated towns does not apply to § 14-44-108 governing mayor's court in second-class cities. Mountain Home v. Ray, 223 Ark. 553, 267 S.W.2d 503 (1954).

Counsel.

An indigent misdemeanor defendant in a mayor's court was not deprived of his constitutional rights by failure to assign counsel to him where, upon appeal to the circuit court, the cause was tried de novo and he was represented by counsel. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967).

Fines and Penalties.

A town is entitled to retain all the fines and penalties imposed by the mayor's court for violation of its ordinances, notwithstanding the ordinances make the same acts offenses as are made offenses against the state by statute and the county is entitled only to such fines and penalties as are imposed by the mayors of these courts, acting in their capacity of justices of the peace for violation of the state laws within their jurisdiction. Incorporated Town of Pocahontas v. State ex. rel. Randolph County, 114 Ark. 448, 170 S.W. 89 (1914).

Jurisdiction.

The mayor of an incorporated town has no authority to fine for contempt the editor of a newspaper whose editorial page criticized the mayor's policies. Ex parte Patterson, 110 Ark. 94, 161 S.W. 173 (1913).

Affidavit setting forth charge of resisting an officer was held sufficient to give the mayor jurisdiction of the offense. Robinson v. City of Malvern, 118 Ark. 423, 176 S.W. 675 (1915).

Claims for damages from torts in excess of $100 arising out of the same transaction and constituting but one course of action were held not within the jurisdiction of the mayor's court or the circuit court on appeal therefrom. Hively v. Jones, 178 Ark. 1127, 13 S.W.2d 612 (1929).

Pleadings.

Trial before mayor was not required to be styled in name of state when no ordinance covered subject matter. Harris v. City of Harrison, 211 Ark. 889, 204 S.W.2d 167 (1947).

Sitting as Court.

A mayor's court can sit only inside the municipal limits, though it has powers of process throughout the county. Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

A justice of the peace sitting as justice of the mayor's court of a town must do so within the corporate limits of that town. Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

Cited: Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967); Gore v. Emerson, 262 Ark. 463, 557 S.W.2d 880 (1977).

14-45-107. Presiding officer of council — Clerk.

  1. The mayor or, in case of his or her absence, the recorder-treasurer, shall preside at all meetings of the town council. The recorder-treasurer shall also be and act as clerk of the town. He or she shall attend all meetings of the council and make a fair, accurate, and correct record of all the proceedings, laws, rules, and ordinances made and passed by the council. The records shall be open at all times for the inspection of the electors of the town.
  2. In the absence of the mayor and recorder-treasurer from any meeting of the council, the council shall have power to appoint any two (2) of their number to perform the duties of mayor and recorder-treasurer for the time being.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, §§ 42, 43, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7672, 7674; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 3; Pope's Dig., §§ 9794, 9796; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1203, 19-1206.

Case Notes

Cited: Blake v. Trout, 127 Ark. 299, 192 S.W. 179 (1917); Langston v. Johnson, 255 Ark. 933, 504 S.W.2d 349 (1974).

14-45-108. Election of recorder-treasurer.

  1. The qualified voters of incorporated towns shall elect one (1) recorder-treasurer on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November 1982 and every four (4) years thereafter.
      1. The town council may provide by ordinance for the appointment of the town recorder-treasurer.
      2. An ordinance under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section shall be passed before the filing period begins for an election for the office of town recorder-treasurer, but no later than the February preceding the beginning of the early filing period.
    1. A town recorder-treasurer appointed under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section shall not administer the oath of office under § 14-42-106 or § 21-2-105.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 41, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7671; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9793; Acts 1965, No. 483, § 1; 1981, No. 343, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1201; Acts 2005, No. 1008, § 1; 2019, No. 234, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1965, No. 483, § 2, provided that the purpose of this act is to provide that the time for election of the officials of incorporated towns shall be at the regular general election for the election of state and county officials and to abolish the odd year election for the election of officials of incorporated towns.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment designated the existing text as (a); and added (b).

Case Notes

Cited: Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).

14-45-109. Appointment of marshal and other officers.

  1. The council of any incorporated town shall have power to provide, by ordinance, for the election of a town marshal and such other subordinate officers as they may think necessary for the good government of the town.
  2. In regard to the officers mentioned in subsection (a) of this section, the council shall have the power to:
    1. Prescribe their duties and compensation or the fees they shall be entitled to receive for their services; and
    2. Require of them an oath of office and bond with surety for the faithful discharge of their duty.
  3. The period for the election of any officer shall be fixed at the time of the regular biennial election. No appointment of any officer shall endure beyond the period of the term of office of the council making the appointment and one (1) week after the qualification of the members of the succeeding council.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 44, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7675; Acts 1937, No. 259, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 9797; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1202.

Cross References. Removal of town marshal by mayor, § 14-42-110.

Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Programs, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Langston v. Johnson, 255 Ark. 933, 504 S.W.2d 349 (1974); Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

14-45-110. Residency of marshals.

Incorporated towns shall have the authority to require their appointed marshals to reside within their corporate limits, and they shall have the authority to permit their appointed marshals to reside outside their corporate limits.

History. Acts 1979, No. 10, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1103.4.

14-45-111. Powers and duties of marshals.

  1. The town marshal of incorporated towns shall be the principal ministerial officer of the town. He or she shall have the same power that sheriffs have by law, and his or her jurisdiction shall be coextensive with the county for offenses committed within the limits of the town.
  2. The town marshal shall execute the process of the mayor and collect the same fees for his or her services that sheriffs are allowed in similar cases.
  3. It shall be the duty of the town marshal to:
    1. Suppress all riots and disturbances and breaches of the peace;
    2. Apprehend all disorderly persons in the town;
    3. Pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state; and
    4. Apprehend any person in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state or ordinances of the town and immediately bring the person before the mayor, or other competent authority, for examination or trial.
  4. The town marshal shall have power to appoint one (1) or more deputies, for whose official acts he or she shall be responsible.
  5. All persons or parties arrested by any officer of the state for violation of any town ordinance shall be turned over to the town marshal and shall be by him or her taken before the proper authorities for investigation.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 46, p. 1; 1883, No. 106, § 2, p. 189; C. & M. Dig., § 7677; Pope's Dig., § 9799; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1205.

Case Notes

In General.

A town marshal is a public officer and has broad and numerous duties and responsibilities. Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 212 S.W.2d 710 (1948).

Chapter 46 Commission Form of Municipal Government

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

14-46-101, 14-46-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1991, No. 49, § 3. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-46-101. Acts 1965, No. 162, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-642 — 19-644.

14-46-102. Acts 1957, No. 384, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-641.

Subchapter 2 — Boards of Three Commissioners

14-46-201 — 14-46-249. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1991, No. 49, § 3. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-46-201. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 1; 1949, No. 25, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.

14-46-202. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 25; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-626.

14-46-203. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-603.

14-46-204. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-602.

14-46-205. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 28; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-629.

14-46-206. Acts 1965, No. 3, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-604.2, 19-604.3.

14-46-207. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 26; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-627.

14-46-208. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 27; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-628.

14-46-209. Acts 1913, No. 13, §§ 6, 7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-606, 19-607.

14-46-210. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-608.

14-46-211. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-212. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-213. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-214. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-215. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-216. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-217. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-218. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-219. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-220. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-221. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-222. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 5; 1949, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.

14-46-223. Acts 1965, No. 97, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-605.1

14-46-224. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 4; 1917, No. 3, § 1, p. 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-604.

14-46-225. Acts 1965, No. 97, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-604.1.

14-46-226. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 9; 1917, No. 3, § 3, p. 16; 1957, No. 377, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-609.

14-46-227. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-610.

14-46-228. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-621.

14-46-229. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-620.

14-46-230. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 9; 1957, No. 377, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-609.

14-46-231. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-619.

14-46-232. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-611.

14-46-233. Acts 1953, No. 271, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-611.1.

14-46-234. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 12; 1923 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 14, § 1; 1943, No. 279, § 1; 1949, No. 92, § 1; 1953, No. 72, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-612.

14-46-235. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-611.

14-46-236. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-611.

14-46-237. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-616.

14-46-238. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 17; 1927, No. 12, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-618.

14-46-239. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-613.

14-46-240. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-613.

14-46-241. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 8; 1917, No. 3, § 2, p. 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-614.

14-46-242. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-617.

14-46-243. Acts 1949, No. 475, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-633, 19-634.

14-46-244. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-615.

14-46-245. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 22; 1917, No. 3, § 4, p. 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-622.

14-46-246. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 30; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-623.

14-46-247. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 23; 1935, No. 156, § 1; 1963, No. 523, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-624.

14-46-248. Acts 1913, No. 13, § 24; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-625.

14-46-249. Acts 1949, No. 49, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-635, 19-636.

Subchapter 3 — Boards of Five Commissioners

14-46-301 — 14-46-310. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1991, No. 49, § 3. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-46-301. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.9.

14-46-302. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.1.

14-46-303. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.7.

14-46-304. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.8.

14-46-305. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.10.

14-46-306. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.2.

14-46-307. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.3.

14-46-308. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.4.

14-46-309. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.5.

14-46-310. Acts 1971, No. 436, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-601.6.

Chapter 47 City Manager Form of Municipal Government

Cross References. City manager enabling provisions, § 14-61-101 et seq.

Election of city officials, § 14-42-201 et seq., § 14-42-301 et seq.

Government of cities of the first class generally, § 14-43-201 et seq.

Government of cities of the second class generally, § 14-44-101 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1947, No. 403 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, some of the provisions of Act 99 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas for the year 1921 are cumbersome and involved, so that it is desirable to simplify the act and make it available for any city in the state coming within its classification that may desire to avail itself of the provisions of the act;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 35: approved Feb. 10, 1921. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in force and effect and take effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1947, No. 403, § 6: approved Mar. 28, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that there is need in some of the cities of the state for the adoption of a city manager form of government, in order to promote the health and safety of the inhabitants thereof, and therefore an emergency exists and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1957, No. 8, § 24: Feb. 1, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found, and is hereby declared that the management form of city government authorized under this Act provides an improved and superior method for the administration and government of cities of the first and second class; that many Arkansas cities would be greatly benefited by immediately changing from the aldermanic to the management form of government but that Act No. 99 of 1921 (and the prior amendments thereto) contained defective provisions, cured by the amendments contained in this Act, which grossly impaired the efficiency and desirability of the management plan of reorganization and constituted a deterrent to such municipal reorganizations; that the passage of this Act will make available to cities of the first and second class whose present government is inadequate or inefficient an opportunity to reorganize hereunder and thereby greatly improve the efficiency and economy of their respective municipal governments. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and, this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 226, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1965, No. 6, § 3: Jan. 26, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the designation of Monday, as the only day on which the Board of Directors of cities adopting the manager form of governments may meet is unduly restrictive; that the efficiency of the manager form of government will be improved by permitting the boards of the respective cities to choose the day of the week on which to meet; and, that the immediate passage and effectiveness of this Act is necessary to correct this situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 165, § 2: Feb. 28, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Arkansas Arts Center exists for the benefit of and should be supported by the entire State of Arkansas; that in order to obtain greater support for and participation in the activities of the Arkansas Arts Center that the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Arts Center should be more representative of the entire State; and that enactment of this bill will accomplish these purposes and aims. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 188, § 3: Feb. 28, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that this Act is immediately necessary to eliminate the expense of certain special elections and to provide a satisfactory and permanent method of filling a vacancy in the office of a Director in cities having the management form of government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 74, § 5: Feb. 12, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the present laws of this State, many municipal boards and commissions are self perpetuating in that vacancies on such boards and commissions are to be filled by a vote of the remaining members of the boards and commissions; that it is in the best interests of the citizens of this State that vacancies on municipal boards and commissions in cities having a manager form of government be filled by a majority vote of the board of directors of the city rather than the remaining members of the affected board or commission; that this Act is designed to correct this situation and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 874, § 5: approved Apr. 4, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain officials and employees of municipal governments operated under management form are unable to acquire retirement security under existing and available retirement plans and it is necessary that such cities be able to assure reasonable retirement security to certain officials and employees to attract competent personnel to its services and that this Act is immediately necessary to retain competent key officials and employees of the cities; therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1987, No. 25, § 3: Feb. 11, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the city manager residency requirement of Act 99 of 1921 puts cities with less than six thousand (6,000) persons in population at a serious disadvantage when competing with larger cities for the services of professional city managers and that allowing these cities the option to eliminate the residency requirement will reverse this inequity. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the cities of the State shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 117, § 5: Feb. 15, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present city manager law which prohibits a person related to a member of the board of directors or the city manager from holding a position of employment or appointment with the city is unreasonably strict; that this act modifies that provision to make it more reasonable; and that until this act goes into effect, unreasonable discrimination will continue as a result of the current law. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 29: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 30: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2007, No. 689, § 3: Mar. 29, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Arkansas cities are faced with ever-increasing problems of providing services to their citizens caused by a combination of globalization, rapid technological change, rising citizen expectations, mandates from higher levels of government, and a constrained tax base which together have created a context in which more effective and efficient methods of governance have become mandatory; and that this act is immediately necessary to meet these needs and for the efficiency of government. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2007, No. 729, § 3: Mar. 30, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Arkansas cities are faced with ever increasing problems of providing services to their citizens caused by a combination of globalization, rapid technological change, rising citizen expectations, the need for more accountability, mandates from higher levels of government, and a constrained tax base which together have created a context in which more effective and efficient methods of governance have become mandatory; and that this act is immediately necessary to meet these needs and for the efficiency of government. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 608, § 2: Mar. 23, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain statutes require the chief executive officer to serve on certain boards and commissions; that in a city manager form of government there is no chief executive officer; and that this act is immediately necessary because it makes clear that the mayor is the chief executive officer and allows the mayor to appoint the city manager as his or her designee to serve on essential boards and commissions. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 801, § 2: Mar. 30, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the ability to utilize citizens as members of municipal boards, commissions, and task forces is essential to carrying out the functions of local government; that the restriction in this statute threatens the ability to attract citizen volunteers; and that this act is immediately necessary because of the dire need of municipalities to be able to use these volunteer citizens. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2011, No. 1185, § 21: Oct. 2, 2011.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 181 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

14-47-101. Applicability generally.

Any city within the State of Arkansas having a population of two thousand five hundred (2,500) or more, according to the latest federal census, may become organized under the provisions of this chapter by proceeding as provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 1; 1931, No. 226, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10089; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-701.

Case Notes

Cited: Williams v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n, 249 Ark. 309, 459 S.W.2d 52 (1970); Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

14-47-102. Applicability of 1957 amendments.

Acts 1957, No. 8, amending §§ 14-47-10114-47-103, 14-47-105, 14-47-10614-47-111, 14-47-11414-47-121, 14-47-12314-47-127, 14-47-131, 14-47-133, 14-47-134, and 14-47-13614-47-139, shall be applicable to:

  1. All cities of the first and second class hereafter electing to reorganize under this chapter, as heretofore amended and as amended in this legislation; and
  2. All cities of the first and second class that have not yet consummated a reorganization into the management form of government but whose electors, prior to the enactment of this legislation, may have voted through an election held pursuant to § 14-47-106 to reorganize the city under this chapter.

History. Acts 1957, No. 8, § 22; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-732.

Case Notes

In General.

The fact that Little Rock may be the only city at the present time coming within the category mentioned in subdivision (2) does not make Acts 1957, No. 8 local legislation. Mann v. Lowry, 227 Ark. 1132, 303 S.W.2d 889 (1957).

Effect.

Acts 1957, No. 8 did not repeal the provision of Acts 1951, No. 49 relating to the election of municipal court judges in the city of Little Rock at the general municipal election. Laster v. Pruniski, 228 Ark. 132, 306 S.W.2d 123 (1957).

Validity.

The emergency clause of Acts 1957, No. 8 was valid. Mann v. Lowry, 227 Ark. 1132, 303 S.W.2d 889 (1957).

14-47-103. Savings provisions.

  1. When a city effects a change of government under this chapter, it shall remain subject to and controlled by all laws, except those inconsistent with this chapter, which on the effective date of the reorganization applied to or governed the city, including, without limiting the foregoing, laws relating to improvement districts or providing for the creation thereof.
  2. All bylaws, ordinances, and resolutions lawfully passed and in force in any city under its former organization, and not in conflict with this chapter, shall remain in force until altered or repealed by the board of directors elected under the authority of this chapter.
  3. The territorial limits of the city shall remain the same as under its former organization, and all rights and property of every description which were vested in the city under its former organization shall remain vested in it under the reorganization provided for in this chapter.
  4. No existing right or liability either in favor of or against the city or any agency thereof, including, without limiting the foregoing, improvement districts and no suit or prosecution of any kind shall be affected by the change unless otherwise provided for in this chapter.
  5. No valid pledge or mortgage of the revenues or property of the city, or of any agency or instrumentality thereof, or of any municipal improvement district, shall be impaired by the reorganization.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10091; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-703.

14-47-104. Penalties for election violations.

  1. Any person who shall perform any service in the interest of any candidate for any office provided in this chapter in consideration of any money, promise of employment, or other valuable thing or any candidate who shall pay or make promises to pay such consideration shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction by any court of competent jurisdiction, an offender shall be punished by a fine not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding thirty (30) days, or both.
  2. Any person offering a bribe, either in money or other consideration, to any elector for the purpose of influencing his or her vote at any election provided in this chapter or any elector entitled to vote at any election receiving or accepting any bribe or other consideration, any person making a false answer relative to his or her qualification to vote at the election, any person voting or offering to vote at the election, knowing he or she is not entitled to vote at the election, and any person knowingly procuring, aiding, or abetting in violation of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction, an offender shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than ten (10) days nor more than ninety (90) days, or both.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, §§ 6, 7; Pope's Dig., §§ 10094, 10095; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-706, 19-707.

14-47-105. Forms of government.

  1. The form of government created by an organization under this chapter is called the management form of city government.
  2. The form of government of a municipality operating under the control of a municipal council, under either § 14-43-201 et seq. or § 14-44-101 et seq., is called the mayor-council form of government.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 1; 1931, No. 226, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10089; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-701; Acts 2017, No. 878, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (b), substituted “under” for “pursuant to”, and substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic”.

Case Notes

Cited: Williams v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n, 249 Ark. 309, 459 S.W.2d 52 (1970).

14-47-106. Election on city manager form of government.

  1. Any city in this state having a population of two thousand five hundred (2,500) or more according to the most recent federal census may call and hold an election to determine whether or not the city shall be organized under and governed by the manager form of city government as provided for in this chapter.
  2. The proceeding shall be in the following manner:
      1. When petitions containing the signatures of electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of ballots cast for all candidates for mayor in the preceding general city election are presented to the mayor, the mayor by proclamation shall submit the question of organizing the city under the manager form of government to the electors of the city at a special election to be held in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
      2. The proclamation shall be published at length in some newspaper published in the city for one (1) time, and notice of the election shall be published in some newspaper published in the city one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks, the first publication to be not less than fifteen (15) days before the date set for the election. No other notice of the election shall be necessary;
      1. At the special election for the submission or resubmission of the proposition, the ballots shall contain substantially the following:
        1. The election thereon shall be conducted, the vote canvassed, and the result thereof declared in the same manner as provided by law in respect to other city elections.
        2. The county board of election commissioners shall certify the result to the mayor. This result shall be conclusive and not subject to attack unless suit is brought in the circuit court of the county in which the city is situated to contest the certification within thirty (30) days after the certification;
      1. If a majority of the votes cast on the proposition is against the organization of the city under this chapter, the question of adopting the manager form of government shall not be resubmitted to the voters of that city for adoption within four (4) years thereafter. It shall be resubmitted then only upon presentation to the mayor of petitions signed by electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of ballots cast for all candidates for mayor at the preceding general city election.
        1. If a majority of the votes cast on the proposition at any such election shall be for the organization of the city under this chapter, the mayor shall file certificates stating that the proposition was adopted with the Secretary of State and with the county clerk of the county in which the city is situated. The mayor shall call a special election to be held in the city for the purpose of electing seven (7) city directors.
        2. This election shall be called and conducted and the results determined and certified as provided in § 14-47-110.

“FOR the proposition to organize this city under Act 99 of the General Assembly of 1921, as amended

AGAINST the proposition to organize this city under Act 99 of the General Assembly of 1921, as amended

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 10090; Acts 1947, No. 403, § 1; 1957, No. 8, § 2; 1965, No. 157, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-702; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 31; 2007, No. 1049, § 50; 2009, No. 1480, § 68.

Publisher's Notes. Act 99 of the General Assembly of 1921, referred to in this section, is codified as § 14-47-101 et seq.

Acts 1965, No. 157, § 5, provided that it is the intent and purpose of this act to make uniform the requirements for a city having the aldermanic form of government to submit to a vote the question of adopting the manager form of government and for a city having the manager form of government to submit to a vote the question of adopting the aldermanic form of government.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (b)(1)(A).

Case Notes

Approval.

The city manager form of government may be put into operation under this section as amended in 1957, even though the election at which the electors of the city voted in favor of the city manager plan was prior to the time of the 1957 amendment. Mann v. Lowry, 227 Ark. 1132, 303 S.W.2d 889 (1957).

14-47-107. Subsequent election on mayor-council form of government.

      1. After the expiration of six (6) years from the date on which the first board of directors takes office in a city organized under this chapter, a petition may be presented to the mayor by the board of directors by ordinance or by petition signed by electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of ballots cast for the position of mayor in the immediately preceding mayoral general election.
      2. Upon the receipt of a petition under this subdivision (a)(1), the mayor by proclamation shall submit the question of organization of the city under the mayor-council form of government at a special election to be held in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
      1. The proclamation shall be published at length one (1) time in a newspaper published in the city.
        1. Notice of the election shall be published in a newspaper published in the city one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks, the first publication to be not less than fifteen (15) days before the date set for the election.
        2. No other notice of the election is necessary.
  1. If the plan is not adopted by a majority of the voters voting upon that issue at the special election called, the question of adopting the mayor-council form of government shall not be resubmitted to the voters of the city for adoption within four (4) years thereafter. Then the question to adopt shall be resubmitted upon the presentation to the mayor of a petition signed by electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of votes cast for the position of mayor in the immediately preceding mayoral general election.
  2. At the special election for the submission or resubmission of the proposition, the ballots shall read:
    1. The election thereupon shall be conducted, the votes canvassed, and the result declared in the same manner as provided by law in respect to other city elections.
      1. The county board of election commissioners shall certify the result to the mayor.
      2. The result shall be conclusive and not subject to attack unless suit is brought within thirty (30) days after the certification by the county board of election commissioners in the circuit court of the county in which the city is situated to contest the certification.
    1. Except as provided in subdivision (e)(2) of this section, if the majority of the votes cast on the issue are in favor of organization of the city under the mayor-council form of government, the city shall proceed to the election of all of the city officials who were subject to election in the city immediately before the date on which the city was organized under the management form of city government.
    2. At the time the reorganization is effective under this chapter:
      1. The mayor shall continue in office until the remainder of his or her term of office; and
      2. A member of the city board of directors shall become a member of the city council and shall continue in office until the remainder of his or her term of office.
    3. In a city that has a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) persons according to the most recent federal decennial census:
      1. A person who is on the ballot in 2020 to become a member of the city council shall serve a term of two (2) years if elected; and
      2. At the 2022 General Election, the newly elected city council members shall draw initial two-year or four-year terms to result in staggered four-year terms.
  3. If no suit is brought to contest the certification of the results of the election within the thirty-day period after the certification, the mayor shall file certificates stating that the proposition was adopted with the Secretary of State and county clerk of the county in which the city is situated.
    1. The election of the city officials shall be held at the next time provided for the election of city officials under the statutes then in effect pertaining to the mayor-council form of government pertaining to the class of cities to which the particular city belongs.
      1. All laws pertaining to the mayor-council form of government for such class of cities shall apply.
        1. On the date as prescribed by such laws when newly elected city officials take office, the term of office of all members of the board of directors shall terminate, and the transition to the mayor-council form of government shall be completed.
        2. If, under the mayor-council form of government, the terms of council members are staggered, determination shall be made by lot and the length of the terms fixed accordingly.
  4. The provisions of this section for converting to the mayor-council form of government shall be in addition to the right to change to the mayor-council or any other form of municipal government that may exist under present law.
    1. When a municipality elects to adopt the mayor-council form of government in the manner provided in this section, the question of reorganizing the municipality under the manager form shall not be submitted to the electors within a period of six (6) years, and thereafter only in the manner provided in § 14-47-106.
    2. If the qualified electors of the municipality do not approve the organization of the municipality under the manager form of government at the election, the proposition shall not again be submitted to the electors of the city for a period of four (4) years, and then only in the manner provided in § 14-47-106.

“FOR the proposition to organize this city under the mayor-council form of government

AGAINST the proposition to organize this city under the mayor-council form of government

History. Acts 1957, No. 8, § 26, as added by Acts 1957, No. 389, § 1; 1965, No. 22, § 1; 1965, No. 157, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-733; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 32; 2007, No. 1049, § 51; 2009, No. 1480, § 69; 2013, No. 1291, § 1; 2017, No. 878, § 4; 2019, No. 1092, §§ 2, 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1965, No. 157, § 5, provided that it is the intent and purpose of this act to make uniform the requirements for a city having the aldermanic form of government to submit to a vote the question of adopting the manager form of government and for a city having the manager form of government to submit to a vote the question of adopting the aldermanic form of government.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a)(1).

The 2013 amendment substituted “for the position of mayor” for “for all candidates for director in that position for which the greatest number of ballots were cast” in (a)(1) and (b); inserted “one (1) time” preceding “in some newspaper” in (a)(2); and inserted “immediately” and “mayoral” in (a)(1) and (b).

The 2017 amendment substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic” in the section heading and throughout the section; substituted “council members” for “alderman” in (g)(2)(B)(ii); inserted “of government” in (i)(2); and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment added the (a)(1)(A) and (B) and (a)(2)(A) and (B) designations; rewrote (a)(1)(A); substituted “Upon the receipt of a petition under this subdivision (a)(1)” for “Whereupon” in (a)(1)(B); substituted “a newspaper” for “some newspaper” twice in (a)(2); substituted “is necessary” for “shall be necessary” in (a)(2)(B)(ii); and rewrote (e).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

There is nothing in Ark. Const. Amend. 7 limiting the power of the legislature to pass an act authorizing a city to change its form of government at a special election to be called by its mayor on the petition of a certain number of voters therein. Accordingly, this section governs the validity of the ballot procedure. Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

Scope of Election.

This section provides that the only issue to be presented is the question of whether to organize under the aldermanic form; therefore, petitions and ballot calling for the establishment of six wards were beyond statutory authority, and trial court's ruling that the proposal was invalid was proper. Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

14-47-108. Effect of reorganization.

    1. A reorganization is effective when in connection with the reorganization of a municipality under this chapter an initial board of directors shall be elected and the respective terms of office of the directors commence or when changes are made under subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section.
    2. Concurrent with the commencement of the terms of the directors:
      1. The office of mayor, as existing under the mayor-council form of government, all memberships on the city council, and all memberships on the board of public affairs shall become vacant, each of these offices being abolished as to cities reorganized under this chapter;
      2. Subject to subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section and except as is otherwise provided for city attorneys in cities with the city manager form of government, the statutory term of office of the city treasurer, city clerk, city attorney, city marshal, and recorder in cities of the second class shall cease and terminate, and the incumbent of each of these offices shall remain in office subject to removal and replacement at any time by the board of directors;
      3. Subject to subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section, in cities with the city manager form of government having a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, the statutory term of office of the city attorney shall cease and terminate, and the incumbent city attorney shall remain in office subject to removal and replacement at any time by the city manager, if the authority is vested in the city manager through:
        1. An ordinance of the board of directors; or
        2. An initiated measure adopted pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7;
      4. In cities with the city manager form of government having a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, the statutory term of office of the city attorney shall cease and terminate, and the incumbent city attorney shall remain in office subject to removal and replacement at any time by the mayor if the authority is vested in the mayor under § 14-47-140; and
        1. Every other executive officer or executive employee of the city, including, without limiting the foregoing, the city purchasing agent and the members hereinafter called “board members” of every other municipal board, authority, or commission, whether the office, employment, board, authority, or commission exists under statute or under any ordinance or resolution, whose official term of office or employment is fixed by statute, ordinance, or resolution, shall serve until the expiration of the term so fixed, after which the position held by each such executive officer, executive employee, or board member shall be filled through appointment by the board of directors, the appointees to hold at the will of the board. However, at any time in cities with the city manager form of government, the appointments shall be made by the mayor and appointees shall hold at the will of the mayor, if the mayor is authorized to make the appointments by:
          1. The board of directors, by ordinance; or
          2. An initiated measure adopted pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7.
        2. Each such executive officer or executive employee serving on the effective date of the reorganization, and whose office or employment carries no fixed term created either by statute, ordinance, or resolution shall be subject to removal and replacement at any time by the board of directors or the mayor, if authorized.
        3. However, the provisions of this subdivision (a)(2)(E) shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section and to the exceptions therein contained.
    1. It is expressly directed that a reorganization under this chapter shall not affect, impair, or terminate the employment of any city officers or employees whose employment is subject to, or regulated by, civil service laws.
      1. The reorganization shall not operate to abolish, terminate, or otherwise affect any of the following departments, commissions, authorities, agencies, or offices of the city government then existing:
        1. Waterworks commission existing under §§ 14-234-301 — 14-234-309;
        2. Sewer committee existing under § 14-235-206;
        3. Airport commission existing under § 14-359-103;
        4. Housing authority existing under § 14-169-208;
        5. Any board of civil service commissioners serving under § 14-49-201 et seq., § 14-50-201 et seq., § 14-51-201 et seq., or under any other statute enacted;
        6. Auditorium commission existing under § 14-141-104;
        7. Library trustees existing under § 13-2-502;
        8. City planning commission existing under Acts 1929, No. 108, § 1 [repealed]; or
        9. Board of commissioners of any improvement district.
        1. The reorganization shall not terminate, impair, or otherwise affect the official status, tenure of office, or powers of the persons serving as commissioners, committee members, trustees, or members of any of the boards, authorities, commissions, agencies, or departments listed in this subdivision (b)(2).
        2. This power, whether consisting of the power to appoint or the power to confirm appointments or nominations, as may be vested in the municipal council immediately prior to the reorganization in respect to the filling of vacancies on the boards, authorities, commissions, agencies, departments, or in the judgeships listed in this subdivision (b)(2)(B) shall be transferred to and vested in the board of directors or the mayor, if the mayor has appointment power pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(E) of this section. Each appointee designated by the board or by the mayor, if authorized, to fill a vacancy in any such position shall serve for the statutory term, if any, applicable to the vacancy or, if there is no statutory term, shall serve at the will of the board or the mayor, if authorized.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10091; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 3; 1957, No. 226, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-703; Acts 2001, No. 1472, § 1; 2001, No. 1473, §§ 1, 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 28; 2003, No. 1185, § 29; 2007, No. 689, § 2; 2007, No. 729, § 1; 2017, No. 878, § 5.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1929, No. 108, § 1, referred to in this section, was repealed by Acts 1957, No. 186, and a new law enacted; see § 14-56-401 et seq.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic” in (a)(2)(A).

Cross References. Transition provisions, tenure of present justices and judges, and jurisdiction of present courts, Ark. Const., Amend. 80, § 19.

14-47-109. Board of directors generally.

    1. The seven (7) directors elected by a city reorganized under this chapter shall be known and designated as the board of directors of that city.
    2. The board shall constitute the supreme legislative and executive body of the city and, subject to § 14-47-120(10), shall be vested with all powers and authority which, immediately prior to the effective date of the reorganization, were vested under then-existing laws, ordinances, and resolutions in the mayor and council of that city and in its board of public affairs.
    3. Except where expressly permitted under this chapter, a board member may not serve the city in any other capacity.
    1. For election purposes, the positions on the board shall be permanently designated as positions numbered respectively as “one”, “two”, “three”, “four”, “five”, “six”, and “seven”.
      1. Each candidate for election to membership on the board shall specify the position for which he or she is running.
      2. The electors shall vote separately on the candidates for each position, with the position sought by each candidate to be shown on the ballot.
  1. The candidate for any designated position on the board of directors who, in any general or special election, shall receive votes greater in number than those cast in favor of any other candidate for the position shall be deemed to be elected.
    1. All regular and special elections of directors shall be nonpartisan, the ballots to show no party designation.
    2. In all regular and special elections, each candidate for the office of director shall be elected by the electors of the city at large.
    3. A director shall not be prohibited from holding successive terms of office.
    1. Any director elected at a special election shall take office on the first Monday following the certification of his or her election as required in this chapter.
    2. A director elected at a regular election shall take office on January 1 next following his or her election.
    1. At any regular or special election for the election of a director, any adult person who has resided within the municipality for at least thirty (30) days and is qualified to vote at an election of county or state officers shall be deemed a qualified elector.
    2. Any person more than twenty-one (21) years of age possessing these same qualifications also shall be eligible to run for the office of director.
  2. When a city is reorganized under this chapter, at the first meeting of its initial board, the seven (7) directors will be divided by lot into two (2) classes. The tenure of office of those in each class shall be as follows:
    1. Those in class number one, which shall contain three (3) members, shall serve until and including December 31 following the first regular election held after their term of office commences and until their successors have been elected and qualified. Thereafter, those in class number one shall serve four-year terms; and
    2. Those in class number two, which shall contain four (4) members, shall serve until and including December 31 following the second regular election held after their term of office commences and until their successors have been elected and qualified. Thereafter, those in class number two shall serve four-year terms.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 10092; Acts 1947, No. 403, § 2; 1957, No. 8, § 4; 1973, No. 168, § 1; 1979, No. 68, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-704; Acts 1989, No. 905, § 6.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1973, No. 498, § 4, provided that the provisions of this act shall be supplemental to the provisions of Act 99 of 1921, as amended, and shall repeal only those laws or parts of laws that specifically conflict.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Provisions in subsection (c), as amended by Act 168 of 1973, tended to disenfranchise many voters and were therefore invalid. Mears v. City of Little Rock, 256 Ark. 359, 508 S.W.2d 750 (1974).

At-Large Elections.

Black citizens who alleged that the at-large method of electing city directors effectively diluted the voting power of blacks were not entitled to injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since they did not demonstrate that they had had less opportunity than other citizens or groups of citizens to participate in the election of city directors and in the political processes and government of the city. Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock, 499 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. 1980), aff'd, Leadership Roundtable v. Little Rock, 661 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. Ark. 1981).

Candidates.

A political practice pledge is not required of the candidates for board of directors in cities operating under the city manager form of government, since all such candidates run without political affiliation. Williams v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n, 249 Ark. 309, 459 S.W.2d 52 (1970).

14-47-110. Election of directors.

  1. Candidates for the office of director shall be nominated and elected as follows:
        1. A special election to elect the initial membership of the board shall be called by the mayor as provided in § 14-47-106.
        2. The mayor's proclamation shall be in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq.
        1. A special election to fill any vacancy under § 14-47-113 shall be called through a resolution of the board of directors.
        2. A proclamation announcing the holding of the election shall be signed by the mayor and published in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq.;
    1. The petition mentioned in subdivision (a)(3) of this section supporting the candidacy of each candidate to be voted upon at any general or special election shall be filed with the city clerk or recorder not more than one hundred two (102) days nor fewer than eighty-one (81) days before the election by 12:00 noon;
        1. In respect to both special and general elections, the name of each candidate shall be supported by a petition, signed by at least fifty (50) qualified electors of the municipality, requesting the candidacy of the candidate.
        2. The petition shall show the residence address of each signer and shall carry an affidavit signed by one (1) or more persons, in which the affiant or affiants shall vouch for the eligibility of each signer of the petition.
      1. Each petition shall be substantially in the following form:
      2. A petition for nomination shall not show the name of more than one (1) candidate.
        1. The name of the candidate mentioned in each petition, together with a copy of the election proclamation if the election is a special election, shall be certified by the city clerk or recorder to the county board of election commissioners not less than seventy-five (75) days before the election unless the clerk or recorder finds that the petition fails to meet the requirements of this chapter.
          1. Whether the names of the candidates so certified to the county board of election commissioners are to be submitted at a biennial general election or at a special election held on a different date, the election board shall have general supervision over the holding of each municipal election.
          2. In this connection, the board shall post the nominations, print the ballots, establish the voting precincts, appoint the election judges and clerks, determine and certify the result of the election, and determine the election expense chargeable to the city, all in the manner prescribed by law in respect to general elections. It is the intention of this chapter that the general election machinery of this state shall be utilized in the holding of all general and special elections authorized under this chapter.
          3. The result of the election shall be certified by the election board to the city clerk or recorder; and
    2. The candidate for any designated position on the board of directors who, in any general or special election, shall receive votes greater in number than those cast in favor of any other candidate for the position shall be deemed to be elected.
  2. Each director, before entering upon the discharge of his or her duties, shall take the oath of office required by Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20.

“The undersigned, duly qualified electors of the City of …, Arkansas, each signer hereof residing at the address set opposite his or her signature, hereby request that the name… be placed on the ballot as a candidate for election to Position No. … on the Board of Directors of said City of … at the election to be held in such City on the … day of …, 20…. We further state that we know said person to be a qualified elector of said City and a person of good moral character and qualified in our judgment for the duties of such office.”

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, §§ 5, 8; Pope's Dig., §§ 10093, 10096; Acts 1957, No. 8, §§ 5, 6; 1965, No. 6, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-705, 19-708; Acts 1989, No. 347, § 1; 1993, No. 541, § 1; 2001, No. 552, § 1; 2005, No. 2145, § 33; 2007, No. 1049, § 52; 2009, No. 1480, § 70; 2011, No. 1185, § 20.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(ii).

The 2011 amendment substituted “not more than one hundred two (102) days nor fewer than eighty-one (81) days” for “not more than ninety (90) days nor fewer than seventy (70) days” in (a)(2); and substituted “seventy-five (75)” for “thirty-five (35)” in (a)(3)(D)(i).

Case Notes

Elections.

Black citizens who alleged that the at large method of electing city directors effectively diluted the voting power of blacks were not entitled to injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since they did not demonstrate that they had had less opportunity than other citizens or groups of citizens to participate in the election of city directors and in the political processes and government of the city. Leadership Roundtable v. City of Little Rock, 499 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. 1980), aff'd, Leadership Roundtable v. Little Rock, 661 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. Ark. 1981).

Where appellant's petition for nomination for city director was denied because she failed to present the names and resident addresses of fifty qualified electors, appellant's request for mandamus relief to compel the city clerk to certify her as a candidate for the city director position was moot as the election had already taken place and appellant's prayer for relief could no longer be granted. Lott v. Langley, 2013 Ark. 247 (2013).

Candidates.

A political practice pledge is not required of the candidates for board of directors in cities operating under the city manager form of government, since all such candidates run without political affiliation. Williams v. Pulaski County Election Comm'n, 249 Ark. 309, 459 S.W.2d 52 (1970).

Cited: Mears v. City of Little Rock, 256 Ark. 359, 508 S.W.2d 750 (1974); Knoop v. City of Little Rock, 277 Ark. 13, 638 S.W.2d 670 (1982).

14-47-111. Refusal of director to serve.

  1. Any person who shall have been elected or appointed a director and shall neglect or refuse to qualify and serve as such shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined in any sum of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300).
  2. However, the directors, for good cause shown, may permit a director to resign.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 14; Pope's Dig., § 10102; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 8; 1983, No. 650, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-714.

14-47-112. Removal of director.

  1. The holder of office of city director is subject to removal by the electors qualified to vote for a successor of the incumbent.
  2. The procedure to effect the removal of the incumbent of this elective office shall be as follows:
        1. A petition shall be filed with the city clerk. This petition shall be signed by electors entitled to vote for a successor to the incumbent sought to be removed, equal in number to at least thirty-five percent (35%) of the number of ballots cast for all candidates for directors at the preceding primary election at which directors were nominated or elected, demanding the election of a successor of the person sought to be removed.
        2. The petition shall contain a statement of the grounds and reasons on account of which the removal is sought.
      1. The signatures to the petition need not all be appended to one (1) paper, but each signer shall add to his or her signature his or her place of residence, giving street and number, if any.
      2. One (1) of the signers of each of the papers shall make oath before an officer competent to administer oaths that the statements therein made are true as he or she believes and that each signature to the paper appended is a genuine signature of the person whose name it purports to be.
        1. Within ten (10) days of the date of filing the petition, the city clerk shall ascertain and determine whether or not the petition is signed by the requisite number of qualified electors.
        2. If necessary, the board of directors shall allow the city clerk extra help for that purpose.
      1. The city clerk shall attach to the petition his or her certificate showing the result of his or her examination;
        1. If by the clerk's certificate the petition is shown to be insufficient, it may be amended within ten (10) days.
        2. Within ten (10) days after an amendment, the clerk shall make like examination of the amended petition.
        1. If his or her certificate shall show the amended petition to be insufficient, it shall be returned to the person filing it, without prejudice, however, to the filing of a new petition to the same effect.
        2. If the petition shall be deemed sufficient, the clerk shall submit it to the board without delay;
      1. If the board shall find the petition thus submitted to it contains the requisite number of electors signed thereto and is otherwise found to be sufficient, it shall order and fix a date for holding an election. This date shall be not less than thirty (30) days nor more than forty (40) days from the date of the clerk's certificate to the board that a sufficient petition is filed.
      2. The board shall make, or cause to be made, publication of notice and all arrangements for holding the election;
      1. The election shall be conducted, returned, and the result thereof declared in all respects as are other such elections under the general election laws of the city.
      2. At the election, the proposition submitted to the electors shall be:
      1. If the majority of votes cast on the issue shall be in favor of the removal of the officer, the officer shall be deemed removed and his or her office vacated, and it shall be filled in the manner provided for filling vacancies.
      2. If the majority of the votes cast on that issue shall be against the removal of the officer, the officer shall continue to serve.
  3. No recall petition shall be filed against any officer until he or she shall have held his or her office for at least six (6) months, nor shall any officer be subject to more than one (1) recall proceeding between biennial elections.

“FOR the removal of from the office of director” (name of officer) “AGAINST the removal of .. from the (name of officer) office of director; and”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 18; Pope's Dig., § 10106; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-718.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Constitutionality of state and local recall provisions. 13 A.L.R.6th 661.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Suit for a declaratory judgment as to constitutionality of this section was dismissed where there was no case or controversy. Cummings v. City of Fayetteville, 294 Ark. 151, 741 S.W.2d 638 (1987).

14-47-113. Director vacancy.

Whenever a vacancy shall occur by any reason in the office of a director, the board of directors shall elect a person by majority vote to fill the vacancy and serve for the unexpired term thereof.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 13; Pope's Dig., § 10101; Acts 1967, No. 188, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-713.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230 (1978).

14-47-114. Director not compensated — Per diem.

  1. The board of directors of any city with the city manager form of government may provide by ordinance for the compensation of board members.
  2. Directors of a city having a population of at least four thousand (4,000) but not more than four thousand five hundred (4,500) and located in a county having a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or more may receive a per diem to be fixed by ordinance of the board not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100) for attending designated meetings of the board. In no event shall any director receive per diem in excess of two hundred dollars ($200) for any one (1) month.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 14; Pope's Dig., § 10102; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 8; 1983, No. 650, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-714; Acts 1987, No. 458, § 1; 1991, No. 1012, § 1.

14-47-115. Prohibition against director interest in contracts.

    1. A director of the city shall not be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contracts made with the city unless the board of directors of the city shall have enacted an ordinance specifically permitting a director to conduct business with the city and prescribing the extent of this authority.
    2. This prohibition shall not apply to contracts for the furnishing of supplies, equipment, or services to be performed for a municipality by a corporation in which no director holds any executive or managerial office, or by a corporation in which a controlling interest is held by stockholders who are not directors.
  1. Any director acting on any contract with the city in which he or she is interested or receiving any benefit in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined in any sum of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 14; Pope's Dig., § 10102; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 8; 1983, No. 650, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-714.

14-47-116. Mayor.

    1. The board of directors shall organize by electing one (1) of their number as a chair to preside over the meetings of the board, the person so elected to have the title of “mayor”.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section, the mayor shall serve in this capacity for two (2) years from the date of his or her election as mayor unless his or her tenure of office as a director expires in less than two (2) years, in which event he or she will serve as mayor merely until the expiration of his or her tenure of office as director.
      2. The board of directors of any city may provide by ordinance that the term of mayor in the city shall be one (1) year, in which event the mayors of the city selected thereafter shall be selected for and serve terms of one (1) year.
    2. When the mayor's term expires, the board shall elect a successor mayor. However, the mayor shall not be prohibited from serving in this capacity for more than one (1) term.
    3. The mayor shall receive no compensation for his or her duties in such capacity but shall be reimbursed for all actual expenses incurred by him or her in the discharge of his or her duties as mayor.
  1. The mayor shall have the following powers:
    1. He or she shall preside at all meetings of the board;
    2. He or she shall be recognized as the head of the city government for all ceremonial purposes and by the Governor for the purposes of military law;
    3. He or she shall sign, on behalf of the city, all written agreements, contracts, bonds, mortgages, pledges, indentures, conveyances, and other written instruments, the execution of which has been approved by the board; and
    4. He or she may vote on all matters coming before the board but shall have no veto power.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 10096; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 6; 1985, No. 21, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-708.

14-47-117. Assistant mayor.

    1. The board shall also elect from its membership an assistant mayor who shall serve in such capacity for two (2) years or until his or her tenure of office as a director expires, whichever period may be shorter. Provided, however, that the board may prescribe at its option a method to rotate the assistant mayor among all or part of its membership for a term of not less than six (6) consecutive months.
    2. The assistant mayor shall not be prohibited from serving in such a capacity for more than one (1) term.
    1. The assistant mayor shall act as mayor during the absence or disability of the mayor.
      1. If a vacancy in the office of mayor occurs, the assistant mayor shall perform the duties of mayor until a successor mayor is elected.
        1. If the mayor shall be continuously absent or disabled for more than six (6) months, his or her office will automatically become vacant and a successor mayor shall be elected.
          1. A certificate of the city clerk or recorder, recorded in the record of the proceedings of the board, as to the absence or disability of the mayor or as to any vacancy in the office of mayor may be relied upon by all persons dealing with the municipality as conclusive evidence of the assistant mayor's authority to assume the powers of the mayor.
            1. Where any such certificate is so recorded, upon the termination of the absence or disability of the mayor and the resumption by him or her of his or her official duties as such, the city clerk or recorder shall record in the records of the board a separate certificate attesting this fact.
            2. This separate certificate shall show the date of the termination of absence or disability and resumption of duties.
          2. [Repealed.]

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 10096; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-708; Acts 1997, No. 471, § 1; 2019, No. 383, § 8.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment repealed (c).

14-47-118. Acting mayor.

If both the mayor and assistant mayor should be absent or disabled from performing their duties, the board may designate by resolution one (1) of its members as acting mayor to serve during the absence or disability and no longer.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 10096; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-708.

14-47-119. Employment of city manager.

      1. The initial board of directors, as promptly as possible after effecting its organization, shall employ a city manager.
      2. However, in cities with the city manager form of government having a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, the mayor may be authorized to employ a city manager. The mayor may be authorized by:
        1. An ordinance of the initial board; or
        2. An initiated measure, adopted pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, authorizing the mayor to employ a city manager. If the authority is vested by an initiated measure, the board shall not have the power to rescind the authority.
      1. The city manager's employment shall be for an indefinite term.
      2. Thereafter, subject only to such interruptions as are unavoidable, a city manager shall be maintained in the employ of the city.
    1. The appointment and continued employment by the board or mayor of a city manager shall be mandatory.
    1. It shall not be essential that the city manager, at the time of his or her employment, be a qualified elector of the city or of the State of Arkansas or a resident of the city or of the State of Arkansas.
    2. However, the city manager shall be a person found by the board or mayor to have special qualifications in respect to the management of municipal affairs.
    3. During his or her employment, the city manager shall reside in the city and devote his or her full time to the business of the city.
    4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b)(3) of this section regarding the residency requirements for city managers, the city manager of a city with a city manager form of government and with a population of fewer than six thousand (6,000) persons, upon approval of a majority of the board, may reside outside the city during his or her employment as city manager.
  1. A member of the board may not be appointed city manager nor acting city manager during the term for which he or she shall have been elected nor within three (3) years following the expiration of the member's term of office as director or mayor.
  2. The city manager shall receive a salary in such amount as may be fixed by the board.
  3. The board, on the vote of a majority of its elected membership, or the mayor, if authorized pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may terminate the city manager's employment at any time, either with or without cause.
    1. The city manager shall furnish a fidelity bond, the premiums on which shall be paid by the city, in such amount, on such form, and with such security as may be approved by the board.
    2. The bond, in no event, shall be less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 12; Pope's Dig., § 10100; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-712; Acts 1987, No. 25, § 1; 2001, No. 1790, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The operation of subsection (f) of this section was suspended by adoption of a self-insured fidelity bond program for public officers, officials and employees, effective July 20, 1987, pursuant to § 21-2-701 et seq. The subsection may again become effective upon cessation of coverage under that program. See § 21-2-703.

Case Notes

Status.

A city manager under this section, as amended in 1957, is an employee, and not an officer. Mann v. Lowry, 227 Ark. 1132, 303 S.W.2d 889 (1957).

14-47-120. Powers and duties of city manager.

The city manager shall have the following powers and duties:

    1. To the extent that such authority is vested in him or her through an ordinance enacted by the board of directors, a city manager may supervise and control all administrative departments, agencies, offices, and employees.
    2. In addition, in cities with a city manager form of government having a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000) persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, the city manager also shall have the authority to supervise and control the city attorney and may remove and replace the city attorney at any time at the city manager's discretion if the city manager has been given the authority to remove and replace the city attorney pursuant to § 14-47-108(a)(2);
  1. He or she shall represent the board in the enforcement of all obligations in favor of the city or its inhabitants which are imposed by law, or under the terms of any public utility franchise, upon any public utility;
  2. He or she may inquire into the conduct of any municipal office, department, or agency which is subject to the control of the board, in which connection he or she shall be given unrestricted access to the records and files of any such office, department, or agency and may require written reports, statements, audits, and other information from the executive head of the office, department, or agency;
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (4)(A)(ii) of this section, he or she shall nominate, subject to confirmation by the board, persons to fill all vacancies at any time occurring in any office, employment, board, authority, or commission to which the board's appointive power extends.
      2. If the mayor has appointment power pursuant to § 14-47-108(a)(2)(E), the nominations shall be made by the mayor.
      1. He or she may remove from office all officials and employees, including without limitation members of any board, authority, or commission who under laws, whether applicable to cities under the mayor-council or management form of government, may be removed by the city's legislative body.
        1. Removal by the city manager shall be approved by the board.
        2. Where, under the statute applicable to any specific employment or office, the incumbent may be removed only upon the vote of a specified majority of the city's legislative body, the removal of the person by the city manager may be confirmed only upon the vote of the specified majority of the members.
    1. The provisions of this subdivision (4) shall have no application to offices and employments controlled by any civil service or merit plan lawfully in effect in the city;
    1. To the extent that, and under such regulations as the board may prescribe by ordinance, he or she may:
      1. Contract for and purchase, or issue purchase authorizations for, supplies, materials, and equipment for the various offices, departments, and agencies of the city government, and he or she may contract for, or authorize contracts for, services to be rendered to the city or for the construction of municipal improvements. However, in such connection, the board shall establish by ordinance a maximum amount, and each contract, purchase, or authorization exceeding the amount so established shall be effected after competitive bidding as required in § 14-47-138;
      2. Approve for payment, out of funds previously appropriated for that purpose, or disapprove any bills, debts, or liabilities asserted as claims against the city. However, the board shall establish by ordinance in that connection a maximum amount, and the payment or disapproval of each bill, debt, or liability exceeding that amount shall require the confirmation of the board or of a committee of directors created by the board for this purpose;
      3. Sell or exchange any municipal supplies, materials, or equipment. The board shall establish by ordinance an amount, and no item or lot, to be disposed of as one (1) unit, of supplies, materials, or equipment shall be sold without competitive bidding unless the city manager shall certify in writing that in his or her opinion, the fair market value of the item or lot is less than the amount established by ordinance as prescribed; and
      4. Transfer to any office, department, or agency, or he or she may transfer from any office, department, or agency to another office, department, or agency any materials and equipment.
    2. For the purpose of assisting the city manager in transactions arising under subdivisions (5)(A)(i)-(iii) of this section, the board may appoint one (1) or more committees to be selected from its membership. Or in the alternative, it may create one (1) or more offices or departments to be composed of personnel approved by the city manager. If for these purposes the board shall create any new office or department, the person appointed to fill the office or to head the department shall be responsible to the city manager and act under his or her direction;
  3. He or she shall prepare the municipal budget annually and submit it to the board for its approval or disapproval and be responsible for its administration after adoption;
  4. He or she shall prepare and submit to the board, within sixty (60) days after the end of each fiscal year, a complete report on the finances and administrative activities of the city during the fiscal year;
  5. He or she shall keep the board advised of the financial condition and future needs of the city and make such recommendations as to him or her may seem desirable;
  6. He or she shall sign all municipal warrants when authorized by the board to do so;
  7. He or she shall have all powers, except those involving the exercise of sovereign authority, which, under statutes applicable to municipalities under the mayor-council form of government or under ordinances and resolutions of the city in effect at the time of its reorganization, may be vested in the mayor; and
  8. He or she shall perform such additional duties and exercise such additional powers as may be lawfully delegated by ordinance to him or her by the board.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 12; Pope's Dig., § 10100; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-712; Acts 1987, No. 25, § 1; 2001, No. 1790, § 1; 2003, No. 1185, § 30; 2017, No. 878, §§ 6, 7; 2019, No. 383, § 9.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “without limitation” for “without limiting the foregoing” in (4)(B)(i); and substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic” in (4)(B)(i) and (10).

The 2019 amendment substituted “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(E)” for “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(C)” in (4)(A)(ii).

Case Notes

Removal of Employees.

Trial court's failure to make factual findings as to whether interracial associations between a black man, who had been appointed to head a division of a community's model cities program, and a white woman, whom he had employed, were a factor in their discharge by city manager required a reversal of a judgment upholding the discharges. Langford v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1973).

14-47-121. Acting city manager.

  1. If the city manager is absent from the city or is unable to perform his or her duties, if the board of directors or the mayor, if authorized, suspends the city manager, or if there is a vacancy in the office of city manager, the board, by resolution, or the mayor, if authorized to employ the city manager pursuant to § 14-47-119(a), may appoint an acting city manager to serve until the city manager returns, until his or her disability or suspension ceases, or until another city manager is appointed and qualifies, as the case may be.
  2. The board or the mayor, if authorized, may suspend or remove an acting city manager at any time.
    1. The board, in the exercise of its discretion, or the mayor, if authorized, may determine whether the acting city manager shall furnish bond.
    2. If in any instance the board requires the acting city manager to furnish bond, in respect to form, amount, and security it shall be subject to the approval of the board or the mayor.
  3. The acting city manager shall receive a reasonable compensation to be fixed by the board.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 12; 1957, No. 8, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-712; Acts 2001, No. 1790, § 2.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-47-122. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning police courts, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 31. The section was derived from Acts 1921, No. 99, §§ 9-11; Pope's Dig., §§ 10097-10099; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-709 — 19-711.

14-47-123. Meetings of board of directors.

    1. A majority of the elected membership of the board of directors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
    2. Except where otherwise provided by law, the concurring vote of a majority of those attending a meeting, provided a quorum is present, shall represent the action of the board.
  1. The board shall meet on days certain to be chosen in advance by the board within the first and third weeks in each calendar month, except when any meeting date falls on a legal holiday, in which event the meeting shall be held on a substituted date fixed by adjournment at the preceding meeting.
    1. Special meetings may be called at any time by the mayor or by directors representing a majority of the elected membership of the board.
    2. The board may establish by ordinance the procedure for calling and giving notice of special meetings.
  2. All meetings shall be open to the public.
  3. Every motion, resolution, and ordinance adopted by the board shall be signed by the mayor. Each of the foregoing shall be attested by the city clerk, if the municipality is a city of the first class, if otherwise, by the recorder.
  4. All laws not inconsistent with this chapter which immediately prior to its reorganization under this chapter controlled the proceedings of the council of the city, including, without limitation, procedure for the adoption, enactment, and publication of ordinances and resolutions, shall govern the proceedings of its board.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 10096; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 6; 1965, No. 6, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-708.

14-47-124. Initiative and referendum.

  1. The initiative and referendum laws of this state are applicable to cities reorganized under this chapter.
  2. The number of signatures required upon any petition shall be computed upon the highest vote cast at the preceding general election for any position on the board of directors of the municipality.
  3. Except for a municipal referendum petition concerning a municipal bond, a sponsor shall be given sixty (60) days to circulate a municipal referendum petition.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 17; Pope's Dig., § 10105; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-717; Acts 2015, No. 1093, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment added (c).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional as a violation of Ark. Const. Amend 7. Czech v. Munson, 280 Ark. 219, 656 S.W.2d 696 (1983).

Applicability.

Sections 14-47-124 and 14-55-304 dictate a deadline within which to circulate a referendum petition, not file a referendum petition with the city clerk, and the statutes do not identify when the time commences; the statutes address the circulation of referendum petitions, not the filing of referendum petitions. Pritchett v. Spicer, 2017 Ark. 82, 513 S.W.3d 252 (2017).

Sections 14-47-124 and 14-55-304 did not make the referendum petition timely because the city set the deadline at 30 days, which comported with Ark. Const. Amend 7 (which amended Ark. Const., Art. 1, § 5); to the extent that a municipality enacts measures that comport with Amendment 7, then those measures control. Pritchett v. Spicer, 2017 Ark. 82, 513 S.W.3d 252 (2017).

Signatures.

Where city clerk refused to accept referendum petition that had less than the minimum required number of signatures and complaint was filed in chancery court by proponents of petition asking that this section be declared unconstitutional and that the clerk be ordered to accept the petition, motion to dismiss complaint should have been granted, since complaint did not state a cause of action. Czech v. Munson, 280 Ark. 219, 656 S.W.2d 696 (1983).

Cited: Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992).

14-47-125. Budget and appropriations.

  1. The approval by the board of directors of the budget shall amount to an appropriation for the purposes of the budget of the funds which are lawfully applicable to the different items therein contained.
  2. The board may alter or revise the budget from time to time, and unpledged funds appropriated by the board for any specific purpose may be appropriated by subsequent action of the board to another purpose, subject to the following exceptions:
    1. Funds resulting from taxes levied under statute or ordinance for a specific purpose may not be diverted to another purpose; and
    2. Appropriated funds may not be diverted to another purpose where any creditor of the municipality would be prejudiced thereby.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 16; 1957, No. 8, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-716.

Case Notes

Cited: Prismo Universal Corp. v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 326, 472 S.W.2d 96 (1971).

14-47-126. Annual audit.

The board of directors shall be obligated to have the financial affairs of the city audited annually by the Division of Legislative Audit of the State of Arkansas or by an independent certified public accountant who is not otherwise in the service of the city.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 16; 1957, No. 8, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-716; Acts 2011, No. 623, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “the Division of Legislative Audit of the State of Arkansas or by.”

Case Notes

Cited: Prismo Universal Corp. v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 326, 472 S.W.2d 96 (1971).

14-47-127. Civil service plans.

  1. If, on the effective date of the reorganization of any city under this chapter, a civil service plan for any municipal employees or officers shall be in effect in the city, reorganization under this chapter shall not terminate or otherwise impair the civil service plan. That plan shall remain in full force and effect, subject to § 14-47-131, following the reorganization under this chapter.
  2. The municipal civil service plans made available under the provisions of § 14-49-101 et seq., § 14-50-101 et seq., and § 14-51-101 et seq. may be adopted, subject to § 14-47-131, by any city reorganized under this chapter.

History. Acts 1957, No. 8, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-720.1.

Publisher's Notes. The former last sentence of this section provided that, inasmuch as civil service programs are made available under the statutes enumerated to cities organized under this chapter, Acts 1921, No. 99, § 20, providing for a civil service commission, was repealed.

14-47-128. Deferred compensation agreements.

  1. Any city in the State of Arkansas organized and operating under a management form of municipal government is authorized and empowered to enter into a deferred compensation agreement with any employee of the city for the purpose of deferring payment of any portion of the employee's salary or income and to deposit the deferred compensation funds with a third party, agreed to in writing by the employee, in trust, with directions that the funds be paid to the employee as authorized by the deferred compensation agreement.
  2. For the purposes of this section, a “deferred compensation agreement” is any agreement approved by the city for its employees and executed by an employee of the city, the city, and a third party, as trustee, chosen by the employee, where the third party agrees to pay a periodic income to the employee in the event of retirement or disability or to the employee's beneficiary in the event of death.
  3. Deferred compensation funds deposited with a third party trustee as provided for in this section may be invested and reinvested by the trustee in any manner which, in its sole discretion, it deems desirable, notwithstanding legal limitations on the investment of public funds as provided for by the laws of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1975, No. 874, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1047, §§ 19-736 — 19-738.

14-47-129. Dependents of killed police officer or firefighter.

  1. Whenever a police officer or firefighter of the city is killed in the actual performance of his or her official duties, the board of directors shall cause to be set aside for the use and benefit of his or her spouse and children or others necessarily dependent upon him or her for their support, if they survive him or her, the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  2. This sum shall be paid in installments as shall be required and, in the judgment of the boards, as shall be deemed advisable.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 30; Pope's Dig., § 10118; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-728.

14-47-130. Public health jurisdiction.

  1. The board of directors shall have power to pass such ordinances and to make and enforce such rules and regulations as shall be necessary to promote the public health and to prevent and control disease.
  2. Their jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to health and sanitation, and for purposes of quarantine, shall extend five (5) miles beyond the city limits.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 21; Pope's Dig., § 10109; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-721.

14-47-131. Creation of new departments, etc.

  1. The board of directors may from time to time by ordinance:
    1. Create any new municipal:
      1. Department;
      2. Office;
      3. Employment;
      4. Board;
      5. Authority;
      6. Commission; or
      7. Agency;
      1. Appoint the personnel to serve in the department, office, employment, board, authority, commission, or agency.
      2. However, the appointment of personnel shall be by the mayor if the mayor has appointment power pursuant to § 14-47-108(a)(2)(E);
    2. Fix the term of employment and compensation of each appointee; and
    3. Specify whether each appointee shall or shall not be subject to the city's civil service or merit system.
    1. By ordinance, the board also, in the exercise of its discretion, may consolidate the office of city treasurer with the office of city clerk or such other office or position as the board, by ordinance, may charge with the responsibility of administering the financial affairs of the city.
    2. The board may:
      1. Delegate all of the duties of the city treasurer to the person holding that office or position in the city;
      2. Fill the consolidated office by appointment;
      3. Fix the term and compensation of the appointee; and
      4. Specify whether the appointee shall be subject to the city's civil service or merit system.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 16; 1957, No. 8, § 10; 1959, No. 50, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-716; Acts 2001, No. 1473, § 4; 2019, No. 383, § 10.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(E)” for “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(C)” in (a)(2)(B).

Case Notes

Cited: Prismo Universal Corp. v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 326, 472 S.W.2d 96 (1971).

14-47-132. Vacancy on municipal board, etc.

  1. Any vacancy on any municipal board or commission of any city of the first class having a population of fewer than fifty thousand (50,000) and having a city manager form of government shall be filled by a majority vote of the board of directors of the city or by the mayor, if the mayor has appointment power pursuant to § 14-47-108(a)(2)(E).
    1. The provisions of this section shall apply to all existing boards and commissions and to all boards and commissions hereafter established in which vacancies are filled by the remaining members of the board or commission or by the city manager.
    2. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any Arkansas city which is divided by a state line from an incorporated city or town in an adjoining state.

History. Acts 1971, No. 74, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-734, 19-735; Acts 2001, No. 1473, § 5; 2019, No. 383, § 11.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(E)” for “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(C)” in (a).

14-47-133. Appointees generally.

  1. Subject to the exceptions contained in § 14-47-108, every person appointed by the board of directors or by the mayor, if authorized as provided in § 14-47-108(a)(2)(E), to any municipal office, employment, or position or to membership on any board, authority, or commission shall serve for such time and shall receive such compensation as the board of directors may fix and determine by ordinance.
  2. This section is applicable even in respect to offices and employments which, under statutes applicable to the mayor-council form of government, were held for a fixed term or on a salary basis fixed by statute.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 16; 1957, No. 8, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-716; Acts 2001, No. 1473, § 6; 2017, No. 878, § 8; 2019, No. 383, § 12.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (b), substituted “is applicable” for “shall be applicable”, and substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(E)” for “§ 14-47-108(a)(2)(C)” in (a).

Case Notes

Cited: Prismo Universal Corp. v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 326, 472 S.W.2d 96 (1971).

14-47-134. Qualifications of appointees.

      1. In the exercise by the board of directors of its authority in respect to the filling of vacancies in executive positions and memberships on municipal boards, authorities, and commissions, only those qualified electors of the city found by the directors to possess the necessary qualifications shall be appointed or confirmed.
      2. Provided, a board of directors may appoint, at its discretion, persons who reside outside the city to museum boards and commissions.
    1. In filling vacancies on any municipal board, authority, or commission, unless the statute applicable to the position forbids the appointment thereto of a city employee, the city manager, if otherwise qualified, shall be an eligible appointee.
    2. The city manager, however, shall not be, ex officio, a member of any municipal board, authority, or commission.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 3; 1957, No. 8, § 3; 1967, No. 165, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-703; Acts 1999, No. 1295, § 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1999, No. 1295, § 1, provided:

“Legislative Findings. The current Arkansas law concerning qualifications for appointment to municipal boards, authorities, and commissions in cities operated under the city manager form of government limits appointment, with one (1) exception, to qualified electors of the city. However, museums attract many visitors from outside the city and develop a statewide utilization in addition to the local use. The appointment of persons who reside outside the city to these museum boards and commissions would enhance financial support for the local facility and increase daily attendance. It is thus appropriate in certain circumstances, in the sound discretion of the city board of directors, to provide for the appointment of persons who reside outside the city limits to such museum boards and commissions.”

14-47-135. Relations barred from employment.

No person shall hold an appointive position or employment in the pay of the city if that person is related by blood or marriage in the third degree either to a member of the board of directors or to the city manager. Provided, however, this prohibition shall not prevent a person who holds an appointive or employment position with the city at the time the person's relative becomes city manager or a member of the board of directors from continuing in that position or employment.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 32; Pope's Dig., § 10120; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-730; Acts 1993, No. 117, § 1.

14-47-136. Bond of officers and employees.

All officers and employees of a city reorganized under this chapter with the exception of the city manager, whose bond requirement is controlled by § 14-47-119, shall be required to make bond in such amount, on such form, and with such security as may meet the approval of the board of directors.

History. Acts 1957, No. 8, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-729.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-47-137. Prohibited actions by officers or employees.

    1. An officer or employee elected or appointed in any city shall not be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract or job for work or materials, or the profits, or service to be furnished or performed for the city unless the board of directors of the city has enacted an ordinance specifically permitting an officer or employee to conduct business with the city and prescribing the extent of this authority.
    2. This prohibition shall not apply to contracts for the furnishing of supplies, equipment, or services to be performed for a municipality by a corporation in which an officer does not hold any executive or managerial office or by a corporation in which a controlling interest is held by stockholders who are not officers or employees.
    3. This prohibition shall not apply to contracts for the furnishing of supplies, equipment, or services to be performed for a municipality by a volunteer who has been appointed to a municipal board, municipal commission, or municipal task force.
    1. An officer or employee shall not accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any frank, pass, free ticket, or free service from any person, firm, or corporation operating within the territorial limits of the city any public transportation service, gas works, waterworks, electric light or power plant, heating plant, telegraph line or telephone exchange, or other business acting or operating under a public franchise of the city; nor shall any officer or employee accept or receive, directly or indirectly, from any person, firm, or corporation, or its agents, any other service upon terms more favorable than those granted to the public generally.
    2. The prohibition of free transportation shall not apply to police officers or firefighters in uniform, nor shall any free service to city officials heretofore provided by franchise or ordinance be affected by this subsection.
  1. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined in a sum of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), and every such contract or agreement shall be void.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 16; Pope's Dig., § 10104; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 10; 1983, No. 650, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-716; Acts 2011, No. 801, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (a)(3).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Official misconduct under the Arkansas Criminal Code, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 160.

Case Notes

Cited: Prismo Universal Corp. v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 326, 472 S.W.2d 96 (1971).

14-47-138. Competitive bidding required.

    1. Before making a purchase of or contract for supplies, materials, or equipment and before obligating the city under a contract for the performance of services or for the construction of municipal improvements in which the anticipated cost to the city of the transaction exceeds the maximum amount established by the board of directors under the authority of § 14-47-120, opportunity for competitive bidding shall be given under such rules and regulations as the board may prescribe by ordinance, and the contract shall be consummated only on a bid approved by the city manager and by the board.
    2. Competitive bids may be accepted in the form of a written bid or by electronic media.
  1. The board, by ordinance, may waive the requirement of competitive bidding in exceptional situations where this procedure is not feasible, but lacking such exceptional situations, the board may not except any particular contract, purchase, or sale from the requirement of competitive bidding.
  2. All purchase and sale records of the city shall be open to public inspection.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 16; 1957, No. 8, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-716; Acts 2017, No. 170, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (a)(2) and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

In General.

A city is required to solicit bids for all contracts except where there is an affirmative showing, by enactment of a separate ordinance, that the solicitation of bids is not feasible or practical. Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 293 Ark. 128, 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987).

Damages.

Violation of this section did not give rise to a claim for damages. Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 297 Ark. 385, 762 S.W.2d 388 (1988).

Professional Services.

Contracts for professional services are not exempt from the competitive bidding requirements of § 14-58-303 or this section. Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 293 Ark. 128, 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987).

Cited: Prismo Universal Corp. v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 326, 472 S.W.2d 96 (1971).

14-47-139. Public utility franchises, etc.

Every ordinance or resolution granting any public utility franchise, or granting the right to occupy the streets, highways, bridges, or other public places in the city for any purpose shall be completed in the form in which it is finally passed and remain on file with the city clerk for public inspection at least one (1) week before its final passage or adoption.

History. Acts 1921, No. 99, § 15; Pope's Dig., § 10103; Acts 1957, No. 8, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-715.

14-47-140. Powers and duties of mayor.

    1. Any municipality organized and operating under the city manager form of government may authorize the mayor of the municipality to have the following duties and powers by ordinance or by a majority of the qualified electors of the municipality by petition:
        1. The power to veto an ordinance, a resolution, or an order adopted by the municipal board of directors.
          1. The municipal board of directors may override the veto by a two-thirds vote of the number of members of the board.
          2. The mayor shall be entitled to vote only in case of a tie vote, and his or her presence may be counted to establish a quorum for the conduct of business;
      1. The power to appoint, subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the municipal board of directors, persons to fill vacancies on any board, authority, or commission of the municipality;
        1. The power to hire the city manager and to designate the city manager to serve in the mayor's stead on any board or commission that requires the service of the chief executive officer of the city.
        2. The power to hire the city manager under subdivision (a)(1)(C)(i) of this section is subject to:
          1. The approval of a majority of the members of the municipal board of directors; or
          2. Override by a two-thirds vote of the members of the municipal board of directors;
      2. The power to remove the city manager, subject to:
        1. The approval of a majority of the members of the municipal board of directors; or
        2. Override by a two-thirds vote of the members of the municipal board of directors;
      3. The power to prepare and submit to the municipal board of directors for its approval the annual municipal budget;
      4. The power to hire the city attorney, subject to:
        1. The approval of a majority of the members of the municipal board of directors; or
        2. Override by a two-thirds vote of the members of the municipal board of directors; and
      5. The power to remove the city attorney, subject to:
        1. The approval of a majority of the members of the municipal board of directors; or
        2. Override by a two-thirds vote of the members of the municipal board of directors.
    2. If the ordinance under subdivision (a)(1) of this section is adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of the municipal board of directors or the petition under subdivision (a)(1) of this section is approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the municipality, the mayor shall have the powers and duties authorized under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
      1. Subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) of this section do not apply to offices and employments controlled by any civil service or merit plan lawfully in effect in the municipality.
      2. In municipalities that maintain district courts, the district court judge and the district court clerk shall be elected and appointed in the manner prescribed by law.
    3. A mayor who has the duties and powers authorized under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be compensated with salary and benefits comparable to the salary and benefits of an official or employee of the municipality with similar executive duties and powers.
  1. If called by petition of the qualified electors of the municipality, the special election under this section shall comply with the following:
    1. A petition under subsection (a) of this section shall be filed with the clerk of the city;
    2. Each signature on a petition filed shall have been signed within one hundred eighty (180) days prior to filing;
    3. The clerk of the city shall note on the petition the date and time filed; and
    4. If a petition contains the signatures of electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the number of ballots cast for the mayor in the last mayoral election, or if the mayor is not directly elected, for the director position receiving the highest number of votes in the last general election, then the clerk of the city shall deliver the petitions to the mayor who shall by proclamation submit the question to the electors at a special election, provided that:
      1. The clerk of the city shall verify the number of signatures and the authenticity of the signatures on the petition within ten (10) days of the date they are filed;
      2. If there are insufficient signatures on the petition, the petitioners shall not receive an extension for the petition; and
      3. If there is a sufficient number of signatures on the petition but the clerk of the city is unable to verify the required number of signatures and the authenticity of the signatures, then the petitioners shall be given ten (10) days to provide a sufficient number of verified signatures.
  2. The proclamation submitting the question under subsection (a) of this section to the qualified electors of the municipality shall be issued within three (3) working days of the date the clerk of the city verifies the number of signatures on the petition or within three (3) working days of the date a referendum ordinance is passed by the municipal board of directors.
  3. The special election shall be held not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days after the proclamation.
    1. If two (2) or more groups file petitions seeking a special election under subsection (a) of this section and the petition filed first is declared insufficient, then the city clerk shall determine the sufficiency of the petition that was filed next in time.
    2. Upon a declaration that a petition is sufficient and first in time, then a petition filed after the first sufficient petition and before the special election shall be deemed moot and shall be destroyed.
  4. If an election held under subsection (a) of this section results in the adoption of the question under subsection (a) of this section, then the adopted question shall not be presented again to the electors for a period of four (4) years from the date of the election.
  5. If an election held under subsection (a) of this section results in the failure to adopt the question under subsection (a) of this section, then the failed question shall not be presented again to the electors for a period of two (2) years from the date of the election.
  6. Notice of the election shall be given by the clerk of the city by one (1) publication in a newspaper having general circulation within the city not less than ten (10) calendar days before the election.
  7. Within thirty (30) calendar days after completion of the tabulation of the votes, the mayor of the city shall proclaim the results of the election by issuing a proclamation and publishing it one (1) time in a newspaper having general circulation within the city.
  8. The results of the election as stated in the proclamation shall be conclusive unless a suit contesting the proclamation is filed in the circuit court in the county where the election took place within thirty (30) calendar days after the date of publication of the proclamation.
  9. If the question under subsection (a) of this section is approved at an election as provided in this section, that approval shall be final and shall continue in effect thereafter as long as authorized.
  10. The mayor shall continue to be selected under § 14-61-111.
  11. At the time of a transition after an election as provided in this section, the current mayor shall continue to serve until the end of his or her elected term.

History. Acts 2007, No. 689, § 1; 2011, No. 608, § 1; 2017, No. 260, § 7; 2019, No. 978, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 19(B)(2) provided: “District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Municipal Courts, Corporation Courts, Police Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts, and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these courts of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amendment on January 1, 2005. City Courts shall continue in existence after the effective date of this Amendment unless such City Court is abolished by the governing body of the city or by appropriate action of the General Assembly. Immediately upon abolition of such City Court, the jurisdiction of the City Court shall vest in the nearest District Court in the county where the city is located.”

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “municipal” in (a)(1), (a)(1)(A)(ii) (a) , (a)(1)(C), (D), (F) and (G); and added “and to designate the city manager to serve in the mayor's stead on any board or commission that requires the service of the chief executive officer of the city” at the end of (a)(1)(C).

The 2017 amendment substituted “district courts, the district court judge and the district court clerk” for “municipal courts or police courts, the municipal judge, police judge, and the clerk of both courts” in (a)(3)(B).

The 2019 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “powers by ordinance” for “powers if approved by the qualified electors of the municipality at an election called by the municipal board of directors by referendum”, inserted “a majority of”, and substituted “petition” for “initiative”; inserted “municipal” in (a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(E); added the (a)(1)(C)(i) designation; deleted “subject to the approval of a majority of members of the municipal board of directors” following the first occurrence of “city manager”; added (a)(1)(C)(ii); deleted “the approval” following “subject to” in the introductory languages of (a)(1)(D) and (a)(1)(F); added the (a)(1)(D)(i) designation; added (a)(1)(D)(ii); added the (a)(1)(F)(i) designation; in (a)(1)(F)(i) and (a)(1)(G)(i), inserted “The approval” and inserted “the” preceding “members”; added (a)(1)(F)(ii); added (a)(1)(G)(ii); inserted “the ordinance under subdivision (a)(1) of this section is adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of the municipal board of directors or” in (a)(2); substituted “section do not” for “section shall not” in (a)(3)(A); substituted “petition” for “initiative” in the introductory language of (b); deleted former (e)(1); redesignated (e)(2) as (e)(1) and redesignated the remaining subdivision accordingly; and made stylistic changes.

Chapter 48 City Administrator Form of Municipal Government

Effective Dates. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 20: Feb. 2, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found, and is hereby declared, that the City Administrator form of city government authorized under this Act provides an improved and superior method for the administration and government of cities of the first and second class; that many Arkansas cities would be greatly benefited by immediately changing from the commission, aldermanic or City Manager to the City Administrator form of government; that the passage of this Act will make available to cities of the first and second class whose present government is inadequate or inefficient, an opportunity to reorganize hereunder and thereby greatly improve the efficiency and economy of their respective municipal governments. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and, this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 49, § 7: Feb. 7, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law pertaining to the recall of municipal officials is confusing and conficting; that this Act clarifies the law; and that clarification should go into effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 32: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 33: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Case Notes

Cited: City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 294 Ark. 311, 742 S.W.2d 921 (1988).

14-48-101. Applicability.

  1. Any municipality of this state having a population of two thousand five hundred (2,500) or more inhabitants, according to the most recent federal census, or any city of the first class may call and hold an election on the question of becoming organized under, and governed by, the city administrator form of government authorized in this chapter.
  2. Any such election shall be called and conducted in the manner provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-801.

14-48-102. Savings provisions.

  1. When a city effects a change of government under this chapter, it shall remain subject to and controlled by all laws, except those inconsistent with this chapter which on the effective date of the reorganization applied to or governed the city, including, without limiting the foregoing, the laws relating to improvement districts.
  2. The city, as reorganized, shall have all of the rights, powers, and authority which it had immediately prior to reorganization and shall also be entitled to exercise any right, power, or authority, except those inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, which are permitted cities organized under any other form of government.
  3. In cities having the commission form of government immediately preceding the adoption of the city administrator form of government, the board of directors elected under the authority of this chapter may organize or reorganize by ordinance duly adopted any municipal board, commission, authority, agency, or department under the general laws of the state for municipalities having the mayor-council form of government. However, no reorganization shall be lawful which impairs the validity of existing contracts.
  4. All bylaws, ordinances, and resolutions lawfully passed and in force in the city under its former organization and not in conflict with this chapter shall remain in force until altered or repealed by the board elected under the authority of this chapter.
  5. The territorial limits of the city shall remain the same as under its former organization. All rights and property of every description which were vested in it shall remain unimpaired by the reorganization provided for in this chapter.
  6. No existing right or liability either in favor of or against the city or any agency thereof, including, without limiting the foregoing, improvement districts and no suit or prosecution of any kind shall be affected by the change unless otherwise provided for in this chapter.
  7. No valid pledge or mortgage of the revenues or property of the city or of any agency or instrumentality thereof or of any municipal improvement district shall be impaired by the reorganization.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-807; Acts 2017, No. 878, § 9.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in the first sentence of (c), substituted “under” for “pursuant to the authority provided in” and substituted “mayor-council” for “mayor-aldermanic”.

Case Notes

Applicability.

City lost the protection of the saving clause when, at the time of the government reorganization, it promoted firemen in accordance with the law governing cities of the first class having a city administrator form of government contained in this chapter, and including § 14-51-301, which requires promotion solely on the basis of examination. City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748 (1991).

Repeal.

No legislative intent found to repeal this section. City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 294 Ark. 311, 742 S.W.2d 921 (1988).

14-48-103. Form of government.

The form of municipal government authorized by this chapter shall be known as the city administrator form of municipal government.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-801.

14-48-104. Submission of governmental form question to electors.

  1. When petitions are filed with the county clerk containing the signatures of qualified electors of a municipality equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of votes cast at the preceding general municipal election for all candidates for mayor in cases in which a municipality operates under the mayor-council form of government or the commission form of government and, for all candidates for the office of director, then for the director position for which the greatest number of votes were cast in the case of a municipality operating under the city manager form of government, and the petition requests that an election be called to submit the proposition of organizing the municipality under the city administrator form of municipal government authorized by this chapter, then within ten (10) days after the filing of the petition, the county clerk shall certify to the Secretary of State the number of qualified electors whose signatures appear on the petitions.
  2. If the number of signatures certified by the clerk is equal to or greater than fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of votes cast, as prescribed, the Secretary of State shall call by proclamation in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq. a special election to be held not more than ninety (90) days from the date of the clerk's certification.
    1. The election shall be called to submit the proposition of organizing the municipality under the city administrator form of municipal government authorized by this chapter.
      1. The proclamation shall be published one (1) time at length in a newspaper having a general circulation in the municipality.
      2. Notice of the election shall be published in the newspaper one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks, with the first publication to be not less than fifteen (15) days before the date set for the election.
  3. At the election, the proposition shall be submitted to the electors in substantially the following form:
    1. The election shall be conducted, the votes canvassed, and the results declared in the same manner as is provided by law with respect to other city elections.
      1. The county board of election commissioners shall certify the results of the election to the Secretary of State.
      2. The result certified shall be conclusive and not subject to attack unless suit is brought to contest the certification within fifteen (15) days after such certification in the circuit court of the county in which the municipality is situated.
  4. If a majority of the votes cast at the election shall be in favor of the proposition and no suit is brought to contest the certification of the results of the election within the fifteen-day period after the certification by the election board, then, within five (5) days, the Secretary of State shall file certificates stating that the proposition was adopted with the county clerk of the county in which the municipality is situated.
  5. The cost of the election provided in this section shall be paid by the city.

“FOR the City Administrator form of government

AGAINST the City Administrator form of government

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-802; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 34; 2007, No. 1049, § 53; 2009, No. 1480, § 71; 2017, No. 878, § 10.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (b).

The 2017 amendment, in (a), substituted “are filed” for “shall be filed”, substituted “cases in which” for “cases where”, and substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic”.

14-48-105. Procedure to change to another form of government.

  1. When the question of the adoption of the city administrator form of government is submitted to, and approved by, a majority of the qualified electors of a municipality voting on the issue, the question of changing to another form of government shall not again be submitted to the electors of that municipality for a period of four (4) years.
        1. After the expiration of four (4) years from the date on which the first board of directors and mayor take office in a city organized under this chapter, a petition signed by electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of ballots cast for all candidates for mayor in the preceding general election may be presented to the mayor, calling for an election to consider any other form of municipal government authorized by the laws of this state.
        2. As an alternative to the petition presented to the mayor by electors under subdivision (b)(1)(A)(i) of this section, a petition may be presented to the mayor by the board of directors by ordinance.
      1. At the time the reorganization is effective under this chapter:
        1. The mayor shall continue in office until the remainder of his or her term of office; and
        2. The member of the city board of directors shall become a member of the governing body and shall continue in office until the remainder of his or her term of office.
        1. Upon the receipt of a petition under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section, the mayor by proclamation in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq. shall submit the question of organization of the city under the form of government stated in the petition at a special election to be held at a time specified therein.
        2. The proclamation shall be published one (1) time at length in a newspaper having a general circulation in the city.
        1. Notice of the election shall be published one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks in a newspaper having a general circulation in the city, the first publication to be not less than fifteen (15) days before the date set for the election.
        2. No other notice of the election is necessary.
  2. At the special election for the submission or resubmission of the proposition, the ballots shall read:
    1. The election shall be conducted, the votes canvassed, and the results declared in the same manner as provided by law in respect to other city elections.
      1. The county board of election commissioners shall certify the results to the mayor.
      2. The results shall be conclusive and not subject to attack unless suit is brought in the circuit court of the county in which the city is situated to contest the certification within thirty (30) days after certification by the county board of election commissioners.
  3. If no suit is brought to contest the certification of the results of the election on the question of the form of government within the thirty-day period after certification, the mayor shall file certificates stating that the proposition was adopted with the Secretary of State and county clerk of the county in which the city is situated.
      1. If the majority of the votes cast on that issue shall be in favor of the adoption, the city shall thereupon proceed to the election of all of the city officials required by the laws governing the form of government adopted.
      2. The election of the city officials shall be held at the next time provided for the election of city officials under the statutes then in effect pertaining to the form of government adopted for the class of cities to which the particular city belongs, and all laws pertaining to the form of government adopted for such class of cities shall apply.
        1. On the date prescribed by these laws when newly elected city officials take office, the term of office of all members of the board and mayor shall terminate and the transition to the form of government adopted shall be completed.
        2. If under the form of government adopted the terms of the officials elected are staggered, then determination shall be made by lot, and the length of the terms fixed accordingly.
    1. The provisions of this section for converting to another form of government shall be in addition to the right to change to any other form of municipal government that may exist under present law.
  4. If the plan is not adopted by a majority of the voters voting upon that issue at the special election called, the question of adopting that same form of government shall not be resubmitted to the voters of that city for adoption within four (4) years thereafter. At that time the question may be resubmitted upon the presentation to the mayor of a petition signed by electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate number of votes cast for all candidates for mayor in the preceding general election.
    1. When a municipality elects to adopt any other form of government in the manner provided in this section, the question of reorganizing the municipality under the city administrator form shall not be submitted to the electors within a period of four (4) years, and thereafter, only in the manner provided in § 14-48-104.
    2. If the qualified electors of the municipality do not approve the organization of the municipality under the city administrator form at the election, the proposition shall not again be submitted to the electors of the city for a period of four (4) years, and then, only in the manner provided in § 14-48-104.

“FOR the proposition to organize this City under the form of government

AGAINST the proposition to organize this City under the form of government

The name of the form of government specified in the petition for election shall be printed on the ballot in lieu of the blank lines appearing above.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-818; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 35; 2007, No. 1049, § 54; 2009, No. 1480, § 72; 2019, No. 1092, § 4.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (b)(2)(A)(i).

The 2019 amendment added the (b)(1)(A)(i) designation; added (b)(1)(A)(ii) and (b)(1)(B); substituted “Upon the receipt of a petition under this subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section” for “Whereupon” in (b)(2)(A)(i); substituted “a newspaper” for “some newspaper” twice in (b)(2); and substituted “is necessary” for “shall be necessary” in (b)(2)(B)(ii).

14-48-106. Effect of reorganization.

    1. When, in connection with the reorganization of a municipality under this chapter, an initial board of directors shall be elected, the reorganization shall be deemed to be effective as of the time when the respective terms of office of the directors commence.
    2. Concurrently with the commencement of the terms of the directors:
      1. The office of mayor and the offices of the members of the city council in the case of the mayor-council form of government, the office of mayor and the offices of the other members of the board of commissioners in the case of the commission form of government, and the office of the mayor, the board of directors, and the city manager in the case of the city manager form of government shall become vacant;
      2. The statutory term of office of the city treasurer, city clerk, city attorney, city marshal, and recorder in cities of the second class shall cease and terminate. The incumbent of each of these offices shall remain in office subject to removal and replacement at any time by the city administrator, with the approval of the board of directors; and
        1. Every other executive officer or executive employee of the city, including, without limiting the foregoing, the city purchasing agent and the members, hereinafter called “board members”, of every other municipal board, authority, or commission, whether such office, employment, board, authority, or commission exists under statute or under any ordinance or resolution, whose official term of office or employment is fixed by statute, shall serve until the expiration of the term so fixed. Any of the executive officers or executive employees of the city and members of municipal boards, authorities, or commissions whose respective term of office is fixed by ordinance or resolution shall continue to serve until the expiration of the term so fixed or until the term is modified by ordinance or resolution. Thereafter, the position held by any such executive officer, employee, or board member shall be filled through appointment by the city administrator, with the approval of the board of directors, and the appointees shall hold their position at the will of the city administrator and the board of directors. However, definite terms may be provided for board members by ordinance.
        2. Every executive officer, employee, or board member serving on the effective date of the reorganization whose office, employment, or board membership carries no fixed term created either by statute, ordinance, or resolution shall be subject to removal and replacement at any time by the board of directors.
        3. The provisions of subdivision (a)(2)(C) of this section providing that the term of office of board members shall be held at the will of the city administrator and the board of directors shall have no application to the statutory term, if any, of the boards, authorities, or commissions listed in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section.
    1. Reorganization under this chapter shall not affect any civil service plan in effect for any city employees at the time of reorganization, except that commissioners, as their terms expire, shall thereafter be appointed by the city administrator, with the approval of the board of directors, and any city organized under this chapter which has no civil service plan at the time of reorganization may adopt a plan pursuant to the provisions of any statute under which it otherwise qualifies.
      1. Reorganization under this chapter shall not operate to abolish or terminate any of the following listed departments, commissions, authorities, or agencies of the city government:
        1. Waterworks commission existing under §§ 14-234-301 — 14-234-309;
        2. Sewer committee existing under § 14-235-206;
        3. Airport commission existing under § 14-359-103;
        4. Housing authority existing under § 14-169-208;
        5. Any board of civil service commissioners serving under § 14-49-201 et seq., § 14-50-201 et seq., or § 14-51-201 et seq.;
        6. Auditorium commission existing under § 14-141-104;
        7. Library trustees existing under § 13-2-502;
        8. City planning commission existing under § 14-56-404; and
        9. Parking authority existing under § 14-304-101 et seq.
        1. The reorganization shall not terminate, impair, or otherwise affect the official status, statutory tenure of office, if any, or powers of the persons serving as commissioners, committeemen, trustees, or members of any of the boards, authorities, commissions, agencies, or departments listed in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, except as specifically provided by this chapter.
        2. Whether consisting of the power to appoint or the power to confirm appointments or nominations, such power as may be vested in the mayor and the municipal council or in the mayor and other municipal legislative body immediately prior to the reorganization in respect to the filling of vacancies on the boards, authorities, commissions, agencies, or departments listed in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section shall be transferred to, and vested in, the city administrator, with the approval of the board of directors. Each appointee designated by the city administrator, with the approval of the board of directors, to fill a vacancy on any of these bodies shall serve for the statutory term, if any, applicable to the vacancy or, if there is no statutory term, shall serve at the will of the board. The boards, authorities, commissions, agencies, or departments listed in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section may be required by the board of directors, by ordinance duly adopted, to purchase all vehicles, equipment, materials, supplies, and services through a central municipal purchasing agent or department. The boards, authorities, commissions, agencies, or departments may be required to adopt and conform to the city personnel policies duly adopted by ordinance or resolution, including, but not limited to, the amount and form of remuneration, job classification, and civil service plans.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-807; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 32; 2017, No. 878, § 11.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “mayor-council” for “mayor-aldermanic” in (a)(2)(A).

14-48-107. Division of city into wards.

    1. Following the adoption of the city administrator form of government in any city and prior to the special municipal election for the initial membership of the board of directors and the mayor, the governing body of the city, by ordinance, shall divide the city into four (4) wards with each ward being composed of contiguous territory and of substantially equal population and which shall be designated numbers one, two, three, and four.
    2. The designation of wards shall be made not more than twenty (20) days after the certification of results of the election to the Secretary of State.
    1. If the governing body of the city fails to act within the time prescribed, then any elector of the city may present to the judge of the circuit court for the county in which the city is situated a petition requesting a designation of wards and asking for the appointment of three (3) commissioners to act in relation thereto.
      1. Within five (5) days after receipt of the petition, the circuit judge shall appoint three (3) electors of the city to serve as a board of commissioners. It shall be this board's duty to divide the city into four (4) wards, with each ward being composed of contiguous territory and of substantially equal population, which shall be designated numbers one, two, three, and four.
        1. The board of commissioners, by majority action, shall make a report which shall designate the boundaries of the wards and then file the report with the city clerk within fifteen (15) days after the date of their appointment.
          1. If no report is filed within this time, that board of commissioners shall be automatically dissolved, and the circuit judge, upon the filing of a petition reciting the failure of the board to act, shall appoint a new board of commissioners for the same purpose, with the same authority, and with the same limitations.
          2. In the event of failure of the second board to act, the process may be continued until a report is filed.
            1. The board of directors of the city under the city administrator form of government shall review the apportionment among the wards after each federal census in the city or in the event there is an imbalance in population among the wards in excess of fifteen percent (15%).
              1. The board of directors may reapportion the wards to maintain substantially equal population in each ward whenever they deem necessary.
              2. In the event a redesignation of ward boundaries results in director number one, two, three, or four residing outside the boundary of the ward which he or she is representing, he or she shall nonetheless continue in office until his or her regular term expires.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-803.

14-48-108. Calling of elections for directors and mayor.

    1. Within ten (10) days after the designation of the four (4) wards, the Secretary of State by proclamation in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq. shall call special primary and general elections to be held in the municipality for the purpose of electing seven (7) directors and a mayor.
      1. The primary election shall be held in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq.
      2. The special general election shall be held in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq.
  1. These elections shall be called and conducted, and the results shall be determined and certified, as provided in § 14-48-109.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-804; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 36; 2007, No. 234, § 1; 2007, No. 1049, § 55; 2009, No. 1480, § 73.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in three places in (a).

14-48-109. Election of directors and mayor — Oath.

  1. Candidates for the office of director and mayor shall be nominated and elected as follows:
        1. A special election for the election of the initial membership of the board of directors and mayor shall be called by the Secretary of State as provided in § 14-48-108.
        2. The proclamation shall be published in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq.
        3. For the initial election of directors and mayor, any person desiring to become a candidate shall file within twenty (20) days following the date of the proclamation by the Secretary of State with the city clerk or recorder a statement of candidacy in the form and with the supporting signatures as provided in this section. In all other respects, the initial elections shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter for holding municipal elections.
        1. Special elections to fill any vacancy under § 14-48-115 shall be called through a resolution of the board.
        2. A proclamation of the election shall be signed by the mayor and published in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq. in some newspaper having a bona fide circulation in the municipality;
      1. Candidates to be voted on at all elections to be held under the provisions of this chapter shall be nominated by primary election, and no names shall be placed upon the general election ballot except those selected in the manner prescribed in this chapter.
        1. The primary elections, other than the initial primary, for those nominations for offices to be filled at the municipal general election shall be held on the second Tuesday of August preceding the municipal general election.
          1. The elections shall be under the supervision of the county board of election commissioners, and the election judges and clerks appointed for the general election shall be the judges and clerks of the primary elections.
          2. Primary elections shall be held in the same places as are designated for the general election, so far as possible, and shall be conducted, so far as practicable, in the same manner as other elections under the laws of this state;
    1. Any person desiring to become a candidate for mayor or director shall file with the city clerk not less than seventy-five (75) days nor more than ninety (90) days prior to the primary election by 12:00 noon a statement of his or her candidacy in substantially the following form:
    2. The statement of candidacy and the petition for nomination supporting the candidacy of each candidate to be voted upon at any general or special election shall be filed with the city clerk or recorder not less than seventy-five (75) days nor more than ninety (90) days before the election by 12:00 noon;
    3. The name of each candidate shall be supported by a petition for nomination signed by at least fifty (50) qualified electors of the municipality requesting the candidacy of the candidate. The petition shall show the residence address of each signer and carry an affidavit signed by one (1) or more persons in which the affiant or affiants shall vouch for the eligibility of each signer of the petition. Each petition shall be substantially in the following form:
      1. A petition for nomination shall not show the name of more than one (1) candidate.
      2. The name of the candidate mentioned in each petition, together with a copy of the election proclamation if the election is a special election, shall be certified by the city clerk or recorder to the county board of election commissioners not less than seventy (70) days before the election unless the clerk or recorder finds that the petition fails to meet with the requirements of this chapter.
        1. Whether the names of the candidates so certified to the county board of election commissioners are to be submitted at a biennial general election or at a special election held on a different date, the county board of election commissioners shall have general supervision over the holding of each municipal election.
          1. In this connection, the election board shall post the nominations, print the ballots, establish the voting precincts, appoint the election judges and clerks, determine and certify the results of the election, and determine the election expense chargeable to the city, all in the manner prescribed by law in respect to general elections. It is the intention of this chapter that the general election machinery of this state shall be utilized in the holding of all general and special elections authorized under this chapter.
          2. The result of the election shall be certified by the election board to the city clerk or recorder;
    4. The names of all candidates at the election shall be printed upon the ballot in an order determined by draw. If more than two (2) candidates qualify for an office, the names of all candidates shall appear on the ballot at the primary election;
      1. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in the primary, the two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes for mayor and for each director position to be filled shall be the nominees for those respective offices to be voted upon in the general election.
      2. If no more than two (2) persons qualify as candidates for the office of mayor or for any director position to be filled, no municipal primary election shall be held for these positions, and the names of the two (2) qualifying candidates for each office or position shall be placed upon the ballot at the municipal general election as the nominees for the respective positions. Primary elections shall be omitted in wards in which no primary contest is required.
      3. In any case in which only one (1) candidate shall have filed and qualified for the office of mayor or any director position, or if a candidate receives a clear majority of the votes cast in a primary election, that candidate shall be declared elected. The name of the person shall be certified as elected without the necessity of putting the person's name on the general municipal election ballot for the office; and
    5. Any candidate defeated at any municipal primary election or municipal general election may contest it in the manner provided by law for contesting other elections.
  2. Each member of the board of directors, before entering upon the discharge of his or her duties, shall take the oath of office required by Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20.

“STATE OF ARKANSAS

COUNTY OF

I, , being first duly sworn, state that I reside at Street, City of , County and State aforesaid; that I am a qualified elector of said city and the ward in which I reside; that I am a candidate for nomination to the office of (Mayor) (Director) , to be voted upon at the primary election to be held on the day of , 20 , and I hereby request that my name be placed upon the official primary election ballot for nomination by such primary election for such office and I herewith deposit the sum of ten dollars ($10.00), the fee prescribed by law.”;

Click to view form.

“The undersigned, duly qualified electors of the City of , Arkansas, each signer hereof residing at the address set opposite his or her signature, hereby requests that the name of be placed on the ballot as a candidate for election to Position No. on the Board of Directors (or Mayor) of said City of at the election to be held in such city on the day of 20 We further state that we know said person to be a qualified elector of said city and a person of good moral character and qualified in our judgment for the duties of such office.”;

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, §§ 5, 9; 1971, No. 439, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-805, 19-809; Acts 1989, No. 347, §§ 2, 3; 1989, No. 905, § 7; 1997, No. 879, §§ 1, 2; 2005, No. 67, §§ 27, 28; 2005, No. 489, §§ 1, 2; 2007, No. 580, § 1; 2007, No. 1049, § 56; 2009, No. 1480, § 74; 2013, No. 313, §§ 1, 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(ii).

The 2013 amendment substituted “seventy-five (75) days” for “seventy (70) days” in (a)(3) and (a)(4).

14-48-110. Board of directors and mayor generally.

    1. The seven (7) directors elected by a city reorganized under this chapter shall be known and designated as the board of directors of the city.
    2. The board of directors of the city shall constitute the legislative and executive body of the city, subject to the powers of the mayor in § 14-48-111, and shall be vested with all powers and authority which, immediately prior to the effective date of the reorganization, were vested under then-existing laws, ordinances, and resolutions in the governing body of the city and in its board of public affairs subject to the powers of the city administrator in § 14-48-117.
    3. Except when expressly permitted under this chapter, the mayor or director may not serve the city in any other capacity.
    1. For election purposes, the positions upon the board of directors shall be permanently designated as positions numbered “one”, “two”, “three”, “four”, “five”, “six”, and “seven”, respectively.
      1. Each candidate for election to membership on the board of directors of the city shall specify the position for which he or she is running.
      2. The electors shall vote separately on the candidates for each position, and the position sought by each candidate shall be shown on the ballot.
    1. Except in the instances in which the mayor and directors are elected at special elections as provided in §§ 14-48-108 and 14-48-109, the mayor and directors shall be elected at the general elections held biennially for the election of state and county offices.
    2. Each such general election shall be utilized for the election of successors to the mayor and to those directors whose terms expire on December 31 following the election.
    1. All primary, general, and special elections of the mayor and directors shall be nonpartisan, and the ballots shall show no party designation.
      1. In all primary, general, and special elections, each candidate for the office of mayor or director shall be elected by the electors of the city as follows:
        1. The persons elected to fill director positions one, two, three, and four, respectively, shall be qualified electors of the respective wards and shall be elected by the qualified electors of the respective wards; and
        2. The persons elected to fill the position of mayor and director positions five, six, and seven, respectively, shall be qualified electors of the city and shall be elected by the qualified electors of the entire city.
      2. Neither the mayor nor a director shall be prohibited from holding successive terms of office.
          1. The persons elected to fill director positions one, two, three, and four, respectively, shall continue to reside in the ward from which he or she was elected for the term for which he or she was elected.
          2. The persons elected to fill the position of mayor and director positions five, six, and seven, respectively, shall continue to reside in the city from which he or she was elected for the term for which he or she was elected.
        1. If a duly elected director shall cease to reside in the ward or the city from which he or she was elected, the director shall be disqualified to hold the office, and a vacancy shall exist that shall be filled as prescribed by law.
    1. The mayor and any director elected at a special election shall take office on the first Monday following the certification of his or her election, as required in this chapter.
    2. The mayor and any director elected at a general election shall take office on January 1 following his or her election.
    1. At any primary, general, or special election for the election of the mayor or any director, any adult person who has resided within the municipality for at least six (6) months and is qualified to vote at an election of county or state offices shall be deemed a qualified elector.
    2. Any person twenty-one (21) years of age or older possessing these same qualifications also shall be eligible to run for the office of mayor or director.
  1. When a city is reorganized under this chapter, the mayor and board of directors will be divided into two (2) classes, and the tenure of office of those in each class shall be as follows:
    1. Director positions one, two, three, and four shall be Class Number One. Class Number One directors shall serve until and including December 31 following the first general election held after their terms of office commence and until their successors have been elected and qualified. Thereafter, those in Class Number One shall serve four-year terms; and
    2. The mayor and director positions five, six, and seven shall be Class Number Two. Class Number Two directors shall serve until and including December 31 following the second general election held after their terms of office commence and until their successors have been elected and qualified. Thereafter, those in Class Number Two shall serve four-year terms.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 6; 1979, No. 69, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-806; Acts 2009, No. 27, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (d)(2)(C), and made related and stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Powers of Board.

Where city had a regulation that a department head could not be discharged without notification in writing from the governing body of the city, the city administrator alone did not have authority to discharge the chief of the municipal fire department. Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 494, 473 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

14-48-111. Mayor.

    1. The mayor of a city having the city administrator form of government shall be recognized as the head of the city government for all ceremonial purposes and by the Governor for the purposes of military law.
    2. He or she shall sign on behalf of the city all written agreements, contracts, bonds, mortgages, pledges, indentures, conveyances, and other written instruments, the execution of which have been approved by the board of directors.
    3. He or she shall serve as chair of the board and shall preside at regular and special meetings of the board, but he or she shall not have a vote on any matter coming before the board.
    1. The mayor shall have the power of veto over all decisions made by the board except matters relative to city personnel.
    2. A veto by the mayor may be overridden by the affirmative vote of five (5) or more members of the board.
    1. The mayor shall not be required to devote his or her full time to the office and shall receive a compensation or salary not to exceed the salary permitted municipal officers by the Constitution of this state, to be fixed by the board.
    2. When once fixed, the salary shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which he or she may have been elected.
  1. The mayor, before entering upon the discharge of his or her duties, shall take the oath of office required by Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-808.

Cross References. Veto of ordinances, etc., by mayor, § 14-48-120.

14-48-112. Assistant mayor or vice mayor.

    1. The board of directors shall elect from its membership an assistant mayor or vice mayor who shall serve in that capacity for two (2) years or until his or her tenure of office as a director expires, whichever is shorter.
    2. The assistant mayor or vice mayor shall not be prohibited from serving in that capacity for more than one (1) term.
    1. The assistant mayor or vice mayor shall act as mayor during the absence or disability of the mayor.
      1. If a vacancy in the office of mayor occurs, the assistant mayor or vice mayor shall perform the duties of mayor until a successor mayor is elected.
        1. If the mayor is continuously absent or disabled for more than six (6) months, his or her office will automatically become vacant, and a successor mayor shall be elected.
          1. A certificate of the city clerk or recorder recorded in the record of the proceedings of the board as to the absence or disability of the mayor or as to any vacancy in the office of mayor may be relied upon by all persons dealing with the municipality as conclusive evidence of the assistant mayor's or vice mayor's authority to assume the powers of the mayor.
            1. Where any such certificate is so recorded, upon the termination of the absence or disability of the mayor and the resumption by him or her of his or her official duties, the city clerk or recorder shall record in the records of the board a separate certificate attesting that fact.
            2. This separate certificate shall show the date of the termination of absence or disability and resumption of duties.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-808; Acts 2009, No. 27, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “or vice mayor” in the section heading and inserted “or vice mayor” or variant throughout the section; and made minor stylistic changes.

14-48-113. Acting mayor.

If both the mayor and assistant mayor should be absent or disabled from performing their duties, the board of directors may designate by resolution one (1) of its members as acting mayor to serve during the absence or disability, and no longer.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-808.

14-48-114. Removal of mayor or directors.

  1. Any person holding the office of mayor and any person holding the office of member of the board of directors of any city organized under the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to removal from the office by the electors qualified to vote for a successor of the incumbent.
  2. The procedure to effect the removal of a person holding the office shall be as follows:
    1. When petitions requesting the removal of any such officer signed by qualified electors equal in number to thirty-five percent (35%) of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for that office at the preceding general municipal election at which the office was on the ballot are filed with the city clerk, the clerk shall determine the sufficiency of the petitions within ten (10) days from the date of the filing;
    2. If the petitions are deemed sufficient, the clerk shall certify them to the county board of election commissioners;
    3. The county board of election commissioners shall issue a proclamation in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq., calling a special election on the question and shall fix a date for holding it not more than ninety (90) days from the date of the certification of the petitions by the clerk;
    4. At the election, the question shall be submitted to the electors in substantially the following form:
      1. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the question at the election shall vote for the removal of the officer, a vacancy shall exist in the office.
      2. If a majority of the qualified electors voting on the question at the election shall vote against the removal of the officer, the officer shall continue to serve during the term for which elected.
  3. No recall petition shall be filed against any officer until he or she shall have held his or her office for at least six (6) months.

“FOR the removal of (name of officer) from the office of (Mayor) (Director) AGAINST the removal of (name of officer) from the office of ”; and (Mayor) (Director)

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-817; Acts 1991, No. 49, § 1; 2005, No. 2145, § 37; 2007, No. 1049, § 57; 2009, No. 1480, § 75.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (b)(3).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Constitutionality of state and local recall provisions. 13 A.L.R.6th 661.

14-48-115. Mayor or director vacancy.

In the case of a vacancy in the office of mayor or in the office of a member of the board of directors, the board, at the first regular meeting after the occurrence of the vacancy and by majority vote, shall appoint a person or call for a special election to be held in accordance with § 7-11-101 et seq. to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the unexpired term.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-810; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 38; 2007, No. 234, § 2; 2007, No. 1049, § 58; 2009, No. 1480, § 76; 2015, No. 384, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-101 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(a)” in the introductory language of (b).

The 2015 amendment rewrote the section.

14-48-116. Employment of city administrator.

  1. The initial board of directors shall employ a city administrator as promptly as possible after effecting the board's organization. A city administrator's employment shall be for an indefinite term. Thereafter, subject only to such interruptions as are unavoidable, a city administrator shall be maintained in the employ of the city. The appointment and continued employment by the board of a city administrator is mandatory.
    1. It shall not be essential that the city administrator at the time of his or her employment be a qualified elector of the city or of the State of Arkansas or a resident of the city or of the State of Arkansas. However, the city administrator shall be a person found by the board to have special qualifications in respect to the administration of municipal affairs, and during his or her employment he or she shall reside in the city and devote his or her full time to the business of the city.
      1. A member of the board may not be appointed city administrator or acting city administrator during the term for which he or she shall have been elected, nor within three (3) years following the expiration of that member's term of office as director.
      2. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section regarding residency requirements for city administrators, the city administrator of a city having a population of less than five thousand (5,000) persons, upon approval of a majority of the board of the city, may reside in an adjoining city during his or her employment as administrator.
  2. The city administrator shall receive a salary in such amount as may be fixed by the board.
  3. The board, on the vote of a majority of its elected membership, may terminate the city administrator's employment at any time, either for or without cause. However, the city administrator's employment may not be terminated between the dates of January 1 and March 1 of the year following any general election in which members of the board are elected.
    1. The city administrator shall furnish a fidelity bond, the premiums on which shall be paid by the city in such amount, in such form, and with such security as may be approved by the board.
    2. In no event shall the bond be less than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 11; 1983, No. 159, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-811, 19-811.1.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-48-117. Powers and duties of city administrator.

The city administrator shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. To the extent that such authority is vested in him or her through ordinance enacted by the board of directors, he or she may supervise and control all administrative departments, agencies, offices, and employees;
  2. He or she shall represent the board in the enforcement of all obligations in favor of the city or its inhabitants which are imposed by law or under the terms of any public utility franchise upon any public utility;
  3. He or she may inquire into the conduct of any municipal office, department, or agency which is subject to the control of the board. In this connection, he or she shall be given unrestricted access to the records and files of any office, department, or agency and may require written reports, statements, audits, and other information from the executive head of the office, department, or agency;
    1. He or she shall nominate, subject to confirmation by the board, persons to fill all vacancies at any time occurring in any office, employment, board, authority, or commission to which the board's appointive power extends.
      1. He or she may remove from office all officials and employees, including without limitation, members of any board, authority, or commission who, under existing or future laws, whether applicable to cities under the mayor-council, manager, or commission form of government, may be removed by the city's legislative body.
        1. Removal by the city administrator shall be approved by the board.
        2. When, under the statute applicable to any specific employment or office, the incumbent may be removed only upon the vote of a specified majority of the city's legislative body, the removal of the person by the city administrator may be confirmed only upon the vote of the specified majority of the board members.
    2. However, this subdivision (4) does not apply to offices and employments controlled by any civil service or merit plan lawfully in effect in the city;
    1. To the extent that and under such regulations as by ordinance the board may prescribe:
      1. He or she may contract for and purchase, or issue purchase authorizations for, supplies, materials, and equipment for the various offices, departments, and agencies of the city government, and he or she may contract for, or authorize contracts for, services to be rendered to the city or for the construction of municipal improvements. In this connection, the board shall by ordinance establish a maximum amount, and each contract, purchase, or authorization exceeding the amount so established shall be effected after competitive bidding as required in § 14-48-129;
      2. He or she may approve for payment out of funds previously appropriated for that purpose or disapprove any bills, debts, or liabilities asserted as claims against the city. The board shall by ordinance establish in that connection a maximum amount, and the payment or disapproval of each bill, debt, or liability exceeding that amount shall require the confirmation of the board or of a committee of directors created by the board for that purpose;
      3. He or she may sell or exchange any municipal supplies, materials, or equipment. However, the board shall by ordinance establish a maximum value above which no item or lot designated to be disposed of as one (1) unit of supplies, materials, or equipment shall be sold or exchanged without competitive bidding unless the city administrator shall certify in writing that in his or her opinion the fair market value of the item or lot is less than the amount established by the ordinance as prescribed; and
      4. He or she may transfer to any office, department, or agency or he or she may transfer from any office, department, or agency to another office, department, or agency any materials and equipment.
    2. For the purpose of assisting the city administrator in transactions arising under subdivisions (5)(A)(i)-(iii) of this section, the board may appoint one (1) or more committees to be selected from its membership. In the alternative, the board may create one (1) or more offices or departments to be composed of personnel approved by the city administrator. If, for such purposes, the board shall create any new office or department, the person appointed to fill the office or to head the department shall be responsible to the city administrator and act under his or her direction;
  4. He or she shall prepare the municipal budget annually and submit it to the board for its approval or disapproval and be responsible for its administration after adoption;
  5. He or she shall prepare and submit to the board within sixty (60) days after the end of each fiscal year a complete report on the finances and administrative activities of the city during the fiscal year;
  6. He or she shall keep the board advised of the financial condition and future needs of the city and make such recommendations as to him or her may seem desirable;
  7. He or she shall sign all municipal warrants when authorized by the board to do so;
  8. He or she shall have all powers except those involving the exercise of sovereign authority, which under statutes applicable to municipalities under the mayor-council form of government or under ordinances and resolutions of the city in effect at the time of its reorganization may be vested in the mayor;
  9. He or she shall perform such additional duties and exercise such additional powers as may by ordinance be lawfully delegated to him or her by the board; and
  10. He or she shall be the executive officer of the boards of improvement and shall supervise under the direction of those boards all work done by them.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-811; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 33; 2017, No. 878, §§ 12, 13.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote (4); and substituted “mayor-council” for “aldermanic” in (10).

Case Notes

Discharge of Department Heads.

Where city had a regulation that a department head could not be discharged without notification in writing from the governing body of the city, the city administrator alone did not have authority to discharge the chief of the municipal fire department. Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 494, 473 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

14-48-118. Acting city administrator.

    1. If the city administrator is absent from the city or is unable to perform his or her duties, if the board of directors suspends the city administrator, or if there is a vacancy in the office of the city administrator, the board may appoint by resolution an acting city administrator to serve until the city administrator returns, until his or her disability or suspension ceases, or until another city administrator is appointed and qualified, as the case may be.
    2. The board may suspend or remove an acting city administrator at any time.
    1. The board, in the exercise of its discretion, may determine whether the acting city administrator shall furnish bond.
    2. If in any instance the board requires the acting city administrator to furnish bond, the premiums shall be paid by the city. The bond in respect to form, amount, and security shall be subject to the approval of the board.
  1. The acting city administrator shall receive a reasonable compensation to be fixed by the board.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-811.

14-48-119. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning election of municipal judges, was repealed by Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 34. The section was derived from Acts 1967, No. 36, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-807.

14-48-120. Meetings of board of directors.

    1. A majority of the elected membership of the board of directors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
    2. Except where otherwise provided by law, an affirmative vote of four (4) or more members shall represent the action of the board, and a like vote shall be required to suspend the rules.
  1. The board shall meet twice during each calendar month, and, until otherwise provided by ordinance, the meetings shall be held on the first and third Monday evenings of each calendar month unless that day is a legal holiday, in which case the meeting shall be held on the following evening.
    1. Special meetings may be called by a majority of the membership of the board.
    2. The board may establish by ordinance the procedure for calling and giving notice of special meetings.
  2. All regular and special meetings of the board shall be open to the public.
    1. Every motion, resolution, and ordinance adopted by the board, if approved by the mayor, shall be signed by the mayor and attested by the city clerk.
    2. Any ordinance, resolution, or motion for which the mayor has the power of veto and which is enacted or adopted over the veto of the mayor as authorized in this section shall be signed by the assistant mayor and attested by the city clerk.
  3. All laws in effect on February 2, 1967, regarding the proceedings of the city council of a city operating under the mayor-council form of government and not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, including those laws prescribing the procedure for the adoption, enactment, and publication of ordinances and resolutions, shall govern the proceedings of the board provided for in this section.
      1. All ordinances, resolutions, and motions adopted by the board at a regular or special meeting shall be delivered to the mayor within forty-eight (48) hours after the adoption thereof.
      2. The mayor shall have a period of three (3) days from the date of the receipt of any ordinance, resolution, or motion adopted by the board to approve or veto it. If he or she shall fail to approve or veto it within that period, it shall become law without his or her signature.
      1. Any ordinance, resolution, or motion enacted or adopted by the board which is vetoed by the mayor may be enacted over the veto of the mayor by an affirmative vote of five (5) or more members of the board.
      2. When any ordinance, resolution, or motion of the board is vetoed by the mayor, it shall automatically be on the agenda for consideration of the board at the next regular meeting of the board and may be considered at a special meeting called in the manner authorized herein.
    1. Each member of the board shall receive compensation for each regular meeting of the board which he or she attends but shall receive no compensation for attending a special meeting of the board.
    2. The compensation for each meeting shall be set by the board but shall not exceed one twenty-fourth of twenty percent (1/24 of 20%) of the compensation permitted municipal officers per annum by the Arkansas Constitution.
  4. The board may hold agenda meetings at such times, under such circumstances, and on such conditions as the board may prescribe for the purpose of informing itself of the business and affairs of the city. However, no official action of the board shall be taken at such meetings.
  5. The board shall adopt rules of order to govern the deliberations and meetings of the board.
  6. Any director who fails to attend five (5) consecutive regular meetings of the board or who fails to attend fifty percent (50%) of the regular meetings of the board held during a calendar year while he or she is a qualified member of the board shall be deemed to have resigned. A vacancy shall then exist in that position to be filled as provided in § 14-48-115.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-809; Acts 2017, No. 878, § 14.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “mayor-council” for “mayor-aldermanic” in (f).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Harris v. City of Fort Smith: Arkansas's Sunshine Clouds Over, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 147.

Case Notes

Discharge of Employees.

Where city administrator met in executive session with city board of directors and announced he wished to discharge the fire chief, but the notification was sent by the city administrator without being seen by the board of directors or signed by them, the discharge was not in compliance with subsections (c) and (g). Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 494, 473 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

14-48-121. Initiative and referendum.

  1. The initiative and referendum laws of this state are applicable to cities reorganized under this chapter.
  2. The number of signatures required upon any petition shall be computed upon the total vote cast for mayor at the preceding general election for mayor.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-816.

14-48-122. Budgets and appropriations.

  1. The approval of the budget by the board of directors shall amount to an appropriation, for the purposes of the budget, of the funds which are lawfully applicable to the different items therein contained.
  2. The board may alter or revise the budget from time to time, and unpledged funds appropriated by the board for any specific purpose may by subsequent action of the board be appropriated to another purpose subject to the following exceptions:
    1. Funds resulting from taxes levied under statute or ordinance for a specific purpose may not be diverted to another purpose; and
    2. Appropriated funds may not be diverted to another purpose where any creditor of the municipality would be prejudiced thereby.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-812.

14-48-123. Annual audit.

The board of directors shall have the financial affairs of the city audited annually by the Division of Legislative Audit of the State of Arkansas or by an independent certified public accountant who is not otherwise in the service of the city.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-812; Acts 1987, No. 220, § 1; 2011, No. 623, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “the Division of Legislative Audit of the State of Arkansas or by.”

14-48-124. Creation of new departments, etc.

    1. The board of directors may from time to time by ordinance create, reorganize, or abolish, except as provided in § 14-48-106, any municipal departments, offices, employments, boards, authorities, commissions, and agencies and fix the term of employment and compensation of each appointee.
    2. The city administrator, with the approval of the board, shall appoint the personnel to serve in the departments, offices, employments, boards, authorities, commissions, and agencies.
    1. The board also in the exercise of its discretion by ordinance may consolidate the office of the city treasurer with the office of the city clerk or such other department, office, or position as the board by ordinance may charge with the responsibility of administering the financial affairs of the city.
    2. The board may delegate all of the duties of the city treasurer to the person holding such an office or position in the city and fix the term and compensation of the appointee.
    3. With the approval of the board, the city administrator may fill this consolidated office by appointment.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-812.

Case Notes

Applicability.

In order for this section to apply to the Multi-Ethnic Committee created by the mayor, the Committee must have been shown to constitute a subdivision of city government, and appellant failed to provide any evidence that the Committee constituted anything other than a mere citizen advisory group with no authority to act for the city. McCutchen v. Patton, 340 Ark. 371, 10 S.W.3d 439 (2000).

14-48-125. Appointees generally.

Subject to the exceptions contained in § 14-48-102, every person appointed by the board of directors to any municipal office, employment, position, or to membership on any board, authority, or commission shall serve for such time and shall receive such compensation as the board may fix and determine by ordinance.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-812.

14-48-126. Qualifications of appointees.

  1. In the exercise by the board of directors of its authority in respect to the filling of vacancies on municipal boards, authorities, and commissions, only those qualified electors of the city found by the board to possess the necessary qualifications shall be appointed or confirmed.
    1. In filling vacancies on any municipal board, authority, or commission, unless the statute applicable to the position forbids the appointment thereto of a city employee, the city administrator, if otherwise qualified, shall be an eligible appointee.
    2. The city administrator, however, shall not be, ex officio, a member of any municipal board, authority, or commission.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-807.

14-48-127. Bond of officers and employees.

All officers and employees of a city reorganized under this chapter, excepting the city administrator whose bond requirement is controlled by § 14-48-116, may be required to make bond in such amount, in such form, and with such security as may meet the approval of the board of directors.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-813.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-48-128. Prohibited actions by officers or employees.

    1. No member of the board of directors nor any officer or employee appointed in any city shall have an interest in any contract or job for work or materials, or the profits thereof, or service to be furnished or performed for the city.
    2. No officer or employee shall have an interest in any contract or job for work or materials, or the profits thereof, or service to be furnished or performed for any person, firm, or corporation operating any public transportation service, gas works, waterworks, electric light or power plants, telegraph line, telephone exchange, or other public utility within the territorial limits of the city.
      1. No officer or employee shall accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any frank, pass, free ticket, or free service from any person, firm, or corporation operating within the territorial limits of the city any public transportation service, gas works, waterworks, electric light or power plant, heating plant, telephone exchange, telegraph line, or other business acting or operating under a public franchise of the city, nor shall he or she accept or receive, directly or indirectly, from any such person, firm, or corporation, or its agents, any other service upon terms more favorable than those granted to the public generally.
      2. The prohibition of free transportation shall not apply to police officers or firefighters in uniform, nor shall any free service to the city officials heretofore provided by franchise or ordinance be affected by this section.
  1. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined in a sum not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), and every such contract or agreement shall be void.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-812.

14-48-129. Competitive bidding required.

  1. Before making any purchase of, or contract for, any supplies, materials, or equipment, and before obligating the city under any contract for the performance of services or for the construction of municipal improvements where the anticipated cost to the city of the transaction exceeds the maximum amount established by the board of directors under the authority of § 14-48-117, opportunity for competitive bidding shall be given under such rules and regulations as the board may by ordinance prescribe, and the contract shall be consummated only on a bid approved by the city administrator and by the board.
  2. The board, by ordinance, may waive the requirement of competitive bidding in exceptional situations where this procedure is not feasible. However, such exceptional situations being lacking, the board may not except any particular contract, purchase, or sale from the requirement of competitive bidding.
  3. All purchase and sale records of the city shall be open to public inspection.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-812.

14-48-130. Public utility franchises, etc.

Every ordinance or resolution granting any public utility franchise or granting the right to occupy the streets, highways, bridges, or other public places in the city for any purpose shall be completed in the form in which it is finally passed. It shall remain on file with the city clerk for public inspection at least one (1) week before the final passage or adoption thereof.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-814.

14-48-131. Improvement districts.

    1. The board of directors elected under the provisions of this chapter shall constitute the respective boards of improvement for any and all improvement districts existing or created in any city operating under the provisions of this chapter and shall discharge and perform all duties required of any board of any improvement district under the provisions of the laws of this state dealing with improvement districts. However, the directors shall receive no compensation as members of such boards.
    2. It shall not be necessary for the board of directors who shall constitute such a board to be owners of real property or, where the district does not embrace the whole of the city, to reside in the improvement district.
      1. The board of directors, where districts have been created and are in existence when they qualify and enter upon the discharge of their duties as such a board of the city, in addition to the oath required as a board of directors of the city, shall each, as a member of the board of improvement, take the oath of office required by Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20. Each member shall also affirm that he or she will not, directly or indirectly, have an interest in any contract made by the board of which he or she is a member.
        1. This oath shall be made for each separate district.
        2. The oath shall be filed in the office of the city clerk.
    1. When an improvement district is formed after the board of directors has qualified, each director, immediately upon the formation of the improvement district, shall take and file the oath required by this section as a member of that board of improvement.
    1. When the directors have taken the oath provided for by this section, the terms of office of all members of improvement boards in the city shall cease and determine. They shall cause to be delivered to the board of directors, as their successors, all records, papers, and contracts, as well as everything belonging to the improvement districts in their possession and under their control.
    2. These items shall be kept separate from the records, papers, contracts, and property of the city.
      1. The board of directors, in lieu of serving as the board of commissioners for any improvement district, may appoint three (3) electors of the city to act as commissioners.
        1. Each of these commissioners shall take the oath of office required by Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20, and shall also swear that, directly or indirectly, he or she shall not have an interest in any contract made by the board and that he or she will well and truly assess all benefits resulting from the improvement and all damages caused thereby.
        2. Any commissioner failing to take the oath within thirty (30) days after his or her appointment shall be deemed to have declined, and his or her place shall be filled by the board of directors.
      2. The commissioners shall select one (1) of their number as chair, and a majority shall constitute a quorum.
    1. The board of directors may remove any member of the board of commissioners.
    2. The board of directors may provide for the compensation of commissioners at a rate not to exceed ten dollars ($10.00) for each day spent attending meetings of the board of commissioners. However, a board of commissioners shall not be compensated for more than two (2) meetings in any calendar month.
    1. The records, proceedings, moneys, and revenues of each improvement district shall be kept separate and distinct from each other and separate and distinct from the records, proceedings, moneys, and revenues of the city.
    2. The city clerk shall be ex officio secretary and collector, and the city treasurer or finance officer shall be ex officio treasurer of each and every improvement district, subject, however, to the right of the board, if it shall be deemed best, to designate and appoint some person other than the city clerk as secretary or collector and some person other than the city treasurer or finance officer as treasurer.
    1. The board for each and every improvement district shall prepare quarterly a detailed and itemized statement of all receipts and expenditures of each district with proper vouchers for all payments and cause it to be filed with the clerk of the circuit court.
      1. Within six (6) months, any taxpayer may file exceptions to the report in the circuit court.
        1. The circuit court shall proceed, after ten (10) days' notice given to the chair of the board of improvement for the district, to examine the exceptions to the report and account and disallow any and all unjust, illegal, and improper charges and credits.
        2. From any final judgment or order of the circuit court in respect thereto, the aggrieved parties shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, as in other cases.

History. Acts 1967, No. 36, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-815.

Chapter 49 Civil Service for Cities of 75,000 or Over

Preambles. Acts 1937, No. 322 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, cities having a population of more than 75,000 inhabitants, own, operate and maintain hospitals, airports, libraries, health departments, electrical departments, engineering departments, street departments, weights and measures departments, collection departments, sewer departments, purchasing departments, parks and sanitation departments and waterworks, and employ hundreds of people who work in said departments, some of them requiring years of experience to become sufficiently skilled to properly do the necessary work required of them; and

“Whereas, such employees are usually employed in accordance with political expediency rather than merit; and,

“Whereas, it is for the best interest of such cities that applicants for positions with said city, and employees working for the city, be employed and discharged according to their merits, and the necessity of the city for their services … .”

Effective Dates. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 19: Mar. 25, 1937.

Cross References. Civil service for police and fire departments, § 14-51-101 et seq.

Research References

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., §§ 469, 488.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

14-49-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “board”, “commission”, or “commissioners” means the board of civil service commissioners, as provided for in § 14-49-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1315.

14-49-102. Applicability.

Every city in this state shall be entitled to operate under this chapter whenever any federal census taken shows that the city has attained a population of seventy-five thousand (75,000) or over.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-103. Penalty.

Any person violating any part of this chapter, upon conviction, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1317.

Cross References. Misdemeanors, § 5-1-107.

Subchapter 2 — Board of Civil Service Commissioners

Cross References. Civil service board for police and fire departments, § 14-51-201 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1943, No. 17, § 2: Feb. 3, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, welfare and safety, an emergency is hereby declared and the same shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1951, No. 386, § 2: Mar. 20, 1951.

14-49-201. Appointment of members.

  1. The city council or governing body in cities which, according to the last federal census taken, have a population of seventy-five thousand (75,000) or over shall name by ordinance three (3) citizens of its respective cities as a board of civil service commissioners.
  2. The commissioners shall hold office as follows:
    1. One until the first Monday in April of the second year after his or her appointment;
    2. One until the first Monday in April of the fourth year after his or her appointment; and
    3. One until the first Monday in April of the sixth year after his or her appointment.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

Case Notes

De Facto Commissioners.

Where plaintiffs filed representative suit in behalf of all city police officers of Little Rock whose employment was cut off by service in the war, against members of Little Rock Civil Service Commission and asked that commissioners be permanently enjoined from acting as commissioners on theory that 1933 act authorized cities of first class to create a civil service commission for police officers and fire fighters only, and 1937 act authorized cities of more than 75,000 to create a second civil service commission for employees other than fire fighters and police officers, that hence members of the commission had violated law prohibiting members from holding more than one political office, court properly sustained demurrer to the complaint, as even though plaintiffs were right in their theory that commissioners were serving on two commissions, the defendants would still be de facto commissioners, and equity had no authority to decide whether defendants were also de jure officers. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949) (decision prior to § 14-51-201).

14-49-202. Persons excepted.

  1. No person on the commission shall hold or be a candidate for any office or public trust under any national, state, county, or municipal government or school district or be connected in any way in any official capacity with any political party or organization.
  2. No person as enumerated in this section shall be eligible for a place on the board who, at the time of his or her election, shall hold any such office.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-203. Organizational meeting.

  1. The commissioners named as provided in this chapter shall meet and organize.
  2. The commissioner who shall be elected for a term of two (2) years shall act as chair.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1302.

14-49-204. Chair of commission.

    1. The chair of the commission for each biennial period shall be the member whose term first expires.
    2. The member of the commission whose term shall next expire shall serve as chair during the last two (2) years of his or her term.
  1. The chair shall preside over all meetings of the commission and be its executive officer.
  2. In the absence of the chair, the board shall elect one (1) of its number to act instead of the chair during the absence of the chair.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1301, 19-1302.

14-49-205. Secretary of board.

  1. The board shall elect one (1) of its members as secretary.
  2. The secretary shall:
    1. Keep the books and records of the board;
    2. Conduct the correspondence of the board;
    3. Report the evidence at all trials;
    4. Act as clerk when the board shall constitute a trial court; and
    5. Perform any other duties that may be ordered by the board.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-206. Attorney for commission.

The city attorney shall act as attorney for the commission provided for in this chapter in all trials and other legal transactions of the commission.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; 1943, No. 17, § 1; 1951, No. 386, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-207. Regular meetings, etc.

The city council or other governing body, as the case may be, shall:

  1. Provide suitable rooms for the board to hold meetings;
  2. Allow all reasonable supplies; and
  3. Permit use of public buildings for holding examinations by the board.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1302.

14-49-208. Quorum for business.

Two (2) of the commission members shall constitute a quorum to transact business.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-209. Investigative powers.

  1. In any investigation conducted by the commission provided for in this chapter, the commission shall have the power of subpoena, to require the attendance of any witness and the production of any papers or records pertinent to the investigation, and the power to administer oaths to the witnesses.
  2. To punish for contempt the nonattendance of witnesses, or the failure to produce books or papers, or misbehavior of any person during the investigation, the commission may impose a fine not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) for each offense.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1310.

14-49-210. Salary of commissioners.

The salary of the commissioners shall be paid by the city and shall be fixed by the city council or other governing body of the city.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-211. Removal of commissioner.

  1. The city council or the governing body, by two-thirds vote may remove any of the commissioners during his or her term of office for cause.
  2. The vacancy thereby created shall be filled as provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-212. Vacancies on board.

  1. When a vacancy shall occur on the board by death, resignation, expiration of the term of office, or in any other manner, the vacancy shall be filled by the other members of the commission within thirty (30) days from the time the vacancy shall have occurred.
  2. Vacancies occurring during the term of office of any commissioner shall be filled for the remainder of the term.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

Subchapter 3 — Civil Service System

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 43, § 3: Feb. 13, 1941.

Acts 1943, No. 17, § 2: Feb. 3, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, welfare and safety, an emergency is hereby declared and the same shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1951, No. 386, § 2: Mar. 20, 1951.

Acts 1957, No. 152, § 3: Mar. 6, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that a number of city employees affected by this Act are presently excluded from the benefits of the civil service system of such cities and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order to include such employees within the benefits and protections of such a system. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-49-301. Employees not covered.

  1. This chapter shall not apply to any officer, servant, employee, or attorney of the city who is elected by vote of the people of his or her respective cities.
    1. This chapter shall not apply to the following employees of the city:
      1. Secretary to the mayor;
      2. Assistant secretary to the mayor;
      3. Secretary to the district courts and clerks;
      4. Assistant city attorneys;
      5. Secretary to city attorneys;
      6. Members of the police and fire departments of cities;
      7. City purchasing agent;
      8. All employees of the city library;
      9. Superintendent of the city hospital;
      10. All members of honorary boards;
      11. All members of the municipal waterworks and the commissioners thereof;
      12. All officers and employees of the sewer department;
      13. Members of the board of public affairs;
      14. Special attorneys who may be employed by the city from time to time; and
      15. Public accountants who may be employed for special work by the city.
    2. These employees of the city shall be appointed as they were before the passage of this act.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; 1943, No. 17, § 1; 1951, No. 386, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

Publisher's Notes. In reference to the term “the passage of this act,” Acts 1937, No. 322 was signed by the Governor on March 25, 1937, and became effective on June 10, 1937. (Emergency clause invalid).

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1937, No. 322, as amended, codified as § 14-49-101 et seq., § 14-49-201 et seq., and § 14-49-301 et seq.

14-49-302. Temporary employees.

The mayor of the city shall have authority to employ and discharge common laborers for work that is temporary. He or she shall have the authority to employ accountants and auditors for the purpose of auditing the city's books, or the books of the departments thereof, and special attorneys.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1301.

14-49-303. City clerk's employees included.

In addition to the city employees originally affected by and brought within the provisions of this chapter providing for the establishment of a civil service system in certain cities, the employees of the city clerk's office in these cities from the passage of this act shall be affected by and rendered subject to all of the provisions, rights, and benefits of this chapter as though originally provided for therein.

History. Acts 1957, No. 152, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1318.

Publisher's Notes. In reference to the term “the passage of this act,” Acts 1957, No. 152 was signed by the Governor and became effective on March 5, 1957.

Acts 1957, No. 152, § 2, provided that no employee affected by this section at the time of its passage would be subject to an examination, except for promotion or advancement, but would retain his current position, subject to all other provisions of § 14-49-101 et seq.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 14-49-301.

14-49-304. Rules and regulations generally.

    1. The board provided for in this chapter shall prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations governing the employees, except those excepted in this chapter, of their respective cities.
    2. The rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law.
    3. The board shall keep a record of its examinations and shall investigate the enforcement and effect of this chapter and the rules as provided for in this section.
  1. These rules shall provide for:
    1. The qualification of each applicant for appointment to any position affected by this chapter;
    2. Testing by open competitive examinations the relative fitness of applicants for the positions;
      1. Public advertisements of all examinations by publication of notice in some newspaper having a bona fide circulation in the city and by posting of notice at the city hall at least ten (10) days before the date of the examination.
      2. The examinations shall be held on the first Monday in April and the first Monday in October of each year and more often if necessary under the rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the board;
      1. The creation of eligible lists for each position of employment in the city in which shall be entered the names of the successful applicants in the order of their standing in the examination.
        1. All lists for appointments or promotions as certified by the board shall be and remain in force and effect for a period of one (1) year from the date thereof.
        2. At the expiration of this period, all right of priority under the lists shall cease;
      1. The rejection of applicants or eligibles who fail to comply with reasonable requirements of the board in regard to age, sex, physical condition, or who have attempted fraud or deception in connection with the examination.
      2. The board may adopt proper rules and regulations for a suitable physical examination of all applicants;
        1. Certification to the department head of the three (3) standing highest on the eligibility list for appointment for that rank of service and the department head to select for appointment one (1) of the three (3) certified to him or her and notify the commission thereof; and
        2. The promotion or advancement of the one (1) standing highest on the eligibility list for that rank of service.
      1. The governing body may adopt by ordinance the following provisions for employment or advancement in lieu of subdivision (b)(6)(A) of this section:
        1. Certification to the department head of the five (5) standing highest on the eligibility list for appointment for that rank of service and the department head to select for appointment one (1) of the five (5) certified to him or her and notify the commission thereof; and
        2. The promotion or advancement of one (1) of the three (3) standing highest on the eligibility list for that rank of service;
      1. A period of probation not to exceed twelve (12) months before any appointment is complete and six (6) months before any promotion is complete, during which time the commission, upon reasons stated in writing by the department head, may discharge the probationer, in case of appointment, or reduce the probationer, in case of promotion.
      2. From a discharge or reduction, there shall be no appeal;
      1. Temporary employees without examination, with the consent of the commissioner, in case of emergency and pending appointment from eligible lists.
      2. No temporary appointment shall continue longer than sixty (60) days, nor shall successive temporary appointments be allowed except in time of grave danger, of which the commission shall decide;
      1. Promotion lists based upon open competitive examinations of efficiency, character, and conduct shall be created for each rank of service, and promotions shall be made therefrom as provided in this chapter; and
      2. Advancement in rank or increase in salary beyond the limits fixed for the grade by the commission which constitutes a promotion;
      1. Suspension for not longer than thirty (30) days; and
      2. Leave of absence;
      1. Discharge or reduction in rank or compensation after promotion or appointment is complete, only after the person to be discharged or reduced has been presented with the reasons for the discharge or reduction in writing.
        1. The person so discharged or reduced shall have the right within ten (10) days from the time of notice or discharge or reduction to reply in writing.
        2. Should the person deny the truth of the reasons upon which the discharge or reduction is predicated and demand a trial, the commission shall grant a trial as provided in this chapter.
        3. The reasons and the reply shall constitute a part of the trial and shall be filed with the record;
    3. An adoption and amendment of rules after public notice and hearing; and
    4. The preparation of a record of all hearings and other proceedings before it, which shall be stenographically reported.
  2. The commission shall adopt such rules not inconsistent with this chapter for the necessary enforcement of this chapter.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 3; 1941, No. 43, § 1; 1959, No. 464, § 1; 1983, No. 543, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1303.

14-49-305. Departmental rules and regulations.

All employees affected by this chapter shall be governed by rules and regulations set out by the heads of their respective departments after rules and regulations have been adopted by the governing bodies of their respective municipalities.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1304.

14-49-306. Political activity prohibited.

  1. No employee in any department affected by this chapter shall engage in the solicitation of any subscription funds or assessments or contribute thereto for any political party or purpose.
  2. An employee shall not be connected with any political campaign or political management except to cast his or her vote and to express his or her personal opinion privately.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1312.

Cross References. Political activity of public employees permitted, § 21-1-207.

14-49-307. Employees and salaries fixed.

The city council or other governing body shall fix from time to time the number of employees and the salaries to be drawn by each in the departments affected by this chapter.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1316.

Case Notes

Cited: Satterfield v. Fewell, 202 Ark. 67, 149 S.W.2d 949 (1941).

14-49-308. Certification for compensation.

  1. The secretary of the commission shall file with the treasurer or disbursing officer of his or her city a certificate of those entitled to compensation from the city under this chapter.
  2. No compensation shall be allowed to any member of the affected cities unless his or her name shall be so certified by the secretary.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1309.

14-49-309. Examinations.

All examinations provided for in this chapter shall be fair and impartial and such as to test the qualifications of the applicants for the particular service and position to be filled.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1307.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 8, provided that no employee affected by § 14-49-101 et seq. at the time of the passage of this act would be subject to an examination, except for promotion or advancement but would retain his current position, subject to the other provisions of § 19-49-101 et seq. Acts 1937, No. 322, was signed by the Governor on March 25, 1937, and became effective on June 10, 1937. (Emergency clause invalid).

Case Notes

Cited: Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982).

14-49-310. Suspension of competition.

In the case of a vacancy in a position requiring peculiar or exceptional qualifications of a scientific, professional, or expert character, upon satisfactory evidence that competition is impracticable and the position can best be filled by the selection of some person designated and of recognized attainment, the board may suspend by a majority vote competition in this case. However, the suspension shall not be general in its application, and each case must be handled on its own merits.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1306.

14-49-311. Suspension, discharge, or reduction in rank or compensation.

      1. No employee of any department of any city affected by this chapter shall be discharged or reduced in rank or compensation without being notified in writing as provided in this section.
      2. In case of suspension, discharge, or reduction, the affected or accused person shall have written notice of the action at the time it is taken.
    1. The person shall have the right of reply and trial as provided in this section and may be discharged or reduced only after conviction by trial before the commission.
    1. The trial must take place within fifteen (15) days after demand for it is made.
    2. The accused must be notified at least ten (10) days prior to the trial of the date and place of trial.
    3. The accused may have compulsory process to have witnesses present at the trial.
    1. The chair shall preside at all trials and shall determine and decide all questions relative to pleadings and admissibility of evidence.
    2. The decision of the commission shall be a majority vote of members of the commission.
      1. A right of appeal by the city or employee is given from any decision of the commission to the circuit court within whose jurisdiction the commission is situated.
      2. The appeal shall be taken by filing with the commission, within thirty (30) days from the date of the decision, a notice of appeal. Whereupon, the commission shall send to the court all pertinent documents and papers, together with a complete transcript of all evidence and testimony adduced before the commission and all findings and orders of the commission.
        1. The court shall review the commission's decision on the record and in addition may hear testimony or allow the introduction of any further evidence upon the request of either the city or the employee.
        2. The testimony or evidence must be competent and otherwise admissible.
      1. A right of appeal is also given from any action from the circuit court to the Supreme Court.
      2. The appeal shall be governed by the rules of procedure provided by law for appeals from the circuit court to the Supreme Court.
  1. In the event that it is finally determined that there was a wrongful suspension, discharge, or reduction in rank of any employee, the employee shall be entitled in such case to summary judgment against the city for full pay for the time he or she lost by reason of his or her suspension or discharge, or for the difference in salary or loss he or she shall have sustained by reason of any reduction in salary.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, §§ 5, 13; 1959, No. 464, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1305, 19-1313.

Case Notes

Appeals.

Inasmuch as a state statute prohibited judicial review of a police pension board's denial of a police officer's application for a pension, the state circuit court's unappealed dismissal of a mandamus suit, in which the police officer sought to compel the board to award him a pension, was not res judicata as to the police officer's civil rights suit in the federal courts. Hirrill v. Merriweather, 629 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1980).

Discharge.

This section does not prevent discharge in good faith without trial and without notice when a position is temporarily discontinued for economy purposes. Satterfield v. Fewell, 202 Ark. 67, 149 S.W.2d 949 (1941).

Trials.

Within the context of public administrative law and procedure, a claimant or litigant is not denied a constitutionally guaranteed fair hearing before an impartial tribunal simply because the agency factfinders or decisionmakers may have had some prior knowledge or even preliminary participation in the case or even though they may have formed some tentative ideas as to the merits of the controversy about to be decided. Hirrill v. Merriweather, 629 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1980).

Where an employee appeared and testified without suggesting that the board had lost jurisdiction by not trying him within 15 days after demand for trial, it was held that he waived the objections. Watkins v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 201 Ark. 626, 146 S.W.2d 159 (1941).

14-49-312. Reductions, reinstatements, or transfers in personnel.

    1. If it shall become necessary to reduce the personnel of any department, reduction shall be from the lowest rank, seniority having priority.
    2. In event the personnel is subsequently increased, any employee who has been transferred to another department or discharged by reason of the reduction shall have seniority rights over any other employee or any applicant for employment to any position created on account of the increase in personnel.
  1. If the personnel of any department is reduced by reason of the transfer of any duties of one department to another department, any person so discharged shall have priority in the department to which the duties are transferred over any employee performing the duties who does not have a seniority rating at least equal to the person relieved on account of the transfer of the duties and over any applicant for employment covering the duties.
  2. When a vacancy occurs in any department, any employee of the same classification in any other department, seniority having priority, shall have the option of transferring to the vacancy in the department.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 14; 1941, No. 43, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1314.

Case Notes

Reinstatement.

Police officer who stood at head of list for promotion at the time of his entrance into military service was not entitled to appointment upon his return to position vacant at his entrance into the service, even though the commission's regulations made appointments retroactive to the inception of the vacancy, his status of police officer being suspended during his war service. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).

14-49-313. Political discrimination prohibited.

No person in any department affected by this chapter shall be appointed, reduced, suspended, discharged, or otherwise discriminated against because of his or her political opinion or affiliation.

History. Acts 1937, No. 322, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1311.

Chapter 50 Civil Service for Cities of 20,000 to 75,000

Research References

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., §§ 469, 488.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 191, § 1, provided:

“Every city of the first class having the mayor-council form of government and a population of no less than 37,000 inhabitants nor more than 70,000 inhabitants according to the 1980 federal decennial census may add two more members to its civil service commission. The law applicable to the commission shall apply to the additional members except that in each such city the first two additional members appointed pursuant to this act shall serve staggered terms to be determined by lot so that one will serve a three year term and one a six year term and their successors shall serve six year terms.”

14-50-101. Applicability.

  1. Any city of the first class in this state having a population of twenty thousand (20,000) or more but less than seventy-five thousand (75,000) inhabitants, according to the most recent federal census, may establish or continue a civil service system for the nonuniformed employees of these cities, either by action of the city council or other governing body of the city or by a local initiated measure.
  2. Any civil service system established or continued pursuant to this chapter shall cover such nonuniformed employees of the city as the ordinance establishing or continuing the system shall prescribe.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1419.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 20, provided that the purpose of the act is that it be the only one under which first-class cities with a population of at least 20,000 but less than 75,000 inhabitants can establish a civil service system for nonuniformed employees, and to this end all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the act, including Acts 1939, No. 339, and all amendments thereto, and Acts 1941, No. 61, and all amendments thereto, are repealed.

14-50-102. Penalty.

Any person violating any part of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished accordingly.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1437.

Cross References. Misdemeanors, § 5-1-107.

Subchapter 2 — Civil Service Commission

14-50-201. Appointment of members.

  1. In any city establishing or continuing a civil service system pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the city council or other governing body of the city shall name by ordinance five (5) citizens of the city as a civil service commission for the system.
  2. The members of the commission shall hold office as follows:
    1. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the second year after his or her appointment;
    2. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April on the fourth year after his or her appointment;
    3. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the sixth year after his or her appointment;
    4. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the eighth year after his or her appointment; and
    5. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the tenth year after his or her appointment.
  3. If any city establishing or continuing a civil service system under this chapter already has a five-member commission for uniformed employees, the existing commission shall also be the commission for the system established or continued under this chapter.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1420.

14-50-202. Qualifications of members.

  1. Members of the civil service commission shall be citizens of the State of Arkansas and residents of the city for at least three (3) years immediately preceding their appointment.
    1. No person on the commission shall hold or be a candidate for any political office under any national, state, county, or municipal government or be connected in any official capacity with any political party or organization.
    2. No person who is a candidate for or holds any office or position described in this subsection shall be eligible to serve as a member of the commission.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1420.

14-50-203. Organizational meeting.

After the members of the civil service commission are named as provided in this chapter, the commission shall meet and organize.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1422.

14-50-204. Chair of commission.

The chair of the civil service commission for each biennial period shall be the member whose term of office first expires.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1421.

14-50-205. Secretary of commission.

  1. The civil service commission shall select one (1) of its members as secretary, who shall keep the books and records of the commission and shall conduct the correspondence of the commission.
  2. The secretary shall also report or cause to be reported the evidence in all trials or hearings before the commission, and the municipality shall pay the reasonable expense thereof.
  3. The secretary shall act as clerk when the commission is conducting a trial or hearing and shall perform such other functions and duties as the commission shall direct.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1421.

14-50-206. Attorney for commission.

The city attorney shall act as attorney for the civil service commission in all trials or other legal transactions. However, the commission may appoint an attorney to represent the commission if it so desires.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1421.

14-50-207. Regular meetings, etc.

The city council or other governing body shall provide:

  1. Suitable rooms for the civil service commission to hold its meetings;
  2. All reasonable supplies; and
  3. The use of public buildings for holding examinations by the commission.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1422.

14-50-208. Quorum for business.

Three (3) members of the civil service commission shall constitute a quorum for transacting the business of the commission.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1421.

14-50-209. Investigative powers.

  1. In any investigation conducted by the commission provided for in this chapter, the commission shall have the power to subpoena, the power to require the attendance of any witness and the production of any papers or records pertinent to the investigation, and the power to administer oaths to the witnesses.
  2. To punish for contempt the nonattendance of witnesses, or the failure to produce books or papers, or the misbehavior of any person during the investigation, the commission may impose a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1430.

14-50-210. Removal of commissioner.

  1. The city council or other governing body of the city by a two-thirds vote may remove any of the civil service commissioners during his or her term of office for cause.
  2. In the event of the removal of one (1) or more of the commissioners, the city council or other governing body of the city shall fill the vacancy created by the removal.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1420.

14-50-211. Vacancy on commission.

  1. When a vacancy shall occur on the civil service commission by death, resignation, expiration of the term of office, or in any other manner, the vacancy shall be filled by the city council or other governing body of the city.
  2. In the event a vacancy occurs during the term of office of any member, his or her successor shall fill the unexpired term caused by the vacancy.
  3. At the normal expiration of the term, the council or other governing body of the city shall fill the vacancy by the appointment of a commissioner for a term of six (6) years.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1420.

Subchapter 3 — Civil Service System

14-50-301. Existing employees.

No person who is employed by a city at the time action is taken to establish or continue a civil service system under this chapter shall be required to take an examination except for promotion or advancement, but he or she shall retain his or her present position subject to the other provisions of this chapter.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1428.

14-50-302. Department heads.

  1. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to department heads except as provided in this section.
  2. A “department head” means an employee in a supervisory capacity who is directly responsible to the elected governing body for the direction and execution of policies and services on city work projects and duties.
  3. Department heads shall be designated in the salary ordinance, and their status shall be a matter of fact, subject to subsection (b) of this section and the appeal provisions of the ordinance.
  4. Any employee who has established a classification under the provisions of the ordinance and who has been promoted, elevated, transferred, or otherwise placed in the capacity of a department head shall, upon termination of employment as a departmental head, be permitted to return to his or her previous classified job or to any position for which he or she may qualify with full accumulated seniority.
  5. No provision of this section shall be construed as amending public law requirements for licenses or education.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1436.

14-50-303. Private secretaries excepted.

Private secretaries to elected officials shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1436.

14-50-304. Rules and regulations generally.

    1. The civil service commission provided for in this chapter shall prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations governing the employees of their respective cities who are under the civil service system.
    2. The rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law.
    3. The commission shall keep a record of its examinations and shall investigate the enforcement and effect of this chapter and the rules as provided for in it.
  1. These rules shall provide for:
    1. The qualification of each applicant for appointment to any position affected by this chapter;
    2. Testing by open competitive examinations the relative fitness of applicants for the positions;
      1. Public advertisements of all examinations by publication of notice in some newspaper having a bona fide circulation in the city and by posting of notice at the city hall at least ten (10) days before the date of the examination.
      2. Examinations shall be held on the first Monday in April and the first Monday in October of each year and more often if necessary under rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the commission;
      1. The creation of eligibles lists for each position of employment in the city in which shall be entered the names of the successful applicants in the order of their standing in the examination.
        1. All lists for appointments or promotions as certified by the commission shall be and remain in force and effect for a period of one (1) year from the date thereof.
        2. At the expiration of this period, all right of priority under the lists shall cease;
      1. The rejection of applicants or eligibles who fail to comply with reasonable requirements of the commission in regard to age, sex, and physical condition or who have attempted fraud or deception in connection with the examination.
      2. The commission may adopt proper rules and regulations for a suitable physical examination of all applicants;
      1. Certification to the department head of the three (3) standing highest on the eligibility list for appointment for that rank of service, the department head to select for appointment one (1) of the three (3) certified to him or her and notify the commission thereof; and
      2. The promotion or advancement of the one (1) standing highest on the eligibility list for that rank of service;
      1. A period of probation not to exceed twelve (12) months before any appointment is complete and six (6) months before any promotion is complete, during which time the commission may discharge, upon reasons stated in writing by the department head, the probationer, in case of appointment, or reduce the probationer, in case of promotion.
      2. From discharge or reduction, there shall be no appeal;
      1. Temporary employees without examination with the consent of the commission in case of emergency and pending appointment from eligibles lists.
      2. No temporary appointment shall continue longer than sixty (60) days, nor shall successive temporary appointments be allowed except in time of grave danger, as the commission shall decide;
      1. Promotion based upon open competitive examinations of efficiency, character, and conduct; lists shall be created for each rank of service, and promotions shall be made therefrom as provided in this chapter; and
      2. Advancement in rank or increase in salary beyond the limits fixed for the grade by the commission which constitutes a promotion;
      1. Suspension for not longer than thirty (30) days; and
      2. Leave of absence;
      1. Discharge or reduction in rank or compensation after promotion or appointment is complete, only after the person to be discharged or reduced has been presented with the reasons for the discharge or reduction in writing.
        1. The person so discharged or reduced shall have the right within ten (10) days from the time of notice or discharge or reduction to reply in writing.
        2. Should the person deny the truth of the reasons upon which the discharge or reduction is predicated and demand a trial, the commission shall grant a trial as provided in this chapter. The reasons and the reply shall constitute a part of the trial and shall be filed with the record;
    3. An adoption and amendment of rules after public notice and hearing; and
    4. The preparation of a record of all hearings and other proceedings before it, which shall be stenographically reported.
  2. The commission shall adopt such rules not inconsistent with this chapter for the necessary enforcement of this chapter.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1423.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

14-50-305. Departmental regulations.

All employees covered by a civil service system established or continued under the provisions of this chapter shall be governed by the regulations set out by the heads of their respective departments and approved by the city council or other governing body of the city in their respective municipalities.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1424.

14-50-306. Political activity prohibited.

  1. No employee in any department affected by this chapter shall engage in the solicitation of any subscription funds or assessments or contribute thereto for any political party or purpose.
  2. An employee shall not be connected with any political campaign or political management except to cast his or her vote and to express his or her personal opinion privately.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1432.

Cross References. Political activity of public employees permitted, § 21-1-207.

14-50-307. Employees and compensation fixed.

The city council or other governing body shall from time to time fix the number of employees and the salaries to be drawn by each as well as the vacation and sick leave of employees in the departments affected by this chapter.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1435.

14-50-308. Certification for compensation.

  1. The secretary of the civil service commission shall file with the treasurer or disbursing officer of his or her city a certificate of those entitled to compensation from the city under this chapter.
  2. No compensation shall be allowed to any member of the system of the affected cities unless his or her name shall be so certified by the secretary.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1429.

14-50-309. Examinations.

All examinations provided for in this chapter shall be fair and impartial and designed to test the qualifications of the applicants for the particular service and position to be filled.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1427.

14-50-310. Suspension of competition.

In the case of a vacancy in a position requiring peculiar or exceptional qualifications of a scientific, professional, or expert character, upon satisfactory evidence that competition is impracticable and the position can best be filled by the selection of some person designated and of recognized attainment, the commission by majority vote may suspend competition in this case. However, the suspension shall not be general in its application, and each case must be handled on its own merits.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1426.

14-50-311. Discharge or reduction in rank or compensation.

    1. No civil service employees under a system established or continued pursuant to this chapter shall be discharged or reduced in rank or compensation without being notified in writing of the discharge and the cause therefor.
    2. In case of discharge or reduction, the affected or accused person shall have written notice of the action at the time it is taken.
    1. Within ten (10) days after the notice in writing is served upon the officer, private, or employee, he or she may request if he or she so desires a trial before the civil service commission on the charges alleged as grounds for discharge.
      1. In the event a request for trial is made, the commission shall fix a date for the trial not more than thirty (30) days after request therefor is made.
      2. If the request for trial is not made within ten (10) days from the date of service of notice of discharge, the discharge shall become final and no trial shall be granted thereafter.
    1. In the event of a trial, the officer, private, or employee requesting the trial shall be notified of the date and place of the trial at least ten (10) days prior to the date thereof.
    2. The employee shall have compulsory process to have witnesses present at the trial.
      1. The chair of the commission shall preside at all trials and shall determine and decide all questions relative to pleadings and the admissibility of evidence.
      2. The decision of the commission shall be by a majority vote of the members of the commission.
      1. In all trials under this section for cities having a mayor-council form of government and a population of not less than fifty-five thousand (55,000), the commission shall employ an attorney to advise and represent the commission.
      2. The attorney shall not be the city attorney, nor shall he or she be associated with any attorney then employed by the city.
      1. A right of appeal by the city or employee is given from any decision of the commission to the circuit court within whose jurisdiction the commission is situated.
      2. The appeal shall be taken by filing with the commission within thirty (30) days from the date of the decision a notice of appeal. Whereupon, the commission shall send to the court all pertinent documents and papers, together with a complete transcript of all evidence and testimony adduced before the commission and all findings and orders of the commission.
        1. The court shall review the commission's decision on the record and in addition may hear testimony or allow the introduction of any further evidence upon the request of either the city or the employee.
        2. The testimony or evidence must be competent and otherwise admissible.
      1. A right of appeal is also given from any action from the circuit court to the Supreme Court.
      2. The appeal shall be governed by the rules of procedure provided by law for appeals from the circuit court to the Supreme Court.
  1. In the event that it is finally determined that there was a wrongful discharge or reduction in rank of any employee, the employee shall be entitled to judgment against the city for whatever loss he or she may have sustained by reason of his or her discharge or demotion, taking into consideration any remuneration which the employee may have received from other sources pending the final determination of his or her case.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, §§ 7, 15; 1975, No. 260, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1425, 19-1433.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

Case Notes

Discharge.

Discharge for reason that work was unsatisfactory was not sustained by a preponderance of the evidence where employee had been continued in her employment after expiration of six months' probationary period and where evidence as to the alleged poor quality of work was vague and uncertain. City of Little Rock v. Tucker, 234 Ark. 35, 350 S.W.2d 531 (1961) (decision under prior law).

14-50-312. Reductions, reinstatements, or transfers in personnel.

    1. If it shall become necessary to reduce the personnel of any department reduction shall be from the lowest rank, seniority having priority.
    2. In the event the personnel is subsequently increased, any employee who has been transferred to another department or discharged by reason of the reduction shall have seniority rights over any other employee or any applicant for employment to any position created on account of the increase in personnel.
  1. If the personnel of any department is reduced by reason of the transfer of any duties of one department to another department, any person so discharged shall have priority in the department to which the duties are transferred over any employee performing the duties who does not have a seniority rating at least equal to the person relieved on account of the transfer of the duties and over any applicant for employment covering the duties.
  2. When a vacancy occurs in any department, any employee of the same classification in any other department, seniority having priority, shall have the option of transferring to the vacancy in the department.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 16; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1434.

14-50-313. Political discrimination prohibited.

No person in any department affected by this chapter shall be appointed, reduced, suspended, discharged, or otherwise discriminated against because of his or her political opinion or affiliation.

History. Acts 1963, No. 221, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1431.

Chapter 51 Civil Service for Police and Fire Departments

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1987, No. 530, §§ 1, 2, provided that any city of the second class may establish, maintain, and operate a civil service system for its police and fire departments in the manner prescribed by law for the establishment, etc., of these systems in cities of the first class, and that the provisions of Acts 1933, No. 28, as amended, Acts 1949, No. 326, as amended, and all other laws relating to the authority of cities of the first class to establish, etc., these systems shall be equally applicable to the establishment, etc., of these systems in cities of the second class.

Acts 1989, No. 191, § 1, provided: “Every city of the first class having the mayor-council form of government and a population of no less than 37,000 inhabitants nor more than 70,000 inhabitants according to the 1980 federal decennial census may add two more members to its civil service commission. The law applicable to the commission shall apply to the additional members except that in each such city the first two additional members appointed pursuant to this act shall serve staggered terms to be determined by lot so that one will serve a three year term and one a six year term and their successors shall serve six year terms.”

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1933, No. 28, §§ 21, 22: Feb. 13, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “That there is dire necessity for control and management of the police and fire departments of cities affected by this act in order to increase the efficiency of the personnel of said departments and affording much needed protection to citizens in the prosecution of crimes and fires, and this act being necessary for the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

14-51-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: “board”, “commission”, or “commissioners” means the board of civil service commissioners of the police and fire departments as provided for in § 14-51-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 16; Pope's Dig., § 9960; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1616.

14-51-102. Applicability.

In addition to all other powers possessed by cities of the first class, these cities may establish a board of civil service commissioners for the police and fire departments of their cities.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 3a, provided that none of the provisions of this act would be applicable to civil service commissions in cities of the first class having a commission form of government; however, Acts 1959, No. 97, § 1, repealed § 3a and in §§ 2 and 3 provided that all cities of the first class having duly established civil service commissions under the provisions of Acts 1933, No. 28, and not having fully complied with Acts 1949, No. 326, were to take immediate steps to do so and provided that the action of all civil service commissions referred to were validated and that all civil servants affected should retain all rights acquired.

Case Notes

Cited: Barrows v. City of Fort Smith, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38222 (W.D. Ark. May 9, 2008).

14-51-103. Penalty.

Any person violating any part of this chapter shall be subject to civil suit for injunctive and declaratory relief by the aggrieved party.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 20; Pope's Dig., § 9964; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1618; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Board of Civil Service Commissioners

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 432, § 4: Mar. 9, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the chairmanship of many city civil service commissions changes during the first week in May; that this act provides that the chairmen should be selected by the commission; and that this act must go into effect immediately in order to coincide with the change in chairmanships. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 439, § 5: Mar. 9, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the powers and duties of Civil Service Commissions established pursuant to Act 28 of 1933, as amended, require immediate clarification in that such commissions' interference with the day to day operations and management of police and fire departments is contrary to the efficient and effective operation of such departments and is injurious to the public health, safety and welfare. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Case Notes

In General.

There is nothing in this subchapter creating an enforceable expectation of continued employment; it merely gives employees certain procedural rights surrounding termination. Dalton v. City of Russellville, 290 Ark. 603, 720 S.W.2d 918 (1986).

14-51-201. Appointment of members.

  1. In all cities of the first class having a civil service system, the city's governing body shall name by ordinance five (5) upright and intelligent citizens of their cities as a board of civil service commissioners for the police and fire departments or the nonuniformed employees.
  2. The commissioners shall hold office as follows:
    1. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the second year after his or her appointment;
    2. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the fourth year after his or her appointment;
    3. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the sixth year after his or her appointment;
    4. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the eighth year after his or her appointment; and
    5. One shall hold office until the first Monday in April of the tenth year after his or her appointment.
    1. In all cities of the first class having a civil service system, the governing body may add by ordinance two (2) more members to its civil service commission. The law applicable to the commission shall apply to the additional members, except that in each such city the first two (2) additional members appointed pursuant to this subsection shall serve staggered terms to be determined by lot so that one (1) will serve a three-year term and one (1) a six-year term, and their successors shall serve six-year terms.
    2. In all cities having a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or more persons and having a civil service system, the governing body may add by ordinance four (4) more members to its civil service commission. The law applicable to the commission shall apply to the additional members, except that in each such city the first four (4) additional members appointed pursuant to this subsection shall serve staggered terms to be determined by lot so that two (2) will serve a three-year term and two (2) a six-year term, and their successors shall serve six-year terms.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 2; 1997, No. 1221, § 2.

Case Notes

De Facto Commissioners.

Where plaintiffs filed representative suit in behalf of all city police officers of Little Rock whose employment was cut off by service in the war, against members of Little Rock Civil Service Commission and asked that commissioners be permanently enjoined from acting as commissioners on theory that 1933 act authorized cities of first class to create a civil service commission for police officers and fire fighters only, and 1937 act authorized cities of more than 75,000 to create a second civil service commission for employees other than fire fighters and police officers, that hence members of the commission had violated law prohibiting members from holding more than one political office, court properly sustained demurrer to the complaint, as even though plaintiffs were right in their theory that commissioners were serving on two commissions, the defendants would still have been de facto commissioners and equity had no authority to decide whether defendants were also de jure officers. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Ordinances.

Ordinance appointing an individual to civil service commission was not legislation subject to referendum under Ark. Const. Amend. 7, inasmuch as the ordinance in questioning was merely a procedural device for administering a previous ordinance adopted pursuant to this section. Greenlee v. Munn, 262 Ark. 663, 559 S.W.2d 928 (1978).

14-51-202. Qualifications of commissioners.

  1. The commissioners shall be:
    1. Citizens of the State of Arkansas and residents of the city for more than three (3) years preceding their appointments; and
    2. Qualified electors of the city at all times during their appointments.
    1. No person on the commission shall hold or be a candidate for any political office under any national, state, county, or municipal government or be connected in any way in any official capacity with any political party or political organization.
    2. No person as enumerated in this subsection shall be eligible as a member of the board who at the time of his or her election shall hold any office.
  2. The commissioners shall be familiar with these statutes, civil rights laws, and all other state and federal public employment laws.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 3; 2009, No. 738, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment in (a) inserted (a)(2), redesignated the remaining text accordingly, and made related changes.

14-51-203. Organizational meeting.

  1. The commissioners named as provided in this chapter shall meet and organize.
  2. The commissioner who shall be elected for a term of two (2) years shall act as chair.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9946; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1602.

14-51-204. Chair of civil service commission.

  1. The board of civil service commissioners shall select annually on the first Monday of May one (1) of the commissioners to serve as chair of the commission.
    1. The chair shall preside over all meetings of the commission and be its executive officer.
    2. The chair shall vote on questions before the board.
    1. In the absence of the chair, the board shall elect one (1) of its number to act instead of the chair.
    2. The member so elected shall be clothed with all the powers, rights, and duties of the chair during the absence of the chair.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 2; 1949, No. 326, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9946; Acts 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1601.1, 19-1602; Acts 1989, No. 432, § 1; 1997, No. 131, § 1.

14-51-205. Secretary of board.

  1. The board shall elect one (1) of its members as secretary.
  2. The secretary shall:
    1. Keep the books and records of the board;
    2. Conduct the correspondence of the board;
    3. Report the evidence in all trials or cause the evidence to be reported, for which the reasonable expense shall be paid by the municipality;
    4. Act as clerk when the board is conducting a trial court;
    5. Work with and act as liaison to the city employee assigned to assist the board; and
    6. Perform any other duties that may be ordered by the board.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 4.

14-51-206. Attorney for commission and city.

  1. Except if the commission decides otherwise, the city attorney shall act as attorney for the commission in all trials or other legal transactions. However, the commission may appoint an attorney to represent the commission if it so desires.
  2. The city shall hire on an annual basis independent legal counsel to represent the city and the department head when the city's managerial employment decisions are brought for review before the commission and in all trials, proceedings, or other legal transactions before the commission.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 5; 1995, No. 1135, § 1.

14-51-207. Responsibilities of the city.

The city council or other governing body, as the case may be, shall:

  1. Provide suitable rooms for the board to hold meetings;
  2. Allow all reasonable supplies;
  3. Permit use of public buildings for holding examinations by the board;
  4. Provide, designate, manage, and supervise a paid city employee, full-time or part-time, as may be deemed necessary by the city's chief executive officer, to be known as the administrative assistant to the commission. This assistant shall help with the clerical and administrative needs of the board; and
  5. Provide adequate funding for legal counsel as enumerated in this chapter.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9946; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1602; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 6.

14-51-208. Quorum for business.

A majority of the total number of the members of a civil service commission authorized by statute and city ordinance shall constitute a quorum for any business, meeting, or hearing.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1; Acts 2013, No. 750, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

14-51-209. Investigative powers.

  1. In any investigation conducted by the commission provided for in this chapter, the commission shall have the power of subpoena, to require the attendance of any witness and the production of any papers or records pertinent to the investigation, and to administer oaths to the witnesses.
  2. To punish for contempt the nonattendance of witnesses, or the failure to produce books or papers, or misbehavior of any person during the investigation, the commission may impose a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 10; Pope's Dig., § 9954; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1610; Acts 1993, No. 206, § 7.

14-51-210. Removal of commissioner.

  1. The city council or governing body of the city by a two-thirds vote may remove any of the commissioners during their term of office for cause.
  2. In the event of the removal of one (1) or more of the commissioners, the council or governing body shall fill the vacancy created by the removal.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1.

Case Notes

Cause.

City council had the right to determine what would have been a sufficient cause for removal of commissioners. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940) (decision under prior law).

Resolution.

Since former statute did not require removal of civil service commissioners to be by ordinance, a resolution of city council was sufficient. McAllister v. McAllister, 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940) (decision under prior law).

14-51-211. Vacancy on board.

  1. When a vacancy shall occur on the board by death, resignation, or expiration of the term of office, or in any other manner, the vacancy shall be filled by the city council or governing body of the city.
  2. In the event a vacancy occurs during the term of office of any commissioner, except as caused by the normal expiration of his or her term, his or her successor shall fill the unexpired term caused by the vacancy, and at the normal expiration of the term, the council shall fill the vacancy by the appointment of a commissioner for a period of six (6) years.

History. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 1; 1971, No. 166, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1601.1.

14-51-212. No control over police or fire departments.

  1. The powers and duties of every civil service commission established pursuant to this chapter shall be and are hereby expressly limited such that the said commissions shall not have any control nor shall said commissions attempt to exercise any control over the normal and routine day-to-day operations of a police or fire department, directly or indirectly.
  2. No provision of this chapter shall be construed to provide authorization to said commissions to have such authority.

History. Acts 1989, No. 439, § 1.

Case Notes

Policy Against Smoking.

City civil service commission's rule requiring a grievance hearing for a violation of the city's policy against smoking by police officers while on duty did not constitute interference, within the meaning of this section, in the daily operations of the police department, and the trial court did not err in ordering the commission to follow its own rule. Williams v. Taylor, 311 Ark. 94, 841 S.W.2d 618 (1992).

Cited: Donaldson v. Taylor, 327 Ark. 93, 936 S.W.2d 551 (1997).

Subchapter 3 — Civil Service System

Effective Dates. Acts 1949, No. 326, § 4: approved Mar. 21, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, this Act is necessary to give proper protection to Civil Service employees in cities of the first class, to provide a more equitable means of administering Civil Service laws in said cities, and to properly protect the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1973, No. 101, § 3: Feb. 12, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the existing laws of this State relative to the holding of civil service examinations for municipal policemen and firemen, when read with the other laws of the State relative to civil service for policemen and firemen are vague and unclear regarding the time and frequency of holding such examinations and with respect to the priority of the names on lists compiled as a result of such examinations; that this confusion and uncertainty should be removed as soon as possible in order to clarify the law with respect to holding such examinations and to clarify the rights of persons taking such examination in order to provide proper police and fire protection in the various municipalities in this State; and this Act is designed to accomplish this worthy purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 262, § 3: Mar. 17, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that some of the civil service commissions affected by this Act will test police and firefighter candidates in April; that this Act should be in effect prior to the testing; that unless this emergency clause is enacted this Act will not go into effect prior to April. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 657, § 4: Apr. 6, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 952 of 1977, as amended, is unnecessary and that the civil service commissions created under that law are unnecessary; that the Act should be immediately repealed and the commissions immediately abolished, in order to provide for the efficient operation of the offices subject to the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 439, § 5: Mar. 9, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the powers and duties of Civil Service Commissions established pursuant to Act 28 of 1933, as amended, require immediate clarification in that such commissions' interference with the day to day operations and management of police and fire departments is contrary to the efficient and effective operation of such departments and is injurious to the public health, safety and welfare. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-51-301. Rules and regulations generally.

    1. The board provided for in this chapter shall prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations governing the fire and police departments of its respective cities.
    2. The rules and regulations shall have the same force and effect of law.
    3. The board shall keep a record of its examinations and shall investigate the enforcement and effect of this chapter and the rules as provided for in this section.
  1. These rules shall provide for:
      1. The qualifications of each applicant for appointment to any position on the police or fire department.
          1. A person must be at least eighteen (18) years of age and, except as provided in subdivision (b)(1)(C) of this section, must not have arrived at thirty-five (35) years of age to be eligible for appointment to any position on the fire department.
          2. The board may require a person to be at least twenty-one (21) years of age to be eligible for appointment to any position on the fire department.
        1. A person shall meet the minimum standards established by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training to be eligible for appointment to the police department affected by this chapter.
      2. However, the maximum age limit for appointment to any position with a fire department in subdivision (b)(1)(B)(i) of this section shall not apply to:
        1. Any person who has at least two (2) years of previous experience as a paid firefighter with another fire department and whose years of experience as a paid firefighter when subtracted from the person's age leaves a remainder of not more than thirty-two (32) years;
        2. Any person who is applying for a position with a fire department in which the primary functions of the job involve duties that are administrative, managerial, or supervisory in nature; or
        3. A current or former service member of the regular or reserve component of the uniformed services of the United States as defined under 10 U.S.C. § 101 who is within three (3) years of separation or retirement from the regular or reserve component of the uniformed services of the United States.
      1. Open competitive examinations to test the relative fitness of applicants for the positions.
        1. The examinations are to be protected from disclosure and copying, except that the civil service commission shall designate a period of time following the conclusion of testing in which an employee taking an examination shall be entitled to review his or her own test results.
        2. During the employee review process, the employee may not copy test questions in any form whatsoever;
      1. Public advertisement of all examinations by publication of notice in some newspaper having a bona fide circulation in the city and by posting of notice at the city hall at least ten (10) days before the date of the examinations.
      2. The examinations may be held on the first Monday in April or the first Monday in October, or both, and more often if necessary under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the board;
        1. (a) The creation and maintenance of current eligibles lists for each rank of employment in the departments, in which shall be entered the names of the successful candidates in the order of their standing in the examination. However, for ranks in each department where there may not be openings during the effective period of a list, the board may establish rules to create the eligibles list on an as-needed basis.
          1. A person is not eligible for examination for advancement from a lower rank to a higher rank until that person has served at least one (1) year in the lower rank, except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be decided by the board. The board shall determine the rank or ranks eligible to be examined for advancement to the higher rank.
          2. If the board designates an effective period for eligibles lists of more than one (1) year under subdivision (b)(4)(B)(i) of this section, a person shall be eligible for examination for advancement from a lower rank to a higher rank if the person is within twelve (12) months of meeting the time in service requirement for eligibility. However, if that person takes the examination and then is placed on the eligibles list for promotion, the person shall not be promoted from the eligibles list until the person meets the minimum service time requirement in the lower rank as established by the board.
          3. The eligibles list for promotion shall be certified within ninety (90) days upon completion of the examination process for advancement under this section.
          1. Unless the board designates a longer effective period for eligibles lists that is not less than one (1) year nor more than two (2) years, all lists for appointments or promotions as certified by the board shall be effective for the period of one (1) year.
            1. If the period of the eligibles list is for more than one (1) year, the time period shall be established and certified before a component of the test is administered to an employee.
            2. After the eligibles list is certified, the time period shall not be extended.
        1. At the expiration of this period, all right of priority under the lists shall cease;
      1. The rejection of candidates as eligibles who fail to comply with reasonable requirements of the board in regard to age, sex, physical condition, or who have been guilty of a felony, or who have attempted fraud or deception in connection with the examination.
        1. All applicants for appointment and all applicants for reinstatement shall undergo a suitable physical examination.
          1. The examination shall be conducted in the manner and form as provided by law.
          2. If no provision has been made by existing law for such examination, then the board may adopt proper rules and regulations to carry this subdivision (b)(5) into effect;
    1. Certification to the department head of the three (3) standing highest on the eligibility list for appointment for that rank of service, and for the department head to select for appointment or promotion one (1) of the three (3) certified to him or her and notify the commission thereof;
      1. A period of probation not to exceed twelve (12) months for potential fire department appointees and at least one (1) year but no longer than two (2) years for potential law enforcement appointees before any appointment is complete and six (6) months before any promotion is complete.
      2. During the period, the probationer may be discharged in case of an appointment or reduced in case of promotion by the chief of police or the chief of the fire department;
      1. Temporary employees without examination with the consent of the commission, in cases of emergency, and pending appointment from the eligibles list.
        1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(8)(B)(iii) of this section, a temporary promotion or appointment for a vacancy created by death, termination, resignation, demotion, retirement, or promotion shall not be made for longer than sixty (60) days when there is a current eligibles list, except to the extent necessary to comply with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 20 C.F.R. Part 1002, as in effect on January 1, 2015.
        2. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(8)(B)(iii) of this section, in the absence of a current eligibles list, a temporary promotion or appointment may be allowed for a vacancy created by death, termination, resignation, demotion, retirement, or promotion until an eligibles list is certified unless the position is determined to be eliminated or not funded by the governing body of the city. A temporary promotion for a vacancy created by death, termination, resignation, demotion, retirement, or promotion shall not last longer than sixty (60) days, except to the extent necessary to comply with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 20 C.F.R. Part 1002, as in effect on January 1, 2015.
        3. If an appeal is filed in connection with a vacancy that is created by a termination or demotion, the vacancy may be filled by a temporary promotion until all appeals in connection with the termination or demotion are exhausted.
      2. A vacancy that is created by vacation, bereavement leave, medical leave, military leave, or suspension on a day-to-day basis may be filled by a temporary promotion on a day-to-day basis as vacancies occur.
      3. An increase in salary beyond the limits fixed for the grade by the rules of the commission may be allowed while an employee is working outside of his or her grade while temporarily promoted to fill a vacancy under this subdivision (b)(8);
        1. Establishing eligibility lists for promotion based upon open competitive examinations.
        2. The examinations are to be protected from disclosure and copying, except that the civil service commission shall designate a period of time following the conclusion of testing in which an employee taking an examination shall be entitled to review his or her own test results.
        3. During the employee review process, the employee may not copy test questions in any form whatsoever.
        4. The exams may include a rating of applicants based on results of written, oral, or practical examinations, length of service, efficiency ratings, and educational or vocational qualifications.
          1. Lists shall be created for each rank of service and promotions made from the lists as provided in this section.
          2. Promotions shall be made within sixty (60) calendar days of a vacancy created by death, termination, resignation, demotion, retirement, or promotion unless the position is determined to be eliminated, except to the extent necessary to comply with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 20 C.F.R. Part 1002, as in effect on January 1, 2015.
      1. Advancement in rank or increase in salary beyond the limits fixed for the grade by the rules of the commission shall constitute a promotion;
    2. Suspension for not longer than thirty (30) calendar days and leave of absence;
      1. Discharge or reduction in rank or compensation after promotion or appointment is complete, only after the person to be discharged or reduced has been presented with the reasons for the discharge or reduction in writing.
        1. The person so discharged or reduced shall have the right, within ten (10) days from the date of notice of discharge or reduction, to reply in writing.
        2. Should the person deny the truth of the reasons upon which the discharge or reduction is predicated and demand a trial, the commission shall grant a trial as provided in this chapter.
        3. The reasons and the reply shall constitute a part of the trial and be filed with the record;
    3. The adoption and amendment of rules after public notice and hearing;
    4. The preparation of a record of all hearings and other proceedings before it, which shall be stenographically reported; and
    5. A review of complaints filed by any citizen pursuant to rules promulgated by the commission, including rules that give the commission the authority to consider certain personnel issues in executive session and to establish any necessary appellate procedures.
    1. The board may prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations that provide for and apply to a category of police officers whose promotion to any rank or grade below that of sergeant is exempted, in whole or in part, from subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(9) of this section.
    2. If the board prescribes the rules and regulations authorized in subdivision (c)(1) of this section, the board shall prescribe criteria for the promotions.
  2. The commission shall adopt such rules not inconsistent with this chapter for necessary enforcement of this chapter, but shall not adopt any rule or rules which would authorize any interference with the day-to-day management or operation of a police or fire department.

(b) If the board creates an eligibles list on an as-needed basis and a vacancy is created as a result of death, termination, resignation, demotion, retirement, or promotion, the chief of the fire department or police department shall notify the board within five (5) business days, and the board shall schedule an examination to establish an eligibles list from which an appointment or promotion shall be made unless the position is determined to be eliminated or not funded by the governing body of the city.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 9947; Acts 1959, No. 205, § 1; 1973, No. 101, § 1; 1977, No. 450, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1603; Acts 1987, No. 262, § 1; 1987, No. 276, § 1; 1987, No. 657, § 3; 1989, No. 439, § 2; 1993, No. 206, § 8; 1995, No. 473, § 1; 1997, No. 542, § 1; 1997, No. 1221, § 1; 1999, No. 303, § 1; 2001, No. 1597, § 1; 2003, No. 280, § 1; 2005, No. 1953, § 1; 2007, No. 743, § 1; 2009, No. 527, §§ 1, 2; 2011, No. 1029, § 1; 2013, No. 468, § 1; 2013, No. 1061, § 2; 2015, No. 579, § 1; 2019, No. 192, § 1; 2019, No. 206, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Formerly, the last proviso in subdivision (b)(1) of this section provided that the age limits were not applicable to any persons employed in a police or fire department at the time of the passage of this act. Acts 1933, No. 28, was signed by the Governor and became effective on February 13, 1933.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted (b)(4)(B)(i) (b) , redesignated the remaining text of (b)(4)(B)(i) accordingly, and inserted “of employment or promotion” in (b)(8)(B).

The 2011 amendment added (b)(4)(A)(i) (b) ; rewrote (b)(8)(B); added (b)(8)(C); and added (b)(9)(A)(v) (b) .

The 2013 amendment by No. 468, in (b)(4)(A)(ii), substituted “A person is not” for “No person shall be” and “has” for “shall have”; and added (b)(4)(A)(ii) (c)

The 2013 amendment by No. 1061 inserted “for potential fire department appointees and at least one (1) year but no longer than two (2) years for potential law enforcement appointees” in (b)(7)(A).

The 2015 amendment added “except to the extent…January 1, 2015” at the end of (b)(8)(B)(i) and (ii); and added “except to the extent…January 1, 2015” at the end of (b)(9)(A)(v) (b)

The 2019 amendment by No. 192 added (b)(1)(C)(iii).

The 2019 amendment by No. 206 rewrote (b)(1)(B).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Administrative Law in Arkansas, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 107.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey—Civil Rights, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 149.

Survey—Miscellaneous, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 235.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where plaintiff was passed over for promotion to assistant police chief and alleged denial of due process and equal protection under the 14th amendment based on violations of this section, supreme court held that alleged violations of civil service statutes did not constitute a clearly established right under the federal constitution. Virden v. Roper, 302 Ark. 125, 788 S.W.2d 470 (1990).

In General.

Subdivision (a)(1) gives a civil service commission the authority to enforce fire department regulations adopted by city council. Frego v. Jonesboro Civil Serv. Comm'n, 285 Ark. 35, 684 S.W.2d 258 (1985).

Appointments and Promotions.

Increase in pay within pay range of a rank is not a promotion or advancement in rank under subdivision (b)(9) requiring an examination. Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W.2d 633 (1967).

The requirement of subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) that a person serve at least one year in a lower rank before becoming eligible for promotion expressly applies to advancement and there is nothing in this section suggesting that vacancies must be filled only by an advancement of personnel through the ranks; the provisions clearly contemplate otherwise by making a distinction between persons who are promoted and those who are appointed. Amason v. City of El Dorado, 281 Ark. 50, 661 S.W.2d 364 (1983).

The Arkansas civil service statutes for police officers and fire fighters do not require that a vacancy in the office of chief of police must be filled by promotion from within the ranks of the police department. Amason v. City of El Dorado, 281 Ark. 50, 661 S.W.2d 364 (1983).

The statutory language in subdivision (b)(6) which speaks of certification of the three highest persons refers to the appointment of applicants, not the promotion of employees. Bradley v. Bruce, 288 Ark. 342, 705 S.W.2d 431 (1986), rehearing denied, 288 Ark. 342, 713 S.W.2d 451 (1986).

This section specifically provides that promotion shall be made on the basis of the examination; there is no provision authorizing any other criterion, including seniority. Bradley v. Bruce, 288 Ark. 342, 705 S.W.2d 431 (1986), rehearing denied, 288 Ark. 342, 713 S.W.2d 451 (1986).

This section does not provide for seniority to be used as a factor in promotion; thus seniority cannot be used as a factor. Worth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 294 Ark. 643, 746 S.W.2d 364 (1988).

City lost the protection of the saving clause of § 14-48-102 when, at the time of the government reorganization in 1967, it promoted firemen in accordance with the law governing cities of the first class having a city administrator form of government contained in § 14-48-101 et seq., including this section which requires promotion solely on the basis of examination. City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748 (1991).

Discharges or Reductions.

Action of demoted police officer making scurrilous and defamatory allegations against mayor and civil service commission was held insubordination in violation of the rules and regulations of the commission, justifying his dismissal. Ward v. City of Fort Smith, 201 Ark. 1117, 148 S.W.2d 164 (1941).

Where city had regulation that a department head could not be discharged without notification in writing from governing body of city, the city administrator alone did not have authority to discharge the chief of the municipal fire department. Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 494, 473 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

Where private citizen files charges against a police officer, civil service commission, after conducting a trial to investigate, has the authority to dismiss the officer. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Bass, 252 Ark. 178, 477 S.W.2d 842 (1972).

Judgment affirming findings of civil service commission was reversed where neither the notice of discharge nor the findings of the commission upholding a dismissal contained a statement of the rules and regulations that were allegedly violated. Magness v. Shock, 262 Ark. 148, 554 S.W.2d 342 (1977).

A civil service commission is authorized to modify, by increasing or decreasing, the punishment imposed by a police chief. Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

The modification of an officer's punishment, after a statutory hearing, cannot be construed as interference with the day-to-day management or operation of a police department, instead, it is the statutorily authorized enforcement of a regulation. Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Fire chief's letter gave a firefighter sufficient notice that the firefighter's conduct of fleeing from law enforcement officers was the reason for the firefighter's termination, satisfying the requirement of presenting the reason for a discharge in writing under subdivision (b)(11)(A) of this section; accordingly, the firefighter's argument that the firefighter's termination was not in accordance with state law was without merit. Lawrence v. City of Texarkana, 2011 Ark. 42, 378 S.W.3d 127 (2011).

Evidence.

Evidence was held to support civil service commission's findings in proceeding to dismiss chief of detectives charged with being drunk while on duty. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Finding of circuit court that charges were not sustained and restoring official to his position as chief of police was held not against preponderance of the testimony. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943).

Evidence supported civil service commission's finding of dismissal where police officer frequently left his work early while on the night shift, and on occasion, came to work after he had been drinking. Tittle v. City of Conway, 268 Ark. 1126, 599 S.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1980).

Examinations.

—In General.

That one occupying position of motor patrolman without examination was, as a result of an examination for that position, demoted to his original position as patrolman and another was appointed motor patrolman, was held not to show discrimination. Ward v. City of Fort Smith, 201 Ark. 1117, 148 S.W.2d 164 (1941).

Use of oral examinations in the selection process is not prohibited, but it must be capable of objective grading and review. Bennett v. Blytheville Civil Serv. Comm'n, 293 Ark. 136, 733 S.W.2d 414 (1987).

—Advancements in Rank.

Advancement in rank denotes an advance from a lower rank to a higher rank and not an increase in pay within the pay range of the rank. Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W.2d 633 (1967).

Word “grade” does not mean a pay step within the pay range for a particular job class title, but is synonymous with “rank.” Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W.2d 633 (1967).

Where city board of directors is empowered to fix salaries, reasonable variations therein for persons holding the same rank will be upheld. Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W.2d 633 (1967).

—Eligibility Lists.

This section plainly rebuts the notion that promotion is automatic, for the appointing authority makes the selection from among the three persons standing highest on the eligibility list; moreover, the eligibility list remains in force for one year, which also indicates that promotions need not be made at once. Orrell v. City of Hot Springs, 265 Ark. 267, 578 S.W.2d 18 (1979).

Under subdivision (b)(4), police and fire departments may maintain more than one eligibility list simultaneously, and each list expires one year after it is certified. Cross v. Bruce, 284 Ark. 230, 681 S.W.2d 339 (1984).

Individuals who underwent examination process and established their eligibility for promotion may not have their rights prejudiced by litigation in which they were not joined. Worth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 Ark. 251, 761 S.W.2d 169 (1988).

Each time a position became available within the police department, the Commission was required to submit the names to the police chief of the three applicants with the highest examination scores at that time. Burcham v. City of Van Buren, 330 Ark. 451, 954 S.W.2d 266 (1997).

Force and Effect.

Provision in subsection (a) that rules and regulations promulgated by civil service commission shall have the force of law is not an improper delegation of power; authority to make rules and regulations must be read in connection with express purpose of the statute, and force of law cannot be given to any rule and regulation unless it comes within the purview of the legislation. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Civil service commission may delegate details of administration if purely ministerial but, being charged by law with power to make rules, cannot delegate that power, though authority as to execution may be delegated. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Civil service commission does not surrender control of the police department by adoption of rules designating chief of police executive head of the department with power to establish rules and regulations for the department. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Delegation by civil service commission to a panel to hold oral examinations of applicants to an eligibility promotion list would constitute an unlawful delegation of the commission's authority where no rule or regulation of the commission established the measurable standards capable of review by which the panelists should examine the applicants. Booth v. Baer, 263 Ark. 213, 563 S.W.2d 709 (1978).

Suspensions.

—In General.

Where legislature in plain language limited the suspension of police officers or fire fighters to a period of 30 days, police officer could not be suspended longer than 30 days without pay pending investigation into criminal offenses despite police officer's alleged failure to assist and cooperate with the investigation. City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16, 546 S.W.2d 154 (1977).

The import of the decision in City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16, 546 S.W.2d 154 (1977), overruled the holding in Russ v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 222 Ark. 666, 262 S.W.2d 137 (1953), insofar as that case held that the word “suspend” in a regulation could be interpreted to include permanent discharge from employment; accordingly, a police chief, acting under a regulation empowering him to suspend officers, did not have authority to discharge officer, but could only suspend him for 30 days. Tittle v. City of Conway, 268 Ark. 1126, 599 S.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1980).

A suspension without pay is not equivalent to a reduction in compensation for the purposes of determining whether a suspended civil service employee is entitled to a trial. Honeycutt v. City of Fort Smith, 327 Ark. 530, 939 S.W.2d 306 (1997).

—Entitlement to Trial.

While this chapter provides that a firefighter or police officer is entitled to a trial when discharged or reduced in rank or compensation, this chapter does not require a trial for a ten-day disciplinary suspension. Honeycutt v. City of Fort Smith, 327 Ark. 530, 939 S.W.2d 306 (1997).

—Leaves of Absence.

Section 21-4-301 et seq. providing for authorization of leaves of absence to all public employees entering military service amended previous civil service act and was retroactive, so that ordinance providing for retention of civil service status of all municipal employees while in the armed forces was valid. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).

Police officer who stood at head of list for promotion at the time of his entrance into military service, was not entitled to appointment upon his return to position vacant at his entrance into the military even though civil service commission's regulations made appointments retroactive to the inception of the vacancy, his status of police officer being suspended during his war service. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).

Police officer who was at head of list when he entered military service was entitled to be restored to position on list on return from service, as court had to consider federal, state, and municipal legislation in passing on rights of public employee as returning serviceman. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).

Police officer at head of the list for appointment as sergeant in which there was a vacancy when he entered military service was not entitled to be applicant for grade of lieutenant upon his return when he was a patrolman when he entered the military, as subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) requires applicant for position of higher rank to serve for one year in lower rank before applying for higher rank position. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).

Temporary Appointments.

In case of an emergency, civil service commission, may fill a vacancy without competitive examination but such an appointment is not intended to extend beyond the emergency. Connor v. Ricks, 213 Ark. 768, 212 S.W.2d 552 (1948).

Where ordinance provided that all appointments to municipal grades were to be considered temporary until six months after termination of emergency by the President of the United States, all appointments would still be temporary until such declaration by the President although hostilities had ceased, and court could not require new examinations for permanent positions until the city council set up machinery for procedure. Smith v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 214 Ark. 765, 218 S.W.2d 366 (1949).

Cited: Wammack v. City of Batesville, 522 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Roper v. City of Pine Bluff, 673 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Pulaski County Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Davis, 292 Ark. 340, 730 S.W.2d 220 (1987); Bennett v. Blytheville Civil Serv. Comm'n, 293 Ark. 136, 733 S.W.2d 414 (1987); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 294 Ark. 311, 742 S.W.2d 921 (1988); Williams v. Taylor, 311 Ark. 94, 841 S.W.2d 618 (1992).

14-51-302. Departmental rules and regulations.

All employees in any fire or police department affected by this chapter shall be governed by rules and regulations set out by the chief of their respective police or fire departments after rules and regulations have been adopted by the governing bodies of their respective municipalities.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 9948; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1604.

Case Notes

Adoption.

The adoption of fire department regulation by a city council motion was an acceptable means since this section is open ended as to the method of adoption. Frego v. Jonesboro Civil Serv. Comm'n, 285 Ark. 35, 684 S.W.2d 258 (1985).

Authority to Regulate Employees.

Circuit court erred in reversing a civil service commission's decision upholding the termination of an employee because a fire department provided legitimate public-policy reasons behind its zero-tolerance policy on drug usage and the necessity for consistency in the application of that policy, and the employee violated the policy; there was overwhelming evidence of the employee's positive tests for methamphetamine, and the department had the authority to govern and regulate its employees. City of Little Rock v. Muncy, 2017 Ark. App. 412, 526 S.W.3d 877 (2017).

Commission's Authority.

Civil service commission, and not the chief of police, is the agency responsible for enforcing its rules. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Civil service commission does not surrender control of police department by adoption of rules designating chief of police executive head of the department with power to establish rules and regulations for the department and to discipline those under his authority for violation of such rules and regulations, and exercise of disciplinary measures by the chief does not deprive the commission of the power to prefer charges against officer for violation of rules. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991).

Civil service commission has authority to dismiss police officer. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Bass, 252 Ark. 178, 477 S.W.2d 842 (1972).

Off Duty Employment.

Patrolman was properly discharged for failure to obtain written permission to engage in off duty employment as required by the police department's rule. Dalton v. City of Russellville, 290 Ark. 603, 720 S.W.2d 918 (1986).

Cited: City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16, 546 S.W.2d 154 (1977).

14-51-303. Political activities.

In addition to all powers and duties provided by law, the civil service commissions for police and fire departments of cities of the first and second class shall promulgate rules and regulations governing the political activities of fire department and police department personnel.

History. Acts 1987, No. 67, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The language “and second class” was inadvertently added to and adopted as part of, the 1989 corrective bill, Acts 1989, No. 990.

Publisher's Notes. Former § 14-51-303, concerning prohibition of political activity, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 67, § 2. The former section was derived from Acts 1933, No. 28, § 12; Pope's Dig., § 9956; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1612.

14-51-304. Employees and salaries fixed.

The city council or board shall from time to time fix the number of employees and the salaries to be drawn by each rank in the fire and police departments of its respective cities.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 17; Pope's Dig., § 9961; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1617.

Case Notes

In General.

Civil service commission did not abdicate any authority when it stated that fixing the number of employees and the salaries to be drawn by each rank in the fire department was the duty of board of directors of the city. Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W.2d 633 (1967).

Employees.

A city ordinance authorizing a day chief and a night chief of police was void; as authority to create the office of chief of police did not authorize the appointment of two chiefs. Stout v. Stinnett, 210 Ark. 684, 197 S.W.2d 564 (1946).

Salaries.

In city under city manager form of government, the board of directors has the power to fix the salaries within each rank of the fire department. Haynie v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 86, 418 S.W.2d 633 (1967).

The fixing of wages, hours, and the like for city employees is a legislative responsibility that cannot be delegated or bargained away; thus, a proposed “binding-arbitration” ordinance, which was to be a permanent measure, providing a procedure by which any future wage controversy with the city police not resolved by agreement was to be referred to an arbitration panel, whose decision would be final, binding all parties, and not reviewable by any court, would violate this section and Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 4. Czech v. Baer, 283 Ark. 457, 677 S.W.2d 833 (1984).

14-51-305. Certification for compensation.

  1. The secretary of the commission shall file with the treasurer or disbursing officer of his or her city a certificate of those entitled to compensation from the city under this chapter.
  2. No compensation shall be allowed to any member of the police or fire departments of the affected cities unless his or her name shall be so certified by the secretary.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 9953; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1609.

14-51-306. Examinations.

All examinations provided for in this chapter shall be fair and impartial and such as to test the qualification of the applicants for the particular service and position to be filled.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 9951; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1607.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 8, provided that no employee affected by § 14-51-101 et seq. and in the employ of any police or fire department at the time of the passage of this act would be subject to an examination, except for promotion or advancement, but would retain his current standing, subject to the other provisions of § 14-51-101 et seq. Acts 1933, No. 28, was signed by the Governor and became effective on February 13, 1933.

Case Notes

Qualifications.

The use of a sergeant's eligibility promotion list was properly enjoined where there was no showing as to the qualifications designated by the civil service commission for a police sergeant and where there was no showing that the personality traits, upon which the applicants were examined, had been determined by the commission to be necessary and important to the position to be filled. Booth v. Baer, 263 Ark. 213, 563 S.W.2d 709 (1978).

14-51-307. Suspension of competition.

In the case of a vacancy in a position requiring peculiar or exceptional qualifications of a scientific, professional, or expert character, upon satisfactory evidence that competition is impracticable and that the position can best be filled by the selection of some person designated who is of recognized attainment, the board may suspend by a majority vote competition in this case. However, the suspension shall not be general in its application, and each case must be handled on its own merits.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 9950; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1606.

Case Notes

In General.

Civil service commission may fill a vacancy which requires “peculiar or exceptional qualifications of scientific, professional, or expert character,” with a person who does not meet the qualifications, rules, and regulations required of others, and such appointee will be deemed the best one available. Connor v. Ricks, 213 Ark. 768, 212 S.W.2d 552 (1948).

14-51-308. Suspension, discharge, or reduction in rank or compensation.

    1. No civil service employee shall be discharged, reduced in rank or compensation, or suspended for three (3) or more days without being notified in writing of the discharge, reduction in rank or compensation, or the suspension for three (3) or more days and its cause.
    2. In case of suspension, discharge, or reduction, the affected or accused person shall have written notice of the action at the time action is taken.
    1. Within ten (10) days after the notice in writing is served upon the officer, private, or employee, the person may request a trial before the board of civil service commissioners on the charges alleged as the grounds for discharge, reduction, or suspension for three (3) days or more if he or she so desires.
      1. In the event a request for trial is made, the municipal civil service commission shall fix a date for the trial not more than fifteen (15) days after the request is made.
        1. If the request for trial is not made within ten (10) days from the date of service of notice, the discharge, reduction, or suspension for three (3) days or more shall become final and no trial shall be granted after that date.
        2. The appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the commission within thirty (30) days from the date of the decision. The responsibility of filing an appeal and paying for the transcript of the proceedings before the commission shall be borne by the party desiring to appeal the commission's decision.
        3. Upon receiving notice of an appeal, the commission will prepare a written order containing its decision and ensure that the transcript and evidence be made available for filing in the circuit court once the appealing party has paid the cost of preparing the transcript.
        4. However, if the court determines that the party appealing the commission's decision took the appeal in good faith and with reasonable cause to believe he or she would prevail, the commission shall reimburse the appealing party for the cost of the transcript.
    1. In the event of a trial, the officer, private, or employee requesting the trial shall be notified of the date and place of the trial at least ten (10) days prior to the date thereof.
    2. The officer, private, or employee shall have compulsory process to have witnesses present at the trial.
    1. The chair of the commission shall preside at all trials and shall determine and decide all questions relative to pleadings and the admissibility of evidence.
    2. The decision of the commission shall be by a majority vote of the members of the commission.
      1. A right of appeal by the city or employee is given from any decision of the commission to the circuit court within the jurisdiction of which the commission is situated.
        1. The appeal shall be taken by filing with the commission, within thirty (30) days from the date of the decision, a notice of appeal. The responsibility of filing an appeal and paying for the transcript of the proceedings before the municipal civil service commission shall be borne by the party desiring to appeal the commission's decision.
        2. Upon receiving notice of an appeal, the commission will prepare a written order containing its decision and ensure that the transcript and evidence be made available for filing in the circuit court once the appealing party has paid the cost of preparing the transcript.
        3. However, if the court determines that the party appealing the commission's decision took the appeal in good faith and with reasonable cause to believe he or she would prevail, the commission shall reimburse the appealing party for the cost of the transcript.
        4. The circuit court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party for the proceedings in circuit court.
        1. The court shall review the commission's decision on the record and in addition may hear testimony or allow the introduction of any further evidence upon the request of either the city or the employee.
        2. The testimony or evidence must be competent and otherwise admissible.
      1. A right of appeal is also given from any action from the circuit court to the Supreme Court.
      2. The appeal shall be governed by the rules of procedure provided by law for appeals from the circuit court to the Supreme Court.
  1. In the event that it is finally determined that there was a wrongful suspension, discharge, or reduction in rank of any employee, the employee shall be entitled to judgment against the city for whatever loss he or she may have sustained by reason of his or her suspension, discharge, or demotion, taking into consideration any remuneration which the officer, private, or employee may have received from other sources pending the final determination of his or her case.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 13; Pope's Dig., § 9957; Acts 1949, No. 326, § 2; 1959, No. 205, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1605.1, 19-1613; Acts 1991, No. 244, § 1; 2001, No. 1441, § 1; 2003, No. 1815, § 1; 2013, No. 994, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added (e)(1)(B)(iv).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former similar statute authorizing appeal and hearing in circuit court from finding of civil service commission was held not unconstitutional as conferring administrative powers and duties upon the court. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Procedure under this section affords parties ample due process. Eldridge v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1992).

In General.

Civil service commission could not try anyone for violation of a rule unless they had prescribed such written rule, but no rule would be required to charge a person with the commission of a crime or a violation of civil service statutes. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Cruse, 192 Ark. 86, 89 S.W.2d 922 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Civil service commission, and not the chief of police, was the agency held responsible for enforcing its rules. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991) (decision under prior law).

Civil service commission did not surrender control of the police department by adoption of rules designating chief of police executive head of the department with power to establish rules and regulations for the department and to discipline those under his authority for violation of such rules and regulations, and exercise of disciplinary measures by the chief did not deprive the commission of the power to prefer charges against officer for violation of rules. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991) (decision under prior law).

Appeals.

—In General.

Legislature has the power to prescribe the mode of procedure on appeals from civil service commission's findings. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

An appeal from an order of the civil service commission after a hearing on a petition for reinstatement is not proper, as the sole remedy for a decision of dismissal by the commission is through appeal of the order of dismissal as provided in this section. Hot Springs Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Miles, 238 Ark. 956, 385 S.W.2d 930 (1965).

Where notice of termination of employment was given by a civil service commission pursuant to its rules and regulations, the commission was the real party in interest in the ensuing litigation and, as the real party in interest, was the proper party to give the notice of appeal. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Reid, 261 Ark. 42, 546 S.W.2d 413 (1977).

Even assuming without deciding that subdivision (e)(1)(B) of this section was applicable to the terminated police chief, the chief would have had 30 days from the entry of the civil service commission's written decision to file a record with the circuit court or to file an affidavit showing that the chief had requested a record from the commission pursuant to Ark. Inf. Ct. R. 9(c); the circuit court was correct in its finding that the chief's failure to comply with the filing requirements of Ark. Inf. Ct. R. 9 required the dismissal of the case. Clark v. Pine Bluff Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 353 Ark. 810, 120 S.W.3d 541 (2003).

This section is silent on the procedure to be followed in perfecting an appeal from a civil service commission to the circuit court, thus, once the requirements of subdivision (e)(1)(B) are met, an appeal from a decision of the civil service commission to circuit court should proceed in accordance with the rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court governing an appeal from inferior courts, specifically Ark. Inf. Ct. R. 9. Clark v. Pine Bluff Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 353 Ark. 810, 120 S.W.3d 541 (2003).

Appeals from civil-service commissions under this section are not “[a]ppeals required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court” within Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(8). While subdivision (e)(2)(A) of this section provides that a right of appeal is to the Supreme Court, this section was enacted in 1933, long before the Legislature was constitutionally empowered to create and establish the Court of Appeals. Civil-service-commission appeals pursuant to this section shall continue to be filed in the Court of Appeals unless there is another basis for Supreme Court jurisdiction under Rule 1-2. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2017 Ark. 161, 518 S.W.3d 76 (2017).

—Circuit Court.

Legislature has the right, in authorizing a civil service commission, to vest in the circuit court the power to review judicially, either by way of original proceeding or by way of appeal, actions of the commission. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Requirements of former similar statute amounted to provision for a trial of matters de novo in circuit court. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

In proceeding to review order of civil service commission, circuit court erred in submitting case to a jury for trial. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Phrase “further or other evidence” in former similar statute meant testimony in addition to that heard at the hearing before the civil service commission and indicated that the legislature intended that the testimony taken before the commission should be brought into the record for trial in circuit court, and the logical inference was that the party appealing should bring up this testimony, duly authenticated by the commission, or otherwise shown to be the testimony. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

While it would have been better practice to file in the circuit court a verbatim record of the testimony before civil service commission, circuit court did not err in permitting the filing of a transcript that the commission certified as being the substance of the testimony heard before it. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court properly ordered records of civil service commission certified for purpose of determining validity of actions of the commission. Terry v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 216 Ark. 322, 225 S.W.2d 13 (1949) (decision under prior law).

On appeal from civil service commission, circuit court is entitled to hear matter de novo by consideration of findings of commission and by taking additional evidence. City of Little Rock v. Newcomb, 219 Ark. 74, 239 S.W.2d 750 (1951).

On appeal, circuit court should give great weight to finding by civil service commission, if evidence is conflicting or evenly balanced. City of Little Rock v. Newcomb, 219 Ark. 74, 239 S.W.2d 750 (1951).

In enacting this section, the legislature intended to provide for a de novo hearing by the circuit court on the record before the civil service commission and any additional competent testimony that either party might desire to introduce. Campbell v. City of Hot Springs, 232 Ark. 878, 341 S.W.2d 225 (1960); Daley v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark. App. 80, 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991).

Inasmuch as state statute prohibited judicial review of a police pension board's denial of a police officer's application for a pension, circuit court's unappealed dismissal of a mandamus suit, in which the police officer sought to compel the board to award him a pension, was not res judicata as to the police officer's civil rights suit in the federal courts. Hirrill v. Merriweather, 629 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1980).

Circuit court erred in affirming a decision of the Little Rock Civil Service Commission that changed a termination order issued against a fireman to a suspension followed by a one year unpaid leave of absence to complete drug rehabilitation on the grounds that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence; the circuit court proceeding was in the nature of an original action and the circuit court was required to conduct a de novo review of the Commission's decision. City of Little Rock v. Hubbard, 82 Ark. App. 119, 112 S.W.3d 375 (2003).

Circuit court's judgment reversing a civil service commission's disciplining of a fireman was affirmed as the court was within its province, in its de novo review under this section, in giving credence to the fireman's evidence as to the existence of mints in his mouth during random breathalyzer tests, the effects of the mints on the tests, and the fireman's not being intoxicated. City of Little Rock v. Hudson, 366 Ark. 415, 236 S.W.3d 509 (2006).

—Supreme Court.

Legislature intended that rule as to affirmance or reversal by Supreme Court of the findings of lower court on questions of fact should prevail. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Appeal from circuit court under this section is not trial de novo in Supreme Court; rather, it determines whether verdict or finding of fact is sustained by substantial evidence. Petty v. City of Pine Bluff, 239 Ark. 49, 386 S.W.2d 935 (1965).

Circuit court judgment affirming findings of civil service commission reversed where neither the notice of discharge nor the findings of the commission upholding the dismissal of a police lieutenant contained a statement of the rules and regulations that the officer allegedly violated. Magness v. Shock, 262 Ark. 148, 554 S.W.2d 342 (1977).

Fireman's appeal from his termination from the city fire department was dismissed for want of jurisdiction as the civil service commission, in affirming the termination, made no written order nor any findings of fact or conclusions of law as required by this section; accordingly, the matter was reversed and remanded so that the trial court could dismiss the appeal without prejudice, allowing the fireman to refile his appeal with the circuit court after the commission entered a written order. Lawrence v. City of Texarkana, 364 Ark. 466, 221 S.W.3d 370 (2006).

Once the requirements of subdivision (e)(1)(B) of this section have been met, an appeal from a decision of the civil service commission to circuit court should proceed in accordance with the rules of the court governing an appeal from inferior courts; thus, a party appealing a decision of the civil service commission has, pursuant to Ark. Inferior Ct. R. 9(c), thirty days from the entry of the commission's written decision to file a record with the circuit court. Barrows v. City of Fort Smith, 2010 Ark. 73, 360 S.W.3d 117 (2010).

Attorney's Fees.

Employee's argument that the circuit court should have awarded him attorney's fees was moot because the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, and thus the employee was no longer the prevailing employee. City of Little Rock v. Muncy, 2017 Ark. App. 412, 526 S.W.3d 877 (2017).

Discharges.

—In General.

Charges that officer was unfit to serve on police force because his word was of no value, and no confidence can be placed in him, if true, justified his dismissal. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Cruse, 192 Ark. 86, 89 S.W.2d 922 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Police officer's failure to comply with promise to resign, made for the purpose of obtaining a dismissal of charges pending against him, fortified his dismissal upon failure to comply with his part of the agreement on ground his conduct constituted a fraud upon the civil service commission. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Cruse, 192 Ark. 86, 89 S.W.2d 922 (1936) (decision under prior law).

City had the right, acting in good faith, to pass ordinance abolishing the office of chief of police, since former similar statute did not prevent the abolishing, by the proper municipal authority, of an office held by a civil service employee when done in good faith. Ellis v. Allen, 202 Ark. 1007, 154 S.W.2d 815 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Where special patrolman appointed during emergency through error was certified for permanent position, but failed civil service examinations and was discharged upon expiration of emergency, patrolman could not challenge actions of civil service commission on ground of estoppel, as commission not only had the right to correct error, but was under a duty to do so. Terry v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 216 Ark. 322, 225 S.W.2d 13 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Police officer who admitted regularly working in a gambling house during his time off was properly dismissed from the police force. Campbell v. City of Hot Springs, 232 Ark. 878, 341 S.W.2d 225 (1960).

Where discharged fireman was given a grievance hearing, and his only right to appeal was under this section, which does not deal with failure to grant a promotion, he exhausted all administrative remedies available to him. City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748 (1991).

—Evidence.

Evidence was held to support civil service commission's findings in proceeding to dismiss chief of detectives charged with being drunk while on duty. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McDougal, 198 Ark. 388, 129 S.W.2d 589 (1939), overruled in part, Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991) (decision under prior law).

Testimony of witnesses who knew only of a police officer's performance and mental state subsequent to dismissal should not have been allowed, since this testimony did not bear on whether the dismissal was proper at the time; his subsequent activities or his ability to perform had nothing to do with his ability to perform earlier and whether the incidents reported were violations of the rules and regulations of the police department for which dismissal was warranted. City of Little Rock v. Bates, 270 Ark. 860, 607 S.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1980).

—Trials.

Former similar statute did not prevent the dismissal of a city officer without a hearing where his office was abolished for economic reasons. Fiveash v. Holderness, 190 Ark. 264, 78 S.W.2d 820 (1935).

Dismissal hearing did not afford person even the barest essentials of due process of law where he was not given prior notice of charges, where even at the hearing he was refused any statement of particular incidents, and where no persons were brought forward to substantiate any of the reasons advanced for termination. Parks v. Goff, 483 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

This section limits the right to a trial to threatened discharge or reduction in rank or compensation, and nothing in this section suggests the legislature intended that the civil service commission, in addition to the other duties imposed, must also hear minor employee grievances. Stafford v. City of Hot Springs, 276 Ark. 466, 637 S.W.2d 553 (1982).

Where accident review committee found that an accident in which a fire fighter was involved was preventable, and the committee assessed three penalty points against the fire fighter's driving record, the fire fighter was not entitled to a trial before the civil service commission under this section, because he was not discharged, suspended, or reduced in rank or compensation, although his accumulation of penalty points increased his susceptibility to those sanctions. Stafford v. City of Hot Springs, 276 Ark. 466, 637 S.W.2d 553 (1982).

—Notice.

Where city had regulation that a department head could not be discharged without notification in writing from the governing body of city, city administrator alone did not have authority to discharge the chief of the municipal fire department. Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 494, 473 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

Notice to person of the charges resulting in his dismissal was clearly inadequate where he was not informed of any specific conduct or occasion of an alleged violation, where he was not informed of the names of any person who supplied information of any alleged violation, and where he was not informed of the substance of any such information known to the city council. Parks v. Goff, 483 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

Jurisdiction.

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the local civil service commission made its initial decision on November 4, 2014, and that the 30-day time limit for a former employee to file his notice of appeal with the commission under this section was triggered on that date. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2017 Ark. App. 443, 528 S.W.3d 845 (2017).

Circuit court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a former city employee's wrongful termination case where he had filed the notice of appeal one day after the properly calculated 30-day period. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2017 Ark. App. 443, 528 S.W.3d 845 (2017).

Because this section and Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 are so interconnected concerning the procedural requirements for perfecting an appeal from a civil service commission decision to the circuit court, the Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division Three, holds that the statutory filing requirements with respect to the commission are jurisdictional, as is true for Rule 9’s filing requirements with respect to the circuit court. Accordingly, as is true for Rule 9’s requirements, strict compliance is necessary, and substantial compliance will not suffice. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2017 Ark. App. 443, 528 S.W.3d 845 (2017).

Reductions in Rank.

Finding that officer neglected his duty so as to warrant his demotion was not against weight of the evidence. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Suspensions.

Where police officer was discharged for slapping a suspected felon after a finding by the civil service commission that he had violated regulations, circuit court could reduce punishment to a 30-day suspension, even though they confirmed finding of the commission that he had violated regulations. City of Little Rock v. Hall, 249 Ark. 337, 459 S.W.2d 119 (1970).

Summary judgment for police officer was proper in suit for lost wages brought by police officer who was indefinitely suspended without pay pending investigation into criminal charges where the issues of fact were uncontroverted except as to whether indefinite suspension was justified and the court concluded, as a matter of law, that § 14-51-301 precluded suspension without pay in excess of 30 days. City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16, 546 S.W.2d 154 (1977).

A suspension without pay is not equivalent to a reduction in compensation for the purposes of determining whether a suspended civil service employee is entitled to a trial. Honeycutt v. City of Fort Smith, 327 Ark. 530, 939 S.W.2d 306 (1997).

While the civil service statutes provide that a firefighter or police officer is entitled to a trial when discharged or reduced in rank or compensation, the statutes do not require a trial for a ten-day disciplinary suspension. Honeycutt v. City of Fort Smith, 327 Ark. 530, 939 S.W.2d 306 (1997).

Decision to impose on the officer a 30-day suspension without pay was not clearly erroneous for purposes of this section; while the officer admittedly violated police department policy regarding the repair of a police vehicle and involved other officers, he had no evil intent, he had served admirably for 18 years, he took responsibility for his error in judgment, and the previous police chief had permitted the exercise of some discretion in deciding to handle minor repairs without formally adhering to reporting and repair protocol. Little Rock Police Dep't v. Phillips, 2017 Ark. App. 410, 526 S.W.3d 872 (2017).

Terminations.

Police officer's termination was appropriate because the Civil Service Commission entered a written order as required by the statute and thus, the circuit court had proper jurisdiction. As such, there was no basis to vacate and remand the circuit court's decision. Edgmon v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 2013 Ark. App. 470 (2013).

Circuit court erred in reversing a civil service commission's decision upholding the termination of an employee because a fire department provided legitimate public-policy reasons behind its zero-tolerance policy on drug usage and the necessity for consistency in the application of that policy, and the employee violated the policy; there was overwhelming evidence of the employee's positive tests for methamphetamine, and the department had the authority to govern and regulate its employees. City of Little Rock v. Muncy, 2017 Ark. App. 412, 526 S.W.3d 877 (2017).

Wrongful Suspension, Etc.

Where the city administrator attempted to fire the fire chief, but no lawful discharge was shown, the chief, if he so elected, could prove his net damages under this section in circuit court. Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 494, 473 S.W.2d 182 (1971).

Word “loss” in subsection (f) does not include attorney's fees, as the General Assembly did not intend for the generic and relative term of “loss” to have such a meaning. Williams v. Little Rock Civil Serv., 266 Ark. 599, 587 S.W.2d 42 (1979).

Cited: Briley v. Little Rock Civil Serv. Comm'n, 266 Ark. 394, 583 S.W.2d 78 (1979); Wammack v. City of Batesville, 522 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Dalton v. City of Russellville, 290 Ark. 603, 720 S.W.2d 918 (1986); Williams v. Taylor, 311 Ark. 94, 841 S.W.2d 618 (1992); McGann v. Pine Bluff Police Dep't, 334 Ark. 352, 974 S.W.2d 462 (1998).

14-51-309. Reduction in personnel.

In the event that it shall be necessary to reduce the personnel of any department affected by this chapter, reduction shall be done from the lowest rank, seniority having priority.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 15; Pope's Dig., § 9959; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1615.

14-51-310. Transfers prohibited.

No person in any department affected by this chapter shall be transferred from one department to another.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 14; Pope's Dig., § 9958; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1614.

14-51-311. Political discrimination prohibited.

No person in any department affected by this chapter shall be appointed, reduced, suspended, discharged, or otherwise discriminated against because of his or her political opinion or affiliation.

History. Acts 1933, No. 28, § 11; Pope's Dig., § 9955; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1611.

Chapter 52 Municipal Police Departments

Research References

ALR.

Requirement of residency within or near specified governmental unit as condition of continued employment for policemen or firemen. 4 A.L.R.4th 380.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damages to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 4 A.L.R.4th 865.

Liability for failure of police response to emergency call. 39 A.L.R.4th 691.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 114.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 563 et seq.

87 C.J.S., Towns, §§ 60, 70, 71.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Appointment of police chiefs, §§ 14-42-110, 14-47-120, 14-48-117.

Civil service for police departments, § 14-51-101 et seq.

Police pension and relief funds, § 24-11-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1937, No. 250, § 24: approved Mar. 16, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary for the peace, preservation and public health, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act shall take effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 11, § 3: approved Jan. 24, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “Because of the fact that there are needy members of the Police Departments of the Cities of this State who are entitled to receive pensions under Act 250 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1937, and funds provided to pay such pensions are insufficient, resulting in deprivation to those entitled to relief, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1969, No. 68, § 3: Feb. 18, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that in order to attract qualified and capable policemen, it is necessary to offer an adequate pension in the case of retirement; that under the present provisions, policemen in border cities are required to contribute only two and one-half percent of their monthly salaries to such pension fund instead of four percent as in the case of other cities; that an increase in the amount of contributions to such fund will permit the payment of a more adequate pension to such policemen upon retirement; and that in order to provide adequate funds to grant sufficient pensions for retired policemen, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 393, § 5: Apr. 11, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present sick leave provisions are not adequate to provide for the essential sick leave of policemen in cities of the first and second class; that the existing provisions for sick leave are not uniform; and that in order to remedy this situation, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 241, § 5: Mar. 9, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the existing sick leave provisions as to fire fighters are not adequate to provide for the essential sick leave of such fire fighters in cities of the first and second class; that the existing provisions for sick leave are not uniform; and that only by the passage of this Act can this situation be properly remedied. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 486, § 4: Jan. 1, 1982.

Acts 1981, No. 668, § 3: Mar. 23, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there appears to be no law authorizing incorporated towns to organize police departments and that such authorization is immediately necessary to provide for the security of the citizens of incorporated towns. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 864, § 3: Mar. 28, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that incorporated towns do not now have the power of organizing police departments, and that such flexibility should be allowed incorporated towns in order to better provide for the security of the inhabitants thereof; and that this Act is necessary to grant such authority. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 46, § 3: Feb. 3, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the restoration of service credit is necessary in certain instances to retain qualified police officers and that this Act is immediately necessary to provide for such service credit. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 501, § 2: Mar. 17, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there is great confusion over the powers of Municipal Police and Marshals over municipally owned or leased property located outside the corporate limits of such municipality and the police jurisdiction should be clarified; therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 240, § 3: Mar. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present sick leave law applicable to police officers has been misconstrued as not applying to certain municipal police officers, such as city marshals; that such misinterpretation has resulted in inequity; that all law enforcement officers employed by municipalities in this State should receive the benefits of the sick leave law; and that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 252, § 3: Mar. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present laws pertaining to the compensation for municipal policemen and firemen for holidays is obsolete and contradictory; that this Act clarifies the law in that area and should be given effect immediately to eliminate the confusion and avoid expensive and unnecessary litigation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 1283, § 6: Emergency clause failed to pass. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that collection of fees for bail bonds fund various necessary programs in our state; that the law is currently unclear on the collection of these fees; and that this act is necessary because the law needs to be clear on the collection of these fees so that the programs are funded properly in a timely manner. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2013.”

14-52-101. Authorized in cities.

The city council shall have power to establish a city police department, to organize it under the general superintendence of the mayor, and to prescribe its duties and define its powers in such manner as will most effectually preserve the peace of the city, secure the citizens thereof from personal violence, and safeguard their property from fire and unlawful depredations.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 6, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7594; Pope's Dig., § 9680; Acts 1983, No. 501, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1701.

Case Notes

Applicability

While the day-to-day duties of the chief of police and other officers of the police department in a city of the first and second class are under the direction and general superintendence of the mayor, the city council prescribes the police department's duties and defines its powers, i.e., makes the police department's policy. Brinkley v. City of Helena-West Helena, No. 2:11-cv-00207-SWW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116592 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 21, 2014).

Authority to establish police department policy in a city of the first (or second) class generally resides with the city council; the city council, not the former mayor, was the final policymaker for the City's police department when an former police officer allegedly applied excessive force in arresting plaintiff. Brinkley v. City of Helena-West Helena, No. 2:11-cv-00207-SWW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116592 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 21, 2014).

Cited: Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950).

14-52-102. Authorized in towns.

The governing body of any incorporated town may establish a police department for the town, prescribe its duties, and define its powers in such manner as will most effectively preserve the peace of the town, secure the citizens thereof from personal violence, and safeguard their property from unlawful deprivations.

History. Acts 1981, No. 668, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1701.1.

14-52-103. City marshal option.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the governing body of any incorporated town or city of the second class may establish by ordinance either a police department or a city marshal's office.

History. Acts 1981, No. 864, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1701.2.

Cross References. Marshalls in cities of the second class, §§ 14-44-10914-44-113.

14-52-104. Police powers generally.

Municipal police officers and city marshals shall have the same police powers on municipally owned or leased property located outside the corporate limits of the municipality that they exercise within the corporate limits of the municipality.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 6, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7594; Pope's Dig., § 9680; Acts 1983, No. 501, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1701.

Case Notes

Cited: Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950).

14-52-105. Holiday compensation.

  1. All law enforcement officers regardless of their titles, such as city marshal, employed by cities of the first or second class or incorporated towns shall be compensated for all legal holidays established by the governing body of the municipality.
  2. This compensation shall be based on the law enforcement officer's daily rate of pay and in addition to the regular pay schedule.
  3. This compensation may be included within the officer's base pay.
  4. This compensation shall be prorated and paid during the regular payroll periods or paid in one (1) lump sum annually on a date in December designated by the municipality.

History. Acts 1985, No. 252, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1721; Acts 1987, No. 501, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 252, § 1, is also codified as § 14-53-106.

Case Notes

All Legal Holidays.

Police officers are to be paid for all of the legal holidays whether or not they work on such holidays. Deason v. City of Rogers, 247 Ark. 1061, 449 S.W.2d 410 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Lump Sum.

City violated this section when it reduced regular salaries of law enforcement officers in order to begin paying holiday compensation in one lump sum. City of Pocahontas v. Huddleston, 309 Ark. 353, 831 S.W.2d 138 (1992).

Payment Required.

City cannot nullify legislation providing for payment of holidays to retired police officers by refusing to pass an ordinance or make an appropriation. City of Piggott v. Woodard, 261 Ark. 406, 549 S.W.2d 278 (1977) (decision under prior law).

Right of Action.

A police officer may sue a municipality to collect the amount due him and is not limited to an action to compel the appropriate official to make payment. Deason v. City of Rogers, 247 Ark. 1061, 449 S.W.2d 410 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Payment for Unused Leave.

City cannot nullify legislation providing for payment of accumulated sick leave to retired police officers by refusing to pass an ordinance or make an appropriation. City of Piggott v. Woodard, 261 Ark. 406, 549 S.W.2d 278 (1977).

14-52-106. Annual vacation leave.

  1. The head or chief of each police department shall:
    1. Grant each employee annual vacation leave of not less than fifteen (15) working days with full pay; and
    2. Approve the use of annual vacation leave before the annual vacation leave is used.
  2. Unused annual vacation leave may accumulate to a maximum allowance as determined by ordinance of the municipality.
  3. Upon the first day after the end of the term of service or retirement, an employee may be paid for his or her unused accumulated vacation leave at the employee's regular rate of pay, not to exceed the maximum allowance under ordinance of the municipality.

History. Acts 1937, No. 250, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9857; Acts 1939, No. 11, §§ 1, 2; 1953, No. 86, § 1; 1957, No. 415, § 1; 1963, No. 211, § 1; 1969, No. 68, § 1; 1981, No. 486, § 2; 1983, No. 46, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1802; Acts 2019, No. 799, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1937, No. 250, § 2, as amended, is also codified as § 24-11-429.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added “leave” in the section heading; designated the existing text as the introductory paragraph of (a) and (a)(1); substituted “Grant each employee annual vacation leave” for “arrange that each employee shall be granted an annual vacation” in (a)(1); added (a)(2); and added (b) and (c).

14-52-107. Uniform sick leave — Definition.

    1. From and after April 11, 1969, all law enforcement officers, regardless of their titles, such as city marshal, employed by cities of the first and second class or incorporated towns shall accumulate sick leave at the rate of twenty (20) working days per year beginning one (1) year after the date of employment.
    2. If unused, sick leave shall accumulate to a maximum of sixty (60) days unless the city or town, by ordinance, authorizes the accumulation of a greater amount, in no event to exceed a maximum accumulation of ninety (90) days, except for the purpose of computing years of service for retirement purposes.
    1. In cities having sick leave provisions through ordinance, the total sick leave accumulated by the individual officer shall be credited to him or her and new days accumulated under the provisions of this section until the maximum prescribed in subsection (a) of this section is reached.
    2. Time off may be charged against accumulated sick leave only for such days that an officer is scheduled to work. No such sick leave as provided in this section shall be charged against any officer during any period of sickness, illness, or injury for any days which the officer is not scheduled to work.
  1. If, at the end of his or her term of service, upon retirement or death, whichever occurs first, any police officer has unused accumulated sick leave, he or she shall be paid for this sick leave at the regular rate of pay in effect at the time of retirement or death. Payment for unused sick leave in the case of a police officer, upon retirement or death, shall not exceed sixty (60) days salary unless the city, by ordinance, authorizes a greater amount, but in no event to exceed ninety (90) days' salary.
    1. A city of the first class, a city of the second class, and an incorporated town may adopt a catastrophic leave program by ordinance under § 14-42-123 to include a “presumptive illness list for municipal police department” under this section.
    2. As used in this section, a “presumptive illness list for municipal police department” means an illness that is chronic or fatal.

History. Acts 1969, No. 393, §§ 1-3; 1971, No. 241, §§ 1-3; 1983, No. 842, §§ 1-3; 1985, No. 181, § 1; 1985, No. 240, § 1; 1985, No. 892, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1718 — 19-1720; Acts 2019, No. 883, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1969, No. 393, §§ 1-3, as amended, are also codified as § 14-53-108.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (d).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Legislation granting additional pay to retired police officers for accumulated sick leave is not unconstitutional as singling out certain employees for special privileges not afforded all municipal employees, since the legislative classification is founded upon a reasonable basis and operates uniformly upon the class to which it applies. City of Piggott v. Woodard, 261 Ark. 406, 549 S.W.2d 278 (1977).

Cited: City of Fort Smith v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973); Combs v. Cheek, 283 Ark. 69, 671 S.W.2d 177 (1984).

14-52-108. Monthly payroll incentives.

All cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns may establish monthly payroll incentives for police officers in their employ based upon professional certificates of training conferred upon the officer by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training or equivalent certificates acquired from another state.

History. Acts 1991, No. 370, § 1.

Cross References. Commission and advisory board on standards and training, § 12-9-101 et seq.

14-52-109. Participation in political activities.

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, law enforcement officers of cities and incorporated towns shall not be prohibited from engaging in political activities except when on duty, when in uniform, or when acting in an official capacity, nor shall they be denied the right to refrain from engaging in political activities.

History. Acts 1991, No. 580, § 1.

Cross References. Political activity by law enforcement officers of cities or incorporated towns, § 14-52-306.

14-52-110. Fees for serving city warrants.

  1. For serving city warrants only, the chief of police of a city of the second class or his or her deputies shall be entitled to the fees allowed to the sheriffs under § 21-6-307 for similar services in similar cases.
  2. All fees collected by the police chief and his or her deputies for similar services shall be paid over to the city treasury.

History. Acts 1993, No. 459, § 1.

14-52-111. Fees for bail or delivery bond.

A municipal police department in this state may charge and collect a fee of twenty dollars ($20.00) for taking and entering a bail or delivery bond.

History. Acts 1997, No. 252, § 1; 2003, No. 1347, § 1; 2013, No. 1283, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “A” for “Every” at the beginning of the section, substituted “may” for “is authorized to,” inserted “of twenty dollars ($20.00)” following “fee,” and deleted “twenty dollar ($20.00)” preceding “fee.”

14-52-112. Award of pistol and purchase of shotgun upon retirement.

  1. When a law enforcement officer employed by a city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town retires from service or dies while still employed with the city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town, in recognition of and appreciation for the service of the retiring or deceased law enforcement officer, the mayor, city manager, or city administrator of the city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town may award the pistol carried by the law enforcement officer at the time of his or her death or retirement from service to:
    1. The law enforcement officer; or
    2. The law enforcement officer's spouse if the spouse is eligible under applicable state and federal laws to possess a firearm.
  2. When a law enforcement officer retires from service, the law enforcement officer may purchase the shotgun he or she used while on duty at the fair market value as determined by the mayor, city manager, or city administrator of the city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town.

History. Acts 2007, No. 365, § 1.

14-52-113. Property exchange.

  1. A municipal police department may exchange real property or personal property with another municipal police department.
  2. An exchange of property shall be approved by the governing body of the municipality.
  3. This section does not prohibit a governing body of a municipality from authorizing:
    1. An exchange of real property or personal property by the chief of police of a municipal police department; or
    2. A property exchange clearinghouse operated by the Arkansas Association of Chiefs of Police.

History. Acts 2007, No. 433, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Officers

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

14-52-201. Number of police officers.

The governing body of a municipality shall direct by general ordinance the number of subordinate police officers to be appointed.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 53, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7742; Pope's Dig., § 9938; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1703; Acts 2013, No. 726, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “governing body of a municipality” for “city council in cities of the first class.”

14-52-202. Powers and duties of police chiefs.

  1. The chief of police in a municipality shall execute all process directed to him or her by the mayor and shall attend by himself or herself or by someone else on the police force on the sitting of the district court to execute its orders and preserve order therein.
    1. The chief of police has power to appoint one (1) or more deputies from the police force, for whose official acts he or she is responsible, and by whom he or she may execute all process directed to him or her.
      1. He or she shall have power, by himself or herself or by deputy, to execute all process in any part of the county in which the district court is situated or in which the district court has jurisdiction.
      2. The person executing process under this subdivision (b)(2) shall work in coordination with the sheriff for the unincorporated areas of the county.
    2. For serving city warrants only, the chief of police or his or her deputies shall be entitled to the fees allowed to a sheriff under § 21-6-307 for similar services in similar cases.
    3. All fees collected by the police chief and his or her deputies for similar services shall be deposited into the city treasury.
  2. It is the chief of police's duty to suppress all riots, disturbances, and breaches of the peace. To that end he or she may call upon the citizens to assist him or her to apprehend all persons in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state or the ordinances of the city, and he or she shall bring them immediately before the proper authority for examination or trial.
  3. The chief of police has power to pursue or arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state and to receive and execute any proper authority for arrest and detention of criminals fleeing or escaping from any other place or state.
  4. In the discharge of his or her proper duties, the chief of police has like powers and is subject to like responsibilities as sheriffs and constables in similar cases and is required by the city council to give a bond for the faithful performance of his or her duties in a sum as the council may require.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 52, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7703; Pope's Dig., § 9846; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1702; Acts 1989, No. 726, § 1; 2013, No. 726, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The operation of that portion of subsection (e) of this section relating to provision of a bond was suspended by adoption of a self-insured fidelity bond program for public officers, officials and employees, effective July 20, 1987, pursuant to § 21-2-701 et seq. The subsection may again become effective upon cessation of coverage under that program. See § 21-2-703.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “has” for “shall have” and made gender-related changes throughout the section; in (a), substituted “a municipality” for “cities of the first class” and “district” for “police” preceding “court”; inserted the (b)(2)(A) designation; substituted “district court” for “police court” and for “municipal court” in present (b)(2)(A); added (b)(2)(B); and substituted “deposited into” for “paid over to” in (b)(4)

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

It is the police chief of a municipality who is given authority to suppress breaches of the peace, an arguably policy-making position. Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094 (1997).

Liability.

The argument in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a superior should be made liable for a subordinate's decision, although clothed in terms from this section, is no more than an attempt to impose liability under a theory of respondeat superior, a theory of recovery precluded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094 (1997).

Suspension.

The authority to draft citizens into service granted by subsection (c) of this section cannot undo a police officer's suspension. Arkansas State Police v. Davis, 45 Ark. App. 40, 870 S.W.2d 408 (1994), rehearing denied, 46 Ark. App. 320, 879 S.W.2d 473 (1994).

Cited: Wing v. Britton, 748 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1984).

14-52-203. Duties of police officers.

  1. In a municipality, the duty of the chief of police and other officers of the police department is under the direction of the mayor.
  2. It is their duty to:
    1. Suppress a riot, disturbance, or breach of the peace;
    2. Pursue and arrest a person fleeing from justice in any part of this state;
    3. Apprehend a person in the act of committing an offense against the laws of the state or the ordinances of the city and forthwith bring the person before the proper authority for trial or examination; and
    4. Diligently and faithfully enforce at all times all laws, ordinances, and regulations for the preservation of good order and the public welfare as the city council may ordain. For this purpose, the chief of police and other officers of the police department have all the power of constables.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 53, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7704; Pope's Dig., § 9847; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1705; Acts 2013, No. 726, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (a), substituted “a municipality” for “cities of the first class” and “is” for “shall be”; substituted “is” for “shall be” in the introductory language of (b); substituted “a riot, disturbance, or breach” for “all riots, disturbances, and breaches” in (b)(1); substituted “a” for the first occurrence of “any” in (b)(2); in (b)(3), substituted “a person” for “any and all persons,” “an offense” for “any offenses,” and “person” for “persons”; and, in (b)(4), deleted “such” preceding “laws” and substituted “the chief of police and other officers of the police department” for “they shall.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

City of Caddo Valley v. George: Stop or I'll Sue! Police Chases and the Price Cities May Pay, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 425 (2002).

Case Notes

Construction with Other Law.

While the day-to-day duties of the chief of police and other officers of the police department in a city of the first and second class are under the direction and general superintendence of the mayor, the city council prescribes the police department's duties and defines its powers, i.e., makes the police department's policy pursuant to § 14-52-101. Brinkley v. City of Helena-West Helena, No. 2:11-cv-00207-SWW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116592 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 21, 2014).

Off Duty.

A police officer is, in a sense, on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week and is not relieved of his obligation to preserve the peace while “off duty.” Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994).

Cited: Meyers v. State, 253 Ark. 38, 484 S.W.2d 334 (1972); State v. Osborn, 263 Ark. 554, 566 S.W.2d 139 (1978).

14-52-204. Power to arrest.

In a municipality, the mayor or a police officer of the city may arrest upon view a person whom he or she has probable cause to believe is guilty of a breach of the ordinances of the city or of a crime against the laws of the state and, upon reasonable information supported by affidavit, may procure process for the arrest of a person who may be charged with a breach of an ordinance of the city.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 53, p. 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1706; Acts 2013, No. 726, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Search of the Person Incident to a Lawful Arrest, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 79.

Case Notes

Off Duty.

Though patrolman for police department was employed as a security guard for a motel and was off duty as a patrolman at the time of an arrest in the motel, defendant was guilty of resisting the arrest. Meyers v. State, 253 Ark. 38, 484 S.W.2d 334 (1972).

14-52-205. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning hours of work in cities of 25,000 or more, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1955, No. 78, § 1; 1965, No. 564, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1712; Acts 1987, No. 984, § 1.

Subchapter 3 — Bill of Rights for Law Enforcement Officers

14-52-301. Purpose.

  1. The purpose of this subchapter is to recommend a basic Bill of Rights for law enforcement officers of cities and incorporated towns in Arkansas.
  2. Any municipality shall have the authority to adopt a local ordinance establishing any or all of these procedures as a guide for negotiating personnel issues with its law enforcement officers.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, § 1.

14-52-302. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Complainant” means the person or persons providing the information constituting the basis for official departmental charges alleging improper conduct;
  2. “Formal proceeding” means a proceeding heard before any officer, committee, or other body of city government with the authority to take disciplinary action against a law enforcement officer;
  3. “Law enforcement officer” means any public servant vested by law with a duty to maintain order or to make arrests for offenses; and
  4. “Official departmental charges” means a written document from the chief of police or other lawful authority notifying the accused law enforcement officer that charges of misconduct have been made and setting forth the specifics of the alleged misconduct.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, § 2.

14-52-303. Disciplinary proceedings.

Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation for alleged improper conduct with a possible result of termination, demotion, or other disciplinary action causing loss of pay or status, the following minimum standards may apply:

  1. No adverse inference shall be drawn and no punitive action taken from a refusal of the law enforcement officer being investigated to participate in the investigation or be interrogated other than when the law enforcement officer is on duty or is otherwise fully compensated for the time spent in accordance with city and departmental overtime policy and state and federal law;
  2. Any interrogation of a law enforcement officer shall take place at the office of those conducting the investigation, the place where the law enforcement officer reports for duty, or the other reasonable place as the investigator may determine;
  3. The law enforcement officer being investigated shall be informed at the commencement of his or her interrogation of:
    1. The nature of the investigation;
    2. The identity and authority of the person or persons conducting the investigation; and
    3. The identity of all persons present during the interrogation;
  4. During the interrogation of the law enforcement officer, questions will be posed by or through only one (1) interrogator at a time;
  5. Any interrogation of a law enforcement officer in connection with an investigation shall be for a reasonable period of time and shall allow for reasonable periods for the rest and personal necessities of the law enforcement officer;
  6. No threat, harassment, promise, or reward shall be made to any law enforcement officer in connection with an investigation in order to induce the answering of any questions that the law enforcement officer has a legal right to refrain from answering, but immunity from prosecution may be offered to induce such a response;
  7. All interrogations of a law enforcement officer in connection with an investigation against him or her shall be recorded in full. The law enforcement officer shall be allowed to make his or her own independent recording of his or her interrogation and have one (1) witness of his or her choosing present. The witness must be an attorney or a member of the police department that is in no way related to the matter under investigation;
  8. No formal proceeding which has the authority to administer disciplinary action against a law enforcement officer may be held except upon official departmental charges;
  9. Official departmental charges shall contain the specific conduct that is alleged to be improper, the date and the time of the alleged misconduct, the witnesses whose information provided the basis for the charges, and the specific rules, regulations, orders, or laws alleged to have been violated;
  10. Any law enforcement officer under official departmental charges shall be entitled to a predisciplinary hearing before the chief of police if the disciplinary action is being considered. At the hearing, the law enforcement officer shall have the opportunity to have a person of his or her choosing present; and
  11. No formal proceeding which has authority to penalize a law enforcement officer may be brought except upon charges signed by the person making those charges.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, § 3.

14-52-304. Disclosure not required for promotion or assignment.

No law enforcement officer shall be required to disclose for the purposes of promotion or assignment any item of his or her property, income, assets, debts, or expenditures, or those of any member of the officer's household.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, § 4.

14-52-305. Notification of personnel action.

Whenever a personnel action may result in any loss of pay or benefits or status, the law enforcement officer shall be notified of the pending action by written official departmental charges a reasonable time before the action is taken except where exigent circumstances otherwise require.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, § 5.

14-52-306. Participation in political activities.

Except when on duty or acting in his or her official capacity, no law enforcement officer of a city or incorporated town shall be prohibited from engaging in political activity or be denied the right to refrain from engaging in the activity.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, § 8.

Cross References. Political activity by municipal law enforcement officers, § 14-52-109.

Political activity of public employees permitted, § 21-1-207.

14-52-307. No retaliation for exercise of rights — Other legal remedies.

  1. There shall be no penalty nor threat of any penalty for the exercise by a law enforcement officer of his or her rights under this Bill of Rights.
  2. Nothing in this Bill of Rights shall disparage or impair any other legal remedy any law enforcement officer shall have with respect to any rights under this Bill of Rights.

History. Acts 1991, No. 564, §§ 6, 7.

Chapter 53 Municipal Fire Departments

Cross References. Appointment of fire chiefs, §§ 14-42-110, 14-47-120, 14-48-117.

Civil service for fire departments, § 14-51-101 et seq.

Firemen's relief and pension funds, § 24-11-801 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1923, No. 135, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1947, No. 240, § 2: Mar. 18, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is found that firemen have been working an excessive number of hours each week and that this condition should be corrected in the interest of public safety. An emergency is therefore declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 326, § 4: Mar. 26, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the maximum work week for firemen is prescribed by law as 72 hours per week; that a work week of 72 hours is unduly long and that firemen cannot give the best service to the people of this State when required to work 72 hours per week; that the maximum work week of firemen in certain cities must be reduced in order that such firemen can provide the best possible fire protection to the residents of such cities; and that this Act is immediately necessary to correct this situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 393, § 5: Apr. 11, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present sick leave provisions are not adequate to provide for the essential sick leave of policemen in cities of the first and second class; that the existing provisions for sick leave are not uniform; and that in order to remedy this situation, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 241, § 5: Mar. 9, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the existing sick leave provisions as to fire fighters are not adequate to provide for the essential sick leave of such fire fighters in cities of the first and second class; that the existing provisions for sick leave are not uniform; and that only by the passage of this Act can this situation be properly remedied. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1973, No. 278, § 2, provided: “Section 1 of this act shall take effect on July 1, 1973.”

Acts 1973, No. 278, § 4: Mar. 9, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that the maximum work week of firemen in certain cities, which is presently 64 hours per week, must be reduced in order that such firemen can provide the best possible fire protection to the residents of such cities; that Act 151 of 1973 did reduce said maximum work week to 56 hours per week, but that the immediate effectiveness of said Act 151 of 1973, caused by the fact that said Act 151 contained an emergency clause, has presented the cities to which said Act 151 applies with a financial problem for which they had not budgeted, and which they need time to meet. It is necessary, therefore, that said Act 151 of 1973 be immediately repealed and replaced by this Act. An emergency is therefore declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, shall be effective immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 240, § 3: Mar. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present sick leave law applicable to police officers has been misconstrued as not applying to certain municipal police officers, such as city marshals; that such misinterpretation has resulted in inequity; that all law enforcement officers employed by municipalities in this State should receive the benefits of the sick leave law; and that this Act is immediately necessary to accomplish the same. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 252, § 3: Mar. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present laws pertaining to the compensation for municipal policemen and firemen for holidays is obsolete and contradictory; that this Act clarifies the law in that area and should be given effect immediately to eliminate the confusion and avoid expensive and unnecessary litigation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Requirement of residency within or near specified governmental unit as condition of continued employment for policemen or firemen. 4 A.L.R.4th 380.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 115.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 591 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Donaldson v. Taylor, 327 Ark. 93, 936 S.W.2d 551 (1997).

14-53-101. Establishment in cities.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the city council shall establish fire departments and provide them with proper engines and such other equipment as shall be necessary to extinguish fires and preserve the property of the city and of the inhabitants from conflagration.
    2. In lieu of establishing its own fire department under this section, the city council by ordinance may enter into a contract or interlocal agreement for city fire protection with an existing fire department certified by the Arkansas Fire Protection Services Board.
  1. The city council shall promulgate rules to govern the fire department that the city council deems expedient.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 6, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7595; Pope's Dig., § 9681; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2101; Acts 2015, No. 106, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment redesignated former (a) as (a)(1); added “Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section” to the beginning of present (a)(1); inserted (a)(2); and, in (b), inserted “city” preceding “council,” substituted “rules” for “such rules and regulations,” inserted “fire” preceding “department,” and substituted “that the city council deems” for “as it shall deem.”

14-53-102. Firefighting beyond municipal limits.

    1. In order to prevent the destruction by fire of property located outside the corporate limits of cities and towns and in order to lessen the loss caused on account of insufficient means to combat fires and as a protection against such loss, the city council or other governing body of any city or town having an organized fire department may provide by ordinance that the firefighting machinery and equipment, with the necessary firefighters to operate it, may be used to combat fires beyond the corporate limits of any city or town, upon such terms, conditions, and restrictions as may be prescribed in the ordinance.
      1. If the city council or other governing body of any city or town enacts an ordinance to provide that its fire department may operate beyond its corporate limits, then the governing body of the city or town may further provide that necessary facilities may be built or constructed outside the corporate limits to house the firefighting machinery, equipment, and the firefighters in order to properly combat fires beyond the corporate limits, but only if:
        1. There are no active fire protection services offered in the area beyond the corporate limits of the city or town where the facilities are to be constructed; and
        2. The county quorum court approves of the construction of the firefighting facilities by a county ordinance.
      2. However, a city or town may construct necessary facilities to house the firefighting equipment in areas where fire protection services currently exist if, in addition to the requirement of subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, the construction is approved by a unanimous vote of the board of directors of the fire department serving that area outside the corporate limits.
      1. When the organized fire department of a city or town combats a fire beyond the corporate limits of the city or town, a reasonable effort shall be made for ninety (90) days to obtain compensation or reimbursement for the services from the property owner involved.
      2. If the city or town is unable to obtain payment or reimbursement from the property owner for the services within the ninety-day period, the county wherein the property is located may reimburse the municipality for the service in an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200).
        1. A claim under this subsection shall be supported by a completed and attached Uniform Fire Department Insurance Reimbursement Billing Form.
        2. The Arkansas Fire Protection Services Board shall adopt rules to create the form and the allowable rates for reimbursement.
        3. The board shall use the Schedule of Equipment Rates published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security, as in effect on January 1, 2013.
    1. The city or town may seek payment or reimbursement from the property owner involved or the county after the ninety-day period for one hundred percent (100%) of the expendable resources the city or town used to respond to an accident if the accident involved personal property only.
    1. Neither the municipality nor any municipal official or fire department official or employee involved in combatting the fire shall be liable for any damages or loss that occurs while the department is combatting the fire outside the corporate limits of the city or town.
    2. The firefighters shall have the same coverage as they now have if they are injured while outside the city limits.
  1. All members of the fire department of any city or town when engaged in fighting fire beyond the corporate limits of the city or town under the terms of any ordinance as authorized in this section shall be considered to be acting within their line of duty and in discharge thereof. No member of the department shall lose or forfeit any right or benefit in rank, pay, disability, or retirement payments and benefits on account of out-of-city or out-of-town activities.

History. Acts 1951, No. 270, §§ 1, 2; 1957, No. 348, § 1; 1973, No. 114, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2106 — 19-2107; Acts 2001, No. 1464, § 1; 2013, No. 1345, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment redesignated former (b)(1) and (2) as present (b)(1)(A) and (B); and added (b)(1)(C) and (b)(2).

Cross References. Territory annexed by municipality to have fire protection, § 14-40-1212.

14-53-103. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning exemptions for firefighters from military or jury duty, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 484, § 1 and No. 214, § 1. The section was derived from: Acts 1875, No. 1, § 6, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7595; Pope's Dig., § 9681; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2101.

14-53-104. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning duty hours of fire department employees, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 214, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1923, No. 135, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9852; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2103.

14-53-105. Arrangement of members' hours — Emergencies.

    1. The uniformed force of the fire department shall be divided into two (2) platoons, the officers and members assigned to which shall alternate on tours of duty at intervals of not more than fifteen (15) days.
      1. The chief of the department shall arrange the working hours of the employees of the department so that each employee shall work, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of hours per month, not to exceed seventy-two (72) hours per week.
      2. At his or her discretion, the chief of the department may require in case of an epidemic, conflagration, or other emergency the employees for a greater period than provided in this section to continue on duty during the epidemic, conflagration, or other emergency.
    1. The uniformed force of fire departments in cities of Arkansas having a population of fifteen thousand (15,000) or more, according to the latest official federal census, shall be divided into platoons.
        1. The chief of the department in cities of this state affected by this subsection shall assign, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of employees of the department to each platoon so that each employee shall work, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of hours per month, not to exceed an average of fifty-six (56) hours per week for each period of three (3) weeks.
        2. There shall be no reduction of salaries of employees of the departments because of the number of hours worked during each week as provided in this subsection.
      1. At his or her discretion in case of an epidemic, conflagration, or other emergency, the chief of the department may require the employee to continue on duty for a greater period than provided in this subsection during the epidemic, conflagration, or like emergency.

History. Acts 1923, No. 135, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9853; Acts 1947, No. 240, § 1; 1957, No. 157, § 1; 1969, No. 326, § 1; 1973, No. 278, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2104, 19-2104.1.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

That to comply with the provisions of this section restricting a workweek to 72 hours would compel the employment of an additional “platoon” of city fire fighters does not render this section void for want of due process. Nalley v. Throckmorton, 212 Ark. 525, 206 S.W.2d 455 (1947).

“Work.”

Word “work” as used in this section restricting the working hours to 72 hours per week means the hours spent on duty even though a fire fighter is permitted to sleep. Nalley v. Throckmorton, 212 Ark. 525, 206 S.W.2d 455 (1947).

Cited: Mankin v. Dean, 228 Ark. 752, 310 S.W.2d 477 (1958).

14-53-106. Holiday compensation.

  1. All firefighters employed by cities of the first or second class or incorporated towns shall be compensated for all legal holidays established by the governing body of the municipality.
  2. This compensation shall be based on the firefighter's daily rate of pay and in addition to the regular pay schedule.
  3. This compensation may be included within the firefighter's base pay.
  4. This compensation shall be prorated and paid during the regular payroll periods or paid in one (1) lump sum annually on a date in December designated by the municipality.

History. Acts 1985, No. 252, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-1721; Acts 1987, No. 501, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 252, § 1, is also codified as § 14-52-105.

Case Notes

All Legal Holidays.

Fire fighters are to be paid for state legal holidays, but there can be no intent to pay for holidays which do not occur, and in years when there are no elections the number would be fewer. City of Fort Smith v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Basis.

Holiday pay meant “days with full pay” or eight-hour days rather than twenty-four-hour tours of duty. City of Fort Smith v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Included with Base Pay.

Lack of pay check identity for holiday pay did not prove failure by city to comply with former statute granting that pay. International Asso. of Fire Fighters v. Little Rock, 256 Ark. 266, 506 S.W.2d 836 (1974) (decision under prior law).

14-53-107. Annual vacation.

The chief of the fire department shall so arrange that each employee shall be granted an annual vacation of not less than fifteen (15) days with full pay.

History. Acts 1923, No. 135, § 3; 1935, No. 73, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9854; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2105.

Case Notes

Cited: City of Fort Smith v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973).

14-53-108. Uniform sick leave — Definitions.

      1. From and after April 11, 1969, all firefighters employed by cities of the first class and cities of the second class shall accumulate sick leave in accordance with a municipal ordinance at the rate of not less than ten (10) working days nor more than twenty (20) working days per year, beginning one (1) year after the date of employment.
      2. As used in this section, “working day” means that period of time a firefighter is on duty within a twenty-four-hour period. If the firefighter is on duty for twelve (12) hours or more in a twenty-four-hour period, a working day shall be not less than twelve (12) hours nor more than twenty-four (24) hours.
      3. The number of days of sick leave in effect for firefighters employed by cities of the first class and cities of the second class on January 1, 2005, shall remain in effect until changed by authority of a municipal ordinance, and nothing in this section shall be construed to require a reduction in the level of sick leave below the rate of twenty (20) working days per year or the rate in effect on January 1, 2005.
      1. If unused, sick leave shall accumulate to a maximum of one thousand four hundred forty (1,440) hours unless the city by ordinance authorizes the accumulation of a greater amount, in no event to exceed a maximum accumulation of two thousand one hundred sixty (2,160) hours.
      2. Unused accumulated sick leave shall not be used for the purpose of computing years of service for retirement purposes.
    1. In cities having sick leave provisions through ordinance, the total sick leave accumulated by the individual firefighter shall be credited to him or her and new days accumulated under the provisions of this section until the maximum prescribed in subsection (a) of this section is reached.
    2. If the governing body of the employing municipality successfully reduces the accrual rate, no firefighter shall have any previously earned sick leave reduced in value.
    3. Time off may be charged against accumulated sick leave only for the days that a firefighter is scheduled to work. No sick leave as provided in this section shall be charged against any firefighter during any period of sickness, illness, or injury for any days that the firefighter is not scheduled to work.
    1. If at the end of his or her term of service, upon retirement or death, whichever occurs first, any firefighter has unused accumulated sick leave, he or she shall be paid for this sick leave at the regular rate of pay in effect at the time of retirement or death.
    2. Payment for unused sick leave in the case of a firefighter, upon retirement or death, shall not exceed three (3) months' salary unless the city, by ordinance, authorizes a greater amount, but in no event to exceed four and one-half months' salary.
    1. Cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns shall have the option of providing sick leave for firefighters to accumulate at a rate of fifteen (15) twenty-four-hour working days per year beginning with the date of employment and decreasing to twelve (12) twenty-four-hour working days beginning four (4) years after employment.
    2. Unused sick leave shall accumulate to firefighters provided with fifteen (15) twenty-four-hour working days per year sick leave and twelve (12) twenty-four-hour working days per year sick leave to a maximum of one hundred (100) twenty-four-hour working days.
    1. A city of the first class, a city of the second class, and an incorporated town may adopt a catastrophic leave program by ordinance under § 14-42-123 to include a “presumptive illness list for municipal fire department” under this section.
    2. As used in this section, a “presumptive illness list for municipal fire department” means an illness that is chronic or fatal.

History. Acts 1969, No. 393, §§ 1-3; 1971, No. 241, §§ 1-3; 1983, No. 842, §§ 1-3; 1985, No. 181, § 1; 1985, No. 240, § 1; 1985, No. 892, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-1718 — 19-1720; Acts 1987, No. 716, § 1; 1997, No. 412, § 1; 2005, No. 1828, § 1; 2019, No. 883, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1969, No. 393, §§ 1-3, as amended, are also codified as § 14-52-107.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (e).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

As to constitutionality of similar statute concerning payment for accumulated sick leave to police officers, see City of Piggott v. Woodard, 261 Ark. 406, 549 S.W.2d 278 (1977).

Days.

The term “working day” in this section must be construed to refer to an eight-hour day rather than a twenty-four hour shift. Donaldson v. Taylor, 327 Ark. 93, 936 S.W.2d 551 (1997).

In the city of Pine Bluff, in calculating sick leave under subsection (a) prior to January 1, 1993, a fireman working a twenty-four-hour shift who missed his or her entire shift due to illness was charged only one eight-hour day of sick leave; after January 1, 1993, the City's new sick-leave policy, which conformed with this section's language, redefined a sick day as eight hours, so that a fireman missing an entire twenty-four-hour shift would be charged three days of his or her accumulated sick leave. Donaldson v. Taylor, 327 Ark. 93, 936 S.W.2d 551 (1997).

The General Assembly enacted Acts 1983, No. 842, which amended this section, after the decision in City of Fort Smith v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973), where, in calculating firemen's holidays, the statutory term “working days” was construed to mean an eight-hour day rather than a twenty-four-hour shift. Donaldson v. Taylor, 327 Ark. 93, 936 S.W.2d 551 (1997).

Pensions.

Word “salary” as used in § 24-11-818 providing that a retired fire fighter is entitled to be paid a monthly pension equal to one-half the salary attached to his rank does not include payment for unused accumulated sick leave. Combs v. Cheek, 283 Ark. 69, 671 S.W.2d 177 (1984).

Statutory language in § 24-11-818 providing that a retired fire fighter is “entitled to be paid a monthly pension equal to one-half of the salary attached to the rank” was first used in Acts 1921, No. 491, § 4; however, neither sick leave nor lump sum payment for unused accumulated sick leave was statutorily provided for fire fighters until 1971. Thus, the General Assembly could not have intended to include payment for unused accumulated sick leave in its 1921 concept of the word “salary.” Combs v. Cheek, 283 Ark. 69, 671 S.W.2d 177 (1984).

Cited: City of Fort Smith v. Brewer, 255 Ark. 813, 502 S.W.2d 643 (1973); Combs v. Cheek, 283 Ark. 69, 671 S.W.2d 177 (1984).

14-53-109. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning departmental promotions in commission government cities, was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 1121, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1957, No. 138, §§ 1-5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2110 — 19-2113, 19-2113n.

14-53-110. Reimbursement of firefighters.

Cities of the second class may reimburse a firefighter for replacement of personal clothing destroyed during the performance of active service to a fire department.

History. Acts 1989, No. 180, § 1.

14-53-111. Bonus compensation plans.

Cities of the second class may establish through ordinance a bonus compensation plan for firefighters eligible for retirement under the Firemen's Pension and Relief Fund Act, § 24-11-801 et seq., or under the Arkansas Local Police and Fire Retirement System Act, § 24-10-101 et seq., to encourage their continued service to the fire department.

History. Acts 1989, No. 181, § 1.

14-53-112. Fire marshal may be armed.

  1. For purposes of this section, “municipal fire marshal” means a person who holds a full-time office or position of fire marshal created by ordinance in a city of the first class, and who:
    1. Is responsible for the detection and prevention of arson, the enforcement of laws relating to arson and other burning, and enforcement of the city and state fire prevention codes;
    2. Has successfully completed a course of study for law enforcement officers approved by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training;
    3. Has successfully completed an eighty-hour fire and arson investigation course offered by the National Fire Academy, or the Arkansas Fire Training Academy, or an equivalent course; and
    4. Has completed a one-week fire safety inspection class offered by the National Fire Academy or the Arkansas Fire Training Academy or an equivalent class.
  2. A municipal fire marshal is hereby authorized and empowered to carry a weapon and to make arrests for violations of the laws relating to arson and other unlawful burning.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1157, §§ 1, 2.

Cross References. Authority to arrest, § 16-81-106.

Chapter 54 Powers of Municipalities Generally

Research References

Am. Jur. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Est. & Waiv., § 128.

56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp. & Coun., §§ 98 et seq., 193-230, 433-578, 680 et seq.

57 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. & Coun. Tort., § 5 et seq.

56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 193-230, 423-578.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 106-313.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 31, preserved the rights, liabilities and property of municipal corporations organized prior to adoption of the act.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1883, No. 63, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1885, No. 67, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 173, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1931, No. 1, § 4: Jan. 26, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly finds that an opportunity exists at the present time for securing substantial expenditures for the purposes stated in section 1 hereof; that such opportunities may be lost unless the necessary lands can be at once acquired; that such expenditures are much needed during the present unemployment crisis, and that it is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety that this act become effective without delay. An emergency is therefore declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1939, No. 68, § 10: Feb. 10, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “Because the act creating the present Agricultural and Industrial Commission expires on March 25, 1939; and after that time there will be no other Commission to carry into effect the provisions of the Tax Exemption Amendment; and such a Commission being required; and, because competitive bidding for new industrial investments among our neighboring states is now intense, and Arkansas should take full advantage of every opportunity; and, it being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1949, No. 23, § 3: Jan. 28, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, it is necessary that cities and towns be granted additional powers to protect the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 268, § 5: Mar. 12, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the cities and towns of this State are in desperate need of assistance to perform useful public services; that the United States Government has available various forms of financial assistance to enable cities and towns to provide various forms of public services; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to authorize cities and towns to apply for and accept assistance or gifts in the form of funds from the United States of America and to enter into contracts necessary in connection with such financial assistance or gifts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Validity, construction, and effect of state and local laws requiring governmental units to give “purchase preference” to goods manufactured or services performed in state. 84 A.L.R.4th 419.

14-54-101. Body corporate and politic.

Cities or incorporated towns organized under the provisions of this subtitle are declared to be bodies politic and corporate, under the name and style of “The city of ” or “The incorporated town of ,” as the case may be, capable to:

  1. Sue and be sued;
  2. Contract and be contracted with;
  3. Acquire, hold, and possess real and personal property;
  4. Associate with other municipalities for the promotion of their general welfare;
  5. Join with other municipalities in the purchase of equipment, supplies, or services;
  6. Have a common seal and change and alter it at pleasure; and
  7. Exercise such other powers and have such other privileges as are incident to other corporations of like character or degree, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subtitle or the general laws of this state.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 10, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7490; Pope's Dig., § 9533; Acts 1949, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2301.

Cross References. Tort liability immunity, § 21-9-301.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Expansion of Municipal Corporation Tort Liability — A Legislative Responsibility, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 313.

Case Notes

In General.

A municipal corporation has no powers except those expressly conferred and those fairly implied for the attainment of declared purposes. Bain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 116 Ark. 125, 172 S.W. 843 (1915); Willis v. City of Ft. Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S.W. 275 (1916); City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334, 197 S.W. 686 (1917).

In General.

Municipal corporation has standing to challenge an annexation election as a property owner; therefore, a trial court erred in dismissing the case for failure to state a claim. City of Dover v. City of Russellville, 352 Ark. 299, 100 S.W.3d 689 (2003).

Purpose.

This section permits municipalities to associate for the promotion of their general welfare and to join together in the purchase of services, such as legal services. O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1989).

Acquire, Etc., Property.

Municipalities have power to dispose of property held for convenience or profit. Searcy v. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269, 1 S.W. 319 (1886).

Municipalities may acquire land within municipal limits for a public cemetery. City of Ft. Smith v. Wilson, 100 Ark. 587, 140 S.W. 733 (1911).

Municipal corporations have authority to sell property that no longer can be used to advantage or with economy. Fussell-Graham-Alderson Co. v. Forrest City, 145 Ark. 375, 224 S.W. 745 (1920).

Association for Legal Defense Program.

Legal defense program was not a dry-hole contract because it was within the purview of this section for municipalities to create and join such to promote the general welfare of their respective municipalities. Stromwall v. Van Hoose, 371 Ark. 267, 265 S.W.3d 93 (2007).

Municipality is authorized by this section to participate in an association for the promotion of the general welfare of the city and to join with other municipalities to purchase services, and the payment of fees to a legal defense program as a subset of the association is permissible. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in a case alleging an illegal exaction since there was no citation of authority for an argument that there was an illegal use of public funds relating to the payment of punitive damages in a settlement; moreover, the fees associated with the joining of a defense program were allowed under this section. Stromwall v. Van Hoose, 371 Ark. 267, 265 S.W.3d 93 (2007).

Contracts.

Municipalities have the power to enter into contracts. Harrison v. Boone County, 238 Ark. 113, 378 S.W.2d 665 (1964).

Given that this section specifically allowed for municipalities to contract and because nothing in the record indicated a limitation on appellant city's and appellee city's ability to contract, the cities were capable of making a contract by joint resolution to cooperate to obtain funding for a proposed municipal outfall sewer line from a wastewater treatment facility to a point downstream of the city limits of appellant city. City of Dardanelle v. City of Russellville, 372 Ark. 486, 277 S.W.3d 562 (2008).

Suits.

There is no greater impediment in asserting statutory liability on a municipality than in asserting contractual liability. Deason v. City of Rogers, 247 Ark. 1061, 449 S.W.2d 410 (1970).

Municipal funds can be used to pay attorney's fees for public officials and employees who are not charged with a criminal offense, and who are sued in their official capacity. O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1989).

In a garnishment case, there was no need to resort to an official capacity suit against a city as a municipal corporation relating to a failure to pay wages because the city could have been named directly, and process could have been served upon its chief executive officer; although the underlying judgment remained in full force and effect against the parties named in the judgment, the trial court found that the city was not a party to the underlying action or subject to garnishment of its bank accounts. An argument that the city failed to file a verified petition was waived because it was not made below. Collins v. Hall, 2014 Ark. App. 731, 455 S.W.3d 331 (2014).

14-54-102. Powers and restrictions prescribed.

All municipal corporations organized under the provisions of this subtitle shall have general powers and privileges and be subject to the rules and restrictions prescribed in this subtitle.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 11, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7491; Pope's Dig., § 9534; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2302.

Cross References. Premises and real property used by criminal gangs, organizations, or enterprises, or used by anyone in committing a continuing series of violations — Civil remedies, § 5-74-109.

Criminal nuisance abatement boards, § 14-54-1701 et seq.

Common nuisance declared, § 16-105-402.

Case Notes

Commissions.

The Arkansas General Assembly has deemed cities in Arkansas to be bodies politic and corporate which are capable of suing and being sued; no such express power to sue had been vested in the City of Hot Springs Advertising and Promotion Commission by the general assembly at the time it filed its lawsuit. City of Hot Springs Adv. & Promotion Comm'n v. Cole, 317 Ark. 269, 878 S.W.2d 371 (1994).

The mere power to administer the advertising and promotion fund did not imbue the City of Hot Springs Advertising and Promotion Commission with the power to sue to collect hotel and restaurant taxes, especially when the general assembly had not expressly invested the City of Hot Springs with that authority at the time the complaint was filed. City of Hot Springs Adv. & Promotion Comm'n v. Cole, 317 Ark. 269, 878 S.W.2d 371 (1994).

14-54-103. General powers of cities and towns.

Cities and incorporated towns shall have power to:

  1. Prevent injury or annoyance within the limits of the municipal corporation from anything dangerous, offensive, or unhealthy and cause any nuisance to be abated within the jurisdiction given the board of health in § 14-262-102;
  2. Regulate the keeping and transportation of gunpowder, dynamite, and other combustibles and provide or license magazines for them;
  3. Prevent and punish fast or immoderate riding of horses or driving or propelling of vehicles through the streets;
  4. Establish and regulate markets;
  5. Provide for the measuring or weighing of hay, wood, or any other article for sale;
  6. Regulate the transportation of articles throughout the streets and prevent injury to the streets from overloaded vehicles;
  7. Prevent cruelty to animals;
  8. Prevent any riots, noise, disturbance, or disorderly assemblages;
    1. Regulate drumming or soliciting persons who arrive on trains or otherwise for hotels, boardinghouses, bathhouses, or doctors, to license these drummers, provide that each shall wear a badge plainly exposed to view, showing for whom and for what he is drumming or soliciting patronage, and punish by fines any violation of this subdivision.
    2. Any bona fide owner or proprietor of any hotel or boardinghouse may solicit patronage to his hotel or boardinghouse without being required to wear a badge or pay license therefor;
  9. License, regulate, tax, or suppress ordinaries, hawkers, peddlers, brokers, pawnbrokers, money changers, intelligence offices, public masquerade balls, street exhibitions, sparring exhibitions, dance houses, fortune tellers, pistol galleries, corn doctors, private-lock venereal hospitals, museums and menageries, equestrian performances, horoscopic views, lung testers, muscle developers, magnifying glasses, billiard tables or other instruments used for gaming, theatricals, or other exhibitions, shows, and amusements, or any gift enterprise;
  10. Suppress prizefighting, dogfights, chicken fights, gaming, or gambling houses; and
  11. Regulate or suppress bawdy or disorderly houses, houses of ill-fame, or houses of assignation.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 12, p. 1; 1883, No. 63, § 1, p. 97; 1901, No. 173, § 1, p. 326; C. & M. Dig., § 7529; Pope's Dig., § 9589; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2303.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Nuisance — Rock Festivals and Nuisance, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 362.

Nickles and Adams, Pawnbrokers, Police, and Property Rights — A Proposed Constitutional Balance, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 793.

Case Notes

In General.

Where violation of ordinance depended on whether two or more neighbors had filed a written petition, it was in conflict with Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 18. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

Bawdy or Disorderly Houses.

Municipalities have no right to make the mere presence, abode, or return to the municipality of a prostitute a misdemeanor. Buell v. State, 45 Ark. 336 (1885); Paralee v. State, 49 Ark. 165, 4 S.W. 654 (1887).

Combustibles.

Prohibition against erecting and operating filling stations without permission is a regulation within municipality's police power. Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144 S.W.2d 718 (1940).

Municipality has power to regulate, but not to prohibit, blasting in stone quarries within the municipality. Hackler v. City of Ft. Smith, 238 Ark. 29, 377 S.W.2d 875 (1964).

“Dangerous, Offensive, or Unhealthy.”

Municipalities may prohibit appearance of drunken persons on streets. Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark. 12, 65 S.W. 706 (1901); DeWitt v. La Cotts, 76 Ark. 250, 88 S.W. 877, 1905 Ark. LEXIS 34 (1905); Brooke v. State, 86 Ark. 364, 111 S.W. 471 (1908).

Municipalities cannot require illegal exactions under the guise of protecting the public health. Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S.W. 718 (1908).

Butchers may be required to take out a license and have their meats inspected. Trigg v. Dixon, 96 Ark. 199, 131 S.W. 695 (1910).

Municipality has power to pass ordinance prohibiting the hanging of signs within designated area. Berkau v. City of Little Rock, 174 Ark. 1145, 298 S.W. 514 (1927).

Municipality has the power to provide, by proper ordinance, for the removal, at suitable intervals, of garbage, waste, trash, and refuse. Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719, 135 A.L.R. 1305 (1941).

Ordinance providing for collection of garbage, waste, trash, and refuse and for inspection of premises and providing penalty for violation thereof was held not void for imprisonment for debt, since punishment was for violation of law. Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719, 135 A.L.R. 1305 (1941).

State's power to legislate in the protection of public health has been granted and delegated to municipalities. City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942).

Ordinance providing that whenever a person who, upon examination was found to be infected with a venereal disease in a communicable stage, failed to take treatment adequate for the protection of the public health, city health officer could commit that person to a hospital or other place within the state for treatment was held not unconstitutional on ground the regulations were unreasonable. City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942).

Municipality has been given power to perform service of fogging the municipality with insecticide by implication under the provision of this section. Holman v. City of Dierks, 217 Ark. 677, 233 S.W.2d 392 (1950).

Drumming or Soliciting.

Ordinances within the terms of this section as to the regulation of drummers are presumed to be reasonable, and the courts will not interfere on the grounds of unreasonableness. City of Fayetteville v. Carter, 52 Ark. 301, 12 S.W. 573 (1889); City of Hot Springs v. Curry, 64 Ark. 152, 41 S.W. 55 (1897).

“Uninvited callers” ordinance bore no reasonable relation to requirements essential to exercise of municipality's police powers and was void as to solicitors, within city, of orders for portrait photographic work. Wilkins v. Harrison, 218 Ark. 316, 236 S.W.2d 82 (1951).

Gaming.

Municipal ordinance licensing exhibiting of a gaming table or gambling device is void. State v. Lindsay, 34 Ark. 372 (1879).

Municipalities have power to suppress gambling devices, and none to regulate them. Goetler v. State, 45 Ark. 454 (1885).

Hotels.

Municipal corporations are not authorized to regulate hotels. Bragg v. Adams, 180 Ark. 582, 21 S.W.2d 950 (1929).

“License, Regulate, Tax,” Etc.

A dealer in real estate for others is a broker and, under this section, may be required to pay a license for following the occupation within the limits of a municipality. City of Little Rock v. Barton, 33 Ark. 436 (1878); City of Hot Springs v. Rector, 71 Ark. 463, 76 S.W. 1056 (1903).

A peddler is one who goes from house to house exposing for sale the goods that he carries. Conway v. Waddell, 90 Ark. 127, 118 S.W. 398 (1909).

The business of operating moving picture shows is a lawful business, and it may not be suppressed or unreasonably burdened by license fees and taxes that are unreasonably high or discriminatory. Morrilton v. Malco Theatrs, Inc., 202 Ark. 100, 149 S.W.2d 55 (1941).

Power of municipal council extends only to the right to regulate reasonably, and it does not include the power to prohibit anyone from operating more than one picture show. Morrilton v. Malco Theatrs, Inc., 202 Ark. 100, 149 S.W.2d 55 (1941).

If owner of amusement machines pays to city amount specified by statute, city cannot levy an additional tax on the use of the machines, as city cannot levy a tax higher than amount specified in statute. City of Springdale v. Gage, 214 Ark. 356, 216 S.W.2d 390 (1949).

Measuring or Weighing.

Municipality could enforce ordinance providing for measuring or weighing hay, wood, or other articles for sale within its limits, unless the ordinance was unreasonable in its requirements or was enacted for raising of revenue. Taylor, Cleveland & Co. v. City of Pine Bluff, 34 Ark. 603 (1879); Wills v. City of Ft. Smith, 70 Ark. 221, 66 S.W. 922 (1902) (decisions prior to § 14-54-103 et seq.).

Nuisances.

Municipal council is not authorized to condemn any action or thing as a nuisance that in its nature, situation, or use, does not come within the legal notion of a nuisance. Ward v. Little Rock, 41 Ark. 526 (1883); Merrill v. City of Van Buren, 125 Ark. 248, 188 S.W. 537 (1916).

Whether a community shall be invaded by construction and operation of a filling station is a matter which may be regulated, even though the station, per se, is not a nuisance. Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144 S.W.2d 718 (1940).

Municipality cannot declare that to be a nuisance which is not such in fact. Wilkins v. Harrison, 218 Ark. 316, 236 S.W.2d 82 (1951); City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

Municipality may regulate keeping of chickens, but such regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

Municipality may regulate location of livery stables, but such regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

Municipality has no right to declare the keeping of bees in municipal limits a nuisance. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

Keeping of cattle in a municipality is not a nuisance per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

The hide or fur business in a municipality is not a nuisance per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

A livery stable in a municipality is not a nuisance per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

In a case involving a rock quarry that was located entirely outside, but within one mile of, the corporate limits of a city in which a district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Fayetteville, Ark. Ordinance No. 5280 prior to its enforcement date, city argued that the company that operated the quarry was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the city authority to license and regulate its quarry, because the ordinance was enacted pursuant to subdivision (1) of this section. Contrary to the city's argument, since the quarry was located outside the corporate city limits but within one mile of those limits, the city could not regulate the quarry without a judicial determination that its activities constituted a nuisance, and no such judicial determination had been made; the quarry was not a nuisance per se. Rogers Group, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 629 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2010).

Public Health.

A town has the authority to legislate for the protection of public health. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 968 S.W.2d 600 (1998).

Riots, Noise, Etc.

Ordinance requiring places of business in town to remain closed from midnight to four a.m. whose purpose was to prevent youths from driving noisily about the streets during this period was in excess of town's delegated authority relative to enactment of ordinances, since this purpose could have been accomplished by directly prohibiting the objectionable conduct. Dyess v. Williams, 247 Ark. 155, 444 S.W.2d 701 (1969).

Transportation over Streets.

Board of commissioners of an improvement district have no control over a municipal street except for the purpose of making an improvement. Pulaski Gaslight Co. v. Remmel, 97 Ark. 318, 133 S.W. 1117 (1911).

Municipalities have power to pass ordinances regulating the use of streets by trucks. House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 S.W.2d 831 (1955).

Statutory provisions relating to motor vehicles did not repeal or supersede this section or affect the authority of municipalities to regulate the use of streets by trucks. House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 S.W.2d 831 (1955).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Ark. County v. Burris, 308 Ark. 490, 825 S.W.2d 590 (1992).

14-54-104. Additional powers of cities of the first class.

In order to better provide for the public welfare, safety, comfort, and convenience of inhabitants of cities of the first class, the following enlarged and additional powers are conferred upon these cities:

      1. To regulate the use of sidewalks, and all structures and excavations thereunder, to require the owner or occupant of any premises to keep the sidewalks in front or alongside the premises free from obstruction, to build and maintain suitable pavement or sidewalk improvements therealong whenever they may become necessary to the safety or convenience of travel, and to designate the kind of sidewalk improvement to be made, the kind of material to be used by the owner or occupant, and the time within which the improvement is required to be completed.
      2. The kind and character of sidewalk improvement for the same street and block shall be uniform.
        1. Sidewalk improvement shall be ordered, either by a general ordinance for all property owners or occupants on a certain street or within a certain quarter where the necessity of sidewalks is general to that extent, or by a resolution or order adopted by the city council and notice served upon the particular individuals owning or occupying the premises where the special necessity exists.
          1. In either case, the city shall have power to enforce obedience to the sidewalk ordinance, order, resolution, or notice upon the owners or occupants failing or refusing to obey them by the imposition of fines upon conviction thereof in the district court, in like manner and with like consequences and effect as for a violation of any other ordinance of the city.
          2. Each day that the failure or refusal is continued shall constitute a separate offense.
      1. After the owner, upon notice, has failed to repair it, in cases where the sidewalk improvement shall be constructed by an occupant who holds the premises as a tenant or lessee, he or she shall have the right to deduct the cost thereof from the rent that may be due from him or her, or to hold the possession of the premises for such time as the rental value thereof will be sufficient to reimburse him or her for the cost.
      2. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall be so construed as to prevent the city from proceeding by civil action or in any other manner provided by existing laws;
  1. To alter or change the width or extent of streets, sidewalks, alleys, avenues, parks, wharves, and other public grounds, and to vacate or lease out portions thereof, and where lands have been acquired or donated to the city for any object or purpose which has become impossible or impracticable to achieve, the lands may be used or devoted for other proper public or corporate purposes or sold by order of the city council and the proceeds applied for public or corporate purposes;
    1. To punish, prevent, or remove encroachments or obstructions upon any of the streets, sidewalks, wharves, or other public grounds of the city, whether by buildings, fences, or structures of any kind, posts, trees, or any other matter or thing whatsoever.
    2. No statute of limitations or lapse of time during which any obstruction or encroachment may have existed or been continued shall be permitted as a bar or defense against any proceeding or action to remove or abate it or to punish for its continuance after an order has been made by the city council or the district court for its removal or abatement;
    1. To prevent and punish the bringing or importation into the city of any pauper, mendicant, diseased, or other person likely to become a burden on the city or any charity therein or become a charge upon the county in which the city is situated unless such action has been authorized by some competent officer in this state in a manner provided for by law;
    2. To punish the conductor of any railroad, captain of any boat or vessel, proprietor or driver of any stage or other conveyance bringing any such person into the city unless the party providing conveyance can show that he or she had no reasonable grounds to know or become apprised of the condition or circumstances of such person;
    3. To prevent or regulate the carrying on of any trade, business, or vocation of a tendency dangerous to morals, health, or safety, or calculated to promote dishonesty or crime. To provide by ordinance for the punishment of dishonest practices of any kind, and for the prompt arrest and punishment of all dishonest characters or persons of known bad reputation, such as burglars, pickpockets, sneakthieves, forgers, fakirs, confidence men, common cheats, tricksters, and the like, who shall come into or be found within the corporate limits of the city without being able to give a good account of themselves, and to provide that, upon the trial of all such persons, evidence as to general character, reputation, associates, and places frequented shall be admissible, and in all such cases to authorize a fine of not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100); and
    4. To prevent, abate, or remove nuisances of every kind, and to declare what are nuisances, and also to punish the authors or continuers thereof by fine or imprisonment, or both. However, no previous declaration shall be necessary as to any matter, act, or thing that would have been a nuisance at common law, and all nuisances may be proceeded against either by order of the city council or prosecution in the district court.

History. Acts 1885, No. 67, § 3, p. 92; C. & M. Dig., § 7748; Pope's Dig., § 9944; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2304; Acts 2017, No. 260, §§ 8-10; 2017, No. 926, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment by No. 260 substituted “district court” for “police court” in (1)(B)(i) (b)(1) , (3)(B), and (4)(D).

The 2017 amendment by No. 926 substituted “portions thereof” for “such portions thereof as may not for the time being be required for corporate purposes” in (2).

Cross References. Municipal streets generally, § 14-301-101 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

An ordinance under this section must not be oppressive to a property owner. James v. City of Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S.W. 760 (1887).

Cities of the first class are authorized to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks within their limits. State ex rel. Latta v. City of Marianna, 183 Ark. 927, 39 S.W.2d 301 (1931).

Nuisances.

City cannot declare that to be a nuisance which is not a nuisance per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

City has no right to declare keeping of bees in the city a nuisance. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

The keeping of cattle, a livery stable, or the hide and fur business in a city are not nuisances per se. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

City may regulate location of livery stables, but such regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

City may regulate keeping of chickens, but such regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

Sidewalks.

Regulation of use of sidewalks is valid delegation of police power and is not unconstitutional. James v. City of Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S.W. 760 (1887).

Owner can be required only to do surface grading in building sidewalks. City of Little Rock v. Fitzgerald, 59 Ark. 494, 28 S.W. 32 (1894).

Cities may require removal of wooden awnings from above sidewalks. City of Helena v. Wooten, 98 Ark. 156, 135 S.W. 828 (1911).

Streets, Alleys, Etc.

City has no power to sell, exchange, or give away streets. Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 56 S.W. 791 (1900).

Title to an alley cannot be acquired by limitations. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Boles, 88 Ark. 533, 115 S.W. 375 (1908).

Where improvement district in city was organized for purpose of improving a street, the board of commissioners acquired no control over the street except for the purpose of making the improvement, and when that object was accomplished, the street became subject to the exclusive control of the city. Pulaski Gaslight Co. v. Remmel, 97 Ark. 318, 133 S.W. 1117 (1911).

City is without power to organize an improvement district in a city for the purpose of opening, establishing, and creating an alley through property when no alley has ever been opened, dedicated, or provided for. Lewis v. Rieff, 114 Ark. 366, 169 S.W. 1184 (1914).

Subdivision (2) was not repealed by § 14-301-301 et seq. providing a method for the vacation of streets and alleys. Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 211 Ark. 678, 201 S.W.2d 999 (1947); Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).

City cannot bind itself by perpetual contract or by one that lasts an unreasonable time, and any attempt on the part of the city to enter into a contract relating to the permanent establishment or abandonment of its streets would be ultra vires. Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949 (1955), cert. denied, Risser v. Little Rock, 350 U.S. 965, 76 S. Ct. 433 (1956), overruled in part, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).

Where only issue in prior suit to enjoin city from enforcing ordinance adopted under the authority of § 14-301-301 purporting to close certain strees was the validity of the ordinance, authority of city to adopt ordinance under this section relocating portions of the streets was not res judicata in proceedings to enjoin enforcement of second ordinance. Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949 (1955), cert. denied, Risser v. Little Rock, 350 U.S. 965, 76 S. Ct. 433 (1956), overruled in part, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).

When public had only an easement in city streets that were vacated when railroad constructed a terminal so that the railroad could build its tracks, train sheds, and platforms across the streets, and thereafter rail service into the city was discontinued and the terminal facilities were used for other purposes, city, by such discontinuance, acquired no right to reopen the streets except under their power of eminent domain. Kansas City S. Ry. v. City of Ft. Smith, 228 Ark. 625, 309 S.W.2d 315 (1958).

Section 14-301-301 et seq. did not repeal this section, and the failure of parties to secure the closing of an alley under the procedure set out in § 14-301-301 et seq., which required the consent of the abutting property owners, would not be res judicata of any future litigation between the same parties instigated under this section, the procedure in this section involving the closing of an alley in order to better provide for the public welfare of the inhabitants of a city. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).

In litigation involving closing of an alley where the procedure was instituted under § 14-301-303, which necessitated the written consent of the owners of all abutting lots, while the written consent of those owners actually abutting the two ends of the alley had been obtained, from the practical standpoint upon both ends of the alley being closed, the entire alley would become closed and therefore, all abutting property owners not having given their consent, the petitioners had to fail. Roberts v. Pace, 230 Ark. 280, 322 S.W.2d 75 (1959).

Since this section contains no provision limiting to 30 days any attack on a city ordinance, and thus ordinary statutory period for suits against enforcement of an ordinance would apply, plenary suit filed 31 days after passage of ordinance that provided for closing of a street to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance was timely filed. Stephens v. City of Springdale, 233 Ark. 865, 350 S.W.2d 182 (1961).

City does not have right to vacate and close portion of a street where there is no showing that portion to be closed is not being used by the public as a street. Brooksher v. Jones, 238 Ark. 1005, 386 S.W.2d 253 (1965).

On request of person who desired sections of streets and alley, abutting which he owned all the land, vacated to enable him to construct additional facilities, city had power to vacate the sections of streets and alley on evidence that their closing would cause but little inconvenience to persons then using them and their traffic could be readily carried by other nearby streets and alleys. City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968).

Ordinance vacating an easement theretofore accepted by public use and passed without notice to the affected property owners could not deprive an abutting property owner who relied on such easement for access to and egress from his property of his right to use such easement. Flake v. Thompson, Inc., 249 Ark. 713, 460 S.W.2d 789 (1970).

Where city found that traffic on a portion of a street had declined and that closing of this portion of the street would not work a hardship on many people, and where owners of abutting property consented to closing of the street, an ordinance vacating and abandoning the street was not ultra vires. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).

Where nonabutting owners could not show special and peculiar injury suffered in connection with the closing of a street in which the city had only an easement, the nonabutting owners did not have standing to challenge ordinance vacating and abandoning the street. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).

Where street right-of-way had been dedicated by filing of a plat and the easement had been accepted by the city, the ownership of the fee in the right-of-way remained in the abutting owners, so that when the city vacated the street it could not be sold by the city nor devoted to another public use. Freeze v. Jones, 260 Ark. 193, 539 S.W.2d 425 (1976).

Where company in developing subdivision incurred great expense in reliance upon its continued access to street, and since the developer's right of ingress and egress is a property right that cannot be taken away by a city, at least without payment of just compensation, city's action in vacating street that permitted ingress and egress to the development was arbitrary and invalid. City of Sherwood v. Dupree Co., 263 Ark. 442, 565 S.W.2d 425 (1978).

Decision concerning the validity of one ordinance under § 14-301-301 et seq., regarding the closing of an alley was not res judicata with respect to the validity of second ordinance enacted pursuant to this section. Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987).

Ordinance vacating a street exceeded the scope of subdivision (2) when it attempted to extinguish an abutting landowner's property right of ingress and egress over the street without compensation. Wright v. City of Monticello, 345 Ark. 420, 47 S.W.3d 851 (2001).

Trial court did not err in deciding that § 14-54-303 was controlling for the town to vacate a street, because an incorporated town's ability to vacate a street under § 14-54-303 was independent, and §§ 14-301-301 to 14-301-303 had no application when an incorporated town used its authority under § 14-54-303. Riley v. Town of Higginson, 2009 Ark. App. 294, 307 S.W.3d 34 (2009).

Trades, Businesses, or Vocations.

Ordinance requiring butchers to take out a license and requiring their meats to be inspected is a valid exercise of regulatory power. Trigg v. Dixon, 96 Ark. 199, 131 S.W. 695 (1910).

Ordinances regulating sale of milk and fresh meats are a valid exercise of police power. Carpenter v. City of Little Rock, 101 Ark. 238, 142 S.W. 162 (1911).

Sale of cider either by wholesale or retail is a proper subject of municipal regulation. City of Texarkana v. Hudgins Produce Co., 112 Ark. 17, 164 S.W. 736 (1914).

There is no limitation on power of city to prohibit, by ordinance, the maintenance of gasoline filling stations, gasoline pumps, oil tanks, service appliances, etc., on the streets of the city within the fire limits. Sander v. City of Blytheville, 164 Ark. 434, 262 S.W. 23 (1924).

Cities of the first class have regulatory powers over hotels. City of Texarkana v. Brachfield, 207 Ark. 774, 183 S.W.2d 304 (1944).

Ordinance enacted by city under public welfare clause is presumed to be legal and reasonable. Goldman & Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 220 Ark. 792, 249 S.W.2d 961 (1952).

City has power to prohibit operation of junkyard and storing of waste paper within a fire district. Goldman & Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 220 Ark. 792, 249 S.W.2d 961 (1952).

City has power and authority to enact an ordinance providing no license to operate a rooming house or hotel shall be granted unless it shall appear probable that applicant will not rent rooms for immoral purposes or allow prostitutes or pimps to remain on the premises or permit gambling or sale, storage, or the keeping of intoxicating liquor on the premises sought to be licensed, and such an ordinance is not unconstitutional. Hertenberger v. City of Texarkana, 224 Ark. 235, 272 S.W.2d 435 (1954).

Cited: Wynn Motel Hotel, Inc. v. City of Texarkana, 217 Ark. 314, 230 S.W.2d 649 (1950); Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1234 (W.D. Ark. 1985).

14-54-105. Additional powers of cities of the second class.

In order to better provide for the public welfare, safety, comfort, and convenience of their inhabitants, the following enlarged and additional powers are conferred upon cities of the second class:

      1. To regulate the use of sidewalks, and all structures and excavations thereunder, to require the owner or occupant of any premises to keep the sidewalks in front or alongside the premises free from obstruction, to build and maintain suitable pavement or sidewalk improvements therealong whenever they may become necessary to the safety or convenience of travel, and to designate the kind of sidewalk improvement to be made, the kind of material to be used by the owner or occupant, and the time within which the improvement is required to be completed.
      2. The kind and character of sidewalk improvement for the same street or block shall be uniform.
        1. Sidewalk improvement shall be ordered, either by a general ordinance for all property owners or occupants on a certain street or within a certain block or quarter where the necessity of sidewalks is general to that extent, or by a resolution or order adopted by the city council and notice served upon the particular individuals owning or occupying the premises where the special necessity exists.
  1. Each day that the failure or refusal is continued shall constitute a separate offense.
    1. To punish, prevent, or remove encroachments or obstructions upon any of the streets, sidewalks, wharves, or other public grounds of the city whether by buildings, fences, or structures of any kind, posts, trees, or any other matter or thing whatsoever.
    2. No statute of limitations or lapse of time during which any obstruction or encroachment may have existed or been continued shall be permitted as a bar or defense against any proceeding or action to remove or abate it or to punish for its continuance after an order has been made by the city council for its removal or abatement;
    1. To prevent and punish the bringing or importation into the city of any pauper, mendicant, diseased, or other person likely to become a burden on the city or any charity therein or become a charge upon the county in which the city is situated unless such action has been authorized by some competent officer in this state in a manner provided for by law;
    2. To punish the conductor of any train, captain of any boat or vessel, proprietor or driver of any stage or other conveyance, bringing any such person into the city unless the party providing conveyance can show that he had no reasonable grounds to know or become appraised of the condition or circumstances of such person;
    3. To prevent or regulate the carrying on of any trade, business, or vocation of a tendency dangerous to morals, health, or safety, or calculated to promote dishonesty or crime. To provide by ordinance for the punishment of dishonest practices of any kind, and for the prompt arrest and punishment of all dishonest characters or persons of known bad reputation, such as burglars, pickpockets, sneakthieves, forgers, fakirs, confidence men, common cheats, tricksters, and the like, who shall come into or be found within the corporate limits of the city without being able to give a good account of themselves, and to provide that, upon the trial of all such persons, evidence as to general character, reputation, association, and places frequented shall be admissible, and in all such cases to authorize a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100); and
    4. To prevent, abate, or remove nuisances of every kind, and to declare what are nuisances, and also to punish the authors or continuers thereof by fine or imprisonment, or both. However, no previous declaration shall be necessary as to any matter, act, or thing that would have been a nuisance at common law, and all nuisances may be proceeded against, either by order of the city council or by prosecution in the city court.

(i)( 1 ) In either case, the city shall have power to enforce obedience to the sidewalk ordinance, order, resolution, or notice upon the owners or occupants failing or refusing to obey them by the imposition of fines upon conviction in the city court, in like manner and with like consequence and effect as for a violation of any other ordinance of the city.

(ii) After the owner upon notice, has failed to repair it, in cases where the sidewalk improvement shall be constructed by an occupant who holds the premises as a tenant or lessee, he shall have the right to deduct the cost thereof from the rent that may be due from him, or to hold the possession of the premises for such time as the rental value thereof will be sufficient to reimburse him for the cost.

(iii) Nothing contained in this subdivision shall be so construed as to prevent the city from proceeding by civil action or in any other manner provided by existing laws;

(2) To alter or change the width or extension of streets, sidewalks, alleys, avenues, parks, wharves, and other public grounds, and to vacate or lease out such portions thereof as may not for the time being be required for corporation purposes, and, where lands have been acquired or donated to the city for any object or purpose which has become impossible or impracticable to achieve, the lands may be used or devoted for other proper public or corporate purposes or sold by order of the city council and the proceeds applied for public or corporate purposes;

History. Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 1, p. 69; C. & M. Dig., § 7684; Pope's Dig., § 9813; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2305.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Pursuant to Acts 1971, No. 153, references to “mayor's courts” in this section were changed to “city courts.”

Cross References. Municipal streets generally, § 14-301-101 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

Prior to this section, cities of the second class were subject to statute of limitations on recovering property in adverse possession. City of Searcy v. Roberson, 256 Ark. 1081, 511 S.W.2d 627 (1974).

Nuisances.

If a business is a nuisance per se, the city may prevent it; if it is one which may become so by being improperly conducted, but which would not be so otherwise, then it may be so regulated as not to become a nuisance. Bryan v. City of Malvern, 122 Ark. 379, 183 S.W. 957 (1916).

Cities are not empowered to declare something to be a public nuisance that the state has clothed with legality, because state law is paramount and supreme. City of Piggott v. Eblen, 236 Ark. 390, 366 S.W.2d 192 (1963).

Streets, Alleys, Etc.

City is without power to organize an improvement district in a city for the purpose of opening, establishing, and creating an alley through property when no alley has ever been opened, dedicated, or provided for. Lewis v. Rieff, 114 Ark. 366, 169 S.W. 1184 (1914).

Board of public affairs was not given power to let contracts for repair of streets. Connelly v. Lawhon, 180 Ark. 964, 23 S.W.2d 990 (1930).

City that decided to abandon portion of street was authorized to make a conveyance of that portion abandoned to a property owner where grantee owned all of the land abutting portion of street vacated. Barbee v. Carpenter, 223 Ark. 660, 267 S.W.2d 768 (1954).

City had authority to close 200-foot section of a road in order to extend an airport landing strip where only five people and a few hunters used the road and the only damage to these people was the inconvenience of traveling a mile further to reach a nearby state highway. Kemp v. Simmons, 244 Ark. 1052, 428 S.W.2d 59 (1968).

Trades, Businesses, or Vocations.

Ordinance granting to a person exclusive privilege of removing deposits from unsewered privies for a fixed period and to charge a certain sum therefor, to be paid by the owner of the premises, is a valid exercise of police power, if the ordinance is reasonable in its terms and designed solely for the protection of the public health. Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S.W. 718 (1908).

City may pass laws requiring inspection of plumbing, and they may charge fees to any person who follows that trade, or does any work of that character in the city, to help pay expenses of inspection. Shaw v. Conway, 179 Ark. 266, 15 S.W.2d 411 (1929).

Cities are not authorized to regulate hotels. Bragg v. Adams, 180 Ark. 582, 21 S.W.2d 950 (1929).

Cited: Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950).

14-54-106. Cities and towns on state line.

  1. All cities and towns which are located on the state line between Arkansas and any other state in which it is desired to erect a post office or other public building upon the state line or to create a park or lay out a street or boulevard upon, or adjacent to, the state line shall have power for these purposes to:
    1. Take lands by eminent domain, including the power to take the lands in fee simple as well as to take an easement across them;
    2. Take by eminent domain the title in, and to, lands occupied by streets or alleys and to close the streets and alleys and, where the lands are taken for a post office or other public building or its grounds, to sell and convey the fee simple title of it or of any part thereof to the federal government;
    3. Create improvement districts, including the whole or any part of the city or town in the manner provided by law for the creation of improvement districts in cities and towns, to aid the city or town in acquiring the lands needed for new streets and alleys where relocation of streets and alleys is made necessary or desirable by the improvements and for the purpose of paving the new streets and in relocating sewers and drains.
    1. The procedure to be followed by the city to acquire property shall be that prescribed in Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, §§ 22, 23, and Article 12, § 9, and in §§ 14-54-601, 14-91-104, 14-262-102, 14-301-104, 14-333-101, 18-15-101 et seq., 23-11-209, and 23-12-303 for the exercise of the right of eminent domain by municipal corporations and counties.
    2. The order condemning lands for these purposes shall be by ordinance of the city council, with concurrence in the order by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the members elected to the council.
    3. The decision of the city council that it is necessary to condemn lands in fee for any of these purposes shall not be subject to review except as provided in the Arkansas Constitution.

History. Acts 1931, No. 1, §§ 1-3; Pope's Dig., §§ 9521-9523; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2306 — 19-2308.

14-54-107. Aid to new industries.

Cities and incorporated towns shall have full power to purchase sites for new factories or industries and to give other favorable grants and privileges for the purpose of establishing new and additional industries in or near their municipality.

History. Acts 1939, No. 68, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2322.

Cross References. Industrial commission for aiding new industries, § 14-163-201 et seq.

14-54-108. Federal assistance.

  1. Any city or town in this state, acting pursuant to authority of the legislative body thereof, is authorized to apply for and accept assistance or gifts in the form of funds or otherwise from the federal government, or any department, agency, or authority of the federal government, and to utilize these funds for any public purpose in the discretion of the legislative body of the city or town, consistent with restrictions, if any, placed thereon by the federal government.
  2. Any city or town in this state may contract with the federal government or any federal department, agency, or authority for the purpose of accepting assistance or gifts in the form of funds, or otherwise, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, and may utilize these funds for any public purpose.

History. Acts 1971, No. 268, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2348, 19-2349.

Subchapter 2 — Interstate Agreements

14-54-201. Purpose.

It is the purpose of this subchapter to permit any municipality in this state which borders on a state line and which is separated from a municipality in the adjoining state only by the state line to cooperate with the adjoining municipality in the other state in furnishing governmental services and facilities to the inhabitants of the adjoining municipalities to the end that governmental services and facilities may be adequately provided in the most efficient manner.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2337.

14-54-202. Authority to enter.

Any municipality in this state which borders on a state line, and which is separated from a municipality in an adjoining state only by the state line, may enter into agreements with the adjoining municipality whereby either of the municipalities agrees to furnish certain services or facilities for the other or whereby the municipalities agree to furnish, jointly or cooperatively, any governmental service or facility or to exercise or enjoy any power or authority which the Arkansas municipalities involved may furnish, exercise, or enjoy under the laws of this state to the extent that the laws of the state in which the adjoining municipality is located permit such joint or cooperative activity.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2338.

14-54-203. Contents required.

  1. Every agreement or contract entered into by a municipality of this state as authorized in § 14-54-202 shall specify the following:
    1. Its duration;
    2. The precise organization, composition, and nature of any separate legal or administrative entity created thereby, together with the powers delegated thereto, provided such entity may be legally created;
    3. Its purpose;
    4. The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of establishing and maintaining a budget therefor, or in the case of an agreement whereby one (1) municipality agrees to furnish specified services or facilities to the other municipality, the financial arrangement therefor;
    5. The permissible methods to be employed in accomplishing the partial or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of property upon such partial or complete termination; and
    6. Any other necessary and proper matters.
  2. If the agreement does not establish a separate legal entity to conduct the joint or cooperative undertaking, the agreement shall, in addition to subdivisions (1) through (6) enumerated [sic] subsection (a) of this section, contain the following:
    1. Provision for an administrator or a joint board responsible for administering the joint or cooperative undertaking. In the case of a joint board, municipalities party to the agreement shall be represented;
    2. The manner of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real and personal property used in the joint or cooperative undertaking.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2339, 19-2340.

14-54-204. Approval by Attorney General.

  1. Every agreement made under this subchapter, prior to and as a condition precedent to its entry into force, shall be submitted to the Attorney General, who shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and compatible with the laws of this state.
  2. The Attorney General shall approve any agreement submitted to him under this subchapter unless he shall find that it does not meet the conditions set forth in this subchapter and shall detail in writing addressed to the governing bodies of the municipalities concerned the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of law.
  3. Failure to disapprove an agreement submitted under this subchapter within twenty (20) days of its submission shall constitute approval thereof.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2342.

14-54-205. Approval of state officer or agency.

  1. If any agreement made pursuant to this subchapter shall deal, in whole or in part, with the provisions of services or facilities with regard to which an officer or agency of the state government has constitutional or statutory powers of control, the agreement shall, as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the state officer or agency having the power of control. The agreement shall be approved or disapproved by him or it, as to all matters within his or its jurisdiction, in the same manner and subject to the same requirements governing the action of the Attorney General as provided in § 14-54-204.
  2. This requirement of submission and approval shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, the requirement of submission to, and approval by, the Attorney General.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2345.

14-54-206. Filing requirements.

No agreement entered into pursuant to this subchapter shall be effective until a copy of it has been filed in the office of the recorder of the county in which the affected Arkansas municipality is located and in the office of the Secretary of State.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2343.

14-54-207. Satisfaction of obligations.

No agreement made pursuant to this subchapter shall relieve any public agency of any obligation or responsibility imposed upon it by law except that, to the extent of actual and timely performance thereof by an adjoining municipality pursuant to an agreement entered into under this subchapter or by a joint board or other legal or administrative entity created by an agreement made under this subchapter, the performance may be offered in satisfaction of the obligation or responsibility.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2341.

14-54-208. Liability and damages.

  1. Every agreement or contract entered into pursuant to this subchapter shall have the status of an interstate compact, but in any case or controversy involving performance or interpretation thereof or liability thereunder, the municipalities involved shall be the real parties in interest. The state may maintain an action to recoup or otherwise make itself whole for any damages or liability which it may incur by reason of being joined as a party therein.
  2. The action shall be maintainable against any municipality whose default, failure of performance, or other conduct caused or contributed to the incurring of damage or liability by the state.

History. Acts 1965, No. 7, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2344; Acts 1993, No. 403, § 5; 1995, No. 1296, § 47.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment substituted “case or controversy” for “case of controversy” in (a).

The 1995 amendment substituted “damages or liability” for “damages of liability” in (a).

Subchapter 3 — Real and Personal Property

Cross References. Property exempt from sale by virtue of execution, § 16-66-114.

Preambles. Acts 1953, No. 13 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the United States Government has in the past constructed a number of airfields in various places in Arkansas which at the close of World War II, it deeded to nearby or adjacent cities and which the United States Government now proposes to reactivate, enlarge and improve, but before making improvements on any airport, the United States Government requires the conveyance to it of that airport; Now, therefore….”

Acts 1959, No. 159 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, it is desirable to clarify any ambiguity now existing regarding the authority of Municipal Corporations to handle its real and personal property and to remove limitations which may have heretofore existed regarding contracts and conveyances of real estate and personal property owned or held by Municipal Corporations or the leasing and renting of municipal property;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1935, No. 176, § 4: Mar. 21, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “That this Act being necessary for the proper administration of municipal affairs, and the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.” Approved March 21, 1935.

Acts 1953, No. 13, § 2: Jan. 29, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that the United States Government has need to reactivate airfields which it has heretofore donated to municipalities in the State of Arkansas, and which are now needed for national defense; and this Act being necessary for the administration of municipal affairs and the preservation of public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall take effect and be enforced from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1959, No. 159, § 4: Mar. 4, 1959. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being necessary to clarify the power and authority vested in Municipal Corporations and being essential to the proper administration of municipal affairs and the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1977, No. 823, § 3: Mar. 28, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is essential to the effective and efficient operation of municipal government that ambiguities in the present law relating to the authority of municipalities to buy, sell, lease, or otherwise deal with real and personal property be removed at the earliest possible date; that this Act is designed to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 183, § 5: Feb. 15, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 994 of 1981 contained some confusing language which caused difficulty in interpretation and resulted in an undue hardship; that it is necessary in the interest of clarity that Act 994 of 1981 be repealed and that the previous law relating to the subject matter covered in Act 994 be reinstated and that this Act is designed to accomplish this purpose and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 729, § 4: Mar. 21, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there exists no provision in current law to permit incorporated towns to alter streets and alleys for the good of the public; that as a result of this lack of authority, unnecessary hardships have been placed on the governing bodies of incorporated towns in this state who strive to provide for the public welfare, safety, comfort and convenience. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 532 et seq.

C.J.S. 63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 950 et seq.

14-54-301. Ownership authorized.

Municipal corporations are authorized and empowered to acquire and hold real estate, tenements, hereditaments, and such other real and personal property as is necessary and proper for the administration of the affairs of municipal corporations.

History. Acts 1935, No. 176, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9538; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2309.

14-54-302. Purchase, lease, sale, and disposal authorized.

  1. A municipality may:
    1. Sell, convey, lease, rent, let, or dispose of any real estate or personal property owned or controlled by the municipality, including real estate or personal property that is held by the municipality for public or governmental purposes;
    2. Buy any real estate or personal property; and
      1. Donate real estate or personal property, or any part of the real estate or personal property, to the United States Government or any agency of the United States Government, for any one (1) or more of the following purposes, that is, having the real estate or personal property, or both, activated, reactivated, improved, or enlarged by the donee.
      2. The municipality may donate the fee simple title and absolute interest, without any reservations or restrictions, in and to all real estate or personal property, or both, or any part of the real estate or personal property, to the United States Government, if this real estate or personal property was previously conveyed or otherwise transferred by the United States Government to the municipality without cost to the municipality.
      3. All other donation instruments shall contain provisions by which the title to the property donated shall revert to the municipality when the donated property is no longer used by the donee for the purposes for which it was donated.
  2. The execution of all contracts and conveyances and lease contracts shall be performed by the mayor and city clerk or recorder, when authorized by a resolution in writing and approved by a majority vote of the governing body of the municipality present and participating.
  3. The mayor or his or her authorized representative may sell or exchange any municipal personal property with a value of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or less, unless the governing body of the municipality shall by ordinance establish a lesser amount.
  4. Municipal personal property to be disposed of as one (1) unit shall not be sold without competitive bidding if the amount exceeds twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) or the maximum provided by resolution, unless the mayor certifies in writing to the governing body of the municipality that in his or her opinion the fair market value of the item or lot is less than the amount established by ordinance.
    1. If personal property of the municipality becomes obsolete or is no longer used by a municipality, the personal property may be:
      1. Sold at public or internet auction;
      2. Sent to the Marketing and Redistribution Section of the Office of State Procurement;
      3. Transferred to another governmental entity within the state; or
      4. Donated under this section.
    2. If an item of personal property is not disposed of under subdivision (e)(1) of this section, the item may be disposed of in the landfill used by the municipality if the mayor or his or her authorized representative certifies in writing and the governing body of the municipality approves that:
      1. The item has been rendered worthless by damage or prolonged use; or
      2. The item has:
        1. Only residual value; and
        2. Been through public auction and not sold.
    1. A record shall be maintained of all items of personal property disposed of under this section and reported to the governing body of the municipality.
    2. The municipal fixed asset listing shall be amended to reflect all disposal of real estate and personal property made under this section.

History. Acts 1935, No. 176, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9539; Acts 1953, No. 13, § 1; 1959, No. 159, § 1; 1977, No. 823, § 1; 1983, No. 183, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2310; Acts 2005, No. 436, § 1; 2017, No. 470, § 1; 2019, No. 575, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section was amended by Acts 1983, No. 183, § 2, which has been codified above; however, § 4 of the same act repealed, in addition to other provisions, Acts 1935, No. 176, § 2, the same being § 14-54-302 (this section).

As to contracts, leases, or other arrangements under Acts 1981, No. 994 declared binding, see Acts 1983, No. 183, § 3.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1) and added (a)(2).

The 2017 amendment substituted “sale, and disposal” for “and sale” in the section heading; rewrote former (a) and (b) as present (a) and redesignated former (c) as present (b); substituted “municipality” for “municipal corporation” in (b); and added (c) through (f).

The 2019 amendment deleted “real estate or” preceding “personal property” in (c) and (d).

Cross References. Disposition of public use property, § 22-4-501 et seq.

Lease of county lands to municipality, § 14-16-109.

Sale or lease of county hospital to municipality, § 14-16-108.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 373.

Case Notes

Contracts Not Formally Authorized.

Arkansas city having notice of its agent's transactions could not accept and enjoy the benefits under a contract for construction of airport facilities adjacent to city and then be permitted to contest the validity of the contract executed in its name by its agent on the ground that the contract was not formally authorized. L.C. Eddy, Inc. v. City of Arkadelphia, 303 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1962) (decision under prior law).

Failure to have agreement for lease of space on county property for street purposes authorized by a written resolution of the city council was not a fatal defect where city ratified agreement by performing obligations thereunder. Harrison v. Boone County, 238 Ark. 113, 378 S.W.2d 665 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Where, in an action brought by contractors against a city alleging a breach of contract to construct a sewer line, a failure by the city to collect charges from those individuals and businesses tying on to that sewer line, and a failure to remit those charges to the contractors for 15 years, there was substantial evidence supporting the jury finding that the asserted contract existed between the parties, so that the contractors' recovery on theory of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit was not barred even though the contract had not been formally authorized or approved by the city council as required. McCuistion v. City of Siloam Springs, 268 Ark. 148, 594 S.W.2d 233 (1980) (decision under prior law).

Actions of the city constituted ratification of union contract, negotiated by board of commissioners, where an employee of the municipal utilities continued to work for the city several months after the chancery court had ruled the utilities were under the control of the board of directors, and where the union contract was being utilized and the city paid the employee sick leave benefits in keeping with the provisions of the union contract pursuant to the supplemental letter stating nonunion employees would receive the contract benefits on the same terms as the union members. City of Benton v. Powers, 269 Ark. 853, 601 S.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1980) (decision under prior law).

Absence of a city council's resolution was fatal to the validity and viability of an alleged Memorandum of Understanding between a mayor and the owner of a stagecoach who sought to sell the stagecoach to the city. Dotson v. City of Lowell, 375 Ark. 89, 289 S.W.3d 55 (2008).

In property owners' suit against a city, alleging the city failed to comply with the terms and conditions of an agreement between the parties for the location of a storm drainage easement upon the owners' property, the trial court erred in denying the city's motion for a directed verdict because there was no evidence the city engineer had the authority to bind the city to a contract, pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) and subsection (c) of this section, to acquire an interest in the owners' property and obligate the city to perform drainage construction on the property. City of Bryant v. Collins, 2011 Ark. App. 713, 386 S.W.3d 699 (2011).

14-54-303. Authority of incorporated towns.

In order to better provide for the public welfare, safety, comfort, and convenience of their inhabitants, incorporated towns may alter or change the width or extension of streets, sidewalks, alleys, avenues, parks, wharves, and other public grounds, and vacate or lease out such portions thereof as may not for the time being be required for corporation purposes, and, where lands have been acquired or donated to the town for any object or purpose which has become impossible or impracticable to achieve, the lands may be used or devoted for other proper public or corporate purposes or sold by order of the town council and the proceeds applied for public or corporate purposes.

History. Acts 1989, No. 729, § 1.

Case Notes

Proper Authority.

Trial court did not err in deciding that this section was controlling for the town to vacate a street, because an incorporated town's ability to vacate a street under this section was independent, and §§ 14-301-301 to 14-301-303 had no application when an incorporated town used its authority under this section. Riley v. Town of Higginson, 2009 Ark. App. 294, 307 S.W.3d 34 (2009).

14-54-304. Property exchange by municipalities.

  1. Municipalities may exchange properties, real or personal, with the state and any political subdivision of the state.
  2. An exchange under this section shall be approved by ordinance of the governing body of the municipality and shall be accomplished in accordance with procedures prescribed by the governing body.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1248, § 2; 2019, No. 575, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a) and (b) designations; in (a), substituted “Municipalities may exchange” for “Municipalities are authorized to exchange” and substituted “with the state and any political subdivision of the state” for “with other municipalities or with counties. Provided, any such”; and substituted “An exchange under this section shall be approved” for “exchange shall be approved” in (b).

Subchapter 4 — Public Property for Processing Crude Biogenic Gases

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1983, No. 478, is also codified as § 14-16-301 et seq.

14-54-401. Authority to lease, etc.

Each city of the first or second class and incorporated town shall have the authority to lease, let, sell, or convey any real property owned or controlled by the city or town for the production, reclamation, and refining of crude biogenic gases pursuant to competitive sealed bidding procedures under this subchapter.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2356.

14-54-402. Bidding process.

    1. The mayor, city manager, or city administrator shall publish a notice inviting sealed bids for the leasing, letting, selling, or conveying of real property for the production, reclamation, and refining of crude biogenic gases. This notice shall be published in a legal newspaper in the county where the property is located one (1) time each week for the four (4) weeks immediately prior to the date set for receiving bids.
    2. No bid shall be received, accepted, or considered when received after the date set for the receipt of bids.
    1. Within thirty (30) days after the date set for the receipt of bids, the bids shall be opened and read at a public meeting of the city council, board of directors, commissioners, or managers.
      1. At the meeting, the city council, board of directors, commissioners, or managers shall select and award the lease to the property or award the property to the highest, responsible, and best bidder.
      2. The city council, board of directors, commissioners, or managers may reject all bids and begin the bidding process anew.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2357.

14-54-403. Implementing legislation.

Each city of the first or second class and incorporated town may provide by ordinance for the implementation of, but not contrary to, this subchapter.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2358.

14-54-404. Authority to issue bonds.

This subchapter shall not limit the authority of any city of the first or second class or incorporated town to lease, let, sell, or convey any real property pursuant to the Constitution and laws of Arkansas concerning the issuance of bonds for the purpose of industrial development and other lawful purposes.

History. Acts 1983, No. 478, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2359.

Subchapter 5 — Areas Adjacent to Shopping Centers

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1973, No. 472, as amended, is also codified as § 14-16-401 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 796, § 3: Mar. 28, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly of the State of Arkansas hereby finds that the matters affected by this Act have a direct relation to the administration of justice and the preservation of public order and safety in the areas affected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby found and declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

14-54-501. Authority to control use.

The governing bodies of the municipalities of this state are delegated the power and authority to enact ordinances to limit and control the use of areas adjacent to shopping centers and other commercial enterprises which are privately owned, but which are maintained for the convenience of the public, so as to provide ingress and egress, loading and unloading areas, fire lanes, parking spaces, parking areas designated for the exclusive use of disabled persons, and other measures for the safety and convenience of the public.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 1; 1985, No. 527, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2350.

14-54-502. Plat of area.

  1. No ordinance shall be passed unless and until the owner or lessee of an area sought to be regulated has presented to the governing body of the city a plat of the area upon which is shown the proposed limitations and controls.
  2. The plat shall in no way limit the power and authority of the governing body of the municipality but shall be advisory only.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2351.

14-54-503. Posting of signs, etc. — Penalty.

  1. When an ordinance has been passed, the owner or lessee of the area to be controlled shall, at his expense, post the signs, paint the lines, arrows, and curbings in the required colors, and install the devices and signals to apprise the public of the existence of the ordinance.
  2. Thereafter, persons who violate these ordinances shall be punished as provided in the ordinances. However, no fine shall be less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00).

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2352.

14-54-504. Policing of area.

  1. No municipality shall be required to patrol the area which is controlled as provided in this subchapter, but, upon being called, law enforcement officers shall come to the scene of the alleged violation and, where warranted by law or ordinance, issue citations or make arrests.
  2. This section is cumulative to other laws on this subject and specifically does not repeal § 16-81-108.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 4; 1977, No. 796, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2353, 19-2353.1.

14-54-505. Tort liability unchanged.

Nothing in this subchapter shall limit or extend the law of this state with reference to tort liability of any person, firm, or corporation.

History. Acts 1973, No. 472, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2354.

Subchapter 6 — Public Improvements

Cross References. Creation of improvement districts for making municipal improvements, § 14-88-201.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 560 et seq.

C.J.S. 63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 1035 et seq.

Case Notes

Illegal Contracts.

A city which obtains physical improvements pursuant to an illegal contract may be held liable for the value of the improvements. City of Damascus v. Bivens, 291 Ark. 600, 726 S.W.2d 677 (1987).

14-54-601. Authority generally.

Municipal corporations shall have power to:

  1. In regard to streets, alleys, public grounds, wharves, landing places, and marketplaces, lay off, open, widen, straighten, and establish them; improve and keep them in order and repair; and light;
  2. Open, construct, keep in order, and repair sewers and drains; and
  3. Enter upon, or take, for such of the above purposes as may be required, land or material, and to assess and collect a charge on the owners of lots or lands, or on lots or lands through or by which a street, alley, or public highway shall pass, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of constructing, improving, repairing, or lighting the street, alley, or public highway, to be in proportion to the value of the lot or land as assessed for taxation under the general law of the state.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 18, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4006, 7568; Pope's Dig., §§ 5008, 9642; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2313.

Case Notes

In General.

Former statute was held not mandatory. City of Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572 (1872) (decision under prior law).

For the exercise of a lawful power that by law was vested in the judgement and discretion of a municipal corporation, no injury for which an action would lie could have been committed; however, for the imperfect, negligent, unskillful execution of a thing ordained to be done, an action would lie, in the absence of an express statute. City of Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572 (1872) (decision under prior law).

Enter Upon, or Take.

A city has the right to condemn streets across a railroad. Saint Louis & S.F.R.R. v. City of Fayetteville, 75 Ark. 534, 87 S.W. 1174 (1905).

Where municipal corporation possesses right to take property by eminent domain and does take property that might have been condemned by the exercise of that power, remedy of landowner is to sue for damages at law and is not to seek mandatory process to compel withdrawal. Dobbs v. Town of Gillett, 119 Ark. 398, 177 S.W. 1141 (1915).

Municipal corporation may condemn land for drains and sewers. Young v. Gurdon, 169 Ark. 399, 275 S.W. 890 (1925).

This section does not give a municipal corporation the power of eminent domain outside the municipality for the purpose of acquiring a right of way for electric transmission lines. City of Osceola v. Whistle, 241 Ark. 604, 410 S.W.2d 393 (1966).

Sewers and Drains.

Individual may file suit against municipal corporation for damages from discharge of sewage into his running streams. McLaughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913).

Streets, Alleys, Etc.

—In General.

“Streets” includes road, gutters, and sidewalk. Eickhoff v. City of Argenta, 120 Ark. 212, 179 S.W. 367 (1915)Limited byHot Spring County v. Bowman, 229 Ark. 790, 318 S.W.2d 603 (1958); Willis v. City of Ft. Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S.W. 275 (1916).

—Authority.

Individual who purchases land subsequent to closing of street by consent of municipal council cannot compel opening of street without proving special injuries. Ruffner v. Phelps, 65 Ark. 410, 46 S.W. 728 (1898).

Municipal corporation was held not authorized to vacate streets. City of Texarkana v. Leach, 66 Ark. 40, 48 S.W. 807 (1898).

Authority to exchange streets for other property is not vested in the mayor and council of a municipality. Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 56 S.W. 791 (1900).

Where improvement district in a municipality was organized for the purpose of improving a street, the board of commissioners acquired no control over the street except for the purpose of making the improvement, and when the object was accomplished, the street became subject to the exclusive control of the municipality. Pulaski Gaslight Co. v. Remmel, 97 Ark. 318, 133 S.W. 1117 (1911).

The state, in its sovereignty over all public highways, has full power over streets as well as over public roads and, unless prohibited by the Arkansas Constitution, the legislature may confer, as it shall deem best, the power of supervision and control of streets. Sanderson v. City of Texarkana, 103 Ark. 529, 146 S.W. 105 (1912).

Municipal corporation is without power to organize an improvement district in municipality for the purpose of opening, establishing, and creating an alley through property when no alley has ever been opened, dedicated, or provided for. Lewis v. Rieff, 114 Ark. 366, 169 S.W. 1184 (1914).

Neither the mayor nor street committee of a municipal council had authority to contract for the improvement of city streets; rather, the municipal council alone can contract for these improvements. Venable v. Town of Plummerville, 130 Ark. 477, 198 S.W. 106 (1917).

The legislature, in granting to municipal corporations the exclusive power to open streets and alleys, did not lose its authority to withdraw such power and vest it in another agency. Bulloch v. Dermott-Collins Rd. Imp. Dist., 155 Ark. 176, 244 S.W. 327 (1922), rev'd, 265 U.S. 570, 44 S. Ct. 457 (1924).

Municipal council has no power to permit permanent operation and maintenance of a filling station in the street, and such license, if granted, would confer no vested right or irrevocable right to operate the filling station. Sander v. City of Blytheville, 164 Ark. 434, 262 S.W. 23 (1924).

Municipal council had authority to make contracts for furnishing the municipality with patching material and labor to do repair work. Connelly v. Lawhon, 180 Ark. 964, 23 S.W.2d 990 (1930).

Municipal corporation is authorized to build crossing over railroad tracks. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Smith, 182 Ark. 299, 31 S.W.2d 407 (1930).

Municipal corporation has the power and duty to make reasonable provision for safety of persons and property using its streets by the enactment of ordinances, resolutions, or bylaws looking to that end, and municipal authorities have a wide discretion on these matters. City of Ft. Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).

Resolution authorizing construction of dividing curb along center of boulevard, making it a four lane highway and permitting crossings only at street intersections, was held not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory against owner of tourist camp in center of a long block, whose prospective customers would be prevented from turning to the left into his property, but would have to drive to the next intersection and return. City of Ft. Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).

Municipality did not abuse its discretion in enacting ordinance for establishing of parking meters in front of business even though business was deprived of suitable loading and unloading space. City of Marianna v. Gray, 220 Ark. 468, 248 S.W.2d 379 (1952).

Municipal corporation cannot bind itself by perpetual contract or by one that lasts an unreasonable time, and any attempt on the part of a municipality to enter into a contract relating to the permanent establishment or abandonment of its streets would be ultra vires. Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949 (1955), cert. denied, Risser v. Little Rock, 350 U.S. 965, 76 S. Ct. 433 (1956), overruled in part, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).

Municipality had authority to close 200-foot section of road in order to extend airport landing strip and open and improve new road along side of airport to give residents on closed section of old road access to state highway where only five people and a few hunters used the section closed and the only damage to these people was the inconvenience of traveling a mile further to reach the state highway. Kemp v. Simmons, 244 Ark. 1052, 428 S.W.2d 59 (1968).

—Liabilities.

Municipal corporations have authority to lay out, open, grade, and keep in good repair the streets of a municipality and a suit would not lie at the instance of an individual for damages resulting from injuries to private property from the lawful exercise of this authority where there has been no negligence, or want of care or skill in its exercise. Simmons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 276 (1870) (decisions under prior law).

Municipal corporation is not liable for damages sustained by a party injured through defects in streets of the municipality. City of Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139, 4 S.W. 450 (1887); City of Ft. Smith v. York, 52 Ark. 84, 12 S.W. 157 (1889); Birchfield v. Diehl, 126 Ark. 115, 189 S.W. 845 (1916).

Value.

When lots are assessed for street improvement, the assessment shall be ad valorem, and not according to frontage, and upon both vacant and occupied lots similarly situated. Town of Monticello v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251, 2 S.W. 852 (1886).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968).

14-54-602. Drainage of property.

Municipal corporations shall have power to cause any lot of land within their limits to be raised up or drained on which or on part of which water shall at any time become stagnant, and to cause all putrid substance, whether animal or vegetable, to be removed from any lot or lots.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 20, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7535; Pope's Dig., § 9610; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2315.

14-54-603. Assessment of property.

  1. Each municipal corporation may prescribe, either by general or special bylaws or ordinance, the mode in which the charge on the respective owners of lots or lands and on the lots or lands shall be assessed and determined for the purpose authorized by the provisions of this subchapter.
  2. A charge, when assessed, shall be payable by the owners at the time of the assessment, personally, and shall also be a lien on the respective lots or parcels of land in the possession of any owner from the time of assessment.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 19, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7569; Pope's Dig., § 9645; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2314.

Cross References. Correction of assessments by county court, § 26-73-205.

14-54-604. Collection of liens.

  1. The amount of the lien provided for in §§ 14-54-601 — 14-54-603 may be determined by action against the owner of any lot.
  2. The amount ascertained, with cost of suit and five percent (5%) penalty for collection, shall be certified by the mayor to the clerk of the county, and placed by him on the taxbook as delinquent taxes, and collected accordingly.
  3. The amount, when so collected, shall be paid to the city by the county collector.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 21, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7536; Pope's Dig., § 9611; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2316.

Cross References. Collection of delinquent assessment for opening or improving street or alley, § 14-301-104.

Subchapter 7 — Public Utilities

Cross References. Municipal boards and commissions, § 14-201-301 et seq.

Public utilities generally, § 14-199-101.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 186, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1903, No. 88, § 2: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 20, 1903.

Acts 1909, No. 230, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1915, No. 163, § 2: approved Mar. 19, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1923, No. 101, § 2: approved Feb. 10, 1923. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety it should take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1933, No. 101, § 3: effective 90 days after passage.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 560 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 292.

63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 1050 et seq.

14-54-701. Authority generally.

    1. Municipal corporations shall have power to provide for, or construct, or acquire works for lighting the streets, alleys, parks, and other public places by gas, electricity, or otherwise; to furnish power to consumers; or to purchase power, gas, or electricity for these purposes from any individual, company, or corporation manufacturing it.
    2. In connection therewith, they may furnish lights and power to private consumers upon just compensation therefor and authorize construction of gas or electric works and street railroads.
    1. Improvement districts created within municipal corporations, or that embrace or include territory therein, which are organized for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and selling either gas or electricity shall have the same right granted to municipal corporations to purchase power, gas, or electricity from any individual, company, or corporation manufacturing or distributing it for use in any of their plants or for resale or distribution to their customers or patrons.
    2. The exercise of this right shall not be construed in any way to impair or affect the validity of any bond issue or any other indebtedness of an improvement district.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 14, p. 1; 1901, No. 186, § 1, p. 341; 1909, No. 230, § 1, p. 695; C. & M. Dig., § 7565; Acts 1923, No. 101, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9639; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2318.

Cross References. Municipal authority over utilities, § 14-200-101 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

Power to construct water and light systems for domestic purposes may be conferred by legislature on municipalities. Bank of Commerce v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).

Appeals.

Where, in an eminent domain proceeding to procure an easement across property, chancellor held that the municipality had authority to enter and take private property for the lawful purpose of furnishing light and power to consumers in connection with operation of municipal corporation, the chancellor's order was not appealable because it was not a final judgment in that it did not determine right of landowners to just compensation. Hyatt v. City of Bentonville, 275 Ark. 210, 628 S.W.2d 326 (1982).

Bonds.

That municipally owned electric light plant had been leased and generating machinery was not in use, current being supplied to the distributing system from outside sources, was held immaterial in determining whether municipality was entitled to issue bonds for construction of ornamental standards and electric lighting equipment to provide modern “white way” illumination for designated streets. Todd v. McCloy, 196 Ark. 832, 120 S.W.2d 160 (1938).

Contracts.

Municipal council has authority to pass an ordinance providing for lighting the streets, parks and other public places in the city, and when the ordinance is properly passed and accepted by the contractor, it becomes a contract and is governed by the same rules and principles that control other contracts. City of Mena v. Tomlinson Bros., 118 Ark. 166, 175 S.W. 1187 (1915).

Liability.

In the grant of a franchise to a street railway company, municipal corporation has power to reserve the right to pass ordinances for the protecting of the person and property of individuals and creating a liability against the company in their favor for a violation of the ordinance, but when no such reservation was made in the grant of the franchise, the violation of an ordinance subsequently passed could not become the basis of a liability for personal injuries. Bain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 116 Ark. 125, 172 S.W. 843 (1915).

Rates.

Legislature intended to include in this section authority to agree upon rates to be charged during life of a lighting franchise. Town of Pocahontas v. Central Power & Light Co., 152 Ark. 276, 244 S.W. 712, dismissed, 260 U.S. 755, 43 S. Ct. 94, 67 L. Ed. 498 (1922).

Cited: City of N. Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978); Cosgrove v. City of W. Memphis, 327 Ark. 324, 938 S.W.2d 827 (1997).

14-54-702. Construction or acquisition of waterworks.

  1. Municipal corporations shall have power to:
    1. Provide a supply of water by constructing or acquiring, by purchase or otherwise, wells, pumps, cisterns, reservoirs, or other waterworks and to regulate them;
    2. Prevent unnecessary waste of water; and
    3. Prevent pollution of water or injury to waterworks.
  2. For the purpose of establishing and supplying waterworks, any municipal corporation may go beyond its territorial limits. Its jurisdiction to prevent or punish any pollution or injury to the stream or source of water, or to the waterworks, shall extend five (5) miles beyond the corporate limits.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 14, p. 1; 1903, No. 88, § 1, p. 152; C. & M. Dig., § 7564; Pope's Dig., § 9638; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2317.

Cross References. Waterworks and water supply, § 14-234-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section conferring authority on municipalities to establish waterworks is a valid exercise of legislative power. Bank of Commerce v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).

In General.

Municipal corporations are authorized to construct or acquire waterworks. Hope v. Dodson, 166 Ark. 236, 266 S.W. 68 (1924).

Municipal corporation is authorized to purchase a water supply for distribution to its inhabitants from another municipality or any other source. McGehee v. Williams, 191 Ark. 643, 87 S.W.2d 46 (1935).

Financing.

Municipal corporations may borrow money to pay expense of moving the pumping station of their water plant. Forrest City v. Bank of Forrest City, 116 Ark. 377, 172 S.W. 1148 (1915).

Rates.

Ordinance providing that if the water company should become dissatisfied with its flat rate it could, after installing a meter at its expense, require consumer to pay at meter rates is valid. Wilson Water & Elec. Co. v. City of Arkadelphia, 95 Ark. 605, 129 S.W. 1091 (1910).

Repairs.

Repairs are not restricted to reconstruction in identical form in which waterworks were originally constructed. Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. City of Paragould, 146 Ark. 1, 225 S.W. 435 (1920).

Cited: Cosgrove v. City of W. Memphis, 327 Ark. 324, 938 S.W.2d 827 (1997); Davis v. City of Blytheville, 2015 Ark. 482, 478 S.W.3d 214 (2015).

14-54-703. Municipal ice plants.

  1. Cities of the first and second class shall have the authority, in addition to the powers now granted by law, to construct, maintain, and operate municipal ice plants.
    1. Funds may be used for the construction, maintenance, and operation of ice plants derived from the operation of any other public utility owned or operated by the city.
    2. This subsection shall not apply to public utilities constructed, owned, or operated by an improvement district.

History. Acts 1933, No. 101, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 9974, 9975; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2320, 19-2321.

14-54-704. Contracts for utility services.

  1. For the purpose of providing water, gas, electric lights, heat, power, cold storage, street railroads, emergency medical services, and other public utility necessities for itself and for the inhabitants of any municipality, the mayor and city council, or the other governing bodies of municipalities having a commission, administrator, or city manager form of government, may contract on its own behalf, and on behalf of the inhabitants of the municipality, with any person or company to construct and operate the utility and may grant to the person or company, whether municipally owned and operated or otherwise, for a time which may be agreed on, for the privilege, exclusive or otherwise, of using the streets, alleys, and public grounds of the municipality for such purposes, on such rates, charges, and terms as may be agreed upon.
  2. The mayor and council or other governing body may authorize the person or company to assign the contract or privileges and to transfer the utility to any other person, or company having authority to conduct any such business in the municipality, with full authority to assignee or transferee to enjoy and use them, in like manner and to the same extent, as the assignor could have done.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 14, p. 1; 1915, No. 163, § 1, p. 692; C. & M. Dig., § 7492; Acts 1929, No. 122, § 1; 1929, No. 291, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 9535, 9537; Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 23, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2319.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 1001, § 8, provided that nothing in the act repealed, by implication or otherwise, Acts 1981 (Ex. Sess.), No. 23, part of which is codified in this section.

The former last part of subsection (b) of this section provided that all assignments and transfers that had been made were ratified and approved.

Cross References. Rate-making authority of Arkansas Public Service Commission, § 23-4-201.

Case Notes

Authority.

Municipal corporation is empowered to contract with any person or corporation to construct and operate waterworks. Lackey v. Fayetteville Water Co., 80 Ark. 108, 96 S.W. 622 (1906).

Franchise granted to a corporation to furnish gas for heat, light, and power becomes, when accepted, a binding contract to be governed by the same rules and principles that control other contracts. Natural Gas & Fuel Corp. v. Norphlet Gas & Water Co., 173 Ark. 174, 294 S.W. 52 (1927).

Privilege, Exclusive or Otherwise.

Municipal council may grant an exclusive privilege or not, as in their judgment seems best. City of El Dorado v. Coats, 175 Ark. 289, 299 S.W. 355 (1927).

Electric power company that occupied some territory of a town prior to its incorporation did not prevent the town from granting to another company an exclusive privilege to use the streets of the town for furnishing electricity. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. West Memphis Power & Water Co., 187 Ark. 41, 58 S.W.2d 206 (1933).

Rates.

Injunction would not be granted to protect contract rates when contract for change in rates was disapproved and rendered inoperative by referendum. Texarkana v. Southern Cities Distributing Co., 64 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1933) (decision prior to § 23-4-201).

Cited: City of Ft. Smith v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 278 Ark. 521, 648 S.W.2d 40 (1983); L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1985).

Subchapter 8 — Public Health

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 70, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 102, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 202, § 2: effective on passage.

Research References

ALR.

Regulation of private landowner's disposal of solid waste on own property. 37 A.L.R.4th 635.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 439.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., §§ 133, 265, 270.

14-54-801. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning nurses' training schools, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1150, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1901, No. 70, § 1, p. 118; C. & M. Dig., § 7752; Pope's Dig., § 10051; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2334.

14-54-802. Regulation of burials generally.

  1. Municipal corporations shall have the power to:
    1. Regulate the burial of the dead;
    2. Provide, outside the corporate limits of the corporation, places for the interment of the dead; and
    3. Prevent any such interment within any such limits, except in public burying grounds established before the adoption of this section.
  2. Municipal corporations may not only impose proper fines and penalties but shall also have power to cause any body interred contrary to this prohibition to be taken up and buried outside the limits of the municipality.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 15, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7534; Pope's Dig., § 9609; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2323.

Cross References. Eminent domain for cemetery purposes, § 18-15-1401 et seq.

Case Notes

Corporate Limits.

Under this section, a municipal corporation is authorized to acquire land within the municipal limits for a public cemetery. City of Ft. Smith v. Wilson, 100 Ark. 587, 140 S.W. 733 (1911).

Conway, Ark., Ordinance 0-94-54 may be read harmoniously with § 20-17-903; municipalities that had passed a relevant zoning ordinance in accordance with § 14-56-416 could regulate the construction and expansion of cemeteries pursuant to the ordinance, and municipalities that had not done so had only the benefit of §§ 20-17-903, 14-54-803, and this section, such that the city's denial of the landowner's request for a conditional-use-permit precluded the establishment of a cemetery on his property. Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

14-54-803. Power to require burial outside municipal limits.

  1. Cities of the first and second class and incorporated towns shall have the power to prohibit the burial of the dead within their limits.
    1. Where old and abandoned burial grounds which are no longer kept up or used as such are situated within the limits of any such city or incorporated town, it may, by suitable ordinance, require persons having dead buried therein to cause them, within some reasonable time, to be removed and buried beyond the limits of the city or incorporated town.
    2. In the event the bodies are not removed within the time specified in the ordinance of the city or incorporated town, after the ordinance has been published in the mode and manner prescribed by law, then the city or incorporated town may itself have the remains of all such persons as can be found removed and buried, as provided in this section. It may then and not before, by proper ordinance, vacate the cemetery or burial ground and declare that it is not any longer a cemetery exclusively used as such. Thereafter, the property shall become subject to taxation like other property.

History. Acts 1901, No. 102, § 1, p. 168; C. & M. Dig., § 7602; Acts 1929, No. 202, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9697; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2324.

Case Notes

Corporate Limits.

Conway, Ark., Ordinance 0-94-54 may be read harmoniously with § 20-17-903; municipalities that had passed a relevant zoning ordinance in accordance with § 14-56-416 could regulate the construction and expansion of cemeteries pursuant to the ordinance, and municipalities that had not done so had only the benefit of §§ 20-17-903, 14-54-802, and this section, such that the city's denial of the landowner's request for a conditional-use-permit precluded the establishment of a cemetery on his property. Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

14-54-804. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning municipal trash dumps, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1969, No. 171, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2346, 19-2347.

Subchapter 9 — Regulation of Unsanitary Conditions

Effective Dates. Acts 1979, No. 339, § 3: Mar. 9, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Municipalities of this State have the duty and responsibility to protect the public health and welfare by cutting unsightly weed lots when the property owner neglects to do so. It has also been found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that said Municipalities are experiencing great difficulty in collecting the costs for weedcutting, and that this Act will provide alternative means of collection of said costs to remedy this situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety, and welfare, shall be in full force and effect after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 80, § 2: Feb. 8, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that an emergency exists with reference to the ability of municipalities in this State to cure problems of unsightly and unsanitary conditions on real property and problems relating to the removal of dilapidated and unsafe structures by reason of the inability of said municipalities to effectively recover the expenses to the public in performing such public health functions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2011, No. 903, § 3: Mar. 31, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that cities in Arkansas are facing a significant increase in abandoned homes; that these homes can be a strain on the cities and create unsafe conditions; and that this act is immediately necessary because federal moneys are available to assist cities to combat this problem. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

ALR.

Regulation of private landowner's disposal of solid waste on own property. 37 A.L.R.4th 635.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 455 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 265, 279-281.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Property, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 659.

14-54-901. Municipal authority.

Incorporated towns and cities of the first and second class are empowered to order the owner of lots and other real property within their towns or cities to cut weeds; to remove garbage, rubbish, and other unsightly and unsanitary articles and things upon the property; and to eliminate, fill up, or remove stagnant pools of water or any other unsanitary thing, place, or condition which might become a breeding place for mosquitoes, flies, and germs harmful to the health of the community, after the town or city has provided therefor by an ordinance to that effect.

History. Acts 1943, No. 100, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2325.

Case Notes

Ordinances Appropriate.

City ordinances did not exceed the authority granted under this section where they specifically addressed the storage of household appliances and furniture, building rubbish, dead trees, and the height of weeds and grass, and the testimony of the city employees demonstrated that the purpose behind the ordinances was to prevent conditions that might become a breeding place for mosquitoes, snakes, vermin, and other things harmful to the health of the community. Steffy v. City of Fort Smith, 2018 Ark. App. 170, 545 S.W.3d 804 (2018).

Cited: Tsann Kuen Enters. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003).

14-54-902. Notice to unknown or nonresident owners.

    1. In case the owner of any lot or other real property is unknown or his or her whereabouts is not known or he or she is a nonresident of this state, then a copy of the written notice under § 14-54-903 shall be posted upon the premises.
    2. Before any action to enforce the lien, the municipal recorder or the city clerk shall make an affidavit setting out the facts as to unknown address or whereabouts of nonresidents.
    1. Thereupon, service of the publication as provided for by law against nonresident defendants may be had.
    2. An attorney ad litem shall be appointed to notify the defendant by certified letter addressed to his or her last known place of residence if it can be found.
  1. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, notices required by this subchapter shall be published, mailed, or delivered by the municipal recorder or the city clerk or other person as designated by the governing body of the municipality.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after a notice has been issued for a specific violation of an order under § 14-54-901 directing an owner to eliminate a condition on the owner's property, an additional notice for a subsequent violation of that specific violation within the same calendar year shall not be required before the issuance of a citation.

History. Acts 1943, No. 100, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2327; Acts 1989, No. 239, § 2; 2009, No. 503, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment subdivided (a) and (b); substituted “certified” for “registered” in (b)(2); added (d); and made minor stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Cited: Tsann Kuen Enters. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003).

14-54-903. Refusal of owner to comply — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
      1. “Clean-up lien” means a lien securing the cost of work undertaken by a town or city to remove, abate, or eliminate a condition in violation of local codes or ordinances.
      2. A clean-up lien may have priority against other lienholders as provided in this section;
    1. “Court lien” means a lien securing the fines or penalties imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction against the owner of an unsafe and vacant structure or weed lot for failure to comply with applicable building codes that have been secured by a court lien by action of the local governing body;
    2. “Priority clean-up lien” means a clean-up lien for work undertaken by a city or town on an unsafe and vacant structure or weed lot that is given priority status over other lienholders following notice and hearing;
    3. “Unsafe and vacant structure” or an “abandoned home or residential property” means:
      1. A structure located on previously platted and subdivided property that is not fit for human habitation and has been declared unsafe and vacant by the city or town in which it is located in violation of an applicable ordinance; or
      2. A home or residential property that is:
        1. Unoccupied;
        2. In violation of a city safety standard; and
        3. Located in an area eligible for federal funds under § 14-54-905; and
    4. “Weed lot” means a previously platted and subdivided lot that is vacant or upon which an unsafe and vacant structure is located and that contains debris, rubbish, or grass which is higher than that permitted by local ordinance.
  2. If the owner or lienholder of any lot or other real property within an incorporated town or city neglects or refuses to remove, abate, or eliminate any condition under an ordinance passed by the city or town as provided in § 14-54-901, after having been given seven (7) days' notice in writing to do so, then the town or city may do whatever is necessary to correct the condition and to charge the cost thereof to the owner of the lots or other real property.
    1. The town or city is given a lien against the property for the costs, including all administrative and collection costs.
    2. The town or city shall file the lien with the circuit clerk no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the town or city completes the clean-up work on the property.
    3. The town or city may perfect its clean-up lien as a lien against the property if the property:
      1. Contains an unsafe and vacant structure; or
      2. Has been cited as a weed lot.
    4. The clean-up lien amount shall equal costs, including administrative costs, that the city or town incurs to help bring the property into compliance with local ordinances because the owner or lienholder failed to remove or repair an unsafe and vacant structure or failed to correct the conditions that caused the property to become a weed lot within the time required by the notice.
      1. If a court of competent jurisdiction levies fines or penalties against the owner of an unsafe and vacant structure or weed lot for failure to comply with applicable building codes, then the local governing body, by majority vote, from time to time and subject to notice and hearing provided by this section, may secure any outstanding court fines or penalties resulting from the owner's failure to clean up an unsafe and vacant structure or weed lot with a court lien against the property for the full value of all the outstanding fines and penalties.
      2. A court lien does not have first priority status over prior recorded liens and may be imposed in addition to clean-up liens.
      1. Notices shall be sent by regular mail and by certified mail, return receipt requested.
      2. Notice to an owner is sufficient if sent to the owner's address of record on file with the applicable county treasurer, county collector, or county assessor.
      1. If the city or town wishes to secure a priority clean-up lien, it shall provide seven (7) business days' notice to lienholders before undertaking any work at the property.
      2. Notice is sufficient if the notice is sent to the lienholder's address shown in the relevant land records.
      3. Cities and towns are not required to give notices to holders of unrecorded liens or to unrecorded assignees of lienholders.
      4. Any lienholder receiving notice under this section shall send, within seven (7) business days from receipt of the notice, a written response to the city or town indicating whether the owner of the property is in default under the terms of the note or mortgage.
  3. Any notice required under this section may be issued by a:
    1. Police officer employed by the city or town;
    2. City or town attorney; or
    3. Code enforcement officer employed by the city or town.
      1. After the work has been completed, the city or town shall provide second notice to the owner of the total amount of the clean-up lien, including administrative and filing costs.
      2. If the city or town wishes to secure a priority clean-up lien after the work has been completed, it shall provide second notice to the lienholders of record of the total amount of the clean-up lien.
    1. Cities and towns are not required to give notice of court liens to prior lienholders.
    2. Notice of the amount of a clean-up lien or a court lien may be combined with the notice of the hearing before the governing body to create and impose the clean-up lien or court lien.
  4. The amount of any clean-up lien or court lien provided in this section may be determined at a public hearing before the governing body of the city or town held after thirty (30) days' written notice by mail, return receipt requested, to the owner of the property if the name and address of the owner are known and to the lienholders of record.
  5. If the name of the owner cannot be determined, then the amount of the clean-up lien or court lien shall be determined at a public hearing before the governing body of the city or town only after publication of notice of the hearing in a newspaper having a bona fide circulation in the county where the property is located for one (1) insertion per week for four (4) consecutive weeks.
    1. The determination of the governing body confirming the amount of any clean-up lien or court lien and creating and imposing any clean-up lien or court lien under this section is subject to appeal by the property owner or by any lienholder of record in the circuit court, filed within forty-five (45) days after the determination is made.
    2. If the owner or lienholder fails to appeal in this time, the lien amount is fully perfected and not subject to further contest or appeal.
  6. The city or town shall file its lien with the circuit clerk no later than sixty (60) days after the governing body of the city or town confirms the lien amount, or if the lien is appealed, within sixty (60) days after the city or town wins on appeal.
    1. If the city or town wishes to secure a first-priority status for any priority clean-up lien created and imposed under this section, it shall file an action with the circuit court within which the property is located seeking a declaration that the clean-up lien is entitled to priority over previously recorded liens and naming the holders of the recorded liens as defendants.
    2. Priority status shall be awarded to the priority clean-up lien with respect to any previously recorded lien if the court determines that such lienholder has failed to exercise its rights to foreclose its lien when the obligation it secures becomes in default or has failed to pay the costs of work undertaken by a city or town that composes the clean-up lien. However, the amount as to which the clean-up lien shall have priority shall be the amount the court finds reasonable and is limited to:
      1. No more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for grass or weed cutting;
      2. No more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) to board and secure the property;
      3. No more than seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) to demolish any structures on the property; or
      4. No more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for environmental remediation.

History. Acts 1943, No. 100, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2326; Acts 1989, No. 239, § 1; 2005, No. 887, § 1; 2007, No. 854, § 1; 2009, No. 143, § 1; 2011, No. 903, § 1; 2017, No. 495, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (b) as present (b)(1); and added (b)(2) and (c).

The 2009 amendment inserted “or ordinances” in (a)(1)(A); inserted “priority” preceding “clean-up” in (c)(7)(A), (j)(1), and (j)(2); deleted “as may be provided for” following “condition” in (b), in (e), inserted (e)(1)(B), redesignated the remainder of (e)(1) accordingly, and deleted “and lienholders of record” following “notice to the owner” in (e)(1)(A); and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 2011 amendment added the (a)(4)(A) designation and (a)(4)(B); and inserted “or an abandoned home or residential property” in the introductory language of (a)(4).

The 2017 amendment, in (c)(6)(B), inserted “on file”, inserted “county” preceding “collector”, and substituted “county collector, or county assessor” for “or collector”.

14-54-904. Enforcement of lien for clearance by municipality.

  1. The liens provided for in § 14-54-903 may be enforced and collected at any time within ten (10) years after a lien has been filed in either one (1) of the following manners:
    1. By an action for foreclosure in the circuit court by the city or town, or if the city or town has established a land bank, by a land bank that has been assigned the lien; or
      1. The amount so determined at the hearing, plus ten percent (10%) penalty for collection, shall be certified by the governing body of the municipality to the tax collector of the county where the municipality is located and placed by him or her on the tax books as delinquent taxes and collected accordingly.
      2. The amount, less three percent (3%) thereof, when so collected shall be paid to the municipality by the county tax collector.
      1. In any situation in which a city of the first class or city of the second class issues an order for the removal, repair to return the structure to compliance with minimum building code standards, or razing of a building or house under the provisions of § 14-56-203 and such order is not complied with by the owner of the building or house and the city then removes, repairs, or razes the building or house, a lien is granted and given against the real property for the cost of the removal, repair, or razing.
      2. If the city determines to repair the building or house to meet the minimum building code standards, the city shall comply with all necessary requirements under § 14-58-303 for competitive bidding for purchases of supplies and materials or for contracts for work or labor needed to complete the repairs on the building or house.
    1. The lien granted by this subsection shall also be enforced pursuant to the lien enforcement procedures set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
  2. In all suits brought to enforce the liens described in this section, the reimbursement of costs, including title search fees and reasonable attorney's fees, shall be awarded to the municipality.

History. Acts 1943, No. 100, § 4; 1979, No. 339, § 1; 1983, No. 80, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2328; Acts 2001, No. 1538, § 1; 2005, No. 887, § 2; 2007, No. 854, § 2.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment redesignated the five sentences in (a)(2) as (a)(2)(A)(i)( a ) through (a)(2)(B)(ii); made gender neutral changes in present (a)(2)(B)(i); in present (b)(1)(A), substituted “first class or city of the second class” for “first or second class,” inserted “repair to… code standards” following “order for the removal,” inserted “repairs” following “removes,” and inserted “repair” following “cost of the removal”; added (b)(1)(B); and added (c).

The 2005 amendment substituted “three (3) years” for “eighteen (18) months” in (a)(1); and, in (a)(2)(A)(i)(a), substituted “by mail, return receipt requested” for “by certified mail” and “address” for “whereabouts.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 5 does not apply to the collection by a tax collector of a grass-cutting lien for a city pursuant to this section. Tucker v. Holt, 343 Ark. 216, 33 S.W.3d 110 (2000).

Limitations Period.

Eighteen month limitation period, which appears solely in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, is exclusive to that subsection. It does not apply to the certification option in subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Taylor v. City of Fort Smith, 2014 Ark. App. 450, 441 S.W.3d 36 (2014).

City's clean-up lien claim was not time-barred where the 18-month limitation period applied solely to subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the city had used the certification option set forth in subdivision (a)(2) in this section, and it was inappropriate to apply the more general statutes of limitations when the General Assembly chose not to include a limitation period in subdivision (a)(2). Taylor v. City of Fort Smith, 2014 Ark. App. 450, 441 S.W.3d 36 (2014).

Tax Collector.

This section provides the tax collector with authority to collect a grass-cutting lien for a city. Tucker v. Holt, 343 Ark. 216, 33 S.W.3d 110 (2000).

A tax collector had authority to collect a grass-cutting lien for a city where the appropriate ordinance was passed by the city council and the city's governing body properly certified the amount of the lien to the county tax collector for collection. Tucker v. Holt, 343 Ark. 216, 33 S.W.3d 110 (2000).

14-54-905. Federal programs.

An owner of an abandoned home or residential property that is located in a designated neighborhood stabilization or revitalization area may voluntarily participate in a United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's housing program if federal funds are available.

History. Acts 2011, No. 903, § 2.

Subchapter 10 — Plumbers and Plumbing Regulations

14-54-1001 — 14-54-1017. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 214, § 1. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-54-1001. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 11; Pope's Dig., § 9749; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3702, 19-3713.

14-54-1002. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 12; Pope's Dig., § 9750; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3714.

14-54-1003. Acts 1925, No. 166, §§ 2 [3], 4; Pope's Dig., §§ 9741, 9742; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 3; 1945, No. 27, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3704, 19-3705.

14-54-1004. Acts 1925, No. 166, §§ 1, 5; Pope's Dig., §§ 9739, 9743; Acts 1941, No. 321, §§ 1, 2, 4; 1945, No. 27, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3701, 19-3702, 19-3706.

14-54-1005. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9740; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3703.

14-54-1006. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9743; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 4; 1945, No. 27, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3706.

14-54-1007. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9743; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 4; 1945, No. 27, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3706.

14-54-1008. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 5; 1941, No. 321, § 4; 1945, No. 27, §§ 2, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3706, 19-3707.

14-54-1009. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9743; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 4; 1945, No. 27, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3706.

14-54-1010. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9743; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 4; 1945, No. 27, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3706.

14-54-1011. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 9743; Acts 1941, No. 321, § 4; 1945, No. 27, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3706.

14-54-1012. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 9744; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3708.

14-54-1013. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 9745; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3709.

14-54-1014. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 9746; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3710.

14-54-1015. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 9747; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3711.

14-54-1016. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 9747; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3711.

14-54-1017. Acts 1925, No. 166, § 10; Pope's Dig., § 9748; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3712.

Subchapter 11 — Regulation of Animals

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 122, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 172, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1917, No. 376, § 2: approved Mar. 24, 1917. Emergency declared.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and application of ordinances relating to unrestrained dogs, cats, or other domesticated animals. 1 A.L.R.4th 994.

Construction of provisions of statute or ordinance governing occasion, time, or manner of summary destruction of domestic animals by public authorities. 42 A.L.R.4th 839.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 212 et seq.

14-54-1101. Livestock running at large.

  1. Cities of the first and second class and incorporated towns are empowered to prevent the running at large within their corporate limits of cattle, horses, mules, asses, swine, sheep, goats, and other animals of the kind. These cities and towns are authorized and empowered to restrain and impound any such animals so found running at large within their corporate limits, in violation of any ordinance passed by the cities and towns in conformity with this section.
      1. Whenever any person or officer of any city or incorporated town in this state under the law of this state, or under an ordinance of any city or incorporated town, shall take charge of any horse, cow, ass, sheep, goat, or hog for the purpose of impounding it, the persons so impounding the stock found to be running at large in the city or town shall at once notify the owner of the animal, if known to the person or officer, that the animal has been taken possession of.
      2. If the owner of the animal shall, within twenty-four (24) hours after being notified, appear and claim his stock, it shall be delivered to the owner.
      1. If the owner of the stock is unknown to the person or officer taking up or impounding, then that person or officer shall post written notices in at least three (3) public places in the incorporated towns, and by notice in some newspaper in cities of the first and second class. This notice shall give a description of the animal, set out therein the marks, brands, and flesh marks of the animals so impounded, and call upon the owner of the animal to prove his ownership or interest therein to such person or officer having it in his possession or custody, within ten (10) days after the publication of the notice.
      2. Upon proof being made to the satisfaction of the person or officer and the payment of actual expenses incurred in the taking care of the animal, the person or officer having it in his possession shall at once deliver the animal to the owner.
  2. If the pound master, his agent or employee, or any employee of any city shall drive or entice any of the stock enumerated in this section from outside the city into the city, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction, he shall be fined in any sum not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00).

History. Acts 1895, No. 137, § 1, p. 201; 1899, No. 122, §§ 1, 2, p. 198; 1901, No. 172, § 1, p. 325; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7551-7553; Acts 1921, No. 299, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 9625-9627; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2503 — 19-2505.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Absolute Liability in Arkansas, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 83.

Case Notes

Construction.

Acts 1901, No. 172, relating to the impounding of stock in cities and towns, does not cover the entire subject matter of Acts 1895, No. 137, nor impliedly repeal it. Benton v. Willis, 76 Ark. 443, 88 S.W. 1000 (1905).

Acts 1899, No. 122, and Acts 1901, No. 172, empowering municipalities to prevent the running at large within their limits of the animals therein named impliedly repealed Acts 1895, No. 137, § 2, providing that it shall be unlawful to impound such animals when known to be the property of some persons residing outside the municipal limits. De Queen v. Fenton, 100 Ark. 504, 140 S.W. 716 (1911).

Authority.

Municipal corporations are empowered to provide for the impounding of certain animals found running at large within their corporate limits. McKenzie v. Newlon, 89 Ark. 564, 117 S.W. 553 (1909).

Municipal ordinances providing for the enforcement of the statutory provisions of this section are valid police regulations. De Queen v. Fenton, 98 Ark. 521, 136 S.W. 945 (1911).

Fowls.

Ordinance that it shall be unlawful for any fowls to run at large within the corporate limits of a municipality is a valid exercise of the right given to municipalities to cause any nuisance to be abated. Merrill v. City of Van Buren, 125 Ark. 248, 188 S.W. 537 (1916).

Liability of Municipalities.

Municipal corporations are not liable for the negligent or illegal acts of their officers in the wrongful impounding of animals running at large. Gregg v. Hatcher, 94 Ark. 54, 125 S.W. 1007 (1910).

Recovery by Owners.

The owner must pay lawful charges before the recovery of an animal will be permitted. White v. Town of Clarksville, 75 Ark. 340, 87 S.W. 630 (1905).

The owner may recover an animal wrongfully impounded. Gregg v. Hatcher, 94 Ark. 54, 125 S.W. 1007 (1910).

Where animals, the owner of which lived outside the city limits, were impounded while running at large and were sold in manner provided by ordinance when their owner refused to pay charges, the owner was not entitled to recover the animals. Hall v. Benton, 160 Ark. 254, 254 S.W. 530 (1923).

Cited: Weeks v. City of Paragould, 230 Ark. 908, 328 S.W.2d 81 (1959).

14-54-1102. Dogs running at large.

  1. Municipal corporations shall have the power to prevent the running at large of dogs, and injuries and annoyances therefrom, and to authorize the destruction of them, when at large contrary to any prohibition to that effect.
      1. Municipalities may impound and destroy any dog running at large within the municipality.
        1. Prior to destroying the dog, the municipality shall give the dog's owner at least five (5) days' notice of the date of the proposed destruction of the dog.
        2. The notice shall be by certified letter, return receipt requested. Dog owners may claim their dogs at the municipal pound by reimbursing the municipality for the cost of the notice plus other costs and requirements which may be established by ordinance of the municipal governing body prior to the date set for destruction of the dogs.
    1. This subsection shall apply only in instances where the dog carries its owner's address.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 16, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7554; Pope's Dig., § 9628; Acts 1979, No. 534, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2502, 19-2502.1.

Case Notes

Authority.

Ordinance making it unlawful for owner of a dog living within municipal limits to permit dog to run at large and providing for a fine for its violation is valid. Weeks v. City of Paragould, 230 Ark. 908, 328 S.W.2d 81 (1959).

Destruction.

Municipalities may provide for the killing of dogs upon which the tax has not been paid. Gibson v. Harrison, 69 Ark. 385, 63 S.W. 999 (1901).

14-54-1103. Taxation.

The city council of any municipal corporation shall have the power whenever, in their opinion, the interest of the corporation requires it, to levy and collect a tax on dogs and other domestic animals not included in the list of taxable property, for state and county purposes.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 69, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7581; Pope's Dig., § 9660; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2501.

Case Notes

Authority.

Ordinance imposing a yearly tax on dogs, subjecting their owners to a fine for nonpayment thereof and providing for the killing of dogs upon which the tax is unpaid, is a valid police regulation. Gibson v. Harrison, 69 Ark. 385, 63 S.W. 999 (1901).

14-54-1104. Auctions.

Municipal corporations shall have power to regulate or prohibit the sale of all horses or other domestic animals at auctions in the streets, alleys, or highways.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 17, p. 1; 1917, No. 376, § 1, p. 1810; C. & M. Dig., § 7532; Pope's Dig., § 9601; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2329.

Subchapter 12 — Milk Production and Sale

Research References

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 244.

14-54-1201. Authority to regulate.

Municipalities are authorized to regulate, in accordance with the terms of the 1939 edition of the United States Public Health Service milk ordinance, the production, transportation, processing, handling, sampling, examination, grading, labeling, and sale of all milk and milk products sold for ultimate consumption within municipalities.

History. Acts 1935, No. 121, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9972; Acts 1939, No. 131, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3401.

14-54-1202. Form of ordinance.

Authority for the regulation authorized in § 14-54-1201 may be had by the passage of an ordinance in the following form:

“An ordinance to regulate the production, transportation, processing, handling, sampling, examination, grading, labeling, regrading, and sale of milk and milk products; the inspection of dairy herds, dairies, and milk plants; the issuing and revocation of permits to milk producers and distributors; the placarding of restaurants and other establishments serving milk or milk products; and the fixing of penalties.

“The city of ordains:

“Section 1. The production, transportation, processing, handling, sampling, examination, grading, labeling, regrading, and sale of all milk and milk products sold for ultimate consumption within the city of , or its police jurisdiction, the inspection of dairy herds, dairies, and milk plants, the issuing and revocation of permits to milk producers and distributors, the placarding of restaurants and other establishments serving milk or milk products, and the fixing of penalties, shall be regulated in accordance with the terms of the 1939 edition of the United States Public Health Service Milk Ordinance, a certified copy of which shall be on file in the office of the city clerk: Provided, That the blank spaces following the words “city of” in said Public Health Service Milk Ordinance shall be understood to refer to the city of ; Provided further, That in section 8 of said Public Health Service Milk Ordinance the alternative wording shall apply: Provided further, That sections 16 and 17 of said Public Health Service Milk Ordinance shall be replaced, respectively, by sections 2 and 3 below.

“Section 2. Any person, firm, or corporation violating any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by

“Section 3. All ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are hereby repealed; and this ordinance shall take effect upon its adoption and publication.”

History. Acts 1935, No. 121, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9973; Acts 1939, No. 131, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3402.

Subchapter 13 — Public Recreation and Playgrounds

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1941, No. 291, is also codified as § 6-21-501 et seq. and § 14-16-201 et seq.

Cross References. Land dedicated for park purposes, cancellation of delinquent taxes, § 26-37-212.

Parks annexed to city, § 14-40-204.

Title to parks not acquired by adverse possession, § 22-1-201.

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 6: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the promotion of an adequate National Defense and an able-bodied citizenry, an emergency is declared to exist and the same shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 202.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 211.

64 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., §§ 1818-1823.

14-54-1301. Authority to operate.

  1. Any city or town, or any board thereof, may:
    1. Operate a program of public recreation and playgrounds;
    2. Acquire, equip, and maintain land, buildings, or other recreational facilities; and
    3. Expend funds for the operation of the program pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter.
  2. The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to §§ 17-22-201 — 17-22-204, 17-22-301 — 17-22-303, and 17-22-305.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3601.

Publisher's Notes. Sections §§ 17-19-20117-19-204, 17-19-301, 17-19-302, 17-19-303, and 17-19-305, referred to in this section, have been renumbered as §§ 17-22-20117-22-204, 17-22-301, 17-22-302, 17-22-303, and 17-22-305, respectively.

Case Notes

Swimming Pools.

Evidence was sufficient to establish that swimming pool operated by municipality was operated in governmental capacity, and not in a proprietary capacity for profit; hence city was not liable for drowning of child in the pool. Handley v. City of Hope, 137 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. Ark. 1956), appeal dismissed, Handley v. Hope, 239 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

Where municipal swimming pool was being operated in municipality's governmental capacity, plaintiff could not avoid governmental immunity in action against municipality based on drowning of child in pool by alleging an action in contract where the action was clearly in tort. Handley v. City of Hope, 137 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. Ark. 1956), appeal dismissed, Handley v. Hope, 239 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

Where evidence showed that municipality owned property on which swimming pool was constructed and leased the pool to a boys' club and club operated the pool and received all revenues therefrom, a minor who was injured while diving where depth of pool was allegedly unmarked could not sue the municipality in tort since the municipality, in owning pool, was acting in governmental capacity and was immune from tort liability to user of pool, there being no liability insurance involved. Cabbiness v. City of N. Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957).

Where complaint was based on tort liability and damages were requested for personal injuries, allegations therein that municipality constructed and leased a nuisance (swimming pool) to boys' club, which maintained the pool, were immaterial, since proper procedure for person aggrieved by nuisance is to bring abatement action. Cabbiness v. City of N. Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957).

Cited: Kendall v. Henderson, 238 Ark. 832, 384 S.W.2d 954, 384 S.W.2d 955 (1964).

14-54-1302. Operation of programs generally.

  1. Any city or town, or any board thereof, may operate a program of public recreation and playgrounds independently; they may cooperate in its conduct and in any manner in which they may mutually agree, including with counties or school districts; or they may delegate the cooperation of the program to a recreation board created by one (1) or more of them and appropriate money voted for this purpose to the board.
  2. In the case of school districts, the right to enter into such agreements with any other public corporation, board, or body or the right to delegate power to a board for operating a program of recreation shall be authorized only by a majority vote cast at an annual school election.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3602.

Cross References. Operation and management of parks and recreation programs, § 14-269-201 et seq., § 14-269-301 et seq.

14-54-1303. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, prohibiting the use of state aid for recreational purposes, was repealed by Acts 2007, No. 63, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1941, No. 291, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3602.

14-54-1304. Use of school funds.

In all cases where school funds are utilized for programs under this subchapter, the State Board of Education shall prepare or cause to be, prepared, published, and distributed adequate and appropriate manuals and other materials as it may deem necessary or suitable to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3604.

14-54-1305. Gifts and bequests.

Any corporation, board, or body designated as given charge of a recreation program shall have authority to accept gifts and bequests for the benefit of the recreational service.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3603.

14-54-1306. Property used for activities.

Any corporation, board, or body designated as given charge of a recreation program is authorized to conduct its activities on:

  1. Property under its custody and management;
  2. Other public property under the custody of any other public organization, body, or board, with the consent of the corporations, bodies, or boards; and
  3. Private property, with the consent of its owners.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3603.

14-54-1307. Use of school facilities.

  1. The facilities of any school district operating a recreation program pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter shall be used primarily for the purpose of conducting the regular school curriculum and related activities, and the use of school facilities for recreation purposes authorized by this subchapter shall be secondary.
  2. In all cases where school property is utilized for programs under this subchapter, the State Board of Education shall prepare or cause to be prepared, published, and distributed adequate and appropriate manuals and other materials as it may deem necessary or suitable to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, §§ 4, 5; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3604, 19-3605.

14-54-1308. Directors and instructors.

  1. Any corporation, board, or body designated as given charge of a recreation program shall have authority to employ directors and instructors of recreational work.
  2. In all cases where school funds or property are utilized for programs under this subchapter, the State Board of Education shall establish minimum qualifications of local recreational directors and instructors.

History. Acts 1941, No. 291, §§ 3, 4; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-3603, 19-3604.

Subchapter 14 — Miscellaneous Regulations

Preambles. Acts 1977, No. 400 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the use of barber poles as advertising signs has become an American tradition; and

“Whereas, the traditional candy-striped barber pole is neither an eye sore nor a traffic hazard; and

“Whereas, some municipalities are attempting to prohibit the use of barber poles by the barber shops in the State;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1917, No. 376, § 2: approved Mar. 24, 1917. Emergency declared.

Acts 1917, No. 397, § 2: approved Mar. 28, 1917. Emergency declared.

Acts 1957, No. 367, § 6: Mar. 27, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there has been considerable controversy in recent months concerning the operation of businesses on Sunday, that much confusion exists in regard to the present status of certain state laws and city ordinances, and this act will clarify and improve this undesirable situation. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the public peace, health, safety and welfare shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 211 et seq.

14-54-1401. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning regulation of amusement places, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1150, § 3. The section was derived from Acts 1917, No. 397, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7530; Pope's Dig., § 9599; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2330.

14-54-1402. Business on Sunday.

  1. The city council or board of managers of any city or incorporated town in this state shall have the authority, by ordinance, to regulate the operation of businesses within their cities or towns on Sunday.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not in any manner amend, repeal, or otherwise affect the provisions of § 5-60-119 permitting motion picture shows on Sundays.

History. Acts 1957, No. 367, §§ 1, 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2335, 19-2336.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Constitutional Law — Due Process — Arkansas' Sunday Closing Law is Declared Unconstitutionally Vague, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 305.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is sufficiently broad and definite to grant a municipality full and complete authority to enact an ordinance prohibiting the Sunday sale of all but certain items. Green Star Supermarket, Inc. v. Stacy, 242 Ark. 54, 411 S.W.2d 871 (1967).

Authority.

Where, prior to enactment of this section, ordinance had been enacted prohibiting certain business on Sunday under provisions of former statute, the fact that the statute was repealed and this section enacted did not invalidate the prior ordinance so that a new ordinance would be required under the provisions of this section. Hickinbotham v. Williams, 227 Ark. 1102, 303 S.W.2d 563.

14-54-1403. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning carriages for hire, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1150, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 1, § 17, p. 1; 1917, No. 376, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7532; Pope's Dig., § 9601; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2329.

14-54-1404. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning livery stables, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1150, § 5. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 1, § 17, p. 1; 1917, No. 376, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7532; Pope's Dig., § 9601; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2329.

14-54-1405. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning public exhibitions and shows, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 1150, § 6. The section was derived from Acts 1875, No. 1, § 17, p. 1; 1917, No. 376, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7532; Pope's Dig., § 9601; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2329.

14-54-1406. Traditional barber pole.

No municipality, by ordinance or otherwise, may prohibit the placement or the maintenance and use of the traditional barber pole on the premises of barbershops within this state, whether internally or externally lighted or not lighted, and whether rotating or stationary.

History. Acts 1977, No. 400, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2355.

14-54-1407. Transient vendors.

  1. All municipalities shall have power to define, license, regulate, or tax transient and itinerant vendors, or transient dealers in merchandise, or transient dealers in horses and mules.
  2. No one who conducts the same business in the same municipality for six (6) consecutive months shall be classed as a transient.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 17, p. 1; 1917, No. 376, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7532; Pope's Dig., § 9601; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2329.

14-54-1408. Vagrants, etc.

The city council shall have power to provide that all vagrants, common street beggars, common prostitutes, and persons disturbing the peace of the city shall, on conviction, be punished by fine or imprisonment not exceeding thirty (30) days.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 9, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7599; Pope's Dig., § 9685; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2333.

Case Notes

Prostitutes.

Ordinance making it a misdemeanor for any male person over 14 years of age to walk the streets at any time with a female having the reputation of a prostitute was held invalid. Coker v. City of Ft. Smith, 162 Ark. 567, 258 S.W. 388 (1924).

Municipal court was held to have jurisdiction to commit to the state farm for women a woman who pleaded guilty to charges of habitual prostitution. Adams v. Pace, 193 Ark. 1020, 104 S.W.2d 212 (1937).

14-54-1409. Rent control preemption.

  1. As used in this section, “local governmental unit” means a political subdivision of this state, including, but not limited to, a county, city, village, or township, if the political subdivision provides local government services for residents in a geographically limited area of this state as its primary purpose and has the power to act primarily on behalf of that area.
  2. A local governmental unit shall not enact, maintain, or enforce an ordinance or resolution that would have the effect of controlling the amount of rent charged for leasing private residential or commercial property.
  3. This section does not impair the right of any local governmental unit to manage and control residential property in which the local governmental unit has a property interest.

History. Acts 1993, No. 545, §§ 1-3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 545, §§ 1-3 are also codified as § 14-16-601.

14-54-1410. Operation of golf carts on city streets — Definition.

  1. It shall be within the municipal affairs and authority of any municipality in the State of Arkansas to authorize by municipal ordinance, any owner of a golf cart to operate the golf cart upon the city streets of the municipality; provided, however, operation shall not be authorized on city streets which are also designated as federal or state highways or as a county road.
  2. When authorized by the municipality to operate on the city streets and limited to the circumstances and provisions of this section, there shall be no motor vehicle registration or license necessary to operate the golf cart on the public street.
  3. The term “municipality” as used in this section means any city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town.

History. Acts 1993, No. 976, § 1; 2013, No. 170, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment deleted former (b) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

Cross References. Registration and licensing of motor vehicles generally, § 27-14-101 et seq.

14-54-1411. Firearms and ammunition — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “local unit of government” means a city, town, or county.
      1. A local unit of government shall not enact any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner, the ownership, transfer, transportation, carrying, or possession of firearms, ammunition for firearms, or components of firearms, except as otherwise provided in state or federal law.
      2. This shall not prevent the enactment of an ordinance regulating or forbidding the unsafe discharge of a firearm.
      1. A local unit of government shall have no authority to bring suit and shall have no right to recover against any firearm or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public.
      2. The authority to bring any suit and the right to recover against any firearm or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief shall be reserved exclusively to the State of Arkansas.
      3. Provided, this shall not prevent a local unit of government from bringing suit against a firearm or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by the local unit of government.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, the governing body of a local unit of government, following the proclamation by the Governor of a state of emergency, may enact an emergency ordinance regulating the transfer, transportation, or carrying of firearms or components of firearms.
    2. Such emergency ordinance shall not be effective for a period of more than twenty (20) days and shall be enacted by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the governing body.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1100, §§ 1-3; 1999, No. 951, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1100, §§ 1-3, are also codified as § 14-16-504.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment added (b)(2); and made stylistic changes in (b)(1) and (c).

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Civil Liberties, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 73.

14-54-1412. Designated entertainment districts — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “designated entertainment district” means a contiguous area located in a part of a city, a municipality, or an incorporated town that:
    1. Is zoned for or customarily used for commercial purposes; and
    2. Contains any number and any combination of restaurants, taprooms, taverns, entertainment establishments, hospitality establishments, music venues, theaters, bars, art galleries, art studios, tourist destinations, distilleries, dance clubs, cinemas, or concert halls.
    1. A city, a municipality, or an incorporated town collecting a gross receipts tax on prepared food or hotel and motel accommodations under §§ 26-75-602 — 26-75-613 and located in a county authorized to sell alcoholic beverages may by ordinance create a designated entertainment district.
    2. A designated entertainment district may be permanent or temporary.
      1. A city, a municipality, or an incorporated town that creates a designated entertainment district under this section shall set by ordinance reasonable standards for the regulation of alcohol possession within the boundaries of the designated entertainment district.
      2. An ordinance enacted under this subsection does not diminish the requirements of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the Department of Finance and Administration concerning permits issued within the designated entertainment district.
    3. A city, a municipality, or an incorporated town that creates a designated entertainment district under this section shall notify the division within ten (10) days of the issuance or removal of a permanent or temporary designation as a designated entertainment district.

History. Acts 2019, No. 812, § 3.

Subchapter 15 — Violation of Municipal Health and Safety Codes

14-54-1501. Intent.

The intent of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas in this subchapter is to enact civil remedies that eliminate any conduct within a municipality which constitutes a nuisance.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 1.

14-54-1502. Common nuisance declared.

  1. Conduct within a municipality that unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of lands of another, including conduct on property which disturbs the peaceful, quiet, and undisturbed use and enjoyment of nearby property, constitutes a common nuisance.
  2. For purposes of this subchapter, a common nuisance shall not include conduct which is permitted by and in conformance with city ordinances.
  3. A common nuisance shall include any three (3) separate district court convictions of health and safety code violations with respect to any one (1) lot or parcel of property within a one-year period or one (1) such conviction if the offense constitutes an imminent threat to the health, safety, or welfare of any citizen. Such conduct is declared to be detrimental to the law-abiding citizens of the municipality and may be subject to an injunction, a court-ordered eviction, or a cause of action for damages as provided for in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 2.

14-54-1503. Action to abate — Permanent injunction — Verification of complaint.

  1. Whenever there is reason to believe such a common nuisance is kept or maintained or exists in any city, a circuit court may enjoin permanently the person conducting or maintaining the nuisance and the owner, lessee, or agent of the building or place in or upon which the nuisance exists from directly or indirectly maintaining or permitting the nuisance.
  2. For activities involving multiple convictions of municipal code violations, the city attorney may bring the action permitted in this subchapter. For other activities constituting a nuisance as defined in § 14-54-1502, any citizen of the city may bring the action in his or her own name.
  3. The complaint in the action shall be certified, unless the action is brought by the city attorney.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 3.

14-54-1504. Temporary injunction — Bond required — Precedence.

  1. If the existence of the nuisance is shown in the action to the satisfaction of the court, the court shall allow a temporary writ of injunction to abate and prevent the continuance or recurrence of the nuisance.
  2. On granting the temporary writ, the court shall require a bond on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the enjoined defendant such damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, as the defendant sustains by reason of the injunction should the court finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. No bond shall be required where the proceeding is instituted by the city attorney.
  3. The action shall be filed in the circuit court and have precedence over all other actions except election contests, hearings on injunctions, and hearings under §§ 5-74-109 and 16-105-403.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 4.

14-54-1505. Dismissal for want of prosecution.

  1. If the complaint is filed by a citizen, it shall not be dismissed by the plaintiff for want of prosecution except upon a sworn statement made by the plaintiff setting forth the reasons why the action shall be dismissed and by dismissal ordered by the court.
  2. If the action is brought by a citizen and the court finds there was no reasonable ground or cause for the action, costs shall be assessed against the plaintiff.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 5.

14-54-1506. Order of abatement — Lien for costs — Enforcement.

  1. If the existence of the nuisance is established in the action, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in the case, and plaintiff's costs in carrying out the order shall constitute a lien upon the property, building, or place.
  2. The lien is enforceable and collective by execution issued by order of the court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 6.

14-54-1507. Order of abatement — Damages.

  1. If the existence of the nuisance is established in the action, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment. The order shall provide for any appropriate equitable relief as determined by the court to be necessary to abate the nuisance and may further provide, if determined to be the least restrictive alternative available to effectively accomplish the abatement, for the closing of the building or place for such period of time as determined to be necessary by the court as adequate to abate the nuisance.
  2. An alternative to closure may be considered only as provided in this section.
  3. If the court finds that any vacancy resulting from closure of the building or place may create a nuisance or that closure is otherwise harmful to the community, in lieu of ordering the building or place closed, the court may order the person who is seeking to keep the premises open to pay damages to the city in an amount equal to the fair market rental value of the building or place, for such period of time as determined appropriate by the court.
  4. These funds shall be used either to investigate and litigate future nuisance abatement actions or by the city for the purpose of neighborhood safety and enhancement programs.
  5. For purposes of this section, the actual amount of rent being received for the rent of the building or place or the existence of any vacancy therein may be considered, but shall not be the sole determinant of the fair market rental value.
  6. Expert testimony may be used to determine the fair market rental value.
  7. In addition, the court may award damages equal to the plaintiff's costs in the investigation and litigation of the abatement action, not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), against any or all of the defendants based upon the severity of the nuisance and its duration.
  8. The damages may be collected in any manner provided for the collection of any civil judgment.
  9. While the order of abatement remains in effect, the building or place is in the custody of the court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 7.

14-54-1508. Release of the building to owner.

  1. If the owner of the building or place has not been guilty of any contempt of court in the proceedings and appears and pays all costs, fees, and allowances that are liens on the building or place and files a bond in the full value of the property conditioned that the owner will immediately abate any nuisance that may exist at the building or place and prevent it from being a nuisance within a period of one (1) year thereafter, the court, if satisfied of the owner's good faith, may order the building or place to be delivered to the owner and the order of abatement canceled so far as it may relate to the property.
  2. The release of property under the provisions of this section does not release it from any judgment, lien, penalty, or liability to which it may be subject.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 8.

14-54-1509. Lien — Enforcement.

  1. Whenever the owner of a building or place upon which the act or acts constituting contempt have been committed or the owner of any interest therein has been guilty of contempt of court and fined in any proceedings under this subchapter, the fine is a lien upon the building or place to the extent of the owner's interest in it.
  2. The lien is enforceable and collectible by execution issued by order of the court.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 9.

14-54-1510. Criminal violations — Penalties.

A violation of or disobedience of the injunction or order for abatement is punishable as contempt of court by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1561, § 10.

Subchapter 16 — The Affordable Housing Accessibility Act

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 2: Oct. 1, 2003.

14-54-1601. Title.

This subchapter shall be known and cited as the “Affordable Housing Accessibility Act”.

History. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 1.

14-54-1602. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter:

  1. “Federal standards” means the federal Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards, 24 C.F.R. pt. 3280, promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 5401 et seq., as it existed on January 1, 1976;
  2. “Manufactured home” means a dwelling unit constructed in a factory in accordance with the federal standards and meeting the definitions set forth in the federal standards and under § 20-25-102; and
  3. “Mobile home” means a dwelling unit constructed in a factory before the enactment of the federal standards.

History. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 1.

14-54-1603. Municipal construction and installation standards.

  1. Municipalities shall not establish or continue in effect any ordinance or regulation that sets standards for manufactured home construction or safety that are not identical to the federal standards.
  2. Municipalities shall not establish or continue in effect any ordinance or regulation that sets standards for manufactured home installation that are inconsistent with the state standards for installation set forth under § 20-25-106 and the design of the manufacturer.

History. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 1.

14-54-1604. Municipal regulation of manufactured homes.

    1. Municipalities that have zoning ordinances shall allow the placement of manufactured homes on individually owned lots in at least one (1) or more residential districts or zones within the municipality.
    2. Municipalities shall not establish or continue in effect any ordinance or regulation that restricts the placement of manufactured homes only in mobile home parks, subdivisions, or land-lease communities.
  1. Municipalities may establish reasonable regulations or conditions for the placement of manufactured homes within the jurisdiction, including, but not limited to:
    1. Perimeter foundation enclosures;
    2. Connection to utilities;
    3. Building setbacks;
    4. Side or rear yard offsets;
    5. Off-street parking;
    6. Construction of carports, garages, and other outbuildings;
    7. Entries and exits, porches, decks, and stairs; and
    8. Other regulations or conditions that are applicable to other single-family dwellings in the same residential district or zone.
  2. Municipalities shall not impose regulations or conditions on manufactured homes that prohibit the placement of manufactured homes or that are inconsistent with the regulations or conditions imposed on other single-family dwellings permitted in the same residential district or zone.

History. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 1.

14-54-1605. Regulation of mobile homes.

Municipalities may prohibit the placement of mobile homes in all residential districts or zones or may restrict the placement of mobile homes to designated mobile home parks, subdivisions, or land-lease communities.

History. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 1.

14-54-1606. Exceptions.

  1. This subchapter shall not supersede, prevent, or preempt any valid covenants or bills of assurance.
  2. This subchapter shall not require that manufactured homes be permitted in historic districts.

History. Acts 2003, No. 624, § 1.

Subchapter 17 — Criminal Nuisance Abatement Boards

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No 1190, § 11: Apr. 9, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that municipalities in the state have the authority to create criminal nuisance abatement boards; that this act is needed to provide proper procedures for the boards and procedures for appeals to the circuit court; and that this act is immediately necessary because without proper procedures citizens of the state could be harmed by actions of the board without recourse to the circuit courts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Cross References. Common nuisance declared, § 16-105-402.

Municipal corporations' powers and restrictions, § 14-54-102.

Premises and real property used by criminal gangs, organizations, or enterprises, or used by anyone in committing a continuing series of violations — Civil remedies, § 5-74-109.

Prostitution, § 5-70-102.

14-54-1701. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote, protect, and improve the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the municipalities of this state by authorizing the creation of criminal nuisance abatement boards with authority to impose remedies, administrative fines, and other noncriminal penalties in order to provide an equitable, expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method of abating public nuisance as defined by state law.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 1.

14-54-1702. Creation of criminal nuisance abatement board.

  1. Any city of the first class or city of the second class by ordinance may create a quasi-judicial board to hear complaints regarding places or premises used as public or common nuisance as defined by §§ 5-74-109, 14-54-1502, and 16-105-402 or that are used for prostitution as defined by § 5-70-102.
  2. A criminal nuisance abatement board created under this subchapter shall be composed of five (5) citizens of the creating city who shall be appointed by the governing body of the city.
  3. The governing body of the city shall select one (1) of the members of the board to call the first meeting and serve as chair at the first meeting.
    1. At the first meeting, members of the board shall draw lots so that:
      1. One (1) member shall serve a three-year term;
      2. Two (2) members shall serve a four-year term; and
      3. Two (2) members shall serve a five-year term.
    2. All successors appointed to the board shall serve one (1) five-year term.
  4. The members shall elect a chair and any other officers needed to conduct the business of the board.
  5. The governing body of the city shall provide necessary staff for the board.
  6. The board may promulgate rules and regulations needed to conduct the hearings on the complaints concerning places and premises used as public or common nuisances.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 2.

14-54-1703. Filing of complaint with board.

    1. Any employee, officer, or resident of the city may bring a sworn complaint before the criminal nuisance abatement board against the owner of a place or premises that may constitute a nuisance.
    2. A hearing shall be conducted after the owner of the place or premises has been given ten (10) calendar days' notice of the hearing.
  1. The notice shall:
    1. Be provided to the owner of the place or premises according to Rule 4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure; and
    2. Include a copy of the complaint and a copy of the ordinance creating the board.
  2. If notice of the hearing is made by personal service, the notice may be served by a certified law enforcement officer or a certified court process server.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 3.

14-54-1704. Hearing and board findings.

  1. At a hearing:
    1. A criminal nuisance abatement board may consider any evidence, including evidence of the general reputation of the place or premises; and
    2. The owner of the premises shall have an opportunity to present evidence in his or her defense.
  2. All witnesses at a hearing shall be sworn.
    1. After the hearing, the board may declare the place or premises to be:
      1. A public nuisance as defined by §§ 5-74-109, 14-54-1502, and 16-105-402; or
      2. Used for prostitution as defined by § 5-70-102.
    2. After declaring a place or premises a nuisance, the board shall make a factual determination as to the reasons why the board finds that a public nuisance exists.
  3. The sworn testimony and the board's findings shall become a part of the record.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 4.

14-54-1705. Order of abatement.

  1. If the criminal nuisance abatement board declares a place or premises to be a public nuisance, it may enter an order requiring the owner of the place or premises to adopt such procedure as may be appropriate under the circumstances to abate any such nuisance.
  2. The order may include, but is not limited to, the following:
    1. Prohibiting the maintenance of the nuisance;
    2. Prohibiting the operation or maintenance of the place or premises, including the closure of the place or premises or any part of the premises for a period no longer than the effective date of the order;
    3. Prohibiting the conduct, operation, or maintenance of any business or activity on the premises which is conducive to the nuisance;
    4. Ordering the eviction of tenants of the place or premises who are responsible for the criminal conduct or who allow or permit another to commit the criminal conduct;
    5. Ordering the owner of the place or premises or the owner's agents to perform criminal background checks of tenants before renting the property; or
    6. Ordering the owner to bring the place or premises into compliance with state and local safety codes before allowing the reoccupation of the property.
  3. The order must include a statement stating that violations of this order may be punishable by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each day that violations of the order continue or that the public nuisance continues to exist.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 5.

14-54-1706. Effective date of an order.

  1. A finding or order entered pursuant to this subchapter shall become effective seven (7) calendar days after the order has been posted on the subject premises and mailed to the owner's last known address by first class mail.
  2. The order shall expire after one (1) year after the effective date or at such earlier time as is stated in the order.
  3. The order may be stayed pending appeal to circuit court pursuant to § 14-54-1707.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 6.

14-54-1707. Appeals to circuit court.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after an order or decision has been entered by the criminal nuisance abatement board according to the provisions in this subchapter, any party may appeal to a circuit court for a de novo review on the record.
  2. If an appeal is filed, the decision or order of the board shall remain in effect unless stayed by the circuit court.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 7.

14-54-1708. Violations of orders or continuations of nuisance.

  1. If an order that has been entered is violated, the criminal nuisance abatement board on its own or pursuant to a complaint may hold a hearing on whether the order has been violated or whether or not a public nuisance continues to exist.
  2. If the board finds that the public nuisance continues to exist or that the order has been violated, the board may impose a civil penalty of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each day that the order is violated or that the nuisance continues to exist.
  3. Before such a hearing may be held, the owner must be given ten (10) calendar days' notice in writing of the hearing according to methods stated in Rule 4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
  4. The notice must state that if the board finds that the nuisance continues to exist or that the order has been violated, the board may impose a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each day that the order has been violated or that the nuisance has continued to exist.
  5. The maximum amount of a civil penalty that may be imposed is ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  6. In addition to a civil penalty, the board may award costs of a successful complainant not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  7. All civil penalties imposed shall be used by the local police department for nuisance abatement purposes.
  8. Any civil penalty or costs awarded by the board may be appealed to the circuit court within thirty (30) days.
  9. Any order imposing costs or civil penalties not appealed to circuit court may be filed with the circuit clerk's office and constitutes a judgment of record and a lien against the nuisance property.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 8.

14-54-1709. Supplemental measure.

  1. This subchapter does not restrict the right of any person or government official from proceeding against a public nuisance by any other means.
  2. This subchapter is supplemental to all other laws and any other powers of a city of the first class or city of the second class.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 9.

14-54-1710. Immunity.

  1. The criminal nuisance abatement board, its individual members, and city employees assisting the board are immune from suit or action for their activities in discharge of their duties under this subchapter to the full extent of judicial immunity.
  2. Except for perjury and false swearing, complainants and witnesses are absolutely immune from suit or action for all communications with the board and all statements made within the nuisance abatement process.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1190, § 10.

Chapter 55 Ordinances of Municipalities

Research References

ALR.

Ordinance prohibiting picketing, parading, demonstrating or appearing in public while masked or disguised. 2 A.L.R.4th 1241.

Ordinance prohibiting use of obscene language in public. 2 A.L.R.4th 1331.

Ordinance establishing rent control benefit or rent subsidy for elderly tenants. 5 A.L.R.4th 922.

Ordinances prohibiting profanity or profane swearing or cursing. 5 A.L.R.4th 956.

Ordinances requiring sex-oriented businesses to obtain operating licenses. 8 A.L.R.4th 130.

Right of municipal corporation to review of unfavorable decision in action or prosecution for violation of ordinance. 11 A.L.R.4th 399.

Ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone. 12 A.L.R.4th 238.

Ordinance protecting landmarks. 18 A.L.R.4th 990.

Ordinances prohibiting or regulating advertising of intoxicating liquors. 20 A.L.R.4th 600.

Ordinance requiring compliance with housing standards before rent increase or possession by new tenant. 20 A.L.R.4th 1246.

Ordinance making it offense to have possession of open or unsealed alcoholic beverage in public place. 39 A.L.R.4th 668.

Validity of state or municipal tax or license fee upon occupation of practicing law. 50 A.L.R.4th 467.

Validity of local regulation of hazardous waste. 67 A.L.R.4th 822.

Validity, construction, and effect of requirement under state statute or local ordinance giving local or locally qualified contractors a percentage preference in determining lowest bid. 89 A.L.R.4th 587.

Validity of state or local government regulation requiring private school to report attendance and similar information to government (post-Yoder cases). 8 A.L.R.5th 875.

Validity of ordinances restricting location of “adult entertainment” or sex-oriented businesses. 10 A.L.R.5th 538.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 343 et seq.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 411 et seq.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Case Notes

In General.

The general powers conferred in this subchapter do not enlarge the powers conferred in § 14-54-103. Tuck v. Waldron, 31 Ark. 462 (1876).

14-55-101. Authority to enact.

Municipal corporations shall have the power to make and publish from time to time bylaws or ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for carrying into effect or discharging the powers or duties conferred by the provisions of this subtitle.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 22, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7493; Pope's Dig., § 9542; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2401.

Case Notes

Evidence.

There is a presumption in favor of a municipal ordinance, and one who challenges its validity alleging it to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory should make it appear so by clear and satisfactory evidence. City of Ft. Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).

No Authority to Regulate.

Incorporated town could not require jeweler to pay license for doing business. Town of Mena v. Smith, 64 Ark. 363, 42 S.W. 831 (1897).

Municipal corporations were held not authorized to regulate hotels. Bragg v. Adams, 180 Ark. 582, 21 S.W.2d 950 (1929).

Publication of Ordinances.

The burden of showing that there was no publication of ordinance is on the person accused who interposes that defense. City of North Little Rock v. Kirk, 173 Ark. 554, 292 S.W. 993 (1927).

Section 14-55-206(a)(1)(A), read in conjunction with this section, clearly gives only the municipality the power to publish ordinances. Phillips v. City of Eureka Springs, 312 Ark. 57, 847 S.W.2d 21 (1993).

Subjects of Regulation.

Theaters are proper subjects for police regulation, and an ordinance regulating the construction of moving picture theaters alone is not void because it does not apply to other theaters or places of amusement. City of N. Little Rock v. Rose, 136 Ark. 298, 206 S.W. 449 (1918).

Sunday Laws.

Ordinance that prohibited the operation of grocery stores and meat markets on Sunday was held constitutional. Hickinbotham v. Williams, 227 Ark. 126, 296 S.W.2d 897 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 961, 77 S. Ct. 867 (1957).

Violations.

Where violation of ordinance depended on whether two or more neighbors had filed a written petition, it was in conflict with Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 18, relating to privileges and immunities of citizens. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

14-55-102. Purposes generally.

Municipal corporations shall have power to make and publish bylaws and ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of this state, which, as to them, shall seem necessary to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of such corporations and the inhabitants thereof.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 22, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7494; Pope's Dig., § 9543; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2401.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justin Craig, Note: Municipal Police Power & Its Adverse Effects on Small Businesses in Arkansas: A Proposal for Reform, 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 177 (2014).

Case Notes

Health.

Ordinance providing that any physician who, for the purpose of procuring patients, employed any solicitor, capper, or drummer or subsidized any hotel or boarding house shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor was valid. Burrow v. City of Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 396, 108 S.W. 823 (1908).

Ordinance granting exclusive privilege of removing deposits from unsewered privies within municipal limits is a valid exercise of the police power if the ordinance is reasonable in its terms and designed solely for protection of public health. Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S.W. 718 (1908).

Municipalities may regulate the sale of milk and fresh meats by requiring that they be inspected before sale. Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S.W. 718 (1908); Carpenter v. City of Little Rock, 101 Ark. 238, 142 S.W. 162 (1911).

By ordinance, municipality may provide for erection of municipal hospital. Cumnock v. City of Little Rock, 154 Ark. 471, 243 S.W. 57, 25 A.L.R. 608 (1922).

While municipal corporations, under general welfare clause, may require those who pursue avocation of plumbing to perform their work in such manner as not to endanger public health and safety, they have no power to prevent anyone from engaging in that occupation or placing restriction upon them so long as their work is not done in a manner detrimental to public welfare. Replogle v. City of Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S.W. 353, 36 A.L.R. 1333 (1924).

Municipality is authorized to provide for inspection of all plumbing work done in the municipality and to impose a fee upon each person engaged in the trade for the purpose of defraying the expense of the inspection. Shaw v. Conway, 179 Ark. 266, 15 S.W.2d 411 (1929).

State's power to legislate in protection of public health has been granted and delegated to municipalities. City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942).

Ordinance providing that whenever a person who, upon examination, is found to be infected with a venereal disease in a communicable state fails to take treatment adequate for the protection of public health, municipal health officer may commit that person to a hospital or other place within the state for treatment was held not unconstitutional on ground the regulations were unreasonable. City of Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S.W.2d 705 (1942).

Municipality may regulate location of livery stables, but this regulation must not be arbitrary or unjust. City of Springdale v. Chandler, 222 Ark. 167, 257 S.W.2d 934 (1953).

A town has the authority to legislate for the protection of public health. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 333 Ark. 183, 968 S.W.2d 600 (1998).

Morals, Etc.

Municipalities may, by ordinance, prohibit intoxication on streets and public places. DeWitt v. La Cotts, 76 Ark. 250, 88 S.W. 877, 1905 Ark. LEXIS 34 (1905).

Ordinance appropriating money to welfare association organized to help poor and unfortunate of municipality is valid. Bourland v. Pollock, 157 Ark. 538, 249 S.W. 360 (1923).

Municipality has no authority to adopt ordinance providing that the mayor or chief of police may summon any person before such officer to answer whether he knows of any violations of the criminal laws of the city and to impose a fine for refusal to answer the question. Waldrum v. Wilbanks, 171 Ark. 321, 283 S.W. 979 (1926).

Ordinance relating to storage of motor vehicles abandoned on streets is valid. Means v. American Equitable Assurance Co., 186 Ark. 83, 52 S.W.2d 737 (1932).

Provisions authorizing municipality to regulate construction, alteration, and repair of buildings by passing ordinances for the general welfare was held not to authorize ordinance establishing building and setback lines. City of Stuttgart v. Strait, 212 Ark. 126, 205 S.W.2d 35 (1947).

Ordinance requiring places of business in municipality to remain closed from midnight to four a.m. whose purpose was to prevent youths from driving noisily about the streets during this period was in excess of municipality's delegated authority relative to enactment of ordinances, since this purpose could have been accomplished by directly prohibiting the objectionable conduct. Dyess v. Williams, 247 Ark. 155, 444 S.W.2d 701 (1969).

Prosperity.

Municipality did not abuse its discretion in enacting ordinance for establishing of parking meters in front of business even though business was deprived of suitable loading and unloading space. City of Marianna v. Gray, 220 Ark. 468, 248 S.W.2d 379 (1952).

Safety.

Municipality could not bind itself to pay for levee. Newport v. Batesville & B. Ry., 58 Ark. 270, 24 S.W. 427 (1893).

Power of municipality to prohibit, by ordinance, filling stations and other service appliances on streets, alleys, or sidewalks within the fire limits of the municipality is not limited by this section. Sander v. City of Blytheville, 164 Ark. 434, 262 S.W. 23 (1924).

Municipal council has no statutory power to permit permanent operation and maintenance of a filling station in the street, and such a license, if granted, would confer no vested or irrevocable right to operate a filling station. Sander v. City of Blytheville, 164 Ark. 434, 262 S.W. 23 (1924).

Municipality has power and duty to make reasonable provision for the safety of persons and property using its streets by the enactment of ordinances, resolutions, or bylaws looking to that end, and the municipal authorities have a wide discretion on these matters. City of Ft. Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).

Resolution authorizing construction of dividing curb along center of boulevard, making it a four-lane highway and permitting crossings only at street intersections, was held not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory against owner of tourist camp in center of a long block, whose prospective customers would be prevented from turning to the left into his property, but would have to drive to the next intersection and return. City of Ft. Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S.W.2d 187 (1938).

Whether a community shall be invaded by construction and operation of a filling station is a matter that may be regulated, even though the station, per se, is not a nuisance. Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144 S.W.2d 718 (1940).

Prohibition against erecting and operating filling stations without permission is a regulation within municipality's police power. Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144 S.W.2d 718 (1940).

Municipalities have power to pass ordinances regulating use of streets by trucks. House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 S.W.2d 831 (1955).

Statutory provisions relating to motor vehicles did not repeal or supercede this section or effect the authority of municipality to regulate use of streets by trucks. House v. City of Texarkana, 225 Ark. 162, 279 S.W.2d 831 (1955).

In light of the devastation caused by a tornado, the city had the authority to adopt an ordinance which added new requirements for the construction and anchoring of manufactured homes. Smith v. City of Arkadelphia, 336 Ark. 42, 984 S.W.2d 392 (1999).

14-55-103. Duty to enact.

It is the duty of municipal corporations to publish such bylaws and ordinances as shall be necessary to:

  1. Secure such corporations and their inhabitants against injuries by fire, thieves, robbers, burglars, and other persons violating the public peace;
  2. Suppress riots, gambling, and indecent and disorderly conduct; and
  3. Punish all lewd and lascivious behavior in the streets and other public places.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 22, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7494; Pope's Dig., § 9543; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2401.

Case Notes

Vagrancy.

The provisions of Ark. Const., Art. 7, § 28, relating to jurisdiction of the county courts, did not abrogate the jurisdiction of municipal courts to try and punish vagrancy. Brizzolari v. State, 37 Ark. 364 (1881).

Subchapter 2 — Procedures for Adoption

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1949, No. 36, § 3: Feb. 2, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the proper recording of municipal ordinances is necessary for the enforcement of municipal laws, and whereas, this Act is necessary for the protection of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1949, No. 267, § 5: Mar. 10, 1949.

Acts 1993, No. 295, § 6: Mar. 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the laws of the state of Arkansas pertaining to notice of the adoption of ordinances by municipalities are, in some cases, inconsistent, conflicting and confusing; that, following the adoption, in 1987, of Title 19, Chapter 9, Subchapter 6 of the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated (requiring published notice and public hearing prior to the adoption of ordinances authorizing revenue bonds), prior laws requiring similar notice with respect to municipal waterworks revenue bonds are redundant; and that it is essential that there be no confusion regarding the conduct of governmental proceedings by Arkansas municipalities. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2005, No. 1552, § 2: Apr. 5, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the laws concerning the effective dates of local ordinances are in need of immediate clarification; that the orderly administration of cities requires certainty in the application of local laws; and that this act is necessary to ensure that local residents and city administration have clear direction in the applicability and effective dates of local ordinances. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-55-201. Only one subject.

No bylaw or ordinance shall contain more than one (1) subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 86, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7502; Pope's Dig., § 9562; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2402.

Case Notes

Stipulations.

Where parties stipulated that ordinance was legally submitted to vote of qualified electors, they were bound by their stipulation and could not assert that it was invalid as containing more than one subject. Rooker v. City of Little Rock, 234 Ark. 372, 352 S.W.2d 172 (1961).

Titles.

Resolution of municipal counsel was not void for failure to contain a proper title as required by this section where it was apparent that one subject was clearly expressed in its title. Adams v. Sims, 238 Ark. 696, 385 S.W.2d 13 (1964).

City clerk was not entitled to quo warranto relief finding Harrisburg, Ark., Ordinance 86-001 created the office of city clerk/treasurer because, inter alia, (1) the ordinance only dealt with funding such a position, and (2) this section barred an ordinance from dealing with more than one subject. King v. City of Harrisburg, 2014 Ark. 183 (2014).

Zoning Ordinances.

The court would reject the contention that a zoning ordinance dealt with multiple subjects as it regulated both landscaping and signage; the ordinance only dealt with one subject, that is, the zoning rules for a newly constructed portion of a road. Craft v. City of Fort Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 984 S.W.2d 22 (1998).

Cited: Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712 (1911).

14-55-202. Reading requirement.

  1. All bylaws and ordinances of a general or permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly read on three (3) different days unless two-thirds (2/3) of the members composing the municipal council shall dispense with the rule.
  2. In a city with a population of less than fifteen thousand (15,000) persons in the most recent federal decennial census, if the ordinance under consideration has been submitted to and approved by the electors of the municipality and is being amended, repealed, or otherwise altered by the municipal council, then the ordinance shall be fully and distinctly read on three (3) different days not less than twenty-eight (28) days apart.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 86, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7502; Pope's Dig., § 9562; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2402; Acts 2017, No. 1052, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added the (a) designation; and added (b).

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to ordinance entering into a special contract such as an electric light franchise. Barnett v. Mays, 153 Ark. 1, 239 S.W. 379 (1922).

This section has no applicability to ordinance entering into a contract, such as electric light and water franchise, as the fact that a franchise created by ordinance runs for a long period of time does not make ordinance creating it general or permanent. City of El Dorado v. Citizens' Light & Power Co., 158 Ark. 550, 250 S.W. 882 (1923).

Resolutions.

Provisions of this section regarding reading of ordinances on three separate days apply only to bylaws and ordinances of a general or permanent nature; it does not specify resolutions and would not apply to a resolution held to be not an ordinance and which could not be construed to be of a general or permanent nature. Adams v. Sims, 238 Ark. 696, 385 S.W.2d 13 (1964).

Annexation of lands from a city to a municipality, at the request of the lands' owners, was not invalid due to a failure to read the annexation resolutions on three different days or to publish the resolutions because (1) the resolutions were not general, as the resolutions encompassed only annexed areas, and (2) the resolutions were not permanent, as the resolutions were terminable without repeal. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2012 Ark. 445, 424 S.W.3d 870 (2012).

Suspension of Rules.

Where record of passage of ordinance fails to show that ordinance was passed under suspension of the rules, it may be amended to show that fact at a subsequent meeting of the municipal council if all the members present at the latter meeting were present when the ordinance was passed. White v. Town of Clarksville, 75 Ark. 340, 87 S.W. 630 (1905).

Ordinance that was read three times and passed at same meeting is not invalid because record does not show number of aldermen voting to suspend the rule, if it does show that two-thirds of the councilmen were present and voted to suspend the rule. McLeod v. Purnell, 164 Ark. 596, 262 S.W. 682 (1924).

Adoption of resolution by unanimous vote of all members of municipal council dispenses with statute requirement. Young v. Gurdon, 169 Ark. 399, 275 S.W. 890 (1925).

Adoption of resolution by unanimous vote of all members of municipal council dispenses with requirement of this section for the reading of bylaws and ordinances on three different days. El Dorado v. Jacobs, 174 Ark. 98, 294 S.W. 411 (1927).

Law requires ordinances to be read fully and distinctly on three different days, unless two-thirds of the members composing the municipal council shall dispense with the rule; and when rules have been suspended, an ordinance, unlike a bill in the legislature, need not be read again. Vaughan v. City of Searcy, 199 Ark. 585, 135 S.W.2d 319 (1940).

Legal effect of unanimous action by municipal council is to dispense with the need for formally suspending the rules; therefore an ordinance is not invalid for failure to read the proposed measure a third time. Holman v. City of Dierks, 217 Ark. 677, 233 S.W.2d 392 (1950).

Passage of Springtown, Ark., Ordinance No. 2014-03 was in direct violation of this section, and as a result, was void where the town council consisted of five members, but only three members voted to dispense with the reading requirement. The fact that the other two council members had abstained due to a conflict did not alter the requirement that four members' votes were needed. Town of Springtown v. Evans, 2020 Ark. App. 176, 598 S.W.3d 538 (2020) (decided under pre-2017 version of statute).

Cited: Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712 (1911).

14-55-203. Voting requirements for passage — Effective dates.

  1. On the passage of every bylaw, ordinance, resolution, or order to enter into a contract by the council of any municipal corporation, the yeas and nays shall be called and recorded.
  2. To pass any bylaw, ordinance, resolution, or order, a concurrence of a majority of a whole number of members elected to the council shall be required.
      1. The effective dates for ordinances of a general or permanent nature and other local measures of a general or permanent nature of cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns shall be upon publication or posting as is otherwise required by law, but not before ninety-one (91) days after passage by the governing body of the city or town.
      2. In the event that the governing body of the city or town has by ordinance fixed the deadline for filing referendum petitions upon ordinances or other local measures at not less than thirty (30) days nor more than ninety (90) days after passage of an ordinance or measure, then the effective date shall be the day next following the deadline fixed in the ordinance.
      3. An ordinance containing an emergency clause shall go into effect immediately upon passage or at the time specified by the emergency clause, regardless of publication or posting, but an emergency clause shall not be effective to impose any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or deprivation of liberty or property until after the ordinance has been published or posted as is otherwise required by law.
    1. The effective date of an ordinance that is not of a general or permanent nature of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town is the date of passage of the ordinance unless a later effective date is provided in the ordinance.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 29, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7528; Pope's Dig., § 9588; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2403; Acts 2001, No. 1187, § 1; 2005, No. 1552, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment added (c).

The 2005 amendment inserted “of a general or permanent nature” twice in (c)(1)(A); and added (c)(2).

Case Notes

Contracts.

By keeping and using goods purchased under an unauthorized contract, municipality is estopped to deny validity of purchase by reason of informalities in execution of contract. City of Ft. Smith v. United States Rubber Co., 184 Ark. 588, 42 S.W.2d 1004 (1931).

Contract illegally entered into or entered into without authority by agent or officer of a municipal corporation may be ratified and rendered binding upon the municipal corporation by affirmative action on its part, or some negative action, which would amount to an approval of the contract. Day v. Malvern, 195 Ark. 804, 114 S.W.2d 459 (1938).

Oral contract between property owner and mayor on behalf of municipality by which municipality agreed to lower lot to street level in consideration of bed of gravel thereon needed for street construction was held ratified by municipality by its affirmative action in paying carpenter and helper to move house to another part of lot and in using gravel removed from the lot. Day v. Malvern, 195 Ark. 804, 114 S.W.2d 459 (1938).

Where municipal water plant was turned over to board of managers by ordinance, which did not authorize employment of superintendent, contract made by board employing superintendent, not authorized or approved by municipality, was not binding; payment of superintendent's salary could be enjoined, but the contract being neither illegal nor immoral, superintendent could retain salary already received if not in excess of the actual value of his services. Gladson v. Wilson, 196 Ark. 996, 120 S.W.2d 732 (1938).

Failure to have agreement for lease of space on county property for street purposes authorized by a resolution under this section was not a fatal defect where municipality ratified agreement by performing obligations thereunder. Harrison v. Boone County, 238 Ark. 113, 378 S.W.2d 665 (1964).

Majority.

Where less than majority of qualified elected members of municipal council voted for approval of ordinance, injunction should have been granted. Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144 S.W.2d 718 (1940).

Mayors.

Mayor of second class city is a member of the municipal council of a second class city and thereby entitled to vote on the council's ordinances. Clark v. Mahan, 268 Ark. 37, 594 S.W.2d 7 (1980).

Mayor of city of the first class could break five-to-five city council tie vote to pass appropriation ordinance for the city's fiscal year. Gibson v. City of Trumann, 311 Ark. 561, 845 S.W.2d 515 (1993).

Passage.

Mere passage of resolution by municipal council does not create in anyone a vested right to demand that land be devoted forever to public use; legislative measures are, in the absence of vested rights, subject to repeal by later action of the legislative body. Hammon v. Dixon, 232 Ark. 537, 338 S.W.2d 941 (1960).

Recording.

Unless yeas and nays are recorded on passage of a resolution of municipal council making contract, it will be void. Culter v. Russellville, 40 Ark. 105 (1882); Frick v. Brinkley, 61 Ark. 397, 33 S.W. 527 (1895); Oglesby v. City of Ft. Smith, 105 Ark. 506, 152 S.W. 145 (1912); City of Mena v. Tomlinson Bros., 118 Ark. 166, 175 S.W. 1187 (1915); Gladson v. Wilson, 196 Ark. 996, 120 S.W.2d 732 (1938).

Ordinance was invalid where ayes and noes were not called and recorded. Natural Gas & Fuel Corp. v. Norphlet Gas & Water Co., 173 Ark. 174, 294 S.W. 52 (1927).

Failure to record names of those voting for and against an ordinance was not fatal to its validity, since this requirement applies only to ordinances authorizing the execution of contracts. Holman v. City of Dierks, 217 Ark. 677, 233 S.W.2d 392 (1950).

The purpose of recording votes is to make members of municipal council feel the responsibility of their action when important measures are before them, and to compel each member to bear his share in the responsibility, by a record of his action that should not afterwards be open to dispute. Hammon v. Dixon, 232 Ark. 537, 338 S.W.2d 941 (1960).

Where in recording passage of ordinance, the minutes recite that all the aldermen present voted in favor of it, this recording constitutes a substantial compliance with this section. Hammon v. Dixon, 232 Ark. 537, 338 S.W.2d 941 (1960).

14-55-204. Approval of appropriations.

All bylaws, ordinances, resolutions, or orders for the appropriation of money shall require for their passage or adoption the concurrence of a majority of the council members of any municipal corporation.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 86, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7502; Pope's Dig., § 9562; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2402; Acts 2017, No. 879, § 35.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen”.

Case Notes

Mayors.

Mayor of city of the first class could break five-to-five city council tie vote to pass appropriation ordinance for the city's fiscal year. Gibson v. City of Trumann, 311 Ark. 561, 845 S.W.2d 515 (1993).

Cited: Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496, 140 S.W. 712 (1911).

14-55-205. Recording and authentication.

All bylaws or ordinances after their passage shall be recorded in a book kept for that purpose and shall be authenticated by the signature of the presiding officer of the governing body and the clerk or recorder.

History. Acts 1949, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2404.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296 (1980).

Survey of Arkansas Law: Public Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 243 (1981).

Case Notes

Construction.

This section did not repeal § 14-55-402, relating to admissibility of copies of bylaws and ordinances in evidence. City of Benton v. Nethercutt, 264 Ark. 769, 574 S.W.2d 269 (1978).

Applicability.

This section applies only to bylaws and ordinances passed by a municipal council and is not applicable to resolutions passed by a council. Adams v. Sims, 238 Ark. 696, 385 S.W.2d 13 (1964).

Authentication.

Authentication by acting mayor and acting recorder is sufficient. Lackey v. Fayetteville Water Co., 80 Ark. 108, 96 S.W. 622 (1906) (decision under prior law).

Ordinance was legal though signed by mayor after his term of office had expired. Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. City of Paragould, 146 Ark. 1, 225 S.W. 435 (1920); Lewis v. Forrest City Special Imp. Dist., 156 Ark. 356, 246 S.W. 867 (1923) (decisions under prior law).

14-55-206. Publishing or posting requirements.

      1. All bylaws or ordinances of a general or permanent nature and all those imposing any fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall be published in some newspaper published in the municipality.
      2. In municipalities in which no newspaper is published, written or printed notice posted in five (5) of the most public places designated by the governing body in an ordinance or minutes of the governing body shall be deemed a sufficient publication of any law or ordinance.
    1. It shall be deemed a sufficient defense to any suit or prosecution of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture to show that no notice was given as provided herein.
  1. As to ordinances establishing rules and regulations for zoning, construction of buildings, the installation of plumbing, the installation of electric wiring, or other similar work, where such rules and regulations have been printed as a code in book form, the code or provisions thereof may be published by the municipality by reference to title of the code without further publication or posting thereof. However, no fewer than three (3) copies of the code shall be filed for use and examination by the public in the office of the clerk or recorder of the municipality after the adoption thereof if there is no electronic form of the code available for examination by the public.

History. Acts 1949, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2404; Acts 1993, No. 295, § 2; 2009, No. 25, § 1.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment, in (a)(1)(A), substituted “published in the municipality” for “of general circulation in the corporation”; in (a)(1)(B), substituted “In municipalities in which” for “In incorporated towns where” and substituted “designated by the governing body in an ordinance or minutes of the governing body” for “in the town”; in (a)(2), substituted “no notice was given as provided herein” for “no publication was made”; and in the last sentence of (b), substituted “no fewer” for “not less” and deleted “city” preceding “clerk”.

The 2009 amendment in (b) added “if there is no electronic form of the code available for examination by the public” and made a minor stylistic change.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296 (1980).

Survey of Arkansas Law: Public Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 243 (1981).

Case Notes

Construction.

This section did not repeal § 14-55-402, relating to admissibility of copies of bylaws and ordinances in evidence. City of Benton v. Nethercutt, 264 Ark. 769, 574 S.W.2d 269 (1978).

Applicability.

Former statute had no applicability to an ordinance entering into a special contract. Barnett v. Mays, 153 Ark. 1, 239 S.W. 379 (1922) (decision under prior law).

This section applies only to bylaws and ordinances passed by a municipal council and is not applicable to resolutions passed by a council. Adams v. Sims, 238 Ark. 696, 385 S.W.2d 13 (1964).

Annexation of lands from a city to a municipality, at the request of the lands' owners, was not invalid due to a failure to read the annexation resolutions on three different days or to publish the resolutions because (1) the resolutions were not general, as the resolutions encompassed only annexed areas, and (2) the resolutions were not permanent, as the resolutions were terminable without repeal. City of Rockport v. City of Malvern, 2012 Ark. 445, 424 S.W.3d 870 (2012).

Effective Date.

The effective date of an ordinance of municipality is the date of its publication. Eureka Springs v. Brightman, 243 Ark. 836, 422 S.W.2d 681 (1968).

Ordinance passed by unanimous vote of municipal council under suspension of rules and containing an emergency clause voted upon separately is effective upon adoption, its effectiveness not being suspended until publication. Kemp v. Simmons, 244 Ark. 1052, 428 S.W.2d 59 (1968).

Notice.

Written notice by manager of power company that installation of pumping plant had been completed per contract was acceptance of ordinance. Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. City of Paragould, 146 Ark. 1, 225 S.W. 435 (1920) (decision under prior law).

Where notice of hearing contained no statement that copies of a regulation or an ordinance and related documents were available for public examination, the notice did not comply with the statutory procedure by informing the public of the availability of the regulations prior to the passage of the ordinance. Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571, 826 S.W.2d 259 (1992).

Publication.

Fact that municipal records failed to show publication of ordinance was insufficient to show that it had not been published; and it was the burden of the person interposing failure of publication as a defense to prove that no publication was made. City of North Little Rock v. Kirk, 173 Ark. 554, 292 S.W. 993 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Resolution authorizing and directing mayor to take census of town for the purpose of raising it to a city of the second class as prayed for in petition signed by more than 10 qualified electors and filed with the recorder and subsequent resolution resolving that application be made to have town declared a city of the second class was held within the purview of this section and should have been published. McClellan v. Stuckey, 196 Ark. 816, 120 S.W.2d 155 (1938) (decision under prior law).

A “resolution” declaring need for a housing authority was in fact an ordinance and an “enactment” of both general and permanent character — general in that it applied to all citizens of the municipality and permanent in that it would be effective until repealed — and, therefore, required publication as provided in this section before final enactment. Eureka Springs v. Brightman, 243 Ark. 836, 422 S.W.2d 681 (1968).

Where General Assembly had provided for establishment of a police court, in lieu of a municipal court, by cities upon reaching first class status until such time as the governing body of the city determined that the city had sufficient funds to support a municipal court, such action by the General Assembly did not mean that a city of the first class could create a police court without first publishing an ordinance, bylaw, or other act creating such a court as required by this section. Landthrip v. City of Beebe, 268 Ark. 45, 593 S.W.2d 458 (1980).

Ordinance which applied to all commercial and residential customers and would remain in force until repealed was both permanent and general, and the post-enactment publication was mandatory. Invalidity of municipal ordinance for failure to comply with § 14-235-223 and this section was not cured by subsequent publication of ordinance. City of Ft. Smith v. O.K. Foods, Inc., 293 Ark. 379, 738 S.W.2d 96 (1987).

Scope of Authority.

This section authorizes adoption, by ordinance, of a preexisting code published in book form by referring to the code by title only in the publication of the ordinance, but does not authorize the adoption of an ordinance creating a code by publication of the title of the ordinance only. Thomas v. Vaughn, 249 Ark. 1043, 463 S.W.2d 102 (1971).

Subdivision (a)(1)(A), read in conjunction with § 14-55-101, clearly gives only the municipality the power to publish ordinances. Phillips v. City of Eureka Springs, 312 Ark. 57, 847 S.W.2d 21 (1993).

14-55-207. Adoption of technical codes by reference.

  1. Every municipality in the State of Arkansas is authorized by the passage of a municipal ordinance to adopt by reference technical codes, regulations, or standards, without setting forth the provisions of the code or parts thereof, if three (3) copies of the code, or the pertinent parts thereof, and any related documents are filed either electronically or by hard copy in the office of the clerk of the municipality for inspection and view by the public before the passage of the ordinance.
  2. The term “technical codes” shall include any building, zoning, health, electrical, or plumbing codes, and the term “regulations” shall include any criminal code of the State of Arkansas.
  3. It is the duty of the municipality to give a notice to the public, by publication in a paper of general circulation within the municipality, stating that copies of the code, or the pertinent parts thereof, and the related documents are open to public examination either electronically or by hard copy before the passage of the ordinance adopting the code.

History. Acts 1949, No. 267, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2421 — 19-2423; Acts 2009, No. 25, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment inserted “either electronically or by hard copy” in (a) and (c); and made minor stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Notice.

Where notice of hearing contained no statement that copies of a regulation or an ordinance and related documents were available for public examination, the notice did not comply with the statutory procedure by informing the public of the availability of the regulations prior to the passage of the ordinance. Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571, 826 S.W.2d 259 (1992).

Zoning Map.

Prior to the passage of the ordinance adopting the code, the proposed zoning map must be available for public examination for a reasonable length of time. Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571, 826 S.W.2d 259 (1992).

Cited: Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Subchapter 3 — Referral to Electors

Preambles. Acts 1963, No. 218 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, requests for legislation are made to the City Councils and governing bodies of municipalities in cases where it is difficult for the aldermen to know the true desires of the people; and

“Whereas, in certain controversial matters the Council would prefer the people make their desires known by vote of the electors; and

“Whereas, at present there is no procedure by which a city council may refer a measure to the people and the electors can refer an ordinance only after the city council has enacted the ordinance and in some municipalities a period of two years must elapse before the people can exercise their rights under the Constitution to initiate a measure themselves;

“Now, therefore”….

Effective Dates. Acts 1981, No. 220, § 3: Feb. 26, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is confusion regarding the right of the people to exercise the initiative and referendum with respect to county and municipal measures; that this Act is designed to clarify this confusion and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Identical Acts 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), Nos. 2 and 3, § 3: July 22, 2015. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act is essential to the public interest and operation of the state; that the acts at issue contain inadvertent engrossment errors; and that this act is necessary to correct the engrossment errors in order to avoid the potential confusion that may result if the engrossment errors are not corrected. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall become effective on July 22, 2015.”

14-55-301. Proposed or adopted ordinances.

  1. The city council or governing body of any municipality, by a majority vote of its members, may refer any proposed ordinance to the people for adoption or rejection.
  2. The city council, or governing body, may at the time of, or within thirty (30) days of, the adoption of any ordinance refer the ordinance to the electors for their acceptance or rejection by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the members of the council.
  3. The action of the city council shall constitute a referral to the people, and from that point the procedure shall be that as required by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7.

History. Acts 1963, No. 218, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2428 — 19-2430.

Case Notes

Notice.

This section does not require notice as specified in § 7-5-202 in the referral of a municipal ordinance to the people. Cowling v. Foreman, 238 Ark. 677, 384 S.W.2d 251 (1964).

14-55-302. Enacted ordinances.

Any ordinance enacted by the governing body of any city or town in the state may be referred to a vote of the electors of the city or town for approval or rejection in the manner and procedure prescribed in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 7, and laws enacted pursuant thereto for exercising the local initiative and referendum, and the manner and procedure prescribed therein shall be the exclusive method of exercising the initiative and referendum regarding these local measures.

History. Acts 1981, No. 220, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-4003.1.

14-55-303. Form of ordinance ballot question.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2) of this section, the ballot in an election on an ordinance proposed by initiative shall plainly state the title of the ordinance to be voted on, followed by the words:
    2. If the election is for repeal of an ordinance by referendum petition, the ballot in the election shall plainly state the title of the ordinance to be voted on followed by the words:
  1. The ballot in an election on a referred measure shall plainly state the title of the referred measure, followed by the words:

“FOR PROPOSED INITIATIVE NO.

AGAINST PROPOSED INITIATIVE NO.

“FOR REPEAL OF THE ORDINANCE NO.

AGAINST REPEAL OF THE ORDINANCE NO.

“FOR REFERRED MEASURE (OR ORDINANCE OR AMENDMENT) NO.

AGAINST REFERRED MEASURE (OR ORDINANCE OR AMENDMENT) NO.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1036, § 2; 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 1; 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 (1st Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 2 and 3 added “No. ” at the end of (b).

14-55-304. Municipal referendum petition.

Except for a municipal referendum petition concerning a municipal bond, a sponsor shall be given sixty (60) days to circulate a municipal referendum petition.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1093, § 2.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Sections 14-47-124 and 14-55-304 dictate a deadline within which to circulate a referendum petition, not file a referendum petition with the city clerk, and the statutes do not identify when the time commences; the statutes address the circulation of referendum petitions, not the filing of referendum petitions. Pritchett v. Spicer, 2017 Ark. 82, 513 S.W.3d 252 (2017).

Sections 14-47-124 and 14-55-304 did not make the referendum petition timely because the city set the deadline at 30 days, which comported with Ark. Const. Amend 7 (which amended Ark. Const., Art. 1, § 5); to the extent that a municipality enacts measures that comport with Amendment 7, then those measures control. Pritchett v. Spicer, 2017 Ark. 82, 513 S.W.3d 252 (2017).

Subchapter 4 — Effect of Passage

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

14-55-401. Existing ordinances continue in force.

All laws, ordinances, resolutions, or orders, lawfully passed and adopted by the city or town council, not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of this state, shall be, remain, and continue in force until altered or repealed by the council.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 33, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7500; Pope's Dig., § 9560; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2406.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 33 (3rd sentence), provided that all special acts relating to any municipal corporation repealed by § 5 of this act would, so far as they affected particular police regulations or local affairs in matters not inconsistent with this act, remain in force as bylaws and ordinances of the particular corporation until altered or repealed by the city or town council.

Case Notes

Repeals.

Rule that a statute does not repeal a prior statute unless in irreconcilable conflict therewith applies to municipal ordinances. Helena v. Russwurm, 188 Ark. 968, 68 S.W.2d 1009 (1934).

14-55-402. Admissibility of copies in evidence.

  1. The printed copies of the bylaws and ordinances of any municipal corporation published under its authority, and transcripts of any bylaw, ordinance, or of any act or proceeding of any municipal corporation, recorded in any book or entered on any minutes or journal, kept under the direction of the municipal corporation and certified by its clerk, shall be received in evidence for any purpose for which the original ordinances, books, minutes, or journals would be received with as much effect.
  2. It shall be the duty of the clerk or recorder to furnish the transcript to persons demanding it, and he shall be entitled to charge therefor at the same rate that the clerks of the county and circuit court are entitled to charge for transcripts for such courts.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 27, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7497, 7498; Pope's Dig., §§ 9557, 9558; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2405.

Cross References. Printed copies of ordinances admissible in evidence, § 16-46-203.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Heller and Sallings, Survey of Public Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 296.

Case Notes

Construction.

Sections 14-55-205 and 14-55-206 did not repeal this section. City of Benton v. Nethercutt, 264 Ark. 769, 574 S.W.2d 269 (1978).

Judicial Notice.

Courts will not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. Strickland v. State, 68 Ark. 483, 60 S.W. 26 (1900); Bolstad v. Pergeson, 305 Ark. 163, 806 S.W.2d 377 (1991).

Objections.

Failure to object and except to the manner in which an ordinance is introduced waives a formal introduction thereof in the manner provided by this section. Sharp v. City of Booneville, 177 Ark. 294, 6 S.W.2d 295 (1928).

Parol Evidence.

Parol evidence is not admissible to prove an ordinance or resolution of a municipal council; the ordinance or resolution itself, or a certified copy of it, must be produced. Pugh v. Little Rock, 35 Ark. 75 (1879).

Where record of municipal ordinances kept by the clerk, together with the journals showing the progress of the ordinances through municipal council, show a valid ordinance, they cannot be attacked by parol evidence. Lewis v. Forrest City Special Imp. Dist., 156 Ark. 356, 246 S.W. 867 (1923).

Where admission of copies of resolutions of municipal council was objected to on grounds they were not recorded or on file in the office of the municipal clerk, parol evidence of the municipal clerk was sufficient to admit them under this section. Adams v. Sims, 238 Ark. 696, 385 S.W.2d 13 (1964).

Printed Copies.

Printed copy of municipal ordinance published by authority of a municipality is prima facie evidence of the legal existence of the ordinance and its contents. Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 14 S.W. 38 (1890); Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. City of Arkadelphia, 56 Ark. 370, 19 S.W. 1053 (1892).

The record is prima facie evidence that an ordinance was enacted. Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. City of Paragould, 146 Ark. 1, 225 S.W. 435 (1920).

An ordinance of a municipality may be proved by a printed copy properly certified. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 186 Ark. 590, 54 S.W.2d 692 (1932).

Proof of publication of notice of adoption of an ordinance, with a printed copy attached, from the local newspaper, filed in a municipal ordinance book became a part thereof sufficient to satisfy this section. City of Benton v. Nethercutt, 264 Ark. 769, 574 S.W.2d 269 (1978).

Subchapter 5 — Prescribing of Penalties

Effective Dates. Acts 1891, No. 59, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1897, No. 22, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 36, § 2: effective on passage.

14-55-501. Authority generally.

The town or city council in all cities or incorporated towns in this state are authorized and empowered to prohibit and punish any act, matter, or thing which the laws of this state make a misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1891, No. 59, § 1, p. 96; 1897, No. 22, § 1, p. 29; C. & M. Dig., § 7496; Pope's Dig., § 9556; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2410.

Case Notes

Adoption.

Municipal ordinance adopting certain statutory provisions as misdemeanors will be held to have made provisions a part of the valid ordinances of the municipality. Searcy v. Turner, 88 Ark. 210, 114 S.W. 472 (1908).

A printed copy of a municipal ordinance published by authority of the municipality is prima facie evidence of the legal existence of the ordinance and its contents. Heno v. City of Fayetteville, 90 Ark. 292, 119 S.W. 287 (1909).

Fees and Penalties.

A municipality was held entitled to retain all the fees and penalties imposed by the mayor's court for violation of its ordinances, notwithstanding that the ordinances made the same acts offenses as were made offenses against the state by statute, and the county was entitled only to such fines and penalties as were imposed by the mayors of such courts acting in their capacity of justice of the peace for the violation of state laws within their jurisdiction. Incorporated Town of Pocahontas v. State ex. rel. Randolph County, 114 Ark. 448, 170 S.W. 89 (1914).

Penalties fixed by a city must fall within the state minimums and maximums. Ford v. City of Hot Springs, 294 Ark. 435, 743 S.W.2d 394 (1988).

14-55-502. State law to be followed.

  1. The town or city council in all cities or incorporated towns in this state are authorized and empowered to prescribe penalties for all offenses in violating any ordinance of the city or town not exceeding the penalties prescribed for similar offenses against the state laws by the statutes of this state.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any town or city council in this state to prescribe, by city ordinance, less severe penalties for all offenses in violation of any ordinance of the city or town than are prescribed for similar offenses against the state laws by the statutes of this state.

History. Acts 1891, No. 59, § 1, p. 96; 1897, No. 22, § 1, p. 29; 1899, No. 36, § 1, p. 45; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7496, 7555; Pope's Dig., §§ 9556, 9629; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2410, 19-2411.

Case Notes

Imprisonment.

The General Assembly did not intend for cities to impose penalties of imprisonment for violation of city ordinances, unless those ordinances regulate conduct proscribed under a valid state statute, in which case the General Assembly has ordered that cities are not permitted to provide lesser penalties than those demanded by the statutes. Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 628 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. Ark. 1987).

Less Severe Penalties.

Where ordinance under which person was tried was void because it prescribed a less penalty than that prescribed by state laws, nevertheless, he was not prejudiced because the fine adjudged against him was less than he would have had to pay had he been tried under the state laws. Robinson v. City of Malvern, 118 Ark. 423, 176 S.W. 675 (1915).

Ordinances that fix minimum fines for misdemeanors are properly invalid where the ordinances prescribe a minimum penalty substantially less than that fixed by state law, since the penalty fixed by a municipality must fall within the minimum and maximum penalty prescribed by state law for a similar offense. Wright v. Burton, 279 Ark. 1, 648 S.W.2d 794 (1983).

Penalties Not Exceeding State Law.

Ordinance making something a misdemeanor cannot be broader than the statute upon which it is based, and hence that which would be a defense to a prosecution under the statute will be a defense to a prosecution under the ordinance. Greenwood v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 158, 146 S.W. 109 (1912).

Penalties fixed by a city must fall within the state minimums and maximums. Ford v. City of Hot Springs, 294 Ark. 435, 743 S.W.2d 394 (1988).

14-55-503. Effect of conviction.

Upon conviction of any person under an ordinance before any police or city court, the conviction shall be, and operate as, a bar to further prosecution in any of the courts of this state for the same offense.

History. Acts 1899, No. 36, § 1, p. 45; C. & M. Dig., § 7555; Pope's Dig., § 9629; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2411.

Cross References. Conviction bar to further prosecution, § 16-85-712.

14-55-504. Maximum penalties permitted.

    1. A municipal corporation shall not impose a fine or penalty greater than:
      1. One thousand dollars ($1,000) for the first offense or violation of a bylaw or ordinance;
      2. Two thousand dollars ($2,000) for the second offense or violation of the bylaw or ordinance; or
      3. Four thousand dollars ($4,000) for each subsequent offense or violation of the bylaw or ordinance.
    2. If a thing prohibited or rendered unlawful is, in its nature, continuous in respect to time, the fine or penalty for allowing the continuance thereof, in violation of the bylaw or ordinance, shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each day that it is unlawfully continued.
  1. If any bylaw or ordinance provides for any greater fine, penalty, or forfeiture than is provided in this section, it shall and may be lawful, in any suit or prosecution for the recovery thereof, to reduce it to such amount as shall be deemed reasonable and proper and to permit a recovery or render a judgment for such amount as authorized.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 24, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7557, 7558; Pope's Dig., §§ 9631, 9632; Acts 1975, No. 548, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2409; Acts 2009, No. 341, § 1; 2017, No. 559, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” for “five hundred dollars ($500)” in (a)(1), substituted “five hundred dollars ($500)” for “two hundred fifty dollars ($250)” in (a)(2), and made a minor stylistic change.

The 2017 amendment rewrote (a)(1); and added (a)(1)(A) through (a)(1)(C).

Case Notes

Construction.

Section 14-55-502(a) enlarged the provisions of subdivision (a)(1). Richardson v. State, 56 Ark. 367, 19 S.W. 1052 (1892).

Authority.

Penalty provisions of ordinance prohibiting serving or consumption of mixed drinks at private clubs during early morning hours were held authorized under this section. Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 658 S.W.2d 404 (1983).

Imprisonment.

The General Assembly did not intend for cities to impose penalties of imprisonment for violation of city ordinances, unless those ordinances regulate conduct proscribed under a valid state statute, in which case the General Assembly has ordered that cities are not permitted to provide lesser penalties than those demanded by the statutes. Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 628 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. Ark. 1987).

Not Exceeded.

Late fees charged by city water department on overdue accounts were not usurious, unreasonable, or an unconscionable penalty, and the statutory limits on penalties for violations of ordinances, set out in subsection (a) of this section, were not exceeded. Davis v. City of Blytheville, 2015 Ark. 482, 478 S.W.3d 214 (2015).

Reduction of Amount.

Ordinance is not invalidated by fixing a penalty for its violation in excess of that allowed by this section, since the penalty would be reduced to the amount authorized by law in such cases. City of Little Rock v. Reinman, 107 Ark. 174, 155 S.W. 105 (1913), aff'd, 237 U.S. 171, 35 S. Ct. 511 (1915); Scott v. Roberson, 145 Ark. 408, 224 S.W. 746 (1920).

Cited: Weeks v. City of Paragould, 230 Ark. 908, 328 S.W.2d 81 (1959).

Subchapter 6 — Enforcement and Remedies

Cross References. Mayor to cause ordinances to be obeyed, § 14-43-504(a).

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1885, No. 67, § 7: effective on passage.

Acts 1891, No. 59, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56: Jan. 1, 2012.

Acts 2007, No. 663, § 56, as amended by Acts 2009, No. 345, § 7, provided:

“(a) Sections 2 through 15 of this act are effective January 1, 2008.

“(b) Sections 16 through 50 and 52 through 55 of this act are effective January 1, 2012.

“(c) Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 is effective January 1, 2012, except:

“(1) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-933, establishing the Cleburne County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-936 is effective July 1, 2009; and

“(2) That portion of Section 51 of Act 663 of 2007 that is referred to in Act 663 of 2007 as 16-17-950, establishing the St. Francis County District Court and departments of that court, codified as § 16-17-954 is effective July 1, 2009.”

14-55-601. Power to enforce generally.

  1. Bylaws and ordinances of municipal corporations may be enforced by the imposition of fines, forfeitures, and penalties on any person offending against or violating them.
    1. The fine, penalty, or forfeiture may be prescribed in each particular bylaw or ordinance or by a general bylaw or ordinance made for that purpose.
    2. Municipal corporations shall have power to provide in like manner for the prosecution, recovery, and collection of the fines, penalties, and forfeitures.
  2. Except for moving traffic violations, it is proper service for a code enforcement officer to send a citation to a person charged with a violation of a municipal code, ordinance, or regulation to that person's last known place of residence by certified mail, return receipt requested, and delivery restricted to the addressee.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 23, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7495; Pope's Dig., § 9544; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2408; Acts 2009, No. 556, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment added (c).

Case Notes

Penalties.

The General Assembly did not intend for cities to impose penalties of imprisonment for violation of city ordinances, unless those ordinances regulate conduct proscribed under a valid state statute, in which case the General Assembly has ordered that cities are not permitted to provide lesser penalties than those demanded by the statutes. Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 628 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. Ark. 1987).

Violations.

Fact that a dog might be impounded does not prevent a municipality from enforcing an ordinance that makes it unlawful for persons to allow their dogs to run at large by levying a fine against persons who violate the ordinance. Weeks v. City of Paragould, 230 Ark. 908, 328 S.W.2d 81 (1959).

Cited: Gore v. Emerson, 262 Ark. 463, 557 S.W.2d 880 (1977); Ark. County v. Burris, 308 Ark. 490, 825 S.W.2d 590 (1992); Davis v. State, 68 Ark. App. 346, 8 S.W.3d 36 (1999)Jarrett v. City of Marvell, 69 Ark. App. 98, 9 S.W.3d 574 (2000).

14-55-602. Imprisonment to enforce fine.

    1. The city council shall have power to provide that, when a fine shall be imposed for the violation of any of the ordinances of the city and it is not paid, the party convicted shall, by order of the mayor or other proper authority or on process issued for the purpose, be committed until the fine and costs of prosecution shall be paid, or the party discharged by due course of law.
    2. The council shall also have power to provide that any person convicted of a repeated and willful violation of any ordinance, who shall refuse or neglect to pay the fine imposed and the cost of prosecution, by like order or process, shall be imprisoned and kept in confinement for any term not exceeding thirty (30) days.
  1. Any city shall be allowed, for the purpose of imprisonment authorized under this section, the use of the county jail of the proper county. All persons so imprisoned shall be under the charge of the sheriff of the county, who shall receive and discharge the persons in such manner as shall be prescribed by the ordinances of the city, or otherwise, by due course of law.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 9, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7598, 7600, 7603; Pope's Dig., §§ 9684, 9686, 9698; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2413, 19-2414.

Cross References. City jails, § 12-41-401 et seq.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Because the city resident offered no evidence to support his contention that the city's garbage collection ordinance had been discriminatorily applied, he did not meet his burden of proving that the ordinance was unconstitutional as a result of its selective application to him. Jarrett v. City of Marvell, 69 Ark. App. 98, 9 S.W.3d 574 (2000).

14-55-603. Outside work for jailed persons.

Prisoners confined in the county jail or city prison, by sentence of the district court, for a violation of a city or town bylaw, ordinance, or regulation, may, by ordinance, be required to work out the amount of all fines, penalties, forfeitures, and costs at the rate prescribed in § 16-90-108, on the streets or other improvement under the control of the city council.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 87, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7562; Pope's Dig., § 9636; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2416; Acts 2017, No. 260, § 11.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “district court” for “city or police court”.

14-55-604. Working out of fines.

The city council may, at its discretion, provide, by ordinance, that fines imposed for violation of ordinances may be discharged by the offender working out the fine upon the streets or alleys of the towns, at the rate prescribed in § 16-90-108, and may adopt all necessary regulations for the safekeeping, management, and control of offenders while working out the fine.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 9, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7601; Pope's Dig., § 9687; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2415.

Publisher's Notes. This section provides that the “city” council may legislate, etc., but refers to streets or alleys of the “towns” afterwards.

Cross References. Labor of city prisoners, § 12-42-101 et seq.

14-55-605. Suit for recovery of fines, etc.

  1. Fines, penalties, and forfeitures, in all cases and in addition to any other mode provided, may be recovered by suit or action before any court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the proper municipal corporation and for its use.
  2. In such a suit or action, where pleading is necessary, it shall be sufficient to declare generally for the amount claimed to be due, in respect to the bylaw or ordinance, referring to its title and the date of its adoption or passage, and showing, as nearly as may be, the true time of the alleged violation.
  3. All suits or prosecutions for the recovery of any fines, penalties, or forfeitures, or for the commission of any offense made punishable by any bylaw or ordinance of any municipal corporation, shall be commenced within one (1) year after the violation of the bylaw or ordinance, or commission of the offense, and not afterwards, if the offender has remained within the jurisdiction of the municipal corporation during the one (1) year. If not, then the limitation provided in this subsection shall extend for the term of five (5) years.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, §§ 25, 26, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7559, 7561; Pope's Dig., §§ 9633, 9635; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2417, 19-2418.

14-55-606. Additional remedies of cities of the first class.

    1. In all cases of violation of any of its ordinances, any city of the first class in addition to any other mode provided by law shall have the right to recover in a civil action the amount of the lowest penalty or fines provided in the ordinance for each violation or, where the offense is in its nature continuous in respect to time, for each day's violation thereof, and also the amount of any license which the person guilty of the violations was required by any such ordinance to take out.
    2. The district court shall have jurisdiction in all such actions.
  1. In all cases where a fine may have been imposed by the district court, that court in addition to the power of enforcing payment of the fine by imprisonment shall have full power to issue an execution or writ of garnishment to be executed by the chief of police.

History. Acts 1885, No. 67, § 5, p. 92; C. & M. Dig., § 7735; Pope's Dig., § 9931; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2419; Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 35.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment substituted “district court” for “municipal court” in (a)(2) and (b); deleted “concurrent with justices of the peace” from the end of (a)(2); and deleted “in like manner and with like effect as if issued by a justice of the peace in any civil case tried before him, and like proceedings may be had thereunder” from the end of (b).

14-55-607. Additional remedies of cities of the second class.

In all cases of violation of any of its ordinances, any city of the second class, in addition to the modes provided by law, shall have the right to recover, in a civil action, the amount of the penalty or fines provided by the bylaws or ordinances of these cities or imposed by the mayor thereof for a violation of any ordinance or bylaw. In addition to the power to enforce payment of a fine or penalty by imprisonment, the mayor shall have full power to issue an execution or writ of garnishment, to be executed by the marshal, in like manner and with like effect as if issued by a justice of the peace in any civil action tried before him, and like proceedings be had thereunder.

History. Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 24, § 3, p. 69; C. & M. Dig., § 7686; Pope's Dig., § 9815; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2420.

14-55-608. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning disposition of fines, was repealed by Acts 2007, No. 663, § 20, effective January 1, 2012. The section was derived from Acts 1891, No. 59, § 2, p. 97; C. & M. Dig., § 7556; Pope's Dig., § 9630; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2412.

Subchapter 7 — Codification of Ordinances

14-55-701. Authority to codify.

  1. A municipality may codify its ordinances, or any part of them, into one (1) or more volumes, either bound or in loose-leaf form, without setting forth the provisions of the municipal code or parts thereof, if three (3) copies of the municipal code, or the pertinent parts thereof, and any related documents are filed either electronically or by hard copy in the office of the clerk or recorder of the municipality for inspection and viewing by the public before the passage of the ordinances.
    1. The ordinance adopting the codification shall be enacted under the requirements for passage of ordinances of the municipality.
    2. The ordinance adopting the codification may provide for the repeal of certain ordinances and parts of ordinances by the deletion or omission of them from the codification.
  2. In exercising the authority to codify ordinances under this subchapter, the municipality may:
    1. Correct the spelling of words;
    2. Change capitalization for the purpose of uniformity;
    3. Correct manifest typographical and grammatical errors;
    4. Correct manifest errors in references to laws, ordinances, and other documents;
    5. Correct manifest errors in internal reference numbers;
    6. Substitute the proper ordinance numbering or designation for the terms “this ordinance”, “the preceding ordinance”, or any similar words or phrases;
    7. Number, renumber, redesignate, and rearrange organization of material within an ordinance;
    8. Change internal reference numbers to agree with renumbered ordinances or material within an ordinance;
    9. Substitute the correct calendar date for “the effective date of this ordinance” and other phrases of similar import;
    10. Correct inaccurate references to:
      1. Funds;
      2. Fund accounts;
      3. The titles of officers;
      4. The names of departments or other agencies of the federal government, the state government, or local governments, and the names of other entities; and
      5. The short titles of other laws or ordinances;
    11. Make any other name changes necessary to be consistent with the laws or ordinances currently in effect;
    12. Alphabetize definitions and make any necessary changes to conform the definitions sections to ordinance style and format;
    13. Insert or delete hyphens in words to follow correct grammatical usage;
    14. Change numerals or symbols to words or vice versa and add figures or words if they are merely repetitions of written words or vice versa for purposes of uniformity and style;
    15. Change the form of nouns, pronouns, and verbs for purposes of style and grammar;
    16. Correct punctuation;
    17. Correct word usage;
    18. Change gender-specific language to gender-neutral language; and
    19. Remove obsolete language.

History. Acts 1961, No. 209, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2424; Acts 2019, No. 205, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1961, No. 209, § 4, provided that any revision or codification of ordinances adopted at any time prior to June 8, 1961, which would have been valid if this section had been in effect, were ratified and validated in all respects whatsoever.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, deleted “revise and” preceding “codify” in the section heading; in (a), substituted “A municipality may codify” for “Any municipality is authorized and empowered to revise and codify”, and substituted “without setting forth the provisions of the municipal code or parts thereof, if three (3) copies of the municipal code, or the pertinent parts thereof, and any related documents are filed either electronically or by hard copy in the office of the clerk or recorder of the municipality for inspection and viewing by the public before the passage of the ordinances” for “without the publication or posting of any part thereof”; substituted “codification shall be enacted under the requirements for passage of ordinances of” for “revision or codification shall be enacted in accordance with the requirements for the passage of ordinances pertaining to” in (b)(1); deleted “revision or” twice in (b)(2); and added (c).

14-55-702. Copies of municipal code filed.

Upon the adoption of any municipal code, three (3) copies of the municipal code shall be filed and maintained in the office of the city clerk or recorder.

History. Acts 1961, No. 209, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2425; Acts 2019, No. 205, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “municipal” in the section heading; substituted “three (3) copies of the municipal code” for “or revision, three (3) copies of it”, and added “or recorder”.

14-55-703. Code prima facie evidence.

In determining the content of any ordinance so codified, it shall not be necessary to go beyond the code. The code shall be admitted in evidence without further proof and shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of the existence and regular enactment of each particular ordinance contained therein.

History. Acts 1961, No. 209, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2425.

14-55-704. Amendment of municipal code authorized.

  1. A municipal code may be amended from time to time by ordinances duly enacted and published as required by law and passed in such form as to indicate the intention of the legislative body of the city to make them a part of the municipal code or revision.
    1. When so passed, copies of the ordinances shall be inserted in the copies of the municipal code maintained by the city clerk or recorder, and the ordinances are a part of the municipal code and have the same force and effect as if included at the time of the original adoption of the municipal code.
    2. Under this section, an amendment does not give an amended ordinance retroactive effect.

History. Acts 1961, No. 209, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2426; Acts 2019, No. 205, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “municipal” in the section heading; in (a), substituted “A municipal code” for “Municipal codes or revisions” and inserted “municipal”; and rewrote (b).

Chapter 56 Municipal Building and Zoning Regulations — Planning

Research References

ALR.

Zoning regulations prohibiting or limiting fences, hedges, or walls. 1 A.L.R.4th 373.

“War zone” ordinances restricting location of sex-oriented businesses. 1 A.L.R.4th 1297.

Enforcement of zoning regulation as affected by other violations. 4 A.L.R.4th 462.

Validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding protest by neighboring property owners. 7 A.L.R.4th 732.

Standing of civic or property owners' association to challenge zoning board decision (as aggrieved party). 8 A.L.R.4th 1087.

Construction of new building or structure on premises devoted to nonconforming use as zoning violation. 10 A.L.R.4th 1122.

Ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone. 12 A.L.R.4th 238.

Standing of zoning board of appeals or similar body to appeal reversal of its decision. 13 A.L.R.4th 1130.

Zoning or building regulations restricting mobile homes or trailers to established mobile home or trailer parks. 17 A.L.R.4th 106.

Local use zoning of wetlands or flood plain as taking without compensation. 19 A.L.R.4th 756.

Applicability and application of zoning regulations to single residences employed for group living of mentally retarded persons. 32 A.L.R.4th 1018.

Validity and construction of zoning laws setting minimum requirements for floorspace or cubic footage inside residence. 87 A.L.R.4th 294.

Validity of zoning laws setting minimum lot size requirements. 1 A.L.R.5th 622.

Validity and construction of zoning regulations relating to illuminated signs. 30 A.L.R.5th 549.

Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 53 A.L.R.5th 1.

Am. Jur. 83 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning, §§ 7 et seq, 17 et seq., 128 et seq., 161.7, 520, 611.

Ark. L. Rev.

Legal Control of Business in Arkansas, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 137.

Regulation of Urban Nonconforming Uses in Arkansas: Limitation and Termination, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 270.

Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 22.

Land Use — Mandatory Dedication for Park and Recreational Facilities, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 415.

Land Use — Wetlands Regulation, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 527.

The Role of Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 221.

Judicial Handling of Restrictive Covenants in Arkansas Residential Subdivisions, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 245.

Zoning — The Expanding Business District Doctrine in Arkansas: An Obstacle to Land Use Planning, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 262.

Riggs, Case Note: Zoning — Termination of Preexisting Nonconforming Uses, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 797.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 225 et seq.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Wright, Zoning Law in Arkansas: A Comparative Analysis, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 421.

Note, Property — Zoning — The Courts Further Define Their Limited Role. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981). 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 2007, No. 310, § 2 provides: “Retroactive Effect. This act shall be applied retroactively to July 16, 2003. Any municipality or municipal service agency that, on or after July 16, 2003, collected a utility hookup fee or access fee that fits the definition of development impact fee as defined in § 14-56-103(a)(3) shall refund any portion of the fee or fees that were not levied for making the physical connection for utility services or to recover the construction costs of the line to which the connection is made.”

Acts 2007, No. 310, § 2, provided: “Retroactive Effect. This act shall be applied retroactively to July 16, 2003. Any municipality or municipal service agency that, on or after July 16, 2003, collected a utility hookup fee or access fee that fits the definition of development impact fee as defined in § 14-56-103(a)(3) shall refund any portion of the fee or fees that were not levied for making the physical connection for utility services or to recover the construction costs of the line to which the connection is made.”

14-56-101. Liability for excavations.

If the owner or possessor of any lot or land in any city or incorporated town in this state shall dig or cause to be dug any cellar, pit, vault, or excavation to a greater depth than twelve feet (12') below the curb of the street on which the lot or land abuts, or, if there is no curb, below the surface of the adjoining lots, and shall, by this excavation, cause any damage to any wall, house, or other building upon the lots, adjoining thereto, the owner or possessor shall be liable, in a civil action, to the party injured, to the full amount of the damage. However, the owner or possessor may dig or cause to be dug any cellar, pit, or excavation, to the full depth of any foundation walls of any building upon the adjoining lots, and to the full depth of twelve feet (12') below the grade of the street whereon the lot abuts, established by the corporation authority, without incurring the liability prescribed by this section.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 34, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7545; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2819.

Case Notes

Court Decisions.

Where previous holding was based on old zoning statute, it was necessarily modified by the passage of superseding statute, for a strict and literal interpretation of all the language in that case would certainly result in nullification of subsequent statute. City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921 (1966).

14-56-102. Legally erected outdoor advertising sign.

This subchapter, § 14-56-201 et seq., § 14-56-301 et seq., § 14-56-401 et seq., § 14-56-501 et seq., and § 14-56-601 et seq. shall not be construed to authorize the legislative body of any city, incorporated town, or county to adopt any ordinance, law, or regulation that requires the taking, elimination, alteration, or diminishment of a legally erected outdoor advertising sign without first making the payment of just monetary compensation therefor.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1268, § 1.

14-56-103. Development impact fees — Definition.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Capital plan” means a description of new public facilities or of new capital improvements to existing public facilities or of previous capital improvements to public facilities that continue to provide capacity available for new development that includes cost estimates and capacity available to serve new development;
    2. “Development” means any residential, multifamily, commercial, or industrial improvement to lands within a municipality or within a municipal service agency's area of service;
      1. “Development impact fee” means a fee or charge imposed by a municipality or by a municipal service agency upon or against a development in order to generate revenue for funding or for recouping expenditures of the municipality or municipal service agency that are reasonably attributable to the use and occupancy of the development. A fee or charge imposed for this purpose is a “development impact fee” regardless of what the fee or charge is named.
      2. “Development impact fee” shall not include:
        1. Any ad valorem real property taxes;
        2. Any special assessments for an improvement district;
        3. Any fee for making the physical connection for utility services or any fee to recover the construction costs of the line to which the connection is made;
        4. Any fees for filing development plats or plans for building permits or for construction permits assessed by a municipality or a municipal service that are approximately equal to the cost of the plat, plan, or permit review process to the municipality or the municipal service agency; or
        5. Any fee paid according to a written agreement between a municipality or municipal service agency and a developer for payment of improvements contained within the agreement;
    3. “Municipality” means:
      1. A city of the first class;
      2. A city of the second class; or
      3. An incorporated town;
    4. “Municipal service agency” means:
      1. Any department, commission, utility, or agency of a municipality, including any municipally owned or controlled corporation;
      2. Any municipal improvement district, consolidated public or municipal utility system improvement district, or municipally owned nonprofit corporation that owns or operates any utility service;
      3. Any municipal water department, waterworks or joint waterworks, or a consolidated waterworks system operating under the Consolidated Waterworks Authorization Act, § 25-20-301 et seq.;
      4. Any municipal wastewater utility or department;
      5. Any municipal public facilities board; or
      6. Any of these municipal entities operating with another similar entity under an interlocal agreement in accordance with the Interlocal Cooperation Act, § 25-20-101 et seq., or § 25-20-201 et seq.;
    5. “Ordinance” means a municipal impact fee ordinance of a municipality or an authorizing rate resolution by a board of commissioners of a consolidated waterworks system authorized to set rates for its customers under the Consolidated Waterworks Authorization Act, § 25-20-301 et seq.; and
    6. “Public facilities” means publicly owned facilities that are one (1) or more of the following systems or a portion of those systems:
      1. Water supply, treatment, and distribution for either domestic water or for suppression of fires;
      2. Wastewater treatment and sanitary sewerage;
      3. Storm water drainage;
      4. Roads, streets, sidewalks, highways, and public transportation;
      5. Library;
      6. Parks, open space, and recreation areas;
      7. Police or public safety;
      8. Fire protection; and
      9. Ambulance or emergency medical transportation and response.
  2. A municipality or a municipal service agency may assess by ordinance a development impact fee to offset costs to the municipality or to a municipal service agency that are reasonably attributable to providing necessary public facilities to new development.
    1. A municipality or municipal service agency may assess, collect, and expend development impact fees only for the planning, design, and construction of new public facilities or of capital improvements to existing public facilities that expand its capacity or for the recoupment of prior capital improvements to public facilities that created capacity available to serve new development.
    2. The development impact fee may be pledged to the payment of bonds issued by the municipality or municipal service agency to finance capital improvements or public facilities for which the development impact fee may be imposed.
    3. No development impact fee shall be assessed for or expended upon the operation or maintenance of any public facility or for the construction or improvement of public facilities that does not create additional capacity.
    1. A municipality or a municipal service agency may assess and collect impact fees only from new development and only against a particular new development in reasonable proportion to the demand for additional capacity in public facilities that is reasonably attributable to the use and occupancy of that new development.
    2. The owner, resident, or tenant of a property that was assessed an impact fee and paid it in full shall have the right to make reasonable use of all public facilities that were financed by the impact fee.
    1. A municipality or municipal service agency may assess, collect, and expend impact fees only under a development impact fee ordinance adopted and amended under this section.
    2. A development impact fee ordinance shall be adopted or amended by the governing body of a municipality or municipal service agency only after the municipality or municipal service agency has adopted a capital plan and level of service standards for all of the public facilities that are to be so financed.
    3. The development impact fee ordinance shall contain:
      1. A statement of the new public facilities and capital improvements to existing public facilities that are to be financed by impact fees and the level of service standards included in the capital plan for the public facilities that are to be financed with impact fees;
      2. The actual formula or formulas for assessing the impact fee, which shall be consistent with the level of service standards;
      3. The procedure by which impact fees are to be assessed and collected; and
      4. The procedure for refund of excess impact fees in accordance with subsection (h) of this section.
    1. The municipality or municipal service agency shall collect the development impact fee at the time and manner and from the party as prescribed in the ordinance and shall collect the fee separate and apart from any other charges to the development.
      1. A development impact fee shall be collected at either the closing on the property by the owner or the issuance of a certificate of occupancy by the municipality.
      2. However, a municipal water or wastewater department, waterworks, joint waterworks, or consolidated waterworks system operating under the Consolidated Waterworks Authorization Act, § 25-20-301 et seq., may collect a development impact fee in connection with and as a condition to the installation of the water meter serving the property.
    2. At closing, the development impact fee that has been paid or will be paid for the property shall be separately enumerated on the closing statement.
    3. The ordinance may include that the development impact fee may be paid in installments at a reasonable interest rate for a fixed number of years or that the municipality or municipal service agency may negotiate agreements with the owner of the property as to the time and method of paying the impact fee.
    1. The funds collected under a development impact fee ordinance shall be deposited into a special interest-bearing account.
    2. The interest earned on the moneys in the separate account shall be credited to the special fund and the funds deposited into the special account and the interest earned shall be expended only in accordance with this section.
    3. No other revenues or funds shall be deposited into the special account.
    1. The municipality or municipal service agency shall refund the portion of collected development impact fees, including the accrued interest, that has not been expended seven (7) years from the date the fees were paid.
      1. A refund shall be paid to the present owner of the property that was the subject of new development and against which the fee was assessed and collected.
      2. Notice of the right to a refund, including the amount of the refund and the procedure for applying for and receiving the refund, shall be sent or served in writing to the present owners of the property no later than thirty (30) days after the date on which the refund becomes due.
      3. The sending by regular mail of the notices to all present owners of record shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of notice.
      1. The refund shall be made on a pro rata basis and shall be paid in full not later than ninety (90) days after the date certain upon which the refund becomes due.
      2. If the municipality or municipal service agency does not pay a refund in full within the period set in subdivision (h)(3)(A) of this section to any person entitled to a refund, that person shall have a cause of action against the municipality for the refund or the unpaid portion in the circuit court of the county in which the property is located.
      1. On and after July 16, 2003, a municipality or municipal service agency shall levy and collect a development impact fee only if levied and collected under ordinances enacted in compliance with this section.
      2. Beginning January 1, 2004, a municipality or municipal service agency shall collect development impact fees under ordinances enacted before July 16, 2003, or under ordinances amended after July 16, 2003, only if collected in compliance with subsections (f)-(h) of this section.
    1. However, except for the compliance with the collection requirements under subsections (f)-(h) of this section, this section does not invalidate any development impact fee or a similar fee adopted by a municipality or municipal service agency before July 16, 2003, nor does this section apply to funds collected under any development impact fee or similar fee adopted July 16, 2003.
    2. In addition, a municipality with a park land or green space ordinance that has been in existence for ten (10) years on July 16, 2003, and any amendments to the ordinance, which allows the option to pay a fee or to dedicate green space or park land in lieu of a fee, may continue to be administered under the existing ordinance.

History. Acts 2003, No. 1719, § 1; 2007, No. 310, § 1.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Carl J. Circo, Land Use Impact Fees: Does Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District Echo an Arkansas Philosophy of Property Rights?, 2014 Ark. L. Notes 1626.

Subchapter 2 — Building Regulations

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1887, No. 32, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1907, No. 352, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1939, No. 102, § 2: Feb. 17, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the erection of buildings of a non-fireproof nature in congested areas constitutes a menace to the public safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act is necessary for the public peace, health and safety and shall be in full force and effect after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Requirement of compliance with housing code before rent increase or possession by new tenant. 20 A.L.R.4th 1246.

Liability of governmental entity to builder or developer for negligent issuance of building permit subsequently suspended or revoked. 41 A.L.R.4th 99.

Ark. L. Rev.

Equity — Enjoinability of Threatened Nuisance, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 231.

14-56-201. Authority generally.

Municipal corporations shall have the power to:

  1. Regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, and repair of buildings;
  2. Make regulations for the purpose of guarding against accidents by fire;
  3. Require the use of fireproof or fire-resistant materials in the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or repairs of buildings; and
  4. Provide for the removal of any buildings, or additions thereto, erected contrary to this prohibition.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 13, p. 1; 1887, No. 32, § 1, p. 41; C. & M. Dig., § 7544; Pope's Dig., § 9619; Acts 1939, No. 102, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2801.

Case Notes

Construction.

Section 14-56-202 conferred upon cities of the first class the exclusive power to issue or refuse to issue building permits and to regulate the building of houses and thereby denied such power to cities of the second class, despite the general powers listed in § 14-56-201. First State Bank v. City of Elkins, 2018 Ark. 191, 546 S.W.3d 477 (2018) (answering question of law certified by the federal district court).

Billboards.

Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was improperly granted because a complaint filed by a lessor and a lessee sufficiently alleged that their rights or other legal relations were affected by Avoca, Ark., Ordinance No. 69 where a town was making demands regarding the removal of billboards; therefore, the lessor and the lessee were entitled to declaratory relief under § 16-111-104. They were arguing that the town lacked power to regulate the billboards at issue. Statewide Outdoor Adver., LLC v. Town of Avoca, 104 Ark. App. 10, 289 S.W.3d 111 (2008).

Erection, Construction, Etc.

A city may regulate the construction of buildings, but it cannot prevent construction unless the proposed construction is dangerous per se to the public health and safety. Bennett v. City of Hope, 204 Ark. 147, 161 S.W.2d 186 (1942).

Provisions authorizing a city to regulate the construction, alteration, and repair of buildings by passing ordinances for the general welfare does not authorize an ordinance establishing building and setback lines. City of Stuttgart v. Strait, 212 Ark. 126, 205 S.W.2d 35 (1947).

Where general zoning law of state provides for certain procedure and statutory provisions authorize the giving of permits by city council in special instances, a permit given by the council is valid, but if ordinances are not passed under provisions providing for issuance of permits, but under a statute which did not provide for permits, the provisions allowing for permits are not relevant in determining validity of permit. Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949).

Cities, in certain instances, have the authority to regulate some features relating to public buildings. Where the ordinance is not before the reviewing court, the court cannot make a sweeping finding that the municipality cannot regulate, in any manner, any phase, aspect, or feature relating to the construction of a public building. Lavender v. City of Rogers, 232 Ark. 673, 339 S.W.2d 598 (1960); Lavender v. City of Rogers, 233 Ark. 161, 343 S.W.2d 103 (1961).

A board of adjustment had authority to authorize the enlargement of a kindergarten being operated in a residential district as a preexisting nonconforming use of the property. Williams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).

In light of the devastation caused by a tornado, the city had the authority to adopt an ordinance which added new requirements for the construction and anchoring of manufactured homes. Smith v. City of Arkadelphia, 336 Ark. 42, 984 S.W.2d 392 (1999).

Refusal of the department of inspection and zoning to issue a repair permit was not a procedural due process violation; in order to make an informed decision about whether repair was feasible and would promote public safety, the department reasonably exercised its regulatory power by requesting more detailed plans from an engineer or architect. Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 2017 Ark. App. 638, 536 S.W.3d 139 (2017).

Fire Prevention.

A town council has power to prohibit the erection of wooden buildings in certain districts of the town as a precaution against fire; and if such building be erected in violation of an ordinance prohibiting it, the council may promptly remove it without any prosecution or judicial proceedings of any kind against the owner of the building. McKibbin v. City of Ft. Smith, 35 Ark. 352 (1880). See Paris v. Hall, 131 Ark. 104, 198 S.W. 705 (1917).

City may extend its fire limits, but cannot give it an ex post facto effect. Wilder v. City of Little Rock, 150 Ark. 439, 234 S.W. 479 (1921).

An ordinance prohibiting the construction of wooden buildings and enlargement and alteration of old buildings within fire limits is authorized. The term “alteration” means that an old building shall not be changed in such a way as to convert it into a new and different structure. Earle v. Shackleford, 177 Ark. 291, 6 S.W.2d 294 (1928).

Where city passed ordinances relative to guarding against destruction of buildings by fire and prohibited erection of nonfireproof building, a permit issued by the city council to erect a nonfireproof building was invalid where statute under which ordinances were passed did not provide for issuance of permits. Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949).

Cited: Corning v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972).

14-56-202. Additional powers of cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns.

    1. The following enlarged and additional powers are conferred upon cities of the first class.
    2. A city of the first class may:
      1. Regulate the building of houses;
      2. Provide that a house or structure not be erected within the city limits except upon a permit to be issued by an officer the governing body designates; and
      3. Provide that a permit not be issued for the building of any house or structure deemed to be unsafe, unsanitary, obnoxious, or detrimental to the public welfare.
  1. The authority to appoint and remove department heads, including the building official, is governed by § 14-42-110 without regard to the classification of the city or town.
    1. The following enlarged and additional powers are conferred upon cities of the second class and incorporated towns.
    2. A city of the second class and an incorporated town may:
      1. Enforce building and safety codes for the building and construction of houses and other structures;
      2. Provide that a house or structure not be erected before a building permit is issued by a building official the governing body designates; and
      3. Provide that a permit not be issued for the building of any house or structure deemed to be unsafe, unsanitary, obnoxious, or detrimental to the public welfare.
    3. The authority given to a city of the second class and an incorporated town under this subsection does not include the authority under § 14-56-416 unless the city of the second class or the incorporated town has adopted and filed a land use plan and corresponding zoning ordinances under § 14-56-101 et seq.
  2. This section does not:
    1. Authorize a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town to regulate the building of houses or structures in a manner contrary to other applicable law; or
    2. Restrict the authority of a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town under other applicable law.

History. Acts 1907, No. 352, § 1, p. 842; C. & M. Dig., § 7754; Pope's Dig., § 10053; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2802; Acts 2005, No. 943, § 1; 2019, No. 574, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (b).

The 2019 amendment added “cities of the second class, and incorporated towns” in the section heading; substituted “A city of the first class may” for “They shall have the power to” in (a)(2); rewrote (a)(2)(B); substituted “Provide that a permit not be issued” for “Provide that no permit shall be issued” in (a)(2)(C); in (b), substituted “The authority to appoint” for “However, the authority to appoint”, substituted “building official, is governed” for “building official, shall be governed”, and substituted “§ 14-42-110 without regard to the classification” for “§ 14-42-110 regardless of the classification”; and added (c) and (d).

Case Notes

Construction.

Section 14-56-202 conferred upon cities of the first class the exclusive power to issue or refuse to issue building permits and to regulate the building of houses and thereby denied such power to cities of the second class, despite the general powers listed in § 14-56-201. First State Bank v. City of Elkins, 2018 Ark. 191, 546 S.W.3d 477 (2018) (answering question of law certified by the federal district court).

Billboards.

Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was improperly granted because a complaint filed by a lessor and a lessee sufficiently alleged that their rights or other legal relations were affected by Avoca, Ark., Ordinance No. 69 where a town was making demands regarding the removal of billboards; therefore, the lessor and the lessee were entitled to declaratory relief under § 16-111-104. They were arguing that the town lacked power to regulate the billboards at issue. Statewide Outdoor Adver., LLC v. Town of Avoca, 104 Ark. App. 10, 289 S.W.3d 111 (2008).

Building of Houses.

The authority of a city of first class to regulate the building of houses does not give the city the authority to establish a building line. City of Stuttgart v. Strait, 212 Ark. 126, 205 S.W.2d 35 (1947).

Permits.

The grant of a permit to erect a frame building is not a contract; and, until vested rights accrue under it, the city may extend its fire limits so as to prevent the erection of such building. Wilder v. City of Little Rock, 150 Ark. 439, 234 S.W. 479 (1921).

Large outside signboard constructed wholly of wood with a steel sheeting front was held to be a “structure” within the meaning of ordinance couched in the same general terms as this section. Seiz v. City of Hot Springs, 194 Ark. 544, 108 S.W.2d 897 (1937).

In an action to compel the issuance of a building permit, the findings of the chancellor denying such action will not be disturbed on a disputed fact, unless such findings are against the preponderance of the evidence. City of Little Rock v. Tate, 212 Ark. 1003, 209 S.W.2d 92 (1948).

14-56-203. Removal or razing of buildings.

Cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns may order the removal or razing of, or remove or raze, buildings or houses that in the opinion of the city council or town council have become dilapidated, unsightly, unsafe, unsanitary, obnoxious, or detrimental to the public welfare and shall provide by ordinance the manner of removing and making these removals.

History. Acts 1907, No. 352, § 2, p. 842; C. & M. Dig., § 7755; Pope's Dig., § 10054; Acts 1979, No. 219, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2803; Acts 2017, No. 303, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “or razing” in the section heading; substituted “Cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns may” for “Cities of the first and second class shall have the power to”, substituted “or remove or raze, buildings” for “or to remove or raze, any buildings”, inserted “city council or town”, and made stylistic changes.

Cross References. Enforcement of removal or razing orders, § 14-54-904.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where preponderance of evidence was to effect that buildings in question were a fire, health, and structural hazard, decree ordering their destruction under city ordinance enacted under the authority of this section was proper and did not constitute a violation of owner's constitutional rights. Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 290 S.W.2d 620 (1956).

Authority.

The authority of a city of first class to regulate the removing of houses does not give the city the authority to establish a building line. City of Stuttgart v. Strait, 212 Ark. 126, 205 S.W.2d 35 (1947).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a city on a property owner's petition for an injunction to prevent the city from razing the owner's house because the city had the authority under the statute to determine that the house was a nuisance; the city had the authority given by statute to raze buildings that were detrimental to the public welfare. Kearney v. City of Little Rock, 2009 Ark. App. 125, 302 S.W.3d 629 (2009).

Because the issues regarding a building located in an historic district went beyond the character of the building and into the safety of the public, the authority to determine the status of the building belonged to the city under this section and the city ordinance, and due process was achieved; the city declared the owner's building a public nuisance and blocked off the street and the perimeter of the building in part to prevent injury to the public. Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 2017 Ark. App. 638, 536 S.W.3d 139 (2017).

Compensation.

The city may order unsanitary buildings or buildings injurious to the public health destroyed without compensation to the owner if necessary to abate the nuisance and protect the public health and safety. Springfield v. City of Little Rock, 226 Ark. 462, 290 S.W.2d 620 (1956).

14-56-204. Municipal regulation of residential building design elements prohibited — Findings — Exceptions — Definitions.

  1. The General Assembly finds that:
    1. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and other provisions of federal law establish the principles and standards in this section;
    2. It is difficult and expensive for citizens to readily access fundamental property rights protection in federal court; and
    3. This section is necessary to ensure property rights protection is accessible and to ensure state law is consistent with federal law.
  2. A municipality shall not regulate residential building design elements.
    1. As used in this section, “residential building design elements” means:
      1. Exterior building color;
      2. Type or style of exterior cladding material;
      3. Style or materials of roof structures, roof pitches, or porches;
      4. Exterior nonstructural architectural ornamentation;
      5. Location, design, placement, or architectural styling of windows and doors, including garage doors and garage structures;
      6. The number and types of rooms;
      7. The interior layout of rooms; and
      8. The minimum square footage of a structure.
    2. As used in this section, “residential building design elements” does not include:
      1. The height, bulk, orientation, or location of a structure on a lot; or
      2. Buffering or screening used to:
        1. Minimize visual impacts;
        2. Mitigate the impacts of light and noise; or
        3. Protect the privacy of neighbors.
  3. This section does not apply to:
    1. A structure located in an area designated as a local historic district under applicable state law;
    2. A structure located in an area designated as a historic district on the National Register of Historic Places;
    3. A structure designated as a local, state, or national historic landmark;
    4. A regulation created by a valid private covenant or other contractual agreement among property owners relating to residential building design elements, including without limitation a cooperative contractual agreement between a property owner and a municipality;
    5. A regulation directly and substantially related to the requirements of applicable state or federal building or safety codes;
    6. A regulation applied to manufactured housing in a manner consistent with applicable law;
    7. A regulation adopted as a condition for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program;
    8. A central business improvement district under the Central Business Improvement District Act, § 14-184-101 et seq.;
    9. A multifamily residential structure or other nonsingle-family dwelling;
    10. The application of a municipal policy, regulation, or ordinance affecting residential building design elements on an existing property on or before February 28, 2019, but not as to any other property thereafter;
    11. A municipal policy, regulation, or ordinance derived from the municipality's police power and directly related to an established immediate public health or safety hazard;
    12. A valid exercise of express statutory authority to regulate residential building design elements under § 14-95-101 et seq. concerning urban service districts; or
    13. A policy or regulation of an overlay district, if before the policy or regulation is implemented:
      1. Notice is provided to property owners of an overlay district under § 14-56-422;
      2. A petition to support the policy or regulation is attached with signatures of a majority of property owners in the proposed overlay district; and
      3. The overlay district makes a determination that the policy or regulation complies with the Private Property Protection Act, § 18-15-1701 et seq.

History. Acts 2019, No. 446, § 2.

Subchapter 3 — Zoning Regulations

Effective Dates. Acts 1905, No. 222, § 4: became law without Governor's signature, May 2, 1905.

Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 5: approved July 1, 1924. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 312, § 2: Mar. 19, 1949.

Acts 2001, No. 1198, § 2: Mar. 30, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the Eighty-third General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Act 779 of 1999 created many situations whereby municipal boundary areas were changed rapidly and the proper coordination of land use regulations between municipal jurisdictions is nearly impossible; that urban areas of northwest Arkansas are developing rapidly and creating conflicts between the land uses in different municipalities growing into one another; that situations where zoning regulations create incompatible land uses are a hardship on property owners in these boundary areas; and that this act should have immediate effect to prevent any further undue burden on those landowners. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-56-301. Authority generally.

  1. Cities of the first and second class are authorized to establish zones limiting the character of buildings that may be erected therein.
  2. Zones may be of three (3) classes:
    1. Portions of the city where manufacturing establishments may be erected or conducted;
    2. Portions of the city where business other than manufacturing may be carried on; and
    3. Portions of the city set apart for residences.

History. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 10056; Acts 1949, No. 312, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2805.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 1, provided that the beauty of surroundings constitutes a valuable property right that should be protected by law, particularly residential sections where people have established their homes.

Acts 1961, No. 115, § 1, provided that any property used for commercial purposes at or prior to the adoption of Acts 1929, No. 108 [repealed], that had been used continuously since that time for commercial purposes, together with any other contiguous property used for rental or commercial purposes regardless of the period of such use, upon application to the planning commission or governing body in a city of the first class, accompanied by an affidavit in support thereof, should be zoned for commercial use.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is within the range of the power of this state to legislate for the protection of health and the general welfare and is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1924).

Appeals.

Since there is generally no procedure to appeal the rezoning decisions of the cities, it is logical that either the chancery or circuit court would have jurisdiction to hear complaints on this subject. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

When a municipality takes action in zoning classifications, it is exercising a legislative function and is not subject to review by the courts of its wisdom in so doing; the role of the courts is simply to determine whether or not the action of the municipality is arbitrary. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

Where a chancery court agreed with a city and rezoned certain land as commercial, it exceeded its authority, since the legislature only gave the rezoning power to city councils or the legislative body of a city. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981).

Businesses Other Than Manufacturing.

Where the city council granted the landowner a permit to use his lots for parking space and the property had been so used for some time, it was unnecessary for the landowner to petition to have such lots rezoned for business purposes, as such was the effect of the permit. City of Little Rock v. Griffin, 213 Ark. 465, 210 S.W.2d 915 (1948).

Residential Districts.

When evidence showed that there were already in the immediate vicinity numerous businesses, it was not an abuse of discretion to permit a filling station to be erected in a residential district. Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1924).

An ordinance regulating buildings used for business purposes in residence districts of the city is valid. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925)Questioned byCity of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, 323 Ark. 332, 916 S.W.2d 95 (1996)Limited byCity of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981)Questioned byFields v. Little Rock, 251 Ark. 811, 475 S.W.2d 509 (Ark. 1972).

Petition for rezoning was not arbitrarily denied where testimony clearly showed the house purchased in order to be converted to business purposes was in and surrounded by a residential district. City of Little Rock v. Connerly, 222 Ark. 196, 258 S.W.2d 881 (1953)Questioned byCity of Little Rock v. Andres, 237 Ark. 658, 375 S.W.2d 370 (1964).

Residential property which is adjacent to business zoned property is not automatically entitled to rezoning as business property, and this fact is so even though the highest and best use of the property might be other than residential. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

Where property owners purchased the property knowing that it was zoned single family, the city's refusal to rezone the property to apartment classification did not constitute a taking for public use without compensation and was not an unreasonable limitation placed upon the use of the property, since rezoning is not justified by the mere fact that the property owners seeking the rezoning would benefit economically if the rezoning was allowed, or that the land would be put to its most remunerative use. McMinn v. City of Little Rock, 275 Ark. 458, 631 S.W.2d 288 (1982).

Zoning Ordinances.

Where a landowner obtained a permit for 90 days to violate a zoning ordinance, and refused to remove the building erected when notified, but brought a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the zoning ordinance, such action was dismissed because he had an adequate remedy at law and had not exhausted it. City of Little Rock v. Evans, 213 Ark. 522, 212 S.W.2d 28 (1948).

Failure of a city to comply with statutes in passing and putting into effect a zoning ordinance renders the ordinance invalid. Searcy v. Roberson, 224 Ark. 344, 273 S.W.2d 26 (1954).

Cited: Arnold v. City of Jonesboro, 227 Ark. 832, 302 S.W.2d 91 (1957); Ark. Release Guidance Found. v. Hummel, 245 Ark. 953, 435 S.W.2d 774 (1969); Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975).

14-56-302. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning zoning authority outside corporate limits, was repealed by Acts 1987, No. 56, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1969, No. 379, §§ 1-3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2804.1 — 19-2804.3.

14-56-303. Height of buildings.

The city council of a city shall have power to pass ordinances limiting the height of buildings in the zones created by it, so that the beauty of monumental buildings may not be impaired by the contrast.

History. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 10058; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2807.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is within the range of the power of the state to legislate for the protection of health and the general welfare and is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1924).

Cited: Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975).

14-56-304. Setback lines in cities of the second class.

    1. Upon the petition of a majority of the owners of lots, or parts thereof, in any district comprising one (1) or more blocks fronting on any residential street in any city of the second class, the city council shall have the power to prohibit, by ordinance, the use of the front part of the lots, for the distance of two-thirds (2/3) of the depth thereof from the street, for stables, barns, or other outhouses, or for stock lots.
    2. Persons already so using such property shall have six (6) months in which to remove such buildings or discontinue such use.
    1. The petitions and ordinance mentioned in subsection (a) of this section shall set forth the metes and bounds of the proposed district, which shall include both sides of the residential street, not to exceed one-half (½) the distance through the block.
    2. It shall be immaterial in what part of the proposed district the petitioners' property lies, so that the petition contains a majority of all property owners in the district.
  1. The continued occupancy of these lots by the owner contrary to the terms of an ordinance, when duly passed, shall constitute a public nuisance. The owner or proprietor of them shall, upon conviction, be fined in any sum not less than five dollars ($5.00) and not to exceed fifteen dollars ($15.00) per day for the continued violation thereof.

History. Acts 1905, No. 222, §§ 1-3, p. 562; C. & M. Dig., §§ 7687-7689; Pope's Dig., §§ 9816-9818; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2808 — 19-2810.

14-56-305. Conformance required — Exceptions.

    1. When the city council shall have laid off zones, it shall not be lawful for anyone to construct or carry on within a given zone any business not authorized by the ordinance of the city establishing it, unless with special permission granted by the council of the city, or by a commission which it may create for the purpose of determining whether an exception shall be made, in the particular instance.
    2. Exceptions shall be made only for good cause.
  1. In case of abuse, the adjacent property owners shall have the right to appeal to the courts of chancery to protect their property from depreciation by reason of the setting up of exceptional business within the zone.

History. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10057; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2806.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is within the range of the power of the state to legislate for the protection of health and the general welfare and is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1924).

Appeals.

An unreasonable and arbitrary building restriction, constituting an abuse of discretion by a city council, is void, and an aggrieved property owner is entitled to relief in equity whether provision is made therefor in the statute or ordinance or not. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925)Questioned byCity of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, 323 Ark. 332, 916 S.W.2d 95 (1996)Limited byCity of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981)Questioned byFields v. Little Rock, 251 Ark. 811, 475 S.W.2d 509 (Ark. 1972).

Since there is generally no procedure to appeal the rezoning decisions of the cities, it is logical that either the chancery or circuit court would have jurisdiction to hear complaints on this subject. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

When a municipality takes action in zoning classifications, it is exercising a legislative function and is not subject to review by the courts of its wisdom in so doing; the role of the courts is simply to determine whether or not the action of the municipality is arbitrary. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

Exceptions for Good Cause.

Residentially zoned property which happened to be adjacent to established business zoned property was not automatically entitled to rezoning as business property as a matter of law where owner's requested rezoning was first attempt to invade for business purposes a residential zone. Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975).

Residential property which is adjacent to business zoned property is not automatically entitled to rezoning as business property, and this fact is so even though the highest and best use of the property might be other than residential. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).

Nonconforming Uses.

When city council passes an ordinance creating a city planning commission, vested with the authority to grant permits for nonconforming uses, the discharge of those duties by the commission is not repugnant to the council's reserved power to issue building permits. Economy Whsle. Co. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960).

A “halfway” house for the temporary lodging, counseling, guidance, and employment placement of convicts released on pardon or parole or upon completion of their sentences, operated by a nonprofit organization, was not a religious, educational, or philanthropic institution within the meaning of a city ordinance providing for permits for such institutions in residential areas as nonconforming uses. Ark. Release Guidance Found. v. Hummel, 245 Ark. 953, 435 S.W.2d 774 (1969).

14-56-306. Land use in adjacent and contiguous cities to be compatible — Definitions.

  1. If municipalities become adjacent and contiguous to one another through annexation or other procedures, then lands or properties within the boundary area of each municipality shall be zoned only for land uses which are compatible with the zoned land uses of the adjoining lands or properties, even if the adjoining lands or properties are located outside the corporate limits or are located within the corporate limits of another municipality.
  2. Adjoining lands within the boundary area shall remain zoned with a compatible land use until the governing body of each municipality which is adjacent and contiguous to the boundary area adopts a resolution agreeing to a change in the zoning of the lands or properties that adjoin one another and stating that the rezoning to a land use which is not compatible will not adversely impact the adjoined land or property.
  3. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
    1. “Adjacent and contiguous” means any time the corporate limits of one municipality come in contact with the boundaries of the corporate limits of another municipality, or if the boundaries of one municipality extend to within one thousand feet (1000') of the corporate limits of another municipality;
    2. “Boundary area” means the area of land along the municipal boundary that is:
      1. Inside the municipality and within one thousand feet (1000') of the municipality's corporate boundary that is adjacent and contiguous to another municipality; and
      2. Outside the municipality, but within the planning and zoning jurisdiction of the municipality and also within one thousand feet (1000') of the municipality's corporate boundary that is adjacent and contiguous to another municipality;
      1. “Compatible land use” means any use of lands, buildings, and structures which is harmonious to the uses and activities being conducted on the adjoining lands and properties and which does not adversely affect or unreasonably impact any use or enjoyment of the adjoined land.
      2. A compatible land use includes a land use authorized by the municipal zoning ordinance for the zone that is the equivalent to, or that is as nearly equivalent as possible to, a land use authorized by the municipal zoning ordinance; and
    3. “Municipality” means:
      1. A city of the first class;
      2. A city of the second class; or
      3. An incorporated town.
  4. This section shall apply to municipalities with planning commissions and zoning ordinances authorized under §§ 14-56-401 — 14-56-425 and shall apply to any other municipal zoning regulations authorized by Arkansas law.
  5. Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (a)-(d) of this section, this section shall not apply to any property if the owners of the property have sought to have services extended to the property pursuant to § 14-40-2002 prior to March 30, 2001.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1198, § 1.

Case Notes

Compatible Use.

Circuit court did not err in granting an adjacent city summary judgment in a town's action alleging that the adjacent city's rezoning was not compatible with or equivalent to those of the adjacent lands in the town as required by this section. By providing affidavits and exhibits, the adjacent city established a prima facie case that its rezoning of property from agricultural to industrial was a use that was compatible with the zoned uses of the town, and the plaintiff town did not meet proof with proof. City of Bethel Heights v. City of Springdale, 2017 Ark. App. 81, 514 S.W.3d 472 (2017).

Subchapter 4 — Municipal Planning

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 14-56-40114-56-425 may not apply to § 14-56-426 which was enacted subsequently.

Effective Dates. Acts 1963, No. 36, § 3: Feb. 8, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the population of this State has shifted from primarily rural population to urban population; that the growth of urban population is expected to increase at a rapid pace; that many incorporated towns in this State are experiencing a rapid increase in population growth; that many of such incorporated towns do not have plans for public improvements, land use, community facilities and other factors that must be anticipated with increased population growth; that the present laws of this State do not authorize incorporated towns to establish planning agencies; and, that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to correct such situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1965, No. 138, § 2: Mar. 2, 1965. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and declared by the General Assembly that there is conflict and uncertainty as to the respective powers of cities and counties relative to planning under Act 186, Ark. Acts of 1957, as amended; that this has resulted in great confusion and frustration of the purposes of the aforesaid Act to the detriment of both private and public interests; that the aforesaid conflict demands immediate resolutions and the aforesaid uncertainty demands immediate clarification; and that enactment of this measure will provide an appropriate remedy. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 66, § 3: Feb. 9, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 186 of 1957, as amended, provides that members of the Municipal Planning Commissions shall receive no compensation for attendance at commission meetings, and that in many instances members of said commissions are required to devote time to attend such meetings which works undue hardships upon such members, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order that cities or towns may, if they so desire, authorize the payment of compensation to Planning Commission members for attendance at commission meetings. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 56, § 5: Feb. 18, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Arkansas cities of 8,000 or more population along navigable streams must have the authority to plan and control for orderly growth outside their corporate limits to preserve the quality of life for all citizens. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force on the date of enactment.”

Acts 1995, No. 530, § 9: Mar. 6, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an immediate need for Arkansas cities wherein air force facilities are located to enact land use ordinances to provide for the health and safety of the residents of the area and this act so provides and should go into effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman, Time to Pay the Pfeifer: Arkansas Inches Closer to Giving Legal Effect to Comprehensive Planning, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 51.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

Case Notes

Implementation.

The city can follow one or two courses in implementing this subchapter: (1) The city can secure the approval of the county court to its projected plans; in such event it seems that all questions of jurisdictional encroachment would be eliminated; or (2) it can proceed without the county court's approval; in this event it is possible that the county court will never attempt to exert any jurisdiction it may have in internal improvement matters in conflict with city plans, but the city would be taking the calculated risk. Butler v. City of Little Rock, 231 Ark. 834, 332 S.W.2d 812 (1960).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 318 Ark. 679, 887 S.W.2d 296 (1994).

14-56-401. Construction.

This subchapter shall be construed liberally. The enumeration of any object, purpose, power, manner, method, or thing shall not be deemed to exclude like or similar objects, purposes, powers, manners, methods, or things.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2831.

Case Notes

Cited: City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

14-56-402. Authority generally.

Cities of the first and second class and incorporated towns shall have the power to adopt and enforce plans for the coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the municipality and its environs.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 1; 1963, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2825.

Case Notes

Conflict of Jurisdiction.

Where there is a conflict over the exercise of jurisdiction over roads in an unincorporated portion of the county, between the county court and any creature of the legislature, the latter must give way. Butler v. City of Little Rock, 231 Ark. 834, 332 S.W.2d 812 (1960).

Nature of Authority.

A municipal corporation's exercise of its zoning power is the equivalent of an act by the General Assembly. City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, 323 Ark. 332, 916 S.W.2d 95 (1996).

By enacting the ordinance in question, the board approved the recommended action and amended a prior ordinance, but it rezoned the subject property and added new conditions to accommodate the rezoning and, thus, the board took legislative action delegated to it under this section; because the action was not administrative, the landowners who challenged the ordinance were not required to proceed under § 14-56-425 and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. Summit Mall Co. v. Lemond, 355 Ark. 190, 132 S.W.3d 725 (2003).

Rezoning Power.

Where a chancery court agreed with a city and rezoned certain land as commercial, it exceeded its authority, since the legislature only gave the rezoning power to city councils or the legislative body of a city. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981).

Cited: Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975); McMinn v. City of Little Rock, 275 Ark. 458, 631 S.W.2d 288 (1982); Potocki v. City of Ft. Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983); Mings v. Ft. Smith, 288 Ark. 42, 701 S.W.2d 705 (1986).

14-56-403. Purpose of plans.

  1. The plans of the municipality shall be prepared in order to promote, in accordance with present and future needs, the safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare of the citizens.
  2. The plans may provide, among other things, for:
    1. Efficiency and economy in the process of development;
    2. The appropriate and best use of land;
    3. Convenience of traffic and circulation of people and goods;
    4. Safety from fire and other dangers;
    5. Adequate light and air in the use and occupancy of buildings;
    6. Healthful and convenient distribution of population;
    7. Good civic design and arrangement;
    8. Adequate public utilities and facilities; and
    9. Wise and efficient expenditure of funds.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 1; 1963, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2825.

Case Notes

In General.

The land use plan is plainly not a zoning ordinance. It is merely a broad declaration of policy, specifying in a general way the uses to which the land in and near the city is now being put and to which it may be put in the future. The plan does not contain exact descriptions so that the property owner may ascertain what restrictions are being placed upon his land. The land use plan contains none of the details that are essential to a zoning ordinance. Economy Whsle. Co. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960).

Cited: Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975); McMinn v. City of Little Rock, 275 Ark. 458, 631 S.W.2d 288 (1982); Potocki v. City of Ft. Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983); Mings v. Ft. Smith, 288 Ark. 42, 701 S.W.2d 705 (1986); Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

14-56-404. Planning commission created.

    1. The legislative body of the municipality may create a planning commission of not less than five (5) members, of whom at least two-thirds (2/3) shall not hold any other municipal office or appointment except membership in the board of adjustment or a joint planning agency.
    2. A city of the second class or an incorporated town may elect by ordinance to allow the city council to serve as the planning commission and board of adjustment under this subchapter.
  1. The legislative body may confer on the commission the powers necessary to carry out the municipal plan.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 1; 1963, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2825; Acts 2011, No. 280, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added the (a)(1) designation and (a)(2).

Case Notes

Authority.

The legislature has the authority to create city planning boards and to provide rules and regulations for their government. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975); McMinn v. City of Little Rock, 275 Ark. 458, 631 S.W.2d 288 (1982); Potocki v. City of Ft. Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983); Mings v. Ft. Smith, 288 Ark. 42, 701 S.W.2d 705 (1986).

14-56-405. Appointment of members.

  1. Appointment and terms of the members of the planning commission shall be as provided by city ordinance.
  2. The legislative body of the municipality may appoint one-third (1/3) of the membership of the commission from electors living outside the corporate limits of the municipality but within the recorded planning jurisdiction of the municipality.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2826; Acts 2005, No. 901, § 1.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (b).

14-56-406. Commission officers.

    1. The planning commission shall designate one (1) of its members as chair and select a vice chair and such other officers as it may require.
    2. The mayor shall serve as the chair of the planning commission if the city council is operating as the planning commission and board of adjustment under § 14-56-404(a)(2).
  1. The terms of office of the chair and other officers of the commission shall be as provided by the rules of the planning commission.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2826; Acts 2011, No. 280, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (a)(2); and substituted “chair” for “chairman” throughout the section.

14-56-407. Meetings of commission.

  1. Regular meeting dates shall be established providing for at least one (1) regular meeting to be held in each quarter of each calendar year.
  2. The commission shall keep a public record of all business, resolutions, transactions, findings, and determinations.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2826.

14-56-408. Rules and regulations.

The planning commission shall adopt rules and regulations for the discharge of its duties and the transaction of business.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2826.

14-56-409. Compensation of members.

The members of the municipal planning commissions established pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter shall be entitled to receive such compensation, if any, for attendance at commission meetings as may be authorized by an ordinance duly adopted by the governing body of the city.

History. Acts 1967, No. 66, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2833.

14-56-410. Appropriations.

The municipality is authorized to appropriate funds to the planning commission to be used in carrying out its functions.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 1; 1963, No. 36, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2825.

Case Notes

Cited: Baldridge v. City of N. Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975); McMinn v. City of Little Rock, 275 Ark. 458, 631 S.W.2d 288 (1982); Potocki v. City of Ft. Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983); City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983); Mings v. Ft. Smith, 288 Ark. 42, 701 S.W.2d 705 (1986).

14-56-411. Purpose of commission.

The general purpose of the planning commission is to:

  1. Prepare, or have prepared, a plan of the municipality;
  2. Receive and make recommendations on public and private proposals for development;
  3. Prepare and administer planning regulations;
  4. Prepare and transmit to the legislative body recommended ordinances implementing plans; and
  5. Advise and counsel the city government and other public bodies.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2827.

Case Notes

Public Buildings.

Cities, in certain instances, have the authority to regulate some features relating to public buildings. Where the ordinance is not before the reviewing court, the court cannot make a sweeping finding that the municipality cannot regulate, in any manner, any phase, aspect, or feature relating to the construction of a public school building. Lavender v. City of Rogers, 232 Ark. 673, 339 S.W.2d 598 (1960); Lavender v. City of Rogers, 233 Ark. 161, 343 S.W.2d 103 (1961).

Rezoning.

Failure of the planning commission to give sufficient notice of their hearing on a petition for rezoning and denying request of an objector for a continuance of prior scheduling of oral surgery were not rendered immaterial by the fact that the objector was subsequently heard before the city board of directors and the chancery court. Wenderoth v. Freeze, 248 Ark. 469, 452 S.W.2d 328 (1970).

Where a previously adopted city ordinance prohibited consideration of the same property for rezoning within a year of prior rejection, the city board of directors erred when it allowed the rezoning of two lots just three months after a rezoning petition, which included those same two lots, had been rejected. Potocki v. City of Ft. Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983).

Cited: City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983).

14-56-412. Powers and duties of commission.

  1. Generally. The planning commission shall have the duty and function of promoting public interest in, and understanding of, the long-term coordinated municipal planning.
  2. Comprehensive Studies. The commission shall prepare a work program and make comprehensive studies of the present conditions and the probable future growth of the municipality and its neighboring territory.
  3. Planning Area Map. The commission shall prepare and maintain a map showing the general location of streets, public ways, and public property and the boundaries of the area within the territorial jurisdiction for which it will prepare plans, ordinances, and regulations. The map shall be known as the planning area map.
  4. Plans of Area. Following preparation of the planning area map, the planning commission may prepare plans for all, or any portion of, the area encompassed by the map, which may consist of maps, plats, charts, diagrams, and necessary documents and descriptive matter. The plans may include, but shall not be limited to:
    1. A master street plan;
    2. A land use plan; and
    3. A community facilities plan.
  5. Implementation of Plans. In order to promote, regulate, and control development, and to protect the various elements of the plans, the commission, after adoption of appropriate plans as provided, may prepare and transmit to the legislative body such ordinances and regulations as are deemed necessary to carry out the intent of the plans, or of parts thereof.
    1. Referral to Planning Commission. After adoption and filing as provided of a plan, no public way, ground, or open space; public building or structure; publicly or privately owned public utility line or terminal or transportation line or terminal; or public development or redevelopment or renewal project shall be acquired, constructed, or authorized unless such a project, proposal, or development has been submitted to the commission for review, recommendation, and approval as to its conformity with the plan.
    2. The commission's disapproval of a proposal submitted to it may be overruled only by a recorded vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the full membership of the submitting or authorizing body.
    3. Failure of the commission to act within sixty (60) days of the submission of the proposal shall be deemed approval unless further time is allowed by the submitting public board, commission, or body.
  6. Referral to Bodies Responsible for Land Acquisition. After adoption and filing as provided of a community facilities plan or a master street plan, no parcel of land indicated by the plan which lies within the bounds of a proposed public use facility or mapped street shall be privately developed until the public board, commission, or body having jurisdiction or financial responsibility for the reserved area shall have refused to execute a written option or to file suit for condemnation to acquire the area. This refusal shall be given by the public board, commission, or body within one (1) year of the date the action is requested by the property owner. This procedure may be enforced for the specified one (1) year period by the refusal to issue building permits or by other methods. However, it may be enforced only in cases where regulations governing the development and subdivision of land do not apply.
  7. Public Improvement Program. The commission may prepare, annually, a program for an appropriate period, recommending a coordinated program of capital expenditures for public improvements. For the purpose of preparing this program, the commission may request and receive information concerning public improvements from all public officials and public bodies.
  8. Recommendations and Reports. The commission may make recommendations and reports to the public and to public and private agencies.
  9. Surveys. The commission may enter upon land to make examinations and surveys and to maintain necessary monuments and markers thereon.
  10. Funds and Personnel. The commission may receive and spend funds from federal, state, county, municipal, and other public and private sources, may contract with respect thereto, and may hire a staff and contract for consultant services.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2827.

Case Notes

Compensation.

This section contemplates purchase or condemnation of land by the city, and in either case, the owner is to be compensated by money rather than waiver of some safety regulation, such as a fire wall requirement, completely irrelevant to the acquisition of land to widen a street. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Cited: City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983).

14-56-413. Territorial jurisdiction.

      1. The territorial jurisdiction of the governing body of a municipality for the purpose of this subchapter shall not exceed the limits stated under this subsection.
      2. If the territorial limits of two (2) or more municipalities conflict, the limits of their respective territorial jurisdictions shall be a line equidistant between them, or as agreed on by the respective municipalities.
    1. In addition to the powers under this subchapter, cities now having eight thousand (8,000) population or more shall have the authority to administer and enforce planning ordinances outside their corporate limits as follows:
      1. For cities of eight thousand (8,000) to sixty thousand (60,000) population, the jurisdictional area will be one (1) mile beyond the corporate limits;
      2. For cities of sixty thousand (60,000) to one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) population, the jurisdictional area will be two (2) miles beyond the corporate limits; and
        1. For cities of one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) population and greater, the jurisdictional area will be three (3) miles beyond the corporate limits.
        2. Upon July 3, 1989, no city with a population in excess of one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) persons shall exercise any zoning authority outside the boundaries of the county wherein it is located without the approval of the quorum court of the county wherein the city is not located and the approval of the governing bodies of all other cities having zoning authority over the area.
    2. Cities having a population of eight thousand (8,000) persons or less:
      1. Shall have a jurisdictional area that does not exceed one (1) mile beyond the corporate limits; and
      2. Shall not exercise any zoning authority outside the corporate limits.
    3. Cities now having an eight thousand (8,000) population or more and situated on a navigable stream may administer and enforce zoning ordinances outside their corporate limits but may not exceed the territorial limits under subdivision (a)(2) of this section.
    4. The city populations will be based on the most recent federal decennial census.
    1. The planning commission shall designate the area within the territorial jurisdiction for which it will prepare plans, ordinances, and regulations.
    2. A description of the boundaries of the area shall be filed with the city clerk and with the county recorder.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, §§ 3, 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; 1965, No. 138, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-2827, 19-2829; Acts 1987, No. 56, §§ 1, 4; 1989, No. 94, § 1; 2011, No. 280, § 3; 2013, No. 1053, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town” for “the city having a planning commission” in (a)(1)(A); deleted “of the first or second class” following “municipalities” in (a)(1)(B); and, in (a)(2)(A), added “In addition to the powers under this subchapter” and deleted “planning and” following “enforce.”

The 2013 amendment rewrote this section.

Case Notes

In General.

Because the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission acted within its statutory authority under § 15-22-503(e) in approving a water project submitted by a municipality that included a portion of a neighboring city's five-mile extraterritorial planning area, which was not preempted under this section by the neighboring municipality's planning authority in the five-mile area surrounding its city limits, and because the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court affirmed the Commission's order approving the municipality's water development project, as amended, for water plan compliance certification. Ark. Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n v. City of Bentonville, 351 Ark. 289, 92 S.W.3d 47 (2002).

There was no requirement in subdivision (b)(2) of this section that a map of a planning area be filed; thus, a city met the requirement of filing a “description of the boundaries” of the area by filing a legal description with the county clerk. Potter v. City of Tontitown, 371 Ark. 200, 264 S.W.3d 473 (2007).

Annexation.

Circuit court properly upheld the annexation of four tracts of real property totaling approximately 1,951 acres into the City of Sherwood, Arkansas because the City of Jacksonville's plans for the area were not superior to, and did not defeat, the landowners' right to petition for annexation to another city. City of Jacksonville v. City of Sherwood, 375 Ark. 107, 289 S.W.3d 90 (2008).

Regulation of Land Use.

Delegation of authority to regulate land use on property outside the city limits but within the city's extraterritorial-planning jurisdiction was permitted under this section, but approval of a subdivision application was unlawful due to the city's failure to prove that the necessary documents had been submitted. McLain v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 2011 Ark. App. 285, 383 S.W.3d 432 (2011).

Cited: National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987); City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005); City of Dover v. City of Russellville, 363 Ark. 458, 215 S.W.3d 623 (2005).

14-56-414. Preparation of plans.

  1. Studies. The planning commission shall undertake suitable studies related to the plans to be prepared. The studies shall be conducted after the completion of the planning area map and prior to the preparation of the plans.
    1. Land Use Plan. The commission may prepare and adopt a land use plan which may include, but shall not be limited to:
      1. The reservation of open spaces;
      2. The preservation of natural and historical features, sites, and monuments;
      3. The existing uses to be retained without change;
      4. The existing uses proposed for change; and
      5. The areas proposed for new development.
    2. The plan may include areas proposed for redevelopment, rehabilitation, renewal, and similar programs.
    1. Community Facilities Plan. The commission may prepare and adopt a community facilities plan indicating the general location and extent of the service areas of, and the future requirements of:
      1. Community facilities such as schools, playgrounds, recreational areas, hospitals, special education facilities, and cultural facilities;
      2. Governmental buildings and areas;
      3. Public and private utility terminals and lines; and
      4. Transportation terminals and lines.
    2. The plan may indicate areas to be reserved for future public acquisition as provided in this subchapter.
    1. Master Street Plan. The commission may prepare and adopt a master street plan which shall designate the general location, characteristics, and functions of streets and highways.
      1. The plan shall include the general locations of streets and highways to be reserved for future public acquisition.
      2. The plan may provide for the removal, relocation, widening, narrowing, vacating, abandonment, and change of use or extension of any public ways.
  2. Other Plans. The commission may prepare and adopt such other plans as are significant to the health, safety, and general welfare of the municipality and its environs.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2828.

Case Notes

Community Facilities Plans.

Where a city's comprehensive land use and public facilities plan was nothing more than a statement of broad possibilities for the future, the city was not justified in exacting cash contributions from private developers for future establishment of park areas when no location for any future park had been determined, and there was apparently no way of determining when, if ever, the contributed money would be spent, or where, other than in the district, or for what, except as the planning commission might eventually decide. City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983).

Land Use Plans.

The land use plan is plainly not a zoning ordinance. It is merely a broad declaration of policy, specifying in a general way the uses to which the land in and near the city is now being put and to which it may be put in the future. The plan does not contain exact descriptions so that the property owner may ascertain what restrictions are being placed upon his land. The land use plan contains none of the details that are essential to a zoning ordinance. Economy Whsle. Co. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960).

Where a plan was accepted by the city as a “land use” guide and the plan included a “land use plan” which included policy statements, general design considerations, proposed land uses, and projections as to future land use needs, this sufficed for compliance with this section. Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983); McLain v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 2011 Ark. App. 285, 383 S.W.3d 432 (2011).

14-56-415. Plan recommendations.

Following the adoption and filing of any plan, the planning commission may transmit to the legislative body, for enactment, recommended ordinances and regulations which will carry out or protect the various elements of the plan.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829.

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman, Time to Pay the Pfeifer: Arkansas Inches Closer to Giving Legal Effect to Comprehensive Planning, 1995 Ark. L. Notes 51.

Case Notes

Acceptance.

The insertion of the word “adopt” into the resolution accepting the plan as a land use guide is not a necessary prerequisite for compliance with this section; certainly, use of the word “accepts” falls within the spirit of the law. Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987); McLain v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 2011 Ark. App. 285, 383 S.W.3d 432 (2011).

14-56-416. Zoning ordinance.

    1. Following adoption and filing of the land use plan, the commission may prepare for submission to the legislative body a recommended zoning ordinance for the entire area of the municipality.
    2. The ordinance shall consist of both a map and a text.
      1. The ordinance may regulate the location, height, bulk, number of stories, and size of buildings; open space; lot coverage; density and distribution of population; and the uses of land, buildings, and structures.
      2. The ordinance may require off-street parking and loading.
      3. The ordinance may provide for districts, of compatible uses, for large scale unified development, for elimination of uses not in conformance with provisions of the ordinance, and for such other matters as are necessary to the health, safety, and general welfare of the municipality.
      4. The ordinance shall include provisions for administration and enforcement.
        1. The ordinance shall designate districts or zones of such shape, size, or characteristics as deemed advisable.
        2. The regulations imposed within each district or zone shall be uniform throughout the district or zone.
    1. The ordinance shall provide for a board of zoning adjustment, which may either be composed of at least three (3) members, or the commission as a whole may sit as the board of zoning adjustment.
    2. The board shall have the following functions:
      1. Hear appeals from the decision of the administrative officers in respect to the enforcement and application of the ordinance, and may affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the decision of the administrative officer;
          1. Hear requests for variances from the literal provisions of the zoning ordinance in instances where strict enforcement of the ordinance would cause undue hardship due to circumstances unique to the individual property under consideration, and grant such variances only when it is demonstrated that such action will be in keeping with the spirit and intent of the provisions of the ordinance.
          2. The board shall not permit, as a variance, any use in a zone that is not permitted under the ordinance.
          3. The board may impose conditions in the granting of a variance to insure compliance and to protect adjacent property.
        1. Decisions of the board in respect to the above shall be subject to appeal only to a court of record having jurisdiction.
      1. The board shall establish regular meeting dates, adopt rules for the conduct of its business, establish a quorum and procedure, and keep a public record of all findings and decisions.
      2. Each session of the board shall be a public meeting with public notice of the meeting and business to be carried on published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city, at least one (1) time seven (7) days prior to the meeting.
  1. The ordinance shall be observed through denial of the issuance of building permits and use permits.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829.

Research References

ALR.

Validity of Zoning Regulations Prohibiting or Regulating Removal or Exploitation of Oil and Gas, Including Hydrofracking. 84 A.L.R.6th 133.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Justin Craig, Note: Municipal Police Power & Its Adverse Effects on Small Businesses in Arkansas: A Proposal for Reform, 36 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 177 (2014).

Case Notes

In General.

This section applies only to zoning laws that affect an entire city and, therefore, did not apply to an ordinance which dealt only with a small portion of a city. Craft v. City of Fort Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 984 S.W.2d 22 (1998).

Appeals.

This section provides no limitations as to persons or entities which may bring an appeal, and a city had standing to appeal from the order of its board of zoning adjustment reinstating a building permit. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

In spite of the language of Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971), which held § 14-56-425 unconstitutional when applied to allow de novo review of zoning or rezoning ordinances enacted by city legislative bodies, the provision of this section requiring appeals to a court of record from actions of a board of zoning adjustment is not subject to the constitutional limitations applicable to city council zoning actions because the board of adjustment acts administratively, not legislatively; appeals to the circuit court from the board of adjustment are permitted. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

In an appeal from the lower court's affirmance of the Board of Adjustment's decision to grant a zoning variance to a restaurant despite having inadequate parking facilities on its property, the Board and lower court properly found, pursuant to this section, that the intended use of the property for a restaurant (for which the property was zoned) and the concomitant need for an additional five off-site parking spaces was an undue hardship that would have negligible adverse impact on other property and that granting a variance to accommodate the use was in keeping with the spirit and intent of the provisions of the ordinance. Loca Luna, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment, 2013 Ark. App. 336 (2013).

Building Permits.

A city cannot test the validity of a building permit issued by its own agency by collaterally attacking its correctness in an original injunctive proceeding in chancery court. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

Compliance with Section.

Compliance with subdivision (a)(2) is mandatory, and failure to comply with it will render a zoning ordinance void. Osborne v. City of Camden, 301 Ark. 420, 784 S.W.2d 596 (1990); Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571, 826 S.W.2d 259 (1992).

Location, Etc., of Buildings.

The board of adjustment is vested with the power and authority to permit the enlargement of a building. Williams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).

Nonconforming Uses.

A board of adjustment was justified in authorizing the enlargement of a kindergarten being operated in a residential district as a pre-existing nonconforming use of the property by the fact that the health department required such enlargement as a condition to the continued operation of the kindergarten. Williams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).

Where the local zoning ordinance required the board of adjustment to permit the location of an educational use in a district where such use was otherwise prohibited, it was not necessary for the property owner to show undue hardship to obtain authority from the board to enlarge a kindergarten being operated in a residential district as a preexisting nonconforming use. Williams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).

Conway, Ark., Ordinance 0-94-54 may be read harmoniously with § 20-17-903; municipalities that had passed a relevant zoning ordinance in accordance with this section could regulate the construction and expansion of cemeteries pursuant to the ordinance, and municipalities that had not done so had only the benefit of §§ 20-17-903, 14-54-802, and 14-54-803, such that the city's denial of the landowner's request for a conditional-use-permit precluded the establishment of a cemetery on his property. Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

Procedure.

When property owners and builder requested a writ of mandamus in circuit court, challenging a city's stop-work order on a building permit issued to the builder to construct a garage, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction as the builder and property owners prematurely circumvented the appellate process by filing a writ of mandamus prior to the board of zoning adjustment's reaching a final decision on the matter. Douglas v. City of Cabot, 347 Ark. 1, 59 S.W.3d 430 (2001).

Rezoning.

Where a previously adopted city ordinance prohibited consideration of the same property for rezoning within a year of prior rejection, the city board of directors erred when it allowed the rezoning of two lots just three months after a rezoning petition, which included those same two lots, had been rejected. Potocki v. City of Ft. Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983).

Variances.

In an appeal by an association of property owners of real estate in several contiguous subdivisions from a decision of the board of zoning adjustment denying a variation to permit the association to construct and operate a swimming pool and recreation area in the community for the use of residents thereof, testimony of real estate salesman that lots in subdivisions containing such facilities brought higher prices and of another witness that he could not conceive of a situation where such facilities properly constructed and operated would lessen the value of surrounding property were sufficient to sustain the circuit court's decision granting the variance. City of Little Rock v. Leawood Property Owners Ass'n, 242 Ark. 451, 413 S.W.2d 877 (1967).

Evidence that the owner of an office building did not have adequate parking space for his tenants and had acquired two vacant lots nearby was sufficient to support his request for a variance to permit additions to the building and the establishment of a parking lot on the two vacant lots and to sustain the trial court's finding that strict enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause undue hardship due to circumstances unique to the individual property under consideration. City of Little Rock v. Kaufman, 249 Ark. 530, 460 S.W.2d 88 (1970).

Where the board of adjustment produced expert testimony to the effect that release of traffic from the lot onto the street would threaten the residential character of the neighborhood to the north, and where the director of comprehensive planning and the former director both testified that the original variance had created problems for the city, and that the granting of the variance requested would not alleviate the problem and would, instead, have a substantially adverse effect on the residential neighborhood to the north, this testimony clearly constituted substantial evidence to support the denial of the zoning variance. Deboha II v. Summerlin, 266 Ark. 1037, 589 S.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1979).

Zoning Map.

The purpose of the map requirement is to give notice of a zoning proposal so that, before adoption, residents may object or make suggestions, and after adoption, purchasers and users may acquaint themselves with the zoning restrictions. Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571, 826 S.W.2d 259 (1992).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987); Kennedy v. Papp, 294 Ark. 88, 741 S.W.2d 625 (1987); City of Fort Smith v. Didicom Towers, Inc., 362 Ark. 469, 209 S.W.3d 344 (2005); Talley v. City of N. Little Rock, 2009 Ark. 601, 381 S.W.3d 753 (2009).

14-56-417. Regulations to control development of land.

    1. Following adoption and filing of a master street plan, the planning commission may prepare and shall administer, after approval of the legislative body, regulations controlling the development of land.
    2. The development of land includes, but is not limited to:
      1. The provision of access to lots and parcels;
      2. The extension or provision of utilities;
      3. The subdividing of land into lots and blocks; and
      4. The parceling of land resulting in the need for access and utilities.
    1. The regulations controlling the development of land may establish or provide for the minimum requirements as to:
      1. Information to be included on the plat filed for record;
      2. The design and layout of the subdivision, including standards for lots and blocks, street rights-of-way, street and utility grades, consideration of school district boundaries, and other similar items; and
      3. The standards for improvements to be installed by the developer at his or her own expense such as:
        1. Street grading and paving;
        2. Curbs, gutters, and sidewalks;
        3. Water, storm, and sewer mains;
        4. Street lighting; and
        5. Other amenities.
      1. The regulations may permit the developer to post a performance bond in lieu of actual installation of required improvements before plat approval.
      2. They may provide for the dedication of all rights-of-way to the public.
      1. The regulations may govern lot or parcel splits, which is the dividing of an existing lot or parcel into two (2) or more lots or parcels.
      2. No deed or other instrument of transfer shall be accepted by the county recorder for record unless the deed or other instrument of transfer is to a lot or parcel platted and on file or accompanied with a plat approved by the commission.
    2. The regulations shall establish the procedure to be followed to secure plat approval by the commission.
      1. The regulations shall require the developer to conform to the plan currently in effect.
        1. The regulations may require the reservation for future public acquisition of land for community or public facilities indicated in the plan.
        2. This reservation may extend over a period of not more than one (1) year from the time the public body responsible for the acquisition of reserved land is notified of the developer's intent.
    3. When a proposed subdivision does not provide areas for a community or public facility based on the plans in effect, the regulations may provide for reasonable dedication of land for such public or community facilities or for a reasonable equivalent contribution in lieu of dedication of land, such contribution to be used for the acquisition of facilities that serve the subdivision.
  1. Within the area within which the municipality intends to exercise its territorial jurisdiction as indicated on the planning area map, the county recorder shall not accept any plat for record without the approval of the planning commission.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829; Acts 2005, No. 2144, § 4.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment inserted “consideration of school district boundaries” in (b)(1)(B).

Research References

ALR.

Validity of Zoning Regulations Prohibiting or Regulating Removal or Exploitation of Oil and Gas, Including Hydrofracking. 84 A.L.R.6th 133.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Paving New Bicycle Paths Through the Thickets of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 823.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional per se. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Construction.

The “development of land” contemplated in subdivisions (a)(2)(A) through (D) of this section has to do with land which is not yet developed. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Plats Filed for Record.

In mandamus proceeding to compel circuit clerk to record plat not approved by city planning board because of refusal to dedicate additional strips for roads, court was held not authorized, without any evidence and without any claim that the board acted arbitrarily, to set aside its judgment. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941) (decision under prior law).

In mandamus proceedings to compel circuit clerk to record plat not approved by city planning board because of refusal to dedicate additional strips for roads, trial court's holding that action of the board was unauthorized because no provision was made for compensation to the landowner was held erroneous. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941) (decision under prior law).

Approval of bill of assurance and plat of subdivision by planning commission did nothing more than entitle the owner to place them of record, and such approval did not operate to confer standing upon landowners outside the subdivision to enforce the bill of assurance. Cases holding that owners of nearby property may challenge changes in zoning, even though they own no property in the rezoned area, have no applicability where it does not appear that there was any zoning of the subdivision in question. Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987); Kennedy v. Papp, 294 Ark. 88, 741 S.W.2d 625 (1987); McLain v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 2011 Ark. App. 285, 383 S.W.3d 432 (2011).

14-56-418. Setback ordinance.

When a master street plan has been adopted and filed as provided, the legislative body of the city, upon recommendation of the commission, may enact ordinances establishing setback lines on such streets and highways as are designated by the plan and may prohibit the establishment of any new structure or other improvements within the setback lines.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829; Acts 1991, No. 620, § 1.

Case Notes

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987).

14-56-419. Control of road entry.

Following the adoption and filing of a master street plan as provided, the legislative body, upon recommendation of the commission, may enact ordinances providing for the control of entry into any of the major streets and highways shown in the plan.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829.

Case Notes

Controlled Access Highways.

In determining amount of compensation due to landowners whose property was condemned for a service road along a controlled access highway, § 27-68-101 et seq., governing controlled access facilities, and not this section, were applicable. Accordingly, a city ordinance requiring the owner and developer of land abutting a controlled access highway to construct a service road at his own expense and dedicate it to the city was in conflict with the controlling statutes and would constitute a taking of private property without due process in violation of Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 22. Calabria v. City of Fayetteville, 277 Ark. 489, 644 S.W.2d 249 (1982).

This section deals exclusively and comprehensively with subdivisions across the state, while § 27-68-101 et seq. address themselves to controlled access facilities as defined in these provisions; a subdivision is not a controlled access facility, even though it may abut one and it does not appear inconsistent considering the separate purposes of the statutory provisions that a developer should receive compensation for giving up a right-of-way along a controlled access facility while having to relinquish title and control of the streets within a subdivision without being compensated. Calabria v. City of Fayetteville, 277 Ark. 489, 644 S.W.2d 249 (1982).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987).

14-56-420. Adoption and amendment procedures.

Any of the recommended ordinances and regulations that may be prepared by the commission shall be adopted or amended only in conformance with procedures specified in § 14-56-422.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829.

Case Notes

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987); City of Fordyce v. Vaughn, 300 Ark. 554, 781 S.W.2d 6 (1989).

14-56-421. Enforcement of ordinances and regulations.

    1. Violations of any provision of ordinances and regulations adopted to carry out the intent of plans shall be considered a misdemeanor.
    2. Each day's violation shall be considered a separate offense.
    1. The legislative body may enjoin any individual or property owner who is in violation of a planning ordinance to prevent or correct the violation.
    2. Any individual aggrieved by a violation of the ordinance may request an injunction against any individual or property owner in violation of the ordinance, or may mandamus any official to enforce the provisions of the ordinance.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 5; 1965, No. 134, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2829.

Case Notes

Sign Ordinances.

A municipal sign ordinance which provided for summary removal of signs upon determination by the city's building inspector that a particular sign was unlawfully maintained was not ultra vires, for the penalty provisions set out in this section are not exclusive. Osage Oil & Transp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 260 Ark. 448, 541 S.W.2d 922 (1976).

Enjoining of Violations.

This section does not unconstitutionally enlarge jurisdiction of chancery courts by permitting the city to enjoin violations of zoning ordinances. Bassett v. City of Fayetteville, 282 Ark. 395, 669 S.W.2d 1 (1984).

Cited: City of Little Rock v. Linn, 245 Ark. 260, 432 S.W.2d 455 (1968); Rickman v. Mobbs, 253 Ark. 969, 490 S.W.2d 129 (1973); National Lumber Co. v. Advance Dev. Corp., 293 Ark. 1, 732 S.W.2d 840 (1987).

14-56-422. Adoption of plans, ordinances, and regulations.

All plans, recommended ordinances, and regulations shall be adopted through the following procedure:

    1. The planning commission shall hold a public hearing on the plans, ordinances, and regulations proposed under this subchapter.
    2. Notice of public hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city at least one (1) time fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing.
    3. Notice by first class mail to the boards of directors of all school districts affected by a proposed plan, ordinance, or regulation shall be provided sufficiently in advance to allow representatives of all affected school districts a reasonable opportunity to submit comments on any proposed plan, ordinance, or regulation.
  1. Following the public hearing, proposed plans may be adopted and proposed ordinances and regulations may be recommended as presented or in modified form by a majority vote of the entire commission.
  2. Following its adoption of plans and recommendation of ordinances and regulations, the commission shall certify adopted plans or recommended ordinances and regulations to the legislative body of the city for its adoption.
  3. The legislative body of the city may return the plans and recommended ordinances and regulations to the commission for further study or recertification or by a majority vote of the entire membership may adopt by ordinance or resolution the plans and recommended ordinances or regulations submitted by the commission. However, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the city council's authority to recall the ordinances and resolutions by a vote of a majority of the council.
  4. Following adoption by the legislative body, the adopted plans, ordinances, and regulations shall be filed in the office of the city clerk. The city clerk shall file the plans, ordinances, and regulations as pertain to the territory beyond the corporate limits with the county recorder of the counties in which territorial jurisdiction is being exercised.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 6; 1959, No. 128, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2830; Acts 2005, No. 2144, § 5.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment added (1)(C).

Case Notes

Construction.

Section 14-56-423 permits a change in the zoning plan, or rezoning, by a majority vote of the city council, without following the procedure requiring further planning by the commission as prescribed in this section. City of Russellville v. Banner Real Estate, 326 Ark. 673, 933 S.W.2d 803 (1996).

Compliance with Ordinance.

Nothing requires a city to create a planning commission or to delegate authority to it by ordinance; having chosen to do so, however, the city must abide by its own decisions until the ordinance is legally altered or repealed in accordance with the law. City of Fordyce v. Vaughn, 300 Ark. 554, 781 S.W.2d 6 (1989).

Substantial Compliance with Section.

Where zoning ordinance map was filed in city's planning and code enforcement office, and not the city clerk's office, and citizens who went to the clerk's office and asked for a zoning map were referred to the planning office, such a filing did not render the ordinance invalid as there was substantial compliance with the statute. Osborne v. City of Camden, 301 Ark. 420, 784 S.W.2d 596 (1990).

Cited: Corning v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972); Tillery v. Meadows Constr. Co., 284 Ark. 241, 681 S.W.2d 330 (1984).

14-56-423. Change in plans, etc.

After adoption of plans, ordinances, and regulations and proper filing in the offices of city clerk and county recorder, no alteration, amendment, extension, abridgement, or discontinuance of the plans, ordinances, or regulations may be made except in conformance with the procedure prescribed in § 14-56-422, or by a majority vote of the city council.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 6; 1959, No. 128, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2830.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section permits a change in the zoning plan, or rezoning, by a majority vote of the city council, without following the procedure requiring further planning by the commission as prescribed in § 14-56-422. City of Russellville v. Banner Real Estate, 326 Ark. 673, 933 S.W.2d 803 (1996).

Amendment Procedures.

Where ordinance did not provide for the alternative method of amendment of boundaries by vote of city council, but, instead, provided for amendment only through the complete planning procedure, such choice of procedures did not conflict with this section, for it simply continued to authorize the more extensive planning procedure. Taggart & Taggart Seed Co. v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570, 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983).

Where comprehensive zoning ordinance provided for amendment of boundaries only through complete planning procedure, such provision was mandatory, and subsequent ordinance attempting to change boundary without complying with procedural requirements was invalid. Taggart & Taggart Seed Co. v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570, 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983).

Cited: Corning v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972); Tillery v. Meadows Constr. Co., 284 Ark. 241, 681 S.W.2d 330 (1984).

14-56-424. Existing plans, etc.

  1. All plans, ordinances, regulations, or amendments thereto shall comply with the provisions of this subchapter.
  2. Nothing in this subchapter shall invalidate any plans, ordinances, or regulations duly adopted in accordance with the statutes in effect at the time of adoption.
  3. No alteration or amendments may be made to plans, ordinances, and regulations unless in conformity with the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2830.

Case Notes

Cited: Corning v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972); Tillery v. Meadows Constr. Co., 284 Ark. 241, 681 S.W.2d 330 (1984).

14-56-425. Appeals to circuit court.

    1. Appeals from the final administrative or quasi-judicial decision by the municipal body administering this subchapter shall be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county using the same procedure as for administrative appeals of the District Court Rules of the Supreme Court.
    2. The final administrative or quasi-judicial decision shall be tried de novo with the right to a trial by jury.
    1. Appeals from the passage of legislative rezoning decisions by the municipal governing body administering this subchapter shall be taken to the circuit court of the county in which the rezoning was authorized using the same procedure as for administrative appeals of the District Court Rules of the Supreme Court.
    2. The legislative rezoning decision shall be reviewed by the court, and the decision shall be upheld unless it is arbitrary or capricious or lacking a rational basis.

History. Acts 1957, No. 186, § 7; 1965, No. 134, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2830.1; Acts 2013, No. 749, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. In view of the decision in Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971), the word “legislative” following “administrative and quasi-judicial” has been deleted preceding “agencies” as unconstitutional.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Antley, Judicial Review of Non-Court Decisions: A Constitutionally Based Examination of Arkansas' Review System, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 425.

Recent Developments: Administrative Agencies–Appellate Procedure, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 511.

Case Note, Lost in Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs of Appeals Procedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 351.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not void for vagueness, notwithstanding the contention that it fails to give adequate notice of the proper procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of a city planning commission, since the statute's requirements may be adequately determined by reference to a prior decision of the court. Night Clubs, Inc. v. Fort Smith Planning Comm'n, 336 Ark. 130, 984 S.W.2d 418 (1999).

Administrative Agencies.

In spite of the language of Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971), which held this section unconstitutional when applied to allow de novo review of zoning or rezoning ordinances enacted by city legislative bodies, the provision of § 14-56-416 requiring appeals to a court of record from actions of a board of zoning adjustment is not subject to the constitutional limitations applicable to city council zoning actions because the board of adjustment acts administratively, not legislatively; appeals to the circuit court from the board of adjustment are permitted. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

Pursuant to this section, the city's Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) was an administrative agency and did not have power to legislate; the city's BZA was acting in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner when it denied the owner's variance request; the statute was constitutional as it did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, expressed in Ark. Const., Art. 4, § 2. City of Fort Smith v. McCutchen, 372 Ark. 541, 279 S.W.3d 78 (2008).

Collateral Attacks.

A city cannot test the validity of a building permit issued by its own agency by collaterally attacking its correctness in an original injunctive proceeding in chancery court. City of Paragould v. Leath, 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 76 (1979).

Compliance with Court Rules.

In landowner's challenge to a decision by the board of zoning adjustment that he had abandoned a nonconforming use of the property, the circuit court never had jurisdiction where the landowner failed to perfect his appeal in the time and manner provided by AICR 9. Board of Zoning Adjustment v. Cheek, 328 Ark. 18, 942 S.W.2d 821 (1997).

Trial court had jurisdiction to hear landowners' appeal as their affidavit was sufficient to comply with Pulaski County, Ark., Dist. Ct. R. 9(c) where the substance of the affidavit and the clerk's response made clear that the record was not available to the landowners on July 7 and would not be available until after it was transcribed and approved by the city board of directors. Nettles v. City of Little Rock, 96 Ark. App. 86, 238 S.W.3d 635 (2006).

Where the city council permitted a landowner to make curb cuts in front of his home that were contrary to the development plans' uniform design, the developers did not appeal that decision within thirty days as required by Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9. The trial court did not have jurisdiction over their complaint and appeal filed a year later; the developers did not file either a certified copy of the city council's proceedings or an affidavit stating that they could not timely file the record. Franks v. Mt. View, 99 Ark. App. 205, 258 S.W.3d 799 (2007).

Landowner's complaint filed in circuit court was not an appeal of final action taken by the City Council, but was, instead, a complaint against the mayor based on his alleged failure to comply with a mandatory duty; therefore, this section did not apply, and the landowner was not required to comply with the directives of Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9, and the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction of his claims. Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009).

Because a construction company failed to perfect its appeal of the final decision of a city's planning commission in the time and manner provided by Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear it, and the commission's decision was a final action under this section since it ended the controversy and left no issues to be resolved as to the right-of-way requirement; because the decision was a final action, the company was required to comply with the directives of Rule 9 in filing an appeal, but it did not file its complaint until more than thirty days after the commission's decision, and failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 9 prevented the trial court from acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction. Ark. Constr. & Excavation, LLC v. City of Maumelle, 2009 Ark. App. 874 (2009).

Procedure.

When property owners and builder requested a writ of mandamus in circuit court, challenging a city's stop-work order on a building permit issued to the builder to construct a garage, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction as the builder and property owners prematurely circumvented the appellate process by filing a writ of mandamus prior to the board of zoning adjustment's reaching a final decision on the matter. Douglas v. City of Cabot, 347 Ark. 1, 59 S.W.3d 430 (2001).

Property owners' appeal of a trial court's order dismissing the property owners' challenge to an action taken by a city planning commission regarding a proposed mobile home park, on the grounds that the owners' lacked standing to bring the challenge, was dismissed by the appellate court for lack of jurisdiction because the commission's action was not final for the purposes of this section; although the term “final action” is not defined in this section, the court used principles drawn from other cases dealing with different issues and determined that the commission's action was not final, as there were several issues that still needed to be considered by the commission before it took final action on the proposal. Stromwall v. City of Springdale Planning Comm'n, 350 Ark. 281, 86 S.W.3d 844 (2002).

By enacting the ordinance in question, the board approved the recommended action and amended a prior ordinance, but it rezoned the subject property and added new conditions to accommodate the rezoning, and thus the board took legislative action delegated to it under § 14-56-402; because the action was not administrative, the landowners who challenged the ordinance were not required to proceed under this section and the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. Summit Mall Co. v. Lemond, 355 Ark. 190, 132 S.W.3d 725 (2003).

Circuit court correctly granted the motion on the pleadings as to the property owner's counts against the city and planning commission for deprivation of property as the owner's appeal, filed two years after the city's decision, was well outside the 30-day requirement and was thus untimely; because the counts had nothing to do with action by the city council, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark. 129, 133 S.W.3d 382 (2003).

Developer's appeal to circuit court of city council's conditional final approval of a subdivision plat was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where it was filed more than 30 days after the conditional approval was issued. Green v. City of Jacksonville, 357 Ark. 517, 182 S.W.3d 124 (2004).

Property owners' appeal of the denial of nonconforming use status was improperly dismissed because their appeal was perfected under Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 and this section by the timely filing of the record in circuit court; Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 did not apply because there was no requirement of service of summons and complaint for the appeal and, to the extent that Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409, 961 S.W.2d 28 (1998), was inconsistent, it was overruled. Wright v. City of Little Rock, 366 Ark. 96, 233 S.W.3d 644 (2006).

Because a property owner did not appeal to the circuit court the decision of the Code Enforcement Board of Zoning Adjustments and Appeal declaring his property a nuisance, he was barred from raising the issue on appeal. Trice v. City of Pine Bluff, 2017 Ark. App. 638, 536 S.W.3d 139 (2017).

Trial De Novo.

This section requires that appeals from the board of adjustment to the circuit court be tried de novo on the same issue that was pending before the board. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 290, 420 S.W.2d 85 (1967).

In an appeal from action of a board of zoning adjustment denying a variance, the petitioners were entitled to present their petition for a variance anew and have it tried de novo. City of Little Rock v. Leawood Property Owners Ass'n, 242 Ark. 451, 413 S.W.2d 877 (1967).

In an appeal to the circuit court from a board of zoning adjustment, it was error for the circuit court to review the decision of the board only as to whether or not there was substantial evidence in the record of the hearing before the board to support the ruling of the board instead of trying the petition for a variance de novo. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 290, 420 S.W.2d 85 (1967).

A de novo hearing on appeal is proper when the appeal is from actions taken by administrative boards, commissions, and agencies exercising adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. McCammon v. Boyer, 285 Ark. 288, 686 S.W.2d 421 (1985); City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Review de novo of a legislative act is unconstitutional. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Where appeal to the circuit court was from action of the City Council on application of its zoning regulations rather than from the enactment of them, de novo review was proper. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).

Pursuant to this section, “appeals” to circuit court are not limited proceedings where the circuit court merely conducts a substantial evidence review but instead, are trials de novo. Carmical v. McAfee, 68 Ark. App. 313, 7 S.W.3d 350 (1999).

City council meeting where the council denied landowner's request to split his lots was the final decision for purposes of triggering the time limit on when to appeal under this section. Combs v. City of Springdale, 336 Ark. 31, 233 S.W.3d 130 (2006).

Rational basis circuit court review of denial of a conditional use permit for operation of a group home was improper, as an Arkansas municipality's decision granting or denying an application for conditional use under a zoning ordinance was a quasi-judicial act requiring a de novo review by the circuit court under this section. King's Ranch of Jonesboro, Inc. v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. 123 (2011).

Although the circuit court did err in its statement of the standard of review applicable to factual findings of the Board of Adjustment by citing the substantial evidence standard of review rather than the de novo standard required under this section, no prejudice could possibly have resulted from the error because there was no dispute regarding the relevant facts: the case was submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment and decided on undisputed facts. Loca Luna, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment, 2013 Ark. App. 336 (2013).

Zoning Cases.

Because the city council's decision to deny a developer's petition to rezone land was legislative, this section did not apply and the judicial branch did not have the authority to review the decision de novo. As the city council expressed legitimate concerns about traffic and safety, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that its zoning decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 2009 Ark. 504, 344 S.W.3d 660 (2009).

Although this section allowed for a jury trial in a circuit court in an appeal from a zoning board's decision, appellees also asserted a claim in equity for a private nuisance and only sought injunctive relief; thus, the circuit court erred by submitting the private nuisance claim to a jury. Ludwig v. Bella Casa, LLC, 2010 Ark. 435, 372 S.W.3d 792 (2010).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting an adjacent city's motion to dismiss a town's declaratory judgment action because the town was presented the opportunity to adduce any additional evidence; although the circuit court made a collateral finding that the adjacent city's zoning decision was not arbitrary or capricious, it nonetheless set the matter for a hearing on the remaining merits, at which time the legislative decision to rezone the property would be reviewed. City of Bethel Heights v. City of Springdale, 2017 Ark. App. 81, 514 S.W.3d 472 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in granting an adjacent city summary judgment in a town's action alleging that the adjacent city's rezoning was not compatible with or equivalent to those of the adjacent lands in the town as required by § 14-56-306. By providing affidavits and exhibits, the adjacent city established a prima facie case that its rezoning of property from agricultural to industrial was a use that was compatible with the zoned uses of the town, and the plaintiff town did not meet proof with proof. City of Bethel Heights v. City of Springdale, 2017 Ark. App. 81, 514 S.W.3d 472 (2017).

Cited: Osage Oil & Transp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 260 Ark. 448, 541 S.W.2d 922 (1976); Corder v. City of Sherwood, 579 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Talley v. City of N. Little Rock, 2009 Ark. 601, 381 S.W.3d 753 (2009).

14-56-426. Control of property use — Proximity to military installation.

  1. A city of the first class in this state within five (5) miles of an active-duty United States Air Force military installation shall enact a city ordinance specifying that within five (5) miles of the corporate limits, future uses on property that might be hazardous to aircraft operation shall be restricted or prohibited.
  2. The ordinance shall restrict or prohibit future uses within the five-mile area which:
    1. Release into the air any substance that would impair visibility or otherwise interfere with the operation of aircraft, i.e., steam, dust, or smoke;
    2. Produce light emissions, either direct or indirect, that are reflective and that would interfere with pilot vision;
    3. Produce electrical emissions that would interfere with aircraft communications systems or navigational equipment;
    4. Attract birds or waterfowl, including, but not limited to, the operation of sanitary landfills, maintenance of feeding stations, or the growing of certain vegetation;
    5. Provide for structures within ten feet (10') of aircraft approach, departure, or transitional surfaces; or
    6. Expose persons to noise greater than sixty-five (65) decibels.
  3. The ordinance shall restrict or prohibit future uses within the five-mile area that violate the height restriction criteria of Federal Aviation Regulation, 14 C.F.R. Part 77, Subpart C.
    1. The ordinance shall be consistent with recommendations in the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study for Little Rock Air Force Base, dated June 2011 and prepared by the United States Air Force.
    2. Interpretations of such an ordinance shall take into account recommendations or studies with a view toward protection of the public and maintenance of safe aircraft operations.
  4. The ordinance shall not prohibit single-family residential use on tracts one (1) acre or more in area, provided that future construction shall comply with Guidelines for the Sound Insulation of Residences Exposed to Aircraft Operations, Wyle Research Report WR 89-7, which construction shall be regulated and inspected by the city's existing building permit and inspection ordinances and procedures.

History. Acts 1995, No. 530, §§ 1-5; 2005, No. 540, § 1; 2017, No. 602, §§ 1, 2.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this subchapter” in §§ 14-56-40114-56-425 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment substituted “sixty-five (65)” for “seventy-five (75)” in (b)(6); and substituted “April 2003” for “October 1992” in (d)(1).

The 2017 amendment, in (a), substituted “A city” for “Any city” and “five (5) miles of” for “which there lies, in whole in part”; and substituted “in the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study for Little Rock Air Force Base, dated June 2011 and prepared by the United States Air Force” for “or studies made by the United States Air Force entitled Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study, Volumes I, II, and III, dated April 2003” in (d)(1).

Subchapter 5 — Metropolitan or Regional Planning Commissions

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1955, No. 26, is also codified as § 14-17-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 8: Feb. 1, 1955. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined by the General Assembly that many cities and counties are faced with many problems which have arisen due to increased population, expansion of urban areas, and many other problems which have resulted from improper planning and which have resulted in the endangering of the health, safety and welfare of the people of such areas and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to alleviate such conditions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note, Property — Zoning — The Courts Further Define Their Limited Role. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981). 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279.

14-56-501. Provisions supplemental.

  1. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to remove or limit the powers of the cooperating cities and counties as provided by state law.
  2. All legislative power with respect to zoning and other planning legislation shall remain with the governing body of the cooperating cities and counties.
  3. Each participating city or county may continue to have its own planning commission or board but may, under the joint agreement and in the interest of economy and efficiency and in the interest of uniform standards and procedures, request the metropolitan or regional planning commission to assume duties and functions of local planning agencies, in whole or in part.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2824.

14-56-502. Authority generally.

Any two (2) or more cities of the first class, cities of the second class, incorporated towns, or counties, or other civil subdivisions having adjoining planning jurisdictions, or any counties, and cities within or adjacent to the county, may jointly cooperate in the exercise and performance of planning powers, duties, and functions as provided by state law for cities and counties.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2820.

Case Notes

Annexation.

Since this subchapter concerning the establishment, powers, and duties of a joint planning commission in no way deals with annexation, the annexation of an area to a city will not be denied because the annexation has not been approved by a planning commission. City of Sherwood v. Hardin, 230 Ark. 762, 325 S.W.2d 75 (1959).

14-56-503. Contents of joint agreement.

  1. The cooperating cities and counties which join to create a metropolitan or regional planning commission, through joint agreement, shall determine the number and qualifications of the members of the commission.
  2. The joint agreement shall also provide for the manner of cooperation and the means and methods of the operation and functioning of the commission, including the employment of a director of planning and such staff and consultants as it may require, the proportionate share of costs and expenses, and the purchase of property and materials for the use of the commission.
  3. The joint agreement may also allow for the addition of other public bodies to the cooperative arrangement.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 3; 1967, No. 29, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2822.

14-56-504. Establishment of commission.

  1. When two (2) or more cities and counties shall adopt joint planning cooperation by ordinance, resolution, rule, or order, there shall be established a joint planning commission for the metropolitan area or region comprising the area coterminous with the areas of planning jurisdiction of the cities or counties cooperating jointly.
  2. A joint planning agency for the metropolitan area or region may be empowered to carry into effect such provisions of state law relating to planning which are authorized for the joining cities or counties and which each may, under existing laws, separately exercise and perform.
  3. Any other public authority or agency which operates within, wholly or in part, the area covered by this joint planning cooperation may likewise join with the cooperating cities or counties in cooperative planning through resolution of its governing board or commission.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2820.

14-56-505. Purpose of commission.

The general purpose of a metropolitan or regional planning commission shall be to make those studies and plans for the development of the metropolitan area or region that will:

  1. Guide the unified development of the area;
  2. Eliminate planning duplication;
  3. Promote economy and efficiency in the coordinated development of the area; and
  4. Promote the general welfare and prosperity of its people.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2821.

14-56-506. Duty of commission.

The metropolitan or regional planning commission shall have the duty and function of promoting public interest and understanding of the economic and social necessity for long-term coordinated planning for the metropolitan or regional area, but its official recommendations shall be made to the governing bodies or the county judges of the cooperating cities or counties.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2824.

14-56-507. Plans and recommendations.

    1. The metropolitan or regional commission shall make plans for development for the area. These plans may include, but shall not be limited to, recommendations for principal highways, bridges, airports, parks and recreational areas, schools and public institutions, and public utilities.
    2. Any metropolitan or regional plan so developed shall be based on studies of physical, social, economic, and governmental conditions and trends.
  1. The plans and its recommendations may, in whole or in part, be adopted by the governing bodies of the cooperating cities and counties as the general plans of such cities and counties.
    1. The commission may also assist the cities and counties within its area of jurisdiction in carrying out any regional plans developed by the commission; and
    2. The commission may also assist any planning commission, board, or agency of the cooperating cities or counties in the preparation or effectuation of local plans and planning consistent with the program of the commission.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2821.

14-56-508. Receipt of funds.

A metropolitan or regional planning commission established under the provisions of this subchapter is authorized to receive, for its own uses and purposes, any funds or moneys from any participating city or county, from the state or federal government, and to receive from any other source any other funds including bequests, gifts, donations, or contributions.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2823.

14-56-509. Appropriations.

The participating cities and counties, or other public bodies, are authorized to appropriate funds for the expenses and costs required by the metropolitan or regional planning commission in the performance of its purposes and functions.

History. Acts 1955, No. 26, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-2823.

Subchapter 6 — Commercial Medical Waste Incinerators

Cross References. County planning, commercial medical waste incinerators, § 14-17-401 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 7: Feb. 24, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the powers of local governments in Arkansas to regulate the construction or operation of commercial medical waste incinerators are vague or incomplete; that the unregulated incineration of commercial medical waste poses a threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Arkansas cities and counties; and therefore commercial medical waste incinerators should be made subject to the regulation by and control of local governments in Arkansas. Therefore, in order to clearly establish the authority of local governments to limit and regulate commercial medical waste incinerators, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-56-601. Definition.

“Commercial medical waste” means any medical waste transported from a generator to an off-site facility for disposal where such off-site disposal facility is engaged in medical waste disposal for profit.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 3 is also codified as § 14-17-401.

14-56-602. Authorization to establish zones.

Notwithstanding any and all laws regarding municipal planning and zoning, all cities of the first and second class and all incorporated towns in Arkansas are authorized to establish, by ordinance, zones to limit or to regulate the construction or operation, or both, of commercial medical waste incinerators within the corporate limits of the city or town.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 1.

14-56-603. Enforcement.

The commercial medical waste incinerator zoning ordinance shall be enforced through the issuance or denial of building and use permits in accordance with the conditions and terms of the limitations and regulations established by the ordinance.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 1.

14-56-604. Unlawful construction or operation.

When the city or town council shall have laid off zones, by ordinance, to limit or to regulate the construction or operation, or both, of commercial medical waste incinerators, it shall be unlawful for anyone to construct or to operate a commercial medical waste incinerator within a given zone except in accordance with any building and use permits issued for the incinerator.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 1.

14-56-605. Violation — Penalty — Injunction.

    1. Violation of any provision of an ordinance adopted as authorized by this subchapter shall be considered a misdemeanor.
    2. Each day's violation shall be considered a separate offense.
  1. The city or town adopting the ordinance or any individual aggrieved by a violation of the ordinance may request an injunction against any commercial medical waste incinerator or property owner who is in violation of the ordinance.

History. Acts 1993, No. 199, § 1.

Chapter 57 Regulation and Taxation of Vehicles by Municipalities

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 481.

C.J.S. 62 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., §§ 307, 308.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. General authority to license carriages etc., kept for hire, § 14-54-1403.

Motor vehicular traffic powers of local authorities, § 27-49-106.

Regulation of the transportation of articles generally, § 14-54-103.

Effective Dates. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 95: effective on passage.

Acts 1901, No. 89, § 2: effective on passage.

14-57-101. Regulation of cabs and buses.

The city council shall have the power in cities of the first class to establish, by ordinance, stands for taxicabs and buses and enforce the observance and use thereof, and to fix the rates and prices for the transportation of persons and property in cabs and buses from one (1) part of the city to another.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 7, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7597; Pope's Dig., § 9683; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3501.

14-57-102. Unlawful riding on cars.

All cities and incorporated towns shall have the power to pass ordinances prohibiting persons from unlawful riding on cars within the limits of the city or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1901, No. 89, § 1, p. 154; C. & M. Dig., § 7531; Pope's Dig., § 9600; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3502.

14-57-103. Regulation of tire width.

The city council shall have the power, in cities of the first class, to prescribe, by ordinance, the width of the tire of all wagons, carts, drays, and other vehicles used in transportation of persons or articles from one (1) part of the city to another, or in the transportation of coal, wood, stone, lumber, or iron into the city.

History. Acts 1875, No. 1, § 7, p. 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7597; Pope's Dig., § 9683; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3501.

14-57-104. Tax on certain wheeled vehicles.

  1. Cities of the first class are authorized to require residents of the city to pay a tax for the privilege of keeping and using wheeled vehicles, except motor vehicles and bicycles.
  2. The tax shall be appropriated and used exclusively for repairing and improving streets of the city.

History. Acts 1901, No. 66, § 1, p. 113; C. & M. Dig., § 7749; Pope's Dig., § 10047; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3505.

Case Notes

Motor Vehicles.

This section, as applied to automobiles was held repealed by § 27-14-702, which provides that the owner of a motor vehicle who shall have obtained a certificate as provided shall not be required to obtain any other license or permits to use and operate the vehicle. City of Helena v. Dunlap, 102 Ark. 131, 143 S.W. 138 (1912).

This section was not repealed but was modified as to motor vehicles only. Van Buren v. Lawson, 160 Ark. 631, 255 S.W. 295 (1923).

Subchapter 2 — Motor Carriers Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1931, No. 239, § 3: approved Mar. 24, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “The licensing and regulation of taxicabs and other carriers within the cities of Arkansas being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 126, § 3: approved Feb. 24, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Due to requirements made by certain municipal Governments in this State that operators of motor propelled vehicles for transportation of persons for compensation, carry a large amount of liability insurance which cannot be written in this State, many persons, firms, corporations, and associations of persons are prohibited from operating motor propelled vehicles for the transportation of persons for compensation and therefore, are losing large sums of money invested in such enterprise and will thereby suffer irreparable injury if they cannot secure immediate relief, and will thereby be deprived of their property and the use thereof; an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after the day of its passage.”

14-57-201. Right to regulate and tax.

Municipalities within the state shall have the right to regulate and tax all motor carriers operating within their corporate limits transporting persons or freight both originating at and destined to points within the corporate limits of the same city or town, or transporting from one (1) city or town to another city or town whose corporate limits join each other, or within a radius of five (5) miles beyond any such corporate limits of cities or towns, or for occasional trips of ten (10) miles beyond any such corporate limits, and shall not be governed by, or amenable to, the provisions of § 23-13-103 in regulating or taxing vehicles used for these purposes.

History. Acts 1931, No. 239, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9734; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3510.

Case Notes

Wreckers.

This section was held not to exempt automobile wreckers. Gates v. Reese, 185 Ark. 883, 50 S.W.2d 236 (1932).

14-57-202. Cash indemnity bonds of passenger carriers.

In any case where ordinances of any municipality require persons, firms, corporations, or associations operating motor-propelled vehicles for transportation of persons for compensation to procure liability insurance or indemnity bonds, it shall be a substantial compliance with the ordinances if the persons, firms, corporations, or associations furnish a cash indemnity bond conditioned on the same conditions as required on liability insurance policies and in such amount as required for liability insurance policies.

History. Acts 1937, No. 126, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10048; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3511.

Subchapter 3 — Regulation of Taxicab Operators

Cross References. Liability insurance prerequisite to licensing, § 27-14-1501.

Effective Dates. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 10: Mar. 9, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “By reason of the fact that confusion and uncertainty now exist as to where the power to license and regulate the business herein referred to is vested, which confusion and uncertainty should be eliminated, and by reason of the further fact that the control and regulation of such business in cities of the first class ought immediately to be clearly vested in the municipalities in which such businesses and activities are respectively carried on, an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force immediately after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1947, No. 392, § 4: Mar. 28, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “By reason of the fact that confusion and uncertainty exists in some cities of the second class by reason of the unrestricted, uncontrolled and unregulated operation of taxicabs is carried on and by the reason of the fact that the control and regulation in such business in cities of the second class ought immediately to be vested in the municipalities in which businesses are respectively carried on an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety and welfare, shall take effect and be in force immediately after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 238, § 4: Mar. 8, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the requirement of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in a bank as a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit to operate a taxi service is unduly restrictive, harsh, unjustified, and obsolete; that the reason for this requirement originally was to insure a solvent and responsible operator; that since the passage of the original Act, each taxi must have liability coverage under Section 1 of Act 485 of 1949, as amended, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a motor vehicle license; and that, in order to remove this obsolete provision, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The unconstitutionality of Acts 1939, No. 213, § 7, does not affect the validity of the remaining sections of the act which are separable from § 7 and are sufficient alone to constitute a workable act. North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of North Little Rock, 207 Ark. 976, 184 S.W.2d 52 (1944).

14-57-301. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Taxicab” means motor-driven vehicles having a seating capacity not in excess of seven (7) passengers and used for the transportation of persons for hire. Included within the meaning of the term shall not be any vehicle have a seating capacity in excess of seven (7) passengers and employed in transporting persons over regular routes having fixed termini or upon regular schedules of operation;
  2. “Taxicab operator” means any person, firm, association, or corporation owning and operating taxicabs.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3512.

Case Notes

Taxicab.

Section 14-57-307 did not apply to mini buses operated by a mass transportation service where the mini buses did not fit within the definition of a “taxicab.” Razorback Cab of Ft. Smith, Inc. v. Flowers, 122 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 1997).

Cited: Carr v. City of El Dorado, 217 Ark. 423, 230 S.W.2d 485 (1950).

14-57-302. Exclusive power to regulate.

Cities of the first and second class are vested, within their respective corporate limits, with the exclusive power and authority to permit, regulate, and control, by ordinance, the business and operation of motor-driven taxicabs over or upon the streets and public ways of their respective municipalities. This power and authority shall include the right to approve or disapprove, to prescribe or reject, and to enforce maximum rates and tariffs to be charged for services rendered by any taxicab operator in these cities and to enforce, by such suitable penalties and forfeitures as may be fixed by ordinance, all regulations, rates, and tariffs that may be approved or prescribed.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 2; 1947, No. 392, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3513.

Case Notes

Criminal Offenders.

Section 17-1-103, which states a broad policy of rehabilitating those who have been convicted of a crime, does not conflict with this section, which allows cities to regulate the operation of taxicabs, because § 17-1-103 does not attempt to give a person a right to a particular job; therefore, the city ordinance which prohibited the issuance of a taxicab driver's permit to any person convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors within the past three years did not violate Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 4, which prohibits cities from enacting local laws contrary to state statute. Bolden v. Watt, 290 Ark. 343, 719 S.W.2d 428 (1986).

Revocation of Permits.

Where the city issued a permit to operate a taxicab and the permittee failed to operate a cab for approximately a year, the city was justified in revoking the permit for noncompliance. Veteran's Taxicab Co. v. City of Ft. Smith, 213 Ark. 687, 212 S.W.2d 341 (1948).

14-57-303. Approval and review of rates, etc.

  1. No rate, tariff, or regulation shall be approved or prescribed by any first class or second class city, except after due and reasonable notice to each and every taxicab operator affected shall have been given and after adequate opportunity to be heard with respect thereto shall have been afforded to each and every taxicab operator.
    1. Any rate, tariff, or regulation approved, disapproved, prescribed, or rejected shall be subject to judicial review.
      1. On review, they shall be sustained if reasonable and adequate to permit a fair, just, and reasonable return to the operator.
      2. If unreasonable, confiscatory, or inadequate to permit a fair and reasonable return to the operator, they shall be annulled.
    2. No court shall, in any event, however, have any power or jurisdiction to make or fix rates, tariffs, or regulations.
  2. All rates, tariffs, and regulations initiated, prescribed, approved, or enforced by any municipality shall apply equally and uniformly to all taxicab operators in the municipality.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3514.

Case Notes

Graduated Rates.

This subchapter conferring power to municipalities in their exercise of police power to pass ordinances imposing an occupational tax on taxis does not authorize the imposition of a graduated tax, and such an ordinance is void. Baldwin v. City of Blytheville, 212 Ark. 975, 208 S.W.2d 458 (1948).

14-57-304. Permit required.

  1. No person, firm, corporation, or association shall engage in or carry on the business referred to in § 14-57-302 in cities of the first or second class without first procuring from the governing body of the municipality in which it is proposed to operate a permit so to do.
  2. Governing bodies of these cities are authorized to grant or to refuse these permits.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 4; 1947, No. 392, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3515.

Case Notes

Issuance and Revocation.

The city commissioner has authority to issue or revoke a permit to operate a taxicab. Veteran's Taxicab Co. v. City of Ft. Smith, 213 Ark. 687, 212 S.W.2d 341 (1948).

14-57-305. Application for permit.

Before granting any permit under § 14-57-304, the governing body shall require the seeker of the permit to file with it an application, verified by oath and setting forth the facts showing his qualification to render the service for which he seeks the permit, together with the facts which he considers justified, and require the rendering to the public of the service.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 5; 1947, No. 392, § 3; 1967, No. 238, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3516.

14-57-306. Surety bond requirement.

  1. No permit shall be granted under § 14-57-304 until and unless the applicant shall file with the governing body of the city or town a surety bond of a corporate surety authorized to do business in this state, in such amount as the city or town shall determine, conditioned upon the applicant establishing, maintaining, and continuing the proposed service until such time as the permit issued to applicant is cancelled, withdrawn, or has expired.
  2. If the applicant fails to comply with the provisions of the bond, the city or town shall forfeit such amount of the bond as it shall deem necessary to adequately compensate the city or town for loss of the applicant's service.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 5; 1947, No. 392, § 3; 1967, No. 238, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3516.

14-57-307. Hearing on application.

  1. Upon the filing of an application, the city shall cause to be given to each and every taxicab operator in the city a due and reasonable notice, in writing. Notice of the hearing shall set forth the time and place of the hearing. The hearing shall be conducted by the governing body of the city for all persons interested in, or affected by, the application.
  2. All persons interested in, or affected by, the application, including all carriers at the time rendering any type of for-hire service in the city, shall have the right either in person or by representatives of their own choosing, to be present at all such hearings and to introduce evidence and to be heard either in support of, or in opposition to, the application.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3517.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section did not apply to mini buses operated by a mass transportation service where the mini buses did not fit within the definition of a “taxicab.” Razorback Cab of Ft. Smith, Inc. v. Flowers, 122 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 1997).

Cited: Carr v. City of El Dorado, 217 Ark. 423, 230 S.W.2d 485 (1950).

14-57-308. Judicial review.

Any final action of the governing body of the municipality in respect to any application shall be subject to judicial review.

History. Acts 1939, No. 213, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3518.

Subchapter 4 — Taxicab and Bus Drivers

Effective Dates. Acts 1919, No. 557, § 5: approved Mar. 28, 1919. Emergency declared.

14-57-401. Penalty.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to employ another, who is under the age of twenty-one (21) years, to operate or drive a taxicab or bus for hire, or otherwise, in cities of the first class in this state. Any person found guilty of a violation of this subchapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00) for each offense.

History. Acts 1919, No. 557, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 7443; Pope's Dig., § 6655; Acts 1941, No. 346, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3522.

14-57-402. Unlawful for minors to operate.

It shall be unlawful for any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years to operate any taxicab or bus service for hire, or otherwise, in a city of the first class in the State of Arkansas or to drive a bus or taxicab, as employee, partner, or otherwise, for another.

History. Acts 1919, No. 557, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 7440; Pope's Dig., § 6652; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3519.

14-57-403. Persons not licensed.

No person who is under the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be licensed to drive a bus or taxicab for hire, or otherwise, in any city of the first class in the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1919, No. 557, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 7441; Pope's Dig., § 6653; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3520.

14-57-404. Proof of age required.

Before anyone shall be licensed to drive a bus or taxicab in this state, satisfactory proof must be made that the applicant is twenty-one (21) years of age or over and of good moral character.

History. Acts 1919, No. 557, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 7442; Pope's Dig., § 6654; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3521.

Subchapter 5 — Parking Meters Generally

14-57-501. Authority to install.

Cities of the first and second class are authorized, upon the passage of a municipal ordinance, to install parking meters on the streets and other municipally owned property of the city.

History. Acts 1953, No. 89, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3533.

Case Notes

Initiative and Referendum.

A city has no power to enter into any contract or to enact any ordinance which would limit the rights of the citizens under the initiative and referendum amendment of the Arkansas constitution. Duncan Parking Meter Corp. v. City of Gurdon, 146 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Ark. 1956).

14-57-502. Ordinances subject to initiative and referendum.

Any municipal ordinance authorizing the installation of parking meters shall not be subject to an emergency clause. Nothing in this subchapter shall limit the rights of the people under the Initiated and Referendum Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1953, No. 89, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3534.

Cross References. Initiative and Referendum, Ark. Const. Amend. 7.

Subchapter 6 — Parking Meter Revenues

Effective Dates. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 12: Mar. 19, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “Because there are many municipalities that have immediate need for funds in order to provide rights-of-way or to improve streets and thoroughfares within their corporate limits, it is hereby ascertained and declared that an emergency exists; and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force upon its passage and approval.”

14-57-601. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Municipality” means an incorporated town or a city of the first or second class;
  2. “Net revenues” means that part of the revenue derived by a municipality from the operation of parking meters which remains each year after paying all costs of operation and maintenance for that year, making adequate provisions for depreciation and obsolescence, and providing for the payments due that year on any indebtedness of the municipality arising from the purchase or installation, or both, of the parking meters and payable out of the revenues from the meters; and
  3. “Legislative body” means the council of any municipality, or the city commission if the municipality has a commission form of government.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3523.

14-57-602. Construction.

This subchapter, being necessary for the public health, safety, and welfare, shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3532.

14-57-603. Provisions exclusive.

Without reference to any other statute, this subchapter shall be deemed full authority for the issuance and sale of the bonds authorized by this subchapter. No petition or election or other or further proceedings in respect to the issuance or sale of bonds under this subchapter, and no publication of any resolution, ordinance, notice, or proceeding relating to such issuance or sale of such bonds shall be required except such as are prescribed by this subchapter, any provisions of other statutes of the state to the contrary notwithstanding.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3531.

14-57-604. Use of revenues.

  1. Any municipality in the State of Arkansas owning and operating parking meters may use the net revenues derived from this ownership and operation for:
    1. The purchase of real estate to be used for parking lots;
    2. The purchase of rights-of-way for the construction of public streets, alleys, and boulevards or for the construction of, widening, straightening, paving, resurfacing, lighting, or otherwise improving streets, alleys, and boulevards;
    3. The purchase, development, and improvement of public parks located within or without the corporate limits of the municipality;
    4. The purchase of fire fighting apparatus and fire alarm systems;
    5. The purchase of sites for, construction of, and equipment of city halls and prisons;
    6. Buildings for housing of fire fighting apparatus;
    7. Buildings for the police department; and
    8. The construction and equipment of any municipal complex.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any municipality to use these revenues, to issue or sell revenue bonds, or to use the proceeds thereof to purchase, condemn, or otherwise acquire any utility, plant, property, or facilities owned or operated by any regulated utility.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 2; 1965, No. 156, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3524.

14-57-605. Election for issuance of revenue bonds.

    1. Whenever the legislative body of any municipality shall determine to exercise the power granted by this subchapter, it shall state the purpose and cause an estimate to be made of cost of such purpose.
      1. If the cost is greater than the legislative body deems should be paid in a single year, it shall, by ordinance, provide for an election to be called for the issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions of this subchapter.
      2. The ordinance shall set forth:
        1. A brief description of the purpose of the bond issue. If for more than one (1) purpose, provision shall be made in the ordinance for balloting on each separate purpose;
        2. The estimated cost thereof;
        3. The amount of the bond issue;
        4. The rate of interest;
        5. The time of payment; and
        6. Other details in connection with the issuance of bonds.
    1. The election shall be held and conducted and the vote thereof canvassed and the result declared under the law and in the manner provided for municipal elections, so far as it may be applicable, except as otherwise provided in this section.
      1. Notice of the election shall be given by the presiding officer of the legislative body of the issuing municipality by advertisement once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in the municipality or, if no newspaper is published therein, in a newspaper having a bona fide and general circulation therein.
        1. The first publication shall be not less than thirty (30) days prior to the date of the election.
        2. This shall be the sole notice required for the election.
    2. Only qualified voters of the municipality shall have the right to vote at the election.
      1. The result of the election, after the vote has been canvassed by the county board of election commissioners, shall be proclaimed by the presiding officer of the legislative body. His proclamation shall be published one (1) time in some newspaper published in the municipality or, if none is published therein, in a newspaper having a bona fide circulation therein.
      2. The result as proclaimed shall be conclusive unless attacked in the courts within thirty (30) days after the date of the publication of the proclamation.
    3. The expenses of the election shall be paid in the manner prescribed by law.
    4. In the event a majority of electors voting in the election approve the issuance of the bonds, the legislative body shall then have power to issue bonds, which shall bear interest at not more than five percent (5%) per annum, payable semiannually. The bonds shall be payable at such times, not exceeding thirty (30) years from their date, as shall be prescribed by the ordinance authorizing their issuance.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3525.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Municipal Improvement Bonds in Arkansas, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 146.

14-57-606. Form and sale of bonds.

    1. Bonds issued under the provisions of this subchapter shall be negotiable instruments and shall be executed by the presiding officer and clerk or recorder of the legislative body of the issuing municipality, and shall be sealed with the corporate seal of the municipality.
    2. In the case any of the officers whose signatures appear on the bonds or coupons shall cease to be such officers before the delivery of the bonds, their signatures shall, nevertheless, be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if they had remained in office until the delivery.
  1. The bonds may be sold at not less than ninety cents (90¢) on the dollar, and they may be sold with the privilege of converting to a lower interest rate if, by such conversion, the municipality shall receive no less and pay no more than it would receive or pay if the bonds were not converted.
    1. The bonds shall be sold at a public sale after advertisement once a week for three (3) weeks in some newspaper published in the county in which the municipality lies.
    2. The first publication shall be not less than twenty (20) days before the date fixed for the sale.
  2. The bonds shall be sold for cash, and the proceeds derived therefrom shall be used exclusively for the purpose for which the bonds are issued.
  3. The bonds may be sold and issued all at one (1) time or they may be sold and issued in parcels as funds are needed.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3526.

Cross References. Form of bonds, § 19-9-101.

14-57-607. Bonds payable from meter revenues.

  1. Bonds issued under the provisions of this subchapter shall be payable solely from the net revenues derived by the municipality from the ownership and operation of the parking meters, which net revenues may be pledged for the payment of these bonds.
    1. The revenue bonds shall not in any event constitute an indebtedness of the municipality within the meaning of the constitutional provisions or limitations.
    2. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that the bond has been issued under the provisions of this subchapter and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the municipality within any constitutional or statutory limitation.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3527.

14-57-608. Pledge not to discontinue operation of meters.

A municipality issuing revenue bonds for the payment of which it pledges the net revenues derived from the ownership and operation of parking meters shall, by the favorable vote at the election for the purpose of issuing the revenue bonds, be construed to have made a binding contract with the holders of the bonds that the municipality will not remove or discontinue the operation of the parking meters until the revenue bonds, and all interest thereon, for the payment of which the net revenues have been pledged, have been paid in full.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3528.

14-57-609. Default in payment of bonds.

  1. If there is a default in the payment of the principal of, or interest on, any of the revenue bonds authorized by this subchapter, any court having jurisdiction, in any proper action, may appoint a receiver to take charge of and operate the parking meters, with power to charge and collect rates sufficient to provide for the payment of the bonds, and interest thereon, after providing for the payment, if any, of the operating expenses of the property, and to apply the income and revenues derived from the property in conformity with this subchapter and the ordinance providing for the issuance of the bonds.
  2. When the default has been cured, the receivership shall be ended.
  3. This suit may be brought by the holder of any bond issued under the provisions of this subchapter or of any coupon representing interest accrued thereon.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3529.

14-57-610. Acceleration of maturities — Priorities.

  1. The ordinance authorizing the issuance of the revenue bonds may contain provisions for the acceleration of the maturities of all unmatured bonds in the event of default in the payment of any principal or interest maturing under the bond issue, or upon failure to meet any sinking fund requirements, or in any other event stipulated in the ordinance; and such provisions will be binding.
  2. The priorities as between successive issues of revenue bonds may also be controlled by the provisions of the ordinance.

History. Acts 1951, No. 269, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3530.

Subchapter 7 — City or Town Vehicle Tax

Cross References. Municipal motor vehicle tax, § 26-78-101.

Effective Dates. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 9: Feb. 21, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that cities and towns in the State of Arkansas are in great need of additional revenues to construct and maintain streets and roads in such cities and towns; that the provisions of Act 446 of 1965, as amended, are burdensome and hamper the cities and towns in the levying of additional vehicle taxes to obtain these needed revenues; and that in order to remedy this situation, it is necessary that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Research References

C.J.S. 87 C.J.S., Towns, §§ 155, 161.

14-57-701. Penalty.

  1. Any owner of any vehicle, delinquent in the payment of the city or town vehicle tax for more than five (5) months, who thereafter shall use and operate any such vehicle upon the public roads, streets, and other public ways within the city or town levying the vehicle tax, or who shall knowingly permit it to be so used and operated by another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction, he shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00) for each violation.
  2. The fine so assessed shall be in addition to the tax and penalty for delinquent payment.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3509.

14-57-702. Authority to levy.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 26-78-102 — 26-78-108 and in addition to such taxes as may be levied by the State of Arkansas for the privilege of using and operating motor vehicles on the public roads and highways of this state, any city of the first or second class and any incorporated town are authorized to levy an annual tax upon the owners of vehicles for the privilege of using and operating a motor vehicle upon the public roads, streets, and other public ways in the city or town.
  2. The levy of the tax authorized by this section shall be, by ordinance, duly adopted by the governing body of the city or town.
  3. The tax authorized in this section to be levied shall be designated and known as the “city or town vehicle tax.”
  4. Each levy by the governing body of the city or town shall be for collection during the calendar year following the year in which the levy is made, and each year thereafter, until the tax is amended or repealed by the governing body of the city or town.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3506.

14-57-703. Other taxation prohibited.

Any city of the first or second class or any incorporated town levying and collecting a vehicle tax under the provisions of this subchapter shall not be entitled to levy and collect a vehicle tax under the provisions of §§ 26-78-10226-78-108, relating to motor vehicle tax for local highways.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3508.

14-57-704. Special election required.

    1. Before the vehicle tax levied by the governing body of any city of the first class or city of the second class or incorporated town upon vehicle owners residing in the city or town may be collected, the mayor shall call a special election in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
    2. This election shall be held not more than ninety (90) days from the date of the publication of the proclamation, at which the qualified electors of the city or town shall vote on the question of the levy of the tax.
    1. If a majority of the qualified electors of the city or town voting on the issue shall vote for the levy of the tax at the special election, then the tax may be thereafter levied in the city or town in the manner authorized in this subchapter and it shall not be necessary that an election be called again in the city or town on the question of levying the tax.
    2. If a majority of the qualified electors of the city or town voting on the issue at the special election shall vote against the levy of the tax, then the tax shall not be levied in the city or town. However, the governing body of the city or town may propose the levy of the tax at any time after the expiration of one (1) year from the election in the city or town, and the election thereon shall be called as provided in this section.
  1. Special elections held pursuant to this section shall be conducted in accordance with the election laws of this state, and the form of the ballot, the method of voting, and the counting, tabulation, and certification of the election results shall be in the manner provided by law.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3507; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 39; 2007, No. 1049, § 59; 2009, No. 1480, § 77.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1) and (a)(2)(A); substituted “thirty (30)” for “twenty (20)” and “sixty (60)” for “thirty (30)” in (a)(2)(A); and added (a)(2)(B).

The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a)(1).

14-57-705. Classification of vehicles.

  1. Under this subchapter, the ordinance of the governing body of a city or town may contain therein a classification of vehicles by types and the rate of tax levy, stated in dollars and cents, to be collected from the owners of the vehicles coming within these classifications.
  2. No such classification shall, at the time of the adoption of the ordinance, include any vehicle for the use of which a state tax or fee for the registration or licensing of motor vehicles is not, at the time, levied upon the owner.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3508.

14-57-706. Maximum tax.

The maximum city or town vehicle tax which may be levied and collected shall not exceed five dollars ($5.00) per year per vehicle, irrespective of its classification.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3508.

14-57-707. Date due.

The city or town vehicle tax shall be due and payable, without penalty, during the month of January of the calendar year following the year in which the levy is made.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3509.

14-57-708. Delinquent payment.

Penalty for delinquent payment of the city or town vehicle tax shall be one dollar ($1.00) per vehicle per month for each month's delinquency.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3509.

14-57-709. Vehicles acquired after July 1.

  1. The owner of any vehicle first acquired or first used in the city or town after July 1 of the taxable year shall be required to pay only one-half (½) of the annual rate of the city or town vehicle tax for the remainder of the calendar year. The tax may be paid, without penalty, during the thirty-day period following the date of first acquisition or first use.
  2. No vehicle tax shall be required of the owner if the vehicle tax for the particular year has been paid by a former owner, whether or not in the same city or town.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3509.

14-57-710. Payment to one municipality only.

The owner of a vehicle, having paid the city or town vehicle tax in any city or town for a particular year, shall not be required to pay the vehicle tax for the use of the same vehicle in any other city or town for the same year.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3508.

14-57-711. Collection of and receipt for tax.

  1. Any city or town levying a vehicle tax under the provisions of this subchapter shall designate, by ordinance, an official to collect the tax.
    1. The official shall use consecutively numbered receipts, printed in duplicate, to acknowledge payment of the tax.
    2. Each receipt shall have printed on it:
      1. The name of the city or town;
      2. The name of the tax;
      3. The year of the tax;
      4. Space for indicating the name and address of the taxpayer;
      5. The date of payment;
      6. The amount of tax;
      7. The amount of penalty;
      8. The total amount collected;
      9. The make and model of the vehicle;
      10. The state motor vehicle license number at the time attached to the vehicle; and
      11. Space for the signature of the official collecting the tax.
  2. At the time of issuing his receipt, the official shall also deliver to the taxpayer a windshield sticker, metal tag, or other type of identification to be attached to the vehicle by the owner.
  3. A new series of receipts shall be issued for each year's tax.
    1. A separate receipt shall be issued for each vehicle, the original of which shall be given to the taxpayer at the time of the payment of the tax.
    2. The duplicate receipt shall be retained by the official for accounting and auditing purposes.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3509.1.

14-57-712. Disposition of proceeds.

  1. All tax, interest, and penalties collected under the provisions of this subchapter shall be deposited in a separate bank account to be maintained by the city or town. From the proceeds shall be paid the cost of duplicate receipts and windshield stickers.
  2. All proceeds remaining after the payment of the expenses shall be used as follows:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds shall be used for the payment of salaries of law enforcement personnel and personnel of the fire department; and
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds shall be used for the maintenance, construction, and reconstruction of streets and other public ways in the town or municipality.

History. Acts 1969, No. 88, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-3509.2.

Cross References. Use of motor vehicle tax revenues, §§ 26-78-108, 26-78-109.

Chapter 58 Fiscal Affairs of Cities and Incorporated Towns

Cross References. Local audits, § 10-4-201 et seq.

Research References

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., §§ 579 et seq., 637 et seq.

C.J.S. 64 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 1833 et seq.

87 C.J.S., Towns, §§ 113-172.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Levy of tax for pensions in cities of first and second class, § 24-11-404.

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 160, § 3: July 1, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the Arkansas Constitution laws enacted by the General Assembly without an emergency clause become effective ninety days after adjournment sine die or recess in excess of ninety days; that it is essential to the proper and effective administration and application of this Act that it be given effect on July 1, 1977, and that in the event of an extension of the regular session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1977, would be highly detrimental to the proper administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1977.”

Acts 1985, No. 15, § 4: effective for audits of the 1985 calendar year and thereafter.

Acts 2005, No. 499, § 2: Mar. 2, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the provisions of this act are of critical importance to preserve the efficient operations of the Division of Legislative Audit and provide the flexibility needed to supply the General Assembly and the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee information vital and necessary to fulfill their constitutional and statutory mandates. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 756, § 25: Apr. 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that motor vehicle dealers are experiencing economic difficulties related to the state of the national economy and the motor vehicle industry in particular; that an unprecedented number of motor vehicle dealers may terminate their franchises as a result of these economic conditions; and that this act is immediately necessary to assist dealers that are facing possible termination of their franchise. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-58-101. Audit by independent accountant.

  1. The audit or agreed-upon procedures engagement of every municipality shall be made by Arkansas Legislative Audit or other independent persons licensed and in good standing to practice accounting by the Arkansas State Board of Public Accountancy, to be selected by the governing body of the municipality.
  2. Any statutorily required audit of a municipality shall include, as a minimum, a review and comments on substantial compliance with each of the following Arkansas laws:
    1. Arkansas Municipal Accounting Law, § 14-59-101 et seq.;
    2. Arkansas District Courts Accounting Law, § 16-10-201 et seq.;
    3. Improvement contracts, §§ 22-9-202 — 22-9-204;
    4. Budgets, purchases, and payments of claims, etc., § 14-58-201 et seq. and 14-58-301 et seq.;
    5. Investment of public funds, § 19-1-501 et seq.; and
    6. Deposit of public funds, §§ 19-8-101 — 19-8-107.
    1. For the purposes of this section, an audit shall be planned, conducted and the results of the work reported in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, if applicable.
      1. The financial statements of municipalities shall be presented on a fund basis with, as a minimum:
        1. The general fund and the street fund presented separately; and
        2. All other funds included in the audit presented in the aggregate.
      2. The financial statements shall consist of the following:
        1. A balance sheet;
        2. A statement of revenues (receipts), expenditures (disbursements), and changes in fund equity (balances);
        3. A comparison of the final adopted budget to the actual expenditures for the general fund and street fund of the entity; and
        4. Notes to financial statements.
      3. The report shall include as supplemental information a schedule of general fixed assets, including land, buildings, and equipment.
    2. In the alternative to subdivision (c)(2) of this section, the governing body of the municipality may adopt an annual resolution requiring their audit to be performed in accordance with the guidelines and format prescribed by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the United States Government Accountability Office, if applicable.
    1. As an alternative to an audit, the municipal governing body may authorize an agreed-upon procedures engagement of the records and accounts.
    2. For the purposes of this section, agreed-upon procedures engagements shall be conducted in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and subject to the minimum procedures prescribed by the Legislative Auditor.
  3. The Legislative Joint Auditing Committee shall monitor the reports prescribed in this section to ensure that the reports meet the needs of the General Assembly, the public entities, and the general public.

History. Acts 1977, No. 160, § 1; 1985, No. 15, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4416.1; Acts 2001, No. 1052, § 1; 2005, No. 499, § 1.

Amendments. The 2001 amendment, in (c), inserted “conduct the audit and,” substituted “guidelines and format” for “format and guidelines as,” substituted “Governmental Accounting Standards Board” for “appropriate professional organizations such as the National Council on Governmental Accounting and,” and added “and the United States General Accounting Office, if applicable.”

The 2005 amendment rewrote (a), (b) and (c); and added (d) and (e).

Cross References. Required audit inquiry, § 12-8-405.

14-58-102. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning transfer of balances in bond redemption fund to general revenue fund, was repealed by Acts 1997, No. 214, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1973, No. 51, § 1; 1977, No. 276, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 17-607; Acts 1987, No. 285, § 1; 1987, No. 604, § 1.

14-58-103. Withholding of membership dues — Definition.

  1. As used in this section, “municipality” means:
    1. A city of the first class;
    2. A city of the second class;
    3. An incorporated town; or
    4. A city or town department, agency, board, or commission.
    1. Effective January 1, 2006, upon receipt of a written request signed by a full-time municipal employee who is represented by a union or professional association, the municipality shall withhold membership dues of the union or professional association from the salary of the employee.
    2. The withholding request authorized by this section shall be on a form provided to the employee by the municipality.
  2. After a withholding request is received by the municipality and after withholding of an employee's dues is started under subsection (b) of this section, the withholding shall be discontinued only upon receipt of a written notice of cancellation signed by the employee.
  3. The municipality shall transmit all dues that are withheld under this section to the union or professional association representing the employee within five (5) days of the end of the pay period.

History. Acts 2005, No. 2133, § 1.

14-58-104. Specific purchases and contracts.

  1. The municipal governing body of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town may purchase the following commodities without soliciting bids:
    1. Motor fuels, oil, asphalt, asphalt oil, and natural gas; and
    2. New motor vehicles from a motor vehicle dealer licensed under the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission Act, § 23-112-101 et seq., if the motor vehicle is purchased for an amount not to exceed the fleet price awarded by the Office of State Procurement and in effect at the time the municipal governing body of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town submits the purchase order for the same make and model motor vehicle.
  2. The municipal governing body of a city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town may renew or extend the term of an existing contract without soliciting bids.

History. Acts 2009, No. 756, § 23.

14-58-105. Purchase of commodities or services by municipalities through competitive bidding — Preference among bidders — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Commodities” means all property, including without limitation equipment, printing, stationery, supplies, insurance, and capital improvements, but excluding leases on real property, real property, or a permanent interest in real property, and exempt commodities and services;
    2. “Firm resident in the municipality” means any individual, partnership, association, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, that:
      1. Maintains at least one (1) staffed place of business located within the corporate limits of the municipality; and
      2. For not less than two (2) successive years immediately before submitting a bid, has paid taxes to the county that benefit the municipality on either real or personal property used or intended to be used in connection with the firm's business;
    3. “Lowest qualified bid” means the lowest bid that conforms to the specifications and request for bids;
    4. “Municipality” means an incorporated town, a city of the first class, and a city of the second class;
    5. “Nonresident firm” means a firm that is not included in the definition of a “firm resident in the municipality”; and
    6. “Services” means labor, time, or effort furnished by a contractor.
      1. In the purchase of commodities or services by competitive bidding, a municipality may grant by ordinance a percentage preference to the lowest qualified bid from a firm resident in the municipality.
      2. The ordinance may provide a preference of up to five percent (5%) for a bidder that qualifies as a firm resident in the municipality.
      3. The ordinance may place a specific dollar cap on the total monetary amount of preference granted, regardless of the bid amount or percentage of preference designated in the ordinance.
        1. In calculating the preference to be allowed, the appropriate procurement officials shall take the total amount of each bid of each firm resident in the municipality who claimed the preference and deduct the percentage mandated by ordinance, if applicable, from the total amount of each bid.
        2. If after making the deduction the bid of any firm resident in the municipality claiming the preference is lower than the bid of the nonresident firm, then the award shall be made to the firm resident in the municipality that submitted the lowest qualified bid, whether or not that particular firm resident in the municipality claimed the preference.
      1. The preference provided for in this section only applies in comparing bids when one (1) or more bids are by a firm resident in the municipality and the other bid or bids are by a nonresident firm.
      2. The preference provided for in this section does not apply to competing bids if each bidder is a firm resident in the municipality.
        1. If any provision or condition of this section or the municipal ordinance conflicts with any provision of federal or state law or any rule or regulation made under federal or state law pertaining to federal grants-in-aid programs or other federal or state aid programs, the provision or condition shall not apply to the state-supported or federal-supported contracts for the purchase of commodities or services to the extent that the conflict exists.
        2. However, all provisions or conditions of this section with which there is no conflict apply to contracts to purchase commodities or services to be paid, in whole or in part, from federal funds.
  2. The provisions of this section, if adopted by local ordinance, shall apply to public works projects, capital improvements, commodities, materials, equipment, and services procured by the municipality.
  3. When circumstances arise to which this section and § 19-11-259 apply, both the preference provided under this section and the preference provided under § 19-11-259 also apply.
  4. To the extent that federal purchasing laws or bidding preferences conflict, this section does not apply to projects related to supplying water or wastewater utility services, operations, or maintenance to a federal military installation by a municipality of the state.

History. Acts 2015, No. 1059, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Budgets in Mayor-Council Municipalities

Effective Dates. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 14: Feb. 10, 1959. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the municipal purchasing laws of cities of the first class have not been revised since the year 1885, and whereas, it is necessary to revise said purchasing laws and other matters in order to save the unnecessary expenditure of taxpayers money, and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-58-201. Annual submission.

On or before December 1 of each year, the mayor of all cities and incorporated towns having the mayor-council form of government shall submit to the governing body of the city or town, for its approval or disapproval, a proposed budget for operation of the city or town from January 1 to December 31 of the forthcoming year.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 1; 1981, No. 344, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4421.

14-58-202. Adoption of budget.

Under this subchapter, the governing body of the municipality shall, on or before February 1 of each year, adopt a budget by ordinance or resolution for operation of the city or town.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 2; 1981, No. 344, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4422; Acts 2011, No. 622, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment inserted “by ordinance or resolution.”

14-58-203. Appropriations and changes.

  1. The approval by the municipal governing body of the budget under this subchapter shall, for the purposes of the budget from time to time amount to an appropriation of funds which are lawfully applicable to the items therein contained.
  2. The governing body may alter or revise the budget and unpledged funds appropriated by the governing body for any purpose may be subsequently, by action of the governing body, appropriated to another purpose, subject to the following exceptions:
    1. Funds resulting from taxes levied under statutes or ordinances for specific purposes may not be diverted to another purpose;
    2. Appropriated funds may not be diverted to another purpose where any creditor of the municipality would be prejudiced thereby.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4423.

Case Notes

Cited: Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989).

Subchapter 3 — Cities of the First Class Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 14: Feb. 10, 1959. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the municipal purchasing laws of cities of the first class have not been revised since the year 1885, and whereas, it is necessary to revise said purchasing laws and other matters in order to save the unnecessary expenditure of taxpayers money, and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1979, No. 154, § 2: Feb. 20, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, a maximum dollar amount was established for first class Mayor-Council cities in 1959 which has become impractical and obsolete due to inflation since that time; and these unnecessary restrictions are not placed on cities operating under the City Administrator or City Manager forms of government or Mayor-Council cities of the second class or incorporated towns. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate protection of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect immediately on its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 756, § 25: Apr. 1, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that motor vehicle dealers are experiencing economic difficulties related to the state of the national economy and the motor vehicle industry in particular; that an unprecedented number of motor vehicle dealers may terminate their franchises as a result of these economic conditions; and that this act is immediately necessary to assist dealers that are facing possible termination of their franchise. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 1985, No. 745, § 4: Aug. 1, 1985.

14-58-301. Administration of provisions.

  1. For the purpose of assisting the mayor of a first-class city in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter, the municipal governing body may appoint one (1) or more committees, to be composed from its membership, or, by ordinance, it may create one (1) or more departments, fixing the compensation and manner of employment for the employees thereof.
  2. The persons appointed to fill any offices or to head any departments shall be responsible to the mayor and act under his direction.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4428.

14-58-302. Annual report by mayor.

  1. The mayor of a first class city shall prepare and submit to the municipal governing body within the first ninety (90) days of each year a complete report on the finances and administrative activities of the city during the previous year.
  2. The mayor shall also keep the governing body advised as to the financial condition and future needs of the city and make such recommendations as to him or her may be desirable.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4424; Acts 2009, No. 161, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment in (a) substituted “the first ninety (90) days of each year” for “sixty (60) day after the end of each fiscal year”, and deleted “fiscal” following “previous”.

14-58-303. Purchases and contracts generally.

  1. In a city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town, the mayor or the mayor's duly authorized representative shall have exclusive power and responsibility to make purchases of all supplies, apparatus, equipment, materials, and other things requisite for public purposes in and for the city and to make all necessary contracts for work or labor to be done or material or other necessary things to be furnished for the benefit of the city, or in carrying out any work or undertaking of a public nature in the city.
      1. Except as provided under § 14-58-104, the municipal governing body of any city of the first class shall provide by ordinance the procedure for making all purchases which do not exceed the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
      2. Except as provided under § 14-58-104, the municipal governing body of any city of the second class or incorporated town may provide by ordinance the procedure for making all purchases.
        1. Except as provided under § 14-58-104, in a city of the first class where the amount of expenditure for any purpose or contract exceeds the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), the mayor or the mayor's authorized representative shall invite competitive bidding on the purpose or contract by legal advertisement in any local newspaper.
        2. Bids received pursuant to the advertisement shall be opened and read on the date set for receiving the bids in the presence of the mayor or the mayor's authorized representative.
        3. The mayor or the mayor's authorized representative shall have exclusive power to award the bid to the lowest responsible bidder, but may reject any and all bids received.
      1. The governing body by ordinance may waive the requirements of competitive bidding in exceptional situations where this procedure is deemed not feasible or practical or as provided under § 14-58-104.
      2. Cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and incorporated towns may accept competitive bids in the following forms:
        1. Written; or
        2. Electronic media.
    1. In a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town, the governing body by ordinance shall have the option to make purchases by participation in a reverse internet auction, except that purchases and contracts for construction projects and materials shall be undertaken pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section and § 22-9-203.
    2. The ordinance shall include, but is not limited to, the following procedures:
      1. Bidders shall be provided instructions and individually secured passwords for access to the reverse internet auction by either the city or the town, or the reverse internet auction vendor;
      2. The bidding process shall be timed, and the time shall be part of the reverse internet auction specifications;
      3. The reverse internet auction shall be held at a specific date and time;
      4. The reverse internet auction and bidding process shall be interactive, with each bidder able to make multiple bids during the allotted time;
      5. Each bidder shall be continually signaled his or her relative position in the bidding process;
      6. Bidders shall remain anonymous and shall not have access to other bidders or bids; and
      7. The governing body shall have access to real-time data, including all bids and bid amounts.
    3. The governing body may create by an additional ordinance reverse internet auction specifications for the anticipated purchase of a specific item or purchase.
      1. The governing body is authorized to pay a reasonable fee to the reverse internet auction vendor.
      2. The fee may be included as part of the bids received during the reverse internet auction and paid by the winning bidder or paid separately by the governing body.
    4. The governing body retains the right to:
      1. Refuse all bids made during the reverse internet auction; and
      2. Begin the reverse internet auction process anew if the governing body determines it is in the best interest of the city or town.
  2. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Reverse internet auction” means an internet-based process in which bidders:
      1. Are given specifications for items and services being sought for purchase by a municipality; and
      2. Bid against one another in order to lower the price of the item or service to the lowest possible level; and
    2. “Reverse internet auction vendor” means an internet-based entity that hosts a reverse internet auction.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 5; 1979, No. 154, § 1; 1985, No. 745, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4425; Acts 1995, No. 812, § 1; 2001, No. 508, § 1; 2005, No. 1435, § 2; 2005, No. 1957, § 1; 2009, No. 756, § 24; 2017, No. 170, § 2.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” for “five thousand dollars ($5,000)” in (b)(1) and (b)(2)(A)(i); rewrote (b)(2)(A)(iii); and deleted former (b)(2)(A)(iv).

The 2001 amendment inserted “city of the second class, or incorporated town” in (a); in (b), inserted “of any city of the first class” in (b)(1)(A), added (b)(1)(B), and substituted “In a city of the first class, where” for “Where” in (b)(2)(A)(i).

The 2005 amendment by No. 1435 substituted “twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)” for “ten thousand dollars ($10,000)” in (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)(A)(i).

The 2005 amendment by No. 1957 added (c) and (d).

The 2009 amendment inserted “Except as provided under § 14-58-104” in (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2)(A)(i), inserted “or as provided under § 14-58-104” in (b)(2)(B), and made related changes.

The 2017 amendment added (b)(2)(C).

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Contractual and Quasi-Contractual Liability of Arkansas Local Government Units, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 292.

Case Notes

Contracts for Labor or Materials.

It was against public policy to permit a bank of which the mayor of a city was a stockholder and president to take an assignment of the claim of a contractor against the city for the price of work which he had performed for the city and which work must have been inspected and accepted by the city by a board of which the mayor was chairman. People's Sav. Bank v. Big Rock Stone & Constr. Co., 81 Ark. 599, 99 S.W. 836 (1907) (decision under prior law).

Contractor was entitled to recover fair value of rest rooms installed in city building though city council bypassed board of public works in letting contract where city accepted improvements and ratified contract by ordinance. Lykes v. City of Texarkana, 223 Ark. 287, 265 S.W.2d 539 (1954) (decision under prior law).

A city is required to solicit bids for all contracts except where there is an affirmative showing, by enactment of a separate ordinance, that the solicitation of bids is not feasible or practical. Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 293 Ark. 128, 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987).

Contracts for Professional Services.

Contracts for professional services are not exempt from the competitive bidding requirements of this section or § 14-47-138. Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 293 Ark. 128, 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987).

Lowest Responsible Bidders.

Under Arkansas law governing competitive bidding on public contracts, the lowest responsible bidder in compliance with the bidding specifications and procedures has a legitimate expectation in being awarded the contract once the governmental body makes a decision to award the contract on which bids were solicited. L & H San., Inc. v. Lake City San., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1985).

Complaint held to state cause of action on question of competitive bidding. Smith v. City of Springdale, 291 Ark. 63, 722 S.W.2d 569 (1987).

African-American contractor who was the sixth lowest bidder on a contract that the city awarded to a Caucasian contractor, and then extended without competitive bidding, did not have a property interest in the extended portion of the contract; thus, the African-American contractor's 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against the city failed. Harris v. Hays, 452 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2006).

Purchase of Supplies, Etc.

Contract for sale of truck and flusher to city without compliance with former statute was held void. City of Little Rock v. White Co., 193 Ark. 837, 103 S.W.2d 58 (1937) (decision under prior law).

City could not have used cleaning equipment purchased under invalid contract, contract for things other than necessary expenses, and thereby avoid payment for the use of the equipment on ground revenue was insufficient, but if the payment would exceed the revenue for the year the contract was made, city could not pay. But where evidence did not show that revenue was insufficient to pay reasonable rent of street cleaning equipment received under invalid contract at the time it was used, city was held liable for rental. City of Little Rock v. White Co., 193 Ark. 837, 103 S.W.2d 58 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Second Class Cities.

The statute does not allow cities of the second class to pass an ordinance authorizing their mayors to make purchases or to contract for labor and materials up to a certain amount. Burke v. Elmore, 341 Ark. 129, 14 S.W.3d 872 (2000).

Void Contracts.

No recovery could be had under a contract which former statute declared to be null and void. Ridge v. Miller, 185 Ark. 461, 47 S.W.2d 587 (1932) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Cosgrove v. City of W. Memphis, 327 Ark. 324, 938 S.W.2d 827 (1997).

14-58-304. Purchase of insurance.

The purchase of all types of insurance by cities of the first class shall be governed by the provisions of § 14-58-303.

History. Acts 1981, No. 926, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4425.1.

14-58-305. Payment of claims.

  1. In a city of the first class, the mayor or his duly authorized representative may approve for payment out of funds previously appropriated for that purpose, or disapprove, any bills, debts, or liabilities asserted as claims against the city.
  2. The municipal governing body shall, by ordinance, establish in that connection a maximum amount, and the payment or disapproval of such bills, debts, or liabilities exceeding that amount shall require the confirmation of the governing body.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4426.

14-58-306. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning disposal of municipal supplies, etc., was repealed by Acts 2017, No. 470, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1959, No. 28, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4427; Acts 2007, No. 661, § 1; 2011, No. 622, § 2.

Cross References. For current law, see § 14-54-302.

14-58-307. Annual audit.

In cities of the first class, the municipal governing body shall have the financial affairs of the city audited annually by an independent certified public accountant, who is not otherwise in the service of the city, or by the Division of Legislative Audit of the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4429.

14-58-308. Bonds of officers and employees.

  1. All officers and employees of a city of the first class handling financial matters for the city shall furnish a fidelity bond in such amount, on such form, and with such security as may be approved by the municipal governing body.
  2. The premiums on these bonds shall be paid by the city.

History. Acts 1959, No. 28, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4430.

Cross References. Self-Insured Fidelity Bond Program, § 21-2-701 et seq.

14-58-309. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning legislative findings, was repealed by Acts 2011, No. 629, § 4. The section was derived from Acts 1999, No. 1341, §§ 1, 2.

Subchapter 4 — Borrowing of Money by Cities of the First Class

Cross References. Borrowing and bankruptcy, § 14-74-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1931, No. 233, § 5: approved Mar. 26, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “In view of the existing financial depression many cities of the first class are finding it impossible to finance their operation without anticipating tax collections, and are in such urgent need of immediate assistance that an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and, therefore, this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-58-401. Authority generally.

  1. Upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the city council, cities of the first class may borrow money for the ordinary operating expenses of the city after January 1 of each year in anticipation of the property tax collections collectible in that year.
  2. The sum so borrowed shall not exceed, in the aggregate, fifty percent (50%) of the amount of city taxes extended on the county tax books for collections during the year.
  3. These cities shall have power to issue to the lender thereof negotiable but noninterest-bearing evidences of indebtedness for moneys so borrowed, to be executed by the mayor and city clerk in behalf of the city.

History. Acts 1931, No. 233, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9820; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4406.

14-58-402. Assignment of uncollected property tax.

    1. Cities of the first class may further assign to the lender or to a trustee for the lender as security for the repayment of borrowed moneys, the uncollected general municipal property taxes then extended upon the county tax books to be collected during the current year.
    2. The assignment shall be executed in the name and in behalf of the city by the mayor and city clerk, duly acknowledged and recorded on the real estate mortgage record in the county or judicial circuit where the city may be situated. A certified copy thereof shall be delivered by the lender or trustee for him to the county collector of revenue.
    1. As the city taxes are collected, the county collector may pay them over, less his commission, to the lender of the money or trustee for him, upon surrender to the collector of a note or certificate of indebtedness secured by the assignment, which instrument shall be accepted by the city as the equivalent of money in its settlement with the collector.
      1. At the time of paying the money over to the lender or his trustee, the collector shall cause him, either by noting on the margin of record of the assignment attested by the recorder or by a separate duly acknowledged instrument, to acknowledge payment of the sum so paid.
        1. If, when the collector makes his settlement with the county court, a sufficient sum of city taxes has not been collected to pay in full the debt secured thereby, the balance of funds on hand applicable to the debt shall be paid over by the collector to the assignee and credited against the debt.
        2. The payment shall be shown of record as specified in this section.
        3. The unpaid balance shall constitute a lien on redemption collections from the assigned taxes by the county clerk and shall, at all times, constitute a general obligation of the city, payable from any fund not appropriated by law to some other exclusive purpose.

History. Acts 1931, No. 233, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9821; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4407.

14-58-403. Assignments not to affect warrants — Priority.

  1. Since the Arkansas Constitution prohibits the issuance by a municipal corporation of any interest-bearing evidence of indebtedness for the purpose mentioned in this subchapter, no evidence of indebtedness bearing interest is authorized by this subchapter.
    1. Since the Arkansas Constitution further provides that municipal corporation warrants may be used in payment of municipal taxes, the assignment of taxes provided for in this subchapter shall be without prejudice to the rights of warrant holders to use municipal warrants in payment of municipal taxes.
      1. Unless this provision is held unconstitutional by the courts, the written assignment of taxes provided for in this subchapter may stipulate that the city will use the funds so borrowed for operating expenses and that no warrant will be thereafter issued by the city in excess of an aggregate amount capable of being paid out of the funds so borrowed and out of revenues of the city arising from some other source than the general municipal property tax until the borrowed moneys secured by the assignment have been repaid in full, to the end that, after making the assignment, no new city warrants capable of being used in payment of the municipal property tax shall come into existence until the indebtedness has been paid.
      2. The city may contract as to right of priority or payment when more than one (1) assignment of the taxes is made.

History. Acts 1931, No. 233, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 9822; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4408.

Cross References. Municipal corporation warrants used in payment of municipal taxes, Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 10.

Subchapter 5 — Financial Aid to School Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1931, No. 229, § 4: approved Mar. 26, 1931. Emergency clause provided: “Owing to the fact that many public schools are in urgent need of finances and financial assistance an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

14-58-501. Authority generally.

Incorporated towns and cities of the first or second class in the State of Arkansas are empowered and authorized annually to grant financial aid to any public school district in which the town or city is located for the purpose of assisting the school district in retiring school bonds or paying the operating expenses of the district.

History. Acts 1931, No. 229, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 9652; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4409.

14-58-502. Funds from which payable.

Financial aid granted and paid to public school districts shall be paid out of any funds received by the town or city. However, payments shall not be made from the regular city taxes collected by the county or state for the town or city.

History. Acts 1931, No. 229, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 9653; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4410.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1993, No. 1070, § 5, provides that to the extent § 14-58-502 conflicts with § 26-73-114, § 14-58-502 is superseded.

14-58-503. Terms of assistance.

  1. The incorporated town or city council granting financial aid shall do so by resolution which shall fix the amount and time of the payments.
  2. The resolution shall be effective for the period of twelve (12) months.
  3. The payments shall not exceed the annual revenue from which the funds are paid.

History. Acts 1931, No. 229, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 9654; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4411.

14-58-504. Financial aid to state colleges and universities.

  1. Cities of the first or second class and incorporated towns in the State of Arkansas shall be empowered and authorized annually to grant financial aid to any state-supported college or university which is located in the city or town or which has facilities located within the city or town. The grant of financial aid shall be for the purpose of aiding or assisting the college or university in retiring any bonded indebtedness on any building or facilities within the city or town or for the purpose of paying for the operating expenses of the college or university for programs or facilities located within the city or town.
    1. The governing body of the city or incorporated town granting financial aid to a state-supported college or university shall do so by ordinance, which shall specify the time and amount of the payments to be made, the name of the college or university receiving the funds, and the source of the funds.
    2. The ordinance shall not be effective for more than a twelve-month period of time.
  2. The financial aid granted and paid to the state-supported college or university shall be paid out of donations or gifts received by the city or town for general purposes. No moneys of the city or town arising from a tax levied for a specific purpose shall be used for any grant of financial aid to a college or university, unless the tax has been levied for the specific purpose of granting financial aid to the college or university.

History. Acts 1993, No. 367, §§ 1-3.

14-58-505. Financial aid.

  1. Incorporated towns and cities of the first or second class, pursuant to an ordinance properly and lawfully adopted by their governing bodies, are empowered and authorized to annually grant financial aid to any public postsecondary educational institution located within their borders for the purpose of assisting the institution in paying its lawful expenses of operation.
  2. The ordinance shall be effective for a period of twelve (12) months.

History. Acts 1993, No. 866, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1993, No. 866, § 1, is also codified as § 14-16-114.

Subchapter 6 — Outstanding Municipal Warrants

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 97, § 6: effective on passage.

14-58-601. Duty to order presentment.

Whenever the council of any city or incorporated town in this state may deem it expedient to call in the outstanding warrants of the city or incorporated town in order to redeem, cancel, reissue, or classify them, or for any other lawful purpose whatsoever, it shall be the duty of the council of the city or town to make an order for that purpose fixing the time for the presentation of the warrants, which shall be at least three (3) months from the date of the order.

History. Acts 1893, No. 97, § 1, p. 169; C. & M. Dig., § 7584; Pope's Dig., § 9665; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4401.

Case Notes

Power to Call.

All municipal corporations have the power to call in outstanding warrants for cancellation, reissuance, or classification, or for any lawful purpose whatever. Eureka Fire Hose Co. v. Furry, 126 Ark. 231, 190 S.W. 427 (1916).

14-58-602. Annual call permitted.

Annually, the council of any city or incorporated town may call in the outstanding warrants of the city or incorporated town or the floating evidence of indebtedness of the city or town for the purpose of cancelling and reissuing them.

History. Acts 1893, No. 97, § 4, p. 169; C. & M. Dig., § 7587; Pope's Dig., § 9668; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4404.

14-58-603. Notice of time and place for redemption, etc.

It shall be the duty of the clerk or recorder of the council of the city or incorporated town to notify the holders of the warrants to present them to the council at the time and place fixed for the redemption, cancellation, reissuance, or classification of the warrants, or for any other purpose whatever specified in the order of the council, by putting up, at the county courthouse door and at the election precincts in each ward in the city or town a true copy of the order of the council in the premises. This order shall be posted at least thirty (30) days before the time appointed by the order of the city or town council for the presentation of the warrants. It shall be published in newspapers printed and published in the State of Arkansas for two (2) weeks in succession, the last insertion to be at least thirty (30) days before the time fixed by the council for the presentation of the warrants.

History. Acts 1893, No. 97, § 2, p. 169; C. & M. Dig., § 7585; Pope's Dig., § 9666; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4402.

14-58-604. Failure to present.

All persons who hold any warrants of a city or incorporated town and neglect or refuse to present them as required by the order of the city or town council and the notice prescribed by § 14-58-603 shall thereafter be forever debarred from deriving any benefits from their claims.

History. Acts 1893, No. 97, § 3, p. 169; C. & M. Dig., § 7586; Pope's Dig., § 9667; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4403.

14-58-605. Rejection of indebtedness.

Whenever the warrants called in shall be presented to the municipal council, it shall be the duty of the council to examine them thoroughly and to reject all such evidences of indebtedness as in their judgment their city or town is not justly and legally bound to pay, subject to appeal to the circuit court.

History. Acts 1893, No. 97, § 5, p. 169; C. & M. Dig., § 7588; Pope's Dig., § 9669; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4405.

Subchapter 7 — Revolving Cash Funds

14-58-701. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning authority to create the fund, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1949, No. 40, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4417.

14-58-702 — 14-58-704. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concering deposit of fund in bank, disbursements from fund and appropriations for fund, were repealed by Acts 1997, No. 214, § 1. They were derived from the following sources:

14-58-702. Acts 1949, No. 40, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4418.

14-58-703. Acts 1949, No. 40, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4419.

14-58-704. Acts 1949, No. 40, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4420.

Subchapter 8 — Bonding of Municipal Officers and Employees

14-58-801 — 14-58-805. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning bonding of municipal officers and employees, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-58-801. Acts 1959, No. 155, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4433.

14-58-802. Acts 1959, No. 155, § 1; 1961, No. 105, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4431.

14-58-803. Acts 1959, No. 155, § 1; 1961, No. 105, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4431.

14-58-804. Acts 1959, No. 155, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4432.

14-58-805. Acts 1959, No. 155, § 1; 1961, No. 105, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4431.

Subchapter 9 — Annual Audits

14-58-901, 14-58-902. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning annual audits, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-58-901. Acts 1949, No. 292, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4414.

14-58-902. Acts 1949, No. 292, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-4415.

Subchapter 10 — Alternative Negotiated Purchasing for Municipalities

14-58-1001. Projects exceeding two million dollars.

  1. In the event funds from any sources for a municipal project other than revenues derived from a performance-based efficiency project exceed two million dollars ($2,000,000), excluding the cost of land, the provisions of this subchapter and all other provisions of this Code governing construction of public facilities, including, but not limited to, the provisions of § 22-9-201 et seq. at the election of municipalities shall not be applicable to the project if the selection and contracting process set forth in this section is followed.
    1. The selection procedures for the construction manager, general contractor, architect, or engineer shall provide for solicitation for qualified, licensed professionals to submit proposals.
    2. The procedures shall assure the design and completion of the project in an expeditious manner while adhering to high standards of design and construction quality.
    3. A municipality shall:
      1. Publish notice of its intention to receive written proposals three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local distribution;
      2. Allow a minimum of ten (10) working days from the first date of publication for the professionals to send letters or resumes in response to the newspaper advertisement; and
      3. Provide additional means of notification, if any, as the municipality shall determine is appropriate.
      1. A preselection committee which shall be composed of at least three (3) members from the municipality shall review the proposals.
      2. The preselection committee shall select a maximum of five (5) applicants and schedule interviews.
      3. The municipality shall notify the finalists of their status.
      1. The final selection committee shall be composed of the members on the preselection committee.
      2. The final interviews shall be held at the times and dates designated by the final selection committee.
      3. In selecting a general contractor, construction manager, architect, or engineer, the municipality shall consider established criteria, which shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
        1. The experience of the professional or professionals in similar projects;
        2. The record of the professional or professionals in timely completion of the projects with high quality workmanship; and
        3. Other similar matters to determine that the professional or professionals will complete the project within the time and budget and to the specifications set by the municipality.
      1. The final selection committee shall make a formal recommendation to its governing body of the professional or professionals whom it determines to be in the best interest of the municipality.
        1. Contracts for architectural, engineering, and land surveying professional consultant services shall be negotiated on the basis of demonstrated competence and qualifications for the type of services required and at fair and reasonable prices without the use of competitive bidding.
        2. No rule or regulation shall inhibit a municipality's authority to negotiate fees for the services.
    1. Construction contracts for the projects shall not be entered into without a payment and performance bond in the amount of the contract and any amendments thereto and shall provide for the manner in which the construction shall be managed and supervised.
    2. All project architects and engineers shall be properly licensed in accordance with the Arkansas State Board of Architects, Landscape Architects, and Interior Designers and the State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Professional Surveyors.
    3. The construction manager or general contractor shall be properly licensed by the Contractors Licensing Board.
      1. All subcontractors on the project shall be properly licensed by the Contractors Licensing Board.
      2. Any person who is not considered a contractor under § 17-25-101 et seq. may continue to perform subcontracting work under the provisions of this subchapter.
  2. The funds may be represented in whole or in part by a written pledge or commitment from a donor, provided that the municipality shall assure itself of the financial stability of the donor to fulfill the pledge or commitment.
    1. All projects constructed pursuant to this section, to the extent applicable, shall be in accordance and compliance with:
      1. Section 17-38-101 et seq., regulating plumbers;
      2. Section 17-33-101 et seq., regulating the heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration industry;
      3. The Fire Prevention Act, § 12-13-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 12-80-101 et seq., regarding earthquake resistant design for public structure;
      5. Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. A, adopted by the authority; and
      6. The minimum standards of the authority and criteria pertaining to projects constructed under this section.
    2. Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, the provisions of §§ 19-11-801, 22-9-101, 22-9-103, 22-9-104, and 22-9-213, § 22-9-301 et seq. [repealed], § 22-9-401 et seq., § 22-9-501 et seq., § 22-9-601 et seq., § 22-9-701 et seq., and all competitive bidding statutes shall remain in full force and effect and not be affected hereby.
    3. This section shall not authorize a design-build project contract.

History. Acts 2005, No. 1989, § 1.

Cross References. Authorization for state agency to commit cash funds for construction — Penalty, § 22-9-103.

Contractors' Bonds, § 22-9-401 et seq.

Deposit of Securities, § 22-9-501 et seq.

Exemption of state projects from local regulation, § 22-9-213.

Observation by registered professionals required, § 22-9-101.

Policy, § 19-11-801.

Proposed capital expenditures, § 22-9-104.

Retainage, § 22-9-601 et seq.

Chapter 59 Arkansas Municipal Accounting Law

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in §§ 14-59-101 through 14-59-116 may not apply to §§ 14-59-117 and 14-59-118 which were enacted subsequently.

Cross References. Audit by independent accountant, § 14-58-101.

Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1977, No. 308, § 3: Feb. 28, 1977. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, there is a great deal of confusion and uncertainty as to the requirements for publication of financial information by the towns and cities of Arkansas; and, whereas, it is essential that the citizens and qualified voters in the towns and cities have a periodical report of the financial condition of their local municipal government. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public health, welfare and safety, shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval.”

14-59-101. Title.

This chapter shall be known and cited as the “Arkansas Municipal Accounting Law”.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5301; Acts 2011, No. 621, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted “of 1973” at the end of the sentence.

14-59-102. Applicability.

This chapter shall apply to all funds under the budgetary control of the council or board of directors of the various municipalities of this state, except water and sewer departments.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5302; Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 1.

14-59-103. Exemption for other systems.

  1. In the event any municipality feels its system of bookkeeping is such that it equals or exceeds the basic system prescribed by this chapter, the municipality may request a review by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
  2. Upon the committee's concurrence with these facts, it may issue a certificate to the municipality stating that the municipality's accounting system is of a degree of sophistication such that the basic requirements of this chapter are being met and exempting the municipality from the requirements of the particulars of the system prescribed by this chapter.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5314.

14-59-104. Bank accounts.

  1. All municipalities of this state receiving state aid in the form of either turnback of general revenues or highways revenues shall maintain all funds in depositories approved for such purposes by law.
  2. The municipalities shall maintain separate bank accounts for general funds and street funds.
  3. The accounts shall be maintained in the name of the municipality.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5303.

14-59-105. Prenumbered checks — Electronic funds transfers.

  1. All disbursements of municipal funds, except those described in this section and as noted in § 14-59-106, petty cash funds, are to be made by prenumbered checks drawn upon the bank account of that municipality.
  2. The checks shall be of the form normally provided by commercial banking institutions and shall contain as a minimum the following information:
    1. Date of issue;
    2. Check number;
    3. Payee;
    4. Amount; and
    5. Signature of two (2) authorized disbursing officers of the city.
  3. Disbursements of municipal funds used for payment of salaries and wages of municipal officials and employees may be made by electronic funds transfer provided that the municipal employee or official responsible for disbursements maintains a ledger containing at least the:
    1. Name, address, and Social Security number of the employee receiving payment of salary or wages;
    2. Routing number from the bank in which the funds are held;
    3. Account number;
    4. Accounts clearing house trace number pertaining to the transfer;
    5. Date and amount transferred; and
    6. Proof that the employee has been notified of direct deposit of his or her salary or wages by electronic funds transfer.
  4. Disbursements of municipal funds used for payments to federal or state governmental entities may be made by electronic funds transfer.
    1. Disbursements of municipal funds, other than for payments under subsections (c) and (d) of this section, may be made by electronic funds transfer provided that:
      1. The governing body of the municipality shall establish by ordinance an electronic funds payment system directly into payees' accounts in financial institutions in payment of any account allowed against the municipality;
      2. For purposes of this subsection, municipalities opting for an electronic funds payment system shall establish written policies and procedures to ensure that the electronic funds payment system provides for internal accounting controls and documentation for audit and accounting purposes; and
      3. Each electronic funds payment system established under this subsection shall comply with the information systems best practices approved by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee before implementation by the municipality.
    2. A single electronic funds payment may contain payments to multiple payees, appropriations, characters, or funds.
  5. A disbursement of municipal funds shall have adequate supporting documentation for the disbursement.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5305; Acts 1997, No. 543, § 1; 2009, No. 316, § 1; 2011, No. 621, § 2; 2019, No. 138, § 2.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment inserted “those described in this section and” following “municipal funds, except” in (a); and added (d).

The 2009 amendment added (e).

The 2011 amendment deleted “both in numerical and written form” following “Amount” in (b)(4); substituted “two (2) authorized disbursing officers” for “authorized disbursing officer” in (b)(5); deleted (c) and (d)(6); inserted present (d) and (e) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly.

The 2019 amendment substituted “written policies and procedures to ensure that the electronic funds payment system” for “an electronic payment method that” in (e)(1)(B); and, in (e)(1)(C), substituted “funds payment system” for “payment method”, and substituted “this subsection shall comply with the information systems best practices” for “subdivision (e)(2) of this section shall be”.

14-59-106. Petty cash funds.

  1. Municipalities are permitted to establish petty cash funds, so long as the funds are maintained as set forth in this section.
    1. The establishment of such a fund must be approved by the city council.
      1. In establishing such a fund, a check is to be drawn upon the general fund of the municipality payable to “petty cash.”
      2. That amount may be maintained in the municipal offices for the handling of small expenditures for items such as postage, light bulbs, delivery fees, etc.
    1. A paid-out slip is to be prepared for each item of expenditure from the fund and signed by the person receiving the moneys.
    2. These paid-out slips shall be maintained with the petty cash. When the fund becomes depleted, the municipality may then draw another check payable to “petty cash” in an amount which equals the total paid-out slips issued. At that time, the paid-out slips shall be removed from the “petty cash fund,” and utilized as invoice support for the check replenishing petty cash.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5306.

14-59-107. Fixed asset records.

  1. The governing body shall adopt a policy defining fixed assets. At a minimum, the policy shall set forth the dollar amount and useful life necessary to qualify as a fixed asset.
    1. All municipalities shall establish by major category and maintain, as a minimum, a listing of all fixed assets owned by the municipality.
    2. The listing shall be totaled by category with a total for all categories.
    3. The categories of fixed assets shall include the major types, such as:
      1. Land;
      2. Buildings;
      3. Motor vehicles, by department;
      4. Equipment, by department; and
      5. Other assets.
  2. The listing shall contain as a minimum:
    1. Property item number, if used by the municipality;
    2. Brief description;
    3. Serial number, if available;
    4. Date of acquisition; and
    5. Cost of property.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5307; Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 2; 2011, No. 621, § 3.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (a) and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; inserted “by department” in (b)(3)(C) and (D); and added “assets” in (b)(3)(E).

14-59-108. Reconciliation of bank accounts.

    1. On a monthly basis, all municipalities shall reconcile their cash receipts and disbursements journals to the amount on deposit in banks.
    2. The reconciliation under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be approved by a municipal official or employee, other than the person preparing the reconciliation, as designated by the chief executive officer of the municipality.
  1. The reconciliations should take the following form:

City of Date Amount Per Bank Statement Dated $ .00 Add: Deposits in transit (Receipts recorded in Cash Receipts Journal not shown on this bank statement). DATE RECEIPTS NO. AMOUNT $ .00 .00 .00 .00 Deduct: Outstanding Checks (Checks issued and dated prior to date of bank statement per Cash Disbursements Journal not having yet cleared the bank). CHECK NO. PAYEE AMOUNT $ .00 .00 .00 .00 RECONCILED BALANCE $ .00 This reconciled balance shall agree to either the cash balance as shown on the municipality's check stubs running bank balance or the municipality's general ledger cash balance, whichever system the municipality employs.

Click to view table.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5312; Acts 2011, No. 621, § 4.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment added (a)(2); and deleted “receiving state aid” following “municipalities” in (a)(1).

14-59-109. Prenumbered receipts.

  1. All funds received are to be formally receipted at the time of collection or the earliest opportunity by the use of prenumbered receipts or mechanical receipting devices.
    1. In the use of prenumbered receipts, the following minimum standards shall be met:
      1. If manual receipts are used, receipts are to be prenumbered by the printer and a printer's certificate obtained and retained for audit purposes. The certificate shall state the date printing was done, the numerical sequence of receipts printed, and the name of the printer;
      2. The prenumbered receipts shall contain the following information for each item receipted:
        1. Date;
        2. Amount of receipt;
        3. Name of person or company from whom money was received;
        4. Purpose of payment;
        5. Fund to which receipt is to be credited; and
        6. Identification of employee receiving money.
    2. If manual receipts are used, the original receipt should be given to the party making payment. One (1) duplicate copy of the receipt shall be maintained in numerical order in the receipt book and made available to the auditors during the course of annual audit. Additional copies of the receipt are optional with the municipality and may be used for any purposes they deem fit.
  2. If an electronic receipting system is used, the system shall be in compliance with the Information Systems Best Practices Checklist provided by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5304; Acts 2011, No. 621, § 5.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment redesignated (a)(2) as present (b)(1); deleted former (b); in (a), substituted “funds received” for “items of income,” inserted “at the time of collection or the earliest opportunity,” and deleted “such as cash registers, or validating equipment” at the end; redesignated (a)(2)(C) as (b)(2); added “If manual receipts are used” at the beginning of (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2); redesignated (a)(2)(B)(vi) and (vii) as (b)(1)(B)(v) and (vi); substituted “Identification” for “Signature” in (b)(1)(B)(vi); and added (c).

14-59-110. Cash receipts journals.

    1. Municipalities shall establish a cash receipts journal or an electronic receipts listing that shall indicate:
      1. The receipt number;
      2. The date of the receipt;
      3. The payor;
      4. The amount of the receipt; and
      5. Classification or general ledger account.
    2. The classification of the receipts shall include the major sources of revenue, such as:
      1. State revenues;
      2. Property taxes;
      3. Sales taxes;
      4. Fines, forfeitures, and costs;
      5. Franchise fees;
      6. Transfers in; and
      7. Other.
    1. All items of receipts shall be posted to and properly classified in the cash receipts journal or electronic receipts listing.
      1. The journal shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
      2. The journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the municipalities' bank statements.
    2. The electronic receipts listing shall be posted to the general ledger at least monthly. The general ledger shall be reconciled monthly to total bank deposits as shown on the municipalities' bank statements.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5310; Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 3; 2011, No. 621, § 6.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote the introductory language of (a)(1); deleted former (a)(2)(A) with introductory language; redesignated former (a)(2)(A)(i) through (iv) as (a)(1)(A) through (D); added (a)(1)(E); redesignated former (a)(1)(B) through (a)(1)(B)(v) as (a)(2) through (a)(2)(E); deleted (a)(1)(B)(vi); inserted (a)(2)(F) and (G); substituted “fees” for “taxes” in (a)(2)(E); added “or electronic receipts listing” at the end of (b)(1); substituted “properly balanced” for “footed, crossfooted” in (b)(2)(A); and added (b)(3).

14-59-111. Cash disbursements journals.

    1. Municipalities shall establish a cash disbursements journal or electronic check register that shall indicate the date, payee, check number or transaction number, amount of each check written or transaction, and classification or general ledger account.
    2. The classifications of expenditures shall include the major type of expenditures by department, such as:
      1. Personal services;
      2. Supplies;
      3. Other services and charges;
      4. Capital outlay;
      5. Debt service; and
      6. Transfers out.
    1. The cash disbursements journal shall be properly balanced and totaled monthly and on a year-to-date basis.
    2. The cash disbursements journal shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.
    3. The electronic check register shall be posted to the general ledger at least monthly. The general ledger shall be reconciled monthly to total bank disbursements as indicated on the monthly bank statements.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5311; Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 4; 2011, No. 621, § 7.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment redesignated (a)(1)(A) and (B) as (a)(1) and rewrote (a)(1); rewrote (a)(2)(A) through (E); added (a)(2)(F); substituted “properly balanced” for “footed, crossfooted” in (b)(1); and added (b)(3).

14-59-112, 14-59-113. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. These sections, concerning cash receipts journals and cash disbursements journals, were repealed by Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 8. They were derived from the following sources:

14-59-112. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5308.

14-59-113. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5309.

For present law, see §§ 14-59-110 and 14-59-111.

14-59-114. Maintenance and destruction of accounting records.

  1. Accounting records can basically be divided into the following three (3) groups:
      1. Support Documents. Support documents consist primarily of the following items:
        1. Cancelled checks;
        2. Invoices;
        3. Bank statements;
        4. Receipts;
        5. Deposit slips;
        6. Bank reconciliations;
        7. Check book register or listing;
        8. Receipts listing;
        9. Monthly financial reports;
        10. Payroll records;
        11. Budget documents; and
        12. Bids, quotes, and related documentation.
      2. These records shall be maintained for a period of at least four (4) years and in no event shall be disposed of before being audited for the period in question.
      1. Semipermanent Records. Semipermanent records consist of:
        1. Fixed assets and equipment detail records;
        2. Investment and certificate of deposit records;
        3. Journals, ledgers, and subsidiary ledgers; and
        4. Annual financial reports.
        1. These records shall be maintained for a period of not less than seven (7) years and in no event shall be disposed of before being audited for the period in question.
        2. For investment and certificate of deposit records, the seven (7) years of required maintenance begins on the date of maturity.
      1. Permanent Records. Permanent records consist of:
        1. City or town council minutes;
        2. Ordinances;
        3. Resolutions;
        4. Employee retirement documents; and
        5. Annual financial audits.
      2. These records shall be maintained permanently.
  2. When documents are destroyed, the municipality shall document the destruction by the following procedure:
      1. An affidavit is to be prepared stating which documents are being destroyed and to which period of time they apply, indicating the method of destruction;
      2. This affidavit is to be signed by the municipal employee performing the destruction and one (1) council member.
      1. In addition, the approval of the council for destruction of documents shall be obtained, and an appropriate note of the approval indicated in the council minutes along with the destruction affidavit;
      2. This council approval shall be obtained before the destruction.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 15; 1979, No. 616, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5315; Acts 2011, No. 621, § 8.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “three (3)” for “two (2)” in the introductory language of (a); added (a)(1)(A)(iv) through (xii); substituted “four (4)” for “three (3)” in (a)(1)(B); substituted “Semipermanent” for “Permanent” twice in the introductory paragraph of (a)(2)(A); deleted (a)(2)(A)(i) through (iv) and redesignated (a)(2)(A)(v) as (a)(2)(A)(i); added (a)(2)(A)(ii) through (iv); substituted “and in no event shall be disposed of before being audited for the period in question” for “by the municipality, after which period the records may be destroyed after an audit has been made of the records” in (a)(2)(B); and added (a)(2)(B)(ii) and (a)(3).

14-59-115. Duties of municipal treasurer.

  1. Each municipal treasurer of this state or the designated representative that has been approved by the governing body shall submit a monthly financial report to the council or board of directors.
    1. Municipal treasurers shall maintain the accounting records prescribed in this chapter.
        1. If the municipal treasurer does not comply with this chapter or requests that specific duties be assigned to another employee or contracting entity, the governing body of a municipality may assign specific duties outlined in this chapter to another employee, or it may contract for the services to be performed by a private, qualified person or entity.
          1. (1) Before the governing body of a municipality assigns or contracts with a person or entity for the disbursing of funds, the governing body of a municipality shall establish by ordinance a method that provides for internal accounting controls and documentation for audit and accounting purposes.
          2. The governing body of a municipality shall ensure that the person or entity is adequately insured and bonded and conforms to best practices and standards in the industry.
        1. The governing body of a municipality may not assign duties relating to the collecting of funds to anyone other than an employee of the municipality.
        2. The governing body of a municipality may assign or contract with a private, qualified person or entity for the duties relating to the disbursing of funds for payroll, bonded debt, or construction projects funded with bond proceeds.

(2) The municipal treasurer shall approve the disbursement of funds before the private, qualified person or entity disburses the funds.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 19-5313; Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 5; 2011, No. 621, § 9; 2015, No. 582, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (a), substituted “financial report” for “a copy of the bank reconciliations” and deleted “city” preceding “council”; and substituted “collecting” for “receipting” in (b)(2)(B).

The 2015 amendment redesignated (b)(2)(A) as (b)(2)(A)(i); inserted “municipal” preceding “treasurer” near the beginning in present (b)(2)(A)(i); inserted (b)(2)(A)(ii); redesignated (b)(2)(B) as (b)(2)(B)(i) and added (b)(2)(B)(ii); and deleted “or disbursing” following “collecting” in (b)(2)(B)(i).

14-59-116. Annual publication of financial statement.

    1. The governing body of each municipality shall publish annually a financial statement of the municipality, including receipts and expenditures for the period and a statement of the indebtedness and financial condition of the municipality. The financial statement shall be published one (1) time in a newspaper published in the municipality.
    2. This financial statement shall be at least as detailed as the minimum record of accounts as provided in this chapter.
    3. This financial statement shall be published by April 1 of the following year.
  1. In municipalities in which no newspaper is published, the financial statement shall be posted in two (2) of the most public places in the municipality.

History. Acts 1973, No. 159, §§ 18, 19, as added by 1977, No. 308, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 19-5316, 19-5317; Acts 2011, No. 621, § 10.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment rewrote (a)(1), (a)(3) and (b).

14-59-117. Withholding of turnback for noncompliance.

    1. If Arkansas Legislative Audit determines that a municipal treasurer is not substantially complying with this chapter, Arkansas Legislative Audit shall report the findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
      1. If a public official or a private accountant determines that a municipal treasurer is not substantially complying with this chapter, the official or accountant shall notify the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee of his or her findings.
      2. Upon notification, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee shall direct Arkansas Legislative Audit to confirm that the municipal treasurer is not substantially complying with this chapter.
      3. Upon confirmation, Arkansas Legislative Audit shall report the findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
    1. Upon notification of noncompliance by Arkansas Legislative Audit, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee shall notify in writing the mayor and the city council or town council that the municipality's accounting records do not substantially comply with this chapter.
    2. The municipality has sixty (60) days after the date of notification to bring the accounting records into substantial compliance with this chapter.
      1. After the sixty (60) days allowed for compliance or upon request by the appropriate municipal officials, Arkansas Legislative Audit shall review the records to determine if the municipality substantially complies with this chapter.
      2. Arkansas Legislative Audit shall report its findings to the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.
      1. If the municipality has not achieved substantial compliance within the sixty-day period, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee may report the noncompliance to the Treasurer of State.
      2. Upon receipt of the notice of noncompliance from the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, the Treasurer of State shall place fifty percent (50%) of the municipality's turnback in escrow until the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee reports to the Treasurer of State that the municipality has substantially complied with this chapter.
    1. If the municipality has not achieved substantial compliance within the sixty-day period, the governing body of the municipality shall assign specific duties outlined in this chapter to another employee or shall contract for the services to be performed by a qualified person or entity.
      1. Arkansas Legislative Audit shall notify the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee when the municipality has substantially complied with this chapter.
        1. The Legislative Joint Auditing Committee shall notify the Treasurer of State that the municipality has substantially complied with this chapter.
        2. Upon notice of compliance from the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, the Treasurer of State shall remit all turnback due to the municipality.
    1. If Arkansas Legislative Audit has not received a request for a review of the records from the municipality before the end of the one-hundred-twenty-day period after the first date of notification of noncompliance, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee may notify the municipality and the Treasurer of State of the continued noncompliance.
    2. Upon notice by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, the Treasurer of State shall withhold all turnback until such time that the accounting records have been reviewed and determined by Arkansas Legislative Audit to be in substantial compliance with this chapter.
    1. If Arkansas Legislative Audit has not received a request for a review of the records from the municipality before the end of six (6) months after the initial notification of noncompliance, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee may notify the municipality and the Treasurer of State of the continued noncompliance.
    2. Upon notice of noncompliance for six (6) months, the municipality forfeits all escrowed funds, and the Treasurer of State shall redistribute all escrowed turnback funds applicable to the municipality among all other municipalities receiving turnback.
    3. The municipality shall not be eligible to receive any additional turnback from the state until the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee notifies the Treasurer of State that the municipality has substantially complied with this chapter.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 6; 2009, No. 288, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in §§ 14-59-101 through 14-59-116 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment redesignated (a), inserted “substantially” in (a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), and substituted “municipal treasurer is not substantially complying with this chapter” for “required books and records are not being maintained” in (a)(2)(B); substituted “has sixty (60)” for “shall have ninety (90)” in (b)(2) and substituted “sixty (60)” for “ninety (90)” in (b)(3)(A); substituted “sixty-day” for “ninety-day” and “may” for “shall” in (c)(1)(A), inserted (c)(2), and redesignated the subsequent subdivision accordingly; substituted “one-hundred-twenty-day” for “six-month” and “may” for “shall” in (d)(1); substituted “six (6) months” for “one (1) year” in (e)(1) and (e)(2), and substituted “may” for “shall” in (e)(1); and made minor stylistic changes.

14-59-118. Penalty.

  1. Any municipal treasurer who refuses or neglects to maintain the books and records provided in this chapter shall be deemed guilty of malfeasance.
  2. Upon conviction in circuit court, the treasurer shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and shall be removed from office.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1062, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. References to “this chapter” in §§ 14-59-101 through 14-59-116 may not apply to this section which was enacted subsequently.

14-59-119. Debit card and credit card payments.

  1. A municipality may accept a legal payment and any associated costs through a debit card or credit card in accordance with applicable state and federal law.
    1. A municipality may enter into a contract with a credit card or debit card company and pay any fee normally charged by the credit card or debit card company for allowing the municipality to accept the credit card or debit card as payment as authorized under subsection (a) of this section.
    2. When a payment is made through a credit card or debit card, the municipality shall assess a transaction fee equal to the amount charged to the municipality by the credit card or debit card company.
    3. A municipality shall not assess a transaction fee for payments made through a credit card or debit card if the governing body of the municipality determines that the transaction fee is included in the amount charged for the service or product for which a credit card or debit card payment is made.

History. Acts 2019, No. 195, § 1; 2019, No. 773, § 1.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added (b)(3).

Chapter 60 Workers' Compensation

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 866, as amended, is also codified as § 14-26-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 2: June 26, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 866 of 1985 mandated that municipalities and counties provide Worker's Compensation coverage for their employees, with such coverage to be provided through private carriers or through one or more self-funding groups on a statewide basis; that such Act is in need of clarification with respect to the self-funding groups established on a statewide basis to authorize the formation of one or more self-funding groups of municipalities, or counties, or for both municipalities and counties, so long as safeguards are provided whereby any municipality or county shall have a right to participate in such group, if application is made for coverage thereunder; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to make said clarification and to assure competition in the providing of Worker's Compensation coverage for employees of municipalities and counties in this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 2: July 11, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Act 866 of 1985 mandated that municipalities and counties provide Worker's Compensation coverage for their employees, with such coverage to be provided through private carriers or through one or more self-funding groups on a statewide basis; that such Act is in need of clarification with respect to the self-funding groups established on a statewide basis to authorize the formation of one or more self-funding groups of municipalities, or counties, or for both municipalities and counties, so long as safeguards are provided whereby any municipality or county shall have a right to participate in such group, if application is made for coverage thereunder; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to make said clarification and to assure competition in the providing of Worker's Compensation coverage for employees of municipalities and counties in this State. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 901, § 52: Apr. 6, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present laws addressed in this omnibus Act on workers' compensation benefits and insurance licensure and other insurance regulatory issues are inadequate for the protection of the Arkansas public and immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order to provide for the protection of the public. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this omnibus Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1997, No. 975, § 20: Apr. 1, 1997. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-First General Assembly, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas prohibits the appropriation of funds for more than a two (2) year period; that the effectiveness of this Act on July 1, 1997 is essential to the operation of the agency for which the appropriations in this Act are provided, and that in the event of an extension of the Regular Session, the delay in the effective date of this Act beyond July 1, 1997 could work irreparable harm upon the proper administration and provision of essential governmental programs. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1997.”

Acts 2003, No. 1473, § 74: July 1, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act includes technical corrects to Act 923 of 2003 which establishes the classification and compensation levels of state employees covered by the provisions of the Uniform Classification and Compensation Act; that Act 923 of 2003 will become effective on July 1, 2003; and that to avoid confusion this act must also effective on July 1, 2003. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2003.”

Research References

ALR.

Law enforcement officers' recovery for injury sustained during exercise or physical recreation activities. 44 A.L.R.5th 569.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Workers' Compensation, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 617.

14-60-101. Requirement generally.

  1. All municipalities shall be required to provide workers' compensation coverage for their officials, employees, and volunteer fire fighters.
  2. Coverages shall be provided for losses incurred while performing work for the municipality.
  3. Individuals convicted of a criminal offense and committed to a municipal detention facility or state correctional facility who are required to perform work for the municipality shall not be considered employees of the municipality.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1364; Acts 1993, No. 901, § 3.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 1 is also codified as § 14-26-101.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment added (c).

14-60-102. Date of coverage.

This chapter shall be effective July 1, 1985. Claims incurred prior to July 1, 1985, shall continue to be the responsibility of the state. Claims incurred on or after July 1, 1985, shall be the responsibility of the municipalities.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1366.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 3 is also codified as § 14-26-102.

14-60-103. Responsibility for providing coverage.

  1. Municipal governing bodies shall be responsible for providing the workers' compensation coverage required by this chapter.
  2. Each municipal governing body is authorized to require reimbursement of its general fund on a pro rata basis from the budgets of its various municipal departments and agencies for whom the workers' compensation coverage is provided.
  3. Failure of a municipality to provide the workers' compensation coverage as required in this chapter shall result in loss of the municipality's general revenues turn back from the State of Arkansas for the period for which workers' compensation coverage is not provided.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1367.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 4 is also codified as § 14-26-103.

14-60-104. Coverage through private carrier or self-funding.

  1. Municipalities may provide workers' compensation coverage either through private carriers or through one or more self-funding groups.
  2. Self-funding groups established for this purpose shall meet the following requirements:
    1. Any self-funding group established to provide such coverage for municipalities only shall offer coverage to any municipality in the state that applies for coverage;
    2. Any such group established to provide coverage for both municipalities and counties shall offer coverage to any municipality or county in the state desiring to participate therein;
    3. Any group established to provide workers' compensation coverage to municipalities or to counties and municipalities shall offer such coverage at rates as established and filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission by the organization establishing the self-funding group. Rates for municipalities participating in any such group shall be revised annually based on the cost experience of the particular municipality, or group of municipalities, or group of municipalities and counties; and
        1. Any self-funding group of participating municipalities or counties which is governed by a board of trustees of elected municipal or county officials shall be subject to the rules of the Workers' Compensation Commission applicable to self-insured groups or providers. However, cities and counties shall not be required to enter into an indemnity agreement binding them jointly and severally.
        2. Each board governing a self-funding group shall be permitted to declare dividends or give credits against renewal premiums based on annual loss experience.
        3. All self-funded groups shall obtain excess reinsurance from an admitted or approved insurance company doing business in Arkansas.
      1. However, in lieu of the reinsurance requirements in subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this section, any self-funded group under this section with one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000) or more in annually collected premiums may provide excess reserves of twenty percent (20%) of annual premiums by any one (1) of the following ways:
        1. Cash or certificates of deposit in Arkansas banks;
        2. Letters of credit from an Arkansas bank; or
        3. Purchase of reinsurance from the National League of Cities' Reinsurance Company or County Reinsurance, Limited, a national reinsurance facility for county governments.

History. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 2; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 34, § 1; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1365; Acts 1987, No. 206, § 1; 2003, No. 1473, § 70; 2019, No. 315, § 996.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 866, § 2, as amended, is also codified as § 14-26-104.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added “or County Reinsurance, Limited, a national reinsurance facility for county governments” to (b)(4)(B)(iii).

The 2019 amendment substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (b)(4)(A)(i).

14-60-105. Municipalities over 70,000.

Municipalities with populations over seventy thousand (70,000) citizens are specifically authorized to provide workers' compensation coverage for their officials and employees through either private carriers or by self-funding on either a statewide or an individual basis.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 22, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1368; Acts 1999, No. 1179, § 13.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment made no change to this section.

14-60-106. Municipalities over 150,000.

Municipalities with populations over one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) citizens or their sewer committees are specifically authorized to provide workers' compensation coverage for their officials and employees through either private carriers or by self-funding on either a statewide or individual basis.

History. Acts 1997, No. 975, § 14.

Chapter 61 City Manager Enabling Act of 1989

Cross References. City manager form of municipal government, § 14-47-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1991, No. 49, § 7: Feb. 7, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law pertaining to the recall of municipal officials is confusing and conficting; that this Act clarifies the law; and that clarification should go into effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 1294, § 11: Apr. 22, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that cities with the management form of government and at-large elections face legal challenges to the method of selection of directors because of potential violations of federal laws concerning the voting rights of particular segments of a community; that in order to avoid problems under the federal and state voting laws it is essential to provide cities with the management form of government greater flexibility to implement governing plans that best meet the needs of the citizens; that providing such flexibility is essential to the public health, safety and welfare. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1995, No. 750, § 6: Mar. 23, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that federal courts may order the reorganization of the city governing body in city manager forms of government to provide for the election of all members of the board of directors by wards; that this can result in the loss of citizens being able to elect a mayor by popular vote in the city at-large; and that it is necessary to provide the citizens of cities under federal court orders the option to petition for special elections at anytime to reorganize their city governments. Therefore, in order to allow the municipal citizens of Arkansas the opportunity to reorganize their city government, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2007, No. 729, § 3: Mar. 30, 2007. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that Arkansas cities are faced with ever increasing problems of providing services to their citizens caused by a combination of globalization, rapid technological change, rising citizen expectations, the need for more accountability, mandates from higher levels of government, and a constrained tax base which together have created a context in which more effective and efficient methods of governance have become mandatory; and that this act is immediately necessary to meet these needs and for the efficiency of government. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

Case Notes

In General.

This chapter ratified the various city-manager forms of government then in operation and provides cities with a variety of alternatives for structuring or re-structuring the city-manager form of government. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Supp. op.861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).

14-61-101. Title.

This chapter shall be known as the “City Manager Enabling Act of 1989”.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 1.

14-61-102. Applicability.

This chapter shall apply to all cities of the first class that now have, or may hereafter adopt, the management form of government. For purposes of this chapter, the phrase “city affected by this chapter” shall mean a city of the first class that adopts or utilizes the management form of government.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 2.

14-61-103. Construction.

This chapter shall be liberally construed to provide affected cities with the maximum amount of freedom to structure their own municipal government within the basic constraints of the management form of government. Nothing in this chapter, however, should be read to diminish the powers and authority of the city manager in the management form of government.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 18.

14-61-104. Ratification of existing procedures.

A city affected by this chapter that is organized under the management form of government on July 3, 1989, shall continue to elect members of the board of directors, or mayor, or both, and to compensate them in the manner used at the time of the general election immediately preceding July 3, 1989, unless the city chooses, at a special election called for that purpose, to exercise one (1) of the options provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 3.

14-61-105. Change in size of board of directors.

A city affected by this chapter may choose, by ordinance, to increase or decrease the number of directors, provided that the board of directors, including the office of mayor, shall always be an uneven number and shall never have less than five (5) members.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 4.

14-61-106. Voting order.

If the city provides for the direct election of the mayor from an at-large position and if permitted to vote, that position shall vote last in board proceedings.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 6.

14-61-107. Methods of selecting directors.

A city affected by this chapter may choose one (1) of the options included within this chapter as the method by which to select a board of directors. These options are:

  1. All members of the board of directors being elected at-large;
  2. An odd number of directors, including the mayor, with any combination of directors being elected at-large and from wards, whether the position designated as mayor is appointed or directly elected;
  3. An odd number of directors, including the mayor, with any combination of directors being elected from wards and from larger designated districts that overlap wards, whether the position designated as mayor is appointed or directly elected;
  4. All members of the board of directors but one (1) being elected from wards, with one (1) member elected at-large who shall be the mayor; or
  5. All members of the board of directors being elected from wards.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 5; 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 58, § 1; 1993, No. 1294, § 1; 2019, No. 978, § 2.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment rewrote (2); and added “or” at end of (3).

The 2019 amendment inserted (3) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; inserted “being” in (1), (4), and (5); and made a stylistic change.

Case Notes

In General.

An election among the statutorily permitted options in this section may come about from petitions filed by electors under § 14-61-113 or by reference of an option selected by the board to the voters under § 14-61-114; whatever the option being used, however, the directors (and where appropriate the mayor) are all selected by a plurality under § 14-61-112. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Supp. op.861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).

Method Held Improper.

The present four-three structure for the election of the city board of Taxarkana deprives black citizens of the city of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Supp. op.861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).

Seven-zero plan held to be one which is permitted under subdivision (4) of this section, held to be the more prudent plan for the city, and held to accomplish the remediation of the federal Voting Rights Act violation as to all positions on the board of directors in Texarkana. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

14-61-108. Designation of positions.

A city affected by this chapter shall provide for election of the city's directors on the ballot as follows:

  1. If a city chooses to select all members of its board of directors at-large, or chooses to select all of its members by ward, each position shall be numbered sequentially and candidates shall file for a numbered position, e.g., Director Position 1, Director Position 2, etc.;
  2. If a city chooses to select some of its members of the board of directors by ward, each ward position shall be numbered sequentially beginning with the number one (1) and candidates shall file for the numbered position, e.g., in a city with four (4) ward positions Director Ward 1, Director Ward 2, etc.;
  3. If a city chooses to select some members of the board of directors at-large, each at-large position for director shall be numbered sequentially beginning with the first number after the last designated ward position, and candidates shall file for the numbered position, e.g., Director Position 5, Director Position 6, etc.;
  4. If a city chooses to select some members of the board of directors from larger designated districts that overlap wards, each district position for director shall be numbered sequentially, beginning with the number one (1) and candidates shall file for the number position, e.g., in a city with four (4) district positions Director District 1, Director District 2, etc.; and
  5. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the city provides for the direct election of the mayor from an at-large position, candidates for the position of mayor shall file for the position entitled “Mayor”.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 6; 2019, No. 978, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in the introductory language, substituted “A city” for “If a city”, deleted “chooses to select some of its members at large, it” following “chapter”, deleted “their” preceding “election”, and inserted “of the city's directors”; inserted (4) and redesignated former (4) as (5).

14-61-109. Determination of ward and district positions.

Ward positions and positions for larger designated districts that overlap wards shall be determined as follows:

  1. If a city affected by this chapter chooses to select some of its members by ward, the governing body shall divide the territory of the city into the number of wards having substantially equal population, according to the most recently published federal decennial census of population in the city, equal to the number of members of the governing body to be elected from wards;
  2. If a city affected by this chapter chooses to select some of its members by larger designated districts that overlap wards, the governing body shall divide the territory of the city into the number of districts having substantially equal population, according to the most recent federal decennial census, equal to the number of members of the governing body to be elected from districts;
  3. The governing body shall complete its apportionment of the respective districts or wards from which members of the governing body of the cities shall be elected and shall file it with the county clerk of the county and with the city clerk of the applicable city;
  4. The districts or wards so established, unless changed or modified by order of a court of competent jurisdiction or by ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the governing body of the city under § 14-61-107, shall be the districts or wards of the city from which each of the respective members of the governing body of the city are to be elected;
  5. Following each federal decennial census of population and following any special federal census of population within a particular city, if there has been a substantial change in the population of the districts and wards from the preceding federal census, the governing body shall reapportion the districts and wards in each city in the manner and procedure as provided in this section from which the members of the governing body are to be elected; and
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other act, candidates for ward positions shall be residents of the ward they wish to represent, and candidates for district positions shall be residents of the district they wish to represent.
    2. Unless the electors choose otherwise, only those qualified electors residing in a ward may vote on a candidate from that ward.
    3. Unless the electors choose otherwise, all qualified electors of the city may vote on candidates for each larger designated district that overlaps a ward.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 7; 2013, No. 314, § 1; 2019, No. 978, § 4.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “governing body” for “county board of election commissioners” and “governing body” for “governing board” throughout; and deleted “by the board” following “established” in (3).

The 2019 amendment inserted “and district” in the section heading; and rewrote the section.

Case Notes

Cited: Moorman v. Priest, 310 Ark. 525, 837 S.W.2d 886 (1992); Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

14-61-110. Compensation of directors.

Neither a director nor the mayor of the city shall receive any compensation for his services unless authorized by the voters of the city at a special or general election. Following such authorization, the board of directors, by ordinance, shall set such compensation pursuant to the provisions of Arkansas Constitution Amendment 56, as may be amended, provided that no ordinance setting compensation shall contain an emergency clause.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 8.

14-61-111. Selection of mayor.

  1. Unless a majority of the qualified electors of the city voting on the issue choose otherwise, the mayor will be selected by a majority vote of the board of directors from among its members.
      1. If a majority of the qualified electors of the city voting on the issue vote to do so, the mayor shall be directly elected by the qualified electors of the city.
      2. Any person so elected shall serve as mayor for a term of four (4) years.
      1. At a special or general election on the question of whether to directly elect the mayor, a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue may also vote to require that a successful candidate for mayor receive a minimum percentage, less than fifty percent (50%), of the total votes cast for the position of mayor in order to be elected mayor without a runoff.
      2. The minimum percentage necessary for election without a runoff shall be determined by ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the governing body or referred to the electors for their approval.
      1. If it is required that a candidate receive a minimum percentage, less than fifty percent (50%), of the total votes cast for mayor in order to be elected mayor without a runoff, and if no candidate for the position of mayor receives at least the required percentage of the votes cast, then the two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall be the nominees for the position of mayor and shall be certified to a special runoff election which shall be held four (4) weeks from the day on which the general election is held.
      2. The special runoff election shall be conducted, and the election results shall be canvassed and certified in the manner prescribed by law for municipal runoff elections.
  2. The question of whether to directly elect the mayor may be voted on at a general or special election held:
    1. At the time the city seeks to organize or reorganize under this chapter;
    2. As the result of a properly presented petition filed pursuant to § 14-61-113; or
    3. As the result of the referral of an ordinance by the board of directors calling for a reorganization under this chapter.
  3. If an election to provide for the direct election of the mayor is unsuccessful, the issue shall not be submitted again for at least two (2) years after the date of the unsuccessful election.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 9; 1993, No. 1294, § 2; 2019, No. 642, § 1; 2019, No. 978, § 5.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment rewrote this section.

The 2019 amendment by No. 642 substituted “four (4)” for “two (2)” in (b)(3)(A).

The 2019 amendment by No. 978, in (b)(2)(B), inserted “ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of” and substituted “or” for “and”.

14-61-112. Selection of directors and mayor.

  1. Unless special provisions for the position of mayor are implemented pursuant to § 14-61-111, the candidate for mayor, who in any special or general election shall receive a majority of the votes cast in favor of another candidate for the position, shall be deemed to be elected.
  2. If special provisions for the election of the mayor are implemented pursuant to § 14-61-111, then those special provisions will control the election of the mayor, unless those special provisions are amended by ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the governing body of the city.
    1. The candidate for a designated position on the board of directors of a city affected by this chapter who in a special or general election receives votes greater in number than those cast in favor of another candidate for the position and who receives at least forty percent (40%) of the votes cast, shall be deemed elected.
    2. Subdivision (c)(1) of this section may be amended by ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the governing body of the city or by the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of the municipality by petition.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 10; 1993, No. 1294, § 3; 2019, No. 978, § 6.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment, in (a), added the exception at the beginning, substituted “including the mayor” for “including, if applicable, the position of mayor,” and substituted “special or general” for “general or special”; and added (b).

The 2019 amendment, in the section heading, substituted “Selection of directors” for “Directors” and deleted “selected by plurality vote” following “mayor”; in (a), deleted “any designated position on the board of directors of a city affected by this chapter, including the” preceding “mayor”, inserted “a majority of the”, deleted “greater in number than those” preceding “cast”, and substituted “another candidate” for “any other candidate”; added “unless those special provisions are amended by ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the governing body of the city” in (b); added (c); and made a stylistic change.

Case Notes

Applicability.

An election among the statutorily permitted options in § 14-61-107 may come about from petitions filed by electors under § 14-61-113 or by reference of an option selected by the board to the voters under § 14-61-114; whatever the option being used, however, the directors (and where appropriate the mayor) are all selected by a plurality under this section. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Supp. op.861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).

14-61-113. Petition process for special elections.

Except for questions that may be referred to the voters by the board of directors, unless it is a city where a federal court has ordered the redistricting of wards under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, options provided by this chapter shall be voted on at special elections called as a result of a petition for the special election being filed with the city clerk and provided to the mayor. The following procedure shall be utilized for initial elections to organize under the management form of government, for reorganization elections by a city already operating under the management form of government, and for elections to reorganize the selection of directors in cities where a federal court has ordered the redistricting of wards under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965:

  1. A petition that calls for an election on one (1) particular option for selecting members of the board of directors using the form of the question outlined in § 14-61-115(b) shall be filed with the city clerk and provided to the mayor. The city clerk shall note on the petition the date and time that it was filed. If such a petition contains the signatures of electors equal in number to fifteen percent (15%) of the number of ballots cast for the mayor, or if the mayor is not directly elected, for the director position receiving the highest number of votes in the last general election, then the mayor by proclamation in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq. shall submit the question to the electors at a special election, provided:
      1. The city clerk shall verify the number of signatures on the petitions within ten (10) days of the date they are filed.
      2. If there are insufficient signatures on the petitions, the petitioners shall not receive any extensions for the petition.
      3. If, however, there are a sufficient number of signatures on the petitions but the city clerk is unable to verify the required number of signatures as those of qualified electors, then the petitioners will be given ten (10) days to provide a sufficient number of verified signatures;
    1. The proclamation calling the special election shall be issued within three (3) working days of the date the city clerk verifies the number of signatures on the petitions; and
    2. The special election shall be held not more than sixty (60) days after the proclamation calling the election, provided that if the county board of election commissioners certifies in writing that it cannot prepare the ballots because of other pending elections, then the election can be held not more than ninety (90) days after the proclamation;
  2. Except for the provisions of subdivision (1)(A) of this section, if petitions filed with the mayor that call for an election on one (1) of the options set forth in this chapter are found to be insufficient for any reason whatsoever, then new petitions will have to be circulated and filed before the question can be considered again;
  3. Notwithstanding subdivision (2) of this section, if two (2) or more groups file petitions seeking a special election on one (1) of the options set forth in this chapter and the first filed petitions are declared to be insufficient, then the city clerk will determine the sufficiency of the petitions that were filed next in time. Otherwise, upon a declaration that a set of petitions is sufficient and the first in time, then all petitions filed after the first sufficient petitions and before the special election shall be deemed moot and may be destroyed;
  4. Once an election has been held pursuant to the provisions of any act that results in a change in the manner of selecting the governing body of a city with the manager form of government or seeks to reorganize a manager-government city under any other form of government, then none of the options presented by this chapter or any act concerning the organization of the government under any form of municipal government may be submitted to the voters for a period of four (4) years from the date of the election; and
  5. Except as provided in § 14-61-114(a), if an election held pursuant to the provisions of any act fails to result in a change in the manner of selecting the governing body of a city with the manager form of government or fails to reorganize such a city under any other form of government, then no other petitions seeking to adopt any of the options presented by this chapter or to reorganize the city under any form of municipal government may be submitted to the voters for a period of two (2) years from the date of the election.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 11; 1993, No. 1294, § 4; 1995, No. 750, § 1; 2005, No. 2145, § 40; 2007, No. 1049, § 60; 2009, No. 1480, § 78.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 11, provided, in part: “any election held pursuant to the provisions of this section shall submit the question presented in substantially the form set forth in Section 10 of this Act.” This language was in the act as adopted, but it refers to a section of the bill as originally introduced, which was amended out of the bill during passage, concerning the submission of the granting of veto power to the mayor.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment, in (1), added (1)(A)(i) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly, and made minor stylistic changes; in (1)(c), made minor punctuation changes; and rewrote (4) and (5).

The 1995 amendment, in the introductory paragraph, inserted “unless it is a city where a federal court has ordered the redistricting of wards under the federal Voting Rights Act” and added “and for elections to reorganize the selection of directors in cities where a federal court has ordered the redistricting of wards under the federal Voting Rights Act.”

The 2005 amendment redesignated former (1)(C) as present (1)(C)(i); and added (1)(C)(ii).

The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in the last sentence of the introductory language of (1).

U.S. Code. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq.

Case Notes

Construction.

An election among the statutorily permitted options in § 14-61-107 may come about from petitions filed by electors under this section, or by reference of an option selected by the board to the voters under § 14-61-114; whatever the option being used, however, the directors (and where appropriate the mayor) are all selected by a plurality under § 14-61-112. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Supp. op.861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).

14-61-114. Options may also be referred by vote, ordinance — Mayor's veto power.

    1. Notwithstanding any other provision, the board of directors in a city operating under the city manager form of government may by a two-thirds vote of all the members, including the mayor, refer to a special or general election, for approval by a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue, one (1) of the options set forth in § 14-61-107, provided no election on a board-referred option has been held within the previous two (2) years.
    2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection and §§ 14-43-201 and 14-61-117, in a city operating under the management form of government where a federal court has ordered the redistricting of wards under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, the voters of the city are authorized to petition for a special election to vote on the options set forth in § 14-61-107 for reorganizing the selection of directors, including the election of a mayor at large, at any time. The option shall be voted on at special elections called as a result of a petition for the special election's being filed with the city clerk and provided to the mayor under § 14-61-113.
  1. The board of directors in a city with the management form of government where all directors are elected from wards and the directly elected mayor does not have the veto power may by ordinance referred to the electors and approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue grant the mayor the veto power, provided that no election on such an ordinance will occur sooner than two (2) years after the last special election on the issue of veto power for the mayor.
  2. The board of directors in a city with the management form of government where all directors are elected from wards and the directly elected mayor has the veto power may by ordinance referred to the electors and approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue remove the mayor's veto power, provided that no election on such an ordinance will occur sooner than two (2) years after the last special election on the issue of veto power for the mayor.
    1. The board of directors of any city operating under the management form of government may by ordinance refer to the electors the issue of electing the mayor from an at-large board position or the issue of granting veto power to the mayor, or both.
      1. In any instance where the mayor of a city operating under the management form of government has a veto power, the board of directors may override the veto by a two-thirds vote of the number of members of the board.
      2. Mayors who have the veto power shall not be entitled to vote unless the vote is necessary for passage of a measure.
    1. The board of directors by ordinance may provide that the duties of the city manager under § 14-47-120 or other statute be performed at the direction of the mayor.
    2. An ordinance under subdivision (e)(1) of this section shall not be amended for four (4) years following passage of the ordinance by the board of directors unless by an ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the board of directors.
    3. If an ordinance under subdivision (e)(1) of this section is passed, the mayor shall be compensated with a salary and benefit package comparable to the highest-ranking municipal official.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 12; 1993, No. 1060, § 1; 1993, No. 1294, § 5; 1995, No. 750, § 2; 2007, No. 729, § 2.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment by No. 1294 rewrote (a).

The 1993 amendment by No. 1060 added (d).

The 1995 amendment added (a)(2).

U.S. Code. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq.

Case Notes

Construction.

An election among the statutorily permitted options in § 14-61-107 may come about from petitions filed by electors under § 14-61-113 or by reference of an option selected by the board to the voters under this section; whatever the option being used, however, the directors (and where appropriate the mayor) are all selected by a plurality under § 14-61-112. Williams v. City of Texarkana, 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992)Supp. op.861 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, Williams v. City of Texarkana, 32 F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994).

14-61-115. Initial organization as a management form of government.

  1. A city affected by this chapter that has not yet held an election on petitions calling for an election to adopt the management form of government shall submit at a special election a ballot that addresses the following questions:
    1. Whether to adopt the management form of government;
    2. Which option to follow for the selection of members of the board of directors, the number of directors, and whether to directly elect the mayor.
  2. At the special election on the question of whether to adopt the management form of government, the ballot shall contain substantially the following question:
  3. In the area of the ballot immediately below the questions set forth in subsection (a) of this section, one (1) of the following explanations will be provided:
    1. For options where all directors are elected at large:
      1. A city manager government with a (number) member board of directors elected at large. The mayor shall be selected from among the directors; or
      2. A city manager government with a (number) member board of directors elected at large. The mayor shall be directly elected.
    2. For options where a majority of directors are elected from wards and the remaining directors are elected at large:
      1. A city manager government with (majority plus one) members of the board of directors from wards and (remaining number) members of the board of directors at-large. The mayor shall be selected from among the directors.
      2. A city manager government with (majority plus one) members of the board of directors from wards and (remaining number) members of the board of directors at-large. The mayor shall be directly elected.
    3. For options in which the directors are elected from a combination of wards and from larger designated districts that overlap wards:
      1. A city manager form of government with (number) members of the board of directors from wards and (number) members of the board of directors from larger designated districts that overlap wards. The mayor shall be elected from among the directors.
      2. A city manager government with (number) members of the board of directors from wards and (number) members of the board of directors from larger designated districts that overlap wards. The mayor shall be directly elected.
    4. For options in which all members of the board of directors are elected from wards, but the mayor is elected at large:
      1. A city manager government with a (number) member board of directors all elected from wards. The mayor shall be directly elected at large.
      2. If a city affected by this chapter votes on an option under this subsection, then the following question shall also appear on the ballot:
      3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, if the vote under this subdivision (c)(4) to provide the mayor with a veto power is unsuccessful, the issue shall not be submitted again for a period of two (2) years after the date of the certification of the unsuccessful election.
  4. If a majority of the votes cast are in favor of the proposition of adopting the management form of government, then the city shall organize under the management form of government in accordance with the options selected.

FOR adoption of the management form of government as set forth below AGAINST adoption of the management form of government as set forth below

Click to view form.

FOR giving the mayor a veto power but no vote unless there is a tie AGAINST giving the mayor a veto power but no vote unless there is a tie

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 13; 2019, No. 978, § 7.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 13, provided, in part: “in a city where all directors are elected by ward but the Mayor is elected at-large, whether the Mayor should have a veto power as provided by Section 10 of this Act.” This language was in the act as adopted, but it refers to a section of the bill as originally introduced, which was amended out of the bill during passage, concerning the submission of the granting of veto power to the mayor.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted (c)(3) and redesignated former (c)(3) as (c)(4); substituted “in which” for “where” in the introductory language of (c)(4); deleted “and only if” following “If” in (c)(4)(B); and substituted “under this subdivision (c)(4)” for “pursuant to this subdivision” in (c)(4)(C).

14-61-116. Reorganization election by city with management form of government.

  1. A city affected by this chapter that is already organized under the management form of government shall hold a special election on petitions calling for a reorganization under this chapter in accordance with the provisions of § 14-61-114 provided that no special election shall be held on the option already being utilized by the city.
  2. A city affected by this chapter that has held a special election on petitions calling for a reorganization under this chapter may, by ordinance approved by a two-thirds vote of the municipal board of directors:
    1. Choose a different method by which to select a municipal board of directors under § 14-61-107; and
    2. Determine the minimum percentage a special candidate for mayor shall receive in order to be elected without a runoff under § 14-61-111.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 14; 2019, No. 978, § 8.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a) designation and added (b).

14-61-117. Implementation of change in form of government under this chapter.

The following procedure will be used to implement this chapter by cities that have changed the manner by which directors and the mayor are selected:

  1. If an option is chosen in which the mayor is directly elected, the position of mayor shall be elected at the first general election after the organization or reorganization of the city under the management form of government. Because of this fact, at the first meeting of the board of directors after the special election results have been certified, the mayor shall prepare slips of paper for each member of the board of directors whose current terms expire soonest. One (1) of these slips of paper shall have the word “Mayor” imprinted on it and the rest of the slips shall be blank. Each member whose term will expire soonest after the reorganization will draw a slip of paper and the director drawing the slip of paper with the word “Mayor” imprinted on it will not draw again. The successor for this director will be the elected mayor.
  2. The mayor shall then prepare slips of paper for each member of the board of directors, except the one (1) that has drawn the mayor's slip, upon which will be imprinted the name of a director position, or ward position, as may be needed. These members of the board of directors shall draw one (1) slip of paper, and the words imprinted on the slip drawn by each member shall determine the position and method of selection for such member's successor.
  3. Upon the expiration of the current term of a member, his successor shall be elected in the manner designated under this section. For example, if a member draws “Director Ward 1”, then that member's successor shall be selected from the area designated as Ward 1 by the county board of election commissioners.
      1. If an option is selected that decreases the existing size of the board of directors, including the position of mayor, then at the first meeting after the results of the election have been certified, the mayor shall prepare slips of paper for each member of the board of directors, upon which will be imprinted the designation of the director positions that will remain after the decrease, whether at-large or ward positions, or a directly elected mayor. The remaining slips of paper shall remain blank.
      2. The members of the board of directors shall draw one (1) slip of paper, and the words imprinted on the slip drawn by each member shall determine the position for which that member's successor will be selected.
      3. Directors drawing a blank slip of paper shall not be succeeded upon the expiration of their terms of office.
      1. If an option is selected that increases the existing number of directors, including the position of mayor, and the next general municipal election is more than one (1) year away, then a special election to fill the new positions shall be held within a reasonable time. This special election shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of §§ 14-47-106 and 14-47-110. Persons elected at this special election shall serve until the next general municipal election, at which time the positions shall again be on the ballot for a full four-year term.
      2. If an option is selected that increases the existing number of directors, including the position of mayor, and the next general municipal election is less than one (1) year away, then the board of directors, by majority vote, may:
        1. Conduct a special election, in accordance with the provisions of §§ 14-47-106 and 14-47-110, but declare that the initial term of office for these positions shall be from the date the results of the special election are certified until the end of the term for directors elected at the next general municipal election, and that thereafter persons elected to fill the positions will serve a term of four (4) years; or
        2. Choose to leave the positions vacant until the next general municipal election; or
        3. Fill the vacancies in accordance with § 14-47-113, with the persons appointed to serve until the next general municipal election.
    1. If an option is approved pursuant to § 14-61-107(2) that results in a change in the number of directors selected from wards, the board of directors, by majority vote, may determine how to select the positions as follows:
      1. The board may designate any or all of the positions to be selected at any special election called to implement the change, and at the succeeding two (2) general municipal elections, in order to fully implement the option adopted;
        1. In order to fully implement that option selected, the board may draw lots to determine which positions will be elected at any special election called to implement the change, and at the succeeding two (2) general municipal elections, in order to fully implement the option adopted. Each slip will be imprinted with the name of a ward position, an at-large position, or the mayor, as necessary, and the successor of the board member drawing a particular slip of paper will be elected from the position. For purposes of illustration, the director from Ward 1 will be elected at the general municipal election when the position of the director drawing the slip marked “Ward 1” is up for election. If the option selected increases the size of the board of directors, and if the board has not otherwise determined the positions to be selected, then the mayor and one (1) board member whose term expires at the general municipal election before or after the mayor's term expires will draw an extra slip for each necessary position. For example, if two (2) new positions are authorized and the mayor's term expires at the next general municipal election, then the mayor would draw one (1) extra slip and a board member whose term expires two (2) years after the mayor's term would draw one (1) extra slip.
        2. Once the board has determined how successors, or new members, or both, are to be selected, it may unanimously vote to fill all positions on the board, including the position of mayor, at a special election, or no later than the next general municipal election. If a decision is made to so expedite the election of the board, the board may designate which positions will initially be filled for two-year terms, with successors to be elected for four-year terms thereafter, which positions will be elected for four-year terms, with successors to be elected for four-year terms thereafter.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 15; 1993, No. 1294, § 6.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment rewrote this section.

14-61-118. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning the resignation of director to run for mayor, was repealed by Acts 2015, No. 222, § 1. This section was derived from Acts 1989, No. 907, § 16.

14-61-119. Removal of director.

  1. The holder of the office of city director or the mayor is subject to removal by the electors qualified to vote for a successor of the incumbent.
  2. The procedure to effect the removal of the incumbent of this elective office is as follows:
    1. The city clerk shall send to the subject of the recall a certified letter, return receipt requested, and a copy of the petition stating the basis of the recall shall be mailed to the incumbent whose removal is sought under this section;
        1. A petition shall be filed with the city clerk within ninety (90) days after the collection of signatures began.
        2. The collection of the signatures for the petition shall not begin before the date the certified letter is mailed under subdivision (b)(1) of this section.
      1. This petition shall be signed by electors entitled to vote for a successor to the incumbent sought to be removed equal in number to at least thirty-five percent (35%) of the number of ballots cast for all candidates for the position held by the incumbent sought to be removed at the preceding general election for that position;
    2. The petition shall contain a statement of the grounds and reasons on account of which the removal is sought;
    3. The signatures to the petition need not all be appended to one (1) paper, but each signer shall add to his or her signature his or her place of residence, giving street and number, if any; and
    4. One of the signers of each of the papers shall make an oath before an officer competent to administer oaths that:
      1. The statements therein made are true as he or she believes;
      2. Each signature to the paper appended is a genuine signature of the person whose name it purports to be;
      3. The petition contains the information concerning the reason for the removal of the incumbent; and
      4. The petition contains the date upon which the collection of signatures began.
  3. Within ten (10) days of the date of filing the petition, the city clerk shall ascertain and determine whether or not the petition is signed by the requisite number of qualified electors. If necessary, the board of directors shall allow the city clerk extra help for that purpose.
  4. The city clerk shall attach to the petition his or her certificate showing the result of his or her examination.
  5. If by the clerk's certificate the petition is shown to be insufficient, it may be amended within ten (10) days.
    1. Within ten (10) days after an amendment, the clerk shall make like examination of the amended petition.
    2. If his or her certificate shows the amended petition to be insufficient, it shall be returned to the person filing it, without prejudice, however, to his or her filing a new petition to the same effect.
    3. If the petition is deemed sufficient, the clerk shall submit it to the board without delay.
  6. Upon receipt from the city clerk certifying that the petition is sufficient, the board of directors shall order and fix a date for holding an election under § 7-11-201 et seq. This date shall be not more than ninety (90) days from the date of the clerk's certificate to the board that a sufficient petition is filed.
  7. The board of directors shall make or cause to be made, publication of notice and all arrangements for holding the election.
  8. The election shall be conducted and returned, and the result thereof declared in all respects as are other such elections under election laws.
  9. At the election, the proposition submitted to the electors shall be:
  10. If the majority of votes cast on the issue are in favor of the removal of the officer, the officer shall be removed and his or her office vacated, and it shall be filled in the manner provided for filling vacancies.
  11. If the majority of the votes cast on that issue are against the removal of the officer, the officer shall continue to serve.
  12. No recall petition may be filed against any officer until he or she has held his or her office for at least six (6) months, nor may any officer be subject to more than one (1) recall proceeding during any one (1) term of office.

“FOR the removal of (name of officer) from the Office of (Director)(Mayor) AGAINST the removal of (name of officer) from the Office of (Director)(Mayor)

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1989, No. 907, § 17; 1991, No. 49, § 2; 2007, No. 1049, § 61; 2009, No. 1454, § 1; 2009, No. 1480, § 79; 2011, No. 778, § 1.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 1454 inserted (b)(1), present (b)(2)(A)(ii), present (b)(5)(C), and present (b)(5)(D), and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; inserted gender-neutral language throughout the section; inserted “within ninety (90) days after the collection of signatures began” in (b)(2)(A)(i) and inserted “general” in (b)(2)(B); substituted “Upon receipt from the city clerk certifying that the petition is sufficient, the board shall” for “If the board shall find the petition thus submitted to it contains the requisite number of electors signed thereto and is otherwise found to be sufficient, it shall” in (g); substituted “during any one (1) term of office” for “between biennial elections” in (m); and made related and minor stylistic changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 1480 substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in the first sentence of (g).

The 2011 amendment substituted “to his or her filing” for “to the filing of” in (f)(1).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

Constitutionality of state and local recall provisions. 13 A.L.R.6th 661.

14-61-120. Limited voting — Cumulative voting.

  1. A majority of the qualified electors voting on the issue may vote to permit limited voting or cumulative voting for directors, other than the mayor, elected at large.
  2. Under a limited voting system, voters are restricted to casting only one (1) vote for any single candidate, but are not given as many votes as there are at-large seats to fill.
  3. Cumulative voting shall be construed as allowing every voter to cast as many votes as there are positions to be filled of the same category, without restricting the voter to casting only one (1) vote for any particular candidate. This system permits voters to aggregate or cumulate their votes. For example, in a three-seat, three-vote election, a voter may provide three (3) candidates with one (1) vote each, or the voter may cast two (2) votes for one (1) candidate and one (1) vote for a second candidate, or the voter may cast all three (3) votes for a single candidate.

History. Acts 1993, No. 1294, § 7.

Chapter 62 Revocation of Charter of a Municipal Corporation

14-62-101. Authority generally.

The charter of a municipal corporation may be revoked, its offices abolished, and the territory and inhabitants returned to the county in which the municipal corporation is located in the manner provided in this chapter, subject to the authority of the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 and to the interests of creditors.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-102. Revocation due to noncompliance.

    1. If the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee concludes the process under § 14-59-117 on a municipal corporation, and in the immediately subsequent three-year period the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee concludes the process a second time, the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee may notify the Attorney General and the Governor of its actions.
    2. The Attorney General shall file pleadings in the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District to revoke the charter of the municipal corporation based on the notification under subdivision (a)(1) of this section.
  1. Upon a finding that the conditions under subsection (a) of this section have been met, the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District shall revoke the charter of a municipal corporation under this section, and the clerk of the circuit court shall certify a transcript of the order under the official seal of the clerk and forward a copy of the transcript to the:
    1. Secretary of State;
    2. Arkansas Geographic Information Systems Office;
    3. Governor; and
    4. County judge of the county in which the municipal corporation is located.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-103. Surrender and repeal of charter.

    1. When the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District issues an order revoking the charter of a municipal corporation under § 14-62-102, the order is effective upon the qualification and appointment of the receiver.
    2. Once an order becomes effective under subdivision (a)(1) of this section:
      1. The charter of the municipal corporation is surrendered and repealed;
      2. The population and territory governed under the charter are returned back to the county in which the municipal corporation is located, subject to the authority of the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 and to the interests of creditors;
      3. The offices held under the charter are abolished;
      4. The power of taxation vested in or exercised by the municipal corporation is withdrawn, unless otherwise specified under this chapter;
        1. Title to all property, whether real, personal, mixed, tangible, or intangible, of the municipal corporation is transferred to the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104, unless otherwise specified under this chapter.
          1. The receiver shall take immediate possession of and control over the property.
          2. The receiver shall execute any necessary documentation transferring his or her interest in the property to the county if the property is no longer needed for the purposes under this chapter;
      5. All ordinances, regulations, codes, or other laws promulgated by the municipal corporation and its agencies are repealed and are void; and
      6. All licenses, permits, and similar documents issued by the municipal corporation are void.
  1. Until a final order of dissolution is entered under § 14-62-114, the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 shall continue to collect the share of:
    1. General revenue turnback funds, as defined in the Revenue Stabilization Law, § 19-5-101 et seq., that the municipal corporation is entitled to under § 27-70-207;
    2. County and state taxes that were being paid to the municipal corporation; and
    3. Any other funds, revenues, or fees as otherwise provided under this chapter.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-104. Receiver — Appointment — Oath — Duties — Authority.

  1. Within five (5) business days of receipt of the order revoking the charter of a municipal corporation under § 14-62-102, the Governor shall appoint a qualified officer, to be known as the receiver, for an extinct municipal corporation whose charter has been revoked under this chapter.
  2. A receiver shall:
    1. Take the oath required of other collectors of public revenue and give bond with good sureties to be approved by the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District;
    2. Enter upon the duties of the office as soon as appointed and qualified;
    3. Take possession of:
      1. All books, papers, and documents pertaining to the assessment and collection of taxes of the extinct municipal corporation; and
      2. Any property belonging to the extinct municipal corporation; and
    4. Resolve the outstanding indebtedness of the extinct municipal corporation pursuant to this chapter.
    1. The receiver may be removed at any time by the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District for good cause, including failure to discharge one (1) or more duties imposed by this chapter.
    2. Removal may be upon:
      1. The circuit court's own motion; or
      2. The motion of:
        1. A person interested as an inhabitant of the extinct municipal corporation;
        2. A creditor of the extinct municipal corporation;
        3. The county judge of the county in which the extinct municipal corporation was located; or
        4. The Attorney General on behalf of the state.
    3. A substitute receiver shall be appointed in the same manner as the initial receiver appointed under this chapter.
    4. The office of the receiver shall cease and terminate at the time a final order of dissolution is entered under § 14-62-114.
  3. The receiver may:
    1. Employ attorneys, accountants, or other persons to assist in performing the duties of the receiver, to be paid out of the funds collected by the receiver;
    2. Sue or be sued;
    3. Take possession and control of all property, whether real, personal, mixed, tangible, or intangible, of the extinct municipal corporation;
    4. Enforce all contracts of the extinct municipal corporation, subject to the rights of creditors;
    5. Receive fees, taxes, and other charges, collect debts, and otherwise enforce all claims of the extinct municipal corporation for money owed;
    6. Exercise any other powers conferred in this chapter expressly or by necessary implication; and
    7. Take any other action necessary and beneficial to the extinct municipal corporation's former inhabitants, creditors, or other interested persons, upon approval of the circuit court.
  4. If the receiver takes possession and control of any property of the extinct municipal corporation, the receiver may manage or operate the property as necessary to collect debts, preserve the property, and generate income, all for the benefit of the inhabitants, creditors, bondholders, or any other interested persons or entities of the extinct municipal corporation.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-105. Reports and collections by receiver.

  1. Every six (6) months, a receiver for an extinct municipal corporation appointed under § 14-62-104 shall make to the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District a clear and complete statement reflecting all moneys collected, all taxes collected and settled, and all taxes that remain to be collected and settled.
    1. The Department of Finance and Administration shall continue to administer and to collect as provided by law all sales and use taxes of the extinct municipal corporation.
    2. The department shall remit collection of the taxes under subdivision (b)(1) of this section to the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104.
      1. At least one (1) time per month, the receiver shall pay into the State Treasury the whole sum collected or received from taxes.
      2. The receiver shall distinguish the respective sources from which the moneys paid in are derived, reflecting what is collected from taxes for general purposes and what is collected for special purposes, and designating the general or special purpose, so that the moneys may be kept separate in the State Treasury.
      1. At least one (1) time per month, the receiver shall pay into a bank approved under § 19-8-105 the whole sum collected and received from any nontax revenue sources.
      2. The receiver shall distinguish the respective sources from which the moneys paid in are derived, so that the moneys may be kept separate in the bank under subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-106. Compensation of receiver.

  1. A receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 shall receive such compensation for his or her services as shall be fixed by the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District.
  2. As the circuit court may allow, a receiver shall have credit for all taxes, expenses, attorney's fees, and other necessary disbursements in the execution of the receiver's duties, to be paid out of the funds collected by the receiver.
  3. If insufficient funds have been collected under this chapter to compensate the receiver, the circuit court may request the Governor to transfer adequate funds to compensate the receiver from the available funds.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-107. Audit of receiver.

A receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 is subject to audit by Arkansas Legislative Audit:

  1. At the request of the:
    1. Circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District; or
    2. County judge of the county in which the extinct municipal corporation was situated; or
  2. At the discretion of the Legislative Auditor.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-108. Proceedings to collect revenue due.

    1. For the purpose of collecting the revenue under this chapter, a receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 may file proceedings in the name of the receiver on behalf of all creditors and against taxpayers who owed taxes to the extinct municipal corporation, in cooperation with the Department of Finance and Administration under § 14-62-111.
    2. The proceedings shall be filed in the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District.
  1. All pending lawsuits involving the extinct municipal corporation in connection with the collection of taxes or the payment of indebtedness are revived in the name of the receiver and consolidated with the proceedings provided for in this section, in cooperation with the Department of Finance and Administration under § 14-62-111.
      1. The circuit court may settle and adjust all equities, priorities, and liens and give all appropriate relief.
      2. The circuit court may enforce all liens upon property for the payment of the taxes and order and make all sales of property necessary to the collection of the taxes.
      3. The taxes embraced by this section, and which this section provides for, are all taxes imposed by the extinct municipal corporation before the revocation under this chapter and shall continue to be fully collected after the revocation under this chapter up to the time of the full accord and satisfaction of the indebtedness for which the taxes were levied, and no other taxes.
    1. The circuit court shall include in the proceedings only those taxpayers of the extinct municipal corporation so that no other citizens of the county shall be responsible for the payment of taxes owed to or the debts of the extinct municipal corporation, except as otherwise provided under this chapter or for other pledged or dedicated sales and use taxes of the extinct municipal corporation.
    2. The circuit court or receiver shall not raise any rate of taxation in effect as of the date of the entry of an order revoking the charter of a municipal corporation under § 14-62-102.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-109. Public utilities.

  1. A public utility operating and organized as an improvement district and serving residents of the extinct municipal corporation shall continue in operation.
      1. A public utility operated by the extinct municipal corporation is transferred to the receiver.
      2. Funds held by the extinct municipal corporation in connection with the operation of the public utility are transferred to the receiver, including without limitation customer deposits and debt reserve funds.
    1. The receiver shall continue to:
      1. Operate the public utility;
      2. Collect all fees and taxes due to and all funds associated with the public utility; and
      3. Continue to pay any bonded indebtedness of the public utility.
    2. The transfer of the public utility to the receiver is subject to any liens held on the public utility that existed at the time of the transfer under this chapter, including without limitation mortgages and security interests.
    3. If a public utility is transferred under this section, the Department of Finance and Administration shall continue to collect as provided by law pledged or dedicated sales and use taxes levied for bonded indebtedness of the public utility and remit the collections to the receiver under § 14-62-105(b) until the indebtedness is satisfied.
  2. Within sixty (60) days of the appointment of the receiver under § 14-62-104, the receiver shall publish a notice in a newspaper with general circulation in the county in which the municipal corporation is located that the opportunity for the acquisition of the public utility shall:
      1. Be first extended to an adjacent municipality located within five (5) miles of the extinct municipal corporation, and if a majority of the governing body of the adjacent municipality votes to acquire the public utility under this subdivision (c)(1)(A), the acquisition transaction shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days of the appointment of the receiver under § 14-62-104.
      2. If more than one (1) adjacent municipality located within five (5) miles of the extinct municipal corporation votes to acquire the public utility under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of this section, the adjacent municipalities shall be given priority based on population from largest to smallest;
      1. Be next extended to the county in which the extinct municipal corporation is located if the public utility is not acquired by an adjacent municipality under subdivision (c)(1) of this section.
      2. If a majority of the governing body of the county in which the extinct municipal corporation is located votes to acquire the public utility under subdivision (c)(2)(A) of this section, the acquisition transaction shall be completed within two hundred seventy (270) days of the appointment of the receiver under § 14-62-104;
        1. Be next extended to an adjacent public utility operated and organized as an improvement district and located within five (5) miles of the extinct municipal corporation if the public utility is not acquired by the county in which the extinct municipal corporation is located under subdivision (c)(2) of this section.
        2. If a majority of the governing body of the adjacent public utility improvement district votes to acquire the public utility under subdivision (c)(3)(A)(i) of this section, the acquisition transaction shall be completed within three hundred sixty (360) days of the appointment of the receiver under § 14-62-104.
      1. If more than one (1) adjacent public utility improvement district located within five (5) miles of the extinct municipal corporation votes to acquire the public utility under subdivision (c)(3)(A) of this section, the adjacent public utility improvement districts shall be given priority based on evidence of economic viability and the number of customers served from largest to smallest;
    1. Be next extended to an entity other than the entities listed in subdivisions (c)(1)-(3) of this section if none of the entities listed in subdivisions (c)(1)-(3) of this section acquire the public utility of the extinct municipal corporation, and the acquisition transaction shall be completed within four hundred fifty (450) days of the appointment of the receiver under § 14-62-104; and
        1. (a) Not be further extended and remain with the receiver if none of the entities in subdivisions (c)(1)-(4) of this section acquire the public utility of the extinct municipal corporation.
          1. A suburban improvement district created under subdivision (c)(5)(A)(i) of this section is created by operation of law without the statutory requirements under § 14-92-201 et seq. concerning petitions or hearings or other statutory requirements at the discretion of the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District.
          2. The receiver shall serve as the board of commissioners, and the boundaries of the suburban improvement district created under subdivision (c)(5)(A)(i) of this section shall include the service area of the public utility of the extinct municipal corporation.
        2. A suburban improvement district created under subdivision (c)(5)(A)(i) of this section is considered an instrumentality of the state for purposes of bankruptcy proceedings.
      1. At the conclusion of any bankruptcy proceeding instituted under subdivision (c)(5)(A) of this section, the public utility shall be transferred to the county.
  3. The receiver may request a reasonable extension of time from the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District for the purpose of the completion of an acquisition of a public utility under subsection (c) of this section.

(b) The receiver shall establish a suburban improvement district to operate the public utility using the authority set out in § 14-92-201 et seq. for the purpose of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings for the public utility.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-110. Retirement pension funds — Exemption from chapter — Control transferred to Arkansas Local Police and Fire Retirement System.

  1. Moneys due and owing the Arkansas Local Police and Fire Retirement System under § 24-10-101 et seq. or due and owing a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund under § 24-11-101 et seq. are not subject to the proceedings under this chapter and are transferred to the control of the system.
      1. A local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund created under § 24-11-101 et seq. that is not subject to the administration of the system at the time of the order entered under § 14-62-102 is consolidated with the system.
          1. The actuary under contract to the system shall compute the retirement reserve for vested and active members and for eligible beneficiaries of a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund.
          2. After receiving the report of the actuary, the receiver shall transfer the computed reserve to the system to be held in an account designated as the retirement reserve for a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund and from which the system shall pay eligible beneficiaries.
        1. If the retirement reserve of a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund is inadequate to pay full benefits to eligible recipients, the receiver may reduce benefits based on such actuarially computed amounts as are necessary to pay eligible recipients, without impairing contracts and to the extent allowed under law.
          1. The receiver shall continue to collect such millages, fines, fees, state insurance tax turnbacks, and other revenues as allowed by law for the support of a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund.
          2. When a final order of dissolution is entered under § 14-62-114, the millages, fines, fees, state insurance tax turnbacks, and other revenues as allowed by law shall be paid to the system.
      1. Pledged or dedicated taxes levied by the extinct municipal corporation at the time of the order under § 14-62-102 for a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund shall continue to be collected until the indebtedness is satisfied.
      2. When a final order of dissolution is entered under § 14-62-114, pledged or dedicated taxes collected under subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section shall continue to be collected and remitted to the system until the indebtedness is satisfied.
    1. The system shall refund all member contributions made to the system or fund applicable to the extinct municipal corporation to a member who has not yet vested in the system or in a local firemen's relief and pension fund or a local policemen's pension and relief fund at the time of the order entered under § 14-62-102.
    2. Service credit earned with the extinct municipal corporation by a nonvested member under the system is cancelled, and any member contributions relating only to the extinct municipal corporation shall be refunded to the nonvested member.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3; 2019, No. 383, § 13.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “fines” in (b)(1)(B)(iii) (b)

14-62-111. Collection of sales and use taxes.

  1. If a receiver is appointed under § 14-62-104, sales and use taxes of the extinct municipal corporation shall continue to be collected in the manner provided by law by the Department of Finance and Administration, with the collections paid to the receiver for the benefit of the extinct municipal corporation.
  2. At the time a final order of dissolution is entered under § 14-62-114, the collection of sales and use taxes of the extinct municipal corporation shall cease, except as otherwise provided under this chapter.
  3. Delinquent sales and use taxes of the extinct municipal corporation shall continue to be collected in the manner provided by law, and the Department of Finance and Administration and the receiver shall cooperate in the collection of the delinquent sales and use taxes.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-112. Filing of claims — Appeals.

    1. If a party is dissatisfied with the decision of any litigated question under this chapter, he or she may have the question reheard upon appeal to the Supreme Court.
    2. Only so much of the record as pertains to the appeal shall form the transcript and record for the appeal.
    1. Except as provided under subdivision (b)(2) of this section, the costs shall be paid by the parties to the appeal as the Supreme Court may direct.
    2. If the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 is a party to the litigation on behalf of creditors generally, the costs may be charged to the whole or to some particular fund if the Supreme Court deems proper and as right and justice may require.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-113. Payment of funds collected.

Funds collected under this chapter shall be paid out from time to time to those entitled to the funds and in such manner as the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District may determine, on the warrant of the receiver appointed under § 14-62-104 and countersigned by the judge of the circuit court.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

14-62-114. Final order of dissolution.

At the time of the full accord and satisfaction of the indebtedness of the municipal corporation whose charter is revoked under this chapter and upon the request of the receiver, the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial District shall enter a final order of dissolution.

History. Acts 2017, No. 712, § 3.

Chapters 63-69 [Reserved.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 4. Public Finance Generally

Chapter 70 General Provisions

[Reserved]

Chapter 71 Fiscal Years

Cross References. School fiscal year, § 6-20-410.

Effective Dates. Acts 1925, No. 210, § 8: approved Mar. 23, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that by reason of the heavy indebtedness hanging over many cities and towns they are unable to procure or maintain proper facilities for the extinction of fires, proper police protection, or proper safeguards for the public health and that by reason of the indebtedness hanging over many counties they are unable to maintain the public buildings, the roads and bridges in a safe condition, are unable to maintain such deputy sheriffs and deputy constables as are necessary to preserve the public peace and to protect the citizens against criminals and are unable to maintain the institutions and enforce the regulations for the preservation of the public health, and for these reasons it is hereby declared that an emergency exists, and that this act is immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety and the same shall take effect and be in force upon its passage.”

14-71-101. County fiscal year — Accounting method for county budget and treasury audit purposes — Definition.

  1. The fiscal year of the counties of the state, covering each period of twelve (12) months, begins on January 1 of each year and ends at the close of business on December 31 of the same year.
    1. Counties shall use the modified accrual accounting basis for audit purposes.
      1. For county government and the regulatory basis of accounting under § 10-4-412(b)(2), “modified accrual accounting basis” is defined as an accounting system that recognizes revenues at the time revenues become available and measurable and expenditures at the time liabilities are incurred.
      2. Revenues and expenditures are accruable to the fiscal year as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
    1. Obligations incurred by a county on or before the end of the fiscal year that are not issued an accounts payable claim until the following fiscal year shall be posted to the prior fiscal year appropriations journal when paid within the first two (2) months of the following fiscal year.
      1. Revenues collected and owed to a county treasury before the end of the fiscal year and not remitted to the county treasury until the following fiscal year are accruable to the prior fiscal year when receipted by the county treasurer within the first two (2) months of the following fiscal year, except as provided in subdivision (c)(2)(C) of this section.
      2. Moneys received by the respective counties from the County Aid Fund are revenues of the year in which the moneys are received and are not revenues of the year in which the moneys were collected and paid into the State Treasury.
      3. Moneys received by the respective counties from the Treasurer of State representing county sales and use taxes are revenues of the year in which the moneys are received and are not revenues of the year in which the moneys were collected and paid into the State Treasury.
  2. The finance officers of the county shall keep and maintain records as required by law to account for accruable receivables or payables for audit purposes.

History. Acts 1939, No. 28, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-102; Acts 2017, No. 527, § 1; 2019, No. 310, § 3.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment rewrote the section heading, which formerly read “Counties”; designated the existing language as (a); rewrote (a); and added (b) through (d).

The 2019 amendment added the (c)(2)(A) designation; added “except as provided in subdivision (c)(2)(C) of this section” in (c)(2)(A); and added (c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C).

Case Notes

Claims.

The county court's allowance of a claim on December 31, 1932 must have been allocated to the fiscal year of 1931-1932 in determining whether the warrant issued therefor was void as having been given for an amount in excess of the revenues for the fiscal year. Mitchell v. Volkmer, 190 Ark. 11, 76 S.W.2d 947 (1934) (decision under prior law).

14-71-102. Cities and towns.

The fiscal year of each city and town in this state shall begin with January 1 and end at 12:00 midnight on December 31 of each year.

History. Acts 1925, No. 210, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 9536; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-103.

Chapter 72 Bonds of Counties, Cities, and Towns

Research References

ALR.

Computation of net “loss” for which fidelity insurer is liable. 5 A.L.R.5th 132.

Am. Jur. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Mun. Corp., § 592 et seq.

C.J.S. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 258 et seq.

64 C.J.S., Mun. Corp., § 1902 et seq.

87 C.J.S., Towns, §§ 1139-1540.

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1973, No. 514, § 3: Mar. 30, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that municipalities which have received grants for water pollution control projects funded by bonds issued by the Department pursuant to Act No. 108 (which bonds are payable from the proceeds of a Water Quality Control Charge levied against users of the utility system of the Municipality receiving the grant), may, by refunding the bonds issued to fund the grant, obtain the use of reserves required to be maintained in connection with the Department bonds and realize a savings in debt service requirements, and this Act is necessary to authorize the issuance of refunding bonds by municipalities for the purpose of refunding bonds issued under Act No. 108. An emergency is, therefore, declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

14-72-101. Municipal water and sewer revenue bonds for repayment of water pollution control grants.

  1. Any city of the first class, city of the second class, or incorporated town, hereinafter referred to as a “municipality”, which has received from the Division of Environmental Quality of the Department of Energy and Environment a water pollution control project grant funded from the proceeds of bonds of the division issued pursuant to §§ 8-5-301 — 8-5-318 [repealed] may issue water revenue bonds under the provisions of § 14-234-201 et seq., sewer revenue bonds under the provisions of §§ 14-235-201 — 14-235-224, or combined water and sewer revenue bonds for the purpose of refunding the bonds of the division issued to fund the grant.
  2. The refunding bonds may be combined with other bonds issued by the municipality under the provisions of § 14-234-201 et seq. and §§ 14-235-201 — 14-235-224 into a single issue.
  3. All bonds issued under this section shall in all respects be authorized, sold, issued, and secured in the manner provided for other bonds issued under § 14-234-201 et seq. and §§ 14-235-201 — 14-235-224 pursuant to which the refunding bonds are being issued.

History. Acts 1973, No. 514, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1238; Acts 1999, No. 1164, § 122; 2019, No. 910, § 3032.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, No. 1219, § 2, provided:

“‘Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology’ renamed to ‘Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality’.

“(a) Effective March 31, 1999, the ‘Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology’ or ‘Department,’ as it is referred to or empowered throughout the Arkansas Code Annotated, is hereby renamed. In its place, the ‘Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality’ is hereby established, succeeding to the general powers and responsibilities previously assigned to the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology. The Director of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology is directed to identify and revise all inter-agency agreements, financial instruments, funds, and other necessary legal documents in order to effect this change by March 31, 1999.

“(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as impairing the powers and authorities of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology prior to the effective date of the name change.”

Amendments. The 2019 amendment, in (a), substituted “Division of Environmental Quality” for “Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality”, and substituted “division” for “department” twice.

14-72-102. Transfer of unexpended balance of bond redemption fund to county hospital building fund.

In all cases where bonds have been issued in any county for the construction, reconstruction, or extension of any county hospital as authorized by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 25 [repealed], and all bonds issued for those purposes by any county have been wholly retired, the county courts of those counties may by appropriate order transfer any balances remaining unexpended to the credit of the bond redemption funds in those counties to the county hospital building funds. The moneys may then be used for all purposes for which the county hospital building fund could be used.

History. Acts 1969, No. 325, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1237.

A.C.R.C. Notes. It is questionable whether Ark. Const. Amend. 25 is repealed in whole or whether only those provisions that conflict with Ark. Const. Amend. 62 are repealed by Ark. Const. Amend. 62.

14-72-103. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning refunding bonds for industrial development issued under Ark. Const. Amend. 49, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The section was derived from Acts 1965, No. 487, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1236.

Subchapter 2 — Refunding Bonds of Counties Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1935, No. 102, § 3: retroactive to Oct. 1, 1934.

Acts 1937, No. 371, § 5: approved Mar. 30, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of substantial decrease in assessed valuation of taxable property, many counties of the state are unable to pay their maturing bonds and interest, when due; that there is grave danger that suits will be brought in the Federal Courts to increase the assessed valuation of the taxable property in such counties thereby causing much additional expense, adding to the burden of the taxpayers in such counties and impeding the orderly administration of county governments so that this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety. Therefore an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Case Notes

Cited: Arkansas Rural Medical Practice Student Loan & Scholarship Bd. v. Luter, 292 Ark. 259, 729 S.W.2d 402 (1987).

14-72-201. Authority to refund — Procedure.

  1. Any county of this state shall have the power and is authorized to refund its outstanding bonded indebtedness on terms the county court shall deem for the best interest of the county and to that end may issue negotiable bonds with interest coupons attached. Such refunding bonds either shall mature serially, the first principal payment to be not more than five (5) years after date, over a period of not more than forty (40) years from date thereof or shall mature on or before some fixed date not more than forty (40) years from date thereof, in which event the bonds shall provide for tender or call, or both, to be paid out of any surplus in the bond fund account.
  2. The county judge of the county may exchange refunding bonds for outstanding bonds of the county.
  3. The refunding bonds shall not be issued in a greater amount than the face value of the outstanding bonds then being refunded, and in no event shall the refunding bond bear a greater rate of interest than that borne by the bond for which it is exchanged.
  4. The new bonds shall bear the original signature of the county judge, under the seal of the county.
  5. This subchapter is intended to authorize only the refunding of valid, outstanding county funding, courthouse, or jail bonds.

History. Acts 1935, No. 102, § 1; 1937, No. 371, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 11315; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1220.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Whenever taxes collected from the millage tax fixed by the quorum court are inadequate to meet the county's bonded maturing obligations, the refunding scheme provided by this section is available. Ruddell v. Jones, 191 Ark. 1063, 89 S.W.2d 600 (1936).

Notice.

Notice of an order of the county court refunding the county's bonds is not required by this section. Talkington v. Turnbow, 190 Ark. 1138, 83 S.W.2d 71 (1935).

Cited: Turnbow v. Talkington, 191 Ark. 492, 86 S.W.2d 940 (1935).

14-72-202. Form of bonds — Rights and remedies.

The refunding bonds:

  1. Shall be negotiable instruments;
  2. May have coupons evidencing interest, payable annually or semiannually; and
  3. Shall have all the rights of security and remedies for collection that are provided for the original bonds issued by the county.

History. Acts 1935, No. 102, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 11319; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1221.

14-72-203. Certificates of indebtedness for interest due on refunded bonds and expense of issuing refunding bonds.

  1. In order to facilitate the refunding of its bonds, any county issuing refunding bonds may issue certificates of indebtedness bearing interest not to exceed five percent (5%) per annum, payable to bearer and negotiable, to cover matured interest due on outstanding bonds at the time they are exchanged for refunding bonds and may issue certificates of indebtedness, not bearing interest, payable to bearer, and negotiable, to cover the expenses of issuing refunding bonds.
  2. Both classes of certificates shall be paid out of the bond fund account of the county from any surplus that remains in the bond fund account in any year after the payment of the full amount of bonds and interest due that year on the refunding issue.
  3. Both classes of certificates of indebtedness issued in connection with an issue of refunding bonds shall be registered by the county treasurer, except that the certificates for expenses shall bear the early registration numbers to be followed by the certificates for interest. The certificates for interest shall be paid in numerical order of registration out of the money available for their payment.

History. Acts 1937, No. 371, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 11316; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1223.

14-72-204. Tax for original bonds continued for refunding bonds.

The tax for the payment of the outstanding bonds levied by the quorum court of the county issuing the refunding bonds shall continue for the payment of the refunding bonds and certificates of indebtedness. If the tax proves insufficient to meet the maturities of the refunding bonds with interest, it shall be the duty of the quorum court of the county to increase the levy of taxes, but not beyond three (3) mills upon the dollar of the assessed valuation existing at the time of the levy.

History. Acts 1937, No. 371, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 11317; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1224.

14-72-205. Refunding bonds under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 17.

  1. Any county that has issued funding bonds, under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 10, to take up its outstanding indebtedness which included any balance then due on the cost of construction of a courthouse or jail, or both, shall have the right to issue bonds under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 17 [repealed], and laws in aid thereof, to refund the same proportionate part of its outstanding funding bonds that the included balance of the cost of construction of a courthouse or jail, or both, was of the total indebtedness funded under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 10.
  2. Before proceeding under this section to refund courthouse or jail indebtedness, the county court shall enter upon its records an order declaring what part of the funding bonds issued by the county under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 10, represented indebtedness for the construction of a courthouse or a jail, or both, and what part represented general county indebtedness.
  3. This order shall be published one (1) time in some newspaper published in the county. If no suit is brought within thirty (30) days after the publication to review the correctness of the finding made in the order, the finding shall be conclusive of the proportionate part of the funding bond issue represented by indebtedness for the construction of a courthouse or a jail, or both, and shall not be open to further attack.
  4. In the event a county shall refund part of its outstanding funding bonds under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 17 [repealed], and the laws in aid thereof, the county court shall then have authority to refund the balance of the county's outstanding funding bonds under the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1937, No. 371, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 11318; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1225.

A.C.R.C. Notes. It is questionable as to whether Ark. Const. Amend. 17 is repealed in whole or if only those provisions that conflict with Ark. Const. Amend. 62 are repealed by Ark. Const. Amend. 62.

Subchapter 3 — County Bonds for Courthouses and Jails

Effective Dates. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 8: Mar. 29, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the want of proper jails in which to confine criminals and proper court houses in which to try them, the public peace and safety are endangered; that many counties will immediately proceed to avail themselves of the benefit of Amendment No. 17 to our Constitution and issue bonds to build court houses and jails, and that it is necessary immediately to provide proper safeguards for the sale of such bonds; that many counties have built court houses and jails and have issued therefor warrants now outstanding payable through a long period of years, and the funds necessary to pay such warrants will so deplete the revenues of the counties that they will not have funds enough to preserve the public peace, health and safety; and for these reasons it is hereby ascertained and declared that an emergency exists requiring that this act go into immediate effect. It is therefore provided that this act shall go into effect and be in force immediately after its passage.” But see, Hargrove v. Arnold, 181 Ark. 537, 26 S.W.2d 581 (1930).

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-72-301. Authority to issue.

Any county which has built, constructed, or extended a county courthouse or jail, or both, which has not been completely paid for and for which county warrants are now outstanding, may issue bonds through its county court to raise money to pay the indebtedness when authorized by a vote of the majority of the qualified electors of the county, voting on the question in the manner hereinafter provided.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 2467; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1213.

Case Notes

Elections.

County court could not issue bonds to take up outstanding warrants issued for building a courthouse without submitting the matter to qualified electors of county under former Ark. Const. Amend. 17. Irwin v. Alexander, 184 Ark. 572, 43 S.W.2d 85 (1931) (decision prior to Ark. Const. Amend. 62).

14-72-302. Interest, maturity, and sale.

  1. Bonds bearing interest at a rate not exceeding five percent (5%) per annum and maturing in not more than thirty-five (35) years may be issued by the county court in the name of the county when authorized by a vote of the qualified electors, and they may be exchanged for the warrants when the warrants are discounted at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum, from the date of the bonds to the date of the maturity of the warrants, or they may be issued only as the warrants mature.
  2. In the latter event, the bonds shall be dated in installments as the outstanding warrants mature and bear interest only from that date.
  3. The bonds may be sold at public auction or upon sealed bids after notice by publication once a week for at least three (3) insertions in some newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county. The last insertion is to be not less than seven (7) days before the date of sale, or they may be exchanged at par for warrants maturing on their date.
  4. The county court may, in its discretion, advertise the sale in other newspapers or in financial journals.
  5. The validity of the bonds shall not be affected by the fact that any of the officers executing them may have died or gone out of office before their sale or delivery.
  6. The bonds shall be made serially through a term of years.
  7. They shall be executed by the county judge and attested by the county clerk and shall bear the seal of the county court.
  8. They may all be sold at once, or they may be sold in installments, from time to time, as the outstanding warrants mature.
  9. Bonds shall not be sold on a basis of less than par for five percent (5%) bonds.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 2468; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1214.

14-72-303. Submission of question to electors — Special election.

  1. If the county court decides that it would be advantageous to issue bonds under the authority of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 17 [repealed], this section, and §§ 14-72-301, 14-72-302, and 14-72-304 — 14-72-307, it shall order the submission of the question to the qualified electors of the county at a special election to be held in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq.
  2. In all other respects, the special election shall be held as provided by law for the conducting of general elections. It is made the duty of the sheriff of the county, by proclamation duly made and published for the time and in the manner provided by law, to give notice of the time and place of holding the election.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 2469; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1215; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 41; 2007, No. 1049, § 62; 2009, No. 1480, § 80.

A.C.R.C. Notes. It is questionable whether Ark. Const. Amend. 17 is repealed in whole or whether only those provisions that conflict with Ark. Const. Amend. 62 are repealed by Ark. Const. Amend. 62.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (b) as present (b)(1); added (b)(2); and inserted “as” in the first sentence in (c).

The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a).

14-72-304. Form of ballot — Returns — Appeal.

  1. In the order calling the election, the county court shall prescribe the form of the ballot, which shall show the amount of the proposed bond issue, its purpose, and the amount of tax necessary to be levied in order to pay the bonds with interest, which amount shall not exceed five (5) mills on the dollar.
  2. The election officers shall make their returns of the result of the election to the county court which shall then enter of record an order showing the number of votes cast in favor of the bond issue and the number cast against it, and the clerk of the court shall publish the order for one (1) insertion in some newspaper having a general circulation in the county.
  3. Any elector and any property owner of the county may appeal from the finding of the county court as to the result of the election within thirty (30) days thereafter. If no appeal is taken within that time, the finding shall be conclusive.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 2470; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1216.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The provisions of this section requiring that the amount of the proposed bond issue (for refunding) and the amount of the tax to be levied therefor be shown on the ballot were held not to apply to an election called under former Ark. Const. Amend. 17, to determine whether the proposed court house, jail, or hospital shall be built. Rogers v. Parker, 211 Ark. 957, 203 S.W.2d 401 (1947) (decision prior to Ark. Const. Amend. 62).

Finding of Court.

The finding of the county court under this section from which an appeal must be taken within 30 days does not amount to a judgment rendered in an election contest. Jones v. Dixon, 227 Ark. 955, 302 S.W.2d 529 (1957).

Where neither appellant nor appellee questions the correctness of the court's tabulation of election returns, but rather the law as applied to the tabulation, the 30-day limit for appeal provided in this section does not apply. Vance v. Johnson, 238 Ark. 1009, 386 S.W.2d 240 (1965).

Cited: Hughes v. Jackson, 213 Ark. 243, 210 S.W.2d 312 (1948).

14-72-305. Levy of special funding bond tax.

  1. If a majority voting in the election vote in favor of the issue of the bonds and the levy of the tax, then the quorum or levying court, at any regular, special, or adjourned term thereafter held, shall levy, in addition to all other taxes authorized by law to be levied against all taxable property in the county, a special funding bond tax of not exceeding five (5) mills on the dollar, of the assessed valuation of the property, for the payment of the bonds. This levy, when once made, shall continue and be in force from year to year and extended on the tax books and collected until sufficient funds are collected to pay off and discharge the bonds and interest thereon.
  2. The county court may call a special meeting of the quorum or levying court for the purpose of levying the tax.
  3. If the tax first levied proves insufficient to pay the bonds with interest, it shall be the duty of the quorum or levying court to make the additional levies at a rate not exceeding five (5) mills on the dollar till the bonds with interest are paid.
  4. The proceeds of the tax shall be used only for the payment of the bonds with the interest, and the tax shall be and is pledged as security for the payment of bonds and shall never be diverted to or expended for any other purpose, nor collected for any greater amount or length of time than is necessary to pay and retire the principal and interest of the bonds.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 2471; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1217.

Cross References. Use of bond redemption fund after payment of bonds, § 14-21-107.

14-72-306. Publication — Sale of bonds.

  1. Bonds that may be issued to pay for courthouses or jails, or both, which may be built or extended, shall be sold only at public auction or on sealed bids after notice given by order of the county court and published once a week for at least three (3) insertions in some newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county, the last insertion to be not less than seven (7) days before the date of sale.
  2. The notice shall state the amount and maturities of the bonds and the purposes for which they are issued.
  3. The county court may reject any and all bids for any bonds within the scope of this subchapter, and may order a new publication and a new sale, to be conducted in like manner; but the sale must always be to the highest bidder.
  4. Bonds may be sold on condition that they are to be delivered and paid for in installments as the work progresses, but that condition must appear in the notice, which may provide for bids in the alternative for cash or for payment and delivery in installments.
  5. The county court may, if it deems it advisable, advertise the sale in financial journals or in other newspapers published within or without the state.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 2472; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1218.

Case Notes

Manner of Sale.

The bonds issued to pay for public buildings shall be sold only at public auction or on sealed bids after notice is given by the court as provided by law. Campster v. Sanderlin, 212 Ark. 665, 208 S.W.2d 16 (1948).

14-72-307. Quorum court to levy tax.

Whenever, at an election called for the purpose of authorizing the construction, reconstruction, or extension of any county courthouse or county jail, a majority voting in the election vote for such building or buildings, as the case may be, and for the necessary tax, the county court may, by order entered of record, call a special meeting of the quorum or levying court for the purpose of levying the tax authorized at the election; and it shall be the duty of the levying court to meet at the time specified in the order of the county court and to levy the tax authorized by the vote of the electors as aforesaid.

History. Acts 1929, No. 294, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 2473; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1219.

Subchapter 4 — Purchase of County Bonds by County Treasurer

14-72-401 — 14-72-405. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, concerning the purchase of county bonds by the county treasurer, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 232, § 11. The subchapter was derived from the following sources:

14-72-401. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 55, § 1, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 2012; Pope's Dig., § 2561; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1226.

14-72-402. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 55, § 2, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 2013; Pope's Dig., § 2562; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1227.

14-72-403. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 55, § 3, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 2014; Pope's Dig., § 2563; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1228.

14-72-404. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 55, § 4, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 2015; Pope's Dig., § 2564; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1229.

14-72-405. Acts 1875 (Adj. Sess.), No. 55, § 5, p. 96; C. & M. Dig., § 2016; Pope's Dig., § 2565; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1230.

Subchapter 5 — Refunding Municipal Bonds Issued Under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 13

Effective Dates. Acts 1945, No. 103, § 6: approved Feb. 27, 1945. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby determined by the General Assembly that many cities in the state are paying interest rates on their outstanding bonds issued under Amendment No. 13 to the Constitution higher than those at which they might be refunded; that unprecedentedly low interest rates now prevail which have created a market advantageous to the issuance of refunding bonds; that the duration of said low interest rates is uncertain for the reason that Congress may shortly enact a statute taxing the interest upon future issues of such bonds which would render the refunding of the outstanding bonds impracticable, if not impossible; that such cities should take advantage of the present favorable market and their failure to do so would result in great financial detriment to tax-payers; that under said Act No. 13 of 1939, refunding bonds cannot be issued so long as the taxes collected from the millage tax levied for the payment of the bonds to be refunded shall be sufficient to pay such bonds as they mature; that in many cases the taxes collected from said millage tax are sufficient to pay such bonds as they mature, which fact prevents the issuance of refunding bonds under said Amendment No. 13; that for said reasons it is hereby declared necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety that this act shall become effective without delay. An emergency therefore exists and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-72-501. Application of subchapter — Successive refunding.

  1. The power and authority granted by this subchapter may be exercised successively.
  2. Any bonds which have once been refunded under this subchapter may thereafter, from time to time, be refunded.

History. Acts 1945, No. 103, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1233.

14-72-502. Authority to refund — Issuance.

Any city of the first or second class of this state shall have the power and is authorized to refund, in whole or in part, from time to time, its valid outstanding bonds issued under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 13 [repealed]. To that end, the city may issue negotiable refunding bonds upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set out.

History. Acts 1945, No. 103, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1231.

A.C.R.C. Notes. It is questionable whether Ark. Const. Amend. 13 is repealed in whole or whether only those provisions that conflict with Ark. Const. Amend. 62 are repealed by Ark. Const. Amend. 62.

14-72-503. Methods of issuance.

    1. No refunding bonds shall be issued until the debt refunded is cancelled simultaneously with the delivery of the refunding bonds:
      1. By the surrender and cancellation of the bonds to be refunded;
      2. If the outstanding bonds are redeemable before maturity and have been duly called for payment, by the deposit of the money for their payment upon presentation according to the terms of the call in trust with an escrow agent duly designated by the city council, which escrow agent shall be a bank or trust company whose trust funds are secured in the manner provided by the national or state banking laws, rules, and regulations thereunder; or
      3. By a combination of methods (A) and (B).
    2. The refunding bonds shall not be in a greater principal amount than the principal amount of the bonds to be refunded and shall not bear a greater rate of interest than that borne by the bonds to be refunded, except that the owners of the outstanding bonds taking refunding bonds in exchange or the purchasers, as the case may be, may have the privilege of conversion to bonds bearing a lower rate of interest, provided that by the conversion the city will receive no less and pay no more in principal and interest combined substantially than it would receive and pay if the bonds were not converted.
    1. The refunding bonds may be exchanged for outstanding bonds or they may be sold for cash and the proceeds used to pay the outstanding bonds, or part may be exchanged and part may be sold.
    2. No refunding bonds shall be sold except at public sale after twenty (20) days' advertisement in some newspaper of bona fide circulation in the city issuing them.
    3. The refunding bonds that are sold shall be duly executed and deposited with the designated escrow agent which shall have authority to deliver them to the purchaser upon payment to it of the purchase price on or before the redemption date of the bonds that have been called, provided that the city has deposited with the escrow agent a sum sufficient to pay the interest on the bonds called to the redemption date.
    4. The proceeds of the sale of the refunding bonds and the interest to be paid by the city shall be held by the escrow agent and applied solely to the payment of the principal of the bonds refunded at their call date and the accrued interest thereon to that date when they are presented for payment.
  1. When any refunding bonds are to be exchanged for outstanding bonds, they may be executed and delivered to the escrow agent which shall have authority, from time to time, as outstanding bonds are presented to it for exchange, to deliver refunding bonds in principal amount of the same proportion of the total principal amount of the refunding bonds that the principal amount of the outstanding bonds to be exchanged bears to the total principal amount of the outstanding bonds to be refunded.

History. Acts 1945, No. 103, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1232; Acts 2019, No. 315, § 997.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment inserted “rules” in (a)(1)(B).

14-72-504. Form of bonds.

  1. All such refunding bonds shall be negotiable instruments and may have coupons evidencing interest, payable annually or semi-annually, and shall have all the rights of security and remedies for collection that are provided for the bonds that are refunded.
  2. They shall bear the original signature of the mayor of the city and be sealed with the seal of the city. The interest coupons may be signed with the facsimile signature of the mayor.
  3. In case the mayor whose signature appears on the bonds or interest coupons shall cease to be the mayor before delivery of the refunding bonds, the signature shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes, the same as if he had remained in office until delivery.

History. Acts 1945, No. 103, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1233.

14-72-505. [Transferred and repealed.]

A.C.R.C. Notes. The provisions of former § 14-72-505 were renumbered as § 14-58-102 and later repealed, by Acts 1997, No. 214, § 1.

Subchapter 6 — Local Government Revenue Bond Elections

Cross References. Local capital improvement bonds, Ark. Const., Amend. No. 62.

Effective Dates. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 13: May 8, 1986. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in the case of City of Hot Springs v. Creviston (decided March 3, 1986, supplemental opinion on rehearing, April 15, 1986) requires that an election be held by a county or municipality for the lawful issuance of revenue bonds, that there now exist no specific provisions for municipalities and counties to conduct elections for the issuance of revenue bonds, and that there is an immediate and pressing need for the municipalities and counties of the State to issue revenue bonds for the construction of needed waterworks, sewer systems, airports, facilities to secure and develop industry or agriculture, and other public purposes. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the protection of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect, and be in full force, immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 2009, No. 1480, § 117: Apr. 10, 2009. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act makes various revisions to Arkansas election laws that are designed to improve the administration of elections and special elections and that these revisions should be implemented as soon as possible so that the citizens of this state may benefit from improved election procedures. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-72-601. Title.

This subchapter shall be referred to and may be cited as the “Local Government Revenue Bond Election Act of 1986.”

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1287.

14-72-602. Legislative intent.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has determined in the case of City of Hot Springs v. Creviston, that the Constitution of the State of Arkansas requires that the issuance of revenue bonds by counties and municipalities, including their boards and agencies, must be approved by the electors of the county or municipality at an election called for that purpose. In its decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that these elections might be conducted under the general election laws of the state until the General Assembly provided otherwise. This subchapter is adopted in order that the procedures for these elections be more clearly established. This subchapter is not intended otherwise to limit in any manner the exercise of the powers of counties or municipalities with respect to elections under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 62, for bonds to be paid from taxes or other permitted sources and is not intended to alter or amend the procedures established by § 14-164-301 et seq.

(b) It is the specific intent of this subchapter that the provisions of this subchapter are in implementation of or supplemental to other constitutional or statutory provisions now existing or hereafter adopted which may provide for the issuance of revenue bonds. Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be deemed to be a restriction or a limitation upon the issuance of revenue bonds, except as specifically provided in this subchapter with respect to the necessity of approval at an election.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, §§ 2, 10; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 13-1288, 13-1295.

Publisher's Notes. City of Hot Springs v. Creviston is reported at 288 Ark. 286, 705 S.W.2d 415 (1986).

This section has no subsection (a) designation.

14-72-603. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Bonds” means any evidence of indebtedness of a county or municipality issued pursuant to laws in effect authorizing the issuance of bonds, notes, certificates, or other instruments or evidences of indebtedness;
  2. “Clerk” means the clerk or recorder of a municipality or county clerk of a county;
  3. “County” or “municipality” also mean any agency, board, commission, or instrumentality of a county or municipality;
  4. “Legislative body” means the quorum court of a county or the council, board of directors, or other elected governing body of a municipality;
  5. “Municipality” means any city or incorporated town;
  6. “Ordinance” means an ordinance, resolution, or other appropriate legislative enactment of a legislative body;
  7. “Revenue bonds” means all bonds the repayment of which are secured by the pledge of rents, user fees, charges, or other revenues, other than assessments for local improvements and taxes, derived from the project or improvements financed in whole or in part by such revenue bonds, from the operations of any governmental unit, or from any other special fund or source.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1289.

14-72-604. Construction.

This subchapter shall be construed liberally to effectuate the legislative intent and the purposes of this subchapter as complete and independent authority for the performance of each and every action and thing authorized in this subchapter, and all powers granted in this subchapter shall be broadly interpreted to effectuate this intent and these purposes and not as a limitation of powers.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1296.

14-72-605. Certain districts excluded.

The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to bonds, notes, certificates, or other evidence of indebtedness issued by a regional water distribution district organized under § 14-116-101 et seq., or to any drainage district, levee district, or other improvement or special assessment district organized with the consent of the owners of land affected thereby under the laws of the state heretofore or hereafter adopted, notwithstanding that the district may pledge revenues from its operations or other sources in addition to, or in lieu of, a pledge of assessed benefits or interest thereon to secure payment of the indebtedness.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1294.

14-72-606. Election procedures — Contest.

    1. Whenever a county or municipality shall determine the need to issue revenue bonds, the issuance of which under the Arkansas Constitution requires approval at an election, the legislative body thereof shall, by ordinance, submit the question of the issuance of the revenue bonds to the qualified electors of the county or municipality.
    2. The question of the issuance of revenue bonds may be submitted at a special election called for that purpose in accordance with § 7-11-201 et seq., as provided in the ordinance, and held in the manner provided in this subchapter.
    3. When revenue bonds are to be issued for more than one (1) purpose, the principal amount of revenue bonds applicable to each purpose shall be stated on the ballot as a separate question, and no revenue bonds shall be issued for such a purpose unless a majority of the electors voting on the question shall have approved the issuance of revenue bonds for that purpose.
    4. Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, the election shall be held and conducted in the same manner as a special or general election under the election laws of the state.
    1. The ordinance shall set forth the form of ballot questions, which shall include a statement of the purposes for which the revenue bonds are to be issued and the proposed sources of repayment of the revenue bonds.
    2. Notice of the election shall be given by the clerk of the county or municipality by one (1) publication in a newspaper having general circulation within the county or municipality not less than ten (10) days prior to the election.
    1. The county judge or mayor of the county or municipality shall proclaim the results of the election by issuing a proclamation and publishing the proclamation one (1) time in a newspaper having general circulation within the county or municipality.
      1. The results of the election as stated in the proclamation shall be conclusive unless suit is filed in the circuit court in the county in which the municipality is located within thirty (30) days after the date of the publication.
      2. No other action shall be maintained to challenge the validity of the revenue bonds and of the proceedings authorizing the issuance of the bonds unless suit is filed in the circuit court within thirty (30) days after the date of the adoption of an ordinance authorizing the sale of the revenue bonds.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1290; Acts 2005, No. 2145, § 42; 2007, No. 1049, § 63; 2009, No. 1480, § 81.

Amendments. The 2005 amendment redesignated former (b)(3) as present (b)(3)(A); and added (b)(3)(B).

The 2009 amendment substituted “§ 7-11-201 et seq.” for “§ 7-5-103(b)” in (a)(2).

14-72-607. Venue.

For the purposes of this subchapter, when it is necessary to determine whether publication or other activity has taken place within a municipality lying in more than one (1) county, or where suit shall be filed contesting an election in the municipality, then the publication, activity, or suit shall take place in the county in which a majority of the persons living in the municipality reside.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1292.

14-72-608. Elections held prior to effective date.

Any election called for the purpose of authorizing revenue bonds and any ordinances or resolutions of a legislative body, or orders of a county court adopted in connection therewith prior to May 8, 1986, shall be deemed ratified and in full compliance with this subchapter if the ordinance, order, or resolution calling the election or notice of election was published at least one (1) time in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or county and all other procedures followed complied substantially with the provisions of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1293.

14-72-609. Refunding bonds.

  1. Revenue bonds issued for the purpose of refunding revenue bonds issued prior to March 3, 1986, may be issued without the necessity of an election under this subchapter if the source of repayment is substantially the same as that provided at the original issuance of the revenue bonds to be refunded.
  2. Revenue bonds to refund revenue bonds authorized at an election pursuant to this subchapter may be refunded without the necessity of an election. However, if the refunding revenue bonds shall be in a greater principal amount than the revenue bonds being refunded or shall be payable from a different source of revenues, the question of issuing the refunding revenue bonds shall be submitted at an election called in the manner provided in this subchapter.
  3. These refunding revenue bonds may be either sold for cash or delivered in exchange for the outstanding obligations. If sold for cash, the proceeds may either be applied to the payment of the revenue bonds being refunded or deposited in an irrevocable trust for the retirement of the revenue bonds at maturity or on an authorized redemption date.

History. Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 2, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1291.

Subchapter 7 — Refund of Amendment 13 Municipal Bond Proceeds

Effective Dates. Acts 1989, No. 490, § 6: Mar. 10, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that it is necessary and desirable to provide for the disposition of interest and principal of certain Amendment 13 bonds, the proceeds of which were never expended; that such provisions are immediately necessary to resolve present uncertainty in the law in order that needless litigation may be avoided or concluded; and that such provisions are immediately necessary in order for certain of our cities to plan budgets and expenditures and thereby serve the interest of their citizens. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

14-72-701. Disposition of principal and interest.

In instances where bonds were issued by a municipality under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 13 [repealed], and the project for which the bonds were issued has not been commenced within ten (10) years after the bonds were issued, all interest accrued and accruing on the bond principal may be transferred into the general fund of the city upon a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its governing body. The principal balance shall be refundable to the taxpayers under the procedure prescribed by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1989, No. 490, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. It is questionable whether Ark. Const. Amend. 13 is repealed in whole or whether only those provisions that conflict with Ark. Const. Amend. 62 are repealed by Ark. Const. Amend. 62.

Case Notes

Cited: Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989).

14-72-702. Filing of claims.

  1. The taxpayer must file a claim with the city clerk stating:
    1. The name and mailing address of the taxpayer;
    2. The time when and the period for which the tax was paid;
    3. The amount of the tax which the taxpayer claims was levied for retirement of the bond issue;
    4. Any other necessary information required by the city clerk.
  2. The city clerk shall be available for assistance in providing the above necessary information.

History. Acts 1989, No. 490, § 2.

14-72-703. Publication of notice.

  1. Before any money is transferred into the city general fund under this subchapter, the city shall publish a notice of the refund procedure at least once per week for at least four (4) consecutive weeks in a newspaper having general circulation within the city.
  2. All principal not claimed within six (6) months after the fourth publication of the notice shall be transferred into the general fund of the city.

History. Acts 1989, No. 490, § 3.

Chapter 73 Local Government Reserve Funds

Effective Dates. Acts 1983, No. 542, § 7: approved Mar. 19, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that various communities and local governments as described in this Act, are in need of improvements of the kind authorized by this Act to provide for the public health and safety and there is no authorization to provide a means for saving funds for these improvements in the future, leaving such local governments only with the alternatives of borrowing or paying for such improvements out of current revenues. Therefore, it is hereby declared that an emergency exists and that this Act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety and that this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-73-101. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Local government” means any:
    1. City of the first or second class;
    2. Incorporated town;
    3. County;
    4. School district;
    5. Improvement district; or
    6. Board, agency, or commission of the governments set out in subdivisions (1)(A)-(E) of this section including, but not limited to:
      1. Waterworks commission;
      2. Sewer committee;
      3. Airport commission;
      4. Parking authority;
      5. Public transit authority;
      6. Library commission;
      7. Advertising and promotion commission; or
      8. Port authority.
  2. “Improvement” means:
    1. Public works or projects authorized by law which are undertaken by a local government for public use or benefit including, but not limited to, streets and transportation facilities, waterworks facilities, sewer facilities, airports, parking facilities, drainage facilities, buildings, sidewalks, convention centers, schools, city halls, jails, fire stations, solid waste disposal facilities, courthouses, recreational facilities, stadiums, libraries, and hospitals; and
    2. Engineering and architectural fees and other development and acquisition costs of those public works or projects.
  3. “Governing body” means:
    1. The legislative body of any:
      1. City, town, or county;
      2. Improvement district; or
      3. School board; and
    2. The body or board authorized to operate a board, agency, or commission including, but not limited to, the board of commissioners of a waterworks commission, members of a sewer committee, the board of commissioners of an airport commission, members of a parking authority, the board of commissioners or directors of an improvement district, the board of directors of a public transit authority, members of an advertising and promotion commission, commissioners of a housing authority, board of trustees of a library, or members of a port authority.

History. Acts 1983, No. 542, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2701.

14-73-102. Authority to establish reserve for improvements.

  1. Any local government desiring to own, acquire, construct, reconstruct, remodel, equip, extend, operate, maintain, or otherwise provide improvements may establish a reserve for those improvements so that the costs thereof may be accumulated out of revenues from year to year.
  2. The reserve shall be authorized by resolution of the governing body, provided that a reserve for a local government board, agency, or commission shall also be approved by resolution of the governing body creating the board, agency, or commission.

History. Acts 1983, No. 542, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2702.

14-73-103. Trust agreement.

  1. The reserve fund shall be established by written agreement with a trustee independent from the local government. The trust agreement shall contain:
    1. A description of the improvements for which the reserve is established;
    2. A covenant that the reserve funds will not be used for any purpose other than the purposes described in the trust agreement;
    3. A covenant by the trustee that all sums in the reserve fund will be invested by the trustee in a manner consistent with the “prudent man” rule, as authorized and defined by §§ 28-71-105 and 28-71-106;
    4. A covenant by the trustee to disburse the reserve funds only to the contractor or to a trustee for bonds or notes issued to finance the improvements or to disburse the reserve funds in such manner that they will be applied to the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, remodeling, equipping, extending, operating, maintaining, or providing the improvements;
    5. A term for the agreement which shall not exceed twenty-one (21) years.
  2. A trust agreement in which a city, town, or county is a party shall specify that each payment to the reserve fund shall be a separate contract with the trustee and shall specifically limit the amount of payments to the reserve fund in any fiscal year to the amount of the appropriation to the reserve fund for that fiscal year.
  3. The trust agreement may contain provisions providing for the trustee's fee, if any, to be paid from the reserve funds held in trust.

History. Acts 1983, No. 542, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2703.

14-73-104. Payment of funds into reserve.

After the execution of the trust agreement, the local government may, during the fiscal year in which the agreement is executed and in subsequent fiscal years, appropriate, pay, or disburse the funds into the reserve as the governing body may determine during those fiscal years.

History. Acts 1983, No. 542, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2704.

Chapter 74 Taxing Agencies — Borrowing and Bankruptcy

Preambles. Acts 1939, No. 69 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the Congress of the United States has passed laws providing that taxing agencies, including municipal corporations and improvement districts may borrow from Reconstruction Finance Corporation and other Federal agencies and may make compositions of their debts with creditors and refinance and refund their debts and obligations by voluntary proceedings in Federal Courts of Bankruptcy; and

“Whereas, it is expedient and advisable that the State cooperate by enabling all such districts to avail themselves of the benefits of said laws passed by Congress;

“Therefore … .”

Effective Dates. Acts 1939, No. 69, § 3: Feb. 10, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared to be a fact that owing to depression in the value of farm and timber products and of real estate, and to the general financial depression that has prevailed for a number of years, many of such taxing agencies have been enable to pay their bonds and other obligations as they mature and many of such districts have become insolvent; that the State is unable to grant relief to the taxpayers of such districts because States are forbidden by the Constitution of the United States to impair the obligation of contracts; that Congress under the provisions of the Constitution may impair such obligations and adjust and modify liens without violating any constitutional provision; and that Congress has provided such laws, but some question has been raised as to whether certain types of taxing agencies can avail themselves of the benefits of such bankruptcy statutes without the permission of the State, and that the result has been to leave many districts faced with indebtedness they cannot pay and the situation is causing hardship to taxpayers as well as to creditors. Now, Therefore, an emergency is found to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, it shall be in force and take effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

ALR.

Validity of state or municipal tax or license fee upon occupation of practicing law. 50 A.L.R.4th 467.

14-74-101. Chapter cumulative.

The provisions of this chapter shall be cumulative to any similar provisions of law now in effect.

History. Acts 1939, No. 69, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1302.

14-74-102. Enumeration of taxing agencies and instrumentalities.

The taxing agencies and instrumentalities to which this chapter is applicable shall be all those recited in those acts of the United States Congress and that may be recited in any amendment thereof, including the following:

All the taxing agencies or instrumentalities hereinafter named, payable:

  1. Out of assessments or taxes, or both, levied against and constituting liens upon property in any of the taxing agencies or instrumentalities;
  2. Out of property acquired by foreclosure of the assessments or taxes or both;
  3. Out of income derived by the taxing agencies or instrumentalities from the sale of water or power or both, or any combination thereof; or
  4. From any combination of:
    1. Drainage, drainage and levee, levee, reclamation, water, irrigation, or other similar districts, commonly designated as agricultural improvement districts or local improvement districts, organized or created for the purpose of constructing, improving, maintaining, and operating certain improvements or projects devoted chiefly to the improvement of lands therein for agricultural purposes;
    2. Local improvement districts such as sewer, paving, sanitary, or other similar districts, organized or created for the purposes designated by their respective names;
    3. Local improvement districts such as road, highway, or other similar districts, organized or created for the purpose of grading, paving, or otherwise improving public streets, roads, or highways;
    4. Public school districts or public school authorities organized or created for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating public schools or public school facilities;
    5. Local improvement districts such as port, navigation, or other similar districts, organized or created for the purpose of constructing, improving, maintaining, and operating ports and port facilities; or
    6. A city, town, village, borough, township, or other municipality, a receiver of a city, town, village, borough, township, or municipality, or an improvement district of a public utility created under § 14-62-109(c)(5).

History. Acts 1939, No. 69, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1301; Acts 2017, No. 712, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (4)(F), substituted “A” for “Any”, and added “a receiver of a city, town, village, borough, township, or municipality, or an improvement district of a public utility created under § 14-62-109(c)(5)” at the end.

Case Notes

Bankruptcy.

Solid waste district that was established pursuant to § 8-6-701 et seq. was not eligible under 11 U.S.C.S. § 109 to declare bankruptcy because it was neither “local” nor an “improvement district” that was specifically authorized to file bankruptcy pursuant to this section; even assuming arguendo that the district was qualified under state law to seek relief under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, its petition had to be dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 921 because it did not act in good faith when it borrowed money to conduct operations but decided not to collect a service fee from residents and businesses within the district because board members believed that imposing the fee would have cost them votes. In re Ozark Mt. Solid Waste Dist., No. 3:14-bk-70015, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5226 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Aug. 5, 2014).

14-74-103. Authority to use federal finance laws — Bankruptcy.

  1. Any and all the taxing agencies or instrumentalities named in § 14-74-102 shall have the right and power to:
    1. Avail themselves of any and all acts of the United States Congress providing for the lending of money to such districts and for the refinancing, refunding, adjustment, or composition of indebtedness of taxing agencies and any amendments or additional laws the United States Congress may adopt in that behalf; and
    2. Proceed in the district courts of the United States in bankruptcy or in any other federal courts given like jurisdiction by voluntary proceedings in accordance with those acts of the United States Congress and any amendments thereto.
  2. This chapter expresses the consent of the state for the institution of bankruptcy proceedings by all such taxing agencies acting through their governing boards, through a receiver under § 14-74-102(4)(F), or through an improvement district under § 14-74-102(4)(F).

History. Acts 1939, No. 69, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1301; Acts 2017, No. 712, § 2.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (b), deleted “any and” preceding “all”, and added “through a receiver under § 14-74-102(4)(F), or through an improvement district under § 14-74-102(4)(F)” at the end.

14-74-104. Authority to refinance, refund, etc.

Any and all of the taxing agencies and instrumentalities set out in § 14-74-102 acting through their governing boards shall have the right to cooperate with and to borrow from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and with any and all other governmental agencies, and with creditors, banks, trust companies, and other private or public lending agencies in refinancing and refunding and effecting compositions or the debts of the taxing agencies and instrumentalities and to issue refunding bonds, certificates of indebtedness, notes, and other securities to refinance debts and to pledge the assessments, revenues, and income of the taxing agencies or instrumentalities for the repayment of the refunding bonds, notes, certificates, and securities and to take any and all steps reasonably necessary to complete the refinancing or refunding programs and debt compositions.

History. Acts 1939, No. 69, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1302.

14-74-105. Participation by state departments.

Any department of this state authorized by any law of this state to purchase, own, or hold as security any bonds issued by any agencies or districts enumerated in the previous provisions of this chapter is authorized and empowered to give its consent to and participate in any plan, composition, or arrangement for the readjustment or refunding of the bonded indebtedness of any of the districts or agencies set out in § 14-74-102.

History. Acts 1939, No. 69, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-1302.

Chapter 75 Management Letter for Audit

14-75-101. Definition.

For the purpose of this chapter, a “political subdivision” shall not include levy districts, drainage districts, or any other improvement districts.

History. Acts 1973, No. 392, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2002.

14-75-102. Letter required.

Any political subdivision of the State of Arkansas engaging the services of a certified public accountant for the purpose of statutorily required audits shall require the certified public accountant to issue, in addition to the audit report, what is commonly referred to in the accounting profession as a management letter.

History. Acts 1973, No. 392, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2001.

14-75-103. Contents of letter.

The management letter shall include:

  1. Comments by the certified public accountant as to his observations on the system of internal control employed by the political subdivision;
  2. Exceptions to statutory provisions;
  3. Requirements which may have been noted by the certified public accountant; and
  4. Any recommendations or suggestions the certified public accountant may desire to make to the subdivision under audit.

History. Acts 1973, No. 392, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2001.

14-75-104. Furnishing copy to Legislative Joint Auditing Committee.

  1. The political subdivision shall supply the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee with one (1) copy of the management letter in addition to the required copy of the audit report.
  2. The management letter shall be forwarded to the committee with the audit report.

History. Acts 1973, No. 392, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 13-2003.

Chapter 76 Local Government Lease Agreements and Purchase Contracts

14-76-101 — 14-76-108. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This chapter, concerning local government lease agreements and purchase contracts, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 555, § 1. The chapter was derived from the following sources:

14-76-101. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 1.

14-76-102. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 2.

14-76-103. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 11.

14-76-104. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 3.

14-76-105. Acts 1991, No. 508, §§ 4-6.

14-76-106. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 6.

14-76-107. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 7.

14-76-108. Acts 1991, No. 508, § 8.

Chapter 77 Local Fiscal Management Responsibility Act

Effective Dates. Acts 2003, No. 1185, § 36: Jan. 1, 2005, by its own terms.

Acts 2005, No. 2201, § 12: Apr. 13, 2005. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee and the Division of Legislative Audit provide essential auditing and investigative services to the General Assembly and the State of Arkansas; that to avoid confusion, the General Assembly finds it is necessary to combine the Arkansas Code provisions concerning the Division of Legislative Audit and the local audit section of the division in one Arkansas Code chapter; that to avoid certain undue hardships on public entities of the state, it is also necessary for the General Assembly to provide a basis of financial statement presentation for certain public entities; that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards Number 99 regarding the detection of fraud requires auditors to document unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in their working papers; and that this act is immediately necessary because the General Assembly finds that the public disclosure of such unsubstantiated allegations do not serve a public purpose and may cause irreparable harm to innocent individuals and public employees. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-77-101. Title.

This chapter may be known and cited as the “Local Fiscal Management Responsibility Act”.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 1.

14-77-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Executive officer” means the following for the applicable political subdivisions:
    1. For school districts, an “executive officer” is the superintendent of the school or the executive director of the education service cooperative;
    2. For municipalities, an “executive officer” is the mayor, city manager, or city administrator; and
    3. For counties, an “executive officer” is the elected official exercising administrative control over a particular county employee;
  2. “Fiscal responsibility and management laws” means the following laws, as amended, and as applicable to the following subdivisions:
    1. Counties:
      1. County government, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 55;
      2. County Records Retention, § 13-4-301 et seq.;
      3. Legislative Procedures (County), § 14-14-901 et seq.;
      4. Executive Powers (County), § 14-14-1101 et seq.;
      5. Personnel Procedures (County), § 14-14-1201 et seq.;
      6. Officers (County), § 14-15-101 et seq.;
      7. Sale of county property generally, § 14-16-105, and sale of surplus property, § 14-16-106;
      8. County Funds, § 14-21-101 et seq.;
      9. County Purchasing Procedures, § 14-22-101 et seq.;
      10. Claims Against Counties, § 14-23-101 et seq.;
      11. County Warrants, § 14-24-101 et seq.;
      12. The Arkansas County Accounting Law of 1973, § 14-25-101 et seq.;
      13. Correction of errors (on tax books), § 26-28-111;
      14. Settlement and payment of taxes: Time for payment, § 26-39-201; and
      15. Review of audit reports by legislative governing bodies, § 10-4-219 [repealed];
    2. Municipalities:
      1. Prohibited actions by municipal council members or municipal officials and employees: Interest in offices or contracts, etc. by council members prohibited, § 14-42-107, and Prohibited actions by municipal officials or employees — Penalty, § 14-42-108;
      2. Powers and Duties Generally (of municipal officers), § 14-43-501 et seq.;
      3. Purchase, lease, and sale of real and personal property: Purchase, lease, and sale authorized, § 14-54-302;
      4. Cities of the first class generally: Fiscal Affairs of Cities and Incorporated Towns, § 14-58-101 et seq.;
      5. The Arkansas Municipal Accounting Law, § 14-59-101 et seq.;
      6. The Arkansas Municipal Water and Sewer Department Accounting Law, § 14-237-101 et seq.;
      7. The Arkansas District Courts Accounting Law, § 16-10-201 et seq.; and
      8. Review of audit reports by legislative governing bodies, § 10-4-418;
    3. Schools:
      1. School disbursing officer: Organization — Disbursing officer, § 6-13-618;
      2. School district treasurer: District Treasurer, § 6-13-701 et seq.;
      3. The Arkansas Teachers' Salary Law, § 6-17-901 et seq.;
      4. School finance acts: Finances, § 6-20-101 et seq.;
      5. School's acquisition of commodities: Acquisition of Commodities Generally, § 6-21-301 et seq.; and
      6. Review of audit reports by boards, § 6-1-101(d) and § 10-4-208(d)[repealed];
    4. The following laws are applicable to some or all of the political subdivisions:
      1. Limitation on legislative and taxing power — Local bond issues, Arkansas Constitution, Article 12, § 4;
      2. Political subdivisions not to become stockholders in or lend credit to private corporations, Arkansas Constitution, Article 12, § 5;
      3. Lending credit — Bond issues — Interest-bearing warrants, Arkansas Constitution, Article 16, § 1;
      4. Levy and appropriation of taxes, Arkansas Constitution, Article 16, § 11;
      5. Local Capital Improvement Bonds, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 62;
      6. Revenue Bonds, Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 65;
      7. Clerks of courts, collection and settlement, additional fees, investment of moneys held in trust:
        1. Fines, penalties, taxes, etc. — Collection and settlement — Accounting — Audit and adjustment, § 16-20-106;
        2. Collection and payment of additional fees — Use of funds, § 16-20-107 [repealed]; and
        3. Investment of moneys held in trust — Disposition of funds, § 16-20-108;
      8. Depositories for Public Funds, § 19-8-101 et seq.;
      9. Public Works, § 22-9-101 et seq.; and
      10. The Local Fiscal Management Responsibility Act, § 14-77-101 et seq.;
  3. “Knowingly” means that a person is aware or should have been aware that his or her conduct will violate the fiscal responsibility and management laws;
  4. “Political subdivision” means any county, municipality, or school district of the State of Arkansas; and
  5. “Public officer or employee” means any officer or employee of a county, municipality, or school district located in the State of Arkansas.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 2; 2003, No. 1185, § 36; 2005, No. 2201, § 8; 2007, No. 617, § 38.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment rewrote (5)(B)(vii).

The 2005 amendment substituted “§ 10-4-418” for “§ 10-4-219” in (5)(B)(viii).

14-77-103. Compliance with fiscal responsibility and management laws — Investigation.

  1. All public officers and employees shall comply with the provisions of the fiscal management and responsibility laws contained in this chapter.
  2. Upon discovery or notification of an alleged violation of the fiscal responsibility and management laws, the executive officer of the political subdivision shall investigate such allegations and take appropriate administrative action.
  3. After completing the investigation, if the executive officer of the political subdivision determines that one (1) or more of the fiscal responsibility and management laws have been violated, the facts and circumstances relating to a violation and any corrective or remedial action shall be documented and placed in the personnel files of the public officer or employee involved in the violation.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, §§ 3-5.

14-77-104. Notification of violation.

  1. The executive officer of the political subdivision shall notify the public officer or employee of its findings and any corrective or remedial action to be taken.
  2. Notification shall be made in a manner ensuring actual notice to the public officer or employee.
  3. The public officer or employee shall be notified that the failure to make corrective or remedial action within thirty (30) days after the date of notification creates the rebuttable presumption that the violation was committed knowingly.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 6.

14-77-105. Remedial or corrective action.

The public officer or employee violating a fiscal responsibility and management law shall be given not more than thirty (30) days from the date of notification to effect corrective or remedial action recommended by the executive director of the political subdivision. Failure to make corrective or remedial action within thirty (30) days after notification creates the rebuttable presumption that the violation was committed knowingly.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 7.

14-77-106. Investigation by prosecuting attorney.

  1. If the executive officer determines that there has been a violation of the fiscal responsibility and management laws, the executive officer may request the appropriate prosecuting attorney to conduct an investigation regarding the violation.
  2. The Legislative Joint Auditing Committee may request the appropriate prosecuting attorney to conduct an investigation regarding violations of the fiscal responsibility and management laws documented in the audit report.
  3. The prosecuting attorney shall conduct a timely investigation into all matters referred to him under the provisions of this chapter. If the prosecuting attorney fails to conduct a timely investigation or file a civil suit under the provisions of this chapter, the executive officer or the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee may request the Attorney General to conduct an investigation into the violations.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 8.

14-77-107. Civil suit by prosecuting attorney.

After conducting an investigation into the alleged violations, the appropriate prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General may file a civil suit in circuit court against the public officer or employee alleged to have violated the fiscal responsibility and management laws. Venue shall be in the county where the political subdivision is located.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 9.

14-77-108. Civil penalty.

If the public officer or employee is found by the court to have knowingly violated the provisions of the fiscal responsibility and management laws, the court shall impose a civil penalty upon the public officer or employee of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation, and may subject the public officer or employee to the payment of damages resulting as a direct consequence of any violation.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 10.

14-77-109. Recovery of costs.

  1. If the public officer or employee is found by the court to have knowingly violated the provisions of the fiscal responsibility and management laws, the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General shall be allowed to recover costs and attorney fees associated with the civil suit from the public officer or employee.
  2. Any costs or fees recovered by a prosecuting attorney under this provision shall be deposited into an account administered by the prosecuting attorney and shall be used for expenses of the office.
  3. Any costs or fees recovered by the Attorney General under this provision shall be deposited into the State Treasury.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 11.

14-77-110. Civil procedures apply.

All actions and procedures under the provisions of this chapter are civil in nature and shall be governed by the appropriate rules, regulations, and laws regarding civil actions and remedies.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 12.

14-77-111. Existing remedies not impaired.

The provisions of this chapter are supplemental to any other remedies available by law. In addition, the provisions of this chapter do not limit or diminish any civil rights or administrative procedures available to any public officer or employee or political subdivision.

History. Acts 1991, No. 724, § 13.

Chapter 78 Local Government Short-Term Financing Obligations

Effective Dates. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 11: Apr. 19, 2001. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly that legislation is needed to establish a procedure pursuant to which municipalities and counties may issue and sell short-term financing obligations under Amendment 78 to the Arkansas Constitution, and that the immediate passage of this act is necessary for municipalities and counties to avail themselves of the public debt market. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on the date of its approval by the Governor. If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, it shall become effective on the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, it shall become effective on the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-78-101. Title.

This chapter shall be referred to and may be cited as the “Local Government Short-Term Financing Obligations Act of 2001”.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 1.

14-78-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Chief executive” means the mayor of a municipality or the county judge of a county;
  2. “County” means any county in the State of Arkansas;
  3. “Issue” means, depending on the type of obligation, to issue, enter into, or incur;
  4. “Issue date” means the date on which the obligation commences to bear interest;
  5. “Issuer” means a municipality or a county;
  6. “Legislative body” means the quorum court of a county or the council, board of directors, board of commissioners, or similar elected governing body of a municipality;
  7. “Mortgage lien” means a lien on or security interest in real property or personal property, financed or refinanced, in whole or in part, with the proceeds of obligations;
  8. “Obligations” means short-term financing obligations;
  9. “Short-term financing agreement” means any loan agreement, line of credit agreement, note purchase agreement, security agreement, mortgage, trust indenture, or other agreement, other than the short-term financing obligation itself, pursuant to which a short-term financing obligation is secured, sold, or otherwise provided for; and
  10. “Short-term financing obligations” means “short-term financing obligations” within the meaning of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 2.

14-78-103. Authorization for issuance of obligations.

    1. Municipalities and counties are authorized to issue obligations for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, installing, and renting real property or tangible personal property having an expected useful life of more than one (1) year.
    2. The maximum term and maximum interest rate for the obligations shall be as set forth in Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 89.
    3. The amount of obligations issued shall be sufficient to pay all or a portion of the cost of accomplishing the specified purpose.
    4. Proceeds of the obligations may pay all or a portion of the costs of issuing the obligations.
    5. The obligations shall be issued pursuant to ordinance adopted by the legislative body specifying the principal amount of the obligations to be issued, the purpose or purposes for which the obligations are to be issued, and provisions with respect to the obligations.
    6. A municipality shall not authorize the issuance of obligations unless at the time of issuance, the aggregate principal amount of short-term financing obligations, including the obligations to be issued, outstanding and unpaid, will equal five percent (5%) or less of the assessed value of taxable property located within the municipality as determined by the last tax assessment completed prior to the issuance of the obligations to be issued.
    7. A county shall not authorize the issuance of obligations unless at the time of issuance, the aggregate principal amount of short-term financing obligations, including the obligations to be issued, outstanding and unpaid, will equal two and one-half percent (2.5%) or less of the assessed value of taxable property located within the county as determined by the last tax assessment completed prior to the issuance of the obligations to be issued.
  1. The obligations may:
    1. Be in registered or other form;
    2. Be in denominations exchangeable for obligations of another denomination;
    3. Be payable in or out of the state;
    4. Be issued in one (1) or more series, bearing the date or dates of maturity;
    5. Be payable in the medium of payment, subject to terms of redemption; and
    6. Contain other terms, covenants, and conditions as the ordinance or short-term financing agreement may provide, including, without limitation:
      1. Terms pertaining to custody and application of proceeds;
      2. Remedies on default;
      3. The rights, duties, and obligations of the officers and legislative body of the issuer and the trustee, if any; and
      4. The rights of the owners of the obligations.
  2. Successive obligations may be issued for the purpose of financing the same property.
    1. The total annual principal and interest payments in each fiscal year on the obligations shall be charged against and paid from the general revenues of the issuer for the fiscal year, including road fund revenues.
    2. The obligations shall not be deemed to be revenue bonds for purposes of any statute, and it shall not be necessary for a public hearing to be held by the legislative body or a delegate thereof on the issuance of the obligations.
    1. The ordinance authorizing the obligations may provide for execution by the chief executive officer of the issuer of a short-term financing agreement or agreements defining the rights of the owners of obligations and, in the case of a trust indenture, provide for the appointment of a trustee for the owners of the obligations.
    2. The ordinance or short-term financing agreement may provide for priority between and among successive issues and may contain any of the provisions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any other terms, covenants, and conditions that are deemed desirable.
  3. The obligations may be sold at public or private sale for the price, including, without limitation, sale at a discount and in a manner as the legislative body of the issuer may determine.
  4. The obligations shall be signed by the chief executive officer of the issuer and shall be executed in the manner provided by the Registered Public Obligations Act of Arkansas, § 19-9-401 et seq.
  5. It shall be plainly stated in the obligation, ordinance, or short-term financing agreement that the obligation has been issued under the provisions of this chapter and Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 3; 2013, No. 1139, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “89” for “78” at the end of (a)(2).

14-78-104. Refunding obligations.

  1. Obligations may be issued under this chapter to refund any outstanding short-term financing obligations issued pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78, whether or not issued under this chapter.
    1. Refunding obligations may be either sold for cash or delivered in exchange for the outstanding obligations being refunded.
    2. If sold for cash, the proceeds may be applied to the payment of the obligations refunded or deposited in irrevocable trust for the retirement thereof, either at maturity or on an authorized redemption date.
  2. Refunding obligations shall in all respects be authorized, issued, and secured in the manner provided in this section.
  3. Refunding obligations shall mature not later than five (5) years beyond the issue date for the obligations being refunded.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 4.

14-78-105. Obligations may be secured by mortgage lien.

  1. The ordinance or short-term financing agreement may impose or authorize the imposition of a forecloseable mortgage lien upon the property financed or refinanced, in whole or in part, with the proceeds of obligations issued under this chapter.
  2. The nature and extent of the mortgage lien may be controlled by the ordinance or short-term financing agreement, including provisions pertaining to the release of all or part of the land, buildings, facilities, and equipment from the mortgage lien, the priority of the mortgage lien in the event of successive issues of obligations, and authorizing any owner of obligations, or a trustee on behalf of all owners, either at law or in equity, to enforce the mortgage lien and, by proper suit, compel the performance of the duties of the officials of the issuer set forth in this chapter, the ordinance or short-term financing agreement authorizing the securing of the obligations.
  3. Obligations which are discharged or are secured by deposit in irrevocable trust shall not be taken into account in determining the aggregate principal amount outstanding for the purpose of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78, § 2.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 5.

14-78-106. Tax exemption.

Obligations issued under this chapter and all amounts treated as interest thereon shall be exempt from all state, county, and municipal taxes.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 6.

14-78-107. Obligations are negotiable instruments.

Unless set forth in the ordinance, obligation, or short-term financing agreement, all obligations issued under the provisions of this chapter are negotiable instruments within the meaning of the negotiable instruments law of the state.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 7.

14-78-108. Nonliability.

No officer, employee, or member of the legislative body of the issuer shall be personally liable for any obligations issued under the provisions of this chapter or for any damages sustained by any person in connection with any contracts entered into to carry out the purposes and intent of this chapter, unless the person acted with corrupt intent.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 8.

14-78-109. Supplemental nature of this chapter.

  1. The provisions of this chapter are supplemental to constitutional or statutory provisions now existing or later adopted which may provide for the financing of real or personal property.
  2. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to be a restriction or limitation upon alternative means of financing previously available or made available to municipalities or counties for the purposes of this chapter.
    1. It is hereby recognized that Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78, is self-executing.
    2. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to require a municipality or county to utilize the provisions of this chapter in authorizing and issuing short-term financing obligations under Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 78.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 9.

14-78-110. Construction.

This chapter shall be construed liberally to effectuate the legislative intent and the purposes of this chapter as complete and independent authority for the performance of every act and thing authorized, and all powers granted under this chapter shall be broadly interpreted to effectuate the intent and purposes, and not as a limitation of powers.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1808, § 10.

Chapters 79-85 [RESERVED.]

[Reserved]

Subtitle 5. Improvement Districts Generally

Chapter 86 General Provisions

Research References

C.J.S. 82 C.J.S., Stat., § 98.

Case Notes

In General.

Improvement districts are agents of the state and derive their limited powers and duties of a public and governmental nature by legislative delegation through the taxing power of the state, and constitute a separate and distinct species of taxing districts as contradistinguished from counties, municipal corporations and school districts. Quapaw Cent. Bus. Imp. Dist. v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 315 Ark. 703, 870 S.W.2d 390 (1994).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1929, No. 127, § 2: approved Mar. 13, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “This act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1993, No. 915, § 5: Apr. 7, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that current laws are uncertain with respect to whether the value of mobile/manufactured homes which are located on leased real property must be taken into account in determining the value of real property necessary to support the creation of certain improvement districts under the laws of Arkansas; that such uncertainty has resulted in inconsistent interpretations in the requirements for formation of such improvement districts, with attendant delays associated with obtaining necessary water, sewer and other improvement projects vital to the public peace, health and safety of the citizens of the state; and that the enactment of this legislation is necessary to eliminate the confusion and uncertainty which exists with respect to such laws. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Identical Acts 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), Nos. 6 and 7, § 4: May 23, 2016. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there are currently many vacancies in levee district boards across the state; that the current procedure for filling these vacancies makes the process more difficult; and that this act is immediately necessary because of the critical importance of the efficient functioning of levee district boards. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-86-101. Ratification of certain actions.

  1. All improvements which may have been made by any public improvement district in this state, whether made according to plans and specifications previously adopted or not, or whether made under incomplete plans or specifications, by any board of improvement of any highway improvement district created under the laws of the State of Arkansas, and all actions of boards of these districts in expending money in the construction of improvements and procuring federal aid for use in the construction thereof, or paying the costs incident to construction, are ratified, approved, and confirmed, and declared to be beneficial to the taxpayers in any such district.
  2. This section shall not apply to districts whose boards have been guilty of fraud in appropriating the funds of the districts to their own uses.

History. Acts 1929, No. 127, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 6536; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1104.

14-86-102. Mobile homes.

    1. A mobile home or manufactured home of any width or description permanently affixed to a foundation on property which is owned by the owner of the mobile home or manufactured home shall be deemed real property for the purposes of the creation of special improvement districts and collection of assessments relative thereto.
    2. Mobile homes and manufactured homes located on leased property where the mobile home or manufactured home owner does not own any direct or indirect interest in the leased property shall be deemed personal property and shall not be considered real property for the purposes of the creation of special improvement districts and collection of assessments relative thereto.
    1. Mobile homes and manufactured homes which are deemed personal property may not be assessed by special improvement districts, and the location of such mobile homes or manufactured homes shall not be cause for increasing the assessment on underlying property.
    2. No lien may be affixed to the mobile home or manufactured home to secure collection of any assessment.
  1. As used in this section, the term “permanently affixed to a foundation” shall mean permanently attached or affixed by bolting, welding, or mortaring to a structural foundation placed on or in the ground by means other than:
    1. Resting on concrete blocks or other devices used merely for leveling the floors of such structures; or
    2. Attachment of underpinnings, underskirts, or other tie-downs customarily employed primarily for cosmetic or weather resistance purposes; or
    3. A combination of methods described in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection.
  2. This section shall apply to:
    1. All property located or to be located within improvement districts formed or with respect to which the initial assessment of benefits is made after April 7, 1993;
    2. All property annexed after April 7, 1993, to improvement districts which have been formed prior to April 7, 1993; and
    3. Any property presently located within any improvement district which has been formed and in which the initial assessment of benefits has been made prior to April 7, 1993.
  3. This section shall not apply to fire protection districts created pursuant to 14-284-201 et seq.

History. Acts 1993, No. 915, § 1.

14-86-103. Reporting — Definition.

  1. Definitions.
    1. Formed or operating under this chapter, § 14-87-101 et seq., § 14-88-101 et seq., § 14-89-101 et seq., § 14-90-101 et seq., § 14-91-101 et seq., § 14-92-101 et seq., the Property Owners' Improvement District Law, § 14-93-101 et seq., the Municipal Property Owner's Improvement District Law, § 14-94-101 et seq., § 14-95-101 et seq., § 14-114-101 et seq., the Interstate Watershed Cooperation Act, § 14-115-101 et seq., the Arkansas Irrigation, Drainage, and Watershed Improvement District Act of 1949, § 14-117-101 et seq., § 14-118-101 et seq., The Water Improvement District Accounting Law of 1973, § 14-119-101 et seq., § 14-120-101 et seq., § 14-121-101 et seq., § 14-122-101 et seq., § 14-123-101 et seq., § 14-124-101 et seq., and the Conservation Districts Law, § 14-125-101 et seq.; or
    2. Created by a special act of the General Assembly.
    1. On or before December 31, 2009, each district shall file an initial report with the clerk of the county court in whose jurisdiction any property of the district is located.
    2. The initial report shall include the following:
      1. The name of the district;
      2. The date on which the district was formed;
      3. The statutory or other legal authority under which the district was formed;
      4. A description of the district's boundaries and a map of the district;
      5. The names and addresses of the district's directors and its officers and their respective terms of office;
      6. An identification of any vacancy on the district board or district commission;
      7. A map of the parcels of property located in the district; and
      8. The time, date, and location of the district board's or district commission's next annual meeting or, if the annual meeting is unscheduled, the time, date, and location of the district board's or district commission's next meeting.
    3. The clerk shall forward a file-marked copy of all reports filed under this subsection to the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission.
    1. On or before December 31, 2010, and annually afterwards, the district shall file with the clerk of the county court in whose jurisdiction any property of the district is located a report that:
      1. Provides the names and addresses of the members of the district board or district commission and its officers;
      2. Identifies any vacancy on the district board or the district commission; and
      3. Provides the time, date, and location of the district board's or district commission's next annual meeting, if scheduled, and its next regularly scheduled meeting.
    2. The clerk shall forward a file-marked copy of all reports filed under this subsection to the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission.
    1. A district that fails to perform any of the requirements of subsection (b) or subsection (c) of this section commits a violation punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each offense.
    2. A fine recovered under subdivision (d)(1) of this section shall be deposited into the county clerk's cost fund.
    3. A district shall not receive financial assistance from any state agency for a two-year period following the date the fine was assessed under subdivision (d)(1) of this section.

As used in this section, “district” means any levee, drainage, irrigation, watershed, or river improvement district in Arkansas, including without limitation those districts:

History. Acts 2009, No. 386, § 1; 2011, No. 778, § 2; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 6, § 1; 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 7, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment deleted the (d)(1)(A) designation, redesignated (d)(1)(B) as (d)(2), and redesignated (d)(2) as (d)(3); substituted “subsection (b) or subsection (c)” for “subdivision (b) or (c)” in (d)(1); and substituted “(d)(1)” for “(d)(1)(A)” in (d)(2) and (d)(3).

The 2016 (3rd Ex. Sess.) amendment by identical acts Nos. 6 and 7 substituted “without limitation” for “but not limited to” in the introductory language of (a)(1); added (b)(3); added (c)(2); and made stylistic changes.

14-86-104. Improvement district — Audit — Vacancy — Meetings.

      1. Ten percent (10%) or more of the property owners in an improvement district may present to the county judge of the county or to the mayor of the municipality in which the improvement district lies a petition and an affidavit:
        1. Concerning the financial affairs of the improvement district; and
        2. Showing substantially insufficient financial information of an improvement district provided by the improvement district as a result of a valid request under the Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq.
      2. Upon the presentation of a petition and affidavit under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, the county judge or mayor shall request the financial information of the improvement district.
      1. The improvement district shall provide the financial information requested under subdivision (a)(1) of this section if the financial information exists.
      2. If within thirty (30) days of the request under subdivision (a)(1) of this section the improvement district does not provide to the county judge or to the mayor the financial information or state that the financial information does not exist, the county judge or the mayor with the city council's approval may order an independent audit to be conducted of the improvement district at the improvement district's expense.
  1. If a vacancy exists on a board of commissioners of an improvement district and the procedure for filling the vacancy is for the remaining commissioners to appoint a replacement commissioner, the county judge of the county or the mayor of the municipality in which the improvement district lies may appoint a replacement commissioner on his or her own accord or by petition of ten percent (10%) or more of the property owners in the improvement district.
    1. All meetings of the board of commissioners of an improvement district shall be held in a central and convenient location in the county or the municipality in which the improvement district lies.
    2. Upon petition of ten percent (10%) or more of the property owners in the improvement district, the meeting location shall be determined by the county judge or the mayor.
  2. This section does not apply to a general consolidated public utility system improvement district established under the General Consolidated Public Utility System Improvement District Law, § 14-217-101 et seq.

History. Acts 2017, No. 623, § 1.

14-86-105. Improvement district board of commissioners — Administrator.

  1. The county judge of the county or the mayor of the municipality in which an improvement district lies shall appoint an administrator of the improvement district to act as the board of commissioners if all positions on a board of commissioners of the improvement district are vacant and no interested property owner within the improvement district boundaries is willing to serve as a commissioner.
  2. The administrator appointed under subsection (a) of this section:
    1. Is subject to the applicable laws of the improvement district;
    2. Shall provide evidence of his or her economic viability;
    3. Shall receive such payment for his or her services as the county judge or the mayor may allow;
    4. Shall serve at the pleasure of the county judge or mayor or until an interested property owner in the improvement district boundaries is willing to serve as commissioner of the improvement district; and
    5. Is not liable for damages in connection with the improvement district unless the administrator acted with corrupt and malicious intent.
  3. This section does not apply to a general consolidated public utility system improvement district established under the General Consolidated Public Utility System Improvement District Law, § 14-217-101 et seq.

History. Acts 2017, No. 623, § 1.

Subchapter 2 — Petition to Establish Improvement District

Effective Dates. Acts 1983, No. 739, § 4: Mar. 23, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that many people who are asked to sign petitions for the establishment of improvement districts are not aware that their signature indicates that they favor the establishment of the district or that the establishment of the district may result in assessment of benefits (taxes) against their property; that fairness and equity demand that persons asked to sign a petition be advised of the possible consequences and that the most appropriate way to so advise the people is by printing a notice on the front of the petition form; that this Act is designed to provide for printing of such notice on the form and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-86-201. Notice provision required.

  1. Each and every petition circulated in the state for the establishment of an improvement district of whatever nature shall contain on the front and near the top thereof the following notice, which shall be in letters at least one-fourth inch (¼") in height and shall be enclosed in a box in substantially the following form:
  2. It is unlawful for any person to circulate, or cause to be circulated, any petition for the establishment of an improvement district of whatever nature in this state which does not conform to the provisions of this section. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.

NOTICE YOUR SIGNATURE HEREON SHOWS THAT YOU FAVOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT. IF THE DISTRICT IS FORMED, YOU MAY BE CHARGED FOR THE COST OF THE IMPROVEMENTS.

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1983, No. 739, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-104.1, 20-104.2.

Case Notes

Cited: Hannah v. Deboer, 311 Ark. 215, 843 S.W.2d 800 (1992).

Subchapter 3 — Notice on Formation of Improvement District

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

14-86-301. Definition.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “address” means the address as reflected on the official tax records of the county where the property is located.

History. Acts 1981, No. 546, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1159.

14-86-302. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of this subchapter shall not be applicable to any city, county, or area which is under an order from the Division of Environmental Quality of the Department of Energy and Environment and the United States Environmental Protection Agency to meet the minimum requirements of the United States Environmental Protection Agency for sanitary sewer discharge.
  2. The provisions of this subchapter shall not be applicable to levee, drainage, fire protection, or road improvement districts.

History. Acts 1981, No. 546, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1159; Acts 1999, No. 1164, § 123; 2005, No. 1197, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 3033.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 1997, No. 1219, § 2, provided:

“‘Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology’ renamed to ‘Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality’.

(a) Effective March 31, 1999, the ‘Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology’ or ‘Department,’ as it is referred to or empowered throughout the Arkansas Code Annotated, is hereby renamed. In its place, the ‘Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality’ is hereby established, succeeding to the general powers and responsibilities previously assigned to the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology. The Director of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology is directed to identify and revise all inter-agency agreements, financial instruments, funds, and other necessary legal documents in order to effect this change by March 31, 1999.

“(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as impairing the powers and authorities of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology prior to the effective date of the name change.”

Amendments. The 1999 amendment substituted “Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality” for “Department of Pollution Control and Ecology” in (a).

The 2005 amendment inserted “fire protection” in (b).

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Environmental Quality” for “Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality” in (a).

14-86-303. Requirements.

  1. No improvement district shall be created unless a notice, prior to the hearing on the formation of the district, has been mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the addresses of all owners of real property within the boundaries of the proposed improvement district.
  2. The notice shall inform the property owners of:
    1. The proposal to form an improvement district;
    2. The purpose and powers of the proposed district; and
    3. The names and addresses of the organizers of the district.
  3. The notice shall also notify the property owners of the date, time, and place of the hearing on the proposed formation of the improvement district.

History. Acts 1981, No. 546, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1159.

Case Notes

Cited: Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Subchapter 4 — Correcting Defects in Formation of Improvement District

Cross References. Creation of new district to replace void municipal improvement district, § 14-88-206.

Effective Dates. Acts 1919, No. 661, § 4: effective on passage.

Acts 1921, No. 503, § 5: approved Mar. 26, 1921. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-86-401. Construction.

This subchapter is not intended to and does not repeal any existing remedy.

History. Acts 1919, No. 661, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1103.

14-86-402. Proceedings generally.

    1. Ten (10) resident citizens and property owners residing and owning property within any improvement district or road district within any county, city, or town, or within the territory to be intended to be included in the district may file with the clerk of the county court of the county in which the district is situated a petition setting forth the defects or irregularities sought to be corrected.
    2. The petitioners shall cause a notice of the filing of the petition and its purposes to be published in a paper of general circulation in the county for three (3) weeks before the petition shall be presented for hearing.
  1. Any of the property owners in the district shall have a right to appear and become parties to the petition or to file objections or an answer to protest and resist the granting of the petition.
    1. Upon the hearing of the petition and answer or protest, the county court shall have full power and authority to correct any mistake or error in the formation or organization of the district.
      1. The order of the county court shall be final and conclusive of the formation and organization of the district and any and all corrections in its formation or attempted formation.
        1. Any interested parties to the record shall have the right to appeal, within fifteen (15) days from the judgment of the county court, to the circuit court.
        2. The circuit court shall have the power to hear the case de novo and render judgment.
  2. When the boundaries of other districts are involved, ten (10) of the resident property owners in the other districts may join in the petition and notice, and the residents of the other districts shall have a right to appear and become parties to the proceedings or to resist them.

History. Acts 1919, No. 661, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5636-5640; Acts 1921, No. 503, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 7372-7376; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1101.

Case Notes

Cited: Hannah v. Deboer, 311 Ark. 215, 843 S.W.2d 800 (1992).

14-86-403. Judgment conclusive.

When a judgment is rendered by the county court in accordance with this subchapter, it shall be conclusive unless appealed from within fifteen (15) days, shall be binding upon all parties, and shall not be collaterally attacked.

History. Acts 1919, No. 661, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 5641; Pope's Dig., § 7377; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1102.

Subchapter 5 — Destruction of Section Corners in Improvement Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1921, No. 82, § 7: effective on passage.

14-86-501. Applicability.

The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to engineers and commissioners in all improvement districts in this state.

History. Acts 1921, No. 82, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 3222; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1108.

14-86-502. Penalty.

    1. Any engineer or commissioner who shall neglect, fail, or refuse to comply with any of the provisions of this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250).
    2. Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) of the fine shall be paid to the informer.
  1. Each corner destroyed where there is a failure to comply with the provisions of this subchapter as to corners shall constitute a separate offense.

History. Acts 1921, No. 82, §§ 3, 5; Pope's Dig., §§ 3221, 3223; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-1107, 20-1109.

14-86-503. Duty to perform.

  1. It is made the duty of the commissioners of any district to cause the work described in § 14-86-504 to be done by the engineers.
  2. All corners destroyed shall be reestablished at once during the time construction work is being done in the district.

History. Acts 1921, No. 82, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 3220; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1106.

14-86-504. Location of corners and notes required.

    1. It shall be the duty of all engineers in the employ of any improvement district in this state or engineers doing any work for the improvement district, if the doing of the work or the construction of the improvement, or any work connected therewith, destroys any section corner or quarter section corner, to locate each corner so destroyed correctly in accord with the United States survey field notes of the corner and cause to be erected reference monuments of some indestructible material, which may be either concrete, stone, galvanized iron pipe, or cast iron posts not less than two-by-four inches (2" x 4") and sunk in the ground not less than three feet (3').
    2. The posts or monuments shall be placed forty-five degrees (45°) N. E., forty-five degrees (45°) N. W., forty-five degrees (45°) S. W., and forty-five degrees (45°) S. E., if possible, from the corner and shall be far enough away from the corner so as not to be covered up or destroyed in constructing the improvements.
    1. A copy of the engineer's notes of his locating the survey of each corner and the monuments thereto shall be kept. The notes shall tell how he proceeded in locating each corner, giving the course and distance from the true corner that each witness or monument is placed, and the kind of monument. The notes shall be so full and complete that any surveyor can, from the notes, find the corner without difficulty.
    2. The notes shall be filed by the engineer in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the corners are situated and shall be recorded by the clerk in a book kept for that purpose. The book shall be correctly indexed as to section, township, and range so as to be readily referred to or found from the index.
  1. The cost or charge for locating the corners and recording the notes shall be paid by the district as a part of the cost of the construction of the improvement.

History. Acts 1921, No. 82, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 3219; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1105.

Subchapter 6 — Assessment in Improvement Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1919, No. 404, § 2: approved Mar. 27, 1919. Emergency declared.

Acts 1919, No. 515, § 2: approved Mar. 28, 1919. Emergency declared.

14-86-601. Partition among several owners.

Wherever lands or other real property in an improvement district are assessed in one (1) body and are at the time owned in separate parcels or where the ownership subsequently becomes divided, any owner of any part of the property may apply to the chancery court of the county where the lands, or some part thereof, lie, making defendants in his suit the other parties interested in the lands. Thereupon, it shall be the duty of the court to partition the assessment against the lands among the several owners thereof, as equity and good conscience may require.

History. Acts 1919, No. 404, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 5634; Pope's Dig., § 7302; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1116.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not authorize dividing annual tax assessments which have become due and have not been paid; it authorizes proration of subsequent and future assessments against the property. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Paving Dist., 199 Ark. 506, 135 S.W.2d 59 (1939).

14-86-602. Assessed benefits not reduced.

Where any improvement district shall have issued bonds or incurred indebtedness, the total amount of the assessed benefits shall never be reduced upon a reassessment.

History. Acts 1919, No. 515, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 5635; Pope's Dig., § 7301; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1115.

Case Notes

Cited: Sugarloaf Dev. Co. v. Heber Springs Sewer Imp. Dist., 34 Ark. App. 28, 805 S.W.2d 88 (1991).

14-86-603. State agencies and commissions owning land to pay assessments.

It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that some state agencies and commissions owning land within levee, drainage, or other improvement or special assessment districts do not pay the assessments; that such land may be benefitted by the assessment levied by the district; that although public property used exclusively for public purposes is exempt from ad valorem property taxation under the Arkansas Constitution, the Arkansas Supreme Court has distinguished a tax from an assessment, stating that the word “taxes” refers to exactions laid by the government for the purpose of general revenues and that the word “assessments” refers to exactions laid for making improvements; and that state agencies and commissions owning land in these districts should pay the assessments levied by the districts because they benefit from the districts' improvements.

History. Acts 1991, No. 877, § 1.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Arkansas Supreme Court case referred to in this section is Rainwater v. Haynes, 244 Ark. 1191, 428 S.W.2d 254 (1968).

14-86-604. Exemptions.

  1. It is found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly that all property owned by the State Highway Commission or the Arkansas Department of Transportation is public property used exclusively for public purposes.
  2. Since neither the commission nor the department pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Article 16, § 5, is required to pay real or personal property taxes on real estate and tangible personal property owned by that commission or department, likewise, notwithstanding any provision of law or any provision in §§ 14-86-603 — 14-86-606 to the contrary, the commission and department shall not be required to pay any improvement district assessments that may be assessed against the commission or department as a result of such ownership.

History. Acts 1991, No. 877, § 2; 2017, No. 707, § 24.

A.C.R.C. Notes. The Arkansas State Highway Commission is an incorrect agency name. It is actually the State Highway Commission.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment, in (a), deleted “hereby” preceding “found”, and substituted “Department of Transportation” for “State Highway and Transportation Department”.

14-86-605. Assessments to be paid from date of implementation — Applicability.

  1. Any state agency or commission, including the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, owning real property located within a levee, drainage, or any other improvement or district and benefiting from the district shall pay the assessments levied by such districts from the date of implementation.
  2. However, the provisions of this section shall not apply retroactively to lands owned by state agencies prior to July 15, 1991, unless the state agencies were already paying taxes or assessments on their lands.
  3. This section shall not apply to the Commissioner of State Lands.

History. Acts 1991, No. 877, § 3.

14-86-606. Sale or transfer of land.

The sale or transfer of real property located within a levee, drainage, or other improvement or special assessment district to a state agency or commission, including the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, if benefitted by the stated purpose of the improvement district, shall not extinguish any lien for delinquent assessments of such districts or relieve the purchaser or transferee of liability for delinquent assessments in such districts.

History. Acts 1991, No. 877, § 4.

14-86-607. Exclusions.

  1. At its option, any state agency or commission may be excluded from any newly formed levee, drainage, or other improvement or special assessment districts.
  2. If the purpose of the improvement district does not benefit the affected lands, then no taxes or assessments will apply to the nonserved lands. Sections 14-86-606 and 14-86-607 shall not apply to the Commissioner of State Lands.

History. Acts 1991, No. 877, § 4.

Subchapter 7 — Tax for Preliminary Expenses of Improvement District

Cross References. Levy of tax for preliminary expenses in drainage districts, § 14-121-422.

Levy of tax in suburban improvement districts, § 14-92-238.

Effective Dates. Acts 1923, No. 562, § 4: approved Mar. 22, 1923. Emergency clause provided: “All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed; and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-86-701. Authority to levy.

    1. In all improvement districts in this state, the county court or board of commissioners or directors is authorized and empowered, upon the completion of the assessment of benefits and its confirmation, to levy and collect a tax. This tax shall be based upon the assessment of benefits and collectible from the real property in the district in the proportion of the respective assessments of benefits against the several pieces of property for the purpose of paying preliminary expenses wherever it is deemed prudent not to proceed immediately with construction and not to wind up the district.
    2. The tax shall be levied and collected in the same manner as is provided for the levy and collection of the taxes of the district for the purpose of construction.
  1. If any improvement district is abandoned before the making of the assessment of benefits, the tax for preliminary expenses shall be levied upon the real estate therein, upon the basis of the assessment for county and state purposes.

History. Acts 1923, No. 562, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 4466; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1117.

14-86-702. Issuance of bonds.

  1. In case the directors or commissioners of any improvement district find it desirable to do so, they may issue coupon bonds or other negotiable evidences of indebtedness for the purpose of raising money to pay preliminary expenses.
  2. These bonds or other evidences of indebtedness may be issued, from time to time, in payment for preliminary work done. The directors or commissioners may secure the payment of the bonds by a pledge and mortgage of the assessment of benefits whenever the assessment of benefits has been confirmed.

History. Acts 1923, No. 562, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 4467; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1118.

Cross References. Refunding bonds, § 14-121-445.

Subchapter 8 — Collection of Taxes in Improvement Districts

Preambles. Acts 1933, No. 46 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, abuses are prevalent in receiverships of levee, drainage and road districts, in the allowance of excessive fees to counsel for filing suits for receivers, the allowance of excessive fees to receivers, the appointment of unnecessary attorneys for receivers and the allowance of excessive fees to them, all of which imposes an additional financial burden on the landowners of the district; and

“Whereas, the collection officers provided by law can collect improvement district taxes more expeditiously and at less expense than receivers, if they are made to discharge their duties;

“Now, therefore….”

Act 1933, No. 79 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, abuses are prevalent in receiverships of municipal, bridge, suburban and road maintenance improvement districts, in the allowance of excessive fees to counsel for filing suits for receivers, the allowance of excessive fees to receivers, the appointment of unnecessary attorneys for receivers and the allowance of excessive fees to them, all of which imposes an additional financial burden on the landowners of the districts; and

“Whereas, the collection officers provided by law can collect improvement district taxes more expeditiously and at less expense than receivers, if they are made to discharge their duties;

“Now, therefore….”

Acts 1939, No. 100 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, it being ascertained by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, now in regular session, that an emergency now exists and that said emergency effects a vast number of the home owners and land owners of the State, and also the bond holders owning bonds issued by improvement districts within the State of Arkansas, that the cause of the emergency with excessive assessments on the lands and homes of many of the inhabitants of the State of Arkansas for improvement purposes and the impossibility of the payment of such assessments by the owners of the lands located in improvement districts, which assessments coupled with the general depression which is recognized to exist within the United States of America, is causing the land owners to lose their homes and the bond holders to lose their investment in the bonds…”

Effective Dates. Acts 1933, No. 46, § 2: approved Feb. 18, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “As this act is intended to prevent abuses in the administration of justice, to require improvement district officers to perform their legal duties, and to relieve the lands in improvement districts from the payment of unnecessary expenses, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1933, No. 79, § 2: approved Mar. 7, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “As this act is intended to prevent abuses in the administration of justice, to require improvement district officers to perform their legal duties, and to relieve the lands in improvement districts from the payment of unnecessary expense, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 100, § 3: approved Feb. 17, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It being ascertained by the General Assembly that by reason of the fact that a great financial depression exists within the State of Arkansas that land values have greatly depreciated within the past few years, that many people are losing their homes and their lands by reason of their inability to pay the assessments imposed on such lands in improvement districts, and that many persons owning the bonds of such improvement districts are unable to collect such bonds, or the interest thereon, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and all laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed, and this act shall become in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 238, § 2: Mar. 4, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that in such levee, drainage and road districts as are now without a duly appointed, qualified and acting Board of Commissioners, landowners are without an authorized collector to whom payments of annual installments of assessed benefits, current and delinquent, may be paid and the lien thereof satisfied; that the situation resulting therefrom unduly interferes with the alienation of property in said districts, unnecessarily burdening the owners thereof by clouding the title thereto, and that an emergency therefore exists, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, the same shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Case Notes

In General.

Improvement districts are agents of the state and derive their limited powers and duties of a public and governmental nature by legislative delegation through the taxing power of the state, and constitute a separate and distinct species of taxing districts as contradistinguished from counties, municipal corporations and school districts. Quapaw Cent. Bus. Imp. Dist. v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 315 Ark. 703, 870 S.W.2d 390 (1994).

14-86-801. Collection in levee, drainage, and road districts.

  1. All taxes in levee, drainage, and road improvement districts shall be collected at the time, in the manner, and by the officers specified in the statutes creating them or under which they were organized if there is then a duly appointed, qualified, and acting board of commissioners for the district.
  2. The duty to promptly extend and collect these taxes may be enforced by mandamus or by a mandatory injunction in equity, at the instance of any landowner in the district, the trustee in any deed of trust securing the bonds of the district, the holder of any bond as to which the district has defaulted in the payment of interest or principal, or any other creditor of the district.
  3. The remedies provided in this section shall be exclusive, and all laws providing for or authorizing the appointment of a receiver for any such district having a duly appointed, qualified, and elected board are repealed. No court shall appoint a receiver to collect levee, drainage, or road district taxes in a district having such a board.

History. Acts 1933, No. 46, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 4591; Acts 1949, No. 238, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1121.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts as applied to preexisting trust deeds or mortgages securing an improvement district's bonds. Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 69 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, Mercantile-Commerce Bank & T. Co. v. Drainage Dist., 293 U.S. 566, 55 S. Ct. 77 (1934).

Jurisdiction.

The power to compel collection of drainage taxes by mandatory injunction against the officers of the improvement district may be exercised by the federal district court. Kersh Lake Drainage Dist. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 138 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, Neblett v. Caminetti, 320 U.S. 802, 64 S. Ct. 428, 88 L. Ed. 484 (1943).

14-86-802. Collection in municipal, bridge, suburban, and road districts.

  1. All taxes in municipal, suburban, bridge, and road improvement districts shall be collected at the time, in the manner, and by the officers specified in the statutes creating them, or under which they were organized.
  2. The duty to promptly extend and collect these taxes may be enforced by mandamus or by a mandatory injunction in equity, at the instance of any landowner in the district, the trustee in any deed of trust securing the bonds of the district, the holder of any bond as to which the district has defaulted in the payment of interest or principal, or any other creditor of the district.
  3. The remedies provided in this section shall be exclusive, and all laws providing for or authorizing the appointment of a receiver for any such district are repealed. No court shall appoint a receiver to collect municipal, bridge, suburban, or road district taxes.

History. Acts 1933, No. 79, § 1; Pope's Dig., §§ 6540, 7336; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1120.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not invalid as an abridgment of the jurisdiction of the courts of equity. Dickinson v. Mingea, 191 Ark. 946, 88 S.W.2d 807 (1935).

Applicability.

This section is not retroactive and has no applicability to a receivership pending at the time it was enacted. Cutsinger v. Strang, 203 Ark. 699, 158 S.W.2d 669 (1942).

Delinquent Assessments.

Even though foreclosure sale of sewer improvement district plans was held valid where the proceedings had lain dormant for a period of 15 years and there was some question as to the validity of the sale, it was proper for the chancery court to order the commissioners of the district to collect all delinquent assessments with a notice that the owners of the delinquent lands could redeem them by the payment of the delinquency, with accumulated interest, within 90 days from the date of the notice. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 229 Ark. 697, 318 S.W.2d 831 (1958).

Enforcement of Duty.

The provisions of this section may be invoked by the holder of any bond of a municipal improvement district which has defaulted in the payment of interest or principal thereof. Dickinson v. Mingea, 191 Ark. 946, 88 S.W.2d 807 (1935).

Receivers.

Chancery court's appointment of a receiver to take charge of assets of paving district was held in violation of this section, and allowance of fee to receiver and attorneys was error. Rogers Paving Imp. Dist. v. Swofford, 193 Ark. 260, 99 S.W.2d 577 (1936).

Where original owner of property filed an action 10 years after foreclosure sale and attacked validity of purchaser's title on the ground that receiver was appointed illegally, such illegality in appointment of receiver did not affect title of purchaser, as district had title at time of sale to purchaser and period of redemption against district is restricted to five years. Schuman v. Cherry, 215 Ark. 342, 220 S.W.2d 817 (1949).

14-86-803. Payment and redemption with district bonds.

  1. It shall be lawful for any person, firm, or corporation owning lands in any drainage district, levee district, or other improvement districts within the State of Arkansas to pay any part or all of the assessments against their respective lands located in the drainage district, levee district, or other improvement districts with bonds issued by the district.
    1. It shall be lawful for any collector or improvement district commissioner or person lawfully designated to collect improvement district assessments to accept these bonds as payment, in part or in full, of any assessment imposed upon any land within any improvement district as payment of any past due assessments or assessments to become due and payable.
    2. The collector or other person lawfully designated to collect improvement district assessments in making his settlements with any district shall only apply such bonds on the settlement as he has actually received in payment of assessments or redemptions. He shall furnish the districts with a sworn statement setting out the names of property owners paying with bonds and the amounts of assessments each individual has paid in bonds.
    1. In the making of their payments, the landowners may pay with either past due bonds or bonds to become due in the future issued by the proper authority of the particular district for which payment is being made.
      1. It also shall be lawful for any person, firm, or corporation whose lands have been sold and which lands are owned by an improvement district and have not been resold to a private individual, firm, or corporation to redeem the lands or repurchase them with the bonds either past due or to become due of the particular district where the land is located and assessed for improvement purposes.
      2. The commissioner of any and all districts are authorized to execute to the person redeeming or repurchasing the lands a deed conveying all right, title, and interest of the district in and to the lands, subject, however, to any unpaid assessments that may accrue after the purchase or redemption. All bonds used in the payment of assessments, redemption, or repurchase of lands, as provided for in this section, shall be accepted at face value.
    1. The provision of this section shall in no way interfere or prevent the reassessment against any lands in any improvement district as provided by law.
    2. In the event any landowner shall have paid all assessments against his lands, including past due assessments and future assessments, nothing in this section shall prevent additional assessments against any such lands that may be made under any existing law.

History. Acts 1939, No. 100, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-1122, 20-1123.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former similar statute held valid. Watson v. Barnett, 191 Ark. 990, 88 S.W.2d 811 (1935) (decision under prior law).

Powers of Commissioners.

Drainage district commissioner had right to purchase and acquire lands in the district from other owners and also to remove the lien of the district against such lands by using bonds of the district. Bishop v. Gregory, 201 Ark. 448, 144 S.W.2d 1083 (1940) (decision under prior law).

Subchapter 9 — Extending Collection of Tax in Improvement District

Preambles. Acts 1961, No. 427 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the several County Clerks are now obligated by law to extend certain improvement district taxes and the failure to make uniform the fees to be allowed for such service results in injustice and confusion and may retard and hinder the orderly process of the administration of such improvement districts;

Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1961, No. 427, §§ 5, 6: Jan. 1, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that many county clerks are obligated by law to extend certain improvement taxes, that the fees allowed for such additional duties are not uniform throughout the State, that uniformity in such fees is necessary to the orderly administration of such districts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.” Approved March 15, 1961.

14-86-901. Applicability.

This subchapter shall not apply to any improvement district that collects its annual assessments or taxes by a collector other than the collector of the state and county taxes, nor shall this subchapter apply to any improvement taxes of any district which maintains a permanent office open during business hours throughout the year and which has full-time employees in charge of it.

History. Acts 1961, No. 427, § 1; 1963, No. 505, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1152.

14-86-902. County clerk's commission.

In all counties in this state in which the county clerks are required by law to extend any improvement taxes, whether the taxes are from municipal, suburban, road, fire, drainage district, or otherwise, the county clerk of any such county shall receive, for his services in extending the tax annually upon the books of his county, a commission necessary to reimburse the clerk for the cost of extending the taxes. However, in no event may the commission exceed two percent (2%) of the amount so extended.

History. Acts 1961, No. 427, § 1; 1963, No. 505, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1152.

14-86-903. Additional deputy clerks.

County clerks are authorized to employ additional deputies to handle the additional work load imposed. They may pay the deputies salaries up to the sum of three thousand six hundred dollars ($3,600) per annum. However, these salaries shall never exceed the receipts from the commissions allowed by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1961, No. 427, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1153.

14-86-904. Tax collector's commission.

In counties operating under the unit tax ledger system, the county tax collector shall receive a commission of two percent (2%) for extending the improvement taxes and a commission of an additional two percent (2%) for collecting them.

History. Acts 1961, No. 427, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1154.

14-86-905. Additional deputy tax collectors.

County tax collectors shall be authorized to employ additional deputies subject to the limitations in § 14-86-903.

History. Acts 1961, No. 427, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1154.

Subchapter 10 — Collection of Delinquent Improvement District Taxes or Assessments

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 268, § 3: Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “Because of strained financial conditions, and because property owners are unable to pay taxes on real property situated within the State of Arkansas, forcing them thereby to lose their lands, an emergency is found and declared to exist, and this act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in full force from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 710, § 3: Apr. 28, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the present laws of this State it is the responsibility of the circuit or chancery court clerk in each county to collect the delinquent taxes or assessments of improvement districts in the county; that this places an unjust burden on the clerks in the respective counties and that this responsibility of the collection of such delinquent taxes and assessments should be vested in the tax collector in each county and that this Act is designed to correct this situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-86-1001. Authority and responsibility generally.

  1. All authority and responsibility vested in the circuit clerk or chancery clerk for the collection of delinquent taxes or assessments of improvement districts are transferred to and vested in the tax collector in each county.
  2. The tax collector shall perform all actions in the matter of collecting delinquent taxes and assessments of improvement districts required of the clerks and shall be entitled to such fees therefor as is provided by law for these clerks.
  3. All laws in effect in this state relating to the collection of delinquent taxes or assessments of improvement districts which refer to the collection of these taxes by the circuit or chancery clerk shall be deemed to be applicable to the tax collector in each county.

History. Acts 1971, No. 710, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1155.

14-86-1002. Remission of delinquent penalties.

The board of improvement of any levee, drainage, street improvement, and other districts, however created, may remit, by resolution duly adopted of a general character applicable alike to all lands and property assessed in the districts for taxes, all that part of any penalty which has accrued upon delinquent tax assessments, in excess of ten percent (10%) for these tax delinquencies.

History. Acts 1941, No. 268, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1130.

14-86-1003. Relief from penalties in apportioned assessment.

  1. On any acreage tract of land embraced in any municipal improvement district located in the municipality, where two (2) or more property owners own different portions of such an acreage tract, the benefits to which were assessed as a unit or with one (1) assessment of benefits for the entire tract, and a majority of the property owners desire to pay their just part of the assessment of benefits but cannot pay it because the assessment is on the entire tract and not apportioned to each parcel of the tract as owned, any one of the respective owners may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for an apportionment of the assessment, making the other owners of the tract embraced in the unit assessment defendants.
  2. Upon payment of the apportioned assessment as fixed by the court, the person so paying shall be relieved of all penalties accruing prior to the apportionment of the assessment as fixed by the court.

History. Acts 1941, No. 268, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1130.

Subchapter 11 — Delinquent Improvement Taxes and Assessments Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1921, No. 534, § 6: approved Mar. 26, 1921. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall take effect and be enforced from and after its passage.”

Acts 1931, No. 227, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1939, No. 163, § 4: approved Feb. 28, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health and security, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-86-1101. Definition.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “real property” means all property assessed for the improvement within the district including lands, town lots, railroads, tramroads, bridges, and any other real property.

History. Acts 1921, No. 534, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 13892; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1129.

14-86-1102. Applicability.

The provisions of this subchapter do not apply to the counties of Hot Spring, Boone, Lawrence, Faulkner, White, Sevier, and Stone.

History. Acts 1921, No. 534, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 13892; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1129.

14-86-1103. Lists of delinquent realty.

  1. All taxes or assessments levied on the real property in any road improvement, drainage, levee, or fencing district in this state, to which this subchapter applies, if not paid on or before October 1 of the year in which it is due, as required by law, shall be delinquent. The tax collector of the county in which the property is situated shall, in those districts where it is his duty to do so, on or before October 15, make out a list of the real property so delinquent.
  2. The list shall include:
    1. The name of the supposed owner as it appears on the tax books;
    2. A description of the property; and
    3. The amount of the tax due thereon.
  3. Before the list is filed, the collector shall make an affidavit that it is true and correct.
  4. A separate list shall be made for each improvement district.

History. Acts 1939, No. 163, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1124.

Case Notes

Applicability.

The provisions of this section were held not to affect any rights already fixed under acts creating improvement districts. Miller Levee Dist. v. Evers, 200 Ark. 53, 137 S.W.2d 915 (1940).

Names of Supposed Owners.

Where, in foreclosure sale, this section was complied with in that the name of supposed owner was given as “appears on the tax books,” it was not necessary that investigation be undertaken to determine supposed owner as was formerly required. Leonard v. Thompson, 228 Ark. 136, 306 S.W.2d 869 (1957).

Where the purchaser of land recorded his deed, but neglected to have the land assessed for taxation, notice to the purchaser's grantor of foreclosure for delinquent drainage district taxes was sufficient. Sadler v. Hill, 243 Ark. 247, 419 S.W.2d 298 (1967).

Cited: Isaack v. Davis, 254 Ark. 115, 491 S.W.2d 784 (1973).

14-86-1104. Recording of delinquent list.

  1. The county tax collector shall record the list in a well-bound book kept by him for that purpose preceding the list by a caption, which may be in substance as follows:
    1. Then shall be copied the delinquent list filed by the collector together with the names of the supposed owners and the certificate of the collector and the date of the filing, and the collector shall add the penalty prescribed by law to the tax.
      1. The collector shall append at the foot of the list a certificate that it is a true copy of the list filed by the collector.
        1. The certificate shall show the date of filing and recording of the delinquent list.
        2. The certificate shall be conclusive evidence that the list was filed and recorded as stated in the certificate.

“The lands, town lots, railroads, tramroads, and bridges returned delinquent in (stating corporate name of the district) for the nonpayment of taxes due said district for the year 19 , together with tax, penalty and cost chargeable thereon are contained and described in the following list.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1921, No. 534, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 13889; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1126.

14-86-1105. Redemption of land on delinquent list.

  1. Anyone desiring to redeem any of the delinquent lands, town lots, railroads, tramroads, bridges, or other real property included in the list shall apply to the county tax collector.
  2. Upon the payment of the tax, penalty, interest, and costs, the collector shall issue a redemption certificate in triplicate, a copy of which shall be sent to the secretary of the board of improvement of the district. A copy shall also be sent to the treasurer of the district, or the depository, if one. The collector shall immediately remit the amount of the tax, penalty, and interest to the treasurer of the depository of the district and shall mark opposite the tract by whom redeemed and the date of the payment.
  3. For his services on filing and recording the list, the collector shall be entitled to the sum of ten cents (10¢) per tract, which shall be added as cost and, if not redeemed by the owner, paid by the district.
  4. If the lands are redeemed, the collector shall be entitled to the sum of one dollar ($1.00) per tract as a redemption fee, which sum, with the cost of recording, shall be paid by the party redeeming and charged as cost against the tract.

History. Acts 1921, No. 534, § 3; 1931, No. 227, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 13890; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1127.

Case Notes

Payment of Tax, Etc.

By depositing the proper amount within the statutory period, an owner perfects his right to redeem the property, and he is not required to notify anyone of the redemption payment, nor is any court proceeding necessary to effect redemption. Killian v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 201 Ark. 1137, 148 S.W.2d 1085 (1941).

Redemption Fee.

A fee of $1.00 for redemption of lands sold for improvement taxes must be treated as one of the fees which is required to be collected and paid into the county treasury. Swearingen v. State ex rel. Benton County, 160 Ark. 326, 254 S.W. 537 (1923).

Statute of Limitations.

Action by former owner of land sold for payment of levee district assessment who redeemed from the sale within the period allowed by law for writ of assistance to obtain possession from purchasers from district prior to expiration of redemption period was held not subject to statute of limitations as to judicial sales. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 205 Ark. 1023, 172 S.W.2d 241 (1943).

Cited: Locust Creek Drainage Dist. v. Seay, 190 Ark. 739, 81 S.W.2d 835 (1935).

14-86-1106. Suit for collection of taxes.

    1. When the board of improvement or anyone authorized by law to file suit for the collection of delinquent taxes desires to commence a suit, they shall obtain a certified copy of the list from the county tax collector, which shall be filed with the complaint and taken as a part thereof.
    2. For making the list, the county tax collector shall be entitled to ten cents (10¢) per tract, which shall be taxed as costs in the suit.
  1. No suit for the collection of delinquent taxes shall be brought after three (3) years from date they became delinquent.

History. Acts 1921, No. 534, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 13891; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1128.

Cross References. Applicability of 1949 provisions, § 14-90-102.

Case Notes

Delinquent Taxes.

Taxes are delinquent when the taxpayer fails to pay taxes on or before the day fixed by law for payment. Tallman v. Board of Comm'rs, 185 Ark. 851, 49 S.W.2d 1039 (1932).

Annual assessments of a drainage district were due and payable from the first Monday in January of each year to and including April 10, and became delinquent thereafter. Tarleton Drainage Dist. v. American Inv. Co., 186 Ark. 20, 52 S.W.2d 738 (1932).

Judgments.

Where realty owner paid levee district taxes and received the regular redemption certificate, but the clerk inadvertently failed to make the endorsement in the delinquent record so that a default decree of foreclosure resulted, on motion to set the judgment aside, it was held that there was an unavoidable casualty or misfortune which prevented the owner from appearing or defending the suit. Wilder v. Harris, 205 Ark. 341, 168 S.W.2d 804 (1943).

Limitation of Actions.

This section contemplates that suit shall be brought within the time fixed. Western Clay Drainage Dist. v. Wynn, 179 Ark. 988, 18 S.W.2d 1035 (1929).

Although the limitations of § 14-86-1208 would not apply to an improvement district, the identical provisions of this section would. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

—Interest.

Question of whether interest on assessment is barred by limitations need not be considered in proceeding by receiver to procure instructions of chancery court to permit receiver to apply to county court for order of collection, but such question may be raised in a suit for the collection of such interest. Greer v. Blocker, 218 Ark. 259, 236 S.W.2d 68 (1951).

Cited: Isaack v. Davis, 254 Ark. 115, 491 S.W.2d 784 (1973).

Subchapter 12 — Delinquent Improvement Taxes and Assessments in Counties with a Population Exceeding 75,000

Effective Dates. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 10: approved Feb. 16, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety an emergency is hereby declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 107, § 2: approved Feb. 17, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-86-1201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Real property” means all property assessed for the improvement within the district including lands, town lots, railroads, tramroads, bridges, and any and all other real property embraced in the district;
  2. “Per tract” means each several and separate tract, piece, or parcel of real property listed upon the delinquent list furnished by the collector;
  3. “Collector” means any and all persons, by whatever official title known, or whether known by an official title or not, who shall have in his custody or possession the tax books for the purpose of collecting taxes as set out in § 14-86-1205.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1141.

14-86-1202. Applicability.

    1. The provisions of this subchapter shall apply only to those counties which have a population as shown by the last federal census in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) inhabitants.
      1. The tax collecting officer of every improvement district as set out in this subchapter which embraces lands situated within a county having a population in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) inhabitants, but the principal office of which or the office of the tax collecting officer of which is located in a county not having a population in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) inhabitants, shall, within sixty (60) days and in the manner required in this subchapter of the tax collecting officers of districts the boundaries of which are located wholly within counties having a population in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) inhabitants, make and certify to the county tax collector of a county having a population in excess of seventy-five thousand (75,000) inhabitants lists showing the lands situated within the last named county the taxes payable upon which to the district shall have become delinquent.
      2. The last named collector shall be subject to the same fines and damages as set out in § 14-86-1203.
  1. The provisions of this subchapter shall not be applicable to improvement districts which embrace lands situated within three (3) or more counties.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 8; 1937, No. 107, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1142.

Case Notes

Limitation of Actions.

Although the limitations of § 14-86-1208 would not apply to an improvement district, the identical provisions of § 14-86-1106 would. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

14-86-1203. Penalty — Damages.

    1. Any collector of taxes as designated in § 14-86-1205 who shall fail or refuse to make, certify, and file with the county tax collector the delinquent lists named in this section, within the time provided in this subchapter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined in the sum of ten dollars ($10.00).
    2. Each day intervening between the expiration of the time allowed the collector for filing the list and the actual filing of it shall constitute a separate offense and shall be punishable as provided in this section.
    1. The district may recover of and from the collector or his bondsmen, or both, any amount of damages it may sustain by reason of the failure or refusal of the collector to comply with the provisions of this subchapter. However, in no event shall any such district recover an amount exceeding the total amount of the taxes so delinquent, together with its costs expended.
    2. Any court of competent jurisdiction in the county shall have jurisdiction to fix the damages, if any, sustained by any district as set out in this section.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1137.

14-86-1204. Time when taxes delinquent.

In case of any district, as set out in § 14-86-1205 where no time is fixed at which the taxes therein become delinquent, if not paid, they shall become delinquent at the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date they become due and payable.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1136.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This specific statute, dealing with when special improvement taxes became delinquent, was applicable to a municipal water improvement district's foreclosure action against a taxpayer because the District never adopted the general taxes provision of § 26-36-201 by an ordinance; thus, a portion of the District's foreclosure action was time barred. Wilkins & Assocs. v. Vimy Ridge Mun. Water Improvement Dist. No. 139, 373 Ark. 580, 285 S.W.3d 193 (2008).

14-86-1205. Lists of delinquent realty.

    1. All taxes or assessments not delinquent but levied on the real property of this state in any road improvement district, fencing district, levee district, bridge district, drainage district, sewer district, street improvement district, sidewalk district, water district, light district, gas district, or any other district organized for the purpose of making any character of local improvements authorized by law, whether the district is situated within the corporate limits of a city or town, or otherwise, if not paid within the time provided for the payment thereof, shall be delinquent. The city collector, town collector, or any other person by whatever official title known, except the ex officio collector of the county where such property is situated, having in his custody or possession tax books for the purpose of collecting the taxes in any district, shall make out and file a list of all real property of the county becoming delinquent. This shall be done within sixty (60) days after any delinquency. This list shall be filed with the county tax collector of the county in which the property is situated, upon a form to be approved by the county tax collector.
    2. The ex officio collector of the county shall, in all respects, be subject to and shall comply with the provisions of this subchapter except that he shall file with the county tax collector the delinquent lists required by this subchapter within one hundred (100) days from the date the taxes become delinquent in his office.
  1. The list shall be preceded with a caption, which may be in substance, as follows:
  2. The list shall include:
    1. The name of the supposed owner as it appears on the tax books;
    2. A description of the property; and
    3. The amount of tax due thereon.
    1. On the list, the collector shall append his affidavit that it is true and correct.
    2. The affidavit shall also state the time the list became delinquent.
  3. The taxes shown delinquent by the list shall be designated as the delinquent taxes for the year in which they became payable.
  4. A separate list shall be made for each improvement district.
  5. On the margin of the lists, provisions shall be made for the extension of penalty and cost and for the redemption of the property.

“The lands, town lots, railroads, tramroads, bridges and other property returned delinquent in (stating the corporate name of the district) for the nonpayment of taxes due said district for the year 19 with the tax chargeable thereon, are contained and described in the following list:”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1135.

Case Notes

Cited: Martin v. Board of Comm'rs, 190 Ark. 747, 81 S.W.2d 414 (1935).

14-86-1206. Filing of lists.

  1. Upon the filing of any list as provided in § 14-86-1205, the county tax collector shall immediately add to the list the penalty and cost chargeable on each separate tract or parcel of ground, extending opposite thereof the total tax penalty and cost.
    1. At the foot of the list, the collector shall append a certificate, duly signed, showing the time of the filing of the list.
    2. The certificate shall be taken as conclusive evidence that the list was filed as stated therein.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1138.

14-86-1207. Redemption of land on delinquent list.

  1. Anyone desiring to redeem any of the delinquent lands, town lots, railroads, tramroads, bridges, or other property included in the list shall apply to the county tax collector.
  2. Upon the payment of the tax penalty and cost, the collector shall issue a redemption certificate in triplicate, a copy of which shall be furnished to the board of commissioners of the district and a copy to be retained by the collector, and he shall mark opposite the tract by whom redeemed and the date of the redemption.
  3. The collector shall immediately remit the amount of the tax and penalty so collected to the treasurer, or depository of the district, or other person authorized to receive it.
  4. For his services in filing the list and extending the tax, penalty, and cost thereon, and in issuing certificate of redemption, the collector shall be entitled to the sum of fifty cents (50¢) per tract, which shall be added at the time of the filing of the list and shall be charged as costs against the district and paid into the general revenue fund of the county, when collected, as other costs.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1139.

A.C.R.C. Notes. A proviso to this section provided that this section and § 14-86-1208 would apply to all property previously certified to the clerk of the chancery court pursuant to Act 534 of 1921 (§§ 14-86-1101, 14-86-1102, 14-86-1104—14-86-1106, 14-86-1208) and then remaining unredeemed.

14-86-1208. Suit for collection of taxes.

    1. When the board of improvement or anyone authorized by law to file suit for the collection of these delinquent taxes desires to commence a suit, they shall obtain a certified copy of the remaining delinquent property on the list from the county tax collector, which shall be filed with the complaint, within ten (10) days thereafter, and taken as part thereof.
    2. The collector making the list shall be entitled to ten cents (10¢) per tract payable in advance, which shall be taxed as costs in the suit.
    1. The chancery court of the county, by proper order entered in the case, may permit the collector to furnish the list to the board or may permit anyone authorized by law to file suit for the collection of the delinquent taxes, without requiring payment in advance.
    2. In this event, the collector's fees for making and certifying the list shall be taxed as costs in the case and become payable out of any fund collected from the delinquent property.
  1. No suit for the collection of the delinquent taxes shall be brought after three (3) years from the date the taxes become delinquent.

History. Acts 1925, No. 85, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1140.

Publisher's Notes. See “Publisher's Notes” to § 14-86-1207.

Cross References. Applicability of 1949 provisions, § 14-90-102.

Case Notes

Limitation of Actions.

Although the limitations of this section would not apply to an improvement district, the identical provisions of § 14-86-1106 would. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

Subchapter 13 — Delinquent Improvement Taxes and Assessments in Counties with a Population Exceeding 150,000

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 449, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Apr. 3, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and hereby declared that due to the fact that delinquent assessments exist against many tracts and parcels of land in the State where the assessment amounts to less than the Chancery Clerk's costs for certificate of redemption, which unduly penalizes the owners of property and frequently results in their failure to pay assessments or effect redemption, thus depriving various improvement districts of funds necessary for maintenance of the improvement constructed by the districts, that the want of funds for maintaining paving of paving districts is a hazard to the traveling public and the want of funds for maintaining sanitary sewers of sewer districts is detrimental to the public health, therefore, the immediate operation of this act is essential for the protection of the public health and safety. An emergency is therefore declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1975, No. 879, § 2: Apr. 4, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the present laws of the State, it is the responsibility of certain County Collectors to collect delinquent taxes and assessments of improvement districts and that the sum allowed as a fee for such collection is wholly inadequate and is putting an unjust burden on the counties doing such collection. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-86-1301. Applicability.

This subchapter shall only apply to counties having a population in excess of one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, according to the most recent federal census.

History. Acts 1941, No. 449, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1134.

14-86-1302. Construction.

The provisions of this subchapter shall not be construed to affect any other costs which may have been or may be assessed by the chancery court in an action filed therein for the collection of delinquent improvement district assessments.

History. Acts 1941, No. 449, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1133.

14-86-1303. Redemption of property.

  1. Any person, firm, or corporation having an interest in any property which has been certified by the county tax collector's office prior to the enactment of this section for delinquent assessments in any improvement district and which property has not been sold for the delinquent assessments prior to the enactment of this section may pay the assessments or redeem the property within the time and in the manner provided by law. However, one (1) receipt or certificate of redemption shall be issued to the person, firm, or corporation embracing all of the property in the improvement district on which assessments are then paid or redemption then made by the person, firm, or corporation, regardless of the number of calls describing the property or the number of years of delinquency.
    1. For the receipt or certificate of redemption, the collector shall be entitled to a fee equal to ten percent (10%) of the combined tax and penalty collected.
    2. On all delinquent improvement district property certified by the collector's office subsequent to the enactment of this section, the collector's cost for redemption shall be a fee equal to ten percent (10%) of the combined tax and penalty collected on each call or twenty-five cents (25¢) per call, whichever is greater.

History. Acts 1941, No. 449, § 2; 1975, No. 879, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1132.

Case Notes

Redemption Fee.

This section is not the exaction of a tax but instead deals with a redemption fee; it is a method of statutory reimbursement to the collector for the additional expense which a landowner causes by failing to pay his assessment on time. Keith v. Barrow-Hicks Extensions of Water Improv. Dist. No. 85, 275 Ark. 28, 626 S.W.2d 951 (1982).

A common sense interpretation of this section dictates that the collection of the delinquency fee be had from the delinquent landowner and not from the improvement district; it is clearly inequitable to require the other property owners in the districts who have paid their assessments on time to bear the costs of collecting from the delinquent owner, which is the result if the districts pay 10 percent of the combined assessment and penalty or fee to the collector. Keith v. Barrow-Hicks Extensions of Water Improv. Dist. No. 85, 275 Ark. 28, 626 S.W.2d 951 (1982).

14-86-1304. Fee for recording abolished.

The fee of the chancery clerk for filing and recording the delinquent lists of assessments of any improvement district certified to the chancery clerk's office by any person, board, or officer is abolished.

History. Acts 1941, No. 449, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1131.

Subchapter 14 — Notice to Sell Land for Nonpayment of Improvement District Assessment

Cross References. Applicability of 1949 provisions, § 14-90-102.

Levee and improvement districts, taxes, alternate procedure for extension, collection and payment, § 14-120-401 et seq.

14-86-1401. Purpose.

The purpose of this subchapter is to ensure that owners of land receive notice of the filing of suit to sell lands for nonpayment of improvement district assessments, in those instances in which the law requires the filing of such a suit, and notice of the sale of lands for nonpayment of improvement district assessments, in those instances in which the law does not require the filing of suit before such a sale.

History. Acts 1979, No. 628, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1157.

14-86-1402. Construction.

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to modify or limit the rights of landowners to redeem lands sold for nonpayment of improvement district assessments as previously provided by law.

History. Acts 1979, No. 628, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1157.

14-86-1403. Notice required.

At least twenty (20) days prior to selling or filing suit to sell any lands for nonpayment of improvement district assessments, the person charged with making the sale or filing the suit shall mail, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the owner of the lands at his last known address a notice:

  1. Describing the delinquent lands;
  2. Specifying the year of delinquency;
  3. Stating the amount necessary for redemption; and
  4. Advising the owner that he may redeem the lands at any time within twenty (20) days of the date the notice is mailed.

History. Acts 1979, No. 628, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1156; Acts 1991, No. 92, § 2.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where notices were given the landowner, whose property was being sold to satisfy a lien created by his failure to pay an improvement district assessment, by publication and by mail as required by § 14-90-1408 and this section, respectively, the notice given the landowner comported with due process. Fulmer v. Board of Comm'rs, 286 Ark. 419, 692 S.W.2d 246 (1985).

Rules of Procedure.

The notice provisions of ARCP 4 do not apply in an action by the board of commissioners to sell a landowner's property to satisfy a lien created by his failure to pay an improvement district assessment. Fulmer v. Board of Comm'rs, 286 Ark. 419, 692 S.W.2d 246 (1985).

14-86-1404. Costs of notice.

The costs of giving notice to owners shall be charged to the delinquent lands and collected either from the owners when the lands are redeemed or from the purchaser when the lands are sold.

History. Acts 1979, No. 628, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1158.

14-86-1405. Sale of lands.

  1. If the lands are not redeemed within twenty (20) days after the notice is mailed, the person charged with making the sale or filing the suit may sell the lands or file suit to sell the lands.
  2. If the notice is mailed to the owner prior to filing suit to sell the lands, it shall not be necessary to mail a second notice to the owner prior to the sale of the lands.

History. Acts 1979, No. 628, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1156.

Cross References. Redemption of real property to be sold for taxes, § 26-37-301 et seq.

Subchapter 15 — Right of Redemption of Delinquent Lands Sold in Improvement Districts

Cross References. Applicability of 1949 provisions, § 14-90-102.

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 43, § 2: approved Feb. 9, 1915. Emergency declared.

Acts 1925, No. 359, § 3: effective on passage.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

A Commentary on State and Improvement District Tax Sales, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 386.

14-86-1501. Right of purchaser to possession.

  1. In all sales made by commissioners under decrees of chancery courts for foreclosure of delinquent special assessments in drainage, levee, and bridge districts, improvement districts in cities and towns, and in all special assessment districts of every kind, the court may approve the sale subject to the right of redemption.
  2. Immediately upon approval, the purchaser shall have the right to possession of the lands and premises so sold and may have process therefor.
  3. The purchaser, while so in possession, shall not be accountable for rents upon redemption. However, the purchaser shall not dispose of nor injure the timber nor minerals nor fixtures upon the property until the expiration of the right of redemption and shall not recover in case of redemption for improvements upon the property.

History. Acts 1915, No. 43, § 1; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5642, 5643; Pope's Dig., §§ 7329, 7330; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1143.

Case Notes

In General.

This section was repealed by Acts 1933, No. 129, but the repealing act was held void. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935).

Quieting Title.

While this section gives improvement district right of possession and right to ask for writ of assistance, where it has not done so and original owner has not relinquished possession, transferee of quit claim deed of district has no possession on which to base action to quiet title. Calvert v. Haley, 218 Ark. 752, 238 S.W.2d 664 (1951).

14-86-1502. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning right of redemption generally, was repealed by Acts 1995, No. 801, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1915, No. 43, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 5644; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1144.

14-86-1503. Time for redemption in certain districts.

All persons shall have the right to redeem from the sale for taxes of road, drainage, levee, or other improvement districts at any time within two (2) years from the date when the lands are sold by the commissioner making the sale, and not thereafter.

History. Acts 1925, No. 359, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 13898; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1145.

Publisher's Notes. A proviso to this section provided that this section would not apply to property that was delinquent or forfeited prior to when it went into effect.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Though when drainage district was formed statute fixed at five years the time within which property may be redeemed from delinquent tax sale, subsequent reduction by the legislature of the redemption period was held not a violation of the contract clause of the Constitution. State Nat'l Bank v. Morthland, 196 Ark. 346, 118 S.W.2d 266 (1938).

In General.

This section constitutes a reasonable extension of the time for redemption. Harris v. Little Red River Levee Dist., 188 Ark. 975, 69 S.W.2d 877 (1934).

The legislature may enlarge the period of redemption or extend the time in which redemption may be effected at any time during the redemption period as fixed by a former statute where the sale has been to the improvement district and not to a private individual. Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to sales for delinquent assessments in municipal improvement districts. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Delinquent Lands, 189 Ark. 723, 75 S.W.2d 62 (1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935).

This section does not apply to municipal districts since the phrase “or other improvement districts” has reference to other improvement districts of the same kind as those specifically enumerated. Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

Bridge district, not a municipal improvement district, was of the class of improvement districts to which this section applies, and two years were, therefore, allowed from the date when lands were sold for nonpayment of the bridge assessments, in which to redeem. Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

Bar of Claims.

Where the statutory bar was complete under this section, a subsequent amendment of § 18-61-101 did not revive the claim since the rights of the parties had become vested under the statute before amendment. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

Payment of Taxes.

To redeem from drainage and levee taxes, a purchaser of the state's tax title must pay such improvement taxes accruing both before and after the state's tax title was acquired. Harris v. Little Red River Levee Dist., 188 Ark. 975, 69 S.W.2d 877 (1934).

Cited: Roberts v. Owen, 183 Ark. 6, 34 S.W.2d 752 (1931).

Subchapter 16 — Enforcement of Improvement District Tax Lien When Land Forfeited to State for General Taxes

Cross References. Applicability of 1949 provisions, § 14-90-102.

Effective Dates. Acts 1939, No. 126, § 2: approved Feb. 24, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that great quantities of land in improvement districts have been forfeited to the State and will be forfeited hereafter, and by reason of the inability of the local improvement districts to enforce the payment of their assessments or taxes while the title is in the State they are unable to perform their functions; drainage districts are unable to keep their ditches clean, resulting in the spread of diseases; road districts are unable to keep their roads in repair; bridge districts are unable to maintain their bridges in safe condition; levee districts are unable to keep their levees in a condition to resist flood water, so that immediate operation of this act is essential to the public health and safety, and an emergency is therefore declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 329, § 5: effective on passage.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Memorandum Relative to Certain Aspects of Tax Title, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 167.

A Commentary on State and Improvement District Tax Sales, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 386.

14-86-1601. Right of district to enforce.

Where any lands have been forfeited or sold to the state for the nonpayment of general taxes and any of the lands may be located in any improvement district of any kind or class, the district may, nevertheless, proceed as provided by law to enforce its lien for delinquent taxes or assessments, subject to the paramount lien of the state, without waiting until the lands are redeemed from or sold by the state.

History. Acts 1939, No. 329, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1146.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of prior delinquent tax sales, Acts 1939, No. 329, § 2.

Case Notes

District Taxes.

The right of an improvement district to enforce collection of special assessments is suspended while the title to the land is apparently in the state under a forfeiture for delinquent general taxes, and whether the sale to the state is valid or invalid is immaterial. Davidson v. Crockett, 200 Ark. 488, 140 S.W.2d 695 (1940).

Land sold to the state after confirmation of improvement district's purchase on foreclosure for previous taxes is not relieved of district taxes while owned by the state; only the right of enforcement is suspended until return to private ownership. Terry v. Drainage Dist. No. 6, Miller County, 206 Ark. 940, 178 S.W.2d 857 (1943).

Sale of Lands.

Where lands have forfeited for failure to pay betterments assessed them and there has been foreclosure and purchase by improvement district, public policy forbids a member of the board of commissioners to purchase such lands. Mitchell v. Parker, 201 Ark. 177, 143 S.W.2d 1114 (1940).

Superior Title.

This section is curative and retroactive, but while it confers the right on the improvement district tax purchaser to redeem from the state, it does not confer such right to redeem from one to whom the state has conveyed its title. Watson v. Anderson, 201 Ark. 809, 147 S.W.2d 28 (1941).

Purchaser of land from the state following forfeiture and sale for general taxes, prior to accrual of right of redemption under this section acquired superior title to that of purchaser from levee district following foreclosure of lien for levee taxes. Watson v. Anderson, 201 Ark. 809, 147 S.W.2d 28 (1941).

In suit by donee of land forfeited to the state and thereafter sold to drainage district under decree foreclosing its tax lien, even if foreclosure sale to district was void because the title to the land was then in the state, grantee of district, who had also acquired the title of the original owner, had right to intervene and defend suit brought against his tenant. Stow v. Burkes, 202 Ark. 1147, 155 S.W.2d 568 (1941).

Where sale to levee district on foreclosure of the district's lien was confirmed more than a year before the state's tax lien attached, but issuance of deed was delayed awaiting the expiration of the two-year period of redemption, during this period the district was the owner of the equitable title and this ownership was sufficient to prevent the lien of the state from attaching; therefore land was not subject to sale to the state for state and county taxes, and deed from state was without validity. Duncan v. Board of Dirs., 206 Ark. 1130, 178 S.W.2d 660 (1944).

Title derived from improvement district prevails over tax title from state where district institutes foreclosure proceedings prior to date on which tax lien is affixed. Terry v. Starks, 221 Ark. 870, 256 S.W.2d 545 (1953).

14-86-1602. Redemption from state.

  1. Where any lands have been foreclosed on by any improvement district for delinquent taxes or assessments due it and the title to any of the lands may have been or is in the state, the purchaser at any sale for the improvement district taxes shall have the right to redeem the land from the state.
  2. In case a receiver shall be appointed by the chancery court for any such lands being foreclosed on by a district, the receiver may, out of the first moneys coming into his hands from rentals, or a sale thereof, redeem the lands from the state.
  3. The purchaser or receiver shall have a lien thereon for the sums so paid the state.

History. Acts 1939, No. 329, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1147.

14-86-1603. Rights of purchaser.

Upon the expiration of the period allowed for redemption from foreclosure sales, the purchaser shall have the right to the possession of the lands without accountability for rents or damages until the state exercises its paramount authority.

History. Acts 1939, No. 126, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1148.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1939, No. 329, which was enacted at the same session of the General Assembly as this section is deemed to have superseded the former first part of this section, as it covers the same subject matter. See §§ 14-86-1601, 14-86-1602.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section is not retroactive or curative in its provisions. Davidson v. Crockett, 200 Ark. 488, 140 S.W.2d 695 (1940).

Title to Lands.

Title to lands claimed by a drainage district by purchase at a foreclosure sale presented a question of law as to whether commissioner's deeds to the district conveyed good title or whether the district's foreclosure for taxes and deeds were ineffective because of the sale of the land for delinquent state taxes. It was held that the question could only be settled by the decisions of the state court, and where such decisions had not fully settled the question, the federal district court ought not to have undertaken to decide the controversy over title to the land. Johnson v. Drainage Dist., 126 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1942).

Subchapter 17 — Refund of Money in Improvement District Land Sale Forfeiture upon Failure of Title

14-86-1701. Refund if sale set aside.

All improvement districts in this state are directed to make refunds of amounts received by a district for the purchase of lands acquired by it by foreclosure of the district's lien for taxes, or assessments levied by it upon lands located therein, when the title shall fail and the sale by which the district has acquired the lands is cancelled and set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.

History. Acts 1953, No. 38, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1149.

14-86-1702. Amount of refund.

No refund shall be made under this subchapter except the amount in excess of the sum legally due the district at the time of the purchase.

History. Acts 1953, No. 38, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1150.

14-86-1703. Value of items removed.

Any claimant for refund of purchase money shall be chargeable with the value of any timber, minerals, or other thing of value sold or removed from the land by the purchaser.

History. Acts 1953, No. 38, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1151.

Subchapter 18 — Bond of Depositories for Improvement Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1927, No. 182, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1979, No. 1001, § 3: Apr. 17, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the current requirement that depositories furnish bond for the entire amount of improvement district funds on deposit is obsolete and unnecessary in that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures a certain amount of said funds and that this Act is necessary to avoid duplicating the guaranty of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-86-1801. Penalty.

Any officer or commissioner of any improvement district of this state failing, refusing, or neglecting to comply with the provisions of this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction fined in any sum not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

History. Acts 1927, No. 182, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1111.

14-86-1802. Deposit requirements.

    1. All commissioners, treasurers, and other officers of all road, drainage, levee, bridge, street, sewer, paving, and all other improvement districts of this state, both rural and urban, having in their charge the moneys and funds of the districts, shall, before depositing them in any bank, trust company, savings association, or with any other person or company, require of the depository a good and sufficient bond signed by some surety company authorized to do business in the State of Arkansas, conditioned for the apt and full and complete payment of all funds so deposited, together with interest thereon.
    2. The commissioners may decrease the amount of the bond by an amount not to exceed the amount of funds deposited which are fully insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
  1. The depository may, in lieu of the bond, deposit United States bonds or notes of the State of Arkansas, or the bonds of any legally organized school, levee, drainage, or other improvement district of the State of Arkansas, which bonds and all proceedings concerning the issuing of them have been approved as collateral security by some reputable attorney who is recognized by the bond buyers of the United States as such. The bonds shall be deposited in escrow with some bank other than the depository of the funds of the district to be delivered to the district only on failure of the depository of the funds to repay the funds to the district or to pay them on the order of the district.
  2. The premium for the bond may be paid out of the funds so deposited or may be paid by the depository, it being intended that it shall be discretionary with the commissioners of the district in the matter of the payment of the premiums on the bonds.

History. Acts 1927, No. 182, § 1; 1979, No. 1001, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1110.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section should be strictly construed for the benefit of stockholders of the bank and the protection of depositors. Arkansas-Louisiana Hwy. Imp. Dist. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440, 6 S.W.2d 533 (1928); Arkansas County Rd. Imp. Dist. v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 293, 47 S.W.2d 27 (1932).

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to school districts. Merchants' & Planters' Bank v. McGehee Special School Dist., 179 Ark. 805, 18 S.W.2d 372 (1929). See also Merchants' & Planters' Bank v. Hammock, 178 Ark. 746, 12 S.W.2d 421 (1929).

Depository Bonds.

Depository bonds given by bank to street improvement district are statutory bonds. American Bonding Co. v. Board of Street Improv. Dist., 187 Ark. 300, 59 S.W.2d 605 (1933).

Depository bonds must be construed like other contracts, and if it can do so, court must ascertain intention of parties; the court may examine not only the bond itself but also the statute and all facts connected with the making of the bond. American Bonding Co. v. Board of Street Improv. Dist., 187 Ark. 300, 59 S.W.2d 605 (1933).

The statutory bond required of a depository covers all the moneys and funds of an improvement district which the depository has in its charge, including all funds deposited in the name of the district's collector. American Bonding Co. v. Board of Street Improv. Dist., 187 Ark. 300, 59 S.W.2d 605 (1933).

Failure to Comply.

Treasurer of levee district who had not complied with this section was not entitled to credit for a deposit lost in the failure of the bank. Jefferson Bank v. Little Red River Levee Dist., 186 Ark. 1048, 57 S.W.2d 805 (1933).

Pledges by Depositories.

This section does not authorize depository banks to pledge their assets other than the bonds and notes of the state mentioned. Arkansas-Louisiana Hwy. Imp. Dist. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440, 6 S.W.2d 533 (1928).

Bank may not pledge its bills receivable to secure deposits. Arkansas-Louisiana Hwy. Imp. Dist. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440, 6 S.W.2d 533 (1928).

This section does not authorize the pledge of school warrants. Arkansas County Rd. Imp. Dist. v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 293, 47 S.W.2d 27 (1932).

Subchapter 19 — Surplus Funds in Improvement Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1927, No. 122, § 5: Mar. 7, 1927.

14-86-1901. Disposition of surplus required.

Wherever any excess or surplus remains in any special district in this state created for road improvement, levee, bridge, or drainage construction after the improvement has been completed and all costs and expenses thereof, including all principal and interest of bonds issued, have been paid and the excess or surplus is not needed for the special improvement or for the maintenance thereof; wherever the special improvement district has been abandoned and an excess or surplus remains therein after the payment of all legal and preliminary costs and expenses thereof; or wherever any special taxing funds exist for the payment of outstanding bonds or refunding bonds or other legal purposes and all expenses and costs of the special taxing fund, including the principal and interest of all outstanding bonds, have been paid or a sum sufficient to care for all outstanding bonds or interest outstanding has been created and collected through taxation, or otherwise, and remains in a sinking fund to meet the interest and bonds as they mature, and in addition thereto an excess or surplus remains in the special fund and is not needed nor required to meet the interest and outstanding bonds or other legal cost or expense of the special taxing fund, in each and all of the special districts or special taxing funds, the excess or surplus so remaining as indicated in this section shall, by appropriate court orders, be passed to and become a part of the general revenue funds of the counties where the special districts or special taxing funds exist.

History. Acts 1927, No. 122, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1112.

14-86-1902. Distribution of funds to counties.

  1. Wherever any of the special districts or special taxing funds lie and exist wholly in one (1) county, then the county court shall have jurisdiction of the excess or surplus funds and may order them transferred to the general revenue fund of the county.
  2. Wherever the special taxing districts or special taxing funds lie in two (2) or more counties, then any chancellor in whose district any one (1) or more of the counties lie shall have jurisdiction of the excess or surplus so remaining and may, upon petition of any county judge or any taxpayer of any of the counties, order the excess and surplus so remaining to be paid and transferred to the treasurer of the respective counties in the proportion that the whole fund was contributed by the respective counties. The treasurers shall credit the funds so received to the general revenue funds of their respective counties.

History. Acts 1927, No. 122, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1113.

14-86-1903. Right to contest transfer.

  1. Any citizen or taxpayer shall have the right to contest the transfer of the excess or surplus so remaining by showing that it, or a part thereof, may be required to meet the legal costs, expenses, interest, or bonds of the special district or special taxing funds.
  2. Any part of the surplus or excess so remaining that is shown to be needed or required for such legal purposes shall not be transferred from the special district or special taxing funds.

History. Acts 1927, No. 122, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1114.

Publisher's Notes. As to ratification of prior transfers of surplus funds, see Acts 1927, No. 122, § 4.

Subchapter 20 — Audits in Nonmunicipal Improvement Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 910, § 6346(b): July 1, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that this act revises the duties of certain state entities; that this act establishes new departments of the state; that these revisions impact the expenses and operations of state government; and that the sections of this act other than the two uncodified sections of this act preceding the emergency clause titled ‘Funding and classification of cabinet-level department secretaries’ and ‘Transformation and Efficiencies Act transition team’ should become effective at the beginning of the fiscal year to allow for implementation of the new provisions at the beginning of the fiscal year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and Sections 1 through 6343 of this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on July 1, 2019”.

14-86-2001. Authority generally.

  1. Upon a petition signed by not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the owners of real property in any road, bridge, or other improvement district in this state outside of any incorporated city or town, the county judge of the county in which the district lies is authorized and empowered, and is directed within sixty (60) days after the filing of the petition, to enter into a contract with the Department of Finance and Administration.
  2. The department is empowered to make such a contract with the county judge for auditing all books, accounts, and transactions of the commissioners of a district and, insofar as they pertain to the district, the accounts of the collectors or any other persons who have handled any of funds of the district.
  3. If the services of the department cannot be obtained, the county judge is authorized and directed to employ some other competent certified public accountant to make such an audit.
  4. An audit shall begin with the formation of the district or the close of the last previous audit, as the petitioners desire, and close with a date specified in the petition.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 1.

14-86-2002. Districts in different counties.

In all cases where improvement districts may be composed of territory lying in two (2) or more counties, an audit shall be made upon an order of the county judge of each of the counties in which any portion of the territory of the district lies upon a petition signed by twenty-five percent (25%) of all owners of real property in the entire district.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 4.

14-86-2003. Scope of examination.

    1. The Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration or any auditors appointed by him or her shall have power to make a thorough examination into the affairs of a district specified in § 14-86-2001 when called upon by the county judge.
      1. The secretary shall have access to all records, books, accounts, papers, and documents concerning the district undergoing such an audit.
      2. The secretary is also authorized to:
        1. Examine, under oath, any officer, assistant, clerk, or other person touching the matters he or she may be authorized to inquire and examine; and
        2. Summon and, by attachment, compel the attendance of any person to testify, under oath, before him or her in relation to the affairs of the district.
  1. The failure or refusal of any person to appear before the secretary or to deliver to him or her any books, records, or other documents shall subject the person to a fine of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each day the person refuses or fails to comply with the request.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 2; 2019, No. 910, § 3379.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment substituted “Secretary” and “secretary” for “Director” and “director” throughout the section; and made stylistic changes.

14-86-2004. Reports of findings.

  1. A full and complete report of the findings of an audit under this subchapter, together with a synopsis of the indebtedness of the district, shall be filed in the office of the Department of Finance and Administration.
    1. A copy of the report of the findings of the audit shall be filed in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the audit is made and shall be there kept as a public document.
    2. If the district is composed of territory lying in two (2) or more counties, a copy of the report of the audit shall be filed in the office of the county clerk of all of the counties.
  2. A copy of the report of the findings of the audit shall also be delivered to the commissioners of the district.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 3.

14-86-2005. Payment of expenses generally.

  1. An itemized statement of the cost of an audit under this subchapter for each district shall be presented by the county judge to the commissioners of the district for which any audit has been made.
  2. It is the duty of the commissioners to allow this claim and pay it in like manner as other expenses of the district are paid.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 5.

14-86-2006. Payment by county.

In cases where an audit is ordered to be made in any district that has been abolished or in any district which has no funds with which to pay for the audit, the county judge may order such audits to be made at the expense of the county.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 6.

14-86-2007. Exception.

This subchapter shall not apply to Sebastian County.

History. Acts 1923, No. 605, § 6.

Subchapter 21 — Improvement Districts and Protection Districts Procedures when County Collector Used for Collection of Assessments

14-86-2101. Legislative intent.

This subchapter applies to all improvement districts or protection districts organized under Arkansas law that use the county collector for collection of improvement district assessments or protection district assessments unless otherwise noted.

History. Acts 2011, No. 210, § 1.

14-86-2102. Annual improvement district or protection district filing.

  1. By March 1 of each year or upon the creation of an improvement district or protection district, an improvement district or protection district that uses or intends to use the county collector for collection of improvement district assessments or protection district assessments shall:
      1. File an annual report with the county clerk in any county in which a portion of the improvement district or protection district is located.
      2. The annual report shall be available for inspection and copying by assessed landowners in the district.
      3. The county clerk shall not charge any costs or fees for filing the annual report.
      4. The improvement district or protection district shall deliver a filed copy of the annual report to the county collector within five (5) days of filing; and
    1. The annual report shall contain the following information as of December 31 of the current calendar year:
      1. Identification of the primary statute under which the improvement district or protection district was formed;
      2. A general statement of the purpose of the improvement district or protection district;
      3. A list of contracts, identity of the parties to the contracts, and obligations of the improvement district or protection district;
        1. Any indebtedness, including bonded indebtedness, and the reason for the indebtedness.
        2. The stated payout or maturity date of the indebtedness, if any, shall be included.
        3. The total existing delinquent assessments and the party responsible for the collection;
      4. Identification of the improvement district or protection district commissioners and contact information;
      5. The date, time, and location for any scheduled meeting of the improvement district or protection district for the following year;
      6. The contact information for the improvement district or protection district assessor;
      7. Information concerning to whom the county treasurer is to pay improvement district or protection district assessments;
      8. An explanation of the statutory penalties, interest, and costs;
      9. The method used to compute improvement district or protection district assessments; and
      10. A statement itemizing the income and expenditures of the improvement district or protection district, including a statement of fund and account activity for the improvement district or protection district.
    1. An improvement district or protection district that does not comply with subsection (a) of this section commits a violation punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each offense.
    2. A fine recovered under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be deposited into the county clerk's cost fund.
    1. On or before December 31, the improvement district or protection district shall file its list of special assessments for the following calendar year with the county clerk.
      1. After filing the list of special assessments, the improvement district or protection district shall deliver a copy of the filed list of special assessments to the preparer of the tax books.
      2. If the county collector is not the designated preparer of the tax books, the improvement district or protection district shall deliver a copy of the filed list of special assessments to the county collector.
    2. The list of special assessments shall contain:
      1. A list of each parcel with an assessment levied against it within the improvement district or protection district; and
      2. The contact information for the improvement district assessor or protection district assessor.
    3. The list of fees shall not include assessments on parcels that otherwise would not appear on the tax books for the following year.
    4. After the December 31 deadline to file the list of special assessments, the county collector may reject an assessment submitted by the improvement district or protection district for inclusion in the list of special assessments.

History. Acts 2011, No. 210, § 1.

14-86-2103. County treasurers — Retention of fees.

  1. A county treasurer may retain up to five percent (5%) of all remittances to a fire district in reserve for up to sixty (60) days.
  2. Upon approval of the governing body of a fire district, a county treasurer may retain up to ten percent (10%) of all remittances to a fire district in reserve until final settlement is made in December of each year.

History. Acts 2011, No. 210, § 1.

14-86-2104. Delinquent levies.

    1. A county collector may certify all delinquent levies to an improvement district or protection district for collection after January 1 of each year.
      1. A county collector shall accept a delinquent levy after certification to an improvement district or protection district if the payor is paying:
        1. In person; and
        2. By separate check from the payment of ad valorem taxes.
      2. The county collector shall forward the delinquent levy to the improvement district or protection district.
        1. The county collector is not required to provide a receipt for the payment of the delinquent levy.
        2. The payor is responsible for obtaining a receipt for payment of the delinquent levy from the improvement district or protection district.
  1. A county collector who continues to collect and remit delinquent levies to the improvement district or protection district after certification shall impose penalties against the payor on behalf of the improvement district or protection district.

History. Acts 2011, No. 210, § 1.

14-86-2105. District levies not to be certified for delinquency.

The county collector shall not certify an improvement district levy or protection district levy to the Commissioner of State Lands for delinquency.

History. Acts 2011, No. 210, § 1.

Subchapter 22 — Financial Requirements and Minimum Standards of Districts

14-86-2201. Definition.

  1. As used in this subchapter, “district” means any improvement district in Arkansas, including without limitation:
    1. Levee, drainage, road, irrigation, watershed, consolidated utility, and river improvement districts formed or operating under:
      1. Section 14-86-101 et seq.;
      2. Section 14-87-101 et seq.;
      3. Section 14-88-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 14-89-101 et seq.;
      5. Section 14-90-101 et seq.;
      6. Section 14-91-101 et seq.;
      7. Section 14-92-101 et seq.;
      8. The Property Owners' Improvement District Law, § 14-93-101 et seq.;
      9. The Municipal Property Owner's Improvement District Law, § 14-94-101 et seq.;
      10. Section 14-95-101 et seq.;
      11. Section 14-114-101 et seq.;
      12. The Interstate Watershed Cooperation Act, § 14-115-101 et seq.;
      13. The Arkansas Irrigation, Drainage, and Watershed Improvement District Act of 1949, § 14-117-101 et seq.;
      14. Section 14-118-101 et seq.;
      15. Section 14-119-101 et seq.;
      16. Section 14-120-101 et seq.;
      17. Section 14-121-101 et seq.;
      18. Section 14-122-101 et seq.;
      19. Section 14-123-201 et seq.;
      20. Section 14-124-101 et seq.;
      21. The Rural Development Authority Act, § 14-188-101 et seq.;
      22. The General Consolidated Public Utility System Improvement District Law, § 14-217-101 et seq., and serving less than thirty thousand (30,000) residents;
      23. Section 14-218-101 et seq.;
      24. Section 14-249-101 et seq.;
      25. Section 14-250-101 et seq.; and
      26. Section 14-251-101 et seq.; or
    2. Levee, drainage, road, irrigation, watershed, and river improvement districts created by a special act of the General Assembly.
  2. As used in this subchapter, “district” does not include levee, drainage, road, irrigation, watershed, consolidated utility, and river improvement districts formed or operating under:
    1. The Water Authority Act, § 4-35-101 et seq.;
    2. The Regional Water Distribution District Act, § 14-116-101 et seq.;
    3. The Conservation Districts Law, § 14-125-101 et seq.;
    4. Section 14-184-101 et seq.;
    5. Section 14-187-101 et seq.;
    6. The General Consolidated Public Utility System Improvement District Law, § 14-217-101 et seq., and serving more than thirty thousand (30,000) residents;
    7. Section 14-282-101 et seq.;
    8. Section 14-283-101 et seq.;
    9. Section 14-284-101 et seq.;
    10. Section 14-285-101 et seq.;
    11. Section 14-286-101 et seq.;
    12. Section 14-287-101 et seq.;
    13. Section 14-316-101 et seq.;
    14. Section 14-317-101 et seq.;
    15. Section 14-318-101 et seq.;
    16. Section 14-319-101 et seq.;
    17. Section 14-320-101 et seq.;
    18. Section 14-321-101 et seq.;
    19. Section 14-322-101 et seq.;
    20. Section 14-386-101 et seq.; or
    21. Section 14-387-101 et seq.

History. Acts 2019, No. 708, § 1.

14-86-2202. Record retention and public examination of records.

  1. A district covered under this subchapter shall retain all financial records, bank statements, and contracts relating to the bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness undertaken by the district during the existence of the district and for five (5) years following dissolution of the district.
  2. Any person who negligently violates any of the provisions of this subchapter is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor for each violation.
  3. Any person who purposely violates any of the provisions of this subchapter is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor for each violation.
  4. The Freedom of Information Act of 1967, § 25-19-101 et seq., applies to records retained under this subchapter.

History. Acts 2019, No. 708, § 1.

14-86-2203. Subsequent indebtedness.

    1. After the initial creation, bonding, and indebtedness of a district, but before subsequent bonds, notes, or indebtedness is incurred under the authority of this subchapter, a majority of the owners of record in the district, including no less than a majority of the total number of real property owners in the area affected if the majority of owners owns more than half of the acreage affected, shall be required to authorize the issuance of bonds or the incurring of notes or indebtedness by a vote called by the governing body of the district for that purpose.
    2. Subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not apply to:
      1. The Interstate Watershed Cooperation Act, § 14-115-101 et seq.;
      2. The Arkansas Irrigation, Drainage, and Watershed Improvement District Act of 1949, § 14-117-101 et seq.;
      3. Section 14-118-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 14-120-101 et seq.;
      5. Section 14-121-101 et seq.;
      6. Section 14-122-101 et seq.;
      7. Section 14-123-201 et seq.;
      8. Section 14-124-101 et seq.; or
      9. A district seeking an increase in fees, taxes, or assessments without the issuance of bonds, liens, or other indebtedness.
  1. The governing body shall not require a vote if:
    1. The indebtedness is necessary to fulfill directives of a regulatory governmental agency;
    2. The district has one thousand (1,000) or more owners of record;
    3. The bonds, notes, or indebtedness does not include the assessed property as specific collateral for the bonds, notes, or indebtedness; or
    4. The indebtedness is incurred for the refunding of outstanding bonds, notes, or indebtedness of the district for the purpose of reducing debt service and creating economic savings.
  2. Before incurring the indebtedness, the secretary or other administrative officer of the governing body shall:
    1. Give notice of the required action and improvement by publication one (1) time per week for two (2) weeks in a newspaper published and having a general circulation in the county; and
    2. Transmit a copy of the notice by certified mail to each owner of real property within the boundaries of the district.

History. Acts 2019, No. 708, § 1.

14-86-2204. Nominal assessments.

    1. All lands shall be assessed as to value and taxed within the boundaries of the district, and no exclusions or nominal assessments apply except under subsection (b) of this section.
    2. Subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not apply to:
      1. The Interstate Watershed Cooperation Act, § 14-115-101 et seq.;
      2. The Arkansas Irrigation, Drainage, and Watershed Improvement District Act of 1949, § 14-117-101 et seq.;
      3. Section 14-118-101 et seq.;
      4. Section 14-120-101 et seq.;
      5. Section 14-121-101 et seq.;
      6. Section 14-122-101 et seq.;
      7. Section 14-123-201 et seq.;
      8. Section 14-124-101 et seq.; or
      9. A district seeking an increase in fees, taxes, or assessments without the issuance of bonds, liens, or other indebtedness.
  1. At its option, any state agency or commission may choose to be excluded from any newly formed district.

History. Acts 2019, No. 708, § 1.

14-86-2205. Minimum standards for water and sewer improvements made by districts — Rules.

  1. The Department of Health shall promulgate rules that establish minimum standards for water and sewer improvements made by districts under this subchapter.
    1. The department shall promulgate rules necessary to implement this section.
      1. When adopting the initial rules to implement this section, the final rule shall be filed with the Secretary of State for adoption under § 25-15-204(f):
        1. On or before January 1, 2020; or
        2. If approval under § 10-3-309 has not occurred by January 1, 2020, as soon as practicable after approval under § 10-3-309.
      2. The department shall file the proposed rule with the Legislative Council under § 10-3-309(c) sufficiently in advance of January 1, 2020, so that the Legislative Council may consider the rule for approval before January 1, 2020.

History. Acts 2019, No. 708, § 1.

Chapter 87 Reorganization or Consolidation of Improvement Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 10: approved Mar. 18, 1927. Emergency clause provided: “It being necessary, therefore for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Right of one governmental subdivision to challenge annexation proceedings by another such subdivision. 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

14-87-101. Purpose.

This chapter is not intended to repeal or modify any existing law but to furnish other and better methods than those existing for refunding the indebtedness of any reorganizing improvement districts.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 10; Pope's Dig., § 11331; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1010.

14-87-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Taxing district” means any road, drainage, levee, or other local improvement district in which proceedings for the refunding of the indebtedness or the reorganization of the district are instituted;
  2. “Subsidiary district” means any local improvement district whose indebtedness, or a part thereof, is assumed or absorbed by a taxing district;
  3. “Original district” means any local improvement district, all or a part of whose territory is embraced in a subsidiary district, or a part of whose indebtedness is being assumed by a taxing district.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 11322; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1001.

14-87-103. Jurisdiction over proceedings.

  1. The proceedings prescribed by any special or general law for the refunding of any improvement district bonds or the reorganization of any improvement district may be begun and had in the chancery court of the proper county the same as in any county or circuit court provided by law under which the district was originally created.
  2. Chancery courts are given complete jurisdiction to hear and determine these matters.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 11328; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1007.

14-87-104. Records and transcripts.

  1. Where an improvement district is located in more than one (1) county, records of the proceedings shall be made in each of the counties whose lands are embraced in the district.
  2. Transcript of records imposing liens on any lands properly certified shall be recorded in the proper records of mortgage in the county where the land affected is located.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 11329; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1008.

14-87-105. Implementation and expenses.

  1. The court in which the proceedings prescribed in this chapter are had shall provide such facilities and instrumentalities for effecting the purposes of the district as may be deemed advisable.
  2. The necessary expenses shall be determined by the court and shall be borne by the taxing district involved.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 11330; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1009.

14-87-106. Reorganization of districts.

    1. Proceedings instituted under any general or special law for refunding the indebtedness of any improvement district may include the reorganization of the governing body of the district.
    2. The reorganization shall be effected by the same court or board as is given the authority and jurisdiction under the law to provide for the refunding of the bonds of the district.
    1. The membership of the governing body may be reduced or increased as may be deemed advisable.
      1. Pending the election of any additional members, if the law creating the district prescribes that they be elected, additional members shall be appointed by the court or board where the proceedings are had and shall be made in compliance with the petition of the petitioners prosecuting the proceedings.
      2. It is mandatory upon any court or board to appoint the additional members named in any petition of fifty-one percent (51%) or more of the owners in assessed value of the real estate of the district.
  1. Any reorganized board shall have the same power, be given the same rights, have imposed upon it the same duties, and be selected in the same manner as was the old board.
  2. The reorganization of the district may include:
    1. The change of the name of the district;
    2. The method of collecting taxes;
    3. The keeping of records;
    4. The handling of funds of the district; and
    5. The doing of anything that would not operate to impair the outstanding obligations of the district.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 11323; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1002.

14-87-107. Consolidation of districts.

  1. Where lands of a road, levee, drainage, or other local improvement district are included, in whole or in part, in another district whose indebtedness is being refunded, the first district may become a subsidiary district of the second or taxing district insofar as related to those lands of the first district which may be embraced or included in the second district.
  2. Consolidation may be effected at the same time, in the same manner, and in the same proceeding as is the refunding of the indebtedness of the taxing district.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 11324; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1003.

14-87-108. Refunding bonds of consolidated district.

  1. Where a subsidiary district is established as provided in § 14-87-107, the indebtedness of the subsidiary district may be refunded in the same manner as is provided for the refunding of the indebtedness of the taxing districts.
  2. The governing body of the taxing district may take up all or a part of the indebtedness of the subsidiary district, including such annual maturities of principal or interest as may be allotable to the lands of the subsidiary district included in the taxing district.
  3. In order to enable the taxing district to pay such indebtedness, it may issue and sell the refunding bonds or certificates of indebtedness either of the taxing or subsidiary district.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 11325; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1004.

14-87-109. Allocation and assumption of debt.

  1. Such part of the indebtedness, principal or interest, of the original district growing out of the cost of the local improvement as has been allocated, or may be allocable, to the lands of the subsidiary district, or may, from time to time, be so allocable to and chargeable against the lands of the subsidiary district in the way of special improvement taxes, may be assumed and paid by the taxing district from a fund produced by the sale of its bonds or certificates of indebtedness.
  2. In the assumption of the debts of the subsidiary district, the taxing district shall be subrogated with respect to liens, pledges, and such other provisions relating to securities for the debt assumed as belonged to the original district of which the subsidiary district was a part.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 11326; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1005.

14-87-110. Payment of overdue taxes.

  1. On such terms as is deemed advisable and as may meet the approval of the board or court before which the proceedings are had, the taxing district may assume and pay any overdue special improvement taxes of any lands embraced in the subsidiary district from the fund produced by the sale of certificates of indebtedness or of refunding bonds of the taxing district.
  2. The taxes so paid, including penalties, cost of redemption, or any other necessary cost incurred, must be allocated to each tract of land properly chargeable with it, and proper proceedings must be had by which the taxing district may be given sufficient lien or may become subrogated to all rights of existing lienors or pledgees to the end that the taxing district may have a first lien on the lands whose obligation it has assumed for all special taxes paid by it.

History. Acts 1927, No. 162, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 11327; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-1006.

Chapter 88 Municipal Improvement Districts Generally

Research References

Am. Jur. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adv. Poss., § 270.

C.J.S. 87 C.J.S., Towns., § 36.

Case Notes

In General.

The municipal improvement district statutes were not repealed or abrogated by § 14-235-201 et seq., the sewer revenue bond statute, since the statutes do not cover the same field and are not repugnant. Ray v. City of Mt. Home, 228 Ark. 885, 311 S.W.2d 163 (1958).

Improvement districts are agents of the state and derive their limited powers and duties of a public and governmental nature by legislative delegation through the taxing power of the state, and constitute a separate and distinct species of taxing districts as contradistinguished from counties, municipal corporations and school districts. Quapaw Cent. Bus. Imp. Dist. v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 315 Ark. 703, 870 S.W.2d 390 (1994).

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

14-88-101. Enforcing duty to perform.

Any duty required to be performed by this act may, at any time, be enforced by mandamus at the suit of any person or board interested in it.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 26, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5742; Pope's Dig., § 7383; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-131.

Publisher's Notes. As to applicability of statutory provisions pertaining to municipal improvement districts before and since July 1, 1952, see §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

Pursuant to this section, the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a petition for a writ of mandamus where the property owner was challenging the city's decision on whether to create an improvement district. City of N. Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 2017 Ark. 113, 515 S.W.3d 593 (2017).

Subchapter 2 — Creation of Districts

Cross References. Levy of tax and issuance of bonds for preliminary expenses, § 14-86-701 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1929, No. 26 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, There are improvement districts in cities and towns in this State, organized on petition of what was supposed to be a majority of the property owners of the district, and which have made or begun this improvement for which they were organized, but whose organization was void, and the majority of whose owners desire to pay the honest debt incurred by the district for the improvement which they enjoy; and

“Whereas, the same is likely to occur in the future….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 9: approved Mar. 3, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1923 (1st. Ex. Sess.), No. 20, § 3: approved Oct. 13, 1923. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 145, § 8: approved Mar. 20, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the fact that heretofore it has been necessary to obtain the consent of only a bare majority in value of the owners of real property in order to organize a local improvement district, the organization of such districts all over the State of Arkansas has been in the past greatly abused, advantage has been taken of the owners of property therein and burdensome taxes have been laid upon property owners without any actual increase in property values as compensation therefor, many of such districts having been organized for promotion purposes; that many property owners throughout the State are in danger of losing their said property by reason of their inability to pay the said local improvement taxes; and that unless legislation is immediately enacted making it necessary to obtain the consent of more than a majority in value of said property owners the practice of organizing such districts and the abuse thereof will be continued, all to the serious detriment and injury of owners of property. It is, therefore, found and declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1938 (Ex. Sess.), No. 22, § 2: approved Apr. 1, 1938. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that the passage of this act is essential in the making of public improvements throughout the State of Arkansas by which grade crossings may be eliminated and the overflow of public highways may be prevented, and highways may be made safer in other ways and that therefore there is an urgent need that this act go into immediate operation, and that its immediate operation is essential to the public safety. An emergency is therefore declared, and it is hereby provided that it shall take effect and be in force immediately upon its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 310, § 3: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that the passage of this act is essential in the making of public improvements throughout the State of Arkansas by which grade crossings may be eliminated and the overflow of public highways may be prevented, and highways may be made safer in other ways and that therefore there is an urgent need that this Act go into immediate operation, and that its immediate operation is essential to the public safety. An emergency is therefore declared, and it is hereby provided that it shall take effect and be in force immediately upon its passage.”

Acts 1967, No. 163, § 7: Feb. 28, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly that in many cities and towns in the State of Arkansas the streets and highways are subject to heavy traffic by motor vehicles, that on account of parking motor vehicles in the streets and the lack of facilities for off-street parking of motor vehicles, vehicular traffic in the said streets and highways is made dangerous to drivers and to pedestrians, and that on account thereof the streets and highways are made hazardous to the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas; that it is necessary in order to protect the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas to provide adequate facilities for the off-street parking of motor vehicles and that only by the passage of this Act and giving it immediate effect can the lives and property of the residents of the State of Arkansas be protected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1968 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 3: May 29, 1968. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared by the General Assembly that numerous local improvements, to be effected by municipal improvement districts in this State, will be in need of maintenance and repair and that only by the immediate operation of this Act may this necessary maintenance and repair be carried out. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 290, § 7: Mar. 21, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared by the General Assembly that the laws governing the organization of municipal improvement districts previously required the petition of a majority in value of the property owners in the affected territory, that this requirement was later increased to two-thirds in value, and that the requirements of existing laws obstruct the organization of many municipal improvement districts which would otherwise be organized for the construction or acquisition of improvements essential to the health and welfare of the inhabitants of this State. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

14-88-201. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of § 14-88-202 shall extend to any municipal improvement district formed or created.
  2. The formation and creation of these districts is authorized, in whole or in part, outside of any city of the first or second class or incorporated town.

History. Acts 1941, No. 310, § 1A; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-102.

Publisher's Notes. As to applicability of statutory provisions pertaining to municipal improvement districts before and since July 1, 1952, see §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

A proviso to this section provided for the extension of municipal improvement districts to include certain Works Progress Administration (W.P.A.) projects.

Case Notes

“Any Improvement District.”

In action challenging validity of sewer improvement district on ground that district embraced lands lying within and outside city, fact that emergency clause of this section permitting establishment of districts outside of city limits mentioned only necessity of improvement of grade crossing did not mean that other items in the statute were omitted or had been deleted; therefore words “any improvement district” apply to sewer districts, and establishment of sewer improvement districts was valid. Smart v. Gates, 234 Ark. 858, 355 S.W.2d 184 (1962).

Outside City Limits.

As legislature is vested with all powers not prohibited by the Arkansas Constitution and the Constitution requires only that assessments be ad valorem, uniform, and with consent of a majority in value of the affected property holders, the legislature could authorize municipality to tax lands lying outside city limits by assessment of benefits on the lands in sewer improvement district. Smart v. Gates, 234 Ark. 858, 355 S.W.2d 184 (1962).

14-88-202. Purposes for which created.

The council of any city of the first or second class or any incorporated town may assess all real property within the city or town, or within any district thereof, for the purpose of opening, grading, or otherwise improving streets and alleys, including viaducts and underpasses either within the boundaries of an improvement district, or beyond the boundaries and beyond the limits of the city or town if the property in the district will be benefited thereby, including the acquisition of rights-of-way by purchase or the exercise of the power of eminent domain as provided in § 14-91-104 and the payment of damages for the taking or injuring of property resulting from the making of any such improvement, if the work or construction is done or paid for by the federal government or any of its agencies or by the State of Arkansas or any other public body, or to pay for any local improvement of a public nature, including sewer systems, theretofore made, by which the property within the district has benefited; for the purpose of paying the principal of and interest on any bonds at any time authorized and issued by any district under and in the manner and for the purposes specified in this section; for the purpose of buying existing sewer systems, or the construction of sewers, or constructing facilities for the off-street parking of vehicles, including without limitation constructing, reconstructing, widening, extending, and maintaining and operating off-street parking facilities, or constructing sidewalks, sidewalk overhead covers, benches, recreational areas, and other facilities pertaining to the construction, maintenance, and utilization thereof; for the purpose of the making of any other local improvement of a public nature in the manner set forth in this subchapter; and for the purpose of maintaining, repairing, and operating any improvements.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 1, p. 161; 1889, No. 18, § 1, p. 17; C. & M. Dig., § 5647; Acts 1927, No. 68, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7279; Acts 1938 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 22, § 1; 1941, No. 310, § 1; 1967, No. 163, § 1; 1968 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 4, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-101; Acts 2013, No. 563, § 1.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment inserted “including without limitation constructing, reconstructing, widening, extending, and maintaining and operating off-street parking facilities” and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section giving the city council authority to assess for local improvements is constitutional. City of Little Rock v. Board of Improvs., 42 Ark. 152 (1883).

Assessments.

—In General.

Special assessments for local improvements can be made only on account of peculiar benefits which the improvements bestow upon the property assessed. Rector v. Board of Improv., 50 Ark. 116, 6 S.W. 519 (1887); Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908); Board of Imp. v. Pollard, 98 Ark. 543, 136 S.W. 957 (1911).

The theory upon which improvement district taxes are sustained is that the proposed improvements will enhance the value of the land sought to be taxed, and the tax is imposed upon this enhanced value, called betterment. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

—Improvements Allowed.

Property may be assessed to construct waterworks or electric light plants. Crane v. City of Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S.W. 955 (1899); Wilson v. Blanks, 95 Ark. 496, 130 S.W. 517 (1910); Bank of Commerce v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).

Property may be assessed to construct a city park. Matthews v. Kimball, 70 Ark. 451, 66 S.W. 651 (1902).

Property may be assessed to construct a city wharf. Solomon v. Wharf Imp. Dist., 145 Ark. 126, 223 S.W. 385 (1920).

An ordinance creating a paving district, providing for repairing a certain street and for drainage when necessary “and all other work necessary and incidental to said paving and drainage” did not authorize any work not necessary and incident to the main purpose of repaving and was not uncertain. Kempner v. Sanders, 155 Ark. 321, 244 S.W. 356 (1922).

Betterments for sewerage purposes may be assessed against vacant property where, if and when desired, the sewerage connections may be made. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

—Improvements Not Allowed.

A municipal corporation was without power to organize an improvement district in a city for the purpose of opening, establishing, and creating an alley through property when no alley had ever been opened, dedicated, or provided for. Lewis v. Rieff, 114 Ark. 366, 169 S.W. 1184 (1914). (Decision prior to 1927 amendment.).

Property may not be assessed to construct an auditorium. Lipscomb v. Lenon, 169 Ark. 610, 276 S.W. 367 (1925); Board of Imp. v. Moore, 171 Ark. 839, 286 S.W. 964 (1926).

Improvement Districts.

The entire city may be included in an improvement district. Crane v. City of Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S.W. 955 (1899); Matthews v. Kimball, 70 Ark. 451, 66 S.W. 651 (1902); Wilson v. Blanks, 95 Ark. 496, 130 S.W. 517 (1910); Bank of Commerce v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).

One district may be created to make two different kinds of improvements. Wilson v. Blanks, 95 Ark. 496, 130 S.W. 517 (1910); Bateman v. Board of Comm'rs, 102 Ark. 306, 143 S.W. 1062 (1912).

Two distinct districts, coterminous in extent, may be organized, one for grading and paving and the other for curbing, guttering, and storm sewering the same streets. Bottrell v. Hollipeter, 135 Ark. 315, 204 S.W. 843 (1918).

Remedies.

The remedy of landowners for the taking, appropriation, or damage to private property for use of the public would be an action at law; but where the complaint alleges that a sewer system as maintained by the defendants constitutes a nuisance and the answer denies such allegation, the issue is properly triable in equity. Sewerage Dist. v. Black, 141 Ark. 550, 217 S.W. 813 (1920).

Cited: McDonnell v. Improvement Dist., 97 Ark. 334, 133 S.W. 1126 (1911).

14-88-203. Petition and notice.

      1. When persons claiming to be a majority in value, as shown by the last county assessment of the owners of real property, in the whole or any part, of any city or incorporated town, file with the city or town clerk or recorder a petition for the organization of an improvement district for any purposes authorized by § 14-88-202, it shall be the duty of the city or town clerk or recorder to give notice that the petition will be heard at a meeting of the governing body of the city or town named in the notice, which will be held more than thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition.
      2. A petition under this section shall contain a bold heading stating that a signature on the petition is a vote to create the district.
    1. The notice shall be published one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks, the last insertion to be not less than seven (7) days before the date fixed for the hearing, in a newspaper having a general circulation in the county and, if available, on the website of the county or of the Secretary of State.
  1. The mayor, if he sees fit, may call a special meeting of the governing body for the purpose of hearing the petition. The called meeting shall be held not less than fifteen (15) days after the date of the call, and the notice of the hearing thereat shall be published for the time and in the manner prescribed in subdivision (a)(2) of this section.
  2. The notice may be in the following form:
  3. The petition may limit the cost of the improvement either to a fixed sum or to a percentage of the assessed value of the real property in the district.

“All owners of real property within the following described territory (here describe the territory to be included in the district) in the City (or Town) of , are hereby notified that a petition has been filed with the City Clerk (or Town Recorder) of the said City (or Town) of , purporting to be signed by a majority in value of the owners of real property within said territory, which petition prays that a local improvement district be formed embracing said territory for the purpose of (here describe purpose and name of the streets to be improved, if any) , and that the cost thereof be assessed and charged upon the real property above described. All owners of real property within said territory are advised that said petition will be heard at the meeting of the (governing body) to be held at the hour of p.m., on the day of , 20 , and that at said meeting said (governing body) will determine whether those signing the same constitute a majority in value of such owners of real property; and at said meeting all owners of real property within said territory who desire will be heard upon the question. City Clerk (or Town Recorder)”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 2; 1935, No. 145, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7281; Acts 1967, No. 163, § 2; 1969, No. 290, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-104; Acts 2019, No. 1025, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Notice provisions are required on every petition for the establishment of improvement districts of whatever nature. See § 14-86-201.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 19, provided that this section did not apply in any case where a first petition had been filed for the organization of a district under the statutes existing at the time of passage of this section.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a)(1)(A) designation; substituted “thirty (30) days” for “fifteen (15) days” in (a)(1)(A); added (a)(1)(B); in (a)(2), substituted “one (1) time a week” for “once a week” and added “in a newspaper having a general circulation in the county and, if available, on the website of the county or of the Secretary of State”.

Case Notes

In General.

The petition, the notice, and the ordinance relative to an improvement district must be in harmony. American State Bank v. Street Imp. Dist., 197 Ark. 986, 125 S.W.2d 796 (1939).

Notice.

The giving of the notice of hearing was jurisdictional. Voss v. Reyburn, 104 Ark. 298, 148 S.W. 510 (1912); Pope v. City of Nashville, 131 Ark. 429, 199 S.W. 101 (1917); Bennett v. Kelley, 179 Ark. 530, 16 S.W.2d 992 (1929) (decisions under prior law).

A notice of hearing on a petition signed by the mayor and attested by the city clerk was sufficient. Selz v. Paving Dist., 173 Ark. 245, 292 S.W. 133 (1927) (decision under prior law).

A suit contesting the validity of the organization and assessment of benefits in a municipal improvement district was too late where the suit had not been brought within 30 days after the ordinance creating the district and after the publication of the assessment. Yates v. Phillips, 180 Ark. 709, 22 S.W.2d 559 (1929) (decision under prior law).

In absence of publication in substantial compliance with statutory requirements, a town council is powerless to proceed with formation of street improvement district. American State Bank v. Street Imp. Dist., 197 Ark. 986, 125 S.W.2d 796 (1939).

Omission of seven words in the description of property in the published notice of hearing for the creation of an improvement district was not sufficiently material to invalidate the notice. Linder v. Street Improv. Dist., 224 Ark. 457, 274 S.W.2d 470 (1955).

Petitions.

—In General.

A city council had jurisdiction to lay off a street improvement district only as designated by the property owners in the first petition, and the council must have conformed strictly to the authority conferred upon it. Smith v. Improvement Dist. No. 14, 108 Ark. 141, 156 S.W. 455 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Names may have been removed from petition for fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and duress, but not for a change of opinion as to how burdensome the improvement might have been. Echols v. Trice, 130 Ark. 97, 196 S.W. 801 (1917); Pope v. City of Nashville, 131 Ark. 429, 199 S.W. 101 (1917); Lipscomb v. Blanz, 163 Ark. 1, 258 S.W. 624 (1924) (decisions under prior law).

The petition for the formation of an improvement district is jurisdictional, and the discretion of the board of commissioners is limited to carrying out the purposes of the petition. Ahern v. Paving Imp. Dist., 181 Ark. 1020, 29 S.W.2d 265 (1930) (decision under prior law).

—Content.

The extent and character of an improvement as expressed in the municipal ordinance must substantially have complied with the petition of the property owners upon which it was based. Kraft v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 269, 146 S.W. 505 (1912) (decision under prior law).

In construing a petition filed by property owners asking that the improvement be made, it was held that the petitioners meant the same as a request for the assessment of the improvement against the real property in the district, although such a request was not made in so many words. Mustin v. Brain, 135 Ark. 98, 204 S.W. 621 (1918) (decision under prior law).

—Descriptions.

The petition may describe the character of the improvement only in general terms, or expressly leave with the commissioners the decision as to what kind of materials should be used. McDonnell v. Improvement Dist., 97 Ark. 334, 133 S.W. 1126 (1911)Questioned byTappan v. Helena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Petitions should accurately describe the territory. Bell v. Phillips, 116 Ark. 167, 172 S.W. 864 (1915); Henry v. Board of Imp., 170 Ark. 673, 280 S.W. 987 (1926) (decisions under prior law).

The petition for the formation of an improvement district would be insufficient where it does not contain any description of the boundaries of the proposed district and where it cannot be ascertained from the petition what territory is included in the proposed district. Bell v. Phillips, 116 Ark. 167, 172 S.W. 864 (1915) (decision under prior law).

The map or plans and specification or estimate of costs must have been regarded as part of the petition for organization of a road district for the purpose of determining whether a proposed improvement was certainly and definitely described. Tarvin v. Road Improv. Dist., 137 Ark. 354, 209 S.W. 81 (1919) (decision under prior law).

A petition for the organization of an improvement district in a city or town need have stated the nature of the improvement only in general terms, and therefore a petition describing the improvement as macadamizing, grading, graveling, paving, curbing, or guttering the streets mentioned was sufficient. Baird v. Street Paving Imp. Dist., 148 Ark. 246, 229 S.W. 712 (1921) (decision under prior law).

The preliminary petition for a street paving district sufficiently described the improvement as “repaving with asphaltic surface and otherwise improving the street”, the words “and otherwise improving” referring to such work as was incident and essential to making the repavement a successful and complete improvement, it being enough to describe the improvement in general terms while leaving the details and plans to be worked out by the board of improvement after the district was established. Kempner v. Sanders, 155 Ark. 321, 244 S.W. 356 (1922) (decision under prior law).

One who signed a petition for the improvement of certain streets had no right to rely upon the assurance of the city council that an adjoining street, not described in the petition, would also be improved. Ahern v. Paving Imp. Dist., 181 Ark. 1020, 29 S.W.2d 265 (1930) (decision under prior law).

By specifying in the petition for a paving district the kind of material and manner of paving, the property owners may have restricted the powers of the commissioners. Thacker v. Paving Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 368, 31 S.W.2d 758 (1930) (decision under prior law).

Where ordinance was in the language of the petition and erroneous description in one of two publications extended the proposed improvement one block, but boundaries of the district for betterment assessments were not affected, there was no ground for invalidation of street improvement district. American State Bank v. Street Imp. Dist., 197 Ark. 986, 125 S.W.2d 796 (1939).

—Form.

No particular form of the petition is prescribed, and in determining whether the property owners' petition is valid, the court will look to the petition, not to find a formal prayer, but to ascertain whether the effect of the petition is to express the consent of the majority of the property owners. Mustin v. Brain, 135 Ark. 98, 204 S.W. 621 (1918) (decision under prior law).

—Majority in Value.

The power of the city council to make an assessment upon real property depends upon the assent of a majority in value of the property holders owning property adjoining the locality to be affected; this fact is jurisdictional, and the want of it makes a local assessment by a city council void. Rector v. Board of Improv., 50 Ark. 116, 6 S.W. 519 (1887) (decision under prior law).

A complaint was insufficient in failing to allege that the signatures procured by fraud were sufficiently numerous to reduce the number of the remainder of the signers to less than a majority. Boles v. Kelley, 90 Ark. 29, 117 S.W. 1073 (1909) (decision under prior law).

A special improvement district within a city declared on direct attack to be void ab initio for failure of a majority of the taxpayers to sign the petition for the improvement was held not to be a de facto district, and all obligations entered into by it were nullities. Davis v. Lawson, 168 Ark. 1143, 272 S.W. 646 (1925) (decision under prior law).

In a suit by taxpayers attacking the validity of the organization of an improvement district where the record had shown the filing of the first and second petitions and a finding of the city council that the second petition contained a majority in value of the taxpayers of the district, in the absence of a contrary showing, it would have been presumed that the district was legally established. Williams v. Serer Improv. Dist., 180 Ark. 510, 22 S.W.2d 405 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Taxpayers were precluded from questioning the correctness of a finding of the city council that a majority in value of the owners of real property in the district had signed the petition for the improvement, where the suit was not brought within 30 days of the finding. Williams v. Serer Improv. Dist., 180 Ark. 510, 22 S.W.2d 405 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Property owners alleging that petition for organization of improvement district was not signed by required majority of property owners have burden to show that fact, and finding of council that it was signed by required majority is prima facie correct. High v. Bailey, 203 Ark. 461, 157 S.W.2d 203 (1941).

Where consent for establishment of district was secured by petition signed by owners of two-thirds (now majority) in value of realty within district, no election was necessary to obtain consent to be taxed for such purpose. Ray v. City of Mt. Home, 228 Ark. 885, 311 S.W.2d 163 (1958) (decision prior to 1969 amendment).

The question whether there is a majority of signers is not determined as of the time the petition was signed, but is determined as of the time the city's governing body acts upon the petition. Appleby Rd. St. Imp. Dist. v. Powell, 282 Ark. 398, 669 S.W.2d 3 (1984).

Where, at the time the board acted in the matter, the landowners' petition for the formation of a street improvement district no longer contained the signatures of the owners of a majority in value of the assessed property in the district, two of the original signers having conveyed their property to others by deeds that were of record, the ordinance creating the district was invalid. Appleby Rd. St. Imp. Dist. v. Powell, 282 Ark. 398, 669 S.W.2d 3 (1984).

Cited: Ray v. City of Mt. Home, 228 Ark. 885, 311 S.W.2d 163 (1958); Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

14-88-204. Who may sign petition.

Women, married or single, may sign the petition; guardians may sign for their wards; and executors or administrators may sign for the estates represented by them.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 16, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5653; Pope's Dig., § 7287; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-105.

Case Notes

Designating Numbers.

Where a municipal improvement district was created as District No. 7 to cure infirmities in which another was created to be known as No. 8 and having for its purpose the same object in view as that of District No. 7 covering practically the same territory, but excluding certain city lots that should not have been included in No. 7 and including some that should not have been excluded from No. 7, it became immaterial by which number it was known since one district cured the infirmities of the other, and although given separate numbers it cannot be said that there are two districts having for their objects and purposes the making of the same improvements. Christian v. Forrest City St. Imp. Dist., 196 Ark. 523, 118 S.W.2d 868 (1938).

Persons Authorized to Sign.

A guardian may sign a petition for a local improvement. Malvern v. Nunn, 127 Ark. 418, 192 S.W. 909 (1917).

One partner may sign for partnership property. Malvern v. Nunn, 127 Ark. 418, 192 S.W. 909 (1917).

A mortgagor may sign even after foreclosure, if time to redeem has not expired. Holt v. Ring, 177 Ark. 762, 9 S.W.2d 43 (1928).

Persons Not Authorized to Sign.

This section authorizing administrators to sign for estates cannot, so far as the heirs are concerned, give their signatures any efficacy in the face of constitutional provisions requiring the consent of owners. Rector v. Board of Improv., 50 Ark. 116, 6 S.W. 519 (1887).

An administrator is not competent to sign a petition for improvement so as to bind the heirs, and there is no distinction between the power of an administrator and an executor, even where the executor is clothed with a power of sale. Ahern v. Board of Improv. Dist. No. 3, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S.W. 575 (1901).

A widow who is life tenant of dower or homestead lands cannot sign a petition for a local improvement. Colquitt v. Stevens, 111 Ark. 314, 163 S.W. 1141 (1914).

14-88-205. Apportionment of assessed value for signers.

  1. If the boundaries of a local improvement district as petitioned for embrace a part of any lot, block, or parcel of land which, upon the county assessment books, is assessed as a whole, any signer of the petition may demand, in writing, of the county assessor that he shall apportion the assessment for state and county purposes upon the lot, block, or parcel of land so as to show the assessed value of that portion which is within the proposed district and the assessed value of the remainder which is without the district.
  2. It shall be the duty of the county assessor, within ten (10) days after the request is made of him, to make the reassessment and to deliver to the city or town clerk or recorder a certificate showing the assessed value of that portion of the lot, block, or parcel of land that is within the district, to the end that in determining whether a majority in value has signed the petition, the city or town council can compute the value of the portion of the lot, block, or parcel of land that is within the district.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 21; Pope's Dig., § 7286; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-106.

14-88-206. New district to replace void district.

When a void improvement district in a city or town has done or shall do the whole or any part of its work of improvement, a new district may be organized under the provisions of this subchapter or under any laws which may be passed for the organization of local improvement districts in cities and towns, for the purpose of paying for the improvement made or commenced by the void district.

History. Acts 1929, No. 26, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7280; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-133.

Cross References. Proceedings to correct errors or irregularities in formation of district, § 14-86-401 et seq.

14-88-207. Hearing and establishment.

    1. At the time named in the notice, the municipal governing body shall meet and hear all owners of real property within the proposed district who desire to be heard on the question as to whether a majority in assessed value of the property owners has signed the petition and shall make a finding as to whether the petition is signed by a majority in assessed value of the property owners.
      1. The finding of the governing body shall be expressed in an ordinance.
        1. If it finds that a majority has signed the petition, it shall then be the duty of the governing body, by the same ordinance, to establish the district.
          1. The ordinance shall designate the boundaries of the district and the object of the proposed improvement as described in the petition.
          2. The ordinance shall also give the district a name descriptive of the nature of the proposed improvement and a number to prevent its being confused with other similar districts.
    1. The ordinance shall be published within thirty (30) days after its adoption for one (1) insertion, in some newspaper published in the city or town where the district lies, or if there is no such newspaper, then in some newspaper published in the county.
      1. Where improvement districts are organized in any city or town in which no newspaper is regularly published, all notices required may be published in any newspaper that is published and has a bona fide circulation in the county.
      2. If there is no newspaper published in the county where the city or town lies, the ordinances and notices provided for in the cases of local improvement districts in cities and towns may be published by posting them in at least ten (10) conspicuous places in the city or town where the improvement is to be made.
  1. The findings of the governing body shall be conclusive unless attacked by a suit in the chancery court of the county, brought within thirty (30) days after the publication.
  2. The governing body and the chancery court in their finding shall be governed by the record of deeds in the office of the recorder of the county and shall not consider any unrecorded instrument. They shall also be governed by the value placed upon the property as shown by the last county assessment on file in the county clerk's office.
  3. If any petition is not acted on by the governing body within one (1) year from the date of its filing, it shall become void unless there is pending in the court an injunction suit which prevents such action or a mandamus suit to compel action by the governing body. In any event, the petition shall become void unless acted on within two (2) years from the date of its filing.

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 5; C. & M. Dig., § 5680; Acts 1929, No. 64, §§ 3, 9; 1935, No. 145, § 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 7282, 7378, 7379; Acts 1969, No. 290, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-108, 20-110, 20-111.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Assessments.

The city council is governed by the last county assessment and should not consider property omitted therefrom. Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 99 Ark. 508, 139 S.W. 308 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Former similar statute was valid as fixing the method of procedure in determining the value of real property in the proposed improvement district. Fry v. Poe, 175 Ark. 375, 1 S.W.2d 29 (1927) (decision under prior law).

The value of a lot assessed as a whole, which was divided, part being within and part without the improvement district, could not have been considered. Holt v. Ring, 177 Ark. 762, 9 S.W.2d 43 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Church property was subject to assessment. Bensberg v. Parker, 192 Ark. 908, 95 S.W.2d 892 (1936) (decision under prior law).

Findings of Governing Bodies.

The determination of the municipal council as to the singleness of the improvement and the selection of the property to be benefited is conclusive, except for fraud or demonstrable mistake. Cooper v. Hogan, 163 Ark. 312, 260 S.W. 25 (1924); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 165 Ark. 585, 265 S.W. 81 (1924); Carnahan v. City of Fayetteville, 175 Ark. 405, 1 S.W.2d 10 (1927) (decisions under prior law).

The finding of a city council that a petition for an improvement contains a majority in value of the real property owners of the district is prima facie correct. Dunbar v. Street Imp. Dist., 172 Ark. 656, 290 S.W. 372 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus where this section plainly required the city to make a finding in an ordinance as to whether a petition was signed by a majority in assessed value of the property owners, and the city failed to make the requisite findings; the circuit court went too far, however, when it specified the findings that the city was to make and its order was therefore affirmed as modified. City of N. Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 2017 Ark. 113, 515 S.W.3d 593 (2017).

Majority in Assessed Value.

Consent of required majority in value is necessary. Watkins v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 344, 27 S.W. 234 (1894); Craig v. Board of Improv., 84 Ark. 390, 105 S.W. 867 (1907); Fry v. Poe, 175 Ark. 375, 1 S.W.2d 29 (1927) (decisions under prior law).

The fact that the requisite number of property owners consent to the formation of an improvement district is jurisdictional and without such consent all proceedings therefor are void. Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 99 Ark. 508, 139 S.W. 308 (1911) (decision under prior law).

In determining whether the requisite majority had been obtained by those who petition for the establishment of an improvement for the purchase of an electric lighting plant, the value of real property of railroad companies within the district had to be considered. Walton v. Commissioners of Light Imp. Dist., 144 Ark. 249, 222 S.W. 1056 (1920) (decision under prior law).

A landowner signing a petition for the establishment of a municipal improvement district was entitled to have the lands to which he had deeds on record at the time the council passed on the petition counted in determining whether the required majority of landowners in the district had signed for the improvement. Smith v. Callahan, 175 Ark. 974, 1 S.W.2d 82 (1928) (decision under prior law).

The question whether there is a majority of signers is not determined as of the time the petition was signed, but is determined as of the time the city's governing body acts upon the petition. Appleby Rd. St. Imp. Dist. v. Powell, 282 Ark. 398, 669 S.W.2d 3 (1984).

Where, at the time the board acted in the matter, the landowners' petition for the formation of a street improvement district no longer contained the signatures of the owners of a majority in value of the assessed property in the district, two of the original signers having conveyed their property to others by deeds that were of record, the ordinance creating the district was invalid. Appleby Rd. St. Imp. Dist. v. Powell, 282 Ark. 398, 669 S.W.2d 3 (1984).

Ordinances Establishing Districts.

The extent and character of the improvement, as expressed in the ordinance, must substantially comply with the petition. Kraft v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 269, 146 S.W. 505 (1912) (decision under prior law).

The descriptions in the ordinance must conform to those in the petition. Smith v. Improvement Dist. No. 14, 108 Ark. 141, 156 S.W. 455 (1913); Riddle v. Ballew, 130 Ark. 161, 197 S.W. 27 (1917) (decisions under prior law).

Variance between description in ordinance as passed and published ordinance is material. McRaven v. Clancy, 115 Ark. 163, 171 S.W. 88 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Journal of municipal council showing passage of ordinance cannot be impeached by parol evidence. Roberts v. Street Improv. Dist., 156 Ark. 248, 245 S.W. 489 (1922); Lewis v. Forrest City Special Imp. Dist., 156 Ark. 356, 246 S.W. 867 (1923) (decisions under prior law).

The adoption of an ordinance or resolution by unanimous vote of the municipal council dispenses with the rule requiring it to be read on three different days, unless two-thirds of the council vote to dispense with the rule. Young v. Gurdon, 169 Ark. 399, 275 S.W. 890 (1925); El Dorado v. Jacobs, 174 Ark. 98, 294 S.W. 411 (1927) (decisions under prior law).

The validity of a municipal ordinance may be collaterally attacked where the ordinance is void for lack of power to enforce it. Board of Imp. v. Moore, 171 Ark. 839, 286 S.W. 964 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Publication of Ordinances and Notices.

Ordinances are void if not published within a required time. Crane v. City of Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S.W. 955 (1899); Bennett v. Kelley, 179 Ark. 530, 16 S.W.2d 992 (1929) (decisions under prior law).

Ordinances of a city creating an improvement district and providing for assessments, to be valid, must be published in some newspaper published in the city or town in which the district is organized. Gibson v. Hoxie, 110 Ark. 544, 162 S.W. 568 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Subdivision (b)(2)(A) governs the publication of an ordinance levying assessments for an improvement already constructed. Boaz v. Coates, 114 Ark. 23, 169 S.W. 312 (1914).

Review.

In the organization of an improvement district, it was held that the findings of the chancellor as to the assessment of benefits upon a person's land would not have been disturbed on appeal. Burrus v. Board of Sewer Improv., 134 Ark. 10, 203 S.W. 20 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Where the city council, in proceedings to establish an improvement district, found that a majority in value of the property owners in the district had signed the petition for the district and no review of such finding was sought within 30 days thereafter, the council's finding became conclusive on the courts and the chancery court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit to enjoin the improvement on the ground that a majority in value had not signed the petition. Wigley v. House, 179 Ark. 503, 16 S.W.2d 588 (1929) (decision under prior law).

City council in making finding that requisite two thirds (now majority) in assessed value of property owners had signed the petition for a street improvement district would necessarily have to find the total assessed value in the district, so that finding of council was conclusive, where finding was not attacked by suit in chancery within 30 days of publication of ordinance. Street Imp. Dist. v. Cooper, 215 Ark. 760, 223 S.W.2d 607 (1949) (decision prior to 1969 amendment).

Mandamus is not a proper method to review a city's decision regarding the creation of an improvement district because this section provides for an adequate remedy by way of an appeal to chancery court. Powell v. Bishop, 279 Ark. 365, 652 S.W.2d 9 (1983).

Time to Act.

This section, which provides that a petition for the creation of a municipal improvement district shall become void unless it has been acted upon within two years from the date of its filing, does not apply to annexation of territory to a municipal improvement district. Hazen v. City of Booneville, 260 Ark. 871, 545 S.W.2d 614 (1977).

Cited: McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981); Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

14-88-208. [Repealed.]

Publisher's Notes. This section, concerning denial on planning commission recommendations, was repealed by Acts 2013, No. 563, § 2. The section was derived from Acts 1931, No. 275, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10027; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-107.

14-88-209. Compensation for preliminary work.

Commissioners of municipal improvement district boards are authorized to pay a reasonable compensation to the persons who have done necessary preliminary work in the organization of them.

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 6; C. & M. Dig., § 5741; Pope's Dig., § 7382; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-112.

Case Notes

Enforcement.

Where the legal right of an attorney to have a voucher issued for legal services rendered to an improvement district has been determined by the commissioners of the district, such right will be enforced in a mandamus proceeding. Huie v. Barkman, 179 Ark. 772, 18 S.W.2d 334 (1929).

Preliminary Expenses.

The services of a promoter in circulating a petition and creating sentiment for organization of a district is not a “preliminary expense.” Martin v. Street Imp. Dist., 167 Ark. 108, 266 S.W. 941 (1924).

14-88-210. Corporate powers.

Municipal improvement districts shall be bodies corporate and shall have power to sue and be sued and to contract by the corporate name.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 3; 1935, No. 145, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 7282; Acts 1969, No. 290, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-108.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

Tort Liability.

Even though this section allows a natural gas improvement district to sue and be sued, there is still an immunity from tort liability for gas explosions. Reeme v. Natural Gas Imp. Dist., 247 Ark. 983, 448 S.W.2d 647 (1970).

14-88-211. Existing road improvement districts.

No road improvement district within the state shall, in any way, affect the validity of any municipal improvement district which is organized for the purpose of paving any streets over which any road improvement district may pass.

History. Acts 1923 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 20, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-135.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of existing districts, see Acts 1923 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 20, § 2.

Case Notes

Purpose.

This section suspended or withdrew the authority of rural road districts over streets which are subjects of municipal improvement districts, validated the latter districts, and was effective retroactively. Moore v. North College Ave. Imp. Dist., 161 Ark. 323, 256 S.W. 70 (1923); Paving Dists. of Blytheville v. Baker, 171 Ark. 692, 286 S.W. 945 (1926).

14-88-212. Districts to install electric streetlights in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants.

  1. Local improvement districts may be organized in cities having more than ten thousand (10,000) inhabitants according to the federal census under the provisions of this chapter for the purpose of installing electric streetlights within the district and of supplying the lights with electric current.
  2. The commissioners of the district are authorized to purchase, construct, and install the necessary columns, fixtures, wiring, conduits, and other appliances and to maintain them.
  3. Districts may make contracts with municipalities, companies, or individuals supplying electricity for furnishing the necessary electric current during a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years.
  4. The district shall not cease to exist when the work is completed, and the improvement shall not be turned over to the city, but the district shall be operated by the commissioners thereof, to the end that the electric columns, wiring, fixtures, conduits, and other appliances may be kept in good condition and the electric current paid for out of the local assessments upon the property benefited.

History. Acts 1929, No. 207, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-103.

Subchapter 3 — Members — Increase in Number in Certain Cities

Cross References. Publication of annual report, § 1-3-105.

Preambles. Acts 1941, No. 74 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, in many instances vacancies occur on the boards of commissioners of improvement districts by reason of one of the commissioners dying or moving out of the State; and

“Whereas, in many such instances said vacancies are not promptly filled by appointment of new members to the board of commissioners, when the law governing the creation of such districts contemplates a full board of three commissioners, and it is to the best interest of the property holders in looking after the affairs of said district that a full board of three commissioners be always maintained;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 158, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 94, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 80, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 81, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 145, § 8: approved Mar. 20, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the fact that heretofore it has been necessary to obtain the consent of only a bare majority in value of the owners of real property in order to organize a local improvement district, the organization of such districts all over the State of Arkansas has been in the past greatly abused, advantage has been taken of the owners of property therein and burdensome taxes have been laid upon property owners without any actual increase in property values as compensation therefor, many of such districts having been organized for promotion purposes; that many property owners throughout the State are in danger of losing their said property by reason of their inability to pay the said local improvement taxes; and that unless legislation is immediately enacted making it necessary to obtain the consent of more than a majority in value of said property owners the practice of organizing such districts and the abuse thereof will be continued, all to the serious detriment and injury of owners of property. It is, therefore, found and declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 7, § 2: approved Jan. 30, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “That it is hereby stated, ascertained and found that because of the language of section 7283 of Pope's Digest there is now uncertainty in the law as to whether the Mayor and City Commissioners in Cities operating under a commission form of government pursuant to Act 13 of the Acts of 1913, as amended, are the Commissioners of Improvement Districts formed in such cities, and that such uncertainty is preventing, hindering and delaying the making of many improvements of a public nature, and that, therefore, this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 74, § 2: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 18, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “As the improvement made by districts created by town or city council, are organized for the purpose of making improvements such as sidewalks, street paving, sanitary and storm sewers, water lines to supply the inhabitants with water, etc., which improvements are for the health and safety of the people residing in the district, it is ascertained and hereby declared that unless such districts maintain a full board of three commissioners that the repairs and maintenance of the improvements may not be carried on in such a way as to safeguard the health and safety of the public, it is therefore, hereby declared that an emergency exists and that for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, this act shall immediately take effect upon its passage.”

Acts 1961, No. 70, § 3: Feb. 9, 1961. Emergency clause provided: “In order to secure efficiency and economy in the operation of municipal improvement districts and to promote the health and comfort of the residents and property owners of said districts, there is a need for the authorization granted by this Act, and, therefore, an emergency is declared, and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 928, § 1: effective simultaneously with the Arkansas Criminal Code on Jan. 1, 1976.

Acts 1999, No. 1505, § 8: July 1, 1999. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eighty-second General Assembly that the various laws regulating the boards of commissioners of municipal improvement districts contain provisions which provide for the lifetime appointments of commissioners and do not allow for the prompt removal of commissioners when the situations might be in the best interest of the districts and its members, and that these restrictions mean that these small government bodies are often unresponsive to the district's property owners who benefit from the services and pay the assessments for these improvement districts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall become effective on July 1, 1999.”

14-88-301. Appointment of commissioners.

        1. In the ordinance creating a municipal improvement district, the city or town council shall appoint three (3) owners of real property as commissioners, who shall compose a board of improvement for the district.
          1. The number of commissioners for an improvement district created under this section may be increased from three (3) to five (5) or seven (7) members by:
            1. Ordinance of the city or town council; or
            2. Petition to the city or town council signed by property owners representing ten percent (10%) or more of the assessed properties in the improvement district and that designates persons to fill the newly created positions on the board of commissioners who shall be property owners of assessed properties in the improvement district.
            1. On a board of commissioners whose membership has been increased from three (3) to five (5) or seven (7) members under subdivision (a)(1)(A)(ii)(a) of this section, a commissioner is limited to three (3) three-year terms.
            2. The terms shall be initially staggered for terms of one (1) year, two (2) years, and three (3) years as determined by lot, with each term counting toward the three-term limit.
          1. Beginning on and after July 1, 1999, in cities of the first class with a population of between sixty-one thousand five hundred (61,500) and sixty-two thousand (62,000) persons according to the 1990 Federal Decennial Census, the commissioners serving at that time and any board of commissioners of new districts created after that date shall have terms of office of six (6) years and shall serve until their successors are duly selected and qualified.
          2. These terms of office shall begin January 1, 2000, for commissioners serving at that time or the January 1 next following the creation of the district.
        1. For the initial terms, the commissioners shall select one (1) of their number to serve for two (2) years, one (1) to serve for four (4) years, and one (1) to serve for six (6) years.
        2. The names and terms so selected shall be certified to the city clerk on or before January 1 of the applicable year.
          1. Before the end of a commissioner's term, the city council shall appoint an owner of real property in the district as a new commissioner.
          2. Except for persons having been removed as a commissioner, any person serving or having served as a commissioner may be reappointed, but need not necessarily be reappointed.
    1. In cities operating under a commission form of government, the mayor and city commissioners, by virtue of their offices, shall be commissioners of each improvement district and shall compose the board of improvement of each district.
    2. If a property owner or creditor is a corporation, partnership, trust, or other legal entity, any officer, director, trustee, employee, or other designated representative of the entity may be named and appointed as a commissioner.
  1. The ordinance may be in the following form:

“AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. . “WHEREAS, parties claiming to be the owners of two-thirds in assessed value of the property located within the territory hereinafter described have filed a petition praying that an improvement district be established for the purpose hereinafter set out. “WHEREAS, after due notice as required by law, the City (or Town) Council of the City (or Town) of has heard all parties desiring to be heard, and has ascertained that said petition was signed by two-thirds in assessed value of the owners of real property within said territory; “NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City (or Town) Council of the City (or Town) of . “Section 1. There is hereby established an improvement district embracing the following property (here describe territory) for the purpose of (here describe the purpose) “Said district shall be known as Improvement District No. ; and , and are hereby named commissioners, who shall compose the Board of Improvement for said district. “Section 2. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 4; 1935, No. 145, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 7283; Acts 1941, No. 7, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-109; Acts 1999, No. 1505, § 1; 2003, No. 550, § 1; 2013, No. 563, § 3; 2015, No. 1043, § 1; 2017, No. 924, § 1.

Amendments. The 2003 amendment added (a)(1)(A)(ii).

The 2013 amendment added (a)(3).

The 2015 amendment deleted “therein” following “property” in (a)(1)(A)(i); rewrote (a)(1)(A)(ii) as (a)(1)(A)(ii) (a) , inserting “from three (3) to five (5) or seven (7)” preceding “members” and adding the language designated as (a)(1)(A)(ii) (a)(2) ; and added (a)(1)(A)(ii) (b)

The 2017 amendment, in (a)(1)(A)(ii) (a)(2) , substituted “property owners representing ten percent (10%) or more of the assessed properties in” for “fifteen percent (15%) of the property owners of record within” and inserted “and that designates persons to fill the newly-created positions on the board of commissioners who shall be property owners of assessed properties in the improvement district”.

Cross References. Board of commissioners in cities having city administrator form of government, § 14-48-131.

Case Notes

Commissioners.

Mayor and alderman were ineligible as commissioners, but if appointed, they were commissioners de facto, and their appointment did not impair the validity of the improvement district. Anderson v. Pixley, 132 Ark. 539, 201 S.W. 796 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Where one commissioner was not a property owner in improvement district, but the other two were, all proceedings where all three were present were valid, since a majority may act; also no attack on validity because commissioner was not a property owner in district could be made after 30 days. Gannaway v. Street Imp. Dist., 164 Ark. 407, 262 S.W. 22 (1924) (decision under prior law).

Where city council creates an improvement district board and appoints three real property-owning commissioners to serve thereon as required by this section and where the board has not yet formed a plan or ascertained the cost of the improvement as required, the question of the correctness of the assessments or the method employed cannot be brought before the courts. Ketcher v. Mayor of N. Little Rock, 2 Ark. App. 315, 621 S.W.2d 12 (1981).

Initiative and Referendum.

The initiative and referendum amendment did not apply to an improvement district ordinance. Hodges v. Board of Improv., 117 Ark. 266, 174 S.W. 542 (1915); Paving Dist. v. Little, 170 Ark. 1160, 282 S.W. 971 (1926) (decisions under prior law).

Cited: Linder v. Street Improv. Dist., 224 Ark. 457, 274 S.W.2d 470 (1955).

14-88-302. Oath of office.

  1. Each member of the board of improvement, within ten (10) days after his appointment, shall take the oath of office required by Arkansas Constitution, Article 19, § 20, and an oath that he will not, either directly or indirectly, be interested in any contract made by the board.
  2. The oaths of office of the commissioners of municipal improvement districts may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths.
  3. The oath required under this section shall be filed in the office of the city or town clerk.
  4. If any member of the board shall fail to take this oath and to file it in the office of the clerk within the time allowed in this section, he shall be taken to have declined the office. The city or town council shall at once appoint another person, having the like qualifications, in his place, who shall take and file his oath of office within ten (10) days after his appointment.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5714, 5715; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 20; Pope's Dig., §§ 7353-7355; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-113 — 20-115.

Case Notes

Failure to Take Oath.

This section is mandatory, and failure of a member of the board to take the oath within the time required amounts to a declination of the office, imposing on city council the duty to select another in his place. Hickey v. Hargraves, 194 Ark. 64, 105 S.W.2d 88 (1937).

Member's failure to take oath within required time prevents him from acquiring any right or title to the office, and he cannot be treated as a de facto officer in a direct attack to review city council's proceedings in declaring vacancy and making appointment. Hickey v. Hargraves, 194 Ark. 64, 105 S.W.2d 88 (1937).

Filing of Oaths.

Effect of failure by a commissioner of improvement district to file his oath of office is to invest the city council with power to appoint a successor, the presumption being that the commissioner has declined to serve. Jones v. Leighton, 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940).

That oath of office of commissioner of street improvement district was found in a desk at the city hall created a presumption it was filed, but not a presumption that the filing occurred within 10 days from its execution. Jones v. Leighton, 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940).

Nunc pro tunc resolution adopted by city council after commissioners of street improvement district had been serving almost 10 months, stating they had been appointed, created presumption that it would not have been passed if the commissioners had failed to file their oaths of office, and resolution adopted 10 years later declaring the position vacant for failure to file the oath was held properly set aside on certiorari. Jones v. Leighton, 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940).

14-88-303. Vacancies generally.

  1. A vacancy that occurs after a municipal board is organized shall be filled by the city or town council.
  2. If a position on the board is vacant because of a resignation, death, removal under § 14-88-305, refusal to act, or negligence, a new member shall be appointed by the city or town council, if a petition under § 14-88-304(b)(1) is filed.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; 1909, No. 81, § 1, p. 224; C. & M. Dig., § 5716; Pope's Dig., § 7356; Acts 1961, No. 70, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-116; Acts 1999, No. 1505, § 2; 2017, No. 924, § 2.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment added the exception in (b).

The 2017 amendment, in (a), substituted “A vacancy that occurs” for “All vacancies that may occur” and “is” for “shall have been”; and rewrote (b).

14-88-304. Petition of property owners to fill vacancy.

    1. The city or town council shall appoint a new commissioner to the board of commissioners of an improvement district created by the council if:
      1. There is a vacancy on the board because a commissioner has died or has ceased to reside in the state in which the improvement district was created; and
      2. Ten percent (10%) or more of the property owners of the improvement district petition the council calling attention to the vacancy on the board and requesting the appointment of a new commissioner to fill the vacancy.
    2. A commissioner appointed under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be a property owner in the improvement district in which the vacancy occurs.
    1. A person shall cease to be a commissioner on the board of commissioners upon the filing of a petition with the city or town council that:
      1. Is signed by property owners representing ten percent (10%) or more of the assessed properties in the improvement district affected;
      2. Recites that the commissioner is no longer a property owner in the improvement district;
      3. Is accompanied by a corroborative certificate of an abstractor;
      4. Indicates a vacancy exists under § 14-88-303; and
      5. Designates a person to fill the vacancy who is a property owner of assessed property in the improvement district.
    2. The office is declared to be vacant from the date of filing the petition, and the council that created the improvement district shall name as commissioner of the improvement district to fill the vacancy the person named in the petition and recommended for commissioner of the improvement district if the person is a property owner in the improvement district.

History. Acts 1941, No. 74, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-117; Acts 2015, No. 1043, § 2; 2017, No. 924, § 3.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment inserted “improvement” preceding “district” throughout the section; redesignated (a) as (a)(1) and (2) and rewrote the subsection; redesignated (b) as (b)(1) and (2); substituted “ten percent (10%) or more of” for “five (5) or more” in (b)(1); and deleted “forthwith” preceding “name as commissioner” in (b)(2).

The 2017 amendment rewrote (b)(1).

14-88-305. Removal of member.

    1. The city or town council may remove a municipal board of improvement or any member of the board by a two-thirds vote of the whole number of council members elected to the council.
      1. Removal shall be for cause only, including without limitation noncompliance with state or federal law or local ordinance, and after a hearing upon sworn charges proffered in writing by a real property owner in the improvement district.
      2. Ten (10) days' notice of the hearing of the charges shall be given.
  1. The council may remove the board or any member of the board by a vote of a majority of the whole number of council members elected to the council, upon the written petition of fifteen percent (15%) of the owners of real property located within the improvement district stating that the petitioners believe it to be in the best interest of the improvement district, and after a mandatory hearing upon ten (10) days' notice to each member of the board affected.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; 1909, No. 81, § 1, p. 224; C. & M. Dig., § 5716; Pope's Dig., § 7356; Acts 1961, No. 70, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-116; Acts 1999, No. 1505, § 3; 2015, No. 1043, § 3; 2017, No. 879, § 36.

Amendments. The 1999 amendment added (b)(2); and made stylistic changes in (a)(1) and (a)(2)(A).

The 2015 amendment, in (a)(1), substituted “may” for “shall have the power to,” substituted “of the board” for “thereof,” and deleted “(2/3)” following “two-thirds”; in (a)(2)(A), inserted “including without limitation noncompliance with state or federal law or local ordinance,” substituted “a” for “some” preceding “real property,” and inserted “improvement” preceding “district”; deleted (b)(1) and redesignated (b)(2) as (b); in present (b), deleted “After July 1, 1999, in cities of the first class with a population of between sixty one thousand five hundred (61,500) and sixty two thousand (62,000) persons according to the 1990 Federal Decennial Census” at the beginning, substituted “may remove” for “shall have the power to remove,” inserted “of the board” following “any member,” deleted “city” preceding “council” near the middle, substituted “fifteen percent (15%)” for “twenty-five percent (25%),” inserted “improvement” preceding “district” twice, and inserted “mandatory” preceding “hearing.”

The 2017 amendment substituted “council members” for “aldermen” in (a)(1) and (b).

Case Notes

Cause for Removal.

“Cause” or “sufficient cause” shall mean “legal cause” and not any cause which the municipal council may think sufficient; the cause must be one which specially relates to and affects the administration of the office and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. Carswell v. Hammock, 127 Ark. 110, 191 S.W. 935 (1917).

A petition to remove the commissioners of a street improvement district which charged them with incompetency, gross negligence, willful neglect of duties, waste of funds, and failure to file an annual settlement with vouchers was held to state a cause for removal. Boullioun v. City of Little Rock, 176 Ark. 489, 3 S.W.2d 334 (1928).

City councilman was held not entitled to hold the office of a commissioner of street improvement district because the offices are incompatible. Tappan v. Helena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458 (1937).

Where record of proceedings before city council was silent as to on which charge water commissioner was guilty and as to what evidence order of city council for removal was based, court properly quashed order of removal of commissioner, as commissioner is entitled to know on what specific charge he was removed and the evidence upon which council based its order of removal. Martin v. Cogbill, 214 Ark. 818, 218 S.W.2d 94 (1949).

Court would not substitute its judgment for that of city board as to whether “cause” was sufficient for removal of commissioners. Martin v. Quinn, 294 Ark. 60, 740 S.W.2d 627 (1987).

Power to Remove.

City council has authority to remove a commissioner of an improvement district upon a showing sufficient to justify action. Martin v. Cogbill, 214 Ark. 818, 218 S.W.2d 94 (1949).

Proceedings for Removal.

In a proceeding to remove the commissioners of an improvement district, it is not necessary that the city council should vote or make finding upon each separate charge; rather, it can decide upon proof as a whole. Boullioun v. City of Little Rock, 176 Ark. 489, 3 S.W.2d 334 (1928).

Review.

Action of city council in refusing to remove councilman from the board of commissioners of the city is subject to certiorari review in the circuit court. Tappan v. Helena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458 (1937).

Where commissioner is removed by city council after petition filed by taxpayer for his removal and hearing upon it, proper remedy for review of proceedings of council is by certiorari, but court does not try the case de novo as writ is merely for errors of law, one of which may be the legal sufficiency of the testimony supporting order of the council. Martin v. Cogbill, 214 Ark. 818, 218 S.W.2d 94 (1949).

In reviewing city board's action, circuit court was not required to conduct a de novo review; circuit court reviews record of errors of law and for legal sufficiency of evidence to support action of board. Martin v. Quinn, 294 Ark. 60, 740 S.W.2d 627 (1987).

14-88-306. Chairman.

A municipal board of improvement shall elect one (1) of their number chairman.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; 1909, No. 81, § 1, p. 224; C. & M. Dig., § 5716; Pope's Dig., § 7356; Acts 1961, No. 70, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-116.

14-88-307. Quorum.

A majority of a municipal board of improvement shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and the performance of the duties enjoined by this act.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5717; Pope's Dig., § 7357; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-118.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 14-88-101.

14-88-308. No compensation.

The members of a municipal board shall receive no compensation for their services.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; 1909, No. 81, § 1, p. 224; C. & M. Dig., § 5716; Pope's Dig., § 7356; Acts 1961, No. 70, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-116.

14-88-309. Interest in contracts unlawful — Penalty.

  1. It shall be unlawful for any board of improvement, or any member thereof, in any city or town in this state to be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract made by the board for, or on behalf of, any improvement district.
  2. Any person violating the provisions of this section commits a felony and shall be:
    1. Fined in any sum not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000); and
    2. Imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years.

History. Acts 1909, No. 80, §§ 1, 4, p. 222; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5711, 5713; Pope's Dig., §§ 7350, 7352; Acts 1975, No. 928, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-120, 20-123.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1975, No. 928, § 2, provided that, notwithstanding that all or part of a statute defining a criminal offense is amended or repealed by this act, the provisions so amended or repealed shall remain in force for the purpose of authorizing the prosecution, conviction, and punishment of a person committing an offense under the provisions prior to the effective date of this act.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subsection (b) is valid. Wilson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 181 Ark. 391, 26 S.W.2d 92 (1930).

Contracts Void.

A contract between the commissioners of a waterworks district and a corporation in which the commissioners were stockholders is void. Gantt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 189 Ark. 449, 74 S.W.2d 232 (1934).

Contract by which waterworks district surrendered to private corporation privilege of furnishing water to consumer was held void from its inception where one of the commissioners owned stock in his own name and two in the name of their wives in the corporation when they entered into the contract. Gantt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 194 Ark. 925, 109 S.W.2d 1251 (1937).

Transactions Not Invalidated.

The sale of an improvement district's bonds to a bank of which one of the commissioners was an officer did not invalidate the assessment of benefits. Davidson v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 741, 32 S.W.2d 1062 (1930).

14-88-310. Interest in loans unlawful — Penalty.

  1. It shall be unlawful for a municipal board of improvement, or any member thereof, to:
    1. Loan the funds, or to be interested in the loan of the funds, raised in any improvement district; or
    2. Apply or use the funds for any purpose except the purpose for which they were raised; or
    3. Purchase, or to be interested in the purchase of, any lot or lands sold for the payment of delinquent assessments; or
    4. Loan money or furnish money or credit to any person, company, or corporation to make such a purchase.
  2. Any person violating the provisions of this section commits a felony and shall be:
    1. Fined in any sum not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000); and
    2. Imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years.

History. Acts 1909, No. 80, §§ 2, 4, p. 222; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5712, 5713; Pope's Dig., §§ 7351, 7352; Acts 1975, No. 928, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-121, 20-123.

Publisher's Notes. As to savings clause contained in Acts 1975, No. 928, see Publisher's Notes to § 14-88-309.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subsection (b) is valid. Wilson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 181 Ark. 391, 26 S.W.2d 92 (1930).

Cited: Russell v. State, 112 Ark. 282, 166 S.W. 540 (1914).

14-88-311. Combining boards.

Where there is more than one (1) improvement district in the city or town for the same general purpose, the same member may be on two (2) or more boards of improvement, or the boards of different districts may combine so as to form only one (1) board for the whole territory, to be thus improved so as to make the whole improvement uniform. However no money raised by assessment in one (1) district shall be expended in another district.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; 1893, No. 158, § 1, p. 271; 1899, No. 94, § 1, p. 156; C. & M. Dig., § 5735; Pope's Dig., § 7363; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-119.

14-88-312. Members — Increase in number in certain cities.

    1. Whenever a majority in value of the owners of real property in any municipal improvement district in cities of the first class with a population of between sixty-one thousand five hundred (61,500) and sixty-two thousand (62,000) persons according to the 1990 Federal Decennial Census shall petition the city council of the creating municipality for the board of improvement to be enlarged from three (3) members to five (5) members, then the city council shall pass an ordinance to expand the number of members of the board of improvement for the district, and to appoint two (2) additional owners of real property as commissioners of the district. Thereafter, the total membership of the board of improvement shall consist of five (5) members who shall serve staggered terms of three (3) years.
    2. The initial terms of office of the two (2) additional members shall be determined by the appointing ordinance with one (1) individual serving an initial term of three (3) years and the second individual serving an initial term of two (2) years. Thereafter, the terms of office shall be three (3) years.
    3. Commissioners serving at the time the petition is filed shall continue to serve.
  1. Vacancies in the two (2) additional commissioners' positions shall be filled in the same manner as provided for filling vacancies under § 14-88-303. The position shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term, except that no person who is removed as a commissioner shall qualify.
  2. All action by the board of commissioners of any municipal improvement district affected by this section shall be by a majority vote of the membership of the board of improvement.

History. Acts 1999, No. 1505, § 4.

Subchapter 4 — Officers Serving Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1897, No. 16, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1909, No. 80, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 78, § 4: approved Feb. 26, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas at the present time there are several different people collecting taxes in the same town which makes it inconvenient for the taxpayers thereof to determine the amount of and pay their taxes and also makes it more expensive than it should be upon said taxpayers an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1975, No. 928, § 1: effective simultaneously with the Arkansas Criminal Code on Jan. 1, 1976.

Acts 1995, No. 362, § 5: Feb. 20, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the present law pertaining to the representation of local improvement districts is outdated, unduly restricts representation of improvement districts to noncontroversial matters and limits legal fees to amounts which prohibit the retention of counsel. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-88-401. Penalty for misuse of funds generally.

Any commissioner, treasurer, attorney, or other subordinate officer appointed by a municipal board of improvement who uses or lends, or who participates, directly or indirectly, in any loan or use of funds belonging to the improvement district, for other than district purposes, shall be guilty of a felony. Upon conviction, he shall be confined in the penitentiary for a period of not more than five (5) years nor less than two (2) years.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 24; 1953, No. 210, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-124.1.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

14-88-402. Unlawful actions by subordinate officers — Penalty.

  1. It shall be unlawful for the collector or treasurer of a municipal improvement district, or for any other subordinate officer appointed by the board of improvement, to loan or use, or to be interested in the loan or use of, any funds raised by the district.
  2. Any person violating the provisions of this section commits a felony and shall be:
    1. Fined in any sum not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000); and
    2. Imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years.

History. Acts 1909, No. 80, §§ 3, 4, p. 222; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5706, 5713; Pope's Dig., §§ 7345, 7352; Acts 1975, No. 928, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-122, 20-123.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1975, No. 928, § 2, provided that, notwithstanding that all or part of a statute defining a criminal offense is amended or repealed by this act, the provisions so amended or repealed shall remain in force for the purpose of authorizing the prosecution, conviction, and punishment of a person committing an offense under the provisions prior to the effective date of this act.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subsection (b) is valid. Wilson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 181 Ark. 391, 26 S.W.2d 92 (1930).

14-88-403. Appointment of collector and treasurer generally.

  1. The board of a municipal improvement district shall appoint the collector and treasurer of the district, who shall take the oath of office required by § 14-88-302 and shall execute bond to the chairman of the board, each in a sum at least equal to twice the amount of moneys which will probably come to their hands, with good and sufficient security, to be approved by the board. The bond shall be conditioned that they will faithfully discharge the duties of their office and account for and pay over all moneys that may come to their hands according to law and the orders of the board for the district for which they are appointed.
  2. The Cities of Little Rock and Pine Bluff shall have power to provide, by ordinance, that the city collector shall be ex officio collector of improvement districts and to provide the manner of collecting and the compensation to be paid.
  3. The same person may be treasurer or collector of one (1) or more districts in the city or town, but the moneys of the different districts shall be kept separately.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 11, p. 161; 1897, No. 16, § 2, p. 23; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5702, 5703; Pope's Dig., §§ 7339, 7342; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-124, 20-125.

Case Notes

Ex Officio Collectors.

In view of this section, the clerk and the city collector of North Little Rock was not the collector of improvement districts in such city and a bond given for the faithful performance of his duties did not cover a defalcation in regard to funds belonging to improvement districts collected by him. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. City of North Little Rock, 157 Ark. 291, 248 S.W. 294 (1923).

Liability.

In an action by an improvement district to hold the city liable for funds of the district deposited by the city collector in the district's authorized depository bank and lost in the bank's subsequent failure, it was held that the collector being dead and only one commissioner testifying that he did not authorize the deposit, it will not be presumed that the deposit was unauthorized, especially in view of the custom shown to exist of the collector making such deposits only upon a request of a representative of the district. Board of Comm'rs v. City of Little Rock, 190 Ark. 27, 76 S.W.2d 667 (1935).

14-88-404. Appointment of treasurer.

    1. A municipal board of improvement may appoint a treasurer of the district, who shall take the oath of office prescribed by § 14-88-302 and shall execute a bond in favor of the board in a sum equal to the amount of moneys that will probably come into his or her hands in any one (1) year.
    2. The bond shall be signed by a corporate surety company authorized to do business as such in this state. It shall be conditioned that the treasurer will faithfully discharge the duties of his or her office and that he or she will account for and pay over all moneys that may come into his or her hands according to law and the orders of the board.
  1. The same person may be treasurer of more than one (1) district, but moneys of each shall be kept separately.
    1. The treasurer shall pay out no moneys except on order of the board.
    2. Upon order of the board to pay out moneys, the chair or one (1) of the other commissioners appointed to act on behalf of the chair shall approve the warrant.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 24; 1953, No. 210, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-124.1; Acts 2007, No. 131, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

14-88-405. City improvement collector.

  1. The city councils of the cities of the first and second class are authorized and empowered to designate and appoint someone to collect all of the city improvement taxes, to be known as “city improvement collector.”
  2. When so appointed by the council, the collector shall have exclusive power and authority to collect the taxes in all improvement districts lying wholly or partially within the city, except such taxes as are collected by the regular county tax collector.
  3. The collector may or may not be a city official.
  4. The collector shall receive such remuneration as shall be fixed by the city council.
  5. The collector shall be required to give a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties as approved by the council.
  6. The collector's term of office shall be fixed by the council.
  7. The collector shall maintain an office or place of business open at all reasonable hours.
    1. When any collector has been appointed under the provisions of this section and has qualified by giving bond, it shall be the duty of all persons at that time who are collecting such taxes to at once turn over to the collector all books and records in their possession pertaining to the collections.
    2. Anyone failing to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).

History. Acts 1935, No. 78, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 7340, 7341, 9663, 9664; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-126, 20-127.

14-88-406. Attorney of cities of the second class and towns.

    1. In all cities of the second class and incorporated towns within the State of Arkansas, the attorney representing the municipality may be the attorney for all boards and commissioners of all local improvement districts within the city or incorporated town.
    2. Municipal improvement districts formed under § 14-88-201 et seq. for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, operating, or maintaining a recreational facility, and local improvement districts within cities of the second class or incorporated towns, may, at their option, employ private attorneys in lieu of the city attorney.
    1. It shall be the duty of the attorney to:
      1. Advise the board at any time needed;
      2. Do all things enjoined upon him by the commissioners; and
      3. Perform all legal duties pertaining to the formation and operation of the district.
    2. The attorney shall represent a board in all suits brought for or against it.
  1. The attorney shall receive as his compensation such fees as may be agreed upon by the boards.

History. Acts 1931, No. 224, §§ 1-3; Pope's Dig., §§ 7338, 9757-9759; Acts 1985, No. 179, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-128 — 20-130; Acts 1995, No. 362, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “may” for “shall” in (a)(1); substituted “§ 14-88-201 et seq.” for “§ 14-88-202 et seq.” and inserted “and local improvement districts within cities of the second class or incorporated towns” in (a)(2); deleted the former last sentence in (c); and made stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not objectionable as unequal in application or restricting the municipality's right to contract. Water Improv. Dist. v. Briner, 185 Ark. 742, 48 S.W.2d 1104 (1932).

Power to Employ.

Commissioners of city, acting as a board for the improvement districts therein, had power to employ the city attorney to represent all such districts in all legal matters and to prorate such attorney's continuing salary for such services among the districts. Bourland v. Coleman, 187 Ark. 392, 60 S.W.2d 1021 (1933).

Private Attorneys.

Under this section, an improvement district in a city of the second class or town cannot employ another attorney to sue for delinquent assessments. Water Improv. Dist. v. Briner, 185 Ark. 742, 48 S.W.2d 1104 (1932).

14-88-407. Oath of assessor.

The oaths of office of the assessors of municipal districts may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 20; Pope's Dig., § 7354; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-114.

Subchapter 5 — Affairs of Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 158, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1899, No. 94, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1913, No. 125, § 9: approved Mar. 3, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1919, No. 280, § 2: approved Mar. 17, 1919. Emergency declared.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1967, No. 163, § 7: Feb. 28, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly that in many cities and towns in the State of Arkansas the streets and highways are subject to heavy traffic by motor vehicles, that on account of parking motor vehicles in the streets and the lack of facilities for off-street parking of motor vehicles, vehicular traffic in the said streets and highways is made dangerous to drivers and to pedestrians, and that on account thereof the streets and highways are made hazardous to the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas; that it is necessary in order to protect the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas to provide adequate facilities for the off-street parking of motor vehicles and that only by the passage of this Act and giving it immediate effect can the lives and property of the residents of the State of Arkansas be protected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-88-501. Sale or lease of improvements.

  1. Any improvement district organized under the provisions of this chapter after February 1, 1967, may sell or lease its improvement, or any part thereof, to the city or town or to a public authority or other agency serving on behalf of the property owners of the district on such terms as the commissioners of the improvement board may deem for the best interest of the district and apply the proceeds therefrom on the payment of the principal of and interest on its outstanding bonds, if any, together with any paying agent's or other charges in connection therewith.
  2. The city or town within which the district is located is authorized to purchase or to lease as lessee and to operate the improvement of the district on such terms as it may agree with the commissioners.

History. Acts 1967, No. 163, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-140.

Case Notes

Cited: McClure v. City Council of Paragould, 255 Ark. 521, 501 S.W.2d 247 (1973).

14-88-502. Improvements outside limits.

When, in the opinion of the board of a municipal improvement district or the boards of different improvement districts, where combined and acting together in a city or town, it shall be necessary for the benefit of the inhabitants residing in the district or districts, it shall be lawful for money raised by assessment in the districts to be expended in:

  1. The purchase of lands or erection of houses, reservoirs, or other improvements necessary for the proper construction and operation of waterworks outside of the limits of the city or town in which the districts exist;
  2. The construction and operation of any portion of a sewerage system, or acquisition of rights-of-way therefor, which may be extended outside of the limits of any such city, town, or improvement district.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 3, p. 161; 1893, No. 158, § 1, p. 271; 1899, No. 94, § 1, p. 156; C. & M. Dig., § 5735; Pope's Dig., § 7363; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-119.

Case Notes

Sewerage Systems.

Where a sewer is extended beyond the limits of a city or improvement district to obtain a proper outlet, an assessment may be levied to secure such outlet. Kraft v. Smothers, 103 Ark. 269, 146 S.W. 505 (1912).

14-88-503. Annexation of territory to district.

    1. When persons claiming to be a majority in value of the owners of real property in any territory contiguous to any improvement district organized in any city or town desire that the territory shall be annexed to the district, they may present their petition in writing to the city or town council, describing the territory to be annexed and the character of the improvement desired.
    2. Thereupon, the city or town council shall direct the clerk or recorder to publish for two (2) weeks, in some newspaper issued and having a general circulation in the county where the city or town is situated, a notice calling upon the property owners to appear before the council on a day named and show cause for or against the annexation.
    1. On the day named in the notice, the council shall hear all persons who desire to be heard on the question whether a majority in value of the owners of real property in the territory sought to be annexed have signed the petition.
    2. Its findings shall have all the force and effect of a judgment and shall be conclusive unless, within thirty (30) days thereafter, suit is brought in the chancery court to review it.
  1. The finding of the council shall be expressed in an ordinance in case it is in favor of the petitioners, and in that event, the territory sought to be annexed shall become a part of the district, and the improvements petitioned for shall be made by the commissioners on the board of improvement.
  2. The commissioners shall make the assessment for the improvement on the territory annexed under the provision of this section on the same basis as if the territory was included in the original district.
  3. If petitioned for, the improvement in the territory annexed may be of different material or of a different method of construction from that in the original district.

History. Acts 1919, No. 280, § 1; C. & M. Dig., § 5733; Pope's Dig., § 7389; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-134.

Cross References. Annexation of territory upon extension of water, electric light, or sewer system, § 14-91-502.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Public Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 230.

Case Notes

In General.

Original improvement district and annexation must have separate assessments, bond issues, and construction contracts. Bahlau v. Bloom, 154 Ark. 349, 242 S.W. 547 (1922).

Assessments.

Where territory is annexed, the assessed benefits cannot exceed the limit of cost of the total value of the property in the entire district. White v. Loughborough, 125 Ark. 57, 188 S.W. 10 (1916); Blackburn v. Dunlap, 143 Ark. 625, 221 S.W. 176 (1920).

New assessors must be elected by the council if it should find that the old board had finished the original assessment. Board of Comm'rs v. City of Little Rock, 174 Ark. 519, 295 S.W. 972 (1927).

Improvements.

This section contemplates that, when territory is annexed, the improvements in the annexed territory are to be made by the commissioners of the districts according to the provisions of § 14-86-1501 et seq. which, among other things, govern as to the mode of assessing benefits. Poe v. Street Imp. Dist., 159 Ark. 569, 252 S.W. 616 (1923).

Improvement in annex must be of same general character as in original district; one district to pave and one to curb and gutter cannot be annexed to an original district, the purpose of which was to pave. Price v. Street Imp. Dist., 169 Ark. 787, 276 S.W. 861 (1925).

Notice.

A notice which does not describe the territory to be annexed is void. Blackburn v. Dunlap, 143 Ark. 625, 221 S.W. 176 (1920).

Petition.

The petition need not limit the cost, but it must be proportionate to that of the original district. Pledger v. Soltz, 169 Ark. 1125, 278 S.W. 50 (1925); Carnahan v. City of Fayetteville, 175 Ark. 405, 1 S.W.2d 10 (1927).

Territory Annexed.

An annexation may embrace property in the original district and may be for work partly within it. Miller v. Seymour, 156 Ark. 273, 245 S.W. 811 (1922); Davidson v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 741, 32 S.W.2d 1062 (1930).

Cited: Hazen v. City of Booneville, 260 Ark. 871, 545 S.W.2d 614 (1977).

14-88-504. Priority of suits.

  1. All suits which involve the validity of any municipal improvement district, of its assessment of benefits or any individual assessment, or of its power to make the improvement petitioned for, or which involve the title to office of any of the commissioners or assessors of the district, and all suits to collect its taxes laid on its assessed benefits, shall be deemed suits involving the public interest and shall be advanced in all courts and heard at the earliest practical moment.
  2. All appeals in these suits shall be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days.

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 5655; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 7289; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-132.

14-88-505. Records of meetings.

  1. The commissioners of a municipal improvement district shall maintain on file for inspection and copying a record of regular and special meetings of the municipal improvement district board.
  2. The records kept under subsection (a) of this section shall include without limitation:
    1. Meeting notices with date, time, and location;
    2. Meeting agendas;
    3. Detailed minutes of meetings;
    4. Financial reports with supporting bank statements; and
    5. Actions taken by the board with supporting documentation and plans, if any.

History. Acts 2013, No. 1428, § 1.

Subchapter 6 — Dissolution of Districts

14-88-601. Applicability.

  1. This subchapter shall not apply to any municipal improvement district which operates a water system, a sewerage system, or an electric light or power system; nor to any district whose commissioners are elected by property owners; nor to any district which is repairing streets, sidewalks, or other improvements from the proceeds of redemptions or sales of lands forfeited to it under previously existing laws.
  2. This subchapter shall not apply to any municipal wharf improvement district or municipal paving improvement district which is entitled to, is eligible for, and can qualify for state aid and has not received any or all thereof.

History. Acts 1945, No. 215, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-136.

14-88-602. Authority to wind up affairs.

In any and all municipal improvement districts which, at the time of their organization, had boundaries coextensive with the city or town in which they were located, which have paid their bonds and other obligations and have levied no tax for the past five (5) years, and which still hold title to lands purchased at foreclosure sale for delinquent taxes or have past due taxes owing, and the commissioners on the board of improvement of the district have no further duties to perform except the collection of delinquent taxes, the commissioners may proceed to wind up their affairs as set out in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1945, No. 215, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-136.

Case Notes

In General.

This section providing method for winding up of affairs of improvement district is not an exclusive method, nor is it compulsory. Searcy Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Searcy, 221 Ark. 360, 253 S.W.2d 211 (1952).

Funds.

City could not require banks holding funds of improvement district whose bonds had been paid to turn funds over to city for purpose of street repairs. Searcy Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Searcy, 221 Ark. 360, 253 S.W.2d 211 (1952) (decision prior to enactment of § 14-89-1301).

14-88-603. Procedures and final report.

  1. The commissioners on the board of a municipal improvement district shall execute a deed in favor of the city conveying all real estate as to which it holds title and shall turn over to the city clerk a list of all lands which have not been sold to the district, but which are delinquent for nonpayment of taxes, and shall pay to the city all funds which it has on hand.
  2. The commissioners shall then file with the city or town council a final report bringing up to date its receipts and disbursements since the last annual report filed by it in compliance with § 14-89-1102.
  3. The city or town council shall examine and readjust the annual report as set out in § 14-89-1103.
  4. If the city or town council approves the report, the commissioners shall stand discharged from their duties in such capacity, and thereafter the city or town collector shall handle the collection of all delinquent taxes due the districts.

History. Acts 1945, No. 215, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-137.

14-88-604. Conveyances of lands.

All conveyances which are necessary as to lands to which a municipal improvement district holds title shall be executed under the hand of the mayor or acting mayor. The city or town seal shall be attached thereto, which shall be attested by the city or town clerk.

History. Acts 1945, No. 215, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-138.

14-88-605. Redemption of lands.

  1. Any person holding an interest in any land sold or delinquent to any municipal improvement district shall be permitted to obtain a deed or redemption receipt, as the case may be, by payment of the amount for which the land was sold to the district, without interest, or the face of the tax for which the land is delinquent in the event it has not been sold to the district.
  2. All moneys received from any of these redemptions shall be placed in the street fund of the city and shall be used in the maintenance of the streets of the district. No funds so received by the city shall be diverted from the street fund and used for any other purposes.

History. Acts 1945, No. 215, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-139.

Chapter 89 Fiscal Affairs of Municipal Improvement Districts

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Borrowing and bankruptcy, § 14-74-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1985, No. 22, § 4: Feb. 5, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that municipal improvement districts should be required to file annual reports in the manner prescribed by Act 154 of 1959 for other improvement districts; that Act 154 of 1959 requires annual financial reports to be filed by March of each year; and that this Act is immediately necessary in order to be implemented in time for the March 1985 reporting deadline. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Research References

C.J.S. 84 C.J.S., Tax., § 202.

14-89-101. Applicability of water district accounting law.

  1. Each municipal improvement district of any kind heretofore or hereafter established pursuant to the provisions of §§ 14-88-203, 14-88-205 — 14-88-207 shall be subject to and shall comply with the provisions of § 14-119-101 et seq.
  2. If the board of improvement of any improvement district established pursuant to §§ 14-88-203, 14-88-205 — 14-88-207 fails or refuses to comply with any provision of § 14-119-101 et seq., such failure or refusal shall constitute misfeasance in office and shall be grounds for removal of the members of the board from office.

History. Acts 1985, No. 22, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-247.

Subchapter 2 — Borrowing of Money

Cross References. Borrowing money for repairs, replacements, improvements, and extensions of waterworks, electric plants, and sewers, § 14-91-501.

Effective Dates. Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 47, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1929, No. 207, § 3: approved Mar. 27, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that the lighting of the streets of our cities is necessary for the safety of the traveling public, and that for want of proper lighting of the streets great facilities are given to highwaymen and other criminals in the perpetration of crimes against the public peace and safety; and it is therefore ascertained and hereby declared that the immediate operation of this act is essential for the preservation of the public peace and safety, and an emergency is therefore declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1941, No. 310, § 3: approved Mar. 26, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that the passage of this act is essential in the making of public improvements throughout the State of Arkansas by which grade crossings may be eliminated and the overflow of public highways may be prevented, and highways may be made safer in other ways and that therefore there is an urgent need that this Act go into immediate operation, and that its immediate operation is essential to the public safety. An emergency is therefore declared, and it is hereby provided that it shall take effect and be in force immediately upon its passage.”

Acts 1967, No. 163, § 7: Feb. 28, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly that in many cities and towns in the State of Arkansas the streets and highways are subject to heavy traffic by motor vehicles, that on account of parking motor vehicles in the streets and the lack of facilities for off-street parking of motor vehicles, vehicular traffic in the said streets and highways is made dangerous to drivers and to pedestrians, and that on account thereof the streets and highways are made hazardous to the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas; that it is necessary in order to protect the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas to provide adequate facilities for the off-street parking of motor vehicles and that only by the passage of this Act and giving it immediate effect can the lives and property of the residents of the State of Arkansas be protected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 45, § 4: Mar. 13, 1970. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 224, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 19, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations and that the existing mandatory form of assessment ordinance for municipal improvement districts is unduly restrictive to the financing of such improvements, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 425, § 54: Mar. 11, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Case Notes

Issuance of Bonds.

Sewer improvement districts are not bound by the provisions of Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 1. Even if, under City of Hot Springs v. Creviston, 288 Ark. 286, 705 S.W.2d 415 and Hot Springs v. Creviston, 288 Ark. 286, 288 Ark. 293A, 713 S.W.2d 230 (1986), bonds issued by a sewer improvement district were held to be under the restrictions of Ark. Const., Art. 16, requiring an election prior to the issuance of bonds, bonds issued prior to that decision were not affected by it. Bell v. Fulkerson, 291 Ark. 604, 727 S.W.2d 141 (1987).

14-89-201. Authority generally.

  1. For preliminary expenses and to raise money to do the work or to pay for an improvement already completed, a municipal improvement district board may:
    1. Borrow money not exceeding the estimated cost thereof, including interest on the money borrowed to a date six (6) months subsequent to the estimated date of completion of the work and a reserve not to exceed one (1) year's principal and interest requirements;
    2. To that extent, issue negotiable bonds or certificates of indebtedness bearing interest at rates provided in the resolution authorizing their issuance; and
    3. Pledge and mortgage all uncollected assessments for the payment thereof.
    1. The board may also issue its negotiable bonds for the purpose of funding or refunding any of the floating debts of the improvement district or any outstanding bonds, including interest thereon due or about to become due, whether or not represented by coupons or interest certificates, theretofore issued to finance the construction of such an improvement already completed, including sewer systems, or to finance any betterments, extensions, or repairs thereto, irrespective of whether the outstanding bonds were originally issued by the improvement district.
      1. The funding or refunding bonds may be exchanged for the outstanding bonds or interest thereon as provided in this section, or they may be sold and the proceeds thereof used in the retirement of the outstanding bonds and interest.
        1. It shall be a felony for any officer of the district or any other person to use the proceeds of the funding or refunding bonds for any other purpose than that for which they are issued.
        2. The party guilty of such a felony shall be punished as provided in §§ 14-88-309, 14-88-310, 14-88-402.
    2. For the repayment of funding or refunding bonds, the board may pledge and mortgage all uncollected assessments.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 17, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5708; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 17; Pope's Dig., § 7347; Acts 1941, No. 310, § 2; 1967, No. 163, § 3; 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 45, § 1; 1975, No. 224, § 2; 1981, No. 425, § 28; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-201.

Cross References. Issuance of bonds for preliminary expenses, § 14-86-702.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

An improvement district is not a “municipality” nor the agent of one within Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 1, which prohibits a county or municipality from issuing interest bearing evidences of debt. Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148, 17 S.W. 702 (1891).

An improvement district is not a municipality and is not bound by the restrictions contained in Ark. Const., Art. 16, requiring an election prior to the issuance of bonds. Bell v. Fulkerson, 291 Ark. 604, 727 S.W.2d 141 (1987).

Bonds.

Improvement districts may sell their bonds at private sale and below par where not prohibited by statute. Hopson v. Hellums, 108 Ark. 460, 158 S.W. 771 (1913).

Where improvement district was authorized to borrow money, the power to issue negotiable bonds was implied. Logan v. Sidewalk Dist., 163 Ark. 591, 260 S.W. 407 (1924) (decision prior to 1929 amendment).

The security of the original pledge follows refunding bonds. Simpson v. Little Rock-North Heights Water Dist., 191 Ark. 451, 86 S.W.2d 423 (1935).

Estimated Cost.

The “estimated cost” is the estimated cost as reported to the municipal council and on file with the city clerk. Meyer v. Ring, 162 Ark. 9, 257 S.W. 388 (1924).

14-89-202. Mortgage of water and light plants.

  1. Any district improvement board in any city or incorporated town in this state, in addition to the power given to the board by any statute to pledge all uncollected assessments to secure money borrowed by the board for the purpose of and use in the building, construction, and putting into operation a system of waterworks or an electric light plant in any district shall also have the power to mortgage any waterworks system or electric light plant to secure the payment of money borrowed by any of the boards as indicated and used in the building and putting into operation any waterworks system or electric light plant in any improvement district in any city or incorporated town in this state.
  2. Any such mortgagee or his assignees shall have all the rights against the property as is given mortgagees on property of individuals, either at law or in equity.

History. Acts 1897 (Ex. Sess.), No. 47, § 1, p. 114; C. & M. Dig., § 5709; Pope's Dig., § 7348; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-204.

14-89-203. Electric streetlight districts in cities with a population of more than 10,000.

Improvement districts for the purpose of installing electric streetlights in cities having more than ten thousand (10,000) inhabitants may borrow money for the purpose of doing the work of construction at a rate of interest provided in the resolution of the board of improvement and may mortgage their improvements and pledge their income as security for the money borrowed, and they may execute negotiable bonds for the money borrowed.

History. Acts 1929, No. 207, § 2; 1981, No. 425, § 31; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-202.

Subchapter 3 — Payment of Bonds

Effective Dates. Acts 1927, No. 201, § 2: approved Mar. 23, 1927. Emergency clause provided: “Since certain municipal corporations and boards of commissioners having controlled the work completed by improvement district have on hand funds recovered in litigation or accumulated from operating expenses which are likely to be dissipated or squandered, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, the same shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-89-301. Use of funds to pay off.

It shall be lawful for any municipal corporation or board of commissioners having control of any improvement district within a municipal corporation, or any work completed by any district, to appropriate and use any funds recovered in litigation or for operating expenses for the purpose of paying off any bonded indebtedness of the district when the funds are not needed for the operating expenses of the district.

History. Acts 1927, No. 201, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7361; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-208.

14-89-302. Default in payment.

  1. If any bond or interest coupon on any bond issued by any municipal improvement district is not paid within sixty (60) days after its maturity, it shall be the duty of the chancery court, on application of the trustee for the bondholders or of the holder of any such bond or coupons overdue to cause the collection of the taxes of the district and appoint an assessor to reassess the benefits, if necessary.
  2. The proceeds of the taxes and collections shall be applied after payment of cost, first to overdue interest and then to payment pro rata of all bonds issued by the board, which are then due and payable.
  3. The commissioners may be directed by suit to foreclose the lien of the taxes on the land. A suit so brought by the commissioners shall be conducted in all matters as suits by the board and with like effect, and the decrees and deeds therein shall have the same presumptions in their favor.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 22; Pope's Dig., § 7337; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-203.

Cross References. Collection in municipal bridge, suburban, and road districts, § 14-86-802.

Case Notes

Overdue Interest.

An order was void which directed the purchase of bonds not due at 50 percent discount from taxes collected leaving overdue interest unpaid. Dickinson v. Mingea, 191 Ark. 946, 88 S.W.2d 807 (1935).

Subchapter 4 — Refunding Indebtedness

Cross References. Reorganizing districts upon issuance of refunding bonds, § 14-87-101 et seq.

Sale of refunding bonds when old bonds cannot be presented for payment, § 19-9-302.

Effective Dates. Acts 1933, No. 112, § 5: approved Mar. 18, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability of many improvement districts to pay their maturing bonds and interest coupons, there is grave danger that the taxpayers in such districts will lose their homes and that disorder and civil disturbance may result and this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1937, No. 241, § 2: approved Mar. 10, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that many improvement districts are unable to pay their maturing bonds and interest coupons, that judgments have been secured on such bonds, that by reason of the above mentioned conditions there is grave danger that the taxpayers in such districts will lose their homes through foreclosure of the lien securing the payment of the bonds, that such loss of homes would cause disorder and civil disturbance; and that this act is therefore necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety. It is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and that this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 4: Mar. 13, 1970. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 225, § 26: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 19, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this state and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 425, § 54: Mar. 11, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 828, § 2: Apr. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Section 1 of Act 112 of 1933 was amended by Section 11 of Act 425 of 1981 to clarify the maximum rate of interest that may be charged with respect to refunding bonds issued by municipal improvement districts, but that through an oversight Section 2 of said Act was not amended and said Section still contains a limitation of six percent on the maximum rate of interest that may be charged with respect to such refunding bonds, and that such inconsistency is prohibiting municipal improvement districts from issuing refunding bonds under current market conditions, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to correct such inconsistency. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 865, § 2: Apr. 4, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Section 1 of Act 112 of 1933 was amended by Section 11 of Act 425 of 1981 to clarify the maximum rate of interest that may be charged with respect to refunding bonds issued by municipal improvement districts, but that through an oversight Section 2 of said Act was not amended and said Section still contains a limitation of six percent on the maximum rate of interest that may be charged with respect to such refunding bonds, and that such inconsistency is prohibiting municipal improvement districts from issuing refunding bonds under current market conditions, and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to correct such inconsistency. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This subchapter is not unconstitutional as providing for expenses not in the property owner's minds when the petition for the improvement is signed and the assessment of benefits made. Benton v. Nowlin, 187 Ark. 738, 62 S.W.2d 16 (1933).

Construction.

This subchapter constitutes a grant of power to municipal improvement districts and is not mandatory. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

Applicability.

This subchapter is prospective in applicability. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

14-89-401. Purpose.

This subchapter is intended to permit only the refunding of valid outstanding bonds and accrued matured interest on the bonds of any municipal improvement district, expressly including bonds on which judgment has been rendered in any court and not including any other form of indebtedness, and then only after the board of improvement thirty (30) days prior to the actual refunding has given notice to do so in some newspaper of bona fide circulation in the county where the district which will refund is located.

History. Acts 1933, No. 112, § 1; 1937, No. 241, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 11343; Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 1; 1975, No. 225, § 11; 1981, No. 425, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-205.

14-89-402. Authority generally.

  1. Any municipal improvement district of any city of the first or second class or incorporated town of this state shall have the power to fund and refund its outstanding indebtedness, including its bonded indebtedness and accrued matured interest on the indebtedness, and to extend the maturity of the indebtedness on such terms as the commissioners of the district shall deem for the best interest of the district. To that end, the district may issue the negotiable bonds of the district, with interest coupons attached. These refunding bonds shall run for a period not exceeding fifty (50) years from date thereof.
  2. The commissioners of the district may exchange new bonds for outstanding bonds, including accrued matured interest thereon, or may issue and sell new bonds and use the proceeds thereof to take up any of the outstanding bonds or other indebtedness of the district in the refunding thereof.
  3. These refunding bonds shall not be issued in a greater amount than is necessary to pay the outstanding bonds and accrued interest coupons then being refunded, with interest to the date the new bonds are delivered, plus expenses incurred in connection with the issuance of the new bonds. They shall not be delivered except upon the surrender and cancellation of a proportionate part of the indebtedness being refunded.
  4. These refunding bonds shall bear interest at such rate or rates as the commissioners shall provide in the resolution authorizing their issuance.

History. Acts 1933, No. 112, § 1; 1937, No. 241, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 11343; Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 43, § 1; 1975, No. 225, § 11; 1981, No. 425, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-205.

14-89-403. Methods of raising revenue.

In order to provide for the additional interest requirement of refunding bonds and the expense incurred in connection with the issuance of refunding bonds, a municipal improvement district issuing refunding bonds may follow any one (1) of the alternative procedures hereinafter outlined and designated as subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section:

  1. A district issuing refunding bonds may provide by resolution of the board of commissioners, duly adopted, that the entire balance unpaid on the date of the refunding bonds of the assessment of benefits against each lot, block, and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way shall draw interest at any rate deemed advisable or necessary, as provided in the resolution of the commissioners authorizing the issuance of the refunding bonds, from the date of the refunding bonds until paid. However, the interest need not be collected until it is necessary to do so to avoid exceeding the total amount of benefits and, if collected, shall be collected on each installment or annual levy separately. After the date of the refunding bonds, the annual levies of assessment of benefits shall be collected on the balance unpaid on the date of said refunding bonds against each lot, block, and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way in the improvement district. A certified copy of the resolution shall be filed by the secretary of the district with the collector of the district; or
  2. A district issuing refunding bonds may provide by resolution of the board of commissioners duly adopted that the entire balance unpaid on the date of the refunding bonds, for the assessment of benefits against each lot, block, and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way shall be the assessment of benefits against each respective lot, block, and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way for the refunding issue of bonds and shall draw interest, as provided in the resolution of the commissioners authorizing the issuance of the refunding bonds, from the date of the refunding bonds until paid. However, the interest need not be collected until it is necessary to do so to avoid exceeding the total amount of benefits and, if collected, shall be collected on each installment, or annual levy separately. After the date of the refunding bonds, the annual levies of the assessment of benefits shall be collected on the respective assessments of benefits as thus fixed against each lot, block, and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way, with or without an interest charge thereon, as the commissioners may deem necessary. However, when such a resolution is adopted by the board, it shall be certified by the secretary of the district, and it shall be filed with the city clerk or town recorder who shall publish in some newspaper published in the city or town, if there be one, and if not then in some newspaper published in the county and having a bona fide circulation in the city or town, a notice which shall be in the following form:

“NOTICE TO OWNERS OF PROPERTY IN IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. OF , ARKANSAS. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Commissioner(s) of Improvement District No. of , Arkansas, have filed with the undersigned a resolution fixing the assessment of benefits on each lot, block and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way in said improvement district, and the same is now subject to inspection. Any property owner in said district may appeal to the City (or Town) Council within ten (10) days from this date. GIVEN this day of , 19 . City Clerk (or Town Recorder) of

Click to view form.

Within ten (10) days after the publication of the notice, the district or any property owner may apply to the city or town council to revise the assessment so made, and the district or the property owner may within thirty (30) days apply to the chancery court of the county to have the assessment revised and corrected. If no application is made to the council within ten (10) days or to the court within thirty (30) days, the assessment shall become final and incontestable, subject only to annual revision as provided by law. On appeal to the city or town council, a hearing can be had as prescribed in § 14-90-501. When the assessment is filed, the city clerk or town recorder shall make the corrections upon the original assessment roll on file in red ink, and shall certify said assessment to the collector of the district.

History. Acts 1933, No. 112, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 11344; Acts 1985, No. 828, § 1; 1985, No. 865, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-206.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional as transferring the power to make assessments from assessors to commissioners. Benton v. Nowlin, 187 Ark. 738, 62 S.W.2d 16 (1933).

Construction.

The cardinal difference between subdivisions (1) and (2) is that under subdivision (1) the existing unpaid balance of betterments is finally determined to be the particular and total benefits as a basis for refunding, while under subdivision (2) an opportunity for reassessment of benefits is afforded any property owner in the district. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

Applicability.

This section expressly negatives any retroactive effect or applicability of interest on installment payment of benefits. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

Assessments.

No assessment of benefits can be levied by improvement district beyond that set out in the original assessment. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

Interest.

The provisions that interest on refunding bonds is to be levied only on the “entire balance unpaid on the date of the refunding bonds of the assessment of benefits against each lot, block, and parcel of land and railroad track and right-of-way … from the date of the refunding bonds until paid … clearly limit interest to the basis of unpaid benefit assessments which are such as of the date of the refunding bonds. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

Delinquent betterment assessments only draw interest from date of publication of notice of refunding. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 221 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1955).

14-89-404. Form of bonds.

All refunding bonds shall be negotiable instruments and may have coupons evidencing interest, payable at annual or semiannual periods, and shall have all the rights of security, including liens on assessments of benefits and levy of taxes on the lands, together with all remedies for their collection that are provided for the original bonds issued by a municipal improvement district and may be further secured by a pledge and mortgage of the assessment of benefits and taxes in the district, to be executed by the commissioners.

History. Acts 1933, No. 112, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 11345; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-207.

Subchapter 5 — Receipt of Tax Revenues Generally

Cross References. County road tax, § 26-79-101 et seq.

Proportion of tax to suburban improvement districts, § 14-92-236.

Effective Dates. Acts 1939, No. 90, § 2: approved Feb. 15, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas there are incorporated towns and cities of the second class in counties having two levying courts which have formed, or will hereafter form, municipal improvement districts for the purpose of improving streets and alleys, and said districts are handicapped by lack of funds and inadequate collection of assessed benefits, this act is found necessary for the public peace, health and safety and an emergency is declared to exist and this act shall be in effect from and after the date of its passage.”

14-89-501. Road tax — Payment to certain improvement districts.

  1. In counties which have two (2) levying courts, in which there is an incorporated town or city of the second class that has formed any municipal improvement district for the purpose of improving any of its streets or alleys, the amount of the three-mill road tax collected by the county on property situated within the district shall be paid by the tax collector for the county directly to the collector for the district, to be expended as funds of the district.
  2. This section shall not apply in any manner to cities of the first class.

History. Acts 1939, No. 90, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-216.

14-89-502. Distribution of road tax in certain cities of the first class.

  1. Whenever, by an act of the General Assembly or by the order of a county court, the three-mill road tax collected on the property in a street improvement district and annex in a city of the first class is given to the district and annex, respectively, as an aid to the property owners on account of the extra width of the street or for any other reason, the commissioners on the board of improvement may, if they deem it fair and equitable, distribute between the district and the annex the total amount received for both the three-mill tax, in the proportion that the cost of the improvement in each bears to the total cost of the improvement in both.
  2. This section shall apply only to those counties having a population of eighty-five thousand (85,000) or more according to the latest federal census.

History. Acts 1927, No. 120, §§ 1, 2; Pope's Dig., §§ 9643, 9644; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-217, 20-218.

Subchapter 6 — District School Tax

Effective Dates. Acts 1933, No. 64, § 6: approved Mar. 2, 1933. Emergency clause provided: “In view of the facts which are hereby declared to exist that improvement districts of the foregoing type have been immune from school district taxation in this State notwithstanding the fact that they are revenue-producing, that the present shortage of school revenues in school districts where such improvement districts exist would be materially lessened by removing said exemption from taxation as applied to district school taxes and that the public school would be enabled to function longer as free public schools without compelling the patrons thereof to provide for private schools taught on a tuition basis, an emergency is hereby declared to exist; and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-89-601. Applicability.

  1. This subchapter shall apply in cities of the first class to any water, electric light, or power improvement district organized under the laws of this state, whether general or special, and operated by a governing improvement board of commissioners or directors elected by the vote of the property owners owning real property within the municipal improvement district.
  2. This subchapter shall likewise apply to such districts even when they may have been consolidated with each other or when a water district and a light district shall have been consolidated with a sewer district, though in the latter case the property owned by the sewer district or sewer department, as the case may be, shall not be subject to the terms of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1933, No. 64, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 10033; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-220.

14-89-602. Property subject to tax.

  1. The property, real and personal, of the kind of municipal improvement district described in § 14-89-601 shall be subject, in the school district of the domicile of the improvement district, to the district school tax levied by vote of the electors of the school district under the provisions of Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 11.
  2. If any such improvement district furnishes free electric lighting service and water to the municipality in which it is located, that part of its property, such as, the street and ornamental lighting equipment and fire hydrants, which is used exclusively for the purpose of furnishing free service, shall not be included in fixing the assessed valuation of the property of the improvement district.

History. Acts 1933, No. 64, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 10034; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-221.

14-89-603. Assessment and collection.

  1. The assessment of the value of property for taxation shall be made on a unit basis each year by the county assessor in the same manner as public utilities generally assessed by the Arkansas Public Service Commission, and the value thereof shall be returned on the personal property assessment book.
  2. The county clerk shall then extend the amount annually of the district school tax thereon on the tax books, and the taxes shall be collected by the county tax collector along with other taxes.
  3. In case of nonpayment, the remedy shall be by mandamus against the board of directors or commissioners of the improvement district and not by sale of the district's property.

History. Acts 1933, No. 64, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 10035; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-222.

Cross References. Assessment of utilities, § 26-26-1601 et seq.

Subchapter 7 — Aid by Counties

Effective Dates. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 2: approved June 30, 1924. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-89-701. Applicability.

The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to the following counties: Ashley, Carroll, Cross, Chicot, Lee, Prairie, Lawrence, Franklin, Van Buren, Jackson, Greene, Lincoln, Nevada, Hempstead, Faulkner, Madison, Monroe, Yell, Lonoke, White, Clay, Lafayette, Crawford, St. Francis, Polk, Phillips, Benton, Boone, Columbia, Clark, Calhoun, Ouachita, Scott, Dallas, Drew, Independence, Sharp, Miller, Izard, Little River, Union, Howard, Logan, Stone, Bradley, Grant, Craighead, Hot Spring, Baxter, Randolph, Sevier, Woodruff, Fulton, Montgomery, and Johnson.

History. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-219.

14-89-702. Validity of indebtedness.

All warrants and other evidences of indebtedness allowed and issued by any county quorum court or judge of any county court, or by any city or town council or the mayor and clerk thereof, or which may be so allowed and issued for the aid of improvement districts in cities and towns, are declared to be valid and negotiable.

History. Acts 1924 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-219.

Subchapter 8 — Advancement of Funds by Municipalities

Effective Dates. Acts 1973, No. 404, § 5: Mar. 20, 1973. Emergency clause provided: “The General Assembly has determined that improvement districts are valuable financing vehicles for needed extensions to municipal water and sewer systems and that the lack of authority for municipalities to advance necessary moneys to pay the organizational expenses of improvement districts is a serious impediment to the formation of such districts. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-89-801. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Municipality” means a city of the first class, a city of the second class, or an incorporated town;
  2. “Improvement district” means either a municipal improvement district or a suburban improvement district;
  3. “Organization expenses” include engineering fees, legal fees, fees of financial advisers, abstractors' fees, the costs of newspaper advertising, and all other necessary fees and expenses in determining the feasibility of and organizing the proposed improvement district; and
  4. “Area adjacent to the municipality” means all or any portion of the area lying outside, and within ten (10) miles, of the corporate limits of the municipality that the governing body determines should be served by the water or sewer system of the municipality.

History. Acts 1973, No. 404, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-246.

Cross References. Suburban improvement districts, § 14-92-201 et seq.

14-89-802. Conditions precedent.

A municipality may advance available moneys derived from the operation of its water or sewer system, or other available moneys, to pay the organizational expenses of one (1) or more proposed improvement districts if the governing body of the municipality determines, as to each such district, that:

  1. The proposed improvement district will provide water or sewer services, or both, to an area within or adjacent to, or in part within and in part adjacent to, the municipality;
  2. The water or sewer facilities to be acquired or constructed by the improvement district will become a part of the water or sewer system of the municipality; and
  3. The water or sewer facilities to be acquired or constructed by the improvement district are required to complete the water or sewer system of the municipality so as to enable the municipal system to adequately serve the area within and adjacent to the municipality.

History. Acts 1973, No. 404, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-244.

14-89-803. Procedure for advances.

  1. Moneys advanced under the authority of this subchapter shall be in such amounts and shall be paid to such persons, including, without limitation, to those persons doing the work or to trustees or committees created by the governing body for the purpose, at such times either in one (1) lump sum or in installments, from time to time, and under such conditions and restrictions as the municipal governing body shall determine and prescribe by ordinance.
  2. No one (1) ordinance shall authorize advances to more than one (1) improvement district.
  3. There may be one (1) ordinance authorizing, and prescribing the manner of making, all advances to or for the benefit of a single district, or multiple advances to or for the benefit of a single district may be authorized by separate ordinances.

History. Acts 1973, No. 404, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-245.

Subchapter 9 — Use of Profits

Effective Dates. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 9: approved Mar. 9, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained that because of economic conditions existing in the State of Arkansas for a period of several years a large number of people owning property subject to assessment in municipal improvement districts have been unable to pay assessments extended against such property and such property owners are in danger of losing title to their property by reason of such assessments; and it being further ascertained that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the peace, health, safety, and general welfare of a large number of the people in the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-89-901. Applicability.

  1. The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to any municipal improvement district in the State of Arkansas which has been created, either by special act of the General Assembly or under the general laws of the state, for the purpose of repairing, enlarging, overhauling, erecting, and equipping any electric power plant, waterworks system, or sewer system which may have been constructed by a previously existing district within the municipality.
  2. No part of this subchapter shall apply to a municipal plant operated solely by city commissioners without a majority vote of the commissioners.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-215.

14-89-902. Construction.

This subchapter is cumulative, and it is expressly declared that this subchapter shall not modify, amend, or repeal §§ 14-199-202—14-199-205, relating to use of profits from municipally owned electric power plants or waterworks systems.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-215.

14-89-903. Purpose of expenditures.

  1. Any improvement district within any city or town in the State of Arkansas which is created for the purpose of constructing, repairing, enlarging, and overhauling any electric power plant, waterworks system, or sewer system is authorized to use the profits, or any part thereof, derived from the operation of the plants or systems toward:
    1. The payment of the outstanding bonded indebtedness of all street, sewer, or other improvement districts within the limits of the municipality; and
    2. The payment of any obligations of the city or town which may have been incurred by the city or town in the manner provided by law.
  2. The expenditures authorized in this section shall be made as provided for in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-209.

Cross References. Profits from electric or water systems, § 14-199-201 et seq.

14-89-904. Special account to pay bonds.

  1. At the end of each fiscal year of the operation of an electric power plant or waterworks system, the commissioners of a municipal improvement board shall set aside, in a special account out of the profits from the operation of the plant or system, such sum as may be necessary to pay all bonds and interest of the improvement district which shall accrue during the next ensuing fiscal year so that the district shall, at all times, have in the special account a sum sufficient to pay all principal bonds and interest which may accrue within the next fiscal year.
  2. The funds so deposited in the special account shall be used for no other purpose except the payment of bonds and interest of the district.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-210.

14-89-905. Depreciation and reserve accounts — Improvements.

  1. Before any expenditures as authorized by § 14-89-903 shall be made, the commissioners of a municipal improvement board shall provide from the operation of an electric power plant or waterworks system adequate depreciation and reserve accounts.
  2. Adequate provisions shall also be made for such alterations, improvements, or extensions of the electric power plant or waterworks system as, in the judgment of the commissioners of the board, will be necessary during the ensuing year.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-211.

14-89-906. Approval by municipal council.

The profits from the operation of any electric power plant or waterworks system shall not be used for the purposes set forth in § 14-89-903 until such expenditures by a municipal improvement district have first been authorized by resolution duly adopted by the council of the city or town.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-212.

14-89-907. Allocation of profits to districts and municipality.

  1. After compliance with §§ 14-89-904 and 14-89-905, the remaining profits from the operation of an electric power plant or waterworks system shall be determined by the commissioners of a municipal improvement board.
  2. If the commissioners determine that the remaining profits from the operation of the plant or system, or any part thereof, shall be used for the purposes set forth in § 14-89-903, then the commissioners may, upon the adoption of a proper resolution by the city or town council, allocate to the various improvement districts within the municipality and for other municipal expenses the amounts which are to be appropriated for these purposes.
  3. No part of these profits shall be allocated to any district until the commissioners of the district have furnished proof to the commissioners of the light and water district that bonds and interest of the district which is to receive the allocation of profits will mature during the ensuing year and that the district will not be able to pay the maturities without collecting an assessment against the property of the district.
  4. The allocation to the various districts within the municipalities as prescribed shall be according to the following ratio: The total amount of bond and interest maturities of all street and other improvement districts within the municipality coming due during the particular year, that is, the year following the fiscal year for which the profit of the plant and system was determined, shall be determined, and the ratio which the total bond and interest maturities of any street and other improvement district for the fiscal year bears to the total bond and interest maturities of all the street and other improvement districts for the fiscal year shall be the percentage used to allocate to each street and other improvement district its proportion of the profit to be used for the retirement of the bonded indebtedness of any such district.
  5. The funds allocated to any district under the provisions of this subchapter shall be used exclusively for the purpose of paying bonds and interest of the districts and for no other purpose.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-213.

14-89-908. Payments to districts and municipality.

  1. The amounts allocated to the various improvement districts within the limits of a municipality shall be paid to the districts when the commissioners on the boards of improvement shall request that it be paid in order that the funds may be used by such districts to pay the bonds and interest maturities of the districts which are about to become due.
  2. The amounts allocated to the municipality shall be paid into the treasury of the municipality upon resolution duly adopted by the council of the city or town.

History. Acts 1939, No. 208, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-214.

Subchapter 10 — Payment of Moneys

Effective Dates. Acts 1897, No. 16, § 5: effective on passage.

14-89-1001. Payment by treasurer.

    1. The treasurer of a board of improvement shall pay out no moneys save upon the order of the municipal board of improvement.
    2. Upon the order of the municipal board of improvement to pay out moneys, the chair shall sign the warrant.
  1. The treasurer shall be allowed a commission not exceeding one percent (1%) upon all sums lawfully paid out, to be fixed by the board.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 13, p. 161; 1897, No. 16, § 4, p. 23; C. & M. Dig., § 5705; Pope's Dig., § 7344; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-226; Acts 2007, No. 131, § 2.

14-89-1002. Warrant requirements.

  1. Under this subchapter, every warrant shall state upon its face to whom, the amount, and the purpose for which it is issued.
  2. All warrants shall be dated and shall be numbered consecutively in a record to be kept by the municipal board of improvement of the number and amount of each.
  3. No warrant shall be paid unless there is in the treasury funds enough to pay all outstanding warrants bearing a lower number.
  4. No warrant shall be increased by reason of any depreciation in the market value thereof, nor shall any contract or warrant be made payable or paid in anything but currency.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 13, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5707; Pope's Dig., § 7346; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-227.

Subchapter 11 — Annual Financial Settlements

Cross References. Publication of annual reports, § 1-3-105.

14-89-1101. Penalties.

Every member of any municipal improvement board who fails or refuses to make settlement as required by this subchapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). In addition thereto, he may be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days.

History. Acts 1895, No. 140, § 3, p. 205; C. & M. Dig., § 5720; Pope's Dig., § 7360; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-230.

14-89-1102. Filing requirement.

    1. Annually on or before March 1, all municipal boards of improvement created under § 14-88-212 shall file a settlement with the clerk of the city or town in which the improvements shall have been ordered showing all collections and money received and paid out, with proper vouchers for all payments.
    2. The settlement may be included with the report required by § 14-86-2102.
  1. The settlement shall lie over for one (1) month for examination and adjustment, during which time any taxpayer of the district may file exceptions to the settlement.

History. Acts 1895, No. 140, § 1, p. 205; C. & M. Dig., § 5718; Pope's Dig., § 7358; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-228; Acts 2011, No. 210, § 3.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1); substituted “on or before March 1” for “during the month of September” in (a)(1); and added (a)(2);

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section has no applicability to an action for an improvement district to recover from an employee and his surety money embezzled by the employee. Kelley v. Ballard, 192 Ark. 663, 93 S.W.2d 1256 (1936).

Effect.

Report filed by commissioners admitting obligation to contractor who had made improvements before the bar of the statute of limitations attached to the claim constituted acknowledgment of the indebtedness. Street Improv. Dist. v. Mooney, 203 Ark. 745, 158 S.W.2d 661 (1942).

Enforcement.

Property owner is entitled to writ of mandamus to require commissioners to file report. Buchanan v. Halpin, 176 Ark. 822, 4 S.W.2d 510 (1928).

Mandamus will lie to compel compliance with this section. Street Improv. Dist. v. Mooney, 203 Ark. 745, 158 S.W.2d 661 (1942).

Cited: Lawrence v. Jones, 228 Ark. 1136, 313 S.W.2d 228 (1958).

14-89-1103. Examination and adjustments.

  1. Whether any exceptions are filed or not, the city or town council shall proceed to examine the settlements and shall disallow any and all unjust charges and credits, if there are any.
    1. The council shall readjust the settlement wherever an improper item may be included in it.
    2. The adjustment shall be finally subject to reexamination in a court of chancery for error or mistake upon suit brought by the board or by any taxpayer of the district.

History. Acts 1895, No. 140, § 2, p. 205; C. & M. Dig., § 5719; Pope's Dig., § 7359; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-229.

Case Notes

Cited: Boles v. Kelley, 90 Ark. 29, 117 S.W. 1073 (1909); Puryear v. City of Jonesboro, 110 Ark. 562, 163 S.W. 504 (1914); Water Improv. Dist. v. Briner, 185 Ark. 742, 48 S.W.2d 1104 (1932); Kelley v. Ballard, 192 Ark. 663, 93 S.W.2d 1256 (1936).

Subchapter 12 — Refund of Excess Collections

Effective Dates. Acts 1949, No. 350, § 5: approved Mar. 21, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas there being no standard set forth for the refund assessment benefits in municipal improvement districts; and

“Whereas, there are street improvement districts which have fully paid their bonded indebtedness and now desire to refund the excess collections, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the people of the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-89-1201. Definition.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “property owner” means the holder of the legal title at the time a refund is made.

History. Acts 1949, No. 350, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-232.

Case Notes

In General.

Refund on street assessment to the title owner of the property at the time board formally adopts its resolution directing disbursement does not impair a vested right of former owner who had paid final assessment. Street Imp. Dist. No. 419 v. Lewis, 216 Ark. 595, 226 S.W.2d 813 (1950).

14-89-1202. Authority of street or water improvement districts.

When any municipal street or water improvement district has fully retired and paid out the bonded indebtedness of the district and there remains a surplus of money derived from the collection of benefit assessments levied against the real property in the district for the purpose of retiring the bonds or funds derived from the sale of unredeemed real property acquired by the district, the surplus funds may be refunded to the property owners of the district pro rata by the board of improvement of the district.

History. Acts 1949, No. 350, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-231; Acts 1995, No. 583, § 1.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment inserted “or water.”

14-89-1203. Delinquent realty not counted.

Under this subchapter, any real estate or parts or parcels of real estate which are delinquent at the time a refund is made shall not be counted in arriving at the pro rata distribution.

History. Acts 1949, No. 350, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-233.

Subchapter 13 — Surplus Funds

Effective Dates. Acts 1953, No. 180, § 3: approved Mar. 2, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas there are sewer improvement districts which have fully paid their bonded indebtedness and have turned over the improvement to the municipality and such improvement is being operated and maintained by such municipality and such district now desires to turn over its surplus funds to such municipality, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety of the people of the State of Arkansas, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1953, No. 310, § 3: Mar. 26, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly that the poor condition of the streets within cities and incorporated towns constitutes a hazard to the life and limb of the inhabitants thereof, and that the provisions of this act will make funds available to in part alleviate the prevailing conditions. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 222, § 2: Mar. 12, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and declared by the General Assembly that municipal improvement heretofore dissolved have unused funds remaining after their dissolution and that they have no further indebtedness, and that such funds may be utilized by the various municipal corporations concerned, and that there is an urgent need by the municipal corporations for operating funds. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 200, § 3: Mar. 6, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there are municipal airport improvement districts in some of the first class cities of this State who have paid off and retired all of their bonded indebtedness; that such improvement districts still have a remaining surplus of property and moneys after paying all other legal obligations; that there is much confusion regarding the disposition of such surplus property and moneys in the possession of such improvement districts; that the municipal airports of many of the cities of the first class are in great need of additional funds to make improvements for the safety and comfort of their citizens; that it is necessary, in order to alleviate this chaos and confusion and to insure the municipal airports of cities of the first class of addition improvement funds, that this Act become effective immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-89-1301. Special improvement districts receiving state aid.

  1. In instances where state aid has been extended to paving and other special improvement districts within cities and incorporated towns and all bonds and other obligations of the districts have been retired or money is set aside with the paying agents in amounts sufficient to provide for their retirement, then all moneys and other assets in the hands of the commissioners of the districts, or in the hands of the paying agents, in amounts exceeding the full debt service requirements of the bonds and other obligations shall be paid over to the respective treasurers of the cities and incorporated towns for the credit to the street fund, there to be used for the repair and maintenance of its streets.
  2. No such moneys may be paid over to the treasurers in amounts which shall exceed the state aid previously extended to paving and other special improvement districts, it being the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of this section to redefine such excess moneys as being available in the first instance for both the retirement of the districts' obligations and the improvement of its streets and alleys as prescribed.
  3. In instances in which the districts are no longer in existence, or are inactive, the city or town treasurer shall draw drafts on the bank accounts of the districts for the amounts so found to be due, and all the drafts shall be honored and paid by the banks upon which the drafts are drawn.

History. Acts 1953, No. 310, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-237.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1953, No. 310, § 2, provided that this section did not apply to any municipal street improvement district whose commissioners had adopted a resolution for a refund of surplus taxes under §§ 14-89-120114-89-1203 prior to March 26, 1953.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section violated Ark. Const., Amend. 13 insofar as applied to funds collected in the form of tax assessments from property owners, since neither the city nor the legislature had authority to divert such funds to another purpose without the consent of the property owners in violation of the Constitution. City of Searcy v. Headlee, 222 Ark. 719, 262 S.W.2d 288 (1953) (decision prior to Ark. Const. Amend. 62).

14-89-1302. Street improvement districts.

When any municipal street improvement district has paid out and fully retired its bonded indebtedness and there remains a surplus of money in the district and thereafter the property embraced in the district, or at least two-thirds (2/3) of it, shall have been included in a new paving improvement district, then the funds remaining on hand shall be paid by the commissioners on the bonds of the new district.

History. Acts 1951, No. 392, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-234.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1951, No. 392, § 2, provided that this section did not apply to any municipal street improvement district whose commissioners had adopted a resolution for a refund of surplus taxes under §§ 14-89-120114-89-1203 prior to March 21, 1951.

14-89-1303. Sewer improvement districts.

Where any municipal sewer improvement district has fully retired and paid out the bonded indebtedness of the district and there remains a surplus of money derived from the collection of benefit assessments levied against the real property in the district for the purpose of retiring the bonds or funds derived from the sale of unredeemed real property acquired by the district, the surplus funds may be transferred to the municipality where the municipality has taken over the sewer improvement constructed by the district and is maintaining it.

History. Acts 1953, No. 180, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-239.

14-89-1304. Airport improvement district in city of the first class.

When any municipal airport improvement district of a city of the first class has paid out and fully retired its bonded indebtedness, and there remains a surplus of money or property in the district, the commissioners of the district, after payment of all obligations of the district, shall pay the surplus funds and transfer the property to the city, and the city shall use any such funds and property so received for the sole purpose of making improvements upon the municipal airport of the city.

History. Acts 1967, No. 200, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-243.

14-89-1305. Reversion generally in certain municipalities.

  1. Any balance of money remaining in municipal improvement districts which have no further indebtedness, and which have been dissolved for three (3) years or more, shall revert to the municipal corporation and may be used for legitimate corporate purpose.
  2. This section shall apply only to municipal corporations whose population according to the latest federal census was not less than two thousand three hundred seventy-five (2,375) and not more than two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons.

History. Acts 1957, No. 222, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-240.

Subchapter 14 — Annual Financial Report

Effective Dates. Acts 1985, No. 22, § 4: Feb. 5, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that municipal improvement districts should be required to file annual reports in the manner prescribed by Act 154 of 1959 for other improvement districts; that Act 154 of 1959 requires annual financial reports to be filed by March of each year; and that this Act is immediately necessary in order to be implemented in time for the March 1985 reporting deadline. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-89-1401. Penalty.

Any person violating the provisions of this subchapter or any person filing any false financial report shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History. Acts 1959, No. 154, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-242.

14-89-1402. Filing required.

      1. All improvement districts in any city or incorporated town in this state established for the purpose of making improvements for municipal purposes shall file an annual financial report with the city clerk or recorder of the city or town on or before March 1 of each year, covering the financial affairs of the districts for the preceding year.
      2. The filing under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section shall include without limitation a complete itemization of revenues and expenditures and status of district projects.
    1. All improvement districts in any city or incorporated town in this state established for the purpose of providing electric utility services for municipal purposes shall file an annual financial report with the city clerk or recorder of the city or town on or before June 1 of each year, covering the financial affairs of the districts for the preceding year.
    2. The annual financial report may be included with the report required by § 14-86-2102.
  1. The annual financial report shall be certified and filed as provided in this section by the commissioners of each district.

History. Acts 1959, No. 154, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-241; Acts 2011, No. 210, § 4; 2011, No. 1225, § 1; 2013, No. 1428, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment by No. 210 added (a)(2); and, in (b), substituted “annual financial report” for “statement” and “commissioners” for “chief financial officer.”

The 2011 amendment by No. 1225 inserted present (a)(2).

The 2013 amendment added (a)(1)(B).

Case Notes

Cited: Hyde v. Quinn, 298 Ark. 569, 769 S.W.2d 24 (1989).

14-89-1403. Failure to file.

If the board of improvement of any municipal improvement district established pursuant to §§ 14-88-203, 14-88-20514-88-207, fails or refuses to file, or cause to be filed, the annual financial report required by this subchapter, such failure shall, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law, constitute misfeasance in office and shall be grounds for removal of the members of the board from office.

History. Acts 1985, No. 22, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-248.

Subchapter 15 — Quarterly Financial Reports

14-89-1501. Quarterly financial reports.

    1. All improvement districts in any city or incorporated town in this state established for the purpose of making improvements for municipal purposes shall meet at least four (4) times per year or quarterly.
    2. Notice of each meeting, including without limitation each quarterly meeting under this section, shall be given by the improvement district to all record owners of property in the district no more than thirty (30) days before the meeting date and no less than ten (10) days before the meeting date.
    1. At each quarterly meeting of the improvement district, a financial report shall be included as an item on the agenda.
    2. The financial report shall be provided to any member of the public who requests a copy of the report.
    3. The financial report required under this section shall include without limitation:
      1. Supporting documentation;
      2. Bank statements;
      3. Operating budget;
      4. Projected budget; and
      5. Itemization of revenues and expenditures.

History. Acts 2007, No. 132, § 1; 2013, No. 1428, § 3; 2017, No. 924, § 4.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added (a)(2) and (b)(3).

The 2017 amendment rewrote (a)(2).

Chapter 90 Assessments by Municipal Improvement Districts

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Cross References. Publication of notices when no newspaper published in county, city, or town, § 14-88-207.

Effective Dates. Acts 1907, No. 167, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1951, No. 363, § 3: Mar. 20, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It being found and determined that the affairs of all municipal improvement districts heretofore or hereafter created in cities having a Commission Form of Government can be more economically administered in said cities under the laws as same existed with regard thereto prior to February 28, 1949, the passage of this Act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-90-101. Definitions.

As used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Real property” shall have the same meaning and significance as are attached to these words in statutes providing for the collection of state, county, and city revenue.
  2. “Blocks, lots, or parcels of land” shall include railway tracks and rights-of-way.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, §§ 4, 5, p. 161; 1907, No. 167, § 1, p. 402; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5657, 5658; Pope's Dig., §§ 7285, 7292; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-401, 20-415.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Case Notes

Real Property.

Words “real property” mean not only the lot, but also all the buildings, structures, improvements, and other fixtures thereon. City of Eureka Springs v. Banks, 206 Ark. 289, 174 S.W.2d 947 (1943).

Street Railways.

A street railway being personal property, its value should not be included in the valuation of real property in ascertaining whether the petition for a local improvement is signed by a majority in value of the owners of real property in the district. Lenon v. Brodie, 81 Ark. 208, 98 S.W. 979 (1906).

Cited: McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981).

14-90-102. Applicability of 1949 provisions.

    1. All municipal improvement districts created after June 9, 1949, shall be governed by the provisions of §§ 14-88-401, 14-88-404, 14-90-102, 14-90-801, 14-90-802, 14-90-901 — 14-90-915, 14-90-1002, 14-90-1107, 14-90-1301, 14-90-1303(a)-(b), 14-90-1405, and 14-90-1406.
      1. All municipal improvement districts existing on June 9, 1949 shall continue to function under laws existing prior to June 9, 1949 except with respect to foreclosure suits.
        1. Within sixty (60) days after any annual installment becomes delinquent, the board of commissioners shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of §§ 14-90-911, 14-90-1002, 14-90-1301, 14-90-1405, and 14-90-1406, excepting the first sentence of § 14-90-1002.
        2. Sections 14-90-1107, 14-90-1301 and 14-90-1303(a)-(b) shall also be applicable to municipal improvement districts existing prior to June 9, 1949.
    1. Sections 14-88-401, 14-88-404, 14-90-102, 14-90-801, 14-90-802, 14-90-901 — 14-90-915, 14-90-1002, 14-90-1107, 14-90-1301, 14-90-1303 (a)-(b), 14-90-1405, and 14-90-1406 shall not apply to any city which has a commission form of government organized under the provisions of Acts 1913, No. 13 and all municipal improvement districts heretofore or hereafter created in cities having such a commission form of government shall continue to function under the laws pertaining to them as they existed prior to February 28, 1949.
      1. In cities having a commission form of government, improvements may be undertaken which will not exceed in cost sixty percent (60%) of the value of the real property in these municipal improvement districts as shown by the last county assessment.
      2. In computing the sixty percent (60%), interest on borrowed money shall not be treated as a part of the cost of it.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 25; 1951, No. 363, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-455.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Except with respect to foreclosure suits, Acts 1949, No. 195 became effective on June 9, 1949. Acts 1953, No. 145 extended the provisions of Acts 1949, No. 195, to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 27, as amended by Acts 1951, No. 363, § 2, read:

“All laws and parts of laws applicable solely to municipal improvement districts which are in conflict herewith are repealed, excepting those which are to remain in force for the functioning of existing districts, and those laws shall stand repealed when all existing districts have ceased to function, except as same affect municipal improvement districts heretofore or hereafter created in cities having a Commission Form of Government organized under the provisions of Act No. 13 of the Acts of the General Assembly of Arkansas of 1913, as amended. All laws and parts of laws applicable to municipal and other improvement districts which are in conflict herewith are repealed only so far as they affect municipal improvement districts. Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting Acts 126 and 329 of 1939.”

14-90-103. Districts organized prior to July 1, 1952.

All municipal improvement districts organized prior to July 1, 1952, in compliance with the statutes which, prior to the enactment of Acts 1949, No. 195, regulated the organization of these districts are declared to be legally organized, all their proceedings under the provisions of these statutes are declared to be valid, and these districts shall continue to function under these statutes except with respect to foreclosure suits.

History. Acts 1953, No. 145, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-456.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Except with respect to foreclosure suits, Acts 1949, No. 195, became effective on June 9, 1949. Acts 1953, No. 145, extended the provisions of Acts 1949, No. 195, to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1949, No. 195 is codified as §§ 14-88-401, 14-88-404, 14-90-102, 14-90-801, 14-90-802, 14-90-90114-90-915, 14-90-1002, 14-90-1107, 14-90-1301, 14-90-1303, 14-90-1405, and 14-90-1406.

Subchapter 2 — Boards of Assessment

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

Effective Dates. Acts 1907, No. 167, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1907, No. 406, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1969, No. 290, § 7: Mar. 21, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared by the General Assembly that the laws governing the organization of municipal improvement districts previously required the petition of a majority in value of the property owners in the affected territory, that this requirement was later increased to two-thirds in value, and that the requirements of existing laws obstruct the organization of many municipal improvement districts which would otherwise be organized for the construction or acquisition of improvements essential to the health and welfare of the inhabitants of this State. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

14-90-201. Appointment.

As soon as a municipal board of improvement shall have formed a plan and shall have ascertained the cost of the improvement, it shall report this plan to the city or town council. The council shall appoint three (3) electors of the city or town who shall constitute a board of assessment to review the benefits to be received by each lot or block or other subdivision of land within the improvement district by reason of the proposed local improvement.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 5, p. 161; 1889, No. 18, § 3, p. 17; 1899, No. 183, § 1, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 2, p. 264; 1907, No. 167, § 1, p. 402; C. & M. Dig., § 5657; Pope's Dig., § 7292; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-401.

Case Notes

Annexation Districts.

When plans for annexation district are formed, the municipal council shall have power to appoint a new board of assessors to make assessment for the annexation district if the old board has finished its original assessment, and its action in the matter will not be reviewed. Board of Comm'rs v. City of Little Rock, 174 Ark. 519, 295 S.W. 972 (1927).

Judicial Review.

Where city council created an improvement district board and appointed three real property-owning commissioners to serve thereon as required by § 14-88-301 and where the board has not yet formed a plan or ascertained the cost of the improvement as required by this section, the question of the correctness of the assessments or the method employed cannot be brought before the courts. Ketcher v. Mayor of N. Little Rock, 2 Ark. App. 315, 621 S.W.2d 12 (1981).

Manner of Appointment.

The municipal council may appoint assessors by resolution adopted without roll call. McLeod v. Purnell, 164 Ark. 596, 262 S.W. 682 (1924).

Plans and Costs.

The municipal council cannot appoint assessors until the board of commissioners has made definite plans and ascertained the cost according to the plans. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Waterworks Improv. Dist., 134 Ark. 315, 203 S.W. 696 (1918).

Where board of improvement formed plans and procured estimate of cost and reported to municipal council that it had done so, but did not file the plans and estimate, the council was authorized to appoint the assessors. Ingram v. Thames, 150 Ark. 443, 234 S.W. 629 (1921).

Term of Service.

The board of assessors exists until the improvement district is paid out and there is no further service for it to perform. Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908).

Cited: McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981).

14-90-202. Oath.

Each of the assessors for a municipal improvement district shall, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, take oath that he will well and truly assess, to the best of his knowledge and ability, the value of all the benefits to be received by each landowner by reason of the proposed improvements as affecting each of the lots, blocks, or parcels of land, or railroad tracks and rights-of-way within the district.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 2, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 3, p. 264; 1907, No. 167, § 2, p. 402; 1907, No. 406, § 1, p. 1023; C. & M. Dig., § 5658; Pope's Dig., § 7293; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-404.

Case Notes

Failure to Take.

Failure of assessors to take oath is not jurisdictional, and no attack on assessments on this ground can be made after 30 days from publication of assessment ordinance. Webster v. Ferguson, 95 Ark. 575, 130 S.W. 513 (1910).

14-90-203. Compensation.

  1. The members of a municipal improvement board of assessment shall receive such compensation as the board of improvement shall determine.
  2. The compensation shall be paid out of the funds collected by taxation of the local improvements or out of the proceeds of the money borrowed or bonds issued by the improvement district, as determined by the board of improvement.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 9, p. 323; C. & M. Dig., § 5663; Pope's Dig., § 7298; Acts 1969, No. 290, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-408.

Subchapter 3 — Property Subject to Assessment

Preambles. Acts 1947, No. 325 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, in many cities and towns in the State of Arkansas, plats have been made of either the whole or parts of said cities or towns, and have been filed in the office of the city clerk, city recorder, or town recorder, as the case may be, and have been used as a basis of descriptions for tracts of real property so platted, but said plats have never been filed for record in the office of the circuit clerk and ex-officio recorder of the county in which the real property so platted lies, and therefore are not official records, but they have been used and accepted for the purpose of making the assessments of benefits in local improvement districts which include real property so platted;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 9: approved Mar. 3, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1947, No. 325, § 3: approved Mar. 28, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that because of the fact that there is some doubt as to the descriptions to be used for real property to be included in local improvement districts organized for the purpose of advancing the health and safety of the inhabitants of the respective communities of the state, an emergency exists and this act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-90-301. Validity of land descriptions based on plat.

The descriptions of lands in an improvement district in any incorporated town or city of the first or second class which are based upon a plat, of a part or the whole, of the municipality, which has been filed in the office of the municipal clerk and is not in conflict with a duly executed and recorded plat of the same territory in the office of the circuit clerk and ex officio recorder of the county shall be valid descriptions of the lands so platted for the purpose of making the assessment of benefits for any local improvement district on the lands within the territory so platted and for the collection of the assessments of benefits on the lands so platted and described, including suits brought to enforce their collection.

History. Acts 1947, No. 325, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-452.

Publisher's Notes. As to prior descriptions validated, see Acts 1947, No. 325, § 2.

14-90-302. Railroads.

If any railroad company owning or operating a line of railway in this state shall occupy any street which is in an improvement district by having laid within it its railway tracks and by using the street as a right-of-way, then the railway tracks and right-of-way shall be subject to assessment by the board of assessment in the same manner as each lot, block, or other subdivision of land provided for in this act.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 5, p. 161; 1907, No. 167, § 1, p. 402; C. & M. Dig., § 5657; Pope's Dig., § 7292; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-401.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Case Notes

Railway Tracks.

The tracks of an interurban railway lying within a city are not to be classified as real estate for the purpose of assessment for a local improvement, and the 1907 amendment to this section does not apply to street railways. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. McDonough, 119 Ark. 254, 177 S.W. 926 (1915); Board of Imp. v. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 121 Ark. 105, 180 S.W. 764 (1915).

Right-of-Way.

The right-of-way granted to a street railway company does not create an interest in the soil but only grants the right to use the streets in common with other travelers, and such a privilege is not real property within the meaning of the Arkansas Constitution which provides that property in cities and towns may be specially taxed for local improvements. Board of Imp. v. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 121 Ark. 105, 180 S.W. 764 (1915).

Cited: McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981).

14-90-303. School districts.

  1. The property of public school districts shall be subject to assessment for local improvements beneficial to them.
  2. The president or secretary of the district may sign the petition for the making of the improvements, when authorized by the board of directors.

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 5654; Pope's Dig., § 7288; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-402.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Assessments for improvement benefits are not taxes in the usual and ordinary sense of the word and, therefore, this section does not conflict with Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 5. Rainwater v. Haynes, 244 Ark. 1191, 428 S.W.2d 254 (1968) (decision prior to Ark. Const., Amend. 59, § 17).

Applicability.

This section is not retroactive and contains no authority for the levy of assessments on school property by a local improvement district formed prior to its enactment. Special Sch. Dist. v. Board of Imp., 127 Ark. 341, 191 S.W. 918 (1917).

Subchapter 4 — Assessment Procedures Generally

Cross References. Assessment of benefits for maintenance and repairs, § 14-91-601 et seq.

Partition of assessments among several owners of single tract, § 14-86-601.

Effective Dates. Acts 1907, No. 167, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1907, No. 406, § 2: effective on passage.

14-90-401. Duties of assessors.

    1. The assessors for a municipal improvement district shall at once proceed to inscribe in a book to be used for that purpose the description of each of the lots, blocks, or parcels of land and railroad tracks and rights-of-way. The assessors shall assess the value of the benefit to accrue to each of the lots, blocks, or parcels of land and railroad tracks and rights-of-way by reason of the improvement.
    2. The assessment shall be entered in the book opposite the description.
  1. The assessors shall then subscribe the assessment and deposit it in the office of the recorder or city clerk of the town or city, where it shall be kept and preserved as a public record.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 2, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 3, p. 264; 1907, No. 167, § 2, p. 402; 1907, No. 406, § 1, p. 1023; C. & M. Dig., § 5658; Pope's Dig., § 7293; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-404.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

Case Notes

Act as Board.

Two members of the board of assessors cannot act as a board in the absence of third member and without notice to him. Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908).

Assessors must act as a board and not individually. Board of Comm'rs v. City of Little Rock, 172 Ark. 544, 289 S.W. 478 (1927).

Assessments.

An action instituted by property owners attacking an assessment of benefits in an improvement district is collateral where it is instituted more than 30 days after approval of the assessments at the hearing on notice. Lewellyn v. Street Imp. Dist., 172 Ark. 496, 289 S.W. 470 (1927).

A suit in equity against the commissioners of an improvement district attacking the assessment of benefits for a street improvement commenced more than 30 days after notice of the filing of the assessments is a collateral attack and not maintainable. Smith v. Grabiel, 177 Ark. 611, 7 S.W.2d 13 (1928).

Where one person owns several lots, blocks, or parcels of land in an improvement district, the benefits to them may be assessed together. Board of Comm'rs v. Freeman, 201 Ark. 1061, 148 S.W.2d 1076 (1941).

A complaint, if proven true, which alleged that assessors omitted the description of certain lands from their original assessment list and systematically excluded high value property from assessment and included low value property would show fraud. McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981).

14-90-402. Notice of filing.

Immediately on the filing of an assessment by the assessors of a municipal improvement district, the city clerk shall insert in some newspaper the following notice:

“The assessment of local Improvement District No. (giving the number of the district) was filed in my office on the day of , 19 , and the same is now subject to inspection. Clerk of the City of

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 3, p. 323; C. & M. Dig., § 5660; Pope's Dig., § 7294; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-405.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

Case Notes

Time to Assess.

It was sufficient if the city council waited 10 days after publication of the notice before passing the ordinance assessing the cost of the improvement. Board of Improv. Dist. No. 5 v. Offenhauser, 84 Ark. 257, 105 S.W. 265 (1907).

Cited: Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

14-90-403. Setoff for private improvements.

  1. If, in the construction of sidewalks or making of other improvements, any owner of taxable property in a municipal improvement district shall be found to have improved his own property in such a manner that his improvement may be profitably made a part of the general improvement of the kind in the district, being also as good as that required by the system as determined by the board of improvement, the board shall appraise the value of the improvement made by the owner and shall allow its value as a setoff against the assessment against his property.
  2. In case the owner who has made these improvements shall be found to have failed to come up to the required standard, the board may allow him the value of the materials, so far as they may be profitably used in perfecting the system prescribed, as a setoff against his property thus improved.
  3. In these cases, the board shall issue to the owner a certificate showing the amount of setoff allowed, which shall be received by the collector in lieu of money for the amount enumerated and charged against the property.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 9, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5672; Pope's Dig., § 7310; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-403.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section relates only to the private ownership of property and cannot be extended so as to give owners of property in an old improvement district credit for an improvement made by the old district when it is merged into a new district. Sembler v. Water & Light Imp. Dist., 109 Ark. 90, 158 S.W. 972 (1913).

Allowance Request.

A property owner must ask for an allowance as against an improvement district which uses his property in the construction in order to be entitled to the benefit of this section, but if he does ask such an allowance and it is refused, he may present his claim as a setoff to a suit to collect his assessment, if done in apt time. Casey v. Trout, 114 Ark. 359, 170 S.W. 75 (1914).

Certificate.

Where an allowance is made to a property owner for materials belonging to him and used in the improvement, the certificate issued to the landowner may be used in the payment of the tax for the improvement against the property. Casey v. Trout, 114 Ark. 359, 170 S.W. 75 (1914).

Setoff Allowed.

A property owner is entitled to compensation from the improvement district for curbing belonging to him and used by the district in the construction of the work of the district. Casey v. Trout, 114 Ark. 359, 170 S.W. 75 (1914).

Where property owners had curbed and guttered their property and the improvement was of value to an improvement district formed to improve the street, the commissioners of the district should allow the value of the improvement as a setoff against their assessments. Meyer v. Board of Imp. Paving Dist., 148 Ark. 623, 231 S.W. 12 (1921).

Setoff Denied.

A property owner in a sewer district who has previously connected his property to an adjoining sewer district is not entitled to set off the value of such connection against assessments upon his property in the former district. Board of Improv. Dist. No. 5 v. Offenhauser, 84 Ark. 257, 105 S.W. 265 (1907).

Subchapter 5 — Appeals from Assessments

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

14-90-501. Notice and hearing.

  1. Anyone whose real estate is embraced in a municipal improvement district assessment may file, within ten (10) days from the giving of the notice, with the city clerk in writing, his notice of appeal from the action of the board of assessors in making the assessment of his property.
  2. The appeal shall be heard and disposed of at the next regular meeting of the city council.
  3. On the appeal, the matter shall be heard de novo on the evidence that may be adduced on either side.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 4, p. 323; C. & M. Dig., § 5661; Pope's Dig., § 7295; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-406.

Research References

ALR.

What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State Remedy Under Tax Injunction Act, (28 USCS § 1341) Prohibiting Federal District Courts from Interfering with Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business Taxes. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.

Case Notes

Appeals.

City council cannot grant relief to property owners not appealing. Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908).

Chancery Suits.

Landowners have a right to sue in chancery within 30 days to have an improper assessment set aside where the city council fails to give relief from an assessment which exceeds the value of benefits conferred on the property assessed. Lenon v. Street Improv. Dist., 181 Ark. 318, 26 S.W.2d 572 (1930).

If school property was not benefited by an improvement, the directors of the school district could have appealed the finding of the assessors to the city council for a hearing de novo and then have had its assessment corrected by applying to the chancery court within 30 days after publication of the city ordinance confirming the assessments and, in absence of a showing that these procedures were successfully followed, it must be presumed that the school property was benefited. Rainwater v. Haynes, 244 Ark. 1191, 428 S.W.2d 254 (1968).

Collateral Attack.

Refusal of a city council to postpone the hearing of a protest against a sewer assessment on account of the plaintiff's illness, even if arbitrary, was not a “demonstrable error” such as would subject the assessment to a collateral attack. Davidson v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 741, 32 S.W.2d 1062 (1930).

Complaint.

It is proper to require the plaintiff in a suit attacking an assessment in an improvement district for certain irregularities to state in his complaint when notice of the filing of the assessment was given since he has only 10 days after the notice is given in which to appeal from the assessment to the city council. Boles v. Kelley, 90 Ark. 29, 117 S.W. 1073 (1909).

Federal Jurisdiction.

In an action to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and where the plaintiffs had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Arkansas courts under this section, § 14-90-804, § 16-111-103, and § 16-113-306, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred federal jurisdiction. Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Reassessments.

A city council is not authorized to repeal an improvement district reassessment ordinance which had been duly adopted and published where no suit was brought in the chancery court within 30 days after its publication for the purpose of correcting the reassessment. City Council v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 191 Ark. 1139, 89 S.W.2d 739 (1936).

The remedy of one complaining of reassessments for local improvements is in the chancery court under § 14-90-602, and not by appeal to the city council, since the jurisdiction to revise reassessments has been taken away from the council and vested in the chancery court. Paving Dist. of Harrison v. Fowler, , 192 Ark. 1122, 96 S.W.2d 951 (1936).

14-90-502. Findings and changes.

  1. The city council shall enter on its minutes the result of its finding on any appeal of a municipal improvement district assessment and shall cause a copy of its finding to be certified to the board of assessors.
  2. The board shall make its assessment conform thereto if any change has been made in the assessment by the council.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 5, p. 323; C. & M. Dig., § 5662; Pope's Dig., § 7296; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-407.

Case Notes

Cited: Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908).

Subchapter 6 — Correction, Revision, and Reduction of Assessments

Cross References. Change of plans in cities with a population exceeding 60,000, § 14-91-1101 et seq.

Reassessment for repair, replacement, improvement, or extension of electric light, water, and sewer systems, § 14-91-503.

14-90-601. Correction of erroneous descriptions or omitted lands.

    1. The assessors of municipal improvement districts or their successors in office, or a majority of them, may file with the recorder or city clerk their certificate correcting erroneous descriptions of the lots, blocks, and parcels of land and railroad tracks and rights-of-way or describing them where the description was in the original assessment defective or wholly or partly omitted.
    2. In the case of omitted lands and lots, they shall in these cases make an assessment of benefits thereon.
  1. Thereupon, the city clerk or recorder shall publish in some newspaper published in the city or town, if there is one, and if not, then in some newspaper published in the county and having a bona fide circulation in the city or town, a notice in substantially the following form:
      1. Within ten (10) days after the publication of the notice, the district or any property owner may apply to the city or town council to review the assessment so made and corrected.
      2. The district, or any property owner, may apply within thirty (30) days to the chancery court of the county to have the amended assessment reviewed and corrected.
    1. If no application is made to the council within ten (10) days or to the court within thirty (30) days, the assessment shall become final and incontestable, subject only to annual revision so provided by law.
    2. On appeal to the council, the hearing shall be as prescribed in § 14-90-501.
  2. When the certificate correcting the assessment is filed, the city or town clerk or recorder shall make the corrections upon the assessment roll on file in red ink.

“The assessors of Improvement District No have filed their certificate correcting mistakes in the assessment of benefits thereof, which certificate is now in my office subject to inspection. All property owners may appeal to the City Council at any time within ten (10) days from this date. City Clerk (or Recorder) of the City (or Town) of

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 2, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 3, p. 264; 1907, No. 167, § 2, p. 402; 1907, No. 406, § 1, p. 1023; C. & M. Dig., § 5659; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 7297; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-409.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

Case Notes

Effect of Correction.

Where property insufficiently described was taxed, and taxes were not paid, and assessors thereafter attempted to correct description by authorized statutory procedure applying to lands wholly omitted from tax list, or insufficiently described, such procedure, even if followed correctly, was not retroactive in effect, and fatal defect in prior assessments were not cured. Schuman v. Winn, 216 Ark. 153, 224 S.W.2d 538 (1949).

14-90-602. Revision of assessments.

    1. The commissioners of a municipal improvement district may require the assessors to revise their assessment only one (1) time per annum, increasing or diminishing the assessment against particular pieces of property as justice may require.
    2. However, the total amount of benefits shall not be diminished if the district borrowed money or incurred indebtedness.
      1. The reassessment shall be filed with the city clerk or town clerk.
      2. Before the filing of the reassessment with the city or town clerk under this section, the requirements of this section, § 14-88-505, and other applicable law shall be met.
      3. The filing under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of this section shall include without limitation:
        1. Minutes of the meeting in which action was taken by the board concerning a reassessment under this section;
        2. Affidavit of compliance with notification requirements; and
        3. A detailed plan for use of the reassessment moneys and a proposed budget for implementation.
      1. On the filing of a reassessment with the city clerk or town clerk, the city clerk or town clerk shall publish in a newspaper published in the county one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks a notice as follows:
      2. The notice shall be mailed by the district to all record owners of property in the district on the date of the first publication, and an affidavit of mailing shall be filed with the city clerk or town clerk at least six (6) days before the hearing date.
      3. The notice shall be posted prominently and continuously in the district at least thirty (30) days before the hearing date.
    1. On the day named by the notice, the commissioners of the district shall meet at the place named, hear all matters raised concerning the assessment, and adjust the assessment if necessary.
    1. When assessments of benefits are revised and notice is given as provided in this section, the assessments shall be final and conclusive if approved by the governing body of the city or town and unless suit is brought in the circuit court within thirty (30) days after action is taken by the governing body for the purpose of correcting the assessment.
    2. Notice shall be given by the district to all record owners of property in the district at least ten (10) days prior to the meeting date of the governing body of the city or town during which the ordinance on the assessment will be considered.

“The reassessment of Improvement District No (giving the style and number of the district) has been filed in my office, and the same is now open for inspection.

“All persons wishing to be heard on the reassessment shall be heard by the commissioners of the district in the office of the city clerk or town clerk at on the day of , 2

Clerk of the City (or Town) of

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 2; 1929, No. 64, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 5664; Pope's Dig., §§ 7299, 7300; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-410, 20-411; Acts 2013, No. 1428, § 4.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment redesignated former (a) as present (a)(1) and added (a)(2); in (a)(1), deleted “thereof” following “assessors” and substituted “only one (1) time” for “not more often than once”; deleted “shall have” following “district” in (a)(2); and rewrote (b) and (c).

Cross References. Assessments not to be reduced after issuance of bonds, § 14-86-602.

Case Notes

Failure to Reassess.

While section does not require district to revise assessments, district cannot insulate itself from inaction since excessive assessment constitutes taking of property without just compensation. Sugarloaf Dev. Co. v. Heber Springs Sewer Imp. Dist., 34 Ark. App. 28, 805 S.W.2d 88 (1991).

Increased or Diminished.

Assessment cannot be diminished or increased where there has been no material physical change in the condition of the property since the original assessment. Street Imp. Dist. v. Goslee, 183 Ark. 539, 36 S.W.2d 960 (1931); Paving Dist. of Harrison v. Johnson, 186 Ark. 1033, 57 S.W.2d 558 (1933); Sugarloaf Dev. Co. v. Heber Springs Sewer Imp. Dist., 34 Ark. App. 28, 805 S.W.2d 88 (1991).

Where an assessment was increased when there had been no material change, it was held void on collateral attack. Paving Dist. of Harrison v. Johnson, 186 Ark. 1033, 57 S.W.2d 558 (1933).

Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction to review reassessment of benefits is in the chancery court and not in the city council, so that action of council in reducing assessment is without authority and void. Paving Dist. of Harrison v. Fowler, , 192 Ark. 1122, 96 S.W.2d 951 (1936).

Physical Change in Property.

Assessments cannot be increased or diminished except for some physical change that occurs in the property after the original assessment. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

A material physical change is a basis upon which a property owner may obtain, by direct action, a reassessment of benefits for future periods; a ruling retroactively allowing relief for taxes already paid is error. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

14-90-603. Annual readjustment.

A municipal improvement district assessment may be annually readjusted according to additional improvements placed upon the lands and railroad tracks and rights-of-way when a succession of collections is necessary to pay for the improvements.

History. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 2, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 3, p. 264; 1907, No. 167, § 2, p. 402; 1907, No. 406, § 1, p. 1023; C. & M. Dig., § 5658; Pope's Dig., § 7293; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-404.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

Case Notes

Reconsideration.

Municipal council is without power to return assessment to board for reconsideration. Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908).

If, for any reason, the first assessment is found to be erroneous before it becomes final, it may be withdrawn and a new assessment made. Thomas v. Street Improv. Dist., 158 Ark. 187, 249 S.W. 590 (1923); Paving Dist. v. Meyer, 158 Ark. 610, 250 S.W. 892 (1923).

Until the assessments have been acted upon by the municipal council, the assessors may be granted permission to withdraw them for reconsideration. Turner v. Adams, 178 Ark. 67, 10 S.W.2d 41 (1928).

14-90-604. Reduction of excessive assessments.

      1. Wherever lands, or other real property, in an improvement district in cities and towns have been assessed for such an unreasonable or excessive amount that the taxes or assessments against the property and which have accumulated against the property are as much or more than the reasonable market value of the property, and there is no existing law authorizing a reduction of the assessment or giving relief to the property owner, any owner of the land or other real property may file a joint petition with the commissioners on the board of improvement of the district, may file a separate petition, or the commissioners may file a separate petition asking the chancery court having jurisdiction to foreclose the lien of assessments in the district to reduce the assessment.
      2. Where the petition is not a joint petition, the other party shall be made a defendant and served with ten (10) days' notice. Thereupon, it shall be the duty of the court to hear the petition.
    1. If on the hearing it appears that all outstanding bonds, interest coupons, and other indebtedness of the district have been fully paid, or that to facilitate the liquidation of the district all of its bonds, coupons, and other indebtedness have been acquired and are held by a trustee or by the commissioners of the district exclusively in trust for the property owners of the district, and if it further appears that the assessment is excessive and should be reduced, it shall be the duty of the court to reduce the assessment as equity and good conscience may require, taking into consideration the market value of the property involved, the benefits accruing to the property by reason of the improvement, the assessments against similar property in the district, the amount of other taxes and assessments against the property in other districts in which the land may be, and any other pertinent facts.
  1. This section is cumulative to other laws pertaining to improvement districts in cities and towns.

History. Acts 1947, No. 328, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-453, 20-454.

Case Notes

Cited: Sugarloaf Dev. Co. v. Heber Springs Sewer Imp. Dist., 34 Ark. App. 28, 805 S.W.2d 88 (1991).

Subchapter 7 — Levy of Additional Tax

Effective Dates. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-90-701. Insufficient tax to complete improvement.

  1. If the tax first levied is insufficient to complete or pay for a municipal improvement, the board of improvement shall report the amount of the deficiency to the governing body of the municipality, and it shall make a determination on whether or not to levy further taxes based on the assessment of benefits for a sum sufficient to complete or pay for the improvement, which shall be collected in the same manner as the first levy.
  2. However, the taxes levied shall not exceed the total amount of the benefits assessed or the limitation of cost fixed in the petition or by this act.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 15, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5665; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 11; Pope's Dig., § 7303; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-420; Acts 2013, No. 1428, § 5.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment subdivided the section into (a) and (b); in (a), substituted “is” for “shall prove,” “governing body of the municipality” for “council,” and “make a determination on whether or not to” for “thereupon,” inserted “or pay for” twice, and “deleted “or pay therefor” twice following “improvement”; and substituted “not” for “never” in (b).

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Case Notes

Levy of Taxes.

The council may before the first assessment is exhausted make a second levy without any new petition where the first assessment is insufficient to complete the work. Earl v. Board of Imp., 70 Ark. 211, 67 S.W. 312 (1902).

Subchapter 8 — Payment of Assessments

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1899, No. 183, § 10, provided that nothing in the act validated preexisting improvement districts.

Preambles. Acts 1967, No. 90, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, many areas newly annexed to municipalities do not have water, sewer, and other improvements, and can obtain the same only by the formation of municipal improvement districts; and

“Whereas, many of such areas have low tax valuations because of the lack of development which will come only with the extension of water, sewer, and other municipal benefits; and

“Whereas, the construction costs of such improvements have risen in recent years to such an extent that the present cost limitation on said improvements does not permit the landowners to benefit their property with improvements constructed by a municipal improvement district;

“Now, therefore ….”

Acts 1967, No. 351 contained a preamble which read as follows:

“Whereas, Act No. 90 of the 1967 Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas raised the cost limitation of any municipal improvement district from 60% to 80% of the assessed value of the real property in the district; and

“Whereas, through inadvertence, when Senate Bill 22 (which became Act 163 of 1967) was adopted the cost limitation was left at 60%, and said limitation is not sufficient to permit many municipal improvement districts in Arkansas to construct needed facilities ….”

Acts 1971, No. 107, contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, many areas within municipalities do not have adequate water, sewer and other improvements, and can obtain the same only by the formation of municipal improvement districts; and

“Whereas, the construction costs of such improvements have risen in recent years and the present cost limitation on such improvements does not permit the landowners to benefit their property with improvements constructed by a municipal improvement district in some instances ….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1913, No. 5, § 3: approved Jan. 30, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1913, No. 125, § 9: approved Mar. 3, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1921, No. 395, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1925, No. 184, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 145, § 8: approved Mar. 20, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the fact that heretofore it has been necessary to obtain the consent of only a bare majority in value of the owners of real property in order to organize a local improvement district, the organization of such districts all over the State of Arkansas has been in the past greatly abused, advantage has been taken of the owners of property therein and burdensome taxes have been laid upon property owners without any actual increase in property values as compensation therefor, many of such districts having been organized for promotion purposes; that many property owners throughout the State are in danger of losing their said property by reason of their inability to pay the said local improvement taxes; and that unless legislation is immediately enacted making it necessary to obtain the consent of more than a majority in value of said property owners the practice of organizing such districts and the abuse thereof will be continued, all to the serious detriment and injury of owners of property. It is, therefore, found and declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 397, § 2: Mar. 21, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that hardship is being worked by the inability of taxpayers to pay their taxes and this will in a great measure afford them relief. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 90, § 2: Feb. 14, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “That it is hereby ascertained and declared that there is a real and urgent need to raise the present 60% cost limitation on municipal improvement districts in order that property owners in sparsely-built municipal areas may obtain for themselves water, sewer, and other improvements; that there is an urgent need for such services; and an emergency is therefore declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 163, § 7: Feb. 28, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly that in many cities and towns in the State of Arkansas the streets and highways are subject to heavy traffic by motor vehicles, that on account of parking motor vehicles in the streets and the lack of facilities for off-street parking of motor vehicles, vehicular traffic in the said streets and highways is made dangerous to drivers and to pedestrians, and that on account thereof the streets and highways are made hazardous to the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas; that it is necessary in order to protect the property and lives of the residents of the State of Arkansas to provide adequate facilities for the off-street parking of motor vehicles and that only by the passage of this Act and giving it immediate effect can the lives and property of the residents of the State of Arkansas be protected. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 351, § 2: approved Mar. 14, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “That it is hereby ascertained and declared that there is a real and urgent need for the State's municipal improvement districts to be able to construct needed facilities, and that because of undeveloped lands in the boundaries of the districts the districts have insufficient tax evaluations to permit construction under the 60% limitation in order to meet the increasing needs for public services; an emergency is therefore declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1969, No. 290, § 7: Mar. 21, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared by the General Assembly that the laws governing the organization of municipal improvement districts previously required the petition of a majority in value of the property owners in the affected territory, that this requirement was later increased to two-thirds in value, and that the requirements of existing laws obstruct the organization of many municipal improvement districts which would otherwise be organized for the construction or acquisition of improvements essential to the health and welfare of the inhabitants of this State. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 107, § 2: Feb. 18, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “That it is hereby ascertained and declared that there is a real and urgent need to eliminate the present 80% cost limitation on municipal improvement districts in order that property owners in municipal areas may be provided with an adequate means to obtain for themselves water, sewer and other improvements; that there is an urgent need for such services and an emergency is therefore declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975, No. 224, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Feb. 19, 1975. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations and that the existing mandatory form of assessment ordinance for municipal improvement districts in unduly restrictive to the financing of such improvements, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 504, § 7: Mar. 13, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the impairment of the rights of owners of real property located within various improvement districts to prepay their assessments greatly infringes on their rights to own, manage, and enjoy their real property and that it must be made unimpeachably clear that these owners of real property do have and should have the right to prepay these assessments and to be released from the liens upon the prepayment of these assessments. Therefore, in order to clarify and extend rights of owners of real property located within various improvement districts, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-90-801. Ordinance providing for installments.

  1. It shall be provided, by ordinance, that the municipal improvement district assessment of benefits shall be paid in successive annual installments so that the tax levied in any one (1) year shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the assessed benefits accruing to real property.
    1. The ordinance shall provide that the first annual installment shall be collected by the county tax collector on the date fixed in the ordinance, and the second and subsequent annual installments shall be paid thereafter with the first installment of general taxes beginning with the installment of general taxes becoming due more than five (5) months after the date fixed in the ordinance.
    2. The municipality may provide in the ordinance that, after payment of the initial installment, the annual assessment of benefits may be paid in quarterly installments along with the quarterly installments of ad valorem taxes at the election of the taxpayer.
  2. The ordinance may provide that the collection of the annual installment shall be suspended, in whole or in part, for any year upon the filing with the collector, by December 1 of the preceding year, by the commissioners of the district of a certificate reciting the amount of funds available to meet the debt service requirements of the bonds of the district and, if necessary to provide additional funds sufficient therefor, certifying the percentage of the next annual installment on the amount of benefits necessary to be collected.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 5, p. 161; 1899, No. 183, § 6, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 4, p. 264; 1913, No. 125, § 3; C. & M. Dig., § 5666; Acts 1921, No. 395, § 1; 1925, No. 184, § 1; 1929, No. 64, § 12; 1935, No. 145, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 7304; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 1; 1951, No. 397, § 1; 1967, No. 90, § 1; 1967, No. 163, § 4; 1967, No. 351, § 1; 1971, No. 107, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-412.

Publisher's Notes. The 1949 amendment to this section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Cross References. Levy of tax for preliminary expenses, § 14-86-701.

Case Notes

Failure to Comply.

If council refuses to pass the assessment ordinance, it can be compelled to do so by mandamus. Board of Imp. v. Earl, 71 Ark. 4, 71 S.W. 666 (1903); Paving Dist. v. Little, 170 Ark. 1160, 282 S.W. 971 (1926).

Appellant's appeal from the circuit court's order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment was dismissed because the appellate court was barred from considering the appeal under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) due to the lack of a final order as claims against multiple parties might remain viable, and further, the addendum prepared by appellant appeared to be deficient because it did not contain a copy of the city ordinance that was mandated by § 14-90-801 to provide for the payment of an assessment of special improvement district taxes. Wilkins & Assocs. v. Vimy Ridge Mun. Water Improvement Dist. 139, 369 Ark. 50, 250 S.W.3d 246 (2007).

Cited: Kirst v. Street Improv. Dist. No. 1, 86 Ark. 1, 109 S.W. 526 (1908); McDonnell v. Improvement Dist., 97 Ark. 334, 133 S.W. 1126 (1911); Bateman v. Board of Comm'rs, 102 Ark. 306, 143 S.W. 1062 (1912); Cherry v. Bowman, 106 Ark. 39, 152 S.W. 133 (1912); Deane v. Moore, 112 Ark. 254, 165 S.W. 639 (1914); Rogers v. Semmes, 123 Ark. 467, 185 S.W. 479 (1916); White v. Loughborough, 125 Ark. 57, 188 S.W. 10 (1916); Malvern v. Nunn, 127 Ark. 418, 192 S.W. 909 (1917); Bottrell v. Hollipeter, 135 Ark. 315, 204 S.W. 843 (1918); Blackburn v. Dunlap, 143 Ark. 625, 221 S.W. 176 (1920); Withrow v. City of Nashville, 145 Ark. 340, 224 S.W. 614 (1920); Meyer v. Board of Imp. Paving Dist., 148 Ark. 623, 231 S.W. 12 (1921); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 165 Ark. 585, 265 S.W. 81 (1924); Hill v. Walthour, 166 Ark. 277, 266 S.W. 85 (1924); Pledger v. Soltz, 169 Ark. 1125, 278 S.W. 50 (1925); Paving Dist. v. Little, 170 Ark. 1160, 282 S.W. 971 (1926); Fry v. Poe, 175 Ark. 375, 1 S.W.2d 29 (1927); Stevens v. Shull, 178 Ark. 269, 10 S.W.2d 511 (1928); Street Improv. Dist. v. Mooney, 203 Ark. 745, 158 S.W.2d 661 (1942); Jones v. Jones, 236 Ark. 296, 365 S.W.2d 716 (1963).

14-90-802. Form of ordinance.

The ordinance referred to in § 14-90-801 may be in substantially the following form:

“Whereas, a majority in value of the property holders owning property adjoining the locality to be affected and situated in District No. organized for the purpose of have petitioned the governing body of the city (or town) of for the construction of said improvement, and that the cost thereof shall be assessed upon the real property of said district according to the benefits received; and “Whereas, said benefits received by each and every block, lot, and parcel of real property situated in said district equals or exceeds the local assessment thereon; and “Whereas, the estimated cost of said improvement is Dollars: “Therefore, it is now ordained by the governing body of the city (or town) of , that said several blocks, lots, and parcels of real property in said district be assessed according to the assessment list for said improvement district as the same now remains in the office of the recorder or city clerk, and that percent of the assessment of each of said blocks, lots, and parcels shall be collected by the County Collector on or before the day of , and percent of the assessment shall be collected with the first installment of general taxes becoming due more than five (5) months thereafter, and annually thereafter, with the first installment of general taxes until the whole of said local assessment shall be paid.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 5, p. 161; 1899, No. 183, § 7, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 5, p. 264; C. & M. Dig., § 5667; Pope's Dig., § 7305; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 2; 1969, No. 290, § 3; 1975, No. 224, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-413.

Publisher's Notes. The 1949 amendment to this section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Case Notes

Cited: McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981).

14-90-803. Publication of ordinance.

Within thirty (30) days after the passage of the ordinance mentioned in § 14-90-801, the recorder or city clerk shall publish a copy of it in some newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the town or city for one (1) time; or if no newspaper is published in the city or town, then in some newspaper published in the county; and, if no newspaper is published in the county, then by posting in at least ten (10) conspicuous places in the city or town.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 6, p. 161; 1899, No. 183, § 8, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 6, p. 264; 1913, No. 5, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 5668; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 13; Pope's Dig., § 7307; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-416.

Case Notes

Construction.

The provisions of this section are mandatory. Gibson v. Hoxie, 110 Ark. 544, 162 S.W. 568 (1913).

Cited: Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

14-90-804. Contesting payment.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after publication as prescribed in § 14-90-803, the municipal improvement district or any property owner may bring suit in the chancery court of the county for the purpose of correcting or invalidating the assessment.
  2. If the suit is not brought within that time, all objections to the creation of the district or the validity of the assessment shall be forever barred and precluded.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 6, p. 161; 1899, No. 183, § 8, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 6, p. 264; 1913, No. 5, § 2; C. & M. Dig., § 5668; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 13; Pope's Dig., § 7307; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-416.

Research References

ALR.

What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State Remedy Under Tax Injunction Act, (28 USCS § 1341) Prohibiting Federal District Courts from Interfering with Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business Taxes. 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The fact that owners made a mistake in valuing their property and consequently in failing to object to that assessment does not make this a governmental taking; the right of the property owner to make a direct attack on the assessment satisfies the due process requirements of the Constitution. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

In General.

This section gives a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Board of Improv. Dist. No. 5 v. Offenhauser, 84 Ark. 257, 105 S.W. 265 (1907); Board of Imp. v. Pollard, 98 Ark. 543, 136 S.W. 957 (1911).

Construction.

The provisions of this section are mandatory. Gibson v. Hoxie, 110 Ark. 544, 162 S.W. 568 (1913).

If school property was not benefited by an improvement, the directors of the school district could have appealed the finding of the assessors to the city council for a hearing de novo and then have had its assessment corrected by applying to the chancery court within 30 days after publication of the city ordinance confirming the assessments, and in the absence of a showing that these procedures were successfully followed, it must be presumed that the school property was benefited. Rainwater v. Haynes, 244 Ark. 1191, 428 S.W.2d 254 (1968).

Appeals.

Where assessments were found excessive as to specific property and collection of benefits permanently enjoined, case was remanded since trial court was in error in not determining the correct benefits to be assessed against the property. Paving Imp. Dist. v. Brooks, 222 Ark. 227, 258 S.W.2d 233 (1953).

Collateral Attack.

The establishment of an improvement district and the assessment of benefits are subject to collateral attack only when they appear on their face to be demonstrably erroneous. Davidson v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 741, 32 S.W.2d 1062 (1930).

Action to set aside assessment of benefits for street improvement commenced more than 30 days after notice of the filing of the assessment was a collateral attack and not maintainable. Wood v. Tobin, 193 Ark. 964, 104 S.W.2d 203 (1937).

If no objection was made to the regularity of the assessment of benefits within the statutory period, no such objection could be made by the city curb and gutter district in an action by the trustee to enforce payment of the district's bonds. Curb & Gutter Dist. v. Parrish., 110 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1940).

A municipal improvement district can be collaterally attacked even after the 30-day limitation has expired if fraud or demonstrable mistake can be shown. McAllister v. Forrest City Street Improv. Dist. No. 11, 274 Ark. 372, 626 S.W.2d 194 (1981).

An improvement district's assessment of benefits is subject to collateral attack, after the period for direct attack has run, in certain limited circumstances; a collateral attack can prevail only in the event the property owner can show that there was fraud or demonstrable error in the original assessment of the benefits. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

The chancellor erred in going outside of the face of the record of the proceedings that created the district to find extraneous evidence of demonstrable error in the assessment of benefits on collateral attack. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

Direct Attack.

A suit by property owners to set aside an assessment brought within the designated time constitutes a direct attack on the assessment. Kelley Trust Co. v. Paving Dist. No. 46, 184 Ark. 408, 43 S.W.2d 71 (1931).

When the direct attack, one within 30 days, relates to the excessiveness of the assessments on specific property, it is for the purpose of correcting the assessment. Paving Imp. Dist. v. Brooks, 222 Ark. 227, 258 S.W.2d 233 (1953).

When a direct attack, one made in 30 days, is against all of the assessments in the improvement district, then the chancery court, if it sustains the attack, necessarily sets aside all the assessed benefits. Paving Imp. Dist. v. Brooks, 222 Ark. 227, 258 S.W.2d 233 (1953).

The assessment of benefits of a municipal improvement district can be attacked directly or, in limited circumstances, collaterally; in order to directly attack an assessment of benefits, a property owner must institute an action to correct or invalidate the assessment within 30 days of its publication. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

Where plaintiffs did not file a direct attack within 30 days of the publication of the assessment, they were barred from directly attacking the assessment of benefits. Maumelle Blvd. Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1 v. Davis, 315 Ark. 353, 868 S.W.2d 73 (1993).

Federal Jurisdiction.

In an action to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes, and where the plaintiffs had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Arkansas courts under this section, § 14-90-501, § 16-111-103, and § 16-113-306, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred federal jurisdiction. Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Limitation of Actions.

Suits contesting assessments must be brought within 30 days. Ahern v. Board of Improv. Dist. No. 3, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S.W. 575 (1901); Burrus v. Board of Sewer Improv., 134 Ark. 10, 203 S.W. 20 (1918); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Waterworks Improv. Dist., 134 Ark. 315, 203 S.W. 696 (1918); Davidson v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 741, 32 S.W.2d 1062 (1930).

Suits not brought within time prescribed held barred. Webster v. Ferguson, 95 Ark. 575, 130 S.W. 513 (1910); Ingram v. Thames, 150 Ark. 443, 234 S.W. 629 (1921); Thomas v. Street Improv. Dist., 158 Ark. 187, 249 S.W. 590 (1923); Carnahan v. City of Fayetteville, 175 Ark. 405, 1 S.W.2d 10 (1927); Williams v. Serer Improv. Dist., 180 Ark. 510, 22 S.W.2d 405 (1929); Yates v. Phillips, 180 Ark. 709, 22 S.W.2d 559 (1929); Missouri P. R. Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 2, 33 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1929); Laflin v. Board of Comm'rs, 205 Ark. 24, 166 S.W.2d 653 (1942); Ray v. City of Mt. Home, 228 Ark. 885, 311 S.W.2d 163 (1958).

Pleadings.

The plaintiff in a suit attacking the validity of an assessment in an improvement district was properly required to amend his complaint by stating when the ordinance was passed. Boles v. Kelley, 90 Ark. 29, 117 S.W. 1073 (1909).

After the expiration of the 30-day period for attacking improvement district ordinances, third persons who were not parties to the action previously instituted for the purpose of attacking an assessment can become party plaintiffs by adopting the pleadings of the original plaintiffs. Meyer v. Board of Imp. Paving Dist., 148 Ark. 623, 231 S.W. 12 (1921).

14-90-805. Preference of assessment.

  1. An assessment shall be a charge and a lien against all the real property in a municipal improvement district from the date of an ordinance and shall be entitled to preference over all judgments, executions, encumbrances, or liens whenever created.
  2. The lien shall continue until the local assessment, including any penalty and costs that may accrue thereon, shall be paid. Provided, however, with the prior written approval of the board of improvement, the county clerk shall release from the lien of any assessment any lot, block, or tract with respect to which the assessment shall have been paid or prepaid.
  3. As between grantor and grantee, all payments not due at the date of the transfer of the real property shall be payable by the grantee.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 5, p. 161; 1899, No. 183, § 7, p. 323; 1901, No. 143, § 5, p. 264; C. & M. Dig., § 5667; Pope's Dig., § 7306; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-414; Acts 1991, No. 504, § 1.

Case Notes

In General.

Assessments for a local improvement are a charge and lien entitled to preference against the real property in the district from the date of the ordinance levying the assessment, which shall continue until the assessment shall be paid. Hudgins v. Schultice, 118 Ark. 139, 175 S.W. 526 (1915).

Continuing Lien.

Improvement district can only release its lien upon full payment of all assessments against the property involved. Lueken v. Burch, 214 Ark. 921, 219 S.W.2d 235 (1949).

It was held proper to require commissioners of improvement district to collect all delinquent assessments with interest with notice that such delinquencies were to be paid within 90 days in order to redeem property, since liability for assessments continues. Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 229 Ark. 697, 318 S.W.2d 831 (1958).

Grantor and Grantee.

A local assessment is not a “tax” within an exception in a covenant of warranty of the taxes for a certain year. Sanders v. Brown, 65 Ark. 498, 47 S.W. 461 (1898).

Lien on All Real Property.

A municipal improvement district has lien for delinquent assessments on buildings on the lot as well as the lot itself. City of Eureka Springs v. Banks, 206 Ark. 289, 174 S.W.2d 947 (1943).

Limitation of Actions.

Where street improvement district foreclosed its lien and sold property and sewer improvement district foreclosed its lien upon the same property and sold its interest, the respective purchasers from the two districts were not tenants in common, but divided fund on sale of property in ratio to amount of their respective liens upon the property. Sanders v. Mhoon, 214 Ark. 589, 217 S.W.2d 349 (1949).

Statute of limitations does not run against right of improvement district to foreclose its lien. Lueken v. Burch, 214 Ark. 921, 219 S.W.2d 235 (1949).

Mortgagee held subrogated to rights of improvement district against which statute of limitations did not run. Lueken v. Burch, 214 Ark. 921, 219 S.W.2d 235 (1949).

Cited: Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991).

Subchapter 9 — Collection of Assessments

Cross References. Payment of improvement district taxes with bonds of district, § 14-86-803.

Effective Dates. Acts 1897, No. 16, § 5: effective on passage.

Acts 1951, No. 234, § 3: Mar. 6, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas Collectors are having great difficulty in securing deputy hire to prepare tax books on Municipal Improvement Districts an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect upon and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1953, No. 39, § 3: Feb. 6, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, Collectors are having great difficulty in securing deputy hire to prepare tax books on Municipal Improvement Districts an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect upon and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1957, No. 332, §§ 2, 3: Jan. 1, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined by the General Assembly that the allowance for deputy hire by County Clerks and Tax Collectors in extending and collecting improvement district taxes is wholly inadequate and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order to correct said condition. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Approved March 27, 1957.

14-90-901. Penalty — Damages.

    1. Any county tax collector who fails to make payment to the county treasurer within the time prescribed by §§ 14-90-904 and 14-90-907, or who fails to certify the delinquent list to the clerk of the chancery court within the time prescribed by §§ 14-90-905 and 14-90-908, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined in the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) for each offense.
    2. Each day intervening between the time fixed for making the payment or filing the delinquent list and the time the payment is made or the delinquent list is filed shall be considered a separate offense.
  1. The municipal improvement district may recover from the collector and his bondsmen all damages sustained by reason of his noncompliance with the provisions of this act.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.6.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1949, No. 195, codified as §§ 14-88-401, 14-88-404, 14-90-102, 14-90-801, 14-90-802, 14-90-90114-90-915, 14-90-1002, 14-90-1107, 14-90-1301, 14-90-1303, 14-90-1405, and 14-90-1406.

14-90-902. Copy of assessments delivered to collector.

Within forty (40) days after the passage of a municipal improvement district assessment ordinance, unless the time is extended by the city or town council, the city clerk or town recorder shall deliver to the county tax collector a certified copy of the assessment of benefits containing a description of the blocks, lots, and parcels of land in the district and the amount assessed on each, duly extended against each lot, block, or parcel of land and a certified copy of the ordinance fixing the percent to be collected each year.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 7, p. 161; 1901, No. 143, § 7, p. 264; C. & M. Dig., § 5669; Pope's Dig., § 7308; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-417.

Publisher's Notes. The 1949 amendment to this section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Acts 1901, No. 143, § 8, provided:

“That this act shall not apply to districts already formed unless a majority of the property owners in value shall apply to the city or town council to reorganize under this act, and shall be granted the privilege of doing so by ordinance duly passed.”

Case Notes

Failure to Deliver.

Failure of city clerk to file annually the assessment list and warrant (now certified copy of ordinance) did not invalidate the lien. Martin v. Board of Comm'rs, 190 Ark. 747, 81 S.W.2d 414 (1935) (decision prior to 1949 amendment).

Board of commissioners of street improvement district of city was held not prevented from bringing suit to enforce payment of delinquent assessment by reason that no warrant (now certified copy of ordinance) for the collection of assessments was ever issued by the city clerk or recorder. Ingram v. Board of Comm'rs, 197 Ark. 404, 123 S.W.2d 1074 (1938) (decision prior to 1949 amendment).

14-90-903. Notice for collection of assessment.

The county tax collector shall immediately upon the receipt of the certified copies of the municipal improvement district assessment of benefits and ordinance cause to be published in some newspaper published in the city a notice, which may be in the following form:

“Special Assessment “The tax book for the collection of the first annual special assessment upon the real property in District No. for the purpose of has been placed in my hands. All owners of real property lying in the District are required to pay their assessment to me within thirty (30) days from this date. If such payment is not made, action shall be commenced at the end of that time for the collection of said assessments and for legal penalties and costs. “Given under my hand this day of , 19 County Collector”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 8, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5671; Pope's Dig., § 7309; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.

Publisher's Notes. The 1949 amendment to this section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-904. First annual special assessment.

  1. The tax collector shall collect that part of the municipal improvement district assessment extended against each lot, block, or parcel of land as specified in the certified copy of the assessment of benefits filed with him.
  2. Within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the time for paying the first annual assessment, the collector shall pay to the county treasurer, for the credit of the district, all moneys received by him in the payment of the first annual special assessment, less the fees allowed him by the provisions of § 14-90-913.
  3. The treasurer shall immediately pay all funds so paid to him by the collector to the board of improvement or other persons authorized to receive them, less the fees allowed by the provisions of § 14-90-913.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.1.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-905. Delinquent first annual assessments.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the period allowed for the payment of the municipal improvement district first annual special assessment, the county tax collector shall certify a list of the lands which have become delinquent by reason of the nonpayment of the first annual special assessment within the time specified under § 14-90-903.
  2. On the list, the collector shall show the name of the supposed owner as it appears on the tax books, describe the delinquent lot, block, or parcel of land, and indicate after each description the amount of the delinquent installment and the year in which that installment became due.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.2.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-906. Filing with county clerk — Extensions.

  1. At the same time the city clerk or town recorder delivers to the county tax collector a certified copy of the municipal improvement district assessment of benefits and a certified copy of the ordinance fixing the percent to be collected, he shall deliver like certified copies to the county clerk.
    1. For the payment of the second and subsequent annual installments of the special assessment, the county clerk shall annually extend on the tax books against the property described in the assessment of benefits the percent designated in the ordinance for annual collection.
    2. In making this extension, the county clerk shall include the name of the district levying the assessment and shall indicate the amount of the annual installment to be collected in dollars and cents.
    1. If the ordinance fixing the percent for annual collection is amended, then a certified copy of the amended ordinance shall be filed with the county clerk, and thereafter he shall extend the percent as fixed by the amended ordinance.
    2. Not more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits may be extended in any one (1) year.
    1. In the event the assessments as contained in the certified copy of the assessments filed in the office of the county clerk are in any manner revised, changed, or divided, then, upon receipt of a certificate executed by the board of improvement or its duly authorized agent, the county clerk shall have the right to change the assessment of benefits as filed in his office so as to correspond with the change, alteration, or division.
    2. When extending the annual installments in the future, the county clerk shall make the extensions in accordance with the change, alteration, or division.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.3.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-907. Subsequent annual installments.

  1. For the second and subsequent annual installments of a municipal improvement district special assessment, the county tax collector shall collect on each lot, block, or parcel of land in the district that part of the assessment which is specified on the tax list as prepared by the county clerk, and this amount shall be collected along with the first installment of general taxes. However, the payment of the annual installment levied by the district shall not be a condition precedent to the payment of general taxes.
  2. After expiration of the time allowed by law for the payment of the first installment of general taxes, except as provided in § 14-90-908, the collector shall not collect any of the annual installments due the district.
  3. Within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the time for paying the first installment of general taxes, the collector shall pay to the county treasurer, for the credit of the district, all moneys received by him in the payment of the annual installments, less the fees allowed him by the provisions of § 14-90-913. However, in counties where collections are made in more than thirty-five (35) improvement districts, the collector shall have ninety (90) days in which to make payment to the treasurer.
  4. The treasurer shall immediately pay all funds so paid to him by the collector to the board of improvement or other persons authorized to receive them, less the fees allowed by the provisions of § 14-90-913.
  5. No disbursement shall be made to any district, however, until all fees due the county clerk for extending the annual installments have been paid.
  6. The payment of any subsequent annual installment after the property has become delinquent by reason of nonpayment of some past-due installment shall not be treated as a redemption and shall not affect the district's right to foreclose the delinquent installment.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.4.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-908. Delinquent annual installments.

    1. Within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the period allowed for the payment of the first installment of general taxes, the county tax collector shall certify a list of the lands which have become delinquent by reason of the nonpayment of the annual installments within the time specified under § 14-90-907. However, in counties where collections are made in more than thirty-five (35) improvement districts, the collector shall have ninety (90) days within which to make the certification.
    2. Separate lists shall be made for each district if the collector collects the annual installments of more than one (1) district.
  1. On that list, the collector shall show the name of the supposed owner as it appears on the tax books, describe the delinquent lot, block, or parcel of land, and indicate after each description the amount of the delinquent installment and the year in which the installment became due.
  2. Until such time as the collector has certified the list of the lands which have become delinquent, the collector may continue to receive payment of the delinquent annual taxes in the same manner and to the same effect as if the payment had been made prior to the time it became delinquent.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.5.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-909. Delinquent penalty.

  1. Upon receipt of the municipal improvement district delinquent list as certified by the county tax collector, the collector shall mark the filing date and add to each delinquent installment a penalty of ten percent (10%).
  2. The collector shall then extend into the books or permanent record each tract, block, or parcel of land with the total of the annual installment, penalty, and costs, together with the name and address of each supposed owner of each tract, block, or parcel.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.7.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-910. Redemption of delinquent lands.

    1. Anyone desiring to redeem any delinquent lot, block, or parcel of land in a municipal improvement district shall pay to the clerk of the chancery court the annual installment, penalty, and costs. The clerk shall thereupon issue a redemption certificate in triplicate.
    2. The original shall be delivered to the person making the redemption, one (1) copy shall be furnished to the board of commissioners of the district, and one (1) copy shall be retained by the clerk.
    3. Opposite each tract appearing on the delinquent list, the clerk shall make a notation of the redemption and the date of the issuance of the certificate.
  1. The clerk shall, at monthly intervals, remit all taxes and penalties so collected to the board of the district or other person authorized to receive them.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.8.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

The authority of the clerk of the chancery court may be transferred to the county tax collector pursuant to the authority of § 14-86-1001.

14-90-911. Proceedings before filing delinquency suit.

    1. Before filing suit to collect delinquent municipal improvement district installments, the board of improvement shall obtain from the county tax collector or the officials having the delinquent list a certified list of all lots, blocks, and parcels of lands unredeemed.
    2. This list shall contain the description and the name of the supposed owner.
    3. For preparing the list, the clerk or person preparing it shall be entitled to ten cents (10¢) per tract, which shall be charged to the delinquent lands and collected from the owners when the lands are redeemed or charged as costs in the foreclosure suit.
    1. The board shall submit the list to a competent abstractor, who shall compile a list of the names and last known addresses of the owners of record of all tracts included in the list prepared by the collector and shall certify as to the source of the addresses furnished by him.
    2. For these services, they may pay the abstractor such sum as may be reasonable and customary, not to exceed fifty cents (50¢) for each lot, block, or parcel.
  1. Certified copies of both lists shall be attached as exhibits to the complaint.
  2. Twenty (20) days prior to the filing of the complaint, the board shall cause to be mailed, by certified mail with return receipt requested, to each record owner as listed by the abstractor, a notice describing the delinquent property, specifying the year of delinquency and the amount or the approximate amount necessary for redemption, and informing the owner as to the date on which the suit will be filed.
    1. As an exhibit to the complaint, there shall be attached an affidavit of the person who mailed the notices.
    2. The affidavit shall:
      1. Set forth a copy of the notice;
      2. Show:
        1. The date the notices were mailed;
        2. The names and addresses of the last owners of record; and
        3. To whom the notices were mailed; and
      3. Contain a list of all notices which, because of insufficient addresses, were returned prior to the filing of the complaint.
  3. The amounts expended by the board in obtaining the list of the last owners of record from the abstractor and in sending the registered letters shall be certified by the board to the collector and shall be charged on a per tract basis to the delinquent lands and collected from the owners when the lands are redeemed, or charged as costs in the foreclosure suit.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.13; Acts 1991, No. 92, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Case Notes

Notice.

Where owners had no notice of any kind (either actual or by registered mail) that the foreclosure suit would be or was in fact filed in this case, the foreclosure decree, together with the deeds based thereon, would be subject to collateral attack. Beck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

Redemption.

It was not necessary for owners to allege they paid the assessments on their land in suit brought by them to redeem the land, since this suit in no way says or intimates that a landowner can redeem only where he has paid his taxes; and it was not incumbent upon them to have a valid defense to the forfeiture action wherein the land was sold. Beck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

14-90-912. Fees for filing delinquencies.

  1. The county tax collector, for his services in filing the delinquent list and extending the taxes, penalty, and costs, and in issuing the certificate of redemption, shall be entitled to the sum of twenty-five cents (25¢) per tract for each delinquency.
  2. This sum shall be added at the time the delinquent list is filed and shall be collected from the property owner when the delinquent property is redeemed.
  3. In the event the property is included in a foreclosure suit, the twenty-five cents (25¢) per tract shall be charged against the delinquent property, taxed as costs, and paid to the collector.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.9.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-913. Fees for extension of annual installments.

  1. For services in extending the annual installments, the municipal improvement district shall pay the county clerk one and one-half percent (1½%) of the total amount extended.
  2. For services in collecting the annual installments, the district shall pay to the county tax collector one and three-eighths percent (13/8%) of the amount collected by him, which he may withhold.
  3. For services in disbursing the moneys, the district shall pay the county treasurer one-eighth of one percent (1/8 of 1%) of the amount received by him from the collector, which he may withhold.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.10.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

14-90-914. Deputy clerks.

  1. County clerks are authorized to employ a deputy to do the additional work imposed by the terms of this act.
  2. The clerk may pay the deputy a salary up to the sum of three thousand three hundred dollars ($3,300) per annum. However, the salary shall never exceed the receipts from the one and one-half percent (1½%) allowed the clerk by the provisions of § 14-90-913.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 15; 1957, No. 332, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.11.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 14-90-901.

14-90-915. Deputy collectors.

  1. County tax collectors are authorized to employ one (1) deputy to do the additional work imposed by the terms of this act.
  2. The collector may pay the deputy a salary up to the sum of three thousand three hundred dollars ($3,300) per annum. However, the salary shall never exceed the receipts from the one and three-eighths percent (13/8%) allowed the collectors by the provisions of § 14-90-913.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 16; 1951, No. 234, § 1; 1953, No. 39, § 1; 1957, No. 332, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-418.12.

Publisher's Notes. This section does not apply to municipal improvement districts in existence prior to July 1, 1952. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Meaning of “this act”. See note to § 14-90-901.

14-90-916. Payments by collector.

The county tax collector shall pay over to the county treasurer, on the first day of each month, all moneys received by him, deducting therefrom his commission for his services, which shall not exceed three percent (3%), to be fixed by the board of improvements. He shall take duplicate receipts therefor, one (1) of which he shall file with the board.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 12, p. 161; 1897, No. 16, § 3, p. 23; C. & M. Dig., § 5704; Pope's Dig., § 7343; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-419.

Publisher's Notes. As to the compensation of collectors in municipal improvement districts created after July 1, 1952, see § 14-90-913.

Subchapter 10 — Suits to Enforce Payment

Cross References. Lien of district may be enforced notwithstanding tax sale to state, § 14-86-1601 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 9: approved Mar. 3, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1937, No. 101, § 3: Feb. 17, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the owners of real property situated in Municipal Improvement Districts in the State of Arkansas, are now being required to pay exorbitant fees for procuring services in suits brought to enforce collection of delinquent assessments. And:

“Whereas, these fees have been, and are burdensome upon the owners of real property whose lands are being foreclosed for the purpose of enforcing collection of the delinquent assessments. And:

“Whereas, there are now many suits about to be brought for the purpose of enforcing collection of such delinquent assessments by reason of which a large number of citizens of this State will be materially damaged in their property rights, an emergency is hereby declared, because of such fact, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, it shall become effective immediately upon its passage and approval.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

A Commentary on State and Improvement District Tax Sales, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 386.

14-90-1001. Precedence of cases.

  1. For the purpose of taking every step in such suits as are referred to in this subchapter from the beginning to the end, the court shall be always open.
  2. All cases brought under this act shall have precedence of all other cases pending in the court and shall be decided within thirty (30) days after service of publication.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5681; Pope's Dig., § 7322; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-425.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Case Notes

Cited: Ferrell v. Massie, 150 Ark. 156, 233 S.W. 1083 (1921).

14-90-1002. Filing of complaint.

  1. A municipal board of improvement, within six (6) months after the delinquent list is prepared by the county tax collector, may file and prosecute a suit to collect the delinquent installments.
    1. In the complaint, it shall only be necessary to allege that the lot, block, or parcel of land, describing it, was assessed and that the annual assessment, giving the amount and specifying the year for which levied, was not paid within the time required by law.
    2. It shall not be necessary to allege the steps taken by the municipal council, the board, or other officer.
    3. It shall conclude with the prayer that the delinquent property be charged with the installment in default, penalty, and costs and that it be condemned and sold in payment thereof.
  2. Any lot, block, or parcel of land which has been sold to the improvement district in a prior foreclosure suit and has not been redeemed shall not be included in any subsequent foreclosure suit.
  3. No exhibits other than those specified in this section need to be attached to the complaint.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5674, 5675; Pope's Dig., §§ 7313, 7314; Acts 1949, No. 195, §§ 19, 20; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-422, 20-422.1.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

The collection of delinquent improvement district taxes or assessments has been transferred to the county tax collector by § 14-86-1001.

Cross References. Certified copy of delinquent list filed with complaint, § 14-86-1208.

14-90-1003. Publication of notice.

  1. Notice of the pendency of a suit to collect delinquent municipal improvement district assessments shall be given by publication weekly for two (2) weeks before judgment shall be entered for the sale of the lands, in some newspaper published in the county where the suit is pending.
  2. The notice may be in the following form:

“COMMISSIONERS OF IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS VS. DELINQUENT LANDS. All persons having a claim and interest in any of the following described lands are hereby notified that suit is pending in the Chancery Court in County, Arkansas, to enforce the collection of certain Improvement District Assessments on the following list of lands, the names of each supposed owner having been set opposite together with the amount of taxes due on each tract, (then shall follow a list of the owners with the descriptive list of delinquent lands, and the several amounts due thereon), all persons and corporations interested in said lands are hereby notified that they are required by law to appear and make defense to said suit, or the same will be taken as confessed and final judgment will be entered, directing the sale of said lands for the purpose of collecting said assessments, together with the penalty and cost allowed by law. (Seal) Clerk of Said Court.”

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History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5678; Acts 1937, No. 101, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-426.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The 1933 amendment of this section was held unconstitutional. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935); Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

14-90-1004. Party defendant.

In suits to foreclose the lien of assessments upon property in a municipal improvement district, the name of the last owner of the property as it appears in the recorder's office shall always be given as the owner and that party shall be made defendant, unless the board of improvement knows that some other party has acquired title, in which event the actual owner shall be made the defendant.

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 4; C. & M. Dig., § 5677; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-424.

14-90-1005. Joinder of parties.

It shall be no objection to any suit brought for the purpose of collecting delinquent municipal improvement district assessments that the lands of two (2) or more owners are joined in the same proceeding, and these suits may be brought against one (1) or more owners.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5676; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-423.

14-90-1006. Decree.

Under this subchapter, if the decree is in favor of the municipal board of improvement and for the condemnation of the land, it shall be for the penalty and costs of suit, as well as for the amount of the assessment.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5683; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-427.

Subchapter 11 — Sale of Property

Publisher's Notes. This subchapter, except § 14-90-1107, may be superseded pursuant to §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103. See also note to § 14-90-1107.

Cross References. Purchaser entitled to possession during redemption period, § 14-86-1501.

Effective Dates. Acts 1925, No. 91, § 3: effective on passage.

14-90-1101. Court order.

  1. In a suit to collect delinquent municipal improvement district assessments brought in the name of the board of improvement, the chancery court shall order, in its decree of condemnation, that if the sum adjudged shall not be paid within ten (10) days, the property shall be sold by a commissioner, appointed for that purpose, upon twenty (20) days' notice.
  2. Only so much of the property shall be sold as will pay the assessment, costs, and penalty, and no more.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5684; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-428.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The 1933 amendment of this section was held unconstitutional. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935); Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

14-90-1102. Rules for sales.

  1. All sales under this subchapter shall be for cash and to the highest legal bidder.
  2. If the sales are not completed on the first day, the commissioner shall continue the sales from day to day until completed.
  3. In other respects, these sales shall be governed by the rules and laws regulating other sales of land made under decrees in chancery, and with like notice.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 25, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5700; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-430.

14-90-1103. Payment.

  1. An amount bid at the sale of lands under this subchapter equal to the assessment, penalty, and costs shall be paid at the time of the sale, and the residue of the purchase money shall be paid into the chancery court.
  2. Within twenty (20) days after the period of redemption shall have expired, the court shall cause the assessment and penalty to be paid over to the municipal board of improvement.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 24, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5696; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-431.

14-90-1104. Certificate of purchase.

Upon a sale under this subchapter, the commissioner shall execute to the purchaser a certificate of purchase, in which shall be stated the whole sum paid by the purchaser.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5691; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-432.

14-90-1105. Failure to pay bid.

In making sales under this subchapter, if any bidder to whom any parcel of land shall be sold shall fail to pay his bid, the commissioner shall at once offer it again, and the bid of the delinquent bidder shall not be taken again at a sale.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 25, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5699; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-433.

14-90-1106. Failure to sell.

Should any of the lands fail to be sold under this subchapter for any reason, the chancery court may, from time to time, order them to be offered again for sale.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 25, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5701; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-434.

14-90-1107. Sale to improvement district.

  1. Municipal improvement districts may purchase lands sold under foreclosure decrees when there are no other bids equal to the delinquent installments, penalties, and costs.
  2. In the absence of bids, the commissioner making the sale, without bidding on the part of the district or its agent, shall sell the lands to the district for the full amount chargeable against the lands by the terms of the decree.
  3. The district may hold, sell, and convey all lands purchased at foreclosure sales.

History. Acts 1925, No. 91, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7335; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-435.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Acts 1925, No. 91, § 2, contained a provision which read “provided that this act shall not apply to any property which shall have become delinquent or have been forfeited prior to the passage of this act.”

Cross References. Lands forfeited to or bought by district for delinquent taxes, § 26-38-204.

Case Notes

Purpose.

Where the sole object of the improvement district is to collect delinquent taxes, it may purchase the property, and the object of this section is to better accomplish that end. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

Power of Districts.

The power conferred on improvement districts by this section implies the power to accomplish the same result by a conveyance of the property by the owners free of other liens. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

14-90-1108. Compensation of commissioner.

For a sale of property under this subchapter, no allowance to the commissioner for his services shall exceed five dollars ($5.00) for each lot, block, or part of a block of land sold and certificate made by him.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5685; Pope's Dig., § 7323; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-429.

Subchapter 12 — Appeal from Decree of Sale

14-90-1201. Advancement of cause.

If any appeal is taken from any decree ordering the sale of property to collect delinquent municipal improvement district assessments, the Supreme Court shall advance the cause on its docket and shall hear and decide the cause at as early a day as practicable.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5686; Pope's Dig., § 7324; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-436.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was repealed in 1933, but the act was declared unconstitutional. W.B. Worthen Co. ex rel. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935); Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

Construction.

This section is mandatory with respect to the time for obtaining the appeal and filing the transcript. Crandell v. Harrison, 105 Ark. 110, 150 S.W. 560 (1912).

14-90-1202. Time to prosecute.

No appeal shall be prosecuted from any decree after the expiration of the twenty (20) days granted in § 14-90-1203 for filing the transcript in the clerk's office of the Supreme Court.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5689; Pope's Dig., § 7327; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-439.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was repealed in 1933, but the act was declared unconstitutional. W.B. Worthen Co. ex rel. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935); Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

Construction.

This section is mandatory, and when a transcript has not been filed on time, the appeal must be dismissed. Miller v. White, 108 Ark. 253, 157 S.W. 934 (1913).

Cited: Osborne v. Board of Imp., 94 Ark. 563, 128 S.W. 357 (1910); Fulmer v. Board of Comm'rs, 286 Ark. 419, 692 S.W.2d 246 (1985).

14-90-1203. Filing of transcript.

  1. In an appeal under this subchapter, the transcript shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days after the rendering of the decree appealed from.
  2. In taking an appeal, the appellant shall only include in the transcript so much of the record as relates to his own lands.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5687, 5688; Pope's Dig., §§ 7325, 7326; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-437, 20-438.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section was repealed in 1933, but the act was declared unconstitutional. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935); Hopkins v. Fields, 202 Ark. 890, 154 S.W.2d 22 (1941).

Construction.

This section is mandatory, and when an appeal has not been filed on time, the appeal must be dismissed. Miller v. White, 108 Ark. 253, 157 S.W. 934 (1913).

Applicability.

This section applies in case of an appeal from a decree although the defendant by cross-claim seeks to attack the validity of the improvement district or of the assessments. Ferrell v. Massie, 150 Ark. 156, 233 S.W. 1083 (1921).

Cited: Fulmer v. Board of Comm'rs, 286 Ark. 419, 692 S.W.2d 246 (1985).

14-90-1204. Decision of court.

In an appeal under this subchapter, the Supreme Court shall either affirm or reverse the decree appealed from, shall render such a decree as should have been rendered by the lower court, or shall remand the cause to the inferior court without delay.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 10, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5690; Pope's Dig., § 7328; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-440.

Subchapter 13 — Redemption of Property

Effective Dates. Acts 1995, No. 801, § 6: Mar. 27, 1995. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Eightieth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the time period for redemption of real property with respect to municipal improvement districts generally, being five (5) years, renders the property unsalable by foreclosing improvement districts; that this results in financial distress for the district and is unfair to the owners of property not delinquent in their assessments; and that these conditions must be relieved immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

14-90-1301. Right to redeem.

The owner or person having an interest in any real property sold for delinquent assessment installments due municipal improvement districts shall have the right to redeem the property by paying to the purchaser or his assignee the sale price plus interest from the date of sale to the date of redemption at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum within the periods that follow:

  1. In the case of foreclosure proceedings commenced after May 1, 1995, two (2) years following the foreclosure sale; or
    1. In all other cases, the later of:
      1. Two (2) years after the date of foreclosure; or
      2. December 1, 1996.
    2. Provided, however, in the case of the redemption periods in subdivision (2) (A) of this section, the period shall not be less than one (1) year following notice sent by registered or certified mail to the owner and the holder of any interest of record in such real property, at the address set forth in the real property records or tax records with respect to such real property, advising the owner and holder of the date of expiration of the applicable redemption period.

History. Acts 1949, No. 195, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-446.1; Acts 1995, No. 801, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment substituted “owner or person having an interest in any real property” for “owner of any land” and “the property by paying to the purchaser” for “at any time within five (5) years from the date of sale, by paying the purchaser” and added “within the periods that follow” in the first paragraph; and added (1) and (2).

Case Notes

Equitable Circumstances.

The fact that this section does not allow redemption as a matter of right after five years does not make it a federal constitutional violation to grant a privilege of redemption beyond the five years as a matter of judicial grace in a situation of equitable circumstances, where no vested legal right is thereby impaired. Dickie v. Sewer Improvement Dist., 328 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, Dickie v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 379 U.S. 821, 85 S. Ct. 42 (1964).

Notice.

This section is not construed to mean the owner could not redeem after five years where he was not given notice of the foreclosure suit, as any other interpretation would seem to nullify the express purpose for which it was enacted, that of providing more protection for the owners of property located within municipal improvement districts. Beck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

Where owners had no notice of any kind (either actual or by registered mail) that the foreclosure suit would be or was in fact filed, the foreclosure decree, together with the deeds based thereon, would be subject to collateral attack. Beck v. Rhoads, 235 Ark. 619, 361 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1962).

14-90-1302. Waiver of right.

    1. If the owner of property sold to collect delinquent municipal improvement district assessments shall come into court at any time within the period allowed for redemption and shall waive his right of redemption, the court shall order the purchaser to pay the amount that may be going to him within twenty (20) days after service of a copy of the order made on him to that effect.
    2. The payment shall be made into court for the benefit of the owner.
  1. On failure of the purchaser to make the payment, the court shall make an order setting aside the sale and restoring the property to the owner free from all claims of the purchaser, upon payment into court for his use of the amount of the assessment, penalty, and costs, and twenty percent (20%) thereon, which shall be paid over to the purchaser on his application.
    1. In case the certificate of purchase shall have been assigned, the notice provided for in this section may be served on the assignee holding it.
    2. In case the owner of the certificate of purchase shall not be known and that fact shall be made apparent to the court, the court shall cause publication to be made of a copy of the order in some newspaper published in the city for two (2) insertions. The last insertion shall be at least two (2) weeks before the making of the order contemplated in this section.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 24, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5697, 5698; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-449.

14-90-1303. Deed after expiration of redemption period.

    1. If any lands sold under this act shall not be redeemed within the time allowed in it, the court in which the suit is brought for the condemnation thereof shall direct a commissioner to execute a deed to the purchaser or his assignee, which may be in the following words:
    2. The deed shall be executed by the commissioner in the same manner as other deeds are required to be executed in cases of sale made under decrees of courts of chancery.
    1. The deed shall be prima facie evidence that all things were done that were necessary to make good the sale and conveyance for the transfer of an estate in fee simple.
      1. Unless the tax has in fact been paid, irregularities which could have been corrected by appeal shall not suffice to impair the validity of the commissioner's deed.
      2. If the name of the owner of record is used, failure to use the name of the true owner shall not impair the validity of the proceeding of the commissioner's deed.
  1. The deed mentioned in this section shall only be made on the filing of the certificate of purchase in the court unless proof of the loss of that certificate shall be made to the satisfaction of the court.

“Know all men by these presents, That whereas, a decree was rendered in the court of the county on the day of , 19 , condemning to be sold for the nonpayment of assessment for local improvement, certain lots (or blocks, as the case may be), which are described as follows: , lying in the city of , and whereas, they were duly sold by a commissioner appointed by said court for that purpose in said cause in which the board of improvement No. , for the purpose of , was plaintiff and was defendant, and were bought by for the following sums respectively, which sums were by him duly paid; and whereas, the time allowed for the redemption of said lands has expired, and I, , as commissioner, appointed by said court in said cause, am directed by said court to execute a deed, conveying said lands to him; therefore, in consideration of the premises, I, the said , do hereby grant and convey unto the said , the lands above described. Witness my hand this day of , 19 ”

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History. Acts 1881, No. 84, §§ 22, 23, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5692-5695; Pope's Dig., § 7334; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 22; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-450, 20-451.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Acts 1949, No. 195, codified as §§ 14-88-401, 14-88-404, 14-90-102, 14-90-801, 14-90-802, 14-90-90114-90-915, 14-90-1002, 14-90-1107, 14-90-1301, 14-90-1303, 14-90-1405, and 14-90-1406.

Cross References. Collection of delinquent improvement district taxes or assessments transferred to county tax collector, § 14-86-1001.

Case Notes

Irregularities.

When a decree condemning land to be sold for delinquent assessments failed to recite that 10 days be allowed before the sale shall be made, the irregularity was cured when the commissioner waited 10 days before advertising the land for sale under the decree. Beasley v. Bratcher, 114 Ark. 512, 170 S.W. 249 (1914).

After the confirmation of a sale has been made by order of the court, all defects and irregularities in the conduct of the sale are cured and every presumption will be indulged in favor of its fairness and regularity. Cassady v. Norris, 118 Ark. 449, 177 S.W. 10 (1915).

Subchapter 14 — Supplementary Foreclosure Proceedings

Effective Dates. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 10: approved Mar. 8, 1937. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the present method of foreclosing liens for past due assessments in municipal improvement districts is unduly costly and expensive to the property owners and to the Districts, an emergency is hereby declared, and this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1939, No. 130, § 2: approved Feb. 24, 1939. Emergency clause provided: “It appearing that numerous suits ought to be brought to foreclose the tax lien of improvement districts, and the expense of bringing them, on account of the requirement of publication for four weeks, has been expensive, and for this reason there is a disturbed condition which should be immediately remedied, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

A Commentary on State and Improvement District Tax Sales, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 386.

14-90-1401. Purpose.

This subchapter is intended to supplement existing laws relative to foreclosure of assessment liens in municipal improvement districts.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 8; Pope's Dig., § 7320; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-447.

14-90-1402. Construction.

This subchapter is to be cumulative and shall repeal only those statutes in direct conflict with it.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 9; Pope's Dig., § 7321; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-448.

14-90-1403. List of delinquent property.

If any assessment, or annual installment thereof, levied by a municipal improvement district shall not be paid within the time provided by the city ordinance approving the assessment, the county tax collector shall add thereto a penalty of ten percent (10%) and shall at once return a list of all the property within the district on which the assessment or installment has not been paid to the board of improvement as delinquent.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7311; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-421.

Cross References. Filing of delinquent lists in counties having in excess of 75,000 inhabitants, § 14-86-1206.

Remission of delinquent penalties in excess of 10 percent, § 14-86-1002.

Case Notes

Interest and Attorneys' Fees.

Where assessments for municipal improvement district remained delinquent at the time of foreclosure, chancery court could properly adjudge interest and attorney's fee. City of Eureka Springs v. Banks, 206 Ark. 289, 174 S.W.2d 947 (1943).

Penalty.

The chancery court has no discretion as to the penalty prescribed in this section. Board of Comm'rs v. Delinquent Lands, 195 Ark. 681, 113 S.W.2d 730 (1938).

Cited: Schuman v. Cherry, 215 Ark. 342, 220 S.W.2d 817 (1949).

14-90-1404. Permanent record of delinquencies.

    1. When the suit with the delinquent list is filed with the county tax collector under this subchapter, the delinquent list of property shall be copied into a permanent record of delinquent lands.
    2. The collector shall receive, as part of his costs, the sum of ten cents (10¢) for each separate line of description of property. This amount shall be paid by the plaintiff when the suit is filed and shall be taxed and collected as part of the cost and refunded to the plaintiff.
    1. On the record of delinquent lands, the collector shall note all redemptions made prior to the date of sale.
    2. The collector shall also note on the record the redemption of lands after the sale, first recording after the description of each piece of property to whom it was sold or if sold to the plaintiff.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 7319; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-442.

Case Notes

Failure to File.

Failure of clerk to file and record delinquent list is not jurisdictional; hence such failure by the clerk did not make the sale under foreclosure action by drainage district void. Rouse v. Teeter, 214 Ark. 488, 216 S.W.2d 869 (1948).

14-90-1405. Jurisdiction of court.

  1. Under this subchapter, the chancery court shall have the jurisdiction of suits brought to collect delinquent installments.
    1. The court shall enter a decree against the lots, blocks, or parcels of land for the amount of the delinquent installments, together with penalty, attorney's fee, and costs.
    2. The decree shall provide for the sale of the delinquent lands by a commissioner, for cash, after advertisement, as specified in § 14-90-1408.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 7312; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-441.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102, 14-90-103.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not violative of the due process clause, U. S. Ark. Const. Amend. 14, because it provides for constructive service. Stith v. Pinkert, 217 Ark. 871, 234 S.W.2d 45 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S. Ct. 613 (1951).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to aid the improvement district in collecting its delinquent taxes, and the express power conferred on the district to acquire property by foreclosure of its tax lien necessarily implies the power to accomplish the same result by a conveyance from the property owner, free of other liens. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

Applicability.

This section is not retroactive and was held not applicable to proceeding pending at the time it was enacted. Cutsinger v. Strang, 203 Ark. 699, 158 S.W.2d 669 (1942).

This section was held applicable to pending litigation on its effective date in that it only applies to or affects remedies in procedure. Stith v. Pinkert, 217 Ark. 871, 234 S.W.2d 45 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S. Ct. 613 (1951).

Entry of Decree.

This section does not make judgment mandatory except as to delinquent assessments and penalties at the time the matter is addressed to the court for decree. Board of Comm'rs v. Delinquent Lands, 195 Ark. 681, 113 S.W.2d 730 (1938).

—Delinquent Assessments.

The board of commissioners of a municipal improvement district is the proper party to bring suit against property owner for delinquent assessment against property. Beloate v. Street Imp. Dist., 203 Ark. 899, 159 S.W.2d 451 (1942).

—Penalty, Attorney's Fee, and Costs.

Chancellor has no discretion as to penalty provided by § 14-90-1403. Board of Comm'rs v. Delinquent Lands, 195 Ark. 681, 113 S.W.2d 730 (1938).

A requisite to a valid collection of attorney fees is that an order be issued, directing that such charge be extended against the particular tract of land included in the notice, and before a taxpayer can be required to pay such fee, there must be judgment to that effect, or payment may be ordered generally from penalties if the improvement district has contracted to that effect. Board of Comm'rs v. Delinquent Lands, 195 Ark. 681, 113 S.W.2d 730 (1938).

Where taxpayers paid amounts with which they stood charged, a finding that no attorney fees were chargeable to property owners until judgment was rendered and fees collected prior thereto should be refunded was held proper. Board of Comm'rs v. Delinquent Lands, 195 Ark. 681, 113 S.W.2d 730 (1938).

Statute of Limitations.

There is no statute of limitations on suits to collect assessments, except § 14-86-1208. Martin v. Board of Comm'rs, 190 Ark. 747, 81 S.W.2d 414 (1935).

14-90-1406. Proceedings in rem.

  1. Under this subchapter, proceedings shall in nature be in rem, and insofar as the rights of the purchaser are concerned, it shall be immaterial that the ownership of the lots, blocks, or parcels of land is incorrectly alleged in the proceedings.
  2. The decree shall be enforceable only against the delinquent property and not against any other property or estate of the defendants or the true owners of the delinquent property.
  3. In listing the lots, blocks, and parcels of land, they may be combined where they are constituent parts of a single improvement.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 7312; Acts 1949, No. 195, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-441.

Publisher's Notes. This section applies to all municipal improvement districts whether created before or after its enactment. See §§ 14-90-102 and 14-90-103.

Cross References. Lien of district may be enforced notwithstanding tax sale to state, § 14-86-1601 et seq.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not violative of the due process clause, U. S. Const., Amend. 14, because it makes foreclosure proceedings an action in rem against the lands and provides that an incorrect allegation of ownership should be immaterial. Stith v. Pinkert, 217 Ark. 871, 234 S.W.2d 45 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S. Ct. 613 (1951).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to aid the improvement district in collecting its delinquent taxes, and the express power conferred on the district to acquire property by foreclosure of its tax lien necessarily implies the power to accomplish the same result by a conveyance from the property owner, free of other liens. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

Applicability.

This section is not retroactive and was held not applicable to proceeding pending at the time it was enacted. Cutsinger v. Strang, 203 Ark. 699, 158 S.W.2d 669 (1942).

This section was held applicable to pending litigation on its effective date in that it only applies to or affects remedies in procedure. Stith v. Pinkert, 217 Ark. 871, 234 S.W.2d 45 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S. Ct. 613 (1951).

Allegations of Ownership.

In action for foreclosure of delinquent assessments on lands within improvement district, clerical error in owner's name does not render the decree void, the action under this section being in the nature of proceedings in rem and any foreclosure judgment therein to be enforced wholly against the assessed property. Stith v. Pinkert, 217 Ark. 871, 234 S.W.2d 45 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S. Ct. 613 (1951).

Delinquent Property.

Where improvement district acquired title by voluntary conveyance from owner in satisfaction of delinquent taxes, inclusion of certain property outside the district so as to include the whole of a little house, being merely incidental to the main purpose, was held not to invalidate the conveyance on ground that district had no power to acquire land beyond its boundaries. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

14-90-1407. Property included in suit.

In proceedings under this subchapter, all of the delinquent property in a municipal improvement district may and should be included in one (1) suit, and the suit may cover more than one (1) past due installment.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 7315; Acts 1939, No. 130, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-443.

14-90-1408. Publication of notice.

    1. The warning order or notice of the pendency of a suit under this subchapter shall be given by publication weekly for two (2) weeks before judgment is entered for the sale of the lands, lots, blocks, or parcels of land, or railroad tracks and rights-of-way in some newspaper published in the county where the suits may be pending.
    2. The warning order or notice may be in the following terms:
  1. The service by notice as provided in this section shall be just as effective and binding on the property as though service was had under § 14-90-1003.

“Board of Commissioners, (and name of improvement district), Plaintiff, vs. Delinquent Lands, Lots, Blocks or Parcels of Land, and railroad tracks and right-of-way, in said district , Defendants. “All persons, firms, or corporations having or claiming an interest in any of the following described lands, lots, blocks, or parcels of land, or railroad tracks and rights-of-way, are hereby notified and warned that suit is pending in the Chancery Court of County, Arkansas, to enforce the collection of certain taxes or assessments on the subjoined list of lands, each supposed owner having been set opposite his or her or its lands, together with the amounts severally due from each, to-wit: “(Then shall follow a list of supposed owners, with a description of each separate property that is delinquent, and amount due thereon respectively as aforesaid), and said warning order or notice may conclude in the following form: “All persons, firms and corporations interested in any of said property are hereby warned and notified that they are required by law to appear within four weeks and make defense to said suit, or the same will be taken for confessed and final judgment will be entered directing the sale of said lands for the purpose of collecting said taxes or assessments, together with the payment of interest, penalty, attorney's fee, and costs adjudged against each tract. Clerk of said Court.”

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History. Acts 1937, No. 207, §§ 3, 8; Pope's Dig., §§ 7315, 7320; Acts 1939, No. 130, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-443, 20-447.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Where notices were given the landowner, whose property was being sold to satisfy a lien created by his failure to pay an improvement district assessment, by publication and by mail as required by this section and § 14-86-1403, respectively, the notice given the landowner comported with due process. Fulmer v. Board of Comm'rs, 286 Ark. 419, 692 S.W.2d 246 (1985).

Rules of Procedure.

The notice provisions of ARCP 4 do not apply in an action by the board of commissioners to sell a landowner's property to satisfy a lien created by his failure to pay an improvement district assessment. Fulmer v. Board of Comm'rs, 286 Ark. 419, 692 S.W.2d 246 (1985).

14-90-1409. Trial, decree, and sale generally.

    1. Under this subchapter, a suit shall stand for trial at the first term of court, or adjourned day of court, after the complaint is filed, if the four (4) weeks shall expire either before the first day of the term or during the term of court to which the suits are brought, respectively, unless a continuance is granted for good cause shown, within the discretion of the court.
    2. A continuance for good cause shown may be granted as to a part of the lands or defendants without affecting the duty of the court to dispose finally of the others as to whom no continuance may be granted.
    1. In all cases where notice has been properly given as prescribed in § 14-90-1408 and where no answer has been filed, or, if filed, and the cause decided for the plaintiff, the court, by its decree, shall grant the relief as requested in the complaint and shall direct the commissioner to sell the lands, lots, blocks, or parcels of land, or railroad tracks and rights-of-way described in the complaint at the courthouse door of the county where the decree is entered, at public outcry, to the highest and best bidder, for cash in hand, after having first advertised the sale. This advertisement may include all the different properties described in the decree. It shall be published weekly for two (2) weeks, consecutively, in some newspaper published in the county, or, if there is no such newspaper, the advertisement may be published in some newspaper published in an adjoining county.
    2. If all the lands, lots, blocks, or parcels of land, or railroad tracks and rights-of-way are not sold on the day as advertised, the sale shall continue, from day to day, until completed.
  1. The commissioner shall, by proper deed, convey to the purchaser the lands, lots, blocks, or parcels of land, and railroad tracks and rights-of-way so sold, and the title to the property shall thereupon become vested in the purchaser as against all others whomsoever, saving to infants and to insane persons having no guardian or curators the right they now have by law to appear and contest the proceedings within three (3) years after their disabilities are removed.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 7316; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-444.

Cross References. Collection of delinquent improvement district taxes or assessments transferred to county tax collector, § 14-86-1001.

Purchaser entitled to possession during redemption period, § 14-86-1501.

Case Notes

Sale of Property.

Where improvement district sold property acquired at foreclosure sale at an inadequate price, such sale was not void on the ground of inadequacy, in action brought by original purchaser over five years after foreclosure sale, as time for redemption had expired, and amount of purchase price was no concern of original owner. Schuman v. Cherry, 215 Ark. 342, 220 S.W.2d 817 (1949).

—Notice.

Where landowner's name is omitted from published notice of sale of lands in foreclosure of improvement district assessments, the defect is immaterial under this section. Stith v. Pinkert, 217 Ark. 871, 234 S.W.2d 45 (1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S. Ct. 613 (1951).

—Redemption.

Until the issuance of the deed provided by this section, the purchaser is not vested with legal title and the chancery court can grant additional redemption time to the holder of the legal title. Dickie v. Sewer Improvement Dist., 328 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, Dickie v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1, 379 U.S. 821, 85 S. Ct. 42 (1964).

14-90-1410. Sale to plaintiff.

At a sale under the provisions of this subchapter, if there be no purchaser offering as much as the total tax or assessment, plus penalty, interest, and all costs and attorney fees allowed, the property shall be sold to the plaintiff.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 7317; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-445.

Case Notes

Improvement Districts.

The authority of an improvement district to purchase real estate under a decree of the chancery court for the collection of delinquent assessments is conferred by this section. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

Improvement district acquiring title by voluntary conveyance from owner in satisfaction of delinquent taxes was held not engaged in real estate business, sole object being to collect its taxes by resale of the property. Dewoody v. Jones, 202 Ark. 345, 150 S.W.2d 208 (1941).

Purchase Price.

Sale of vacant lots on foreclosure sale to improvement district for amount of delinquent taxes and penalties is not void on the ground of inadequacy of sales price. Schuman v. Cherry, 215 Ark. 342, 220 S.W.2d 817 (1949).

14-90-1411. Redemption of property.

Any person, firm, or corporation having an interest in any property sold under the provisions of this subchapter may redeem it as required by law. However, the chancery clerk, in writing up the certificate of redemption, shall not charge and receive more than fifty cents (50¢) for one (1) separate call of property as listed and sold, and the sum of twenty-five cents (25¢) for each additional call or description of property which the person, firm, or corporation so redeeming may require to be redeemed and placed on the certificate.

History. Acts 1937, No. 207, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 7318; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-446.

Publisher's Notes. The collection of delinquent improvement district taxes or assessments has been transferred to the county tax collector by § 14-86-1001.

Cross References. Duty of chancery clerk, § 14-86-1207.

Case Notes

Period of Redemption.

Period of redemption from foreclosure sale by municipal improvement district is five years. Schuman v. Cherry, 215 Ark. 342, 220 S.W.2d 817 (1949).

Chapter 91 Construction, Operation, Repair, and Sale of Municipal Improvements

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Effective Dates. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 9: approved Mar. 3, 1913. Emergency declared.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Research References

ALR.

Damages resulting from temporary conditions incident to public improvements or repairs as compensable taking. 23 A.L.R.4th 674.

Validity, construction, and effect of requirement under state statute or local ordinance giving local or locally qualified contractors a percentage preference in determining lowest bid. 89 A.L.R.4th 587.

What entities or projects are “public” for purposes of state statutes requiring payment of prevailing wages on public works projects. 5 A.L.R.5th 470.

14-91-101. Plans and costs for improvements generally.

    1. Immediately after their qualification, a municipal board of improvement shall form plans for the improvement as requested in the petition and shall procure estimates of the cost thereof. All improvements shall be made with reference to the grades of streets and alleys as fixed, or may be fixed by the ordinances of the city or town.
    2. For this purpose, the board may employ such engineers and other agents as may be needful and may provide for their compensation which, with all other necessary expenditures, shall be taken as a part of the cost of the improvement.
  1. If for any cause the improvement shall not be made, the cost shall be a charge upon the real property in the district and shall be raised and paid by an ad valorem tax upon the real property in the district as assessed for the state and county purposes. This tax shall be levied by the city or town council, on the application of any person interested, and shall be paid to the board, to be distributed among the creditors of the district.
  2. When any improvement is abandoned, it is made the duty of the board to report to the city or town council the total amount of the debts which it has incurred, to the end that the city or town council may make adequate provision for their payment.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 4, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5656; Acts 1929, No. 64, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 7290; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-301.

Case Notes

Abandonment.

Where two petitions for the same improvement were filed but no action was taken on them, they must be treated as abandoned. McDonnell v. Improvement Dist., 97 Ark. 334, 133 S.W. 1126 (1911)Questioned byTappan v. Helena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458 (1937). But see Lenon v. Tunnah, 174 Ark. 765, 297 S.W. 819 (1927).

Attorney representation.

Boards of improvement have power under subdivision (a)(2) to employ attorneys to represent the districts. Bourland v. Coleman, 187 Ark. 392, 60 S.W.2d 1021 (1933).

Filing requirement.

Where the board of improvement formed plans and procured an estimate of costs and reported to the city council that it had done so, but did not file the plans or estimates with that body, the council was authorized to appoint the assessors. Ingram v. Thames, 150 Ark. 443, 234 S.W. 629 (1921).

Formulation of Plans and Cost Estimates.

The board of improvement can fix the method and extent of the improvement, but not determine what streets should be paved. Boles v. Kelley, 90 Ark. 29, 117 S.W. 1073 (1909); McDonnell v. Improvement Dist., 97 Ark. 334, 133 S.W. 1126 (1911)Questioned byTappan v. Helena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458 (1937); Ruddell v. Monday, 179 Ark. 920, 18 S.W.2d 910 (1929).

The nature of the improvement is fixed by the petition and ordinance. Board of Imp. v. Brun, 105 Ark. 65, 150 S.W. 154 (1912).

The board of improvement cannot substitute a different improvement. Meehan v. Maxwell, 115 Ark. 594, 172 S.W. 1013 (1914).

If cost would exceed the limit, the board of improvement may change the plans. Buxton v. City of Nashville, 132 Ark. 511, 201 S.W. 512 (1918).

The board of improvement must make definite plans. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Waterworks Improv. Dist., 134 Ark. 315, 203 S.W. 696 (1918).

Plans for the improvement of certain named streets which provided for a brick, asphalt, or other suitable wearing surface on a concrete base and stated definitely the cost were not indefinite. Conway v. Commissioners of Bd. of Imp. Dist., 165 Ark. 487, 265 S.W. 45 (1924).

By specifying in the petition the kind of materials and manner of paving, the property owners may restrict the powers of the commissioners. Thacker v. Paving Improv. Dist., 182 Ark. 368, 31 S.W.2d 758 (1930).

Grades of Streets and Alleys.

Grades of streets need not be established before improvement district is formed. McDonnell v. Improvement Dist., 97 Ark. 334, 133 S.W. 1126 (1911)Questioned byTappan v. Helena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458 (1937); Williams v. Serer Improv. Dist., 180 Ark. 510, 22 S.W.2d 405 (1929).

City is liable for change of grade and not improvement district. Eickhoff v. City of Argenta, 120 Ark. 212, 179 S.W. 367 (1915)Limited byHot Spring County v. Bowman, 229 Ark. 790, 318 S.W.2d 603 (1958).

It is not necessary that the city council pass an ordinance fixing the grades of street before formation of a street improvement district; rather grades may be established at any time prior to the making of the improvements. Street Imp. Dist. v. Cooper, 215 Ark. 760, 223 S.W.2d 607 (1949).

Where evidence failed to show any passing of an ordinance fixing the grades of streets, the chancellor was justified in restraining district commissioners from proceeding with surfacing of the streets until such ordinance was passed. Street Imp. Dist. v. Cooper, 215 Ark. 760, 223 S.W.2d 607 (1949).

Improvements Not Made.

Municipal council cannot abolish improvement district on the ground that proposed improvement is impracticable or on petition of large majority of property owners, but only where the cost will exceed the limit fixed by law or the petition. Board of Imp. v. Earl, 71 Ark. 4, 71 S.W. 666 (1903).

14-91-102. Approval of State Health Officer.

  1. In municipal waterworks and sewer improvement districts, the commissioners shall confer with the State Health Officer in forming their plans and specifications and shall not adopt any plans and specifications until they have been approved by the officer in writing.
  2. A certificate of his approval shall be filed with the city clerk or town recorder.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 7291; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-302.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Constitutional Law — Fluoridation of City Water, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 496.

14-91-103. Notice before paving streets.

    1. Before any street is paved, the commissioners on the board of improvement for a municipal improvement district may give notice to waterworks companies, gas companies, and other public service corporations of their intention to pave the street. They shall, in the notice, fix a reasonable time in which the public service corporations shall make excavations, for the purpose of laying down the service pipes and conduits to the property line.
    2. Thereafter, it shall be unlawful for the public service corporations or for any individual to make any excavations in the streets, except upon condition of restoring the streets to their condition as they were before the excavation was made, and paying to the commissioners of the district, or, in case of their discharge, to the city or town, twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for each excavation.
    1. The sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) shall be paid before the work of excavation is begun.
    2. If the work of excavation is begun without this payment, the commissioners of the district or, in case of their discharge, the city or town may recover the sum of fifty dollars ($50.00) from the party undertaking the excavations, together with all costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed by the court.

History. Acts 1913, No. 125, § 8; C. & M. Dig., § 5736; Pope's Dig., § 7380; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-310.

Case Notes

Construction.

This section is penal and must be strictly construed. River Valley Gas Co. v. Improvement Dist., 187 Ark. 990, 63 S.W.2d 539 (1933).

Applicability.

This section is limited to such companies as were in existence when the pavements were constructed and received notice of the construction. River Valley Gas Co. v. Improvement Dist., 187 Ark. 990, 63 S.W.2d 539 (1933).

14-91-104. Eminent domain proceedings.

    1. A municipal board of improvement shall have power to enter upon any private property for the construction of any designed improvement.
    2. Any damages that may be sustained thereby shall be paid out of the improvement fund.
    1. If the person damaged and the board cannot agree on the sum to be paid for the damages, the person aggrieved may file his petition in the circuit court of the county, setting forth his grievance, and asking compensation therefor, making the board a party defendant.
    2. The issues in the suit shall be made up as in other cases at law, and the cause shall be tried by a jury, unless dispensed with by the parties.
    3. The case shall be advanced on the docket so as to have precedence of all other causes.
      1. The judge of the circuit court may hold a special term at any time for the trial of any such cause, giving ten (10) days' notice to the parties of the time of holding that special term, which may be in writing.
      2. The notice shall be served on the parties as a writ of summons is directed to be served unless it is waived by the parties or one of them.
      1. The judge of the court may, in vacation, in case an agreement cannot be arrived at between the board and the owner of the property in relation to the damages claimed, fix an amount to be deposited with some person, to be designated by the court, before the entering upon and taking possession of the property to be used and taken as prescribed.
      2. Upon the amount required being deposited and a certificate thereof filed in the cause, the work may proceed.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 21, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 4022-4026; Pope's Dig., §§ 5024-5028; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-309.

Cross References. Eminent domain generally, § 18-15-101 et seq.

Case Notes

Title to Property.

Title to property condemned will not pass until the money has been deposited in court for the payment of the owner's damages. Cannon v. Felsenthal, 180 Ark. 1075, 24 S.W.2d 856 (1930).

14-91-105. Injunctions.

No injunction shall issue to restrain the prosecution of any work contemplated by this act. Rather, any person injured shall seek his relief by proceedings at law, within the time provided, or he shall be deemed to have waived it. However, an injunction may issue where an illegal assessment shall be sought, under the color of this act, to be enforced.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 20, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5740; Pope's Dig., § 7381; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-314.

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1881, No. 84, codified as §§ 14-88-101, 14-88-202, 14-88-204, 14-88-302, 14-88-303, 14-88-30514-88-308, 14-88-311, 14-88-403, 14-88-502, 14-89-201, 14-89-1001, 14-89-1002, 14-90-101, 14-90-201, 14-90-302, 14-90-403, 14-90-701, 14-90-80114-90-805, 14-90-902, 14-90-903, 14-90-916, 14-90-100114-90-1003, 14-90-1005, 14-90-1006, 14-90-110114-90-1106, 14-90-1108, 14-90-120114-90-1204, 14-90-1302, 14-90-1303, 14-91-101, 14-91-10414-91-107, 14-91-201, and 14-235-30114-235-305.

Case Notes

Cited: Ryall v. Waterworks Improve. Dist., 247 Ark. 739, 447 S.W.2d 341 (1969).

14-91-106. Suits on bonds.

Suit may be brought by and in the name of a municipal board of improvement upon any bond given to the board, but the sum recovered shall be for the use of the fund of the improvement district for which the bond was given.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 14, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5738; Pope's Dig., § 7365; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-312.

14-91-107. Exemption from liability.

No member of any municipal board of improvement shall be liable for any damages sustained by anyone in the prosecution of the work under his charge, unless it shall be made to appear that the member has acted with a corrupt or malicious intent.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 19, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., § 5734; Pope's Dig., § 7362; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-313.

Case Notes

Negligent Injuries.

Commissioners of an improvement district charged with the performance of a public undertaking are not liable for a negligent injury to an employee of the district in the absence of a corrupt or malicious intent. Board of Improv. v. Moreland, 94 Ark. 380, 127 S.W. 469 (1910).

Cited: Ryall v. Waterworks Improve. Dist., 247 Ark. 739, 447 S.W.2d 341 (1969).

Subchapter 2 — Construction of Improvements Generally

14-91-201. Powers of improvement boards.

  1. Municipal boards of improvement shall have control of the construction of the improvements in their improvement districts.
  2. The boards may advertise for proposals for doing any work by contract and may accept or reject any proposals.
  3. All contractors shall be required to give bond for the faithful performance of such contracts as may be awarded them, with good and sufficient securities, in double the amount of the contract work, and the board shall not remit or excuse the penalty or forfeiture of the bond for the breaches thereof.
  4. The boards may appoint all necessary agents for carrying on the work and may fix their pay.
  5. The boards may buy all necessary material and may sell any such materials or implements as may be on hand, and which may not be necessary for the completion of the improvement under way, or which may have been completed.
  6. The boards may, in general, make all contracts in the prosecution of the work as may best subserve the public interest.

History. Acts 1881, No. 84, § 17, p. 161; C. & M. Dig., §§ 5710, 5737; Pope's Dig., §§ 7349, 7364; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-311.

Case Notes

Contractual Obligations.

The board of commissioners of an improvement district could not, by its conduct, excuse any failure on the part of the contractor to perform his work according to the contract after the work had been done. This section would not prevent the board, during the progress of the work, from making changes therein by agreement with the contractor, and if the board, during the time the work was progressing, acquiesced in or consented to certain changes, the district would be precluded by such actions on the part of the board from recovering against the contractor for damages based upon these changes as alleged breaches of the contract. Board of Imp. Comm'rs v. Galbraith, 133 Ark. 302, 185 S.W. 474 (1916).

An improvement district was not estopped to maintain a suit for money paid to the contractor under a contract for the construction of a sewer system where it took possession of the system and endeavored to complete it after the contractor quit, as the district could not excuse a failure of performance. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 137 Ark. 375, 209 S.W. 88 (1919).

Subchapter 3 — Construction in Levee or Flood Control Districts

Effective Dates. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 6: Feb. 4, 1947. Emergency clause provided: “That it is found and determined as a fact that the provisions contained in this act are immediately necessary in order that municipal levee and flood control improvement districts in Arkansas may avail themselves to the fullest extent of the flood control program of the United States of America, and that this act is immediately necessary to permit such municipal improvement districts in Arkansas to avoid the disastrous effect of floods which are a menace to the public health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its passage and approval.”

14-91-301. Applicability.

This subchapter shall apply to any municipal levee or flood control district organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arkansas relative to the formation of improvement districts in cities and towns but shall not apply to any rural improvement district.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-337.

14-91-302. Definition.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “levees and flood control projects” mean all sumps, drainage structures, and other works reasonably necessary or desirable for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a levee or flood control project.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-334.

14-91-303. Authority generally.

  1. Any municipal levee or flood control improvement district organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the State of Arkansas relative to the formation of improvement districts in cities or towns may construct and maintain, or cause to be constructed and maintained, levees and flood control projects under, over, across, and along the waters and lands belonging to this state and along and over the public streets and highways of the municipality in which the district is located.
    1. The district may also construct and maintain levees and flood control projects upon, along, and across any railroad right-of-way, on and over any lands belonging to the municipality in which the district is located, and on and over any lands belonging to the county in which the district is located, and on and over the lands belonging to corporations and individuals.
    2. The ordinary use of the railroads shall not be obstructed and just damages shall be paid to the owners of any land structure and railroad right-of-way taken by eminent domain.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-334.

14-91-304. Agreements with federal government.

  1. A municipal levee or flood control improvement district may enter into contracts with the federal government, or any of its agencies, for the construction of levee or flood control projects and may give such assurances to the federal government, or any of its agencies, as may be required by or under any act of Congress, subject only to such limitations as may be imposed on the district by the Constitution of the State of Arkansas or the acts of the General Assembly under which the district is organized.
  2. The district may authorize the federal government, and its officers, agents, and contractors, to construct levee and flood control projects and to enter upon lands or rights-of-way acquired or occupied by the district pursuant to the terms of this subchapter.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-334.

14-91-305. Assistance by municipality.

  1. The municipality in which a municipal levee or flood control district is located may enter into contracts with, and give assurances to, the federal government, or any of its agencies, that the municipality, on completion of the project, will operate and maintain it.
  2. The municipality may, from its own funds, assist the district and it may also donate to the district, by proper conveyance, any land belonging to the municipality reasonably necessary or desirable for the construction, maintenance, and operation of the project.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-334.

14-91-306. Authorization to use county land.

The county court in which a municipal levee or flood control district is located may, by its order, authorize the district, without the payment of compensation or damages, to enter upon and use any land belonging to the county which is reasonably required or desirable for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project upon a finding by the court that the interests of the public and the county will be benefited thereby.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-334.

14-91-307. Right to acquire lands.

A municipal levee or flood control improvement district may acquire and occupy all lands and rights-of-way reasonably necessary or desirable for the construction, operation, and maintenance of levees and flood control projects.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-334.

14-91-308. Failure to obtain rights by agreement.

In the event the district shall fail, upon application to the individuals, corporations, railroads, county, or municipality, to secure the needed right-of-way or lands by consent, contract, or agreement or if the owners of them are unknown, uncertain, nonresidents, or under disability, then the district shall have the right to procure the condemnation of the property, lands, rights, privileges, and easements in the manner prescribed in § 14-91-309.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-335.

14-91-309. Eminent domain proceedings.

      1. The circuit judge of any county in which it becomes necessary or desirable for a municipal levee or flood control improvement district to condemn rights-of-way, lands, or structures shall, upon the written application of the district, appoint three (3) resident landowners of the municipality in which the district is located, to be known as appraisers, to assess damages for the appropriation of land for the project.
        1. The appraisers shall hold their offices for a term of one (1) year and until their successors are appointed and qualified.
        2. Vacancies occurring in the board of appraisers shall be filled by the circuit judge.
      2. The appointment of appraisers shall be made, in writing, by the circuit judge and filed with the circuit clerk and spread by him upon the records of the circuit court.
    1. The appraisers shall take an oath before the circuit clerk that they will make a just and true award of the compensation of any landowner by reason of rights-of-way, lands, or structures taken for the project by condemnation. The oaths shall be reduced to writing, signed by the assessors and spread by the clerk upon the records of the circuit court.
    2. If any appraiser is interested in any property to be condemned, he shall not act as to the property.
    3. The board of improvement of the district may consult with and use the services of the board of appraisers in seeking to acquire needed lands and rights-of-way by consent and deed.
    4. Reasonable compensation to be fixed by the circuit court shall be allowed the appraisers for their services, and the compensation shall be paid by the district.
      1. Whenever any such district deems it necessary to take or use any rights-of-way, land, or structures for the project, or when the project has already been entered upon by the district, then the district may file a petition with the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the property is situated. The petition shall describe, as near as may be practical, the property taken, or proposed to be taken, and ask that the property described in the petition be condemned and that the appraisers make an award to the owners of the land or property.
          1. The owners of each tract of land or right-of-way described in the petition shall be made defendants in the petition.
          2. The term owners shall include unknown owners where it is alleged in the petition that the names of the owners are unknown or uncertain.
        1. Persons or corporations holding any lien or lease upon, or claiming any interest in, the land may also be made defendants.
        2. It shall be no objection that several tracts of land or rights-of-way belonging to different owners are included in the same petition.
        1. When the petition is filed, the circuit clerk shall notify the appraisers of the filing, whose duty it shall then be to assemble, at some convenient time, and ascertain the fair market value of the property appropriated or intended to be appropriated and the damages, if any, to the remainder of each tract.
          1. The appraisers shall reduce their findings to writing, giving the amount of award as to each tract, and shall sign it and file the findings with the circuit court.
            1. The clerk shall immediately issue a summons directed to the sheriff of the county, together with a copy of the award attached thereto, commanding him to serve the owners as in ordinary suits at common law.
              1. If the owners are nonresidents of the state, or if it is alleged in the petition that the owners of any tract or persons having an interest in any tract are unknown or uncertain, it shall be the duty of the clerk to publish a warning order in some newspaper published in the municipality in which the district is located once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks.
              2. (i) The warning order may be in the following form:
      1. If no exception is filed by the owners within twenty (20) days after service of summons, or within twenty (20) days after the date of the first publication of the warning order, or by the district within twenty (20) days after the award is filed, then it shall be the duty of the circuit clerk to call the court's attention to the award and to the failure to file exceptions thereto after notice having been given as provided in this section. Upon such information the court shall proceed to enter a judgment in favor of the owners of such lands against the district for the amount awarded by the appraisers and for condemnation upon payment of the amount adjudged to the owners or into the registry of the court for their benefit.
          1. In case exceptions are filed by either party within the time prescribed in this section, it shall be the duty of the clerk to docket the cause.
          2. The petition originally filed by the district and the award of the appraisers shall constitute all necessary pleadings in the proceedings.
        1. In case a trial is demanded or requested by either party, the question shall be tried as other common law cases are tried.
        1. Where the determination of questions in controversy in the proceedings is likely to retard the progress of the construction, then upon the filing of the award by the appraisers, the circuit court, or the judge thereof, in vacation, upon request of the district, shall designate an amount of money to be deposited by the district, subject to the order of the court, and for the purposes of making just compensation when the amount thereof shall have been assessed.
        2. The judge shall designate the place of the deposit.
      1. In designating the amount of money to be deposited, the court or judge shall accept the award of the appraisers as prima facie correct.
      2. Whenever the deposits shall have been made in compliance with the order of the court or judge, it shall be lawful for that district to enter upon the lands in controversy and proceed with their work of construction prior to the final judgment and payment of damages and compensation.
      1. Upon the petition of the district, any landowner, lienholder, or lessee, the circuit court may order the payment of the final judgment to the parties interested therein in accordance with their several interests.
      2. If there is a conflict in interest among those entitled to the judgment or if the owners are unknown or uncertain, the district may be permitted to pay the final judgment into the registry of the court to await its further orders.
    1. Upon the payment of any judgment, either to the owners or into the registry of the court, a final judgment of condemnation shall be entered.

“To (name of supposed owners) and all other persons, having any claim and interest in and to the following described land situated in County, Arkansas, namely: (here describe the land set forth in the petition over which the levee or flood control project passes); you are hereby warned to appear in the Circuit Court within twenty (20) days, and file exceptions to the award which has been filed in my office by the levee and flood control appraisers of district for the appropriation of the hereinbefore described land, for the construction, or intended construction of a levee and flood control project over and across the same.”

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( ii ) The warning order shall be dated and signed by the clerk.

History. Acts 1947, No. 23, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-336.

Subchapter 4 — Operation of Facilities Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1893, No. 158, § 3: effective on passage.

Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1949, No. 242, § 3: approved Mar. 7, 1949. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas confusion presently exists as to whether water and electric light districts, having discharged their bonded indebtedness shall turn over merely the physical works of said district to the city, or shall turn over all other assets as well, this Act is deemed to be immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-91-401. Operation of water and electric light plants in cities of the first class.

  1. The commissioners on boards of improvement for water and electric light improvement districts in cities of the first class shall control and manage the affairs of the district until the bonds issued to pay therefor and all other indebtedness have been retired. At that time, they shall turn over the works to the city council or other governing body of the city, together with any and all cash on hand, bonds, or other securities, resulting from the operation of the water or electric light plant.
    1. As long as the commissioners continue to operate the water and electric light districts, they shall make an annual report to the city or town council showing, in detail, all receipts and disbursements made by them.
        1. As long as they continue such operation, they shall have the right to fix the rates to be paid by consumers of water and electric light or power.
        2. The rates shall be fixed as nearly as possible at amounts which will pay the bonds of the district as they mature, so as to relieve the real property of the district as far as possible from the burden of taxation therefor.
        1. From the rates fixed by the board, any property owner may take an appeal to the circuit court of the county, which shall confirm or set aside the rates as it finds just.
        2. If it sets aside rates fixed by the board, it shall itself fix rates which will be reasonable and adequate for the purposes prescribed.

History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 18; Pope's Dig., § 7367; Acts 1949, No. 242, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-315.

A.C.R.C. Notes. In subdivision (b)(2)(A)(ii), the words “as they mature, so as to relieve the real property of the district” were inserted inasmuch as they appeared in this section prior to the 1949 amendment and are necessary in order to preserve the meaning.

Cross References. Operation of electric light and water plants in cities of the second class and incorporated towns, § 14-201-301 et seq.

Case Notes

In General.

Section 14-201-301 et seq. does not affect the operation of this section in cities of the first class. Malvern v. Young, 205 Ark. 886, 171 S.W.2d 470 (1943).

Construction.

If this section does not repeal § 14-91-402, then the two sections provide alternative methods. Malvern v. Young, 205 Ark. 886, 171 S.W.2d 470 (1943).

Rates.

Where waterworks district allowed residents of other districts to receive water at the same rate charged residents of the district following payment of all its bonded indebtedness, city could not, upon assuming operation of the district, charge residents of other districts a surcharge, since such surcharge, absent evidence of change in condition or additional expenditures, would constitute an unreasonable discrimination. Malvern v. Young, 205 Ark. 886, 171 S.W.2d 470 (1943).

Retirement of Indebtedness.

Where commissioners continued to operate water plant until all bonded indebtedness was paid off, after turning waterworks over to the city, they were required to collect all delinquent assessments and distribute the money so received, together with any other money on hand, to the property holders. Malvern v. Young, 205 Ark. 886, 171 S.W.2d 470 (1943).

14-91-402. Operation of waterworks, gas, or electric light works.

  1. In case of the construction of waterworks or gas or electric light works by any municipal improvement district, the city or town council, after the works are constructed, shall have full power and authority to operate and maintain them instead of the improvement district board.
  2. The council may supply water and light to private consumers and make and collect uniform charges for the service and apply the income therefrom to the payment of operating expenses and maintenance of the works.

History. Acts 1893, No. 158, § 2, p. 271; C. & M. Dig., § 5739; Pope's Dig., § 7366; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-316.

Case Notes

Construction.

If this section is not repealed by § 14-91-401, then the two sections provide alternative methods. Malvern v. Young, 205 Ark. 886, 171 S.W.2d 470 (1943).

Legal Actions.

Where an improvement district was sued for coal alleged to have been furnished to it to run a water and electric light plant for the city, it was a good defense that such plant was being operated by the city and that the coal was furnished by the city for its operation. Improvement Dist. of Wynne v. Brown, 86 Ark. 61, 109 S.W. 1010 (1908).

Where the authority of a city to maintain its waterworks plant ceased upon the creation by the legislature of a waterworks district to take over such plant and the acceptance thereof by the city, the city could not claim subsequent damages for breach of a contract to furnish power for such waterworks. City of Paragould v. Arkansas Light & Power Co., 171 Ark. 86, 284 S.W. 529, 46 A.L.R. 1186 (1926).

Power and Authority.

—In General.

A city has express statutory authority under this section to own and operate light and power plants and may delegate this authority to an agency without creating a board of public utilities as provided in § 14-201-301 et seq.Adams v. Bryant, 236 Ark. 859, 370 S.W.2d 432 (1963).

—Maintenance.

This section empowered the city council to contract for an electric pump and for the current to operate it, the original steam pumping plant being retained as an emergency plant. Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. City of Paragould, 146 Ark. 1, 225 S.W. 435 (1920).

This section has been held to authorize a city operating electric light works constructed by an improvement district to construct a new power house on another tract and to install new machinery and equipment. McCutchen v. City of Siloam Springs, 185 Ark. 846, 49 S.W.2d 1037 (1932).

—Operations.

Where a city took over the control of the water supply and system of a water district and later a second district was organized covering other territory in the city not covered by the first district, it was held that the city had authority to permit the second district to connect with the mains of the first district and to sell water to the second district where there was an ample water supply and the city made money by the transaction. Armour v. City of Ft. Smith, 117 Ark. 214, 174 S.W. 234 (1915).

Where city water plant was turned over to a board of managers by ordinance which did not authorize employment of superintendent, contract made by board of managers employing superintendent, not authorized or approved by city, was not binding; payment of superintendent's salary could be enjoined, but the contract being neither illegal nor immoral, superintendent could retain salary already received if not in excess of the actual value of his services. Gladson v. Wilson, 196 Ark. 996, 120 S.W.2d 732 (1938).

Cited: Wilson v. Blanks, 95 Ark. 496, 130 S.W. 517 (1910).

Subchapter 5 — Repairs, Replacements, Improvements, and Extensions of Facilities Generally

Effective Dates. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 23: approved Feb. 28, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the inability under the present laws to extend water mains and repair water plants there is great danger of conflagration, that by reason of the inability to extend electric light plants there is great danger to the public peace and safety, owing to the darkness of the streets, and that by reason of the inability to extend and repair sewers there is great danger to the public health, and that for these reasons it is immediately necessary that this act should go into operation, and it is therefore declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1935, No. 145, § 8: approved Mar. 20, 1935. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that by reason of the fact that heretofore it has been necessary to obtain the consent of only a bare majority in value of the owners of real property in order to organize a local improvement district, the organization of such districts all over the State of Arkansas has been in the past greatly abused, advantage has been taken of the owners of property therein and burdensome taxes have been laid upon property owners without any actual increase in property values as compensation therefor, many of such districts having been organized for promotion purposes; that many property owners throughout the State are in danger of losing their said property by reason of their inability to pay the said local improvement taxes; and that unless legislation is immediately enacted making it necessary to obtain the consent of more than a majority in value of said property owners the practice of organizing such districts and the abuse thereof will be continued, all to the serious detriment and injury of owners of property. It is, therefore, found and declared that an emergency exists, and this act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-91-501. Authority generally.

    1. It is realized that waterworks and electric light plants and sewers will wear out and must be repaired and replaced, and that with the growth of our cities and towns, improvement and extensions of these plants and sewers are necessary from time to time.
    2. So far as municipal improvement districts, created for the purpose of installing waterworks and electric light plants and sewers, have funds, they may make these repairs, replacements, improvements, and extensions.
    1. If it is necessary to borrow money for the purpose of making repairs, replacements, improvements, or extensions, the board of improvement of the district shall cause plans and estimates of cost thereof to be prepared and shall file them with the city or town clerk or recorder.
      1. If the improvements so to be made will benefit property beyond the limits of the district as then existing, they shall file with their report a map showing the boundaries of the original district and the territory to be annexed thereto.
        1. If within twelve (12) months thereafter, a petition signed by parties claiming to be two-thirds (2/3) in assessed value of the real property in the original territory and in the territory to be annexed, each taken separately, is filed with the city or town clerk or recorder, requesting that the repairs, replacements, improvements, or extensions be made, he shall give notice of a hearing upon the petition to be had at the next regular meeting of the city or town council held at least fifteen (15) days after the publication of a notice.
        2. The notice may be substantially in the following form:

“Notice is hereby given that the Commissioners of Water (or Electric Light or Sewer) Improvement District No. , of the City (or Town) of , have filed their plans for repairs, replacements, improvements, or extensions, in my office, and there has been filed in my office a petition signed by parties claiming to be a two-thirds in value of the owners of real property within said district, as shown by the last county assessment on file (and within the territory proposed to be annexed) praying that the repairs, replacements, improvements, or extensions be made. Said petition will be heard at a meeting of the City (or Town) Council to be held at the hour of p.m., on the day of , 19 , and at said meeting said Council will determine whether those signing the petition constitute the two-thirds in value of such owners of real property; and at said meeting all owners of real property within the district (and within the territory to be annexed) who desire, will be heard upon the question. “The territory to be added to the district is described as follows: The City Clerk (or Town Recorder)”

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History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 14; 1935, No. 145, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 7368; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-322.

Case Notes

Petition.

A petition of a majority (now two-thirds) in value of the property owners in a waterworks district authorizing the district to borrow money was not required in a purchase of an engine where under the contract of purchase no money was to be borrowed but the engine was to be paid for out of the district's income. Mississippi Valley Power Co. v. Board of Imp., 185 Ark. 76, 46 S.W.2d 32 (1932) (decision prior to 1935 amendment).

14-91-502. Hearing and approval.

    1. At the time named in the notice the city or town council shall meet and hear all persons who wish to be heard upon the question whether two-thirds (2/3) in assessed value of the owners of real property within the original district and two-thirds (2/3) of the owners within the territory to be annexed have signed the petition.
    2. If it finds that two-thirds (2/3) of the property owners in the original district and in the annexation each have so signed, they shall declare the fact by an ordinance.
  1. In the ordinance, they shall annex to the original district the territory described in the petition and notice. They shall authorize the commissioners to proceed with the work of improvement as contemplated in their plans and to borrow the funds necessary for the purpose in the same manner as they were authorized to borrow money for the making of the original improvement.
  2. The finding of the council shall be conclusive unless, within thirty (30) days from publication of the ordinance, suit is brought in the chancery court to set it aside.
    1. The council and chancery court in their finding shall be governed by the record of deeds in the office of the recorder of the county and shall not consider any unrecorded instrument.
    2. They shall also be governed by the value placed upon the property as shown by the last county assessment on file in the county clerk's office.
  3. The ordinance shall be substantially in the following form:

“AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR REPAIRS, REPLACEMENTS, IMPROVEMENTS OR EXTENSIONS OF THE WATERWORKS (OR ELECTRIC LIGHT PLANT OR SEWER) OF DISTRICT NO. OF THE CITY (OR TOWN) OF . “WHEREAS, a petition has been presented to the City (or Town) Council of the City (or Town) of , purporting to be signed by parties constituting two-thirds in assessed value of the real property in the said District No. , and in the territory hereinafter described, sought to be annexed thereto, each taken separately, and praying that the repairs, replacements, and improvements on extensions be made; and “WHEREAS, notice of the filing of said petition has been duly given as required by law, and a hearing has been duly had thereon as the law requires, and at said hearing it was ascertained that a two-thirds in assessed value of the owners of real property within the said district as heretofore established, and a two-thirds in assessed value of the owners of real property in the territory hereby annexed, have signed said petition: “NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY (OR TOWN) COUNCIL OF THE CITY (OR TOWN) OF “Section 1. The commissioners of said District No. are hereby authorized to make the repairs, replacements, improvements or extensions of the waterworks (or electric light plant or sewers) of said district, shown in their plans on file with the city (or town) Clerk (or Recorder), and to borrow money for that purpose, and may extend the said into the adjacent property hereinafter described. “Section 2. The following described property, to-wit. (Here describe the property) which is adjacent to the said district as heretofore laid out, will be benefited by the proposed repairs, replacements, improvements or extensions of the said and said territory is hereby annexed to the said Improvement District No. , and shall hereafter constitute a part thereof. “Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect and be in force immediately after its passage.”

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History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 15; 1935, No. 145, § 6; Pope's Dig., § 7369; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-323.

Cross References. Annexation of territory to district, § 14-88-503.

14-91-503. Assessment procedures.

    1. The city or town council shall also appoint a board of three (3) assessors who shall reassess the benefit that will accrue to the owners of the real property within the improvement district from the making of the original improvements and from the proposed repairs, replacements, improvements, or extensions.
    2. The reassessment shall be filed, advertised, equalized, and corrected like the original assessment of benefits and shall become incontestable under the same circumstances as the original assessment of benefits.
  1. The council shall pass an ordinance levying upon the assessment of benefits the tax essential to pay for the work of improvement, including repairs, replacements, improvements, or extensions, substantially in the following form:
  2. The local assessment shall be a charge and a lien against all the real property in the district from the date of the ordinance and shall be entitled to preference over all judgments, executions, encumbrances, or liens whensoever created.
  3. The assessment shall continue until the local assessment, with any penalty and costs that may accrue thereon, shall be paid.
  4. As between grantor and grantee, all payments not due at the date of the transfer of the real property shall be payable by the grantee.

“AN ORDINANCE LEVYING AN ASSESSMENT FOR REPAIRS, REPLACEMENTS, IMPROVEMENTS OR EXTENSIONS IN WATERWORKS (OR ELECTRIC LIGHT OR SEWER) DISTRICT NO. , OF THE CITY (OR TOWN) OF . “WHEREAS, two-thirds in value of the property holders owning property in District No. of the City (or Town) of as now organized have petitioned the Council of the City (or Town) of for repairs, replacements, improvements or extensions, and that the cost thereof shall be assessed upon the real property of the said district according to benefits received; and “WHEREAS, said benefits received by each and every block, lot, and parcel of real property situated in said district equals or exceeds the local assessment thereon; and “WHEREAS, the estimated cost of said improvement is Dollars; “THEREFORE, it is now ordained by the City or Town Council of the City or Town of , that said several blocks, lots, and parcels of real property in said district be assessed according to the assessment list for said improvement district as the same now remains in the office of the Recorder or City Clerk, and that percent on each of said blocks, lots and parcels shall be paid annually on or before the day of until the whole of said local assessment shall be paid.”

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History. Acts 1929, No. 64, § 16; 1935, No. 145, § 7; Pope's Dig., § 7370; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-324.

Case Notes

Betterment.

The theory upon which improvement districts taxes are sustained is that the proposed improvement will enhance the value of the land sought to be taxed, and the tax is imposed upon this enhanced value, called betterment. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

Subchapter 6 — Continuance of Districts for Maintenance and Repair

Effective Dates. Acts 1909, No. 245, § 6: effective on passage.

Acts 1921, No. 477, § 2: effective on passage.

14-91-601. Procedure generally.

    1. All improvement districts in cities and towns organized under §§ 14-88-203 — 14-88-205, 14-88-207 — 14-88-210, 14-88-301 — 14-88-303, 14-88-305, 14-88-306, 14-88-308, and 14-88-407 may be prolonged or continued after the completion of the improvement for which they were organized for the purpose of maintaining and keeping those improvements in a good state of repair, upon a petition of a majority in value of the owners of real property within the district adjoining the locality to be affected, to the city or town council, requesting that the life of the district be prolonged or continued for that purpose.
    2. The petition shall designate the time during which the maintenance and repair shall be undertaken, and the manner and estimated cost thereof, requesting that the cost be assessed and charged upon the real property situated within the district.
    1. Thereupon, the council shall provide by ordinance for the prolongation or continuation of the district as requested, and the board of assessors shall thereupon assess the value of all benefits to be received by the land owned by reason of the maintenance and keeping in repair of the improvement as affecting each of the blocks, lots, or parcels of land within the district.
    2. The board shall at once proceed to inscribe in the assessment book of the district the value of the benefits to accrue to each of the blocks, lots, or parcels of land.

History. Acts 1909, No. 245, § 1, p. 742; C. & M. Dig., § 5728; Acts 1921, No. 477, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7384; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-317.

Case Notes

In General.

This section confers authority to prolong improvement districts and to assess the maintenance cost thereof against the property in the district. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

Assessment of Benefits.

Ordinance reciting that property in sewer improvement district was assessed according to assessment list in the office of the city clerk was held invalid for undertaking to make the assessment which this section requires the board of assessors to make. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

Betterments for sewerage purposes may be assessed against vacant property where, if and when desired, the sewerage connections may be made. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

Original and Annexed Districts.

Original sewer district and annexed district could be treated as a single district for purposes of maintenance, after the indebtedness of both districts had been discharged, if the two districts were so connected that they might, in fact, be regarded as a single district. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

Where ordinances treated original sewer district and annexed district as separate entities, absent ordinance prolonging life of annexed district, there was no authority to assess and impose upon the lands in that district the cost of maintenance. Ragsdale v. Cunningham, 201 Ark. 848, 147 S.W.2d 20 (1941).

14-91-602. Levy of assessment.

  1. The city or town council shall provide, by ordinance, for the levy of the assessment of the benefits as made by the assessors under § 14-91-601 and shall fix the day in the year when the assessment shall be paid.
  2. The assessment shall be a charge and lien against all the real property in the district from the date of the ordinance and shall be entitled to preference over all judgments, executions, encumbrances, or liens whensoever created, except the lien for original assessment, and shall continue until the assessments, with any penalty and costs that may accrue, shall be paid.
  3. As between grantor and grantee, all payments not due at the date of the transfer of the real property shall be payable by the grantee.

History. Acts 1909, No. 245, § 4, p. 742; C. & M. Dig., § 5731; Pope's Dig., § 7387; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-320.

14-91-603. Limitations on assessment.

The assessments for maintenance and repair made pursuant to § 14-91-601 may be in addition to the twenty percent (20%) maximum assessment permitted for the original cost of the improvement by § 14-90-801, but no additional assessment shall be made in excess of five percent (5%) of the value of the real property in the district as shown by the last county assessment, and not more than ten percent (10%) of the additional assessment of benefits shall be collected in any one (1) year.

History. Acts 1909, No. 245, § 3, p. 742; C. & M. Dig., § 5730; Pope's Dig., § 7386; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-319.

14-91-604. Readjustment of assessment.

The assessment made pursuant to § 14-91-601 may be annually readjusted according to additional improvements upon the lands by board of assessors. Immediately upon the recording of the assessment, notice thereof shall be inserted in some newspaper, and appeals may be filed and shall be heard and disposed of all in the same manner as provided by law for publishing notice of and protesting against the original assessment for the improvement.

History. Acts 1909, No. 245, § 2, p. 742; C. & M. Dig., § 5729; Pope's Dig., § 7385; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-318.

Cross References. Correction, revision, and reduction of original assessments, § 14-90-601 et seq.

14-91-605. Law controlling assessments.

Under this subchapter, the publication of a copy of the ordinance, the infliction of a penalty for nonpayment, and the enforcement and foreclosure of the lien shall all be had and done in the same manner as is provided in reference to the original assessment.

History. Acts 1909, No. 245, § 5, p. 742; C. & M. Dig., § 5732; Pope's Dig., § 7388; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-321.

Subchapter 7 — New Districts to Enlarge or Reconstruct Existing Works

Effective Dates. Acts 1915, No. 5, § 11: approved Jan. 27, 1915. Emergency clause provided: “This Act being for the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety, an emergency is declared, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-91-701. Formation generally.

  1. It shall be lawful for an improvement district in a city or town to be formed for the purpose of enlarging or reconstructing waterworks and electric light plants previously constructed by other improvement districts or owned or controlled by the city or town council, and extending the pipes, wires, and other equipment for it.
  2. The district shall be organized and all the proceedings in it had in pursuance of the provisions of the laws governing improvement districts in cities and towns.
  3. The council, the commissioners of the improvement district board, and assessors shall have the powers and duties prescribed thereby.
  4. When the improvement districts are organized, possession and control of the waterworks and electric light plants shall be taken by the commissioners in the districts.
  5. When the work of the improvement is finished and all debts of the preceding districts have been paid, the control of the waterworks and electric light plants shall pass to the council, as provided by § 14-91-402.
  6. The commissioners may secure the payment of any borrowed money by a mortgage on the plant and a first lien pledge and mortgage of the assessment of benefits made on the reconstruction.

History. Acts 1915, No. 5, § 10; C. & M. Dig., § 5727½; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-338.

Subchapter 8 — Improvement of Water Plants for Veterans' Hospitals

Effective Dates. Acts 1932 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 5: approved Mar. 23, 1932. Emergency clause provided: “It being ascertained that there is great demand in many of the cities of this State for such extension, improvements and developments of such waterworks and plants, and for the financing thereof as herein provided, and that the public peace, health and safety of the citizens of such cities is thereby imperiled, therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

14-91-801. Authority generally.

All water improvement districts in any and all of the cities of the first and second class of the State of Arkansas that may be designated as sites for United States Veterans' Hospitals and their respective boards of managers and boards of improvements, or any of them, are authorized to extend, develop, and improve water plants and systems, and to acquire real estate as to them may seem necessary and advisable for this purpose. They may issue their certain negotiable promissory obligations in payment thereof, payable out of the surplus, from year to year, of the revenue arising from the operation of any such plant of the district, after all operating expenses have been paid or provided for, and to sell and negotiate such obligations for the purpose of securing cash funds with which to so extend, develop, and improve the plant and to acquire real estate.

History. Acts 1932 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-325.

14-91-802. Assistance by city.

All cities of the first and second class in this state are authorized, by ordinance, in consideration of the benefits to be received by the cities by reason of the matters set out in § 14-91-801, to obligate itself to aid or assume the obligations of the improvement districts, or of its board of managers or board of improvement, payable out of the surplus revenues of the city, after the necessary expenses of the city have been paid or provided for. They shall be paid out of such surplus, from year to year, until the obligations assumed shall have been fully paid.

History. Acts 1932 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-326.

Publisher's Notes. As to validation of prior action, see Acts 1932 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 3, § 3.

Subchapter 9 — Sewer Connections to Lands Outside District

Cross References. Connections to suburban sewer districts, § 14-249-103.

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 53, § 4: approved Feb. 13, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “By reason of the need of sanitary sewer connections in our cities and towns, an emergency is hereby declared and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1969, No. 304, § 4: Mar. 21, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is declared by the General Assembly of Arkansas that many purchasers of land have been misled and deceived and put to extra expense by reason of their lack of knowledge that land purchased by them is subject to unpaid connection charges for necessary sanitary sewer facilities and that only through enactment of this bill will this situation be remedied. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

14-91-901. Authority to connect.

All municipal sewer improvement districts shall have authority to permit lands outside the boundaries of the district to connect sewer lines serving the lands with the sewer lines and mains of the district and to make a charge for this privilege.

History. Acts 1941, No. 53, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-332.

14-91-902. Terms of connection.

  1. The commissioners on the board of a municipal sewer improvement district shall have the right to consent to or refuse to allow connections within their discretion.
    1. The connections shall be made on such terms as the commissioners may dictate. However, no lands outside of the district shall be permitted to connect with the sewer line of the district except upon payment to the district of a sum equal to the charge made against similarly benefited lands within the district.
    2. In case such connections have been made without the payment of a charge for the connection, the district may refuse to allow sewer service to the lands until permission for the connection is granted and the charge for the service is paid to the district.

History. Acts 1941, No. 53, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-333.

Case Notes

Connection Charge.

This section imposes a duty on the commissioners to make a connection charge when the land to be served is outside the sewer improvement district. Morrilton Homes, Inc. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 226 Ark. 22, 287 S.W.2d 581 (1956).

Where proof showed that sewer improvement district's assessment of benefits to landowners within the district averaged $100 per lot, an assessment of $30.00 per lot for sewer connections outside the district where corporation which connected to the district's system laid its own mains was not excessive. Morrilton Homes, Inc. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 226 Ark. 22, 287 S.W.2d 581 (1956).

Discretion of Commissioners.

The commissioners have the right to exercise their discretion as to whether connections with sewer line shall be permitted outside the improvement district. Sewer Imp. Dist. v. Davis, 227 Ark. 755, 301 S.W.2d 15 (1957).

The mere fact that property owners have sewer lines from their property connected to the improvement district system for more than three years did not give them a vested right to use the sewer system without consent. Sewer Imp. Dist. v. Davis, 227 Ark. 755, 301 S.W.2d 15 (1957).

14-91-903. Recording required.

  1. In any instance where a municipal sewer improvement district has contracted for the furnishing of sanitary sewer service to lands lying outside the boundaries of the district, that district shall cause to be recorded, in the land records of the county in which the land is located, an instrument containing:
    1. A full and complete description of the lands which are subject to the contract;
    2. A fair summary of the terms and provisions of the contract; and
    3. Such other information as might be pertinent to the transaction.
  2. If the instrument referred to in subsection (a) of this section is not recorded as there required, a subsequent purchaser of all, or any part, of the land covered by the contract shall have the right to connect improvements located on the lands to the sanitary sewer lines of the district without charge for the connections, unless the purchaser had actual notice of the contract and the terms thereof concerning connection charges.

History. Acts 1969, No. 304, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-333.1, 20-333.2.

Subchapter 10 — Sale of Waterworks

Cross References. Lease or sale of public utilities, §§ 14-199-301 et seq., 14-219-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 6: approved Mar. 7, 1929. Emergency clause provided: “It is ascertained and hereby declared that there are in various cities and towns in this State waterworks which are now so inadequate to meet the requirements of the inhabitants of such cities and towns that they are prejudicial to the public health and inadequate for the extinction of fires; and that such cities and towns and such improvement districts owning such waterworks have no means with which to make the necessary improvements, repairs and extensions, so that there is an immediate menace to the public health and safety. Therefore an emergency is declared, and for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety this act shall go into immediate operation and take effect upon its passage.”

14-91-1001. Authority to sell.

  1. Wherever in any city or incorporated town in this state a waterworks plant and a sewer system have been constructed by the same improvement district as part of a single improvement, the city or town council shall have authority to sell the waterworks.
    1. To that end, the council shall select a competent engineer familiar with the waterworks plants, who shall appraise the waterworks and file with the clerk or recorder of the city or town his appraisement in writing.
        1. Thereupon, it shall be the duty of the clerk or recorder of the city or town to publish a notice.
        2. The notice may be in the following form:
      1. The notice shall be published once a week for four (4) weeks.
    1. Unless some property owner of the city or town brings suit in the chancery court within thirty (30) days from the first publication of the notice to review the appraisal, the appraisal shall stand and be conclusive upon all parties.
    2. If such a suit is brought, it shall be treated as a matter of public interest and advanced in all courts, and all appeals therein must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days.
    3. If at the end of the period of thirty (30) days no suit has been brought to set aside the appraisal, the appraisement shall be conclusive of the value of the property.

“NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the appraiser appointed by the City (or Town) Council of the City (or Town) of has appraised the value of the waterworks system constructed by said City (or Town; or by Improvement District No ) at the sum of Dollars ($ ). City Clerk (or Recorder).”

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History. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 7395; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-327.

14-91-1002. Proceedings to approve sale.

  1. The council of any municipal corporation may sell its system of waterworks, together with the right to operate it, when they shall determine, by resolution adopted by a majority vote of the council, that it would be for the best interest of the town or city that the sale be consummated.
    1. Before any such sale shall be consummated, there shall be filed, within one (1) year after the adoption of the resolution, with the council a petition signed by a majority in value as shown by the last county assessment of the owners of real property within the town or city proposing to make the sale, asking that the sale be made and stating the minimum price at which the sale shall be made, which shall in no event be a sum less than the appraised value thereof.
      1. Upon the filing of this petition, the council of the city or town shall give notice by publication once a week for two (2) weeks in some newspaper published in the county in which the city or town is located, advising the owners of real property within the city or town that on a day therein named the council of the city or town will hear the petition and determine whether those signing it constitute a majority in value of the owners of real property.
        1. At the meeting named in the notice, the owners of real property within the city or town shall be heard before the council, which shall determine whether the signers of the petition constitute a majority in value.
        2. The finding of the council shall be conclusive unless, within thirty (30) days thereafter, suit is brought to review its action in the chancery court of the county in which the city or town lies.
      2. In determining whether those signing the petition constitute a majority in value of the owners of the real property within the city or town, the council and the chancery court shall be guided by the records of deeds in the office of the recorder of the county and shall not consider any unrecorded instruments.

History. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 2; Pope's Dig., § 7396; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-328.

14-91-1003. Purchase of waterworks.

    1. The purchaser of the water system in any city or town in this state shall pay at least the appraised value for the plant.
      1. If the purchaser desires to assume an amount of bonds equal to the purchase price outstanding against the plant, he shall give to the city or town an indemnifying bond in some good surety company, conditioned for the payment of the interest and the retiring of the bonds, so assumed by the purchaser, as they may become due and payable.
      2. Should the purchaser desire to take up the amount of bonds that may be adjudged against the waterworks, as shown by the purchase price, he may do so by making the necessary arrangements for retiring them with the holders of the bonds.
      1. The transfer of the properties shall be evidenced by a deed of conveyance in the usual form and with the usual covenants of warranty.
      2. A lien against the property sold shall be retained in the deed for all of the unpaid sale price with the right upon default of payment of any interest or indebtedness when it falls due to declare all of the unpaid sale price due and payable and to proceed with a foreclosure of the lien so retained.
    1. The deed of conveyance shall be executed on behalf of the city or town by the clerk or recorder, when authorized by the city or town council.
    2. A receipt duly executed by the treasurer of the city or town shall release the purchaser from further liability for the payment of the amount of money received.
    3. If payment is made in cash, it shall be applied only to the retirement of the bonds of the district.
  1. Upon the payment of all indebtedness for which a lien may be retained in a deed of conveyance, the mayor, or recorder, or clerk of the town or city is authorized and directed to satisfy the lien by a deed of release, or by marginal entry upon the deed record where it may be recorded.

History. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 7397; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-329.

14-91-1004. Effect of sale.

The sale of the property as mentioned in this subchapter shall not work a forfeiture of the corporate entity of the improvement district. Rather, it shall be maintained for the operating of the sewer system which is to be retained by the district and the town and city.

History. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 3; Pope's Dig., § 7397; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-329.

14-91-1005. Outstanding bonds.

The remainder of the outstanding bonds issued by a municipal waterworks improvement district shall remain as an indebtedness against it and shall be paid by a levy on the assessment of benefits of the district in force at the time of a sale.

History. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 4; Pope's Dig., § 7398; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-330.

14-91-1006. Priority of suits.

All suits in reference to the sale of municipal waterworks shall be deemed matters of public interest and shall be advanced in all courts and heard at the earliest possible moment, and appeals therein must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days.

History. Acts 1929, No. 103, § 5; Pope's Dig., § 7399; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-331.

Subchapter 11 — Change of Plans in Cities with a Population Exceeding 60,000

Effective Dates. Acts 1925, No. 238, § 8: approved Mar. 27, 1925. Emergency clause provided: “This act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act shall be in force from and after its passage.”

14-91-1101. Applicability.

This subchapter shall apply only to improvement districts created in cities having a population exceeding sixty thousand (60,000) inhabitants, as shown by the federal census immediately preceding the proceedings authorized by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1925, No. 238, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-303.

14-91-1102. Authority generally.

The commissioners on the boards of improvement districts formed in cities having more than sixty thousand (60,000) inhabitants are authorized and empowered to change the plans for the improvement either before or after the assessments of benefits are made in their districts and to make and complete the improvement in them according to the changed plans.

History. Acts 1925, No. 238, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-304.

14-91-1103. Revised plans.

  1. At any time before the completion of the improvements in the improvement districts, the commissioners on the boards of improvement may make revised plans for the improvements involving changes in the original plans and complete the improvements according to the changed plans.
  2. As soon as the commissioners have formed the revised plans for the improvements, they shall file a report thereof with the city clerk, together with an estimate of the cost of completing the improvements according to the changed plans.

History. Acts 1925, No. 238, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-305.

14-91-1104. Plans not exceeding cost limit.

  1. If the estimate of cost of making and completing the improvements according to the changed plans does not exceed the limit of cost to be borne by the landowners in the improvement district as limited by the statute in force at the time the second or majority petition is filed, or by a majority petition, the assessors shall immediately proceed to make a reassessment of benefits to be derived from the making of the improvements according to the changed plans.
  2. The reassessment shall be filed, advertised, and heard, and the time for any complaints against it shall be limited, as is provided for on the original assessment in the district.

History. Acts 1925, No. 238, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-305.

14-91-1105. Plans exceeding cost limit.

    1. If the estimate of cost in any improvement district on any revised or changed plans shall exceed the amount limited by statute in force at the time the second or majority petition is filed with the city clerk, or the amount limited by the second or majority petition, the commissioners shall not proceed with the improvements according to the changed plans unless, within one (1) year after the changed plans are filed with the city clerk signed by a majority in value of the owners of real property in the district as shown by the last assessment for state and county taxes and a hearing is had thereon after notice by publication has been given for the time and in the manner required for such hearings on second or majority petitions in improvement districts in cities and towns, the city council finds that the petition contains the consent of a majority in value of the owners of real property in the district, as provided for in this section.
    2. The finding of the city council on the petition shall be conclusive, subject to attack in the chancery court within thirty (30) days after the finding is made, and not thereafter.
    3. The petition of the property owners provided for in this section shall state that the petitioners consent to the making and completion of the improvements in the district according to the changed plans and that the cost thereof be assessed against the real property in the district.
    1. If the city council shall find that a majority of the landowners in the improvement district have petitioned for the making and completion of the improvements according to the revised plans, as provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the assessors shall, as soon as possible, make a reassessment of the benefits to be derived from the making and completion of the improvements according to the changed plans.
    2. The reassessment shall be filed, notice thereof given by publication, and shall be heard by the council for the time and in the manner provided by law on the original assessment in the district, with the right of any property owner to appeal to the chancery court within the time, after the passage of the ordinance levying the installments of the reassessment of benefits, provided by law for appeals from assessments of benefits in improvement districts in cities and towns, and not thereafter.

History. Acts 1925, No. 238, §§ 5, 6; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-306, 20-307.

14-91-1106. Borrowing of money.

In order to secure funds for the making and completion of the improvements in the improvement district according to the changed plans, the board of improvement may borrow money not exceeding the full amount of the estimated cost of making and completing the improvements, with ten percent (10%) added for overhead cost, at a rate of interest not exceeding eight percent (8%) per annum, and may issue negotiable notes or bonds of the district for the payment thereof, and pledge all uncollected assessments for the security of the payment of the notes or bonds.

History. Acts 1925, No. 238, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-308.

Chapter 92 Suburban Improvement Districts

Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

Preambles. Acts 1943, No. 198 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, in the period of prosperity prior to the depression beginning in 1929, certain owners of property in the less populated and developed areas of cities and towns and in areas adjacent thereto gave consent to and joined in the formation of various kinds of improvement districts organized for the purpose of providing for the owners of lands of such areas public facilities and conveniences, and such improvement districts did construct in such areas such facilities and improvements and to pay for the same, issued and sold bonds which are in fact a first mortgage on all the lands in the districts; and

“Whereas, this debt was created in the belief of the owners of the property that the period of prosperity was a permanent period, and that the facilities and conveniences provided by the district would lead to the improvement and building up of the less populated and unimproved area of the district; and

“Whereas, many of such districts had sold their bonds and had completed the installation of the improvements provided for only a short time before the country was struck by the depression, and as a result all development ceased. Persons who had purchased vacant lots for the purpose of building thereon, found it impossible to finance buildings and as a result lost interest in paying special improvement district taxes or county and state taxes on their property; and

“Whereas, during the depression years the Federal Government, in order to relieve unemployed labor, created the Works Progress Administration and the said W. P. A. proposed to states, counties, cities and improvement districts to pay the entire expense of labor and a substantial portion of the cost of the material used in making various public improvements, and under this agency or authority public facilities and conveniences of the same kind and character as those theretofore constructed under the improvement district system of bonded indebtedness were made in other areas at a cost of from one-sixth to one-third of the bonded indebtedness of areas included in improvement districts, and thereby lessened the value and attractiveness of property laboring under the debt of a regular improvement district; and

“Whereas, it is now an evident fact that in many cases ten or more years annual assessments of improvement district taxes have accumulated on the lands of such improvement districts and the sum necessary to redeem such lands, together with state and county taxes which remain unpaid, is too much for the average man to pay in one installment, and such areas are now and must remain blighted until some legal method is devised to relieve such property from accumulation of delinquent improvement district taxes and to devise a method for the payment of such accumulation of taxes in installments distributed in the future; and

“Whereas, it is evident that the best method to place such property on a current basis and to utilize the facilities and conveniences, such as pavements, sidewalks, water, light, and sewer lines now existing thereon is to provide a plan whereby the accumulation of assessments may be paid in annual installments instead of a lump sum….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1943, No. 198, § 2: approved Mar. 11, 1943. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that the provisions of this act are necessary to aid said improvement districts to work out their affairs by making conditions so that more property owners would pay taxes or assessments to the district, to the end that the district can meet its bonded indebtedness and have funds left to take care of necessary maintenance of the improvements constructed, for without sufficient revenue, the districts cannot maintain their water systems or fire hydrants and a continuous supply of water is necessary for the health and protection against fire of the inhabitants and property of the district; similarly necessary repairs of pavements are essential to the safety of the driving public, a regular maintenance of sewers is necessary to prevent stoppages which frequently occur and if not corrected will cause sewage to pour from the manholes and greatly endanger the health of the entire community. These repairs and maintenance of such utilities, as well as the repair and maintenance of other improvements made by such districts are necessary for the public peace, health and safety, and for these reasons it is ascertained and declared that the immediate operation of this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety. An emergency is therefore declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

14-92-101. Assessments delinquent for more than two years.

    1. When, in any improvement district composed of territory adjacent to a city created under any special or general act, for the purpose of grading, draining, paving, curbing, or guttering streets and highways; laying sidewalks; constructing waterworks systems or laying pipes connected with waterworks systems; laying gas pipelines connecting with gas systems; constructing electric lines for light and power connecting with the lines of electric light systems; and constructing independent sewer systems or systems of sewers connecting with the sewer systems of other districts or cities; or for more than one (1) of these purposes, any annual installments of assessments are delinquent for more than two (2) years, its board of improvement, in its discretion, may adopt a resolution finding the amount of the balance of unpaid assessment of benefits against each tract or parcel of land within the district and providing that the balance shall be the assessment of benefits against each respective tract or parcel of land.
    2. No annual installment of assessment against any property which assessment is, on the date of any assessment made under this section, barred by any statute of limitation or on which suit for the collection thereof has not been brought within the time provided or limited by law, or which has been held void by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall be included in the new assessment or in the balance of unpaid assessment of benefits.
  1. After the date of the resolution and the filing of the assessment of benefits, the annual levies on the assessment of benefit shall be collected on the respective assessment of benefits as thus fixed against each tract or parcel of land.
      1. A copy of the resolution, certified by the secretary of the district, shall be incorporated in the assessment book, which shall be filed with the county clerk.
      2. In the making of the assessment book, the assessors shall follow the provisions of the legislation under which the respective district was created.
      1. Upon the filing of the assessment book, the secretary of the board shall thereupon give notice of its filing in a publication of one (1) insertion in a newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county.
      2. This notice may be in substantially the following form:
    1. On the day named in the notice, which shall not be less than ten (10) days from the date of the publication of the notice, it shall be the duty of the assessors and the board of improvement to meet at the place named to hear all complaints as to the correctness of the assessments of benefits. Their determination, evidenced by a resolution, shall be final unless suit is brought in chancery court within thirty (30) days to review it.
    2. Any appeal to the Supreme Court from the chancery court shall be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days and shall be deemed a matter of public interest to be disposed of at the earliest possible moment.
    1. The assessments of benefits fixed by the board of improvement shall supplant all prior assessment or reassessments of benefits.
    2. All annual installments of assessments which were delinquent at the date of any assessment made under this section shall be deemed cancelled on the completion of the new assessment.
  2. The assessment of benefits shall continue to bear interest as provided in the legislation under which the district was organized.

“Notice to landowners of real property in Improvement District No. of County, Arkansas. Notice is hereby given that the Board of Commissioners of Improvement District No. of County, Arkansas, has filed in the office of the County Clerk of County, the assessment book of the district, in which is incorporated a resolution fixing the assessment of benefits on each tract or parcel of land within the district, as authorized by Act No. of the regular session of the General Assembly of Arkansas for the year 1943, (giving the number of this act) and the same is now open to inspection. All persons wishing to be heard on said assessment of benefits will be heard by the assessor or assessors and the Commissioners of the District between the hours of 10 a.m. and 12 noon and between the hours of 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. at the office of the County Clerk of County, Arkansas, on the day of , 19 . “Given this day of , 19 . Secretary. Improvement District No. of County, Arkansas.”

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History. Acts 1943, No. 198, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-728.

Case Notes

Appeals.

The improvement district must act for the benefit of all the affected property owners, and if any property owner feels aggrieved, he has the right to have the decision of the district judicially reviewed. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

Subchapter 2 — Suburban Improvement Districts Generally

Cross References. Formation of municipal improvement districts outside cities or towns, § 14-88-201.

Powers of deputies, § 14-15-503.

Preliminary expenses, levy of tax and issuance of bonds, § 14-86-701 et seq.

Proceedings to correct errors or irregularities in formation of district, § 14-86-401 et seq.

Preambles. Acts 1941, No. 41 contained a preamble which read:

“Whereas, the Federal Government Has Made Available to States and to Their Sub-Divisions, Funds for Improvements Through the Work Projects Administration and Their Agencies, and

“Whereas, Citizens of Cities and Towns Have Availed Themselves of the Funds Through Formation of Improvement Districts for Paving and for Other Purposes; and

“Whereas, Under Existing Arkansas Statutes, Persons Residing Outside Cities and Towns Are Not Permitted to Form Such Improvement Districts and Are Thus Prohibited From Benefits of Funds From the Government of the United States.

“Now Therefore, It Is Declared to Be the Purpose of This act to Make Provision for Formation of Improvement District on the Outside of and Adjacent to Cities Having a Population of 5,000 or more.”

Effective Dates. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 29: approved Feb. 13, 1941. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that many suburban homes are liable to be destroyed by fire for the want of waterworks systems, and the owners thereof are liable to be killed or injured by such fires; that many suburban sections are in need of waterworks systems and sewers for the benefit of public health; that gas light is in many cases of suburban property essential for the public safety; that telephone systems connecting suburban property with the adjacent cities are often necessary to the public safety and health, being essential to give notice of fires, lawless acts and uprisings and for calling physicians to attend the sick; and for these reasons it is ascertained and declared that the immediate operation of this act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is therefore declared, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”

Acts 1951, No. 115, § 2: effective on passage.

Acts 1951, No. 233, § 3: Mar. 6, 1951. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas there is at this time discrimination between Municipal and Suburban Improvement Districts in the rates of commission, and such discrimination is detrimental to the welfare of the state, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act shall be in full force and effect upon and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1953, No. 420, § 4: approved Mar. 30, 1953. Emergency clause provided: “Whereas, the existing statutes of the State of Arkansas with relation to rural fire protection districts are inadequate to provide fire protection to rural districts in the State of Arkansas, and whereas the public peace, health and safety is threatened by the lack of proper rural fire protection, an emergency has arisen, and does now exist, and is hereby declared, and this act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage.”

Acts 1957, No. 331, §§ 2, 3: Jan. 1, 1957. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby determined by the General Assembly that the allowance for deputy hire by County Clerks and Tax Collectors in extending and collecting improvement district taxes is wholly inadequate and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary in order to correct said condition. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.” Approved March 27, 1957.

Acts 1963, No. 150, § 2: Mar. 4, 1963. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that there is no adequate statutory procedure for the dissolution of suburban improvement districts which have surplus funds which are not necessary for the repair and maintenance of the district's facilities, and that substantial amounts of excess collections are lying idle and should be refunded to property owners in said districts; and that an emergency is therefore declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1967, No. 286, § 8: Mar. 10, 1967. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that at the present time there is no provision of law whereby suburban improvement districts may be organized for the purpose of accepting as gifts from the Federal Government and others of recreational facilities and for the maintenance of same; further, that the present laws relative to suburban improvement districts are not specific as to authority and purpose to the extent that districts have not in many instances been organized and the suburban residents of the State of Arkansas have suffered from lack of fire protection, waterworks systems, sewers and other necessities for the health, welfare and safety of suburban residents of the State of Arkansas; for these reasons it is ascertained and declared that the immediate operation of this Act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and an emergency is therefore declared, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1969, No. 230, § 5: Mar. 10, 1969. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an immediate need in some parts of the State for additional hospital facilities, and that the construction and equipment of many of these facilities can be financed only by suburban improvement districts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 3: Mar. 13, 1970. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby ascertained and declared that the present law of suburban improvement districts does not adequately limit the financial interests of the members of the Board of Commissioners in dealings with said Districts; and further, that there is an immediate need to limit the amount of annual instalments of assessed benefits, which may be collected for the purposes of purchasing, maintaining or operating certain improvements in said Districts. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 53, § 4: Mar. 13, 1970. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 263, § 3: Mar. 11, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the requirements for the formation of water and sewer improvement districts under the present suburban improvement district law are too strenuous and creates unnecessary difficulties in the formation of these districts; that since these districts are created for the sole purpose of benefitting the property owners, the proper persons to determine whether a district is to be created should be the majority in value of the property owners of such proposed district; and that only by the passage of this Act can this be accomplished. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall become effective from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1971, No. 360, § 5: became law without Governor's signature, Mar. 23, 1971. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains requires that its provisions be not inconsistent with each other, that necessary administrative powers of its commission be clearly provided therein, and that it have such powers as will avoid unnecessary duplication of public districts, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1213, § 4: Feb. 12, 1976. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that as a result of several developments in recent months ambulance services in many areas of the State are totally inadequate to serve the needs of the residents of such areas; that there is presently no law authorizing the establishment of improvement districts for the purpose of providing ambulance services; that this Act is designed to specifically authorize the establishment of such districts to permit residents of any defined area to establish an ambulance service improvement district to assure adequate ambulance services to the residents of this district and should be given effect immediately in order that appropriate steps may be taken at the earliest possible date to establish such districts in those areas where it is necessary to do so in order to provide adequate ambulance services. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 474, § 9: Mar. 13, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present laws relating to Suburban Improvement Districts and Central Business Improvement Districts are unduly restrictive with respect to the maximum interest rates that such districts are allowed to pay and receive and that this Act is designed to permit such districts to pay and receive the maximum lawful rates of interest; that Central Business Improvement Districts are now severely hampered by their inability to issue revenue bonds to acquire property in the boundaries of the District and that this Act will authorize the issuance of such bonds and will thereby enable such districts to be more effective in eliminating urban blight and decay; that this Act should be given effect immediately to help solve the aforementioned problems. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 510, § 11: Mar. 16, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present law relating to the establishment and dissolution of suburban improvement districts is unclear in many areas and is not adequate to protect property owners in some cases; that this Act is designed to clarify said law and to assure adequate protection to property owners and should be given effect immediately. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1981, No. 703, § 6: Mar. 24, 1981. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and is hereby declared by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the financing of the public improvements to which this Act pertains is not feasible under existing maximum interest rate limitations, that the accomplishment of these public improvements is essential to the continued development of this State and the continued improvement of the economic conditions of her people, and that these public improvements can be accomplished only by the immediate effect of this Act. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1983, No. 524, § 2: Mar. 17, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared by the General Assembly that the present procedure of requiring suburban improvement district warrants to be signed by at least two of the commissioners of the district is unnecessary and unduly cumbersome as to those suburban improvement districts issuing a large number of warrants, resulting in delays of payment of persons supplying goods and services to the district. An emergency is therefore declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of its approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 1008, § 4: Apr. 14, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that because of the case Ricarte v. State, CR 86-31, a question has arisen over the validity of Act 1213 of the Extended Session of 1976; that this Act is a reenactment of the former law; and that the immediate passage of this Act is necessary to clarify the state of the law on this issue. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 7: June 12, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that regulation of small water and sewer utilities as ‘public utilities’ under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission generally imposes heavy regulatory costs upon the consumers, so that the cost of preparing a rate case alone may equal or exceed the other total revenue requirements of those utilities; that the effect of regulation is often to increase costs that are proportionately far in excess of the benefits of regulation; that customers of small water and sewer utilities may be better off in the long run if they could simply buy their water or sewer utility outright and run it themselves; and that this Act is immediately necessary to remedy the present situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 281, § 6: July 1, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and determined by the General Assembly that present law provides for collection of delinquent suburban improvement district taxes by inclusion of the suburban improvement taxes and penalty in the county collector's tax sale for ad valorem real property taxes. Such sale has been abolished, leaving no clear remedy for delinquent suburban improvement taxes. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1991 and shall be applicable to suburban improvement district taxes due and payable on or before October 10, 1991.”

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Goldner, A Call for Reform of Arkansas Municipal Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former statute authorizing the creation of suburban improvement districts was not invalid as an invasion of the jurisdiction of the county courts in the establishment of highways. Newton v. Altheimer, 170 Ark. 366, 280 S.W. 641 (1926); Reed v. Paving Dist. of Jefferson County, 171 Ark. 710, 286 S.W. 829 (1926); Morehart v. Mabelvale Rd. Imp. Dist., 178 Ark. 219, 10 S.W.2d 856 (1928) (decisions under prior law).

This subchapter is not void as making an unreasonable or arbitrary classification. Murphy v. Cook, 202 Ark. 1069, 155 S.W.2d 330 (1941).

This subchapter is general legislation and not a local act. Murphy v. Cook, 202 Ark. 1069, 155 S.W.2d 330 (1941).

14-92-201. Definitions.

As used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Last federal census” means the most recent federal census taken prior to the filing of any petition as provided in this subchapter for the formation of any suburban improvement district;
  2. “Majority in value” means a majority in assessed value as shown by the latest county assessment records for general taxes;
  3. “Land” or “real property” means all property subject to taxation for the purposes of this subchapter;
  4. “County court,” “county judge,” or “county clerk” means “circuit court,” “circuit judge,” or “circuit clerk” in the cases where the district contains lands in more than one (1) county;
  5. “Nearby municipalities” means municipalities within ten (10) miles of any boundary of the district.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, §§ 1, 4, 5, 23; 1951, No. 115, § 1; 1967, No. 286, §§ 1-3; 1969, No. 230, §§ 1, 2; 1971, No. 263, § 1; 1981, No. 510, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-701, 20-704, 20-705, 20-723.

Case Notes

Land.

While timeshare owners do not receive an individual tax bill, the property itself is assessed real property taxes by the assessor and improvement-district assessments, which are then paid by the timeshare owners through the owners association; thus, a timeshare owner owns property subject to taxation and thereby satisfies the definition of a “property owner” entitled to individual notice of commissioner elections under § 14-92-240(c), and each timeshare owner is entitled to one vote for each commissioner position to be filled. Roberts v. Holiday Island Suburban Improvement Dist. #1, 2018 Ark. App. 394, 559 S.W.3d 269 (2018).

14-92-202. Applicability of 1981 amendments.

  1. The provisions of Acts 1981, No. 510, shall not apply to districts in existence on March 16, 1981, and these districts shall continue to be governed by the law in effect immediately prior to that date.
    1. Upon the petition of thirty-five percent (35%) of the property owners of a district in existence on March 16, 1981, the district shall be subject to the provisions of § 14-92-209 concerning the election of commissioners to fill vacancies on the commission and concerning the recall of commissioners.
    2. The petition may also provide for the board of commissioners to be enlarged from three (3) members to five (5) members and may provide for the imposition of a specified term of years on the board positions. If the petition requests a board of commissioners composed of five (5) members, then two (2) additional commissioners shall be elected in the same manner as provided for filling vacancies under § 14-92-209(b).
    3. Commissioners serving at the time the petition is filed shall continue to serve.
    4. The petition shall be filed with the circuit court of the judicial district in which most of the district is located.
  2. Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any improvement district in any city or incorporated town in this state established for the purpose of providing water or sewer services for municipal purposes.

History. Acts 1981, No. 510, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-744; Acts 1993, No. 782, § 1; 2011, No. 1225, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1981, No. 510 is codified as §§ 14-92-201, 14-92-202, 14-92-20414-92-209, 14-92-218, 14-92-221, 14-92-226, and 14-92-237.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment substituted “that” for “this” in present (a); and added (b).

The 2011 amendment substituted “property owners” for “realty owners” in (b)(1); inserted “and may provide for the imposition of a specified term of years on the board positions” in (b)(2); and added (c).

Case Notes

Cited: Adams v. Highway 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 217 Ark. 473, 230 S.W.2d 956 (1950); Reeme v. Natural Gas Imp. Dist., 247 Ark. 983, 448 S.W.2d 647 (1970); Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-203. Penalty.

  1. It shall not be lawful for the board of commissioners of any suburban improvement district or any officer, member, or agent thereof to appropriate or use any money arising from the sale of any bonds authorized to be issued under this subchapter to any use or purpose whatever other than is specified and expressly directed.
  2. And any officer, member, or agent of the board of a district who shall violate any of the provisions of this subchapter as prescribed in this section shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 20; 1967, No. 286, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-720.

Case Notes

Payment by State.

Although the state under former statute would pay all the outstanding bonds of a road improvement district, the state was not entitled to any part of the funds of the district where it had not taken over the roads of the district for maintenance. State ex rel. Holt v. Little Rock-Highland Paving Dist., 199 Ark. 430, 133 S.W.2d 878 (1939) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-204. Hearing prior to filing petition to form district.

      1. Prior to filing the petition for formation of a district, each owner of realty within the boundaries of the proposed district shall be notified by certified letter of the intent of formation of the proposed district.
      2. The notice shall be accompanied by:
        1. A copy of the petition;
        2. A list of those candidates nominated for commissioner;
        3. Proxy materials for the use of those owners not able to attend the public meeting; and
        4. The name and mailing address of the senior justice of the peace within the area encompassed by the proposed district.
    1. The notice shall indicate the date and location of a public meeting to be held not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days prior to filing the petitions with the court.
    2. The letters of notification shall be mailed not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days prior to the public hearing.
      1. The notice shall also be published in a newspaper having general circulation within the counties where the proposed district is located.
      2. The publication shall be once a week for two (2) weeks prior to the public meeting, and the notice shall indicate the date and location of the public hearing.
    1. The public hearing shall be held within the boundaries of the proposed district, unless public meeting facilities of sufficient size are not available, in which instance the meeting shall be held in the nearest public facility of sufficient size.
    2. The public hearing shall be chaired by the senior justice of the peace within the area encompassed by the proposed district or his appointee.
    3. The public hearing shall commence between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.
      1. The purpose of the hearing shall be:
        1. To inform the affected owners of realty of the type of the proposed district, the preliminary cost estimates and basis thereof, and general information; and
        2. The election, by those realty owners in attendance, in person or by proxy given to the senior justice of the peace within the area encompassed by the proposed district, by simple plurality vote with the number of votes for each candidate reported, of seven (7) commissioners, whose names shall be transmitted to the court with the petitions.
        1. Each commissioner shall be nominated and elected by position;
        2. Any owner of realty within the proposed district may nominate candidates for commissioner at any time before or during the public meeting;
      1. Each commissioner shall own realty within the boundaries of the proposed district.
    4. The petitions shall not contain the names of proposed commissioners.
    5. On all questions submitted to the realty owners of a district or proposed district, each owner of realty therein shall be entitled to cast one (1) vote.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 1; 1981, No. 510, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-701.

Case Notes

Cited: Adams v. Highway 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 217 Ark. 473, 230 S.W.2d 956 (1950); Reeme v. Natural Gas Imp. Dist., 247 Ark. 983, 448 S.W.2d 647 (1970).

14-92-205. Petition to form district.

  1. Upon the petition of a majority of the number of realty owners within a proposed suburban improvement district, the owners of a majority of the realty in the area of the proposed district and the owners of a majority of the assessed value of the realty within the proposed district, the greater portion of which realty does not lie within the boundaries of a municipality, meaning a city of the first class, city of the second class, or an incorporated town, it shall be the duty of the county court to lay off into a district the territory described in the petition, for the purpose of purchasing, accepting as a gift, constructing, or maintaining waterworks or waterpipes, recreational facilities, systems of gas pipelines, sewers or grading, draining, paving, curbing and guttering streets and highways and laying sidewalks, and establishing, equipping, and maintaining rural fire departments, or for more than one (1) of these purposes and to name as commissioners of the district the seven (7) persons whose names have been transmitted with the petitions as having been elected at a public hearing held prior to the filing of the petitions.
  2. All, or any portion, of any municipality may be included in these districts, if the portion of the area located within the municipalities shall be less than fifty percent (50%) of the area of the entire district. However, no portion of a municipality shall be included in the district unless it shall be found that a majority of the number of owners of realty within the municipality, the owners of a majority of the realty in area within the municipality, and the owners of a majority of the assessed value of the realty within the municipality have petitioned for the formation of the district.
  3. All districts shall be numbered consecutively or else shall receive names selected by the court.
  4. If the court does not act promptly in complying with the terms of this section, or of any other section of this subchapter essential to the creation and operation of the districts, it may be compelled to do so by mandamus.
    1. If land in more than one (1) county is embraced in the proposed district, the petition shall be addressed to the circuit court in which the largest portion of the land lies, and all proceedings shall be had in that circuit court.
    2. All notices in that event shall be published in newspapers published and having a bona fide circulation in each county in which the district embraces land.
    1. Any number of identical petitions may be circulated, and identical petitions with additional names may be filed at any time until the court acts.
    2. A petition under this section shall contain a bold heading stating that a signature on the petition is a vote to create the district.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, §§ 1, 2; 1953, No. 420, § 1; 1959, No. 170, § 1; 1967, No. 286, § 1; 1969, No. 230, § 1; 1971, No. 263, § 1; 1981, No. 510, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-701, 20-702; Acts 2019, No. 1025, § 2.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (f)(1) designation; and added (f)(2).

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section is prospective in its applicability. Murphy v. Cook, 202 Ark. 1069, 155 S.W.2d 330 (1941).

Majority of Owners.

Petition of the majority required by this section is a jurisdictional fact which must be shown before district can be established. Johnson v. Norsworthy, 239 Ark. 545, 390 S.W.2d 439 (1965).

Majority in Area.

Signature of corporate officers in their individual capacities and not on behalf of the corporations did not permit inclusion of corporate lands in determining whether there was a majority in area of property owners and such defect could not be cured by subsequent ratification or substitution. Johnson v. Norsworthy, 239 Ark. 545, 390 S.W.2d 439 (1965).

Majority of Assessed Value.

Where assessor permitted owner of real estate addition to fix the value of lots in the addition, and he fixed such value far in excess of their actual value, such assessment could not have been used in determining whether a majority in value of the property owners had signed the petition. Fisher v. Texarkana Forest Park Paving Dist., 181 Ark. 450, 26 S.W.2d 111 (1930) (decision under prior law).

Signatures.

Where person had signed petition for creation of district and petition had been filed, he could not withdraw his name without leave of court. Reed v. Paving Dist. of Jefferson County, 171 Ark. 710, 286 S.W. 829 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Adams v. Highway 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 217 Ark. 473, 230 S.W.2d 956 (1950); Reeme v. Natural Gas Imp. Dist., 247 Ark. 983, 448 S.W.2d 647 (1970); Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-206. Hearing on petition and determination.

    1. Upon the filing of a petition as prescribed in § 14-92-205, it shall be the duty of the county clerk to give notice of the filing of it, describing the territory to be affected and calling upon all persons who wish to be heard upon the question of the establishment of the suburban improvement district to appear before the county court on a day to be fixed in the notice, at least thirty (30) days after the filing of a petition.
      1. The notice shall be published one (1) time a week for two (2) weeks in some newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county where the lands affected are situated and, if available, on the website of the county or of the Secretary of State.
      2. This notice may be in the following form:
      1. On the day named in the notice, it shall be the duty of the court to meet and to hear the petition and to ascertain whether those signing it constitute a majority of the number of owners of realty in the proposed district, the owners of a majority of the realty in area of the proposed district, and the owners of a majority of the assessed value of realty in the proposed district.
        1. If the court determines that the majority have petitioned for the improvement, it shall enter its judgment laying off the district as defined in the petition and appoint the commissioners elected at the public hearing held prior to filing the petition.
        2. If the court finds that a majority have not signed the petition, it shall enter its order denying the district.
        1. If any part of the proposed district shall be located within the corporate limits of an incorporated town or city, the court shall make a separate finding on the question of whether a majority of the number of realty owners in the incorporated area, the owners of a majority of the realty in area in the incorporated area, and the owners of a majority of the assessed value of realty in the incorporated area have signed the petition.
        2. The court shall also make a separate finding on the question of whether a majority of the number of realty owners within the unincorporated area of the proposed district, the owners of a majority of realty in area in the unincorporated area of the proposed district, and the owners of a majority of assessed value of realty within the unincorporated area of the proposed district have signed the petition.
        1. If the court determines that the majority have petitioned for the improvement, it shall enter its judgment laying off the district as defined in the petition and appoint the commissioners elected at the public hearing held prior to the filing of the petition.
        2. If the court finds that a majority have not signed the petition, it shall enter its order denying the district.
    1. Any petitioner or any opponent of the petition may appeal from the judgment of the court creating or refusing to create the district. However, the appeal must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days.
    2. If no appeal is taken within that time, the judgment creating the district shall be final and conclusive upon all persons.
    1. The petition shall state the specific purpose for which the district is to be formed, and the judgment establishing the district shall give it a name, which shall be descriptive of the purpose.
    2. The district shall also receive a number to prevent its being confused with other districts formed for similar purposes.

“Notice is hereby given that a petition has been filed praying for the formation of an improvement district for the purpose of Said petition is on file at the office of the County Clerk of County, where it is open for inspection. All persons desiring to be heard on the question of the formation of said district will be heard by the County Court on the day of , 20 The following lands are affected: (Here give description of lands affected; same may be described by using the largest subdivision possible.) County Clerk”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 2; 1981, No. 510, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-702; Acts 2019, No. 1025, § 3.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added “at least thirty (30) days after the filing of a petition” in (a)(1); in (a)(2)(A), substituted “one (1) time a week” for “once a week” and added “and, if available, on the website of the county or of the Secretary of State”; and substituted “20” for “19” in the form in (a)(2)(B).

Cross References. Notice on formation of improvement districts, § 14-86-301 et seq.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The equal protection clause does not require that questions involving the creation, organization, and management of improvement districts be submitted to popular vote. Clem v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Ark. 1972).

Appeals.

Judgment of circuit court on appeal from judgment of county court establishing road district was not defective because it stated that the order of the county court “should be affirmed” where the recitals of the judgment had shown that the circuit court heard the case de novo and found that the district was validly organized. Reed v. Paving Dist. of Jefferson County, 171 Ark. 710, 286 S.W. 829 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Persons objecting to regularity of organization of district should have appealed to Supreme Court from judgment of circuit court, and could not bring an action in the chancery court attacking the organization of the district. Moffett v. Texarkana Forest Park Paving, Sewer & Water Dist., 181 Ark. 474, 26 S.W.2d 589 (1930) (decision under prior law).

The question of the validity of a suburban water improvement district could not have been raised over 30 days after the county court order creating the district even though suit attacking correctness of assessment had been filed before 30 days. Mowrey v. Coleman, 224 Ark. 979, 277 S.W.2d 481 (1955).

On appeal it is the duty of the circuit court to approve the order of the county court unless it is shown by the testimony that the county court order is in error, and the burden is on the appellants to make such showing. Bellott v. Weatherly, 229 Ark. 741, 318 S.W.2d 152 (1958).

Where an order forming a suburban improvement district was contested, the provisions of this section requiring that an appeal from such order be taken and perfected applies rather than the six month period allowed by § 16-67-201, since this section is specific legislation relating to suburban improvement districts; however, the question of timely perfection of such appeal, since it is not specified by this section, is controlled by the general statute, § 16-67-201, which requires that the aggrieved party file an affidavit and prayer for appeal with the clerk of the court in which the appeal is taken. Moore v. Mears, 273 Ark. 411, 619 S.W.2d 662 (1981).

Approval by Court.

An order of a county court creating a district constituted an establishment, by the county court, of a highway in accordance with the route outlined in the petition. Newton v. Altheimer, 170 Ark. 366, 280 S.W. 641 (1926) (decision under prior law).

The owners of the majority of the real estate in an area selected by them may not form an improvement district at will, but the proposed purposes for such a district must be submitted to and approved by the county or circuit court. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

The electoral process does not play any part in the formation, governance, or operation of an improvement district under this section. Clem v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Ark. 1972).

Notice.

—In General.

The publication of notice is for advising people having property within the district of the date of hearing on the petition for the formation of the district in order that such property owners may attend and protect their rights, and the publication of the notice is jurisdictional. Loetscher v. Baseline Sewer Imp. Dist., 235 Ark. 636, 361 S.W.2d 257 (1962).

—Description of Lands.

Where all land included in district was accurately described in notice, the fact that a further description which listed the lots by number failed to include one lot would not invalidate the notice. Castle v. Sanders, 160 Ark. 391, 254 S.W. 674 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Irregularity of boundary lines did not invalidate district, there being no evidence to show an arbitrary or colorable inclusion or exclusion of land. Page v. Highway No. 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 201 Ark. 512, 145 S.W.2d 344 (1940) (decision under prior law).

—Time Requirement.

Where the first notice was published on Jan. 5, 1961, of a public hearing on a petition for the formation of a suburban sewer improvement district on Jan. 19, 1961, and the second notice was on Jan. 13, 1961, one of the days within the second week, the statutory notice was found to have been published for the full time required by this section, and the publication on the 13th of January of the second notice falls within this section, nothing appearing in the statute that connotes an intention by the legislature that any specific time was to be observed within the second week. Loetscher v. Baseline Sewer Imp. Dist., 235 Ark. 636, 361 S.W.2d 257 (1962).

A property owner is assured of two weeks notice of hearing on petition for the formation of a suburban sewer improvement district in that publication for “two weeks” requires an interval of 14 days between the first publication and the events stated in the notice. Loetscher v. Baseline Sewer Imp. Dist., 235 Ark. 636, 361 S.W.2d 257 (1962).

14-92-207. Board of commissioners generally.

      1. Within thirty (30) days after their appointment, the members of a board of commissioners shall take and file with the county clerk their oath of office, in which they shall swear to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Arkansas and to discharge faithfully their duties as commissioners in the manner provided by law.
        1. Any commissioner failing to file his oath within this period shall be deemed to have declined the office.
        2. In such instance, the county court shall call a public hearing in the same manner prescribed in § 14-92-204 for the purpose of electing a successor to fill the vacancy under the same procedures described in § 14-92-204.
      1. The board of commissioners shall organize by electing one (1) of its members chairman, and it shall select a secretary.
      2. The board may also employ such agents, employees, engineers, and attorneys as it deems best and fix their compensation and the compensation of the secretary.
    1. The board shall also select some solvent bank or trust company as the depository of its funds, exacting of the depository a bond in an amount equal to the amount of money likely to come into its hands.
  1. No member of the board shall be liable for any damages unless it shall be made to appear that he had acted with a corrupt and malicious intent.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, §§ 3, 17; 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 1; 1971, No. 360, § 2; 1981, No. 510, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-703, 20-717.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Fact that commissioners may have continued in office after road was completed did not render former statute unconstitutional. Morehart v. Mabelvale Rd. Imp. Dist., 178 Ark. 219, 10 S.W.2d 856 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-208. Interest of commissioners in purchase, acquisition, or donation.

  1. No commissioners, nor the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district, shall be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any firm, corporation, or association from which any property, services, materials, or facilities are purchased, acquired, or received by donation for the district, unless it is first submitted to, and approved by, the court having original jurisdiction under which the district was organized; nor shall any commissioners, or the board, enter into any contract with, or accept a donation of property or facilities from, any person with whom they are, directly or indirectly, engaged in business, without court approval as prescribed.
    1. The court may not act upon such matters until after twenty (20) days from the date of first publication of the notice.
      1. The clerk of the court shall give notice of the hearing by publication once each week for two (2) successive weeks.
      2. The notice shall be commenced the week following the date upon which application is made to the court.
  2. In the event any prohibited transaction shall occur or shall have occurred without court approval as prescribed, then, by action commenced in the circuit court in the county in which the larger portion of land within the district is located, any property owner within the district shall have the right, within one (1) year from the date thereof, to require that the purchase, acquisition, or donation be rescinded. Each commissioner participating in the action shall be subject to removal from office as provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 3; 1970 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 1; 1971, No. 360, § 2; 1981, No. 510, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-703.

Case Notes

Conflict Not Found.

The fact that persons appointed as commissioners were officers and stockholders of a company owning more than 50% of the land included in the proposed district and organized for the purpose of the development and sale of lands with various improvements did not disqualify them for such appointment in the absence of evidence that they have acted in violation of the statutory provisions. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-209. Removal of commissioners — Vacancies.

  1. A commissioner of a suburban improvement district established pursuant to this subchapter may be removed from office as follows:
    1. An owner of realty within the district may petition the county court to call a public hearing for the purpose of the removal of a commissioner named in the petition and the election of a successor;
    2. Upon determining that at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the number of owners of realty within the proposed district have signed the recall petition, the court shall call a public hearing on the matter and shall notify each owner of realty within the proposed district in the manner prescribed by § 14-92-204, except that the notice shall be mailed by first class mail;
    3. Upon the affirmative vote of a majority, but not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of all votes entitled to be cast, of all votes cast by owners in attendance, in person or by proxy, at the public meeting as recorded through the number voting “yea” and the number voting “nay”, a commissioner named in the recall petitions may be removed;
    4. The court shall at the meeting declare the commissioner removed and accept nominations for a successor commissioner;
      1. The successor commissioner shall be nominated by a realty owner in attendance, in person or by proxy, at the public hearing.
      2. The nominee shall meet the qualifications required of the commissioner originally elected; and
    5. A successor commissioner shall be elected from among those so nominated at a subsequent public meeting called and held by the court in accordance with the provisions of § 14-92-204, except that any required notice shall be mailed by first class mail.
  2. A successor commissioner to fill a vacancy on the board of commissioners due to any other reason than proceedings under subsection (a) of this section shall be nominated at a public hearing called by the county court within thirty (30) days of notification of the vacancy, and any required notice shall be mailed by first class mail. The successor commissioner shall be elected at a subsequent public hearing in the same manner as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
    1. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply to a district in existence on March 16, 1981.
    2. A vacancy created by the recall of a commissioner shall be filled in the manner as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
    1. The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall apply to a district in existence on March 16, 1981, and which is an improvement district in any city or incorporated town in this state established for the purpose of providing water or sewer services for municipal purposes.
    2. Any other vacancy on the board of commissioners of any other district in existence on March 16, 1981, shall continue to be filled in the manner as provided by law prior to March 16, 1981.

History. Acts 1981, No. 510, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-743; Acts 1993, No. 492, § 1; 2007, No. 598, § 1; 2011, No. 1225, §§ 3, 4.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment added (c).

The 2011 amendment deleted the (c)(2)(A) designation and (c)(2)(B); and added (d).

14-92-210. Powers of board generally.

In addition to, and not by way of limitation of the powers prescribed in § 14-92-220, the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district shall have the powers to:

  1. Make and execute all contracts, leases, conveyances, and other instruments of the district;
  2. Join with any other political subdivision, municipality, district, or governmental agency, either state or federal, in the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and financing of any of the facilities, works, or operations authorized by this subchapter or as to the performance of any of its functions;
  3. Establish rules and regulations for the transaction of the district's business and for the services, use, and right to use of its facilities or services, or both, or to effectuate any purpose of this subchapter;
  4. Do all things incidental or auxiliary to the exercise of the express powers granted by this subchapter; and
  5. Perform all actions useful to carry out the purposes of this subchapter, unlimited by any express provision of it.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 3; 1941, No. 41, § 4a, as added by Acts 1971, No. 360, § 1; 1971, No. 360, § 2; 1981, No. 510, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-704.1.

Case Notes

District's Authority.

Section 14-92-240(c) explicitly sets out the qualifications of commissioners and voters under the statute and unambiguously provides for the number of votes each property owner may cast in the elections; nothing in this section gives the district the authority to alter those requirements, and thus the improvement district in this case acted outside its authority in enacting certain regulations. Roberts v. Holiday Island Suburban Improvement Dist. #1, 2018 Ark. App. 394, 559 S.W.3d 269 (2018).

14-92-211. Bond of contractors.

  1. All contractors shall be required to give bond for the faithful performance of the contracts as may be awarded them, with good and sufficient sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district.
  2. The board shall not remit or excuse the penalty or forfeiture of the bond or the breaches of it.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-714.

Cross References. Bond of public contractor, § 22-9-401 et seq.

14-92-212. Payments generally — Warrants.

  1. The depository shall pay out no money save upon the order of the board of commissioners and upon a warrant signed by the person designated by the commissioners.
  2. Every warrant shall state upon its face to whom, the amount, and the purpose for which it is issued.
  3. All warrants shall be dated and shall be numbered consecutively, in a record to be kept by the board of the number and amount of each. No warrant shall be paid unless there are in the treasury funds enough to pay all outstanding warrants bearing a lower number.
  4. No warrants shall be increased by reason of any depreciation in the market value thereof, nor shall any contract or warrant be made payable or paid in anything but currency.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 13; 1983, No. 524, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-713.

14-92-213. Payments to contractor.

  1. It shall be the duty of the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district to have the amount of work done by any contractor estimated, from time to time, as may be desirable, by the engineer selected by the board.
  2. The board shall draw its warrants in favor of the contractor for not more than ninety percent (90%) of the amount of work so reported, reserving the remainder until it has been ascertained that the work is completed according to contract and is free from liens.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 15; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-715.

Case Notes

Refusal to Pay.

Where district received benefits of contract to construct road, it could not refuse to pay therefor even though contract was illegal. Morehart v. Mabelvale Rd. Imp. Dist., 183 Ark. 411, 36 S.W.2d 68 (1931) (decision under prior law).

14-92-214. Legal services in organizing.

The board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district shall pay a reasonable fee for legal services in organizing the district and for circulating petitions.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-714.

14-92-215. Sale of unnecessary materials.

The board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district may sell all unnecessary materials and implements that may be on hand and which may not be necessary for the completion of the improvement under way or which may have been completed.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-714.

14-92-216. Planning by board.

    1. Immediately after their qualification, the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district shall consider the offer of any gift of improvements or facilities which has been tendered to the district, if there has been such an offer, and shall carefully examine the conditions as to the acceptance of the gift.
    2. The board may employ such engineers, attorneys, or other assistants as they find necessary and shall file a copy of all reports as well as the copy of the offer of gift with conditions incidental thereto and a written copy of the action of the commission relative to the acceptance or the rejection of the offer of gift with the county clerk.
    1. Likewise, in the event the district has been organized for the purpose of purchasing an improvement or facility or for the purpose of constructing an improvement or facility, the board shall form plans relative to the purchase or the construction of the improvement.
    2. To that end the board may also employ such engineers, attorneys, and other assistants as they may find necessary and shall file copies of all pertinent reports and actions by the commissioners with the county clerk.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 5; 1951, No. 115, § 1; 1967, No. 286, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-705.

Case Notes

Cited: Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-217. Change of plans.

  1. The board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district may, at any time, alter the plans and specifications.
    1. The changed plans, with the accompanying specifications, shall be filed with the county court.
    2. Notice of the filing shall be given by publication for two (2) weeks in some newspaper issued and having a bona fide circulation in the county.
    1. If by reason of the change of plans the board deems that the assessment of benefits has become inequitable, it shall direct the assessor to make a reassessment.
      1. If any property owner deems that, by reason of the change of plans, his assessment has become inequitable, he may, within two (2) weeks after the last publication of the notice, petition the board to order a reassessment.
      2. The decision of the board upon the property owner's petition shall be final, unless an appeal is taken within ten (10) days to the county court.
  2. In case of reassessment, the reassessment shall be filed, advertised, and equalized as provided for in the original assessment.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-723.

Case Notes

Changes Allowed.

This section permits only immaterial changes and not material changes in plans. Adams v. Highway 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 217 Ark. 473, 230 S.W.2d 956 (1950).

Changes Not Allowed.

Where a water pipeline improvement district changed plans to shorten the pipeline one mile thereby leaving out of the improvement a school district, this would be a material change which would be in violation of this section. Adams v. Highway 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 217 Ark. 473, 230 S.W.2d 956 (1950).

14-92-218. Petition by property owners to extend improvements.

  1. In addition to the changes which may be made in the manner provided in § 14-92-217, real property owners sufficient to cause a district to be formed may petition the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district to apply to the county court that the district be authorized to extend any of its empowered improvements into an area in the district for which existing authority does not appear and to assess the cost thereof on benefited property. However, the signatures in the petition shall represent at least sixty-six percent (66%) of the number of owners of realty in the proposed area, the owners of at least sixty-six percent (66%) of the realty in area in the proposed area, and the owners of at least sixty-six percent (66%) of the assessed value of realty in the proposed area as shown in the latest general tax roll.
  2. The court shall take proceedings for granting such authority in like manner and with like effect as provided in §§ 14-92-205 and 14-92-206, with appropriate changes therefor.
    1. The costs of the proposed additional improvements shall be assessed upon the real property benefited thereby, in the manner and with like effect provided in § 14-92-225 et seq., for an original improvement.
    2. When an existing assessment on any parcel or tract of land is proposed to be enlarged by reason of the changed authority, a reassessment of the parcels so affected shall be had in the manner and with like effect provided in § 14-92-227.
    1. Copies of each notice of hearing before the court or the board required in any proceeding authorized in this section shall be sent by certified mail at least fifteen (15) days and not more than thirty (30) days prior to the hearing, to each owner of real property affected by the proceeding as his name and address appear in the latest county assessment records.
    2. Similar notice may be given for any other hearing authorized under this chapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 24, as added by Acts 1971, No. 360, § 4; 1981, No. 510, §§ 6, 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-724.

Case Notes

In General.

The purposes for which an improvement district may be organized are succinctly set out in this section. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

Multi-Purpose Districts.

One district may be created for the purpose of laying a system of water pipes, for the purpose of laying a system of gas pipes, and for the purpose of building a system of electric lines. McCoy v. Holman, 173 Ark. 592, 292 S.W. 999 (1927) (decision under prior law).

14-92-219. Purposes for which district organized.

A suburban improvement district may be organized for any one (1) or more of the following purposes:

  1. To purchase, accept as a gift, or construct a waterworks system or betterments, improvements, and extensions to such waterworks system, either within or without the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will benefit and to operate and maintain any such waterworks system it may purchase, construct, or own;
  2. To purchase, accept as a gift, or construct, either within or without the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will benefit, a sewage collection system or a sewage treatment plant or intercepting sewers, outfall sewers, force mains, pumping stations, ejector stations, and all other appurtenances necessary or useful and convenient for the collection or treatment, purification, and disposal, in a sanitary manner, of the liquid and solid waste, sewage, night soil, and industrial waste of the area within the boundaries of the district or adjacent thereto, and to operate and maintain any such sewage system and facilities;
    1. To open, grade, drain, pave, curb, gutter, or otherwise improve streets, roads, highways, and every other way for passage and use of vehicles, including viaducts and underpasses, either within or without the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will benefit.
    2. Such purpose shall include the acquisition of rights-of-way by purchase or the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and to maintain such streets, roads, highways, and every other way for passage and use by vehicles, lying within the boundaries of the district or beyond the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will benefit;
  3. To build, purchase, or accept as a gift recreational facilities such as, but not limited to, parks, lakes, golf courses, playgrounds, clubhouses, stadiums, auditoriums, arts and crafts centers, folklore centers, interpretative centers, camping areas, greenbelt areas, and any other facilities to provide for the recreation and cultural needs of the owners of the lands within the district and also to care for, maintain, and operate any such recreational facilities;
  4. To lay and maintain sidewalks;
    1. To lay, own, extend, operate and maintain gas pipelines connecting with gas systems.
      1. Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to allow the purchase of an existing natural gas system or any part thereof.
      2. Any such gas system shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Pipeline Safety Division of the Arkansas Public Service Commission and shall be subject to all provisions of the Arkansas Gas Pipeline Code;
  5. To build telephone lines to connect with the telephone systems operating in nearby or adjacent municipalities;
  6. To establish, equip, and maintain rural fire departments, including construction of fire department buildings, purchase of fire trucks, fire boats, and other firefighting equipment;
  7. To own, acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, equip, improve, maintain, and operate hospitals or to acquire appropriate vehicles and equipment for, maintain, and operate ambulance services;
  8. To own, acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, equip, improve, maintain, and operate libraries; and
    1. To provide a solid waste management system to adequately provide for the collection and disposal of all solid wastes generated or existing within the boundaries of the district in accordance with the rules and orders of the Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission.
      1. The governing body of the district may enter into an agreement with one (1) or more municipalities, counties, county solid waste authorities, regional solid waste management districts, private persons, private trusts, or any combination thereof, to provide a solid waste management system or any part of a system for the district.
        1. The district may levy and collect fees and require licenses as determined appropriate to discharge the responsibilities of the district.
        2. Any fees, charges, and licenses shall be based upon a schedule set forth by the district.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 4; 1953, No. 420, § 2; 1967, No. 286, § 2; 1969, No. 230, § 2; 1975 (Extended Sess. 1976), No. 1213, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-704; reen. Acts 1987, No. 1008, § 1; 1997, No. 1134, § 1; 2005, No. 927, § 1; 2019, No. 315, § 998.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Part of this section was reenacted by Acts 1987, No. 1008, § 1. Acts 1987, No. 834 provided that 1987 legislation reenacting acts passed in the 1976 Extended Session should not repeal any other 1987 legislation and that such other legislation would be controlling in the event of conflict.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment rewrote (6).

The 2005 amendment added (11) and made related changes.

The 2019 amendment deleted “regulations” following “rules” in (11)(A).

Case Notes

Cited: Southwest Power Pool, Inc. v. Kanis & Denny Rds. Suburban Water Improvement Dist. No. 349 of Pulaski County, 2016 Ark. 135, 489 S.W.3d 140 (2016).

14-92-220. Powers of districts generally.

  1. Any district, in aid to and furtherance of the purposes prescribed in § 14-92-219, shall have the authority to hire managers and other employees and to pay their salaries incident to the operation and maintenance of any of the improvements and facilities authorized in this subchapter. The district shall also have the authority to acquire and purchase equipment and machinery incident to the operation and maintenance of the facilities and shall be further authorized to do any and all other actions which shall be deemed necessary in order to purchase, construct, accept as a gift, operate, and maintain any and all improvements and facilities authorized in this subchapter.
  2. Any district shall have the power to sell or lease any improvement owned by it to any adjacent or nearby municipality, to an improvement district therein, to public service corporations serving on behalf of the property owners of the district, or to any other corporation, organization, or person. It may make contracts with the inhabitants of nearby municipalities, or it may operate such improvements for water, gas, recreation, or telephone service and may connect sewers with the sewers of any adjacent municipality or of other districts, or carry its sewers to any proper outlet within or without the district.
  3. Any district may accept as a gift any or all of the improvements and facilities authorized in this subchapter upon the assumption of the maintenance and operation of such improvements and facilities. It shall have the authority to effect the assessment of benefits and to levy the necessary tax against such assessment of benefits, as prescribed in this subchapter in order to provide the revenue for the costs of maintenance and operation.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 4; 1953, No. 420, § 2; 1967, No. 286, § 2; 1969, No. 230, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-704.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The powers conferred on improvement districts do not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

In General.

The powers that an improvement district may exercise are succinctly set out in this section. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-221. Corporate powers.

Each suburban improvement district shall be a body corporate with power to sue and to be sued, and it shall have a corporate seal.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 3; 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 1; 1971, No. 360, § 2; 1981, No. 510, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-703.

14-92-222. Right and power of eminent domain.

    1. All improvement districts organized under this subchapter shall have the right of eminent domain in order that they may carry out the purposes of their creation.
    2. This right shall be exercised in the same manner as in the case of railroads, telegraph, and telephone companies but without the necessity of making a deposit of money before entering into possession of the property condemned.
    1. Any district shall have the power of eminent domain for the purposes of:
      1. Condemning any water or sewer utility found within the boundaries of the district which is exempt from the definition of “public utility” as found in § 23-1-101(4);
      2. Securing any lands or rights-of-way needed in making improvements to water or sewer systems owned and operated by that district.
      1. The board of the district shall have the power to enter upon any private property for the purposes stated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section. If the person is damaged and the board cannot agree on the sum to be paid for the damages, the person aggrieved may file his petition in the circuit court of the county setting forth his grievance and asking compensation therefor, making the board a party defendant. The issues in the suit shall be made up as in other cases at law, and the cause shall be tried by a jury, unless dispensed with by the parties. The case shall be advanced on the docket so as to have precedence over all other causes. The judge of the circuit court may hold a special term at any time for the trial of the cause, giving ten (10) days' notice to the parties of the time of holding the special term. The notice may be in writing and shall be served on the parties as a writ of summons is directed to be served unless the notice is waived by the parties, or one of them.
      2. In case an agreement cannot be arrived at between the board of improvement and the owner of the property in relation to the damages claimed, the judge of the court, in vacation, may fix an amount to be deposited with some person to be designated by the court, before the entering upon and taking possession of the property to be used and taken as provided in this subsection. Upon the amount required being deposited and certificate thereof filed in the cause, the work may proceed.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 25; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-725; Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 3.

Cross References. Eminent domain by railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies, § 18-15-1201 et seq.

Case Notes

Public Purposes.

The acquisition of recreational facilities and public parks as authorized by this section are for public purposes. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-223. Sale of land.

Any land that may be acquired by any improvement district organized under this subchapter may be sold by the board of commissioners for the price and on the terms it deems best.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 28; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-727.

14-92-224. Priority of cases.

All cases involving the validity of suburban improvement districts or the assessment of benefits and all suits to foreclose the lien for taxes shall be deemed matters of public interest and shall be advanced and disposed of at the earliest possible moment, and all appeals from them must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-721.

Case Notes

Judicial Review.

The improvement district must act for the benefit of all the affected property owners, and if any property owner feels aggrieved, he has the right to have the decision of the district judicially reviewed. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

Cited: Pate v. Piney Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 32, 15 Ark. App. 231, 15 Ark. App. 235, 691 S.W.2d 882 (1985).

14-92-225. Assessment of benefits and damages.

    1. In the event the board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district shall have voted to accept any offer of gift, shall have voted to purchase any improvement or facility, or shall have voted to construct any improvement or facility, it shall thereupon appoint an assessor to assess the benefits which will accrue to the real property within the district from the acceptance of the gift of improvement or facilities, the purchase of the improvement or facilities, or the construction of the improvement or facilities.
    2. The assessor shall take an oath that he will well and truly assess all benefits that will accrue to the landowners of the district by reason of the acceptance, purchase, or construction of the proposed improvement or facilities, sometimes referred to as “improvement.” He shall thereupon proceed to assess the lands within the district.
    1. The assessor shall inscribe in a book each tract of land and shall place in one column his valuation of each tract or parcel of land prior to the improvement, which may be marked “Assessed Value of Lands Prior to Improvements,” and in another column he shall place what he thinks will be the value of each tract or parcel of land after the improvement, which may be marked “Assessed Value of Lands After Improvements.”
        1. If the assessed value of land after improvements is greater than the assessed value of land before improvements, as assessed by the assessor for the district, then the difference between the two shall be the assessed benefits that will accrue to each tract by reason of the improvement.
        2. If the assessed value of land, as assessed by the assessor of the district, after improvements are acquired or made is less than the assessed value of land before improvements are acquired or made, as assessed by the assessor for the district, then the difference between the two shall be the assessed damages that will accrue to the particular parcel or tract of land by reason of the improvement.
      1. The assessor shall enter the assessment of benefits or damages opposite the description of each piece of property in appropriate columns, one of which may be marked “Assessed Benefits” and the other may be marked “Assessed Damages,” and in another column the assessor shall show the estimate of the probable cost to the landowner, which may be marked “Estimated Cost.”
    1. The assessment shall embrace not merely the lands, but shall embrace all railroads, tramroads, telegraph lines, telephone lines, pipelines, and other improvements on real estate that will be benefited by the acquiring or making of the improvement.
    2. No assessment shall apply against any pipelines or other improvements which are extensions of or connected to the pipeline distribution system or other improvements within any city adjacent to the district.
    1. The assessor shall place opposite each tract the name of the supposed owner as indicated by the deed records, but a mistake in name shall not vitiate the assessment.
      1. The assessor shall also assess all damages that will accrue to any landowner by reason of the proposed improvement including all injury to lands taken or damaged.
      2. Where the assessor returns no such damages to any tract of land, it shall be deemed a finding by him that no damages will be sustained.
  1. The assessor shall hold his office at the pleasure of the board, which can fill any vacancy in the position of assessor.
  2. In assessing benefits which shall accrue as the result of the acquisition or construction of gas pipelines, the assessor may consider the number of burner tips and the historical and estimated usage of gas with respect to each tract of land assessed.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 5; 1951, No. 115, § 1; 1967, No. 286, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-705; Acts 1997, No. 1134, § 2.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment added (f).

Cross References. Partition of assessments among several owners of single tract, § 14-86-601.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Fact that assessors were given power, in making assessment of benefits, to assess damages that would accrue to any landowner by reason of proposed improvement, including all injury to lands taken or damaged, did not render former statute unconstitutional. Morehart v. Mabelvale Rd. Imp. Dist., 178 Ark. 219, 10 S.W.2d 856 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Challenge of Assessments.

Where a sewer improvement district in 1973 filed its assessment of benefits and damages pursuant to this section preparatory to condemning rights of ways for roads and sewer lines and where property owners failed to thereafter file suit in chancery court within 30 days as required by § 14-92-226, the property owners were not precluded by the 30-day limitations period from asking damages in answer to a condemnation suit filed by the district in 1975, since at the time of the 1975 hearing there was a total want of proof by the district regarding its assessment of benefits and the owners' alleged failure to file a timely challenge. Cleveland v. Gravel Ridge Sanitary Sewer Improv. Dist., 274 Ark. 330, 625 S.W.2d 446 (1981) (decision prior to 1981 amendment of § 14-92-226).

Circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to a water district on a power company's challenge to the reasonableness of a reassessment of benefits and accompanying levy of taxes by the district because the company's commercial facility, an improvement that it made on its property, was connected to the city's waterworks system and thus was not subject to assessment under subdivision (c)(2) of this section. Southwest Power Pool, Inc. v. Kanis & Denny Rds. Suburban Water Improvement Dist. No. 349 of Pulaski County, 2016 Ark. 135, 489 S.W.3d 140 (2016).

Method of Assessment.

Where the assessor testified that he had followed the method of assessments provided in this section and that, in determining the proper basis for assessment of value for benefits to accrue to each piece of property, he considered the value, area, location of the property, the improvements thereon, its relation to other properties, and every other element which might go to make up the sum total of benefits, and there was no evidence that he did not comply with the statutory requirements, the chancellor properly found that the assessor's method of assessment was proper. Pate v. Piney Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 32, 15 Ark. App. 231, 15 Ark. App. 235, 691 S.W.2d 882 (1985).

Nature of Assessments.

A local improvement district is not a “taxing agency” as its levies are special assessments or matured assessments of benefits and interest thereon and it is not a subordinate political agency of the state, so such a district is not bound by statutory provisions for minimum prevailing wages to be paid on works of a “taxing agency.” Wood v. Henderson, 225 Ark. 180, 280 S.W.2d 226 (1955).

Cited: Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-226. Filing and notice of assessment.

    1. The assessment shall be filed with the county clerk of the county.
        1. The secretary of the board of commissioners shall thereupon give notice of its filing by publication once a week for two (2) weeks in a newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county.
        1. The secretary shall send a copy of the notice by certified letter to each owner of realty within the boundaries of the district.
        2. The letters of notification shall be mailed not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. The letter notices shall also advise each property owner of the benefits or damages assessed against all of his property located within the district.
  1. On the day named in the notice, it shall be the duty of the commissioners and assessor to meet together at the place named as a board of equalization and to hear all complaints against the assessment and to equalize and adjust it. Their determination shall be final unless suit is brought in the chancery court to review it.

This notice may be in the following form:

“Notice is hereby given that the assessment of benefits and damages of District Number has been filed in the office of the county clerk of County, and where it is open to inspection. All persons wishing to be heard on said assessment will be heard by the commissioners and the assessor of said district between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m., at , in City of , Arkansas, on the day of , 19 . Secretary”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 6; 1981, No. 510, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-706.

Case Notes

Judicial Review.

Suit in chancery court attacking assessments is prematurely brought before an attempt is made to have assessment corrected by board of equalization. Moffett v. Texarkana Forest Park Paving, Sewer & Water Dist., 181 Ark. 474, 26 S.W.2d 589 (1930) (decision under prior law).

Where a sewer improvement district in 1973 filed its assessment of benefits and damages pursuant to § 14-92-225 preparatory to condemning rights of ways for roads and sewer lines and where property owners failed to thereafter file suit in chancery court within 30 days as required by this section, the property owners were not precluded by the 30-day limitations period from asking damages in answer to a condemnation suit filed by the district in 1975, since at the time of the 1975 hearing there was a total want of proof by the district regarding its assessment of benefits and the owners' alleged failure to file a timely challenge. Cleveland v. Gravel Ridge Sanitary Sewer Improv. Dist., 274 Ark. 330, 625 S.W.2d 446 (1981) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

14-92-227. Reassessment.

  1. The board of commissioners may, not more often than one (1) time each year, require the assessor to reassess the benefits in a suburban improvement district. However, if the district has incurred any indebtedness or issued bonds, the total amount of assessed benefits shall never be diminished.
    1. The reassessment shall be filed with the county clerk of the county.
        1. The secretary of the board of commissioners shall give notice of its filing by publication one (1) time each week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper published and having a general circulation in the county.
        2. The form of the notice shall be substantially as follows:
        1. The secretary shall send a copy of the notice by certified letter to each owner of realty within the boundaries of the district whose assessment has increased as a result of the assessment.
        2. The letters of notification shall be mailed not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days before the date of hearing. The letter notices shall advise each property owner of the benefits or damages assessed against all of his or her property located within the district.
    1. On the day named in the notice, the board of commissioners and assessor shall meet together at the place named as a board of equalization and hear all complaints against the reassessment and equalize and adjust the reassessment.
    2. The determination is final unless suit is brought in court to review it.

“Notice is hereby given that the reassessment of benefits and damages of District Number ___ has been filed in the office of the county clerk of ___ County, and it is open to inspection. All persons wishing to be heard on the reassessment will be heard by the commissioners and the assessor of the district between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m., at___, in City of___, Arkansas, on the day of___, 20___. Secretary ___”.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-707; Acts 2015, No. 1116, § 1.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment, in (a), substituted “one (1) time each” for “once a,” substituted “if” for “in the event,” and substituted “has” for “shall have”; rewrote (b); and added (c).

Cross References. Assessments not to be reduced after issuance of bonds, § 14-86-602.

Case Notes

Financial Restraints.

Where district was validly organized, it could not have been restrained from issuing bonds and levying and collecting taxes; the validity of contract for construction of road would not have been involved in such case. Morehart v. Mabelvale Rd. Imp. Dist., 183 Ark. 411, 36 S.W.2d 68 (1931) (decision under prior law).

14-92-228. Levy of tax.

    1. The board of commissioners of a suburban improvement district shall, at the same time that the assessment of benefits is equalized or at any time thereafter, enter upon its records an order, which shall have all the force of a judgment, providing that there shall be assessed upon the real property of the district a tax sufficient to pay the estimated cost of the improvement, with ten percent (10%) added for unforeseen contingencies.
    2. The tax is to be paid by the real property in the district in proportion to the amount of the assessment of benefits thereon and is to be paid in annual installments, not to exceed ten percent (10%) for any one (1) year, as provided in the order.
  1. The tax so levied shall be a lien upon all the real property in the district from the time it is levied and shall be entitled to preference over all demands, executions, encumbrances, or liens, whensoever created, and shall continue until the assessment, with any penalty costs that may accrue thereon, shall have been paid.
    1. The remedy against the levy of taxes shall be by suit in chancery.
    2. The suit must be brought within thirty (30) days from the time of notice that the levy was made, and on the appeal, the presumption shall be in favor of the legality of the tax.
    1. The commissioners shall, promptly after entry of an order levying the tax, publish once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in some newspaper having general circulation in the district, a notice setting forth the order of levy and warning all persons affected by it that it shall become final unless suit is brought to contest it within thirty (30) days of the date of first publication of the notice.
    2. No property owner shall be barred from contest of the levy within the thirty-day publication period.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 8; 1961, No. 154, § 1; 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 16, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-708; Acts 1989, No. 548, § 1.

Case Notes

Judicial Review.

The improvement district must act for the benefit of all the affected property owners, and if any property owner feels aggrieved, he has the right to have the decision of the district judicially reviewed. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-229. Interest on assessments.

The assessment of the benefits shall bear interest at a rate or rates from the time it is equalized, not to exceed that required to service the bonds, or at the maximum interest rate allowed by law if no bonds issue. However, the interest need not be calculated until it is necessary to do so to avoid exceeding the total amount of benefits and interest, or the interest may be first collected.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 9; 1971, No. 360, § 3; 1981, No. 474, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-709.

14-92-230. Extension and collection of taxes.

    1. When the board of commissioners in a suburban improvement district shall make the levy of taxes, it shall be the duty of the assessor to extend the amount levied and set it opposite each benefit assessed in a column marked “Annual Collection”.
      1. It shall be the duty of the county clerk of the county to extend the taxes annually upon the tax books of the county until the levy is exhausted.
      2. For his or her services, the clerk shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1.5%) of the amount so extended.
        1. It shall then be the duty of the tax collector of the county to collect each year the taxes extended upon the books along with the other taxes until the entire levy is exhausted.
        2. For his or her services in making the collections, including prepayments, the collector shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1.5%). In the case of prepayments, the maximum commission shall be the lesser of one and one-half percent (1.5%) or fifty dollars ($50.00).
      1. The taxes shall be paid over by the collector to the depository of the district at the same time he or she pays over the county funds.
    1. In counties operating under the unit tax ledger system, the collector shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1.5%) for extending the taxes and a commission of an additional one and one-half percent (1.5%) for collecting the taxes.
    1. County clerks and tax collectors are authorized to employ additional deputies to do the increased work imposed by the terms of this subchapter.
    2. They may pay the deputies' salaries up to the sum of three thousand three hundred dollars ($3,300) per annum. However, the salaries shall never exceed the receipts from the commissions allowed by this subchapter.
  1. A property owner shall be required to pay applicable suburban improvement taxes provided in this subchapter as a prerequisite to paying his or her ad valorem real property taxes.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 10; 1951, No. 233, § 1; 1957, No. 331, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-710; Acts 1991, No. 281, § 1; 2001, No. 1816, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 281, § 6, provided, in part, that the 1991 amendment to (d) “shall be applicable to suburban improvement district taxes due and payable on or before October 10, 1991.”

Amendments. The 2001 amendment substituted present (b)(1)(A)(ii) for the former, which read: “For his services in making the collections, the collector shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1½%).”

Cross References. Advancement of funds to suburban improvement districts by municipalities, § 14-89-801.

14-92-231. Subsequent levies.

  1. If the tax first levied shall prove insufficient to pay the bonds, both the principal and interest issued by the board of commissioners on account of an improvement, as provided in this subchapter, as it shall become due and payable, they shall, from time to time, make such further levies upon the property previously assessed for sums sufficient to complete the improvement and to pay such bonds and interest, which shall be extended and collected in the same manner as the first levy. However, the total levy shall in no case exceed the value of the benefits assessed on the property with interest.
  2. The performance of such duties may be enforced by mandamus at the instance of any person or board interested.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-711.

14-92-232. Payment of taxes — Enforcement.

  1. All taxes levied under the terms of this subchapter shall be payable at the same time as ad valorem real property taxes.
  2. Delinquent suburban improvement district assessments shall be held by the county collector, and, if not redeemed, the assessments shall be certified to the Commissioner of State Lands for redemption or sale, pursuant to Act 626 of 1983, as amended.
  3. A suburban improvement district may enforce collection of delinquent suburban improvement district assessments by chancery proceedings in the chancery court of the county in the manner as provided for municipal property owners' improvement districts under § 14-94-122.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 12; 1977, No. 463, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-712; Acts 1991, No. 281, § 2; 1993, No. 782, § 2.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1991, No. 281, § 6 provided, in part, that the 1991 amendment to this section “shall be applicable to suburban improvement district taxes due and payable on or before October 10, 1991”.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment added (c).

Meaning of “this act”. Acts 1983, No. 626, codified as §§ 26-37-101, 26-37-101 note; 26-37-10226-37-105; 26-37-20126-37-205; and 26-37-30126-37-303.

Cross References. Lien of district may be enforced notwithstanding tax sale to state, § 14-86-1601 et seq.

Payment of improvement district taxes with bonds of district, § 14-86-803.

14-92-233. Notice of delinquency.

  1. County tax collectors shall, at least once annually, send a delinquency notification to each property owner who is delinquent in the payment of the assessed benefits levied by suburban improvement districts formed under this subchapter.
  2. The notice shall be mailed to the last known address of the delinquent property owner and shall include an identification of the property, the amount of the delinquency, and any interest or penalties thereon.

History. Acts 1983, No. 903, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-745.

14-92-234. Notes, bonds, or evidences of debt.

    1. In order to meet preliminary expenses and to do the work, the board of commissioners may issue negotiable notes or bonds of the suburban improvement district signed by the chair and secretary of the board and bearing such rate or rates of interest as shall be determined by the board and may pledge and mortgage all assessments of benefits of the district and all or any part of the profits of the district derived from its operation of any waterworks, sewer system, gas system, recreational facilities, or hospital to the payment of the notes and bonds.
    2. The board may also issue to the contractors who do the work negotiable evidences of debt bearing interest at the same rate or rates prescribed by the board and secure them in the same manner.
    3. With the consent of the sellers of improvements, as provided in this chapter, it may issue to the sellers negotiable notes or bonds of the district bearing interest at the rate or rates prescribed by the board covering all or a portion of the purchase price of the improvements and secure the notes or bonds in the same manner as provided in this section.
    4. As further security for the payment of any such indebtedness, the members of the board of any district organized for the construction of waterworks or water pipes, tanks, and wells, sewer systems, gas pipelines, recreational facilities, or hospitals may be resolved to establish the water or sewer rates, rates for use of gas pipelines, rates for use of recreational facilities, or rates for use of the hospitals to be collected from the users thereof. The board may mortgage any or all of its property, including the system, buildings, equipment, lands, leases, easements, and rights-of-way.
  1. No bonds issued under the terms of this subchapter shall run for more than thirty (30) years, and all issues of bonds may be divided so that a portion thereof may mature each year as the assessments, revenues, or profits from the systems are collected, or they may all be made payable at the same time, with proper provision for a sinking fund.
  2. The bonds shall not be sold for less than par without the unanimous vote of the board.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 16; 1967, No. 286, § 4; 1969, No. 230, § 3; 1970 (Ex. Sess.), No. 53, § 1; 1981, No. 703, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-716; Acts 1997, No. 1134, §§ 3, 4; 2007, No. 602, § 1.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment inserted “gas system” following “sewer system” in (a)(1); and, in (a)(4), inserted “gas pipelines” following “sewer systems” and inserted “rates for use of gas pipelines” following “water or sewer rates.”

Case Notes

Bonds.

Complaint filed by property holders attacking constitutionality of refunding bonds, issued by district created under former statute, was properly dismissed for lack of equity when the complaint contained no exhibits sufficient in character to constitute proof of illegality and where only proof at the trial was that the plaintiffs were property holders. Pruitt v. Pine Bluff Water & Sewer Extension Dist., 214 Ark. 64, 214 S.W.2d 489 (1948).

Where resident of water and sewer improvement district filed a class suit to prevent sale of bonds, on the ground that certain resolutions and pledge of the board delegated authority to a trustee not authorized, the court would not presume that, if the contingencies arose, the actual procedure followed would be contrary to that authorized; hence complaint was dismissed for lack of equity. Roscoe v. Water & Sewer Improv. Dist., 216 Ark. 109, 224 S.W.2d 356 (1949).

Cited: Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-235. Payment of bonds.

    1. All bonds issued by a board of commissioners for a suburban improvement district under the terms of this subchapter shall be secured by a lien on all real property in the district that will be benefited by the acquiring or making of the improvement financed with the proceeds of such bonds.
      1. The board shall see to it that a tax is levied annually and collected under the provisions of this subchapter, so long as it may be necessary to pay any bond issued or obligation contracted under its authority.
      2. The making of said assessment or levy and collection may be enforced by mandamus.
      1. If any bond or interest coupon on any bond issued by the board is not paid within thirty (30) days after its maturity, it shall be the duty of any court of competent jurisdiction, on application of any holder of the bond or interest coupon so overdue, to appoint a receiver to collect the taxes and an assessor to reassess the benefits, if necessary.
      2. The proceeds of the taxes and collections shall be applied after payment of costs, first to overdue interest and then to payment pro rata of all bonds issued by the board which are then due and payable.
      1. The receiver may be directed, by suit, to foreclose the lien of taxes on lands.
      2. The suits so brought by the receiver shall be conducted in all matters as suits by the board as provided in this subchapter and with like effect, and the decree and deeds therein shall have the same presumption in their favor.
  1. When all the sums have been paid, the receiver shall be discharged and the affairs of the district conducted by the board as provided in this subchapter.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-719; Acts 1997, No. 1134, § 5.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment rewrote (a)(1).

Cross References. Receiver of district may redeem from state, § 14-86-1602.

14-92-236. Public contributions to road or street improvement districts.

    1. The county court is authorized to turn over to any road or street improvement district organized under this subchapter that proportion of the road tax, as may be just and equitable, or any portion of the automobile or gasoline tax.
    2. The county court is further authorized to contribute these funds in money or scrip to the expense of the improvement from the general revenue of the county as it may deem appropriate.
    1. Any such district is authorized to receive any part of the funds that may be set aside by the federal government for the improvement of public roads and any that may be set aside by the government of this state for aid in the improvement of public roads.
    2. The board of commissioners of the district and the Arkansas Department of Transportation are authorized and directed to take such action as may be necessary to secure any of these funds for these districts as an improvement of a part of the public roads of the state in which the state has an interest.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 27; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-726; Acts 2017, No. 707, § 25.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “Department of Transportation” for “State Highway and Transportation Department” in (b)(2).

14-92-237. Dissolution or conversion of district — Definition.

    1. After all bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness plus all interest thereon shall have been paid in full, a suburban improvement district may, by unanimous vote of the board of commissioners, be dissolved and all future levies and assessments cancelled, the board relieved from further duties, and the surplus funds of the district distributed in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, if title to and control of the facilities constructed by the district have been taken over or assumed by any political subdivision, municipal utility commission or agency, or any regulated public utility, or a suburban improvement district may, by unanimous vote of the board of commissioners, be converted into a fire protection district and all future levies and assessments cancelled, the board relieved from further duties, and any remaining funds and any other property of the district transferred to the new entity in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsection (d) of this section.
    2. The districts are authorized, at the discretion of the commissioners, to enter into repair and maintenance agreements or contracts and to expend funds of the districts for these purposes.
  1. Any improvement district created pursuant to this subchapter may be dissolved in the same manner it was created. However, if any district having outstanding bonds or other indebtedness is dissolved, the assessed benefits being levied at the time of dissolution shall continue to be levied and collected until the outstanding bonds or other indebtedness is paid.
      1. If the commissioners vote to dissolve the district or the district is dissolved by vote of the realty owners at a public hearing, the board shall first pay from surplus funds all debts of the district, including any reasonable legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the dissolution, and dispose of the remaining assets under subdivision (c)(1)(B) of this section or subdivision (c)(2) of this section.
        1. The commissioners shall convert all assets into cash and may refund all remaining funds of the district, pro rata, to the property owners who hold title to the property in the district at the time the refund is made.
          1. The pro rata refund to the property owners shall be made on the basis of the most recent assessment or reassessment of benefits on the parcels of property before dissolution and shall be in the same proportion that the assessed benefits of each individual parcel of property bears to the total of the assessed benefits of all the property in the district.
          2. A property or owner whose property is delinquent in any sum for district assessments, penalties, or interest, at the time the refund is made shall not be counted in calculating the pro rata distribution, or receive any portion of the refund.
      2. Within ninety (90) days after the distribution of the surplus funds has been completed, the board shall file a copy of the resolution of dissolution and a financial statement of the district, verified by all commissioners, in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the district is located.
      1. The commissioners may transfer all remaining cash and other monetary assets and any real property and personal property to a school district located within ten (10) miles of any boundary of the district.
        1. The transfer shall be made under a valid contract between the suburban improvement district and the school district.
          1. The contract shall be supported by adequate consideration.
          2. As used in this section, “adequate consideration” includes public advantage that promotes a general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools.
      2. Within ninety (90) days after the transfer of all remaining funds and property has been completed, the board shall file a copy of the resolution of dissolution and a financial statement of the suburban improvement district, verified by all commissioners, in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the suburban improvement district is located.
    1. Any improvement district created pursuant to this subchapter solely for the purposes of providing fire protection services may be converted into a new fire protection district under § 14-284-201 et seq., and shall, after the conversion, be governed under the authority of that law. However, if a district has any outstanding bonds or other indebtedness, it shall not be converted until the outstanding bonds or other indebtedness is paid.
    2. In the event the commissioners vote to convert the district, the board shall choose a date certain of not less than sixty (60) days nor more than twelve (12) months at which time the conversion shall become effective and shall notify the county court of the county in which the district is located that the board has voted to convert the district and shall specifically define the area proposed to be included in the new fire protection district. After verifying that the commissioners have voted unanimously to convert the district to a proposed fire protection district and that there is no outstanding indebtedness for the district, the county court shall enter an order establishing the district as described in the notice by the board and establishing the time and place of a public meeting to be held within the district to elect the new commissioners of the fire protection district as is otherwise provided by law.
    3. After paying all debts of the district, including any reasonable legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the conversion, the board shall transfer any and all remaining cash and other monetary assets and any real and personal property to the new district on the effective date of the conversion. All delinquent assessments of the district and any debts owed to the district shall become debts to the new district and shall be subject to collection by the new district in accordance with its powers and authority.
    4. Within ninety (90) days after the transfer of any and all remaining funds and property has been completed, the board shall file a copy of the resolution of conversion and a final financial statement of the district, verified by all commissioners, in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the district is located. The fire protection district shall be deemed to have been formed upon the date of its conversion from a suburban improvement district.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 18; 1963, No. 150, § 1; 1967, No. 286, § 5; 1981, No. 510, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-718; Acts 1997, No. 323, § 1; 2009, No. 451, § 1.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment added the language beginning “or a suburban improvement district may, by unanimous vote of the board of commissioners” to the end of (a)(1); and added (d).

The 2009 amendment redesignated (c)(1), in (c)(1)(A) deleted “shall convert all assets into cash and” following “the board” and inserted “and dispose of the remaining assets … (c)(2) of this section”, inserted “convert all assets into cash and may” in (c)(1)(B)(i), inserted (c)(2), and made related and minor stylistic changes.

Case Notes

Abolishment by Legislature.

The legislature could not abolish an individual improvement district established under a general law. Raines v. Bolick, 183 Ark. 832, 39 S.W.2d 309 (1931) (decision under prior law).

14-92-238. Lien for preliminary expenses.

  1. In case, for any reason, the improvement contemplated by any suburban improvement district organized under this subchapter is not made, the preliminary expense shall be a first lien upon all the land in the district and shall be paid by a levy of a tax thereon upon the assessed value for county and state taxation.
  2. The levy shall be made by the chancery court of the county and shall be collected by a receiver to be appointed by the court.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 22; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-722.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional because it does not provide that each landowner be served with personal notice of the proceeding to determine the district's preliminary expenses, since no such notice is necessary; in a dispute between an improvement district and its creditors, the district's board of commissioners represents the district. Harrill v. Board of Comm'rs, 282 Ark. 348, 668 S.W.2d 538 (1984).

Jurisdiction.

This section is not invalid as conferring jurisdiction on the chancery court to levy a tax since the chancellor is not vested with any discretion in the levy of the tax; the chancery court has jurisdiction to determine the preliminary expense because it is a first lien on the land, a matter traditionally within the jurisdiction of a court of equity; but, once the amount of the district's debt for preliminary expenses has been determined, the computation of the tax is merely a matter of distributing the burden over the total assessed value of the property within the district. Harrill v. Board of Comm'rs, 282 Ark. 348, 668 S.W.2d 538 (1984).

Notice.

Where landowners did not show that their position differed in any pertinent respect from that of other landowners who contested assessment of benefit and, moreover, their petition to intervene and their proposed complaint were considered at a hearing at which they were specifically given the opportunity to proffer whatever proof they may have had and they presented no evidence to show that the absence of personal notice prejudiced them in any way, they had notice and an opportunity to be heard, so personal notice to each landowner was not required. Harrill v. Board of Comm'rs, 282 Ark. 348, 668 S.W.2d 538 (1984).

Preliminary Expenses.

Judgment was reversed and the case was remanded in engineer's breach of contract case against defendant improvement district because the trial court had to determine the portion of compensatory damages awarded that qualified as “preliminary expenses” and, hence, were subject to a tax levy against the improvement district's land. Perkins v. Cedar Mt. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 43, 360 Ark. 50, 199 S.W.3d 667 (2004).

Although all of the work performed by an engineer was preliminary to the construction phase of a sewer improvement project, the engineer had yet to complete all of the work required by the contract; once the construction began and the contract was completed, the preliminary expenses under this section would merge into the general cost of the improvement. Perkins v. Cedar Mt. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 43, 360 Ark. 50, 199 S.W.3d 667 (2004).

Protests.

Every landowner is given the opportunity to protest when his land is assessed for general taxation; a second opportunity need not be given for them to protest valuations for suburban improvement districts pursuant to this section. Harrill v. Board of Comm'rs, 282 Ark. 348, 668 S.W.2d 538 (1984).

14-92-239. Continued existence of district.

Suburban improvement districts shall not cease to exist upon the acquiring, construction, or completion of the improvement but shall continue to exist for the purpose of preserving, maintaining, and operating the improvement, replacing equipment, paying salaries to employees, and performing any other functions or services authorized in this subchapter. To this end, the board of commissioners may, from time to time, make such additional levies based upon the assessment of benefits as may be necessary for these purposes. However, the amount of the total levies shall not exceed the assessed benefits and interest thereon.

History. Acts 1941, No. 41, § 18; 1953, No. 420, § 3; 1963, No. 150, § 1; 1967, No. 286, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-718.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Provision that districts shall not cease to exist upon completion of the improvement, but may continue for the purpose of preserving and keeping the district in repair, is authorized under the constitution. Murphy v. Cook, 202 Ark. 1069, 155 S.W.2d 330 (1941).

Sale of Improvements.

Since improvement district could build a pipeline and then sell it, it could also contract to sell the pipeline before it was built. Page v. Highway No. 10 Water Pipe Line Improv. Dist., 201 Ark. 512, 145 S.W.2d 344 (1940) (decision under prior law).

14-92-240. Districts of less than six thousand lots — Alteration of number of and method of selecting commissioners.

  1. Any suburban improvement district which contains fewer than six thousand (6,000) lots and which selects successor commissioners by a vote of the remaining commissioners may alter the number and method of selection of members of the board of commissioners of the district pursuant to this section.
    1. Any property owner in the suburban improvement district may make a written request for an election on the question of whether to change the method of selecting the board of commissioners of the district. The request shall be filed with a quorum court member whose district includes all or part of the suburban improvement district.
    2. The property owner filing the request shall be responsible for all costs of the election and any notice required under subsection (b) of this section.
      1. Within forty-five (45) days after receiving the request, the quorum court member shall mail, by first class mail, ballots to all property owners in the district, along with a copy of this section.
      2. The date for returning ballots shall be set by the quorum court member and shall not be less than twenty (20) days after the date he or she mailed the ballots to property owners.
      3. Ballots shall not be valid unless signed by the property owner and mailed within the time allowed.
    3. Two (2) votes shall be awarded for each property. The interests of time-share owners shall be voted by the time-share owners' association on the same basis.
    4. A majority of the votes cast on the issue shall be required for passage of the measure.
    5. The quorum court member who conducted the election shall notify the property owners of the results of the election. If the measure passes, the notice shall include the notice of the meetings for nomination and election.
    6. The commissioners serving on the board at the time of the approval of the measure shall continue to serve until a new board is elected.
      1. Not more than sixty (60) days nor less than thirty (30) days after the measure is approved, the quorum court member who conducted the election under subsection (b) of this section shall hold a meeting to accept nominations for the new commissioners. Nominations for commissioners shall be made by property owners.
      2. The commissioners shall be elected, from among those nominated, at a subsequent public meeting to be held not less than thirty (30) days after the meeting to nominate commissioners.
      3. Notice of the meetings shall be mailed to each property owner at least thirty (30) days prior to the meeting to nominate comissioners.
      4. The notice shall include the following information:
        1. The time, place, and date of the meetings to nominate and elect a new board of commissioners;
        2. How to request an absentee ballot; and
        3. The qualifications for voting in the election.
    1. Each property owner in attendance at the meeting to nominate shall be entitled to nominate one (1) district resident property owner. Each property owner shall be entitled to one (1) vote for each position of commissioner to be filled. A property owner may cast his or her vote in person at the meeting conducted to elect commissioners or may vote by an absentee ballot. Absentee ballots must be received prior to the meeting held to elect commissioners. Any absentee ballot may be requested by any property owner.
      1. A meeting shall be held annually to nominate successor members, and a subsequent meeting shall be held to elect successor members.
      2. The annual meetings shall be conducted by the board.
      3. The same notice requirements as for the initial meetings for nomination and election of commissioners shall apply to the annual meetings for nomination and election of commissioners.
    2. The cost of the election held to select commissioners under this subsection shall be borne by the district.
    1. The new board of commissioners shall consist of five (5) members, who shall serve staggered terms of three (3) years.
    2. The terms of office of initial members shall be determined as follows:
      1. The individuals receiving the highest and second highest number of votes shall serve an initial term of three (3) years;
      2. The individuals receiving the third and fourth highest number of votes shall serve an initial term of two (2) years; and
      3. The individual receiving the fifth highest number of votes shall serve an initial term of one (1) year.
    3. If two (2) commissioners are to be elected at an annual meeting, the individuals receiving the highest and second highest number of votes shall be elected. If one (1) commissioner is to be elected at an annual meeting, the individual receiving the highest number of votes shall be elected.
      1. Vacancies occurring on the board shall be filled until the next annual election by a majority vote of the remaining commissioners.
      2. At the annual election, the position shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term. If two (2) commissioners are to be elected at the annual meeting, the individual receiving the second highest number of votes shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term. If three (3) commissioners are to be elected at the annual meeting, the individual receiving the third highest number of votes shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term.
    4. Whenever any member of the board fails to attend a majority of the meetings of the board during any six-month period, the board shall declare the position vacant, and the position shall be filled in the same manner as by this section for other vacancies.
  2. Whenever notice is required under this section, the notice shall be given by first class mail.

History. Acts 1993, No. 524, § 1; 1993, No. 1138, § 1.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment by No. 1138, which specifically amended Acts 1993, No. 524, rewrote (c)(2).

Case Notes

District's Authority.

Subsection (c) of this section explicitly sets out the qualifications of commissioners and voters under the statute and unambiguously provides for the number of votes each property owner may cast in the elections; nothing in § 14-92-210 gives the district the authority to alter those requirements, and thus the improvement district in this case acted outside its authority in enacting certain regulations. Roberts v. Holiday Island Suburban Improvement Dist. #1, 2018 Ark. App. 394, 559 S.W.3d 269 (2018).

Property Owner.

While timeshare owners do not receive an individual tax bill, the property itself is assessed real property taxes by the assessor and improvement-district assessments, which are then paid by the timeshare owners through the owners association; thus, a timeshare owner owns property subject to taxation and thereby satisfies the definition of a “property owner” entitled to individual notice of commissioner elections under subsection (c) of this section, and each timeshare owner is entitled to one vote for each commissioner position to be filled. Roberts v. Holiday Island Suburban Improvement Dist. #1, 2018 Ark. App. 394, 559 S.W.3d 269 (2018).

Subchapter 3 — Consolidated Systems for Joint Operation

Preambles. Acts 1959, No. 262 contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, There are many improvement districts organized under the authority of the suburban improvement district laws and the municipal improvement district laws that are contiguous or adjacent and which can be more efficiently operated, maintained and extended under a central control; and

“Whereas, the improvements originally contemplated by the organization of the districts have been constructed and completed, but by reason of growth of the community the facilities are inadequate and should be enlarged and extended, requiring additional capital;

“Now, therefore….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 10: Mar. 25, 1959. Emergency clause provided: “In order to secure efficiency and economy in the operation of water and sewer services and to promote the health and comfort of residents of such districts, there is a need for the authorization granted by this Act, and therefore an emergency is declared; and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force upon its passage and approval.”

14-92-301. Authority to contract.

  1. Where there are contiguous or adjacent districts organized under the suburban improvement district laws or the municipal improvement district laws for either water, sewer or gas pipeline services, or any combination thereof, it shall be permissible for all or any two (2) or more of such districts, suburban, municipal, or any combination thereof, to enter into a contract with each other for the joint operation, maintenance, improvement, enlargement, and betterment of their respective systems or of the consolidated system, to be paid for by charges for the services.
    1. Any such district which has paid its outstanding bonds in indebtedness, but which has not been turned over to the municipality for operation, may join in contracts for joint operation.
    2. Any facilities constructed by any districts outside their boundaries shall be included in the consolidated systems.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-732; Acts 1997, No. 1134, § 6.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment substituted “either water, sewer or gas pipeline services, or any combination thereof” for “either water or sewer services, or both” in (a).

14-92-302. Commission members.

    1. When two (2) or more districts enter into a contract described in § 14-92-301, they shall jointly petition the county judge of the county in which the districts lie to appoint a commission of three (3) members, all of whom shall be property owners and electors within the territory affected.
    2. In the event there are more than two (2) districts joining in the petition, no two (2) of the commissioners shall be appointed from the same district.
  1. The members of the commission shall proceed to organize by:
    1. First taking the oath of office as prescribed for a commissioner of a suburban improvement district;
    2. Electing a chairman and a secretary; and
    3. Selecting a name for the consolidated system.
    1. The commission members shall have the authority to carry out the powers conferred by this subchapter.
    2. In all other respects, the commission shall be governed by and have all the authority of § 14-234-301 et seq.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-735.

14-92-303. Authority as body politic.

  1. Any consolidation of improvement districts shall be a body politic as a governmental and political subdivision of the state.
  2. The consolidated systems shall exercise the authority conferred in this subchapter according to the provisions, applicable and not in conflict herewith, of § 14-234-201 et seq. for the details of the issuance of revenue bonds, the pledge in the resolution of the commissioners, the determination of revenue for the payment of bonds, depreciation account, audits, rights of bondholders, and all other matters connected therewith.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-733.

14-92-304. Resolution for financial matters.

  1. After the execution of the contract for consolidation, the commissioners provided for in § 14-92-302 shall adopt a resolution setting forth their estimate of the cost of retiring outstanding bond issues, together with the cost of the contemplated improvements and betterments, and a brief description thereof, and provide for the issuance of revenue bonds including the amount, rate of interest, time and place of payment, and other details connected with them.
  2. The resolution shall also:
    1. Declare that a statutory mortgage lien shall exist upon the property of the consolidated system;
    2. Fix the minimum rates to be collected prior to the payment of the bonds; and
    3. Pledge the revenues derived from its services for the purpose of paying the bonds and interest.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-733.

14-92-305. Notice and hearing on bonds.

  1. After the adoption of the resolution, it shall be published once in a newspaper published in the county where the system lies. If there is no newspaper so published, then the resolution shall be posted in at least three (3) public places in the county, with a notice to all persons concerned stating that the resolution has been adopted, that the consolidated system contemplates the issuance of the bonds so described, and that any person interested may appear before the county judge of the county upon a certain date, not less than ten (10) days subsequent to the publication or posting, to present protests.
  2. The judge shall hear all objections and suggestions and take such action as he shall deem proper in the premises.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-734.

Case Notes

Judicial Review.

The district must act for the benefit of all the affected property owners, and if any property owner feels aggrieved, he has the right to have the decision of the improvement district judicially reviewed. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-306. Borrowing of money.

  1. Consolidated systems may borrow money to pay and discharge any outstanding bond issues and indebtedness of the districts joining in the consolidations and may borrow money also for improvement, enlargement, and betterment of the facilities of the consolidated systems.
  2. To accomplish these purposes, the consolidated systems may issue negotiable coupon bonds or certificates of indebtedness evidencing the money so borrowed, to:
    1. Be secured solely by a pledge of the net revenues derived from the operation of the facilities;
    2. Bear interest not to exceed six percent (6%) per annum;
    3. Mature at such times and places as the issuer shall decide best, but in no event to mature later than forty (40) years after date of issue;
    4. Be issued with such terms of payment, call provisions, and interest rates as the issuer may decide best; and
    5. Be sold with the privilege of conversion to lower interest rates.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-732.

14-92-307. Schedule of rates.

The commission of the consolidated systems shall have the power to fix the schedule of rates for its services.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-737.

14-92-308. Use of net revenues.

  1. The net revenues from a joint operation shall be used first to pay the principal and interest as they mature of revenue bonds issued under this subchapter.
  2. Any remaining net revenues may be used to provide funds or pay bonds and interest issued for improvements, extensions, and betterments.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-736.

14-92-309. Extension of facilities.

    1. Consolidated systems may extend facilities to serve adjacent or nearby areas without applying for a certificate of convenience and necessity.
    2. These systems shall not be limited by the original boundaries of the districts joining in the consolidation.
  1. The operations shall be a governmental function of the consolidated systems, and they may not be required to so extend their services.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-738.

14-92-310. Right of eminent domain.

For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this subchapter, the consolidated systems shall have the right of eminent domain as is provided in §§ 18-15-301 —18-15-307.

History. Acts 1959, No. 262, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-739.

Subchapter 4 — Sale of Property by District

14-92-401. Petition by landowners.

    1. The owners of a two-thirds (2/3) majority in value as shown by the last county assessment of the real property within any suburban improvement district may, by written petition, require the board of commissioners of the district to sell all or any portion of the real or personal property, or both, owned by the district.
      1. The petition shall specify with reasonable certainty what property is to be sold and shall stipulate the sale price and may specify such other terms and conditions of the sale as to the petitioners may seem desirable.
      2. The sale price shall in no event be a sum less than the amount necessary to pay all the outstanding secured indebtedness against the property to be sold.
  1. Upon the filing of the petition, the board shall give notice by publication once a week for two (2) weeks in some newspaper having a general circulation throughout the district, advising the owners of real property within the district that on a day therein named the commissioners will hear the petition and determine whether those signing it constitute a two-thirds (2/3) majority in value of the owners of real property within the district.
    1. At the meeting named in the notice, the owners of real property within the district shall be heard before the board which shall determine whether the signers of the petition constitute a two-thirds (2/3) majority in value.
      1. The finding of the commissioners shall be conclusive, unless within thirty (30) days thereafter, suit is brought to review its action in the chancery court of the county in which the district was organized.
      2. In determining whether those signing the petition constitute a two-thirds (2/3) majority in value of the owners of the real property within the district, the commissioners and the court shall be guided by the record of deeds in the office of the recorder of the county and shall not consider any unrecorded instrument.

History. Acts 1965, No. 377, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-740.

Case Notes

Judicial Review.

The improvement district must act for the benefit of all the affected property owners, and if any property owner feels aggrieved, he has the right to have the decision of the district judicially reviewed. Cherokee Village Homeowners Protective Asso. v. Cherokee Village Road & Street Improv. Dist., 248 Ark. 1055, 455 S.W.2d 93 (1970).

14-92-402. Procedure for sale.

Upon determination of the sufficiency of the petition, the board of commissioners shall proceed to sell the property which the property owners have petitioned to have sold, subject to the terms of the petition.

History. Acts 1965, No. 377, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-741.

14-92-403. Provisions cumulative.

This subchapter shall not be deemed to repeal any other legislation authorizing the sale of improvement district property, but shall be cumulative to all such existing legislation.

History. Acts 1965, No. 377, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-741n.

Subchapter 5 — Systems Turned Over to Municipalities

Preambles. Acts 1959, No. 146, contained a preamble which read:

“WHEREAS, Due to the rapid growth of suburban housing, many of the areas adjacent to municipalities have organized improvement districts under the suburban improvement district law and have been collecting assessments of benefits in addition to the charges for the services of the facility constructed, and it is to the best interests of the residents of both the suburbs and the municipality to have the management and operation of the facilities; and

“Whereas, The municipalities may operate their water and sewer facilities on a revenue basis and are able to pay the bonds therefor without levying a tax on an assessment of benefits, and can thus effect a saving to the property owners and at the same time produce a more efficient service by the facilities; Now, therefore ….”

Effective Dates. Acts 1959, No. 146, § 3: Mar. 3, 1959. Emergency clause provided: “In order to secure efficiency and economy in the operation of water and sewer services and to promote the health and comfort of residents adjacent to a municipality, there is a need for the authorization granted by this Act, and therefore an emergency is declared and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force upon its passage and approval.”

14-92-501. Applicability.

Any municipality that has a population of twenty-five thousand (25,000) or more according to the last federal census shall be entitled to exercise the authority conferred by this subchapter.

History. Acts 1959, No. 146, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-730.

14-92-502. Water or sewer systems.

  1. In those cases where improvement districts have been organized under the suburban improvement district law, or any consolidation of suburban and municipal improvement districts, either for furnishing of water or sewer services, or both, and all, or any part, of it lies outside a municipality within the class affected by this subchapter which desires to operate it as a municipal waterworks or a municipal sewer system, the boards of commissioners of the suburban district, in order to secure more adequate service for the inhabitants within the district, shall have the authority to turn over to the municipality the operation and maintenance of the system.
    1. The municipality may issue revenue bonds, fix the rates for the services, and use the net revenues from the operation to pay the principal and interest and paying charges of its revenue bonds for payment and discharge of the outstanding bonds of the districts.
    2. If the net revenues are not sufficient to prevent a default in the bonds or interest, a tax sufficient to produce enough revenue to cure the default shall be levied on the assessments of benefits in the districts.
    3. Nothing in this section shall impair the rights of the holders of the outstanding bonds to demand and receive sufficient annual collections on the assessments of benefits to meet interest and principal payments as they become due.

History. Acts 1959, No. 146, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-731.

Subchapter 6 — Collection of Taxes

14-92-601. Applicability.

    1. This subchapter shall be applicable to suburban improvement districts organized and existing pursuant to the provisions of § 14-92-201 et seq. with an area of not less than five thousand (5,000) acres and not more than seven thousand (7,000) acres.
    2. These districts will be referred to as “eligible districts.”
  1. This subchapter shall apply to taxes to be collected in 1986 and subsequent years.

History. Acts 1985, No. 430, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-746.

14-92-602. Election to collect taxes.

    1. Any eligible district may elect to collect the taxes levied by it pursuant to the provisions of §§ 14-92-228 and 14-92-239. This election shall be made by resolution of the board of commissioners of the eligible district.
    2. Certified copies of the resolution shall be filed with the county clerk and county tax collector of each county in which any of the territory of the district is located, not later than July 15 of the year immediately preceding the first year in which the district will collect the taxes.
  1. Once the election is made and so long as it continues in force, the clerk shall not extend the district taxes upon the county tax books, and the collector shall not collect the district taxes. The district shall be solely responsible for collecting the district taxes, which shall be due and payable on or before October 15 of each year.
    1. Once an eligible district makes the election provided for in this section to collect its own taxes, the election shall continue in effect and the district shall collect its own taxes unless and until the election is revoked.
      1. The election may be revoked by resolution of the board of the district, and the filing of certified copies thereof with the clerk and collector of each county in which any of the territory of the district is located, such filing to be made on or before July 15 of any year.
      2. The revocation shall be effective as to taxes to be collected in the year immediately succeeding the year in which the revocation is filed.

History. Acts 1985, No. 430, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-747; Acts 2011, No. 175, § 1.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “October 15” for “October 10” in (b).

14-92-603. Collection of delinquent taxes.

  1. If an eligible district has elected to collect its own taxes under § 14-92-602, the district is responsible for and may take action for collecting taxes that have become delinquent.
    1. An eligible district that has not elected to collect its own taxes under § 14-92-602 may elect to assume sole responsibility for the collection of the eligible district's taxes that have become delinquent.
      1. An election under subdivision (b)(1) of this section shall be made by resolution of the board of commissioners of the eligible district, and a certified copy of the resolution shall be filed with the county tax collector of each county in which any of the territory of the eligible district is located, prior to October 15 of any year.
      2. The election shall be effective for taxes becoming delinquent in the year of filing.
    1. If an eligible district has responsibility under this section for collecting the delinquent taxes of the district, or if the eligible district elects to assume this responsibility, the county collector shall take no action to enforce collection of delinquent taxes.
    2. If the eligible district has elected to collect only delinquent taxes, the county collector shall report delinquencies to the board of the eligible district.
  2. If it is the responsibility of the eligible district to collect delinquent taxes, the district shall add to the amount of the tax a penalty of twenty-five percent (25%) and shall enforce collection by civil proceedings in the circuit court of the county and in the manner provided by §§ 14-121-426 — 14-121-432.
    1. Once an eligible district makes the application to collect the delinquent taxes of the district, the election continues in effect until revoked.
      1. Revocation shall be by resolution of the board and the filing of certified copies of the resolution with the collector of each county in which any of the territory of the eligible district is located.
      2. A filing under subdivision (e)(2)(A) of this section shall be made on or before October 15 of any year and shall be effective as to taxes becoming delinquent in that year.

History. Acts 1985, No. 430, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-748; Acts 2011, No. 175, § 2.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “October 15” for “October 10” in (b)(2)(A) and (e)(2)(B); substituted “An election under subdivision (b)(1) of this section” for “This election” in (b)(2)(A); in (d), substituted “civil proceedings” for “chancery proceedings” and “circuit court” for “chancery court”; and substituted “A filing under subdivision (e)(2)(A) of this section” for “These filings” in (e)(2)(B).

Chapter 93 Property Owners' Improvement Districts

Cross References. Deputies employed by property owners associations, insurance, § 14-15-503.

Municipal property owner's improvement district law, § 14-94-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 27: Mar. 21, 1983. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared that the laws of Arkansas pertaining to improvement districts do not at this time provide for the formation and operation of such district on the basis of the consent of all the owners of real property within such districts and that this inadequacy is causing the delay of the accomplishment of projects which are greatly needed and in the public interest. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1985, No. 296, § 12: Mar. 11, 1985. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that the laws of Arkansas pertaining to the organization and operation of property owners improvement districts as authorized by Act 613 of 1983 are inadequate and must be clarified and supplemented in order to permit such districts to effectively carry out the purposes for which they have been created; and that this inadequacy is causing the delay of the accomplishment of projects and improvements of a public nature which are greatly needed and in the best interests of the inhabitants of each such district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987, No. 787, § 6: Apr. 8, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and declared that the laws of Arkansas pertaining to the organization and operation of property owners improvement districts as authorized by Act 613 of 1983 are inadequate and must be clarified and supplemented in order to permit such districts to effectively carry out the purposes for which they have been created; and that this inadequacy is causing the delay of the accomplishment of projects and improvements of a public nature which are greatly needed and in the best interests of the inhabitants of each such district. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 7: June 12, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that regulation of small water and sewer utilities as ‘public utilities’ under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission generally imposes heavy regulatory costs upon the consumers, so that the cost of preparing a rate case alone may equal or exceed the other total revenue requirements of those utilities; that the effect of regulation is often to increase costs that are proportionately far in excess of the benefits of regulation; that customers of small water and sewer utilities may be better off in the long run if they could simply buy their water or sewer utility outright and run it themselves; and that this Act is immediately necessary to remedy the present situation. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 504, § 7: Mar. 13, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the impairment of the rights of owners of real property located within various improvement districts to prepay their assessments greatly infringes on their rights to own, manage, and enjoy their real property and that it must be made unimpeachably clear that these owners of real property do have and should have the right to prepay these assessments and to be released from the liens upon the prepayment of these assessments. Therefore, in order to clarify and extend rights of owners of real property located within various improvement districts, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2013, No. 290, § 4: Mar. 6, 2013. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that certain individuals have used the current law to meet their own ends by abusing the power of eminent domain; that because of that abuse, property value has declined in certain areas; and that this act is immediately necessary because this type of abuse needs to be rectified as soon as possible. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”

14-93-101. Title.

This chapter may be known and cited as the “Property Owners' Improvement District Law.”

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 1; 1985, No. 296, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2401.

14-93-102. Legislative intent.

  1. It is the intent and purpose of this chapter to authorize the formation of improvement districts by the unanimous approval of all owners of real property located in the territory to be included in the district.
  2. It is the intention of Acts 1985, No. 296, to amend or repeal only such sections or subsections of Acts 1983, No. 613, as are specifically mentioned in Acts 1985, No. 296, and the remainder of Acts 1983, No. 613, shall remain in full force and effect as enacted until Acts 1983, No. 613, shall be further amended or repealed.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 1; 1985, No. 296, §§ 1, 11; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-2401, 20-2401n; Acts 1999, No. 475, § 1.

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1985, No. 296, is codified as §§ 14-93-10114-93-103, 14-93-107, 14-93-111, 14-93-124, 14-93-125, and 14-93-13014-93-132.

Acts 1983, No. 613, is codified as §§ 14-93-10114-93-129.

14-93-103. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means any board of commissioners appointed pursuant to this chapter;
  2. “District” means any improvement district formed under the provisions of this chapter;
  3. “Improvement” means any lands, structures, improvements, fixtures, and appurtenant equipment acquired, constructed, improved, or equipped by a district;
  4. “Nearby municipality” means any municipality located within ten (10) miles of any boundary of a district;
  5. “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, firm, or other entity recognized by law as having capacity to own real property in the State of Arkansas. As used in this chapter, person shall include a husband and wife owning property jointly;
  6. “Land” or “real property” means all property subject to taxation for the purposes of this chapter;
  7. “County court”, “county judge”, or “county clerk” means “circuit court”, “circuit judge”, or “circuit clerk” in the cases where the district contains lands in more than one (1) county.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, §§ 2, 3, 7; 1985, No. 296, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-2402, 20-2403, 20-2407.

14-93-104. Construction.

The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, and this chapter shall be the sole authority necessary to accomplish its purposes. To this end, it shall not be necessary to comply with the requirements of other laws in acting pursuant to this chapter to accomplish its purposes.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 24; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2424.

14-93-105. Petition to form district.

  1. Upon the petition of all the owners of the record title as reflected by the deed records in the office of the circuit clerk and ex officio recorder of the pertinent county of real property in any territory, it shall be the duty of the county court to:
    1. Lay off into an improvement district the territory described in the petition for the purpose of:
      1. Purchasing, accepting as a gift, constructing, or maintaining waterworks, recreational facilities, systems of gas pipelines, and sewers;
      2. Grading, draining, paving, curbing, and guttering streets and highways and laying sidewalks;
      3. Establishing, equipping, and maintaining rural fire departments; or
      4. More than one (1) of such purposes; and
    2. Name as commissioners of the district the three (3) persons whose names appear in the petition if the petition contains names, or if not, three (3) individuals of integrity and good business ability.
  2. Portions of municipalities may be included in these districts if the portion of area located within municipalities shall be less than fifty percent (50%) of the area of the entire district.
  3. All districts shall be numbered consecutively or else shall receive names selected by the court.
  4. If the court does not act promptly in complying with the terms of this section, or of any other section of this chapter essential to the creation and operation of the district, it may be compelled to do so by mandamus.
    1. If land in more than one (1) county is embraced in the proposed district, the petition shall be addressed to the circuit court in which the largest portion of the lands lie, and all proceedings shall be had in that court.
    2. Any notices in that event shall be published in newspapers published and having a bona fide circulation in each county in which the district embraces land.
    1. Any number of petitions may be circulated, and identical petitions with additional names may be filed at any time until the court acts.
    2. A petition under this section shall contain a bold heading stating that a signature on the petition is a vote to create the district.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2403; Acts 1987, No. 787, § 1; 1999, No. 475, § 2; 2019, No. 1025, § 4.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (f)(1) designation; and added (f)(2).

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-106. Hearing on petition and determination.

    1. Upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the county clerk to present the petition to the county judge.
      1. The judge shall thereupon set a date and time, not more than sixty (60) days and not less than thirty (30) days after the date of the presentation of the petition to the judge, for a hearing, before the county court, for consideration of the petition.
      2. A notice of the hearing shall be published for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county and, if available, on the website of the county or of the Secretary of State.
    1. At the hearing, it shall be the duty of the court to hear the petition and to ascertain whether those signing it constitute all the owners of the real property to be located in the district.
      1. If the court determines that all the owners of the real property to be located in the district have petitioned for the improvement, it shall enter its judgment laying off the district as defined in the petition and appointing the commissioners named in the petition if commissioners are named therein and are property holders in the district.
      2. If the court finds that fewer than all the owners have signed the petition, it shall enter its order denying the petition.
    1. Any petitioner or any opponent of the petition may appeal from the judgment of the court creating or refusing to create the district. However, appeal must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days after entry of the judgment.
    2. If no appeal is taken within that time, the judgment creating the district shall be final and conclusive upon all persons.
    1. The petition shall state the specific purpose for which the district is to be formed, and the judgment establishing the district shall give it a name which shall be descriptive of the purpose.
    2. The district shall also receive a number to prevent its being confused with other districts formed for similar purposes.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2404; Acts 2019, No. 1025, § 5.

Amendments. The 2019 amendment added the (a)(2)(A) designation; substituted “not more than sixty (60) days and not less than thirty (30) days” for “not later than ten (10) days” in (a)(2)(A); and added (a)(2)(B).

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-107. Board of commissioners generally.

      1. Within thirty (30) days after their appointment, the members of a board of commissioners shall take and file with the county clerk their oath of office, in which they shall swear to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, to discharge faithfully their duties as commissioners, and to not be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract let by the board except upon the approval of all the owners of real property located in the district.
      2. Any commissioner failing to file this oath within this period shall be deemed to have declined the office and the county court shall appoint some property holder as his successor, who shall qualify in like manner within a like time.
      1. In case of a vacancy on the board, after the members have organized, the remaining commissioners shall select the successor.
      2. The person so selected shall qualify by taking the oath of office as prescribed for the original commissioners.
      1. The board shall organize by electing one (1) of its members chairman and another as secretary.
      2. The board may also employ such agents, servants, engineers, and attorneys as it deems best and fix their compensation and the compensation of the secretary.
    1. The board shall also select some solvent bank or trust company as the depository of its funds.
  1. In addition to and not by way of limitation of the above powers, the board shall have the power to:
    1. Make and execute all contracts, leases, conveyances, and other instruments of the district;
    2. Join with any other political subdivision, municipality, district, or government agency, either state or federal, in the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and financing of any of the facilities, works, or operations authorized by this chapter or as to the performance of any of its functions;
    3. Establish rules and regulations for the transaction of the district's business and for the services, use, and right to use of its facilities or services, or both, or to effectuate any purpose of this chapter;
    4. Do all things incidental or auxiliary to the exercise of the express powers granted by this chapter; and
    5. Perform all actions useful to carry out the purposes of this chapter, unlimited by any express provision of this section.
  2. No member of the board shall be liable for any damages unless it shall be made to appear that he acted with a corrupt and malicious intent.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, §§ 5, 16; 1985, No. 296, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 20-2405, 20-2416.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-108. Removal of board members.

  1. When the owners of two-thirds (2/3) in assessed value of the real property located within any district shall sign a petition stating that the petitioners believe it to be in the best interest of the district that the board, or any member thereof, be removed and shall file it with the county court of the county in which the district is located, the court shall set a date for a hearing thereon and shall give notice thereof by one (1) publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the district at least ten (10) days before the date of the hearing.
    1. The purpose of the hearing shall be to determine the sufficiency of the petition.
    2. Any property owner of the district may appear and present evidence either in support of or against the sufficiency of the petition.
    1. If, after hearing the evidence presented, the court shall determine that the petition is signed by at least two-thirds (2/3) in assessed value of the real property owners in the district, the court shall forthwith enter an order of the court removing the member of the board in accordance with the petition.
    2. The vacancies thereby created shall be filled in the manner prescribed by law.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 23; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2423.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-109. Planning by board.

  1. The board shall form plans relative to the acceptance, purchase, or construction of the improvement.
  2. To that end, the board may employ such engineers, attorneys, and other assistants as it may find necessary and shall file copies of all pertinent reports and actions by its members with the county clerk.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2407.

14-93-110. Purposes for which district organized.

Any district may be organized for any one (1) or more of the following purposes:

  1. To purchase, accept as a gift, or construct a waterworks system or betterments, improvements, and extensions to such waterworks system, either within or without the boundaries of the district if the property of the district will be benefited thereby and to operate and maintain any such waterworks system it may purchase, construct, or own;
  2. To purchase, accept as a gift, or construct, either within or without the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will be benefited thereby, a sewage collection system or a sewage treatment plant, intercepting sewers, outfall sewers, force mains, pumping stations, ejector stations, and all other appurtenances necessary or useful and convenient for the collection or treatment, purification, and disposal of industrial or domestic sewage;
  3. To open, grade, drain, pave, curb, gutter, or otherwise improve streets, roads, highways, and every other way, including viaducts and underpasses for passage and use of vehicles, either within or without the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will be benefited thereby. Such purpose shall include the acquisition of rights-of-way by purchase or the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and to maintain such streets, roads, highways, and every other way for passage and use by vehicles, lying within the boundaries of the district or beyond the boundaries of the district, if the property of the district will be benefited thereby;
  4. To build, purchase, or accept as a gift recreational facilities such as, but not limited to, parks, lakes, golf courses, playgrounds, clubhouses, stadiums, auditoriums, arts and crafts centers, folklore centers, interpretative centers, camping areas, green belt areas, and any other facilities to provide for the recreation and cultural needs of the owners of the lands within the district;
  5. To lay and maintain sidewalks;
  6. To lay gas pipelines connecting with gas systems in nearby or adjacent municipalities;
  7. To build telephone lines to connect with the telephone system operating in nearby or adjacent municipalities; and
  8. To establish, equip, and maintain rural fire departments including construction of fire department buildings, and purchase of fire trucks, fire boats, and other fire fighting equipment.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2406.

14-93-111. Powers of districts generally.

  1. Any district, in aid to and furtherance of the purposes prescribed in § 14-93-110, shall have the authority to hire managers and other employees and to pay their salaries incident to the operation and maintenance of any of the improvements authorized in this chapter. It shall also have the authority to acquire and purchase equipment and machinery incident to the operation and maintenance of such facilities and shall be further authorized to do any and all other actions which shall be deemed necessary in order to purchase, construct, accept as a gift, operate, and maintain any and all improvements authorized in this chapter.
  2. Any district shall have the power to sell or lease any improvement owned by it to any adjacent or nearby municipality, or district therein or another improvement district within or near the county, to public service corporations serving on behalf of the property owners of the district, or to any other corporation, organization, or person, and may make contracts with the inhabitants of nearby municipalities, or it may operate any such improvement and may connect any such improvement with the improvements, systems, and transmission lines of any municipality or other district, and with respect to sewers, may carry its sewers to any proper outlet within or without the district.
  3. Any district may accept as a gift any or all of the improvements and facilities authorized in this chapter upon the assumption of the maintenance and operation of the improvement and shall have the authority to effect the assessment of benefits and to levy the necessary tax against the assessment of benefits, as provided in this chapter, in order to provide the revenue for the costs of maintenance and operation.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 6; 1985, No. 296, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2406.

14-93-112. Corporate powers.

Each district shall be a body corporate with power to sue and to be sued, and it shall have a corporate seal.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 5; 1985, No. 296, § 3; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2405.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-113. Right and power of eminent domain.

      1. All districts organized under this chapter shall have the right of eminent domain in order that they may carry out the purposes of their creation.
      2. A district under this chapter shall not have the right of eminent domain to condemn rights-of-way outside the boundaries of the district.
    1. This right shall be exercised in the same manner as in the case of railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies, but without the necessity of making a deposit of money before entering into possession of the property condemned.
  1. A district shall have the power of eminent domain for the purposes of:
    1. Condemning any water or sewer utility other than a water or sewer utility owned by a municipality or other type of improvement district, including without limitation a municipal improvement district or consolidated utility district, that is found within the boundaries of the district and is exempt from the definition of “public utility” defined under § 23-1-101; and
    2. Securing any lands or rights-of-way needed in making improvements to water or sewer systems owned and operated by that district.
      1. The board of the district may enter upon any private property for the purposes stated in subsection (b) of this section.
      2. If the person is damaged and the board of the district cannot agree on the sum to be paid for the damages, the person aggrieved may file his or her other petition in the circuit court of the county setting forth his or her other grievance and asking compensation for the grievance, making the board of the district a party defendant.
      3. The issues in the suit shall be made up as in other cases at law, and the cause shall be tried by a jury, unless dispensed with by the parties.
      4. The case shall be advanced on the docket so as to have precedence over all other causes.
        1. The judge of the circuit court may hold a special term at any time for the trial of the cause, giving ten (10) days' notice to the parties of the time of holding the special term.
        2. This notice may be in writing and shall be served on the parties as a writ of summons is directed to be served unless the notice is waived by the parties or one (1) of the parties.
      1. In case an agreement cannot be arrived at between the board of improvement and the owner of the property in relation to the damages claimed, the judge of the court, in vacation, may fix an amount to be deposited with some person, to be designated by the court, before the entering upon and taking possession of the property to be used and taken as provided in this section.
      2. When the required amount has been deposited and the certificate filed in the cause, the work may proceed.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 21; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2421; Acts 1987 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 37, § 4; 2013, No. 290, §§ 2, 3.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 290, § 1, provided: “This act shall be known and may be cited as Seth's Law.”

Acts 2013, No. 290, § 3, provided:

“Legislative intent.

“(a) The purpose of this act is to limit the power of eminent domain only for property owners' improvement districts.

“(b) This act does not apply to other types of improvement districts, including without limitation municipal improvement districts or consolidated utility districts.

“(c) This act does not limit the power of eminent domain available under applicable law to other types of improvement districts.”

Amendments. The 2013 amendment added (a)(1)(B); in (b)(1)(A), inserted “other than a water or sewer utility ... consolidated utility district, that is,” substituted “and is” for “which is,” and substituted “defined under § 23-1-101(9); and” for “as found in § 23-1-101(4)”; redesignated (b)(2) as (c); substituted “may” for “shall have the power to” in (c)(1)(A); in (c)(1)(B), inserted “of the district” and “or her other” twice, and substituted “for the grievance” for “therefor”; substituted “(1) of the parties” for “of them” in (c)(1)(E)(ii); and rewrote (c)(2)(B).

Cross References. Eminent domain by railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies, § 18-15-1201 et seq.

Case Notes

Cited: Property Owners Imp. Dist. No. 247 v. Williford, 40 Ark. App. 172, 843 S.W.2d 862 (1992); Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-114. Sale of land.

Any land that may be acquired by any district organized under this chapter may be sold by the board thereof for the price and on the terms it deems best.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 22; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2422.

14-93-115. Priority of cases.

All cases involving the validity of districts or the assessment of benefits and all suits to foreclose the lien or taxes shall be deemed matters of public interest and shall be advanced and disposed of at the earliest possible moment, and all appeals from them must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 19; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2419.

14-93-116. Assessment of benefits and damages.

    1. In the event that the board shall have voted to accept any offer of gift, shall have voted to purchase any improvement, or shall have voted to construct any improvement, it shall thereupon appoint an assessor to assess the benefits which will accrue to the real property within the district from the acceptance of the gift of improvement, the purchase of the improvement, or the construction of the improvement.
    2. The assessor shall take an oath that he will well and truly assess all benefits that will accrue to the landowners of the district by reason of the acceptance, purchase, or construction of the proposed improvement. He shall thereupon proceed to assess the lands within the district.
    1. The assessor shall inscribe in a book each tract of land and shall place in one column his valuation of each tract or parcel of land prior to the improvement, which may be marked “Assessed Value of Lands Prior to Improvements,” and in another column he shall place what he thinks will be the value of each tract or parcel of land after the improvement, which may be marked “Assessed Value of Lands After Improvement.”
        1. If the assessed value of land after improvements is greater than the assessed value of land before improvements, as assessed by the assessor for the district, then the difference between the two shall be the assessed benefits that will accrue to each tract by reason of the improvement.
        2. If the assessed value of land, as assessed by the assessor of the district, after the improvement is acquired or made is less than the assessed value of land before improvements are acquired or made, as assessed by the assessor for the district, then the difference between the two shall be the assessed damages that will accrue to the particular parcel or tract of land by reason of the improvement.
      1. The assessor shall enter the assessment of benefits or damages opposite the description of each piece of property in appropriate columns, one of which may be marked “Assessed Benefits” and the other may be marked “Assessed Damages,” and in another column the assessor shall show the estimate of the probable cost to the landowner, which may be marked “Estimated Cost.”
    1. The assessment shall embrace not merely the lands, but all railroads, tramroads, telegraph lines, telephone lines, pipelines, and other improvements on real estate that will be benefited by the acquiring or making of the improvement.
    2. No assessment shall apply against any pipelines or other improvements which are extensions of or connected to the pipeline distribution system or other improvements within any city adjacent to the district.
    1. The assessor shall place opposite each tract the name of the supposed owner as indicated by the deed records, but a mistake in name shall not vitiate the assessment.
      1. The assessor shall also assess all damages that will accrue to any landowner by reason of the proposed improvement, including all injury to lands taken or damaged.
      2. Where the assessor returns no such damages to any tract of land, it shall be deemed a finding by him that no damages will be sustained.
  1. The assessor shall hold his office at the pleasure of the board, which can fill any vacancy in the position of assessor.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2407.

Case Notes

Benefits for Improvement.

Improvement district's right of eminent domain requires payment of the market value for the land taken without offset for any benefit the landowner may receive from the construction of the improvement. Property Owners Imp. Dist. No. 247 v. Williford, 40 Ark. App. 172, 843 S.W.2d 862 (1992).

Burden of Proof.

In a condemnation case where the issue is just compensation, the landowners have the burden of proof on that issue. Property Owners Imp. Dist. No. 247 v. Williford, 40 Ark. App. 172, 843 S.W.2d 862 (1992).

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-117. Filing and notice of assessment — Hearing.

    1. The assessment shall be filed with the county clerk.
      1. The secretary of the board shall thereupon give notice of its filing by publication once a week for two (2) weeks in a newspaper published and having a bona fide circulation in the county.
      2. This notice may be in the following form:
  1. On the day named in the notice, it shall be the duty of the commissioners and assessors to meet together at the place named as a board of equalization, to hear all complaints against the assessment, and to equalize and adjust it. Their determination shall be final, unless suit is brought in the chancery court within thirty (30) days to review it.

“Notice is hereby given that the assessment of benefits and damages of District Number has been filed in the office of the County Clerk of County, and where it is open to inspection. All persons wishing to be heard on said assessment will be heard by the commissioners and the assessor of the district between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m., at , in the City of , Arkansas, on the day of , 19 . Secretary”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2408.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-118. Reassessment.

  1. The board may, not more often than once a year, require the assessor to reassess the benefits in the district. However, in the event the district shall have incurred any indebtedness or issued bonds, the total amount of assessed benefits shall never be diminished.
  2. The reassessment shall be made, advertised, and equalized in the same manner as provided in this chapter for making the original assessment.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 9; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2409.

14-93-119. Levy of tax.

    1. The board of the district shall, at the same time that the assessment of benefits is equalized or at any time thereafter, enter upon its records an order which shall have all the force of a judgment, providing that there shall be assessed upon the real property of the district a tax sufficient to pay the estimated cost of the improvement, with ten percent (10%) added for unforeseen contingencies.
    2. The tax is to be paid by the real property in the district in the proportion to the amount of the assessment of benefits thereon and is to be paid in annual installments, as provided in the order.
  1. The tax so levied shall be a lien upon all the real property in the district from the time it is levied, shall be entitled to preference over all demands, executions, encumbrances, or liens whenever created, and shall continue until such assessment, with any penalty costs that may accrue thereon, shall have been paid. Provided, however, with the prior written approval of the board of the district, the county clerk shall release from the lien of the assessment and tax any lot, block, or tract with respect to which the assessment and tax shall have been paid or prepaid.
    1. The remedy against the levy of taxes shall be by suit in chancery.
    2. The suit must be brought within thirty (30) days from the time of notice that the levy was made, and on the appeal, the presumption shall be in favor of the legality of the tax.
    1. The board shall, promptly after entry of an order levying the tax, publish once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in some newspaper having general circulation in the district, a notice setting forth the order of levy and warning all persons affected thereby that it shall become final unless suit is brought to contest it within thirty (30) days of the date of first publication of the notice.
    2. No property owner shall be barred from contest of the levy within the thirty-day publication period.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 10; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2410; Acts 1991, No. 504, § 2.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-120. Interest on assessment.

The assessment of the benefits shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the time it is equalized. However, the interest need not be calculated until it is necessary to do so to avoid exceeding the total amount of benefits and interest, or the interest may be first collected.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 11; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2411.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-121. Extension and collection of taxes.

    1. When the board shall make the levy of taxes, it shall be the duty of the assessor to extend the amount levied and set it opposite each benefit assessed in a column marked “Annual Collection”.
      1. It shall be the duty of the county clerk of the county to extend the taxes annually upon the tax books of the county until the levy is exhausted.
      2. For his or her services, the clerk shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1.5%) of the amount so extended.
        1. It shall then be the duty of the tax collector of the county to collect each year the taxes extended upon the tax books along with the other taxes until the entire levy is exhausted.
        2. For his or her services in making the collections, including prepayments, the collector shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1.5%). In the case of prepayments, the maximum commission shall be the lesser of one and one-half percent (1.5%) or fifty dollars ($50.00).
      1. The taxes shall be paid over by the collector to the depository of the district at the same time he or she pays over the county funds.
    1. In counties operating under the unit tax ledger system, the collector shall receive a commission of one and one-half percent (1.5%) for extending the taxes and a commission of an additional one and one-half percent (1.5%) for collecting the taxes.
    1. County clerks and tax collectors are authorized to employ additional deputies to do the increased work imposed by the terms of this chapter.
    2. They may pay the deputies salaries up to the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) per annum. However, the salaries shall never exceed the receipts from the commissions allowed by this chapter.
  1. No property owner shall be required to pay the improvement taxes provided in this chapter as a prerequisite to paying his or her general taxes.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 12; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2412; Acts 2001, No. 1816, § 2.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-122. Subsequent levies.

  1. If the tax first levied shall prove insufficient to pay the bonds, both the principal and interest, issued by the board on account of an improvement as provided in this chapter, as it shall become due and payable, the board shall, from time to time, make such further levies upon the property previously assessed for sums sufficient to complete the improvement and to pay such bonds and interest which shall be extended and collected in the same manner as the first levy. However, the total levy shall in no case exceed the value of the benefits assessed on the property with interest.
  2. The performance of the duties set forth in this section may be enforced by mandamus.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 13; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2413.

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-123. Payment of taxes — Enforcement.

  1. All taxes levied under the terms of this chapter shall be payable in installments at the same time as other state, county, and city taxes are paid.
  2. Delinquencies.
    1. If any taxes levied by the board under this chapter are not paid at maturity, the county tax collector shall not embrace the taxes in the taxes for which he shall sell the lands, but shall report the delinquencies to the board of the district, which shall add to the amount of the tax a penalty of twenty-five percent (25%).
    2. The board shall enforce the collection by chancery proceedings in the chancery court of the county in which the lands are situated having chancery jurisdiction. The court shall give judgment against the lands for the amount of the delinquent taxes, and the penalty of twenty-five percent (25%) and interest thereon, from the end of the sixty (60) days allowed for the collection thereof, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, and all costs of the proceeding.
    3. The judgments shall provide for the sale of the delinquent lands for cash by a commissioner of the court, after advertisement as set out in subsection (c) of this section.
    4. Proceedings and judgment shall be in the nature of proceedings in rem.
      1. It shall be immaterial that the ownership of the lands be incorrectly alleged in the proceedings.
      2. Judgment shall be enforced wholly against the lands and not against any other property or estate of the defendant.
    5. All or any part of the delinquent lands for each of the counties may be included in one (1) suit for each county, instituted for the collection of the delinquent taxes, etc., as aforesaid.
    6. The procedures set forth in this section shall apply to all improvement districts subject to this chapter and shall apply retroactively to those improvement districts already subject to this chapter.
  3. Notice of Proceedings for Collection of Taxes. Notice of the pendency of the suit shall be given by publication weekly for four (4) weeks before judgment is entered for the sale of the lands in some newspaper published in the county where the suits may be pending, which public notice may be in the following terms:
  4. Trial Date — Suit by Bondholder.
      1. The suit shall stand for trial at the first term of court after the complaint may be filed, if four (4) weeks shall expire either before the first day of the term, or during the term of court to which the suits are brought respectively, unless a continuance is granted for good cause shown, within the discretion of the court.
      2. The continuance, for good cause shown, may be granted as to a part of the lands or defendants without affecting the duty of the court to dispose finally of the others as to whom no continuance may be granted.
    1. In case the commissioners shall fail to commence suit within sixty (60) days after the taxes become delinquent, the holder of any bond issued by the district or any trustee on behalf of the holder of any bond issued by the district shall have the right to bring suit for the collection of the delinquent assessments, and the proceedings in the suit brought by the bondholder or trustee shall in all respects be governed by the provisions applicable to suits by the commissioners.
  5. Trial Procedure.
    1. Suits for collection shall be conducted in the name of the property owners' improvement district, and in accordance with the practice and proceedings of chancery courts in this state, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, and neither attorneys ad litem, nor guardians ad litem, nor any of the provisions of § 16-65-403 [repealed] shall be required.
    2. The suits may be disposed of on oral testimony, as in ordinary suits at law.
    3. The law shall be liberally construed to give to the assessment and tax lists the effect of bona fide mortgage for a valuable consideration, and a first lien upon the lands, as against all persons having an interest therein.
    4. In such suits, it shall be sufficient to allege generally and briefly the organization of the district and the nonpayment of the taxes, setting forth the description of the lands proceeding against, and the amount chargeable to each tract, with prayer for foreclosure.
    5. No informality or irregularity in holding any of the meetings provided for herein, in valuation, in assessment of the lands, or in the name of the owners, or the number of acres therein shall be a valid defense to the action.
  6. Sale of the Land.
      1. In all cases where notice has been properly given and where no answer has been filed, or if filed, and the cause decided for the plaintiff, the court, by its decree, shall grant the relief as prayed for in the complaint.
        1. The court shall direct the commissioner to sell the lands described in the complaint at the courthouse door of the county wherein the decree is entered, at public outcry, to the highest and best bidder, for cash in hand, after having first advertised the sale weekly for two (2) weeks, consecutively, in some newspaper having a general circulation in the county.
        2. The advertisement may include all the lands described in the decree.
    1. If all the lands are not sold on the day as advertised, the sale shall continue from day to day until completed.
    2. The commissioners shall by proper deeds convey to the purchaser the lands so sold. The title to the lands shall thereupon become vested in the purchaser as against all others whomsoever.
    1. In any case where the lands are offered for sale by the commissioner, as provided by this subchapter, and the sum of the delinquent tax due, together with interest, cost, and penalty, is not bid for the lands, the commissioner shall bid the lands off in the name of the board of directors of the property improvement district, bidding therefore the whole amount due as aforesaid.
      1. The commissioner shall execute his deed conveying the land to the property owners' improvement district board.
      2. No report of sale other than the execution of the deed and its submission to the court for approval and no confirmation other than approval of the deed need be made in any such case and a deed to the land executed by the commissioner, approved by the court and recorded, shall be conclusively presumed to be in consideration of the total amount rightfully due to the district whether that amount is stated or whether it is stated correctly or incorrectly in the deed.
    2. The deeds, together with other deeds as are duly executed in conformity to the provisions of this subchapter and recorded, shall be received as evidence in all cases showing an indefeasible title in the district, unassailable in either law or equity.
    1. No provision contained herein shall relieve any purchasers of lands, excluding the district, from the obligation to pay all future taxes levied under the terms of this chapter following the enforcement of these foreclosure proceedings.
    2. The obligation to pay all future taxes shall also extend to any purchaser of lands who purchases such lands from the district following the district's obtaining of the land pursuant to subsection (g) of this section.
  7. Attorney's Fees. In all suits brought for collection of delinquent taxes under this subchapter, a reasonable attorney's fee shall be taxed in favor of the attorney for the plaintiff, which fee shall be added to the amount of the cost.
  8. Redemption.
    1. At any time within thirty (30) days after the rendition of the final decree of the chancery court provided for in this subchapter, the owner of the lands may file his petition in the court rendering the decree, alleging the payment of taxes on the land for the year for which they were sold and payment of all costs associated with the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter, including attorney's fees.
    2. Upon the establishment of that fact, the court shall vacate and set aside that decree, provided that any landowner shall have the right within thirty (30) days after the day upon which lands are offered for sale to redeem any and all lands sold at the sale.

“Board of Commissioners, Property Owners' Improvement District vs. Delinquent Lands All persons having or claiming an interest in any of the following described lands, are hereby notified that suit is pending in the Chancery Court of County, Arkansas, to enforce the collection of certain property owners' improvement district taxes on the subjoined list of lands, each supposed owner having been set opposite his or her or its lands, together with the amounts severally due from each, to wit: ” (Then shall follow a list of supposed owners, with a descriptive list of said delinquent lands, and amounts due thereon respectively as aforesaid), and said public notice may conclude in the following form: “All persons and corporations interested in said lands are hereby notified that they are required by law to appear within four (4) weeks and make defense to said suit, or the same will be taken for confessed, and final judgment will be entered directing the sale of said lands for the purpose of collecting said taxes, together with the payment of interest, penalty, and costs allowed by law. Clerk of Said Court.”

Click to view form.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 14; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2414; Acts 1997, No. 1338, § 1.

Amendments. The 1997 amendment substituted “levied by the board under this chapter” for “levied by a board in pursuance to this chapter” in (b)(1); rewrote (b)(2); added (b)(3); and added (c)-(j).

14-93-124. Negotiable notes, bonds, or evidences of debt.

    1. In order to meet preliminary expenses and to finance the cost of the improvements to be accomplished with cost incidental to the improvements and to the issuance of the bonds, the board may issue negotiable notes or bonds of the district and may pledge and mortgage all assessments of benefits to the district and all or any part of the profits of the district derived from its operation of any improvements of the district to the payment of the notes and bonds.
    2. The board may also issue to the contractors who do the work negotiable evidences of debt to bear interest at the rates prescribed by the board and secure them in the same manner.
    3. As for the security for the payment of any such indebtedness, the members of the board may, by resolution, establish the rates for use of the improvements to be collected from the users of such improvements and may mortgage any or all of its property, including improvements.
    1. Bonds and notes issued under the authority of this chapter shall bear interest at such rate or rates, shall mature at such time or times, shall be payable, as to principal, premium, if any, and interest, at such places, within or without the State of Arkansas, shall be in such form, whether bearer or registered, shall be subject to such exchange privileges, and shall have such other details as may be set forth in the resolution of the board authorizing their issuance.
    2. The resolution may provide for the execution and delivery of a trust indenture or like instrument by the board securing the bonds and for the execution and delivery of other writings pertaining thereto.
    3. The bonds, and coupons, if any, may be executed by the manual or facsimile signatures of the members of the board.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 15; 1985, No. 296, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2415.

14-93-125. Bonds — Tax exemption.

Bonds, and the interest thereon, shall be exempt from all state, county, and municipal taxes, including income, property, and inheritance taxes.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 15; 1985, No. 296, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2415.

14-93-126. Payment of bonds and interest.

    1. All bonds issued under the terms of this chapter shall be secured by a lien on all real property in the district.
      1. The board shall see to it that a tax is levied annually and collected under the provisions of this chapter, so long as it may be necessary to pay any bond issued or obligation contracted under its authority.
      2. The making of an assessment or levy and collection may be enforced by mandamus.
      1. If any bond, or interest thereon, is not paid within thirty (30) days after its maturity, it shall be the duty of any court of competent jurisdiction, on application of any holder of the bond or interest coupon so overdue, to appoint a receiver to collect the taxes and an assessor to reassess the benefits, if necessary.
      2. The proceeds of the taxes and collections shall be applied, after payment of costs, first to overdue interest, and then to payment pro rata of all bonds issued by the board which are then due and payable.
      1. The receiver may be directed, by suit, to foreclose the lien of the taxes on the real property.
      2. Suits brought by the receiver shall be conducted in all matters as are suits by the board as provided in this chapter and with like effect, and the decree and deeds therein shall have the same presumption in their favor.
  1. When all the sums have been paid, the receiver shall be discharged and the affairs of the district conducted by the board as provided in this chapter.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 18; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2418.

14-93-127. Dissolution of district.

    1. After all bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness, including interest, have been paid in full, then a district by unanimous vote of the board may be dissolved and all future levies and assessments cancelled, the board relieved from further duties, and the surplus funds of the district distributed in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsection (b) of this section if title to and control of the facilities constructed by the district have been taken over or assumed by a political subdivision, a municipal utility commission or agency, a regulated public utility, or an incorporated property owners' association served or benefitted by the facilities.
    2. The districts are authorized, at the discretion of the board, to enter into repair and maintenance agreements or contracts and to expend funds of the districts for these purposes.
    1. In the event the board votes to dissolve the district under subsection (a) of this section, the board shall convert all assets into cash and shall first pay from such surplus funds all debts of the district, including any reasonable legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the dissolution.
      1. The board then shall refund all remaining funds of the district, pro rata, to the property owners who hold title to the property in the district at the time the refund is made.
        1. The pro rata refund to the property owners shall be made on the basis of the most recent assessment or reassessment of benefits on the parcels of property prior to dissolution and shall be in the same proportion that the assessed benefits of each individual parcel of property bears to the total of the assessed benefits of all the property in the district.
        2. No property owner whose property is delinquent in any sum for district assessments, penalties, or interest, at the time the refund is made, shall be counted in calculating the pro rata distribution, or receive any portion of the refund.
      2. Within ninety (90) days after the distribution of the surplus funds has been completed, the board shall file a copy of the resolution of dissolution and a financial statement of the district, verified by all its members, in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the district is located.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2417; Acts 2017, No. 819, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment inserted “or an incorporated property owners' association served or benefitted by the facilities” and made stylistic changes in (a)(1).

Case Notes

Cited: Nat'l Bank of Ark. v. Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC (In re Panther Mt. Land Dev., LLC), 686 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

14-93-128. Lien for preliminary expenses.

  1. In case, for any reason, the improvement contemplated by any district organized under this chapter is not made, the preliminary expense shall be a first lien upon all the land in the district and shall be paid by a levy of a tax thereon.
  2. The levy shall be made by the chancery court of the county and shall be collected by a receiver to be appointed by the court.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 20; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2420.

14-93-129. Continued existence of district.

If the petition for formation of the district provides therefor or the owners of real property in the district agree thereto, then a district shall not cease to exist upon the acquiring, construction, or completion of the improvement, but shall continue to exist for the purpose of preserving, maintaining, and operating the improvement, replacing equipment, paying salaries to employees, and performing any other functions or services authorized in this chapter. To this end, the board may, from time to time, make such additional levies based upon the assessment of benefits as may be necessary for these purposes. However, the amount of the total levies shall not exceed the assessed benefits and interest thereon.

History. Acts 1983, No. 613, § 17; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2417.

14-93-130. Systems turned over to municipality.

  1. In those cases where improvement districts have been organized under this chapter or any consolidation of districts organized under this chapter with one another or with suburban or municipal improvement districts, either for furnishing of water or sewer services, or both, and all or any part thereof lies outside a municipality within the class affected by this chapter which desires to operate them as a municipal waterworks or a municipal sewer system, the boards of these districts, in order to secure more adequate service for the inhabitants within the districts, shall have the authority to turn over to the municipality the operation and maintenance of the systems.
    1. The municipality may issue revenue bonds and fix the rates for the services and use the net revenues from the operation to pay the principal and interest and paying charges of its revenue bonds for payment and discharge of the outstanding bonds of the district.
    2. If the net revenues are not sufficient to prevent a default in the bonds or interest, a tax sufficient to produce enough revenue to cure the default shall be levied on the assessments of benefits in the district and nothing in this section shall impair the rights of the holders of the outstanding bonds to demand and receive sufficient annual collections on the assessments of benefits to meet interest and principal payments as they become due.

History. Acts 1985, No. 296, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2426.

14-93-131. Consolidated systems authorized.

  1. Where there are contiguous or adjacent districts organized under this chapter or under the suburban improvement district laws or the municipal improvement district laws for either water or sewer services, or both, it shall be permissible for all or any two (2) or more of these districts, whether organized under this chapter, the suburban improvement district laws, the municipal improvement district laws, or any combination thereof, to enter into a contract with each other for the joint operation, maintenance, improvement, enlargement, and betterment of their respective systems or of the consolidated system, to be paid for by charges for the services.
  2. Any such district which has paid its outstanding bonded indebtedness but which has not been turned over to the municipality for operation, may join in contracts for joint operation, and any facilities constructed by any districts outside their boundaries shall be included in the consolidated systems.
  3. These consolidated systems may borrow money to pay and discharge any outstanding bond issues and indebtedness of the districts joining in the consolidations and may borrow money also for improvement, enlargement, and betterment of the facilities of the consolidated systems.
  4. To accomplish these purposes, consolidated systems may issue negotiable bonds or notes evidencing the money so borrowed, to be secured solely by a pledge of the net revenues derived from the operation of the facilities, to bear interest at such rate or rates as prescribed by the boards of the district, and to mature at such time and places as the board shall decide best, and to be issued with such terms of payment, call provisions, and interest rates as the board shall deem to be in the best interest of the inhabitants of the consolidated district.

History. Acts 1985, No. 296, § 8; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2427.

14-93-132. Connections outside district boundaries.

  1. All districts organized pursuant to the provisions of this chapter for the purposes of constructing waterworks, sewers, gas pipelines, or telephone lines shall have the authority to permit lands outside the boundaries of the district to connect to these improvements and transmission lines serving the lands with water, sewer, gas, and telephone improvements of the district and to make a charge for this privilege.
    1. The commissioners of the district shall have the right to consent to or refuse to allow these connections within their discretion.
      1. These connections shall be made on such terms as the commissioners may dictate. However, no lands outside the district shall be permitted to connect with the improvements of the district except on payment to the district of a sum equal to not less than the charge made against similarly benefited lands within the district.
      2. In case connections have theretofore been made without the payment of a charge for the connection, the district may refuse to allow service to the lands until permission for the connection is granted and the charge for the service is paid to the district.

History. Acts 1985, No. 296, § 6; A.S.A. 1947, § 20-2425.

14-93-133. Annexation of lands outside district boundaries.

    1. All districts organized under this chapter shall have the authority to permit lands outside the boundaries of the district to be annexed to the district.
    2. Annexation shall be permissible only for the purpose of providing improvements to the property to be annexed for purposes similar to the purposes for which the district was formed or for which the district currently exists.
    1. When persons claiming to constitute all of the owners of territory contiguous to any such district desire that the territory be annexed to the district, they may present their petition describing the territory to be annexed to the clerk of the county court.
    2. The petition shall be accompanied by a resolution of the board of the existing district approving the annexation.
    3. The county court shall then direct the clerk to publish for two (2) consecutive weeks, in some newspaper having general circulation in each county in which the district and the territory proposed to be annexed is located, a notice calling upon the owners in the district and the territory proposed to be annexed to appear before the county court on the date and time and at the place named in the notice and show cause for or against the annexation.
    1. On the day named in the notice, the county court shall hear all persons who desire to be heard on the following questions:
      1. Whether the territory to be annexed to the district lies within the jurisdiction of the county court;
      2. Whether all of the owners of real property in the territory sought to be annexed have signed the petition; and
      3. Whether a majority of the board of the district has approved the annexation by resolution of the board.
    2. The findings of the county court shall have all the force and effect of a judgment, and shall be conclusive, unless, within thirty (30) days thereafter, suit is brought in the chancery court to review it.
    1. The finding of the county court shall be expressed as a judgment in case it is in favor of the petitioners.
    2. In that event, the territory sought to be annexed shall become a part of the district, and the improvements petitioned for shall be made by the commissioners.
    3. The commissioners shall make the assessment of benefits and levy the tax for the improvements on the territory annexed under the provision of this section as if the territory were included in the original district.

History. Acts 1987, No. 787, § 2.

Chapter 94 Municipal Property Owners' Improvement District Law

Publisher's Notes. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 25, provided that the provisions of this act shall not repeal but shall be cumulative and supplemental to all other laws now in effect concerning municipal improvement districts.

Cross References. Property owners' improvement districts, § 14-93-101 et seq.

Effective Dates. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 27: Mar. 4, 1987. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared that the laws of Arkansas pertaining to municipal improvement districts do not at this time provide for the formation and operation of such District on the basis of the consent of all the owners of real property within such District and that this inadequacy is causing the delay of the accomplishment of projects which are greatly needed and in the public interest. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in effect upon its passage and approval.”

Acts 1989, No. 276, § 8: Mar. 1, 1989. Emergency clause provided: “It has been found and it is hereby declared that municipal property owners improvement districts may be formed only upon the petition of all owners of real property located in the territory included in such districts, that it is not feasible in all such districts to require that all commissioners thereof be owners of real property therein, that such a requirement exclude from service as commissioners persons who are qualified so to serve and who would be chosen so to serve by all the owners of real property therein, that the present law impairs the formation and operation of districts which are essential to the orderly and proper growth of municipalities, some of which districts must be and have been formed to accomplish improvements which are urgently needed. Therefore, an emergency is declared and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in force upon its passage and approval and shall apply to municipal property owners districts now being formed or already formed, provided that all owners of real property in such districts shall have petitioned for or agreed to rights and powers as set forth in this Act.”

Acts 1991, No. 504, § 7: Mar. 13, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the impairment of the rights of owners of real property located within various improvement districts to prepay their assessments greatly infringes on their rights to own, manage, and enjoy their real property and that it must be made unimpeachably clear that these owners of real property do have and should have the right to prepay these assessments and to be released from the liens upon the prepayment of these assessments. Therefore, in order to clarify and extend rights of owners of real property located within various improvement districts, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1991, No. 927, § 5: Mar. 29, 1991. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the foreclosure procedure for tax delinquent lands in a municipal property owners' improvement district is unreasonable in length of time and greatly infringes on the rights of bondholders or other interested parties to foreclose upon the land securing their bonds. Therefore, in order to shorten the time in which a bondholder or other interested party may foreclose upon tax delinquent lands within a municipal property owners' improvement district, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 1993, No. 819, § 5: Apr. 1, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the ambiguity in existing laws with respect to the formation of municipal property owners improvement districts for lands lying in more than one municipality inhibits the formation of such districts for the construction of projects urgently needed. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”

Acts 2019, No. 1077, § 7: Apr. 17, 2019. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that fire protection districts provide critical public safety functions often not available from local governmental units; that funding sources for these fire protection districts are limited; and that this act is immediately necessary because without securing better funding, many fire protection districts will be unable to continue providing public safety functions at expected levels. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto”.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Goldner, A Call for Reform of Arkansas Municipal Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 175.

14-94-101. Title.

This chapter may be known and cited as the “Municipal Property Owner's Improvement District Law”.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 1.

14-94-102. Legislative intent.

It is the intent and purpose of this chapter to authorize the formation of improvement districts by the unanimous approval of the owners of real property located in the territory to be included in the district.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 1; 1993, No. 819, § 1; 1999, No. 475, § 3.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment made no change in this section.

Case Notes

Cited: First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A., 2013 Ark. 159, 427 S.W.3d 47 (2013).

14-94-103. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means any board of commissioners appointed pursuant to this subchapter;
  2. “Clerk” means the clerk or recorder of a municipality;
  3. “District” means any improvement district formed under the provisions of this chapter;
  4. “Facilities” means any properties, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible;
  5. “Governing body” means any city council, town council, board of directors, or like body having legislative powers for any municipality;
  6. “Improvement” or “improvements” means any lands, structures, improvements, fixtures, and appurtenant equipment acquired, constructed, improved, or equipped by a district;
  7. “Municipality” means any city or incorporated town of the State of Arkansas;
  8. “Nearby municipality” means any municipality located within ten (10) miles of any boundary of a district;
  9. “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, firm, or other entity recognized by law as having capacity to own real property in the State of Arkansas;
  10. “Real property” shall be construed to embrace all property subject to assessment for the purposes of this chapter.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, §§ 2, 7.

Case Notes

Real Property.

Improvement district's lien for nonpayment of improvement taxes attached to unimproved tracts; under the definition of “real property” in this section, the land need only be subject to assessment, and it is not necessary that a benefit actually be assessed. The unimproved land in question was subject to the initial assessment and therefore constituted “real property” under § 14-94-101 et seq.Bullock's Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc. v. City of Bryant, 2019 Ark. 249, 582 S.W.3d 8 (2019).

14-94-104. Construction.

The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, and this chapter shall be the sole authority necessary to accomplish its purposes. To this end, it shall not be necessary to comply with the requirements of other laws including, without limitation, those pertaining to notice, consent, and like requirements in acting pursuant to this chapter to accomplish its purposes.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 24.

14-94-105. Petition to form district.

  1. Upon the petition of all the owners of the record title as reflected by the deed records in the office of the circuit clerk and ex officio recorder of the pertinent county, it shall be the duty of the governing body to:
    1. Lay off into an improvement district the territory described in the petition for the purpose of purchasing, accepting as a gift, constructing, or maintaining facilities for waterworks, recreation, drainage, gas pipelines, underground trenches and excavations necessary for the installation by public utilities or municipal utilities of electric and telephone distribution systems, sanitary sewers, streets and highways, including curbs and gutters, and sidewalks, together with facilities related to any of the foregoing, or for more than one (1) of those purposes; and
      1. Name as commissioners of the district the three (3) individuals whose names appear in the petition if the petition contains those names, and if not, then three (3) individuals of integrity and good business ability who own real property in the district or are creditors of the district or live in the district.
      2. In the event that a property owner or creditor is a corporation, partnership, trust, or other legal entity, any officer, director, trustee, employee, or other designated representative of the entity may be named and appointed as a commissioner.
  2. All the districts shall be numbered consecutively and shall receive names selected by the governing body. If the governing body does not act promptly in complying with the terms of this section, or of any other section of this chapter essential to the creation and operation of the district, it may be compelled to do so by mandamus.
    1. Any number of petitions may be circulated, and identical petitions with additional names may be filed at any time until the governing body acts.
    2. A petition under this section shall contain a bold heading stating that a signature on the petition is a vote to create the district.
  3. The formation and creation of such districts is authorized, in whole or in part, outside any municipality.
  4. In the event that lands to be included in a district lie in more than one (1) municipality:
    1. The municipality in which lies the largest portion of the lands, exclusive of lands which do not lie in any municipality, shall have jurisdiction to create such district and to conduct all other municipal proceedings relating thereto and to the business and affairs thereof, which municipality is referred to hereinbelow as the “creating municipality”;
    2. No portion of a municipality shall be included in such district unless it shall be found by the creating municipality that the owners of real property lying within such municipality and within the district shall have petitioned for creation of such district;
    3. Notice of the filing of the petition for creation of such district shall be given by first-class mail to the mayor of each such municipality by the clerk or recorder of the creating municipality, and each such municipality may, at any time within fifteen (15) days after the deposit of such notice in the mails, unless such notice shall be waived by resolution of the governing body of such municipality, file with the clerk or recorder of the creating municipality a certified copy of a resolution of its governing body finding that the proposed improvements do not harmonize with the community facilities plans of such municipality or would diminish vehicular or pedestrian traffic in such municipality; and
    4. In the event of the filing of the resolution described in subdivision (e)(3) of this section, the governing body of the creating municipality shall reject the petition for creation of such district.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 3; 1989, No. 276, § 1; 1993, No. 819, § 1; 1995, No. 1127, § 1; 1999, No. 475, § 4; 2019, No. 1025, § 6.

Amendments. The 1993 amendment added (d) and (e).

The 1995 amendment made a stylistic change in (a)(1); added the language beginning “who own real property” at the end of (a)(2)(A); and added (a)(2)(B).

The 2019 amendment added the (c)(1) designation; and added (c)(2).

14-94-106. Hearing on petition and determination.

      1. Upon the filing of the petition with the clerk, it shall be the duty of the clerk to present the petition to the mayor.
      2. The petition shall be accompanied by a certificate from a title insurance company transacting business in the municipality:
        1. Stating that the signatures on the petition constitute all of the owners of real property to be located in the district; and
        2. Identifying any mortgagee holding a first mortgage lien on real property constituting more than ten percent (10%) in area of the real property to be located in the district.
      1. The mayor shall thereupon set a date and time, not more than sixty (60) days and not less than thirty (30) days after the date of the presentation of the petition to the mayor, for a hearing before the governing body for consideration of the petition.
      2. Notice of the hearing shall be sent by certified mail to any mortgagee holding a first mortgage lien on real property constituting more than ten percent (10%) in area of the real property to be located in the district.
      3. The notice of hearing under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section shall state that any existing mortgage shall be subordinated pursuant to this section and § 14-94-118(b) if the mortgagee fails to appear at the hearing and object to formation of the district.
    1. At the hearing, it shall be the duty of the governing body to hear the petition and to ascertain whether those signing the petition constitute all the owners of the real property to be located in the district.
      1. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(2)(B) of this section, if the governing body determines that all the owners of the real property to be located in the district have petitioned for the improvements, it shall then be its duty by ordinance to establish and lay off the district as defined in the petition and to appoint the commissioners as named in the petition if commissioners are named in the petition and are property owners in or creditors of the district, or as is otherwise provided from among such property owners or creditors.
      2. If at the hearing on the petition any mortgagee holding a first mortgage lien on real property constituting more than ten percent (10%) in area of the real property to be located within the district objects to the formation of the district, then the governing body shall reject the petition for creation of the district.
    2. The petition shall state the specific purposes for which the district is to be formed, and the ordinance establishing the district shall give it a name which shall be descriptive of the purpose. It shall also receive a number to prevent its being confused with other districts for similar purposes.
  1. The ordinance establishing the district shall be published within thirty (30) days after its adoption by one (1) insertion in some newspaper of general circulation in the municipality in which the district lies.
  2. The findings of the governing body shall be conclusive unless attacked by a suit in the circuit court of the county in which the municipality is located, brought within thirty (30) days after the publication.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 4; 1989, No. 276, § 2; 1995, No. 1127, § 2; 2009, No. 501, § 1; 2009, No. 1408, § 1; 2019, No. 1025, § 7.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment redesignated former (b)(2)(A) and (B) as present (b)(2) and (3); in (b)(2), inserted “as” preceding “named” and added the language beginning “and are property owners”; and deleted “which suit” preceding “brought” in (d).

The 2009 amendment by No. 501 inserted (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B) and (C), and (b)(2)(B) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; inserted “Except as provided in subdivision (b)(2)(B) of this section” in (b)(2)(A); substituted “circuit” for “chancery” in (d); and made related changes.

The 2009 amendment by No. 1408 rewrote (a)(2)(C).

The 2019 amendment substituted “not more than sixty (60) days and not less than thirty (30) days” for “not later than fifteen (15) days” in (a)(2)(A).

Case Notes

Notice.

Notice provisions in a prior version of this section, allowing notice by publication, did not violate due process because appellants failed to establish that notice by publication was inappropriate to the circumstances of the case. Bullock's Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc. v. City of Bryant, 2019 Ark. 249, 582 S.W.3d 8 (2019) (decision under prior law).

14-94-107. Board of commissioners generally.

      1. Within thirty (30) days after their appointment, the commissioners shall take and file with the clerk their oath of office, in which they shall swear to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, to discharge faithfully their duties as commissioners, and to not be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract let by the board except upon the approval of all the owners of real property located in the district.
      2. Any commissioner failing to file the oath within this period shall be deemed to have declined the office, and the governing body shall appoint some property owner as his successor, who shall qualify in like manner within a like time.
      1. In case of a vacancy on the board after the commissioners have organized, except as set forth in § 14-94-108, the remaining commissioners shall select some property owner in the district or creditors of the district as a successor; provided, however, if all improvements in the district have been completed, then the governing body shall select the successor.
      2. The person so selected shall qualify by taking the oath of office as prescribed for the original commissioners.
      1. The board shall organize by electing one (1) of its members as chairman and another as secretary.
      2. It may also employ such agents, servants, engineers, and attorneys as it deems best and fix their compensation and the compensation of the secretary.
    1. The board shall also select some solvent bank or trust company as the depository of its funds.
  1. In addition to and not by way of limitation of the above powers, the board shall have the power to:
    1. Make and execute all contracts, leases, conveyances, and other instruments of the district;
    2. Join with any county, municipality, improvement district, or other political subdivision or government agency, local, state, or federal, in the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and financing of any of the improvements authorized by this chapter or as to the performance of any of its functions;
    3. Establish rules and regulations for the transaction of the district's business and for the services, use, and right to use of its facilities or services, or both, or to effectuate any purpose of this chapter;
    4. Do all things incidental to the exercise of the express powers granted by this chapter; and
    5. Perform all acts useful to carry out the purposes of this chapter, unlimited by any express provision hereof.
  2. No member of the board shall be liable for any damages unless it shall be made to appear that he acted with a corrupt intent.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, §§ 5, 16; 1995, No. 1127, § 3.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment inserted “as” in (a)(1)(B); and rewrote (a)(2)(A).

14-94-108. Removal of board members.

  1. When the owners of two-thirds (2/3) in assessed value of the real property located within any district shall sign a petition stating that the petitioners believe it to be in the best interest of the district that the board, or any member thereof, be removed and shall file the petition with the governing body, the governing body shall set a date for a hearing on the petition and shall give notice of the hearing by one (1) publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the district at least ten (10) days before the date of the hearing.
    1. The purpose of the hearing shall be to determine the sufficiency of the petition.
    2. Any property owner of the district may appear and present evidence either in support of or against the sufficiency of the petition.
  2. If, after hearing, based upon the evidence presented, the governing body shall determine that the petition is signed by at least two-thirds (2/3) in assessed value of the real property owners in the district, the governing body shall immediately adopt a resolution removing the member of the board in accordance with the petition and appoint some property owner in the district or creditor of the district as a successor to fill the vacancy created by his removal.
  3. No member of the board shall be liable for any damages unless he or she shall have acted with a corrupt intent.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 23; 1989, No. 276, § 3; 1995, No. 1127, § 4.

Amendments. The 1995 amendment inserted “some property owner in the district or creditor of the district as” in (c).

14-94-109. Planning by board.

  1. The board shall form plans relative to the acceptance, purchase, or construction of the improvement.
  2. To that end, the board may employ such engineers, attorneys, and other assistants as it may find necessary and shall file copies of all pertinent reports and actions of the board with the clerk.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 7.

14-94-110. Powers of districts generally.

  1. Any district, in furtherance of any of the purposes set forth in § 14-94-105, shall have the authority to hire managers and other employees and to pay their salaries incident to the operation and maintenance of any of the improvements authorized by this chapter. It shall also have the authority to acquire and purchase equipment and machinery incident to the operation and maintenance of these improvements and shall be further authorized to do any and all other acts which shall be deemed necessary in order to purchase, construct, accept as a gift, operate, and maintain any and all improvements authorized by this chapter.
  2. Any district shall have the power to sell or lease any improvements owned by it to any nearby municipality or district or other improvement district within the nearby municipality serving on behalf of the property owners of the district or to any other person. The district may make contracts with any person, or it may operate any improvement and may connect any improvement with the improvements, systems, and transmission lines of any nearby municipality or other district or improvement district and, with respect to sewers, may carry its sewers to any proper outlet within or without the district.
  3. Any district may accept as a gift any or all of the improvements and facilities authorized in this chapter upon the assumption of the maintenance and operation of the improvements and shall have the authority to assess and collect benefits as provided in this chapter, in order to provide the revenue for the costs of the maintenance and operation.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 6.

14-94-111. Corporate powers.

Each district shall be a body corporate with power to sue and to be sued on its contracts, and it shall have a corporate seal.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 5.

14-94-112. Right of eminent domain.

  1. All districts organized under this chapter shall have the right of eminent domain in order that they may carry out the purposes of their creation.
  2. This right shall be exercised in the same manner as in the case of railroad, telegraph, and telephone companies, but without the necessity of making a deposit of money before entering into possession of the property condemned.
  3. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any property owner improvement district to issue or sell revenue bonds or use the proceeds thereof to purchase, condemn, or otherwise aquire a utility generating plant, transmission or distribution system owned or operated by a regulated public utility.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 21; 1989, No. 276, § 4.

14-94-113. Sale of land.

Any property that may be acquired by any district organized under this chapter may be sold by the board of the district for the price and on the terms it deems best.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 22.

14-94-114. Priority of cases.

  1. All cases involving the validity of districts or the assessment of benefits and all suits to foreclose the lien or taxes shall be deemed matters of public interest and shall be advanced and disposed of at the earliest possible moment.
  2. All appeals therefrom must be taken and perfected within thirty (30) days after the order or decree.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 19.

14-94-115. Assessment of benefits and damages.

    1. In the event that the board shall have voted to accept any offer of gift, or shall have voted to purchase any improvement, or shall have voted to construct any improvement or any facilities for the improvement, it shall thereupon appoint an assessor to assess the benefits which will accrue to the real property within the district as a result of the improvement.
    2. The assessor shall take an oath that he will well and truly assess all benefits that will accrue to the landowners of the district by reason of the improvement.
    1. The assessor shall proceed to assess the real property within the district, and he shall inscribe in a book each tract of real property and shall place in one (1) column his valuation of each tract or parcel of real property prior to the improvement, which column may be marked “Assessed Value of Real Property Prior to Improvement”, and in another column he shall place what he thinks will be the value of each tract or parcel of real property after the improvement, which column may be marked “Assessed Value of Real Property After Improvement”.
        1. If the assessed value of real property after improvement is greater than the assessed value of real property before improvement, as assessed by the assessor for the district, the difference between the two (2) shall be the assessed benefits that will accrue to each tract by reason of the improvement.
        2. If the assessed value of real property as assessed by the assessor of the district after the improvement is less than the assessed value of real property before the improvement, the difference between the two (2) shall be the assessed damages that will accrue to the particular parcel or tract of real property by reason of the improvement.
      1. The assessor shall enter the assessment of benefits or damages opposite the description of each piece of property in appropriate columns, one (1) of which may be marked “Assessed Benefits”, and the other may be marked “Assessed Damages”. In another column the assessor shall show the estimate of the probable cost to the property owner, which may be marked “Estimated Cost”.
    1. The assessment shall embrace not merely the lands but all railroads, tramroads, telegraph and telephone lines, pipelines, and other improvements on land that will be benefited by the acquiring or making of the improvement.
    2. No assessment shall apply against any pipelines or other improvements which are owned by any municipality, county, school district, or improvement district.
    1. The assessor shall place opposite each tract the name of the supposed owner as indicated by the deed records, but a mistake in name shall not vitiate the assessment.
      1. The assessor shall also assess all damages that will accrue to any property owner by reason of the improvement, including all injury to real property taken or damaged.
      2. Where the assessor returns no damages to any tract of real property, it shall be deemed a finding by him that no damages will be sustained.
  1. The assessor shall hold his office at the pleasure of the board, which can fill any vacancy in the position of assessor.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 7.

14-94-116. Filing and notice of assessment — Hearing.

    1. The assessment shall be filed with the clerk.
      1. The secretary of the board shall thereupon give notice of its filing by two (2) publications in a newspaper having a general circulation in the municipality in which the district lies, with the first publication to be not fewer than seven (7) days prior to the date set for the hearing.
      2. This notice may be in the following form:
  1. On the day named in the notice, it shall be the duty of the commissioners and assessors as a board of equalization to meet together at the place named to hear all complaints against the assessment, and to equalize and adjust them. Their determination shall be final, unless suit is brought in the chancery court in which the municipality is located within thirty (30) days to review it.

“Notice is hereby given that the assessment of benefits and damages of District Number has been filed in the office of the City Clerk (or Town Recorder) of , where it is open to inspection. All persons wishing to be heard on the assessment will be heard by the commissioners and the assessor of the District between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m., at , in the City of , Arkansas, on the day of , 19 . Secretary”

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History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 8.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Notice provisions within § 14-94-101 et seq. did not violate due process because indirect notice has been held sufficient in matters affecting real estate and appellants failed to establish that notice by publication was inappropriate to the circumstances of the case. Bullock's Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc. v. City of Bryant, 2019 Ark. 249, 582 S.W.3d 8 (2019).

14-94-117. Reassessment.

  1. The board may, not more often than one (1) time a year, require the assessor to reassess the benefits in the district. However, in the event the district shall have incurred any indebtedness or issued bonds, the total amount of assessed benefits shall never be diminished.
  2. The reassessment shall be made, advertised, and equalized in the same manner as provided in this subchapter for making the original assessment.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 9.

14-94-118. Levy of tax.

    1. At the same time that the assessment of benefits is equalized or at any time thereafter, the board shall enter upon its records an order, which shall have all the force of a judgment, providing that there is levied upon the real property of the district a tax sufficient to pay the estimated cost of the improvement with ten percent (10%) added for unforeseen contingencies.
    2. The tax is to be paid by the real property owners in the district in the proportion to the amount of the assessment of benefits thereon and is to be paid in annual installments, as provided in the order.
  1. The tax so levied shall be a lien upon all the real property in the district from the time it is levied, shall be entitled to preference over all demands, executions, encumbrances, or liens whenever created, and shall continue until the assessment, with any penalty costs that may accrue thereon, shall have been paid. Provided, however, with the prior written approval of the board, the county clerk shall release from the lien for the assessment and tax any lot, block, or tract with respect to which the assessment and tax shall have been paid or prepaid.
    1. Promptly after entry of an order levying the tax, the board shall publish at least one (1) time in some newspaper having general circulation in the municipality a notice setting forth the order of levy and warning all persons affected by it that the order shall become final unless suit is brought to contest the order within thirty (30) days of the date of first publication of the notice; and
    2. No property owner shall be barred from contest of the levy within the thirty-days' publication period.
    1. The remedy against such levy of taxes shall be by suit in chancery.
    2. The suit must be brought within thirty (30) days from the time of notice that the levy was made, and, on the appeal, the presumption shall be in favor of the legality of the tax.

History. Acts 1987, No. 113, § 10; 1991, No. 504, § 3.

Case Notes